These proceedings are composed of papers presented at the 1993 and 1994 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society. The collection is divided into four parts. Part 1 includes: "Failure, Philosophy of Education, and the Music of the Spheres" (David B. Owen); "What Has Philosophy of Education Come To?" (Lawrence J. Dennis). Part 2 covers the 1993 meeting and includes: "Hegel's Influence on the Social and Educational Thought of John Dewey" (Marianne S. Glazek); "How the Concept of Transaction Redefines Subjectivity within Dewey's Theory of Knowledge" (Jeanne Connell); "Why American College of Education Do Not Produce Master Teachers" (Don G. Smith); "Is There a Correlation Between Philosophic World-Views and Social Theories" (Robert N. Barger); "Pragmatics and Identifying Disciplines" (Thomas Kowall); "William James on his 'Talks to Teachers' and on Teachers Themselves" (Harry J. Farnon); "The John Dewey Publications" (Jo Ann Boydston); "Vices and Virtues: A Common Place Between Freud and Aristotle" (Joseph Yacoub); "Biographical Ethics..." (Robert Craig); "Children Dying with Dignity: Another Remembrance of Janusz Korczak" (Ronald Swartz); "Deja vu All Over Again a la Dewey" (James R. Biddle); "Experience as Improvisation" (R. Keith Sawyer); "Peter McLaren and Critical Pedagogy" (Martin McKeown); "Corinne Aldine Seeds: Parallels with John Dewey and Rudolf Steiner" (Nancy Helen Goldsmith Rose); "Moral Character and Moral Conduct..." (Ronald Lee Zigler); and four papers on the theme 'Popular Film as Educational Ideology': "A Framework for Critical Analysis" (Michael J. Oliker); "Cinematic Muse, Where do you Lead?" (Matthew E. Creighton); "'The Blackboard Jungle'" (Gene D. Phillips); "Public Ambivalence Toward Teachers as Reflected in American Film" (Don G. Smith). Part 3 covers the 1994 meeting and includes: "Philosophy of Education in the Post-Analytic Period" (Jerome Popp); "Physiological Basis for the Pragmatic Process of Learning" (George W. Stickel); "African-American Philosophy of Education" (Charlesetta M. Ellis); "Agapism Applied" (Mala Preast); "Using the Visual Arts as a Formal Pedagogic Tool..." (Thomas A. Lifvendahl; Debbie Smith-Shank); "Using Semiotic Reasoning in Empirical Research..." (Gary Shank); "Peace Education: A Modern Educational Reform" (Ian M. Harris); "Roman Catholic Values Statements Affecting American Catholic Education" (Michael T. Risku); "The Educational Theory of Thomas Merton" (Robert P. Craig); "Creativity: Are We Doing Enough?" (David B. Annis); "The Place of Neutrality in the Confident School" (Jon Fennell); "Dewey's Theory of Experience at the Heart of Literature"
(Sonja Darlington); "Review of 'The Collected Works of John Dewey'" (Philip L. Smith). (KCM)

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PROCEEDINGS

OF THE

MIDWEST

PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION

SOCIETY,

1993-1994

Edited by

George W. Stickel and David B. Owen
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PREFACE

These Proceedings are composed of papers which presenters at the 1993 and 1994 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society wished to have published. Each paper herein went through a peer-review process by the Society's Program Committee before being accepted for presentation at its respective Meeting.

We would like to thank the authors represented herein for cooperating with the Society's new approach to publishing their work. Although submitting papers electronically for publication in these Proceedings was undoubtedly awkward for some individuals, it makes for greater accuracy and improved quality of presentation of their contributions. It also reflects well on the Society's growing national visibility, as reflected in the increasingly diverse locales of the contributors herein—from Massachusetts to Nebraska and Texas to Canada.

The Annual Meetings on November 12-13, 1993, and November 11-12, 1994, were held at Loyola University of Chicago. As usual, the Society is greatly indebted to Walter P. Krolikowski, S. J., for arranging such a well-planned and enjoyable setting, even getting us use of the brand-new Rubloff Auditorium for the 1994 Meeting. In addition, the Society also wants to thank the School of Education, Dean Robert E. Roemer, and the University for generously providing facilities for our two-day gatherings.

The Society would also like to express its appreciation to the Program Committees from 1993 and 1994 for refereeing the papers submitted for presentation and for organizing such successful programs.

Finally, on behalf of the Society, we would like to thank Michael A. Oliker for his long-term efforts to have the Society's Proceedings appear in the ERIC database. His commitment to making sure that the work of the Society's members is indexed in that standard source means that the contributions of this volume will have influence well beyond just the individuals who were fortunate enough to attend these Meetings. His leadership in this area gives us a renewed sense of the importance of what we have undertaken here.

The Editors
I. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS
FAILURE, PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION, 
AND THE MUSIC OF THE SPHERES

David B. Owen
Iowa State University

I. Theme

After a dinner full of good food and drink among friends and colleagues, it is not inappropriate to continue our symposium with some informal talk and with "eine kleine nachtmusik." The allusions to Plato and Mozart are intended to suggest that I want to take you on a journey to the Graeco-Austrian Empire, a place that exists in spirit, if not in history, one that I have come to realize I inhabit almost continuously, if sometimes impractically and even, at times, to my own detriment. Rather late in life I have come to see that, despite a rigorous classical training on the one hand and daily circumstances unceasingly pragmatic on the other, I am a romantic at heart. At first I was somehow ashamed of that discovery: it seemed so out of character for the age, for someone with my background and for that person so many others see me to be. After reflecting on it, however, I think I have begun to accept it as my fate.

The opportunity this Society has generously, and perhaps unwisely, afforded me tonight has encouraged me to represent for you something of my experience in this matter. So, I would like to present you with some personal reminiscences on the connection between, on the one hand, my most important leisure activity--listening to music, usually classical--and, on the other hand, my most important working activity, philosophy of education. The connection between these two is one I actually do experience. My talk tonight is not intended to be a formal statement and defense of the "truth" of the idea I want to explore, and I do not wish to convince you of anything, other than, perhaps, of the fact that I am being as honest with you as I am able. I just want to share with you some of my thoughts and, if possible, feelings in hopes that this may lead us into some mutually fruitful conversation.

The main theme here is simple to state: music is, at least for me--is it for others, too?--, a metaphor for philosophy of education. The metaphor not only applies in formal terms--both give rise to pluralism, whether musical (a pluralism of styles) or intellectual (a pluralism of modes of thought)--but also applies in material terms--both offer alternative, equally compelling conceptions of "reality," whether it be thought of as beauty or as human activity, including issues of truth and of moral and social action. Thus, I want to use the following
piece of music, "An die Musik," "On Music," to represent my experience both of music itself and of philosophy of education. All the musical selections this evening will be by Schubert, with whom I have recently been particularly in love, and are songs that have moved me, and continue to move me, profoundly, both in their style and in their subject. Let me read a translation of the poem by Franz von Schober that Schubert set to music in 1817, at the advanced age of twenty!

"An die Musik," D. 547b (1817)  
Music: Franz Schubert  
Text: Franz von Schober

Du holde Kunst, in wieviel Grauen Stunden,  
Wo mich des Lebens wilder Kreis umstrickt,  
Hast du mein Herz zu warmer Lieb entzunden,  
Hast mich in eine bessre Welt entrückt.

Oft hat ein Seufzer, deiner Harf entflossen  
Ein süßer, heiliger Akkord von dir  
Den Himmel bessrer Zeiten mir erschlossen,  
Du holde Kunst, ich danke dir dafür!

[Translation:]  
Thou [charming] art, in many a dreary hour  
When life in all its dreaded toils surrounds me,  
Hast thou my heart enkindled to new love,  
And set me forth into a [better] world!

Often a sigh from out thine harp ascending,  
A sweet, a sacred chord sent to me flowing,  
[A heaven of better times to me has opened.]  
Thou [charming] art, for this I thank thee now!

This recording, like the following ones, is by that extraordinary collaboration between the baritone Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau and the English pianist Gerald Moore.

[PLAY "An die Musik"]

Let me draw your attention to two of the aspects of this song which are among those leading me to pick it to represent my theme tonight. First, "Du holde Kunst" presents the art of music as being lovely, friendly, as something charming, and to charm someone is in some way to cast a spell over them. And this idea of magic leads me to the second aspect I wish to emphasize, which is this idea of art to create "eine bessre Welt" and "bessrer Zeiten," a better
world and better times. I want to alert you to these ideas now, but I will treat them explicitly toward the end of my talk. Let me begin, then, not at the end but at the beginning.

II. Variation 1

I want to set the scene with what has been for me one of the most frightening pieces of music I have ever heard. I listened to it frequently when my children were growing up and was continually reminded of one's utter impotence in the presence of the Eumenides, of fate.

"Erlkönig," D. 328  
Music: Franz Schubert  
Text: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe³

Wer reitet so spät durch Nacht und Wind  
Es ist der Vater mit seinem Kind;  
Er hat den Knaben wohl in dem Arm,  
Er fasst ihn sicher, er hält ihn warm.

>>Mein Sohn, was birgst du so bang dein Gesicht?<<  
>>Siehst Vater, du den Erlkönig nicht?  
Den Erlenkönig mit Kron und Schweif?<<  
>>Mein Sohn, es ist ein Nebelstreif.<<

>>Du liebes Kind, komm, geh mit mir!  
Gar schöne Speile spiel ich mit dir;  
Manch bunte Blumen sind an dem Strand,  
Meine Mutter hat Manch gulden Gewand.<<

>>Mein Vater, mein Vater, und hörst du nicht,  
Was Erlenkönig mir leise verspricht?<<  
>>Sei ruhig, bleibe ruhig, mein Kind:  
In dürren Blättern säuselt der Wind.<<

>>Willst, feiner Knabe, du mit mir gehen?  
Meine Töchter sollen dich warten schön;  
Meine Töchter führen den nächtlichen Reihn  
Und wiegen und tanzen und singen dich ein.<<

>>Mein Vater, mein Vater, und siehst du nicht dort  
Erlkönigs Töchter am düstern Ort?<<  
>>Mein sohn, mein sohn, ich seh es genau:  
Es scheinen die alten Weiden so Grau.<<
Ich liebe dich, mich reizt deine schöne Gestalt;
Und bist du nich willig, so brauch ich Gewalt.<<
Mein Vater, mein Vater, jetzt fasst er mich an!
Erlkönig hat mir ein Leids getan!<<

Dem Vater grauset's, er reitet geschwind,
Er hält in den Armen das ächzende Kind,
Erreicht den Hof mit Mühe und Not:
In seinen Armen das Kind war tot.

[Translation (by Robert Jordan):]
Who is riding so late through the night and wind?
It is the father with his child;
he holds the boy carefully in his arms,
he grips him securely, he keeps him warm.

"My son, why do you hide your face so fearfully?"
"Father, can you not see the Erl King?
The Erl King with crown and train?"
"My son, it is a streak of mist."

"Dear child, do come with me!
I'll play very fine games with you;
there are many pretty flowers by the shore,
my mother has many a golden gown."

"My father, my father, can you not hear
the promises Erl King is whispering to me?"
"Be calm, stay calm, my child:
the wind is rustling in the dead leaves."

"Handsome boy, do you want to go with me?
My daughters shall tend you well:
my daughters lead the nightly round
and lull and dance and sing you to sleep."

"My father, my father, can you not see there
Erl King's daughters in that dark place?"
"My son, my son, I see it clearly:
[it is] the old willows [that] look so grey."
"I love you, your pretty form entices me; 
and if you are not willing, I will use force."
"My father, my father, now he is taking hold of me! 
[The] Erl King has [injured me]!"

The father shudders, he rides fast, 
he holds the groaning child in his arms, 
arrives home [only just barely]: 
in his arms the child was dead.

You will note that four speakers are involved here--narrator, father, son, 
Erlking--, each with a different perspective on the event. Listen to how Fischer- 
Dieskau distinguishes each, even develops the emotions of each character in the 
credibly short span allotted. And there is even one more character, the horse 
in the pianist's left hand) driving events forward without pity until, like the 
listener, utterly exhausted at the end.

[PLAY "Erkönig"]

Although this song is literally about a father and son, it has also 
spontaneously grown to have a metaphorical meaning for me: the central 
relationship becomes that of a man and his offspring of hope for the future, of 
me and my hope. For me, this music becomes a representation of the 
inescapable feelings of personal failure I have about what I do. I have had what 
others would call a very "spotty" career, dropping out frequently during graduate 
education, being incessantly hounded by what Winston Churchill so graphically 
called his "black dog," being turned down for tenure once, and "producing" 
relatively little in the way of scholarship. But many others struggle with 
similar or even more difficult problems, and I know that nothing either unique or 
particularly interesting presents itself my story. I still feel, nevertheless, that I 
have not lived up either to my own or to others' earlier hopes. Perhaps all that I 
am expressing here is conformity to the developmental psychologists' theory: I 
am merely having, at fifty-two, my "mid-life crisis"!

One item, however, I want to explore a little further with you because I 
think it raises questions not just about me but also about what we do as 
philosophers of education and about the character of the times we live in. The 
central feature about my "professional" life, at least from my perspective, is that 
I have chosen to spend the bulk of my effort and thought presenting the ideas of 
another individual, Richard McKeon. This has been a difficult decision for me to 
live with day-to-day, both personally and professionally, however right I may 
still think I was to have made it. The work involves transcribing and editing 
tape recordings of lectures and discussions from three courses the late 
philosopher Richard McKeon gave during the 1960s at the University of 
Chicago in the natural sciences, the social sciences, and the humanities. 
Psychologically, working with an individual of such gifts reminds me
continually of my own shortcomings. The power of these presentations by a man whom I believe to be truly a genius have also tended to overwhelm whatever thoughts I might have to offer as being worthless by comparison, and I frequently find myself bordering on "voicelessness." Professionally, moreover, in the eyes of others in academic life, including colleagues at my university, this work does not provide "an original contribution to the world of knowledge"—to use that famous dissertation criterion—but, rather, merely reiterates the ideas of others. They do not even characterize it as serious research; rather, they describe it as mere "scholarship," their voice implying irrelevant, eccentric antiquarianism. My original decision to follow this line of work was based on the judgment that what McKeon had to offer was way beyond anything I could contribute. I am even more convinced of that today, but I do find that this professional decision makes my life quite difficult.

III. Variation 2

I know a number of others struggle daily with feelings of failure as I do, but we need to remember that our individual responses occur in a much larger and much more significant context. All of us, I believe in my more lucid moments, must struggle with the failure of philosophy of education as a whole in American education today. Looking back over the last century, I have an overwhelming sense of loss of a guiding light for what we do with children in our schools and in our society. To suggest something of this larger failure, this loss, I have chosen the following song, "An die Entfernte," "To the Distant Beloved," one to which I have been particularly drawn.

"An die Entfernte," D. 765
Music: Franz Schubert
Text: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

So hab' ich wirklich dich verloren?
Bist du, o Schöne, mir entflohn?
Noch klingt in den gewohnten Ohren
Ein jedes Wort, ein jeder Ton.

So wie des Wandlers Blick am Morgen
Vergebens in die Lüfte dringt,
Wenn, in dem blauen Raum verborgen,
Hoch über ihm die Lerche singt:

So dringt angstlich hin und wieder
Durch Feld und Busch und Wald mein Blick;
Dich rufen alle meine Lieder;
O komm, Geliebte, mir zurück!
[Translation:]
So have I really lost you,
Are you indeed fled, o lovely one?
I still have in my accustomed ear
Your every word, every inflection.

As the wanderer's gaze in early morning
In vain searches the heavens
When, concealed in the blue of the air,
Sings the lark high above him:

So anxiously I search this way and that,
My eyes darting from field to bush and wood:
All my songs call on you,
O come, Beloved, come back to me!

[PLAY "An die Entfernte"]
I do not believe in some past "golden age" of philosophy of education, but as I look back to the period from roughly 1880 to 1940 I see a period in educational theory and practice of excitement, of growth, of exploration and experimentation, of idealism, of hope for the future. I do not have that sense of the period we live in now. An undertone of failure, of something gone wrong that apparently no one knows how to put right, pervades educational discussions today. Some of that feeling in education, of course, reflects the uniquely complex problems we face in society as a whole. Our general social failures confront us daily: the transformation of the family without sufficient supports for the children and adults involved; the intractability of racial prejudice; the fragmentation of community relationships; the transformation of the workplace and of the national, even international, economy by transnational corporations. I am especially worried about two aspects: first, the decay of the political process, both of election and of governing, which threatens democracy; and second, the uncontained growth of technology, probably the most socially dislocating of which are the media, including the computer and especially television, with their intentional design of an artificial, a "virtual" reality. But many of you have a richer knowledge of these matters than I do, so let me pass on to failure in education itself.

The waves of anti-intellectualism that sweep through American history, so aptly depicted decades ago by Richard Hofstadter, seem once again at flood tide in the public schools, sweeping all individuality and, with it, humaneness away in a wash of accountability, regimentation, and national "standards," threatening even the heart of public schooling with the "for-profit" proposals of EAI, Whittle, and others. Higher education, led by the "leaders"--Stanford, Harvard, M.I.T.--, has turned away from education as its central mission,
whether through teaching or research, and reshaped itself into the R&D department for corporate interests throughout the world. Educational institutions increasingly act as if they were in business, seeking to pump up their quarterly reports. Again, all of you have experienced this.

Let me turn to failure specifically in the field of philosophy of education itself. With all the outside forces just mentioned, it is no surprise that a field like ours is in serious disarray. For me, some of the indices that this is the case include the following. First, educational psychology has grown to have overwhelming control over issues of learning and teaching. Second, the idea of educational "foundations" has been degraded from what was originally a rigorous, imaginative application of Deweyan ideas into an introductory course in teacher preparation dominated by texts composed of intellectual pablum, organized into a smorgasbord of issues with no intellectual coherence, and characterized by a fundamentally technicist, anti-theoretic bias. Third--and here we reach an issue over which the field does have substantial control--, the long dominance of analytic and linguistic philosophy, especially in its more technical and esoteric forms, has had the consequence of convincing others not in the field that philosophy of education has little to offer educational theory and practice. This is reflected in the marked contrast with the progressive period, when a course in philosophy of education, as well as one in history of education, was frequently required at the undergraduate level in teacher training, let alone required at the graduate level for those seeking a Masters or Doctoral degree. Today, in numerous institutions one need never have exposure to any philosophy of education either at the undergraduate or the graduate level. At least one whole generation of professors of education have almost literally no knowledge of what philosophy of education is, has been, and/or could be.

Need I say that any personal sense of failure pales to inconsequence in comparison with the contextual and institutional failures within which we all work?

IV. Variation 3

Coexisting with this extensive awareness of failure--personal, social, and institutional--has been another, contrasting experience I have had, from its beginning one completely unwilled and unintended: I have fallen, and keep falling anew, "in love" with the work of Richard McKeon. I have had similar experiences with Plato and Aristotle and Rousseau and Dewey, but McKeon has always exerted a unique persuasiveness on me. As a partly humorous but also partly serious expression of the attractive power his insights have for me, I have chosen Schubert's setting of Shakespeare's "To Silvia," "An Silvia," an exquisite love song.
"An Silvia," D. 891 (1826)
Music: Franz Schubert
Text: William Shakespeare
(Translated by Eduard von Baurenfeld)

Was is Silvia, saget an,
Dass sie de weite Flur preist?
Schön und zart seh ich sie nahn,
Auf Himmelsgunst und Spur weist,
Dass ihr alles untertan.

Ist sie schön un gut dazu?
Reiz labt wie milde Kindheit;
Ihrem Aug eilt Amor zu,
Dort heilt er seine Blindheit,
Und verweilt in süsser Ruh.

Darum Silvia, tön, o Sang,
Der holden Silvia Ehren;
Jeden Reiz besiegt sie lang,
Den Erde kan gewähren:
Kränze ihr und Saitenklang!

[Translation:]
Who is Silvia, tell me now,
Whom all of Nature praises:
Tender, sweet, I saw her coming,
She leaves the mark of heavenly favour;
All things are subject unto her.

Is she fair, and good withal?
For charm doth please like virtue;
Love dwells within her sparkling eyes,
And there so blind, so holy
Tarries in sweetest peace.

Thus to Silvia's name I sing now
And chant her holy praises;
She possesses all the graces
Ever Heaven did endow:
Silver strings sweep at her crowning.
McKeon's work is not widely known today, and I would like to help change that. Very briefly, he developed a comprehensive, systematic philosophy based on one of the most extensive and profound scholarships of the twentieth century. His ultimate concern was inquiry into new problems, the relation of new people with new ideas and new materials in new circumstances; but he is most widely known for his historical and philosophic semantics, his explication of the issues at the heart of philosophic debates in the west since the Greeks. It is this latter aspect that I have focused on. His central thesis here is one of intellectual pluralism, namely, that certain intellectual positions, however reinvented, endure through time and are all present, in one form or another, at any one time, though with usually one or another being dominant. This makes sense of the apparently endless, and to me heretofore pointless, debates among philosophers. Even more, his semantic schematism allows me to see the reasons—and here I do not mean the "motives"—behind the differences in all the disciplines, not just philosophy. With his assistance I found I could enter the intellectual world and make sense of it.

In essence, what I find appealing in McKeon is that his conception of philosophy is not one of, "I'm right; you're wrong!" but, rather, of, "Look what I've found that makes sense of me and of the world around me and makes my experience of both richer and fuller of possibilities for the future." He has enabled me to understand and appreciate "the great conversation," as Hutchins calls it, to recognize what is often at issue in current conversations, and, maybe most important, to begin to see how to invent possible conversations that may never have occurred in order to deal with circumstances that have never existed before. All of this is, I believe, of the highest importance for education, both in theory and practice. If one can not only perceive what is at issue when confronted with a particular situation but also think through alternatives, whether historical or newly invented, one is well equipped to function fruitfully for oneself and for others: one is educated. Thus, I believe McKeon has much to offer education, especially in these unique times which demand novel solutions to novel problems.

So, I plod on, editing a small piece of his work in hopes of stimulating greater interest in his contribution.

V. Variation 4

So, you may well be wondering, how do these antithetical experiences of failure and of McKeon fit together? To answer that I need now to speak of music as a metaphor for philosophy of education, for I find my experience of hope for "eine bessre Welt" and "bessrer Zeiten" embodied in both music and the universe of ideas. Let me suggest something of this hope with Schubert's "Frühlingsglaube," an exquisite ode to spring, to rebirth, to the possibilities of the future.
"Frühlingsglaube," D. 686b (1822)
Music: Franz Schubert
Text: Ludwig Uhland

Die linden Lüfte sind erwacht,
Sie säuseln und weben Tag und Nacht,
Sie schaffen an allen Enden.
O frischer Duft, o neuer Klang!
Nun, armes Herz, sei nich bang!
Nun muss sich alles, alles wenden.

Die Welt wird schöner mit jedem Tag,
Man weiss nicht, was noch werden mag,
Das Blühen will nicht enden;
Es blüht das fernste, tiefste Tal:
Nun, armes Herz, vergiss der Qual!
Nun muss sich alles, alles wenden.

[Translation:]
Soft airs of spring awake once more,
That waft and breathe through night and day
United in one purpose.
O fresh, sweet air! O new, sweet sounds!
Now cease thy torment, my poor heart!
For all things must be changed.

The world looks fairer each new day:
One knows not what may come of it,
This endless, ceaseless blooming.
The furthest vale bursts forth anew;
Now my poor heart, forget thy pain!
For all things must be surely changed.

[PLAY "Frühlingsglaube"]
Some of you have undoubtedly detected an escapist leitmotiv in what I am saying. Yes, I warned you that I have that genetic trait--defect?--called romanticism: I believe in escapism! In particular, I believe in "escape" into music and into the world of ideas as an essential part of living actively here and now. Let me begin to explain that paradox, using music first.

What should one do if one finds oneself living in circumstances that cripple, even destroy, one's abilities and hopes, that try to make one less than one believes he or she can be? It is possible to let such situations become overwhelming. Escape of some sort, however, whether physical, mental, or
emotional, can give a space within which one can still be true to oneself. The psychiatrist Viktor Frankl, in his description of surviving a concentration camp, speaks movingly about the fact that the Nazis were never able to imprison his mind, and so, despite their most savage efforts, he remained a free man. For me, music offers that freedom. There I can be challenged to the fullest of my capacities to listen and concentrate, to discriminate, to appreciate, to enjoy in a variety of ways unimaginable before encountering a piece of music either new to me or encountered in a new way. Few restraints exist from my circumstances that limit me from becoming most fully who I can be. Even more important, I can be continually in the company of individuals of the greatest achievement, where human capacities stretch to, seem even to exceed, their greatest possibilities. With all the bombastic blather uttered about "excellence" in education today, here is a place I can actually be confronted by it, and made more alive as a consequence. It sets for me a scale of quality I acknowledge voluntarily and unreservedly, one that I can carry with me throughout all my everyday activities.

Most important, I have come to recognize--belatedly, I admit; I know others have always known this--that there is no necessary, single-track hierarchy of value in this universe: the beauty of Schubert is no greater than that of Mozart, and the latter is neither greater nor lesser than that of Bach, and so on. Some widely loved composers I confess I am not often moved by, say, Brahams or the currently popular Mahler. But that doesn't matter. I have learned experientially that beauty is radically plural. As the power to move me and make me more than what I was before experiencing it, music admits of many extraordinary expressions, for me not just the ones already mentioned but also the musics of jazz and of India, to both of which I listen with great joy. These expressions are radically different in both style and content, yet all possess a genuine truth about the complexity and diversity of what it means to be human. Again, that translates directly into my everyday judgment and treatment of the different individuals I work with.

What about my other escape, into the world of ideas? As I suggested above, McKeon has allowed me to see the same radical pluralism in the world of ideas, one that permits, even encourages, a diversity of views on any issue one wishes to explore. I do not view this pluralism to be a mere relativism, a statement that anyone's ideas--or, for that matter, anyone's musical creations--are equally as valuable as any others'. Rather, it is the care, insight, power, subtlety, breadth, persuasiveness with which the ideas, musical or intellectual, are worked out that gives them their value, a value which may also change over time. For me, escape from daily life is essential for bettering daily life, both my own and that of others with whom I come in contact. Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Dewey, a host of others, all force me to think with care, precision, and connectedness about how I and others live and in what ways we might live enriched, human, and humane lives. Through escape I can experience
ideals and reflect on alternatives, all of which can lead to activities aimed at the reduction of suffering, at the increase of knowledge, and at the appreciation of the real pleasures of true beauty, not the transient titillations of callow consumerism. In short, the ideal is a living alternative to the real. What is missing today, I think, is a spirited dialectic between the "is" and the "ought" or the "might be." The pragmatic, mechanistic, corporate spirit of our age denies the importance of much of what we are as humans.

Why do music and philosophy of education seem to merge so much for me? As best I can express it, they join reason and love together. Music is an art that for me uniquely joins reason to love, order to pure expression; philosophy of education, by contrast--and I need only remind you of the word's etymology--, joins love to reason, the feeling of common care for humanity with the ideas of helping others through education. I think this is why I am in philosophy of education and not in philosophy. Education lies at the heart of what I have become and what I hope to offer to others. And in my mind, that offering is in a deep sense musical. It is my way of addressing what may well be the chief problem we face today: the degradation of both reason and passion. We need to find a way to preserve reason from technique, from the mechanistic conception of it encouraged by materialism run rampant; and we need to preserve love from passion unreflective, unrestrained, uncreative. One way to effect such a renewal of each is by putting them back in relation to each other, by making ideas musical and the love of music reflective. Philosophy of education can be a vocation, not just a profession.

VI. Finale

Eight years ago in circumstances identical to these, Lawrence Dennis asked, "Did Dewey Dance?" In answering his own question, he functioned in Deweyan fashion as a critic--and teacher--of Mozart's "Masonic Funeral Music," K. 477. Distinguishing between the "art object" and the "work of art," that is, the transactive experience one has with that object, he directed his audience's perception to, in Dewey's words, "a fuller and more ordered appreciation of the objective content of [the work] of art."14 Though we both agree that Dewey did "dance," though possibly for different reasons, I am making tonight no such attempt to inform or to judge. Instead, I have tried to invent a series of events to suggest something of my idea of feelings as well as my feeling for ideas, stringing Schubert poems together like a string of pearls.

In contrast to Lawrence's use of Dewey, you may well sense in my last variation that Plato has in some way crept in. He has, and I think I should make explicit in what way. In the myth of Er at the end of the Republic, Er tells of his good fortune in seeing the eight spheres within which the universe moves and in hearing the music of the spheres, an idea which has had a long subsequent history. From what I have said I hope you can see why that idea strikes me as metonymically true. Shortly before the Myth of Er, Socrates speaks of a
hierarchy of pleasure which, in its use of proportions, is similar to the hierarchy of truth presented in the Divided Line. As the absence of pain is pleasure to someone in pain, even greater is the pleasure of the soul than that of the body. Plato uses the same kind of proportion in speaking about the hierarchy of reality in imitations of the artist: as the couch is to the painter of the couch, so the idea of the couch exists more truly than does the couch the craftsman made.

I introduce Plato not to declare myself a Platonist but to suggest something of the chain of proportions by which I attempt to reconcile myself with that sense of failure I expressed at the beginning, and especially with my chosen fate of being merely an editor of McKeon, of merely repeating what another has said so well. I am, at best, an accompanist. Yet--and here Plato's ratios come in--as the accompanist is to the singer, a mere support, so the singer is to the composer, a mere interpreter; but, to carry the proportion even further, even the composer is to "the music of the spheres" merely a translator. And as there are many spheres, there are many musics and many translations of what is "heard." In this case, maybe we all, in our different ways, are doing the same thing, and one need not despair utterly at being an accompanist. Is it not possible to be a midwife as Socrates was, even if one is unable to be a creator of wisdom or love? Is it not possible to help others in giving birth to a love of wisdom and even a wisdom of love? In a small way, like those anonymous monks and Arab scholars preserving Plato's and Aristotle's and other ancients' texts, for whom I have the deepest affection, perhaps I can, by editing the work of an extraordinary individual rather than generating my own inharmonious ideas, assist in the activity, however incompletely, of philosophy of education. For, ultimately, it is not my ideas of education but the education of ideas which is important, both today and in future.

A Presidential Address should, I think, in some way be a summing up: What have I learned? What can I pass on? Unfortunately, as your outgoing President, I cannot testify that I have learned anything new or that I can give you some words of wisdom. All I can do is try to act in some fashion like Gerald Moore--ever "The Unashamed Accompanist" (the wonderful title of one of his books)\(^1\) who at his retirement concert bade his listeners public farewell with Schubert. This is what he offered them, and I you.

[PLAY "An die Musik," arr. Moore (without a singer)]\(^{1}\)

Endnotes

\(^1\)"Franz Schubert: Lieder, Vol. II (1817-1828)," with Dietrich Fischer-Dieskau and Gerald Moore (Deutsche Grammophon Compact Discs no. 437 225-2), Disk no. 1, Track no. 1.
Text and translation, ibid., p. 38. Words in brackets are my emendations of the translation.


Text and translation from "Handel - Schubert - Schuman," with Jessye Norman and Geoffrey Parsons (Philips Compact Disc no. 422 048-2), pp. 34 and 36. Words in brackets are my emendations of the translation.

"Franz Schubert, Lieder, Vol. II (1817-1828)," op. cit., Disk no. 5, Track no. 15.


A recent ABC television movie, "Without Warning," shown the night before Halloween last month and playing off of Orson Wells' famous radio broadcast, "The War of the Worlds," had this disclaimer shown after each segment of advertisements: "This is a realistic depiction of fictional events. What you are seeing is not really happening." So much for sensationalist theories of epistemology!


Text and translation, ibid., p. 153.

Ibid., Disk no. 3, Track no. 22.

Text and translation, ibid., p. 83.

See his Man's Search For Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962).


"Homage to Gerald Moore" (Angel Record Set SB-3697), Side no. 4, Band no. 3.
WHAT HAS PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION COME TO?

Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Thank you, David, for this sensitive, introspective talk and for asking me to respond. I assume my musical credentials motivated the invitation; I know you also asked Art Brown, whose wife, Claire, is a very fine pianist. As he cannot be here, am I allowed double time?

This isn't exactly a response, but a winding road which I will follow until it leads back to you, David. I have entitled it--what has philosophy of education come to? . . . .

LITTLE MUSHROOM

Franz Peter Schubert was not terribly prepossessing to look at. He was, in adulthood, short-sighted and plump, under five feet tall. He had a thick mop of curly hair, a turned up nose, a dimple in his chin, and excellent teeth (we know this because of an exhumation later in the century--so much for resting in peace). His friends called him Schwammerl (little mushroom). I like that; it smack[s] of close camaraderie. He died at the appallingly early age of 31 (four years younger than Mozart). There is still some doubt as to the cause. He almost certainly contracted syphilis in 1822, but it would be most unusual for death to result as soon as six years later. From whom did he contract the disease? He seemed to have a propensity for love. Some today believe he was homosexual.

Our composer was the third boy christened Franz, a few days after his birth in 1897, and, if we take into account two girls named Franziska, Father Franz had five attempts to perpetuate his name. Ralph Bates wrote a book in 1934 in which he drew attention to the sexual appetites of Schubert senior on the basis of his fathering at least 15 children. A bit of a stretch in those days before birth control.

As a boy, Schubert attended the Royal Imperial Municipal Konvict. His presence at this prestigious school was due to his lovely soprano voice. Along with ten of his school mates he sang in the Chapel Royal until his voice changed. He wrote on July 26, 1812, "Franz crowed for the last time." The Konvikat advertised a few days later for a new soprano. No sentimental attachment there. Schubert hated school anyway, although his musical talent was recognized, and he consistently received very good grades. His grade for morals fluctuated somewhat (only between very good and good--I expect he daydreamed--teachers hate that, don't they?). Soon after he left school he sold his textbooks in order to raise sufficient money to buy a ticket for the first performance of Beethoven's Fidelio--that would tempt me to sell my books, too.
Franz junior's father was a school master. A rather successful one, so it seems, for at one time his school had around 200 students. He had to employ assistants, and one of the most reluctant was the seventeen year old school-leaver, who, fortunately, found time also to write music. That first year of teaching, 1814, Schubert wrote, among other things, his first great song--"Gretchen am Spinnrade," with words from Goethe's Faust. Where did the inspiration for this great leap come from? One of his teachers quite simply said he "learned it from God." Of course, he had been trained moderately well. Antonio Salieri, of Mozartian fame, was one of his teachers. Some later thought Mozart's mantel, even his reincarnated self, was embodied in this podgy young man (Mozart had died in Vienna, Schubert was born there six years later—they both liked to play billiards).

Schubert tended to be somewhat silent, although wine, which he enjoyed, loosened his tongue. He admired the music of Mozart, Beethoven, and the two Haydn's (Franz Joseph and Michael, one of Mozart's good friends, although now little heard from). He liked to play piano duets (his own compositions as well as those of others; Beethoven symphonies, particularly) with his friend Josef von Gahy, who later said, "the clear, fluent playing, the individual conception, the manner of performance, sometimes delicate and sometimes full of fire and energy, of my small, plump partner afforded me great pleasure."

Schubert had that gift, perhaps the most enviable gift that can be bestowed, of inspiring friendship. The Schubertians, few of them musicians, used to gather often not just in the coffee houses of Vienna but in the surrounding area, and invariably some of Franz's latest music would be performed, much of it by the older singer, older by 30 years, Michael Vogl. Vogl first came to notice when he took part in the court opera, then being run by Sussmayer—the same Sussmayer who was a friend of Mozart and who, reportedly at any rate, completed the Requiem for Mozart and who, on meeting Schubert, quickly realized his genius and became the main exponent of his songs.

It was Vogl who gave the first public performance of "Der Erlkonig," and on that occasion Schubert was too nervous to play the accompaniment himself; also, he obligingly added some extra measures of interludes to that Vogl, who was in his early 50s, could catch his breath. Schubert had already, for his own ease, changed the accompaniment to duplets instead of the stretchingly more difficult triplets. (I've played the song many times myself, and one's right hand is caput by its end. Not just the boy but also the pianist "war Tod.")

At one of Vogl's last concerts, it was for the Viennese Society for the Friends of Music in 1833, he sang one of Schubert's most famous songs--"Der Wanderer." The poet writes, "I have wandered far and have known many lands but not the land of heart's desire." Well, Franz Schubert didn't wander far and he never did know, we believe, the land of heart's desire. Vogl died in 1840, exactly on the 12th anniversary of the composer's death.

A friend of Schubert's, Joseph von Spaun, sent several of Schubert's settings of Goethe verses to the great poet. They included "Gretchen am
"Spinnrade" and "Der Erlkonig" (in the simplified version). They were never acknowledged. It is irony, indeed, that, with the possible exception of Faust, Goethe's name is kept green, in English speaking countries at any rate, by the 89 settings of his verses by Schubert. Some are among his greatest songs, which shows that Schubert was not indiscriminate in his choice of verse.

You've heard two of them this evening, also one by Shakespeare. Schubert set only one of Uhland's verses, "Frühlingsglaube" (faith in spring), described by Alec Robertson as a "perfect marriage of words and music." Then we have David's arc, "An die Musik." Although Schubert set several of Franz von Schober's verses to music, "An die Musik" is by far the most well known.

Schober was an active participant in the Schubert circle, but, although he lived until 1882, declined to write any reminiscences of his friend. A strange inability considering that Schober was a writer. In the 1860s he alluded to a love affair Schubert had. "There is a sort of love-story of Schubert's which I believe not a soul knows, as I am the only one in the secret and I have told it to nobody; I would willingly have passed it on to you to decide how much of it was suitable for publication and in what way, but of course, it is too late now" (D 206). Maybe true friends don't tell.

Schober set out to meet Schubert when both were young men--teenagers. Schober found Schubert in the schoolroom teaching small children. He prevailed on his new friend to quit teaching, and of all his intimates, Schubert was fonder of him than any of the others. It was Schober who introduced the composer to Vogl. And when Schubert finally took the plunge and left teaching, he went to live with Schober for several months. "An die Musik" immortalizes the friendship of these two men. They spent summers together with an entire collection of Schubertians at Schober's uncle's country estate in Atzenbrugg, where they all played games in the fields, did charades, danced, invented poems on given words and melodies from dots on pieces of paper. Schubert took his pipe along with him. Schober was a somewhat disreputable young man, and some of their friends thought he was a bad influence on Schubert.

The last extant letter from Schubert, written probably less than a week before his death, is to Schober:

Dear Schober:

I am ill. I have eaten nothing for eleven days and drunk nothing, and I totter feebly and shakily from my chair to bed and back again. . . . If ever I take anything, I bring it up again at once.

Be so kind, then, to assist me in this desperate situation by means of literature. Of (Fenimore) Cooper's I have read The Last of the Mohicans, The Spy, The Pilot, and The Pioneers. If by any chance you have anything else of him, I implore you to deposit it . . . at the coffee house for me--your friend Schubert.
As I said, Schubert didn't wander far--never very far from the city of his birth, Vienna. Not for him the glittering capitals of Europe and their crowned heads. His wandering was in the woods around Vienna, where he took daily walks. These walks were part of his strict regimen... at work by six in the summer (seven in the winter) and writing until one or two in the afternoon. How otherwise could he have accomplished so much? Schubert was the first great composer who had neither patron nor audience. He wasn't a virtuoso performing his own sensational music to wild applause with snuff boxes and jewelry for reward. He managed to support only a very modest lifestyle--living mostly in rented rooms. On his death, he left 3 cloth coats, 3 frock coats, 10 pairs of trousers, 5 pairs of socks, and 1 mattress. Beethoven, who had died the year before, left 4 mattresses and 19 pairs of socks, but only 8 pairs of trousers. Of course, Schubert also left a pile of manuscripts, unpublished and unperformed for years.

Schubert lived under the spell of Beethoven for all but the last year of his life, almost cowed by the great man's presence nearby. True, he was a pallbearer at Beethoven's funeral, but I think it's remarkable that in the few months between Beethoven's death and Schubert's own untimely one, the younger composer created some of his greatest music: his finest church music (the E flat Mass), his greatest chamber work (the miraculous C major Quintet), his trio of wondrous piano sonatas, the one in B flat being one of the sublimest pieces ever written for the piano, his magnificent Symphony in C Major, which a couple of years ago and maybe this year as well outperformed all other symphonies in the concert programs of American orchestras. It was a year of profusion, which ended with the greatest song cycle ever composed, *Die Winterreise* (Winter's Journey), the proofs of which Schubert corrected on his deathbed. He was free at last from the shadow of the towering genius of Beethoven, and this annus mirabilis (1828) gives some hint perhaps of what might have happened if Schubert had been granted by the gods a normal life span. When a memorial was erected in 1830, the poet, Franz Grillparzer, voiced what many believed: "The art of music here entombed a rich possession but even far fairer hopes."

While the world would hang on the latest creation of Beethoven, these comparable masterpieces of Schubert had to wait, in some cases, years to be seen and heard, through the good offices of well-known musicians such as Mendelssohn and Sullivan, but also of less well-known ones, all people amazed by what they had unearthed. The Mass in E flat wasn't published until 1865 (37 years after Schubert's death), the Quintet in 1853, the 3 sonatas in 1839, and the symphony in 1840, and even in the 1950s and 1960s, I gave the first performances in Canada, in the course of several broadcasts for the CBC, of some of Schubert's unfinished pieces! It is little wonder, then, that Schubert has been misunderstood. Scholarship, now at last accumulating, lags far behind that of most other great composers. As late as 1893 that curmudgeon, George Bernard Shaw, pronounced the C major Symphony, "a more exasperatingly brainless composition was never put on paper." Poor Schubert. We'll be hearing a lot more Schubert as his bicentennial year approaches. In 1895 the
Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra was performing this Great C major symphony. Schubert's youngest brother, Andreas, requested admission to the concert. . . His request was denied.

You might think I have avoided David's paper, so let me conclude with a few observations to bring you back to it. He suggested that music is a metaphor for philosophy of education. How about philosophy of education being a metaphor for music?

Let me quote David:

* "I still feel . . . that I have not lived up to either my own or others earlier hopes."

Do you recall Grillparzer's epitaph?

* "Working with an individual of such gifts (as McKeon) reminds me continually of my own shortcomings."

Beethoven's gifts, I believe, inhibited Schubert at the time.

* "The critical feature of my professional life . . . is that I have chosen to spend the bulk of my effort and thought presenting the ideas of another individual."

If it were not for "other individuals" (Otto Erich Deutsch, Maurice Brown, etc. etc.) much of Schubert's music and reputation would be lost or unknown to us.

* "For me, escape from daily life is essential for bettering daily life, both my own and that of others with whom I come in contact."

Remember Schubert's escape to the woods around Vienna and his convivial ties with friends?

* David likes to escape, as did Schubert, into the world of music and the world of ideas.

"McKeon has allowed me to see the same radical pluralism in the world of ideas, one that permits . . . a diversity of views on any issue one wishes to explore."

James Fenimore Cooper may not be our taste for escape, but it was for Schubert in the last days of his life.
David said, "I am, at best, an accompanist."

Schubert usually accompanied not only Vogl but other singers and did it very well. But even Schubert had to simplify the accompaniment in "Der Erlkonig" for himself. Accompanying can be difficult.

Why do I raise these points? Because the impact of what we do at the time we do it can rarely be assessed accurately. Schubert now has a comfortable place in the pantheon of musical greats, but for almost 100 years after his death and certainly during his lifetime few would have ranked him, and he himself would not, I suspect, along with Bach, Handel, Mozart, Beethoven, and the two Haydns. David's personal statement, tinged with self deprecation as it is, might not, you see, be altogether accurate!

One last observation--

"After a dinner full of good food and drink among friends and colleagues," David said, "it is not inappropriate to continue the symposium."

Little Mushroom himself, like us, heartily enjoyed such evenings with his friends, food, conversation, wine, and there were always songs--just as we've heard five of them tonight. Now let me invite you to continue the symposium.
II. 1993 ANNUAL MEETING
FROM IDEALISM TO PRAGMATISM

Marianne Semann Glazek, PhD
Professor Emerita, Madonna University

I. Childhood Influences

Dewey arrived at the University of Michigan at 1884 with a knowledge of Hegelian idealism and the new empirical physiological psychology. He was especially impressed with the way both disciplines used the biological concepts of organicism, dynamism, continuity, and anti-formalism. At Michigan he started to bring the new psychology and Neo-Hegelianism together in a single system of thought. The distinct elements of his mature philosophy appeared quite early in his writings and can be traced through his shifting thought. As an adolescent he rebelled against his mother's narrow, and excessive pietism and religious emotionalism and found spiritual kinship in liberal evangelism. But, the evangelical teachings as well as the popularist institutionalist philosophy and the prevalent new England vision created divisions and dualism which were like painful laceration to the young Dewey. The isolation of the self from the world, of soul from body, nature from God seemed like "intellectual gymnastics".1

It was Hegel's mediating philosophy which was able to bridge this gap and constituted a liberation, a relief for the emotional wounds of the young man. Social interests and problems of society always had an appeal for the young Dewey. His faith in democracy and its possibilities were later to replace his faith in the church and its work. In Ann Arbor he was still active in the First Congregational Church but during his Chicago years he broke most of his ties with organized religion.

American idealism grew out of New England transcendentalism, a product of misinterpreted German idealism and spread to two associated movements, the St. Louis Hegelian movement, and the Concord School of Philosophy. Towards the close of the century those two movements merged. The St. Louis Hegelians started an intellectual movement which saw in Hegel's Philosophy the only effective weapon against encroaching agnosticism, narrow provincialism, and atomistic individualism. The Hegelian mode of thinking, first to locate contradictions inherent in any situation and then try to resolve them, came naturally to Americans who had to learn the art of compromise beginning with the drafting of the constitution. It was the Hegelian dialectic which showed the way to a new national unity, preserved individual freedom and
M. Glazek thus prepared the way for the evolution of the "pragmatic" or American philosophy.

During his first period as an instructor at the university of Michigan, 1884-88, Dewey's efforts were directed toward bringing together the new psychology of Wilhelm Wundt and G. Stanley Hall and idealism into one system without violating either. He became impressed with the biological model of organism during a short, junior year non-laboratory course in physiology. One of his textbooks at Johns Hopkins was Huxley's *Elements of Physiology*. Thus, the two converging strains of thought of his time, idealism and experimental psychology, based on the theory of Darwinian evolution became dominant in his thinking. Darwinism played a dual role in Dewey's thought, it first reinforced his Hegelianism only to lead him later away from it. One of the key elements in his mature philosophy, continuity versus dualism, has its roots in his Hegelian period. According to his biographers it was idealism which furnished Dewey with the central concept for his thought.

The Darwinian organismic theory as Dewey saw it, served to confirm his earlier convictions. Upon his arrival in 1884 at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor he started to develop his "newer" psychology within the framework of an ethics of dynamic idealism. He wrote two articles in 1886 in *Mind* which made him known to the world of philosophy. He used the method of idealism to explain empirical and experimental psychology. These articles already started to point to some of the weaknesses in Hegel's thought.

In his book *Psychology* (1887) he combined the results of the new empirical physiological psychology with the doctrines of philosophical idealism. This new psychology, allied with Hegelianism, aided him in his opposition to the empirical theory of mind, to atomistic faculty psychologists, and formalistic logic. It became his original inspiration for the later development of his instrumental logic which replaced schematic logic with "the logic of fact, of process of life." His second book *Leibniz's New Essay concerning Human Understanding*, the finest expression of Dewey's absolutistic phase, already contained the elements of thought which later caused him to break with his idealistic past. This was a conscious effort on Dewey's part as he explained in a letter to W.T. Harris on December 17, 1886. Dewey had strong interest in the reconciliation of science and religion, which later became the attempt to integrate moral conduct or ethics with science. Dewey had no trouble reconciling terms like "vital," "organic" and "dynamic" with his growing interest in the Darwinian theory; and in his 1891 revision of *Psychology* he changed the term "idealization" to "reconstruction" "objectification" to "adjustment."

His drifting away from Hegelianism proceeded at an accelerated pace during his second period at the University of Michigan, 1889-94. These were the years in which he started to realize the impossibility of trying to accommodate his growing naturalism to an idealistic interpretation of nature. According to Willinda Hortense Savage, "the available evidence appears to
indicate that the beginnings of Dewey's experimentalism may be traced to the Ann Arbor period of his career."

In 1894 he gave his view the name "experimental idealism" and during his Chicago years 1894-1904 he worked out the main outlines of his instrumentalism. The term "instrumental" probably originated with George Sylvester Morris who occasionally used it "in contexts that strongly suggest the origin of Dewey's nomenclature for his philosophy."

The time came when Dewey, in his own words, realized "that what the principle of Hegel's categories actually stood for could be better understood and stated when completely emancipated from Hegelian garb," As he abandoned the outward forms of the idealist tradition, the "Hegelian bacillus" continued its subtle work. (Dewey used this term in a letter to William James.)

Dewey's interest in education began during his early years in Michigan. He was the first one to realize the need of an organization to study problems of education. He was convinced that methods used in elementary education were not in keeping with what psychology considers the normal process of learning. The search for an education theory which reconciles psychology, philosophy with the process of learning occupied him the rest of his life. He claimed that during his years at Chicago his "earlier confidence in dialectic had given way to skepticism . . . ."

But did he really renounce methods of idealism? William Joseph Sanders argues that "the logical organization of Democracy and Education concurs with the dialectic of another master logician G.W.F. Hegel."

Though Dewey's forms of the universe and those of change and evolution are not a priori forms as Hegel understood them but are generalized from particular experiences which do not conform to pre-existing forms, Sanders is able to find a dialectic unity in Dewey's work. "Instead of the "all embracing unity of the absolute spirit" there is the unity of the "unified, guided action of the individual". Though Sander's method of forcing Dewey's thought into a dialectic straitjacket seems artificial the concept of unity leads us to a more basic concept, that of continuity.

Dewey himself calls the hypothesis of continuity an "inclusive category" which "cannot be denied without self-contradiction." Continuity is a basic requirement of a theory of logic which Dewey calls "naturalistic"; he claims that the logical forms have emerged from organic activities without losing their distinguishing functions. According to Sanders, Dewey uses the logical method in order to establish the dialectic union of educational subject matter and educational method. He explains the meaning of continuity as illustrated by the "growth and development of any living organism from seed to maturity." This is an indication of the settling-down of the "permanent Hegelian deposit," flavored with a pinch of Darwinism. His logic permits Dewey to see changes which occur in science, institution, society, and education as a result of the method of inquiry rather than a sporadic innovation. Continuity implies movement or process and is at the core of all his teachings.
Similarly, unity in Hegel's thought involves a process by which differences are overcome and oppositions transform into agreement.

The idea of growth, of primary importance in Dewey's educational theory, is implicated in the notion of continuity; "... the educative process is a continuous process of growth, having as its aim at every stage an added capacity of growth." Thus, growth becomes a means as well as an end of education, rather a process. Though, the concept of growth is my favorite among Dewey's educational theories, I will restrict myself to demonstrate how it may be distinguished from that of Hegelian idealists: Growth is continuous with the psychical and physical reality of the child and it is a task of education to provide the materials and the intellectual conditions for it to take place. Only then can the child become mature in the freest and fullest sense. In its negative aspects, growth is not something that fills up the gap between the immature and the mature phase of the child's life, it "designates a positive force or ability--the power to grow." Growth is something the children engage in themselves and not something done to them. Growth is never accomplished, it does not have an end, it is a continual process which in itself is the aim in life. A good education creates a desire in the student for continued growth and supplies the means for satisfying it. Growth is an educative process and at every stage has an added capacity to grow.

For Hegel personal development means "obedient assimilation of the spirit to existing institutions." Instead of transformation, as Dewey advocates, conformity is for him the essence of education. During his "Chicago years" Dewey recognized that his philosophical position moved him away from Hegelian absolutism. To the idealist, the child is a young savage, immersed in original sin; he has to be elevated from the darkness of ignorance into the light of knowledge. This is the task of education. The immense possibilities of growth are dormant in the child as potentialities and become active only in the community. The individual acquires importance only as a member of the social whole. Dewey, the idealist, agreed with this view of the individual, the social and the ethical must work together. But he objected to the conservative, even reactionary stand which failed to give elementary school children the insight into the interrelations of things by promoting "a tendency toward isolation and premature specialization upon technical symbols." Dewey's objections foreshadow the bitter controversy which separated the conservative from the progressive educators, much to the detriment of the whole American educational system.

Only democracy, of all forms of government, is capable of providing the opportunity for its citizens for individual growth and development. It creates an atmosphere conducive to intelligent inquiry and experimentation on both levels, individual as well as social. Hegel, on the other hand, saw the ideal state in the constitutional monarchy and his "effect was to consecrate the Prussian
State and to enshrine bureaucratic absolutism. "15 Dewey puts the blame on Hegel's "logic of rigid universals."

In both Hegel and Dewey, we see an identification with social aims, the most important being education. Though, education becomes the primary duty of the state, each philosopher hopes to achieve different results. The individual of Dewey's democracy receives a different type of education than that of the perfect citizen of Hegel's National State. Both philosophers believe in man's ability to, achieve the fullness of his personality, but while for Hegel this fullness is limited to the "inherent natural gifts" of the specific individual, Dewey believes that "while what we call intelligence be distributed in unequal amount ...each individual has something to contribute, whose value can be assessed only as enters into the final pooled intelligence constituted by the contributions of all."16 He realizes that an education founded on universal truth instead of empirical facts will result in the rule of the privileged few over the many. Democracy, the truly human way of living, is based on the belief of equality.

The following constitute the summary of the key concepts of Dewey's philosophy and represent a reaction to his original idealism:

1. The rejection of false dualism resulted in the idea of continuity.
2. The clarification of the concept of growth gave every stage of education its own significance. Knowledge becomes an important element in the learning process. Active learning should be related to the learners needs. The school should be "child centered."
3. The importance of social experience in a changing civilization. As the environment changes rapidly, the curriculum should change also.
4. Dewey's critics rightly observe that Dewey's aversion to disruption and disorder can be considered as a remnant of his Hegelian past.
5. His basic category of continuity could not justify any wild leaps or abrupt changes. Democracy was for him the result of an evolutionary process, a product of the past and a past in relation to the future. Insistence on wholeness became almost a fetish in Dewey's thought, a virtual religious system which rendered holism holy.

ENDNOTES


Ibid: p. 50.

Philosophy and Civilization (Gloucester MA: Peter Smith, 1968).


Democracy and Education, 59.


HOW THE CONCEPT OF TRANSACTION REDEFINES SUBJECTIVITY WITHIN DEWEY'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

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... in our general [pragmatic] procedure of inquiry no radical separation is made between that which is observed and the observer in the way which is common in the epistemologies and in standard psychological constructions.¹

I. Introduction

This paper explores how Dewey's concept of transaction contributes to redefining subjectivity, and subsequently modifies how we view knowledge. Naturalistic assumptions that Dewey makes about our relationship to the environment help us to understand the concept of transaction and its link to knowing and the process of inquiry. Human beings are part of, not separate from, nature.² Dewey places significant emphasis on dynamic modes of transaction, of exchange and interchange, in a world of continuous change. Flower and Murphey explicate that the problem for Dewey is never one of how action is initiated, for we are active in one way or another all the time, but rather is one of channeling, directing, and redirecting activity. "We are not merely reacting to a world but in a world in which our own actions contribute constantly toward a change in that world."³

From a transactional perspective, knower and known (subject and object of knowledge) are seen as on the same plane, interconnected or relational rather than separate and distinct entities. How does a transactional perspective redefine the relationship between subject and object, and thus reshape concepts of subjectivity and objectivity? And, how do these new definitions change the conditions for conducting inquiry?

Within a transactional view, the relationship between subject and object of knowledge is most importantly a generative one, where during the process of inquiry both subject and object of knowledge are modified in some way. A transactional view of knowledge: highlights context in which knowledge construction takes place; stresses both the social and the individual character of construction of knowledge; unifies thought and action; and emphasizes a holistic
approach to the concept of knowledge that blends emotions, body functions, and reason.

II. Redefining Subjectivity: A Case of a Transactional View of Knowledge

A modern day example of the impact a transactional view of knowledge construction is found in Evelyn Fox Keller's *Reflection On Gender and Science*, a feminist, psychoanalytic analysis of science. The possibilities of reframing science based more on a transactional relationship between scientist and nature is exemplified by the work of cytogeneticist and Nobel laureate Barbara McClintock. Keller notes the significant changes in knowledge construction when divisions that secure the autonomy of science, like those division between public and private, or knower and known, are rejected. From a feminist perspective, "science is deeply personal as well as a social activity." I contend that this feminist view finds much in common with Dewey's notion of transactional subjectivity.

McClintock assumes a transactional perspective in her approach to research in genetics. Based on her view of the complexity of nature, McClintock argues that it becomes essential to "let the experiment tell you what to do" and to get a "feeling for the organism." McClintock rejects a dichotomization of subject and object, mind and matter, feeling and reason as organizing principles because it severs connection and imposes distance.

McClintock rejects the standard operating procedures of modern science, which seeks a cosmic unity, an all-encompassing law that typically excludes or devours one of the dichotomized pair. McClintock's respect for complexity and difference permit her to remain content with multiplicity as an end in itself. Difference provides a starting point of relatedness. She pays special attention to the exceptional case, and her own research began with the observation of an aberrant pattern of pigmentation on a few kernels of a single corn plant. "McClintock can risk the suspension of boundaries between subject and object without jeopardy to science precisely because, to her, science is not premised on that division. Indeed, the intimacy she experiences with the objects she studies--intimacy born of a lifetime of cultivated attentiveness--is a wellspring of her powers as a scientist." For McClintock, scientist and organism being studied are part of the same world. Keller suggests that questions about objects that one feels kinship with are likely to differ from questions about objects one sees as unalterably alien. Additionally, McClintock's conception of nature's complexity and her respect for difference that follows provide a different framework to build scientific programs.

III. Defining Terms: Transaction and Knowledge

In the 1930s, Dewey begins to systematically use the term transaction to describe the active/reactive relationship between knowers and knowns. His
The aim is to escape any connotation of separate realms of being implied by the words interaction and integration, terms that he had employed throughout his earlier writings. "Inter-action assumes the organism and its environmental objects . . . as substantially separate existences . . . prior to their entry into joint investigation . . . [whereas] transactions assume no pre-knowledge of either organism or environment alone as adequate."10 The authors' notion of transaction permits full treatment, descriptive and functional, of the whole process of inquiry, inclusive of all its contents.

The concept of transaction cannot simply be understood from the point of view of the individual knower because a transactional point of view "proceeds upon the ground that knowing is co-operative and as such is integral with communication" (Dewey and Bentley, 1949, p. vi).

In his introduction of On Experience, Nature and Freedom, Bernstein contends that the term transaction provides "a more rigorous formulation of the category of the organic."11 This kind of reciprocity means that both subject and object are modified during the process of inquiry. Subjects are modified as new meanings are known, and objects of knowledge gain new meanings during the course of inquiry. Each are constituted by the other as part of the process of inquiry.

Thus, throughout his philosophic career, Dewey argues against any view of experience that denies its transactional character, that separates mind from body, subject from object, or self from world. Boisvert summarizes the importance of Dewey's position as follows:

Subject and object, terms inherited from epistemology-centered philosophy, were no longer to be understood in the traditional manner. Instead of a subject as spectator examining the realm of objects, there is now the biological environment which involved the participation of organisms in their surroundings. The environment or situation provided the dynamic unity of interacting entities.12

Dewey's concept of the transactional relationship stands at the core of his arguments against dualism and provides a crucial framework for redefining subject/object relationship. Knowing, according to Dewey, only occurs as the agent faces problems which interrupt habits and force a reconstruction of meaning based on combining a number of habits with new conditions. The focus is on knowing as an activity, not on a static product. Thus, Dewey restricts the term knowledge to its use in inquiry, with its deliberate prospective nature, an intelligent search for the unknown based on the problem at hand. The purpose of this paper is to explore how Dewey redefines the concept of self, and how this reconstruction of self, with an emphasis on the generative, communicative, and subjective forces transforms the process of inquiry.
While Dewey's notion of transaction emphasizes the relation between subject and object during the process of inquiry, for purposes of analysis we examine each concept separately.

IV. Understanding Subject During the Process of Inquiry

Dewey's view of subject during inquiry benefits to a significant degree from the ground-breaking work of fellow pragmatist Charles S. Peirce. While both are pragmatists, Peirce and Dewey diverge on such key issues as the nature of logic, innate truth, and universal propositions. They do, however, share some degree of agreement regarding the notion of fallibility, the use of scientific method in philosophy, the need for a community of inquirers to warrant assertions, and most importantly for this discussion, on how doubt and belief constitute self. In fact, in their analysis of American philosophy, Flower and Murphey argue that Dewey generalizes Peirce's account of doubt and belief into a full theory of inquiry. In similar ways, Dewey and Peirce identify self with concrete and specific activities. While subject and subjectivity remain key issues for pragmatists, the immersion of individuals within a social and natural environment is also given primary attention. Just as Peirce is quick to acknowledge an inherent social aspect of language, Dewey also stresses the role of culture in mediating individual development: "His responses grow intelligent, or gain meaning, simply because he lives and acts in a medium of accepted meanings and values. . . . [T]he self is not a separate mind building up knowledge anew on its own account."15

V. Dewey's Reconstruction of Subject: Transactional Subjectivity

The world we have experienced becomes an integral part of the self that acts and is acted upon in further experience. In their physical occurrence, things and events experienced pass and are gone. But something of their meaning and value is retained as an integral part of self. Through habits formed in intercourse with the world, we also inhabit the world. 16

Dewey adopts a view of self as collected meanings or what he calls "funded" meanings. For Dewey funded meanings are situated within a complex set of habits. Later Dewey argues that "whenever anything is undergoing in consequences of a doing, the self is modified these funded and retained meanings become part of self."17 These habits or predispositions shape who we are:

All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. In any intelligible sense of the word will, they are will.
They form our effective desires and they furnish us with our working capacities. They rule our thought, determining which shall appear and be strong and which shall pass from light into obscurity. . . . We may think of habits as means, waiting, like tools in a box, to be used by conscious resolve. But they are something more than that. They are active means, means that project themselves, energetic and dominating ways of acting.18

This is not a self, separate from the world, but a self shaped by history and by experiences. For Dewey, self is contained in a perception rather than perception is presented to a self.

Dewey prefers to use the word "habit", rather than attitude, will, or disposition, because he believes habits provide an explicit sense of operativeness that the latter terms lack. Late in his career, Dewey turned to the use of the word "self" to describe the function of habits. The word "habit" denotes the kind of mechanical function and immediacy that distinguishes it from Dewey's idea of intelligence or reflection. There is an immediate, emotional, and pervasive quality of a lived experience, which at the same time is being shaped by habits.19

The point Dewey stresses here is that habits are not simply waiting to be used by conscious resolve, but that habits are actively operating prior to reflection to form the situation. The aim is to discredit the myth that "a mind or consciousness or soul in general" performs these operations.20

Confusion arises when habits and impulses are equated with knowledge. Neither habits nor impulse can think, observe or remember. "Habits by themselves are too organized, too insistent and determinate to need to indulge in inquiry or imagination," the key characteristic of a habit is that it "incorporates, enacts or overrides objects, but it doesn't know them."21 An old habit supplies content, filling, definite, recognizable subject-matter.

VI. Defining Qualitative Immediacy
As a Function of Habits

Kestenbaum argues that qualitative immediacy, qualities of situations which are directly experienced or felt, is ultimately a function of habits.22

Bernstein also notes that Dewey's theory of quality is one of the most original and basic features of his philosophy. It not only distinguishes between knowing and having, but also forms the basis for understanding his contextualism, his anti-dualism, his theory of inquiry, and his ethics.23 In other words, Dewey provides the basis for linking habits and reflective inquiry.

Bernstein makes an important observation here that qualities are immediately felt and emerge out of transactions. Bernstein argues that "The qualities which we apprehend are the resultants, endings, or emergents of natural tra . . . s. They are neither exclusively in the organism nor in its
environment; they are as much a part of the experiencer as of the things experienced." Thus, Bernstein locates quality in the transaction between subject (habits) and external conditions.

Bernstein argues convincingly that qualities are not strictly the function of habits as Kestenbaum contends, but rather must be viewed in transactions. "For the purpose of intellectual or practical control, we may refer the quality to the experiencer or to the object experienced. This is a subtle phenomenological point which has been obscured by the prevalence of the modern distinction between subject and object."  

Habits are then conditions of intellectual efficiency operating in two ways. Obviously, habits fix boundaries and set routines. But in addition, habits are reconstructed as new problems arise, and they interact with present conditions. "Habits become negative limits because they are first positive agencies. The more numerous our habits the wider the field of possible observation and foretelling. The more flexible they are, the more refined perception in its discrimination and the more delicate the presentation evoked by imagination."  

Thus, while Dewey seeks an understanding of habits as constituting self in an immediate, pre-reflective condition, he also envisions habits in a creative, dramatic role when tension arises between constituting and the constituted. The more numerous and flexible habits are, the more refined is perception in its discrimination and the more delicate the presentation evoked by imagination.

By viewing self as a complex mix of habits interacting with a changing environment, Dewey accounts for complexity and diversity of experience in contrast to what might become a more conservative view of habits as organizing mechanisms. Pre-reflective habits are active, creative, and constitutive of conscious subjectivity, but this subjectivity is transactional, modified in its continuous transactional relationship with the world. Habits, in transaction with external conditions set the stage, or perhaps more accurately, constitute the situation, which in turn sets the stage for further transactions between the organism and the environment.

Dewey's concept of habit becomes a key concept undermining the idea of an individual's detachment and neutrality:

... that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systemization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominated activity.

Inquiry begins with habits, which are pre-reflective and make up all lived experiences. Habits are composed of a combination of "reason", body functions, ...
and emotions, which together serve to construct the situation by actively influencing perception. These three constructs, reason, body functions, and emotions, are interrelated and historically formed.

Thus, a pragmatic definition of reason highlights the ongoing process of inquiry that includes bodily and emotional influences. Hence, there is no isolated faculty of reason. Perception is an active capacity, one that constitutes both self and the situation. Pre-reflective habits work in tandem with previously held beliefs to direct the purpose of inquiry. While certainly shaped by habits, selecting a purpose for inquiry represents a more reflective level of human agency that guides the inquiry toward the selected object of knowledge.

VII. The Position of Subject/Object in Inquiry

The history of knowledge would have been quite different if the word "taken" were used instead of "data" or "givens." Dewey distinguishes between the total subject-matter which is had in non-cognitive experiences, and data selected from this total which gives impetus to knowing. The data of the inquiry are the facts, which come from a variety of sources, and the materials which make up a problematic situation. But these so-called facts are not foundational, and can be subject to inquiry as well. Dewey points out that "there must be data at command to supply the considerations required in dealing with the specific difficulty which has presented itself" and "memory, observation, reading, communication are all avenues for supplying data." Determining what data is relevant to the problem in itself requires judgment and decision on the part of the inquirers. While Dewey acknowledges that ability for direct observation is sometimes limited and needs to be supplemented by utilizing the experiences of others, he cautions against an excessive reliance on others for supplying data.

Dewey acknowledges that the selection of a purpose for inquiry is inevitable, especially since there is no single objectivity out there to be discovered. Put simply, selection affects all observation. The object of knowledge is always selected based on the stated purpose, which in turn is influenced, but not absolutely determined, by antecedent conditions. When a transactional relationship is assumed during inquiry, inquirers seek meaning about the object of knowledge, not a representation of the object itself as it exists prior to inquiry. For Dewey, the object of knowledge is not coming to perceive the object as it exists in reality, but rather to understand its meaning--its characteristics and its relationships.

Objects of inquiry are experienced within a time/space dimension emerging out of this process of inquiry. Dewey states: "The names objects will be reserved for subject-matter so far as it has been produced and ordered in settled form by means of inquiry; proleptically, objects are the objectives of inquiry. The apparent ambiguity of using "object" for this purpose (since the word is applied to things that are observed or thought of) is only apparent.
For things exist as objects for us only as they have been previously determined as outcomes of inquiries. Dewey's use of the term "object of knowledge" rather than object helps to make the distinction more clear. This distinction serves to aid our understanding of how these "objects of knowledge" are modified during inquiry. While inquiry might be aimed at modifying the physical environment as a way to solve a problem, a physical transformation is only part of the change which takes place, and is not necessarily required. Unfortunately, Dewey frequently uses both terms, object and object of knowledge interchangeably, which contributes to considerable confusion over his meaning.

