For over a decade, Latino immigrants, especially those of Mexican origin, have been at the heart of the immigration debate and have borne the brunt of conservative populism. Contributing factors to the public reaction to immigrants in general and Latinos specifically include the sheer size of recent immigration, the increasing prevalence of Latinos in the work force, and the geographic concentration of Latinos in certain areas of the country. Based on a conference held at the Julian Samora Institute (Michigan) in April 1995, this book is organized around two main themes. The first discusses patterns of immigration and describes several immigrant communities in the United States; the second looks in depth at immigration issues, including economic impacts, employment, and provision of education and other services to immigrants. Papers and commentaries are: (1) "Introductory Statement" (Steven J. Gold); (2) "Immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean: A Socioeconomic Profile" (Ruben G. Rumbaut); (3) "Discrimination and Conflict: Minority Status and the Latino Community in the United States" (Juan L. Gonzales Jr.); (4) "The Demography of Mexicans in the Midwest" (Rogelio Saenz); (5) "Historical Foundations of Latino Immigration and Community Formation in 20th-Century Michigan and the Midwest" (Dennis Nodin Valdes); (6) "Islanders in the States: A Comparative Account" (Sherri Grasmuck, Ramon Grosfoguel); (7) "Emerging Latino Populations in Rural New York" (Enrique E. Figueroa); (8) "Immigration to the United States: Journey to an Uncertain Destination" (Philip Martin); (9) "Borders and Immigration: Recasting Definitions" (Scott Whiteford); (10) "Mexico-to-U.S. Migration and Rural Mexico: A Village Economywide Perspective" (J. Edward Taylor); (11) "Job Competition Reassessed: Regional and Community Impacts from Los Angeles" (Abel Valenzuela Jr.); (12) "The Social Organization of Day-Laborers in Los Angeles" (Daniel Melero Malpica); (13) "Unpacking 187: Targeting Mejicanas" (Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo); (14) "Proposition 187 and Its Aftermath: Will the Tidal Wave Continue?" (Adela de la Torre); (15) "All Was Not Lost: The Political Victories of Mexican Immigrants in Guadalupe, California" (Victor Garcia); (16) "Other Important Points" (Enrique Figueroa); (17) "What Is
Needed? More Interdisciplinary Work Drawing on the Humanities" (Denise Segura); and (18) "The Different Faces and Dimensions of Immigration: A View from Midwest Reality" (Manuel Chavez). Most papers contain references and author profiles. (SV)
IMMIGRATION AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES:

A FOCUS ON LATINOS

EDITED BY
Refugio I. Rochín
Dedication to Dr. Julian Samora  
March 1, 1920 to February 2, 1996

The Julian Samora Research Institute dedicates this, its first book, to Dr. Julian Samora, a name synonymous with leadership in Latino research. As professor of sociology at Michigan State University and then at the University of Notre Dame, Dr. Samora firmly established Mexican-American studies as an area of specialization. A distinguished teacher, as well as scholar, he mentored more than 50 Latino students in history, law, anthropology, and sociology.

Professor Samora co-founded the National Council of La Raza, one of the leading Hispanic organizations in the country, and served on many governmental and private boards and commissions, including the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the National Institute of Mental Health, and the President's Commission on Rural Poverty. He edited *Nuestro, the International Migration Review*, and other journals. At Notre Dame, he directed the Mexican Border Studies Project, sponsored by the Ford Foundation. Among his many awards were the White House Hispanic Heritage Award (1985) and the Aguila Azteca (Aztec Eagle) medal (1991) which he received along with farm labor leader, Cesar Chavez, from Mexico's President Carlos Salinas de Gortari.

Growing up in Colorado, where he was born in 1920, Julian experienced considerable discrimination — because he was Mexican, the cast resigned when he got the lead in a high school play and, for the same reason, he lost the election as student body president by one vote, cast by his own roommate, who said he would not vote for a Mexican. He got a motel room in Fort Collins only because the manager thought he was from India. Yet fueled by an intense pride in his heritage, raw-instincts for human equality, and a drive to learn, Samora completed the M.S. degree in 1947 and earned a Ph.D. degree in Sociology from Washington University, St. Louis, in 1953. Early in his career in the field of medical sociology, Dr. Samora studied the implications of traditional folk medicine upon modern clinical medicine and explored the correlation between ethnicity and the delivery of health services. Later, his professional efforts focused on making the dominant Anglo society aware of the national importance of Spanish-speaking people through his articles, reports, and books, including the *National Study of the Spanish Speaking People* for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights and *La Raza: Forgotten Americans and Mexican-Americans in the Southwest*.

In 1971, Dr. Samora received a Ford Foundation grant “to produce scholars and scholarly materials in the field of Mexican-American Studies.” Under his mentorship, his students wrote about social linguistics, the Mexican-American family, the history of mutual aid societies, the Mexican-American experience in the Midwest, drug use among Mexican-American youth, and attitudes among Mexican-American children. But it was his study of immigration that constituted his most pathbreaking research. With Gilberto Cardenas' and Jorge Bustamante, Samora wrote on undocumented Mexican migration to the United States — *Los Mojados: The Wetback Story.* This award-winning book has clearly stood the test of time, as it continues to provide insight on an important issue.

Julian Samora endorsed *Immigration and Ethnic Communities: A Focus on Latinos* as a new benchmark to that classic book, published exactly 25 years before. In the interim, he, a first generation Mexican-American, fostered many in the next generation of Mexican-American scholars. His bold leadership, great foresight, and pioneering wisdom advanced the ethnic dimensions of inquiry. Thus, on behalf of all the participants in the development of this book and of the supporters, faculty, and staff of the Julian Samora Research Institute, we dedicate *Immigration and Ethnic Communities: A Focus on Latinos* to Dr. Julian Samora. We will miss him and his supportive mentoring. Long live Julian Samora's legacy.

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1 Professor of Sociology, University of Texas, Austin.  
2 President of Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Mexico.
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I wish to acknowledge the contributions of a number of people who helped in important ways on the conference which resulted in this book, the first for the Julian Samora Research Institute. Lucinda Briones and Rosemary Aponte worked long hours and ably handled all the correspondence, made the travel arrangements, and prepared the facilities for the conference. The advisory group suggested the title: Immigration and Ethnic Communities, A Focus on Latinos, the breakdown of themes, and the structure of the presentations. The group also provided the enthusiasm leading to an outstanding conference.

On the Michigan State University advisory group and also moderating the several sessions were Tom Carroll, director of the Center for the Advanced Study of International Development; Tom Reardon, professor in agricultural economics; Ken Waltzer, professor at the James Madison College; Steve Gold, professor in sociology; and Scott Whiteford, director of the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies. Also serving on the conference advisory group were Manuel Chavez, assistant director of the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies and adjunct professor in resource development; Marcelo Siles, research associate at the Julian Samora Research Institute; Rosemary Aponte, assistant director of the JSRI; Lucinda Briones, administrative assistant at JSRI and coordinator of the conference. I served as chair of the advisory group.

I also wish to thank Lou Anna K. Simon, provost of Michigan State University; Kenneth Corey, dean of the College of Social Science; and Fred Poston, dean of the College of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Without their continued support, this conference would have been a dream, not a reality.

Nora Chapa Mendoza created the artwork that was used on the poster announcing the conference and the conference brochure cover, as well as our cover for the book. Special thanks to Carole Frank Nuckton who as technical editor of the conference proceedings enhanced all the papers in many ways. Also to Danny Layne for his finishing touches to the entire text.

Refugio I. Rochin, Director,
Julian Samora Research Institute
Preface
Refugio I. Rochín and Rosemary Aponte

For more than a decade, Hispanic Americans have been embroiled in a social revolution of major proportions. Like all revolutions, there has been a mix of promise and peril — unmeasurable social costs along with a few benefits. In the current stage, drastic changes are taking place in the lives of Hispanics, with Latino immigrants being the most severely affected. For years now, Latino immigrants, especially those of Mexican origin, have borne the brunt of conservative populism — i.e., the outrage expressed by politicians, local leaders, talk show hosts, and, in essence, a significant part of the white middle class. U.S. society is now peopled by those who feel resentment, anger, and even hate against Latinos.

Clearly, California’s Proposition 187 is a sign of the times. Its blunt message requires state and local agencies to report to California’s attorney general and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service any persons suspected of being illegal aliens, making them ineligible for various public services, including health care (unless emergency under federal law) and public school education at elementary, secondary, and post-secondary levels.

Fueling the immigration debate are new numbers from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, The Foreign-Born Population: 1994 showing that immigrants now constitute 8.7 percent of the U.S. population, the greatest share since before World War II. One-fifth of them have come in the last five years and one-fourth of these are from Mexico. By far, the largest group among the foreign-born is from Mexico — 6.2 million persons in 1994.

Still, the U.S. attitudinal climate about immigration is mixed. Figueroa points out that the more conservative Wall Street Journal frequently discusses the continuing merits of being a nation of immigrants, while the more liberal New York Times tends to oppose increased entry (see box). The result is a lot of confusion, misunderstanding, and emotional reaction.

As an example, consider a recent ABC national television report about the Latino presence in Allenstown, Pennsylvania (about 15 percent of the town’s population), where local whites were seen talking about making Latinos return to their own country: “If they like their culture so much, why don’t they stay home or go back to their own countries?” These simple, middle class whites seemed outraged that Latinos would continue to speak Spanish, play Latino music, and make up a significant share of public school enrollment. However, what these whites apparently did not realize is that these Latinos were mostly U.S. citizens of Puerto Rican ancestry!

Strange Bedfellows
Enrique Figueroa

It is very important to recognize the importance of the national media’s effect on the public’s perception of immigrants and immigration policy. Yet, the views presented in the press are often not what you would expect. I refer to an article (April 26, 1995) in the traditionally conservative Wall Street Journal, almost condoning immigration and another (April 16, 1995) in the more liberal New York Times opposing it.

The WSJ article presents the immigration issue in a historical sense and states that the current wave of immigrants, as well as the public’s concern about them, is not much different from what has occurred in the past, i.e., with the Germans, the Irish, and so on. Current conditions are not sufficiently different from past situations to warrant a “closing the borders” rhetoric. Nor should public policy be formulated on such a mentality.

The NYT article reports how elderly immigrants are receiving federal dollars — Supplemental Security Income — and how these non-citizen receipts are increasing faster than those of citizen recipients.

Thus, we find strange bedfellows — within the total U.S. population as well as within the Latino community — when discussing and formulating national immigration policy.

Before turning to the book itself and to open the discussion, let us mention three basic contributing factors to the public reaction to immigrants in general and Latinos specifically:

First, is the sheer size of the movement of people to the United States. The nation is experiencing a rapid socio-demographic transformation of immense magnitude. A major development of the 1980s was the phenomenal growth in the size and influence of Latinos who added more to the population than all other minorities combined. These Latinos are having a major impact on the ethnic, socioeconomic, and demographic features of the U.S. population.

The second, and perhaps the most noticeable development, is the increasing prevalence of Latinos in the work force. The relative slow-down of young Anglo workers competing for jobs combined with the early retirement of white senior citizens, has meant that Latinos have gained important footholds in several lines of employment in many places in the United States. During the first half of the 1980s, immigration from Mexico surged as its economy experienced the worst economic downturn since the 1930s. The U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act played a part in the increased Latino labor force participation with its amnesty provisions and flawed "Special Agricultural Workers" program.

The third factor is the geographic concentration of Latinos in certain sections of the country. In California, for example, there were over 110 communities in which Latino populations constituted from 50 to 98 percent of the population in 1990. Texas, too, had more than 100 communities whose majority was Latino. Thus, the greatest impact of the recent immigration surge has been felt by a few states — California, Texas, Florida, New York, and Illinois — and certain metropolitan areas — Los Angeles, Dallas/San Antonio, Miami, New York City, and Chicago. As concentration increases, both the median income and the average age of Latinos (except Cubans) decreases below those indicators for other population groups.

To help sort out the complex immigration issue and to inform the debate, we at the Julian Samora Research Institute offer this volume, dedicated to Dr. Julian Samora, a pioneer in Mexican American studies and Latino immigration and settlement.

Latinos in the Midwest

An unusual feature of this book is the inclusion of important information on Latino settlement in the Midwest1 where, during the 1980s, for every white person who moved out, more than two minorities moved in. Specifically, from 1980 to 1990, the white population declined in the Midwest by 330,000, while Latinos, primarily Mexican immigrants coming to the Chicago area, accounted for 56 percent of the Midwest's population increase of more than 800,000. Numbers of Puerto Ricans, Cubans, and Central and South Americans also increased. Thus, the conventional view that the Midwest's population is mostly black and white needs changing. Meanwhile, the social and economic consequences of Latino settlers in the Midwest are still unfolding.2

The Midwest, once the last frontier of Latino settlement, now accounts for 8 percent of the U.S. Hispanic population, exceeding 2 million and growing faster than the rest of the region's population. The change is most pronounced in Illinois and Michigan, whose combined Hispanic population grew by 300,000, while the non-Hispanic declined by 270,000. In Cook County public schools, Latino students increased from about 12 percent in 1980 to almost 20 percent in 1990. In Chicago schools, Latino students now account for 30 percent of the enrollment, up from 10 percent in 1970.

Although midwestern Latinos, aged 25 and older, trail both whites and blacks in educational achievement, according to 1990 census data, a greater share of Latinos is in the work force: roughly four in five midwestern Latino men were working or looking for work in 1990, compared to about two-thirds of black men and three-fourths of white men; almost 60 percent of Latino women were in the work force in 1990, compared to 57 percent of white and black women. Nonetheless, Latino median family income was $26,000 in 1990, compared to a white median of $30,000, while one in five Latinos was in poverty, compared to one in ten of whites.

1In this book, see papers especially by Saenz, Valdés, and Chavez.
2See the Julian Samora Research Institute Research Report No. 5, 1994, where Robert Aponte and Marcelo Siles describe Latino settlement in the Midwest.
This book, based on a conference held at the Julian Samora Research Institute on April 28, 1995, is organized around two main themes — the first discusses patterns of immigration and describes several immigrant communities in the United States; the second looks in depth at immigration issues, including economic and political matters.

In the first section, Immigration Patterns and Immigrant Communities, Rumbaut and Gonzales set the stage with detailed statistics about the immigrant and foreign-born population in the United States. Saenz looks at Mexican settlement patterns in the Midwest. Valdes also describes Latino immigration and community formation in the Midwest, particularly Michigan. Grasmuck and Grosfoguel trace the Caribbean islanders’ journeys to the United States and compare their relative success by time of entry and place of destination, with a special focus on the divergent economic fates of New York’s several immigrant groups. Figueroa reports that, despite a lack of good documentation of the numbers, Latinos, in fact, constitute a sizeable population in rural New York (and other places in rural America) where seasonal agricultural workers live a good share of the year.

In the second section, a group of authors considers in depth, Immigration Issues, Economics, and Politics. Martin describes immigration as a policy issue with views ranging on an advocacy spectrum between complete immigrant assimilation into the American culture and a multicultural, separatist society. Whiteford discusses the meaning of “border” and how it changes depending on whether the movement is of water, people, pollution, or goods. Taylor studies the strong, economic life line tying Mexican villages to U.S. locales, strung by migrants going out, knotted by remittances flowing back. Valenzuela delves deeply into the myth of job competition and finds that, contrary to common belief, immigrants can re-vitalize their communities economically as they become entrepreneurs, replacement workers, and consumers. Malpica offers a fascinating story of day-laborers hired from street-corner sites.

Immigration as a political issue is described by de la Torre as she analyzes California’s Proposition 187. Hondagneu-Sotelo describes how the anti-immigrant narrative shifts, varying in emphasis over time from fears about job competition, to worries about cultural differences that threaten the fabric of society, to the current focus on immigrants draining the public coffers fed by taxpayers. She sees California’s Proposition 187 as exemplifying the narrative switch to one of draining resources and one that especially targets Mexican women and children. Garcia reveals a gradual increase in Latino political clout through a case study of Guadalupe, California.

On a final note, three authors, Figueroa, Segura, and Chavez, summarize, mention some immigration matters that were not discussed, and indicate some future directions for the policy debate.
Because of the large number of Latinos who have arrived in the United States in recent years, social scientists, journalists and community leaders are having to come to grips with the whole immigrant issue. What is the economic fate of immigrant Latinos? What resources and experiences are associated with various nationality groups — Mexicans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans, Central Americans, others? Do Latinos who settle in different regions of the country, even different neighborhoods within a given city, and seek jobs in different industries, experience distinct patterns of economic incorporation? To what extent do immigrants shape their own economic fate by becoming entrepreneurs, participating in networks, or organizing labor markets? And what is their impact on the host society? How are they regarded by employers and established workers?

These conference proceedings provide a rich, broad-based, and timely investigation of Latinos' economic adjustment to the United States. Further, the researcher-authors help us reframe these basic questions. The papers demonstrate that, given the diversity of Latino immigrant groups, as well as the many contexts of their settlement, no simple answers are available. Instead, particular groups and particular settings must be considered in detail.

Several of the papers reveal the great energy, persistence and creativity brought by job-seeking Latinos who, despite their rather limited resources, are able to collectively organize their work lives in such a way as to support themselves and contribute to their own communities and even the larger society in a manner little discussed in the mass media.

However, immigrants' ingenuity notwithstanding, many of the reports suggest the degree of exploitation and conflict that Latino migrants face. In addition, the authors show that as the United States becomes an increasingly diverse society, migrants' contacts and conflicts are no longer limited to their relations with white Americans. Instead, Latino migrants now also interact in various ways with Blacks, Asians and other Latino groups.

Finally, we recognize that Latino workers are stereotyped by employers, who emphasize their positive labor market characteristics (docility, willingness to accept low wages, and lack of union activism). At the same time, however, because of these employer beliefs, Latino workers become prime candidates for exploitation, as well as targets of hostile accusations by native workers, tabloid journalists and cynical politicians.

As a brief introduction to this volume: The papers provide a wealth of information about the economic incorporation of Latinos in the United States. In addition, they remind us of the complexity involved when assessing such a massive and diverse social phenomena as the experience of Latinos in the United States.
Contemporary immigration to the United States and the formation of new ethnic groups are the complex and unintended social consequences of the expansion of the nation to its post-World War II position of global hegemony. Immigrant communities in the United States today are related to a history of American military, political, economic, and cultural involvement and intervention in the sending countries, especially in Asia and the Caribbean Basin, and to the linkages that are formed in the process that open a variety of legal and illegal migration pathways. The 19.8 million foreign-born persons counted in the 1990 U.S. census formed the largest immigrant population in the world, though in relative terms, only 7.9 percent of the U.S. population was foreign-born, a lower proportion than earlier in this century. Today's immigrants are extraordinarily diverse, a reflection of polar-opposite types of migrations embedded in very different historical and structural contexts. Also, unlike the expanding economy that absorbed earlier flows from Europe, since the 1970s new immigrants have entered an "hourglass" economy with reduced opportunities for social mobility, particularly among the less educated. New waves of refugees are entering a welfare state with expanded opportunities for public assistance. (Rumbaut 1994a).