Dewey's use of object of knowledge creates new problems which are not completely resolved. Objects of knowledge are redispositions of antecedent existences produced by means of overt operations. But as Sleeper points out, Dewey fails to discuss what "these overt operations might be in the context of metaphysical inquiry. What experiments we might perform to aid us in drawing the baselines of our ground-map of the province of criticism."

Moreover, selection of purpose always involves some degree of risk, since purpose serves to exclude some avenues of inquiry or at least narrow inquiry in certain directions. Dewey submits that:

Selective emphasis, choice, is inevitable whenever reflection occurs. This is not an evil. Deception comes only when the presence and operation of choice is concealed, disguised, denied. Empirical method finds and points to the operation of choice as it does to any other event. This protects us from conversion of eventual functions into antecedent existence: a conversion that may be said to be the philosophical fallacy. . . .

It is the "eventual functions" that are the objects of our search, not reproduction of antecedent reality. While we can never avoid the problem of selection of purpose, Dewey argues that the advantage of empirical methods comes with the clear disclosure of purpose, thus allowing other communities of inquirers to evaluate outcomes of inquiry on their own. This public exchange provides a framework for a kind of Deweyan objectivity for inquiry, aimed at preventing inquiry from being based solely on personal discoveries.

VIII. The Effect of Subjectivity on Our View of Knowledge

Dewey's definition of inquiry goes beyond merely the technical steps involved in conducting scientific inquiry. A pragmatic theory of inquiry includes consideration of pre-reflective habits, selection of purpose, as well as concepts of judgment, avoidance of universals, emphasis on particulars, emphasis on practice, reliance on a community of inquirers, and finally communication in and with the public at large. This combination of characteristics distinguish
pragmatic inquiry from other experimental and positivistic traditions that embrace some sort of objectivism and dualism.

Thus, we can never achieve neutrality on any issue, or what Dewey calls "primitive naivete", because we cannot eliminate the influence of habits and choice from the process of inquiry. We can, however, achieve a "cultivated naivete of eye, ear, and thought" which renders choice less arbitrary and makes it more significant. Choice is less arbitrary when outcomes of inquiry are shared among a number of people. Here again, Dewey acknowledges the almost "insurmountable difficulty" of achieving some level of detachment from personal interests.

Clearly, there are problems created when, in the process of constructing knowledge, desires and interest affect observations and interpretations of a perceived situation. Within Dewey's method, there is an implicit need then to broaden participation, to include a wide range of interests in the process of inquiry, in order to reach communal "objectivity".

In this part of inquiry, Dewey seems to count on the community finding agreement on problems as well as solutions. Perhaps his optimism is based on an assumption about the degree of homogeneity among members of the community that is naive. Dewey also fails to provide an adequate discussion of how human beings should decide what presumptive knowledge to re-evaluate and what principles should remain intact, especially in light of the complexity that he attaches to ordinary inquiry.

Thus, the need for choice and judgment during the process of inquiry is paradoxical. To his credit, Dewey recognizes the crucial part played by the human being in selecting what part of the problem to address and how to pursue a possible solution. But, the need for choice and judgment also indicate problems for a diverse and conflicting community that is attempting to identify what problems to pursue and what solutions to seek.

IX. Conclusion

When defining knowledge, Dewey rejects the modernist concepts of detachment, neutrality, autonomy of self, and the myth of the given. He stresses instead the constructed, generative nature of our subjectivity, and the influence this subjectivity has on perception, inquiry, and ultimately on our beliefs. This kind of transactional subjectivity makes knowing a complex combination of habits and purposes, and both are infused with emotions, values, body functions, and "reason". Knowledge is not something that can be possessed without being modified the process of coming-to-know. This position undermines modern views of objectivity that privilege certain kinds of knowledge because of its abstract, detached nature. Instead, objectivity is seen as emerging out of subjectivity. It is through Dewey's discussion of a rich doctrine of experience and prereflective habits that he opens the door for greater consideration of emotions, values, body, and interests as positive elements that
work in combination with reflection in shaping inquiry. This position helps to locate the affinity between Dewey's definition of subjectivity and some strains of feminism.

A transactional view also makes knowing a social process, it requires communication in forming knowledge claims. By rejecting certainty and notions of Cartesian objectivity, a pragmatic perspective opens space in the process of inquiry for the inclusion of diverse communities, particularly marginalized voices which stand against previously sacred traditions. Thus, no single group of inquirers can claim to correctly understand "reality" or be the source of "objective" criteria.

Moreover, a transactional view replaces the image of human beings as primarily contemplative thinkers with the image of human beings as doers, actively participating in constructing their understanding of the world, and at the same time being constructed themselves. The image projected here is more creative than even the image of discoverer. Perhaps the image of the artist best captures the relational character of human beings and their world. Dewey suggests that the metaphor of the artist producing a painting is a more appropriate model for thinking about knowledge than a passive, spectator view. The image of the artist emphasizes an "inherent and multifaceted connectedness between human beings and their surroundings. It is one that recognizes possibility, change, and incompleteness as focal, not incidental features of existence. Practice thus become the most accurate expression of the relationship to humans to their enveloping world."41

Endnotes

1John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, Knowing and the Known (Boston: Beacon Press, 1949), 103-104.


3Elizabeth Flower and Murray Murphy, A History of Philosophy in America (New York: Capricorn Books, 1977), 832.

4For an analysis of the affinities between pragmatism and feminism, see the recent special edition of Hypatia, Spring 1993, 8, 2.

6Ibid, 162, 165.

7Ibid, 163.

8Ibid, 1985, 164.


10Dewey and Bentley, Knowing and the Known, 123.


13Flower and Murphey, A History of Philosophy in America, 571.

14Ibid, 811.


17Ibid, 264.


21Ibid, 177.


25Ibid, xliii.


28Ibid, 40-41.


31Ibid, 157-158.

32Dewey and Bentley, *Knowing and the Known*, 68.


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WHY COLLEGES OF EDUCATION DO NOT PRODUCE MASTER TEACHERS

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What is an exemplary teacher? What is a master teacher? Do master teachers share any common qualities? Do we have educationists who are master teachers in colleges of education? If so, do colleges of education cultivate such individuals or discourage them? With those questions in mind I returned to an article published by Benjamin Bloom in 1982 called "The Master Teachers," wherein the author reports the findings of his study into the subject of master teachers and their qualities. Bloom concludes his article saying:

In the schools, colleges, and universities there must be many teachers who have some of the qualities we find in this study of the master teachers. They too are 'national treasures,' but they are not as visible as the small number of master teachers discussed in this paper. Quite frequently they are remembered by only a small number of their students, and occasionally, by a few of their colleagues.

It is to be hoped that, especially in a time of great pessimism about education and schooling, we can find ways of giving recognition to our master teachers as well as increasing our understanding of the vital role they play in the educational process.

Unfortunately, as I will argue, colleges of education are for the most part hostile to the attitudes and methods associated with master teachers as described by Bloom. If Bloom's master educationists do manage to survive in colleges of education, they do so as highly principled outcasts. Those requiring a more pleasant work environment either succumb to the pressure to change or simply move on.

I will first review Bloom's findings regarding the qualities and characteristics of master teachers and discuss to what extent external factors in higher education allow Master educationists to exist. Second, I will explain how and why colleges of education discourage the existence of such master educationists. And finally, I will make some recommendations regarding the future treatment of master educationists within colleges of education.
I. Who Are the Master Teachers?

According to Bloom, the major distinguishing mark of master teachers is their ability to inspire or push students to achieve at their highest levels of potential. Bloom identifies the following additional characteristics:

1. Typically the master teachers will take only those students who have already been successful on a smaller scale and who show great promise, since their own success as great teachers depends in part on the constant production of a series of "great" students.

2. Master teachers look for evidence that the student already possesses the discipline as well as the willingness to work hard for long periods of time.

3. While the great teacher may inspire and demand some of this effort, undisciplined and unwilling students are to be avoided at all costs. The students must want to become great in their field more than anything else.

At first glance it might appear that master teaching in colleges of education is doomed by external circumstances. One might argue that educationists do not have the luxury of choosing only those students who show great promise, nor can they necessarily determine in advance the level of commitment and desire possessed by teacher candidates. While this is true, it misses the point.

First of all, the teacher candidate has already progressed through a long process of general education and training designed to foster much of the skill and knowledge that teachers presumably should possess. For example, teachers should be skilled liberal artists. Toward this end, they should have been perfecting their ability to read, write, speak, listen, think, and do mathematical computation throughout their primary and secondary school careers. Most teacher candidates have also successfully completed a two year core curriculum aimed at both sharpening their skills and providing them with depth and breadth in such general liberal studies as language, the sciences, the arts, philosophy, and history. Now as teacher candidates they are engaged in a process of learning the skills and knowledge required of one who desires to teach others in a professional capacity. Educationists should therefore not be dealing with neophytes in the areas of general skills and knowledge. If they are dealing with such neophytes, educationists certainly have the option and even the responsibility of demanding that those candidates either gain the necessary general skills and knowledge, or pursue some other field.

In order to help teacher candidates reach their highest levels of potential, educationists as master teachers might assign readings that require skills beyond a twelfth grade level. The educationists might then give daily quizzes or written probes designed to test both the students' reading comprehension skills and study skills, as well as their written communication skills. The educationists might point out skill deficiencies and coach the students toward improvement, or
refer the students to some other source for remedial help. If the students' skills fail to improve to an acceptable minimal level, the educationists might pursue the option of assigning failing grades. Educationists as master teachers might also engage students in Socratic discussions (as opposed to "rap sessions" and exercises in "shooting the breeze") in which the students must demonstrate comprehension of the texts and critical thinking skills. When educationists discover serious deficiencies, they can avail themselves of the route suggested above.

Critics might continue by charging that educationists get plenty of undisciplined and unwilling students. The response to such critics is obviously that undisciplined and unwilling students are likely to become undisciplined and unwilling teachers. It is unreasonable to expect unmotivated, unskilled teacher candidates to bloom miraculously into skilled, motivational teachers. It is likewise unreasonable to expect teacher candidates with serious skill deficiencies to effectively identify and correct skill deficiencies in others. Unless educationists want to admit that they accept large numbers of unqualified candidates into teacher training and do little to improve them afterward, the charge that master teacher expectations cannot exist in colleges of education due to external factors is unpersuasive.

II. Demeanor and Expectations of Master Teachers

Bloom explains the demeanor and expectations of master teachers as follows:

1. The master teacher, by a willingness to accept the individual student, conveyed the expectation that the student could go far in the talent field. However, this was always conditional on the student's giving himself or herself fully to the instruction and to the demands for perfection required by the master teacher. Both students and teachers speak of this as "putting oneself in the hands of the teacher without reservation." Although the majority of the talented individuals fully accepted these expectations and requirements, in a few cases there were serious conflicts; typically, these ended with the student's seeking another master teacher.

2. Initially, at least, the student's admiration and "awe" for the master teacher were frequently expressed: "When he spoke it was as though it was the voice of God." The criticism, the explanations, and the expectations and standards set by the master teacher were to be acted on - not to be questioned or debated . . . The overall point to be made here is that the master teacher knew what was to be done; the students responded to this with full commitment and acceptance of the instruction and the related expectations of the teacher. When the student failed to meet these expectations of the master teacher, typically the student was asked to find another teacher.
3. The master teacher is very effective in communicating confidence that the student can and will become one of the great figures in the field. The student is to understand that, given enormous effort and will, he or she is destined for great things, and will in some reasonable number of years be able to attain these high expectations. The master teacher is very much respected by the student, and the student is usually convinced that it is right and proper that the master teacher's expectations, instructions, and requirements be fully met.

Educationists as master teachers should stand as examples of accomplishment in the liberal arts and liberal disciplines. They must stand before their students as both accomplished liberal artists and as broadly educated human beings. When they demand that their students be excellent readers, writers, speakers, listeners, thinkers, etc., they must demonstrate their own high level of mastery of those skills. When they demand that their students be broadly educated human beings, they must demonstrate that they themselves are such human beings. The student must be able to take the master teacher as a model of educational accomplishment to be emulated. When master teachers require students to improve their skills, the students should not doubt the teachers' judgement or authority to do so.

On the other hand, while complete subservience may be desirable in the martial arts student, the piano student, or the swimming student, it is not desirable in the education student. When education is the goal, training alone will not suffice, because critical thinking must ensue. What then is the proper measure of respect and awe that education students owe master teachers? I believe Mortimer Adler describes this golden mean in his work "Two Essays on Docility." Therein, Adler advises that the proper relationship between teacher and student is a mean between subservience and indocility:

Unless the teacher has an authority which comes from greater knowledge or skill, he cannot justly be our master, nor need we be docile as his students. Although the student must never accept what the teacher says simply because he says it [subservience], neither can he reject it on that ground [indocility]. In the field of natural knowledge, the student must ultimately make up his own mind in the light of natural reason, but until he is able to do that finally he should try to get all the help he can from those who offer to teach him. Docility is needed, therefore, to dispose him to seek and to use such help wisely and well. If the teacher claims to demonstrate something which the student cannot see at once to be the case, docility requires that the student suspend judgment—neither accept nor reject—and apply his mind studiously to the teacher's words and intentions.
It must be noted that Adler is restricting his recommendations to cases in which teachers are instructing students in the field of natural knowledge. When master violin teachers instruct their students in technique, they have every right to demand that their students explicitly follow those instructions. Likewise, when master educationists instruct their students in teaching techniques or in the skills of the liberal arts, or when they demand that their students increase their knowledge in the liberal disciplines, they also have every right to demand that their students follow those instructions explicitly.

III. Analysis of Progress

According to Bloom:
1. Master teachers set the goals to be realized and determine what is necessary for students to do to reach those goals. Thereafter, the goals are reviewed periodically in terms of the progress being made and what is still needed.
2. Rarely does the master teacher praise the student; the effort is constantly to search for what is still needed.
3. At all times the master teacher was searching for the unique characteristics of the individual and how these related to the larger field. It was not enough to do things well; this was a search for what the individual could do to reach the limits of what was humanly possible in the field.

Certainly these approaches are possible in colleges of education. Master educationists can determine the goals of their courses. Thereafter they can periodically review the progress their students are making. This can be done in a variety of ways. Master educationists can give their students frequent progress reports, and spell out what must be done if the students are to improve. Master educationists can also restrict the amount of praise lavished on the students, letting the students know, of course, when they are improving, but always placing the focus on the improvement yet expected, thereby pushing the students to previously unrealized levels of accomplishment.

Realistically, master educationists cannot expect all of their students to be potential A students, especially since the course will challenge them to the limits of their ability. That means that master educationists must know the unique individual capabilities of their students. In other words, master educationists set the minimum criteria for passing their course, and they set high standards for the achievement of grades from A through D. Beyond that, they demand the highest performance capable from each student. Students who want to earn an A, and who have the capability, will have to work to capacity in order to achieve it, students who want a B, and who have the capability, must work to capacity in order to achieve it, and so on down to the student capable of earning only a D. There is no question of students with only B, C, or D capabilities earning grades higher than their capacities allow. Therefore, regardless
of the grades they receive, all students will share at least one thing in common: all will have achieved the most they could achieve in relation to their individual capacity. The master teachers will have maximized the learning of all their students. Colleges of education themselves must decide what levels of capability and performance are necessary for students to finally be certified as teachers.

IV. Motivation

According to Bloom, master teachers motivate in the following ways:

1. The student's relations with others became extremely important during the years with the master teacher. The student established personal relations with others who would be his or her peers in the field for many years to come. These fellow students became models to be observed--and, in some cases, to be studied in detail--to discover what could be learned from them.

2. In general, the use of models and examples served to develop skill in observing and analyzing fine points of a very complex process. As the students learned from these observations of others, they also learned to observe and analyze their own performances.

Master educators can encourage student interaction through large group and small group discussion, and through other methods appropriate to the level and type of class being taught. Master educators can use top students as model liberal artists. They can also be sure that students have chances to observe master teachers working at the level for which each student is preparing. Many such experiences must be done in classes with observation components and in student teaching.

Of course the master educator must stand as a model of quality teaching appropriate to the level of higher education. I have already examined some of the components of this model by way of reviewing Bloom's characteristics of the master teacher.

V. Personal Relations

According to Bloom

1. In general the master was a relatively remote person who made clear his or her expectations. Only rarely did any student enjoy a highly personal interaction with the master. Work and progress were demanded, and the demands became higher. The master was "the voice of God," but one didn't get too close to such a person. There were, however, individual students who broke through this remoteness and regarded the master as a "father figure" who indulged in a closer relationship than typically prevailed. The more frequently the students and teachers met, the greater chance that such relationships would develop. In general, master teachers rarely befriended their students.
They were "Olympian" figures who descended for the purpose of helping particular "mere mortals" to rise to a higher level.

2. Master teachers are remembered with gratitude by their successful students, but rarely with love and affection. They were "gurus" who affected their students' development not only in the talent area, but also in their outlook on life and in the highest values central to the talent field and human endeavor.

Largely due to the factor of respect and awe, it is certainly possible for master educationists to maintain relatively non-fraternal relationships with their students. In fact, the nature of the master-student relationship will naturally demand this in all but rare cases. Since educationists usually meet formally with their students one to three times per week, the chances for closer relationships to develop are enhanced.

VI. Assessment

The primary reason that colleges of education do not produce Bloom's master teachers is that they employ philosophies that discourage demanding standards, teaching methodologies that discourage adequate student preparation, and evaluation techniques that fail to adequately discriminate among students of varying abilities.

1. Philosophy: It is no secret that the preferred teaching philosophy among educationists capable of articulating a philosophy is either progressivism, reconstructionism, or existentialism. These philosophies cater to student interests and consider social change a higher goal than liberal education. They also consider high self-esteem more important than knowledge and understanding. Essentialists and perennialists are generally unwelcome in colleges of education, see for example:

- *Teacher in America* (1945) by Jacques Barzun
- *Educational Wastelands* (1953) by Arthur Bestor
- *The Diminished Mind: A Study of Planned Mediocrity in Our Public Schools* (1954) by Mortimer Smith
- *The House of Intellect* (1959) by Jacques Barzun
- *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (1962) by Richard Hofstadter
- *The Miseducation of American Teachers* by James Koerner
- *Crisis in the Classroom* (1970) by Charles Silberman
- *Black Education: Myths and Tragedies* (1972) by Thomas Sowell
- *n's Smoking Gun: How Teachers Colleges Have Destroyed...*
VII. Teaching Methodologies

I highly recommend *Master Teachers: Portraits of Great Teachers* (1991) edited by Joseph Epstein. The book consists of portraits of great university teachers, written by their students. What most of these teachers have in common is a drive to know and understand, as well as the ability to awe their students as role models of the intellectual life.

Sidney Hook says of philosopher Morris Cohen:

> The range of his erudition was the despair of the ambitious of us--history, biology, law, the physical sciences, comparative literature, theology and Biblical criticism, not to speak of all the mansions of philosophy. He could suggest a bibliography for every topic or project, and all students, except those who were completely alienated by his devastating negativism, profited greatly. . . . Where his teaching was concerned, Cohen resolutely defended his conception of the vocation of the teacher (at least on the undergraduate level) as a sanitation engineer sent into the world to free students' minds of intellectual rubbish.

Hook refers to Cohen's methods as insensitive and cruel, approaches that no reputable philosophy of education would recommend. Yet had this great, inspirational teacher been in a modern college of education he would surely be drummed out by his hand-wringing colleagues.

After describing the large, unwieldy historical problems that Frederick Teggert assigned his undergraduates, Robert Nisbet remarks:

> Some might think that in the course Teggert gave for undergraduates, students would have been better served by smaller, more directly manageable problems . . . I don't agree. The most important thing that can happen in a mind is that it be stretched, and the earlier the better. Once stretched, the mind will never retract to its original size. Teggert was an impressive stretcher of minds.

Unfortunately, as Plato and others have suggested, stretching causes some discomfort, and discomfort is for the most part a taboo in modern colleges of education. Students are to always be comfortable and satisfied. If they are not, the master educationist risks negative student evaluations which will be used by his lessers to discredit and humiliate him. Had Teggert been in a modern college of education he would be criticized for making students uncomfortable and 

ish ed to chill out.
Nisbet also says of Teggert, "His opinions and judgments tended, naturally, to be unqualified and set in marble. Of Teggert it used to be said that when he changed his mind the earth shook. He suffered neither fools nor foolish ideas gladly..." Of course, colleges of education loathe the person who thinks he knows the truth because that implies that others are wrong. In colleges of education, no one can be wrong, especially the students.

Writing of literature professor F. O. Matthiessen, Kenneth S. Lynn tells of an instance in which the instructor lost his temper with a student:

He was lecturing on Hamlet, and the bell sounded. A student sitting to Mathiessen's left at once arose and began moving toward the aisle. Suddenly Mathiessen swerved, stabbed his right index finger straight at the student, and yelled at the top of his lungs, 'Will you sit down!' For approximately the next two minutes he was out of control. He had poured his whole being into this course, he raged, and we would not even extend him the courtesy of hearing him out. Finally he calmed down and said he was sorry for yelling, but before dismissing the class he cried out as if in pain, Hamlet had a temper, too.

Lynn points out that some students actually hated Mathiessen, especially, I would guess, those who expect their teachers to share their view that the whole college experience is about accreditation and certification. Of course, no teacher in a college of education would be allowed to get away with the sense of importance that Mathiessen's held of his subject.

Gerald Graff writes of literature professor Yvor Winters that:

Here, clearly, was someone who told you where he stood, so that you had a chance to figure out where you stood... He paid for the rigor of his judgments with bitter isolation... If he seemed eager for combat, it was not because it gave him pleasure but because he thought it his obligation to live up to the standards he had set himself, standards he believed to be impersonal, and I believe he was as hard on himself as in those of others.

George P. Brockway says of philosopher John W. Miller:

Miller was a tall, large-boned man of unfailing courtliness. A favorite world with him was 'presence,' by which he meant proclaiming one's thought in one's actions and accepting in one's thought the implication for one's actions. His own presence was powerful and immediately felt by all his students. He made none of the usual plays for popularity. His classes did not start with warm-up jokes, nor did he make regular references to football games or house parties. He
D. Smith

demanded decorum in his classrooms; if you slouched or put your feet up on the seat in front of you, he made a sharp impersonal comment on the meaning of courtesy. You didn't do it again.  

As another student said, "He was a person who frightened and thrilled me." Brockway writes, "Miller gave very few high marks... He happened to preserve the record of one course's grades; it shows only five A's in two sections totaling seventy-five students, and this was a postwar class, when the 'gentleman's C' was no longer fashionable." Others in the book who could be considered essentialist or perennialists are I. A. Richards, Hannah Arendt, and Leo Strauss.

Colleges of education do not understand that great teachers will make a good many enemies among the least talented and least motivated of students and among colleagues who adopt less demanding expectations. If colleges of education are to produce Bloom's brand of master teachers, they must be tolerant of perennialists and essentialists. They must make room for the information processing model and the behavioral systems model at the educational table. Today, in this age of political correctness, such tolerance appears to be in short supply in colleges of education.

Unfortunately it always has been.

Endnotes


2 The following listings of master teachers' characteristics and subsequent such listings are from Bloom's "The Master Teachers," cited in endnote number one.


6 Nisbet, 87.


10 Brockway, 158.

11 Brockway, 158-159.
IS THERE A CORRELATION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHIC WORLDVIEWS AND SOCIAL THEORIES?

Robert N. Barger
Eastern Illinois University

I. Hypothesis

The hypothesis that I set out to test can be stated as follows: there is a correlation between an individual's philosophic worldview and his or her theory of society. With regard to the outcome of the testing of this hypothesis, one may recall the story of Thomas Alva Edison concerning the events leading up to his discovery of the electric light bulb. Edison was asked if he was not discouraged that, after a thousand tries, he had not discovered a workable bulb. He replied that he was not at all discouraged . . . because he had, in fact, discovered a great deal, namely, a thousand ways that didn't work! Though I have not labored on my hypothesis as long as Edison did on the light bulb, I, too, am not discouraged . . . although I must state at the outset that my testing of the hypothesis was not able to prove it true. Despite finding a few interesting correlations, I have discovered that there is not a statistically verified connection between one's philosophic worldview and one's view of society.

II. Methodology

Scores on a standardized inventory of philosophic worldviews (The Ross-Barger Philosophic Inventory) were recorded for 71 graduate students who were enrolled in multiple sections of a course on the sociology of education at a large Midwestern comprehensive University. These inventory scores were compared with written self-identifications of the students' dominant social theories. This comparison was done using statistical discriminant analysis. The self-identification by the student was done after the student had completed a thorough study of the various social theories during the sociology of education course.

III. Definitions

The philosophic worldviews identified by the Ross-Barger Philosophic Inventory are Idealism, Realism, Pragmatism, and Existentialism.

1. The Idealist worldview holds that reality consists basically of ideas, i.e., that it is more spirit than matter. The Idealist believes that knowing occurs by the
mind grasping ideas. The Idealist believes value is found in ideals, i.e., in perfection.

2. The Realist worldview holds that reality consists basically in matter, i.e., the physical world. The Realist believes that knowing occurs through the grasping of objects by the senses. The Realist believes value is found in nature, i.e., in conforming one's conduct to what is natural.

3. The Pragmatist worldview holds that reality is experience, i.e., that it is a process rather than static ideas or things. The Pragmatist believes that knowing occurs by discovery, i.e., learning by doing or trying things out. The Pragmatist believes value is found in whatever produces a socially-desirable result.

4. The Existentialist worldview holds that reality is self-constructed, i.e., that reality is essentially inner... that is, as each individual sees it for himself or herself. The Existentialist believes that knowing occurs by choice, i.e., that truth is what an individual decides for himself or herself to be true. The Existentialist believes value is found in what is individually chosen as good.

The theories of society are Functionalism, Conflict Theory, Interpretive Theory, and Critical Theory.

1. Functionalism believes that society is one large system made up of a series of infrastructures or subsystems. Social problems, in this view, are caused by imbalance or disharmony in the system.

2. Conflict Theory believes that society is made up of social classes, with control being in the hands of the upper class. In this view, social problems are the result of the oppression of the lower class (workers) by the upper class (capitalists).

3. Interpretive Theory believes that society is defined more in terms of its individual cultures rather than being the same for all people. Social problems, in this view, are defined by the individual cultures.

4. Critical Theory does not have a set vision of society, but is most sympathetic to the social view of the Conflict Theorists. Social problems, in this view, are best defined... and solved... by individual participants. Like the Conflict Theorists, Critical Theorists tend to believe that issues of power are important in understanding the cause of social problems.

IV. Findings and Conclusion

The non-statistical correlation of philosophic world-views and social theories is shown in Tables 1 & 2 below. The population for the study was 71. (The number in parentheses shows total of those responding within that category.) Table 1 distributes the respondents by philosophy and shows percentage of social theories within each philosophical category. Table 2 distributes respondents by social theory and shows the percentage within each philosophy.
TABLE 1
Non-statistical correlation of Philosophical World-view and Social Theories by Philosophies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soc. Th.</th>
<th>Ideal</th>
<th>Real</th>
<th>Prag.</th>
<th>Exist.</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Function</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpret</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL RESPONDENTS</td>
<td>(13)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2
Non-statistical correlation of Philosophical World-view and Social Theories by Social Theory

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophy</th>
<th>Funct.</th>
<th>Conflict</th>
<th>Interp.</th>
<th>Critic</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idealist</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Realist</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatist</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL RESPONDENTS</td>
<td>(33)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(25)</td>
<td>(71)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As can be seen from both tables, seven people were Functionalists and Idealists. Two were Functionalists and Realists. Fifteen were Functionalists and Pragmatists. Nine were Functionalists and Existentialists. There were no combinations of Conflict Theorist and Idealist or Conflict Theorist and Realist. Two people were Conflict Theorists and Pragmatists. One was a Conflict Theorist and Existentialist. Two people were Interpretivists and Idealists. None was an Interpretivist and Realist. Four were Interpretivists and Pragmatists. Four were Interpretivists and Existentialists. Four were Critical Theorists and Idealists. Five were Critical Theorists and Realists. Twelve were Critical Theorists and Pragmatists. Four were Critical Theorists and Existentialists.

With regard to social theories, there were 33 Functionalists, 3 Conflict Theorists, 10 Interpretivists, and 25 Critical Theorists. With regard to philosophic world-views, there were 13 Idealists, 7 Realists, 33 Pragmatists, and 18 Existentialists.

At first glance, the statistically significant results seem to be several. First, of the 35 cases of those who were identified as Interpretivists and Critical Theorists, 74.29% were statistically verified as being correctly classified \( (p = 0.0217) \). Second, Critical Theorists were stronger on Realism than were Interpretivists \( (p = 0.05) \). Third and finally, Idealism and Realism were shown to best discriminate between Interpretivists and Critical Theorists (this showing by a combination of standardized discriminant function and canonical discriminant function at centroids).

While the confidence levels of the above findings are very encouraging, there is cause for concern. The population of 71 is too small, resulting in cell sizes and distributions below what are generally assumed to be the minimum requirements. Thus, although the "p's" look good, the results are not worth much.

I believe this attempt was worth reporting for its statement of hypothesis and methodology. It might be well worthwhile to try the study again with a sufficiently large population.
"PRAGMATICS AND IDENTIFYING DISCIPLINES"¹

Thomas Kowall
University of Toronto

1. The project.

The project of devising satisfactory definitions for philosophical concepts has a long and distinguished history. The project began with Plato when he exercised Athenians who thought they knew what makes for right action, reverence to the gods, even what makes an individual a human being.

However since G.E. Moore, philosophers have largely abandoned the project of defining concepts because philosophical definitions appear to be either trivially true or simply false from clearcut counterexamples. Because the program of defining features for concepts has endured 2,000 years, it may prove useful to consider whether, as a philosophical method, the strategy of conceptual definitions should once more take its place among respected philosophical methods.

This paper argues that a contemporary version of the project of formulating philosophical definitions remains one of philosophy's most useful and important tools, and that in particular, the method helps us to understand a key concept in the philosophy of education, the concept of an academic discipline.

2. The problem.

Let us begin with a definition which, as first year students, we learned is unsatisfactory:

(1) X is a human being =df X is a featherless biped.

Definitions such as (1) fail, so we were instructed, because philosophical definitions require a conceptual relation which surpasses truth by accident. Plucked chickens, we were told, are also featherless bipeds but, by other standards and criteria we hold dear, do not qualify as instances of the concept "human being."

Plato's argument against definitions such as (1) is persuasive because understanding one term is not constituted by understanding a coextensive companion term. The extreme cases of this distinction are those widely appreciated examples in which terms, such as "the present King of France" and "the present Emperor of Russia," have the same extension, "no one" or the "null class," but, so the argument goes, identify different concepts.

Plato's philosophical strategy assesses the success of a conceptual definition by measuring its capacity to evade counterexamples. With this...
philosophically defining concepts, but he also introduces a criterion for determining what satisfactorily defines, or identifies, a concept.

For the better part of 2,000 years, Western philosophy has treated Plato's strategy of philosophical definitions and the immunity to counterexamples as evidence that definitions such as (1) cannot identify the individuating conditions for concepts. The endurance of Plato's paradigm is the basis for much of the esteem granted him and explains why the history of Western philosophy is dotted with attempts by others to propound principles similarly persuasive.

3. How Athenians became pragmatists.

Plato's understanding of principles, examples, and counterexamples masked, even suppressed, a valuable philosophical strategy. Due in large part to the power of Plato's construal of concept identity, examples, and counterexamples, it took more than 2,000 years for the emergence of a philosophical perspective effectively challenging Plato's interpretation of how definitions are related to confirming and disconfirming instances.

Only toward the end of the 19th century did pragmatists, shunning Plato's essentialism, make explicit the elastic nature of conceptual boundaries. In doing so, pragmatists drew our attention to the fact that the relation between principles and instances, identity conditions and counterexamples, is not one of proof but of preponderance. Recognition of the elastic nature of conceptual boundaries shifted the philosophical goal from proof satisfying the standard of necessity to evidence satisfying the standard of plausibility.

Consider how this change manifests itself in the example of Australia's black swans. Before Europeans travelled extensively to Australia, their experience of swans led many to believe that all swans are white. After observing birds in Australia, swanlike in significant ways other than colour, these Europeans were confronted with deciding whether or not to treat whiteness as a defining property of swans, or, in other words, to decide whether whiteness was part of the definition of the concept swan.

The fact that today we speak of the black swans of Australia is evidence that our current conceptual consensus treats whiteness as an accidental property of swans. Today we differ from those Europeans for whom whiteness was a defining characteristic of swans because we draw the conceptual boundaries of white, black, and swan in an alternative manner. For us, colour carries little weight in deciding whether any individual is or is not a swan because we construe cross-fertility data and DNA similarity as more important than colour.

Consider as well the underdetermination at play in the decision whether to treat Euglena viridis as a plant or as an animal. When we decide whether examples confirm or disconfirm our beliefs, our decision procedure follows a pattern of under-determination discernable in the interplay of principles and their instances. Does the presence of a chloroplast in Euglena define it as a plant? Or does Euglena's capacity for self-directed motion define it as an animal? Euglena presents us with the option of deciding whether to treat the concepts of plant and
animal as discrete (with no members in common) or as overlapping (with some individuals being both plant and animal).

The point brought into the foreground by the pragmatists, but suppressed by Plato, is that there is nothing to be right or wrong about when making this decision. For pragmatists there can be no grounds, such as those envisaged by Plato, assuring us that there exists a final and unrevisable answer to the constellation of questions "Is euglena a plant, an animal, both plant and animal, or neither plant nor animal?"

Although for Plato some counterexamples are unassailable, for pragmatists the merit of any particular counterexample is assailable by a multitude of considerations. When conceptual boundaries are permeable in the way that our swan and euglena examples demonstrate, no purported counterexample can be a conclusive argument to reject a conceptual definition. The closure sought by Plato through citing counterexamples is unavailable to pragmatists because one may always decide to (a) retain the counterexample and sacrifice the definition or (b) preserve the definition at the expense of the counterexample.

4. An alternative construal of philosophical definitions.

The project of producing conceptual definitions draws on two legacies: (i) the importance Plato places on the strategy of generating definitions immune to counterexample and (ii) the pragmatists' insight that the relation between conceptual definitions and their instances is elastic.

The question that arises for us then is whether formulating philosophical definitions remains a useful project despite the pragmatists' point that the relationship between principles and instances is the forgiving relation of evidence rather than the stringent standard of proof. When the quest for the certainty that Plato sought from conceptual definitions is forsaken, the question becomes what methodological advantage is gained by attempting to define philosophical concepts.

The answer I propose is this. The construction of definitions, the statement of necessary and sufficient conditions, is useful as a tool to develop our understanding of concepts and the disciplines in which they occur because definitions help us to identify what we believe about a concept and hence what we mean when we use it. The strategy of philosophical definitions provides us with one important procedure for knowing what we are committed to by what we believe. When we know the commitments of our beliefs, we better understand the meaning of the concepts occurring in those beliefs and the nature of the disciplines employing those concepts.

This increase of understanding, gained through determining the consequences of our beliefs, is the primary reason for construing philosophical definitions as an effective tool to increase our understanding of the meaning of a concept and the disciplines in which those concepts are imbedded.

What evidence supports the claim that we better understand meaning when we know the consequences of our beliefs? Consider the meaning of the concepts appearing in:
What evidence supports the claim that we better understand meaning when we know the consequences of our beliefs? Consider the meaning of the concepts appearing in:

(2) Rick came to Casablanca for the waters.

The theory of concept-meaning as belief-consequence asserts that the meaning of the concepts in (2) is determined by the beliefs that one holds as a consequence of believing (2). Some of the consequences of believing (2) can be:

(2.1) Rick came to Casablanca.
(2.2) Rick believed that Casablanca has waters.
(2.3) Rick believed that by coming to Casablanca that he might have some opportunity to take the waters in Casablanca.
(2.4) Casablanca is the type of thing which might reasonably be expected to have waters.
(2.5) To get Casablanca's waters, Rick believed that all things considered that he should come to Casablanca.

This variety of belief-consequence illustrates the openendedness of concept-meaning by displaying the contextual and implied collateral beliefs present when we understand concepts appearing in sentences. As the variety of this list shows, it is only the limits of imagination and experience which provide closure for the meaning of the concepts appearing in (2).

This variety also sheds light on why questions of meaning and belief quickly become complex. Relative to many sentences, ones we regularly encounter in familiar circumstances, sentence (2) is straightforward in syntax and semantics. In contrast, virtually every sentence in this paper is an example of a sentence more complex in syntactic and semantic structure than is sentence (2). Examples of this complexity are consistent with several of the primary metaphors used to illuminate concept-meaning: the "fabric" of meaning for pragmatists, "family resemblance" for Wittgenstein, the "holism" of Quine's theory of words and their objects, and the role of "text" for post-modern theories of interpretation.

The analysis of concept-meaning as belief-consequence accounts for an important feature shared by a number of influential theories of meaning. The theory of concept-meaning accomplishes this by showing how concept-meaning is the product of integrated collateral belief.

Because there is no final set of belief-consequences in which a concept is imbedded, no concept definition through the sheer weight of its necessary and sufficient conditions decides how we shall think, speak, or act regarding the identity of disciplines. That decision rests, for better or for worse, with persons in societies and is a responsibility which may not be abandoned to non-human sources of choice. In the history of philosophy these non-human sources have included clear and distinct ideas, synthetic apriori truth, a and linguistic universals.

Determining the nature of disciplines is accomplished by understanding the rich and complex nature of concept formation achieved through belief-consequences. By anticipating the sets of complex factors at play, the sense of discovery inherent in exploring the limits of the disciplines becomes apparent. Think of euglena.
5. Instrumental Explanation.

When we abandon the desire to interpret concepts as absolutes, we are free to revise our assumptions about the role concepts play in individuating disciplines. Here the pragmatists' interpretation of concepts as instruments is appealing and applicable. The appeal of interpreting concepts as instruments rests in its disavowal of abstract absolutes as it simultaneously provides a framework for the development of principles of thought and action.

The usefulness of interpreting concepts as instruments resides in the natural account it provides for the diversity of individual belief and judgment about what is and is not an instance of a concept. Just as we understand Rick's thoughts about Casablanca's waters because they are imbedded within a context of belief-consequence, we also understand Rick's thoughts because they are imbedded within contexts of reason and value. If Rick's beliefs were not also imbedded in value laden contexts, we would be unable to know what Rick means when he says that he came to Casablanca for the waters.

If Rick's account of his action in light of his belief were without a normative element, we would be at a loss to know how to connect his beliefs to his behaviour. In other words, we would be at a loss to relate Rick's belief to his behaviour unless we also knew what Rick found desirable about Casablanca's waters. Rick's account requires that value (desire, interest, or some other pro-attitude) be present and operative because belief without desire provides no motive for action. The importance of this lesson we owe first to Aristotle. In the absence of making these connections, we are unable to understand Rick's account of why he came to Casablanca. In general an account of human action requires statements about beliefs and desires as the causes of action. In the absence of one part of this trinity, we do not know what is meant by these most ordinary and common explanations of human behaviour.

When concepts are construed as instruments, they become the matter of human minds, of human thought and action. And as instruments, concepts explain in a natural way the variety of individual opinion about the extension of a concept as well as whether any particular instance is a good example of a concept.

6. The semantics and pragmatics of definitions.

What might appear to be the insurmountable task of identifying or defining disciplines is surprisingly straightforward. Generating definitions of philosophically significant concepts key to the identity of their disciplines (concepts such as aesthetic merit, faith, preference, and space-time) masks the set of standards, values, expectations, political pressures, social slants, and personal experiences we bring to bear in the course of deciding the merits of a definition.

A philosophical definition states only the necessary and sufficient conditions thought to identify a concept, but the remaining challenge is to identify sets of these conditions, sufficiently persuasive to a sufficiently large number of individuals, so that these conditions come to hold sway. To hold sway is initially to be communicable, then acceptable, and finally, commonplace.
This approach to philosophical definitions and the identification of disciplines emphasizes, and depends on, the distinction between the semantics and the pragmatics of concept identification. Although philosophical definitions are semantic tools portraying what is meant, the deeper more problematic question is whether a particular concept identification portrays a concept well.

Portraying well is always, in part, a question of the pragmatics of individual and social decision making. The semantics of concept identification is silent on the merit of its analysis just as the field linguist's semantic analysis of "gavagai" as "Lo, a rabbit" remains silent on whether a native speaker has interpreted a citing correctly. The work of field linguists and proponents of philosophical definitions requires conditions surpassing the resources available through the semantics of concept identification. Some of these additional resources are those found in the pragmatics of concept formation and language use.

A second implication of this approach to philosophical definitions is recognition that the force of a concept is weighted by its pragmatics as well as its semantics. Therefore the prospect that we are locked within an iron cage of conceptual definitions misses the point that concepts influence on the basis of their pragmatics (those who persuade us about them) as well as on the basis of their semantics (their meaning). To overlook this distinction is to muddle message (semantics) with messenger (pragmatics).

7. Ancestry and autonomy.

When we understand the strategy of philosophical definitions, we know how the consequences of our beliefs produce conceptual boundaries and provide the means to identify disciplines. At the same time we possess the means to know how to distinguish between concepts and their disciplines. Pragmatism provides clues to the nature of this unifying process through its characterization of the interaction between instances and principles. At the same time pragmatism emphasizes how individual and group purposes distinguish the boundaries of concepts and hence the identification of disciplines.

When the time honored strategy of defining key terms is sensitive to the relation between conceptual identification and evidence, we can see how pragmatics influences concept formation and the identification of disciplines. This is how pragmatics illuminates the identity of disciplines.²

Endnotes

¹c. 1993 Thomas Kowall.

²I am grateful to Ian Winchester (OISE, University of Toronto) for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
In 1890, William James, a teacher at Harvard for eighteen years, published his magnum opus, the two-volume *Principles of Psychology*. This is a work that many readers found tiring because of its heavy doses of philosophical argument.

However, one who would peruse texts in psychology written by popular authors of the post-Civil War period—Grant Allen, Joseph Haven, Laurens Hickok, Edwin Hewitt, James McCosh, James Sully—would find the influence of the Scottish School of Philosophy—Thomas Reid, Thomas Brown, Sir William Hamilton—to be very strong, so much so that it was said by R. C. Davis, an historian of psychology writing in 1936, to have paralyzed the teaching of the subject with a kind of Protestant scholasticism, deriving psychology from theological doctrine. Such psychology texts, with which teachers were made familiar through their normal schooling usually presented what James called, on the first page of the *Principles of Psychology*, "the orthodox 'spiritualistic' theory of scholasticism and of common sense" to explain feelings, desires and cognitions.

Moreover, one who would regard James's arguments against Hegelian idealism as a trifle too long-winded or, even, misplaced, should bear in mind that idealism's influence upon education generally, during that same time period, was even stronger than that of the Scottish School upon psychology. Students of the history of education will no doubt recall that one of the two founders of the St. Louis (Hegelian) Movement was William Torrey Harris, the former St. Louis public school teacher who moved on to become the U. S. Commissioner of Education. (This, by the way, was the same U. S. Commissioner whose official report for 1891-92 cited the danger to public education in having too many female teachers.) The philosophical discussions in the *Principles of Psychology* were, therefore, necessary and timely.

This work established his reputation but it did not make him popular. In 1892, for commercial reasons, as he freely admitted, he brought out a single-volume, "scissors and paste" revision titled *Psychology*, the "Jimmy," students called it—the "James" being the two-volume *Principles*. With most of the philosophical material of the larger text removed, the "Jimmy" became, as its
author had hoped, a big seller, the most widely used text on the subject. It brought him to the notice of the legions of those who would be knowledgeable on the subject that was promising so much, to educators especially.

Even as he worked on the briefer version, in fact, he began to offer what were called "public lectures" on psychology, at Harvard. Presented to teachers and to those studying to prepare themselves for teaching, he began these lectures in a classroom. Because of his reputation and, even more, because of his teaching style, his audience quickly grew and he began to entertain offers to travel--as, for example, so we shall see, to the Chautauqua in New York State--to repeat his Talks.

The material in these lectures, however, could not hold his interest. Seeking to free himself from the lecture circuit, he had the lectures published in 1899. It quickly became an immensely popular work, but one for which he had little regard.

We are going to focus today on two sentences found in the Talks. The first is the opening line of his "Introduction," James's account of the circumstances surrounding the original lectures--how he came into the business of bringing his subject down to the level of the masses. The second sentence had to do with the phenomena of association. It is found in the middle of his book.

I.

In the first line of preface to the printed version of the lectures titled Talks to Teachers on Psychology, William James recalls: "In 1892 I was asked by the Harvard Corporation to give a few public lectures on psychology to the Cambridge teachers."10

This account has been accepted by most of James's biographers and commentators without much comment, from reviewers Alfred Hodder,11 and Edward Griffin12 writing in 1899, to commentators like Frederick Bolton13 in 1930 and Paul Woodring, in an introduction to the (1958) Norton Library, edition of the Talks,14 and to biographers like Ralph Barton Perry (1935),15 Gay Allen (1967), and Jacques Barzun (1983).16 Allen's rephrasing is typical: "In recognition of James's fast-growing fame the Harvard Corporation asked him to deliver a series of lectures to the teachers of Cambridge, and the preparation and delivery of these, later published as Talks to Teachers, occupied a great deal of his time during the late winter and early spring of 1892."17 In the Harvard edition of 1983, Gerald Myers, in his "Introduction," holds to the "1892" date given by James and to the usual descriptions of the group, calling it "an audience of Cambridge teachers" and "the Cambridge school teachers."18 The editors, however, do not agree. They say that the lectures were offered to "members of the university" in 1891 and 1892 and trace the confusion to "the early announcements of James's series of lectures."19
I shall examine these four elements of James's statement: (1) when James learned of, or agreed to give the talks; (2) who originally asked him to give such "public lectures"; (3) whether or not the lectures were truly "public"; and (4) whether the group to be addressed was in fact "the Cambridge teachers," a group made up of two hundred fifty-nine individuals: twenty-seven working in the high schools, one hundred nineteen in the grammar schools, one hundred two in the primary schools and eleven in the kindergartens. (If, to the teachers in the two high schools, ten grammar schools, twenty primary schools, three combination grammar and primary schools and six kindergartens, one would add the teachers of music, drawing and sewing, as well as the secretary-librarian of the high schools, truant officers, and those temporary assistants and members of the training school who, for payroll purposes, were counted as six teachers, the number would be two hundred seventy-two. All of these employees were usually elected by the school committee to service for one school year, at the close of the year previous. Teachers still working in June were considered eligible for service for the following year.)

ia. "In 1892, I was asked by the Harvard Corporation . . ."

During the summer of 1891, when William James was working on the manuscript of the briefer version of his Psychology, Harvard was beginning to demonstrate an interest in secondary school education, offering courses in eleven different subject areas. Earlier, under President Eliot's influence, a committee on education had been formed and the philosophy department, of which James was a member, had agreed to take the new program in pedagogy under its departmental aegis. Josiah Royce approached James informally regarding his participation in a series of these "extra lectures" that were to be offered by teachers in various departments for the stated purpose of improving "the methods of instruction in secondary schools."

James was not asked by the Harvard Corporation in 1892 to lecture on the relation of psychology to education. He was asked by Royce, a colleague in the philosophy department and the representative of a committee on education, to teach a course on the subject and it was early in 1891 that he agreed to do so.

ib. "... to give a few public lectures on psychology . . ."

Whether James's ten lectures were intended to be "public," or were to be offered to a more limited audience, either of Harvard students or of Cambridge teachers, some idea of the size of the group anticipated could be obtained by looking at the room originally scheduled for his lectures. If he had expected to address the teachers of Cambridge, then preparations would have had to have been made to accommodate them. The room in which the lectures began, in the old Law building, Dane Hall, was James's classroom/laboratory. There was
ample space to seat a class. There was not enough room, however, for the two hundred fifty-nine (259) teachers of the city of Cambridge.

The question then arises: Why would the lectures originally be scheduled for a laboratory that could have held but a fraction of the group James said he was asked to address, when a large lecture room a few feet away, at the end of the hallway, would have seated all of them? Even though the lectures were planned far enough in advance so that they could be announced in the catalogue for the 1891-1892 school year, they nevertheless did begin in a relatively small laboratory room, in the middle of the school day.

Individual teachers--or former teachers--living in the Cambridge area may have actually attended, but the teachers of Cambridge could not have been the intended audience for talks scheduled to begin at twelve noon on a Tuesday.

Ic. "... to the Cambridge teachers."

All the days on which the talks were scheduled to be given and on which they were actually delivered were regular school days for the Cambridge teachers. Kindergartens closed at twelve noon. The high schools closed at one-thirty and both grammar and primary schools closed at three-thirty during the months of November, December and January. None of the teachers could have attended the first lecture, on time, after completing their individual duties. Since the time for the second and for the remaining lectures was changed to four-thirty in the afternoon, and the location was likewise changed from a laboratory room to the large lecture room on the same floor in Upper Dane Hall, and since the reason for the changes appears to have been the popularity of the first lecture, we would hardly be able to infer that the changes were made to accommodate the Cambridge teachers. Even with the time change, there were many teachers working in schools situated several miles from Harvard who would have been extremely hard pressed, at that time of year especially, to arrive punctually at Dane Hall, one hour following the official close of the school day. Information on this group that James is said to have lectured, found in their personnel file-cards, "Superintendent's Record of Teachers," reveals that Cambridge had a high percentage of teachers who had, on their own, prepared themselves for their profession with work that would, perhaps, have provided somewhat firmer ground for listening to James and his Talks to Teachers, if only they had been able to hear him. Lectures and courses at many colleges are shown on these cards, with Harvard occupying a repeated place among them. Not one of their records, however, mentions anything that we could link to the lectures said by William James to have been given to themselves and their fellow teachers during the 1891-1892 school year.

In spite of what biographers and commentators have said on the subject, it seems clear that James's description does not agree with the facts. One would hope that, even in Harvard's Philosophy department, no one, in 1892, would asked a colleague to deliver lectures that had already begun on October 27,
1891. It was not the Harvard Corporation but one of his fellow Philosophy teachers who recruited him. The lectures were not intended, at first, at any rate, to be "public." The Cambridge teachers were not involved.

Corrected then, the first line of the preface to James's Talks to Teachers on Psychology should read in this manner: In 1891, I was asked by a committee on education in the person of Professor Josiah Royce, to give a course of twelve lectures--later reduced to ten--to teachers and to men who wished to become teachers, on the topic, "Psychology of Interest to Teachers."

If one would ask how, in March, 1899, James came to write the line in question, a passage from his Principles of Psychology could provide an explanation:

The most frequent source of a false memory is the accounts we give to others of our experiences. Such accounts we almost always make both more simple and more interesting than the truth. We quote what we should have said or done, rather than what we really said or did; and in the first telling we may be fully aware of the distinction. But ere long the fiction expels the reality from memory and reigns in its stead alone. This is one great source of the fallibility of testimony meant to be quite honest... The story takes a tilt that way, and the memory follows the story.

As he looked back upon their origin, he may not have felt compelled to state the account exactly. It was enough that the statement was simple and interesting.

It might also be argued that the whole issue, like the line itself, is trivial, unimportant. It should not be forgotten, however, that the Talks were said, by James, to have been given "offhand." He looked back upon them as likewise trivial and unimportant. He regarded their publication as freeing him from the uninteresting task of delivering them.

II.

The second sentence--which has to do with the phenomena of association, and which is found in the middle of his Talks--will lead us into James's opinion of teachers. He is talking about analogy between objects thought of in succession. This analogy is, he says, "often so subtle that although we feel it, we can with difficulty analyze its ground; as where, for example, we find something masculine in the color red and something feminine in the color pale blue, or where, of three human beings' characters, one will remind us of a cat, another of a dog, the third perhaps of a cow." Cats and dogs are fairly common house pets. Why should he think of "a cow?" With what, in James's mind, is the cow associated?
In a letter to his publisher, Henry Holt, written twenty years before the lectures were given, he had expressed a disdain for both the Hegelian abstractions of William Torrey Harris and the practical concerns of the lowly schoolteacher. He had no interest in pedagogy, he said, because the subject would have to "deal with mighty and aspiring generalities and puerile concretes, with nothing between to fill the gap. Harris and the school-marm!" 26

Although his strong adverse feelings regarding the necessity for providing concrete applications to his teacher listeners had apparently waned by the time his lectures were presented, at least enough for him to speak matter-of-factly about it, another aversion finds expression there: his feelings regarding a found lack of independence and critical-mindedness.

Letters written during his brief stay at the New York Chautauqua, in 1896, show what appears to be a marked and sudden change in his feelings toward teachers. Writing to his wife between lectures on July 23, 1896, he speaks of the "very good-looking . . . teachers and women" 27 who make the best of impressions upon him. By late evening on the following day, however, he writes to Mrs. James of the lack of "flexibility or self-power" with which he has been confronted:

Altogether, what with the teachers . . . and others whom I've met, I'm put in conceit of college training. It certainly gives glibness and flexibility, if it doesn't give earnestness and depth. I've been meeting minds so earnest and helpless that it takes them half an hour to get from one idea to its immediately adjacent next neighbor, and that with infinite creaking and groaning. And when they've got to the next idea, they lie down on it with their whole weight and can get no farther, like a cow on a door-mat, so that you can get neither in nor out with them. Still, glibness is not all. Weight is something, even cow-weight. 28

After two more days, he is barely able to abide their company: "There is hardly a pretty woman's face in the lot, and they seem to have little or no humor in their composition. No epicureanism of any sort!" 29

Determining to give up this kind of lecturing, James looks back on the "trepidity" he has encountered. He writes yearningly of "the flash of a pistol, a dagger, or a devilish eye, anything to break the unlovely level of 10,000 good people--a crime, murder, rape, elopement, anything would do." 30 Even a few more days and a trip by rail through Utica and Lake Placid to Burlington, Vermont, do little to lighten his mood. In a letter to a friend, he sums up his experience thus, disgustedly: "I have seen more women and less beauty, heard more voices and less sweetness, perceived more earnestness and less triumph than I ever supposed possible. Most of the American nation (and probably all nations) is white-trash." 31 One should not then be at all surprised to read of his antipathy toward lecturing.
It was not the teachers' powerlessness of intellect that caused him to agree "to some degree," just as any sensible person would, he later says, with the militarists who saw the horrors of war as "a cheap price to pay for rescue [from] . . . a cattleyard of a planet, . . . a world of clerks and teachers, of co-education and zo-ophile, of consumers' leagues and 'associated charities,' of industrialism unlimited, and feminism unabashed." It was their lack of mental flexibility and their failure to exercise their intellects freely that bothered James so much and brought about the inclusion of teachers into this litany of the world's ills. Perhaps he decided to cease addressing teacher institutes because he came to believe that his presence at such gatherings would not help the ladies any more than the normal schools had done.

In spite of lofty goals and ideals, those who selected teachers for the nation's schools were obliged to send both normal graduates of low scholastic attainments and other persons who lacked even the preparation offered by the normal schools, into the classroom. Small wonder, therefore, that teachers themselves would join school superintendents in judging "the American public school teacher . . . guilty on the three following counts: (1) lack of general culture, (2) lack of scholarship, and (3) lack of professional preparation," according to a survey published in The Atlantic Monthly in 1896.33

Who could be surprised that patience with the educational establishment was growing so thin that this same national publication, shortly before it introduced James's Talks to Teachers on Psychology to print, had, in a piece on "Normal Schools and the Training of Teachers," carried this contemptuous metaphor: "The doctrine that special tricks or devices can take the place of the parental instinct and a liberal education is not a doctrine of pedagogy; it is a disease of the normal school, a green scum which gathers upon the surface of an educational pool which has become stagnant".34

If James's opinion of teachers was low, we can understand why. The traits of character that would recommend a candidate to a school committee would not necessarily endear the person to William James.

Where does this leave us? To earn a little extra money, as he looks towards his retirement, the veteran college professor offers lectures on his subject to primary and secondary school teachers who, he thinks, are good-intentioned but dull. His low opinion of them is shared by other learned professors, school administrators, the public generally and by the teachers themselves.

What else is new?

Endnotes


William James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology, and to Students on Some of Life's Ideals* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1899), iii.

Alfred Hodder, "Review of *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*," *The Nation*, LXVIII, (June 22, 1899), 481.

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Ibid., 234.


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Ibid., 41.
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30Ibid., 43.

31Ibid., 44.


THE JOHN DEWEY PUBLICATIONS

Jo Ann Boydston
Editor and Former Director, The Dewey Center

Just to refresh your memories, I will start by reminding you that in addition to the Works volumes, we published at the Dewey Center—with a little help from the Southern Illinois University Press—a number of related works: the Checklist of Translations (now mercifully out of print); the Checklist of Writings About John Dewey, 2 editions, with a third just about ready now; the Guide to the Works of John Dewey; the Dykhuizen biography; and The Poems of John Dewey. But, as indicated in the program, most of my remarks are reflections on publishing a pioneering edition like the Dewey Works—some of our adventures, thrills, and tribulations—and a bit about the Poems volume as well as something of what we can all look forward to in the forthcoming edition of Dewey's correspondence.

When we started the "Dewey Project"—now the Center for Dewey Studies—in 1961, it was a small research unit in the Graduate School Office of Research and Projects at Southern Illinois University in Carbondale. We had a modest goal, which was to develop a concordance of the philosophical terms in the works of John Dewey. Even though the unit was small and its goal modest, Southern Illinois University was in the early 1960s one of the few places in the United States with a climate favoring such a project, because several philosophers at the University had continued to promote American philosophy during the general decline of interest in pragmatism after World War II. This continuing interest in classical American philosophy helps to explain why the Dewey Project was located at SIU-C rather than at Chicago, or—especially—at Columbia, the institutions with which Dewey is so closely identified. It also helped that the university administration was exceptionally hospitable to new ideas; the SIU press was young, with a director who was enthusiastic about unusual projects—and, at that time, the Dewey Project was indeed unusual. The movement to prepare collected editions of America's greatest writers—Whitman, Twain, Emerson, Melville, Hawthorne—had started only in the 1950s and no one had yet contemplated a collected edition of the works of an American philosopher. Nor, as I said, was the Dewey Project set up in the beginning to prepare such an edition. Nevertheless, in 1991—thirty years after it started—the Project culminated in the completion of the critical thirty-seven-volume edition entitled The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1881-1953, with a single-volume subject and short-title index. This is the story of the evolution of that edition during the thirty years from its start in 1961 to the publication of its final volume, the index, in 1991.
I first became involved in what became known as the "Dewey Project" in the spring of 1961, when George E. Axtelle, a colleague who was teaching an honors seminar with me at Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, told me he expected to get a small research grant to start work on a concordance of philosophical terms in John Dewey's works, an idea that he and William Gruen and Joseph Ratner had been considering for a couple of years before Axtelle came to SIU-C. He mentioned that he was looking for an assistant, so I immediately recommended myself and told him what an outstanding editor I would make. This is what John Dewey would have called a proposition without warranted assertibility, as my editorial experience was limited to helping a couple of fellow graduate students with their dissertations. Axtelle responded to my offer by saying that he wanted a Dewey scholar for the position, but after being turned down by the Dewey scholars he approached, he settled for an editor-pretender.

In the beginning, the Dewey Project's formal title was "Co-operative Research on Dewey Publications" (occasionally the Center still receives mail so addressed). In the fall of 1961, we set up the project in a small house on the edge of the SIU campus. As the concordance was conceived in terms of only Dewey's major works, we began right away trying to find copies of those. We developed procedures to put the concordance terms on computer cards (which was state of the art in computers in 1961); during the summer of 1962, Joe R. Burnett of the University of Illinois worked with us on the concordance. However, by late 1962, when we talked with Vernon Sternberg, the director of the SIU Press, about publishing such a work, he said at once that it would be enormously difficult to prepare and nearly impossible to publish such a work without a uniform collected edition of Dewey's writings. So before long, we abandoned the plan to do a concordance and—with the support of the press, the philosophy department, and the university administration—started work on a plan to prepare a complete edition of Dewey's previously published writings.

Once that decision was taken, we quickly found that the need for such an edition was much more pressing than anyone had realized. After Dewey's death, interest in his life and work had waned so that by the early 1960s, few of his major books were in print and those almost entirely in paperback reprints and/or anthologies. Even though his essays had been widely excerpted and anthologized, it was very difficult to locate the original publication of those articles; many, in fact, most, of his writings were scattered and hard to locate, and copies of works from the earliest years, 1882 to 1900, were almost impossible to find.

Our first step was to collect copies of everything Dewey had published, which meant a great deal of bibliographical inquiring and searching, as the only bibliography of Dewey's works had appeared in 1939, well before his death. Numerous items had appeared in pamphlets, obscure journals, newspapers (unindexed), and some had appeared only in French, Spanish, Japanese, or Chinese. In that early search we were fortunate to have the help of Morris Library staff at SIUC and of Dewey scholars around the world. But, after we started collecting and ordering copies of all Dewey's published works, the press director told us that the only sensible way to organize an edition and plan for the individual volumes was to make a character count of every item in the corpus.
This work turned out to be daunting, as can be seen easily in our estimate after the final volume appeared that, as published, the *Works* text pages alone (no front or end matter) have approximately 38,300,000 characters.

The corpus for which we had to make that full character count is, as you probably know, both extensive and quite complex. The writings—which go from 1882 when his first essay appeared all the way up to 1953 when one was published posthumously—appeared in more than 150 different journals that range in content and emphasis from the *Journal of Philosophy* to *The Ladies Home Journal*. These journal articles treated topics as disparate as "The Metaphysical Assumptions of Materialism" and "Is Co-education Injurious to Girls?" Dewey's pieces appeared in all the major, and many minor, newspapers; students in his classes hired stenographers to record his lecturers; and his public addresses were presented in a wide variety of forums, from the most parochial, such as the Teachers' Union in New York City, to the most august, such as the first William James Lectures at Harvard (*Art as Experience*); the Carus Lectures at Union Theological Seminary (*Experience and Nature*); the Terry Lectures at Yale (*A Common Faith*); and the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh (*The Quest for Certainty*).

Moreover, the topics in these writing are interrelated; hardly ever does an essay focus on a single aspect of philosophy or education or politics. Dewey once referred to this interrelatedness of various aspects of his thought, saying, "Democracy and Education was for many years that in which my philosophy, such as it is, was most fully expounded"; but he added that philosophers in general, although themselves usually teachers, had apparently never believed that "any rational person could actually think it possible that philosophizing should focus about education as the supreme human interest in which, moreover, other problems, cosmological, moral, logical, come to a head."

Because of these complexities, we decided to organize the works in the chronological order of their publication, which is a plan that has some obvious advantages; it starts with the earliest and least accessible materials, and it provides a full sequential view of the sweep and the development of Dewey's thought. Next, following that plan, we arranged all the raw—that is, unedited—materials in volumes, listed the contents, and numbered the volumes sequentially from one to forty. As prospects for funding publication of the volumes were in doubt, the Press preferred to divide those originally planned forty volumes into three series: Early, Middle, and Later Works, starting with five volumes from the earliest period. Dewey scholars have from time to time discussed the dates of the *Early Works* (1882-1898), *Middle Works* (1899-1924), and *Later Works* (1925-1953) series, attempting to tie these periods to pivotal works in the Dewey cannon; but in fact the division was made for financial rather than philosophical reasons. Dewey's philosophy can, naturally, be divided into the three periods mentioned but since few scholars would agree about the exact dates for such periods, a simple arbitrary and pragmatic division into three series was probably wise. There was another practical reason for starting with the earliest period: Dewey's widow, Roberta Grant Dewey, was not willing to give us permission to republish his works, which meant that under the copyright law...
then in effect we had access only to Dewey's writings published between 1882
and 1908.

Throughout the time we were assembling the collection of Dewey's
writings, we had discovered variant versions of a large number of items: differing
editions of books; multiple printings of many books and monographs,
simultaneously published essays with different titles, articles revised and
reprinted in collections—in short, exactly the sort of textual proliferation and
confusion one might expect in a long career of intense publishing activity.
After the basic plan of organization had been set, we had to face the editing
questions that these materials in all their variety raised, such as which version(s)
to reprint; how to choose among different readings; how far to go in "correcting"
apparent errors; and how much to regularize (and by whose standards) the
punctuation and spelling. These questions did little more than buzz about "out
there" until we decided to commit ourselves to the new version of an old
discipline: modern textual criticism, now frequently referred to as "textual"
editing.

Complete, collected editions can be put together and "edited" in many
different ways. Up to the middle of this century (and continuing today in many
editions), the usual approach has been simply to make an exhaustive collection
of the materials (as we had done), order and study them to decide on a proper
organizations (as we had done), photocopy, the last revised versions of the
publications, copyedit them—including regularizing punctuation and spelling—and
prepare printer's copy, arrange for introductions and explanatory notes to the
volumes, and start publishing.

However, the decision to apply the principles of modern textual criticism
to editing the works saved us from that approach to the editing. Textual editing
requires close comparison of all versions of a text (starting with the author's
original manuscript or with a version as close to that manuscript as possible);
studying publishers' records and a work's publishing history in an effort to
determine what the author's final intention was in every respect (the words as
well as the spelling and punctuation); making decisions about which readings
most clearly reflect the way the author wanted the text to read; and recording
every decision so that all the evidence is available for scholars who want to study
it.

The concept of applying the principles of modern textual criticism to the
editing of philosophical works was not an immediate success with local advisers,
who were concerned that this approach, heretofore used only in editing literary
works, might not be well received in the philosophical community. But when
the renowned textual scholar Fredson Bowers visited the project in 1965, he
quickly convinced all those connected with the project that for an edition of such
magnitude—a pioneering edition with great potential for leadership in American
philosophy—the only approach worthy of the investment of time and money was
the full treatment: development of critical texts of every item in the Dewey
canon. Bowers moreover accepted my invitation to act as consultant to the
edition on a continuing basis and our editorial course was set.

We decided to edit the Psychology volume first, even though it is
red Volume 2 in The Early Works. We thought it would be valuable as
an exercise in this new kind of editing and the experience would help with all the subsequent volumes. That was a valuable decision because the Psychology turned out to have an extremely complex publishing history--labeled by two publishers as having three editions, in fact it appeared in 26 different printings of a single edition. The most difficult to locate was a copy of the third impression (1890). The one I finally found cost $25, which was an expensive book in the mid-1960s. In those days, any item costing more then $10 was given a Southern Illinois University inventory tag. The man who came to tag our $25 book refused to believe that we were showing him the right book costing $25. "This must not be it," he said. "Look, this book is used!"

When the Psychology was published in 1967, we were pretty nervous about what sort of response we might get from the philosophical community to using textual criticism in editing a philosophical work. But the very first review was heartening. Harold Dunkel of the University of Chicago wrote in School Review:

"Some who agree to the idea of a 'complete' edition may boggle at the idea of a 'critical' or 'definitive' one. Why not just print up a 'good, usable' text and skip all the elaborate machinery of collation, citation of variants, conjectured emendations, and all the rest?... Second thoughts will convince the skeptical that a 'definitive' text, with all the effort and apparatus it demands, is the only viable solution. For what standards is one to apply in being 'fairly critical' or in seeking to arrive at merely a 'good' text? While being 'partially critical' may not present quite the same problems as being 'partially pregnant,' it suffers from much the same impossibility."

When we started planning The Collected Works of John Dewey, the classical American philosophers were customarily identified by scholarly consensus as six: John Dewey, William James, George Santayana, Josiah Royce, Charles Sanders Peirce, and George Herbert Mead. Critical editions, that is, textual editions, of the works of four of the six have now been undertaken. In addition to The Collected Works of John Dewey, now completed, these editions are: The Works of William James, completed in nineteen volumes, following which an edition of the James correspondence is under way; The Writings of Charles Sanders Peirce, and The Works of George Santayana.

Outside of the Works series, the most exciting materials we edited and published at the Center were the Dewey poems. After the death of Roberta Dewey, the John Dewey Foundation gave the Dewey Center 87 warehouse boxes of Dewey's papers and books. Along with the family correspondence, the doctoral hoods, the class lecture notes, a real bonus in those boxes were the poems purportedly written by John Dewey.

Rumors about a cache of Dewey poems had circulated since 1957 when the French scholar Gérard Deledalle had come across them in the Columbia University Columbiana Collection and made copies. The collection as it came to us was largely put together by Milton Halsey Thomas, curator of the Columbiana Collection, who had an office near Dewey's in the Philosophy building at Columbia. Thomas told me that his "Boswellian" tendencies led him to most of these poems from time to time from Dewey's wastebasket...
and then from his desk when Dewey retired in 1939. A few people had seen copies of the poems made by Deledalle, but otherwise the poems had been inaccessible up to the early 1970s because Roberta Dewey had reclaimed the collection from Columbia University when she found out they existed. The directors of the John Dewey Foundation, which inherited the collection from Roberta Dewey, had retained literary rights in the poems—even though they gave the Center the literary rights and copyrights to everything else. There were among the board of directors those who doubted Dewey's authorship of these poems. In time, the Foundation gave me permission to edit and publish the poems, provided I could authenticate them to the Foundation directors' satisfaction. The evidence I gathered came from painstaking study of the typewriters Dewey used to write many of the poems, from previously unknown biographical material, and from close comparison of the poetic material with Dewey's prose. In 1977, twenty-five years after Dewey's death and twenty years after Roberta Dewey had reclaimed them, these ninety-eight previously unknown poems were published separately from The Collected Works in my volume, The Powers of John Dewey, also an MLA "Approved Edition."

With the help of the National Endowment for the Humanities, which gave the Center two grants before I retired, the Dewey Center has started on the final project that will make the rest of Dewey's writings available for study: the staff is organizing, transcribing, and editing Dewey's correspondence, which is the only remaining and probably the richest resource for Dewey scholarship. In his only published autobiographical statement, Dewey said, "Upon the whole, the forces that have influenced me have come from persons and from situations more than from books."10 Starting with his 1885 love letters to Alice Chipman, Dewey reveals the life-long influence of his family and of close personal friends like George Herbert Mead. The correspondence illuminates his continuing interaction with philosophers such as William James, Charles S. Peirce, Sidney Hook, and Bertrand Russell, and his relations with intellectual and political leaders around the world—from Eleanor Roosevelt to Leon Trotsky, from Jane Addams to Albert Einstein. In his letters Dewey also responds to daily events, describes his impressions of other cultures and peoples, reflects on the meaning of national and international developments, providing almost day-by-day biographical insights. Like the poems, the letters give us many intimate glimpses of the inner man, interacting with his family members and friends—so different from the formal, even remote, person her seems in his published writings.

For all the incoming and outgoing letters, the Center staff is preparing a database, verbatim transcriptions, and a detailed chronology of Dewey's life. As the Center has been collecting Dewey's correspondence since the early 1960s, the materials are mostly in hand for this project which is called "The Correspondence of John Dewey, 1881-1951". This work will continue under the leadership of the new director of the Dewey Center, Larry Hickman.

Thus, I'm happy to report that the Center continues to publish Dewey's writings—in whatever form, hardcover, paperback, electronic—and that through these materials it will keep supporting and facilitating research into the life and of America's leading philosopher.
Endnotes

1In the early years, the University provided all funding for the work, including a publication subvention for the five volumes of *The Early Works*, 1882-1898. Since the 1970s, the project has had outstanding support from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the John Dewey Foundation.


3Milton Halsey Thomas and Herbert Schneider had published *A Bibliography of John Dewey* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929) for Dewey's seventieth birthday; Thomas expanded that work ten years later with an introduction by Schneider: *A Bibliography of John Dewey*, 1881-1939 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939) for Dewey's eightieth birthday. The third edition of this bibliography, *John Dewey: A Centennial Bibliography* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), which Thomas had planned to publish for the Dewey centennial in 1959, was delayed three years. Although the 1939 Thomas list was excellent and reliable, it had been published thirteen years before Dewey's death and twenty two years before we started work. However, during the time we worked on the edition, Thomas's *Centennial Bibliography*--and Thomas himself--gave us constant, valuable help.

4Total number of pages in the volumes, which average some 500 pages each, is just under 20,000.

5"From Absolutism to Experimentalism" (1930), LW5: 156.


7Now the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy regularly includes Ralph Waldo Emerson and Henry David Thoreau in that list.

8"This is a major event in the history of American philosophical scholarship. Nothing of the kind has ever before been undertaken for the work of any American philosopher. [It] will be a model for the publication of other American philosophers." H.S. Thayer, *Religious Humanism* 3 (Summer 1969): 13t.
The Dewey, James, Peirce, and Santayane editions have together produced more than sixty-five volumes approved by the Modern Language Association, a major segment of the total of 272 modern critical editions so approved.

"From Absolutism to Experimentalism" (1930), *LWS*:155.
POPULAR FILM AS EDUCATIONALIDEOLOGY:  
A FRAMEWORK FOR CRITICAL ANALYSIS

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I. Films to be discussed

*Horse Feathers.* The Four Marx Bros. 1932.

*The Mayor of Hell.* James Cagney. 1933.

*Murder on the Blackboard.* Edna May Oliver. 1934.

*Bowery at Midnight.* Bela Lugosi. 1942

*The Stranger.* Orson Welles. 1946.

*Trouble Along the Way.* John Wayne. 1953.


*Rebel without a Cause.* James Dean. 1955.


II. Summaries of Films in Chronological Order

(D = Director; A = Actors; T = Topics/1.1-7.5 see below for concept code; P = Plot; R = References)

*Horse Feathers* (1932).

D: Norman Z. McLeod.  

T: 1.3/3.3/4.3/5.2/6.2/7.1.

P: A new college president makes football the school's main priority and competes with his son for the affections of the "College Widow."

*The Mayor of Hell* (1933).

D: Archie Mayo.  
A: James Cagney, Madge Evans, Frankie Darro

T: 1.1/3.1/4.4/5.1/6.3/7.1.

P: A strict elementary school teacher helps a police detective solve the murder of her fellow teacher.

R: Rimoldi 168.

*Bowery at Midnight* (1942).

D: Wallace Fox.  
A: Bela Lugosi (Brenner/Wagner): Tom Neal (Mills), John Archer (Dennison), Wanda McKay (Judy), Bernard Gorcey (The Tailor).

T: 1.2/3.2/4.3/5.2/6.4/7.2.

P: The proprietor of a Bowery mission who is also the leader of a gang of killers also turns out to be a mildly
student-centered professor of psychology. He is ultimately killed by zombies and his woman assistant abandons her career. Whew!

R: Bojarski 186-188; Lennig 251-252; Polan 185-186; Weaver 84.93.

_The Stranger_ (1946)

T: 1.3/3.2/4.2/5.1/6.4/7.2.
P: A Nazi hunter's search for a missing Nazi war criminal leads him to a history teacher in an upper class prep school in the United States.
R: Blount; McGhee; Rigginn.

_Blackboard Jungle_ (1955).

T: 1.3/3.3/4.2/5.2/6.2 or 6.4/7.3.
P: A new English teacher in a vocational high school finds himself surrounded by incompetent colleagues and juvenile delinquents but survives his ordeal with minor successes.
R: Biskind 200-217; Doherty 71-104; Wolfthal.

_Rebel without a Cause_ (1955).

T: 1.3/3.4/4.2/5.3/6.4/7.3.
P: A high school student is threatened by his peer group and neglected by his family and teachers.
R: Biskind 200-217; Doherty 105-141; Herndon 177-192; Linder; McCann.

_The Eiger Sanction_ (1975).

D: A: Clint Eastwood.
T: 1.2/3.1 or 3.4/4.3/5.1/6.3/7.5.
P: An art history professor takes an assignment as an assassin in order to finance his private art collection.
R: Grenier; Meynell; Patterson; Zmijewsky & Pfeiffer 176-180.

_Blues Brothers_ (1980)

D: John Landis. A: John Belushi, Dan Aykhroyd, Kathleen Freeman, Cab Calloway.
T: 1.1 or 1.3/3.3/4.4/5.3/6.2/7.5.
P: Two musicians with shady backgrounds organize a concert to save the orphanage they grew up in from bankruptcy. They succeed but their activities land them in prison.
III. Some Assumptions about This Analysis
1. Popular film (PF) can be seen as reifications of a variety of ideologies.
2. PF is NOT claimed to be the independent variable in any causal relationship.
3. Symbol of the teacher in PF subject to change; may have different meanings across cultures or over time (Gerbner).
4. Nevertheless, changing teacher images in film since the 1930s may be evidence of growing public disillusionment with education and authority generally (Considine).
5. The selection of films in this presentation is not a representative sample.
6. Evidence supporting B1 seems to justify a rejection of the Marxist view that popular culture can be reduced to a common ideology.
7. The popular claim that the PF of today is more realistic than the PF of the past is unclear unless "realistic" is taken to be synonymous with "violent."
8. Because of the growing importance of film in American culture:
   8.1. Its study deserves to be given greater emphasis in the humanities curriculum (Arrowsmith).
   8.2. Its study should stress critical thinking: "...the operations involved in the examination of statements which we, or others, may believe." (B. Othanel Smith, 1953).

IV. Some Concepts Used in Describing These Films (Topics above)
1.0. EDUCATIONAL IDEOLOGY.
   1.1. Progressivist. (Mayor/Blues?)
   1.2. Essentialist. (Murder/Bowery/Eiger)
   1.3. Fallisilist. (Horse/Stranger/Trouble/BJ/Rebel/Blues?)
   1.4. Reductionist. (Cheaper by the Dozen -- NO CLIP)
2.0. VISUAL ASPECTS OF FILM (APPLICABLE TO ALL FILMS).
   2.1. Shots and Camera Angles.
   2.2. Typecasting.
   2.3. Sequence of scenes.
3.0. PORTRAYAL OF EDUCATORS.
   3.1. Hero. (Mayor / Murder / Eiger?)
   3.2. Villain. (Bowery / Stranger)
   3.3. Ambiguous. (Horse / Trouble / BJ / Blues)
   3.4. Irrelevant. (Rebel / Eiger?)
4.0. EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION.
   4.1. Elementary School. (Murder)
   4.2. Secondary school. (Stranger / Rebel / BJ)
   4.3. College. (Horse / Bowery / Trouble / Eiger)
   4.4. Other. (Reform, School: Mayor / Orphanage: Blues)
5.0. SOCIAL REALITY.
   5.1. Individualist. (Mayor / Murder / Stranger / Eiger)
   5.2. Institutionalist. (Horse / Bowery / Trouble / BJ)
   Holistic (Rebel / Blues)
6.0. PLOT STRUCTURE.
   6.1. Tragic. (Trouble)
   6.2. Comic. (Horse / BJ? / Blues)
   6.3. Romantic. (Mayor / Murder / Eiger)
   6.4. Film Noir. (Bowery / Stranger / BJ? / Rebel)

7.0. HISTORICAL CONTEXT.
   7.1. 1930s. (Mayor / Murder / Horse)
   7.2. 1940s. (Bowery / Stranger)
   7.3. 1950s. (Trouble / BJ / Rebel)
   7.4. 1960s. NO CLIPS (Explosive Generation / Getting Straight)
   7.5. 1970S. (Eiger / Blues)
   7.6. 1980s. No Clips. (Stand and Deliver / Lean on Me)

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2. CRITICISM OF FILMS, ACTORS, AND DIRECTORS.


CINEMATICO MUSE, WHERE DO YOU LEAD?

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Recently, I was asked to join learned peers in a survey of several feature pictures. I came to the task as a mythologist of sorts with some background in film criticism. Marvelously imagistic, the experience was filled to my surprise with varied philosophies.

Over a period of 48 years (1932-1980), they paraded to the screen: comic authoritarism,^1^ democratic optimism,^2^ repetition as value-infusing,^3^ psychological experimentalism,^4^ "master-race" genetics,^5^ fiscal redemption by sports,^6^ pessimism plus blind perseverance,^7^ materialism plus reactionary adolescent skepticism,^8^ and mock suffering to inculcate values. They were not irrelevant. Each had its counterpart in the world of speculation; each, its reflection in the world where real people live and die.

Most were simply exposed for transient effect: to cause laughter, to shock. Typically, the purpose was not to teach; it was to entertain. There was merit in the entertainment. May we consider one or two of these films and leave the others to another day?

"The Dean Waxing Wroth", countered by asking "Roth to wax the Dean"^10^ in an image stream is entertaining. The flow runs helter-skelter. The riot of wit and fancy amuses. It is an end to itself without further purpose. Groucho's comments, albeit helter-skelter, were well-accepted in 1932. Sixty years later, more depth would be helpful. Brilliant "shafts"--felt everywhere then--are no longer enough. They lack dimension, fuller (if you will) social purpose. His innate genius and that of writers Kalmar, Ruby, Perelman, and Johnstone cry for nuancing. Thereby, they could make us think as well as laugh.

Aural approach was, of course, "great escape" in the Depression. The new sound-on-film also astutely exploited Harpo's musical gesticulations and Chico's plebeian organ-grinding as Groucho's context. People returned to the streets with lighter hearts. "Sound and arc-lamp" buoyed up wit. A good mix . . . for a while.

But what do wit, quaint visuals, and organ-grinding mean to those, weighed down in digitalized deluge, too much distracted for happy, slap-stick incongruity? O, for the simple joys!

John Belushi's and Dan Aykroyd's acrobatic deadpanning, perhaps, does something more. It speaks plainly to the perceptive, touches miscommunication between young and old^11^ and dares to hint that humans may finally sing their way into immortality in a paean of charity. (Music is merely its symbol.)

"Image flow" in "Blues" almost destroys Chicago's entire police fleet. Cameos and fine music fill out a context of wonder and delight. The "nun" and
her office are straight out of some kid's pre-Tridentine nightmare. (Special effects would amuse Alfred Hitchcock but the caricature is "ancient classical").

The Blues Brothers' emerging philosophy is surely a definite if hesitating step beyond the Marx Brothers. It is "new age". It's optimism is a fragile beginning suggesting profounder human purpose.

Certainly, the seed needs roots; the vision has yet more fully to permeate the art form. Yet further detail could lead to internal integrity and a grace-responsive world. However, the seed and the vision are authentic. Their possibilities are unlimited. It is we who must explore them.

Though the Blues Brothers speak a language differing from that of the caricatured Sister who thinks "martyrdom" (theirs!) is the secure path to salvation, they ultimately help her to help others. There is the final hint of significance here . . . a movement towards a comedy of thought which gently lays out perspectives amid the incongruities. The audience hits the streets laughing. But, its members also have something to think about.

Overall, with the exception of The Stranger, the experience of these films leads to a related quandary: what governs the full cinemathographic B-budget "image factory"--so much of which is brightly represented in the ten features.

Among the surveyed films, there is, of course, no lofty Becket, no Man for All Seasons, no Shane, no High Noon. Our selections are far more ordinary fare. They stand apart - rightly and with varying merits. Yet, their mostly pioneering efforts could have been better, more thoughtful, more penetrating, even funnier or more tragic.

As we close the 20th century, I beg to suggest: there should be in American B-budget features a more distinctive contribution to humanity--our contribution, after we are gone--in our medium.

A "drama of pertinence," not too dependent on but effectively using special effect, would suggest intelligence and relevance as well as enduring solid "box office". Such drama, by no means "preachy", must flow from life. It should speak to the world through all the opening avenues of communication now at our fingertips. It should be worth preserving in a time capsule for 3000 A.D.

Total conversion to this thesis is not likely to be found in post-production autopsies. It is more surely to be revealed during early testing of original ideas. The potential among us is more evident today than it ever was before. Why not use it more creatively?

Endnotes

1 Horse Feathers, Paramount, 1932. Comedy: A new college president (Groucho Marx) thinks he is sole repository of wisdom: "No matter what it is or who commenced it, I'm against it!"

2 The Mayor of Hell, Warner Bros., 1933. Drama: Innate human goodness plus student government in a reformatory will cure all ills (vs. control by physical punishment).
3 *Murder on the Blackboard*, RKO, 1934. Drama: Writing: "Snoop" "Snoop" "Snoop" to make idle curiosity repugnant.

4 *Bowery at Midnight*, Astor, 1942. Horror: Psychology/psychiatry as universal cure for human pathology should be uninhibited.

5 *The Stranger*, RKO, 1946. Drama: Cure for evil is totally in genetics.


7 *Blackboard Jungle*, MGM, 1955. Drama: (High School) It is absolutely impossible to cure student malevolence. Yet, life will work out without a plan. Also *The Eiger Sanction*, Universal, 1975. Drama: (College) Most students do not respond to significant reality . . . to culture. They never will; they are "dumb".

8 *Rebel without a Cause*, Warner Brothers, 1955. Drama: Given a sonic boom, we shall be "gone". "What does he know about life?"


10 *Horse Feathers*.

11 *The Blues Brothers*. 
THE BLACKBOARD JUNGLE

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The Blackboard Jungle (1955), which was written for the screen and directed by Richard Brooks, focuses on Richard Dadier (Glenn Ford), an army veteran whose first teaching post is in an inner city school for boys. For Dadier his new teaching position represents a challenge: "His dream is to be an educator, to sculpt lives," writes Frank Frost in his dissertation on Brooks—a study which is still the definitive work on the director (p. 116).

From the beginning his classes test his ability to cope with their indifference to the educational process; and Dadier must endeavor to accomplish what Frost calls "the difficult task of educating the unmotivated" (p. 118). Dadier finally succeeds in reaching the minds of his students through the use of a short film. By contrast, Josh Edwards (Richard Kiley), another new teacher (with a far weaker personality than Dadier's), fails to connect with his students. He brings to class his invaluable collection of jazz records, in order to demonstrate the affinity between music and mathematics; and the unruly boys scornfully smash the records to pieces.

At one point Dadier has a conversation with Gregory Miller (Sidney Poitier), the ring leader of the recalcitrant students in one of his classes. Dadier encourages Miller not to quit school, but rather to get his diploma in order to make something of himself in life. For the first time Miller seems genuinely impressed with the advice Dadier has offered him. Nevertheless, Dadier is prone at times to discouragement about his apparent lack of progress in turning the delinquent boys in his classes into real students, and eventually decides to give up his teaching post. At film's end, however, Dadier encounters Miller in the school yard; and the latter encourages Dadier to stay on. Reminding Dadier of their earlier conversation, Miller insists that he honor his commitment as a teacher by keeping his teaching position, in much the same way that Dadier had insisted that Miller honor his commitment as a student by remaining in school till graduation. Accordingly, Dadier decides to continue his fight to reach the minds of his students.

As Frost comments on the film's ending, "It expresses Brooks's belief that if an individual faces any problem with dedication, competence, understand-
ing and tenacity, . . . that person can achieve success" (p. 121). In short, Dadier has become what he wanted to be: an educator.

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PUBLIC AMBIVALENCE TOWARD TEACHERS AS REFLECTED IN AMERICAN FILM

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The image of the teacher in American film reflects the public's ambivalence toward the teaching profession in particular and toward education in general. In his book *American Society: A Sociological Interpretation*, Robin M. Williams identifies the following traditional American values: personal achievement, work, moral concern and humanitarianism, efficiency and practicality, progress and material advancement, equality, freedom, and nationalism and patriotism.¹ Though some of these values conflict with each other, Americans nevertheless embrace them and see them in conflict with certain elements of American schooling.

Consider Groucho Marx's musical address to the faculty of Huxley College in *Horse Feathers* (1932). Groucho's irreverence toward the assembled graybeards is funny for several reasons, not the least being its conformity with America's view of college professors as pompous, inefficient, impractical ivory tower academicians.² Three years later in *A Night at the Opera*, the Marx Brothers would substitute "highbrow" opera for the stuffy academy with similar results. People can despise certain social institutions through fear, distrust, jealousy, or any number of other negative emotions. Americans distrust education largely due to a stubborn anti-intellectualism that permeates American life and its social institutions, including the schools.³ This anti-intellectualism perceives the life of the mind in conflict with nearly all the American values identified by Williams. Proving that people are alike all over, American cinema patrons enjoy watching their despised institutions ridiculed. Of course, Americans do not really want their universities closed down in order to field football teams, which was Groucho's proposal in *Horse Feathers*, but, preferring the Marxism of Groucho to that of Karl, they do want the supposed Darwinist and communist professorate put in its place.

Next consider Bela Lugosi's casting as a psychology professor in Monogram's low budget horror thriller *Bowery at Midnight* (1942). Here, the former Dracula leads the double life of a university professor and criminal mastermind. As a professor, Lugosi defends environment as the key factor in producing criminals. Though most Americans would agree that environment plays a large role in shaping behavior, Lugosi's position as a pseudo liberal social the-
orist tends to discount the cherished American value of personal achievement. As
such, the Lugosi character caters to America's stereotype of the professor as a
soft-headed Pragmatist advocating social welfare as the solution to crime. The
fact that the good professor uses a soup kitchen as a front for crime plays to the
American suspicion that intellectuals (i.e. professors) lack moral concern and
humanitarianism. In fact, Lugosi often played mad intellectuals (usually doctors
or scientist) who allow their single-minded pursuit of knowledge/power to over-
shadow ethical considerations.4

The Fifties saw the rise of a unique film genre, the juvenile delinquency
(or JD) film teenage exploitation pictures made largely for a teen audience. As
such, these films depicted teachers, schools, and parents as studio executives
thought teenagers saw them. The fact that companies such as American
International Pictures (AIP) made a fortune exploiting this youth market
demonstrates the accuracy of the executives' perceptions. Interestingly, in most of
these films, not much in the adult world, including teachers, is worthy of emula-
tion.5

Consider two typical AIP youth exploitation films of the "Fifties. The
first, Blood of Dracula (1957) concerns Nancy Perkins (Sandra Harrison), a hot-
blooded teenager placed against her will in a prestigious girl's prep school.
There she comes under the influence of her science teacher, Miss Branding
(Louise Lewis), a brilliant but bitter feminist. Branding uses Nancy to prove her
theory that an ancient amulet can release forces in human beings powerful
enough to frighten the male political/military establishment into forsaking re-
search on nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, with Branding's full knowledge, the
amulet turns the girl into a murderous vampire whose nocturnal activities
threaten the school's survival. Miss Branding's students revere her as a deserving
scholar and share her frustration with the male-dominated science community.
Reflective of American anti-intellectual stereotypes, however, Branding's bril-
liance is overshadowed by a distasteful disregard for individual human life.

The second film, High School Hellcats (1958) chronicles the trials of
Joyce Martin (Yvonne Lime), a transfer student to the local high school from
out of town. There is a well organized gang of girls at the school known as the
"Hellcats." Their leader tells Joyce that if she wants to belong to the gang she
must defy school authorities and bond with the gang rather than with "square
(hard-working and moral) boys. As usual in such films, the high school teachers
are a bunch of ineffectual, irrelevant blobs. The exception to the rule is Miss
Davis (Rhoda Williams), a youthful teacher who, while stressing the importance
of homework, looks beyond the requirements of her job and really cares about
her students as individuals. Joyce, of course, is a good girl at heart, and largely
through the efforts of Miss Davis and an understanding boyfriend, she is re-
deemed.

The evidence shows that notwithstanding some notable cases to the con-
professors have not fared well in the American cinema because American
are very ambivalent about their value to society. Professors are dangerous and must be watched carefully, a task still undertaken with vigor by movie studios. From the "Fifties through the "Seventies, high school teachers were largely portrayed as teenagers saw them, as "really cared," but that person was the exception to the rule.

Still, the cinema has recently given us professors and high school teachers who were generally respected by American audiences. Professor Kingsfield (John Houseman), the brilliant, no-nonsense task master of The Paper Chase (1973) appealed as a good American who expected his students to make A's the old fashioned way--by earning them. Kingsfield was no fun-and-games progressive teacher, no spoon-feeder, no surrogate parent. Nor as far as the American people were concerned should he have been. Though he was originally not intended to be a sympathetic character, Americans liked him because he stood for personal achievement and hard work, and because the field of law is eminently practical. Likewise, we have seen the true stories of high school math teacher Jamie Escalante (Edward James Olmos) in Stand and Deliver (1987), and of Principal Joe Clark (Morgan Freeman) in Lean on Me (1989). Both educators care enough about their students to demand discipline and excellence, a far cry from the American image of progressivist and existentialist teachers engendered in the "Fifties and beyond as doting surrogate babysitters, value-free egalitarians, and ineffectual classroom entertainers.6

American audiences responded positively to the cinematic depictions of Escalante and Clark, not because the latter represent the life of the mind, but because they represent and stress personal achievement, hard work, progress, and material advancement.7 Though the students learn academic subjects, the real lessons they assimilate are those of personal responsibility and self-discipline. As Robert Hutchins once quipped, Americans want schools without education. Our public schools have always existed primarily for economic and social reasons.8 Americans will tolerate intellectual pursuits if, in the process, students develop self-discipline and good work habits leading to economic and social mobility.

Endnotes


6 The rather unflattering descriptions I use for progressivist and existentialist teachers are derived from books such as *Educational Wastelands* (1953) by Arthur Bestor, *The Diminished Mind: A Study of Planned Mediocrity in Our Public Schools* (1954) by Mortimer Smith, *The Miseducation of American Teachers* (1963) by James D. Koerner, and *Crisis in the Classroom* (1970) by Charles Silberman. More recently, the in-print assault on a failing educational system littered with soft-headed, anti-intellectual teachers has continued with such books as *Ed School Follies* (1991) by Rita Kramer, and *Inside American Education* (1993) by Thomas Sowell. These books, as well as numerous attacks in national news magazines and television broadcasts, contribute to a widespread American perception that many teachers are unskilled and incompetent.


VICES AND VIRTUES: A COMMON PLACE BETWEEN FREUD AND ARISTOTLE.

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In his book Freud and Philosophy Pau Ricoeur asserts that language is the area where "... philosophical investigations cut across one another [in order] to encompass in a single question the problem of the unification of the human discourse."¹ So, discourse is what we aim at: a discourse between Freud's psychoanalysis and Aristotle's ethics.

In this paper we are going to show that what is explicit in Aristotle's ethics is implicit in Freud's psychoanalysis. Since ambiguities are inevitable, we would like to clear the way by considering the following three important perspectives. First, the common places between Freud and Aristotle, second, the typology in Freud's literature as it reveals the vicious and the virtuous character, third, the theory of cure as it unfolds the process of organizing the inner space of the person, i.e., the process of building the virtuous character.

I. The Common Places

The Human Being as a Social Animal: In The Nicomachean Ethics (NE) Aristotle maintains that Poljitical Science "... legislates what must be done and what must be avoided."² It's end is the human good which is also the good of the city. This is to say that the good of the society is the good of the individual. In his Civilization and its Discontents Freud also maintains that the essential task of civilization is to unite the individual with society by "libidinal ties." Moreover, in his essay "A Note upon the Mystic Writing Pad" Freud affirms the responsibility of the external world in the formation of the ego and the super ego, i.e., the human experience is rooted in society. Even in a therapeutic session self understanding is always achieved through an other.

The social dimension, or, the binding unity between the individual and society is evident in the thought of both Freud and Aristotle in the form of participation. Being a participant, the individual incorporates the values, the norms and the customs of his or her society in a form of activity. Also, to be a participant the individual holds him/herself from desiring too much. At this point, we come to the second common place: the notion of desire.
II. Desire
In Book iii of the NE Aristotle calls decision a "deliberative desire." He says that "... when we have judged as a result of deliberation, our desire to do it expresses our wish." But why do we deliberate on our desires? It is simply because Aristotle was aware, as it appears in his De Anima, of the governing powers of the human passions; and by building the virtues the person is capable of organizing his or her inner space and of acting with a sense of proportion.

In this context Freud assumes the same position with an assimilable language. The desiring id is like mobs which acknowledge no values and no good and evil. He says, "Woe, if they should be set loose! The throne would be overturned and the ruler trampled under foot. Society is aware of this—and will not allow this topic to be mentioned..." Freud advocates that these mobs "... eager for enjoyment and destruction [have] to be held down ... by a prudent superior class." Who is this prudent superior class? It is reason. This is our third common place.

III. Reason
Aristotle posits reason as that faculty which distinguishes the human being from other living things. In this sense, the study of political science whose end is "action not knowledge" is guided by reason. In The Future of an Illusion Freud says, "I stand for the claims of reason..." Reason's voice is a "soft one," "weak," but persistent and does not rest until it gains a hearing. So, since there is a constant struggle between the passions and reason, achieving an ethical decision is described by N. Hartmann as a "desireful reason" or a "reasonable desire." But, how does one know that it is the right decision? M. Novak as he interprets Aristotle comes to qualify decision making by the act of discernment which is developed by the person the same way the artist develops his or her art, i.e., by practice and experience. Therefore, the practice of rational decision making is akin to art. How do we see this art in Freud's literature?

In The Ego and the Id Freud describes the ego, the rational agent of the psyche, as a shrewd diplomat who courts his two masters the id and the super ego. It weighs the impinging situation and decides what means to take to preserve itself as well as to preserve its contact with external reality. So, it does not take much to observe that underlying the functioning of the ego there is discernment of the impinging situation. This discernment leads to evaluation and then to decision making; the necessity of these activities results in adaptation and prudence, i.e., doing the right thing at the right time.

In this connection, building a life according to reason constitutes an enormous struggle between the rational and the irrational; a struggle which gives way not only to adaptation, but to articulation and harmony. In achieving this art we notice that for both Freud and Aristotle the commanding "thou shalt" does not have a priority. Neither gives us rules on what to do or what not
to do. They provide us with an "operative structure" which we try to use the best way we can. The matter of choice is an art revealed in a certain style, tact, and manner. As the ego falls sick to preserve itself, so it is the case with Aristotle. He says that, sometimes, it would be better to err on the deficient side rather than to err on the excessive side. For both, a person is capable of prudent and adaptive mistakes. Freud calls this "the self confidence of health." In this regard, Heinz Hartmann in his book Psychoanalysis and Moral Values says that reason would not fail to concede to human emotions the position to which they are entitled. This leads us to the fourth common place: the notion of character.

IV. Character

In The Interpretation of Dreams Freud bases the formation of character on "... the impressions which have had the greatest effect on us ... [and] are precisely the ones which scarcely ever become conscious." Regardless of how the character is formed, for both Freud and Aristotle, the main contributors to its formation are the internal as well as the external world. Being locked in this struggle, the person in order to practice discernment must exercise self-control. Without self-control the person falls into excessive or deficient personality traits.

In his book On Moral Character Jody Palmer shows the language similarities between Freud and Aristotle in describing certain character traits. This will be discussed in due course.

Table 1: Comparison between Aristotle and Freud

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aristotle</th>
<th>Freud</th>
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<tr>
<td>Generous</td>
<td>Genital</td>
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<td>Miserly</td>
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<td>Practical</td>
<td>Oral Aggressive</td>
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<td>Extravagant</td>
<td>Oral Receptive</td>
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It is worth noting that for both thinkers positive and negative character traits coexist. The anal stage may lead to stinginess as well as to cleanliness. The same for Aristotle. A clever person could be courageous as well as he could be stingy. So, for Aristotle building the virtues is a similar activity to what Freud psychologically calls undoing the "libidinal fixation." In other words, we believe in altering the person's character in a favorable way. Philip
Rieff in his book *Freud the Mind of the Moralist* says that the therapeutic aim is to build two major virtues: the virtue of prudence and the virtue of compromise. So, knowing how to adapt, or knowing how to build a favorable strategy towards life a person is always dependent on his or her appropriate evaluation, discernment, and responses in order to develop a more or less virtuous or vicious character. This will lead us to the fifth common place: as-a-matter-of-degree.

V. As-A-Matter-of-Degree

It is without any doubt that in Freud's literature a person could be mildly psychotic, e.g., the state of sleep, and extremely psychotic, e.g., the state of schizophrenia. The same goes for Aristotle. A person could be brave, braver or the bravest. The bravest is the one who faces death in the battlefield because this person "... shows greater prowess against that which threatens life."\(^{14}\)

Having this in mind, we would like to show how vice is implicitly spelled out in Freud's psychoanalysis. To begin with, let us define vice according to Aristotle. In the NE Aristotle identifies vice with that which "ruins," i.e., an activity exercised in either "excessive" or "deficient" practice, and which is contrary to virtue which aims at the "intermediate." In this respect, how do we understand the practice of the excess and the practice of the deficient in Freud's account of what "ruins" the psychological harmony of the person? In order to answer this question, let us start with the functions of the three agents of the psyche. Every agent has its oughts and intentions. David Sachs explains this. He says, "... between any person's emotions ... and the causes thereof, they always obtain an actual proportionality ... no matter how incongruous those relations appear to be."\(^{15}\) Having their conflicting oughts, the excess functioning of one agent implies the deficiency imposed on the other.

Let us start with the super ego. It internalizes values and directs them with harsh aggressiveness against the other portion of the ego. This excess causes an inadequate suppression or repression of the instinctual demands. In his paper "On the Theory of Hysterical Attack" Freud says that the patient refuses to "... allow an adequate discharge for fear of distressing mental conflicts."\(^{16}\) The crucial point here is fear. The patient faces an ethical dilemma; and, to be possessed by fear means the patient lacks the courage, or prudence, or the ability to compromise. This is to say, a "contrary wish fulfillment" which expresses itself in what ruins, i.e., the hysterical attack.

Now, the other side implies that deficient super ego causes an unnecessary permissiveness of the release of the id's impulses. In our society the extreme liberation of the impulses of the id is considered "equivalent to freedom." According to Freud, "If sexual freedom is unrestricted from the outset the result is not better. It can easily be shown that the psychical value of the erotic needs is reduced as soon as their satisfaction becomes easy. An obstacle is required in order to heighten the libido."\(^{17}\) Simply, this means that freedom without an obstacle is chaos, and this leads to lust, greed, etc. ... In other words, the pleasure...
principle dominates one's life and the reality principle is weakened. This kind of character is called by Aristotle a "self indulgent" character. Also, the reduction of the use of temperance, i.e., the excess of release of the id's impulses produces an amazing lack of fear, i.e., a foolhardy character as Aristotle calls it.

Although the ego is feeble, yet, persistent, it also has its excess characteristic. We usually describe a person as having a "big ego." Edith Jacobson, a Freudian psychoanalyst, describes one of her patients' ego who is able to ward off the existence of what is external to itself as a king who rules in a kingdom without subjects. 18

In the course of this paper, we have seen that both Freud and Aristotle show interest in affirming the importance of moral character. The difference between them is that Aristotle qualifies a person's character between vicious and virtuous. Freud's interest lies in describing the psychodynamics of the human personality. As he always did quote F.T. Visher saying that morality is "self evident," then, we take him up on his position that morality, though implicit in his literature, yet, this implicitness is an evidence for its existence. In this connection, let us start with Freud's typology.

The Oral Personality

Fixating on the oral stage, a person tends to be passive, receptive, subservient, trusting, and optimistic. Also, this person enjoys activities related to the mouth, e.g., eating. But, since opposite characteristics do coexist as they stem from the same "sexual instinct," an oral personality might be hostile. In book iv, chapter v of the NE, Aristotle equates hostility with excessive anger. This person tends to be angry at the wrong people and get irritable by the wrong things.

The Anal Personality

This person tends to be orderly, hoarding and obstinate. These traits develop out of the lack of appreciation the child gets from the parents to his or her fecal matter which he or she considers to be his/her first gift to the parents. The result is a tendency of being a taker than a giver. Aristotle calls hoarding the vice of "ungenerosity."

The Urethral Personality

This type develops as a result of the humiliation of enuresis. A burning ambition to succeed in life is developed. This ambition disguises an underneath inhibited envious attitude. Humiliation also hides a sense of inferiority which acts as a catalyst for obtaining an easy success. Struggle brings boredom to this person and the result is a lack of success. So, this person being ambitious, yet, unsuccessful, tends to be selfish and exploitative. In book ii of the Rhetoric Aristotle gives us the same description, i.e., an envious person experi-
ences a sort of pain at the good fortune of men with whom he is at rivalry. The kernel of this envy is usually directed towards those who succeed quickly.

**The Phallic Personality**

It is the result of an unsatisfactory resolution of the Oedipal stage. This type shows the following inclinations: self-centered, egotistical, lustful, and revolutionary. Among females this may develop a masculinity complex. In other words, this person lacks temperance and possesses self-indulgence. For Aristotle an intemperate person of this type is mainly concerned with body pleasures.

**The Genital Personality**

It is the healthiest type. But, we need to caution ourselves that Freud is not clear about the line of demarcation between health and sickness. They both oscillate and overlap. Having this in mind, we feel safe in affirming the idea that the healthiest type is an "idee-limite." But, suffice to say that by the age of six the genital type has already formed a parental "image" to identify with. During this process other negative traits may result by an early fixation. This reminds us that, as we mentioned before, negative and positive personality traits oftentimes coexist. Therefore, an absolute health does not exist. Aristotle is not at all far from this perspective. If we assume that the genital personality is the "generous man" in Aristotle, then this person, according to Aristotle, is not without dissatisfactions.

In discussing Freud's typology our focus, to a large extent, was on the vicious category of Freud's description of the personality traits. This does not mean that Freud overlooked the virtuous traits of the individual. Our main concern is that isolating one issue from the other will make our explanation more understandable. If by any chance, this creates any confusion we ask the reader to be patient with our efforts to explain these complex issues. Now, let us direct our focus to the idea of virtue.

In spite of these theoretical categorizations one cannot overlook the perspective that Freud never divorced himself from everyday life experiences. He uses them as evidences of his theory. Adam Morton in his article "Freudian Commonsense" maintains that "Freud expands common sense so as to obtain an intuitive description of personality." In his "Psychology of Errors" Freud gives importance to the slip of the tongue which is a recurrent natural phenomenon resulting from inaccuracies in mental performance. He gives us this example in a form he calls "interchanges." "The hotel-boy knocking at the bishop's door, nervously replied to the question "who is it?" " The Lord my boy." This explains the perspective that in the human psyche there is an "idea of design," i.e., an unconscious tendency to tell the truth, i.e., an unconscious honesty. This is also well shown in dream interpretation. This hidden honesty is transmuted into different script using the "means of blending and combining."
Now, we would like to pose this question. What is the ultimate purpose of Freud's investigations? Thomas Nagel in his essay "Freud's Anthropomorphism" quotes Freud's letter to his friend Fliess. In this letter Freud explicitly spells out his "... hope of arriving ... at my own original objective, philosophy." What is a greater virtue than the love of wisdom!

But, what is virtue according to Aristotle? "It is a disposition which makes him a good man,[and] enables him to perform his function well." How do we see this disposition in Freud's thought? The psyche, in spite of all the struggle against many impossible demands from her agents, has an inner tendency to recreate the lost harmony, i.e., by sending a message to the external world called "symptom." This is to say, a symptom is a disclosure of compromise by which each agent gets a certain deserved satisfaction. This satisfaction means committing a less dangerous act, e.g., having a paralyzed arm is better than killing somebody with a revolver. It is an unconscious prudence, i.e., the best solution given at the right time and at the right place.

These deliberations of the unconscious part of the ego are not considered by Aristotle. This is why, according to the lecture given by W. Richardson, one must admit that the unconscious intention is specifically Freudian which does effect profoundly the field of ethics. This deep underlying discourse of the psyche is a vital and a vigorous virtue, i.e., functioning well in order to achieve health.

Considering what we already discussed about the inherent tendency of the psyche to function well, now we come to the point to discuss the theory of cure. In order to have a solid understanding of this theory one must consider Freud's recommendations on the method of treatment. His recommendations cluster around one important characteristic. It is self-control. The therapist must not exceed the patient's means nor impose what is not within his or her capacity. He says, "Whoever knows how to appreciate the high value of self-knowledge and increase in self-control so aquired will afterwards continue the analytic examination." Self-control teaches not to be too intimate with the patient. A "moderate intimacy" is necessary. This is what is conducive to health. How similar to Aristotle's definition of the self controlled person. "If something is pleasant and conducive to health or fitness, he will desire this moderately and in the right way. ... [he] does not deviate from what is fine, and does not exceed his means." Also to be a good therapist one must be a good helper. A good helper is the one who, according to Freud, does not expect an absolute solution for the internal conflicts, but, strives to "... secure the best possible psychological conditions for the functions of the ego..." To secure the best possible conditions must not only be dependent on the free association method; one must also consider the activity of the mechanism of resistance which the client employs due to the ambivalent nature of the psyche. The aim of the mechanism of resistance is to oppose cure. One of the main forces of resistance is the mechanism of transference by which the client "merges the physician with the object of the affection."
How does this serve the purpose of our investigation? Activity is the heart of virtue. Aristotle implies that it is better to be brave than to know about bravery. In the process of transference, the analysand acts out the buried vile and unpleasant wishes and brings them out to the open. By acting out the analysand affirms his or her relationship with the therapist by making it under the scrutiny of a conscious rational deliberation. This is to say, the patient's self knowledge is obtained by means of another person. Obtaining his or her self knowledge the analysand earns back the lost independence. This proves to be the means of uncovering that which should be tamed by the superior ruler: reason. Now, with what attitude are the activities of cure to be qualified? The answer to this question is truthfulness. According to Aristotle, truthfulness is a virtue. It is the mean between the booster and the self deprecator. Hence a truthful person is the one "... who is truthful both in what he says and in how he lives."28 What we gather from this is that truthful people show sincerity in both deeds and words. They are equitable.

Seeking for help the patient must possess an inner drive to know the truth about him or herself no matter what is really at stake. Asking for help also means an inner sense of confidence in the other. In spite of the ambivalence they come with, this inner drive for the truth speaks in the free association method and acts out in transference. So, according to Freud, insight should be coupled with activity if the process of cure is to be successful.

Before we come to the end of this discourse, one more point needs to be cleared up. The question we need to pose is: what determines the underlying unity of meaning in the two different languages; i.e., the psychoanalytic language of Freud and the philosophical language of Aristotle? L. Wittgenstein in his book, Philosophical Grammar, says that a basic idea is a rule which determines meaning within a language. This basic idea, we feel safe to say, is the context which a language refers to. In this case, the word vice for Aristotle means the cause of sickness for Freud, and the word virtue refers to health for both thinkers.

To conclude, a perfect state of virtue is a human impossibility. Vices and virtues coexist, health and sickness coexist. Altering one's character is a necessary activity which should target an articulate life of struggle within the boundaries of society. Both Freud and Aristotle teach us that living according to health or virtue is an art acquired by practice and experience. It is an art by which we get to a level of "approximate normality." Using our operative structure to the best of our abilities is what both thinkers ask of us. How to use this operative structure should be a major concern of education.
Endnotes


3. Ibid., bk. 3, 3, 1113a.


5. Ibid.


7. Ibid.


9. Ibid.


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What I will develop in this paper is a biographical approach to ethics. This reflection has the benefit (or lack of it, perhaps) of my own personal relationship with my reality and experience as an ethical being. It could begin with "once upon a time..." But this is presumptuous. Reflecting on my personal ethical journey, I can see development, even progress at times, accompanied by major and minor reversals.

There is a danger, of course, in this project, namely, claiming my ethical experience as authoritative. Thus Part Three will argue for a need to find commonalities in ethical experience. And Part Four will develop Brian Hall's, and my own, research on ethical growth. First, though, some reflection about the dimensions and dynamics of biographical ethical experience; and certainly not all will be said that can be.

An essential dimension I have noted in attempting to take an ethical posture is the need "to pay attention" to others. I take it that "paying attention to the other" is a hallmark concept related to being virtuous, perhaps an example of virtue itself. "Paying attention to the other" merely means being there for or being available to the other--sometimes at my own sacrifice. It strongly connotes accepting the other in her success, failures and confusion: rejoicing in the success, having empathy for the failures, and joining in the confusion.

"Paying attention to the other," then, further requires a dying of sorts, that is, a dying of my ego and selfishness to be able to be there for him or her at all. I think this is what Jesus, the Buddha, and other sages and prophets meant by such concepts as dying to self being as necessary condition of an abundant life.

In "paying attention to the other" I hold my ego-centric ego in abeyance, as it were. I am there unconditionally for the other--not interpreting or using the other to meet my own needs. Perhaps this is part of what Kant meant by connecting the ethical life with "treating others as ends in themselves, and never as means."

To me, conversion, in the Greek, Metenoia, suggests the death that results in life (or rebirth). The change of heart required to change, to convert, is a leaving behind of mere egocentrism. It is transformation. And someone (very close) might say: "You seem different today." I have gone over, am different, have tried to lose what is killing me anyway, through my constant self-absorption. (The desire in biographical ethics is not to say too much about self, lest
this, too, becomes a desire to satisfy personal egocentric needs: to say, "Look at me and my complicated ethical life." The danger is ever present).

Likewise "paying attention to" suggests acceptance of the other as "the other" and not as me. That is, I recognize that my limitations in being me make it impossible to "know" the other. I can barely get inside me sometimes--so much so with the other. Still, there I am with her; and the person is present to me: to share, to dialogue, to feel--or to just be, as one often is with someone who is dying. My limitations do not hold me back. In fact, they are the stimulus to continue the relationship, even if its just to be there with, which is significant as the silence (and looks and gestures) becomes our conversation.

It is the quality of the "paying attention to" that is important. This is not a quantitative ethical measurement game. There is a difference, of course, between the "paying attention to" of the physician or lawyer that is supposed to be an objective and skilled manner of relating, and "paying attention to" in the ethical sense. This requires a letting down of masks and professional demure. This requires "revealing," or what Henri Nouwen refers to as "the wounded healer," that is, by "paying attention to" the other knows I know, as I have needed healing too (still do). In my woundedness (my humanity) I reveal myself, as I "pay attention to" the other.

It must be obvious by now that biographical ethics is a community ethics; and thus the term autobiographical ethics was not used. The community could be one other person, like my wife or one of my children. Or the community could be broader, such as an oppressed social group. To me, the closer one is (by blood or marriage perhaps), the more difficult it is to "pay attention to". He seems always to demand some attention, and I can't leave this situation and go home, as if I were "paying attention to" someone at work. But the point is that in all of our business and frantic activity the quality of the activity of "paying attention to the other" is what matters: is a paradigm example of being ethical. The situation or relationship is brought to me through my and the other's biography. And it is out or this that the ethical life takes on form and substance.

II

Biographical ethics, then, takes the human person (myself) as a given, considering all it means to be a part of the human condition which necessitates ethical action. Yet saying this does not mean that theory and abstraction are unnecessary. "Paying attention to the other" is ambiguous because being other than me (and vice versa) is ambiguous. Likewise human relationships (and relationships to nature, animals, the environment, the cosmos, etc.) consist of mixtures of good and evil, that is, they have the potential for growth as well as for destructiveness. Which of the above predominate will characterize how much my act is one of love, response, recognition, respect and liberation, or how far my act is one of distrust, rejection, disrespect, fear, destruction or manipulation.

Yet, psychological mechanisms are operative in me. As I attempt to protect myself, I deny the recognition of the other; as I desire to justify myself, I may treat the other with disrespect. The ambiguity is between the response of the other, an ambiguity which results when one acts out of the fear
and rejection which leads to manipulation and destructiveness, as the other acts out of love, which leads to acceptance and recognition. Likewise pressure from peers or from social dimensions of morality are a great challenge to the ethical agent. Thus violence and war, racism and sexism, discrimination and exploitation (personal and institutional) affect not only large groups of people, but the ethical agent as well. The effects of the human condition, which will often be a mixture of affirmation/promotion of the other, despite immense obstacles, are inherent in human beliefs, attitudes and actions which I directly experience. There is a mysterious element in ethical experience, as it does not follow universal, absolute or deductive norms. How to deal with the ethical relativism implied by all of this is the intent of Part Three.

The ethical life, then, involves a search—from the dependence of childhood to the independence of adolescence: to the dependence/interdependence (again) on the other I find in encountering him or her. I depend on the other as I "pay attention" to him or her, as I recognize and affirm him. This is quite unlike the unhealthy dependence often found in dysfunctional families or in manipulative and destructive relationships. I am often humiliated by my ignorance, inadequacy and limitations; and it is the other (even in rejecting me) on whom I depend for completeness.

My approach to biographical ethics, then, is to examine the morality I am familiar with, perhaps was raised with and learned. I acquired such a pattern of morality and moral behavior at a time when I did not possess the skills to examine them. I did not invent any of this, as Heidegger says I was "cast into a world I did not make." I was born into a society which is Western, born at a particular place, into a particular family and church, and so on.

As I became a person, I began to reflect and act on what I discerned as right or wrong—and in the process I developed (or accepted) this freedom to act, however conditionally and influenced by my past, etc. Although I experience the ethical obligation following from this discernment and freedom, others are the source of my actions. Again, ethical obligations are interpersonal. To the extent that I listen to the ethical call of the other, and accept, recognize and respect her, I also accept, recognize and respect myself. That is, I become more fully cognizant of my ethical character. And the more I respond to the other's call, the more developed my skills, talents and resources become so that I can better respond to the call. In doing so, I became more ethically (physically, psychologically and spiritually) integrated, to offer to the other whatever I have more fully. Likewise in affirming my freedom to do good to or for the other, I gain a deeper freedom to engage with, respond to and be committed to the other. I became a virtuous person; rather than merely performing a virtuous act - the way my ethical biography began.

Biographical ethics recognizes the current need to reconstruct ethics in terms of human meaning, that is, moral norms are being viewed as human acts. Moral norms are essential in a person's ethical journey (and in historical development) because the norms themselves comprise acts of human meaning.
To rescue such an ethical view from subjective relativism, it needs to be recognized that the moral norms possess another quality: they are transmitted historically as well as biographically. In fact, the biographical acceptance of moral norms implies a structure of the act of meaning without which they could not be accepted as applicable to one's biography.

Viewed differently, moral acts relate to and within a community (from a particular community to the community of humankind, perhaps). It is the community(s) which forms the human relationships which themselves form complexes of human meaning. Thus biographical ethical decisions are interrelated to both historical contents, community and personal goals, and one's posture toward experience—as well as to the structure of the acts of human meaning whose foundation allows one to grasp these acts as meaningful (as true perhaps).

It is not being argued that ethical decision making rests on a universal foundation of some sort, natural law, for instance. The ability to use one's past experiences in light of the complex structure of human meaning is achieved through socially constitutive meaning-structure-uses. Yet the conclusion that historicity is also integral to socially constitutive meaning-structure strongly militates against subjective relativism.

Thus, there are two points being argued:
1. Moral norms are constituted by human structures of relationships which themselves constitute human meaning-structures; and,
2. Such structures themselves are norm-oriented—thus rescuing this position from subjective relativism.

Put another way, without criteria to distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate ethical decisions, human ethical choice rests on an arbitrary foundation. And since criteria are related to moral norms which are integral to ethical decision making (as they are derived from human meaning-structure which give ethical choice meaning), it becomes necessary to distinguish between such contextual criteria which are integral to generalized moral norms and those which are incidental.

Let me give the example of not telling the truth. The basic issue is: What are the relevant data to define the moral character or a series of actions (the context) involving a lie? At the level of greatest generality the data might include: a lie occurs and it is the consequence of the actions of a particular person. But this is not very helpful, for various acts are included, each with a different moral character. For instance, a lie to save another's life, a lie to secure food for a starving family, cheating on one's income tax, a lie to make oneself feel important and a lie to hurt someone else, etc.

The moral character of, and the act itself, differ in each context. To understand the difference, it is necessary to distinguish between essential and incidental data to define the moral character of the act. Thus, many details are significant in determining the moral character of the events and actions inherent in each example: was the lie to save another's life proportionate to the intention, that is, would greater evil occur as a result of this lie? Was the lie to hurt someone else a serious destruction of his reputation? Or was it a silly act of reprisal, such as lying about an insignificant detail? Incidental details, on the and, have no bearing in changing the moral nature of the act. Some such
may be the language spoken, the manner of dress, the city where the action occurred, and so on. Thus if an understanding of the essential details of the context can be grasped, then an ethical situation is discerned, and can be generalized to contexts in which such essential details occur. If this can be done, it retrieves biographical ethics from mere ethical relativism.

Put differently, biographical ethics demands a reformulation of traditional theories of the ethical act: at least those theories which define certain actions as always unethical. As was noted, an ethical act is never a single act, as it occurs within a context of antecedent determinants, subsequent consequences, human goals and interpersonal meaning-structures and situations. Noting this gives biographical ethics a secure theoretical footing for discernment of decisions, consequences, conditions and relevant data; and requires an extensive examination and description of various aspects and spheres of the ethical life.

IV

This section will discuss a particular approach to understanding biographical ethics, namely, the use of the Hall-Tonna Inventory of Values. I have used this Instrument with both health care and educational leadership. The reason for including a somewhat empirical study in this article is simply to note one way of viewing an individual’s biographical ethical journey.

The Hall-Tonna is a forced choice, computer scored Inventory. The printout includes data on one's value clusters, ethical profile and leadership style, among other kinds of information.

The Inventory supplies information about one's Goal Values, or those which energize an individual and by which she forms basic commitments. Means Values, on the other hand, are the ways people live out their Goal Values. Hall argues that value frameworks or clusters are the modus operandi through which one makes ethical decisions—or they are the lenses through which a person views his ethical universe.

According to Hall and Thompson, development in values and ethical frameworks is dependent upon skill growth. That is, skill development is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of values and ethical growth.

There are three skill areas that are especially pertinent to my discussion: (1) interpersonal skills, such as attentive listening and empathy; (2) imaginal skills, or "the ability to use fantasy to imagine possible consequences of situations ..."; and, (3) system skills, which involve the ability to see and understand how all the parts of any complex organization of data or of an institution relate to the functioning of the whole. More will be said when I describe my specific profile.

It may seem egotistical to present aspects of my personal values and ethical profile. The reason I do so (with some hesitation) is to speculate further on some of the possible ingredients in this approach to ethics. It is also to give a scenario in a structured form. What I am about to relate will not be overly personal, in the sense that I lay bare my life before you. To do so would breach confidentiality, as others who have impacted my life and my ethical growth might not want full disclosure.
According to the Hall-Tonna (there are other instruments if one has any sympathy with this approach), my Goal Value cluster is Family/Belonging, Intimacy and Achievement. If I had taken the instrument even five years hence, I would hope it will be different. Value clusters change, according to Hall, as one becomes conscious of various aspects of her reality and experience. Hall refers to this development as Phases of Consciousness;¹² and more will be discussed about this later.

The Means Values are Expressiveness/Freedom, Equality and Care/Nurture. Thus, when I approach an ethical dilemma, my Goal Values energize the problematic situation, that is, they are a framework from which I begin to "pay attention to the other," and they act as lenses by which I experience my ethical reality (in fact, the Goal Values are lenses by which I interpret my reality, my experience). According to Hall, value clusters are predicated by human needs. Inherent in the actualization of these needs is my Phase of Consciousness, that is, my awareness of who I am, what I value, other possibilities and commitments I might have, and so on.

Without spelling out the four Phases, (since this is not the intent of this paper), I am between Phase Two and Phase Three. At Phase Two, I tend to view ethical dilemmas as problems; but as ones which I have developed the skills to handle. At other times, in my family, within the university, I am often at Phase Three. These are the times when I am acutely aware of myself as an ethical being; and I recognize that I must participate in a particular activity or decision because it is my obligation to do so. Hall terms this "viewing reality as a project, but one the individual MUST participate in."¹³ The MUST here is normative.

Since two of my Goal Values are Family/Belonging and Intimacy, it is useful (indeed necessary) to develop Interpersonal and Imaginal skills. Without them I will not grow more consistently toward a Phase Three direction. Let me try to clarify some of this by discussing my reaction when I received the printout at a committee meeting in which we were attempting to develop a workshop on the Hall-Tonna. Part of being able to successfully present this workshop demanded each of us become familiar with our own profiles.

When I turned to the Ethics Profile and read "you look at your ethical world often in terms of black and white, although there is significant growth being made beyond this," I screamed, "This can't be correct. I have a Ph.D. specializing in ethics." I've come to realize now, by giving workshops on the Hall-Tonna, that an outburst like this usually means the Profile is correct. Part of Hall's research indicates that under stress, and this certainly was stressful, the individual reverts to another (former) Phase of Consciousness. I was reverting to Phase One, in which I perceived my immediate reality, the printout, to be hostile, to be attacking me. My basic needs for security were threatened, and, thus, I acted the way I did.

Only later was I able to recognize the truth of the Profile. I was then freed to continue my ethical journey: or at least understand who I had been and was becoming as an ethical person.
Although our ethical decisions are made as part of our specific biography, that is, this person, in this situation, living during this historical period, with this particular view of reality, etc., since we live with and among others, there is an interdependent aspect to biographical ethics. Such issues as the possibility of war, the possibility of economic depression and shortages of various kinds are world problems and require interdependence. This also gives one real insight into the human condition. Out of a sense of interdependence comes a sense of dependence. Since our ethical decisions include and affect others, we depend on others to engage with us in the ethical task. A mere fragile human being has neither the resources nor the knowledge to make ethical decisions alone. As was previously argued, humans are communal beings.

Education, then, can acknowledge the interrelationship between dependence and interdependence. As children start school, their dependency needs are great. Perhaps an intelligible goal for schools is: to consciously lead students from immature dependencies to a more mature acknowledgment of dependency being integral to interdependence.

As human progress through education, in formal and non-formal senses, the goal of education can become more education, as Dewey desired. By instilling in students, and providing them the necessary skills to relate to the fact that education is an ongoing, life-long quest, human life becomes enriched. Humans begin to note that other ethical postures are noteworthy. This wisdom increases the individual's sense of dependence and incompleteness.

There is pain in such an approach to education. As previous Phases of Consciousness are shattered, as they are based on limited knowledge and experience, the student is continually made aware of her personal limitations. What matters, though, is the pursuit of the ethical life, at whatever cost. To admit that one is dependent on others and to continue the ethical search is indeed painful. It demands that one also admit limitations and inadequacies.

Despite the pain (and rigor and hard work) demanded by the ethical life, there is joy in the activity itself. To shed one's egocentric ego and to be aware of one's dependency is liberating. The death of the false self, who knew all the answers, leads to further learning with its alternations between pain and joy, that is, this death leads to resurrections. It is the dependency/ independency nature of human nature that teachers can leave with their students; and this is a gift of life itself, of the possibility of continued human growth subsequent to the ethical life. This is an invitation to each of us; and when we reply we can experience the joys of discovery and fulfillment (education) that at least occasionally come our way.

VI

A question that is always nagging at me when I speak (or write) about biographical ethics is: What is the goal of ethics? This question differs radically from: What is the goal of doing ethics? Whatever the precise answer to the first question happens to be, merely attempting an answer becomes hazardous, as an ardent concern for answering the first question leads to an enamoration with the aesthetics argumentation. That is, the answer is answered within some ethical...
system—deontology, teleology, etc. The danger is that ethical classification becomes an end in itself: forsaking the good of human beings for the elegance of systemization and its sister, logic.

Although I have argued that it is, in theory, possible to demonstrate continuities and discontinuities, similarities and dissimilarities among human ethical responses to problematic situations, I did not begin such an examination here. But one is needed. I also take it that such an examination would be tantamount to viewing ethics within developing historical moral traditions. The danger, again, is that such an activity would lead to an uncritical use of moral traditions in formulating the goal of ethics.

The answer to, what is the goal of doing ethics?, presupposes someone doing something called ethics. One comes to such a human experience acknowledging one's moral autonomy and personal liberty. The novelty of many contemporary ethical problems, such as those brought on by the development of technology in medical science, requires us to rethink the doing of ethics. To participate is this biographical task, as ethics is everyone's business, requires a passionate dedication to the understanding of concrete human lived-experience, that is, the initial task is to understand and to feel what human ethical growth demands. As Brain Hall writes:

The bottom line is we are responsible for the choices that we make within the limits and boundaries of our consciousness... our choices are in fact limitless, relative to maximizing our own gifts and potential in the cultural milieu we find ourselves in.

The above is the best answer I have found to, What is the goal of doing ethics? And, Hall's words represent the best definition of biographical ethics I have discovered to date.

Endnotes


Although "traditions" and not "meaning-structures" is the term MacIntyre uses, the idea is similar. See, Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory.* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).


Hall and Thompson, *Leadership Through Values,* 55.

Ibid., 65.

Hall, *The Genesis Effect,* Chapter Three.

Ibid., 101.

Ibid., 98.


CHILDREN DYING WITH DIGNITY: 
ANOTHER REMEMBRANCE OF JANUSZ KORCZAK

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now the time has come, and we must go away -- I to 
die, and you to live. Which is better is known to the god 
alone.1

Echoes of cries of pain reverberate in my heart. Children in 
famine, victims tortured by oppressors, helpless old people a 
hated burden to their sons, and the whole world of loneliness, 
poverty, and pain make mockery of what human life should 
be.2

I. Overview of a Liberal Philosophical Research Program
Since the Golden Age of Pericles most Western liberal democratic self- 
governing educational theorists have accepted the somewhat impossible task of 
trying to justify apparently outrageous claims such as the notion that students 
can be autonomous learners; from Socrates to Bertrand Russell and beyond 
individuals such as Amos Bronson Alcott, Homer Lane, and Paul Goodman have 
been outside the mainstream of Western educational thought partly because the 
critics of liberalism pointed to the fact that liberals were obviously mistaken 
when they attempted to create schools based upon the philosophical assumptions 
which guided liberal democratic self-governing political institutions.

II. A Footnote on Liberal Schools
In my feeble attempts to understand the magnificent failure of liberal 
educational thought I stumbled across a footnote years ago that has challenged 
me to study a question such as, "Is it reasonable to create educational programs 
that encourage students to be autonomous?" And on many sleepless nights over 
the last fifteen years I have been haunted by an obscure footnote which appears 
in a little known and much misunderstood book; when dreams and nightmares 
refuse to enter my mind I have often found a great deal of comfort in a footnote 
which claims the following:

excess of standards becomes a disaster in education. The 
Enlightenment idea of an Emile learning only from Nature 
herself is too naive to practice. Even Emile himself had a 
mentor. And so schools simply remained, to date, in
paternalistic hands...It is a sad reflection on our culture that until recently the liberal schools were almost all reform schools or orphanages - Homer Lane, Mgr. E.J. Flanagan, Janusz Korczak, Anton Makarenko - or else schools for difficult children - A.S. Neill and even Bertrand Russell.3

III. Short List of Liberal Thinkers and Korczak Remembered

Over the last decade and a half some sleepless nights have been made enjoyable partly because I have had the opportunity to study in detail the works of distinguished liberal philosophers such as Socrates, John Milton, Baruch Spinoza, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Thomas Jefferson, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, F.A. Hayek and Karl Popper; as I studied the monumental writings of outstanding liberals I found it to be increasingly difficult to ignore those individuals who transformed orphanages and reform schools into liberal democratic self-governing learning situations. Furthermore, as I acquired information about the works of liberal reformers such as Lane, Flanagan, Korczak, Makarenko, Alcott, Goodman, and Neill, I often became exposed to problems which were far beyond my imagination when I started my quest for philosophical understanding years ago. And during the month of August 1992 I celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of Korczak's death by writing about how his views on liberal educational programs are indeed relevant for comprehending modern horrors such as the death of babies dying in Somalia.

IV. On the Murder of Korczak and His Children

Korczak was killed by the Nazis. And throughout the month when most of my friends were unaware of the fiftieth anniversary of Korczak's famous death march to the gas chambers of Treblinka, I found it extremely difficult to concentrate on the news reports of starving children in Somalia. For reasons that are mostly unclear to me, my thoughts for much of the month of August 1992 focused on the pain and anguish of children who died almost three years before I was born. And as I tried ever so hard to avoid hearing about or seeing pictures of the starving children who live with me in the global village that is my home, I returned once again to Lawrence Kohlberg's short paper, "Education for Justice: The Vocation of Janusz Korczak." In this essay Kohlberg has noted the following:

Janusz Korczak ... died during the Warsaw Ghetto uprising of World War II. For many years Korczak, trained as a pediatrician, had directed two orphanage schools in Warsaw, one for Christian children and one for Jewish children, expressing a universal concern that went beyond his Jewish heritage ...

On the morning of August 6, 1942, German and Ukrainian guards surrounded the orphanage as part of the plan for elimination of "non-productive elements" to the Treblinka death camp. Prepared for death, Korczak led the 200 children from his own orphanage to the train station where the freight
cars waited. Each child, neatly dressed and carrying a favorite
doll or book, marched the two miles in a parade of quiet
dignity.\textsuperscript{4}

V. Korczak as a Caretaker of Orphans

Children going to their death in quiet dignity? Is such a thing possible? For Korczak it was indeed possible and desirable to imagine that in a just society children and adults could die in a dignified manner. Korczak did not consider it wise to dwell on the possibility that a child might die. On the contrary, Korczak spent much of his time trying to prevent the death of children. Throughout his thirty year career as a caretaker of orphans, Korczak used his medical and administrative skills to preserve the lives of children on a daily basis. Yet, Korczak realized that at times a child's life, as with an adult's life, could continue no longer. Rather than deny the reality of the death of a child, Korczak became a pioneer in the cause for humane and dignified treatment for individuals who would only live for a short time.

VI. The Problem Stated

Korczak's work helps us see that the liberal crusade for justice is enhanced when we ask a question such as, "How can we treat dying children with dignity?" I have decided to call this question "Korczak's problem" because I wish to honor the memory of the man who wrote a \textit{Ghetto Diary} and King Matt the First.\textsuperscript{5} Furthermore, an individual such as Henryk Goldszmit\textsuperscript{6} should be admired partly because he had the courage to confront Korczak's problem at a time when "poverty, and pain made a mockery of what human life should be."\textsuperscript{7} And as my television set bombards me with images from various parts of spaceship earth I cannot help wondering how Goldszmit would solve Korczak's problem if he had lived to see the horror of orphaned babies dying on the streets of Somalia.

VII. Concluding Remarks

Before I came in contact with Korczak's problem I used to think that infant human beings dying in Somalia would have been better off not being born. Now I am not so sure about this claim. Korczak has helped me gain a deeper appreciation of the Socratic lesson which suggests that human beings do not know for sure whether it is better to be alive or dead. Moreover, Korczak's work seems to imply that the Socratic doubt about life and death is relevant for individuals of all ages.\textsuperscript{8} And the dream of having children die with dignity becomes somewhat understandable if we recall that Goldszmit once wrote the following:

The mother's profound love for her child must give him the
right to premature death, to ending his life cycle in only one or
two springs .... Not every bush grows into a tree.\textsuperscript{9}
Endnotes


6 For an account about how the name Janusz Korczak became the pseudonym for Henryk Goldszmit see Bruno Bettelheim, "Introduction" in Janusz Korczak, King Matt the First, pp. x-xi.

7 See footnote two.

8 See footnote one.

DEJA VU ALL OVER AGAIN à la DEWEY?

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The academic parlor game of "What would John Dewey say about thus-and-so if he were here today?" although always popular around final examination times, is revitalized by special occasions--say the centennial of his arrival in Chicago. (A variant of this game, "I know what he would say, but what does he mean?" is more popular at association meetings.) This paper will explore Dewey's attention to interest and will hazard some opinions about how his views might have developed if he were writing today.

We know that upon his arrival in Chicago 100 years ago, Dewey immediately declared war on the ancient enemy of Progressives--traditional education. Dewey's attacks on "the disciplines" and his focus on the role of interest in education were to become cornerstones of his "new education." His monograph "Interest as Related to [the Training of the] Will" was printed in the First Year Book of the National Herbart Society in 1895 (and later amplified as Interest and Effort in Education). In 1897, Dewey stated that "the crying evil in instruction today is that the subject matter of the curriculum, both as a whole and in its various stages, is selected and determined on the objective or logical basis instead of on the psychological" (Wirth, 1966, p. 91).