This chapter seeks to make sense of the new diversity, with a focus on immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean. Some key facts and figures about contemporary immigrants are presented, looking at their patterns of settlement and comparing their distinctive social and economic characteristics to major U.S. racial-ethnic groups. Their differing modes of incorporation in — and consequences for — American society are the subject matter of more extensive articles by the author (see selected references below).

The information is conveyed in four detailed tables, drawn from the 1990 U.S. Census of Population. Each table is designed to address separate, but interrelated, issues of today's Latino population:
- Patterns of settlement of the U.S. Hispanic population,
- A socioeconomic portrait of major U.S. ethnic groups, and
- A socioeconomic portrait of Latin American and Caribbean immigrant groups in the United States today.

Of the 249 million people counted by the 1990 U.S. census, there were 22.4 million Hispanics constituting 9 percent of the U.S. population — up 53 percent from 14.6 million in 1980. The sharp increase in the Hispanic population has been largely due to recent and rapidly growing immigration from Latin America and the Caribbean, making Latinos the largest immigrant population in the country. Only Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia have larger Spanish-origin populations than the United States. If current trends continue, and there is every reason to believe they will, the number of Hispanics in the United States will surpass African Americans sometime in the next decade.

As detailed in Table 1, nearly three out of four Hispanics in the United States reside in just four states — California (with over a third of the total), Texas (nearly one fifth), New York and Florida (combined for one sixth). By contrast, less than one-third of the total U.S. population resides in those states. Indeed, Hispanics now account for more than 25 percent of the populations of California and Texas.

The terms Hispanic and Latino are used here interchangeably, solely in the interest of narrative efficiency, but without enthusiasm for either. They are recent official and unofficial neologisms, respectively, that seek to lump together millions of U.S. residents, immigrants or not, who trace their ancestry to the Spanish-speaking societies of "Latin" America (a term, itself in many ways a misnomer, promoted by the French during their stint of imperial control over Mexico in the 19th Century). The vast region thus labeled encompasses extraordinarily diverse peoples from many countries whose histories are obliterated when they are forced into a one-size-fits-all panethnic category; and the vast majority of people labeled Hispanic or Latino in the United States do not, in fact, identify themselves by either of these supernational terms. Today's polemics about the "politically correct" usage of "Latino" or "Hispanic" ignore the more fundamental point that such labels are historically and empirically incorrect.
Ruben G. Rumbaut

Patterns of concentration are more pronounced for specific groups: Three-fourths of all Mexican-Americans are in California and Texas, half of the Puerto Ricans are in the New York-New Jersey area, and two-thirds of the Cubans are in Florida. Significant numbers of Mexican-Americans and Puerto Ricans are also in Illinois, mostly in Chicago.

The category "Other Hispanic" used by the census includes both long-established groups who trace their roots to the region prior to the annexation of the Southwest after the U.S.-Mexico War and recent immigrants from Central/South America and the Spanish Caribbean. The older group predominates in New Mexico where Hispanics account for more than 38 percent of the population despite relatively little recent immigration. About one-quarter of the recent "Other Hispanic" immigrants came to California, another quarter to New York-New Jersey, and about one-tenth to Florida.

These patterns of concentration are more pronounced in metropolitan areas within states, and, in particular, communities within metropolitan areas. Table 1 lists the 13 U.S. counties with the largest Hispanic concentration. In 1990, there were 3.4 million in Los Angeles County alone, presenting 15 percent of the national Hispanic population and 38 percent of the total population of Los Angeles. Three other adjacent areas in Southern California — Orange, San Diego and San Bernardino counties — experienced the highest rates of Hispanic population growth over the past decade and, combined with Los Angeles, account for 22 percent of the U.S. total.

Nearly 8 percent of the total Hispanic population resides in four boroughs of New York City — the Bronx, Brooklyn, Manhattan and Queens. Half of the populations of Dade County (Miami) and Bexar County (San Antonio) are Hispanic — principally of Cuban and Mexican origin, respectively. Over two-thirds of the population of El Paso (on the Mexican border) and nearly one-quarter of Harris County (Houston) are Hispanic.

Today, the Mexican-origin population of Los Angeles is exceeded only by Mexico City, Guadalajara, and Monterrey; Havana is the only city in Cuba larger than Cuban Miami; San Salvador and Santo Domingo are only slightly larger than Salvadoran Los Angeles and Dominican New York; and there are twice as many Puerto Ricans in New York City than in the capital of Puerto Rico, San Juan.

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Immigration Patterns and Immigrant Communities
Socioeconomic Characteristics of U.S. Hispanics and Non-Hispanics

About 60 percent of all U.S. Hispanics are of Mexican origin (13.5 million), while 12 percent are Puerto Ricans (2.7 million on the mainland, not counting the 3.5 million in Puerto Rico), making them the nation's second and third largest ethnic minority after African Americans (29 million). By comparison, only four other groups had populations in 1990 above one million: American Indians; Chinese — the nation's oldest and most diversified Asian-origin minority, originally recruited as laborers to California in the mid-19th century until their exclusion in 1882; Filipinos — colonized by the United States in the first half of the 20th century; also recruited to work in plantations in Hawaii and California until the 1930s; and Cubans — who account for 5 percent of all Hispanics and whose immigration is tied closely to the history of U.S.-Cuban relations.

Except for the oldest group, the American Indians, and the newest, the Cubans, the original incorporation was through labor importation. What is more, while the histories of each group took complex and diverse forms, the four largest ethnic minorities in the country — African Americans, Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and American-Indians — are peoples whose incorporation originated largely involuntarily through conquest, occupation, and exploitation. In the case of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, the experience was followed by mass immigration during the 20th century, much of it initiated by active labor recruitment by U.S. companies, setting the foundation for subsequent patterns of social and economic inequality. These backgrounds are reflected in the socioeconomic profiles presented in Table 2 for all the major U.S. racial-ethnic groups. Note that the next three largest groups — the Chinese, Filipinos and Cubans — are today largely composed of immigrants who came to the United States since the 1960s, building on structural linkages established much earlier.

While today's immigrants come from over 100 different countries, the majority come from two sets of developing countries located either in the Caribbean Basin or in Asia, all variously characterized by significant historical ties to the United States. One set includes Mexico (still by far the largest source of both legal and illegal immigration), Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Haiti, with El Salvador and Guatemala emerging prominently as source countries for the first time during the 1980s. The other includes the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, and India. In each set, historical relationships with the United States have variously given rise to particular social networks of family and friends that over time serve as bridges of passage to the United States, linking places of origin with places of destination, opening "chain migration" channels, and giving the process of immigration its cumulative, and seemingly spontaneous, character. Many factors — economic, political, cultural, geographic, demographic — come together in particular historical contexts to explain contemporary immigration and socioeconomic incorporation of each group into the United States.

Hispanics differ sharply not only from non-Hispanics, but also among themselves, in terms of education, occupation, poverty, public assistance, per capita income, and family type. In Table 2, the major Hispanic and non-Hispanic racial-ethnic groups in the United States include both the foreign-born and the native-born without breakdown by birth. Of the 13.5 million persons of Mexican origin in the United States, two-thirds are U.S.-born; one-third are immigrants. The rest of the report will focus on the characteristics of only the foreign-born.

Immigrants in the United States Today

Table 3 provides a comparative portrait of the foreign-born population of the United States. The 19.8 million persons represent the largest immigrant population in the world. Immigrants constitute 8 percent of the total U.S. population, but this is a much lower proportion than at the turn of the century.

Table 3 also presents information on the decade of immigration, the proportion of immigrants who became U.S. citizens, and the states of principal settlement, broken down by world region and for all of the major sending countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, ordered by size of immigrant group. Latin America and the Caribbean alone accounted for nearly 43 percent of the foreign-born persons in the United States in 1990 (8.4 million), fully half of them came during the 1980s. As a result, for
the first time in U.S. history, Latin American and Caribbean peoples comprise the largest immigrant population in the country.

In 1990, there were also more U.S. residents who were born in Asia than in Europe. The greatest proportions of both Latinos and Asians settled in California (Table 3).

Also shown in Table 3, the number of Asian and African immigrants more than doubled during the last decade. In fact, over four-fifths of their 1990 foreign-born populations arrived since 1970, after the 1965 Immigration Act abolished racist national-origins quotas that largely excluded non-Europeans from the Eastern Hemisphere.

In sharp contrast, Europeans and Canadians counted in the 1990 census consisted largely of older people who had immigrated well before 1960. Their immigration patterns reflect a declining trend over the past three decades.

Mexico’s 1990 immigrant population in the United States (4.3 million) accounted for half of all immigrants from Latin America and the Caribbean, and indeed for nearly one quarter of the entire foreign-born U.S. population. Over 2 million of these Mexican immigrants were formerly undocumented immigrants whose status was legalized under the amnesty provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986.

The Cuban-born population in 1990 (737,000) was the next largest immigrant group, and the only one that arrived preponderantly during the 1960s. The number of Cubans arriving during the 1980s (including the 125,000 who came in the 1980 Mariel boatlift) was surpassed by the Salvadoran, Dominicans, Jamaicans, and Guatemalans. Among these last-mentioned groups, many entered illegally after the 1981 date required to qualify for the amnesty provisions of IRCA.

Among South Americans, the largest group came from Colombia, although significant numbers of Ecuadorians and Peruvians also came during the 1980s. The largest percentage increase

---

**Table 2. Size, Nativity and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Principal Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Racial-Ethnic Groups in the United States, 1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Racial-ethnic Groups</th>
<th>Number of Persons</th>
<th>Nativity</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Family Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>% Foreign Born</td>
<td>% College Graduates</td>
<td>% Upper White Collar</td>
<td>% Lower Blue Collar</td>
<td>Poverty Rate %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hispanic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>13,495,938</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>2,727,754</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>1,043,932</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran</td>
<td>565,081</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>520,151</td>
<td>70.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Hispanic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>188,128,296</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>29,216,293</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian &amp; Pacific Islander</td>
<td>6,968,359</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>1,645,472</td>
<td>69.3</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>1,406,770</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>847,562</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian Indian</td>
<td>815,447</td>
<td>75.4</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>798,849</td>
<td>72.7</td>
<td>34.5</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>593,213</td>
<td>79.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>25.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islanders</td>
<td>365,024</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian, Eskimo, &amp; Aleut</td>
<td>1,793,773</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Population</strong></td>
<td>248,709,873</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a Education of persons 25 years and older.
*b Employed persons 16 years and older; "upper white collar" includes professionals, executives, and managers; "lower blue collar" includes operators, fabricators, and laborers.
*c Persons below the Federal poverty line; households receiving public assistance income.
*d Hispanics, as classified by the census, may be of any race.
*e Puerto Ricans and Pacific Islanders residing in the 50 U.S. states only.

since the 1970s was registered by the Guyanese. Indeed, the Guyanese share a common pattern with other English-speaking groups in the Commonwealth Caribbean (Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, and Belize): The percentage of immigrants from these countries relative to their 1990 homeland populations is very high, most reaching double-digits.

Table 3 also provides data on the percentage of each group who had become U.S. citizens by 1990. Those immigrant groups who have been in the United States the longest (Europeans and Canadians, most of whom came before the 1960s) had higher proportions of naturalized citizens than the more recent arrivals (Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans, most of whom came the 1980s). Among these latter groups, Latin Americans had the lowest proportion of naturalized citizens (27 percent), despite the fact that Asians and Africans had higher proportions of their foreign-born populations arriving in the 1980s (57 percent and 61 percent, respectively). Clearly, time in the United States is not a sufficient explanation for why various groups become U.S. citizens at different rates. But, along with higher numbers and greater concentrations, citizenship acquisition and effective political participation are at the heart of ethnic politics and are essential for any group to make itself heard in the larger society.

Among legal immigrants, research has shown that the motivation and propensity to naturalize is higher among younger persons with higher levels of education, occupational status, English proficiency, income, and property, and whose spouse or children are U.S. citizens. In fact, the combination of three variables alone — educational level, geographical proximity, and political origin of migration — largely explain differences in citizenship acquisition among immigrant groups. Meanwhile, undocumented immigrants, ineligible for citizenship, remain permanently disenfranchised.

A Socioeconomic Portrait of Principal Immigrant Groups

Table 4 extends this general picture with detailed 1990 census information on social and economic characteristics of immigrant groups, ranked in order of their proportion of college graduates (as a proxy for their social class origins). These data, which are compared against the norms for the total U.S.-born population, reveal the extraordinary socioeconomic diversity of U.S. immigrants, in general, and of those from the Americas, in particular.

A first point that stands out in Table 4 is the high proportion of African and Asian immigrants who are college graduates (47 and 38 percent, respectively) and who have upper-white collar occupations (37 and 32 percent) — well above the U.S. averages for both.

Certain countries are well above their continental averages (while others are, of course, below). For example, over 90 percent of Indian immigrants in the late 1960s and early 1970s had professional and managerial occupations prior to immigration, as did four-fifths in the late 1970s and two-thirds in the 1980s, despite the fact that many of these immigrants were admitted under family reunification preferences. By the mid-1970s there were already more Filipino and Indian foreign medical graduates in the United States than there were American black physicians. By the mid-1980s, one-fifth of all engineering doctorates awarded by U.S. universities went to foreign-born students from Taiwan, India, and South Korea. By 1990, the U.S. census showed that the most highly educated groups in the United States were immigrants from India, Taiwan, and Nigeria. These data document a classic pattern of "brain drain" immigration; indeed, although they come from developing countries, these immigrants as a group are perhaps more skilled than ever before. These facts help explain the recent popularization of Asians as a "model minority" and debunk nativist calls for restricting immigrants to those perceived to be more "assimilable" on the basis of language and culture.

Canadians and Europeans, though high proportions of them are among the older resident groups (as reflected in their low rates of labor force participation and high naturalization rates), show levels of education slightly below the U.S. average, an occupational profile slightly above it, and lower poverty rates.

Latin Americans as a whole, by contrast, have high rates of labor force participation but well below-average levels of educational attainment, are concentrated in lower blue-collar employment (operators, fabricators and laborers), and exhibit higher poverty rates.
As in any of the continental groupings, a much different picture emerges when Latin America is broken down by national origin, rather than under a supranational rubric of “Hispanic” or “Latino.” Among Latin Americans, the highest socioeconomic status (SES) is attained by Venezuelans, Argentinians, Bolivians, and Chileans. That these nationals are among the smallest of the immigrant groups suggests that they consist substantially of highly skilled persons who entered under the occupational preferences of U.S. immigration law. Brazilians have also recently joined this higher status category. Mexicans, Salvadorans, Guatemalans, and Dominicans had the lowest SES — and constituted the largest groups of immigrants entering both legally and illegally in the 1980s.

Their socioeconomic characteristics approximate those of Puerto Ricans on the mainland (see Table 2), with Dominican immigrants’ poverty rate at 30.5 percent, approaching that of the Puerto Ricans’ 31.7 percent (and that of the total Dominican U.S. population at 33 percent). Hondurans, Ecuadorians, and Nicaraguans also exhibited a much above average ratio of lower-blue-collar to upper-white collar employment, as did to a lesser extent Haitians and Colombians. Panamanians, Peruvians, Paraguayans, Uruguayans, and Cubans attained levels of education near the U.S. norm, and their occupational and income characteristics were also closer to the national average. Occupying an intermediate position were groups from the English-speaking Caribbean (Jamaica, Trinidad,

### Table 3. Size, Year of Immigration, U.S. Citizenship and Patterns of Concentration of Principal Immigrant Groups in the U.S. in 1990, by Region and Selected Latin American/Caribbean Countries of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region or Country of Birth</th>
<th># Foreign-Born Persons</th>
<th>Year of Immigration to the United States</th>
<th>Naturalized U.S. Citizen %</th>
<th>Principal States of Settlement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America/Caribbean</td>
<td>8,416,924</td>
<td>50 28 15 7</td>
<td>27 73</td>
<td>38.7 17.9 12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>4,979,037</td>
<td>57 29 9 5</td>
<td>41 59</td>
<td>40.2 15.7 2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4,350,403</td>
<td>20 13 9 48</td>
<td>64 36</td>
<td>15.4 27.2 6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>744,830</td>
<td>17 12 20 51</td>
<td>54 46</td>
<td>21.0 9.6 10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>363,819</td>
<td>61 28 7 4</td>
<td>34 66</td>
<td>18.1 22.2 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latin American &amp; Caribbean Spanish-Speaking Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>4,298,014</td>
<td>50 31 11 8</td>
<td>23 77</td>
<td>57.6 1.3 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>736,971</td>
<td>26 19 46 9</td>
<td>51 49</td>
<td>6.7 15.6 67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>485,433</td>
<td>76 19 4 1</td>
<td>15 85</td>
<td>60.3 10.5 21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>347,858</td>
<td>53 27 17 3</td>
<td>28 72</td>
<td>1.0 79.9 6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>286,124</td>
<td>52 27 18 3</td>
<td>29 71</td>
<td>10.7 43.0 23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>225,739</td>
<td>69 22 7 2</td>
<td>17 83</td>
<td>60.2 10.7 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>168,659</td>
<td>75 16 5 4</td>
<td>15 85</td>
<td>34.6 7.1 42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perú</td>
<td>144,199</td>
<td>60 22 13 5</td>
<td>27 73</td>
<td>26.1 23.2 16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>143,314</td>
<td>40 33 22 5</td>
<td>26 74</td>
<td>13.6 63.1 7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>108,923</td>
<td>64 19 12 5</td>
<td>26 74</td>
<td>24.0 25.2 19.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>92,563</td>
<td>39 24 28 9</td>
<td>44 56</td>
<td>29.1 27.6 14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>85,737</td>
<td>35 22 23 20</td>
<td>51 49</td>
<td>15.0 35.9 13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>55,681</td>
<td>37 39 16 8</td>
<td>33 67</td>
<td>26.1 23.2 16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>43,530</td>
<td>44 26 21 9</td>
<td>33 67</td>
<td>30.0 26.6 15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>42,119</td>
<td>67 15 12 6</td>
<td>23 77</td>
<td>13.3 19.5 33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>31,303</td>
<td>50 23 18 10</td>
<td>30 70</td>
<td>22.5 16.6 9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>20,766</td>
<td>38 38 19 5</td>
<td>38 62</td>
<td>13.2 46.7 13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>6,057</td>
<td>41 40 14 5</td>
<td>33 67</td>
<td>15.4 37.9 5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English-Speaking Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>334,140</td>
<td>47 33 15 5</td>
<td>38 62</td>
<td>3.4 50.2 22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guyana</td>
<td>120,698</td>
<td>63 27 8 2</td>
<td>40 60</td>
<td>3.5 75.6 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>115,710</td>
<td>38 37 22 3</td>
<td>32 68</td>
<td>4.9 59.6 10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>43,015</td>
<td>34 37 19 10</td>
<td>46 54</td>
<td>2.9 68.1 5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>29,957</td>
<td>32 33 31 4</td>
<td>35 65</td>
<td>44.8 25.2 5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahamas</td>
<td>21,633</td>
<td>39 32 8 21</td>
<td>33 67</td>
<td>2.1 12.5 66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other-Language Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>225,393</td>
<td>61 26 11 2</td>
<td>27 73</td>
<td>1.2 45.7 36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>82,489</td>
<td>56 15 18 11</td>
<td>24 76</td>
<td>15.8 27.9 11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Foreign-Born</strong></td>
<td>19,767,216</td>
<td>44 25 14 17</td>
<td>41 59</td>
<td>32.7 19.3 8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Native-Born</strong></td>
<td>228,942,557</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Barbados, Guyana), whose SES patterns are similar, but somewhat below U.S. norms.

Table 4 also shows the level of English language proficiency of the U.S. foreign-born population, by region and for all of the major Latin American and Caribbean immigrant groups. As a whole, both Latin American and Caribbean immigrants exhibit a much lower degree of English proficiency than Asians, Africans and Europeans. But among these Hispanic groups, there is as much diversity in their patterns of language competency as in their other socioeconomic characteristics. Nearly all immigrants from the Commonwealth Caribbean are English monolinguals (a much higher proportion than even Canadians). Among all other Latinos, Panamanians, the oldest resident immigrant group from Latin America (Table 3), were the most proficient in English (over one-fourth were English monolinguals), followed by immigrants from Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile (the highest-SES groups from Latin America). The least proficient, with approximately half reporting being unable to speak English well or at all, were immigrants from Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. Recall that these last-mentioned groups were among the largest immigrant cohorts of the 1980s, as well as the lowest-SES groups from Latin America.

In addition to education and time in the United States, age provides a key to English speaking proficiency (or the lack of it), as does residence within dense ethnic enclaves. For example, among Cuban refugees, whose median age is far higher than other immigrant groups from the Americas (about a third are over 60 years old), 40 percent reported speaking English not well or at all. On closer inspection, these older persons tend to reside in areas of high ethnic concentration, such as Miami.

Still, the data in Table 4 show that even among the most recently arrived groups, large proportions are able to speak English well or very well and that non-negligible proportions of the foreign-born speak English only. These facts notwithstanding, English language competency particularly among Hispanic immigrants in the United States — and their alleged Spanish “retentiveness” and “unwillingness” to assimilate — has become a highly charged sociopolitical issue, with nativist organizations warning about cultural “Balkanization” and Quebec-like linguistic separatism in regions of high Hispanic concentration. Such fears are wholly misplaced. English fluency not only increases over time in the United States for all immigrant groups, but English is also by far the preferred language of the second generation.

For children of immigrants, it is their mother tongue that atrophies over time, and quickly: The third generation typically grows up speaking English only. This historical pattern explains why the United States has been called a “language graveyard.” But such enforced linguistic homogeneity represents an enormous waste of cultural capital in an era of global competition, when the need for Americans who speak foreign languages fluently is increasingly important. Far from posing a social or cultural threat, the resources and opportunities opened up by fluent bilingualism in scattered communities throughout the United States enrich American society and the lives of natives and immigrants alike.

ERRATA: p. 6, Table 3 should be:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Immigration to the United States</th>
<th>1980s (%)</th>
<th>1970s (%)</th>
<th>1960s (%)</th>
<th>Pre-1960 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 In a child custody case in 1995, a Texas judge, Samuel C. Kiser, went so far as to characterize a Mexican immigrant mother’s use of Spanish at home with her five-year-old daughter as a form of child abuse that would “relegate the child to the position of housemaid.” See Sam Howe Verhoved, “Mother Scolded by Judge for Speaking in Spanish,” New York Times, August 30, 1995.
Table 4. English Proficiency and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Principal Immigrant Groups in the United States in 1990 in Order of Percentage of College Graduates, by Region and Selected Latin American/Caribbean Countries of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region of Birth</th>
<th># of Persons</th>
<th>% Speak English*</th>
<th>% Not Well or At All</th>
<th>% College Grads</th>
<th>% in Labor Force</th>
<th>% Upper-White Collar</th>
<th>% Lower-Blue Collar</th>
<th>% in Poverty</th>
<th>% 60 Years or Older</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Region:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>363,819</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>4,979,037</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe and Canada</td>
<td>5,095,233</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean</td>
<td>8,416,924</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>70.7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America and Caribbean: Spanish Speaking Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>42,119</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>92,563</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>31,303</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Chile</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>74.0</td>
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<td>Panama</td>
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<td>Paraguay</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>75.2</td>
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<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>20,766</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Cuba</td>
<td>736,971</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>Nicaragua</td>
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<td>41</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>71.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>28.4</td>
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<td>Dominican Republic</td>
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<td>Guatemala</td>
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<td>45</td>
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<td>75.9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26.0</td>
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<td>El Salvador</td>
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<td>Bahamas</td>
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<td>54.8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>23.6</td>
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<td>Guyana</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trinidad and Tobago</td>
<td>115,710</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>334,140</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbados</td>
<td>43,015</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Belize</td>
<td>29,957</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Language Countries</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>82,489</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>225,393</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Foreign-Born</td>
<td>19,767,316</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Native-Born</td>
<td>228,942,557</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*English proficiency of persons 5 years and older.
'High school graduation or higher of persons 25 years and older.
''Labor force participation and occupation for employed persons 16 years and older; "upper white collar" includes professionals, executives and managers; "lower blue collar" includes operators, fabricators, and laborers.
Peraconce of persons below the federal poverty line.

SIDEPOINT

ALEJANDRO PORTES AND RUBÉN G. RUMBAUT

Immigrant America today differs from that at the turn of the century. The human drama of the story remains as riveting, but the cast of characters and their circumstances have changed in complex ways. The newcomers are different, reflecting in their motives and origins the forces that have forged a new world order in the second half of this century. And the America that receives them is not the same society that processed the “huddled masses” through Ellis Island, a stone’s throw away from the nation’s preeminent national monument to liberty and new beginnings. As a result, theories that sought to explain the assimilation of yesterday’s immigrants are hard put to illuminate the nature of contemporary immigration.

Discrimination and Conflict: Minority Status and the Latino Community in the United States

Juan L. Gonzales, Jr.

This chapter focuses on sociological and demographic characteristics of Hispanics, especially Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Cubans, living in the United States. While Spanish-speaking groups share a common historical, linguistic, and cultural background, they differ in many respects, including their level of social adaptation and degree of assimilation. These characteristics are affected by: (1) their initial period of arrival in the United States, (2) the nature of their immigration experience, and (3) the structure and composition of the ethnic communities that they established in the United States.

Here we examine specific demographic characteristics of these three and other Latino groups to better understand how they are similar in some ways, yet different in others. The graphs and tables provide insight into the rate and level of assimilation of each of these groups into the fabric of American society.

"Hispanic" or "Latino"

The word Hispanic comes from the Latin word Hispania, designating residents of the Iberian Peninsula (Gimenez 1989). Since 1980, the official census designation of any person of Spanish origin or descent is Hispanic. Hence, the term Hispanic now includes (1) Mexicans, Mexican Americans, Chicanos; (2) Puerto Ricans; (3) Cubans; (4) Central and South Americans; and (5) other.

Many members of the Spanish-speaking community prefer the term Latino (or Latina for a female), as opposed to the census term Hispanic. "Latino" is a cultural-linguistic concept encompassing all groups in the Americas who share the Spanish language, culture, and traditions (Gimenez 1989, Padilla 1985).

Minorities in the United States

Out of a total U.S. population of 248,709,873 in 1993, there were 61,207,991 persons of recognized minority status, or one in four Americans. African Americans represent the largest minority group in the United States today, followed by Latinos, Asians, and Native Americans (Figure 1). The 22,354,059 Latinos (8.3 percent of the U.S. population) does not include the 3.4 million Puerto Ricans in Puerto Rico, but it does include an estimated 672,000 undocumented Latino aliens.

---

Figure 1. Minorities in the United States and percent of the Total Minority Population, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Total Latino</th>
<th>Total Asian</th>
<th>Native American</th>
<th>African American</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millions</td>
<td>22,354,059</td>
<td>6,908,638</td>
<td>1,959,234</td>
<td>29,986,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LATINOS IN THE UNITED STATES

Of the twenty-two million Latinos in the United States, Mexican Americans are by far the largest group at 13.5 million persons (Table 1). The second largest group is the Puerto Ricans, at 2.7 million, followed by the Cubans with about one million persons. All the rest number about five million and include immigrants from various Central and South American nations who have settled in the United States. The most populous of these other Latino groups are the Salvadorans and Dominicans (Schick and Schick 1991).

Table 1 shows that three in five of all Latinos are Mexicans or Mexican Americans. Slightly more than one in ten Latinos are Puerto Ricans, while only five in one hundred are Cubans.

### Table 1. U.S. Latino Population by Origin, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Population (1,000)</th>
<th>% of total Latinos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>13,496</td>
<td>61.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>2,728</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalan</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaraguan</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduran</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Central American</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuadorian</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peruvian</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentinean</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other South American</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaniard</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latino</td>
<td>1,403</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Latinos</td>
<td>22,070</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### DISTRIBUTION OF LATINOS BY STATE OF RESIDENCE

The largest concentration of Latinos occurs in the largest state in the nation, California (Table 2). One in three Latinos call California home, and more than four in five (85%) of these Latinos are Mexican Americans.

One in five Latinos lives in Texas where 90 percent are Mexican Americans. The third largest concentration is in New York which has a Latino population of almost two million. Three in five of the New York Latinos are Puerto Rican (Boswell 1985). The Latino population of Florida is 1.6 million and seven in ten of these Latinos are Cubans. Of these major settlement states, California experienced the most dramatic rate of growth in Latino population between 1980 and 1990 (166.3 percent), followed by Florida (151.3 percent), Texas (122.1 percent), and New York (102.8 percent).

### Table 2. U.S. Latino Geographic Distribution, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Population (1,000)</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>6,762,000</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>4,313,000</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>1,982,000</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>1,586,000</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>855,000</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>725,000</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>638,000</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>549,000</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>421,000</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other U.S.</td>
<td>2,245,000</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20,076,000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, proportionately to the total population, the state with the highest Latino representation is New Mexico, where almost four in ten residents are Latino. In comparison, one in four of California residents is Latino. In all states of major Latino concentration, both the number and proportional representation of Latinos increased between 1980 and 1990 (Table 3).

Table 3. Latinos as Percentage of Total Population, 1980 & 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>% in 1980</th>
<th>% in 1990</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevada</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>25.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>California</td>
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<td>25.8</td>
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<tr>
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<td>36.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CONCENTRATION OF LATINOS IN METROPOLITAN AREAS

In selected metropolitan areas, Los Angeles (with a population of 4.8 million) has, by far, the largest number of Latinos. New York has the second highest Latino population, followed by Miami and San Francisco (Table 4).

Considering Latino representation as a proportion of the total population of an area, however, the San Antonio metropolitan area exceeds all others, for over half the metropolitan area’s population is Latino. In Los Angeles, nearly three in ten residents are Latinos; Miami has the third highest proportional representation, followed by Houston, San Diego, and Phoenix (Garcia 1991).

Table 4. Latino Population in Selected Metro Areas, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metro Area</th>
<th>Population (1000)</th>
<th>% of Area’s Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phoenix</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Diego</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dallas/Ft. Worth</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Antonio</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>51.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>772</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>893</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco</td>
<td>970</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>2,778</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>4,780</td>
<td>29.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GROWTH RATE OF THE LATINO POPULATION

The rapid growth of the Latino population in the United States (shown in Figure 2) is attributed to their higher-than-average fertility rates and high rates of immigration (Gonzales 1992, Stroup-Benham and Trevino 1991). In 1950, there were only 4 million Latinos in the United States, but over the next decade, their population increased to 6.9 million. By 1970, the Latino population reached 9.1 million and their numbers continued increasing to 24.1 million in 1992. By the year 2000, Latinos will become the largest minority group in the United States, with an estimated population of 30.6 million. Their average growth rate is well above that of both the general U.S. population and African Americans (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1988).

As the size of the Latino population increases so does its proportional representation among the total U.S. population. In 1970, only 4.5 percent of the U.S. population was Latino; by 1990, the overall proportional representation had doubled to 9 percent. Projections are that by the turn of the century, slightly more than one in ten residents of the U.S. population will be Latino.

Figure 2. Latino Population Growth as a % of Total U.S. Population Middle Series Projections), 1970-2010


LATINO DIVERSITY IN THE UNITED STATES

From the outside, the U.S. Latino population may appear as one monolithic group, but in fact, it is very diverse and heterogeneous. As an example of this diversity, consider the many terms that have been used to describe Latinos, reflecting their differing historical and cultural experiences (some of these terms are listed in Table 5).

Table 5. Terms used to Refer to Latinos

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Spanish</th>
<th>English Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hispanos</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>Hispanic Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>Mexican Americans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Surname</td>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>Cholos/Cholas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Speaking</td>
<td>Mejicano</td>
<td>Mulattos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Origin</td>
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<td>Latino/Latina</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino/a Americano/a</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5, continued on next page
Historically, the Spanish-speaking people in New Mexico were called Hispanos or Hispano Americans. Latinos in Texas are sometimes called Tejanos; they refer to themselves as Latino Americans or Latin Americans, or as members of La Raza. Over the years, the U.S. Census has classified Latinos as Spanish Surname, Spanish Speaking, or Spanish Origin. Today, the census refers to Latinos as Hispanics.

Table 5, continued from previous page

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>La Raza</th>
<th>Latin Americans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Raza Cosmica</td>
<td>Pachucos/Pachuca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicano/Chicana</td>
<td>Pochos/Pochas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tejanos</td>
<td>Cuban/Cubanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Californios</td>
<td>Manitos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Españoles</td>
<td>Alambristas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mojados</td>
<td>Centro Americanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Ricans</td>
<td>Peninsulares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gente de Razon</td>
<td>Criollos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negros/Negras</td>
<td>Peones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indios/Indias</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6a. Latino Population of Los Angeles County, 1991

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peruvian</td>
<td>21,902</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuadorian</td>
<td>18,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombian</td>
<td>21,678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other South American</td>
<td>32,849</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran</td>
<td>253,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamanian</td>
<td>5,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaraguan</td>
<td>33,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduran</td>
<td>22,968</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalan</td>
<td>125,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Central American</td>
<td>12,776</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>2,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>47,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>41,048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Americans</td>
<td>2,519,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latino</td>
<td>147,383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Latinos</td>
<td>3,306,116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6b. Latino Population of San Francisco County, 1991

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salvadoran</td>
<td>17,979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panamanian</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaraguan</td>
<td>10,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduran</td>
<td>591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemalan</td>
<td>3,652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>1,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>4,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican Americans</td>
<td>38,326</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Immigration Patterns and Immigrant Communities
LATINO IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES

Between 1981 and 1990, a total of 7.3 million legal immigrants settled in the United States. Of this number almost half (47 percent) came from Latin American nations (Figure 3). The second largest source during this time period was the various Asian nations (37 percent). Meanwhile, only 10 percent came from Europe; 2 percent from Canada. Among the top sending nations, Mexico is, by far, the largest source (Table 7).

Of all foreign-born persons residing in the United States today, almost four in ten are Latinos. Accordingly, Spanish is the number one foreign language spoken in the United States. Of the slightly more than seven million foreign-born persons in the Latino community today, six in ten are from Mexico, one in seven is from Central America, and about one in ten is from South America or Cuba (Figure 4).

Table 7. Major Sources of U.S. Immigration 1991

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>948,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>68,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>46,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>42,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>42,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>39,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>25,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>23,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>19,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>14,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos</td>
<td>12,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>9,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 3. Legal Immigration by Area of Origin and Percentage of Total Immigration from Each Area, 1981-1990

Total number of legal immigrants, 1981-1990 = 7,338,000
Figure 4. Foreign-Born Persons from Latin America in the United States, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1,275,000</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>485,000</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republic</td>
<td>345,000</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>320,000</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>37,300</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other states</td>
<td>34,700</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total United States</td>
<td>3,200,000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Undocumented Aliens: Estimated Number from Ten Top Countries of Origin, 1993

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>682,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>288,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>128,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>96,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bahamas</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 10. Average Annual Income of Latino Legal Immigrants, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>$12,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>$11,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>$11,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>$10,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>$9,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>$9,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>$9,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>$8,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>$8,233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 11. Percentage of Latino Legal Immigrants on Welfare, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Juan L. Gonzales, Jr.

Of the estimated 3.2 million undocumented aliens in the United States today, only one in five (21 percent) is from Mexico (Table 9). Most of these undocumented Mexican aliens are residents of California or Texas.

Many economic and labor market studies demonstrate that undocumented aliens do not take jobs from U.S. citizens but rather they actually create jobs and contribute to the growth and vitality of the U.S. economy. Still, many people believe just the contrary. Even though it is difficult to know exactly how much undocumented aliens are paid for their labor, a number of studies show that they usually earn at or below the minimum wage. Therefore, if we can determine the average wages paid to legal resident aliens, we can safely assume that undocumented aliens earn less.

The average annual income of legal resident Latino immigrants amounts to only a little more than $10,000 per year. (The minimum hourly wage provides, at most, an annual income of $9,200.) And recall that a family earning less than $14,500 a year is living below the federal government’s established poverty level.

Mexican legal resident aliens earn almost $2,000 less than the average Latino legal resident, earning an average of only $8,233 per year — $1,000 less than the average annual minimum wage (Table 10). Undocumented Mexican immigrants earn even less than that. Therefore, we can safely infer that undocumented Latino aliens take jobs that very few U.S. citizens would ever consider for themselves, because of not only these unattractive potential earnings, but also reputedly poor working conditions.

An issue related to jobs and wages is the often-heard claim that undocumented aliens take advantage of welfare services and benefits. However, only 2 percent of the total Latino legal resident aliens receive any welfare benefits. Because it is well known that undocumented aliens are reluctant to use welfare services and will only do so in emergencies, the actual use of welfare services by Latino undocumented immigrants must certainly be less than 2 percent (Table 11).
The average annual income for Latino families was less than $30,000 a year in 1990, compared with an average annual family income for non-Latino families of almost $44,000 (Figure 5). The fact that Latino families are larger than the average non-Latino family means that their per-capita income is much less than what the difference in total annual family income would indicate (Gonzales 1994).

Among Latinos, Puerto Rican families have the lowest average annual income — $25,000 a year, followed closely by Mexican American families, with an average annual income of almost $28,000 a year. Cuban Americans earn the highest average annual income among Latino families as a group, with an annual income of $38,000 (Figure 5).