And now, 100 years later, the disciplines have enlisted the aid of proficiency examinations, cultural literacy, national curricula, national standards, national assessment, and a host of other pre-determined, externally selected and imposed forces. What a child is interested in is insignificant compared to what "they" say is in the child's best interest. John Dewey would feel uncomfortably at home in 1994 and would probably pick up his pen right where he left off.

He would continue to dual against such dualisms as traditional/modern, internal/external, psychological/logical, and curriculum/child, but in so doing he might focus more on the yin and yang of education. Since it wasn't until WW I, the Depression, and Lenin & Stalin that Dewey began to acknowledge the power of the external world on society and its institutions and individuals, surely the events of the past thirty years would convince him that his "new" education could not regenerate society by itself. (And neither could he avoid the need for an in depth analysis of cultural pluralism in society and the schools.)

Acknowledging the role of society on schools as well as school's influence on society, for example, might lead to a stronger interpretation of
dualisms as archetypal poles of a whole rather than as representatives of two
different categories, as dimensions of a complex but coherent entity rather than
dichotomous antagonists, and as dynamic interactions striving for balance rather
than opposites seeking to obliterate the other. And perhaps his discouragement
over so few educators being able to gain enough perspective to view polar
extremes as both/and rather than either/or would cause him to go even deeper
into the curricular implications of interest as well as the role of an individual's
interest in curriculum development.

From Rousseau on, proponents of student interest were not only
besieged by critics representing various "logical" positions but were beset upon
by the vagueness and ambiguity of their central concept. Even Dewey's notion
of interest remained intertwined with his early naïve acceptance of genetic
psychology: a naturalism which rejects an externally imposed, logically ordered
curriculum and implies that knowledge of the how to entailed a knowledge of
that. Subject matter is to be the constructed outgrowth of individual experience
rather than the constructed outgrowth of collective human experience. Therefore,
in his development of the Laboratory School and his writings about the school's
philosophy, Dewey focused on what he believed were the illogical assumptions
of this "logical" approach to schooling as well as the miseducative consequences
of schooling structured around the disciplines.

However, Archambault (1964) maintains that the proponents of student
interest only succeeded in demonstrating that interest should be a necessary
consideration in curriculum planning and basically ignored the determination of
the sufficiency of such a doctrine. Furthermore, despite their writings about the
curriculum, those who stressed student interest spoke more directly to the
instructional dimension than curriculum development. Since the notions of
interest, in all their forms, permeate the debates of the past 100 years, this paper
will examine three uses of interest and their role in determining the subject
matter of schooling. The notion of sufficiency will also be examined both from
the perspective of personal completeness and from the equally subjective
standpoint of collective human experience.

The three broad uses of interest are the euphemistic, dispositional, and
normative. Supporters of the euphemistic tradition generally adhere to a
Rousseauian view of children and education in which the immediate and natural
interests of the child become the basis of curricular planning. Interest is defined
by this group as attraction or attention evidenced by immediate behaviors. As
Rousseau (1956) succinctly stated: "Present interest: that is the great motive
impulse, the only one that leads sure and far" (p. 52). Kilpatrick's Remaking the
Curriculum (1936) seemed to support this sense of interest by attempting to
vindicate progressive practices accused of exhibiting a certain mindlessness of
the immediate. And despite criticism from progressives such a Bode (1927), the
pedagogical naturalism of Kilpatrick carried the banner of progressive education
the 20's and 30's.
Although Bode, Childs and other reformers sought to redirect reliance upon the euphemistic usage of interest, no one mounted a stronger attack than Dewey. Although harder to pin down on the sufficiency of interests, Dewey was explicit about the insufficiency of certain interests and experiences. From the turn of the century on, Dewey's writings were filled with invectives against pandering to just any whim or fancy of children. In *Interest and Effort*, he referred to such interests as being "a dissipation of energy" and "miseducative" (1913, pp. 41, 91). In *Experience and Education*, Dewey was adamant that an experience could be mis-educative if it "has the effect of arresting or distorting the growth of future experience" (1938, p. 25). Even Rugg & Shumaker's (1928) sympathetic treatment of the child-centered movement was not blind to the lack of coherence in the curricula of child-centered schools--a coherence demanded by educational theory but denied by reliance upon the child's immediate attractions.

From the euphemistic perspective, student interest seems to require nothing from the environment except to be let alone; in safe, laissez-faire conditions, the child's unburdened intellect will naturally develop in educationally valuable directions. However psychologically complete children may feel immediately after following their interests, both Bode and Dewey attacked the logical sufficiency of such an ad hoc curricula. Bode (1927) accused this practice as evading the responsibility of educational guidance and direction and Dewey declared that there exists no magic whereby mere physical activity or pleasant endeavors insure intellectual results. For Dewey (1971), the only educationally worthwhile activities were those that led in an intellectualization of the experience. Thus, the euphemistic perspective failed to meet anything other than an immediate and idiosyncratic sense of sufficiency.

In order to disqualify mere transitory attractions or whimsical attendings as genuine interests, adherents to a dispositional sense of student interest stipulated that an interest was an inclination or settled tendency toward growth and the continuation of a line of activity (Dewey, 1913). This attempt to distinguish momentary attendings from more stable attitudes, while avoiding some Rousseauian pitfalls, inadvertently stumbled across the mine field of attitude theory. Appealing to attitude theories to clarify the notion of interest is precarious at best, for Kiesler argues that more agreement can be found on "interest" than on "attitude" (1969, p. 5). Nevertheless, progressives eager to retain a child-centered approach sought for a more powerful and persuasive concept of interest.

As the leading spokesperson of this position, Dewey (1913) asserted that life demands activity, activity implies a tendency or a direction, and direction underlies interest. Hence, interests are already present in a child's life and all that the teacher must do is to appeal to them. In order to assist teachers in identifying such interests, Dewey (1990) posited four natural impulses or instincts which form the foundation for all interests: communication, creativity,
construction, and inquiry. Since proceeding from student interest is a given, the
only problem the dispositional educator has is determining how to utilize
existing interests in carrying the child to higher planes of perception, judgment,
and control given their present powers and experiences.

Due to his commitment to child-centeredness, however, Dewey (1913)
excluded any interest resulting from external constraint, mere reaction to
excitation, or habit. Teaching was good if and only if it appealed to established
powers while directing them in ways demanding thought or intelligent effort by
the child. Because of his commitment to reflective thinking, Dewey's (1913)
primary criterion was thoughtfulness, or a child becoming consciously reflective
of each activity.

Contrary to the euphemistic position, Deweyan teachers were to
actively suggest various activities and material to students. The only restraint
was that their suggestions had to serve as stimuli to bring forth more adequately
what the child was already "blindly striving to do" (1990, p. 129). Teachers
were to encourage students to develop interest in intellectual matters by helping
them to relate, compare, and contrast existing ideas; however, such
encouragement had to operate within the strict confines of existing pupil interest
(Dewey, 1971). In all cases, teachers directed through structuring the social,
physical, and intellectual resources of the classroom environment (Dewey,
1966).

Despite some obvious improvements in curriculum planning over the
euphemistic position, the critical weakness of both euphemistic and
dispositional views is their adherence to the naturalistic fallacy of assuming that
what is, is worthwhile. In his Schools of Tomorrow, Dewey was unequivocal:
"Interest ought to be the basis for selection [of subject matter] because children
are interested in the things they need to learn... [a child's] interests and his
needs are identical" (1962, p. 217). If taken literally, it is an odd claim indeed
that whatever children are interested in is in their best interest. Even granting
his stipulative definition of interest, Dewey is quite clear that teachers are free to
direct student interest only along the continuum of growth or continuity;
teachers are not at liberty to transform interests into something qualitatively
distinct from the initial interest.

It is not clear, therefore, how Dewey would suggest handling the 75%
of the children of the 1990's who were not in the schools of the 1890's. Some of
the 1990's children have dispositions toward activities of questionable social
value. Many of these activities require conscious reflection, i.e., thoughtfulness,
leading to high degrees of intellectualization of experiences. How should a
teacher deal with the latent interest of the next generation of junk-bond
masterminds?

Proponents of dispositional interests rarely take the following question
seriously: If thoughtfulness and the intellectualization of experience are the
used to determine the educational value of activities, how does one
exclude white-collar, borderline criminal activities? Treating the classroom as a world unto itself, a world generally not touched by society, a world implicitly leaning toward if not resting on the naive pedagogical naturalism of the goodness of children's interests, would be issues Dewey would have to reconsider. When one considers the school and society of the 1990's, the same charges Bode and Dewey leveled against the euphemistic position in the 30's could be made against the dispositional view in the 90's. Given an imperfect society with increasingly more "intellectualized" crimes, then, neither conscious reflection nor intellectualization of experiences are sufficient conditions for determining curricular content or educational aims. What is, is not necessarily worthwhile.

The final manner in which student interest is employed differs qualitatively from the previous forms. Since both the euphemistic and dispositional usages concern what students are interested in, A. R. White (1964) referred to them as psychological uses of interest. The third usage, the normative, refers to what is both worthwhile and appropriate for the pupils; i.e., what is in the student's interest or benefit (Peters, 1967). In its clearest form, this position posits that educational aims or goals cannot be determined from either the momentary or stable interests of individual students; utilization of student interests is appropriate for methodological decisions but not for establishing goals and aims.

By its vary form, the normative position avoids falling into the naturalistic fallacy of the previous positions because it distinguishes is from ought. With this advantage, however, comes the charge that something external to the child is being imposed. And any normative position must be ready to show the relationships between benefit and interest: benefits to whom and for what? And it is at this point that educational aims must be directly addressed.

Rejecting the assumption that interest emanate from naturally good desires, needs, or impulses, the normative position posits that interests are socially acquired attitudes. As such, to enjoin educators from helping to form new interests in children is to permit everyone but educators to determine the content of the curriculum. Educational aims could be dictated by anyone with whom the child interacts--anyone, that is, except educators (Teal & Reagan, 1967). Advocates of the normative interpretation of student interest reject the educator's passive role regarding curricular content implied by the previous positions. Teal & Reagan (1967) assert that "the educator's task is to make the important interesting, not simply to make the interesting important" (p. 62). Dewey views such a position as akin "to search[ing] for some pleasant bait that may be hitched to the alien material" (1966, p. 127). Those from the normative perspective would respond that to have an active role in methodology but a passive role in content, direction, and guidance is akin to educational malpractice.

It would be at this point that Dewey would attack the imposition of pre-determined content and the subsequent efforts to "make it interesting" (1990,
But in spite of his repeated indictments against "subject matter existing wholly independently" of pupil activities (1913, p. 34), Dewey never totally escaped this charge within his own methodology. After all, THE [scientific] METHOD was imposed on individuals who neither generated nor admired it. And his description on how to differentiate a genuine problem (a problem everyone ought to see if they have had the right experiences) from a mock one, merely substitutes a ready-made, and externally formulated, problem situation for a ready-made curriculum (Dewey, 1966).

Recognizing a basic level of control existing within the nature of situations, Dewey repeatedly stated that the teacher's primary responsibility was that of structuring a worthwhile physical, social, and intellectual environment within the classroom (1913 & 1966). Since classroom resources certainly count as external factors, and if these factors exercise elements of control over pupils, Deweyan teachers seem to be always on the tightrope of manipulating external resources or misreading pupil interest, or mistaking excitation for interest, or... Indeed, the teacher is warned against imposing interests and experiences, while simultaneously being told that a primary criterion for classroom projects is that "the activity be worth while intrinsically" (Dewey, 1971, p. 218). How the teacher is to decide "worth" is one of the recurring ambiguities of those espousing the euphemistic and dispositional views.

So it seems that the imposition of pre-determined method/content/value exists to some degree in all of the positions. Those espousing the normative position clearly assert that educators must accept the responsibility for determining which student interests are worth stimulating, which new interests must be cultivated, and which educational attainments should be harnessed to existing interests (Teal & Reagan, 1967).

And perhaps, if he were here today, just perhaps Dewey might make explicit the implications of his treatment of interest in Democracy and Education:

The word interest suggests, etymologically what is between,--that which connects two things otherwise distant. . . . In learning, the present powers of the pupil are the initial stage; the aim of the teacher represents the remote limit. Between the two lie means--that is middle conditions:--acts to be performed; difficulties to be overcome; appliances to be used. Only through them, in the literal time sense, will the initial activities reach a satisfactory consummation [emphasis his] (1966, p. 127).

Dewey's treatment of interest as between-means-through and his provocative but curtailed treatment of direct and indirect interest offer a possible rapprochement with the normative view. A direct interest results in an end which present activity carried to its conclusion; an indirect, i.e., transferred or
mediated interest, while potentially falling prey to process-product ambiguity, could become the only acceptable means toward "making something interesting" (1913, p. 23).

As long as the "remote limit" is not held hostage to overt behaviors; as long as "present powers" can be cultivated rather than observed; as long as interests remain the things which are "between" and are not confused with those things which are aims or goals; and as long as educators can actively transfer and mediate interests, perhaps the yin and yang of interest can approach harmony.

References


I'll be talking about Dewey's aesthetic theory and its relationship to informal education in the nursery school. I know that the theme of this conference is Dewey's years at the University of Chicago, 1894 through 1904, but I'll be referencing a much later Dewey. Most of my references come from the volume *Art as Experience*, which is based on the William James lectures Dewey gave at Harvard in 1931.

In my research I have focused on the empirical study of group improvisational performance. Group improvisation is found in a variety of contexts, including jazz, improvisational comedy, and children's sociodramatic play, and I have active research projects in all three of these areas.

I have begun to develop a theoretical model of improvisational performance which has been influenced by Dewey's theory of the aesthetic experience. Dewey defines experience as *interaction*, with people or the physical environment: "experience is the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and environment which ... is a transformation of interaction into participation and communication" (p. 22). I have focused on social interaction, between a person and others; an extension to all perception (of the natural world) is beyond the scope of this talk.

Rather than solo improvisation, I'm interested specifically in group improvisation: collective performance genres. Although Dewey might argue that all experience, even while one is alone, has a social-interactional dimension, in group improvisation the interaction is immediate.

My specific focus is *verbal improvisation*; for Dewey, language and music both shared the structure of "experience," and music, because of the obvious temporal dimension, was of all the arts the most representative of his aesthetic theory (p. 184). (In my interviews with jazz musicians, it's amazing how often they describe their improvisations in terms reminiscent of Dewey's "experience"). Dewey often compares art, the aesthetic experience, with conversation. They each are interactional, and have a temporal dimension. There is a "continuous interchange and blending" but each component retains its own character (p. 37). Dewey writes "men...are not aware that they have been exercising an art as
long as they have engaged in spoken intercourse with others" (p. 240). It's this creative, improvisational element of everyday conversation which I'm most interested in.

What are the common characteristics of interactional genres as diverse as jazz and children's play? Common to such improvisational phenomena is collective interaction, in which participants' acts are influenced, or constrained by, each other's. Although each individual's participation seems not to be scripted, a highly structured performance emerges. Studying improvisation thus requires being able to model the ways in which genre and group processes constrain individual acts, and the mechanisms whereby participants may creatively influence the realtime flow of the event.

I believe that these conversational skills, or "interactional" skills, if you will, are strongly related to children's social pretend play. To explore how this improvisational skill develops in childhood, I chose to study preschool peer interaction. I have recently completed an 8-month ethnographic study of a 24-child nursery school class, with 3, 4, and 5 year olds. The age range from 3 to 5 seems to be critical for development of a wide range of social and cognitive skills (including creativity, narrative understanding, self-reflexivity or what has been called "metacognition"). I believe that unstructured play interaction with peers plays a large role in this developmental progression. In fact, after the age of three, when given a choice between play with a parent and a peer, the child will usually choose the peer (whereas before this age the child usually chooses the parent).

In the nursery school, children collectively create temporary fantasy worlds which they inhabit and enact. In fact, this is almost all they do! They don't talk about the weather, or what happened on the way to school, or the movie they saw last night: they always play. My research in the nursery school attempts to identify and characterize specific interactional mechanisms which children use to create a collective improvisational performance. This type of play is an experience-based learning environment for the acquisition of social and conversational skills. As such, it is both an aesthetic experience (qua improvisational performance) and a context for learning.

A few developmental researchers have commented on the improvisational nature of peer interaction, but they haven't rigorously explored the interactional/linguistic mechanisms whereby this takes place. As Hugh Mehan writes (about peer interaction in the primary school classroom), classroom conversations are "spontaneous improvisations on basic patterns of interaction." Corsaro's research in the nursery school has led him to talk of embellishment of interactional routines. Corsaro also emphasizes the collective nature of this improvisational creativity. It is the collective improvisations of social play which I am interested in; how do children collectively create a pretend world?

In the context of play, the collective interaction produces what has been a play frame (derived from Goffman, and used primarily in psychological
research: the frame is the situational definition, the stage setting, characters, and relationships). Yet this frame never becomes a fixed definition; it is constantly in flux; at each utterance turn, it changes, is transformed. But children don't have unlimited creative freedom: they are constrained by the play frame. They can't go too far afield, or their utterance will be incoherent to the other children. Thus, each utterance is produced under the influence of two forces: the new projection (creative entailment) of the child, which has the potential to change the play frame; but also, the need for coherence with the play frame operative at the time of the utterance. Each new projection is filtered by the other children, before "entering and changing" the collective, shared, play frame definition.

In many ways, I think this characterization of group pretend play as improvisational shares many aspects with Dewey's notion of experience. Although Dewey does not mention improvisation explicitly (except parenthetically comparing "jazzed music" to movies and comic strips, p. 5), his metaphoric descriptions of "experience," often employing rhythm, would seem quite familiar to jazz musicians. For example, "all interactions . . . in the whirling flux of change are rhythms. There is ebb and flow . . . : ordered change" (p. 16). More common for Dewey is to compare experience to everyday conversation. Dewey thinks of conversation as a form of collective experience; likewise, children's fantasy play qua verbal interaction is collective experience. Dewey quotes a nice passage from William James, which uses several metaphors of "experience" which seem to describe children's play improvisation as well. We find that the twin forces of coherence and projection, characteristic of children's fantasy improvisations, are at play in all experience.

William James aptly compared the course of a conscious experience to the alternate flights and perchings of a bird. The flights and perchings are intimately connected with one another; they are not so many unrelated lightings succeeded by a number of equally unrelated hoppings. . . As with the advance of an army, all gains from what has been already effected are periodically consolidated, and always with a view to what is to be done next. If we move too rapidly, we get away from the base of supplies--of accrued meanings--and the experience is flustered, thin, and confused. If we dawdle too long after having extracted a net value, experience perishes of inanition.

In the first metaphor, that of a bird's flight, we have a characterization of the structure, in time, of an improvisation. Musical notes, or a child's play utterances, are not isolated psychological intentional acts, but are part of a larger, temporal collective process. In the second metaphor, of an advancing army, we see the tension, the balance between the child's interest in creative projection, and the need to maintain coherence with the existing play frame, with what has
In sum, social pretend play, a collective improvisational act, may be a way for the child to learn creativity, aesthetic talent. Dewey is very clear in arguing that art is not a visible product, like a painting, but rather art is the process of creation. "There is a difference between the art product (statue, painting, or whatever) and the work of art. The first is physical and potential; the latter is active and experienced" (p. 162). In improvisation, the artistic process and product are the same; thus the art work is the experience. In democratic fashion, Dewey wanted to connect art with everyday life, to show the continuity between the aesthetic experience and the "normal processes of living." (p. 10). When conversation is viewed as a collective improvisation, we see how it could be the quintessential aesthetic experience.

But more important than simply learning creativity, Dewey argues that children's play is a method of informal learning about how to creatively conduct social interaction; they learn how to improvise. In Dewey's terms, children learn how to have "an experience," learn how to aesthetically structure their experience in a collective, social realm. For Dewey, "experience" is perhaps the most important thing for the child to learn.

References

PETER McLAREN AND CRITICAL PEDAGOGY

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I. Peter McLaren

Peter McLaren is an associate professor of education and associate director of the Center for Education and Cultural Studies at Miami University. He is the author of several books, including *Life in Schools: An Introduction to Critical Pedagogy in the Foundations of Education* (1989).

II. Critical Pedagogy

The goal of critical pedagogy is a critical democracy, individual freedom, social justice, and social change (Shor/Freire, 1988, p. 62). Students are to be empowered by social identities that affirm their race, class, gender positions, while providing a basis for moral self-reflection and social action (Liston/Zeichner, 1987, p. 120).

III. Methodology

**Voice:** The essential concept of acknowledging students' voice is to endorse the concept that each student is a "knowing subject"_ a person who comes to class with ideas and attitudes that represent the individual's current best mode of understanding and interpretation of the world.

**Dialogue and Storytelling:** Students by narrating, sharing, writing and reflecting on their own personal histories, along with their own lived experiences of the cultural process of school, students will begin to develop a sense of the influence of their environment on their own development. Through a dialogue with others they will experience a sense of "self as knowers and makers of history" rather than as passive absorbers of others' ideas of truth (Shor/Freire, 1987).

**Naming Reality:** By consciousness raising and sharing, students begin to realize that there are reasons why they are the way they are.

**Dialogue about Reality and Problem-Posing:** The teacher has to "problematize reality" for students in order that they will begin to think critically of the taken-for-granted reality.

**Empowerment:** By exposure to multiple possibilities of view points and realization of the complex and socially constructed reality students will gradually develop a sense of empowerment that will lead them to conclude that the world
need not be the way that it is and that they have to power to affect the direction and nature of change.

IV. Curriculum

The curriculum takes the actual experiences of the students as a basis for dialogue. The students may come to the classroom influenced by their gender, race, class, and other forces, but it does not prevent them from developing a critical voice. McLaren and Hammer (1989) argue that "while it may be true that there is no privileged vantage point to subjectivity from which we can escape our own constitution in external technologies of power it does not follow that we should submit ourselves without a fight to the processes which have made us who we are." (p. 56) Critical pedagogy is constantly in a state of flux. Teachers have to be facilitators offering critical knowledge and values in order that "differentiated human capacities [can] be realized through the construction of social forms that inhibit the crippling distortions of social and moral regulation that deny individuals from speaking out of their own histories, traditions, voices, and personal experiences." (McLaren/Hammer, 1989, p. 55) Giroux (1986) outlines a pedagogy that "is attentive to the histories, dreams, and experiences that...students bring to school. It is only by beginning with these subjective forms that critical educators can develop a language and set of practices" (p. 64) that will form a bridge between the teacher and student understanding in a "pedagogically progressive" (p. 66) way.

V. Arguments For Critical Pedagogy

Critical pedagogy theory wants to redirect education away from the traditional curriculum that reproduces inequality in society (Apple, 1982; Bowles & Gintis, 1982 for example). Those working in the area want to reactivate resistance to materialism and conformity. With hindsight of the past, they want to attempt to educate "all the children" in a legitimately "common" school. McLaren tries in his writings to develop a critical pedagogy that attempts to give teachers modes of self-reflection by which the classroom teacher will no longer see the classroom as isolated, personal "me" domains, with their own individual concerns, but rather as profoundly social matters needing a "pedagogical praxis that is able to reflectively change the knowledge-basis of their classroom teaching" (McLaren, 1991, p. 26). McLaren suggests that teachers should examine the relationships of language, educational theory, and political power so they can establish educational goals and genuine academic practices that maximize the potential of all students. McLaren wants teachers to be aware they are culturally influenced by their own environment and as such will be careful not to reinforce the social relations that promote race, class, and gender oppression. McLaren and Hammer (1989) write that the main task of critical educators is "knowing how to live continentally and provisionally without the certainty of knowing the truth, with the courage to take a stand on issues of human suffering, domina-
tion, and oppression." (p. 32) These are very lofty goals. McLaren would like to change the schools from within by shaping self-reflective "critical" students who would challenge the assumptions of the society that created them. The goal is to develop in students the analytical skills they need to transform themselves into rational, free, and objective members of society. McLaren (1989) states "... students are continually asked to examine the various codes--that is the beliefs, the values, and the assumptions--that they use to make sense out of their world." (p. 236) How is this accomplished? Dialogue is the key. The classroom, according to Giroux and McLaren (1986) becomes a forum, locus of citizenship where:

students and teachers can engage in a process of deliberation and discussion aimed at advancing the public welfare in accordance with fundamental moral judgments and principles... school and classroom practices should, in some manner, be organized around forms of learning which serve students for responsible roles as transformative intellectuals, as community members, and as critically active citizens outside school (p.237)

The classroom is where social, political, and personal meanings are created and absorbed. In order to create competence for democratic citizenship, the critical pedagogue would develop a classroom where students are given equal opportunity to speak, promote mutual respect for the rights of others, create a sense of feeling self to speak, a toleration for all ideas submitted for discussion, and rational critique of ideas in terms of fundamental judgment and moral principle. Students are encouraged to be partners in their own educative process and are not thought of as passive storage depositories of 'bodies of knowledge.' Dialogue rejects narrative (telling) instruction where the teacher imposes her or his view, silencing and ultimately alienating students. With a problematizing and participatory format, the teacher and students transform learning into a collaborative process in order to illuminate and hence act on reality. McLaren wants the teacher to become a liminal servant in the classroom. The teacher no longer acts as a functionary performer or a drill master rather who casts off the usual status and authority and is guided instead by "compassion and commitment to teach as a social and moral agent in the service of social transformation" (McLaren, 1988, p. 117). The teacher is viewed as a transformative intellectual and not as agent of repression. She or he is more than a talking textbook, more than a functionary who implements standardized test and mandated syllabi. A critical pedagogue is an illuminator of reality who helps us grasp the social limits that constrain us. Students as a result are able to interpret their own lives and their lived worlds and in doing so have wider and wider perspectives and possibilities.
VI. Arguments Against Critical Pedagogy

The goals of critical pedagogy, "Critical democracy", and "social change" are vague and troublesome terms to evaluate. Not everyone agrees with what constitutes "democracy", "individual freedom", or "social justice". Critical pedagogy still appears to have the authoritarian teacher/student relationship. There still exists the institutional authority of the teachers, along with asymmetrical teacher/student and student/student relations, and the basic unknowableness of the "other". The power relations among and between teachers and students of different race, class, and gender are unequal. Giving students a voice in the classroom is problematic. Voice is identity, a sense of self, of relationship to others. We each have many voices. We can view this concept of voice as similar with role or the part we play. We can speak as a member of a particular race, social class, or gender, with a public or private voice. It is simplistic to expect that the student will want to or be able to speak with one voice. There are multiple voices that we could use and given the unequal power base of the different people it is unrealistic to expect that people will act in a fully rational or disinterested way. If a student has poor grades in a particular class, she or he would be more motivated to give back the teacher's bias rather than challenge the direction of discourse. The genuineness of dialogue is a crucial factor in the success of the educative endeavor. Ellsworth (1989) claims that critical pedagogy is a rationalistic theory based on abstract and utopian hypotheses. One can attempt to introduce reflective investigations into issues along with the analysis of possible moral positions in hopes to avoid charges of indoctrination by more "knowledgeable" teachers. However, this assumes that students can be given the skills and inclinations to make them rational individuals capable of willingly selecting moral positions in a similar fashion as those modeled by the teacher. Possibly, there exists an undercurrent belief that when the student has been exposed to the reality of multiple possibilities of viewpoints that they will "naturally" be led to the one that the critical pedagogues advocate. Some students may arrive at positions that would be seen to be "irrational" (biased) by the teacher and/or others in the class.

Although McLaren argues against technical rationality and capitalism, he still places authority in the judgment of the individual. He, like those technocrats he criticizes, equates change and experimentation with new ideas and values as progress. Critical pedagogy assumes that the result of dialogue will be a consensus: People won't have to "agree to disagree". Ellsworth (1989) argues there is abundant evidence to challenge the "myths of the ideal rational person and the 'universality' of propositions that have been oppressive to those who are not European, White, male, middle class, Christian, able-bodied, thin, and heterosexual." (p. 304). Attempts by the teacher to bridge the differences between student and teacher understanding implies a dominant role of the teacher. This contradicts the goals of critical pedagogy that attempts to realize reflectiveness in the individual. The term "empowerment" is vague, general, and difficult to pin...
down (Ellsworth, 1989, p. 307). Student empowerment is usually defined by critical pedagogues in broad humanistic terms that are difficult to challenge or quantify. The approach seems to be cerebral, ignoring powerful influence of emotions that may impede the progress towards individual and collective empowerment. There is an implied hidden agenda to critical pedagogy. Social change and politicization of school masks hidden dangers. The primary role of a teacher is that of an educator. Liston and Zeichner (1987) contend "Teachers, as educators, should be more concerned with enabling students to acquire and critically examine moral beliefs." (p. 122) Giroux and McLaren (1986), in arguing what type of teacher education program we should support, claim:

[That educators must replace pedagogical practices which emphasize disciplinary control and one-sided character formation with practices that are based on emancipatory authority, ones which enable students to engage in critical analysis and to make choices regarding what interests and knowledge claims are most desirable and morally appropriate for living in a just and democratic state. Equally important is the need for students to engage in civic-minded action in order to remove the social and political constraints that restrict the victims of this society from leading decent and humane lives. (p. 225)]

This passage raises several problems. While we want students to be critical it is problematic how we can expect students to make choices or arrive at an agreement on what constitutes "civic-minded" actions when the society they live in can not agree on matters like budget deficit reduction or nuclear arms reduction. True it is important to have students aware that peaceful resolutions of conflicts are more desirable and possible, or what are the various ways to conserve natural resources. Should teachers expect students to engage in action to "remove the social and political constraints that restrict the victims of this society"? Can the teacher free her or himself from their own cultural "baggage" before they emancipate students who can then practice "self-reflection and social action"? The methodology suggested by critical pedagogy seems to target the systems of domination rather than the elimination of the power base.

VII. Discussion of Arguments Against

Giroux (1988) maintains that terms like democracy, justice, and social change have no intrinsic meaning, the need to be redefined by each generation. Each person should value the need to take and justify positions. All value positions are contingent and problematic. McLaren (1988b) comments it "is not so much whether an ideology is true or false, but whether it is persuasive, coherent, and consistent with particular interests, values, and principles that exist in par-
ticular social formations" (p. 177). Given the nature of the present structure of the educational system, there is little hope of eliminating teacher's authority role. However, we can make the classroom more egalitarian and foster democratic classroom environments. I disagree with the argument that teacher authority is intrinsically antithetical to democratic schooling. We need to reexamine the nature of teacher authority continually. Critical pedagogy forces us to tackle the hidden assumptions and forces that form the role of the teacher. Students would need to have a knowledge base before they could be given a true voice in the classroom. They need to have the tools to work with before they are able to be critical and persuasive. A critical pedagogue seems to reflect the Socratic approach. However, Socrates asked two different types of questions. The type of questions Socrates employed in the *Meno* gave the impression that the boy being questioned knew the answer already and that it was merely being "recalled". It was the nature of the questions that led to the discover, not the boy "remembering". In sense, Socrates was the father of programmed learning. The critical pedagogue must be aware of this form of leading the student rather than a real dialogue with the student.

VIII. Conclusion

McLaren has a difficult style to understand. He uses convoluted sentence structures that mask rather than illuminate. Bowers (1991) and Gronn (1988) are critical of McLaren's ideas and style. However, it is to McLaren's credit that he, and others in this field, have generated a theory that points the social nature and forces that form knowledge and power structures. Critical pedagogy has a place in the education of teachers. But where in the public or private schools can we start? How to implement the ideas and when is a problem. It is important to realize different perspectives are possible. On the south side of Chicago, the students in the Roger Taylor Homes live one perspective in a closed and claustrophobic environment. How is one able to make them aware of other viewpoints? Television is not a source of other perspectives just like the Astaire/Rogers' movies were not a real perspective of the thirties. Dialogue is a start. The idea of empowerment is a good one. Students are preoccupied with self that makes them receptive to literature that deals with their concerns. Critical pedagogy is subjective. Knowledge is not "a body to be passed on", it's negotiable and reflects societies' values. Critical pedagogy brings to mind Montaigne's comment, "Life in itself is neither good nor evil, it is the place of good and evil according to what you make it."

References


CORINNE ALDINE SEEDS:
PARALLELS WITH JOHN DEWEY AND RUDOLF STEINER--
POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OR INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT?

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I. Corinne Aldine Seeds (1889-1969)
I am a product of the educational ideas of John Dewey, since I attended University Elementary School (UES), the laboratory school at UCLA, whose longtime principal and now namesake Corinne Aldine Seeds, was a disciple of Dewey. Attending this school had the most profound effect on me and my sisters.

On reading Rudolf Steiner some years later, I noticed a close affinity between his ideas and the praxis of the training school I had attended. In attempting to explain the apparent resemblance of the works by Rudolf Steiner to the schooling I had received as a child, I wondered if there might not be some connection between Corinne Seeds and Rudolf Steiner. The areas of overlap include the importance of mathematics instruction as well as rhythmic expression, movement, music, and art.

When I sought to discover if this was the result of some influence--direct or indirect--I was told only that she had been influenced by Dewey and Kilpatrick. At UES they said that since her ideas had been replaced by behaviorism, all of the materials left from the tenure of Miss Seeds had been dispersed: lent, given away, lost. When I asked at the School of Education about any information on Corinne Seeds, the woman behind the desk puzzled over the name: "Who? I've been here for three years, and I've never heard of her."

The only item in the Readers Guide was an article about the closing of the school, in Time magazine for the fourteenth of July 1947, by which date the school had already reopened in its new location on campus. This article grossly misrepresents both Miss Seeds and what she stood for, amounting to a blanket indictment of progressive education in the very xenophobic climate of the immediate post-war period.

In Virginia I was able to locate just three of her books, all produced in the thirties, the first decade of her tenure as principal of the school. Two books on curriculum come from this early period--Major Units in the Social Studies For the Intermediate Grades (1932) and Handbook For Student Teachers (1935)--both co-edited with Charles Wilkin Waddell, Director of UCLA Teachers College, as it was called then.

A book published in 1937, Childhood Expressions, contains photographs of students engaged in various activities, together with poetry composed by them, as the children "begin to put their thoughts into words...[and..."
paint word pictures which glow with life."² This book, dedicated to Dr. Waddell, "our beloved director, whose guidance has made possible an enriched and progressive program of education conducive to creative work," was particularly magical for me since the pictures showed the neighborhood I grew up in—as it was then. There are several pictures taken at the park of my childhood, of students catching guppies in the stream, as I used to do. One picture is of some children leaning over the edge of a pond full of lily-pads and carp. This pond is no longer there, since it has been filled in, replaced with an enclosed sandbox with swings and other playground equipment, where my own children sometimes played.

In addition, there are books and pamphlets by several of the other supervising teachers. The books that are left are mostly curricular—outlining how to set up the social studies unit—but they contain statements that show the "point of view," including a section on "Dewey's Creed." These books show the powerful intention behind the teaching, and the preparation that went into making the classroom experience what it was.

UCLA Library has some of Seed's things in Special Collections; the Ed-Psych Library has been dismantled and the materials sent to the University Research Library. Fortunately, data-bank coordinator Robert Wenkert has gathered together materials on Miss Seeds.

The folklore at UCLA says that Miss Seeds came to Chicago and studied at the feet of Dewey, then went back out to California to put his ideas into practice. In reality she went to Columbia in the early twenties, where in 1921 she was awarded the Bachelor of Science in Educational Sociology and the Master of Arts in 1925. She took courses at Teachers College from Thomas Alexander, Milo Hillegas, William Heard Kilpatrick, Frank McMurry, Lois C. Mossman, Sarah L. Patrick, and others, crediting them with "Stimulating the desire to experiment in the school and in shaping points of view."³

Born in 1889, Miss Seeds had already been teaching since 1911, following two years of study at Los Angeles State Normal School, before she went back to Teachers College. When she returned from her second year at Columbia, she became principal of the University Elementary School, a post which she retained, along with teaching duties in the School of Education, until her retirement from the University in 1957. The school, which first opened in 1882, had already moved several times. At the time she took over as principal, in the summer of 1925, the Training School was just being displaced from the building that housed it—by the College of Letters and Science. Bungalows were quickly set up at a nearby site, and school was able to open in the fall. When the University moved to its new Westwood campus a few years later, no provision had been made for the Training School, so the same bungalows were moved to a city site near the campus. When that site was withdrawn by the Board of Education, more bungalows were brought to the present location on the UCLA campus. The most recent threat to the existence of the school has been the displacement of some of its space to permit new construction for the business school.

When thinking of Miss Seeds I am reminded of the May Sarton book I a Phoenix. Miss Seeds was indeed a phoenix. I remember her as a
formidable lady. Even in sixth grades, there always arose a hiss of whispered "Miss Seeds" whenever she walked into the room. We were at least a little scared of her, but there was also a part of respect and awe. We had some idea of her place in our lives, some intimation of her important to us. Lots of people didn't understand, but many of us did. Our mothers knew.

Due to the fact that students were assigned to the school because they happened to live nearby, conflict arose over some matters like whether we could read our grandmothers' handwriting, whether we could compete successfully in a spelling bee, and whether we were learning math. When the school was re-opened in 1947, attendance was by application only, no longer by accidents of residence. Normally there was no mathematics until the fifth grade, and no handwriting until the sixth; instead, we learned to print, in order to put all our attention on the content rather than on the form. By far the most serious controversy was over the fact that there was no arithmetic taught in any formal fashion until the fifth grade. I can remember begging the teacher for arithmetic in fourth grade, probably because we were the very last on our block--infinitely worse than being the last to get a decoder ring in exchange for a cereal box top. For me this timing was unfortunate, as the school was closed the year I was in fifth grade. My mother tutored me until I caught up with the other students, who had had arithmetic ever since first grade. Even though I missed the formal introduction of arithmetic in the fifth grade, its proper time, I went on to become a mathematician.

Although we had no formal math instruction, we learned by doing. We had been doing real work with numbers since the beginning, by making change at the post office in second grade, and measuring all the things we made out of wood, astounding our parents at our skill with fractions. What we had been doing all along was a pure abstraction rather than simply an abstraction represented symbolically on paper.

I came to UES after two years spent in the dark, cavernous rooms at Fairborn Avenue School, where we had real air raids and had to wear dog tags. Miss Ivy was memorable for her trooper duty on the day the Japanese were thought to be attacking, for she sat all day and read to us as we hid in our fear and confusion under the desks.

It was in the summer of 1943 that my mother started back for her doctorate at UCLA. She had done her undergraduate work at Mills College and gotten a masters from Berkeley. This was all in English, before she met my father, and before she started having us.

She heard about the Training School near campus, the University Elementary School, and signed us up. I went to summer school that first year, then to second grade in the fall. My first memories of UES were of sitting in a large group on a rug toward the back of the classroom reading a large, neatly lettered hanging sign like a flip chart. In second grade we did a unit on the community; the room was set up with a miniature city spread out on the floor, the streets, the houses, complete with milk delivery and trash collection. We ran a post office, where we sold stamps and made change. For some reason I identified most with the milk man in his milk truck.
For me, UES was one long history of making things. In third grade we carved our own wooden boats to launch in the deep-water harbor one semester, and built a Hopi pueblo the other. The freighter I made was the first thing I ever made myself that wasn't out of Tinker Toys. I remember the thrill of tapping it with the miniature champagne bottle and launching it down the ramp into the replica of the harbor. The real ship launching I went to at the Long Beach shipyard where Uncle George worked during World War II was more exciting only because they smashed the champagne bottle. It's a better ritual when you completely obliterate the offering: that makes it a real sacrifice. For many years I sailed that boat, a freighter complete with booms and hatches, in a ditch near my house. The hatches were carried away once in a flood, but the boat still floated without them.

We also built a Hopi pueblo, made Indian garments, and role-played a day in the life of the pueblo. I remember constructing the Hopi pueblo in third grade, crawling around in and on it, pretending it was night and then day, reliving the rhythm of the day for the big family in the pueblo, sunrise and sunset. I remember the rectangular burlap jerkin we made--later used the same idea for my kids' Halloween costume.

In fourth grade the husband of my student teacher for the unit on Early California came to school and demonstrated lariat twirling. We ground corn with a matate, dipped candles, made soap from lard and lye. I still have the molded clay plate we made. We sewed authentic Early-California costumes, dyeing the fabric ourselves. I took the pattern home and made my first creation out of some old sheets I had dyed pink. The dress wasn't very good, but it was a start. Not long after that I began making all my own clothes.

Due to the sudden closure of the school, there was no fifth grade, otherwise we would have made covered wagons for the study of the pioneer movement westward. Instead, I went to Westwood School where forty or fifty children sat in a large, dark room, in double rows of old-fashioned inkwell desks with ink in them. It was dismal, even with the wall of windows behind us. We had a model of a covered wagon at the front of the otherwise featureless classroom. Once we memorized a list of twenty-five Spanish words.

Saved at last by the opening of the H building on the corner of the UCLA campus, we returned to our school. In sixth grades we studied aeronautics, building model airplanes (mine was a DC-3) and balsa-wood gliders. Most important to me were always the things we made ourselves. My design for the airport was selected and built. During the unit on radio we made real working crystal sets that were able to pick up actual broadcast signals. I took mine home and listened to Jack Benny at nine o'clock every Sunday night. I still remember the talk I gave on cumulus, nimbus, cirrus and stratus cloud formations in the culmination to sixth grade.

The high point of the year came when they asked me, at the last minute, to read the President's proclamation, a very nice inspirational speech sent around by Harry S. Truman to be read before Thanksgiving. I was pleased at being selected, impressed by what I was able to do, and amazed at how easy it was. I rose to the occasion.
We sang "For peace and for plenty, for freedom for rest; for joys in the land, from the east to the west. For the dear starry flag with its red, white, and blue; our father in heaven, our thoughts rise to you. Our father in heaven, our thoughts rise to you." We sang "He-chalutz le-ma'an avoda, avoda le-ma'an he-chalutz" (The pioneer is for work; work is for the pioneer.) I thought it was nonsense at the time. The "Zum gali gali gali, sum gali gali" refrain was nonsense, but the verse of this kibbutz anthem was deadly serious.

Probably the very most important benefit derived from going to the school was in learning how to think. What Miss Seeds tried to do was to present the students with a problem situation, and then provide them with access to the tools they needed to work it out, without ever giving anything away, or telling them the answer. It was a tremendous disruption for the school to be closed for a year, but the really difficult transition for me was the one at the end. I was completely unprepared for the feeling of rejection I would experience in junior high, where it was expected that we would write in longhand and where it was not expected that we would know how to think. A professor at the University of Tel-Aviv later told me that college students were not expected to think for themselves until the second year of graduate study. It seems to me obvious that by then it is too late.

Altogether, the experience of attending UES was the most important thing that ever happened to me in my life. From my point of view, I feel UES existed for my benefit. And I'm grateful.

Miss Seeds presided magisterially over Education 330. Dubbed "The Box"--because of its main activity, the assembling of a box--it was a course in materials. Each teacher-in-training gathered background materials for use in the classroom; they could be seen trudging and traipsing across campus under the load of this priceless resource. The teachers she trained were called "seedlings."

The classes at the training school were organized with one master teacher supervising several student teachers from the School of Education. The exceptional student teachers were picked to become training teachers in their turn. At least four student teachers were assigned to a class, each preparing one segment of the day--with specialists to come in at the joints, like the jewels in a watch movement.

There were teachers everywhere, but not all that much contact between the students and the supervising teacher, who oversaw two classrooms in each grade, one upper and one lower, from her office on a bridge in between them. In addition to the student teachers, students from the School of Education sat around the periphery of the room to observe the class. We got used to having these observers around, in the same way that laboratory rats get used to seeing lab coats all the time. They were always there, and we were supposed to pay no attention to them, although sometimes they would come forward to lean over our shoulder to offer some help if we had raised our hand with a question and no one else was available at the moment.

Each class was organized around some unit of study, called the "unit of work": The Community, The Post Office, The Harbor, The Hopi Pueblo, Early California, The Westward Movement, Radio and Aeronautics.
The social studies unit was centrally important; the rest of the curriculum hinged upon it. As people learned of the effectiveness of this way of organizing studies, however, they failed to grasp the whole picture with its implications. Lamentably, when they went out to apply what they had learned about the social studies unit, all that the teachers remembered was that it should be central. But they did not remember the main point: how to integrate it into the curriculum, how to make the social studies unit infiltrate everything else. Miss Seeds used to complain bitterly about this, because people got the message about the social studies unit—that it was centrally important, a necessity—but they went away thinking that all you had to do was have a social studies unit. In effect, the committed mindless imitation, going through the motions of following an example, without ever really getting it. They copied the idea of the unit, but they failed to understand the point of the unit: that it was a central focus around which all learning activities revolved.

It was important to us to get thoroughly involved in the unit of work. One of the principal ways we did this was through dramatic play: by being someone else, by feeling how it was to be that person, wearing their costumes, eating their food, doing their work, producing their artifacts. The dramatic play was the last part of the day; the next day would begin with a discussion of any question that had come up during the previous day.

Aside from the centrality of the social studies unit and the focusing of everything else around it, the most important factor was rhythms. An essential part of the equipment had to be a room large enough to permit unrestricted space for rhythms. This space could also be used for assembling the entire school population. Phoebe James played the piano and we moved in time with what she was playing. For her we were elephants, our two arms clasped together, heavy trunks swaying to and fro in front of us. We were flowers reaching up to follow the sun. We were trees, our branches blowing in the wind. We were birds, rising to the sky and swooping back down again. We were sailors hauling together an imaginary line as we weighed the invisible anchor.

The art supervisor, Miss Natalie White, was also a centrally important person. She came in to lead the art segment, ensuring that art was another means of expressing the unit of work. The medium of choice was tempera on newsprint.

The other important supervisor was Miss Diana Anderson, who taught PE. All the sports were integrated, with boys and girls on each team, playing together. On the outside, girls weren't even allowed to play on the same field, let alone on the same team. There were swings, teeter-totters, monkey bars, rings and horizontal bars, all set in sand boxes. The playground was covered with loose gravel, which made for nasty scraped knees. By contrast, blacktop makes for a smoother skinned knee.

The must supervisor was named Laverna Lossing. There was always singing, to strummed accompaniment on the autoharp. I acquired a permanent affection for the autoharp.

At the end of each term there would be an event called the culmination. Of course, the word culmination itself remained opaque for us, although we didn't mean that students would present things they had learned during the
semester, the results of their work. For example, in sixth grade I gave the presentation on the formation of clouds, the names of which I still can recall. The students would also sing songs and dance dances.

One of the most noticeable features of this education is the deferral of all formal mathematics instruction until the fifth grade. By then the students are all clamoring for it, bowing to social pressure, because they are the last on their block to have math. Growing up to become a mathematician, I observed that most people have acquired math phobia, picking it up from the fear of the person who first taught them, in their mother's milk.

While the abstract formulation of arithmetic is not presented earlier, students engage in all kinds of practical mathematical activities like measuring and making change. I have often used the knowledge of this effect in tutoring math: no matter how mathematically handicapped students are, they can always make change and play cards, so I use cards and money as tutoring tools.

There was never any lecturing. Instead, situations were created in which the pupil developed a need to know. At the same time, materials were provided which satisfied that need to know. This elaborate preparation had the effect of fostering natural curiosity, but it also had the unfortunate consequence of perhaps not being all that useful in the real world. It's great to have your curiosity aroused, but it is not good to need someone else there first to stimulate and then to feed that curiosity. This is not a strong criticism, but it is a definite drawback. You want to foster curiosity that is able ultimately to dress and feed itself.

It has always seemed to me that I had a UES mind, that my mind was developed in a particular way by my experience at UES. I would take on a problem and wrap my mind around it, could feel my brain doing this physically, as if it were hollow. Whenever we would want to make anything as a family, I would put on my UES brain and analyze the situation. Then I would devise a solution to the problem, design whatever it was going to be, and procure the necessary materials.

Besides May Sarton, Miss Seeds reminds me of Virginia Woolf, whose *A Room of One's Own* contains a recurrent theme of the thrill of discovery, of finding nuggets of pure truth. The reward of doing research is in that moment when one comes across something that rings true. Miss seeds describes the excitement the children feel at finding an original idea, at stretching their own abilities, in the pure joy of using their own mind.

As so it went. All who know those days remember the emphases Corinne Seeds stressed so effectively: the importance of children's active involvement in learning, and the critical role of problem-solving. One basic instructional method in the school allowed children to mobilize their energies to resolve dilemmas real to them and to pursue, with high motivation and meaning, the knowledge and skills that would resolve their dilemmas. This brought that resounding sense of personal accomplishment and mastery that comes with problem resolution.
Many times I recall children concluding one of those marathon problem-solving sessions with a triumphant, "I love problem-solving! You see how clearly you think!" And that insightful follow-up by some fifth-grade children one day, as the commented, all on their own, about the higher order reasoning processes in which they had just engaged: "You bring all your ideas together and you test them." "Yeah, it's a bunch of ideas. You get a good idea and you add that to your bunch. Pretty soon you have a bunch of ideas. Then you fit them all together and you have a really big idea." "And if the ideas isn't right, you can change it. Your ideas bet better as you see what's good and not so good in your reasoning." Scarcely an elegant discourse, but considering the content of these children's unsolicited enthusiasms, "caught" in the cloakroom on the way to recess, it is an impressive demonstration of their sensitivity to some process of inquiry and idea-construction. Perhaps most important, though, was their enthusiasm, their sense of personal mastery and autonomy, their enjoyment in the inquiry process itself. 4

The description is not unlike Steiner's insight experience and Dewey's consummating experiences.

While Miss Seeds refers to John Dewey's work explicitly in her bibliographies, quotes him, and uses his expressions, she makes no reference to Rudolf Steiner. She was at Columbia in the early twenties, during the last years of Steiner's life, around the time he delivered in 1922 lectures on education at Manchester College at Oxford. My intuition says there must be some connection between Seeds and Steiner.

Alexander Sutherland Neill (1883-1973)--founder of Summerhill in England--knew of Steiner's work, was familiar with his ideas, and recognized their originality, although he didn't like the fact that it was a system. 5 It is probably better in the long run to be able to put Dewey's ideas into practice with complete freedom as Miss Seeds did, but then her applications are free in turn to disappear, leaving only her writings. It was ultimately the enormous amount of preparation required, rather than any inadequacy of the theory, that caused progressive education to be replaced by behaviorism. In his preface to William Heard Kilpartrick: Trail Blazer in Education discussing the "point of view" and "philosophy of education," Dewey observes that teachers themselves do not sufficiently practice what they preach, the process of learning. 6

The question remains whether a link exists between Steiner and Dewey. Dewey was undoubtedly familiar with the work of Steiner, but there is no reference to him in the index to the Collected Works. There is no indication that Steiner read Dewey either, although he did read and understand English.

Dewey and Steiner were born about the same time, Dewey in 1859 and Steiner two years later, in 1861; Dewey in New England, in Vermont, and Steiner in Austria/Hungary, in Kraljevec; Dewey to Protestants, Steiner to Catholics. While they both effectively broke their ties with organized religion,
they remained affected by it. Both Steiner and Dewey studied the German philosophers in general, and Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841) in particular.

II. Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925)

Steiner attended the Institute of Technology in Vienna. His teacher there, Karl Julius Schröer, after introducing the young man to the works of Goethe (1749-1832) and Schiller (1759-1805), obtained for him two positions editing Goethe's scientific works. The first, in 1883, was a edition for the popular press, with Joseph Kürschner. The other, done with Bernhard Suphan at the Goethe/Schiller Archive in Weimar, was for the complete edition. In addition to the essays contained in the 1883 edition, Steiner wrote The Theory of Knowledge Implicit in Goethe's World Conception (1886) and Goethe's Conception of the World (1897). At the Goethe Society he gave a lecture on Goethe as the founder of a consciousness of aesthetics (1889).

In 1886 Steiner read Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). He undertook an intensive study of the works of Nietzsche, whom he met on one occasion and for whom he had the highest regard, writing a book called Friedrich Nietzsche: Fighter For Freedom (1895). Steiner took Nietzsche one step further in pointing out the actual source of strength. While still in Weimar, he wrote Philosophy of Freedom (1890). In 1891 Heinrich von Stein (The Seven Books of Platonism) accepted his thesis, "A Theory of Cognition, With Special Reference to Fichte's Scientific Teaching," published the following year as Truth and Science. Fichte-a disciple of Kant (1724-1804) who ended up embracing a pure idealism in which there was no other reality but the self--had been depressed by the claim that we can know nothing; William James (1842-1910) was also depressed by materialism, and Kleist (1777-1811) came close to insanity reading Kant. Goethe's Faust had enabled Steiner to dismiss scientific materialism, and he used Fichte as a wedge against Kant to refute it.

In 1884, while still a student, Steiner became tutor to the family of Ladislaus and Pauline Specht, who had a ten-year-old hydrocephalic child, Otto, for whom Steiner concocted concentrated lessons, instilling confidence and motivation in his pupil. Later Steiner served as tutor for the children of a widow, Frau Anna Eunicke, who became his wife in 1899 after his move from Weimar to Berlin in 1897. He developed his educational theories based largely on his experience with the children of these two families. In 1907 he wrote the essay on education which was read by Emil Molt. In 1919, seeking to prevent a recurrence of a war like the one that had just ended, Molt asked Steiner to start a school for children of workers at the Waldorf-Astoria Cigarette Factory in Stuttgart. Steiner gave the launching lectures in April and August of 1919. His lecture series on "Education As a Social Problem" was followed by lectures to teachers; "Study of Man," "Practical Course For Teachers," and "Discussions With Teachers." In 1922 he gave his lectures on education in Oxford at Manchester College. He continued an intense schedule of lectures and consultations until his death in 1925.
III. John Dewey (1859-1952)

At first Dewey was attracted to the thinking of positivist Auguste Comte (1798-1857), who had high hopes for science in the "idea of a synthesis of science that should be a regulative method of an organized social life." Both Dewey and Steiner were interested in the positivist materialist Johann Friedrich Herbart, author of *Science of Education*. Dewey studied logic with pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) at Johns Hopkins in 1882, seemingly unaware of the importance of Peirce. There also was George Sylvester Morris (1840-1889), whose commitment to the idealism of Hegel (1770-1831) had the most profound effect on Dewey—until he repudiated him in *Quest For Certainty* (1929) in favor of Heisenberg (1901-1976). He was also influenced by the scientific method of Charles Darwin (1809-1882), preferring its instrumentalism to materialism. An importance contact was his collaboration with colleague and friend George Herbert Mead (1863-1931), who had been tutor to the children of James, the author of *Principles of Psychology* (1890).

Dewey came to the University of Chicago in 1890, opening the University Elementary School in 1896, and moving to Columbia in 1905 after the sudden closing of the laboratory school. While still at Chicago Dewey taught a course on Hegel each year from 1894 to 1899. He delivered his Talks to Teachers in 1899 and his Far East Lectures in 1919-1921. Dewey retired from Columbia in 1930 and died in 1952.

IV. Dewey and Steiner

The first thing Steiner and Dewey had in common was that they were both men. They were both philosophers and educators. They both had an intense love of learning, an insatiable curiosity. They were themselves motivated learners, fascinated by the world, devouring knowledge. Steiner was fascinated by the history of ideas. Both Dewey and Steiner were influenced by German philosophers: Steiner by Goethe, Fichte, Hartmann, and Nietzsche; Dewey by Kant and Hegel. Dewey was as immersed in the thought of Hegel as Steiner in Goethe and Nietzsche, and the imprint left on Dewey's thinking as permanent. His turn away from the idealism of Hegel under the influence of Heisenberg is similar to Steiner's turn away from the materialism of Kant under the influence of Goethe and Fichte. Steiner and Dewey both studied Herbart, a positivist materialist.

Steiner considered mathematics to be an excellent preparation because it teaches logic, detachment, concentration upon non-physical realities. Through this training the mind becomes capable of detachment and is able to create order out of chaos. For Dewey, math is the foundation of all strivings after knowledge, and logic requires the ability to see all sides of a question, but Dewey is put off by the absolutes of mathematics.

Both Dewey and Steiner were influenced by German philosophers: Steiner by Goethe, Fichte, Hartmann, and Nietzsche; Dewey by Kant and Hegel. Dewey was as immersed in the thought of Hegel as Steiner in Goethe and Nietzsche, and the imprint left on Dewey's thinking as permanent. His turn away from the idealism of Hegel under the influence of Heisenberg is similar to Steiner's turn away from the materialism of Kant under the influence of Goethe and Fichte. Steiner and Dewey both studied Herbart, a positivist materialist.

Both of them were first involved in nineteenth century science, Steiner as editor of scientific works of Goethe. Goethe's remark that "there is no matter without spirit" allows Steiner to moved away from matter toward spirit. Through his reading of Goethe's *Faust* he was able to dismiss materialism. He was opposed to the monism of Haeckel (1834-1919), who contended that
matter is all and spirit does not exist. Steiner did his 1891 dissertation on science: "A Theory of Cognition, With Special Reference to Fichte's Scientific Teaching," published as Truth and Science (1892).

As Sloan says, "In Dewey's time, the dominant conception of knowledge is that represented and epitomized by the methods of science."14 Dewey followed the science of Darwin, which he preferred to materialism--both Dewey and Steiner have an aversion to materialism. At first fascinated with the idealism of Hegel, he maintained a tension held between realism on the one hand and idealism on the other. "Throughout his life, John Dewey concerned himself with [the] split between knowledge, as defined by science, on the one hand, and ethics and human values, on the other."15

At first Dewey rebelled against the religiosity of his mother; in Chicago he broke ties with organized religion; and ultimately he maintained his aversion to any absolute. Both Steiner and Dewey turned away from the religion of their childhood, but their early training left an indelible stamp on their thinking. Steiner went about as far as possible away from the Catholicism of his childhood, but his ideas are nonetheless pervaded by Christianity: although not quite orthodox, and sometimes in name only, it is still a preoccupation.

Dewey and Steiner both spoke and wrote about the three-fold nature of man, which should be focused upon when dealing with children: body, mind, soul.16 These are the thinking (conscious), feeling (semi-conscious), and willing (unconscious) aspects of the personality.17 The three-fold commonwealth or kingdom means cultural anarchy.18

Both Dewey and Steiner emphasized, advocated, and defended human freedom. For both of them, freedom was essential, and they shared an unwillingness to impinge on the freedom of others. Steiner was against self-governance, but Dewey the author of Democracy As a Way of Life preferred to solve problems in a democratic way. Part of his objection to Hegel was the danger he saw to democratic society. According to Steiner, resolving some anxiety leads to a sense of freedom, of release.19 For him, human freedom plays an active part in perception, in that it leads to insight.20

Whenever some anxiety suddenly evaporates, man experiences a delightful sense of freedom. Whenever he solves an important problem, he experiences a flash of exultation,21 a primal ecstasy from the heart of creation, like the overpowering ecstasy of Nietzsche.22 Steiner obtained information through direct knowing--insight--and Dewey through direct aesthetic experience. In both cases a kind of inward vision is involved: thought (imagination); inspiration; intuition. Steiner's flash of exultation is like Dewey's consummating experience of harmony and wholeness.23 The bliss of knowledge leads to poetry, the heart's desire, so it is necessary to give free expression to artistic feeling.24 This unconscious creativity transforms the world directly into art.25

Art, far from being a peripheral concern, is centrally important in education--as in life. It is the most direct way of learning, and the means of contact with the world. Dewey sought to balance materialism with artistic expression. Sloan says that Dewey--Art As Experience--provides insights that support the Waldorf conception, but worked out in less detail.26 Steiner thought to combine
arts, science, and religion. Steiner—*Education As an Art*—saw that children observe their world and are naturally creative, artistic, and aesthetic.

Steiner believed that a child is a child and should be approached and treated that way, in a kind, understanding, sympathetic, yet structured and disciplined manner. Children were, in Dewey's belief, interested, active, and curious. Both Dewey and Steiner came out of German philosophy, but they came down in different places. They both moved away from materialism, Dewey through the pragmatism of Comte and the instrumentalism of Darwin to the idealism of Hegel and the realism of Heisenberg; Steiner from the materialism of Kant through the idealism of Fichte to the spirituality of Nietzsche, a monism in which the universe is spiritual in nature and the only reality is spirit, more on the side of Goethe (there is no matter without spirit) than Haeckel (matter is all there is, and spirit is only a byproduct of matter). He worked toward a reconciliation of science and religion. His brand of spirituality was incomprehensible in the age of Freud. Dewey's horror of absolutes kept him from going all the way to spirit; the aversion Dewey has for religion is the same as the one he has for mathematics: a fear of absolutes.

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**Endnotes**

1The generous assisatnce of George W. Stickel, Amie Goldsmith Watson, John H. Moses, Jr., Fred Paddock, Earl J. Ogletree, Marjorie Spock, and Douglas Sloan is hereby gratefully acknowledged.

2Seeds, *Childhood Expressions*, p. 5.


4Crabtree, p. 9.

5Croall, p. 153.

6Reprinted in Boydston, p. 53.

7Wilson, pp. 81-82.

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12 Quoted in Wilson, p. 97.
13 Ibid., p. 37.
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25 Ibid., p. 90.
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MORAL CHARACTER AND MORAL CONDUCT: DEWEY'S NEGLECTED LEGACY

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I. Introduction

Throughout his long career, John Dewey employed a distinctly interdisciplinary approach to the study of ethics. The influence of both Charles Darwin and William James is evident in the manner in which he integrates psychology and even physiology with concepts that have ethical import: i.e., impulse, emotion, habit, judgment and conduct. In contrast, we find the work of Lawrence Kohlberg--for more than 25 years, the dominant psychological theory of ethics. Significantly, Kohlberg once referred to himself as "warmed over Dewey." On the surface, Kohlberg's theory appears to be derived from Dewey. In particular, its interactionist approach to understanding the development of moral judgment, and its inquiry approach to moral education. Nonetheless, unlike Dewey, Kohlbergian moral development is, almost exclusively, a concern for the cognitive domain.

No work of Dewey's contrasts more with Kohlberg than Human Nature and Conduct. That text reveals, yet again, a multidisciplinary approach to understanding morality. Unlike Kohlberg, Dewey has a much broader concern for the forces of moral development. Indeed, while Kohlberg has focused on reasoning and moral judgment, Dewey for example, makes it clear that "knowing when to leave acts without distinctive moral judgment and when to subject them to it is itself a large factor in morality." Stepping beyond Kohlberg's arena, Dewey reminds us that constant recourse to moral reasoning can paralyze us--much like the fabled centipede who, when asked how he walked, began to find it difficult to move his feet.

Nonetheless, Kohlberg's theory continues to be compelling. One reason for this is the widespread assumption that mature moral judgment will check or modify our unreflective impulses and emotions. Dewey, however, has a different view. He wrote that "rationality is not a force to evoke against habit and impulse, it is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires." For this reason, the methods of moral education should not simply focus on reasoning; rather, it needs to take account of the role of impulse, emotion and habit, and in doing so, achieve this "working harmony among diverse desires."

In this paper, I would like to reexamine a portion of Dewey's theory which is widely neglected among those concerned with the process of moral de-
velopment and the practice of moral education. I hope to show two things: first that Dewey held valuable insights into the dominant role of emotion and habit in moral development; and secondly, that these insights of Dewey's clearly anticipated more recent research--not in psychology, but in physiology and medicine. Unlike contemporary theorists, John Dewey appreciated the relevance of these fields of study to our understanding of moral growth. Indeed, it is the position of Dewey and myself that without a full account of these areas of study, we cannot hope to advance an accurate understanding of human nature and moral conduct.

II. Moral Character and Moral Conduct

In Human Nature and Conduct we find a mature statement of Dewey's theory. Subtitled "An Introduction to Social Psychology" one would be hard pressed to find a social psychologist whose research takes proper measure of Dewey's insights. What that book reveals, as suggested, is that Dewey more accurately anticipated the implications of research in physiology and even endocrinology for our understanding of human social conduct.

A distinctive feature of Dewey's theory, is the manner in which he views the interactive relation between the mind, the body and the environment. These forces shape--and are shaped by--the interaction of individual and collective impulses, emotions and habits. First and foremost, however, to the development of moral character are the emotions. It is the emotions which are shaped into internal, physiological patterns which Dewey terms "habits." Dewey's concept of habit is unlike ordinary usage of that term. Nonetheless, as will be demonstrated, it is the key feature of his theory of moral character. First, let us examine the role of emotion, since emotions are the building block of habits and moral character.

The connection Dewey makes between our emotions and moral character was made clearly in his earlier work Moral Principles in Education. Addressing the limitations of a purely cognitive approach to moral education he wrote:

We can imagine a person with most excellent judgment, who yet does not act upon his judgment, . . . there must also be a delicate personal responsiveness,--there must be an emotional reaction. Indeed, unless there is a prompt and almost instinctive sensitiveness to conditions, to the ends and interests of others, the intellectual side of judgment will not have proper material to work upon. Just as the material of knowledge is supplied through the senses, so the material of ethical knowledge is supplied by emotional responsiveness.
The significance of Dewey's statement is not only that he identifies our native "emotional responsiveness" as the "material" for "ethical knowledge", but that Dewey was also aware of the physiological basis of our emotional responses. Some of this research is well worth reviewing if we are to appreciate Dewey's theory and the relation between emotion, habit and moral character.

Since the work of Harvard physiologist Walter B. Cannon earlier in this century we have been able to understand emotions in general--and fear and anger in particular--in terms of specific physiological changes which alter the body's homeostasis. These changes are most pronounced during the "fight or flight" response--an alarm reaction first described by Cannon that, as he observed, accompanies the powerful emotions of fear and anger. Normally these internal responses serve the purpose of preparing the body for extreme muscular exertion--fighting or fleeing--when a clear danger is imminent. More recent research however, has demonstrated the adverse effects of the undue elicitation of this alarm reaction on both our health and behavior. For example, research by K.E. Moyer, Leonard Berkowitz and Erich Fromm have pointed out that anger is an "internal condition"--with physiological and biochemical correlates--that makes aggressive responses likely to occur. This conclusion was strengthened by the endocrinologist and stress researcher Hans Selye. Selye is most often credited with providing us the basis for understanding the principal mechanism behind stress related health problems. However, he has also suggested that the body can become "intoxicated" by enzymes from its own endocrine system during the "alarm" or "stress" response. Furthermore, and most significantly, he has written that this form of "drunkenness" has caused more harm to society than alcoholic intoxicants.

It is in Human Nature and Conduct that Dewey clearly anticipates this research. In that text he acknowledges the internal, physiological factors that characterize emotional events as well as their impact on our character and conduct--and consequently on the cultivation of our virtues and vices. As indicated, his key concept in this regard is his concept of habit--a concept which has more to do with internal emotional responses than external conduct. Indeed, Dewey indicated that we are likely to have a conception of habit which "needs to be deepened and extended" since we are accustomed to thinking of habit as simply an external mode of action. However Dewey writes that the essence of habit is a "predisposition to ways or modes of response, not necessarily particular acts." The example he gives is particularly relevant. Dewey pointed out that a man with a "habit of giving way to anger may show his habit by a murderous attack upon someone who has offended." The individual need not have an external habit of committing acts of violence. Nonetheless the individual's act, according to Dewey, is due to habit even though his murderous attack may occur only once in his life. This is because, as Dewey concludes, "the essence of habit is an acquired predisposition to ways or modes of response, not necessarily particular act
Anger, as we have seen, constitutes an internal response which is not only toxic and disease producing, but is likely to trigger unwarranted aggressive responses. Among psychological theorists since Dewey, only Erich Fromm appears to have appreciated these factors and the role they play in ethics. In *Man For Himself*, Fromm describes "character-conditioned hate" as the principal problem of ethics.9

For Dewey also, the problem of character-conditioned hate is a critical concern for ethics: however, he did not use these terms. For Dewey, "character is the interpenetration of habits."10 It is for this reason that an accurate assessment of his theory of moral character requires an understanding of his concept of habit: specifically as emotional dispositions with physiological responses that drive and guide conduct. The central position of his concept of habit to his theory of moral character was clearly stated by Dewey—although widely ignored. As he wrote:

All virtues and vices are habits which incorporate objective forces. They are interactions of elements contributed by the make-up of an individual with elements supplied by the outdoor world. They can be studied as objectively as physiological functions, and they can be modified by change of either personal or social elements.11

There are two features to Dewey's statement which are particularly relevant to our current inquiry. First, virtues and vices can be studied as objectively as physiological functions because, as Dewey understood, internal measurable emotional-physiological responses drive and guide our conduct: they define the "habits" which are our virtues and vices—it is for this reason that, as Dewey wrote, our emotional responsiveness is the material of ethical knowledge. Secondly, these "habits" or emotional responses can be changed by either personal (individual effort) or social elements (the environment). Let us consider the first aspect of Dewey's statement that virtues and vices are "habits" which can be studied as objectively as physiological functions.