Fewer than one in ten families in the general population earns less than $10,000 a year, but one in five Latino families fall into this extremely low income category. Among Latinos, Puerto Rican families are the most likely to have annual incomes of less than $10,000, as one out of three Puerto Rican families earn less than $10,000 a year. Latinos with the smallest number of families earning less than $10,000 a year are the Cubans, followed by the Central and South Americans (Table 12).

At the other end of the income spectrum, only one in seven Latino families has incomes of more than $50,000 a year, compared to almost one-third of the non-Latino families. Among Latinos, Cubans have the highest percentage of families in the upper income bracket, while Mexican Americans have the fewest (Table 12).

Figure 5. Average Family Income Among Latinos and for the Total U.S. Population, 1990
Table 12. Percentage of Families with Income of $10,000 or Less, or $50,000 More, in 1990, by Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>≤$10,000</th>
<th>≥$50,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. population</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Latinos</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>31.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South American</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latino</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Latino Families and Poverty Rates**

These overall low incomes typically earned by Latino families mean that one in four Latino families lives below the government’s official poverty level for a typical family of four. In contrast, only one in ten families in the general population lives below this level (Table 13). Despite these facts, a recent Department of Labor study reports that Latino families living in poverty are the most likely of any poverty-ridden group to have one adult employed full-time in the labor market.

Among Latinos, Puerto Rican families are the most deprived. Almost four in ten Puerto Rican families live below the poverty level. This compares with Cuban American families who have the lowest poverty rate found among Latinos as a group (Vega 1990). See Table 13.

The children in Latino families are most directly affected by poverty. Among non-Latinos, fewer than one in five persons in poverty is a child; whereas among Latinos almost two in five children are poor. Again, Puerto Ricans are the worst off with more of their children being deprived (Table 13).

Female-headed households are the most likely to fall into a permanent life of poverty. In the general population, one-third of all female-headed households experience poverty. However, the situation is worse among Latinos, for almost half of all Latino families headed by women are living in poverty. The situation is most devastating among Puerto Rican families, where almost two in three of all families headed by women subsist below the poverty level (Table 13).

Table 13. Poverty Statistics for Latinos, Total U.S. Population and Non-Latinos.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% families below the poverty level, 1990</th>
<th>Poverty rate (%) for persons ≤ 18 years, 1990</th>
<th>% female-headed households below the poverty level, 1991</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. population</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>38.0%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Latinos</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>31.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>57.0%</td>
<td>64.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South American</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latino</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EDUCATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF LATINOS

Perhaps the long-term effects of poverty on Latino children is most dramatically revealed in their lower levels of advancement in school. For adults, slightly more than one in ten Latinos has had less than five years of formal education. This compares to less than 2 percent of those 25 years or older in the non-Latino population. Among Latinos, Mexican Americans have the highest proportion of individuals with less than five years of education — one in seven persons (Table 14).

Only half of all Latinos have graduated from high school, compared to eight out of ten adults in the non-Latino population. Again, within the Latino community, Mexican Americans have the lowest level of high school completion — slightly more than four in ten (Table 14).

While as a group only half of all Latinos graduate from high school, the variation among states is significant. A state by state comparison of Latino graduation rates shows that those states with the largest Latino populations, e.g., California and Texas, have lower rates of high school completion than states with smaller Latino populations, e.g., Colorado and New Mexico (Table 15). These low rates experienced by some states are partly due to the facts that these same states experience recent and continual immigration and that Mexican immigrants typically arrive in the United States with only minimal levels of education.

As a group, Latinos are under-represented among the ranks of college graduates. While almost one in four non-Latinos have graduated from college, only one in ten Latinos have. Among Latinos, Mexican Americans have the lowest rate of college graduation, while Cuban Americans have the highest rate (Table 14).

As with high-school graduates, the percentage of Latinos who are college graduates varies significantly from state to state. Again, the states with large Latino populations have the lowest college graduation rates (Table 15). But in terms of the actual number of Latino college graduates, California has the largest number of graduates, followed by Texas and Florida.

The fact that Cubans have the highest proportion of college graduates among Latinos (Table 14) shows up in Florida’s having the highest rate of college graduates (Table 15). Seventy percent of Florida’s Latino population of 1.6 million are Cubans. In contrast, California’s Latino population is over 7 million, with 85 percent being Mexican Americans.

California, the state with the most Latinos, also has the most who have graduate or professional degrees, followed by Florida, Texas, and New York. Florida, with a smaller Latino population, nevertheless has the second highest number of Latinos with advanced degrees. Again, this is explained by the prevalence of Cubans among its Latinos (Table 14).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>% persons ≥ 25 years with less than 5 years education</th>
<th>% persons ≥ 25 years with high school education or more</th>
<th>% persons ≥ 25 years with 4 years of college or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. population</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>78.4%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latinos</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>51.3%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Latinos</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>61.0%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and South American</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latino</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Education Statistics for Latinos by State, 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>% Latino High School Graduates</th>
<th>% Latino College Graduates</th>
<th># Latinos with Graduate or Professional Degrees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>49,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>45.0%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
<td>88,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>45,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>52.0%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>55,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total United States</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>370,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CONCLUSION

Thus, there are very real differences among Latinos and between Latinos and non-Latinos in terms of their socio-economic conditions and levels of educational achievement. Part of the disparity can be attributed to differing settlement patterns through time and place. But it is certain that such key political questions as immigration and naturalization, community development, and human opportunities and rights will force Latinos into the political arena. It is in the voting booth that they will begin to address these important social, economic, and political issues.

For their part, Mexican Americans in the Southwest are most involved with the issues of immigration, employment opportunities, the quality of education, and citizenship rights. The Puerto Ricans are concerned about the quality of life in their urban communities and the various social problems that have plagued their homes and families over the past 30 years. The question of the future of Castro’s Cuba and the fate of the thousands of refugees who desire to obtain political freedom in the United States are the key issues for the Cuban American community.

And there are many other social, economic, and political problems of concern in the Latino community today. For this reason, it is of utmost importance that members of the Latino community continue to recognize that, while they differ in many ways, they are nonetheless bound and committed to one another by their common language, culture, and historical experiences. It is these similarities, rather than the minor differences, that will guide the Latino community now and in the near future.

REFERENCES


SIDEPOINT

JULIAN SAMORA, 1971

We find then a situation in which poor people from a developing nation attempt to make a living in another nation at wages which are lower, but acceptable from their nation’s standard. In order to do this, however, they must violate laws, suffer indignities and many inconveniences. They must live in substandard conditions, away from their families, always in fear of being apprehended and without being integrated into the community nor the society in which they may live. In the process they keep wages down, they displace American labor, and they hamper the efforts of the American labor unions to organize and to bargain collectively. On the other hand, it is not difficult to understand why unemployed Mexican aliens cross the border, nor why employers are so willing to hire them. This is the readily available work force. They have absolutely no rights in the host country. They have absolutely nothing to say about the wages which they receive. They are single individuals for the most part. They are a docile group by the very conditions under which they are here. They represent a tremendous oversupply of labor and, thus, can be replaced at will. They have absolutely no bargaining position because the mere threat of being turned in to the Border Patrol prevents bargaining. They have been gotten rid of at a moment’s notice, or whenever the harvest is over, or sometimes without even being paid if an employer is unscrupulous. (pp.101-102)

Source: Julian Samora, 1971, Los Mojad os: The Wetback Story, with the assistance of Jorge A., Bustamante F. and Gilbert Cardenas (University of Notre Dame)
Among the various major non-Anglo racial and ethnic groups in the United States, the Latino population grew the most rapidly in absolute numbers between 1980 and 1990, gaining more than 7.7 million persons. The Latino population growth rate of 53 percent over the 1980s was more than five times that of the U.S. population as a whole. Of the approximate 22.2 million growth in the U.S. population between 1980 and 1990, about 35 percent was accounted for by the Latino population. Population projections show this rapid growth continuing, so that by 2010, Latinos are likely to replace African-Americans as the largest minority group in the country (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992).

Of the three major Latino groups in the nation — Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban — the Mexican-origin population with a population of approximately 13.5 million (or three-fifths of all Latinos) is the largest and the fastest growing (increasing by 54.4 percent during the 1980s). The rapid growth of the Mexican population is due largely to its young age structure, its high fertility rate, and its continual flows of legal and illegal immigrants (Bean and Tienda 1987, Saenz and Greenlees 1996).

While about 83 percent of the U.S. Mexican population lived in the Southwest in 1990, there are significant clusters residing elsewhere in the United States, with the Midwest being the most popular location outside of the Southwest.

Mexicans began arriving in the Midwest in sizable numbers early in the 20th century, especially during the 1920s when they ventured to the region to work in agriculture, railroads, and factories (Acuna 1988; Saenz 1991, 1993; Valdes 1991). The Mexican population moving to the Midwest at this time filled labor voids created by the passage of the National Origins Quota Acts of 1921 and 1924, which restricted the flow of Southern and Eastern Europeans who provided cheap labor for U.S. labor markets (Dinnerstein, Nichols, and Reimers 1990, Easterlin et al. 1982, Montejano 1987, Saenz 1993). Today, the Midwest continues to be a popular destination for Mexicans leaving the Southwest, as well as for Mexican immigrants (Saenz 1991).

Over the last decade, large-scale immigration to the United States has stirred up major debates (Donato 1994, Portes and Rumbaut 1990). Much anti-immigrant sentiment has been directed at Mexicans, the largest group of immigrants. Historically, during economic recessionary periods, immigrants have been marked as convenient scapegoats responsible for economic ills (McLemore 1991). During the late 1970s and 1980s, the Midwest experienced dramatic economic downturns associated with the Farm Crisis (Albrecht and Murdock 1990, Bultena, Lasley, and Geller 1986, Murdock et al. 1986) and the loss of manufacturing jobs (Knudsen 1992, Saenz 1994). Under such conditions, minorities and immigrants become economically vulnerable because of their limited human capital (e.g., education, skills, and training) and labor-market discrimination (Jensen and Tienda 1989, Saenz and Thomas 1990).

**Analytical Plan**

In light of the anti-immigrant sentiments that have intensified over the last decade, along with the major economic changes in the Midwest, this chapter examines the demographic and socioeconomic patterns of seven Mexican-origin immigrant and U.S.-born subgroups living in the Midwest (Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin) in 1990. Mexican-born immigrants are categorized into five subgroups based on the period of U.S. entry — pre-1965; 1965-1974; 1975-1981; 1982-1986; 1987-1990. U.S.-born Mexican Americans (as well as those born abroad to U.S.-citizen parents) are classified into two subgroups — born in the Midwest, born elsewhere). This classification allows us to discern the considerable diversity among the groups with respect to demographic and socioeconomic patterns.

The final part of the analysis compares Mexican immigrants in the Midwest who came to the United States between 1980 and 1990, with those living in other regions of the country [Northeast, South (excluding Texas), Southwest (Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas), and the rest of the West (excluding Arizona, California, Colorado, and New Mexico).
DESCRIPTION OF DATA
The data are from the 1990 Public Use Microdata Samples (PUMS) from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993b). The PUMS data represent a 5 percent individual-based sample of the U.S. population. These individual-based data allow researchers to undertake unique analyses not possible with the aggregate data widely available in printed form or in the various Summary Tape Files (STFs). The PUMS data set contains person weights which are used in the analysis to obtain estimates of the population from the sample.

RESULTS
Table 1 reports the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of the five Mexican immigrant and two U.S.-born groups in the Midwest. About 1.1 million persons of Mexican-origin lived in the Midwest in 1990, with approximately 68 percent being U.S.-born and close to 32 percent being immigrants. By far, the largest subgroup consists of U.S.-born persons born in the Midwest—596,223 or nearly 53 percent of all persons of Mexican-origin in the region. About one-fifth of all Mexicans in the Midwest were immigrants who entered the United States since 1975.

The various segments of the midwestern Mexican population differ in their geographic distribution patterns. For instance, the majority of immigrants, especially those arriving since 1965, were located in Illinois. In contrast, the majority of U.S.-born Mexicans lived outside of Illinois. Still, three-fifths of those born in the Midwest lived in Illinois and Michigan, while nearly two-thirds of those born in other parts of the United States resided in Illinois, Michigan, Kansas, and Ohio.

Immigrant groups are more likely to be found in metropolitan areas (at least 90 percent across the different categories). In contrast, U.S.-born persons born outside of the Midwest represent the least metropolitan (70.2 percent). (The “mixed” category in Table 1 includes both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas to form a county group with at least 100,000 persons.)

The strongest Midwest concentration of Mexican immigrants is in the Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), where from 66 percent to 71 percent of the cohorts arriving in this country since 1965 made their home. On the other hand, only 19 percent of U.S.-born persons born outside of the Midwest were located in the Chicago MSA in 1990.

The seven groups differ significantly in their age structures. Of course, no one in the two earliest groups of immigrants was under 15 years. Slightly more than one-fourth of immigrants who arrived before 1965 were 65 years or older. The U.S.-born group born in the Midwest had the youngest age structure, with nearly 54 percent being younger than 15. Close to one-fourth of the most recent immigrants (those arriving between 1987 and 1990) and U.S.-born persons born outside of the Midwest were less than 15 years of age.

The sex distribution of immigrants reflects the typical structure of foreign-born groups that include undocumented immigrants (Davila and Saenz 1990). Indeed, each immigrant group had a high sex ratio (number of males per 100 females), with the highest (176.2 males per 100 females) associated with those who arrived between 1982 and 1986. The U.S.-born groups, in contrast, had more balanced sex distributions.

The immigrant groups exhibit an increasing assimilation pattern with respect to citizenship status and English proficiency, with the rates of both variables rising in a straight line from the most recent to the earliest group of arrivals. These findings call into question the assumptions often made about Mexican immigrants concerning their supposed lack of desire to integrate into the host society (see Dinnerstein, Nichols and Reimers 1990).

There is a substantial amount of variation in the educational attainment levels of the different groups. U.S.-born Mexicans born outside of the Midwest represent the most educated group, with two-fifths of persons 25 and older being high school graduates. This could reflect the process in which migration is selective of the more educated segment of a given group (Saenz 1991; Shaw 1975). The least educated were those immigrants arriving in the United States since 1975, followed by U.S.-born persons born in the Midwest.

In general, the socioeconomic patterns (i.e., unemployment, average hourly wage, and percent of families in poverty) indicate that U.S.-born persons occupy a middle position between the most recent groups of immigrants (those arriving since 1975) at the bottom of the distribution and earlier immigrants (those coming before 1975) at the top. This pattern counters the predictions of assimilationists (Gordon 1964) who suggest that U.S.-born
Table 1. Selected Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of the Mexican-Origin Population in the Midwest by Immigrant and Native Groups, 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Size:</th>
<th>Immigrant Groups by Period of Entry into U.S.</th>
<th>Native-Born by Region of Birth</th>
<th>Other U.S.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>41,521</td>
<td>77,595</td>
<td>111,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct. Distribution</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Geographic Patterns:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State % distribution</th>
<th>Illinois</th>
<th>Indiana</th>
<th>Iowa</th>
<th>Kansas</th>
<th>Michigan</th>
<th>Missouri</th>
<th>Minnesota</th>
<th>Nebraska</th>
<th>North Dakota</th>
<th>Ohio</th>
<th>South Dakota</th>
<th>Wisconsin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>65.5%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Residence (% Distribution):</td>
<td>Metro</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
<td>93.5%</td>
<td>89.6%</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
<td>70.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nonmetro</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% in Chicago MSA</td>
<td>53.9%</td>
<td>69.0%</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
<td>66.0%</td>
<td>68.4%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/Sex Structure:</td>
<td>% less than 15</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>15.4%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% 65 and older</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sex ratio</td>
<td>114.4</td>
<td>137.4</td>
<td>138.0</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>135.0</td>
<td>101.2</td>
<td>103.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Patterns:</td>
<td>% U.S. citizen</td>
<td>55.0%</td>
<td>33.9%</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% speaking English well or very well</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>46.3%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational Patterns:</td>
<td>% of 25 and older high school grads.</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>33.2%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>40.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Force Patterns:</td>
<td>% civilian labor force unemployed</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational % distribution:</td>
<td>Mgr. and Professional</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tech., Sales, Adm.</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>22.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farm, Forest, Fisheries</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PPC &amp; R'</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fab., oper., laborb</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
<td>39.8%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>29.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Income and Poverty:

| Avg. Hourly Wage: | Males | $14.70 | $11.38 | $8.81 | $7.30 | $6.40 | $11.07 | $12.00 |
|                   | Females | $9.25 | $7.87 | $6.86 | $6.43 | $5.68 | $9.47 | $8.28 |
| % of families in poverty | 9.0% | 12.6% | 19.6% | 22.2% | 28.7% | 19.7% | 18.1% |


Immigration Patterns and Immigrant Communities
persons enjoy superior socioeconomic levels. Immigrants coming in the 1987-1990 period had the highest unemployment rate (13.9 percent), lowest average hourly wages ($6.40 for males and $5.68 for females), and highest rates of family poverty (28.7 percent). In contrast, the group of immigrants arriving before 1965 had the lowest level of unemployment (7.7 percent), highest average hourly wages ($14.70 for males and $9.25 for females), and lowest poverty rate (9.0%).

With respect to occupational distributions, the two groups of U.S.-born persons and the earliest group of immigrants were the most likely to be employed in managerial and professional; and technical, sales, and administrative occupations. In contrast, approximately three-fourths of the immigrant groups arriving since 1982 were working in three occupations (service; farm, forestry, and fisheries; fabricator, operator, and laborer).

Thus, the statistics in Table 1 demonstrate the wide diversity among the Mexican-origin population in the Midwest. Obviously, it is not appropriate to treat immigrants or U.S.-born persons as a homogeneous group.

The Immigrants of the 1980-1990 Period

Table 2 reports characteristics of recent Mexican immigrants by where in the United States they were located in 1990. Most (82.3 percent or about 1.8 million) of the 2.2 million Mexican immigrants entering the United States between 1980 and 1990 resided in the Southwest. About one in 14 recent immigrants was located in the Midwest. Most likely to be living in metropolitan areas were those in the Northeast (96.9 percent), Southwest (93.2 percent), and Midwest (91.3 percent), while the rest were somewhat more likely to locate in nonmetropolitan areas — the South (19.0 percent) and the West (30.5 percent).

There were no significant regional differences in the age composition among immigrants. And the various regions were also relatively similar on the basis of citizenship and English proficiency patterns. However, in each region, there were significantly more males than females, with the sex ratio (number of males per 100 females) ranging from 129 in the Southwest to 207 in the South.

Recent immigrants in the Midwest were apparently slightly worse off socioeconomically (i.e., educational, employment, poverty rates, and average hourly wages for males) than those living in the Northeast, but substantially better off than those in the other regions, especially those in the Southwest and West. One exception is in the average hourly wage of Mexican immigrant women in the Midwest — $6.11, the lowest of all. Mexican immigrants in the Northeast had the highest educational level (29.3 percent of persons 25 and older were high school graduates), the second lowest unemployment rate (7.6 percent), highest average hourly wages ($10.08 for males and $6.85 for females), and the lowest poverty rate (23.9 percent of families). In contrast, those residing in the West and Southwest had the lowest educational levels (17.2 percent and 18.4 percent, respectively, of persons 25 and older were high school graduates), the highest unemployment rates (13.6 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively), and the highest poverty rates (37.8 percent and 36.9 percent, respectively), with males in the West having the lowest average hourly wage ($6.57), even lower than that of their female counterparts ($6.73).

In each of the five regions, most immigrants were employed in one of four occupations — services; farm, forestry, and fisheries; precision production, craft, and repairs; fabricator, operator, and laborer. Approximately two-thirds of the midwestern and northeastern recent immigrants worked in service occupations or in fabricator, operator, and laborer occupations. Larger shares of workers in the West (41.0 percent) and South (30.4 percent) were in farm, forestry, and fisheries occupations.
### Table 2. Selected Demographic and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Mexican Immigrants Arriving in the United States in 1980-1990, by Region of Residence, 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population Size:</th>
<th>Midwest</th>
<th>Northeast</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Southwest</th>
<th>Other West</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>164,639</td>
<td>57,179</td>
<td>87,967</td>
<td>1,830,544</td>
<td>83,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Distribution</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Residence (% Distribution):</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metro</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
<td>93.2%</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>13.4%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonmetro</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age/Sex Structure:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Less than 15</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>16.4%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% 65 and Older</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Ratio</td>
<td>152.7</td>
<td>171.9</td>
<td>206.8</td>
<td>129.3</td>
<td>172.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Patterns:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% U.S. Citizen</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Speaking English</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well or Very Well</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>48.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Patterns:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of 25 and Older</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High School Graduates</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labor Force Patterns:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Civilian Labor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Unemployed</td>
<td>10.8%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational % Distribution:</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mgr. and Professional</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tech., Sales, Admin.</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
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*Precision Production, Craft, and Repairs
*Fabricator, Operator, Laborer

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<td>32.8%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Today, U.S. immigrants from Mexico and U.S.-born persons of Mexican origin find themselves in various positions along the socioeconomic spectrum, depending on when they came, where they went, and in the case of their children, where they were born in the United States. This report compared various groups of midwestern immigrants, segmented by their time of entrance into the United States, with respect to their demographic and socioeconomic attributes. Those who came to the United States before 1975, and especially those arriving before 1965, were found to be in the most favorable socioeconomic position among all Mexican-origin groups. Contrary to predictions of assimilationists (Gordon 1964), these two earliest groups of immigrants are better off even than U.S.-born Mexicans. In contrast, the most recent cohorts of Mexican immigrants — those entering the country since 1975 — tend to occupy the lower rungs of the socioeconomic ladder.

These findings have important implications for programs and policies directed at improving the social and economic conditions of the Mexican-origin population. Programs designed to create jobs or alleviate poverty in the Midwest are most likely to be needed by recent immigrants, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by U.S.-born individuals.

Another significant finding concerns the concentration of immigrants in Illinois, a state that has experienced substantial job reduction in the manufacturing sector. For example, while the Midwest had an 11 percent decline in manufacturing jobs between 1980 and 1990, Illinois experienced a 19 percent reduction (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983, 1993a). In fact, of the nearly 1.5 million manufacturing jobs lost in the nation during the 1980s, the Midwest region accounted for approximately half of the nation’s decline, with Illinois responsible for about 17 percent of the national loss. In such an economic setting, Mexican-origin persons are in a vulnerable position, as they witness low-wage, low-skilled jobs being exported to other places in the country and abroad. Thus, it is difficult to argue that the most recent immigrants will follow the same upward socioeconomic trend of the earlier cohorts of immigrants, who entered the country at a time when manufacturing jobs were expanding.

However, the results do show that immigrants arriving between 1980 and 1990 and settling in the Midwest tend to be better off socioeconomically than those located in other regions except the Northeast. Therefore, fewer resources may be required to improve the social and economic standing of this recent group of Mexican immigrants in the Midwest than will be needed in other regions of the country.

REFERENCES


Due to the cross-sectional nature of the PUMS data, caution should be exercised when interpreting the variation of socioeconomic patterns across the different groups. For example, statistical results for the earliest cohorts of immigrants — and for other groups for that matter — are based on “survivors,” thus excluding people who have died or moved elsewhere. Hence, the superior socioeconomic position of the earliest groups of immigrants in 1990 may be biased by a potential negative selectivity among earlier immigrants who are no longer in the Midwest. Another problem is that U.S.-born groups contain persons of all ages and generations, thus influencing their demographic and socioeconomic patterns. Unfortunately, the PUMS data do not allow us to identify people by generational status.


[SIDEPOINT]

**EDWARD KISSAM, 1995**

In Michigan, traditional migration patterns, housing arrangements, and labor force supervision have changed relatively little from the 1960’s to the 1990’s. The most innovative changes in labor market dynamics stem from the successful efforts of pickle producers to lengthen their growing season by producing pickles in the southern U.S. and to establish a “migrant itenerary” to extend the work season of a core of experienced and favored workers. Successful strategies for decreasing worker turnover and concomitantly reinforcing the “standing waves” of migration patterns have included the provision of improved housing for peak-season migrant workers, reliance on complementary cropping to maintain a relatively steady flow of work and assure that migrants will not leave in search of better opportunities, and structured arrangements to pool labor demand and labor by “lending” workers to neighbors. The “transplantation” of networks of green carder Texans to Florida, at the same time that traditional Texas *troqueros* were evolving into modern farm labor contractors, has made possible southwest Michigan’s continued access to ongoing flows of new immigrants to replace departing workers. (pp. 125-126)

The influence of postmodernism, literary criticism, and cultural studies is evident in recent Chicano historiography, and represents a welcome addition to the field (Limon 1992, Gutiérrez-Jones 1995, Sánchez 1993, Padilla 1993). While they offer a new array of tools and methodology, these ideologies and practices merit further critical examination. Their world views are rooted in an academic and political world that the discipline of Chicano Studies was formed, in large part, to challenge. They neglect Chicano perspectives on the formation of knowledge and ignore concerns basic to Chicano academics (including immigration and the communities from which we come). The impact of cultural studies and postmodernism in the field of Chicano Studies in part reflects the broader impact of changes in the social composition of the nation's Chicano population, including:

- the appearance of a class of academic intellectuals who seek to come to terms with postmodernism,
- record levels of immigration from Mexico,
- a rise in inter-ethnic tensions, and
- rising indices of material inequality in the population as a whole.

The tools of postmodernism might have liberating tendencies, but some of the major assumptions introduced must be considered problematic. This is evident even in the writings of prominent and influential writers like literary critic Fredric Jameson. In his discussion "of our relationship with the past," Jameson introduces the postmodern paradigm of understanding traditions, which he suggests are engaged in fluctuating relations between Identity, or that which belongs to our own past and our traditions, and Difference, "an alien object from ourselves, not in any way part of our roots" (Jameson 1988, Vol. 2, p. 150). This "Difference" is synonymous with the postmodern "Other." While Jameson argues that some traditions, like the classical Greek and Latin, can be understood within the context of Identity at times, and as Difference at other times, he is unequivocal about ancient Mexico, whose counterparts are the Aztecs. He refers to the Aztecs as: "an utterly non- or anti-classical culture (characterized by) electrifying otherness and fascination" (Jameson 1988, Vol. 2, p. 151). The ideological framework of the past with which Jameson identifies, namely European roots which include Greeks and Latins, do not permit us to come to terms with the indigenous ancient classical and postclassical roots of Chicano culture, for, as he acknowledges, the two represent diametrically opposed traditions. In order to understand the ancient historical foundations of Chicanos in their complexity, one cannot rely on the tools of postmodern practitioners or accept their European and Euro-American models, for even those that consider themselves counter-hegemonic like Jameson, are unable to identify with a tradition and its accompanying geography that they consider so utterly different.

The issue of geography in Chicano historiography is complicated by the expansion of the Chicano population beyond the Southwest. Many long-accepted historical and geographical assumptions simply do not apply. The issue of geography can be best demonstrated in the Midwest, where Chicanos have had a continuous presence throughout the 20th century. Yet the framework of dominant Chicano historiography continues to be locked into assumptions linking the distinctiveness of the Chicano experience to the exceptionalism of the Southwest.

Two Paradigms

The extant historiography of the 20th century Chicano in the Midwest is dominated by two general paradigms — the first, a Euro-American tradition to which postmodernism and cultural studies belong; the second, based on the Chicano Studies' focus on the Southwest. I consider them both inadequate, and, in this essay, I suggest some general features of an alternative approach.

The first paradigm, that of Euro-American assimilation and its counterparts, represents the dominant historiography of the Midwest. From the moment of their arrival in large numbers in the early 20th century, Mexicans in the Midwest have been viewed with an eye to earlier European immigrants. Assimilation has been foremost in the minds of advocates of this paradigm, who have portrayed Mexicans as the last of the foreign
immigrants, whether they believed they could be assimilated, or considered them a problem that could only be resolved by restriction of immigration and removal.

The issue of assimilation and its applicability to Mexicans has been debated since the early years of Mexican community formation in the region. One side was articulated in 1926 by Assistant U.S. director of Immigration, Isador Weishar, who said of Mexicans in Detroit: "They are ambitious, self-reliant, and most of them have the assurance that they can make their own way and better their condition in this far country" (Smith 1926).

Those who disagreed with Weishar also based their arguments on the premises of this paradigm. S.L.A. Marshall, a Detroit News journalist argued (1932a), "that the Mexicans formed an unassimilable group" and that the "Mexican problem" could only be resolved by their repatriation. If neither assimilation nor removal has occurred in the course of almost a century, as those engulfed in this debate over assimilation acknowledge, why should we expect either to take place in the immediate future?

The second paradigm for midwestern Chicano historiography is rooted in the dominant writings in the field, whose vision links the special circumstances of Chicanos with the distinctiveness of the Southwest. It treats Chicanos in the Midwest simply as an extension, or a colony of the Southwestern homeland (Deutsch 1987). While the Mexican presence in the two regions has much in common, particularly in the 20th century, a Southwest-centered model of Chicano history and many of its central assumptions is questionable when applied to the Midwest.

There are sharply distinguishing features in the ancient history of the two regions. The indigenous roots of Chicanos in the present-day U.S. Southwest date back thousands of years, while European roots date to the 16th century. The unbroken presence of Chicanos in the Midwest, by contrast, is relatively recent. The hunting and trading parties from central Mexico were cut off by the Spanish conquest.

After a lapse of about two centuries, another phase of interaction occurred in the late-18th century, when Mexican hunters and warriors established themselves in a number of places in the Midwest. They built forts in Cahokia and Kaskaskia, Illinois, and St. Joseph, Michigan (Kinnaird 1932, pgs. 173-74). It was a short-lived moment, for the Mexicans departed the region before the end of the century.

The next sustained appearance of Mexican hunters occurred in the early-20th century. They were job hunters. The present-day Chicanos in the region have a continuous history that dates only from this more recent wave of migration. The vast majority were born in Mexico, rather than the Southwest, and they looked to Mexico rather than Texas or other settings in the United States as their homeland. As McWilliams has observed (1949, p. 222), "In Chicago and Detroit, Mexicans are merely another immigrant group; in the Southwest they are an indigenous people."

Another critical difference between the experiences of Chicanos in the Southwest and the Midwest is in their relationship to the land. Historically, Mexicans and their ancestors in the Southwest were tied to the land. Even after Europeans and their allies invaded the region on behalf of the Spanish Crown and gradually implanted their notions of property, residents were permitted to receive land grants, continuing the ties to the land. While there were certainly large landholders among them, most people in the Southwest held small parcels in conjunction with the communities where they lived. They were a rural, largely self-sufficient people. Accompanying the conquest of Mexico by the United States were more explicit notions of private property and legalism. Euro-Americans engaged in a strategy that systematically wrested the land from its former occupants (Luna 1995). Those efforts resulted in land struggles that continue in the Southwest to this day.

In contrast, Mexicans who migrated to the Midwest in the 20th century came to a region where most of the land was already divided up into private holdings. The earliest Mexican immigrants came largely to work on the land rather than acquire it, and they were never able to establish a land base in the region. Chicanos in the Midwest are largely landless people, so the struggle for land so pervasive in the southwestern historical memory does not apply.

Still another major historical distinction between the experiences of Chicanos in the Southwest and Midwest has been cultural. Culture can be understood in many ways. I want to begin by discussing it in terms of relations,
namely, with whom do Chicanos relate? In the Southwest, the most important cultural dichotomy is expressed in terms of Anglo (or English-speaking) and non-Anglo — Chicano and Native American, plus Asian-American in California (McWilliams 1949, pgs. 208-209). Several indicators of culture, including customs, food, language and traditions, can be understood within the context of this dichotomy. Chicanos are the second most numerous population group in most of the Southwest, and are visibly different from the Anglo population. Furthermore, Spanish is the second language of the Southwest, which has instilled fear among some, hope among others.

In the Midwest, by contrast, the principal cultural dichotomy is between white and black, although the great waves of early and mid-20th century Mexican and African-American migration to the region nearly coincided. There are important differences between the major cultural groups of the two regions. Midwestern blacks are largely urban, whereas southwestern Chicanos historically are rural, although in the last three generations they have been urbanizing very rapidly. Blacks have been monolingual English speakers for several generations. They don’t have the direct and ongoing links with their counterparts outside the United States the way that Mexicans do with Mexico and don’t experience the degree of ongoing cultural renewal from the outside that affects Chicano communities in all parts of the country.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

Because of historical, geographical, ideological, cultural and other factors, both the European assimilationist and southwestern-based Chicano paradigms have only partial explanatory power for understanding the Chicano experience in the Midwest. As an alternative, I wish to suggest a third approach to examine Chicanos in Midwest and other regions within a common framework. It assumes that the homeland is not Texas, New Mexico, or California, but rather Mexico. To understand patterns of Chicano immigration and settlement in all parts of the United States, one must look to Mexico as the common Aztlan. It also assumes that Chicanos are neither a fixed part of the cultural divisions in the Midwest nor within dominant the Euro-American national popular perspectives in which Mexicans and other Latinos are still largely invisible — except inconsistently as stereotypes of gatherers (migrant workers), drug runners, and illegal aliens who refuse to learn English or assimilate like other model immigrants from Europe have done in the past (Georgi and Soza 1975).

In the remainder of this essay, I will discuss how immigration and migration have influenced the 20th century history of Mexicans and other Latinos in Michigan in ways that assimilationist or southwestern-based Chicano perspectives cannot adequately explain. During this period there have been three broad generational cycles, each with its own history and distinct characteristics.

THE FIRST GENERATION

The first was comprised of Mexican immigrants who came to the region in the 1910s and 1920s directly from Mexico, or after a temporary stay in Texas. Almost all of them were attracted to the region as unskilled workers. They were initially recruited by employers to fill job vacancies created by the economic boom of World War I and the 1920s, but soon they developed networks amongst themselves to spread word of employment and to attract family and neighbors from the communities in Mexico they considered home. Their homeland was being influenced by the expansion of U.S. capital investment in railroads, mines, agricultural lands, and, by the second decade of the 20th century, in establishing an automobile industry in Latin America. Not coincidentally, U.S. employers found that Mexicans made satisfactory unskilled workers on the railroads, mines, the fields, and later in the automobile factories and as foundry workers.

Southern and Eastern European immigrants had dominated unskilled labor in the region before World War I, but several factors severed them from their employers. Many “moved up” economically during the period of good times (Janette 1921). Simultaneously, new arrivals from Europe were curtailed by politicians and purveyors of popular opinion strongly expressing pangs of nativist fear that culminated, during World War I, in a series of laws restricting entry of unskilled European workers. But the laws did not exclude immigrants from Mexico because the politicians predicted that Mexicans would not remain permanently. They were surprised when their predictions were not accurate.
Mexicans of this first generation in the Midwest were mostly immigrants from Mexico who worked either in agriculture or industry. In the states of Illinois and Indiana, their lives were mostly urban, while in Minnesota, Kansas and Nebraska, they were predominantly rural (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1930). In Michigan, they encountered a large dose of both rural and urban experiences. In the earliest years, most were recruited by the Michigan Sugar, Columbia Sugar, Isabella Sugar, and Continental Sugar companies to work in the sugar beet fields as beet workers (betabeleros) from spring until fall. At the end of the season, thousands of betabeleros from rural districts in eastern and central Michigan decided to remain in the state for the winter rather than return to Texas or Mexico. Many stayed in smaller towns like Winn, Oil City, and Shepherd, or in little colonias with names like El Pozo, El Hoyo, and Cuatro Esquinas (four corners), some of which were built or purchased by the sugar beet companies for worker housing. In addition to Mexicans from other locations, thousands were soon attracted to nearby cities to work for Ford, Briggs, Saginaw Grey Iron and other foundries, and on the Michigan Central and other railroads (Valdes 1982, Vargas 1994).

The cities were at the heart of the action, most of which was in Detroit, where a semblance of a barrio formed on the edge of downtown, gradually extending west onto Bagley in the 1920s. Other visible clusters of the Mexican population, linked to the automobile industry and foundries, appeared in Dearborn, Saginaw, Port Huron and Toledo. The cities attracted many beet workers seeking employment at the end of the season, as well as relatives, friends and other earlier arrivals who spread the word of high wages in the northern factories. As Tovar (1928) observed from Detroit, "The newcomers here certainly write home the most fabulous tales of the wealth of this area. The letters they send are the most wild things you ever heard in your life." The promise of assimilation was as exaggerated as the tales of quick riches that had spread so rapidly.

This world of Mexican immigrants faced a severe trauma in 1929 when the Great Depression struck. Many public officials and creators of public opinion blamed Mexicans for the Depression (Crawford 1930). They argued that Mexicans took away jobs from citizens and that unemployed Mexicans were a burden on the public relief mechanism thereby draining tax dollars — a refrain frequently reappearing throughout the 20th century. Officials from the U.S. Department of Labor, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Detroit Department of Public Welfare, city police, and social workers concocted a scheme to send Mexican workers back to Mexico — a plan referred to as repatriation or "voluntary" removal from the country (Humphrey 1941). Diego Rivera, who was working in the city spending most of 1932 painting "Man and Machine" at the Detroit Institute of Arts, was also lured into the repatriation scheme (Marshall 1932c). Although public officials insisted that repatriation was voluntary, it frequently involved force, and included children born in Michigan, who saw Mexico for the first time (Humphrey 1941). Like their parents, they were considered unassimilable "others."

Several employers, including Ford, did not want to fire the Mexican workers, but most of them ultimately did. The plan to remove all Mexicans from the state was thwarted, however, by the many Mexican people who did not want to leave, and by farmers and beet companies who encouraged them to stay by promising work in the spring. As Marshall (1932b) reported: "The Mexican is a 'preferred' worker in the sugar industry. He isn't a trouble maker. He isn't interested in politics or Marxian theories. He hoes his row and he takes care of his family. Naturally, the sugar companies want that kind." With or without support from employers, many Mexican families had taken roots and felt little reason to leave; few had more attractive prospects elsewhere, making them even more determined to remain. Although their communities were badly weakened, they did not collapse. Those who stayed formed the core of old-timers within the Michigan Mexican community.