In recent years, Robert Bellah and his associates have recovered the notion that the mores of a society constitute the "habits of our hearts." Dewey's theory validates this notion in a manner which is, perhaps, unintended by Bellah. From Dewey's perspective, these "habits" are not metaphors, but concrete responses rooted in our internal physiological make-up. In view of current research they are not habits of the heart but, more correctly, patterns of response in the endocrine system—triggered by the limbic system in the brain. Most importantly, excessive anger is an internal condition which may reflect an emotional habit that is a major impediment to the overall goals of morality.

These ideas are further strengthened by medical researcher Redford Williams who has summarized years of epidemiological and laboratory research
which outlines the harmful effects that hostility and anger--disruptive internal habits--have on the hostile individual. Williams' research, and that of many others, clarifies a point regarding the "Type A personality": namely, that anger and hostility, alone, are the toxic or pathological components of the so-called "Type A personality." Williams also recognizes the ethical import of this research. He does not hesitate to point out that the behavioral implications of his research have been understood and counseled by the core teachings of the world's great religions for over two millennia.12

While vice and ethical problems may be connected to anger's internal responses, what, we might ask, are the physiological parameters of virtue and positive emotions like love and charity? Dewey is explicit in indicating that "to check the influence of hate there must be sympathy."13 But how is sympathy cultivated? How do we cultivate within the individual "a prompt and almost instinctive sensitiveness to conditions, to the ends and interests of others?"14 This brings us to a consideration of the second aspect of Dewey's thesis: that our habits (read virtues and vices) can be changed by either personal or social elements: i.e., reflecting either individual effort or the impact of the social environment.

For Dewey cultivating moral emotions like sympathy involves two processes: first, reducing disruptive internal responses like anger, and secondly, exposure to environments which practice, model and nurture the moral emotions. Reducing anger involves the modification of our internal physiological responses--a notion which is still novel today despite over twenty years of research in this area. Yet, years before this research Dewey expressed an understanding of both our internal responses and our ability to modify them. This understanding came as a direct outgrowth of the influence of F. Matthias Alexander. Dewey wrote prefaces to three out of Alexander's four books and cites him in Human Nature and Conduct and Experience and Nature. The "Alexander technique" of mind-body integration is now recognized as a predecessor to currently popular relaxation therapies such as biofeedback and meditation training. Dewey, however, recognized more than simply a "relaxation therapy" in Alexander's technique. Rather, as he wrote: "The technique of Mr. Alexander gives to the educator a standard of psycho-physical health--in which what we call morality is included."15 Morality is included in this standard of psycho-physical health since moral character is tied to the body's internal emotional responses. Such techniques as Alexander's reduce the errant responses which characterize "stress" or character-conditioned hate, and thereby reduce a major impediment to good health as well as the development of moral character.

While Dewey considered Alexander's contribution "the new direction that is needed in all education," there was little hard evidence from science, to lend credence to Alexander's claims or Dewey's endorsement.16 Nonetheless Dewey--as a practitioner of the Alexander technique--was well aware of a fact that has recently received wide acceptance as a result of research on biofeedback
and meditation training: that is, we can indeed assume a significant measure of control over our own internal physiological processes—effectively promoting the "working harmony among diverse desires" which Dewey suggests is the key feature of rationality in morals. In a preface to one of Alexander’s books Dewey describes Alexander’s contribution as a "discovery (that) corrects the ordinary conception of the conditioned reflex." It does this by demonstrating that the individual is not a "passive puppet to be played upon by external manipulations." Rather, Alexander’s discovery demonstrates that the "conditioning factor" (namely, the alarm response controlled by the autonomic nervous system and shaped through classical conditioning) may be brought under "conscious direction" thereby enabling "the individual to take possession of his own potentialities."17

And yet, Dewey was equally aware of the fact that our environment will shape as well as trigger emotional responses. It is, in part, on account of the impact of the environment that Dewey indicated that virtues, as well as vices, are not simply the private possessions of individuals: they are "working adaptations" the individual cultivates through his or her interaction with others.18

Furthermore, because the environment can condition our internal responses, it is a factor we must attend to if we are to cultivate a "working harmony" within ourselves and especially the young, growing individual. Indeed, Dewey indicates that a working harmony within the individual may also imply a certain measure of harmony and consensus among the forces in the external environment which shape an individual's habits. That is, the young, growing individual needs to experience the social harmony that is characteristic of positive emotions in the social environment. The consequences of an environment which does not provide this harmony are, perhaps, predictable. Once again, Dewey’s insight is instructive:

It is not easy to exaggerate the extent to which we now pass from one kind of nurture to another as we go from business to church, from science to the newspaper, from business to art, from companionship to politics, from home to school. An individual is now subjected to many conflicting schemes of education. Hence habits are divided against one another, personality is disrupted, the scheme of conduct is confused and disintegrated.19

Dewey was sensitive to an idea we have begun to appreciate also: that other influences often run contrary to the agenda established by both the family and the school. However, from Dewey’s perspective these conflicting agendas create problems both within the individual (i.e., the internal habits) as well as within society.
III. Conclusion

The primary implication we can draw from Dewey's observations as well as our previous discussion is that in nurturing individual moral character and conduct, we need to become more sensitive to both the internal as well as the external environments—and how they interact. Together, these environments define and shape our emotions, habits, character and conduct.

Addressing the internal environment implies informing the individual about the laws governing the health of the mind and body: how psychological and biochemical factors can influence our health, well-being and conduct. It also implies helping the individual to develop those habits and routines which will enhance psychological and physical well-being as we have begun to understand them. Concerning the external environment, we must heed the advice suggested by researchers such as Gerald Grant and Michael Rutter. Consequently, policy makers in our schools must take responsibility for the ethos or moral atmosphere of a school. As Dewey wrote, it is the social medium of the school which imparts values (read habits) to students. The social medium, as Grant and Rutter would concur, is determined by the shared values and norms generated and reinforced by the interaction of students, teachers, and administrators. However, unless the values underlying the integrity of the internal environment are widely shared and reinforced, those values will be undermined. Without widespread agreement on these values we create conditions, under which, as Dewey wrote "personality is disrupted" and "the scheme of conduct is confused and disintegrated."

Our task then, as individuals and communities is to advance a better understanding of our psychological and physiological interdependence. Communitarians like Bellah and Amatai Etzioni have begun the process of making us more aware of the responsibilities which connect us and shape our overall quality of life. If Dewey's theory of moral character is properly understood and appreciated our moral responsibilities must be viewed in the context of both the internal and external environments.

Endnotes

2 Ibid, 196.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.


11 Ibid, 16


19 Ibid, 130.


21 John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education. This is a major theme of the entire book.
III. 1994 ANNUAL MEETING
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION IN THE POSTANALYTIC PERIOD

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I. Methodology of Conceptual Analysis as a Philosphic Problem

Philosophy of education as language analysis was prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, but by the late 1970s its influence had eroded to the point where philosophy of education departments and courses had been assimilated into other areas, and often renamed, "policy studies."

In *The Case of the Philosophers' Ring*, Lord Russell makes the following comment to Mr. Holmes:

> When I was very young and intelligent, I worked exclusively at mathematics. After I grew too old for the mental effort, I turned to philosophy. And now, having exhausted my brains almost entirely, I have turned to politics.¹

As I watched philosophers of education reinvent themselves during the late 1970s as professors of policy studies, I thought of this fictionalized Russellian observation. What was born in the lofty peaks of the analysis of mathematics has, in its educational incarnation, come down to the analysis of policy making. Is this history explained by intrinsic characteristics of the philosophic methodology that has been used? Philip Kitcher observes that,

> A disturbingly large number of contemporary intellectuals perceive post-Fregean, "analytic," "pure" philosophy as having collapsed. They conclude that this is the death of philosophy, and that succession passes variously to history, sociology, or literary theory.²

Is the analysis of educational concepts still the province of philosophy of education in this postanalytic period, or has the normative study of language been reassigned to theory-constructing scientists, and the semantical dimension of ideological activity? Were it not for the vigorous work being done in epistemology and philosophy of science, one might conclude that this reassignment is as it should be.
II. Conceptual Analysis as First Philosophy

A. What is First Philosophy?

From the time of Aristotle, philosophers have seen themselves as guardians of the concept of rationality, and philosophers through the ages have attempted to improve our understanding of this concept. Over a hundred years ago, Gottlob Frege received much acclaim for his analysis of the methodology of mathematics (Die Grundlagen der Arthmetik, 1884). His method of analysis was thought to be so powerful that many philosophers came to believe that the road to improving our conception of rationality had been found, which they refined and applied to other philosophic problems, such as the nature of scientific rationality.

Frege's analysis of mathematics became, according to Kitcher, an "emblem" for the new view of philosophic methodology.

Frege's investigations are commonly viewed as a decisive turn, one that dethroned epistemology from its central position among the philosophical disciplines and that set the philosophy of language in its place. In retrospect, we can trace a great lineage from Frege, leading through Russell, Wittgenstein, and Carnap to the professional philosophy practiced in Britain, North America, Australasia and Scandinavia in the postwar years. Distinguished by its emphasis on logical analysis, the analytic movement, the "linguistic turn," differs from earlier philosophical endeavors in its method as well as in its ordering of philosophical problems. For at least a period, philosophers could be confident of their professional standing, priding themselves on the presence of a method—the method of conceptual analysis—which they, and they alone, were trained to use.

The view that emerged from these efforts is referred to as "first philosophy" because the questions properly addressed by philosophy are always answered prior to those studied in the sciences.

Frege's opposition to what he perceived as intrusions from psychology to biology is evident from celebrated passages in the Grundlagen. The methodological stance he inspired becomes explicit in propositions of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein of the Tractatus holds that philosophy is not one of the natural sciences (Die Philosophie ist keine der Naturwissenschaftn); moreover, psychology is no more relevant to philosophy than any other science (Die Psychologie ist der Philosophie nicht verwandter als irgendeine andere Naturwissenschaft).

Within philosophy of science first philosophy is known as methodological foundationism, the goal of which is to present a rational account of science in terms of two type of statements—analytic truths (statements whose truth can be established solely by reference to the rules of language) and theory-free observation statements. Thus within the logical empiricist period of philosophy
of science one finds a literature (a.) using modern symbolic logic, typically the predicate calculus, to express the form of scientific inference and explanation, and (b.) concerned with the grammar of observation languages.

B. First Philosophy as Philosophy of Education

With such a philosophically prominent method at hand, it was only to be expected that it would be put to work in philosophy of education, an emerging field in need of a methodology that would increase its confidence, pride, and professional standing. The problems to be investigated by first philosophy of education must be problems that should be addressed before other questions, which identifies the so called "prior questions" of analytic philosophy. As Soltis states in his respected book on the methods of conceptual analysis in education,

They are questions of meaning, and, as such, generally are nonsubstantive; that is, they do not deal with the factual or valutational substance of the topic. Rather, they are questions that seek conceptual clarity before commitment to the substantive exploration of a topic.8

Again it is clear that the language analysts take the meaning of words to exist prior to and apart from the uses made of them. To analyze either the facts or the values involved in teaching, for example, requires, according to the language analysts, the establishment of the prior meaning of 'teaching'. The meaning of 'teaching' is, on this view, not a consequent of what teachers do, but an antecedent.

If, as Aristotle argued, rationality is the defining characteristic of humans, then for children to be set on the path to the rational life their teachers would be required to adhere to and pursue rational standards. Scheffler collected several of his essays in a book titled, Reason and Teaching, published in 1973—the first essay in which is "Toward an Analytic Philosophy of Education" (written in 1953).9 Not all work that was thought to be forwarding analytic philosophy of education was imported from the literature of general philosophy, but much of Scheffler's educational writings are obvious applications to education of analytic conclusions from the philosophic literature.

The question of knowing is an important example. The traditional answer given by analytic philosophy is known in philosophy as the justified true belief view. Scheffler, in his 1965 book, Conditions of Knowledge,10 considered what this analysis of knowledge meant for teaching. The belief condition requires the conviction of the knower, and Scheffler considered learning to be the process that led to belief. He holds that to say a person believes something is to say that he or she has learned it, but not that he or she knows it. "To say that someone has learned that Q, does not so commit us [to the truth of Q]; we are, in general, limited only to the claim that he has come to believe that Q."11 For Scheffler, learning is the process that produces belief, and is pre-epistemological in the sense that learning is the process that achieves one of the conditions of know.
Teaching should not only produce learning but it should do so under the limited conditions of rationality or rational inquiry. Consider the following statement:

The person engaged in teaching does not merely want to bring about belief, but to bring it about through the exercise of free rational judgment by the student. This is what distinguishes teaching from propaganda or debating. ... Teaching, it might be said, involves trying to bring about learning under the severe restrictions of manner—that is to say, within the limitations imposed by the framework of rational discussion (emphasis in original).¹²

Scheffler's point is that belief is fixed as a result of learning, which teaching can bring about; but teaching should be conducted in a rational manner, which means that it take into account the justification condition of knowing.

Note again that the standard thesis about the concept of knowing as well as Scheffler's application of it to educational thought makes no reference to psychological theory or data. The disagreements over the nature of the learning process by different psychological orientations is not seen as relevant to the pursuit of conceptual questions about knowing, believing, learning, and teaching. However, this exclusion of psychological elements from epistemology came into question when Edmond Gettier produced his now famous counter-examples to the standard thesis.¹³

C. Difficulties With First Philosophy

Why did first philosophy fall from intellectual grace? Before I deal with this question, the caution should be raised about engaging in generational chauvinism. Logical empiricism was driven by some of the best philosophic thinkers of this century; its efforts in understanding scientific knowledge are legendary, and its failures provide significant insights for contemporary thought.

First philosophy came under criticism from various points of view, but two are important for us. If any philosophy is to have credibility it has to provide answers to two related normative questions: What is knowledge? What is science? Unfortunately, first philosophy has been shown to be unable to adequately answer either—which has lead to the "death of philosophy" talk mentioned by Kitcher or Stich's comment about the "sterile and moribund" nature of philosophy that rejects "out of hand any proposal that makes epistemological questions dependent on empirical findings or technological developments."¹⁴

To see where the flaw appeared in the standard definition of 'knowing', let's briefly review Gettier's now famous first example. Smith and Jones have both applied for the same job. Perhaps they share a hotel room and Smith sees Jones take ten coins from the desk, on which he placed his wallet and the ten coins the night before, and put them in his pocket. Smith has been told by the president of the company, perhaps at dinner the night before, that Jones will get the job. Consider sentence (A) below.
(A) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

Statement (A) entails statement (B) as follows:

(B) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Smith sees that (B) is a logical consequence of (A) and accepts (B) because of this entailment and because he has strong evidence for (A). Smith is justified in believing that (B) is true.

However, in the meantime the president has decided to give the job to Smith instead of Jones. Also, by chance, it turns out that Smith has exactly ten coins in his pocket. Now (B) is true but (A) from which Smith inferred (B) is now clearly false. In his original paper Gettier states the following:

(i) (B) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (B) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (B) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not know that (B) is true; for (B) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (B) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.15

Gettier concludes that the justified, true, belief definition of 'knowing' "does not state sufficient conditions for someone's knowing a given proposition."16 What are now known as "the Gettier counter-examples" stimulated much serious reflection on the adequacy of the standard definition.17 (Steven Stich says that replying to Gettier's counter-examples has become "a thriving cottage industry."18)

By the late 1960s and early 1970s many epistemologists had concluded that any analysis of knowledge must consider, as Kitcher put it, the "causal processes that generate and sustain belief on those occasions where the subject knows."19 Having justified true belief is not enough to know. The Gettier counter-examples show that how we come to believe is an important part of knowing. If the causal processes by which we come to have beliefs is an essential element in the meaning of 'knowing', then philosophers can no longer claim that psychology has no place in the study of knowing. The reconnection of contemporary analyses of 'knowing' to pre-analytic philosophy has taken place for many writers.20 As Kitcher asks,

How could our psychological and biological capacities and limitations fail to be relevant to the study of human knowledge? How could our scientific understanding of ourselves--or our reflections on the history of the sciences--support the notion that answers to skepticism and organons of methodology (or, indeed, anything very much) be generated a priori?21
The shortcomings of the standard thesis about the defining conditions of 'knowing' indicate to some that first philosophy's methodology of conceptual analysis must be reconsidered.

Consider the other question: what is science? First philosophy in philosophy of science, methodological foundationism, sought to establish the rationality of science by appeal to analyticity and a theory-free observation language. Quine has long attacked analyticity; and while his arguments were treated with deference by logical empiricists, they never seemed especially threatened by them. This was not the case for Kuhn's attack on the notion of a theory-independent observation language, for some claim that it was Kuhn's book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that brought down first philosophy in philosophy of science, and that because of this is the most important book in philosophy of the twentieth-century. In general terms, Kuhn showed that the history of science revealed conclusions about the nature of scientific methodology that did not accord with those being advanced within first philosophy. Kuhn asked, "How could the history of science fail to be a source of phenomena to which theories about knowledge may legitimately be asked to apply?" This statement, of course, parallels that of Kitcher's quoted immediately above. How could it be that theories of biological capacity, psychological processes, and the historical development of scientific knowledge not be relevant to the work of epistemologists?

For a time it was believed that the distinction between the logic-in-use and a reconstructed logic for science protected the first philosophy analyses from the "factual" arguments of the historians and sociologists of science, but it turned out that Kuhn's framework for investigating science was more comprehensive than the methodology used by the analysts. Moreover, Kuhn's account appeared at a time when there were serious doubts about analytical philosophy's ability to provide an answer to the problem of rational theory choice or what some call the problem of developing a rational account of inductive inference. Kuhn's naturalistic studies of science became popular in part because of his appeal to "paradigms" and "paradigm shifts," notions that found favor with many--even with those who had no idea of what he meant. Paradigms are in a sense models, and in the education literature there has always been an interest in models of teaching and so forth. But what is epistemically important about paradigms is the standards they establish. A paradigm is a kind of methodological regime that gives commonality to diverse and sometimes chaotic scientific activity.

The philosophically interesting criticism of Kuhn's view is that a paradigm shift is in the end a sociopolitical process: "As in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice--there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community." Some took this view to mean that the norms for doing science are arbitrary; it is no wonder that the logical empiricists, committed to the development of a conception of scientific rationality, fought hard against Kuhn's thesis. Nevertheless, the history of science and its evidence could not be denied.

The kinds of questions being asked were definitely changing. For example, Laudan applauds Laudan for putting "rationality in something like its ap-
appropriate place"\textsuperscript{29} when he says that we should "distinguish between the rationality of acceptance and the rationality of pursuit if we are to make any progress at reconstructing the cognitive dimensions of scientific activity."\textsuperscript{30} Metamethodologists such as Laudan shift the problem from the traditional one of finding a rational means of choosing among competing theories (the problem of induction) to one of finding a rational methodology for scientific progress.

Giere's view is more radical; as he sees it, a major obstacle to our understanding science is that we "do not seriously consider the possibility that rationality might not be an especially useful concept for understanding modern science."\textsuperscript{31} He thinks that in their efforts to be true to their disciplinary traditions and methodology philosophers of science have failed their subject matter--science. This thought should, I think, give us pause. If the history of the analytical period reveals that we have not come to an adequate understanding of science because of making rationality the central organizing concept, then one wonders about the study of teaching; is it possible that the analytical methodology developed around the concept of rationality has failed our subject matter?

III. Conceptual Analysis as Ordinary Language Philosophy

A. What Is Ordinary Language Analysis?

The methodology of language analysis developed by (as philosophers put it) "the later Wittgenstein" (the Wittgenstein of \textit{Philosophical Investigations}) moved away from first philosophy and became what is now known as \textit{ordinary language analysis}. On this view of the methodology of conceptual analysis, the meaning of words was still regarded as existing prior to what we do with them, but the method of establishing such meanings was changed from rational philosophic reflection to the analysis of what words mean in ordinary or everyday language. As Stanley Cavell remarked, "And I know of no respectable philosopher since the time of Descartes who entrusts the health of the human spirit to ordinary language with Wittgenstein's completeness."\textsuperscript{32,33}

The first philosophy view of language analysis did not see ordinary language as being especially valuable for philosophers. The attempts to provide a rational foundation for scientific inference and theory choice, for example, made no appeals to everyday meanings because it was assumed that ordinary meanings would be reconstructed to present a consistent account of scientific knowledge. Even the language used by scientists was seen as little more than a starting point for rational reconstruction. As Nelson Goodman claims, "Scientists and philosophers often...trim and patch the use of ordinary terms to suit their special needs, deviating from popular usage even where it is quite unambiguous...."\textsuperscript{34}

While philosophers of science rejected ordinary language analysis, it flourished in other areas of philosophy. For example during the 1970s there was a great concern for the meaning of 'intention'. For the most part, the focus of these analyses was the ordinary-language characteristics of 'intention' that remained the same in all of its usages.\textsuperscript{35}
B. Ordinary Language Analysis In Philosophy of Education

In the study of education, the methodology of ordinary language analysis was focused on establishing the meanings of terms such as 'education', 'teaching' and 'learning' as the meanings of these terms are of obvious import for thinking about school policy and teacher conduct.

Within philosophy of education there was no antagonism or even much of a distinction to be drawn between rational analysis and ordinary language analysis. As noted, many of Scheffler's educational writings are clear examples of rational analysis, and there are explicit cases of ordinary language analyses of, for example, 'teaching' within the literature. Within these two methodological limits, we find most of the analytic literature in philosophy of education, which, I think, is not particularly concerned with this methodological distinction. From an analysis of everyday meanings of words used to talk about education, discussions could move easily to rational arguments.

C. Difficulties With Ordinary Language Analysis

Several criticisms of relying too heavily on ordinary meaning were made over the years, e.g., it tends to be a very conservative way to talk about education. Theoretical conservatism may have its place, but in an underdeveloped knowledge area, such as theory of effective teaching with various student populations, one has to wonder if all of the effort put into analyses of the concept of teaching showed so little progress because of inherent methodological inadequacies. Cavell and Stich have raised serious questions about the ability of ordinary language methodology to help us with our philosophic problems.

There has recently emerged a line of argumentation that amounts to a direct attack on the methodology of ordinary language analysis. As the Gettier counter-examples cast serious doubt on the idea of an epistemology free of the findings of psychological research, another group of philosophers are arguing for a much more radical view of the role of cognitive science in theory of knowledge. The Churchlands, who refer to themselves as "eliminative materialists," because they believe that psychology can be eliminated in favor of material studies of the form and function of neural tissue, center their argument around the claim that common-sense psychology, now known in the philosophic literature as "folk psychology," stands in the way of further developing our understanding of mental process such as intentions, consciousness, and knowing.

How does Patricia Churchland interpret the expression 'folk psychology'?

Now by folk psychology I mean that rough-hewn set of concepts, generalizations, and rules of thumb we all standardly use in explaining and predicting human behavior. Folk psychology is commonsense psychology--the psychological lore in virtue of which we explain behavior as the outcome of beliefs, desires, perceptions, expectations, goals, sensations, and so forth. It is a theory whose generalizations connect mental states to other mental states, to perceptions, and to actions.
These homey generalizations are what provide the characterization of the mental states and processes referred to; they are what delimit the "facts" of mental life and define the explananda.

Folk psychology is intuitive "psychology," and it shapes our conceptions of ourselves. As philosophers have analyzed it, the preeminent elements in folk psychological explanations of behavior include the concepts of belief and desire. Other elements will of course figure in, but these two are crucial and indispensable. She claims, "it would be astonishing if folk psychology, alone among the folk theories, was essentially correct." She frequently mentions folk physics as an example of a false folk theory; but let us consider it from an independent source. Duit, a science educator, describes the responses of students and others who are shown a drawing of a thrown ball's path through the air. The drawing shows the ball at the top of its arc and the subjects are asked to draw the force or forces acting on the ball. People commonly show two forces: gravity with downward arrow and the direction of the ball's path with another arrow, which they think is required to push the ball along its path. The two-force-theory respondents agree with Aristotle's "impetus" theory (contra-Newton), that an object will remain in motion as long as a force is applied to it.

The claim that folk psychology might just be like folk physics must be taken seriously. Will there come a time when students read about folk psychology and shake their heads the way we do when we read about impetus physics? The only reliable way to deal with these matters is to review the facts and the frameworks that give them meaning. Churchland is explicit on the parallel between folk physics and folk psychology.

[Just as it turned out that there was no such thing as impetus, there may be no such thing as awareness. This is not as bizarre as it first sounds. Presumably there is some monitoring mechanism or other chugging away in the mind-brain in virtue of which our current employment of the concept of "awareness" can get a foothold--just as there is something or other going on in the world in virtue of which the employment of the concept "impetus" got a foothold.

Her analogical argument should lead us to reflection. The point is that we should be very careful about the framework we use to understand our cognitive and affective states. We have to be open to the fact that folk psychology is, as she puts it, "so misconceived, and its taxonomy so askew, that even the formulation of our questions thwarts our inquiry." Dennett seems to be in agreement:

If we individuate states (beliefs, states of consciousness, states of communicative intention, etc.) by their content--which is
the standard means of individuation in folk psychology—we end up having to postulate differences that are systematically undiscoverable by any means, from the inside or the outside, and in the process, we lose the subjective intimacy or incorrigibility that is supposedly the hallmark of consciousness.46

These arguments raise methodological questions about attempting to see philosophy of education as the analysis of ordinary language as a means of establishing the meaning of educational terms such as 'teaching', 'learning', 'explaining' among others. If the epistemic status of the framework we use to think about our psychological nature is no better than that of folk physics, then studies of ordinary language concepts about child rearing, instructing, teaching, and so forth are suspect because of their folk psychological roots. The tradition that gave rise to the methodology of ordinary language analysis, some of which must still support it, has not attended to these discussions, which are debates mainly between the radical and traditional naturalists.

Hilary Putnam has claimed that arguments such as the Churchland's are self-defeating. In an often referred to section of his book, Realism and Reason,47 Putnam asks, "Why not eliminate the normative from our conceptual vocabulary? Could it be a superstition that there is such a thing as reason?"48 His questions are in reaction to Quine but they obviously pertain to the arguments of the epistemological naturalists as well. Putnam argues that, "The elimination of the normative is attempted mental suicide."49 If we do engage in thinking, but convince ourselves that we cannot think, then could we just quit thinking? Putnam asks, "why should we expend our mental energy in convincing ourselves that we aren't thinkers, that our thoughts aren't really about anything...? This is a self-refuting enterprise if there ever was one."50

IV. Conceptual Analysis as Science

A. Sociological Constructivism

In the absence of methodological foundationism, some now argue that scientific knowledge is entirely a sociopolitical construction, i.e., all aspects of what we call 'scientific knowledge' are completely of our own making. Collins, for example, states that "the natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge."51 Others hold that truth is what is created by the politically dominant view, even in physics.52 This total social constructivism gives philosophy of science no objective basis on which to operate. On this view, the only objective studies of science are sociological ones.

If science is no more legitimate than any other human construction, then it is only to be expected that some will raise questions about the difference between practitioners in science and practitioners in witchcraft, claiming there is no epistemological difference between the two. Some have gone so far as to claim that what we call 'science' is nothing more than "our magic."53 What these total constructivists want to argue, as Giere notes, is "the general thesis that a society's image of the natural world is completely on a par with its image of the social world. Both are culturally relative, and in neither case is it possible
to prove one image superior to the other." Giere claims that this is just posturing:

> If our goal is to understand the natural world in a way that makes modern technology possible, we simply must admit that contemporary scientific practice is superior to Azande witchcraft. The task for the cultural study of science is to explain why this is so, not to deny the obvious.

Conceptual analysis for the total social constructivists becomes a matter of studying what people do and what they say when they are doing it. There is no way to evaluate the adequacy of what they do and say. Put differently, there is no normative dimension to this inquiry--other than the statistical sense of 'normative'.

Circularity becomes a problem for this approach in the following way. Let's say that some sociologists are studying an area of scientific effort. The results of this sociological study are scientific results because the sociological study of science is itself a science. We could turn our attention to these sociological studies of science, attempting to determine what terms they are using and what they mean, conceptually. But what will we do if disagreements arise about how to best study the sociology of the sociology of science? We can identify nothing extrasocial to which conclusions must be true, and thus have no nonarbitrary way to fix belief. So when we read the published studies of the sociology of physics or psychology, what are we to make of them? What epistemic merit do they have? While attempting to see conceptual analysis as a form of complete social constructivism leads to a philosophic dead end, this does not mean that the results of doing science are unrelated to the methodology of conceptual analysis.

B. Giere's Naturalized Philosophy of Science

Giere has claimed that philosophy of science is itself a science, but he rejects the complete social constructivist view of scientific concepts. The conclusion that social reality is a social construction "by itself, provides no evidence that natural reality is similarly constructed." As he sees it,

> There is indeed something important missing from the sociological account. That something is not rationality, but causal interaction between scientists and the world.

His claim that it is not rationality that is missing from this analysis separates him from methodological foundationism, and leads him toward studies of "various biologically based cognitive capacities including perception, motor control, memory, imagination, and language." Moreover,

> A cognitive theory of science would attempt to explain how scientists use these capacities for interacting with the world as they go about the business of constructing modern science.
Why do creatures such as ourselves learn to extract meaning from, and develop theories about the world in the ways that we do? These are inchoate, but clear, problems that form a basis for studying how we think about our experience. Giere must surely be correct in claiming that the application of the results of cognitive scientific studies to the study of scientific methodology is essential in this endeavor. It is difficult for me to see how learning more about our cognitive processes would not help us be better scientists and philosophers. The task that Giere has cut out for himself is to show us how cognitive science, whose results are directly relevant to explaining why scientists do what they do, can be used in the study of science without allowing his methodology to simply turn back on itself and thereby encounter the circular-reasoning objection. Clearly normative methodological questions about the proper conduct of cognitive science cannot be answered by simply doing cognitive science. What we require, I think, is an elaboration of how normative discourse serves within cognitive science. (Note that there emerges from Giere's approach an unpredicted interface between philosophy of education and philosophy of science; answers to the question 'What is learning?' become central to both philosophic efforts.)

IV. Philosophy of Education as Normative Inquiry

First philosophy's conception of normative studies is to establish the principles of inquiry prior to and separate from the actual results of that inquiry. This orientation can be found in philosophy of education. For example, Bob Heslep remarks in his P.E.S. presidential address, "a theory of mind in analytical philosophy of education might provide a framework from within which research in educational psychology might be conducted." The framework of which he writes is a normative one, i.e., paradigmatic, and must be more or less complete prior to scientific work in educational psychology.

The post-Fregean epistemologists reject this orientation (that the conclusions of educational psychology are consequents of antecedents built by analytic philosophy) and claim that analyses in philosophy of education that are conducted apart from studies in educational psychology cannot produce adequate normative conclusions. As McCauley puts it: "Standards that are simultaneously external to, superior to, and independent of those of science simply do not exist." Moreover, he warns that, "Philosophical speculation about the capacity, processing, development, and organization of our cognitive system uninformed by the achievements in these sciences risks thorough-going irrelevance to what systematic knowledge we have about these matters."

Our problem is to show how the methodology that makes use of the results of scientific experience within the process of establishing adequate norms avoids the charges of subjectivity and circular reasoning. In a sense, the norms for any activity must be logically separate from the results of the activity, but if we completely separate normative inquiry from all scientific results we deprive it of substantive relevance, the flaw in first philosophy.

First philosophy views the role of the a priori in inquiry as analytic; that is, a priori knowledge must always be established solely by reference to the rules of language. A posteriori knowledge is established in terms of observation, with some contemporary empiricists such as A. J. Ayer returning to
a Humean conception of sensory data. In contradistinction to the analytic conception of the a priori, Kant discovered the synthetic conception. Synthetic statements describe this world while analytic statements are true in all possible worlds—or more to the point, true in this world no matter what it turns out to be. Synthetic a priori knowledge is knowledge of this world that does not derive from our experience in this world. Kant submitted Euclidian geometry is an example. He knew that non-Euclidian geometries were possible, but he held that Euclidian geometry was the only one that creatures such as ourselves could use to understand space.

With the current interest in cognitive science by many epistemologists, I wonder if what Konrad Lorenz, the great zoologist, called the "Kantian a priori" is not about to receive new life. Does our DNA give rise to cognitive structures that place limitations on how we can experience this world? Synthetic a priori knowledge is never explicitly discussed, as far as I can find, by either cognitive scientists or the naturalistic epistemologists, but I believe that philosophers who talk and write about the role of cognitive science in epistemology many times come close to Kant, perhaps without realizing it. But that is another issue.

To avoid the circle objection, empiricists sought a warrant for normative principles in rules of language valid in all possible worlds. Rationalists sought that warrant in the prior structure of the mind. Both of these approaches, if successful, would provide certitude for normative inquiry, and thus philosophy. But it is this very certitude that deprives normative inquiry of the benefits of scientific insight and conclusions. Neither the analytic nor the synthetic conceptions of the a priori can make use of the results of the inquiry that has changed our world, for better or worst, in such remarkable ways. Any view of philosophy of education that deprives itself of science is significant only in the history of educational thought.

So how do we avoid the circle problem, while at the same time making good use of cognitive science in normative inquiry? We have to consider the third conception of the a priori in thought, the pragmatic a priori. In any context of thought, some elements are in doubt and some are not—everything cannot be doubted at once. That which is undoubted in a given context, i.e., that which is taken to be warranted knowledge, is the content of the pragmatic a priori. On this view, the history of ideas has an active role to play since it represents vibrant codifications of intellectual experience. The methodologies of empiricism and rationalism cannot, because of their static a prioris, find a place for our cognitive history since for them experience is sensory data, either gathered to fill analytic categories or assimilated to pre-existing mental structures; the role of judgment informed by its own history has no place in these methodologies.

Giere, in the following statement, indicates a disposition toward this line of thought:

Developing a scientific theory of science is a reflexive enterprise in the sense that one is practicing a form of the very kind of activity under study. Thus, one necessarily begins with commitments about one's subject embedded in one's own
practice. This need not lead to paradox or irredeemable bias so long as one is able to change one's practice in light of one's own findings.66

This approach is at the very least consistent with the views of those who embrace the pragmatic conception of the a priori. His strategy for establishing a naturalized conception of normative inquiry is to focus on the "reflexive" nature of science, as a way to avoid the circle objection. While this approach may eventually be successful, my concern is that those epistemologists of the early part of this century who sought to naturalize epistemology were led not to an account of the reflexive character of science but to instrumental reasoning. Giere recognizes this alternative but rejects it. In a section entitled, "Can Instrumental Rationality Be Enough?," he says:

[I]nvestigating the actual goals of any group of scientists is an empirical matter, as is the investigation of the effectiveness of their means. That there is any way of evaluating the "rationality" of these goals, apart from considering other goals to which scientific activities might be an efficient means, is problematic. That such an evaluation must be possible is an unproven philosophic article of faith.67

In this conclusion he is not alone, but the rejection of the instrumental justification of scientific analyses is, I think, premature in that the classical arguments are not being fully addressed, though some are moving in that direction. For example, Laudan's investigations of the nature of scientific knowledge led him to the realization that he is oriented toward classical naturalism.

[S]cientific methodology is itself a scientific discipline which cannot dispense with the very methods of inquiry whose validity it investigates....More than half a century ago, John Dewey--every eager to naturalize the a priori--repudiated that conception of methodology which saw it as "an affair...of fixed first principles...of methodology which Neo-scholastics called criteriology."68

V. Normative Inquiry as Instrumental

If we are to analyze a concept (or evaluate a methodology for conceptual analysis), we will have to examine the evaluative dimension of its use or operation. That which turns out to be desirable does not derive from some absolute, utopian conception of discourse. Communities of knowers or interpretative communities, as some like to say, must form concepts; and if these concepts are to have normative force (as opposed to being imposed though indoctrination), they will have to be evaluated. Conceptual formation and evaluation begins with a question, i.e., doubt.
But how do we do this? The classic answer is that the evaluanda in Dewey's evaluations are "conditions and consequences," as is presented in the following statement.

The "desirable" as distinct from the "desired" does not then designate something at large or a priori. It points to the difference between the operation and consequences of unexamined impulses and those of desires and interests that are the product of investigation of conditions and consequences.69

When we raise the question of consequences within the context of normative discourse, serious philosophic problems are encountered. What goals do we have for this discourse?

Paul Churchland has argued that what he called the "superempirical virtues" are more important for scientific theories than being true to the data. Consider the following paragraph.

As I see it, values such as ontological simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power are some of the brain's most basic criteria for recognizing information, for distinguishing information from noise. And I think they are even more fundamental values than is "empirical adequacy," since collectively they can overthrow an entire conceptual framework for presenting the empirical facts. Indeed, they even dictate how such a framework is constructed by the questing infant in the first place. One's observational taxonomy is not read off the world directly; rather, one comes to it piecemeal and by stages, and one settles on that taxonomy which finds the greatest coherence and simplicity in the world, and the most and the simplest lawful connections.70

These "superempirical virtues" are often called pragmatic values because they refer to knowers' psychology, but if Churchland and Giere are right, they are not arbitrary human values because they emerge from analysis of our neuroform.

I see this as a clear instantiation of Dewey's account of the instrumental nature of normative argumentation. The methodology we call scientific inquiry is a means to an end, i.e., scientific knowledge, and as the above discussion suggests, just what this end is is hotly debated in philosophy of science. Applying instrumental evaluation to scientific methodology requires that we have some account of the ends of science by which the methodology can be evaluated. This is the Hempelian point. But how do we know which ends to use to warrant the methodology in question? Dewey's answer is to evaluate these proposed ends in terms of their consequences, which is to say, treat these ends to be evaluated as if they were means. At this point philosophy of science lugged, as it were, and found it difficult to make progress. Churchland and Giere have argued that neuroscience cannot be ignored in these debates, and while Giere has doubts about instrumental reasoning, Churchland shows us that there is a way to evaluate the
goals of science. He appeals to what is known about neurological development to defend simplicity, etc. as warranted goals. The ontological (individual) and phylogenetic (species) neurodevelopment provide an evaluative source for evaluation. This suggests that evolutionary theory and neuroscience are essential elements in contemporary epistemology. Note that this evaluation is a matter of shifting the context of evaluation. By shifting from the evaluation of methodology in terms of ends to the evaluation of the ends, we moved the discussion into the context of cognitive science. Giere is worried about circularity, but the pragmatist distinction between the doubted and the undoubted contextualizes this problem.

This gives us direction to the question of goals for inquiry. Note that his appeal to simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power are desiderata that can serve as general targets within inquiry, which can be evaluated in terms of their consequences. Just as Churchland finds empirical correspondence as insufficient for accepting a theory, we find descriptive adequacy within ordinary language analysis an insufficient goal or desideratum. An adequate conceptual analysis must actively pursue, *inter alia*, discourse simplicity, coherence, and explanatory power.

This suggests, further, that to do conceptual analysis, one must have inquiry goals that give direction to the enterprise. I believe that a quantitative distinction can be made between (a) the conceptual development process that is a necessary part of theory construction, and (b) conceptual analysis as conducted in philosophy. When a scientist modifies a definition in light of the other concepts of a theory, or creates original definitions, the process is engaged in with the goal of making the theory more adequate. The concept is developed as a part of a larger whole that will be evaluated, which means that the norms for judging adequacy are remote. For philosophers, the evaluation is more immediate and direct because the concept being analyzed is considered in light of the norms that should be satisfied. The larger whole is a discourse, not a theory. Conceptual analysis within cognitive science is often more like philosophy than normal science because the epistemic virtues are frequently well in mind as the analysis progresses.

If readers go back to the philosophy of education literature of the analytical period and examine the analyses of concepts taken to be significant in educational discourse, one will find that it is not at all clear just what desiderata were being pursued. The analytical equivalent of empirical adequacy, actual usage, seems to be the standard of adequacy, yet there was talk about improving educational discourse. What was missing were, *inter alia*, the cognitive values mentioned above.

VI. Methodology of Conceptual Analysis

The decline of empiricism does not have to lead to the deemphasis of the methodology of conceptual analysis now occurring in philosophy of education. What are our methodological options?

1. Continue with first philosophy's elaboration of rationality in education, while defending it against its critics.
2. Use ordinary language analysis, answering the Churchlands with arguments that folk psychology is unique among the folk theories.\textsuperscript{72}

3. Claim that conceptual analysis is scientific theory construction, and that the domain of philosophy of education is educational policy studies.

4. Reconsider the nature of normative inquiry in light of a naturalized conception of the \textit{a priori}, and use it to reconstruct the meaning of 'conceptual analysis'.

I believe that it is high-time we considered the last alternative because it is possible to articulate a view of conceptual analysis as normative inquiry grounded in a viable epistemology. Without such a methodology, philosophy of education risks becoming more and more irrelevant at a time when philosophic direction is conspicuous by its absence in education. The credibility of philosophy of education among educators depends on the warrant of its methods of normative analysis. Establishing this warrant is a formidable task. Let's factor out some of what is involved.

The notion of pragmatic \textit{a priori} knowledge is essential to establishing a naturalized view of conceptual analysis. The meaning of terms or the nature of concepts have their roots in human experience and conceptual analysts must be as comprehensive as possible in their consideration of it. Naturalized conceptual analysis must reach into the past for meaning as well as consider the best scientific work at hand. How do we extract meaning from the past? The fall of logical empiricism makes this question very important. What normative principles regulate this reaching into the past for conceptual meaning? Having rejected analyticity and theory-free observation, how do we prevent the use of the history of ideas from becoming political revisionism?

A model for what I have in mind is provided by Jerome Kagan in his book, \textit{Galen's Prophecy} (1994), where he attempts to develop an analysis of 'temperament' from current findings in psychology and neuroscience, and from an analysis of human experience with this notion. In place of the topologies and matrices so common to the research literature, he considers a wide range of historical uses of the concept of temperament. So there are some grounds for the claim that there are examples of conceptual analysis that are based on a naturalized conception of \textit{a priori} knowledge. The further development of the methodology for extracting conceptual meaning from human intellectual experience remains as a task before us.

After more than thirty years of conceptual analysis of 'teaching', empiricist methodology did not add much to our knowledge of it, in part for reasons mentioned, but also because of the concern for the legitimacy of the notion of causation. Since Hume rejected this idea, empiricism has been uncomfortable with it and has avoided basing its arguments upon it. Wesley Salmon\textsuperscript{73} has recently argued that it is possible to characterize causal explanations ('putting the cause back in because' as he says) in science and that these explanations are an essential feature of scientific thinking. But does this not undermine my whole argument that Salmon is one of the leading empiricists of our time?
Though he would not like me saying so, he presents a paradigm case for naturalistic studies. How so? Salmon's concept of causation is drawn from the special theory of relativity. The argument is somewhat involved, and I will not attempt to summarize it here; but my point is that Salmon's powerful statement on the nature of causation is grounded in a scientific theory--albeit a very comprehensive one. It is no stretch of language, meaning, or semantics to say that Salmon's analysis of causation and causal explanation is a naturalized one in that it is a counter-example to the wisdom of first philosophy's avoidance of the use of scientific findings in philosophic analysis. Salmon makes a profound philosophic point about the nature of scientific inquiry by making a fundamental appeal to the results of science.

I believe that we can re-establish the elan that characterized philosophy of education in the 1960s, not by recreating the methods of our youth, whether empiricistic or pragmatic, but investigating the epistemology of the post-Fregean period, and using it to reframe the problems that characterize the philosophy of education; and in the process, we will find ourselves, as Stanley Cavell says, "leaping free of enforced speech, so succeeding it. Thus is philosophy successful."74

Endnotes


2Kitcher, op. cit., p. 114.


5Kitcher, op. cit., p. 55.


7Ibid., section 4.1121.


"Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?," *Analysis*, June 1963, pp. 121-127.

Steven Stich, *The Fragmentation of Reason* (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1990), p. 28. In the following sentence he states, "Another younger tradition in epistemology, tracing to James and Dewey, finds nothing untoward in the suggestion that epistemology is inseparable from science and technology."

In the quotation given, 'e' in the original is replaced with 'B' and 'd' in the original is replaced with 'A'.


Psychology was re-introduced to epistemology on other grounds. For example, D. Armstrong, *Perception and the Physical World* (London: Routledge and Keagen Paul, 1969).

Kitcher, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

W. V. O. Quine,


27Kuhn, *op. cit.*, p. 2.


31Giere, *op. cit.*, p. 5.


33This same completeness of commitment to ordinary language is evidenced in Ennis' book, *Ordinary Logic*, in which he suggests that by using the "ordinary meaning of basic logical terms" we can deal with the "reasoning problems of people in their everyday lives" whether they are housewives, mechanics, or Supreme Court Justices. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), p. 5.


35See, for example, H. Castenada, "Intentions and Intending," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 8, 1972, pp. 139-149.


37Cavell reports that Russell viewed the *Investigations* as an expression of "petit bourgeois fear of change, whether of individual inventiveness or of social revolution." Cavell, *op. cit.*, p. 43. I made the point less poetically in, "Philosophical Analysis, Research on Teaching, and Aim-Oriented Empiricism," *Educational Theory*, Fall 1980.

38Cavell's book, *op. cit.*, reveals many other questionable aspects of ordinary language analysis as conceived by Wittgenstein of the *Investigations*.


44Ibid., p. 309.


46Daniel C. Dennett, Consciousness Explained (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), p. 319. Dennett also discusses the relationship between the brain and observation, which raises further questions about the adequacy of empiricism.


48Ibid., p. 245.

49Ibid., p. 246.

50Ibid.

51H. M. Collins, "Stages In the Empirical Program of Relativism," Social Studies of Science, Vol. 11, p. 3.


53See Giere, op. cit., p. 131.

54Giere, Ibid., p. 131-132.

55Giere, Ibid.

57 Ibid., p. 59.
58 Ibid., p. 4.
59 Ibid., p. 5.


62 Ibid., p. 150.


65 Lorenz wrote, "[T]he innate is not only what is not learned but what must be in existence before all individual learning in order to make learning possible. Thus, consciously paraphrasing Kant's definition of the A Priori, we might define our concept of the innate." (Evolution and Modification of Behavior, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 44.


67 Giere, Ibid., p. 10.

68 Science and Values, op. cit.

69 Theory of Valuation, p. 32.


71 Note that the analysis of concepts based on our "intuitions," as is sometimes appealed to by the metamethodologists is not included in this list because analyses that correspond to our intuitions are not normative in the epistemological sense. I do not consider the matter closed, however; Quine's appeal to ancestral lore and Bruner's canonical cultural elements suggest that our intuitions may be approximations of naturalized a priori structures.


Cavell, *op. cit.*, p. 118.
PHYSIOLOGICAL BASIS FOR THE PRAGMATIC PROCESS OF LEARNING

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I. Introduction

The pragmatists of the last century (the founding pragmatists) were on the cutting edge of theory and practice. Pragmatism meant for these founders a unity of theory and practice which moved on the frontier of knowledge and reform.

John Dewey spans the greatest number of years with his pragmatic approach to and application of democracy and the dynamics of school and community, which defined his learning theory as well as his ethic. George Mead's study of relativity (The Philosophy of the Act) and his involvement with social reform (e.g., the Chicago City Club and Hull House), as well as his development of social psychology and social philosophy, stand as a tribute to his contributions. William James was a leader in philosophy and psychology, with his Talks to Teachers and Psychology, which drew from his training in philosophy and medicine. Finally, the patriarch of them all, Charles Peirce, the polymath, trained in chemistry, logic, and mathematics lead the way in theory and application, corresponding with the world's great minds of that age.

Peirce (pronounced "purse") was the first experimental psychologist this side of the Atlantic. He defined most precisely, for his day, the value of gravity and the method for obtaining it. He refined the work of George Boole's logic and mathematics, making it useful for twentieth century computers. He was the first to use a matrix approach to linear algebra, and he wrote extensively on chemistry, mathematics, geodesy, philosophy, logic, and is also known today as the father of modern semiotics. His greatest field of interest was the human mind and the workings of the brain.

These giants made contributions to psychology and learning which integrated, in every way, the latest understandings of social dynamics and biology (Peirce, e.g., was influenced by Cajal, the future Nobel laureate in neuroscience). Unfortunately, however, various strains of psychology began to separate themselves from other disciplines in an attempt to carve an individual niche in a vast comprehensive dynamics of human social evolution.

Today, in neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy of the mind, the cry is for integration and multidisciplinary approaches reminiscent of the work of the early pragmatists. From Barbara Von Eckardt's comprehensive
book, *What is Cognitive science*, 1 to Noble laureate, Gerald M. Edelman's theoretical work on the study of the brain, 2 one sees the reuniting of great ideas from many disciplines to solve the mystery of the mind. What is exciting for American pragmatism is that the early pragmatists are continually found in central roles of these reuniting works. Von Echardt has a chapter dedicated to Peirce's semiotic logic and other chapters which apply it. Edelman uses James as a pivotal figure in his text and has far more in common with Peirce's semiotic theory than he imagines.

This essay is to continue the integration of philosophy and biology as we continue our quest to understand the what's and how's of learning theory. This paper seeks to draw philosophy of education back into the central and productive academic dialog of a multidisciplinary approach to learning, for which this Midwest Philosophy of Education Society is famous, and perhaps infamous.

To accomplish this task, the paper will examine the pragmatist's approach to learning from a neurobiological view to show that the pragmatic theories provide a comprehensive perspective to brain science and learning. Such a perspective was not only well informed for its day, but has value for tomorrow's research.

For the pragmatist the learning act was subdivided into four stages, the first being the irritant, impulse, or problematic situation. It is at this stage that the individual or organism becomes conscious of a new situation, which calls one out of some previous action of habit. Consciousness, then, brings the individual to new levels of observations or perceptions about the details of the situation (the second stage), which in turn provokes reflective thought (the third stage). Thought leads the individual to some conclusion, some hypothesis for action, which is carried out in the fourth stage.

Within the process, then, one finds several key concepts—habit, irritant (called stimulus by the behaviorists), consciousness, perception (observation and remembrance), reflective thought (manipulation or hypothesizing), and action. The process is complex, comprehensive, and efficient for removal of the irritant. It also is logical, using a semiotic representational processing within the individual. While not all the details can be presented today, a broad overview will begin the process.

II. Sociopsychology of Learning

The education or growth of any person can be understood from the perspective of certain foundational concepts. These ideas are at the foundations of our humanness—they are the essence of our being. 3 They also contain all the details of Peirce's semiotic and the logic.

**Experience, habits, and logic**

What an individual can know comes out of the current and past experiences of the individual and the future expectations, whether that future is
immediate or distant. That is, the learning is always within the context of the present situation and only calls forth past experiences appropriate to the situation. It is the expectation of the future (the teleology), however, which pulls the past information into the present and provides the emotional energy to move forward in the learning process. This past experience defines the habits (acquired and congenital, remembering Peirce on deductive logic \(W 4:421\)); it is the set of rules which allows the individual to act, speak, and think within any new experience. The set of rules is the "stadium of mental action" (\(W 3:263\)). Past experiences coupled with the present situation is the "symphony of our intellectual life" \(W 3:263\). How that symphony is played out is the process described below.

The habits of the past, these rules of action, are systems of logic-semiotic logic, and Peirce defines their biological application as follows, beginning first with the deductive logic, in the form of Barbara (\(W 4:421\)):

- **Rule:** All men are mortal;
- **Case:** Enoch was a man;
- **Result:** Enoch was mortal.

Peirce then continues:

The cognition of a rule is not necessarily conscious, but is of the nature of a habit, acquired or congenital. The cognition of a case is of the general nature of a sensation; that is to say, it is something which comes up into present consciousness. The cognition of a result is of the nature of a decision to act in a particular way on a given occasion. [Peirce notes for the reader to see also "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," \(W 3:257-76\). See in particular p. 263 for discussion of habit.] In point of fact, a syllogism in Barbara virtually takes place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated frog. The connection between the afferent and efferent nerve, whatever it may be, constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is the physiological analogue of the major premise. The disturbance of the ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological form of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and, logically considered, is the occurrence of a case. The explosion through the efferent nerve is the physiological form of that which psychologically is a volition, and logically the inference of a result. When we pass from the lowest to the highest forms of innervation, the physiological equivalents escape our observation; but psychologically, we still have, first, habit,—which in its highest form is understanding, and which responds to the major premise of Barbara; we have, second,
feeling, or present consciousness, corresponding to the minor premise of Barbara; and we have, third, volition, corresponding to the conclusion of the same mode of syllogism. Although these analogies, like all very broad generalizations, may seem very fanciful at first sight, yet the more the reader reflects upon them the more profoundly true I am confident they will appear.

Deduction proceeds from Rule and Case to Result; it is the formula of Volition. Induction proceeds from Case and Result to Rule; it is the formula of the formation of a habit or general conception,—a process which, psychologically as well as logically, depends on the repetition of instances or sensations. Hypothesis [also called by Peirce, abduction and retroduction] proceeds from Rule and Result to Case; it is the formula of the acquirement of secondary sensation,—a process by which a confused concatenation of predicates is brought into order under a synthesizing predicate.

We usually conceive Nature to be perpetually making deductions in Barbara. . . . (W 4:421-2)

The following two tables show the details of Peirce's concepts, but the key is that the logic applies, not only, to some classroom application, but it is also the essence of physiological dynamics. (In fact, it has been argued that there is also a chemical semiotic, where the arguments can be found within the quantum dynamics of electrons.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Syllogistic Form</th>
<th>Physiological Form</th>
<th>Psychological Form</th>
<th>Logical Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule</td>
<td>Rule of action, within the interneurons</td>
<td>Nervous habit</td>
<td>Major Premise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case</td>
<td>Afferent neuron impulse</td>
<td>Sensation, feeling, present consciousness</td>
<td>Minor Premise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result</td>
<td>Efferent neuron response</td>
<td>Volition</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Peirce's Forms of Probable Inference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Deduction</th>
<th>Induction</th>
<th>Abduction (Hypothesis)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rule &amp; Case &amp;</td>
<td>Rule &amp;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case to Result to</td>
<td>Result to</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Result Rule</td>
<td>Case</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Formula for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Formation of</th>
<th>Acquisition of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volition</td>
<td>habit</td>
<td>secondary sensation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without explaining the various experimental details, or developing Peirce's other passages on the three forms of logic (particularly W 3:323-338), it should be shared that there is a correlation between Peirce's semiotic logic and the dynamic of what happens during an elementary learning process in the sea hare. Such an argument is presented in a text, currently at press, which examines research of Eric Kandel on the sea hare (a large slug called the Aplysia Californica).

The application of Peirce's logic to neurobiology provides a comprehensive view of learning, but the relation of logic and neurons is not new. Gordon Shepherd and Christof Koch have suggested arrangements of logic at the level of neuronal interaction (at the synapses). Figure 1: Logic Found within Neuroal Organization is a relatively simplistic arrangement, where the "e" is excitatory input and "i" is inhibitory. In "A," the closer inhibitory input (that is, closer to the cell body, symbolized by the large filled circle) can negate a more distal excitatory input, which is similar to "AND-NOT" operation in logic. "B" is more complex and "C" shows the logical operations.

The key is that habits, rules for action, are inferences. Jacob Bronowski wrote in 1978:

> When we look at what the eye does, we become aware that it interprets the world from the outset by a process of inference. Perception itself is a mechanism in which sensations are instantly interpreted by an inferential process.

Habits, which Peirce also called beliefs (W 3:263), define every aspect of processing new information. Stephen M. Kosslyn makes the same point in his text on imagery processing and vision:
Imagery [within the brain] appears to affect the lowest-level visual processing. These findings are sobering from the point of view of visual processing: One's knowledge and beliefs apparently can affect visual processing almost from the start.

Process:
Learning is not at a moment of time, but is drawn through a specious present by emotions and the conscious, by thoughtful evaluation of any current situation. It begins with some impulse, provocation, doubt, problem, or question, which calls an individual to consciousness through the stirrings of one or more emotions. Fear, guilt, doubt, and curiosity are common emotions, found in the life process, but fear and anxiety activate another system, not one of learning. This initial stage of consciousness is what Peirce called an immediate consciousness. (It should also be made known that the driving force, which on the psychological level is emotion and on the physiological level is an irritant, is entropy at the physical chemical level. Each level contains a semiotic logic which does not permit a reductionism of emotion to energy.)

Immediate consciousness begins with some provocation, producing an emotion. Peirce writes (W 4:42): "The irritation of the brain, . . . appears as the uneasy sense of doubt; and the end of all thinking is the removal of doubt, just as the end of all nervous action is the removal of the source of irritation." Here doubt is a conscious doubt, as well as an unconscious doubt. The conscious doubt ranges from, "I can't move my feet in rhythm," during a dance class, to "I wonder if God really exists?" The conscious doubt can address aspects of emotion, perceptions about bodily kinesthetic motion, or conceptual questions. The unconscious may only be the hesitancy to act, as an infant struggles to take a first step, or a vague nagging sense of not taking a step down one path, instead of another on a hiking trail. With the unconscious there is no understanding, no knowing, nor even any real emotion, such as curiosity, that would suggest why one path is preferable to another. Obviously, Robert Frost has brought this unconsciousness to the level of consciousness in "Two Roads Diverged in a Yellow Wood," but there exists a doubt below the level of words, images, or even emotions. Peirce, again, writes:

Now, when our nervous system is excited in a complicated way, there being a relation between the elements of the excitation, the result is a single harmonious disturbance which I call an emotion. Thus, the various sounds made by the instruments of an orchestra strike upon the ear, and the result is a peculiar musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds themselves. This emotion is essentially the same thing as an hypothetic inference, and every hypothetic inference involves the formation of such an emotion. We may say, therefore, that
hypothesis produces the sensuous element of thought, . . . (W 3:337)

The sensuous element may be a "feeling of redness," a favorite subject of Peirce's. Given the physiological logic discussed above, the rule may be congenital--the wiring of the optic nerve through the lateral geniculate nucleus to the visual cortex (which is complex, to say the least). The result is a flash of red that the optic mechanism surmises is from the robin "red-breast" on our lawn, or the vermillion sports car in the drive.

There is merely, a feeling. Early experience, however, begins to differentiate angles and colors, from the "blooming, buzzing confusion," above our cradle. Later, the result is an emotion, e.g., melancholy from a particular gaze (the "case" in logic) at the picture of an absent loved one. The sadness overcomes us, which causes us to focus upon the picture (the case), when perhaps, we were not even conscious of the image, but merely dusting the mantle. The emotion pulls into the individual new data; Peirce writes (W 3:336): "hypothesis infers from facts of one kind to facts of another." The different facts could be the emotion to the visual image of the loved one.

After the impulse, the emotion or immediate consciousness calls out a new level of consciousness in the individual, which addresses the individual's ability to perceive the situation, as comprehensively as possible, which means that a series of hypothetical inferences are made--perhaps they are being made continuously during consciousness. This is the stage of perception, or action and reaction--the seeing and the seen, the individual against the irritant, "consciousness of an interruption into the field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something (CP 1.377)." This perception is what Peirce calls polar consciousness (CP 1.380-2).

Two neurological attitudes are called forth during perception, an external will and an internal will. The first attitude, the external attitude is a sensitization of the context of the situation--the hypotheses discussed above. George Herbert Mead calls this the attitude of immediate experience. Here motor neurons may contract muscles to position the whole body or the eyes, hands, or any combination toward the impulse. The positioning and sensitization is a growing awareness which improves the individual's ability to see, hear, etc., what is in the surrounding environment. If one is reading a brochure or book, the sensitization means a growing consciousness of the words, their meaning, and their relation with the reader.

The second attitude of will, the internal attitude, accomplishes two tasks. First, there are neurological inhibitions which provide a hesitancy, the "stop-and-think" mentality which prepares the learner for an actual processing of the situation (CP 1.383). Second, there is a reflectivity which is called to mind, which enables the individual to "remember" past situations or pieces of
situations. The remembering, however, is only a remembering of those parts of the past which have bearing upon the specious present.

Both attitudes of the polar sense of consciousness provide a sense of difference. That is, the individual begins to compare and contrast, not being aware of the actual process of differentiating. Unconsciously, the mind has established the attitudes of differences, both externally and internally. The external attitude allows the individual to select portions of the environment as being more valuable to the situation. The external attitude moves the individual to focus upon certain aspects of the situation--e.g., straining to hear, or looking in a particular direction, which differentiates those items not of value.

Likewise, the internal attitude selects portions of the past (which means portions of the mind or arrays of neurons where the past is stored--particularly the hippocampus). These internal selections prepare the individual for a processing of differences, just as the external attitude does. These differences are the result of the logic of hypothetical inferences, neurologically executed, which juxtapose different types of facts ("hypothesis infers from facts of one kind to facts of another"--W 3.336). Each focusing, however, (since a focus requires a habit) is similar to the decapitated frog--a deduction. The execution of any rule follows the logic of deduction and there are many "rules" or habits (acquired or congenital) which the mind and body uses in the initial moments of the impulse or irritation. Thus, the turning of the neck and straining of the ears or focusing of the eyes all are executed deductively.

The perceptive consciousness or polar consciousness calls up, in turn, a synthetic consciousness, which is the actual cognition or mental decision-making that is appropriate to the impulse. This stage provides for the manipulation of the data made available during the perception stage. (It should be stated that the perceptive consciousness does not abruptly stop at the threshold of the synthetic or manipulative consciousness. The earlier stage continues until final acts are made and the impulse or doubt is resolved. Thus, there are parallel tracts of activity, which maximizes the efficiency of solving the problem, or removing the irritant.

The synthetic consciousness has three parts. First, out of the external attitude of polar differences, the mind begins a series of associations. Peirce called them associations by contiguity (CP 1.383); they are those juxtapositions brought about by the mere details of the situation. Two very different items in the environment (or two words on the page) become important in their relationship with one another because of their proximity to one another. Initially, one has little control over these associations and they become those components that define the world into which we are thrown. They are, however, the early details of full consciousness, where the brain actively puts together these various associations.

The logical process of association by contiguity is one of abduction or seizing from the external will or attitude of immediate experience.
Perhaps the early information (from abduction) is now brought to new levels, where the first datum is associated with some other datum, just because of accident of how the situation is structured. That is, the time and spacial associations are simplistic and are called up, hypothetically, because of their contiguity.

Second, out of the internal attitude comes an association by resemblance. Details of the current situation compare and contrast with past experiences because of their similarity. Here the person often finds a memory of something "long forgotten," but similar to the present moment. Two words may spark a memory of someone who spoke the words, although the individual will not consciously remember that person speaking them. Perhaps an image of that person becomes associated with the words on the page and is called up immediately, with no understanding of why. The neural activity during this phase, most likely, has processing through the hippocampus and adjacent cortical areas, because memory is so important and the hippocampus is known to be important for memory, while the emotion (probably through the amygdala) has no importance at this stage. Perhaps the hypothesizing process (abduction, perhaps better called retroduction) is carried through the hippocampal area.

Again, the early internal will (the attitude of reflective analysis) found in the polar consciousness, begins the abductive or retroductive process of matching different bits of datum. The data now called forth is brought together in the synthetic conscious stage of association. Such retroductive callings of past cases, from past experiences, call forth inductively, past habits or rules of actions. Thus, "new car," "Uncle Dale," "slap," bring to mind certain automatic remembrances in my mind that may not make any sense in other's mind. They do hang together, however, from an old family story about my uncle. They are called up inductively into a rule or mental habit I personally have when new car and Uncle Dale are brought together. The "rule" is my remembrance of a slap. (The story, briefly was that shortly after WWII, my uncle purchased a brand new car--a coup with a long sloping rear roofline. On the day he purchased it, he stopped to show some friends and some acquaintance thought it would be "smart" to run up over the trunk and up the roofline--he perhaps saw a relationship between the car's contour and an incline plane. He left scratch marks on the car where each foot had trod and my uncle grabbed him and slapped him across the face hard enough to leave his finger marks on the culprit's cheek for a portion of the evening. Whether the story happened or not, that is an image my mind calls forth on certain occasions as data are called into a greater whole, inductively.)

The final part of synthetic consciousness is where one forms hypotheses specifically about the details of the impulse or doubt. This is the cognition generally viewed by the public when a person "thinks" about something. Thoughts always come from somewhere. It is out of the swirls of
confusing associations, that certain associations (pieces of datum) are selected and juxtaposed, forming hypotheses for action, further thought, or hypotheses which can establish feelings. Consciousness is more sensitive to the hypotheses for action and for further thought, but an underlying hypothesis of feelings, which is a subconsciousness, can, later, select hypotheses for actions and thoughts.

The hypotheses are particular forms of logic, which arrange the signs (the pieces of datum). The selection of one hypothesis over another is most likely a competitive process where the details of the hypothesis bring particularly important facts (premises, which are signs) in relation to one another. The relating of one particular case or situation to a set of possible results begins a process of induction, which will establish a new habit, or reinforce an older habit for the individual. Repetition of these thoughts and subsequent actions will produce the habit to some greater or lesser degree of perfection.

Concerning the various hypotheses discussed above, while the process is the same, there are differences in function. The hypotheses of the external will bring external data to the individual and perhaps should be called abductions. The internal attitude of reflective analysis, of the perception or polar consciousness stage, and the association by resemblance address past memories and should be called retroductions. Finally, that synthetic consciousness which pulls them together into a conclusion, which can yield an action, a new emotion, or a new thought, should be called hypothesizing.

Finally, there is a resultant action which responds to the doubt or problem of the impulse stage. The action resolves the problem and can resolve a doubt, yielding a thought, it can remove the problem of the situation with some physical action, or it could result in some feeling to replace a problematic feeling of the impulse. The resultant action from the synthetic consciousness is always executed using a deductive logic.

The above process explains all growth in the individual as long as there is a hesitancy resulting from some impulse. Often what happens is that minimal learning takes place because when a minimal hesitancy begins the inhibition process, other processes move quickly to short circuit thought and a rapid response is made to the situation. The rapid response reinforces old habits as when a child reads a big word and skips it without trying to figure out its meaning. In therapy what often happens is the response, "Oh, I know that," or "I know what you mean, I'll do that," and there is no change that happens. The verbal response relieves any immediate impulse and the person is relieved from further thought or action.
Table 3: Logic within the Processes of Learning

**Logic of Sensoral Element of Thought**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage in Process</th>
<th>Abduction</th>
<th>Retroduction</th>
<th>Hypothesizing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Producing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impulse, resulting in</td>
<td>Initial</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediate Consciousness</td>
<td>emotion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception or Polar</td>
<td>Attitude of</td>
<td>Attitude of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consciousness</td>
<td>Immediate</td>
<td>Reflective</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td>Experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manipulation or Synthetic</td>
<td>Association by</td>
<td>Association</td>
<td>Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consciousness</td>
<td>Contiguity</td>
<td>by</td>
<td>by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resemblance</td>
<td>Action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Logic of Habitual Element of Thought**

(An inductive process, calling forth various rules neurologically, some conscious, some unconscious)

**Producing**

Consummation of Physical Act  
(removal of doubt or irritant)

**Logic of Volition**

(A deductive execution of affective, emotive, or cognitive resulting in the production of an emotion, a physical act, or a conscious thought)
Biological Aspects of Learning:

Learning begins with some irritant, some doubt. Gaynor Wild and Edward Benzel verify the pragmatic belief from a neurological perspective in the following:

Brain pathways for higher learning are much more complex than those for reflexive learning and involve portions of the limbic system, such as hippocampus, amygdala, dorsomedial thalamus, and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. As mentioned, higher learning does require some kind of arousal, and activation of the locus ceruleus is thought to be the arousal mechanism.

A related issue, but more difficult to define and study, is the necessity for psychological "arousal." In practice, in learning experiments with rodents, arousal often means stress, or aversive arousal. Stimulatory drugs can also produce a state of arousal that enhances learning. These drugs, sometimes taken willingly by humans for their ability to produce pleasurable stimulation, have also been used in rodents to augment learning. Some kind of arousal state, either pleasurable or aversive, is therefore required for learning. A tranquil,unaroused rat does not make LTM [long term memory].