THE SECOND GENERATION

The second generation of Chicano history in Michigan, beginning in the 1930s, continuing until the 1960s, was characterized by two waves of migration from the South. The earlier began with the migration of Mexicans born mostly in the United States, particularly Tejanos (Texans of Mexican descent), who started coming in the late 1930s. They originally were recruited by sugar beet companies to work on farms, unknowingly as strike-breakers and union busters. Farm labor organizing in the mid-1930s had achieved a degree...
of success in Michigan and Ohio, and several union locals had succeeded in gaining contracts guaranteeing wages and minimum working conditions for their members (Valdés 1991). The new workers from Texas were mostly children of Mexican immigrants who had themselves come to the United States in the early years of the century. They were recruited to a vastly expanded agricultural industry, and, with the coming of the war, to a wider range of urban industries.

Agriculture was expanding beyond sugar beets in east-central and southeastern Michigan to include many vegetable crops and fruits for the table and for canning. Production expanded sharply in southern Michigan along the Ohio and Indiana borders, and especially in western Michigan, particularly along the Lake Michigan coast between Berrien County and Oceana County, which became the fruit-growing center of the Midwest (Cain 1940). All crops that used hand labor hired Mexicans. By the 1950s, Grand Traverse County had more migrant workers than any other county in the United States, and Michigan employed more migrants than any state outside of Texas. Many of these workers quickly left the fields to work in the shops and factories of the booming cities of the state.

Employers’ demands for Mexicans in the fields and factories were met not entirely with Tejanos, but also with workers born in Mexico who took advantage of the International Labor Program, in effect from 1942 to 1964. This bracero period brought thousands of workers to Michigan directly, mostly to work in agriculture, but also on the railroads and in a number of select urban industrial settings (Valdés 1982). Many braceros skipped contracts and stayed, or returned in other ways, renewing the informal network that brought additional thousands of people directly from Mexico to Michigan, and particularly to its largest city.

As the Detroit barrio expanded rapidly, its heart spilled over from Bagley Street to Clark Avenue (Valdés 1982). Local industries hired workers directly from Mexico, as well as workers of Mexican ancestry from Michigan and Texas to work in auto plants like Cadillac and Ford, steel factories and foundries like Kasel Steel, and in many other areas. The industrial profile of Michigan and the opportunity to work in unionized plants was a powerful lure for thousands of people from Texas and Mexico during these years of economic boom.

In many other locations in the metropolitan Detroit area, and in eastern and mid-Michigan, a number of new Mexican communities appeared, including Ecorse, Wyandotte, Pontiac, Adrian, Port Huron, Flint, and Lansing; many grew rapidly during this generation (de Hill n.d., pgs. 1-3). The Lansing barrio on the north side probably stands out as the most important new community of this generation. (Haney 1976, pgs. 3-5). It was formed originally as a colonia of the local sugar beet factory, and expanded as increased labor demands by local automobile plants and foundries lured workers from the fields, as well as directly from Texas and Mexico (Ratliff 1980).

Another important phase of Latino history in Michigan began at this time with the formation of a visible Puerto Rican community. The key year was 1950 when about five thousand experienced farm laborers were recruited directly from Puerto Rico by the Michigan Sugar Company. They were treated terribly, perhaps even worse than the workers from Texas whom they were replacing. Hundreds of them walked out of the fields around Saginaw, Bay City, Pinconning and Freeland, into Detroit. They were directed to Most Holy Trinity parish, the heart of the Mexican barrio, where Msgr. Clement Kern was in charge, assisted by Father Carlos Talavera from Mexico.1 The priests and Mexicans within the barrio set the men up with housing in the area, and helped find them jobs in various places, including at Kasel Steel. They became the core of the new and rapidly-growing Puerto Rican community in Detroit.

The second generation was thus formed by children of earlier Mexican immigrants from both Michigan and Texas, Puerto Ricans, and more recent Mexican immigrants who came to Detroit and other cities directly from Mexico. It was augmented by Mexican braceros who skipped from the sugar beet and pickling cucumber fields, and the railroad braceros of the World War II period (Hedke 1946, pgs. 28-29). It was part of the great industrial boom that began during the war and lasted through the 1960s, with its tremendous appetite for unskilled factory workers. During this generation, the Latino population settled in communities throughout southeastern, eastern and mid-Michigan, and remained closely linked to the large

1 Interview with Kern by the author, July 30, 1980
manufacturing concerns and the related feeder industries. Although it continued to be predominantly Mexican, it was a much more diverse population than a generation earlier.

**THE THIRD GENERATION**

The third cycle of midwestern Chicano history has a somewhat less distinctive beginning around the middle 1960s, continuing to the end of the century. During this phase the region has been portrayed as suffering from deindustrialization, and characterized by detractors as the "Rust Belt" of the nation, hemorrhaging from a flight of industry and jobs to the southern United States and to foreign countries. Michigan and many other states in the region experienced either stagnating populations or significant population exoduses, especially from the larger cities and many rural communities. While some of the broader outlines of this generalization apply to the majority population, they do not explain the recent history of midwestern Latinos, particularly Mexicans, who played an increasing, but still selective, role in the contemporary history of the region.

A number of important economic and social changes had a profound impact on patterns of Latino migration and settlement in the region during the present generation. One is a change in the farmworker force. The number of migrant and seasonal farmworkers in Michigan peaked during the mid-1960s, then declined sharply until the mid-1970s (Traverse City Record-Eagle 1971). By 1980, the farmworker population stabilized generally, and even increased in some labor-intensive crops like apples, asparagus, and mushrooms. The sharp decline in employment in the fields, in conjunction with the encouragement of government programs such as the federally-sponsored United Migrants for Opportunity, Inc., which later changed its name to Michigan Employment for Economic Development, hastened the permanent settlement of farmworkers (Icenogle 1969).

During this period, employment opportunities increased in a number of agricultural and related activities, including nurseries, canneries, and the dairy industry which industrialized the labor of what had long been perceived as the work of the "hired man." Together these changes further encouraged permanent settlement of Mexicans in rural and small town settings. In a number of midwestern states, settlement in smaller cities and rural communities also increased as a result of the reorganization of the meat processing industry, characterized by relocation from urban settings, lower wages, and an intensification of the work process. The companies used these changes to drive more established and more highly-paid Euro-Americans out of the industry, while recruiting workers from cities along the Mexican border to replace them.

A second feature of the late 20th century cycle is a sharp increase in the number of women working outside of the home, employed mostly in small shops, factories, and offices. Changes in the demands of work, the ideology about women working outside the home, and actual employment opportunities, combined to sharply lessen the distinctions between Chicanas and Chicanos in work settings. Although significant gender differences had marked employment patterns between women and men in the second generation, such sharp distinctions were not as clearly developed in agriculture, where women were always central to company recruitment strategies and where family labor itself had made Mexicans attractive to agricultural employers in the first place. Many of the laws protecting industrial workers kept women out of certain types of employment, but explicitly excluded agricultural workers.

In 1970, labor force participation of Latinas in Michigan was the lowest among the major population groups, with a rate of 38.8 percent of those aged 16-64 employed in the workforce, compared to rates for Euro-American women at 39.5 percent and African-American women at 46.0 percent (Arce et al. 1983, p. 69). By 1990, Latina employment in Michigan was the highest of the three, at 59.9 percent, compared to Euro-American women at 57.3 percent and African-American women at 57.1 percent (Aponte and Siles 1994, pgs. 20-21). On the basis of the assimilationist-oriented literature of earlier generations, the low labor force participation reflected more "traditional" Latina families. According to those experts, the 1990 census data suggest that Latinas would be considered more "modern" than the other women. In fact, they are simply hungrier, because the per capita earnings of Latinos and Latinas is lower than their counterparts, whether black or white (U. S. Bureau of the Census 1990b).
Another feature of the present generation involves the diversity of the midwestern Latino population. Many observers have suggested that the regional Latino population has become increasingly diverse ethnically as a result of migration from other parts of the country and from Latin America, implicitly suggesting a decline in the Mexican proportion of the total. Data do suggest that during the 1970s, migration from Central America and other countries appears to have lessened the Mexican dominance somewhat (the census data for 1970 did not specify the Latino subgroups). But it is clear that in the 1980s and the early 1990s, the Mexican segment of the population has been the most rapidly growing, in both proportional and absolute terms. The accelerated rate of migration from the Southwest and especially from Mexico to Michigan and the Midwest, has resulted in an increase in Mexican dominance throughout the region. In Michigan, according to the 1990 census, the population with Mexican background is about eight times larger than the second largest Latino group, the Puerto Ricans, and 28 times larger than the third group, Cubans (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1990b). The greatest source of diversity among the Latino population involves the Mexican population itself, increasingly distinguished by different generations, regional origins in Mexico and in the United States, and class differences.

In Michigan, the major source of population growth and the most striking demographic feature for Mexicans during this period was the growth of the population born in the United States, particularly second generation births. Meanwhile, migration directly from Mexico to the Midwest accelerated, beginning in the 1960s, in response to industries that were faring well or whose restructuring involved employers’ turning to a new work force. We can note the diversity of experiences in the contrasting histories of Detroit and Chicago as a result of this migration, suggesting the importance of a diverse economy seeking low-wage labor. While the Latino population of the Chicago metropolitan area increased from about 400,000 to 893,000 between 1970 and 1990, that of Detroit grew from only 70,000 to about 91,000 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990b).

The two cities reflect a sharply different geography of settlement and community formation in the two states. The settlement of Latinos in Michigan is more spread out than in Illinois, with significant concentrations throughout the southern half of the state. The pattern differs sharply from Illinois, where Chicago plays a central role. The 1990 census reported Chicago as the home of 57 percent of the state’s Mexican population; whereas, only 13 percent of Mexicans in Michigan resided in Detroit (Aponte and Siles 1994, p. 33). According to the 1990 census, Latinos are the largest minority group in 28 of Michigan’s 83 counties (for details, see the box on the next page).

Still another feature of the present cycle is the appearance of a small, but self-conscious, middle class, the result of struggles for education, increased schooling and demographics. Unlike the Southwest, there was no visible Mexican middle class in the Midwest a generation ago. This change, however, has not been sufficient to offset the more significant general feature of a sharp decline in material conditions for Latinos in the region, particularly since the late 1970s, measured both in comparison to the Euro-American population and in absolute terms (Aponte and Siles 1994, pages viii-ix; Saenz 1994 pages 2-3).

**CONCLUSION**

Key to understanding patterns of migration and community formation in the 20th century Midwest has been the relationship between Mexico and the United States — a geography linking the South and the North. The most rapidly-expanding communities in the region, whether in rural or urban settings, are those most influenced by immigration from Mexico. Paradigms based on the past experiences of European immigrants to and within the eastern United States or Chicano paradigms focusing on the Southwest do not adequately explain recent migration and community formation patterns. While insights introduced from other fields offer the potential of new types of understanding, we must simultaneously examine their premises closely, or we will fall into traps we thought we had already sprung.
DETAILS ABOUT MICHIGAN

Based on census figures for 1970-1990, Latino population growth was slower in the older Mexican settlements of eastern and southeastern Michigan. The slowest population increases in counties with over 1,000 people in 1990 were: Tuscola, 9 percent; Monroe, 11 percent; Wayne, 17 percent; Saginaw, 33 percent; Jackson 36 percent; Genesee, 37 percent; Macomb, 40 percent; and Lenawee, 47 percent. Meanwhile, the counties with most rapid growth in the state were located in western Michigan, typically representing places that, until recently, Mexicans had basically avoided, despite having been major sites of farmworker employment for many years. The sharpest population growth during the period occurred in the counties of Van Buren, 292 percent; Kent, 197 percent; Kalamazoo, 185 percent; Ottawa, 182 percent; Allegan, 153 percent; and Eaton, 153 percent. Oceana and Ionia experienced growth at least within this range, but from a much smaller base in 1970.

Impressionistic evidence also suggests that the expansion of Mexican colonias in the early 1990s has accelerated throughout Michigan, with particularly sharp increases in several counties in western Michigan and the Thumb region. Such rapid growth is characteristic of states throughout the Midwest, and the 1990s have seen the appearance of many new colonias in cities, small towns, and rural areas at a rate unsurpassed in the entire century. Overall, the places of most dynamic growth in recent years, whether in Chicago or rural Minnesota, have experienced the greatest rate of migration from Mexico, with smaller numbers of Tejanos typically interspersed.

REFERENCES

The cultural contacts of the Mexican immigrants in the United States are complicated by the fact that besides the modern American civilization there is another different Mexican-American culture, that of the Americans of Mexican origin. This civilization is American nominally, and exhibits the principal material aspects of modern American civilization, but intellectually and emotionally it lives in local Mexican traditions. This element can be said to constitute a peculiar nationality, within the United States. To the immigrant, it is a sort of go-between, since these Mexican-Americans do not feel racial prejudice against him. Though a struggle occurs between the purely Mexican culture and this semi-Mexican, in the end it often absorbs the Mexican immigrant. With it there can occur a closer fusion than with the purely American culture, for the latter it already shares many traits, while the great difference between the purely American and the purely Mexican, together with the factor of race prejudice, makes an intellectual, emotional, and traditional disparity too great to be bridged rapidly and perhaps never completely. (pp.64-65)

Caribbean migrants began coming to the United States at the beginning of this century with slightly more than 235,000 entering in the first two decades. By 1930, there were 40,000 Puerto Ricans, 90,000 West Indians, and around 30,000 Cubans (Kasinitz 1992, Johnson 1980, Prieto 1984, Portes and Grosfoguel 1994). However, it was not until after World War II that a large-scale movement of Caribbean peoples to the U.S. mainland occurred. Puerto Rico began sending migrants in significant numbers in the 1950s, largely as a result of labor recruiters in the mainland. Migrants from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Haiti began to arrive in large numbers after the early 1960s. Since then, the numbers of Caribbean migrants has grown steadily, with the 1980s witnessing a dramatic upturn. In fact, about half of the migrants living in the United States in 1990 from the Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Haiti arrived during the 1980s.

This paper assesses the differing socio-economic outcomes of migration for five Caribbean migrant groups — Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, and Jamaica. The narrative attempts to make sense of the diverse historical relationship of these groups, how these histories differentially affected who came, where they went, and what difference the place of settlement made for their respective situations.

Table 1 presents an overview of the socio-economic standing of these five Caribbean-origin groups in 1990 and shows a rather wide discrepancy in their living conditions in terms of levels of income, poverty, education, and home ownership. The poverty rates range from a high of 33.4 percent for Dominicans and 29.6 percent for Puerto Ricans, to a low of 11.1 percent for Jamaicans and 11.4 percent for Cubans. Similarly, Puerto Ricans and Dominicans have the lowest median household incomes, $21,056 and 20,006, respectively, whereas Jamaicans with a high of $30,461, are slightly above the average U.S. income, followed by Cubans and then Haitians. This clustering of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans at the lower end, with Jamaicans, Cubans, and Haitians at the upper end is repeated with the percentage of home ownership and levels of educational or occupational attainment. Dominicans have the highest unemployment rate, and while Puerto Ricans' unemployment rate is about the same as the Haitian rate, the Cuban and Jamaican rates are considerably lower.

Paradoxically, the apparently worst off have been here the longest. Puerto Ricans were among the earliest arrivals to the U.S. mainland, while the Dominicans were among the earliest of the post-1960 Caribbean immigrants. Also, somewhat counter-intuitive is the fact that those with the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Families in poverty (%)</th>
<th>Puerto Ricans</th>
<th>Dominicans</th>
<th>Haitians</th>
<th>Cubans</th>
<th>Jamaicans</th>
<th>U.S. Pop.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median household income ($)</td>
<td>21,056</td>
<td>20,006</td>
<td>25,547</td>
<td>27,741</td>
<td>30,461</td>
<td>30,056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeowners (%)</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>63.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduates (%)</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>56.6</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>75.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College graduates, 4 years + (%)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In professional occupations (%)</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In labor force, 16 years and over (%)</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>76.3</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>65.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%)</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female householder (%)</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The authors are grateful to the CUNY Data Service, and Melissa Levitt and John Mollenkopf in particular, for support in providing tabulations from the 1980 U.S. Census of Population for this paper, and to Rubén Rumbaut for his generous help with tabulations from the 1990 census.

Immigration Patterns and Immigrant Communities
most pronounced African heritage — the Jamaicans and Haitians — are among the most economically successful of the Caribbean-origin groups. How is it that those among the earliest to arrive are surpassed in a number of socio-economic indicators by groups who are likely more vulnerable to racial discrimination? To understand, we need to study the histories of each group and the nature of the ties of their homelands to the U.S. mainland which conditioned who came, how they came, where they went, and ultimately how well they fared in their places of settlement.

COMING TO AMERICA: THE TIMING, THE MOTIVES, THE CLASSES

All five of the Caribbean-origin groups share a history of colonial conquest of their island-homelands by European settlers. Plantation economies imposed by European settlers at the end of the 18th century relied on the massive importation of African slaves and indentured servants throughout the Caribbean region. In the 19th century, the gradual abolition of slavery and transition to production of sugar and a narrow range of other commodities for export left many people without land or jobs. Considerable migration within the Caribbean accompanied the growth of large-scale sugar and fruit production, controlled increasingly by U.S. interests. Then, in the early 1900s, U.S. military interventions in the region instigated Caribbean migration to the United States (Portes and Grosfoguel 1994, pp. 50-53).

The preponderant economic influence of the United States over the Caribbean in the early 1900s, tended to be accompanied by temporary political or military control. The differing relationships of these various Caribbean societies to the United States (or other colonial powers) affected the timing and selectivity of the outmigration from each area.

PUERTO RICO

Puerto Rico was a U.S. colony from 1898 until 1917 when Puerto Ricans were granted citizenship, eliminating any restrictions on migration. While some migration was induced by U.S. labor recruiters in the 1910s, relatively few Puerto Ricans came to the United States until the 1940s with the onset of World War II. The rapid economic growth following the war generated high demand for unskilled labor in the United States. Large numbers of Puerto Ricans responded. Still, they were mostly recruited by labor contractors who settled them in the northeastern industrial belt, mostly in the already declining neighborhoods of New York City. The need for unskilled labor in expanding industrial areas complemented the desire on the part of Puerto Rican authorities and U.S. interests to export sectors of the unskilled peasantry, thereby presenting Puerto Rico as a “showcase” of successful capitalist development in the emerging cold war climate (Grosfoguel 1995). This high rate of outmigration of the lower strata of Puerto Ricans beginning in the 1940s, peaking in the 1950s, permitted a more rapid growth in incomes for those remaining in Puerto Rico.