As mentioned, the dopaminergic nigrostriatal system, which may be unconscious, may active reflexive learning, and the noradrenergic locus ceruleus [my emphasis] may activate the conscious learning system. In humans, the requirement for locus ceruleus activation of cognitive learning may translate into the necessity for motivation. One should not forget, however, that negative stimulation, i.e., stress, is also conducive to learning.

A neurological problem which becomes evident to teachers in many classrooms is attention deficit disorder (ADD), where a child's focus is constantly distracted toward any number of things and away from the focus of learning. There is some evidence that the dopamine and noradrenalin systems are the culprits for ADD. The stimulant ritalin is used to activate the neurotransmitter systems to the level needed for the student to focus. Hyperactivity is usually the symptom for ADDs and similar hyperactivity in rats is worsened with phenobarbital "(a sedative), and improve[d] when treated with amphetamine (a stimulant)." Sam Goldstein and Michael Goldstein continue:
The rats become hyperactive not when the cells are injured within the brain stem, but when the dopamine and noradrenalin nerve endings, which are located throughout the brain far from the cell bodies are damaged.

These studies suggest the importance of chemical systems that utilize dopamine and noradrenalin. In a simple model, these systems, when intact, help to control hyperactivity, and when they are not working well, hyperactivity results.

Stephen Kosslyn locates the center of attention slightly above the locus ceruleus and the substantia nigra (see Figure 2: Neurotransmitter Pathways, appended) in the superior colliculus. (See his architecture of visual mental imagery Figure 7 at the end of this paper.) Kosslyn's difference for attention is not problematic, however, since, according to the pragmatic theory, attention would follow arousal from the irritant. The key is that an arousal system is needed and that it is posited in the brain stem. Probably both the conscious and subconscious systems are crucial for initiating the learning process, which will define the memory of the event.

The sensory data that is coming into the brain at any one time is phenomenal. Patricia Smith Churchland reminds us that sensory input is far more complicated than the five senses learned in elementary school. Media experts in education have known for years that when one increases the number of senses engaged in a learning process, the information is learned better, e.g., remembered longer, better integrated.

From the above discussion, the breadth of sensory input increases the effectiveness of the perception stage--the polar consciousness. That is, as the external will produces an attitude of immediate experience, the body will become focused, and that focus produces a great deal of data coming into the brain. The data can be considered to be parallel streams of signs, coming from the multiplicity of sensory nerves. Depending upon the complexity of the situation and perhaps the internal states of the person at that moment of external impulse, there may be phenomenal amounts of data competing for abductive attention.

Competition of sensory, semiotic data begins with the immediate consciousness for two reasons. First, sensory input begins its processing immediately. It goes not only to the thalmus (for filtering), but sensory neurons also send inhibiting signals, through interneurons to neighboring sensory neurons. Such neuronal behavior improves contrast, permitting details of the impulse to stand out. Additionally, competition exists because there is a limit in the size of the various thalmic nuclei (e.g., lateral geniculate nuclei--LGN--for optic input, see Figure 9: Optic Input throuth Thalmus (LGN) to Cortex), which continue the processing or filtering of the data before they reach the cortex of the cerebrum.
In fact, the thalamus (which is the major input structure to the cerebral cortex) is a filtering structure. "Virtually all routes to the cortex are relayed by the thalamus, although a few diffuse and poorly understood pathways from other brainstem sites do exist."31 From the above discussion, then, the thalamus is a central structure in the abductive process. It is the thalamus and some few other routes that bring the data into consciousness--the role of the abductive process. While the exact theory of circuitry must be saved for another paper, the limited number of existing routes, focus the abductive logic within the brain--that is, they assist in the defining of the signs (propositions or premises), which will call forth the various interpreters of the hypothesis.

In fact, a theory of the brain which utilizes the role of the basal ganglia and something of this process of irritant initiating perception has been proposed recently (see Figure 10: Basal Ganglia32; Figure 11: Basal Ganglia Motor Pathways33; and Figure 12: Feedback Loops, Including Thalamus, Basal Ganglia, Cortex, and Cerebellum34). Edelman, the neuroscientist and Nobel laureate who begins with William James, develops his theory of the brain as follows:

We all know that conscious attention plays a large role in the learning of complex skills. But in many cases, successful learning allows us to carry out skilled actions without attention. Performance then remains unconscious until either novelty or threat [irritants] makes additional demands. Remember that, in presenting [this theory], I suggested that the basal ganglia were major organs of succession, acting with the cortex to choose motor plans. Motor plans, which may be consciously formed in humans, are executed via the motor cortex as it sends signals to the spinal cord. But the output of the cortex is also routed to the basal ganglia. These structures have only an indirect connection back to the cortex, but it is a very significant one. The output from the basal ganglia is inhibitory, and therefore it can also inhibit inhibition. In other words, it can disinhibit target areas in the cortex. This either excites them or prepares them for excitatory input, a state important for attention.

In accord with a given plan, the basal ganglia selectively disinhibit thalamic nuclei projecting to the cortex. This leads to anticipatory and selective arousal of cortical areas corresponding to the motor program [the rule for action, which is a logical inference].

What about automatic activity interrupted by novelty [the essence of a habit interrupted by an irritant]? If the task is not completed within a certain time, or if a novel event is
detected and categorized, "alarm" signals may pass down to the midbrain value systems that connect back to the cortex and the basal ganglia. These systems may then send back signals [a semiotic] to interrupt the motor plan in the cortex [a rule of action, such as continuing to move eyes across a line of type] and block the execution of the motor program. As long as an automatized action [habit] is accomplished without a hitch, these midbrain nuclei are not engaged. Otherwise, as in the case of a shouted "watch out!" during a conversation while driving, they will cause a shift in attention to occur.

But how can consciousness alter attention and alter priorities in the construction of global mappings? In the case of primary consciousness, it can alter attention and priorities by a change in the salience among the parallel reentrant loops connected to the basal ganglia in the process similar to the one outlined above. In the case of higher-order consciousness, verbal schemas in conceptual areas can, through the activities of the frontal cortex and limbic system, dominate the apportionment of disinhibition by the basal ganglia, which have strong connections to such regions.

Such reentrant loop connections can be seen in the flow chart offered by Kosslyn for visual processing (see Figure 7: Kosslyn's Schematic of Visual Imagery Processing).

Emotional input appears to be lateralized with positive emotions in the left hemisphere and negative emotions in the right hemisphere, particularly in the frontal lobe. That is, emotional perception and production can be found in the frontal lobe of the cerebral cortex. Another structure of emotion, for "processing of sensory inputs for the generation of aggressive, sexual, and other emotion-laden behaviors," such as fear, is the amygdala. Such structures are other key components in the abductive processing and begin to define the attitudes of immediate experience and reflective experience.

The bodily focusing of immediate experience (the external will) may well be controlled in the basal ganglion (see Figures 10 and 11), which has input from the thalamus and motor cortex. A complex series of feedback loops (see Figure 6) exist to provide a physical readiness. Shepherd writes: "[E]xperiments have shown that in both the cerebellum and the basal ganglia, single cells begin their discharges in advance of the onset of a volitional movement." Nicholls, et al. write:

Although the interconnections of the basal ganglia are complex, some ideas about their function can be deduced from the fact that much, if not most, of their output is to the motor
cortex. Thus their influence is on the lateral system, which is associated with organized activity of small groups of muscles, particularly the distal limbs.\textsuperscript{41}

Thus, hands, arms, legs, and feet would all respond to this system. A question arises about eye movement and focus during this stage of the learning act. The coordination of the eye to body movement, which permits the eye to focus as the body moves, uses a system called the vestibulo-ocular reflex. That system uses two structures in common with the feed-back loops of the thalmus and basal ganglia--namely the thalmus and the vestibular nucleus (see Figure 8).\textsuperscript{42} How these circuits produce the abductive behavior remains for another paper.

The other structure of significance during the perception and manipulation stages of polar and synthetic consciousness is the hippocampus. This structure has been found to be crucial to long term memory and has significant input to the cortical areas.\textsuperscript{43} The retroduction, then, would be the logic routed through this structure. The hippocampus is needed for declarative or working memory, the kind of memory needed for retroduction in both the perceptive and manipulative stages, as well as for memory storage from the learning.

To continue the breadth of semiotic in learning, given Howard Gardner's work on multiple intelligences, problems can be solved within a variety of frames, each corresponding to a particular anatomical portion of the brain.\textsuperscript{44} That is, there may well be mathematical, linguistic, spatial, musical, personal, and bodily-kinesthetic levels of problem solving. Additionally, Stephen Pinker, Director of MIT's Center for Cognitive Neuroscience suggests that thought is not carried out with a particular language, but rather the meaning of thought can be expressed linguistically.\textsuperscript{45} Gardner would surely add that that meaning can be expressed personally, mathematically, spatially, bodily-kinesthetically, and musically, as well as linguistically. What this means is that the thought is not just linguistic, but, this paper suggests that thought is semiotic and the semiotic is executed within a system of logic, through different anatomical regions and structures of the brain.

III. Conclusion

The key to all brain activity is that the entire brain is designed for physical response. Douglas and Martin write:

In all cortical areas, deep layer neurons (usually layer 5) provide subcortical projections to regions that are associated with motor activity--for example, basal ganglia, midbrain, brain stem, and spinal nuclei. Thus every cortical area has an output to a subcortical structure that is concerned with motor functions.\textsuperscript{46}
Further, however, the very process of learning, a process in which we are constantly engaged, is semiotic—which is Peirce's logic (NEM 4:21). There is no reductionism, no dualism; there is only the semiotic.

At each level, sign activity produces interpretants and those interpretants become objects at other levels for a new semiotic. But to understand the essence of what occurs at any level, it is the semiotic, the logic of signs, which provides meaning. The paper ends with some guesses at which brain structures may have roles in the semiotic logic. If indeed, there are structures for the execution of the logic, then, one must move away from a concept of reductionism, because the synaptic activity alone could not possibly define all the levels of logic present in something as simple as learning.

Endnotes

1Barbara Von Eckardt, What is Cognitive Science


3Charles S. Peirce's work will be referenced as: W 4:21, refering to the Chronological Writings of Charles S. Peirce, vol. 4, page 21; NEM 4:20, volume and page number in The New Elements of Mathematics by Charles S. Peirce; and CP 2.250 is a reference to paragraph 250 in volume 2 of The Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce.

4The material presented is a distillation from long studies of the social psychology of George Herbert Mead and the semiotic studies of Charles Sanders Peirce. I have tested Mead's approach over the years, through the analysis of many learning situations, personal, observed in others, and from those found in various sources on creativity, problem solving, or about changed behaviors.

Analysis of the learning process based upon Peirce's logic and semiotic is more recent (since late 1988), but it answers many of the questions found within the Meadian approach. Further, personal applications appear to make a great deal of sense and Peirce's work, at least, begins to explain the development of language and ties nicely to neuroscience.

No attempt has been made to prove any of the information herein, for that, one must look to several publications (some of which are on my vita), including the manuscript A Natural Semiotic.

particularly, "Types of Reasoning," 123-145; "The Logic of Relatives," in which he writes, "Logic is the study of signs," (p. 146), 146-164; and "The First Rule of Logic," 165-180.


14 Peirce, The Essential Peirce, 261; and the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks (Cambridge:
Further references to the Collected Papers will use the standard CP 1.383, to refer to that passage.


17. Ibid.

18. See particularly Zola-Morgan, "Neuroanatomy of Memory," 548-552. The lesions to the amygdala do not affect memory as significantly as lesions to the hippocampal areas.


21. This is a guess based upon experience, the research of parallel distributed processing, and Peirce’s logic, particularly “Deduction, Induction, and Hypothesis,” in W 3:323-338, especially page 326. For parallel distributed processing see, David E. Rumelhart and James L. McClelland, Parallel Distributed Processing, volumes 1 and 2 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1986).


25. Ibid., 42-3.

27 Kosslyn, *Image and Brain*, 380-3, see also 93-4.


29 Ibid, 72-76.

30 Nicholls, *From Neuron to Brain*, 562.

31 Murray Sherman and Christor Koch, "Thalmus," in *Synaptic Organization*, 246 see also, 278.


33 Nicholls, *From Neuron to Brain*, 542.


38 Emotions are firstnesses for Peirce and may, in part be defined on the surface areas of the cortex. See George W. Stickel, "Memory, Morphology, and Mathematics: Peirce and Contemporary Neurostudies," in *Charles S. Peirce and Philosophy of Science: Papers from the Harvard Sesquicentennial Congress*,

40. Shepherd, *Neurobiology*, 449, see also 467 on readiness.


42. Shepherd, *Neurobiology*, 301.


Figure 1: Logic Found within Neural Organization
(see Shepherd & Koch, 15)
Figure 2: Neurotransmitter Pathways
(See Nicholls, 716)
Figure 3: Optic Input through Thalmus (LGN) to Cortex
((A) shows typical sensoral pathway, from sense organ through thalmus, to specific cortical areas. (B) shows partially dissected brain from below and the optic path. (C) shows visual cortex areas, side view, and (D) shows the midsagittal section between the two hemispheres.) (See Nicolls, 562)
Figure 4: Basal Ganglia (in darker patterns)  
(See Wilson, 280)
Figure 5: Basal Ganglia Motor Pathways
(Afferent, Incoming to Ganglia; Efferent, Outgoing)
(See Nicholls, 542)
Figure 6: Feedback Loops, Including Thalamus, Basal Ganglia, Cortex, and Cerebellum
(See Shepherd, 447)
Figure 7: Kosslyn's Schematic of Visual Imagery Processing
(See 383)
Figure 8: The Vestibulo-ocular Reflex
(See Shepherd 301)
THE EDUCATIONAL PHILOSOPHY OF
ROBERT S. ABBOTT

Charlesetta M. Ellis
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It was Plato to whom is attributed the first systematic scheme of education, who taught that it is the aim of education to bring all the powers of man into harmonious cooperation.

--Robert S. Abbott

Until recently, the philosophical views of most African Americans on education has gone unrecognized. A discussion of the subject without some mention of Robert S. Abbott (1868-1940) on morality, idealism, and practicality as components of the learning process would be incomplete.

The first generation of freed slaves, Abbott was born in Georgia. Against the back drop of a hostile environment, he grew into manhood armed with a keen sense of cultural identify. The death of Abbott's biological father (1872) had little, if any, effect on the philosophical approach to education that he would later develop. In fact, it was Abbott's mother and stepfather who inspired his fondness of academics, frugality, and the work ethic.

After completing his formal education at Hampton Institute in 1898, Abbott relocated to Chicago. For the next seven years, he dabbled, unsuccessfully, at the practice of law and as a printer's journeyman. By 1905, he had embarked upon his greatest adventure, the creation of the Chicago Defender. Eventually, the publication became a social, political, and educational catalyst that spurred behavioral changes in the cultural attitude of thousands of African Americans.

As the newspaper grew in size and popularity, educating the nation's black masses through the media became its central theme. Thus, it was not uncommon for Abbott to exert his beliefs regarding education via the publication. For example, in the 1930s he printed a series of articles aimed at motivating school administrators and teachers to re-examine their educational practices.

I. Principles of Informal and Formal Education

Abbott was convinced that the goal of education was to stimulate the mind by way of "quality thought" in order to give definition of purpose to man's
existence. Therefore, moral development became a key factor in the educational process. It was the basic ingredient that bind the cultural fabric of societies together. Quite understandably, he suggested that moral training began with parents and continue throughout schooling.

Because institutions of learning were instrumental in the structuring of our lives it was important that they not operate as "barren scepters" of knowledge. But, instead, leave some indelible imprint upon the memory that would enable humankind to increase its service to society while encouraging morality. Societies that lacked ethics, as well as good value formation were subject to internal destruction.

Misconduct, Abbott argued, was the result of inferior education and undisciplined authority figures. Although, it was the duty of both parents to instill morality the responsibility weighted heaviest upon the mother. Hence, women were to be indoctrinated via the church with Christian values. Meanwhile, family values and ethical behavior were to be re-enforced by institutions of learning.

Abbott believed, that the school as an agent of character molding had an obligation to indulge in "personality unfolding." Such practice served a vital function of cultural enhancement. In essence, he specified three major ideas to accomplish the task: (1) the improvement and correct modulation of the speaking voice which referred to the formulation of good diction and voice tone; (2) the correction of carriage and attainment of grace in bodily movement which included proper posture and refined form; and (3) knowledge of the habits and idiosyncracies of the student which took into consideration the individual's mental abilities and emotions. Accordingly, if educators administered proper unfolding then students would emerge dignified and self assured.

Abbott was cognizant of the additional burden that might ensue if public institutions endeavored to implement such programs. Therefore, he suggested the "finishing" school as a viable alternative. He believed that this kind of institution would benefit all students, especially individuals from the lower classes.

II. The School and Instruction

For Abbott, the school was a place were the idea of true democracy should be practiced. Such institutions were to be staffed with "liberal" thinkers whose primary goal was to present knowledge in an unbiased manner. In particularly, Abbott targeted colleges and universities for their lack of commitment and understanding regarding the issue. Because these institutions produced the future educators and leaders of society, it was their duty to help free their students from prejudicial behaviors and attitudes. Prejudice, he stressed, hampered the intellectual development of all citizens.

Accordingly, improving society through education involved; using the as an agent of social and political change; empowering the educational
process to eliminate all forms of racism; employing the school to increase economic equity; and utilizing institutions of learning to enhance the quality of life.  

Abbott was intrigued by Plato's philosophical ideas. As an advocate of "Platonic" thought, he emphasized the role of the school in preparing students to become productive members of society. Moreover, he acknowledged the importance of certain aspects of idealism in conjunction with formal education. For example, Abbott was in favor of a subject-oriented curriculum based upon the study of the classics and history. However, unlike many of his contemporaries, he argued for the inclusion of African American history.

Abbott, also urged educators to consider the study of black psychology and philosophy at the college and university levels. He believed that such subjects would enhance the quality of education for all students. Of particular concern, was the "inferiority" stigma attached to the African American by the dominant culture. Abbott, suggested that knowledge of these subjects would improve the self-esteem of African American students while providing them with a sense of their cultural heritage. In essence, Abbott's goal was to produce a culturally balanced curriculum that neither reflected a Euro-centric nor Afro-centric perspective.

In addition, the study of higher mathematics as a method for developing abstract reasoning in black males, especially at the secondary level, was of equal important to Abbott. The introduction of great works of music, literature, and art were of equivalent value. However, he insisted that institutions of learning offer courses in African art as part of their school curricula. Abbott believed, that the exclusion of such art because one culture deemed it "primitive" was absurd. Moreover, he chided educators for ignoring black literature and the aspirations of talent African American writers.

Thus, Abbott lamented: "The arrows of prejudice poison at too early a period the probable stream of productivity to give hope for the rise of a literary genius expressive of love, sympathy, and understanding." This attitude lead Abbott to speculate, that if Dumas or Pushkin had been born in the United States their talents would have gone unnoticed.

Teachers' roles were critical for the maintenance of effective schools. For this reason, it was necessary that they recognized their responsibility as the primary motivator with respect to the learning process. Abbott, also considered the issues of teacher competency and quality education as major concerns. It was important that teachers be; (1) supportive of their students; (2) skilled in their subject area; (3) intellectually stimulating; and (4) of good moral character.

In short, teachers were to encourage their students to become self-actualized. Abbott, further insisted that there was no place in education for "mentally" weak individuals. Such persons were easily spurred by bigotry and hatred. He associated this kind of behavior with emotional instability. Abbott, also warned that such action fostered educational retardation among students.
Practically and educational relevancy also were of interest to Abbott. For Abbott, a major function of the school was to address the needs of the student, his community, and society. This task could be accomplished, if teachers induced their students to become "self-reliant" and "inventive." Schools that engaged in outdated instruction, curricula, or programs were of little value to anyone.

In addition, Abbott believed that the African American required a broader educational base that included academics and social skills to overcome the deficiencies incurred during slavery. Courses in cultural refinement and vocational training offered at colleges and universities attended by African American students could provide a means for remedying the situation.

In Abbott's view, college or university degrees did not necessarily guarantee success for any student. In particularly, such degrees for the African American were meaningless if not accompanied with guidance. Along with practical education access to equity of job and professional opportunities also were the keys to economic and social mobility.

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**Endnotes**

1 Robert S. Abbott, "Teachers Also Have an Obligation to Their Pupils," *Chicago Defender* 6 April 1935, part 3, 16.


5 Robert S. Abbott, "Has Education a Purpose?" *Chicago Defender*, 3 October 1936, 18.


7 "Editor Tells Purpose of Cultural Articles," *Chicago Defender*, 24 November 1934, 11.

8 Robert S. Abbott, "Teachers Also Have an Obligation to Their Pupils," *Chicago Defender* 6 April 1935, Part 3, 16.


14. Ibid.


16. Ibid.

AGAPISM APPLIED

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Charles S. Peirce presents two types of love, eros and agape, in the paper "Evolutionary Love". Peirce considers love to be "the great evolutionary agency of the universe," especially when concerning his concept of the mind. In this paper, eros love and agape love will be defined, agapism will be viewed as a tool that further evolves the mind, and agapism's place in the classroom will be considered.

In defining eros, one may look back to Plato's time. Eros was the common word for love, which meant "need or desire, a reaching out for whatever one lacked." The word eros was typically used concerning sexual love, but this term was later broadened by Plato to speak of "a heavenly eros toward the gods, or toward the good." In spite of the broadened use of the term eros, it will be defined here, according to the old meaning, as a love that seeks to fulfill one's own needs. Eros is focused on the self; a selfish love.

Agape love might be considered a direct opposite of eros. This love is defined as a love that sacrifices self. The greatest example of agape is seen in God: "God loves because God is love, not because what God loves is inherently lovable. God's love simply overflows his being and radiates upon us all." Using this example, one can see that agape is not a measure of what the object is capable of doing, nor is it based on what the object looks like. Agape is a love that is given for the sake of giving. This type of love is also seen as an initiating love, again through looking at God, who reached down to people (imperfect and unlovable) through Christ, therefore offering the privilege of fellowship with Love himself. So, agape defined is sacrificial, freely given, unconditional, and an initiating love.

Human agape, by no means comparable to God's example, can still be modeled to some degree. According to Karl Barth "agape means 'identification with [one's] interests in utter independence of the question of [one's] attractiveness.' " Agape may be further defined as unchanging (in spite of changes in the person), limitless and having no base on the person's possessions, and a love that offers permanent stability.

Agape love, according to Peirce's interpretation of the gospel of John, is the way minds are developed or the tool through which the mind is given a
"capability of further evolution." In "Evolutionary Love", Peirce creates a picture of love being a circle (never ending) that produces smaller creations or independencies that serve to pull those involved into a deeper harmony. This love is stable and giving as two objects having differing strengths, weaknesses, and abilities are bound together within the circle, but at the same time each is given the gift of total acceptance and freedom to grow according to the differing gifts. This growth may be viewed as intellectual growth or growth of the mind, through shared thoughts and dreams, as well as, through individual pursuits. Peirce continues by offers that this love says, "Sacrifice your own perfection to the perfectionment of your neighbor" or the one loved. Peirce writes:

> Everyone can see that the statement of St. John is the formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth comes only from love, from--I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the ardent impulse to fulfil another's highest impulse.

As educators, there should be immediate concern for the development of the minds of students and even ourselves as continual learners. How does agapism apply to educators? Does agapism have a place in the classroom?

Following Peirce's ideas of love being a tool used for the expansion of minds, educators, whether Christian or non-Christian, may apply this philosophy. The two-fold goal for most learning facilitators is to inspire doubts and questions that will lead the child into a continuing process of learning or growth, and to help the child realize individual strengths and potential. The final outcome or product in teaching is the individual child.

To apply agapism in the classroom, the teacher must first realize that the process does involve sacrifice. The desire for the perfectionment or growth of each student will be put above the teacher's own needs. Peirce says "[i]t is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make them [the children] grow, but by cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers in my garden." Here, it may be seen that the teacher's ideas or the book's content should not be pushed upon the children as the only way, instead the children do have ideas and questions that are valid, therefore requiring extra time and special attention.

Another requirement for applying agape is seeing that "[l]ove, recognising germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely." Teachers, when viewing only the exterior of children, often see the "bad" or ugliness in children, whether it is a learning disorder, abuse, disrespect, or simple uncleanliness. It is the job of learning facilitators to look past all of the dirt and to help each child to discover the lovely within, which involves their individual gifts and strengths.

Once again looking to Peirce's picture of love as a circle, the classroom viewed as this circle, a community. Through this picture, one may see
the movement of love and the interdependency within this circle, while each student is developing independencies of their own, thus creating harmony as a whole. The relationship between the teacher and the class, and the students with each other involves the meshing together of each individual’s strengths and weaknesses with those of another. This process allows the lovely to develop and provides a model of how this lovliness is to be used in relation to the classroom, then in relation to the community, and then to the world.

In "Evolutionary Love" Peirce has developed "his agapism, the doctrine that love is operative in the world." Because agapism is operative in the world, agapism can be found operative in any classroom. It is through agape love that the roles of educators are fulfilled. Agape love is an initiator; in schools it is an initiator of the lovely, the dreams, the questions, and the ideas. Agape love is sacrificial because it involves the giving of oneself (the educators) to the many (our students). Agape love is unchanging, providing stability for students. This is demonstrated through consistent actions, reactions, and attitudes toward each student as an individual, and through a safe learning environment. Finally, agape love in the classroom has to be what Peirce describes as a circular love; a love that is never-ending, a love that is accepting, and a love that encourages growth and independence in each child.

Endnotes


3Ibid, 65.


5Gene Outka, AGAPE An Ethical Analysis (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 11.


7Ibid, 353.

8Ibid, 354.
I. Introduction

We exist in a world of sensory images. Visual information provides rich sources of data, not only for humans, but for all forms of life (Sebeok, 1963, 1990). Living in an ever-changing sea of images, contextualizing, interpreting, and consequently giving structure and meaning is at the heart of what it means to be "human". Research has shown that cross-culturally, from about the age of two, humans make their own visual marks on the world (Dissanayake, 1992). Thus, there is no culture on Earth without some form of artistic expression. Visual representation and interpretations are integral to human expression!

Visual artworks are signs that allow interpretations that are not dependent on written words. Representations of the visual world can transcend the limits of language. Conversely, people who make art are creating their own interpretations of their worlds. Visual images "express emotions, qualities, and feelings" (Chalmers, 1982, p. 7) that define the cultural aesthetic biases of the people who produce them. "Visual symbols transmit ideas and give expression to certain beliefs" (Chalmers, p. 9) that enrich the intellectual diversity of classroom environments while working to enhance learning.

We argue that artworks, for the persons making them, are constructions. They are the results of experience, which can then be used by teachers to build knowledge in students. They are also interpretations of observations and reflections of the artist's emotional and/or intellectual involvement with the subject matter. Thus, image makers and image viewers interpret their worlds in trans-linguistic ways based upon their own experiences, interests, and emotional responses to topics under study. These responses have the potential to stimulate curiosity, provoke new insights, and increase understanding that is at the heart of educational enterprises.

Many traditional teaching methods leave little room for students to explore beyond the boundaries of the written text. We contend that innovative teaching methods, using visual art as a springboard, will work to free the imagination of the learner. Graduate education, as it is presently structured, is designed to value the written word and oral interpretation above other communication forms for effecting learning. I (Lifvendahl) believe that education, in gen-
eral, "weed's out" students who have "weak writing skills" although they may have exceptional visual literacy. Furthermore, research shows that "some students are attracted primarily to visual stimuli and visual thinking; others to sound and still others to tactile impressions" (Day, 1990, p. 6). It is our premise that learning is facilitated through incorporating visual art into interpretive methodologies because visual signs are as powerful as written ones.

II. Concept

"[T]he sense of sight constitutes an important source of message and meaning making. Visual signification and communication are testaments to the fact that we use sensation (in this case visual) as the substance from which we make our signs. Visual sign-making is probably the oldest form of representation in the human species. There is no culture without visual art . . . The brain's ability to manufacture images is more important to cognition than is the presence of the verbal structures that we use to carry our thinking load" (Dissanayake, 1994 p. 81).

Teaching techniques presently employed in graduate education primarily emphasize the written word: students transcribe and present their thoughts in linguistic form to their teachers for critique and evaluation. They participate in group discussions, write in journals, and orally present results of their research. We believe that there is a need to explore alternate interpretive tools beyond this norm. The grounding for this belief is the conviction that the function of graduate education should be to expand the variety of research tools available to the researcher, not constrict them. Dissanayake's statement provides support for our educational rationale.

We maintain that as students move through the process of graduate education there seems to be a constriction of available "ways of knowing" that emphasizes the value of the written word above all other vehicles of cognition. We remember Bacon's Dictum that "Reading maketh a full Man, Writing an exact Man and Conference a ready Man" (Winn, 1994) but we feel that Seeing makes for a sensitized Human. Visual information, a rich resource of interpretive data, has become marginalized in higher learning. Thus, graduate education, as it presently exists, narrows the student's research menu instead of expanding it. We take a critical stance seeking to "address identification and exposition of those aspects of [standard educational methods that] interferes with pursuit of rational goals" (Merriam & Simpson, p. 119). Further we suggest that expansion of variety in research and educational methodologies is desirable. Finally, we hold that adding methodologies for visual image interpretation creates conditions for exploring alternate forms of research that enhance our practice as educators.
III. Context

Both of us participated in a graduate seminar focusing on the work of the semiotician, Charles S. Peirce, during the Spring semester of 1994. This class, as is pro forma for most graduate seminars, primarily used linguistic means to introduce, explain, and evaluate the text-bound material under study. One of us, (Lifvendahl) brought two paintings to class that he created for the express purpose of depicting Peirce's semiotic ideas (See Figures 1 and 2 at the end of this paper). With the introduction of the paintings, a dramatic increase in class participation, interpretive tension, and animated discussion occurred. Participants gained both insights into Peircean semiotics and opportunities for interpretive freedom not previously available. Visual representation of Peirce's complex philosophical ideas seemed to have provided a qualitative difference in both interest and understanding of the ideas under discussion. Similarly, Smith-Shank gave a presentation using photographic images that elicited parallel student responses. Because of our combined seminar experiences, and because of our positions as educators, we wanted to explore how visual representations can enhance learning. We felt that the potential of this pedagogic domain remains essentially untapped.

It is a paradox that although Peirce's arcane writing style is, for some people, laborious to read and difficult to understand, his intention was to provide comprehension of everyday matters. We decided this paradox would be useful to 'illustrate', so to speak, our position in learning enhancement. Therefore, our examples revolve around actual or potential classroom events using Peirce's ideas.

We present three techniques for delineating a pedagogic process for effectively using visual representations in the graduate education classroom. We also offer a critiquing process designed to support student endeavors in unfamiliar pedagogical terrain.

IV. Instructional Technique

The following three techniques provide an interactive approach to interpreting visually based information. They are based on the pedagogical style and time tested expertise of Professor Robert M. Lifvendahl, who taught undergraduate/graduate painting and drawing at The School of the Art Institute of Chicago for over 32 years. The three art based techniques are titled Three Dimension-Two Dimension, Compare With a Model and Lightest Light-Middle Grey-Darkest Dark. We hold that with the use of these teaching techniques textual and visual signs can be combined to stimulate dynamic tension that lead to holistic pedagogues. Therefore, we suggest using Professor Lifvendahl's framework to ease the incorporation of visual information into the graduate classroom.

Additionally, a Peircean interpretive method has been adapted to ground these techniques in Peirce's ideas of semiotic relationships. Semeiotics is a ph...
and artificial languages. In this context, artwork is an artificial language that suggests the possibility of translation between the natural language of written text and visual representations. This theme is based on Peirce's theory of signs that employ a triadic structure composed of "signs," "objects," and "interpreters" (Peirce, 1868) discussed below.

When students are requested to make artwork to visualize a written piece, the image created is the objectification of that written experience. Thus, their writing experience, in a Peircean sense, is translated into an "object." Art-objects can therefore function as "signs" of writing experiences as will be seen in the examples soon to follow. Accordingly, student's oral presentations of the artwork become natural language "interpreters" generated from this semiotic translation. The additional effort required to overcome the tension inherent in making this verbal translation, from an art-object, stemming from an originating textual work, has great potential for insightful learning.

It is necessary to emphasize that these techniques are not, in and of themselves, Peircean in nature but are an adapted framework upon which instructors create opportunities for expanded inquiry into interpretive meaning when employing visual information as an integral part of their teaching practice. They serve as "illuminating examples that open the door to clearer inquiry" (Winn, 1994).

Comparing the Written Word With the Visual Image: COMPARE WITH A MODEL

If artists are representing concrete objects in their work, one useful way of allowing them the chance to compare their work with the subject being reproduced is to physically take the work and place it directly next to the model being rendered. The artist can then directly see via the tensions created the rendering's strengths and weaknesses by comparing the artwork with the subject.

Introducing this technique when interpreting visual information in graduate education helps in clarifying relationships existent between visual and written information. By having students directly compare and contrast the whole or parts of the whole of their written interpretive work with visual information, graduate discourse is more clearly communicated. This process also augments and enhances student sensitivity in interpreting their visually rendered information through practice in speaking about (essentially-translating into natural language) what the whole or parts of the whole piece signify.

Juxtapositional Comparison of Two Mediums: THREE DIMENSION-TWO DIMENSION

R. M. Lifvendahl's (1992) art training classes required art students to render a single subject in a variety of mediums to increase their ability to 'comprehend' that subject. For instance, a subject originally executed in a two dimensional, painted format might be redone within a sculptural, three-dimensional format. This technique encouraged students to see the tension their sub-
jects radiate when placed within another perspectival dimension. Although this is achieved through the process of semiotic translation of the original written text to the visual representation, it may also be furthered--for better understanding and knowledge of that subject--if imaginatively done. For instance, a two-dimensional sketch or painting, the first translation, may be imaginatively re-transformed into a three-dimensional, kinesthetic or in other ways differently presented manner. This is compatible with triangulation, a research methodology that stresses studying a subject using more than one research method.

According to Denzen (1978) clarity, the heart of interpretive inquiry, requires comparing information through data triangulation. Research shows that two or more qualitative methods used simultaneously but separately provide different "lenses" through which learning is simplified (Stern, 1994). Traditional graduate education requires that students compare their written work with observations of colleagues in open and critical discourse. Our visually-integrated pedagogical method dramatically enriches discourse by adding visual interpretants to the mix of data normally used in classrooms. Instructors using our techniques therefore teach their students to experiment and learn with visual (or other) methods for conveying or interpreting information beyond 'normal' textual data. Student comprehension and articulation of ideas will be enhanced if instructor's approaches are not limited to traditional text-based expression, and certainly the approach is transferable to out-of-classroom contexts.

**Defining the Visual Representation: LIGHTEST LIGHT--MIDDLE GREY--DARKEST DARK**

When artists paint a subject, they must first identify it's chromatic extremes. By defining one specific area as "lightest light" and another as "darkest dark" one can define all the gradations of grey (or the middle ground between colors) that exist between the two extremes. This technique serves as one "frame of reference" from which interpretation can begin.

Although the most complex of the three techniques, this method employed as a template for inquiry, affords potential insight into the meaning of visual images presented in graduate learning situations. By first identifying the extremes of a question, the differences between "clearness" and "obscurity" are refined. A traditional example of this is when an instructor introduces the extreme boundaries of a concept or argument in order to help the student define the middle ground. Interestingly, Edmund Husserl's phenomenological investigation of meaning structures employs similar approaches in that the phenomenon (an idea, problem etc.) is subjected to "free imaginative variation" (a process not unlike 'pruning' by which the extremes that do not truly represent an essential meaning are cognitively removed) to discover "essential insights," and "modes of clarity," which look at ways phenomena are made almost distinct to our perception (Spiegelberg 1985). Visual representations thus work to further clarify the "distinct" (T. H. Huxley, 1878) parameters of a problem, idea, or solution being appre-
hended. This technique, when applied in a consistent manner, in turn provides grounding for one to perceptively interpret that which lies in the "distinct middle grey" areas of knowing, or conversely, the Husserlian essential meaning structure.

This exercise additionally offers the opportunity for practitioners and students to explore issues on the "outer edge of knowledge"---those areas defined above as darkest or lightest. Thus, beyond the delineation and clarification of the original question (exemplified as "distinct/middle grey"), opportunities exist for problematizing questions through restatement: What would the question, problem or meaning be if viewed from the "lightest" or "darkest" perspectives? Thus, two pedagogical benefits potentially accrue from changing interpretive perspectives.

By incorporating these three instructional templates, through an adapted semiotic interpretation of visual representation, dynamic methodologies can be added to our toolbox of graduate teaching methods. Such shifted interpretive paradigms require learners to dialectically review old ways of data interpretation while encouraging experimentation with non-traditional visual information. Thus, when centered in this methodological context, the visual piece, the artwork itself, becomes a catalyst for interpretation and expansion of perspectives and meanings.

V. How To Select Visual Images:

We encourage educators to incorporate visual signs/artwork in graduate instruction so that embedded data in written texts emerges via the interpretations generated from visual art. This form of comparative modeling allows learners to question that which is seen as "normal" (the written text) within new visually enriched contexts. We are not suggesting that every student become a "fine artist" creating "works of art." For many students unaccustomed to drawing, sculpting or the other "fine arts" could be highly intimidating. However, graduate students have been exposed to vast amounts of visual information (television, print media etc.). We argue that visual interpretants illustrate salient comparative points which could be gathered easily from these sources.

An example illustrating this point might be useful. Earlier in this paper I noted the effect this writer's (Lifvendahl) two paintings had when brought into the graduate seminar on Peircean semeiotics. Frustrated with the complexity of Peirce's convoluted writing style, I sought to clarify my personal interpretations of Peircean logic through a visual medium. I am a trained artist, so this interpretive approach is one I often employ. But what might have happened if this task been expanded to an untrained graduate student? One might foresee the following scenarios develop.

Student A had not drawn since she was in high school. She had always been attracted to visual art and was excited at the prospect of using visually based information as a way of portraying her interpretations of Peircean philosophy.
Not feeling comfortable with painting her ideas herself, she began gathering pictures, photographs and illustrations from popular magazines. She then created a photo-collage presentation that represented her experience of reading/deciphering Peirce's text. In this hypothetical situation, insightful interpretations were evidenced through classroom discourse about her photo-collage.

In contrast, hypothetical student B chose a handicraft that he had learned from his wife, quilt making. Student B chose the three layered construction of a quilt: outside design, batting inner layer and underlayment, to represent, in simple abstract form, Peirce's triadic relationships. The difficulty in clarification he had experienced in his written work was eased by this visual metaphoric abstraction describing physical relationships of "Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness" (Peirce, 1868). He then went on to use quilted design patches to illustrate the varied associations between "signs, referents, and interpretants" (Peirce, 1868) about which he had also written.

Other hypothetical students would chose other visual techniques to convey their conceptual beliefs. Each work theoretically generated animated discussion. Each visual experiment enriched data available to the whole class for interpretive understanding. These constructed scenarios serve to illustrate enhanced learning using two different interpretive forms: written text and visual representation.

In order to help clarify what we are talking about in a "real world" context we note that Peter Senge in The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook (1994, p. 327), cites an example of the power of visually transforming ones thoughts through art. He points out that in a book called Creating Shared Vision by Marjorie Parker (1990):

Hydro Aluminum Karmoy Fabrikker, a Norwegian company which is Europe's largest producer of aluminum, spent two years co-creating a shared vision. Marjorie Parker, the organizational consultant who helped them through the process, describes every step along the way. In this story, the pictures were really worth 1,000 words: virtually every employee had a chance to sketch their personal version [of their vision] for the organization and then link it with images others had created. The final "vision statement" was not a piece of writing at all, but an extraordinary mural of a flourishing garden, painted by a local artist, in which every plant and element had rich metaphorical meaning [emphasis Lifvendahl]. For example, the management was the water supply, feeding into the soil underground and providing essential irrigation, but not visible on the surface.
The Art of Critique: MOVE FROM THE POSITIVE TO QUESTION THE NEGATIVE

One of the hardest parts of teaching is criticizing students' work. This is doubly true of art instruction. Artists create by literally exposing their inner-self to public viewing. Any art instructor encouraging improvement must do so with great care. Like students in many professions, special care should be taken to educate, correct and nudge art students in "right" directions without breaking their spirit. A most efficient way to guide improvement is to consistently start the process of critique by finding positive points from which to enter discussion with the student. Most art works have at least one portion that is done well enough or interesting enough to use as the foundation from which to begin a critique. Therefore, having defined the best aspects of the work, the art instructor begins a process of questioning the student, i.e., What would you do to improve this? How can you remove a discordant element etc.? The instructor thereby creates a situation where inadequacies in the work are revealed by the student, not the instructor. Using this process, the art instructor guides improvement while considering the vulnerability of the student. Yet, importantly, control of the final product is essentially left to the student.

It is our position that to introduce visual data into graduate learning instructors should use positively grounded interpretive critique. Taking a consistent, positive methodological stance for clarifying the contextual use of visual information defuses fearfulness in students exploring new interpretive methods. When students lay themselves open to criticism by using a medium with which they are not comfortable, or when they are interpreting visual interpretants of others, the instructor has an important task in guiding the discussion.

One must also remember that in encouraging the use of new interpretive techniques misunderstanding and confusion can occur. Re-casting misunderstanding as a positive element from which to generate new questions therefore enhances learning. Again, referring back to our hypothetical class examples (painting, collage, quilt), what we mean by misunderstanding or confusion is that experimentation with interpretant forms (visual vs. written) may place both students and instructors in awkward positions due to the lack of familiarity with the process. Professors unprepared to implement these concepts need to form intellectual partnerships with colleagues trained in art. Once they are comfortable, they need to prepare their students to fully explore, in a positive way, this "brave new world" of interpretation, students may hesitate putting in the needed effort. They should be "sold" on the idea that using visual information demonstrably adds to their learning and that their efforts will be reinforced. It is our position that by convincing students that their efforts will be positively rewarded through sensitive critique, visual interpretation creatively enhances overall learning in graduate education.
VI. Conclusion

Much research supporting the inclusion of visual elements in children's learning exists. However, what has been neglected is an application to graduate classroom dialogical processes. We maintain that with incorporation of visual pedagogy in graduate education, multiple ways of knowing, learning and understanding are facilitated, resulting in new insights and leaps of imagination.

We have attempted in this position paper to address the need to expand teaching tools available to graduate school educators. We have argued that by consciously stressing the interconnectivity of mediums through which humans learn, semiotically expanded visually based interpretive "signs" make available learning opportunities that go beyond traditional textual ones. Gaining expanded perspectives on embedded views, beliefs and ideas, while providing intellectual guidance, should be at the heart of graduate education. Lastly, we argue that free inquiry is enhanced by expanding the tools through which learning is explored. We encourage debate and intend to investigate these concepts more fully in the future.

References


Figure 1
Figure 2
USING SEMIOTIC REASONING IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH: 
THE EMERGENCE OF PEIRCE'S TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS

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This paper will compress a tremendous amount of information into a few pages. Basically, its purpose is to document a discovery; namely, that C.S. Peirce's ten classes of signs can be used to describe what I further purport to be the ten categories of inference used to do any and all forms of empirical inquiry. The structure of the paper will roughly follow that of an extremely informal proof, using definitions and elaborations on Peirce's ideas to establish my points. All reference numbers are from the collected papers of C.S. Peirce (1931-1965).

For Peirce, the beginning of inquiry starts with an understanding of the role of being in the inquiry process. Peirce postulated three modes of being, which were defined as follows:

I. Definition 1
Peirce's category of being known as *Firstness*, or Pure Potential:

The first is that whose being is simply in itself, not referring to anything or lying behind anything. . . . What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes on it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence--that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. (1.356-1.357)

II. Definition 2
Peirce's category of being known as *Secondness*, or Actual Fact:

If I ask you what the actuality of an event consists in, you will tell me that it consists in its happening *then* and *there* . . . . We have a two-sided consciousness of effort and resistance, which seems to me to come tolerably near to a sense of actuality. On the whole, I think we have here a mode of being of one thing which consists in how a second object is. I call that Secondness. (1.24)

III. Definition 3
Peirce's category of being known as *Thirdness*, or Actual Fact:
Not only will meaning always, more or less, in the long run, mold reactions to itself, but it is only in doing so that its own being consists. For this reason I call this . . . the element of Thirdness. It is that which is what it is by virtue of imparting a quality to reactions in the future. (1.343)

IV. Clarification from Peirce on The Relation Of Firstness, Secondness And Thirdness

By the third, I mean the medium or the connecting bond between the absolute first and last. The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. Then end is second, the means third. The thread of life is a third; the fate that snips it, its second. A fork in the road is a third, it supposes three ways; a straight road, considered merely as a connection between two places is a second, but so far as it implies passing through intermediate places it is third. Position is first, velocity or the relation of two successive positions second, acceleration or the relation of three successive positions third. But velocity so far as it is continuous also involves a third. Continuity represents Thirdness almost to perfection . . . Action is second, but conduct is third. Law as an active force is second, but order and legislation are third. (1.337)

According to Peirce, all inquiry is grounded in these categories of being. But inquiry is also always a sense-making process, and for Peirce, the key "ingredient" from the world of experience for this sense-making activity is the notion of the sign. Hence, the main definition for signs and a related glossary of key terms delineating aspects of the sign are provided below.

V. Definition 4

Peirce's definition of the Sign:

A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. (2.228)

VI. Glossary Of Key Terms Delineating Sign Aspects

Tone: Aspects Of The Sign Dealing With Its Potentiality
Token: Aspects Of The Sign Dealing With Its Actuality
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Type: Aspects Of The Sign Dealing With Its Regulative Powers
Icon: Aspects Of The Ground Of A Sign Dealing With Its Powers Of Resemblance
Index: Aspects Of The Ground Of A Sign Dealing With Its Power To Act As Evidence
Symbol: Aspects Of The Ground Of A Sign Dealing With Its Power To Act As A Rule Or Habit
Open Sign: The Sign Working As A Propositional Function (Peirce used the term "Rheme")
Singular Sign: The Sign Working As A Singular Proposition (Peirce used the term "Dicent")
General Sign: The Sign Working As A Conclusion For A Rule Or Habit (Peirce used the term "Argument")

As we will see, the key terms from the glossary used to elaborate the notion of signs further link aspects of the sign to the three modes of being defined earlier. To determine this, we need to delineate these modes of categorization in greater detail. First of all, we can categorize the sign categories in terms of the basic definition of the sign per se:

1. Sign Categories Manifested In The Nature Of The Sign Per Se: Tone, Token, Type;
2. Sign Categories Manifested In Concept Of The Ground: Icon, Index, Symbol;

Then, we can categorize the sign categories in terms of the three modes of being:

1. Sign Categories Manifested By Firstness: Tone, Icon, Open Sign;
2. Sign Categories Manifested By Secondness: Token, Index, Singular Sign;
3. Sign Categories Manifested By Thirdness: Type, Symbol, General Sign.

These two modes of categorization are then reconciled, according to Peirce, by using an elegantly simple process—they are reconciled using a monotonic intersection with the category of Firstness serving as the starting point. In this fashion, Peirce derived his ten mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes of signs. They are derived in the following section.

VII. Creating The Ten Classes Of Signs
Via Monotonic Intersection

1. Open Iconic Tone
   Open Iconic Token
3. Open Iconic Type
4. Open Indexical Token
5. Open Indexical Type
6. Open Symbolic Type
7. Singular Indexical Token
8. Singular Indexical Type
9. Singular Symbolic Type
10. General Symbolic Type

As long as we stay at this level, then the ten classes of signs remain simply as a categorizational system. But suppose we consider the nature of these classes if they are taken to describe the inferential endpoints of particular acts of empirical inquiry. In this case, they are no longer a mere categorization system, but they become a means for linking signs and the acts of reasoning within inquiry which we use to discover truth, understand the world, and change practice. We begin with Peirce's definitions of the three modes of reasoning, below.

VIII. Definition 5
Peirce's definition of the Abduction:

... is the provisional adoption of a hypothesis, because every possible consequence of it is capable of experimental verification, so that the persevering application of the same method may be expected to reveal its disagreement with facts, if it does so disagree (1.68).

IX. Definition 6
Peirce's definition of the Induction:

Induction is that mode of reasoning which adopts a conclusion as approximate, because it results from a method of inference which must generally lead to the truth in the long run (1.67).

X. Definition 7
Peirce's definition of the Deduction:

Deduction is that mode of reasoning which examines the state of things asserted in the premisses...and concludes their necessary, or probable truth (1.65).

Peirce compares all three modes of reasoning via the following set of syllogisms (2.623):
DEDUCTION.

Rule. -- All the beans from this bag are white.
Case. -- These beans are from this bag.
Result. -- These beans are white.

INDUCTION.

Case. -- These beans are from this bag.
Result. -- These beans are white.
Rule. -- All the beans from this bag are white.

ABDUCTION.

Rule. -- All the beans from this bag are white.
Result. -- These beans are white.
Case. -- These beans are from this bag.

Linking the classes of signs to modes of inquiry, we can see now that all Abductive acts of reasoning lead to Open signs acting as endpoints to inquiry, all Inductive acts of reasoning lead to Singular signs acting as endpoints to inquiry, and all Deductive acts of inquiry lead to General signs acting as endpoints to inquiry. We can lay out these findings in the following schematic way, moving from the most certain forms of empirical conclusions to the most open and fallible forms:

Endpoint Of Deductive Inquiry is a:
1. General Symbolic Type which is a necessary conclusion based upon a rule or habit.

Endpoints Of Inductive Inquiry are a:
1. Singular Indexical Token which is actual evidence of a particular thing.
2. Singular Indexical Type is actual evidence of a probable rule.
3. Singular Symbolic Type is a probable conclusion based upon a rule.

Endpoints Of Abductive Inquiry are an:
1. Open Iconic Tone which is no-more-than a plausible comparison by virtue of a possible potential for comparison.
2. Open Iconic Token which is a plausible comparison by virtue of possible evidence.
3. Open Iconic Type is a plausible comparison by virtue of a possible rule.
4. Open Indexical Token is a plausible evidence based on a particular thing.
5. Open Indexical Type is a plausible evidence of a possible rule.
6. Open Symbolic Type is a plausible conclusion based on a possible rule.
XI. Conclusion

This very brief and sparse exposition should nonetheless demonstrate to the patient reader that Peirce's ten classes of signs can be used as the basis for pulling together all of the inferential tools that an empirical researcher needs and uses, from the simplest and vaguest hunch (now seen as a form of abduction), through evidence selection and gathering, and finally to the most sophisticated forms of theory testing and building. Much more work needs to be done to flesh out this skeleton, but the very existence of this skeleton is, in itself, exciting news.

Reference

I. Peace Education: A Modern Educational Reform

At the school where I teach it is not unusual for children to endure criminal acts and acts of violence in their neighborhoods. During the Gulf War, for example, a girl who was in my class said, "Did you see the shooting last night? My mamma made us all lie on the floor. Was that the war?" Another student asked if he could use the computer to write a letter to his mother's judge asking that she be let out of jail where she was serving a sentence for murder.

One of the girls in my class experienced the murder of her uncle and pistol whipping of her father which necessitated surgery on his jaw. One of the boys in this year's class has been dealing with the intense fear and agony brought about by his mother being shot in the throat during the first week of the school year. He is able to cope with his anger and apprehension by frequently discussing his feelings with the school psychologist, the guidance counselor, or me, and by writing about his mother in his journal. He often writes about being angry; but he also writes about people being able to love one another, even their enemies. (Elementary teacher in a Milwaukee Public School)"
a way to avoid the scourge of modern warfare (Fink, 1980). In this century one of its champions, Maria Montessori (1949), argued that peace education was the best way to counteract the hatred of fascism. More recently, feminist scholars have argued that the patriarchal assumptions supporting militaries deny resources necessary to develop healthy children (Brock-Utne, 1985; Reardon, 1988). These different approaches to peace education have in common the attempt to help young people understand the sources of violence in their lives and to create in their minds both the desire for peace and the skills needed to resolve conflicts nonviolently.

In a postmodern world no longer divided along superpower axes, peace educators address many different concerns in unique cultural circumstances--disarmament, ethnic and regional wars, human rights, domestic violence, refugees, street crime, problems of underdevelopment, ecology, and nuclear issues. Peace education has gained its greatest following in Scandinavian countries (where it is often referred to as education for global survival), the Netherlands and Australia (Thelin, 1992). One form of peace education based upon the work of the Brazilian educator, Paulo Friere (1970), helps adults name forms of violence in their lives and identify ways to respond to the problems of structural violence, where people have no human rights, live in violent neighborhoods, and lack such basic essentials as health care, housing, food, or shelter (Galtung, 1975). With this understanding of structural violence, the situation in the inner cities in the United States is fast becoming of concern to peace educators (Prothrow-Stith, 1992).

Initial attempts to teach about peace in American schools focused on war and international threats. This global emphasis was refined during the 1980s, a decade that saw considerable growth for peace education, when teachers at all levels started to address the threat of a nuclear holocaust. Stimulated by fear of the destructive power of atomic weapons, modern peace education reformers assumed that children failed in schools because of high levels of violence, which frighten young people, creating a sense of despair about the future. In a postmodern world supporters of this grass roots educational reform understand that children will not successfully complete their academic assignments until their security needs are met (Craig, 1992). The nation is at risk because of high levels of violence and school professionals are trying to address school failure rates by teaching about peace.

Many problems in today's schools are related to violence. School reformers who ignore the role of violence in their pupils' lives are constructing utopian curricula while ignoring the conflagration that is destroying the hopes, determination, and self confidence of young people. In spite of the many studies that show that children are being exposed to more violence than ever before (Children's Defense Fund, 1991), educational leaders seem indifferent to the promise of peace education to improve schooling. Most professional journals and the national media have ignored peace educational reforms.²

As violence from home and community creeps into elementary, middle, and high schools, school personnel in the 1990s throughout the United States are on their own discovering peace education to address acts of violence carried schools:
One out of every three children in metro Atlanta knows someone who has brought a gun to school. And one in five worries about falling victim to a gunshot at school. (Loupe & Sheppard, April 13, 1993)

In 1990, 2,162 young Americans were killed in school by firearms and 5.3% of students carried a gun to school (Newsweek, March 9, 1992). A Justice Department survey in 1989 indicated that 7% of students said they were victims of violent crimes at school (Celis, 1993). In 1992 every school day 100,000 students toted guns to school; 160,000 skipped classes because they fear physical harm; 40 were hurt or killed firearms; 6250 teachers were threatened with bodily injury; and 260 were physically assaulted (Time, 1993). Some commentators have gone so far as to state that children in inner city areas are suffering from stress disorders similar to what children in Lebanon, El Salvador, Bosnia, Angola, or Northern Ireland experience:

Today there are war conditions, and war effects, in many urban neighborhoods. A recent study found similar post-traumatic stress disorders in children in war-torn Mozambique, Cambodia, the West Bank--and Chicago. The disorders may include inability to concentrate, persistent sleep disturbance, flashbacks, sudden startling and hypervigilence, nihilistic and fatalistic orientation toward the future, leading to increased risk taking. To be a witness to violence is to be a victim of violence. (Will, 1993)

Teachers are responding to increased levels of violence in a variety of ways that include weapons sweeps, locker searches, and even metal detectors (Harrington-Lueker, 1992). Instead of threatening children with more violence, peace educators teach about alternatives to violence, using a proactive strategy to deal with increasing levels of violence in schools and communities. They teach children and adults that peaceful conflict resolution is a much better choice than violence:

* In New York City in 1992 a violence prevention program in 100 schools is credited with reducing classroom fights by 71 percent.

* Created by Deborah Prothrow-Stith, assistant dean at the Harvard School of Public Health, an interactive course called, "Violence Prevention Curriculum for Adolescents," is used by schools in 400 cities.

* In Chicago, a three-tier violence-prevention course involving students, teachers, and parents is being used by 4,000 students in 16 inner city schools. (Holmstrom, 1993)
Peace educators move beyond responding to isolated crises by teaching their students about the roots of violence and how to respond to conflict constructively. They understand that schools can provide a safe haven where young people can learn about alternatives to violence. Although schools often seem powerless to counteract the influence of parents and peers who promote violence, teachers who embrace peace education are trying to nurture in children the seeds of compassion rather than hatred and revenge (Harris, 1993).

Peace education in the United States has grown considerably in the 1980s. Teachers throughout the United States are using the insights of peace education under the following headings—school based conflict management, environmental education, global studies, multicultural awareness, peer mediation, and violence prevention (Deutsch, 1991). The state of Oregon in 1988 passed a law requiring all schools to teach about peace, and school districts in many large cities (Berkeley, Hartford, and Milwaukee) have passed resolutions mandating peace studies. In describing this recent growth in peace education activities, Helen Swan, a Kansas City, MO social worker and the creator of a conflict-resolution curriculum used in more than 100 schools, says:

Over the past three years, many schools have initiated antiviolence programs from kindergarten through high school. A lot of state departments of education have mandated programs. (Holmstrom, 1993)

This concern about violence in schools has been reflected at the national level with the Goals 2000: Educate America Act which states as one of its goals that by the year 2000 every school in the United States will be free of violence.

This paper will explain the theoretical foundations of this approach to educational reform. First, it will define violence and peace education and then present a case history of how educators in one school district in the United States, the Milwaukee Public School District, have embraced peace education reforms in response to violence. The paper will conclude with a summary of some principles of this reform effort.

II. Definitions

In a postmodern world educational reformers adopting the goals of peace education study all different forms of violence, both international and domestic. Violence, in its broadest sense, includes physical, psychological, and structural violence and can be caused by thoughts, words, and deeds—any dehumanizing behavior that intentionally harms another. Physical violence includes direct harm to others—juvenile crime, gang attacks, sexual assault, random killings, and physical forms of punishment. Psychological forms of violence occur often in schools and homes, diminishing a child's sense of worth. Structural violence comes from the structure of a society whose institutions deny certain basic rights and freedoms, when citizens can't get work, health care, social security, safe housing, or civil rights. Many problems of violence come from a commitment to militarism to solve problems. Environmental violence is caused by pollution.
that threatens people's security and creates fear about the future. Violence at home, in the form of domestic abuse, sexual assault, and child neglect, causes students to have low self esteem and to distrust adults.

Peace educators attempt to address many different aspects of the complex nature of violence in the modern world. Figure 1 (appended) helps illustrate the various domains of peace education. At the international level, peace educators provide insights about why countries go to war and how nations can resolve disputes without using force. At the national level, they teach about defense and the effects of militarism. How do countries provide for the security of their citizens? What military arrangements contribute to peace and security? At the cultural level, peace educators teach about social norms, like sexism and racism that promote violence. At an interpersonal level, they teach nonviolent skills to resolve conflicts. At the psychic level, they help students understand what patterns exist in their own minds that contribute to violence. Peace educators go right to the core of a person's values—teaching respect for others, open-mindedness, empathy, concern for justice, willingness to become involved, commitment to human rights, and environmental sensitivity (Peace, 1992).

The word "education" comes from the Latin word "educare," to draw or lead out. "Peace education" implies drawing out from people their instincts to live peacefully with others and emphasizes peaceful values upon which society should be based. (Harris, 1988, p. 14)

A student in a peace education course should acquire both theoretical concepts about the dangers of violence and the possibilities for peace, as well as practical skills about how to live nonviolently.

Readers who might be disturbed by the comprehensive nature of this definition of peace education need to be reminded of how complex the problems of violence are in the modern world. Peace educators provide a holistic approach to the problems of violence, teaching about the root causes of conflict, not simply attempting to stop one kind of violence (e.g., handguns in schools). Peace educators help children appreciate differences, work cooperatively to solve problems, promote respect for human rights, and provide images of adults striving to make the world a better place.

Teachers who are adopting peace education reforms are using the insights of a nonviolent approach to life that reflects the teachings of Jesus Christ, Buddha, Martin Luther King Jr., Tolstoy, Thoreau, Mother Theresa, Cesar Chavez, and feminist educators like Carol Gilligan, Jane Martin, and Nel Noddings. These efforts at educating youth about peace make schools more conducive to learning. Students distraught by violence—whether it be homelessness, random killings, gang activities, or domestic abuse—have a hard time focusing on school lessons. Educational reforms that ignore these problems of violence are like rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic. The best intentions of adult educators will be undermined by icebergs of violence lurking directly under the surface of children's lives.
Supporters of peace education address the chaotic, frightening aspects of this world by helping young people understand the nature of violence, and stress the potential of nonviolence to solve the problems caused by violence (Bernat, 1993; Lawson, 1984). Peace educators realize that at risk students don't fail in schools because they are stupid, but rather that the problems of violence seem so overwhelming to youth that they can't focus on school assignments. Children won't improve their learning of cognitive material until adults address directly the emotional stresses young people face in a violent world.

Thus, at a peaceful school teachers would have a high level of trust with each other, meeting on a regular basis to discuss school problems. The administrative style would be inclusive, supportive of a democratic community in which the contributions of all members are valued. Such a school would be a sanctuary for children who need a safe place to retreat from violence in their lives (Morrow, 1987). At the micro level peace educators promote a teacher-student relationship based upon the principles of love and caring (Martin, 1992; Noddings, 1986, 1992). Peace educators use a peaceful pedagogy:

According to peace pedagogy, the classroom ought to be constructed with five main principles in mind: dialogue, cooperation, problem solving, affirmation and democratic boundary setting. (Harris, 1990a, p. 255)

Peace educators also use discovery learning (Reardon, 1989) and a curriculum that provides important knowledge about the ways to achieve peace (Reardon, 1988). Core concepts for peace education classes include conflict, peace, war, nuclear issues, justice, development, power, gender, race, environment, and futures (Hicks, 1988). Because many adults, and an ever-expanding number of juveniles, lack the insight, motivation, and skills to use consensual forms of dispute resolution, contemporary schools are rushing to adopt one aspect of this curricular reform, peer mediation, which is teaching youth the skills of conflict resolution (Levy, 1989).

III. A Case History

In 1985 the school district in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (MPS) adopted a resolution endorsing peace studies at all levels and developed a peace studies curriculum (Haessley, 1991). Although the peace studies curriculum in Milwaukee Public schools originally had a focus on the threat of nuclear war, by 1990 teachers in Milwaukee were focussing their efforts on violence in schools, homes, and urban communities in response to the kind of terror expressed by the student quoted at the beginning of this article and in response to rising levels of community crime. Milwaukee, like many other urban areas in the United States, has experienced escalating levels of homicide, drug related violence, domestic abuse, street crime, and gang violence. In 1993 19 children under 18 in Milwaukee were shot dead and 144 were wounded (Bothwell & Lawrence, 1994). Numerous other children were traumatized by these events, as they are throughout urban areas of the United States. Teachers in Milwaukee, almost out of des-
peration, because of the high levels of violence in their students' lives, are turning to peace studies to find ways to teach young people alternatives to violence.

The MPS peace curriculum is divided into three sections--elementary, middle school, and high school. The elementary curriculum has activities that can be added to already existing lessons and is organized along the following lines:

* Kindergarten--friendship
* First grade--people packages
* Second grade--feelings, my own and others
* Third grade--respecting the community and all those in it;
* Fourth grade--getting along and working together
* Fifth grade--cause and effect in history and today
* Sixth grade--getting along peacefully in the world (Milwaukee Public Schools, 1985)

Each section has a selected bibliography and a glossary.

The MPS middle school peace education curriculum focuses on conflict resolution and problem solving. It provides strategies that include taking turns, negotiating, compromising, communication clarification, ventilating, apologizing, exaggeration, sharing, avoiding conflict, acknowledging feelings, and appeals to authority. It has a section on non-recommended strategies and a section on helping students make decisions. It also encourages students and teachers to explore community, national, and global conflicts.

The original MPS high school curriculum addressed directly the nuclear threat. This curriculum is being rewritten to stress human rights, domestic violence, the contributions of peace movements, and nonviolence.

Seven years after Milwaukee Public Schools first created its peace studies curriculum one quarter of the schools in Milwaukee indicated that over half their staff is teaching this curriculum. At 9% of the 160 schools in Milwaukee the entire staff is involved in efforts to teach about peace and nonviolence. In 1991 the whole school system adopted a set of goals which include the following:

* students will demonstrate positive attitudes towards life, living, and learning through an understanding and respect of self and others;
* students will make responsible decisions, solve problems, and think critically;
* students will demonstrate responsible citizenship and an understanding of global interdependence; and
* students will learn strategies to cope with the challenges of daily living and will establish practices which promote health, fitness, and safety. (Milwaukee Public Schools, 1991, p. 4)
These goals support peace education efforts by staff at an urban district located in the 18th largest metropolitan area in the United States. Teachers in Milwaukee have adopted a broad variety of peace education strategies at all levels from kindergarten to high school. The central office at MPS provides considerable support in the area of violence prevention and peer mediation, while the school board and superintendent have been outspoken in their efforts to promote nonviolence in schools.

**Elementary Schools with Peace Themes**

Many elementary schools in Milwaukee have adopted peace themes and activities. Staff at Thirty-eighth Street School emphasize the concept "peace works" and recognize on a daily basis student peacemakers. At this inner city school students write about peace, discuss what attributes a peacemaker holds, and create art activities on peace themes. Students who are stressed out or are disruptive are sent to a "Self Direction and Responsibility Center" where they discuss in depth their problems with an African American male safety aide attached to the school and with each other. Escuela Fratney, a bilingual school, has developed a thematic curriculum based on the four themes of 1) we respect ourselves and others; 2) communication; 3) we make a difference on Planet Earth, and 4) we tell our stories to the world. A new urban Waldorf school has a philosophy based upon peace, as do two elementary Montessori schools. At Fairview School all the teachers promote a program called "Stop and Think" which teaches three ways to respond to conflict: 1) call an adult; 2) walk away; and 3) talk it out. The principal credits this program with completely turning around the climate at Fairview. When she first came there five years ago, the school was chaotic and dangerous with high rates of student turnover. Now there is almost no mobility and Fairview has a long waiting list of children who want to attend.

Several elementary schools in Milwaukee have adopted a special assembly which gives awards to students who have made distinguished contributions to keeping the peace. Other schools award the "good citizen for the semester," to a student who has taken leadership in promoting and encouraging peaceful behavior. Other schools have held pep rallies for peace. Such acknowledgement of peacemaking helps make students feel that these are significant activities and counterbalances public perceptions of peacemaking as being cowardly or weak.

Many elementary schools in Milwaukee are seeking ways to help children deal with the strong emotions associated with violence. At some of the Montessori classes teachers start the day with a circle where students can say anything they like about their own lives. Often in these sessions pupils will mention violent episodes and receive support for their feelings both from their teacher and their peers. A similar tactic is a family meeting in class, or even a "me" box, where students can write down personal issues, place them in the box, and then pull them out to discuss them. Such activities allow children to express their concerns about violence in nonthreatening ways. Some teachers post charts on their bulletin boards that demonstrate positive and constructive ways to deal with anger. Other teachers are working on self esteem exercises and positive pledges that help counteract negative messages some children receive at home.
Peace educators try to create a safe space where children who come from violent homes and communities can express anger constructively, instead of it erupting destructively at teachers and other students. Staff at one inner city school in Milwaukee wrote a grant to hire two art therapists to work with children who had been traumatized by high levels of violence. Peace educators appreciate the legitimacy of this anger and teach their students appropriate ways to express it.

Junior High School Efforts in Peace Education

Many junior high school teachers in Milwaukee have been striving to help young people think about peace. In 1987-88 Fritsche Middle School, which was a typical urban middle school with high rates of suspension, failure, and fighting, received a new principal committed to the principles of peace education. The next year he started a peer mediation program. In the 1991-92 academic year students at Fritsche middle school provided peer mediation services with 273 mediations. In this time period the suspension rate of his school has declined from 31% to 10%. A physical education teacher at Fritsche helps run support groups after school for children who have experienced a death of a family member, who have witnessed violent acts, or who have a relative in prison. A teacher aide runs a 10 week anger management group for students whose disruptive behavior puts them "at risk." The slogan of this school is "Where Knowledge Builds Peace." These efforts have completely turned around this school. The course failure rate has decreased from 10% of the courses failed in 1989-1990 to 4.4% of courses failed in 1992-93. Parent involvement has increased and grade point averages have increased. Even more significant, the number of African American students who request Fritsche as their first choice has doubled from 67 to 131 in the past 3 years. (Fritsche is located in a white part of Milwaukee's south side where African-Americans do not always feel welcome.) The principal at this school had as a goal to get this middle school to achieve the same status as highly popular specialty middle schools. He accomplished this with a daily attendance rate of 86.7% which is similar to the rate at specialty schools and by the high number of students that request Fritsche as their first choice. He attributes his success to peace education.

Teachers at Grand Avenue Middle School focus on future education emphasizing different ways of thinking about peace and nonviolence. One teacher at this school has been assigned to spend her full day in a "Working Out Room," where teachers send referrals, students who have participated in or seen some horrible acts of violence and are too traumatized to participate effectively in normal classrooms. Walker Middle School has an emphasis on international studies, human rights, the United Nations, multicultural education, and celebrations of holidays all from all areas of the world. Students there can study the following languages: Japanese, French, German, and Spanish. Each homeroom at Walker has a country it emphasizes. A unitized curriculum, with four teachers (English, math, social studies, science) focuses on a particular country for each marking period. One marking period in the eighth grade focuses on traditional peace issues. Other junior high schools use the occasion of Martin Luther King Jr.'s birthday, the federal holiday in January, to start a peace month, where they con-
duct activities like having each homeroom present an assembly to the whole school on peace themes. Junior high schools in Milwaukee have also been promoting mentoring programs with local businesses so that young men can learn positive, nonviolent notions of masculinity to offset some of violent images they see in the media.

These activities help young people develop beliefs where they can appreciate how peace strategies can deal constructively with problems of violence. Junior high school students look to adults to construct their own ideologies. Thought patterns adopted by children in this age range, 10 to 13, will last a lifetime. Young people approaching adolescence will model themselves after behaviors they see in their environments. For those children who come from violent homes and/or crime ridden neighborhoods, the presence or caring adults who teach alternatives to violence, can make a huge difference in how they respond to conflict. Young people who never learn about nonviolence will not know how to create a peaceful world when they are adults.

High School Responses

In contemporary schools teenagers face enormous challenges, confronting decisions about sex, pregnancy, alcohol, drugs, depression, and suicide. In order to gain approval from their peers, some have to be tough and even commit violent acts. In addition, adolescents in urban school districts can experience extreme levels of violence. At one high school in Milwaukee half the students indicated that they knew someone who had been violently murdered. Even for those students who do not personally experience violence, news reports full of violent stories about young people being killed or wounded, some in deliberate gang related deaths, but also in random acts of violence, cause youth to fear for their lives. Adolescents in urban areas, often without the guidance of adults, help friends grieve tragic losses, as well as figure out how to achieve safety in communities where terrifying levels of violence pose a constant threat. Peace educators help teens address these challenges by empowering them to solve their problems, express their feelings in healthy ways, and communicate effectively with parents, siblings, and peers.

In several Milwaukee high schools, students in "stop the violence" clubs act out their feelings about violence in role plays. They perform skits that involve young people in role plays where they can learn nonviolent ways to respond to violent street incidents where young people are being assaulted and killed for clothing. The Human Relations staff at Central Office has worked with high school students to give them an appreciation of differences and identify their biases. High school teachers in Milwaukee committed to the peace education curriculum attempt to move beyond tolerance by inviting students from different cultures to brainstorm solutions for the problems of violence in the modern worlds.

At Riverside University High School, the open education program had in 1992 a curricular theme on peace and nonviolence. As part of this theme 300 students spent a day at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, where they heard a keynote speech on the power of love and attended workshops on different aspects of peace. They created a haunted Hunger House and donated proceedings to
the hunger task force. They also established a living museum honoring their African-American heritage. During the spring they built a giant wall of peace where each student added a brick that had his or her wishes for peace. Students divided themselves into mock neighborhood councils to suggest solutions for violence in their communities and held a peace olympics.

Several high schools have held classes specifically geared towards helping adolescents understand the causes of violence. At Pulaski High School a history teacher offered a one semester course, "Alternatives to Violence," in which he encouraged seniors and juniors to discuss problems of violence in their lives, inspired them to seek solutions, and let them ventilate some of their fears. During the spring of 1993, at Washington High School a social worker from the Walkers Point Youth and Family Center is co-teaching a home economics class on nurturing. This class comes as a response from lobbying efforts by community clinics that have adopted for teenage parents a three part nurturing curriculum that, at tenth grade, teaches nurturing the self, in eleventh grade, nurturing family and community; and in twelfth grade, nurturing children (Bavolek, Dravage, & Elliot, 1992). These programs are offered on a counseling, as opposed to a didactic, format. Students meet in small groups and discuss stresses in their environment. They receive support from their peers, which helps heal wounds that can lead to hatred, frustration, depression, rage, and further violence. Nurturing programs also teach assertive skills, self-respect, respect for others, care-taking, empathy, appropriate roles, and nonviolent, nonpunitive ways of managing behavior.

Two half year classes at two of twelve high schools in Milwaukee do not represent a high proportion of teachers adopting peace education reforms. They are just a tip of the iceberg. The student STOP THE VIOLENCE groups are strong expressions of students crying out for adults to pay attention their concerns about violence. High school teachers are infusing peace education concepts into their existing classes--teaching the history of Vietnam and peace movements, choosing literature that speaks to the problems of urban violence in English, or teaching about ecological security in biology. Other teachers committed to peace education reforms are emphasizing the interdependent nature of the human species in a global village with shrinking resources and an instantaneous planetary communications system. There are many clever ways that teachers can teach peace concepts in contemporary high schools, e.g., what does the situation in Somalia portend for residents in the United States? Many high schools in Milwaukee have peer mediation programs and are receiving peer mediators trained in middle schools, whose skills at negotiating school hostilities are helping with the increasingly stratified nature of urban high schools whose students are dividing into hostile, warring camps that are often armed.

**Peer Mediation**

By far the fastest growing and most widely accepted aspect of peace education reforms is peer mediation which has "improved quality of life on the playground, in the lunchroom and halls, and in the classroom" (Gentry & Benenson, 1992, p. 101) by training students to be mediators, so that when students are facing conflicts at school, they don't need to go to adults to solve their
conflicts. Rather, they can solve them nonviolently themselves using skills they have learned as peer mediators (Kreidler, 1990). School mediation programs were initiated in 1982 by the Community Boards program in San Francisco. Research studies about peer mediation have indicated results similar to those stated below:

The teachers reported that after the training conflicts among students became less severe and destructive. Conflicts referred to the teacher were reduced by 80 percent and the number of conflicts referred to the principal was reduced to zero. (Johnson, Johnson, & Dudley, 1992, p. 93)

Teachers in all school settings face daily conflicts which include put downs, teasing, playground conflicts, physical aggression and fights, academic work conflicts, and turn taking. Most youth are not taught how to manage these conflicts constructively. Research shows that young people taught these skills in schools often take them back into their communities helping parents, friends and relatives resolve conflicts nonviolently (Stichter, 1986).

Over half the schools in Milwaukee now have school based conflict management programs. Mediation most frequently occurs in problems where students are hassling each other, fighting, having disagreements, or spreading rumors. In a typical school, one staff member will be given release time to train and supervise peer mediators who are chosen sometimes by teachers but often by peers. After these students are trained, they negotiate conflicts in the school. Students with conflicts will write a note about the conflict and place it in a box in a classroom. At a regular time each day the teacher will collect these notes and assign the students who have the conflict to go to the area of the school set aside for peer mediation and let the students work out a solution.

School mediation programs have been especially successful in school yards and in dealing with bullies who lack empathy and want authority over others. Peer mediators assigned to playgrounds are given T-shirts so that they are easily identified. When the mediators spot a non-physical conflict they approach the pupils involved. If there is a physical conflict, the mediators don't get involved. When they approach a non-physical conflict, they must first introduce themselves and then ask those involved if they would like help solving their problem. If one or more of the parties do not want help, the mediators walk away. If parties agree to accept help, the mediators take the disputants through a structured process to resolve their conflict.

Mediation requires students to use active listening skills to mirror back to disputants their disagreements. This process teaches positive communication and problem solving skills that help improve a school's environment. Mediators help young people listen to each other to keep conversations going, encourage disputants to find a solution, and serve as witnesses to any agreement reached (Johnson & Johnson, 1991). One principal involved in this program at a Milwaukee elementary school who saw a 50% drop in the number of problems referred to his office suggested that all students should go through the peer mediation program because it teaches leadership, communication skills, conflict reso-
olution, along with many other necessary skills students need to live and work with others. A Milwaukee teacher who is the peer mediator trainer at her elementary school made the following comment:

There was a fight in the hall today between two eighth graders. I was just trying to conduct traffic when I overheard some other students saying that those fighting should try to work something out and that it is stupid to fight. I also saw an improvement in attitudes of those students who are peer mediators. It was not only the "best" students (the quiet ones who turn in their homework and never cause trouble) that become peer mediators. Some were students who seem to be involved in so many of conflicts at school and now see themselves as having an important role in the school.

Peer mediation and school based conflict management programs help put out fires in schools. Research has shown that these programs can make schools safer (Burrell & Vogl, 1990). Student mediators at Fritsche Middle School reported to this investigator that their lives with family members and friends were less violent because of the peer mediation training. Several reported that they had been called on to mediate disputes with their friends, but that it "doesn't work with strangers." Peer mediation helps create a more positive school climate; teaches students with skills to manage conflicts constructively; and provides students with a technique to address violence their lives. One principal in Milwaukee who attributes peer mediation for greatly improving the climate at his school told this investigator that peer mediation helps students internalize appropriate behavior, as opposed to having adults telling children how to behave. Through alternative dispute mechanisms, students learn practical skills, but do not necessarily address the larger question of why do these fires get started in the first place. Mediation is a tool that empowers young people to solve their conflicts. Instead of using force, they use their hearts and brains to reconcile differences.

System Wide Training in Nonviolence

Staff at the MPS central office committed to the principles of peace education reform have been addressing problems of violence in the schools. The guidance staff has developed a change curriculum that teaches positive communication skills, self esteem, decision making, problem solving skills, and anger management. The human relations staff has been providing peer mediation training, offering curricula dealing with conflict prevention, and giving workshops for students in communications and cultural awareness. The office of psychological services at MPS has been promoting a second step, violence prevention program that targets elementary schools in an effort to decrease the underlying propensity toward violence and the use of violence as a coping strategy for youth.

For the past 3 years the staff development academy at MPS has sponsored workshops for teachers on peace education. These workshops ac-
quaint teachers with peace education curricula and challenge them to consider how they can apply the insights of nonviolence to their classrooms. They also require teachers to develop peace education lesson plans for their classes.

Most recently, the Milwaukee Board and School Directors and Superintendent have established "Schools Against Violence Week," which began on January 16, 1994 with a moment of silence in memory of 30 children who were slain during 1993:

Superintendent Howard L. Fuller will offer advice to parents on how they can demonstrate non-violent behavior at home. He will also advise parents on how to manage their anger when disciplining their children. . . . Children will be encouraged to offer suggestions on how to make their communities safer. . . . One aim of the anti-violence week is to inspire students to supply ideas themselves. . . . Students will also write reports and create banners based on a theme of nonviolence. (Lawrence, 1993)

In spite of recent budget cuts the Milwaukee School Board and Superintendent have preserved efforts to promote peace in the schools. They realize that peace education activities are badly needed to give students who come from extremely violent backgrounds a positive view of the future. Education is, after all, a future oriented activity. Juveniles who despair about their futures will not be motivated to get an education. How are taxpayers benefitting from their investment in public schools if youths are shot, killed, or maimed by violence?

IV. Principles of Modern Peace Reform

Many contemporary school reform efforts fail to address the impact of violence upon education. Children who are either traumatized or distraught by violence cannot focus clearly on the cognitive tasks presented in school settings and hence are either failing or at risk of failure. This paper has demonstrated how school personnel have responded to escalating levels of violence by promoting peace education. Results from Milwaukee indicate that peace education reforms can improve urban schools. When the principal and staff adopt these reforms, schools have shown an increase in attendance, grade point averages, parent involvement, and a decrease in suspension and mobility. Administrators committed to the goals of peace education rely on a nonpunitive approach to discipline, where students learn to take responsibility for their actions and seek alternatives to violence. At schools committed to these reforms, student mobility rates have declined, and schools have long waiting lists of students. The word gets out into the community. Parents want their children to attend schools that have a nonviolent reputation.

In spite of the important gains made by peace education reforms at some Milwaukee schools, not all school personnel are embracing these reform efforts. Peace education in Milwaukee works best where a strong principal motivates staff to pursue alternatives to violence. In most schools, teachers and strators still use punitive measures to punish students distraught by vio-
ience who are acting out in classrooms. Adults resort to suspensions and expulsions in order to get rid of troublesome students. They believe that strict discipline provides security and do not take time out from teaching traditional curricula to teach children about nonviolence and peace. Many teachers who feel inadequate to handle the psychological trauma brought on by violence in their students' lives do not create spaces in their daily routines for children to talk about the impact of violence upon their lives. Others have neither the time nor inclination to learn new conflict resolution skills so they can teach them to children. Beset by many demands, they have no energy to adopt new reforms. As mentioned earlier, the majority of teachers in the Milwaukee Public School System are not involved in peace education reform efforts. Many teachers, faced with stories like the one used to introduce this paper, are growing cynical and bitter. They see no way out of the endless cycles of violence that seem to be engulfing both them and their students.

Reflection upon seven years of peace educational practice in the Milwaukee Public School system provides some principles for peace education reform—all children can benefit from peace education; violence has a profound emotional impact upon young people; peace education has a broader realm than conflict resolution; all subjects can incorporate peace concepts; and all teachers can use a peaceful pedagogy.

All children can benefit from peace education.

Although this paper has highlighted peace education efforts in an urban school district, violence presents problems in schools in many different communities. Suburban and rural communities are struggling with how to deal with weapons in school. Young people raised in dysfunctional homes need adult care and compassion to help them develop a sense of security. Ignoring problems caused by violence can contribute to despair on the part of youth preoccupied with problems of violence. Peace educators do more than teach people how to stop violence. By spelling out conditions for positive peace, they provide all children with hopeful images for their future.

Violence has a profound emotional impact upon young people.

Compassion, caring, nurturing, and friendship are some of the many tools of peacemaking that should be taught in schools to help overcome the academic failings in a postmodern world where high levels of violence cause youth to despair about the future. Peace educators provide important role models for students troubled by violence who have been wounded either physically or psychologically. Teachers who encourage students to talk about their experiences with violence can through active listening heal some of the hurt of these wounds. In order to help their students manage their anger, teachers have to be skilled in affective educational techniques. Children distraught by violence need adult nurturing to overcome their fears so that they can focus on cognitive tasks in schools.
I. Harris

Peace education has a broader realm than conflict resolution. School based conflict management techniques provide skills to help students deal with anger in productive ways, but peace education explores the roots of violence. Peer mediation can make schools a safer place, but peace education implies much more than learning how to solve conflicts. Conflict resolution is concerned only with the interpersonal domain. Peace educators teach about ways to create just social and personal relations that preclude violence. They enlighten their students about the skills of peacemaking, but not only in the spirit of trying to promote better behavior in schools. Peace education teaches nonviolent alternatives to solve problems of violence in the broader society, not just making schools safer.

All subjects can incorporate peace concepts.

Peace education can be infused throughout the curriculum. Classroom teachers use the insights of peace education to help pupils deal with conflicts in all classrooms. Up to the age 10 young people tend to personalize enemies, but after age ten young people are more interested about conflicts between groups. After age 13 young people start to ask questions about why there are so many conflicts. Teachers in all classes can figure out how to get students to articulate concerns about violence and use the insights of peace education to address these concerns.

All teachers can use a peaceful pedagogy.

Peace educators do not rely on domination but rather establish democratic classrooms where teachers and students together explore the impact of violence upon their lives. These teaching methodologies, by using the principles of cooperative learning, motivate students and result in better student retention. Being in a secure environment will increase the ability of students in today's schools to learn cognitive material. The emphasis upon competition in the curricular proposals advanced during the 1980s has increased student insecurity about the future. Because there aren't enough good paying jobs, schools have become a vicious track meet with the losers being placed on the slag heaps of humanity. Peace pedagogy encourages students to share concerns and pool resources to seek solutions to the terrible problems of violence they see all around them.

There exist many excellent resources for teachers and school personnel who want to learn about peace education. Teachers do not have to invent the wheel in order to infuse peace education curricula into their classes. After 20 years of practice, many fine curricula demonstrate how to teach peace in age appropriate ways. There are also many organizations that can provide training and resources for practitioners.

Contemporary calls to restructure schools and even privatize schools overlook a responsibility of adults to provide a secure environment for young people. Teachers adopting peace education reforms are attempting to live up to that responsibility, although their efforts are often overwhelmed in a culture where 70% of the parents believe it is appropriate to use physical punishment.
(spanking) and the media are replete with violent images. Peace education, which provides students information about how to deal with conflict nonviolently, can contribute a small part to the solution to the problems caused by school failure in a postmodern world. However, it is not a panacea. As peace researchers have pointed out, the problems of violence in the modern world are structural. In its impact peace education resembles sex education. Many young people who learn about safe sex practices in school choose to ignore them. Likewise, a young person who has learned conflict resolution techniques in school may resort to force when confronted with violence on the street. Especially when he looks at the adult world, which is well armed, and resorts to peace through strength to resolve its conflicts. Peace through strength uses force to destroy, subdue, or intimidate enemies. Peace educators assume that humans can be educated to behave in civilized ways.

Endnotes

1. These comments were presented to the author in a written form after an inservice for teachers in the Milwaukee Public Schools in March, 1993.


3. Reported by a teacher who ran the peer mediation program at that school. (See note #4.)

4. From a paper submitted by a graduate student to meet the requirements of a course, "Peace Education," taught by the author.

5. In an interview at Fritsche Middle School, January 6, 1994.

6. Ibid.

7. These are some of the many fine curricula that will provide teachers with ample resources to begin teaching peace education concepts.

Alternatives to Violence (Cleveland; Ohio; Friends Meeting, 1984)

Children's Creative Approaches to Conflict (Nyack, NY: Fellowship of Reconciliation, 1983).
Conflict Management: A Curriculum for Peacemaking (Denver, CO: Cornerstone, 1983)

Creative Conflict Solving for Kids (Miami, FL: Grace Contrino Abrams Peace Education Foundation, 1985)

Choices: A Unit on Conflict and Nuclear War (Washington: Union of Concerned Scientists, 1983)

Decision Making in a Nuclear Age (Weston, MA: Haycon House, 1983)


Education for Peace and Justice (St. Louis, MO: Institute for Peace & Justice, 1981)

Elementary Perspectives I: Teaching Concepts of Peace and Conflict (Boston, MA: Educators for Social Responsibility, 1990)


Learning the Skills of Peacemaking (Rolling Hills Estates, CA: Jalmar Press, 1987)


Milwaukee Public Schools Curriculum, 1985.


Our Future at Stake (Oakland, CA: Citizens Policy Center, 1984)

Second Step: A Violence Prevention Curriculum (Seattle: Committee for Children, 1990)

Starting a Conflict Manager Program (San Francisco: The Community Board Program, 1992)


Some of the leading organizations that provide resources in this field are:

The Community Board Program, 1540 Market St., Room 490, San Francisco, CA 94102 (415) 626-0595

The Consortium for Peace Education, Development, and Research (COPRED), whose offices are located at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia (22030-4444) (703) 993-3639

Educators for Social Responsibility (ESR) has its headquarters at 23 Garden St., Cambridge, MA 02138 (617) 492-1769

The Grace Contrino Abrams Peace Education Foundation, P.O. Box 19-1153, Miami Beach, FL 33139 (305) 576-5075

Humanity House, 513 W. Exchange St., Akron. OH 44302 (216) 864-5442

The National Association for Mediation in Education (N.A.M.E.) 205 Hampshire House, the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA (413) 545-2462

References


I. Introduction

This paper identifies values theory and values statements within the Roman Catholic educational framework that will help provide an understanding of the values that constituted the axiological make-up of American Catholic educational values. Much has been written about values in education, public and private, however, we often are unaware of the origins of these values that we are asked to inculcate into our children. Many questions need be asked about values education, but the first steps should be to determine what values are and from whence they come.

A definition of values is difficult: they are often defined according to a person's working definition that reflects varying cultural and situational circumstances. The perception of values can become one's reality. Immutable values are those which are clearly defined and taught as everlasting and not subject to one's perception. Immutable values are derived from moral law that is defined as, "those rules of action, mandatory in form, which reason itself reveals as having their origins in the archetypal ideas existing in the Divine Essence...."1

Relativism, however, has left the definition of values, in part, up to the individual, or the societal group to which he/she belongs. These values, therefore, are not only subject to change, but they become the accepted norm, the reality, until they do change. Individuals in a relativistic societal structure, without influences from other sources, therefore, may perceive values as coming from the ever changing society, and those values then become that individuals' reality.

Although this view is psychological and not religious, it accounts, in part, for confusion regarding what values actually are. This has not always been the case. The various religions kept a firm grasp upon the value systems of American citizens until around the turn of the 20th century. American cultural pragmatism can be blamed, to a degree, for the ambiguity of values, but the increasingly pluralistic nature of the American culture, especially since World War II is also a big reason.2

Clyde Kluckhohn's definition of values may be used as an acceptable contemporary American definition. Kluckhohn defined values as, "A conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or a group, of the desirable, which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action."3 For purposes of clarification, ethics is defined as "the study of problems of
morality and an elaboration of the principles involved.\textsuperscript{4} Moral is defined as relating to principles of right and wrong human conduct.\textsuperscript{5}

The study of values is known as axiology. The study of values focuses on three areas: (1) whether values are objective-impersonal or subjective-personal; (2) whether they are changing or constant; and (3) whether they are hierarchical.\textsuperscript{6} Objective values are constant and exist despite feelings or desires. Subjective values are relative to personal desire.

Classical Idealism teaches that ideals are absolute and independent of humans; humans have the ability to know them abstractly and by this knowledge have established standards for values. Values derived from idealism are objective and unchanging. Realism also proposes that there are ethical independent principles that humans can discover and use as a guide to find the good.\textsuperscript{7} Both subjective and objective values are represented by Realism. Simply stated, "Idealism depicts man as a thinking observer, whereas realism changes the emphasis enough that he would be called an observing thinker."\textsuperscript{8} Although there are subdivisions of both main camps, it is the division among the Realists that is the most significant for the student of American axiology. Scientific Realists say that values do not have anything to do with God and that values simply result from the environment. This view, allied with Pragmatism, has increasingly affected American education since the early 1900's. Pragmatists insisted that only those values that advance human welfare should be taught in schools.

As to what values are, the National Catholic Education Association (NCEA) has identified the following twenty-seven values that have been considered American Catholic educational values since 1792: 1) justice, 2) industry, 3) frugality, 4) humbleness, 5) piety, 6) patriotism, 7) duty to parents, 8) love of God, 9) thrift, 10) honesty, 11) work, 12) conservative code of behavior, 13) obedience, 14) charity, 15) love of truth, 16) love of good, 17) simplicity and openness with regard to existence, 18) sense of a job well done, 19) sense of cooperation, 20) freedom, 21) community, 22) faith, 23) hope, 24) reconciliation, 25) courage, 26) service, and 27) love. However definitive as this list may seem, circumstance often requires not one over another but rather an emphasis of one or more. Therefore, we need to be able to evaluate the values' development of those in our charge. This being the case we must be able to reevaluate and research values on an ongoing basis.

A strong case for parochial values research comes from the Catholic writer and sociologist, Andrew Greeley. Greeley laments the paucity of our knowledge of educational values and suggests three reasons why American educational researchers have been slow to look at how traditional and religious values are passed down: first, that the majority of American social scientists interested in research are not religious themselves and are uncomfortable with the topic; second, that American public education is a-religious. And third, Greeley argued that the principal institution providing private and religious education in this country has been the Roman Catholic Church and that until recently the church has not really been interested in having its education researched, let alone a plumbing of its value's base.\textsuperscript{9}
Catholic educators need be cogent of not only the affective domain of values but of values development as linked to cognitive and other aspects of the development of children, adolescents, and young adults. Edwin J. McDermott in his Distinctive Qualities of the Catholic School stated an evaluation of the values education process and outcomes is crucial. Value theorists are seemingly in agreement to this end.

Lawrence Kohlberg suggests a theory on moral development that is founded on the stages of general psychological and cognitive development as proposed by Piaget. More specifically the study, "Self, Values, And Affects: Derivations From Tomkins' Polarity Theory" related interpersonal versus individualistic bases of self-conception and of value hierarchy among blacks and whites. This study supported S.S. Tomkins' Polarity Theory, which demonstrated the role of ideoaffective postures in organizing choices and judgments. Tomkins' study supported the humanistic-normative ideological polarity theory that value constructs are measurable and are significant in our development. Furthermore, Tomkins suggested that individualistic or interpersonal bases of self-regard do not develop until late adolescence. "It is likely that stable value structures--as well as stable bases of self-conception--are not established at developmental levels before late adolescence." Further evidence suggested that the development differs between adolescent male's and female's value structures. Tomkins' theory thus supported Kohlberg's theory of moral and value development that implies the need for specification of critical periods and relationships involved in values development.

A hypothesis may be posited that value education is essential throughout all of a child's developmental stages and that the child be exposed to a wide range of value experiences, which could be best served through formal education. This would help ensure blanket coverage for age and sex differences, plus specific developmental needs.

Another question is how have Christian and more specifically Roman Catholic values themselves developed? Historically, Plato's idealism and objective based values, reaffirmed by the writings of Augustine at the end of the Roman Empire, held sway throughout the western world until the writings of Thomas Aquinas. The first known "church-related" school, the Christian School of Alexandria, was started in the early third century by Origen. Even then the problems of cultural heterogeneity existed, and Origen was faced with the question of educational values development. It was not until a century and a half later that Augustine developed an educational synthesis that became the accepted position of the Catholic Church. Augustine's whole system of philosophy was educational, basing the dawn of Christianity as the most important event in the history of education. Christianity revolutionized education and brought about the greatest transvaluation of values both in and out of education that the world had ever seen. Augustine was the first to put this in historical perspective and, therefore, to mold the course of educational philosophy for many hundred years.

It was in the thirteenth century that Thomas Aquinas rediscovered the works of Aristotle, integrated them with Christianity, and changed the philosophical direction of the Roman Catholic Church. Aquinas believed the Aristotelian...
thesis that people are naturally social and that society is an extension of our
nature rather than a condition induced by our fall from grace, as Augustine
held. Aquinas wrote about values in human affairs, and thus education, when
he stated, "Insofar as men judge differently about the goal of human life, so will
they judge differently about the character of their social life together." The
medieval scholastics adopted the philosophy of Aristotle, and therefore
entertained the concept that values could be discovered by means of rationality-
-reason, but this belief raised a serious question about the Christian doctrine of
the weakness of human intelligence due to original sin. This intellectual
dilemma persisted until the Renaissance scholars settled it by simply
proclaiming the intellect superior to faith. "Intellect was the new God." The
Renaissance was the precursor to the scientific positivist movement, crucial to
western education.

Classical Realists agreed with Aristotle that there was a universal moral law
that is objectively based and which reason can foster. Numerous religions,
especially Roman Catholicism with its adherence to Thomism, have embraced
the position that the universal law is established by God. "However, because
[man's] nature has been corrupted by Original Sin, he cannot practice it without
God's grace."

II. Early Modern Roman Catholic Documents Affecting
American Educational Values

The next question we need ask is how and when did Roman Catholic values
emerge. Surely there were values statements before the period mentioned here,
but these particular documents are the most relevant to Catholic parochial
education in the United States, primarily because they grew in proportion to the
growing Catholic population in the U.S. and raised concerns about values
development of Catholic children U.S. public schools. The first statement
directed towards the U.S. was the Encyclical Letter on the Restoration of
Christian Philosophy according to the Mind of St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic
Doctor, by Pope Leo XIII in 1879. The Pope espoused Thomistic principles
within the Church and American Catholic education. The Pope concluded that
for Catholics, St. Thomas was the safest exponent of faith and morals and the
best guide between faith and reason. Thomistic principles in education and
the Church's right to educate were again stated in the Vatican's 1918 Code of
Canon Law, which was in part a response to a growing controversy within the
U.S. between the church and state in regard to educational rights.

The position of the Roman Catholic Church in regard to values was spelled
out in a variety of twentieth century documents. The first significant document
on Catholic education was Christian Education of Youth written by Pope Pius
XI in 1929. This encyclical may have been, in part, a response to the 1925
U.S. Supreme Court Decision in the Oregon School Case that excluded any
general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction in public schools only. Further, worldwide industrialized growth and
the resulting pluralistic nature of societies brought change to traditional
education, especially within the U.S. The encyclical was, in part, a response to
The encyclical addressed several areas that were relevant to value formation, both individually and societally. Foremost, Pope Pius XI made it clear that under only very special circumstances was an education other than a Christian education worthy to be called an education. The Pope stated, "... there can be no ideally perfect education which is not Christian education."(5) Furthermore, "... not merely in regard to the religious instructions there given, but in regard to every other branch of learning and every regulation in so far as religion and morality are concerned."(9) Pius XI used the example of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the Oregon School Case, to urge parents to "... make absolutely sure that the education of their children remain under their own control in keeping with their Christian duty, and above all to refuse to send them to those schools in which there is danger of imbibing the deadly poison of impiety."(14) Further, "... every form of pedagogic naturalism which in any way excludes or weakens supernatural Christian formation in the teaching of youth is false."(24)

Moreover, the Pope stated, "Another very grave danger is that naturalism which nowadays invades the field of education in that most delicate matter of purity of morals."(25) In this same vein, the encyclical reiterated the Church's position on coeducation and sex education as harmful, especially in the decisive periods of formation, mainly that of adolescence.(26-7) In conclusion the Pope called public schools irreligious by their very nature and forbade them to Catholic children.(30) Also, the Pope condemned schools, "... in which students are provided with separate religious instruction, but receive other lessons in common with non-Catholic pupils from non-Catholic teachers."(30) However, the encyclical did favor the mission to educate those outside Christianity and the Church, especially in non-Christian countries.(11) As for specific values, it is intrinsic within the Pope's statement, that "... every Christian child or youth has a strict right to instruction in harmony with the teaching of the Church, the pillar and ground of truth."(23)

That the Christian Education of Youth was a significant document for Catholic education is of little doubt. The effect that the encyclical had on the millions of American Catholic children who were being educated in public schools, however, is debatable because many Catholic students, due to a paucity of Catholic schools, cost, and other reason attended public schools. It is reasonable to assume that Catholic children attending public schools were less affected by encyclicals and pastoral letters on education than Catholic children in prior to the outbreak of World War II, Pius XI again spoke of values and morals, however, he specifically addressed the American bishops. The Pope, no doubt concerned over the spread of secular humanism and the wave of "social" Catholic schools. relativism within the United States, instructed the bishops to design a social program of education based on Christian principles.26 The bishops responded by establishing the Commission on American Citizenship, whose overall goal was to be the betterment of future Catholics and society in general.27

The commission made its report in 1944, defining the goals of Christian education. The commission concluded that moral perfection was the most important because it fulfilled the purpose of human existence: purification
and unification with God. According to the Catholic historian, Harold Buetow, despite an excellent job by the commission, it was too little too late. He stated, "... shadows lurked in the picture. The new psychology saw masses of students--statistics denied the individual case. Fatal to cultural studies, the new movement [social reconstructionism] pushed history from the classroom. Students lost respect for the true values of life. ..."29

III. Vatican II Documents Discussing Educational Values

Vatican Council II of 1962 addressed many educational and moral issues of the day. The Declaration on Christian Education of 1965 became the most significant educational document of Vatican II. Besides the Declaration, other documents also spoke to values. The Pastoral Constitution On the Church In the Modern World was a major document addressing a host of issues that faced the Church. Section seven of the document was about psychological, moral, and religious changes.

In the matter of values the letter stated: "A change in attitudes and in human structures frequently calls accepted values into question. This is especially true of young people ... The institutions, laws, and modes of thinking and feeling as handed down from previous generations do not always seem to be well adapted to the contemporary state of affairs."30 Further, the document claimed that the laity is shaken in their beliefs because scientific progress and the new humanism invite the denial of God, which in turn erodes the base of one's values and morality. The section on cultural education told where one's life values are to be found. The document said, "... it remains each man's duty to preserve a view of the whole human person, a view in which values of intellect, will, conscience, and fraternity are preeminent. These values are all rooted in God the Creator and have been wonderfully restored and elevated in Christ."32

Another document entitled Decree on the Apostolate of the Laity makes it clear that when temporal values were in question, the laity and society were not competent to interpret or judge moral principles. The decree stated:

As regards activities and institutions in the temporal order, the role of the ecclesiastical hierarchy is to teach and authentically interpret the moral principles to be followed in temporal affairs. Furthermore, it has the right to judge, after careful consideration of all related matters [laity included] and consultation with experts, whether or not such activities and institutions conform to moral principles. It also has the right to decide what is required for the protection and promotion of values of the supernatural order.33

The decree also said that in the cultivation of good human relations, valid human values must be fostered.34

The Declaration on Christian Education of Vatican Council II of 1965 addressed many aspects of parochial education and its values. In light of the abrupt end to Vatican Council I in 1870 and the consequent omission of
educational concerns, education was a priority topic for Vatican II. However, due to

... the diversity of conditions in the nations around the world; the vast differences in the operation of Catholic schools; even the problem of the definition of what a Catholic school really is; the fact of the excellent encyclical of Pius XI On the Christian Education of Youth of 1929; the Church-State problems in the nations of the world--these and other difficulties suggested at every stage the possibility of dropping the document entirely in favor of a papal encyclical or action by national conferences of bishops closer to the actual scene.35

The bishops of the United States, however, encouraged a statement of position from the Church on three main points: 1) a repudiation of monopoly in education by the state 2) a statement that the Church promotes both Catholic schools and other forms of education for those not in Catholic schools, and 3) an update of Pius XI On the Christian Education of Youth of 1929 with some advances beyond it with sound theory.(23)

For the purposes of this paper, the following value-related statements have been gleaned from the Declaration. Concerning the philosophy of Christian education, "true education aims at the formation of the human person in the pursuit of his ultimate end and of the good of the societies of which, as man, he is a member, and in whose obligations, as an adult, he will share."(128) Moreover, children and young people, "... have a right to be motivated to appraise moral values ... "(128) In regard to the school, the Declaration stated, "It is designed not only to develop with special care the intellectual faculties, but also to form the ability to judge rightly, to hand on the cultural legacy of previous generations, to foster a sense of values and to prepare for professional life."(133) Further, the school should create, "... a special atmosphere animated by the Gospel spirit of freedom and charity ... "(136)

The Declaration not only recognized that the majority of Catholic youth did not attend Catholic schools, but also made a statement about non-Catholics who attended Catholic school. The Declaration stated,

... the Catholic school is to take on different forms in keeping with local circumstances. Thus the Church considers very dear to her heart those Catholic schools, found especially in the areas of the new churches, which are also attended by students who are not Catholic.(138)

It is understood that the Declaration needs be taken in context with all other Vatican II writings, that the Declaration was formulated carefully over three year's time, and that it addressed many issues. The Declaration, to a limited degree, endorsed sex education and through omission endorsed (88) coeducation, both significant to values in parochial education.
IV. Post-Vatican II Documents Discussing Educational Values

Shortly after the Declaration on Christian Education, another Vatican document spoke about values. The encyclical, On the Development of Peoples by Pope Paul VI in 1967 addressed values. The Pope wrote about a "true scale of values," specifically about greed. The Pope concluded that what must be aimed at was a complete humanism, open to the values of the Spirit Who is their source.36 Although this encyclical spoke to a specific value area (greed) it does make clear the Roman Catholic Church's position as to where values are found.

Another document produced much later by the Catholic International Education Office in 1983 was Values for Societies in the Year 2000. The book, a synopsis in part of the Catholic International World Congress held in Bangkok in 1982, set the stage for the Catholic concepts of values, especially in education for 1980's and the coming century. In the Preface the direction was made clear by this statement:

The values that presided over the painful birth of today's society are of all times and of tomorrow. For values do not change with every new moon. What is deceptive is that with the passing of a much praised period, certain values become magnified, exalted, to the detriment of others; and then people speak of a new society, yet all the time the continuity remains unbroken; and tradition, that is to say the handing on of values, of all values, continues to be assured, at least as long as Civilization lives and survives in the hearts of Men. . . . Let us note that they are traditional values and that they will still be present, valid, active in the decades to come and, . . . for ever.37

Value relativism may have become a reality within the United States, but it was not necessarily the preferred state of value affairs throughout the rest of the Catholic or, indeed, world, nor was value relativism to play an important part of the future schema of Catholic education worldwide.

V. Summary

The philosophical definition of axiology is clearly divided into two camps: Idealism and Realism. American values since the turn of this century have shifted from their idealist foundation to a more realist position.

Regarding Roman Catholic value development, classical Idealism was the early philosophical context of the Church, and through his writings Augustine clarified the idealist educational model for the Church. This remained until the works of Aristotle were recovered in the West and elucidated by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas united Christianity and a Classical Realism that professed a universal moral law established by God that can be discovered and fostered by
reason. Thomism has been the "official" philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church ever since.

The encyclical *The Christian Education of Youth* by Pope Pius XI provided a clear and strong message about Christian education and the values found within. This document provided a guide for millions of Catholics throughout the world. This document defined where values were found, and that was in parochial schools.

The *Declaration on Christian Education* from Vatican Council II was an update of the 1929 *Christian Education of Youth*. This 1965 document modified and through omission endorsed changes in value education. Further, the official church position as to where those values may be imparted allows for more options, taking into consideration cultural and environmental factors. This heterogeneity fostered and validated the N.C.E.A.'s efforts in the 1980's to identify the specific twenty-seven values that are to permeate Catholic education in the United States.

References


Endnotes


5Ibid.


7Stoops, 136.

8Ibid.


12Ibid., 345.

13Ibid., 338-45.


15Ibid., 156.

17Ibid.


22Kneller, 43.


25Pius XI, *Christian Education of Youth* (Rome: Vatican Press, 1929), 3-4. (Citation's hereafter will be inserted in the text in parentheses.)


27Ibid.

28Ibid.

29Ibid., 256. This book was published in 1970, during an era of intense college and university unrest.


31Ibid.

32Ibid., 267.

33Ibid., 514.

34Ibid., 517.

36Ibid., 29.

THE EDUCATIONAL THEORY OF THOMAS MERTON

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I.

What does a member of a contemplative monastic order within the Roman Catholic Church, a Trappist monk, have to offer contemporary public education? What does this poet, artist, novelist, essayist, journal writer, and the author of numerous books and articles on both Eastern and Western spirituality, who died tragically, at a conference in India in 1968, have to say to our contemporary world?

Although Merton was not big on specific methods of spirituality, nor on methods of anything else, he offers the contemporary world a perspective, a way of seeing. If we cannot look deeply, if we cannot see and name reality as it is, we will never know who we are. Merton is saying, then, that we will never become human.

Merton was concerned with the issue of ultimate human identity. His conclusion is that we are one with God. This relationship, this union, is our "true self."

It is a life that cannot be held and studied as object, because it is not 'a thing.' All we can do . . . is produce within ourselves something of the silence, the humility, the detachment, the purity of heart, and indifference which are required if the inner self is to make some shy, unpredictable manifestation of . . . presence.

What Merton has to offer contemporary education is the experience of identity, in a world in which we may feel alienated, like we don't belong. The belonging, though, transcends race, gender, and geography. The belonging is experienced through an insight, a way of seeing. Merton describes this insight as: "... a fusion of freedom and unfreedom, being and unbeing, life and death . . . a spark, an event, an explosion."

In our own age, with such emphasis on proof, verifiability, accountability, empiricism, and so on, Merton's words have a counter-cultural ring. But, as will be argued, or at least suggested, Merton's interest in "seeing" as it relates to personal identity is a crucial perspective within a fragmented society.
II.

Merton wrote extensively on the concepts "true self" and "false self." The "false self," although a helpful conceptual and heuristic device, is, according to Merton, an illusion.

Every one of us is shadowed by an illusory person: a false self. . . . My false and private self is the one who wants to exist outside . . . of reality and outside of life. And such a self cannot help but be an illusion.  

What is there, though, that is false about the "false self?" For one, the "false self" stands outside and peers into reality, that is, the "false self" desires to be alone, to stand outside the doors of community. The terms Merton uses are, of course, metaphors. As Merton puts it:

When we seem to possess and use our being and natural faculties in a completely autonomous manner, as if our individual ego were the pure source and end of our own acts . . . we lack spiritual meaning and authenticity.

In an effort to "make it" in the world we cling to achievement, success, and power as modes of self-verification. We put ourselves at the center of all things and relegate everything else, except our own projects, to the fringes. We are obsessed with a kind of verification of our self-proclaimed reality.

Merton observes that this leads to blindness and illusion: a blindness within us all, a shadow existence. He notes that for . . . most people in the world, there is no greater subjective reality than this false self of theirs, which cannot exist.  

Likewise, the "false self," sensing its fundamental unreality, may begin the power game, that is, to take on the stance and symbols of power. This is a strategy to protect the self; and ultimately to deny reality. The "false self" begins to convince even itself that it is what it does. Merton writes:

And I wind experiences around myself and cover myself with pleasures and glory like bandages in order to make myself perceptible to myself and to the world, as if I were an invisible body that could only become visible when something visible covered its surface.

This illusory success the "false self" gloats in is only a temporary one. Like a child who is afraid of the dark, and sings so that the ghosts will go away, the "false self" tries to continue its game. The child will do anything to avoid living with fear; the "false self" will do anything to avoid living in reality. The permanance the "false self" builds, like a tower for its own protection, is finally unveiled by the experience of human contingency. Eventually and inevitable that which was too frightening to even entertain for a
moment occurs. Death reveals that we have run out of time. We have discover
that:

There is no substance under the things with which I am
clothed. I am hollow, and my structure of pleasure and
ambitions have no foundation. I am objectified in them. But
they are all destined by their very contingency to be destroyed.
. . . to tell me that I am my own mistake.

What Merton is arguing is that we often live in a shadow existence,
like the men chained within Plato's Cave. We become helpless observers, not
participants in the dance of life, as we watch ourselves living out a life we know
to often be a fragmented tragedy. And this is reinforced by going on our daily
rounds ("Business as usual") of self-deception and evasion.

There are other illusions which form the bones of the "false self"; but
to elaborate on these in any detail would take us beyond the scope of this paper.

The True Self

The concept or metaphor of the "true self" is a bit harder to describe and
develop. As the "false self" lives in illusion and separateness, the "true self"
lives in an interrelationary world. We and the universe interpenetrate. Likewise,
the "true self" lives in reality. As Merton says:

And we can accept in ourselves both the evil and the good
which are in us and in the world. Then we see right away that
the world is a question of interpenetration.

Merton used the Myth of Prometheus to symbolize the instinctive
refusal of people to be themselves:

The Promethean instinct is as deep as man's
weakness. . . . It is the despairing cry that rises out of the
darkness of man's metaphysical solitude--the inarticulate
expression of a terror man will not admit to himself: his
terror at having to be himself, at having to be a person.

Promethean theology is a "I, all by myself, can save my soul" thelogy. It is a view of human existence antithetical to community,
antithetical to democratic and collaborative attempts to deal with social injustice.
The Promethean spirit is one of possession, attachment. As Merton says: "In
whatever form it takes, Promethean spirituality is obsessed with 'mine' and
'thine.'" At the center of the "true self," then, is a reversal of the Promethean
instinct, namely, "kenosis," an emptying out of the contents of awareness so
that one becomes an empty vessel, a void. That is, the letting-go of the
awareness of what I want, what I need, what I consider to be right, and so on in
order to develop a different awareness: the awareness that I am not an isolated, individual self, that I am part of the vast expanse of interconnections which make up my self and the universe. In the final analysis, my self and the universe become one. But, it would take me too far afield to develop this mystery, this paradox, the metaphysical issue of the one and the many, in any detail.

Merton, then, is not suggesting that by the mere emptying of the mind of concepts, the emptying of emotions, and so on one experiences the "true self." This is not a matter of will power and effort. The "true self" is not an attainment, not a goal to be arrived at through hard work. Rather, the "true self" is a state in which reality and self are united. It is a state of paradox and mystery, in which one can live certainly in uncertainty. I think this is similar to what Joseph Campbell calls "bliss."12

If a person insists on a certain program, and doesn't listen to the demands of his own heart, ... Such a person has set himself off center.13

The Buddha's "Fire Sermon" uses the metaphor of all of existence being on fire, burning up. Buddha's question is whether there is time for us to get out? Put another way, the question of life is: Can we choose life instead of death, that is, can we go beyond our self-righteous concepts, since any conceptual framework is limited (limitations we often feel to be THE TRUTH, that is, death), to grasp life itself? Merton writes:

The inner self is precisely that self which cannot be tricked or manipulated by anyone ... the true self is like a very shy animal that never appears at all whenever an alien presence is at hand.14

For Merton, one such "alien presence" is the concept, that is, the mistaking of the concept for the thing, for reality--instead of noting that concepts point to reality, to things.

Educational Reflections

How does Merton's discussion of the "true self" and "false self" relate to education? What follows can only be a sketch, an outline, broad strokes, with someone more in touch with the practical reality of schools supplying the "how to's." Building on Merton's ideas, it is important for teachers to help students re-alize that not all analysis and critique is healthy. That is, the intellect can be a place of hiding, of observing reality without participating in it. This leads to a pseudo sense of control. What Merton is suggesting is to teach others how to go beyond the mind, not to cling to it. Often we take our ideas far too seriously--this applies even to what I am not saying. Far too often we confuse our little judgements, opinions, and evaluations for "the truth."
There is something insidious about the current emphasis on thinking well of the self. There are courses in self-esteem. At one level, this is important. At another level it is important to help students recognize self-concept for what it is: a persona, an aspect of the "false self." The experience of the "true self" occurs when I do not need to think that I am better than you, nor worse than you. In fact, the "true self" is experienced when I do not have to think of myself at all.

Here the issue is not a matter of being for the right cause, of having the expected political posture, but coming from the right place, the right energy, the right self. We must help students learn how to detach from thoughts and/or feelings. Descartes "I think therefore I am?" No. We want to get to the "I am," the naked "I am," the "true self," before we thought of anything as being true or false, good or bad.

As Plato noted, when you really get attached to your thoughts, they are called opinions. Opinions are even more troublesome than thoughts; opinions surge with the energy of needing one's own group, to win, to be right. This creates ideological hysteria--we shout slogans and ridicule each other. This increases one's inability to detach oneself from one's thoughts and/or feelings. That is, one identified self with thoughts and/or feelings.

Perhaps the younger generation is more caught in feelings. "I feel, therefore, I am." They tend to think they have an absolute right to their feelings. Pretty soon, you do not have feelings; feelings have you. At this point, all we have are unprocessed feelings and hurts. And for some people, this is all they are. There is no self apart from their feelings.

As Merton notes: How contrary we are to the great Wisdom cultures. They desire to experience the Big Picture, the Big Mind in which everything belongs, everything is interrelated. Of course, this is not logical. It is experiential. We need to be secure enough to be insecure; to have fallen into enough nets that you fall into a net you cannot fall out of. You know you are already held, already named, so you do not have to name yourself.

For most Americans the idea of freedom seems to be connected with having options. The more options we have, the more free we are, or so the argument goes. According to the spiritual traditions Merton writes about, you are so grounded in reality that you do not have to project yourself or advertise yourself anymore. It would be helpful if students could confront the demon of consumerism, to realize that freedom has to do with freedom from the egocentric ego to be free to become one's "true self." But, this is nothing anyone can manufacture. It just happens. In a sense, it is taken away.

This means a process of un-education. We are taught to need this, to need that. The "false self" consists of the projects of identity in which you identify yourself. The Zen tradition asks: "What is the face you had before you were born?" You are who you are, who you are, who you are. This will feel very naked if we have spent most of our life putting on personas, identities, self-esteem--all those clothes, so we can think well of the self.

It is important to facilitate students' understanding, that is, standing under, looking deeply. You can not understand when you are approving or
disapproving--when you are judging. So, you let go of your thoughts and feelings and you find, hopefully, that you have stronger certitude and stronger feelings. This is a letting go of one's self-image, either positive or negative. It is an openness to the "true self," to the face of reality, regardless of the consequences. Looking deeply has nothing to do with what we want or what we think we ought to be. Rather, it is looking deeply at reality, with all its brokenness, sadness, joy, and sweetness.\(^{17}\)

What is needed, then, if our "true self" is to emerge, is to become seers. The light of the "true self" can be trusted, because it is not self-manufactured light. It is seeing reality as it is. Just watch a flower. Watch long enough and it will open for you. When life has meaning, and we cannot live without meaning, that is, when we see deeply into the nature of things, we are alive.

But, most students are not exposed to this kind of seeing, this contact with the "true self." They are only offered a functional, fix it, pragmatic seeing, the seeing of the Market. So, buying and selling are valued. "I am what I produce; I am what I have" become life quests--the ultimate of illusions, the "false self." If you do not produce and you do not buy you are considered nothing in America. There is no other definition of the Western person than a market definition.

Do we want our students to perpetuate such values? It is life's journey, that daily rising and dying, that makes us whole. We use the rhetoric of "teaching the whole person," but is it mere rhetoric, just a slogan? Of course, we cannot develop a curriculum in seeing. As Tony deMello says, the whole point of life is waking up.\(^{18}\) To see one must be awake. In order to re-alize the "true self," Merton observes:

> It is like a pure diamond, blazing with the invisible light of heaven. It is in everybody, and if we could see it we could see these billions of points of light coming together in the face and blaze of a sun that would make all the darkness and cruelty of life banish completely . . . I have no program for this seeing. It is only given.\(^{19}\)

Of course, one wants to ask, given in what sense? Again, a question. More words and concepts. Or, one may say,"How poetical. That makes me feel good." Again, an emotional reaction. It is precisely in letting go of these that the given is given.\(^{20}\)

**Endnotes**


7. Ibid., 34-35.

8. Ibid., 35.


11. Ibid., 35.


13. Ibid., 44-45.


Some of the thoughts expressed here are found in a somewhat different form in Robert P. Craig, "True Self--False Self": The Educational Theory of Thomas Merton," to be published in the *Journal of Thought*. 
CREATIVITY: ARE WE DOING ENOUGH?

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I. The Value of Creativity

Creativity is important because it is linked with valuable "products." A product is creative to the extent it is a novel and valuable response to an open-ended task requiring the exercise of skill and knowledge. Creative products include solutions to problems, theories, ideas, technological inventions, artifacts, designs, pieces of writing, performances in drama, music, dance, etc.

Creativity is essential to our very survival. Try to imagine what our life would be like without creativity or even significantly reduced creativity. No cures to major illnesses except those discovered by pure luck. No vehicular transportation. We would have experienced practically no progress in the improvement of the quality of human life since the early evolution of human beings. Since creativity includes creative problem solving, it is probably impossible to imagine human life without creativity.

How do we reward creativity? Sometimes the marketplace greatly rewards it, but it also greatly rewards pure luck, and even incompetence. When the marketplace fails to recognize great creativity, sometimes public honors are bestowed upon the creative person (Einstein).

Given how absolutely vital creativity is to the quality of our continued existence, it is unclear why we don't publicly stress creativity more. Business and government leaders and educators have publicly bemoaned the lack of critical thinking skills in today's youth, but little is heard about the lack of creativity. There is no call to stress creativity more in the schools, as there has been in the case of critical thinking. This is not to say that programs focusing on creativity haven't been introduced into various schools. There has been a lot of activity. My point is: Given how essential creative thinking is to the quality of our lives, why isn't it stressed even more.

I don't believe the difference in treatment of critical thinking versus creative thinking in the schools is due simply to our having a better understanding of critical thinking. There is still a fair degree of controversy in the professional literature about critical thinking--what it is and how best to improve it. While there may be greater disagreement in creativity research, there is also a fair consensus on various issues, e.g., creative problem solving.

Thus, my position is that, given the importance of creative thinking, we aren't doing enough to develop it in the schools, including higher education. What I do in this paper is (a) to abstract from the rather vast body of creativity research a reasonable account of creativity, and (b) indicate what the account implies about facilitating creative thinking in education.
II. The Interactive, Problem-Solving Model of Creativity

Creativity involves a complex interaction of various (a) cognitive competencies, traits, processes, and activities, and (b) personality, attitudinal, and motivational traits. Various "environmental" conditions such as developmental experiences in the family and school, and the social and historical context also play an important role. Within the cognitive category, creativity requires the development and effective use of a large and fluid knowledge base, critical thinking, problem solving, decision making, and metacognitive skills.

This interactive model is the emerging paradigm for understanding creativity. It is contrasted with more single-focused approaches. For example, cognitive psychologists have tended to focus on the cognitive aspects of creativity, while personality theorists have examined personality correlates of creative productivity. Social psychologists, on the other hand, have focused on the role of social interaction in explaining creative behavior. The interaction model takes important elements from all these approaches.

Many creativity researchers view creativity as a special case of problem solving, namely, where one produces a novel and valuable solution to a problem. While the problem solving view does not apply to all cases of creativity such as many instances of creative expressiveness in art, music, etc., it is sufficiently broad to make it worth focusing on as a means to explain some of the basic concepts involved in creativity research.

The following five-stage model of problem solving can be abstracted from the many different but similar models to be found in the research literature. The first stage is problem recognition. In general this requires a large and fluent domain relevant knowledge base. One must develop the knowledge and skills within a problem area to recognize the existence of a problem—an inconsistency in the data or theory, an inadequate explanation, the need for better predictions, etc.

Creative individuals aren't just good problem solvers; they are also good problem finders. They don't just recognize problems, but problems that are large in scope and important in their potential consequences. They may actively search for gaps in existing knowledge within a domain or make a conscious attempt to break through existing boundaries in their field.

The second stage is problem clarification and representation. What are the elements of the problem? What are the relevant issues involving it? How is the problem to be represented so that it can be explored and solved? This stage involves the retrieval and examination of information about the problem, judging whether new information is needed, and searching for new information that will help in representing the problem. The knowledge base has to be organized so that it is highly retrievable and fluent.

How a problem is represented has an important impact on the probability of solving it. Task definition studies have compared experts with novices in how they define or represent a problem. The studies indicate a clear difference. For example, experts provide greater elaboration of the problem
situation. This may enable them to bridge the gap between a novel problem and their previous experience.

The next stage involves proposing solutions to the problem. Some researchers stress the importance of proposing several alternative solutions, while cognitive scientists stress the use of heuristics for narrowing the solution paths. It is likely that both are important for creativity. One may need to produce several possible solutions at least at some stage of the problem solving process, although alternatives may not have to be produced at the same time. But one has to narrow the search too to the most plausible candidate.

Researchers in discussing this stage characterize the process as combining or synthesizing ideas into new configurations. But proposing solutions will greatly depend on the nature of the problem—are we trying to produce a new explanation of the cause of an illness, are we trying to produce a car that will pollute less, etc.?

Research indicates that individuals begin to try to solve a problem by relatively straightforward applications of their existing knowledge. If the initial attempt is inadequate, the person responds to correct the inadequacy. Inadequacies become further problems to solve. Thus creative solutions begin with prosaic variations of old themes, and novel products evolve in small steps out of these initial attempts.

Various factors interfere with producing solutions to problems. Functional fixedness is the tendency to think about objects only with respect to their most characteristic function. The classic "two string" problem clearly illustrates this. Two 9 feet long strings are attached to the ceiling at one end and hang to the floor. They are 14 feet apart. The task is to grab one of the strings and somehow get the other string and tie the two together. You may use a clothespin or a rat trap to help solve the problem. The solution, once realized, is simple. You tie one of the objects to one of the strings and somehow get the other string swinging. Then, while holding the other string, you grab the swinging string. Repeated experiments show that many people are unable to produce a solution to the two string problem because they focus on the usual purposes of the objects.

There is also the problem of transfer. Research indicates that transfer of knowledge from one problem situation to a very similar one is often difficult for people. One reason for this difficulty is the failure to perceive similarities. Hence, we can see why creativity researchers have stressed the importance of the ability to make remote associations.

Stage four involves the testing and evaluation of solutions. This requires domain specific knowledge, but also critical thinking skills. A recent characterization of the cognitive skills involved in critical thinking lists the following.

Critical Thinking Cognitive Skills

a. Interpretation—to comprehend and express the meaning or significance of data, events, etc., to clarify meaning.

b. Analysis—defining terms, comparing ideas, identifying problems, their elements and relationships, analyzing arguments.
c. Evaluation—assessing the evidential or logical strength of statements, hypotheses, and arguments.

d. Inference—drawing warranted conclusions.

e. Explanation—stating results, justifying procedures, presenting arguments.

f. Self-regulation—monitoring and correcting one's cognitive activities concerning a.-e. above.

Critical thinking and creativity are related in important ways. To be creative within a field requires critical thinking skills. One has to understand the domain methodology, how to criticize and support positions. One has to develop a critical sense of what is relevant. The very cognitive processes involved in creativity include critical thinking skills.

Stage five of the problem solving model of creativity involves revising, restating, and re-evaluation. This is an important part of problem solving. The model is not linear but involves constant adjustment. One represents a problem, formulates a solution, tests it, gets new knowledge, modifies the representation of the problem, alters the proposed solution, retests, and so on.

A number of the skills and processes involved in creativity are metacognitive, in nature. These involve planning, monitoring, and evaluating one's problem-solving activities in a self-conscious way. This careful self-regulation can enhance one's creativity.

III. Attitudes, Motivation, and Personality Traits

Research indicates that creative people frequently have certain attitudes and personality traits. They tend to be self-directed or autonomous, and display independence of judgment. They like to set their own tasks for themselves and are intrinsically motivated. They are also self-confident with a sense of creative power. Creative individuals are committed to work hard, have a drive to produce, and display high perseverance. In addition, such people are willing to take risks, are curious and have a questioning attitude. They are also attracted to complexity and are tolerant of uncertainty and ambiguity in their work. Although we can't generalize a specific constellation of traits, the above set typifies creative people.

The research on creativity shows that creative individuals have high intrinsic motivation. They are motivated primarily by the interest, satisfaction, and challenge of the work itself, not by external pressures or rewards. While the research is complex, making creative production too dependent on external rewards or pressure actually lessens creativity.

The above are some of the key individual differences in explaining creative production. Social and developmental antecedents such as having a diversified, enriching, and intellectually stimulating environment and experiences in the family and school also are important.

IV. Testing for Creativity

Several approaches to testing for creative potential have been developed. There are various attitude, interest, personality, and biographical inventories.
But the most widely used approach in assessing creative potential are tests of divergent thinking.

The famous psychologist J. P. Guilford and his colleagues identified various cognitive abilities as underlying divergent or creative thinking, and they developed various tests to measure these abilities. One key ability they identified is fluency, the number of ideas one can produce in response to some task or problem. In addition, creative people ought to display flexibility, the ability to produce ideas in different categories in response to a task, to change "set." Originality was a third ability they identified. Creative people should be able to produce unusual but appropriate ideas in response to a task. Several other abilities were identified in addition, but the research has focused on these three.

There has been considerable controversy in the literature over the validity of this approach to testing for creative potential. Some researchers claim that tests of fluency, flexibility, and originality have sufficient predicative validity, i.e., they enable us to predict later creative accomplishment. But most creativity researchers seem to doubt this.

Given the complex nature of creativity, it seems reasonable to expect low predicative validity. Fluency, flexibility, and originality scores represent only certain creative thinking abilities, and they don't take into account motivation, attitude, or personality traits. A better approach to measuring creative potential would be to use a battery of instruments that take into account all the above factors.

Even if creativity testing based on fluency, flexibility, and originality lacks predicative validity, these three notions are important to understanding creativity. Being able to produce lots of ideas in response to a task, being able to produce alternative approaches, and producing new or less common ideas are important for creative behavior, as is being able to make connections between ideas or information.

V. Facilitating Creativity in Education

Given the nature of creativity and the relevant empirical research, how can we facilitate creativity in education? We need, of course, to help students develop a large and fluent domain knowledge base and domain skills. In some ways, we may concentrate too much on students acquiring the knowledge base, i.e., the informational content of an area, and not enough on the domain skills required and on other aspects of creativity. Repeated studies show that faculty lecturing is the primary activity that occurs in most courses. There is little student participation and discussion. When "discussion" does occur, it most frequently involves memory questions, not questions requiring evaluation, synthesis, or imagination.

Research indicates that information enters long-term memory (LTM) through "elaborative rehearsal," i.e., when we think about its meaning and relate it to other information already in LTM. This greater processing seems to lead us to encode more features of the item, and this makes it easier to locate the information later. There is some evidence that information may be processed in
several locations in memory at once, and this parallel distributive processing may be increased by elaborative learning.

Elaborative learning also facilitates transfer of knowledge. Exploring applications and limitations of concepts are valuable for promoting understanding and transfer. As noted earlier, experts elaborate a problem more, and this seems to facilitate transfer.

Organized memory is much easier to retrieve than unorganized information. If we want students to retain a large number of facts, terms, principles, theories, an overall organization is vital. Memory researchers and cognitive scientists refer to frameworks for organizing knowledge as schemas. It is a packet of information consisting of basic or core facts, concepts, and principles and less important or variable information.\(^1\)

The above research indicates several things we can do to improve creative potential when we teach students a domain knowledge base. We need to focus on elaborative learning. Hence, we should have the student think about the information—to ask questions about it, to consider its meaning and significance, to examine its relationship to information already in LTM. Clarifying the meaning of information and relating it to other information don't just occur. We have to present the material so that students can grapple with it. We also can encourage transfer by application examples.

To help students organize the information better, we probably need to explicitly focus more on organization, developing schemas, and relating information to prior knowledge. Students probably need help in seeing what is core knowledge from more peripheral information, and what is the structure of that knowledge, even when dealing with smaller subsets of knowledge within a domain.

By focusing more on elaborative learning and the organization of that knowledge, we increase retention, help to make connections with other concepts, develop a sense of relevancy, and increase the probability of transfer.

Mastering a domain isn't just learning the informational content, the knowledge base, but involves acquiring the skills needed in the field. We probably don't focus enough on acquiring these skills. A student can't just take a course on research methodology in field X. The methodology has to be an explicit part of many courses. In short, we need to focus explicitly much more on doing biology, history, philosophy, and the other disciplines.

Learning how to do a discipline relates to acquiring critical thinking skills. One can't do any discipline without these. Extensive research shows that critical thinking skills can be improved as a result of direct instruction in them.\(^2\)

We also need to help students be better problem solvers within a discipline. Thus, we need to explicitly teach problem solving strategies and the heuristics developed within a field, and they need to be given lots of practice at solving problems. To help students be better problem finders (and not just solvers) we should try to develop in them an attitude of asking "why questions," of seeking explanations and justifications. Along with this we should encourage them and give them practice in tracing out the implications of positions,
checking for coherence, and considering comprehensiveness. To develop awareness of comprehensiveness, once in awhile we should focus on "the big picture," how it all hangs together, why it all matters.

We can improve their problem solving skills if we create a more self-conscious awareness of problem solving. This will help to develop the metacognitive skills involved in being a good problem solver. We can do this by explicitly discussing and modeling problem solving within our disciplines and by giving them practice. Research indicates that self-conscious awareness of problem solving improves problem solving.

Important to improving creative potential within a field is the need to develop fluency, flexibility, and originality. Students need to be encouraged and given practice in (a) generating lots of ideas in response to a task or problem (fluency), (b) producing alternative solutions and not fixating on one solution path (flexibility), and (c) being original.

Developing these skills is in part dependent on developing an adequate domain knowledge base and critical thinking and problem solving skills. But they also clearly involve developing one's imagination within a field. I suspect we are so concerned with students acquiring the knowledge base that we neglect the development of imagination. When creative individuals were asked which teachers facilitated or inhibited their creative potential, the facilitators encouraged their independence and original ideas, were enthusiastic and held them to high standards, while the inhibitors emphasized rote learning, were dogmatic and rigid, and hypercritical. As teachers we need to encourage looking for alternative ways of defining and solving problems, and we need to encourage students to develop their own ideas.

By helping students to acquire good critical thinking and problem solving skills we help to empower them, so they may be independent thinkers. This also may help them develop their self-confidence so they are more willing to make conjectures, more willing to take risks. Thus, some of the attitude and personality traits associated with creative people may develop in part as a result of acquiring critical thinking and problem solving skills. But to help develop these attitudes and traits, we need to encourage them and give students appropriate practice. Aristotle notes that the moral virtues are dispositions which are developed through habit or practice. The same is probably true for the cluster of attitudes and traits associated with creativity. If we want to develop independence of judgment or critical evaluation and questioning, then we need to provide the opportunity for practice. The research indicates that we don't do enough of this.

As already noted, motivation plays a key role in creativity. Faculty need to help students experience the intrinsic aspects and satisfaction we get from doing chemistry, history, or writing poetry. By helping them develop critical thinking and problem solving skills, and giving them practice in solving progressively harder problems in the discipline, they can experience the joy that comes from meeting complex challenges. We also need to help them see why the subject matter matters and should matter to them and their lives. We need to
encourage curiosity, questioning, persistence, and hard work, and all this requires that we create a supportive classroom environment for developing creativity.

The research on what activities take place in a classroom, whether it is high school or college, indicates that we don't focus on creativity. We certainly don't do enough, given how important creativity is. Just talking to students about being creative within a discipline may have an impact, but how many of us even do this? By focusing more on elaborative learning, the structure of information, critical thinking, problem solving, and the metacognitive skills, and encouraging and supporting the attitudes and motivation associated with creativity, we can make a difference to creative potential.

Endnotes


3John S. Dacey, Fundamentals of Creative Thinking (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1989), ch. 6 has a nice summary of problem solving according to some key researchers including Wallas, Dewey, Osborne, and Guilford.


5See Barry Stein, "Memory and Creativity," in Handbook of Creativity, 163-176 and the references cited.


8D. Stein "Memory and Creativity," in Handbook of Creativity, 163-176.


Teresa Amabile is the key researcher in this area. See her book The Social Psychology of Creativity (NY: Springer-Verlag, 1983). For a review of some of her more recent research, see Beth A. Hennessey and Teresa M. Amabile, "The Condition of Creativity," in The Nature of Creativity, 11-38.

Dean K. Simonton, "Creativity, Leadership, and Chance," in The Nature of Creativity, 386-426. Luck and living in the right culture at the right time (the Golden Age of Greece, Florence, Vienna, etc.) play a part too!


For a review of current research on memory, see A. Baddeley, Human Memory (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1990). See also R. L. Solso, Cognitive Psychology (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1991) and Barry S. Stein "Memory and Creativity," in the Handbook of Creativity, 163-176.

See, e.g., David Annis and Linda Annis, "Does Philosophy Improve Critical Thinking?," Teaching Philosophy 3 (1979): 145-152.

THE PLACE OF NEUTRALITY IN THE CONFIDENT SCHOOL

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C. J. B. Macmillan, in a presentation to the Philosophy of Education Society (March 1994), expressed concerns regarding the widely held view that schools should help students become proficient in choosing what to believe. Macmillan was particularly concerned with the usual corollary of this view, viz., that schools remain neutral as they assist students in becoming proficient in choosing between beliefs. What can it mean, Macmillan wonders, for schools to be neutral while promoting such a capability?

This paper intends to show that there is in fact a difficulty with the demand that schools remain neutral as they teach students to be proficient in choosing what to believe. The difficulty, however, is not the one Macmillan imagines. Before establishing this point, it will prove useful (in Part I) to examine the meaning of "choosing what to believe" and to ask on what basis anyone would oppose measures that would thwart development of such proficiency. Following this, the paper will in Part II look at the question of neutrality in the public schools and then, in Part III, close with the suggestion that establishment of confidence, rather than concern over neutrality, should be a primary focus of those concerned with the state of the schools.