CUBA

The revolution and rise to power of Fidel Castro in 1959 was perceived as a direct threat to U.S. economic, political, and ideological interests in the region. During this crisis, the Cuban bourgeoisie with a history of reliance on the United States, asked for help as it became clear that the new Cuban government intended to redistribute much of their wealth. Waves of dissatisfied middle and upper class Cubans began entering the United States in the 1960s and into the 1970s. Over half of them had professional, managerial, or white collar backgrounds (Portes and Grosfoguel 1994, p. 8). This first wave of Cubans overwhelmingly preferred the urban area of Miami with its long history of tourist business links to pre-revolutionary Cuba and where a Cuban exile community had been established since the 19th century. Advantaged not only in terms of their occupational backgrounds, Cuban migrants also received preferential treatment in the form of social welfare services, including English training, through the Cuban Refugee Program (Pedraza-Bailey 1985).

Then in the early 1980s, Cubans from poorer strata came to the United States in large numbers — a migration ushered in by Cuban exiles leaving from Florida on boats to fetch their compatriots in Cuba, a movement referred to as the Mariel exodus. Whereas less than half of the working-age Cuban refugees entering the United States in the 1960s were blue-collar or service workers, approximately three-fourths of the refugees of the 1980s were. Like the earlier immigrants, these more recent arrivals also targeted Miami for settlement.
THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The dictatorship of General Trujillo from 1930-1961 severely restricted the movement of Dominicans both internally and externally. A five-year period of explosive political conflict over control of the government ensued after the assassination of Trujillo in 1961. The U.S. foreign policy concern was to avoid another Castro-style regime in the Caribbean. As a start, the U.S. consulate granted wider access to visas for Dominicans to enter the United States — a step perceived as a safety valve against further radical political mobilization (Mitchell 1992). During the Johnson administration, the island was occupied militarily to prevent a feared U.S. hostile, Juan Bosch and his constitutionalist party, from coming to power. Following five years of revolutionary upheaval, bloodshed, and economic stagnation, U.S.-sponsored elections put a Trujillo crony, Joaquin Balaquer, as president. Balaguer's right-of-center party remained in power for the next 12 years. At first, severe repression of dissidents by the Balaguer regime motivated some migration in the mid-1960s. Dominican oppositional leaders headquartered in New York, consolidating it the preferred destination of Dominicans. Supported by lenient U.S. visa policies, Balaguer exported potential sources of political opposition, especially urban-based, thereby helping to sustain his regime in power. Meanwhile, deteriorating economic conditions in the late 1970s and 1980s, accelerated the Dominican outflow.

The Dominicans who left in the late 1960s and 1970s were from the skilled and semi-skilled working class of urban areas. As Dominican economic conditions worsened in the 1980s, emigration surged — more than half of all Dominicans residing in the United States in 1990, arrived in the decade of the 1980s. These immigrants were also from urban working class backgrounds (Grasmuck and Pessar 1995). Despite the fact that Dominicans were not from the poorest or most unskilled sectors of their home society, their educational levels are low compared to the overall U.S. population. Moreover, as "unsponsored immigrants," rather than refugees, Dominicans received no social services to facilitate their transition into their central destination of New York City. Most ended up settling in the deteriorating neighborhoods of Washington Heights, the Lower East Side and in Queens close to Puerto Rican communities, their linguistic kin.

HAITI

Haitians share with Dominicans a history of U.S. military intervention and of political domination by a ruthless dictator for an extended period. For Haiti, this was the infamous father-son dictatorship of Francois Duvalier and Jean-Claude Duvalier from 1957 to 1986 (Nicholls 1985). The Duvalier regime, tolerated by the United States despite its internationally renowned record of human rights violations, created a wave of Haitian-U.S. migration beginning in the 1960s. More than one-third of the more than 18,000 Haitians who entered during the 1960s were professional or white-collar workers. Many of these arrivals went to New York City, although not in such concentration as the Dominicans.

Later, the pattern of migration shifted to new impoverished Haitians who arrived in boats in south Florida, seeking political asylum and relief from increasingly dire economic conditions on the island. Whereas approximately 55 percent of Haitians resided in New York City throughout the 1960s and 1970s, only 29 percent did so by 1990 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993). The proportion of professional and clerical workers dropped from more than one-third of the total immigrant population in the 1960s to 11 percent in the 1980s; more than three fourths of the much larger wave of Haitians in the 1980s were blue-collar and rural workers (U.S. Department of Justice 1991). In summary, over the 30-year period, the composition of the Haitian migrant population included many more from impoverished classes, and Miami overtook New York City as the place of highest concentration.

JAMAICA

As a former British colony, Jamaica's migration pattern differs from the other four Caribbean groups. Before World War II, West Indian migration took the form of low-wage labor migration to agricultural and transportation sites, especially in Central America, the United States and Cuba, encouraged and facilitated by the British colonial governments (Palmer 1995, p. 8). During the war, many Jamaicans left for Britain to serve in the armed forces. After the war, unemployment in Jamaica rose to dramatically high levels, with 30 percent of the labor force out of work (Palmer, p. 9). Up until the early 1960s, Jamaicans, as citizens of the United Kingdom, could migrate to England with ease and did so; over 160,000 Jamaicans moved to Britain between
1953 and 1962 (Palmer, p. 10). During this same period, Jamaican migration to the United States was severely restricted by the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 that virtually denied entrance to any from Europe's colonial dependencies.

Three events in 1962 redirected the flow of Jamaicans from Britain to the United States. First, Britain effectively cut off immigration for work from the British West Indies by instituting the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, a racially discriminatory law that did not exclude Irish immigrants. Second, Jamaica achieved political independence from Britain, making it no longer a European colonial dependency. Then, in 1965, a change in the U.S. immigration law and expanding economic demand encouraged a large movement of Jamaicans to the United States. Between 1960 and 1990, more than 400,000 Jamaicans entered the United States, constituting an estimated 17 percent of the total Jamaican population.

Thus, Jamaican migrants are concentrated at both ends of the occupational spectrum — at upper echelons are professional and white collar workers; at the lower, mostly service workers. This class composition remained fairly constant between 1960 and 1990 with white collar workers representing about 30 percent (U.S. Department of Justice 1991). Despite their potential vulnerability to racial discrimination, this relatively high proportion of middle class migrants, plus Jamaicans' ability to speak English, has given them definite advantages over the other Caribbean immigrant groups.

Table 2. Decade of Entry for Legal Immigrants from the Caribbean, 1920-1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1920-1940</th>
<th>1940s</th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>1960s</th>
<th>1970s</th>
<th>1980s</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Ricans</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>1,141,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominicans</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>497,031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaicans</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>437,330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haitians</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>236,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubans</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>752,443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>422,159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes nationalities listed in the table when their actual proportion was not ascertained, plus migrants from other countries in the region.

Dominicans arrived. In contrast, Haitian and Jamaican migrants had a higher proportion of upper-sector workers than either the Dominicans or Puerto Ricans. They also came mostly to New York City, but their influx was never as great as that of the Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, and they dispersed more rapidly to other places. Still, New York City held onto more of the upper sectors of the Haitian population, while secondary destinations drew a disproportionate share of blue-collar workers and rural laborers who came later. Cubans, both the upper strata that came right after the revolution and the second wave of Mariel refugees of more humble backgrounds, overwhelmingly settled in Miami.

With the exception of the Cuban experience, then, New York City has been an important place of settlement for Caribbean immigrants, especially for Puerto Ricans and Dominicans. Moreover, these two groups with the lowest socio-economic background profiles remain relatively concentrated in New York City. The more class-advantaged of the Haitians and Jamaicans also came to New York. There was a high cost of choosing New York City, especially for the Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, given their social backgrounds and the changing nature of the economy there after the war. Details of the New York story follow.

**NEW YORK CITY — EXTREME DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND ETHNIC SUCCESSION IN THE GARMENT INDUSTRY**

Over the last three decades, a major industrial transformation in the United States resulted in a dramatic decline in industrial production jobs and an accompanying increase in service sector employment (Bluestone and Harrison 1981). This "deindustrialization" occurred in all regions of the country, but the timing, pace, and intensity differ by city (Ortiz 1991, p. 119), with New York City being the case par excellence. Between 1960 and 1980, New York City lost 450,000 manufacturing jobs (Fitch 1994, p. 37). The scale of this loss was much greater than those in other central cities — a 67 percent decline in New York between 1966 and 1991. And less educated workers were the most affected (Ortiz 1991, p. 123).

The repercussions of this decline in manufacturing jobs would have been even more dramatic had it not been accompanied by an overall drop in population in New York during the 1970s, when more than 900,000 workers left the city. While deindustrialization has been associated in many urban contexts with an accompanying increase in service sector employment and high-wage professional jobs, in the New York case there were additional complicating factors. Severe competition for real estate from commercial and high-rent residential interests supported by public economic development efforts independently aggravated the squeeze on manufacturing in New York City with important consequences for some of the Caribbean groups (Fitch 1994).

Since the beginning of the century, immigrant groups in New York City have been closely associated with the garment industry. During the first two decades of the 20th Century, a factory-based clothing industry emerged in American cities, with New York City's garment manufacture surpassing all others. From the very beginning the growth of this industry, stimulated by demand for ready-made clothing, depended heavily on immigrant labor. At first, most immigrant labor drew from among the approximately 460,000 eastern European Jews and 390,000 Italians who arrived in the United States between 1880 and 1920 (Waldinger 1986, p. 51). Eventually, New York's preeminence in garments declined due to: changing consumer preferences for more leisure-type clothing rather than New York's more formal, traditional products; increasing low-cost international competition; and a persistent search for lower-cost labor in other parts of the United States (Waldinger 1986, pgs. 56-79). Nonetheless, New York remained competitive by serving as a spot market specializing in small facilities that produce small quantities of short-lived fashions, aided by the close proximity of designers and merchandisers. Importantly, the New York industry has continued to rely on the low-cost immigrant and minority worker labor (Waldinger 1986, p. 190).

While it may true over the 20th Century that first-generation immigrants in New York look to the garment industry for employment, it appears that their children do not. By the early 1940s there was a marked exodus from this sector of white ethnic workers seeking more lucrative opportunities for themselves and their children. Southern blacks migrating to northern cities in large numbers served as their initial replacements. Between 1940 and 1943, the number of black workers in the garment industry...
increased by 60 percent, and this reliance on black labor intensified even more after the war. As the exodus of white ethnics accelerated, Puerto Ricans, who had just begun their large-scale movement to the mainland, joined blacks as substitutes for departing white ethnics. By the late 1940s and early 1950s the skirt industry was almost exclusively dependent on newly arrived Puerto Rican labor (Waldinger 1986, p. 10).

**After Garments No Place To Go — The Down Side of New York**

Fifty-three percent of all Puerto Ricans employed in New York in 1960 worked in manufacturing, especially in garments and related industry (U.S. Department of Labor 1968, p. 17). But then, wages in apparel jobs shrank in comparison with alternative sources of employment in New York, making garment factory work less attractive, especially to northern blacks and New York-born Puerto Ricans who didn’t want the same fate as their immigrant parents. At the same time, employment possibilities in other manufacturing jobs in New York were rapidly drying up (Fitch 1994, p. 46). During the 1960s, the labor force participation of Puerto Rican males dropped from 79 percent to 66 percent, remaining at that level during the 1970s (Torres 1995, p. 62). Due to the 1960s civil and labor rights struggles, Puerto Ricans began to claim social and labor rights that garment employers were not willing to concede. And as new immigrants, who were willing to work for less, became available, employers had little interest in making concessions to Puerto Ricans (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991). Finally, any incentive to remain in increasingly undesirable, low-wage, seasonally unstable jobs in the garment industry was further weakened by a rapidly expanding welfare system. Weekly earnings from apparel manufacture fell a level of 160 percent of welfare benefits to 130 percent between 1960 and 1970 (Waldinger 1986, p. 111).

Puerto Ricans’ reliance on welfare in the 1960s as an escape from the deteriorating conditions in the garment industry and because of the sharp decline in other sources of manufacturing employment was not countered by any new opportunities for more desirable employment. Thus, the ethnic recycling that formerly had characterized the garment industry where one group entered but after one or two generations moved out and up, became, in the Puerto Rican case, one of entering and then moving out — and staying out — out of the labor force altogether. Thus, the large-scale growth of an underclass sector of Puerto Ricans with weak or non-existent ties to the labor market can be traced to this period of manufacturing displacement.

The Dominican story in many ways is a repetition of the Puerto Rican experience, only it occurred faster. The 1980 profile of Dominicans closely resembles Puerto Ricans two decades earlier, with a concentration in manufacturing, principally in garment trades (about half of the population in both groups were in garments). By 1990, the Dominican profile again resembles that of Puerto Ricans one decade earlier (less than one-third of both groups were still in garments). There are, however, important differences in the two stories. Recall that when Dominicans moved to New York City, they lived in close proximity to Puerto Ricans. The fact that the garment industry had already organizationally adjusted itself to Puerto Ricans by using bilingual supervisors and employee mediators (Hendricks 1974, p. 76) facilitated the Dominican entry. So, by the late 1960s, Dominicans and other Hispanic immigrants had replaced the departing Puerto Ricans. By 1980, almost half of the total Dominican population in New York was employed in manufacturing (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, p. 177).

This large influx of Hispanic, and increasingly Asian, immigrant labor (as well as new immigrant entrepreneurs) into the garment industry was understood as essential to keeping the sector competitive (Sassen-Koob 1986, Waldinger 1986). New immigrants, especially those without documents, tolerated substandard working and wage conditions.

In the 1970s, older entrepreneurs moved up from garments into higher-profit activities. This opening, plus the availability of cheap factory space, stimulated the entry of immigrant

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1During the 1960s, New York manufacturing lost 181,000 jobs; in the 1970s, another 270,000.
2Some Puerto Ricans, of course, did benefit from newly created jobs in white-collar sectors. There was, for example, an increase from 7.5 to 16.2 percent of Puerto Ricans employed in social services between 1960 and 1970 (Grasmuck and Grosfoguel 1995).
3This concentration was even higher among undocumented Dominicans.
entrepreneurs who tended to hire their co-ethnics (large numbers of Dominicans). Then, in the late 1970s, early 1980s, international competition and strong import penetration provoked a sharp decline in national garment production (Waldinger 1986, p. 192). At the same time, the cost of industrial space in Manhattan increased significantly. Commercial firms, aided by local development efforts and generous financing, outbid garment interests in the competition for space (Waldinger 1986, p. 194). Real estate displacement of manufacturing interests by financial and commercial ones constituted a large part of New York City's deindustrialization, severely contracting the sector employing so many Dominican immigrants (Fitch 1994, p. 43).

The sector in which Dominicans were highly concentrated in the early 1970s severely contracted over the decade. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that Dominican firms, already smaller and more short-lived than other garment firms, fared especially poorly during this industrial decline. One solution to the internal and external squeezes in the market was to turn to more sophisticated, higher-priced fashion items, a shift more evident among Chinese firms (Waldinger 1986, p. 195). Indeed, for a host of reasons, including better access to a larger co-ethnic labor force, Chinese garment firms outperformed Dominican ones during this period (Waldinger 1986, p. 189).

Thus, the overall pressures on the garment industry disproportionately affected Dominican firms, further contributing to the pressures pushing Dominican workers out of manufacturing during the 1980s and resulting in a reduction in their representation in manufacturing by almost half (to 27 percent).

In contrast, other Caribbean immigrants in New York fared better than either the Puerto Ricans or Dominicans due to better education, and, especially, better English skills. In the early 1980s when almost half of all Dominicans were working in manufacturing jobs, only 23 percent of the Cubans, 13 percent of the Haitians, and 12 percent of the Jamaicans were so employed — so, as a group, they suffered less from deindustrialization. Over half of the Jamaicans worked in the better paid social and business service sectors in 1980. The greater employment heterogeneity of the other Caribbean immigrants, made possible by their higher educational and occupational levels explains, in a large part, their relatively higher social-economic status enjoyed in the 1980s (see Table 1).

Another important factor in explaining their respective fates is the differing patterns of labor force participation of women. Since World War II, a two-earner household strategy has been the best assurance for getting ahead economically in the United States (Garfinkle and McLanahan 1986), while male unemployment has been consistently linked worldwide to increases in female-headed households and poverty (Katzman 1992, Engle and Breaux 1994, Wilson 1987). The statistics — high rates of male unemployment, low rates of female labor force participation, and high rates of female-head-of-household — all characterize the Puerto Rican and Dominican communities in New York. In 1980, women's labor force participation ranged from 32.5 and 49.0 percent for Puerto Ricans and Dominicans, respectively, to 60.2 percent, 64.8 percent, and 73.4 percent for Cubans, Haitians and Jamaicans (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1983). Understanding the factors that keep participation lower for Puerto Rican and Dominican women is crucial to improving their welfare.

Implicit in the argument that there was something unique about the labor market experience and neighborhood segregation of Puerto Ricans and Dominicans in New York City that selectively disadvantaged them is the expectation that Dominicans and Puerto Ricans outside the context of New York City did better socially and economically — an expectation borne out by 1990 census data: Poverty rates for Puerto Ricans in New York City were 38 percent, compared to 31 percent, elsewhere; for Dominicans, 32 percent, compared to 25 percent elsewhere. In New York City, 40.9 percent of Puerto Rican households were headed by females, compared to 26.8 percent elsewhere; females constituted 39.6 percent of Dominican householders in New York City, 23.5 percent, elsewhere.

The effect of the New York context is exactly the reverse for Haitians and Jamaicans who both have lower rates of poverty in New York (15.1 percent and 9.4 percent, respectively) than outside (23.2 percent and 14.8 percent). This result relates to the fact that the more affluent among the Haitians and Jamaicans came to New York, while the less affluent settled elsewhere.
CONCLUSION

Some important lessons can be drawn from this multifaceted story of the dominant Caribbean migratory flows and from the particular histories of each group. Certainly, no definitive history of any immigrant group can be based on national averages. Rather, immigrant culture is realized differently in different contexts. Immigrants come with varying amounts of social capital to spend, and they take advantage, but are also severely constrained by, the range of possibilities in their chosen place of settlement.

The needs and interests of the United States in the Caribbean islands were far from uniform. The diversity of these former geopolitical ties had "boomerang" repercussions for the kind of immigrants able and willing to leave for a new life in the United States. Migrants' diverse socio-economic backgrounds interacted in important and lasting ways with the local economic climate in the settlement areas. Economic and social outcomes differed not only among the five groups studied, but also within each of the groups.

In the current context of debate, contention, and global judgements about immigration, we must carefully consider how particular local circumstances may be responsible, in less than obvious ways, for what makes migrant winners or losers.

SIDEPOINT

STEVEN J. GOLD, 1992

While immigrant communities are in flux, so are the theoretical prisms through which social scientists view them. Over the course of this century, sociologists have radically transformed their interpretation of immigrant collectiveness. Until the 1960s, most studies depicted ethnic communities as unsavory settings that had a harmful effect upon their members. Since that time, however, immigrant communities have been appreciated as the source of many benefits for their participants and for the larger society as well.