I. Choosing and Believing

To establish a context for his analysis, Macmillan cites several authorities. Among these is Robert H. Ennis whom Macmillan quotes as noting that "critical thinking" is "reasonable reflective thinking that is focused on deciding what to believe or do." Macmillan then adds:

So if the schools are to promote critical thinking, one of the goals must be that students decide (on rational grounds) what to believe. The school promotes rationality in the choice, but that beliefs are an object of choice is not questioned. [Emphasis added.]

What is perhaps most striking about this passage is that it suggests that deciding and choosing are equivalent. But are they? Surely, "deciding," especially in the case of Ennis' critical thinking, constitutes a standard of rigor not required in "choosing." To decide is to make up one's mind. It suggests ratiocination, the weighing of evidence, etc. To choose may involve the exercise of judgment.
But then it may not. Neither the standard nor the process of rationality is implied.

When authorities such as those cited by Macmillan argue for the importance of affording choice in the schools, they are concerned not with the *act of choice*, but with the *occasion for decision*. We fight "against indoctrination, the imposition of beliefs upon students without adequate grounding in evidence and theory, and without their comprehension of this grounding" because it conceals the existence of alternatives. More to the point: We condemn indoctrination because it intends to deny the opportunity to assess a matter; that is, it aims to avoid the occasion for such assessment.

One reason it is important to distinguish between choosing and deciding is that assessment (opportunity for which we wish to provide via the avoidance of indoctrination) may depend on a choice but consist of a decision. This will become clearer as we consider the function of reason in making up our minds.

If the school has avoided indoctrination, the student enjoys the opportunity, in Macmillan's words, to "assess proposed beliefs (theories, knowledge, etc.) before accepting or choosing among the possibilities." Let us also stipulate that the student is able to assess them and that he or she is willing to do so as well. While it is thus perhaps appropriate to say that the student chose to assess the beliefs, what are we to say about the situation at the close of the assessment? Let us imagine that the student has through critical reasoning decided which is the best belief. He or she declares "This is the best view, and I will act accordingly." Is this the result of "choice"? It would seem that the contrary is the case: Insofar as the student has consistently acted in a reasonable fashion, he or she was impelled to reach the conclusion. The student chooses only insofar as he or she elects to stand outside of the authority of reason. To the degree that choice occurs in the space afforded by the opportunity to assess, instruction has failed. Avoidance of indoctrination is essential, but it is not sufficient. The propensity to be reasonable (call it, perhaps, the "spell of reason") must also be present. It is very important to note that this propensity to be reasonable is not itself established through reason.

In reaching his or her conclusion, the student may of course make an error. That is, the student may wrongly decide what is the (most) reasonable belief or action. This suggests the need for more work by the student and additional attention from the teacher of critical thinking. If, however, the student chooses not to be reasonable, or is deaf to the call of reason, there exists a more fundamental problem that requires teaching of a different sort.

One of the most stimulating parts of Macmillan's article is his discomfort with the idea that belief is a matter of choice. He declares that it sounds "queer" for someone to state "'I choose to believe that F = ma,' or that 'I choose to believe in God.'" This, he says, is because:

\[^{3,05}\]

[c]hoice implies options, a sense that there are real possibilities for the chooser to make equally valid but different choices from the one that she has chosen. I am not convinced that belief allows such options.
Macmillan's sense that such statements about choosing to believe are queer is credible because belief depends on satisfaction of criteria for believability. We cannot, that is, believe just anything. A candidate must pass muster in order to receive the honorific "believable."

It is tempting to assert that the process of satisfying criteria for believability is a rational one. But it is prudent to make a distinction before doing so. If rationality means that the "choice" is based on careful, fair, and energetic identification and evaluation of alternatives for belief, then there seems little problem in labelling it as rational. But if the measure of rationality is care, fairness, and energy in the identification and evaluation of the grounds for identification and evaluation, then the assertion is considerably more controversial. For under this requirement, the chooser must be able to defend the criteria for believability. This, however, not only is asking a great deal of the chooser; it may lead to an infinite regress: If rationality were to require that the criteria for believability be understood and defensible, then why should it not furthermore require that the criteria for their assessment be understood and defensible, and so on?

In coming to believe something, then, criteria (which are seldom explicit) are satisfied. It is the satisfaction of these criteria (or some significant number of them) that constitutes believability. What Macmillan perhaps finds "queer" is the implication in the phrase "choosing to believe" that we choose what are to be the constituents of believability (as opposed to deciding what is believable). His examples of "F = ma" and God bring this out nicely. The only way in which these could genuinely be "choices" would be for the very standard of belief itself to be in question, since God and the laws of physics are, for those who understand them, the very standard of what is believable. Indeed, it is difficult to make sense of the concept 'believable' if its meaning is determined by individuals in particular cases.

"Choosing what to believe" thus appears to be closer to "deciding" than to "choosing." One reason for its kinship to "deciding" is that the critical thinking associated with "choosing what to believe" proceeds according to the rule of reason. Indoctrination, in contrast, intends to deny the opportunity for critical thought. It inhibits development of proficiency in "choosing what to believe."

It is important, as we prepare to examine the question of neutrality in schools, to note the grounds upon which it is possible to condemn indoctrination. We are able to move from the observation that indoctrination inhibits proficiency in critical thinking to the judgment that indoctrination is wrongful only on the premise that achievement of proficiency in such thinking ("choosing what to believe") is good. It will prove important, too, to remember that implicit in the very exercise of this proficiency is recognition of a standard, viz., that which is resident in the criteria for believability. In sum, proficiency in "choosing what to believe" depends on endorsement of a valued end as well as on access to a standard that resides outside oneself.
II. The Problem of Neutrality

Macmillan uses an example to illuminate his conception of the problem of neutrality. Let us imagine, he asks, that we need to decide what to eat for breakfast. Candidates range from the traditional (but fatty) eggs and bacon to the currently popular (and leaner) options such as cereal, fruit, or yogurt. Now, says Macmillan, imagine that a school conducts a nutrition class that discusses healthy eating. For Macmillan it is obvious that commitment to neutrality in the schools prohibits the teacher from promoting a particular brand of cereal for breakfast. It would seem, too, to prohibit the teacher from promoting healthy eating habits and, instead, restricts her to saying that if you wish to have good health, then you ought to choose carefully and judge in light of such factors as the fat content of the food. At this point, however, Macmillan balks:

[S]omething seems to have gone astray here; isn't the school in some way committed to such values as the students' continuing health . . . and to their making wise choice in matters that promote [it]?7

Success in the teaching of nutrition, suggests Macmillan, includes not only that students come to possess the knowledge and skills necessary to make the healthy choice, but also that they elect to use them. And herein lies Macmillan's problem of neutrality: Teaching which we would regard as successful is, evidently, not neutral "with regard to its purpose of promoting reasonable choices . . . or with regard to the criteria that would count as reasonable in specific areas like nutrition."8

Macmillan's discussion of the problem of neutrality is interesting on at least two counts. First, it serves to remind us that something may serve as a reason only within a context. That is, there must be some valued end present in order for an attribute (e.g., fat content) to count for or against selection of a particular item.

The second matter raised by Macmillan's concern with neutrality is more important. The problem of neutrality that he describes exists only because of the presumption that schools may remain neutral in regard to their ends. But this is to extend the concept of neutrality to a realm in which it has no place. That is, while it makes perfect sense to suggest that schools remain neutral in regard to legitimate alternatives, it is inappropriate to talk of the schools being neutral in regard to teaching itself. To teach is to act in light of preferences and consequences. The teacher intends to achieve something. In this sense, teaching by its very nature promotes an end. To ask for schools to remain neutral at the level of purposes is to ask them to cease teaching. On the other hand, to ask for schools not to be neutral (i.e., to stand for some purpose or ideal) would be redundant, at least if we were the using the concept 'teaching' in a normal fashion. In short, then, Macmillan's problem of neutrality exists only on the basis of a peculiar view of what teaching is. But this is not to say that it is senseless to speak of neutrality in relation to schools, nor that the idea of neutrality in schools is free of difficulty.
Before developing this line of thought, let us attend to at least one objection to what so far has been said: If the concept of teaching is intrinsically non-neutral, just what purpose or ideal does it promote? We must beware of the tar baby here. To assert that the concept of teaching, when used normally and meaningfully, is non-neutral does not entail that it embodies any particular purpose or ideal (although some commentators would allege that the concept does embody a specific ideal), nor does it entail that we must identify implicit purposes or ideals in particular cases. Rather, the assertion rests upon the simple observation that teaching implies leading the learner in some direction. If we had no sense of something worth leading the student toward, then there would be no reason for schools and teaching.

There is, then, no real problem of neutrality raised by the intention of a teacher or school to promote an end. Real problems do arise, however, when we ask ourselves which ends should be promoted by schools, i.e., when we attempt to establish which purposes they are to serve. There is even a problem of neutrality here (that is quite different from that outlined by Macmillan). Schooling for any nation, community, organization, or family will aim to realize some ideal(s) or purposes(s). It will, moreover, wish to defeat others. But there will be a host of (other) ideals and purposes toward which any particular conception of teaching or schooling is neutral. The problem, therefore, is to determine what we intend to realize through teaching or schooling and to specify what subordinate aims and practices will assist or impede us in our efforts. In more succinct terms, the problem of neutrality raised by teaching or schooling is to understand which matters we cannot, in light of our implicit commitments, afford to overlook or ignore. That is, we are faced with the difficulty of determining what should be prescribed and what must be proscribed. Where, in other words, would neutrality be inappropriate or irresponsible?

Consider, in light of this analysis, the "proficiency in choosing what to believe" that was the topic of Part I of this paper. Starting from a commitment to developing student proficiency in critical thinking, the school is not neutral on the level of purposes and ideals. And, insofar as such proficiency depends on the ability and willingness to be reasonable (i.e., to be consistent, thorough, rigorous, fair, etc.), the school would not be neutral regarding the importance and desirability of reasonability. It could, however, still be neutral regarding the candidates between which the pupil is to "choose." Moreover, we would want the school, in its evaluation of its students, to be unconcerned with the race or gender of the person who was attempting to make the best decision. But note that commitment to the ideal of critical thinking implies that the school not be neutral toward racial and gender prejudice.

We can sum up this section by commenting on two statements in the conclusion to Macmillan's paper. In the first of these, Macmillan alleges that public school teachers (in a pluralistic society) must find themselves in "a very uncomfortable position." This is the case, he says, because the successful attempt to be neutral reduces teaching to triviality or unacknowledged indoctrination, while the alternative throws the teacher into the fray of competing ideals and purposes. The second of Macmillan's statements specifies the conclusion he would have us draw: "there is no escape from arguing on
moral grounds for the presentation of varying positions; and . . . the school must stand for the development of intelligence. But teachers would not suffer the discomfort described by Macmillan if they did not assume that it is possible and desirable to avoid promotion of ideals and purposes. (Having understood this, it would of course then be appropriate for them to turn to the important philosophical task of clarifying, evaluating, and learning to defend such ideals and purposes.) So, Macmillan is quite correct insofar as his second statement suggests that there is no escape, in teaching, from assuming a moral position. This follows from the account of teaching offered in the first section of this paper: Because teaching is to act in light of preferences and envisioned consequences, and because preferences are inevitably value-laden, the teacher is always legitimately subject to requests for a moral defense of his practice. It is unlikely, however, that as much argument is entailed as Macmillan suggests. On the contrary, reflection on the aims of teaching, especially on how they have been understood within the American and Western democratic traditions, will yield considerable agreement regarding what the schools ought to be doing.

Unanimity regarding the aims of education is, of course, unrealistic. Most teachers understand this and, in fact, it may be fear of offending (or harming) some "other," no matter whom it may be, that is largely responsible for Macmillan's "uncomfortable position." Such discomfort, in other words, seems to grow out of the suspicion that principled professional activity always contains the potential for controversy. Left unchecked, this discomfort has a most damaging consequence: It encourages flight from professionalism and undermines the confidence of the teacher and the school.

III. The Confident Public School

In order more clearly to address the question of confidence within the public schools, let us briefly examine the matter of moral education. A useful vehicle for doing so is a recent article by Christina Hoff Sommers. Sommers, a professor of philosophy, argues that in teaching ethics:

one thing should be made central and prominent: Right and wrong do exist. This should be laid down as uncontroversial lest one leaves [sic] an altogether false impression that everything is up for grabs.

Such straightforward action contributes to the "edificatory effect" that teachers should aim to have on their students. But in moral education, as well as in teaching in general, many teachers are loath to act this way, even when faced with blatant relativism and growing nihilism among the young. Why is this?

In reflecting on this question Sommers touches on a key factor: teachers often believe they have no right to tell children what is right or wrong, or even to state that there is a right or wrong. Let us move beyond Sommers' observation by asking why teachers believe they have no right to say such things to children. There are at least two reasons. First, teachers (like a great many other adults who received the very instruction described here) typically lack effective response to challenges such as "Right according to whom? That is
just your way of looking at it." In other words, such teachers either themselves subscribe to moral relativism or, although they intuit that relativism is flawed, lack the means or will to refute it. In the first case, the teacher is apt to say that she has no right to be "edificatory"; in the second, she quietly goes along with the powerful current.

The second reason that many teachers do not act in the manner recommended by Sommers is familiar to anyone who was part of teacher education in the late '60s and '70s, and is an indication of the tenacity of the doctrines that characterized that period. Who does not know teachers who are constantly on guard lest they "impose" or "intrude" on the student? Behind such vigilance is the fear that forthright instruction is deleterious to the uniqueness of the individual child. "Watch yourself!", such teachers seem to be saying to themselves. "You might do something to thwart the unfolding of the pupil or, even worse, you may inhibit the expression of that which makes that child truly himself or herself. Above all, do nothing to undermine the self-esteem of the pupil. For it is only when students feel good about themselves that genuine growth can occur." When possessed by this view of children and their development, the teacher will eschew strong leadership (especially in areas such as morality) and instead assume the role of "facilitator."

What the teachers described above have in common is a need for confidence in themselves, in the role of the school, and in adulthood in general. Due to defective training (in their disciplines as well as in philosophy of education), many teachers are like the one in the nutrition class described by Macmillan. They lack a sense of moral and intellectual authority. And they tremble at the prospect of somehow interfering with the emerging uniqueness of their charges. It is better, they believe, to play it safe (i.e., avoid endorsement of ends or ideals) than to take the risks attendant to forthright instruction. For teachers and administrators who hold this view, the doctrine that the school and teaching as a whole should be neutral is a welcome salve for the annoying suspicion that one is not acting in a responsible fashion.

One might, of course, object that development of confidence promotes rigidity and thus is a danger to the public school. This objection is based in part on the understanding that public schools, in a democratic regime, are established to serve the interests of all of the people and must not systematically act in opposition to the preferences of legitimate factions. The objection is also an attempt to avoid additional stimulation of the controversy and conflict which characterize public education today. In responding to these concerns, let us begin by observing that if there are no ideals and aims which citizens can (at least in principle) confidently embrace, then much more than the schools is in jeopardy. Moreover, reduction of conflict is hardly an ideal objective for the schools, for it is as likely as not to "promote irrationality, ignorance, incompetence, unequal opportunity, or inconsistency of conduct."14

The suggestion that the schools become more confident proceeds from the conviction that a unifying vision is possible. Teachers and others in the schools can, via commitment to specified ends, transcend narrow self-interest and instead work together to achieve something higher.15 Of course, the ends which are...
obvious to everyone. This suggests the need for leadership and outlines a primary responsibility of the professoriate, especially those who teach foundations or philosophy of education.

A presupposition of this project is that there are objectives worth pursuing (and that not all objectives are equally worthwhile). Let us touch on some matters that teachers might confidently embrace. Sommers provides an appropriate starting point with her suggestion that we tell our students that right and wrong do exist. To fulfill this responsibility a teacher requires confidence not only that there is right and wrong, better and worse, but also that she is capable of teaching her students about them. Such confidence rests on the belief that teachers know something important that their students ought to learn. For the confident teacher, schools exist, at least in large measure, in order to provide the young with an opportunity to learn what they need to know. The schools, in other words, have a purpose. That purpose is to change, in defensible ways, the pupils who come to them.

Any responsible suggestion that we "change" pupils presupposes that we are aware of the aims of our instructional activity (and that we are capable of justifying them). What might be included among these aims? Surely, one of these must be the "development of intelligence" that is explicitly endorsed by Macmillan at the close of his essay. Equally important is mastery of the fundamental skills of reading, writing, and computation as well as knowledge of the natural world (science, geography, etc.) No less important (in the United States) is knowledge of American culture (which, at a minimum, would include extensive and repeated study of U.S. and Western history and exposure to the best literature from these traditions). The schools, moreover, need to teach certain fundamental precepts. Among the most important of these are:

1. actual individuals (rather than classes, races, or groups) are the ultimate focus of moral value;
2. reason (as opposed to strength of passion, etc.) is the arbiter of conflict; and
3. one's actions make an important difference (and, hence, that there are important differences to be made).

Above all, schools need to teach the young that it is good to be intelligent, just, courageous, and compassionate and that it is desirable to act wisely, respect others, and be responsible. They need, that is, to aim at establishing in the young a commitment to these ideals. This of course is a great departure from neutrality. But it is a program that places us squarely within the inherently moral enterprise known as teaching.16

Endnotes

1C. J. B. Macmillan, "Choosing to Believe in Modern Schools", a currently unpublished paper presented at the Philosophy of Education Society meeting in 1994. (Forthcoming in the Proceedings for this meeting).
Presumably Macmillan does not mean presentation of all conceivable positions, but rather only those that are non-trivial and reasonable.


Cf. Betty Mensch and Alan Freeman, "Losing Faith in Public Schools," *Tikkun*, vol. 7, no. 2 (1992): 31-36: "The fear of teaching values is now so great that a mother reported to us that her son's publicly funded preschool would not use the word 'wrong' even when one child clobbered another." Mensch and Freeman construe such reluctance to state there is right and wrong as a reaction by school employees to efforts in recent years to banish all trace of religion from the schools. For Mensch and Freeman the purging of religion from the schools eliminates the traditions within which morality was taught and by which it was justified. Absent these foundations, moral rules now appear to the young to be as described by Thrasymachus in the *Republic*, that is, as nothing more than the (relativistic) embodiment of the interests of those currently in power. And religion? To the degree that children encounter it outside the school, it must appear false insofar as it asserts, in direct contradiction to the reigning view in the schools, that there is an objective foundation for morality.

Working together to achieve a common end gives rise to what Richard Weaver calls "fraternity." Fraternity is a denial of egotism and promotes harmony rather than competition. The existence of fraternity depends on distinctions and commitment to something higher. It is therefore incompatible with egalitarianism. See Richard Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp. 41-44.

This paper has benefited from comments by Michael Oliker, Mickey Craig, C. J. B. Macmillan, and Rudy Leverett.
Many teachers complain that students are not showing an interest in literature and notice that engaging students in a meaningful literary experience in secondary and post secondary schools has become less important to educators in higher education than debates about issues in literary criticism. As William Cain documents in *The Crisis in Criticism* (1984), so much criticism is being published that literary theory is creating an overwhelming "scholarly stockpile" (p.63). At the same time, practitioners find themselves wanting a quick, simple guide and step-by-step instructions to help apply critical theories in the classroom (Lynn 1990, p. 258). Thus amidst a variety of approaches aimed at including the views of theorists and critics the question of how to encourage a significant relationship between literature and students has been pushed aside. However, some teachers are aware that the lack of concern for students and the literary experience affects what takes place inside their classrooms. Alert teachers, who are greeted in class by a bewildered group of strangers to literature, know they face the challenge of saving both the subject of literature and the students who are not engaged by it.

Therefore, the most immediate problem is how to put students back in direct touch with the art object (the literary text) in an environment that is besieged by a variety of critics, each with an individual theory of literature, and by educators, each with a desire to acquaint students with critical approaches. The American philosopher of education, John Dewey, foresaw such complications and noted that experience was an organic process in which the individual was not a fixed entity to be manipulated by the environment, in this case twentieth century critical theories which overshadow students' initial experience with literature. As he wrote,

The trouble with traditional education was not that educators took upon themselves the responsibility for providing an environment. The trouble was that they did not consider the other factor in creating experience: namely, the powers and purposes of those taught. It was assumed that a certain set of conditions was intrinsically desirable, apart from its ability to evoke a certain quality of response in individuals. This lack of mutual adaptation made the process of teaching and learning accidental. Those to whom the provided conditions were suitable managed to learn. Others got on as
best they could. Responsibility for selecting objectives carries with it, then, the responsibility for understanding the needs and capacities of the individuals who are learning at a given time. It is not enough that certain materials and methods have proved effective with other individuals at other times (Dewey 1938, 45).

To put the student back in touch with learning, Dewey suggests that educators must not assume that certain fixed conditions, created outside of individual experience, constitute the learning environment. When students' needs and power have not been integrated into the learning environment, there is cause for concern. Even when particular materials and methods have proven effective with other students, there can still be trouble. The precise nature of the trouble is the false assumption that the learning environment depends entirely upon certain effective conditions for learning to take place. As an example, an English teacher can emphasize classifying literature into categories or analyzing specific texts and ignore what the student brings to the learning situation. Instead of concentrating on the necessary conditions for a learning environment, Dewey argues that the learner's *experience* must be at the center of learning and teaching. According to Dewey, there are no givens outside of experience that can in any way amend, curtail, or replace it as the stronghold of learning and teaching. Experience must be center stage, and the needs and capacities of the learner must be given priority. Thus, before conditions can be determined for the learning environment, individuals and their experience must be considered. As the quotation from *Experience and Education* suggests, a set of conditions cannot be reduced to "a diet of predigested materials which replace the experience of the individual" (pp.45-46). Such materials only hinder the learner and create repressive conditions for the learning environment.

In effect, as literary critics and educators of higher education promote critical approaches that secondary teachers incorporate into their classrooms, they are also concentrating their efforts on improving a particular set of conditions. Dewey would object. He would ask, why emphasize possible critical literary methods in the curriculum when students *first* need to be encouraged to experience the art object, literature? He would also ask, have the critics and educators carefully considered the individual needs and abilities of their target audience: the students? He would be more interested in an answer to these questions that he *set* than in an explanation of the various critical approaches. According to Dewey, the approaches are merely another way of focusing on a set of conditions.

Therefore, to clear the ground of critical approaches and other distractions that remove students from direct experience with literature, Dewey serves as the catalyst that rejoins student and art object (literature). He holds this priority status because he places the student at the center of the learning yet, by emphasizing *experience*, fosters a fruitful relationship of the student and the learning environment. The critics who have become the intermediaries between literature and subject must step aside, as must the teachers who espouse critical approaches in the classroom. Dewey must enter center stage. As the scenery has
been cleared for his performance, the philosopher emerges as one who can guide his listeners back to the essentials in the classroom. Having already subdued the interruptive voices that have confused the situation, he has the duty of defining the problem, and to do so he must examine some terminology. Moreover, he must argue a theoretical position, which forces him, like the pantomimist, to work without concrete images, without props. Hence, he can suggest realities rather than imposing them, and he can encourage his audience to recreate his suggestions rather than copying them.

To begin, in Chapter One of *Experience and Education* Dewey examines the interplay of traditional and progressive education. Studying the two approaches in education, Dewey finds that the intersection between the two takes place in the experience of the individual. Experience includes both what is outside the individual (what traditional education provides) and what is within the individual (what progressive education provides). Elaborating on experience in Chapter Two, Dewey clarifies how experience can also be miseducative (pp.25-26). First, he notes, that experience miseducates when it distorts growth and encourages callousness and lack of sensitivity. Second, experience miseducates if an individual falls into a rut. Third, it is counterproductive when, because it is pleasurable, it moves an individual towards a careless attitude. Fourth, experience miseducates if the energy that is produced dissipates in too many directions, thereby generating confusion and aimlessness.

Clearly, these four miseducative experiences do not represent the genuine experience that is desired in education. Dewey maintains that other significant characteristics establish experience as the intersection of what is without and within the individual. Specifically, two aspects of quality can distinguish genuine experience: immediate appeal (agreeableness or disagreeableness) and influence on later experiences. Like the philosopher Mortimer Adler, in his *Paideia Proposal: An Educational Manifesto* (1982), Dewey would agree that quality is "the heart of the matter" (p.49). However, Adler focuses on the quality of learning and notes that it depends on the quality of teaching: didactic instruction, coaching, and Socratic questioning. In contrast, Dewey specifies that the quality of learning depends, first and foremost, on the quality found in experience. Dewey argues that whether experience is agreeable or not is an easily identifiable measure of quality. The critical measure of quality that eludes educators is how experience affects later experiences. Dewey's point is that addressing this aspect of quality sets the problem for educators. They need to spend their energies studying those presently agreeable activities that also promote desirable future experiences (p.27). For Dewey, the problem of education is one of quality. Quality is significant because it rests on activities which sustain experiences that are fruitful and creative in subsequent experiences.

To explain experience so as to place the focus directly on the student, Dewey describes two criteria of experience: continuity and interaction. In Chapter Three of *Experience and Education*, Dewey elaborates these two principles. He lays the foundation for his educational views which target experience as the fulcrum around which the science of education must revolve. As he notes, experience is the interception of continuity and interaction: its longitudinal and lateral aspects (p.44). Likening the relationship to a bow and an arrow, Dewey...
explains how they impose upon each other. The one constitutes the support against which the other must be pulled. And, likewise, the friction caused by one coming into contact with the other propels the motion of the other forwards. Before identifying the more specific properties of each, however, Dewey insists that the interdependent relationship of the bow to the arrow must be understood as analogous to his criteria of experience. Once this is conceptualized, both continuity and interaction can be understood more fully.

The principle of continuity—the arrow or the lateral aspect of experience—is reflected in the fact that "every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after." This implies that it "covers the formation of attitudes, attitudes that are emotional and intellectual; it covers our basic sensitivities and ways of meeting and responding to all the conditions which we meet in living" (p.35). This arrow, then, so to speak, is continually transforming itself as it passes through time and space, though that modification does not destroy its quality of continuity. In contrast, the principle of interaction, the bow or the longitudinal aspect of experience, is reflected in the giving of "equal rights to both factors in experience—objective and internal conditions." This implies "an interplay of these two sets of conditions," so that both internal and external factors—subjective and objective conditions—interact to create a situation (p.42). This bow, then, so to speak, adjusts the inside and outside forces that simultaneously interact upon each other. And, as with experience, the effect of both factors upon each other is critical.

Returning to the bow and arrow metaphor, Dewey concludes that an experience is made up of an aspect of continuity (a habit that is modified) and an aspect of interaction (internal and external conditions). To follow his argument, it is important to note that Dewey makes a shift in terms while describing the internal and external relationship and the environment. He introduces the term transaction to replace interaction. In his words, the transaction is what happens between an individual and objects and other individuals; and, it is the activity that takes place "between an individual and what, at the time, constitutes his environment..."(p.43).

The radical departure from the idea of interaction for Dewey's theory of transaction is the remarkable fluidity that it brings to the experience. Dewey describes both the individual and the environment as being in states of continual flux. Therefore, in the educational situation neither the students nor the environment are fixed entities. They are both engaged in the process of interaction or, as Dewey would note, transaction. They are organically related factors contributing to experience. However, as important as this discussion may be, the primary purpose of including Dewey in an explanation of how to put students back in touch with literature is that he reasserts the importance of the individual, in this case the student, in the learning process. Dewey's overarching interest centers on the subject of experience, the student, rather than on conditions of any kind. As he notes, "experience is truly experience only when objective conditions are subordinated to what goes on within the individuals having the experience" (p.41).
As he was asked to do, Dewey has defined the problem: emphasizing "objective conditions" over students' needs and abilities detracts from the essential quality of experience. As he was also asked to do, he examined the terms continuity and interaction. And, as he found it necessary, he coined a new term transaction which describes what happens between an individual and the environment. Finally, as Dewey argued his theoretical position on learning, he tried to persuade educators that the focus in the classroom should be on experience. For Dewey, experience is the most essential aspect of education, as his Experience in Education suggests. Experience, is what gives education a structure and provides it with the vital signs of life.

Extending Dewey's general ideas on education, his philosophy can be applied to the teaching of literature. In fact, after Dewey's pantomime on stage, it seems clearer why he would say that the critical approaches that literary theorists and educators in higher education explore are external to the student. The critical approaches by structuralists, deconstructionists, Freudian analysts, marxists and feminists are instructive. Yet Dewey would be quick to note that as a group of approaches, they are a set of conditions that cannot replace the emphasis on the needs and abilities of students. Classroom teachers must give priority to the student. Students' experiences are the catalyst around which objective conditions can be created. As Dewey might repeat again, "experience is truly experience only when objective conditions are subordinated to what goes on within the individuals having the experience" (p.41).

Although Dewey has spoken on behalf of the philosophy of education, his part in this discussion on what is at the heart of literature is far from over. His theoretical views on education are far-reaching in terms of their implications and applications to various disciplines. His emphasis on experience would change the curriculum in any area where the external conditions, e.g., the subject matter, are of utmost concern to the educator. Similarly, as the implications of Dewey's views on experience influence pedagogy, the application of his argument would also change the learning process as it has been defined by many teachers. Both of these points, while relevant to many current problems in education, are particularly important in the teaching of literature.

Dewey's theoretical view on transaction (what takes place between the individual and the environment) is a particularly fruitful aspect of his thinking. The significance lies in Dewey's perspective on the relationship between the individual and the environment, especially his emphasis on its interactive character. Both the subject (student) and the object (literature) participate in the interplay between the two and Dewey ascribes importance to both. He does not deny that an object exists outside of the subject; likewise, he does not deny that a subject exists apart from the object. His theoretical position can be visualized as being at the center of a continuum that at one end emphasizes the subject and the other end emphasizes the object. Dewey's concept of experience lies in the middle of these two extremes.

Because Dewey's subject/object argument can also serve as the entry point to a discussion of a theoretical continuum in literature, his ideas are relevant to both literary criticism (the theoretical approaches to literature) and to the practitioner (the teacher at the secondary level). While the work of literary critics
and practitioners overlap, the function of experience as it relates to both the theoretical and practical aspects of literature can be examined separately. The "objective conditions" that Dewey finds are external to the student can be found in literary criticism. The relationship between subject and object can be illustrated in a scheme by M. H. Abrams. Abrams intended his model to help explain the history of various critical theories and their practice (David Lodge 1972,1). However, it may also serve the purpose of clarifying the external conditions in literary criticism. As Abrams notes in *The Mirror and the Lamp* (1953) there are a variety of relations between the four primary elements in literature: the universe, the work, the artist, and the audience (p.6).

UNIVERSE

| WORK |

| ARTIST | AUDIENCE |

**Figure 1: Relations between the Four Primary Elements in Literature**

The link between these four aspects, according to Abrams, constitutes the basis for critical theory, and the interplay among these primary elements, with a varying degree of emphasis on each, distinguishes the nature of particular relationships. These relationships are the cornerstone for specific orientations in literature and in all the other arts as well.

What Abrams' model contributes to Dewey's theoretical argument is that it helps to clarify that three of the four elements in literary criticism can be identified as "objective conditions." These external factors are the universe, the work, and the artist. Dewey's subject is represented by the audience (the individuals who experience literature); therefore, because the other elements function outside of the subject, they can be considered external factors. An analysis of the relative emphasis on these four elements in specific orientations in literary theory reveals that in Abrams' terms, the New Critics emphasize the significance of the work (text), the Reader-Response critics ascribe major importance to the audience (reader), the Romantics and the Biographical critics focus on the creative expression and background of the artist (writer), and the Mimetic theorists, influenced by Plato and Aristotle, concentrate on the universe (reality) captured in the text.

In a jest regarding the complexity of issues related to these four poles of interpretation, Elizabeth Freund notes that criticism, which may be seen as enormously tedious and perhaps worthless in view of its being ultimately unexplainable, is like a "game of musical chairs" (1987, p.11). More seriously, however, it must be noted that in the 1990s, discussion is indeed lively on a wide variety of issues based on these relationships. In particular, theorists are focusing attention on the activities surrounding the reading of a work of art. Louise Rosenblatt, who wrote *Literature as Exploration*, is the connecting link in a discussion that begins with Dewey's theory of experience and moves to the
examination of the reader in reader-response. Her position becomes the central focus of attention because her work places the student at the center of experience. She argues for the transactional between the reader and the text and values the contribution Dewey has made to the understanding of the relationship between subject and object. Her work is a valuable example of the ideas that Dewey elaborated upon in his educational philosophy. It may not be overstating the argument to say that reader-response and Deweyian views on experience are intimately related.

Interestingly, Rosenblatt's contributions to reader-response are valued differently by the theorists and practitioner. While Rosenblatt is credited by theorists Jane Tompkins, Susan Suleiman and Inge Crosman for a significant pioneering work in reader-response, her theoretical efforts appear to be taken more seriously by practitioners. The theoretical critics Tompkins and Suleiman/Crosman relegate Rosenblatt to a footnote in their introductory chapters. Tompkins mentions Rosenblatt's work among the omissions that seem most significant in the theoretical development of reader-response. She writes, "Louise Rosenblatt deserves to be recognized as the first among the present generation of critics in this country to describe empirically the way the reader's reactions to a poem are responsible for any subsequent interpretation of it (p.38)." Suleiman/Crosman's credit to Rosenblatt begins with a regret. "To my regret, Louise M. Rosenblatt's pioneering work in the field of subjective criticism came to my attention only after this essay was in proof" (p.45). They go on to say that Rosenblatt's *Literature as Exploration* challenged the objectivist assumptions of the New Criticism in the classroom of colleges and high schools, and that although the book influenced pedagogical concerns, it was not recognized for its importance to literary theory until recently (p.45).

In contrast to the theoretical critics who all but overlook Rosenblatt, the practitioner Robert Probst cites her as making a substantial contribution to reader-response (1988). In his preface to *Response and Analysis*, a handbook for teachers using reader-response techniques in the classroom, Probst acknowledges the debt of current critical theory to Rosenblatt's idea that experience involves the student as a significant participant in the relationship between reader and text. Applying reader-response to the classroom, Probst credits the current excitement for developments in this area and the rediscovery of the reader's role to Rosenblatt's 1938 *Literature as Exploration*.

Probst finds Rosenblatt's shift of emphasis away from the New Critical approach is particularly important at the secondary level, where all readers, whether serious students of literature or not, are important in the learning environment. Probst elaborates on Rosenblatt's strong leadership in this direction and writes that such an approach to literature

... tries to see what it would mean to assume that literature must be personally significant, to respect the reader's responses to literary works, to insist that the reader accept responsibility for making sense of personal experiences, both literary and otherwise, and to acknowledge the influence of literature in shaping our conceptions of the world (1988, p.[vi]).
Probst's cites Rosenblatt again as "the best representative of modern response-based theory" and suggests that she is the spokesperson for a diverse group (p.235). The binding espistemological assumption, according to Probst, for this variety of views is what Mailloux writes about the perceiver and the perceived: "the object of knowledge can never be separated from the knower; the perceived object can never be separated from perception by a perceiver" (p.235).

Probst identifies this assumption as that aspect of reader-response criticism which makes it compatible with educational theory and makes it important for the teaching of literature in the classroom. The reader-response contribution is, then, that students are the center of teaching and the curriculum and must, therefore, be the primary focus when activities such as literary history or textual analysis are considered. Consequently, as the teaching effort in the classroom shifts from the object (text) to the perceiver of the object (reader or student), another shift occurs in classroom priorities and learning activities.

This is precisely what Dewey argues in *Experience and Education* (1938). He asserted long before Probst that in education the student's experience must be considered prior to objective conditions. The passage quoted earlier in the paper suggests this idea clearly. Dewey maintains that the trouble with traditional education is that students' needs and power are not given due consideration. According to Dewey, these "other factors" have been overlooked and he advocates returning to the experience of the student. His theory of transaction is a means of explaining experience as the interdependent relationship between student and the environment. The relationship depends on the principle of continuity and the principle of interaction but, above all, Dewey asserts that the experience of the student supersedes any other influence.

Likewise, Probst provides evidence for Rosenblatt's assertion that the experience of the reader (student) supersedes any other influence. Both share a philosophical perspective which emphasizes that the student is at the heart of learning. Probst helps to clarify Rosenblatt's position in the center of a continuum that ranges from sole emphasis on the subject to sole emphasis on the text. Maintaining that literary criticism should emphasize the interplay between the two, he places Rosenblatt in a similar place as Dewey on the continuum. Their theoretical views are compatible because they both view the quality of experience in learning as the critical ingredient in the classroom. As Rosenblatt writes in her seminal text on reader-response, she intended *Literature as Exploration* to be "a philosophy for teachers who desire to help young people to gain the pleasures and the understanding that literature can yield" (1968, p. xi-xii). Thus, this argument which began with Dewey and his theory of experience ends with a connecting link to Rosenblatt who proposes an approach that is based on the experience and is at the heart of literature.

**References**


THE CRUX OF OUR INSPIRATION: 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY

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The publication of The Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882-1953 was effectively completed in 1991 with the release of the final volume of Dewey's *Later Works* and a comprehensive index to the entire thirty-seven volume edition of his writings. It marked the culmination of one of the most ambitious and significant archival projects in American intellectual history. In 1993 the entire set of the *Collected Works* was made available in paperback. No one who has studied Dewey's philosophy would doubt the extraordinary value of these volumes.

The beginnings of the "Dewey Project" and the Center for Dewey Studies can be traced to 1961 when George Axtelle tried to produce a concordance of philosophical terms in Dewey's work and found it impossible without a uniform collected edition of this writings. Only nine years after his death few of Dewey's major books remained in print. Jo Ann Boydston, hired by Axtelle to assist with the editing of the concordance for publication by Southern Illinois University Press, subsequently took on the work that would constitute her career, when the Press, led by its director, Vernon Stemberg, made the bold decision to publish under her direction a minimum of five volumes comprising Dewey's writings from 1882-1898. The volumes were called the *Early Works*. Volume I, *Psychology*, appeared in 1967. The successful completion of this first series in 1972 was followed by the fifteen-volume *Middle Works, 1889-1924*, completed in 1983, and the seventeen-volume, *Later Works, 1925-1953*. As others have noted, Dewey was not only a philosopher of enormous scope, and an activist with wide and diverse commitments, he was also a virtual writing machine, churning out over nearly seventy years more than thirty books, hundred of articles, reviews, lectures, encyclopedia articles, pamphlets, and other ephemeral.

Boydston and her colleagues confronted the daunting task of gathering up and editing an enormous body of material. The job was made more difficult by the scattered, often fugitive, character of many of Dewey's writings and the fact that they were often published in different languages. Westbrook reports that "... (Dewey's) work appeared in more than 150 different journals, ranging from the *Journal of Philosophy* to the *Ladies' Home Journal*, and he delivered lectures and talks everywhere from major marquee forums at Harvard, Yale, and the University of Edinburgh to local PTAs and union halls."
Somehow Boydston and her colleagues have accomplished their task and we can proceed as never before in the assessment of the ideas and character of one of the most influential philosophers in modern history. But we need to be careful in selecting our standards. If Dewey is to remain important as a philosopher, it cannot be mainly for his historical role in promoting this or that idea, any more than it can be for the sheer magnitude of his writings. Nor should it be for the validity of his answers or responses to specific philosophical questions. While all great philosophers must provide an appropriate learned audience with intriguing ideas and sage commentary, the overriding factor in judging a philosopher's contributions is the extent to which that person helped shape the future of his or her culture. This is the reason seminal thinkers cannot be judged adequately only in the context of their times or by their immediate peers. They must be judged ultimately by an endlessly unfolding "coming-to-be," by how things actually turn out. Each generation has a better perspective than the previous one for assessing earlier ideas, and, it should be said, a greater responsibility. Thus, we should appreciate the Collected Works. It makes it easier for us to evaluate what Dewey has done, both for us and to us.

With all the ups and downs of Dewey's popularity, with all the diverse, even bizarre, interpretations of his work, pro and con, he remains America's quintessential philosopher and educator. To those who would portray him merely as a transitional figure from 19th to 20th century industrial politics, as someone whose main contribution was to reflect and rationalize the social trends of his time, it must be said that his words can still fire our souls. The reason for this is not nostalgia on our part, or merely that he still speaks to our material self-interests, but rather because the issues he addressed and spoke to so smartly remain for us today matters of grave concern. Still we have differences. For Dewey the inertia and irrational forces of tradition were the problem for which the progressively educated mind was the solution. For a time things looked promising. But now there is a widespread fear, even among liberals, that such a mind may be unattainable or seriously flawed--in short, that we have met the enemy and it is us. Threats to the achievement of democratic ideals can no longer be easily explained by appeals to forces outside of democracy (e.g., tyrants or improperly educated citizens). Increasingly we can see these threats as stemming from within ourselves, from our own hubris and limited mentality, often times legitimized by the very educational process that was supposed to defeat such things.

No one ranks higher than Dewey as someone who convinced us that the imagination of the individual must be unleashed to the fullest extent possible if democratic culture is to fulfill its destiny. The European fathers of the enlightenment, during the 16th and 17th centuries, usually pulled up short of this conclusion. On their scheme the individual would be constrained by reason or science, with the right to unlimited criticism being reserved for the best and the brightest of the educationally privileged few. Dewey made all these distinctions problematic. And, thus, as a logical consequence, he argued that every democratic citizen (i.e., ruler), which was virtually everyone, educated or not, had the right to experiment--loosely defined--with any opinion whatsoever. Dewey felt here this was not the case, our democracy has failed--or, more accurately,
we have failed our democracy. He believed that would-be Kings, in the classical pre-modern sense, should be denied any special moral authority, and that would-be Dictators, the vulgar modern counterpart to Kings, different from tyrants, must be stripped of any amoral grip on power. The right to exercise our imaginations without fear or guilt was, for Dewey, the heart of democratic culture. European fathers of the enlightenment were inclined to see this right as something a person acquires after he or she is educated, or becomes mature, and is made a citizen. Dewey saw it as a necessary condition for being educated and for maturing as a democratic citizen.

The only mechanism Dewey would allow for controlling the individual was intelligence, a form of practical reason, rooted in experience, gained through the right kind of education, and guaranteed to promote both an understanding of, and commitment to, democracy as a way of life. But what kind of control is this? If intelligence is only a method or set of procedures, as Dewey himself often suggested, and if education itself must be democratic and non-imposing in order to promote democracy as a way of life, what reason is there to believe that the outcome will be what is hoped for, or that our assumptions are even coherent? In this regard, the objection often raised against Dewey is the same one raised against Nietzsche, except that Nietzsche was considerably more practical and less naive. That is, what is there to keep this philosophy from reducing itself to a rationalization for egotistical self-indulgence and the will to power?

Even Sidney Hook acknowledged that Dewey's faith in the masses to find their way to a participating democracy--"a commonwealth in which institutions function to be helpful to all individuals seeking to achieve their maximum growth as persons"--has been sorely tried by events in the United States since the Second World War. To achieve their goals interest groups in almost all areas of public life have relied increasingly on techniques of intimidation and propaganda, to say nothing of actual force and violence, rather than "methods of consultation, persuasion, negotiation, communication, and cooperative intelligence" that were proposed by Dewey.

From the time of his public denunciation of Joseph Stalin and his final break with Communism in the late 1930s, Hook was increasingly prone to viewing dysfunctional democracy as a problem rooted in the ideological and self-indulgent fantasies of twentieth century left-wing politics. From considerable frontline experience he writes that, "We live in an age of true believers whose self-righteous absolutisms brook neither contradiction nor delay in bringing about the promised land of their faith. . . . In a few short strides the Utopian idealist becomes a bomb-throwing guerilla warrior, an arsonist or an assassin--still self-righteous and full of moral indignation and completely unaware of the way in which the means he has used have corrupted both his ideas and his character." Hook's image of the problem was one where intelligence and decency, defined in progressive Deweyan terms, form the core of modern life, and where this core is being attacked not so much by the remnants of a pre-modern age but by the twin viruses of subjectivism and hubris that are cultivated at the dark fringes of modernity. He believed that the best cure for this malady is a strong, educated commitment to pragmatic equilibrium and a stern hand. Thus, he could say,
"The major threats to democratic political and social life stem not from relativism or skepticism but from fanaticism." But the problem may go deeper.

What if relativism or skepticism (or some perverse cultural expression of these ideas) was the problem? That would suggest that fanaticism may be an effect of our ills rather than the cause, and that Platonic conceptions of truth may not be so bad after all. The very core of modern life that Dewey did so much to legitimize, and Hook so steadfastly defended, would be undermined. For both of these men, if vulgarity was the disease, intelligence was the cure. Looked at pragmatically, what reason is there for believing this to be the case? Dewey and Hook did not regard "relativism" and "subjectivism" as synonymous terms. Reality may be contingent, and all opinions may be rooted in the experience of the individual. But, as Dewey and Hook were quick to say, reality is not always contingent on us, on what we think or do. We develop as people through the medium of our experience and become a factor in constituting the world as the right kind of education takes hold. But we are never God--no one is. For Dewey and Hook the repudiation of absolutes and purely objective truth, and correspondingly the insistence on the subjective origins of human knowledge, did not imply that there was nothing of meaning or value bigger than us, or outside of us. It was Dewey's hope, and Hook's decree, that relativism should humble us at the very moment it inspires and emboldens us to be better than we are. Alas, on each score it seems all too often to have had the opposite effect.

It was Mortimer J. Adler, of all people--the unrepentant Aristotelian--who in many ways best summarized the power of Dewey's contributions to American's culture. Dewey's 1916 book, Democracy and Education, was, according to Adler, the first time in the whole history of education that the words "democracy" and "education" were put together. In this book, Dewey told us that it is not enough for education to be for the sake of democracy; it must itself be a paradigm of the democratic attitude. Dewey's understanding of this pronouncement was never superficial. But neither was he explicit in defining what he meant. Clearly, he was promoting his doctrine of the organic connection of means and ends. But beyond that when it came to the details of actual practice, Dewey's words have been scandalized by friends and foe alike. What could Dewey have had in mind when he assured us that democracy was the best form of education? If each is both the purpose and instrument for the other (both the final and efficient cause for the other, to use Aristotle's language), this would mean that neither has an essence apart from its relationship to the other, and thus no range of independent authority. As contrasted with classical or traditional education, Deweyan education has no aim save growth, which in turn can only be defined in local, practical (i.e., relative) terms. Formal education could define itself by the high culture it was intended to serve. But Deweyan education serves democratic culture, which defines itself formally in negative terms as being against high culture.

Notwithstanding natural rights conceptions of democracy that purport a positive essence for culture but which always beg the question of relativism, what is there in democracy's low or "popular" conception of culture that education can attach itself to which is not vulgar and/or easy to corrupt? Popular cul-
ure, it has been said, "must provide for the dumbest as well as the smartest of its fans, which makes loving it easy but explaining it hard." In a nutshell, this was Dewey's challenge, to explain how democracy and education could come together to more fully justify our prejudice for each of them. Quality and virtue may not go out the window once we repudiate a fixed, hierarchical order of roles and expectations. But once they are forced to share the stage, in the name of equality and justice, with mediocrity and indifference, we tend to lose our respect for them, and eventually even our ability to discern them.

In discussing this problem Hook acknowledges that fear of failure is usually enough to keep most people from behaving in silly or fanatical ways. But he also recognizes that this is no way to sustain democracy, nor is it consistent with the kind of education democracy requires. It was precisely for this reason, Hook tells us, that Dewey was not interested in techniques of frustration or repression. He argued for "an intellectual approach" to education that would challenge stupid and dangerous tendencies, present in all individuals and societies, tendencies that in a democracy must at least to some extent be tolerated. Dewey expected education to cultivate a practical, especially historical, sense of reality. To paraphrase Hook on this point, since the gist of rationality in human affairs, if not in pure logic or mathematics, is to reflect on ourselves as creatures of the natural world; judgements that are relevant to democratic living are based on more or less rather than either/or. We need to nurture the ability to construct interesting and helpful options for ourselves from the vagueness and ambiguities of experience. The apriori certainties of reason are a critical subset of intelligence, a tool, not its essence. This practical (and historical) perspective on human affairs is wedded in Dewey-inspired education to a lively sense of the pluralism. Again to quote Hook, "conscience has no moral authority unless it is the result of a rational conscientiousness," i.e., the method of intelligence. What more can intelligence provide for us, rooted as it is in experience, other than a health diversity? Intelligence cannot provide certainty on a meta-level either. It was always Hook's conviction that absolutism of any kind, that is, the determination to ignore the consequences of use, inevitably results in fanaticism. Dewey's pragmatism, like William James', may have been looser than Hook's. But Dewey also considered absolutism to be the bane of education and democracy's most serious threat.

Populism assumes that ordinary people in sufficient numbers have the capacity and willingness to make intelligent decisions about the critical moral and civic matters of their time. It assumes that where fundamental interests collide individuals and factional groups will use their intelligence to settle their differences based on shared or common interests, and that they will have the courage to do what is right. Dewey, and the progressive legions he inspired, made one important amendment to populism's faith; they did not regard the qualities of democracy to be innate but saw them rather as acquired through education. Thus, when filtered through the right educational process any given experience is to be valued not solely for its outcome, but also as an experimental exercise in the development of the democratic virtues of intelligence and courage. What evidence is there, however, to justify this faith, especially if education is
P. Smith

defined, as progressives usually defined it, as including more than formal schooling?

Hook acknowledges that Dewey's ideas have been "sorely tried by events," even more in our time than in his. Moreover, "[i]t is still an open question whether Dewey's faith in intelligence will be vindicated. . . . It is still an open question whether events will not make it more reasonable and intelligent, given existing propensities and their institutional contexts, to use methods of social action that Dewey himself eschewed and condemned." Lest we think that it is only social conservatives who believe that things are getting out of hand, even Rupert Murdock has begun to voice some concern. The commercial exploiter of the first amendment, and some would say promoter of sleaze-journalism, said recently about Los Angeles, "There's not much history here, and that leads to good thing and bad things. I mean, there are no rules here. That make it very open on the one hand. On the other hand, there's, perhaps, less taste about it."

Bad taste can result from lack of understanding as much as from disregard or indifference to standards. Among American intellectuals Dewey was early to recognize that modern life has become so complex that the Jeffersonian ideal of self-sufficiency is now an anachronism. A person in our culture can no longer be or know everything, or enough to always act intelligently on his or her own. For many informed and influential people, including some who speak in Dewey's name, the only conclusion to draw from this is that we must rely on specialists or experts to make important decisions on matters where they have better credentials than do we. While many of Dewey's statements would lend support to this attitude, he was at least ambivalent about it, and undoubtedly repulsed when it was interpreted to mean that ordinary people in either their personal or civic lives might disavow their duties, or turn over their future to a technically trained elite. To the extent he was ambivalent or repulsed by the idea of a world controlled by experts, Dewey may have been violating the logic of his own pragmatism. But he always insisted that one must exercise intelligence in order to possess it (which was the crux of his philosophy of education), and, moreover, that specialization and expertise were both narrow in their outlook, as a matter of necessity, and easily corruptible, insofar as they can serve contradictory ends. Assuming that intelligence is separate from its practice was regarded by Dewey as an untenable philosophical dualism. The divorce of purpose from human know-how drapes the same division in the benign-looking language of current day technical competence.

Dewey repudiated the traditional idea of experience found in modern empiricism precisely because he was loathed to believe that intelligence could be driven for long by bad or silly intentions. Instead of defining experience as composed of our private sensations, he defined it as a psycho-physical process of doing and undergoing. We do something, then we undergo and reflect on the consequences, which is the internal dynamic of learning that, in Dewey's view, works do undermine unsavory and stupid motives as much as to decide what we should do next. We use our intentions to interpret our experience and guide our actions. But our intentions will usually be assessed and transformed in the light
of their results. At least, for Dewey, this is what happens when we trust and use intelligence.

So, when Dewey would tell us that intelligence can change things for the better, he meant to imply from both a practical and moral point of view that it could change the intentions behind our deeds as much as results on subsequent occasions. But to what extent is this the case? Events of this century suggest that while our power of means--our ability to do things--has increased exponentially, our ability to grasp and assess the ends we pursue, intellectually and ethically, has lagged pitifully behind. Apparently, reflecting on the experience of doing and undergoing has not sufficiently challenged, developed, or enriched our intentions. All too often it has changed things qualitatively for the worse. When Lenin described fascism as the leadership class gone mad, he was referring to a group of individuals who lacked the capacity to recognize any authority other than their own, who combined power, arrogance, indifference, and ineptitude, as only modern society could, with ferocious outcomes. Failing to see himself, and the class he idealized, as susceptible to the same tendencies, he produced a nightmare in the worst image of his enemy. So much for experience as our teacher.

This problem of how intelligence relates to purpose is not the only matter about which Dewey may have been too sanguine. He also adopted a secularized version of Plato's knowledge-is-virtue thesis. That is, to know what is good is to do it. Whether on Plato's rendering or on Dewey's, this claim is not analytic. The difference between the two philosophers is that for Plato it was a metaphysical truth, whereas for Dewey, it was an empirical judgement. Is it the case that in our society people in the know tend to do what is right? It would not be preposterous to doubt this; nor, moreover, is it laughable to believe that virtue is in decline as something that people actually care about, or even understand. Once the thesis is formulated as an empirical hypothesis and tested under the relativistic assumptions of modern culture, the risks are enormous, as Dewey recognized. But his faith was that with the right kind of education a democracy could meet this challenge, and that, regardless, it had no choice but to take these risks in order to be true to itself. But here again, do intelligent people, as we now define them, show a greater proclivity for virtue in our society than those who are less intelligent? If the answer is "no," we might infer either that Dewey's conception of democracy is flawed, or else that we have failed as philosophers, educators and citizens in our stewardship of Dewey's legacy. If the first be true, we might best ignore Dewey on this topic, or even criticize him for leading us astray by pushing us down the slippery-slope of value relativism. If the second inference proves more valid, we could still maintain that Dewey's strengths and talents are too rare and cannot be duplicated on a large enough scale for his ideas to work.

Quite apart from whether human beings possess the same general potential for intelligence, or whether they have sufficient desire and opportunity to foster that potential, there is the question of what they will do with intelligence once they have it. Intelligence as know-how makes it possible for individuals to do many things they should not do. While aware of this, Dewey believed that it was more than know-how, that it involved other qualities that would
lead invariably to insights about purpose, morality and self, and that because of these features bad things could be seen as unintelligent and would not be done. Certainly, this was true for Dewey. But how confident can we be that it is generally true for intelligent people? In the world today it seems that if something can be done, it will be done, which is a far cry from Dewey's conviction that intelligence alone somehow constrains know-how. It may be that our ability to do things—the power of our technology—has simply outstripped our ability to understand the consequences of what we are doing. Or it may be that our inclination to do bad things results from deep, dark forces within us and that we have given up even trying to control these forces. Either way the world is looking more every day like Dr. Frankenstein's worst nightmare, and less like Dewey's secular democratic community.

However negative and hard-edged Hook may have sounded in assessing the civic culture of our time, he stopped far short of giving up on Dewey and democracy. He championed as Dewey's legacy to our age "a philosophy that would extend the area of desirable human freedoms by the arts of intelligence," the most important corollary of which "in social and political affairs is the interrelatedness and continuity of ends and means, of process and product." While Hook did not believe that this approach worked to justify or defend the status quo—quite to the contrary—he was quick to add that it also "puts us on guard against shortcuts and panaceas, empty revolutionary rhetoric, and the 'reasons' of the heart, blood or passion that have resulted in intellectual absurdities and often culminated in atrocities." His sometimes heavy-handed condemnation of anti-establishment social movements was based in large measure on the contempt he rightly felt for self-serving realpolitickers who disingenuously and arrogantly purport to care about the betterment of humanity. But to some degree it was also rooted in a somewhat un-Deweyan separation of intelligence and emotion. For Dewey this was a relative and problematic distinction that each of us needs constantly to experiment and struggle with. For Hook it was more or less methodological. This is why he could move back and forth with such confidence between liberal and conservative opinions, all the while regarding himself as a consistent and loyal champion of Dewey's philosophy. What mattered most to Hook was intelligence. Anything he saw as out of line with reflective experience, or that smacked of unreasoned practice, was his enemy. By contrast, Dewey deliberately blurred this distinction. He implored us to be better and to do better by using our heads, to intelligently explore and assess both our feelings and the imperatives of higher authority. He considered it to be an error of prudence, but also a threat to democracy, to rely dogmatically on either one. This is what we continue to find so ingratiating about Dewey, and why his ideas resonate so strongly in those of us who fall under his spell. He does not disparage sentiments, nor ridicule our traditions, whatever they may be. He asks only that we not be their prisoner, that we have our own mind on these things.

Hook, too, did not deny the power and importance of emotions in human beings. And, obviously, he recognized the need for individuals to defer on occasion to agencies of higher authority. But he believed that the form and content of both the individual's feelings and community's mandates should be dic-
ated by intelligence. For Dewey their relationship with intelligence was more transactional and less serial. Not intelligence first, then feeling and authority, as intelligence would decree. Rather, they should be taken together in a perpetual process of give and take, where each in its turn would serve as both judger and judged.

Through his work and inspiration, Dewey continues to challenge us to use intelligence to reconstruct our experience. But he also expects us to use experience, in all of its complexity, to restructure our intelligence. He never portrayed intelligence as an autonomous feature of our existence as beings-in-the-world. Insofar as he declared intelligence to have its own integrity, it was not to belittle other dimensions of the human psyche, or to invalidate communal experience.

Those who search for clear-cut rules in deciding what is true, good and beautiful, like the standards of "clear and distinct" recommended by Descartes in his method of apriori reason, will find little solace in Dewey. Quite deliberately, Dewey gives us a picture of intelligence that is every bit as problematic as the subject matter to which it is applied. Americans have generally welcomed this message because they tend to view openness and indeterminacy as liberating. Perhaps, for this reason, too, philosophers of education in American universities still find Dewey's notion to be intoxicating, despite an atmosphere of conceptual intolerance that has policed the field for over thirty years. Be this as it may, we might still ask, have Dewey's ideas worked for us, have they actually benefited our culture and its educational institutions? There are plenty of reasons to celebrate Dewey, but given the current conditions under which we live, and what we might extrapolate to the next century, we can also have doubts about Deweyan exhortations. The sobering fact is that whatever our situation, and however it be explained, we are what we are. The genie is out of the bottle and no amount of looking back is likely to recreate the cultural environment of our Platonic past.

In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey observed that "man continues to live because he is a living creature not because reason convinces him of the certainty or probability of future satisfactions and achievements. He is instinct with activities that carry him on. . . . [M]an as man still has the dumb pluck of the animal." Let's hope so! Let's hope, too, that as philosophers of education we can discover within ourselves some modicum of the wisdom and courage that Dewey modeled for us so impressively.

Endnotes


2Ibid, p. 33, 35.

3Ibid, p. 33.

4Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., p. XXII

Ibid.


Hook, "The Relevance of John Dewey's Thought," p. XXII.

Ibid., p. XXIII.

Ibid., XXVIII.

Ibid., P. XXIX.


Hook, "The Relevance of John Dewey's Thought," p. XXV.

Ibid., p. XXXII.

Ibid.

IV. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A. 1993 PROGRAM

MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1993 Annual Meeting
November 12-13

John Dewey and Chicago:
Centennial Celebration--
a special two-year
MPES celebration

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Water Tower Campus
Marquette Center
Rush and Pearson Streets
Chicago, IL 60611

Host: School of Education
Robert E. Roemer, Dean

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1993

12:30 Registration
Marquette Center, Room 30

1:00pm First General Session--Dewey at Chicago
Marquette Center, Room 30

Study of Philosophy Courses & Content Taught by John Dewey at the University of Chicago
Charles E. Alberti, Bemidji State University--Minnesota
Hegel's Influence on the Social & Educational Thought of John Dewey
Marianne S. Glazek, Ann Arbor, Michigan
The Chicago Connection: The Untold Story of Feminism & Pragmatism
Charlene Haddock Seigfried, Purdue University
2:10pm First Concurrent Session

1. On Dewey
   Marquette Center 30
   *How the Concept of Transaction Redefines Subjectivity Within Dewey's Theory of Knowledge*
   Jeanne Connell, University of Illinois--Champaign
   GRADUATE STUDENT AWARD WINNER
   *Dewey's Pragmatism and Total Quality Management: Practices and Principles*
   Janis Fine, Loyola University

2. On Teacher Education
   Marquette Center, Alumni Lounge
   *Why American Colleges of Education Do Not Produce Master Teachers*
   Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University
   *Is There a Correlation Between Philosophic World-Views and Social Theories*
   Robert N. Barger, Eastern Illinois University

2:55pm Break

3:15pm Second Concurrent Session--On Pragmatism & Education

1. Marquette Center 30
   *Pragmatics and Identifying Disciplines*
   Thomas Kowall, University of Toronto

2. Marquette Center Alumni Lounge
   *Did William James Deliver Any Version of His Talks to Teachers to the Teachers of Cambridge?*
   Harry J. Farnon, Rosemont, Pennsylvania

4:00pm Second General Session--The John Dewey Publications
   Marquette Center 30

   *Dewey's Writings: His Correspondence & the Published Works*
   Jo Ann Boydston, Editor and Former Director of the Dewey Center

5:00pm Business Meeting

5:30pm Adjournment for Dinner
8:00pm Third General Session--On Films & Popular Culture
Marquette Center 30

Part 1: Film Extracts and Comments
Michael A. Oliker, Chicago, Illinois

Part 2: Panel Discussion
Michael A. Oliker, Chicago, Illinois
Matthew E. Creighton, S.J., Loyola University of Chicago
Lawrence Santoro, Video Columnist, Chicago Sun Times
Don G. Smith, Eastern Illinois University

9:50pm Evening Adjournment

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 13, 1993

8:50am Fourth General Session--Ethics
Marquette Center 30

Vices and Virtues: A Common Place Between Freud and Aristotle
Joseph Yacoub, Calumet College of St. Joseph

Biographical Ethics: Our Educational Journey
Robert Craig, University of Houston

Children Dying with Dignity: Another Remembrance of Janusz Korazak
Ronald Swartz, Oakland University

10:00am Third Concurrent Session

1. On Dewey
Marquette Center 30

Déjà Vu All Over Again à la Dewey
James R. Biddle, University of Dayton

Experience as Improvisation: Dewey's Aesthetic Theory Applied to Nursery School Pretend Play
R. Keith Sawyer, University of Chicago

A Silken Web: Anzia Yezierska and John Dewey
William Russell, Merrimack College

2. On Social Aspects of Learning
Marquette Alumni Lounge

Peter McLaren and Critical Pedagogy
Martin McKeown

Everything You Wanted to Ask about Being a Philosopher, But Were Afraid to Role Play
Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University

Doing Community: Classroom Values, Practices, and Ethics
Louis Silverstein, Columbia College
11:10am Fifth General Session
Marquette Center 30

Parallels Between John Dewey & Rudolf Steiner: Possible Influence or Independent Development?
Nancy Rose, Richmond, Virginia
Moral Character and Moral Conduct: Dewey's Neglected Legacy
Ronald Lee Zigler, Grandview College

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Walter P. Krolkowski, S.J., Loyola University of Chicago

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The Talbot Hotel
20 E. Delaware Place
Chicago, IL 60611

312-944-4970 (Within Illinois)
800-621-8506 (Outside Illinois)

Single or Double: $85
The Allerton Hotel
701 N. Michigan Avenue
Chicago, IL 60611

312-440-1500 (Within Illinois)
800-621-8311 (Outside Illinois)

Single: $95
Double: $105

Deadline: Oct. 15
APPENDIX B. 1994 PROGRAM

MIDWEST
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION
SOCIETY

1994 Annual Meeting
November 11-12

John Dewey and Chicago:
A Centennial Celebration--
a special two-year
MPES celebration

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Water Tower Campus
"The New Building"
25 E. Pearson Street
Chicago, IL 60611

Host: School of Education
Robert E. Roemer, Dean

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11, 1994

12:00 Registration
"The New Building," Rubloff Auditorium

12:40pm Rise & Fall of Philosophy of Education
Chair: Philip Smith, Ohio State University

*The Educator's Quest for Philosophy*
Tony Johnson, University of North Carolina--Greensboro

*Philosophy of Education in the Post-Analytic Period*
Jerome Popp, Southern Illinois University--Edwardsville
1:40pm  John Dewey--Politics & Process
Chair: Lawrence Dennis, Southern Illinois University--Carbondale

Dewey, the Commission of Inquiry, & Leon Trotsky
William Russell, Merrimack College, MA
Physiological Basis for the Pragmatic Process of Learning
George W. Stickel, Cobb County Schools, Georgia

2:30pm  Pluralism & Philosophy of Education
Chair: Janis Fine, Loyola University of Chicago

African-American Philosophy of Education:
An Overview:
   Bartley L. McSwine, Chicago State University
On Robert S. Abbott
   Charlesetta M. Ellis, Chicago State University
On W.E.B. DuBois
   Alexander Makedon, Chicago State University

3:45pm  Break

4:00pm  Pluralism Continued

Is Nothing Sacred?: Public Universities as Secular Institutions
Richard C. Pipan, Oakland University

4:25pm  On Charles Sanders Peirce
Chair: George W. Stickel, Cobb County Schools, Georgia

Agapism Applied
   Mala Preast, Kennesaw State College
   STUDENT AWARD WINNER
Using Visual Arts as a Tool for the Instruction of Adults
   Debbie Smith-Shank, Northern Illinois University
Using Abductive Reasoning in Educational Research: Peirce's 10
   Classes of Signs
   Gary Shank, Northern Illinois University

5:30pm  Business Meeting

6:30pm  Banquet (See back of brochure.)
8:00pm  Presidential Address  
*Failure, Philosophy of Education and the Music of the Spheres*  
David B. Owen, Iowa State University  
*Response*  
Lawrence Dennis, Southern Illinois University

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1994  
"The New Building," Rubloff Auditorium

8:00am  Naturalism, Ethics, & Reform  
Chair: Byron Radebaugh, Northern Illinois University

*Economic Development & Educational Reform at a Midwestern University*  
George A. Kizer, Emeritus, Iowa State University  
*On Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue*  
Joseph Yacoub, Whiting, Indiana  
*Anthropocentrism or Non-Anthropocentrism: The Irrelevant Debate*  
Huey-li Li, Champaign, Illinois  
*Teaching and the Human Possibility*  
Louis Silverstein, Columbia College  
*Peace Education: A Modern Educational Reform*  
Ian M. Harris, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

10:05am  Break

10:20am  The Impact of Catholic Values and Education  
Chair: Walter Krolikowski. S.J., Loyola University of Chicago

*Roman Catholic Values Statements Affecting American Catholic Education*  
Michael T. Risku, University of Minnesota-Morris  
*The Educational Theory of Thomas Merton*  
Robert P. Craig, University of Houston
11:10am Creativity & Choice
Chair: Peter Collins, Marquette University

Creativity: Are We Doing Enough?
David B. Annis, Ball State University
The Place of Neutrality in the Confident School
Jon Fennell, Hillsdale College

12:00 N Dewey, Literature, and the Collected Works
Chair: Craig Schley, Harrison Township, Michigan

Dewey's Theory of Experience at the Heart of Literature
Sonja Darlington, Beloit College
Philip L. Smith, Ohio State University

12:50pm Adjournment

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Sat., $115

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Chicago, IL 60611
312-440-1500 (Within Illinois)
800-621-8311 (Outside Illinois)

Single or Double (Thur.-Sat.):  $95

Deadline: Oct. 15

BANQUET: 6:30 P.M. @ Armandos

The banquet will cost $17.00 and can be paid during registration. Please reserve a banquet seat by calling or sending a note requesting a reservation by November 1 to:

George W. Stickel
2130 Shillings Chase Court
Kennesaw, GA 30144

404-419-1006 call (after 6:00 Eastern time)

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Walter P. Krolikowski, S.J., Loyola University of Chicago
Friederika Kaider, Loyola University of Chicago
Title: Proceedings of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society 1993-1994
Author(s): Stickel, George W. and Owen, David B. (Editors)
Corporate Source (if appropriate): Midwest Philosophy of Education Society
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