REFERENCES
Emerging Latino Populations in Rural New York
Enrique E. Figueroa

The portrait of what is developing in rural New York state with respect to Latino immigrants is relevant to other parts of the northeastern United States. And any policy implications have applicability beyond New York.

According to U.S. Census of Population data, between 1980 and 1990, the Hispanic population in New York State (NYS) grew by 33.4 percent to 2.2 million persons in 1990, while the state as a whole grew by only 2.5 percent to 18.0 million. Within the Hispanic category, the Mexican population grew at 141 percent — a rate higher than any other group, Hispanic or Non-Hispanic, reaching 90,000 persons. Puerto Ricans totaled 1.1 million in 1990, while Dominicans numbered 360,000.

Nonmetropolitan inhabitants represent only 10 percent of NYS’s population, and only 1.7 percent of the state’s Hispanic population resides in nonmetropolitan areas. However, Hispanics in nonmetropolitan areas had a higher growth rate — 86.5 percent.

DATA DIFFiculties
The March 1993 Current Population Survey of the U.S. Bureau of the Census provides an annual geographical and ethnic distribution of the 18-64 year-old population in NYS. For the “Mexican” and “Mexican-American” populations in nonmetropolitan areas, the survey indicates a zero population for both groups. When I discussed this (unbelievable) figure with personnel at the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Office of Hispanic Enumeration, they admitted to its questionability. Indeed, the Office would not count the figure as at all reliable.

This situation highlights a fact crucial to immigration policy and relevant to Latino communities — the difficulty of obtaining accurate data on rural populations of Latinos. Annual Hispanic enumeration in rural communities is made difficult because:

- Sampling technique and sample size decrease the probability of accurately enumerating Latinos because of where they live in rural communities.
- Undocumented Latinos will generally not cooperate with enumerators.
- Single males — irrespective of ethnicity — are more difficult to enumerate.

Therefore, since most Latinos in rural areas are single males, Latinos are surely undercounted and we know they don’t number zero.

Like many other communities in rural America, New York, and particularly western and central New York state, is experiencing a rapid growth in the Latino population. Though the growth has been primarily in numbers of migrants, there is some evidence that Latinos are settling in communities. Unfortunately, official census statistics do not reflect an increase in the Latino population in rural New York, even though the Mexican and Mexican-American populations in New York City show the rates of growth larger than any other group over the last decade. Also, since the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, New York’s agricultural labor force has progressively become more Latino — primarily Mexicans and Mexican-Americans.

Increases in immigrant populations — be they Latino or not — present new challenges to rural communities, particularly in regard to the delivery of social service programs. Community acceptance or non-acceptance of immigrants is influenced by national issues such as the passage of Proposition 187 in California, the deteriorating economic climate in Mexico, and the general national concern about our country’s inability to control its borders. These national issues are faced, with varying levels of success, at the local level when Latino immigrants reside in the communities during their migrant stay or establish residency there.
Latinos in NYS Agriculture

My experience in working with horticultural product producers in NYS indicates that there are significantly large numbers of Latinos — particularly Mexican and Mexican-Americans — in rural NYS. My own research surveying the state’s vegetable growers in 1992, showed sizable numbers of Mexicans and Mexican-Americans in the farm labor force. Also, the number of farm labor contractors (FLC) and number of workers under FLCs has increased since 1987 in NYS.

This increase in FLC-labor can be partly attributed to their ability to communicate in Spanish, whereas many producers cannot. Also, the paperwork and regulations imposed by the Immigration Reform and Control (IRCA) of 1986 prompted producers to shift these responsibilities to FLCs.

My survey also showed that the crop mix in NYS has slightly shifted towards more labor intensive crops since 1987. This development indicates that IRCA did not reduce the availability of workers — particularly undocumented workers.

In NYS, the labor force for the largest commodity-based employer of farm labor — the apple harvest — has historically been composed of African-American and, to a lesser extent, Haitians. Also, approximately 2,500 Jamaicans under the H-2 or H-2A programs were imported for apple harvesting. Since IRCA, however, the labor force has changed dramatically and is now primarily Latino. This change has created some tensions in some rural communities between members of the historical African-American labor force and new Latino workers.

A related problem is the English-speaking monolingual staff of social service agencies with mandates to assist farm workers and their families. Their inability to communicate adequately with their clients has tended to diminish the quality of services delivered.

Also, many policy makers and social service staff members in NYS interpret the term Hispanic to mean Puerto Ricans. As we all know, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans or Mexican-Americans are not the same in terms of customs, historical presence in agricultural labor, level of documentation, migrancy, or interest in settling out of the migrant stream. Overcoming the publicly-held notion that Hispanics are primarily, if not entirely, Puerto Ricans in the Northeast will take time. However, this misconception is probably unique to NYS and the rest of the Northeast.

Policy Implications

Latinos in much of rural America are migrants, or the recent descendants of migrants. In NYS, most Latinos in rural areas are there between June and October, so if a census is taken between November and April, most will not be counted. Though some would argue that migrants should not be enumerated because they are not residents of NYS, from a public policy perspective Latinos constitute a sizable population in rural NYS during half the year. If public policy is formulated based on inaccurate data that does not recognize their presence, then surely the policies arrived at will be suboptimal.
**Immigration to the United States:**
**Journey to an Uncertain Destination**

**Philip Martin**

**IMMIGRATION: A MAJOR POLICY ISSUE**

Immigration is a major public policy issue at the end of the 20th century, just as it was at the beginning. It consistently ranks as one of the "top ten" U.S. issues in public opinion polls today. The debate over immigration stems from many factors, but three stand out:

- Rising numbers of immigrants (about one million persons annually — legal and unauthorized),
- The failure of 1980s immigration reforms to achieve their objectives, and
- A world-wide sense that immigration is getting out of control.

First, the number of immigrants arriving is large, and there are significant differences between immigrants and most of the U.S.-born population. No one knows exactly what the consequences of today's immigration will be, so that some forecasters paint optimistic scenarios of diverse peoples living harmoniously, while others project pessimistic scenarios in which various ethnic and racial groups are pitted against one another.

Second, the federal government has exclusive authority to make immigration policy, yet it has not been effective at enforcing those policies it makes. On numerous occasions, the aims of immigration reforms have been undone by unanticipated or unintended consequences, from those in 1965 that set off a wave of Asian migration, to those in 1986 that gave a boost to the false documents industry.

Third, the United States shares with most other industrial countries fears about out-of-control immigration. There are about 100 million persons living outside their country of citizenship, including 25 million in the United States and Canada, 20 million in Western Europe, and two million in Japan. If assembled in one place, these immigrants would constitute the world's 10th largest nation (Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994).

Western Europe and Japan are looking to the United States for advice on how to deal with south-to-north migration pressures. Perhaps the most important lesson from the U.S. experience is that immigration occurs in waves — large-scale immigration induces control measures that reduce it, so that peaks are always followed by troughs. Based on U.S. immigration history, it is likely that steps will be taken today to reduce future levels of immigration (Briggs 1992).

**NUMBERS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF RECENT U.S. IMMIGRANTS**

More immigrants are arriving in the United States than ever before — an average 2,500 legal immigrants come every day (900,000 per year). Meanwhile, 60,000 non-immigrant visitors arrive daily (21.5 million); 5,000 of these are illegal aliens — slipping into the United States, usually at night (an estimated two million illegal entries per year), or arriving legally, say as a tourist, and then violating the terms of their admission by going to work or not returning to their countries of citizenship. An estimated 800 unauthorized aliens settle in the United States every day, adding 300,000 illegal aliens to the four million believed to be here in fall 1994.

Is the number of foreigners arriving in the United States too high, about right, or too low? There are two ways to look at immigration flows, by rate and by absolute numbers. The number of legal immigrants per 100 U.S. residents — the immigration rate — was higher at the beginning of the 20th century: One million immigrants arrived in 1910, when the U.S. population was 91 million, meaning that the United States added about 1 percent to its population through immigration. Almost none of them were non-immigrants (they were coming to stay) or illegal entries. Today, however, the 900,000 legal immigrants in a population of 260 million, represents only a one-third of 1 percent population increase.

So, the rate of immigration is lower today, but immigrants contribute far more to U.S. population growth today than they did in the early 1900s. At the beginning of the 20th century, legal immigration accounted for about 20 percent of annual U.S. population growth; today, for almost 30 percent. But including illegal immigration, total immigration amounts to as...
much as 40 percent of the U.S. annual population growth. A contributing factor in these percentages is the low birth rate among American women today.

If immigration continues at today’s rates, the U.S. population will be almost one-fourth larger in 2050 than it would be without immigration. Continued immigration will also change the ethnic composition of the U.S. population — White non-Hispanics and Blacks represented 88 percent of the 1990 population; they are projected to be 68 percent of the 2050 population (Table 1 and Figure 1).

Three-fourths of today’s immigrants are from Latin America and Asia, a marked change from the 1950s, when almost 70 percent were from Western Europe and Canada. And today’s immigrants differ markedly from U.S.-born citizens in the single-best indicator of economic success — years of education. Most adult U.S.-born adults in 1990 had a high school education, but not a college degree, so that, if Americans were lined up by years of education, they would generate a diamond-shaped pattern, with the biggest concentration at the high school diploma marker. By contrast, the distribution of recent immigrants by years of education would form an hourglass (with a much larger bottom than top); i.e., A higher percentage of adult immigrants who arrived during the 1980s have a college or professional degree than do U.S.-born citizens, and almost twice as many recent immigrants were without a high school diploma than were U.S. citizens.

Immigration Policy

Experience does not seem to be a good teacher about making immigration policy. Despite two centuries of experience with immigration, the unintended consequences of the three major 1980s immigration policy changes have been more significant than their intended effects:

First, the Refugee Act of 1980 did not resolve the issue of federal reimbursement for the costs of settling refugees in the United States. The federal government makes newly-arrived refugees eligible for welfare, but reimburses states only while the annual appropriation for this purpose lasts. With budget cuts, federal reimbursement for refugee assistance has decreased from 36 to six months.6

Second, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 has not reduced illegal immigration. IRCA’s employer sanctions and legalization programs represented a compromise between those who wanted to reduce illegal immigration and those who wanted to be generous to the unauthorized aliens who had developed a stake in the United States.

The legalization part of this “Grand Bargain” was quite successful — almost three million unauthorized aliens became legal immigrants. However, the lure of legalization and the threat of sanctions encouraged the growth of the false documents industry, converting “undocumented workers” into “documented illegals,” and rendering sanctions ineffective at closing the labor market door to unauthorized workers. By most measures, the illegal alien population is growing as fast today as it did in the early 1980s before IRCA was enacted.7

Finally, the Immigration Act of 1990 was enacted in response to the feeling that more immigrants should be selected on the basis of the economic contributions they can make to the United States, so that through immigration, U.S. competitiveness in the global economy could be bolstered. However, the overall immigration quota was also raised, and by so much that most immigrants continue to arrive because of their ties to family members already here, not because of their potential economic contributions.

Thus, the unintended or unanticipated consequences of the three major immigration reforms of the 1980s proved to be more significant than their intended consequences. This is one reason that Americans are skeptical of the government’s ability to deal effectively with immigration and seem willing to embrace extreme solutions for immigration issues, such as

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6Nor did the Refugee Act of 1980 deal with asylum-seekers — those who arrive in the United States asking to stay on the grounds that, if they are returned to their countries of citizenship, they will face persecution there. The number asking for safe haven — about 120,000 in fiscal year 1993 — now about equals the number of refugees that the United States selects from safe havens abroad to be resettled here — 119,000 that same year.

7Illegal immigration may be increasing even faster in 1995, as a result of recession in Mexico and recovery in California. Compared to year-earlier levels, apprehensions along the US-Mexican border were up 10 percent in January, 38 percent in February, and 40 percent in March 1995. Apprehensions totaled 512,000 in the first six months of FY95, up 15 percent over FY94. About one million illegal aliens were apprehended in FY94, including 65 percent in San Diego and El Paso, and another 15 percent in the Tucson and south Texas areas.
as Proposition 187 (see box on next page).

**Immigrant Economic Impacts**

Most immigrants come to the United States for economic opportunity, so a major issue is how their presence affects economic opportunities for U.S.-born workers, especially those of lower educational attainment. Economic theory predicts that large numbers of immigrants would depress the wages of similar American workers or displace them from jobs. Case studies have supported this theory. For example, Los Angeles janitorial services using unionized American workers were dislodged by labor contractors hiring migrants, many of whom were illegal. But it is in California agriculture, an industry that employs 1 in 20 workers in the state sometime during the year, that the labor displacement and wage depression effects of large-scale unskilled immigration become even more evident.

Until the 1980s, most farm labor leaders opposed illegal immigration and endorsed employer sanctions and other policies designed to reduce it. During the 1950s and 1960s, Ernesto Galarza, Julian Samora, and Cesar Chavez called for a beefed up border patrol and stiff employer sanctions. In the 1970s and 1980s, the United Farm Workers, a major farm labor leader, called for more open guest-worker programs but never endorsed illegal immigration. But in the 1990s, most farm labor leaders have endorsed guest-worker programs. This is partly because the laws have changed, and partly because of the dramatic increase in the number of guest workers, which now exceeds the number of migrants who would have entered if there had been no adjustment to immigration laws.

### Table 1. U.S. Population, 1990-2050

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2030</th>
<th>2050</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Total Population (millions)</td>
<td>249,415</td>
<td>298,109</td>
<td>344,951</td>
<td>382,674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic White</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic origin</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Indian</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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Immigrant worker impacts can be even more significant if the migrants are guest workers with restricted work and residence rights in the host society (Miller and Martin, 1982).
Proposition 187

California voters on November 8, 1994, voted 59 to 41 percent to approve Proposition 187, the “Save Our State” Initiative. Proposition 187 primarily creates a state-mandated screening system for persons seeking tax-supported benefits. In the language of Proposition 187 — no person — citizen, legal immigrant or illegal immigrant — “shall receive any public social services to which he or she may otherwise be entitled until the legal status of that person has been verified.”

Proposition 187 has five major sections. As of May 1995, only the fifth section of Prop 187 has been implemented.

First, it bars illegal aliens from the state’s public education systems from kindergarten through university, and requires public educational institutions to begin verifying the legal status of both students (effective January 1, 1995, but stayed by court order) and their parents (effective January 1, 1996).

Second, Proposition 187 requires all providers of publicly-paid, nonemergency health care services to verify the legal status of persons seeking services in order to be reimbursed by the state of California. Persons seeking emergency care must also establish their legal status, but all persons, including unauthorized aliens, must be provided emergency health services.

Third, Proposition 187 requires that persons seeking cash assistance and other benefits, verify their legal status. Unauthorized aliens are generally not eligible for such benefits, so this provision adds a state-run verification system on top of the current federal screening system.

Fourth, all service providers are required to report suspected illegal aliens to California’s attorney general and to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This means that those enrolling children in school, or clerks determining whether someone is eligible for public benefits, report any they suspect of being unauthorized aliens. Also, state and local police must determine the legal status of persons arrested and report suspected unauthorized aliens.

Fifth, the making, distribution, and use of false documents to obtain public benefits or employment by concealing one’s legal status is now a state felony, punishable by fines and prison terms.*

Proposition 187 may mark the beginning of a national effort to reduce legal and illegal immigration, much as Proposition 13 in 1978 arguably laid the basis for the Reagan-era tax cuts of the early 1980s. On the other hand, Proposition 187 may turn out to be a largely symbolic expression of frustration with illegal immigration, much as Proposition 63, which made English the state’s “official language” in 1986, proved to be.

*Proposition 187 does not pertain, for example, to teenagers who use false documents to buy alcohol.
sanctions to stop illegal immigration.

Immigration marked the rise and fall of the United Farm Workers (UFW) union in California. In 1965, Cesar Chavez organized a strike by California grape harvesters to protest grower refusal to pay local workers the same wages that they were required to pay to non-immigrant Mexican Bracero workers. With no Braceros to replace the strikers, Chavez’s UFW was able in 1966 to win a 40 percent wage increase. Then, in 1980, the UFW asked for another 40 percent increase. After a bitter strike that saw growers turn to labor contractors who organized crews of mostly illegal workers to be strike breakers, the UFW won an Pyrrhic victory — many companies that agreed to UFW demands, but then went out of business. UFW membership fell from a peak of perhaps 60,000 in the late 1970s to as few as 5,000 in the early 1990s. After Chavez died in 1993, the UFW resumed efforts to organize farm workers. In December 1994, the union won an election to represent the 1,400 workers employed by Bear Creek, better known as Jackson-Perkins, the rose company. On March 17, 1995, the UFW negotiated a three-year contract that increases wages and benefits 22 percent over the life of the contract, sets a $5.82 hourly starting wage, and offers nine paid holidays, including Chavez’s birthday, March 31st.

These displacement and depression effects of unskilled immigration so apparent in case studies in agriculture, are rarely found in econometric studies that try to measure the effects of immigrants in cities such as Los Angeles (Borjas 1990). Even in Miami, which absorbed 125,000 Cubans in 1980 after the Mariel boatlift, adding about 7 percent to its work force, there seemed to be no measurable wage depression or job displacement effects on U.S.-born workers because of large-scale immigration.

The failure to find expected wage depression and job displacement effects in statistical studies led most economists to conclude that the case study effects were isolated and not significant (U.S. Department of Labor 1989). More recent data and analyses, however, suggest that an influx of immigrants does affect American workers, but in an unexpected manner. Unskilled Americans tend to move away from immigrant cities such as Miami or Los Angeles, or do not move to them, in part because of competition in the labor market.

Economists’ conclusions about the economic progress of immigrants are also changing. Studies in the early 1980s suggested that the immigrants who arrived in the 1950s and 1960s started out in the United States with lower earnings than Americans similar to them in education and age but, within 15 to 20 years, the extra drive and ambition of immigrants enabled them to earn more than their American counterparts. However, this story of hard-working immigrants making it in America seems to be changing. Most immigrants still work hard, and the well-educated continue to catch up to Americans in income. But there is new evidence that the less educated are no longer likely to catch up. Unless immigrants are able to obtain the education and job skills needed to succeed in the United States, this country may be adding to its frustrated underclass by way of immigration.

PUBLIC FINANCES

There is currently a debate over the public benefits and costs of immigrants. As framed by California Governor, Pete Wilson, the question is whether recent immigrants pay more in taxes than they consume in tax-paid services. Governor Wilson argues that 10 percent of California’s $50 billion annual budget goes to provide services to recent legal and illegal aliens, and he has sued the federal government to reimburse the state for about one-third of these costs.

Taxes paid and the costs of services provided are hard to estimate accurately. All studies agree that most of the (social security and income) taxes paid by immigrants accrue to the federal government, while the costs of the services low-earning immigrants are most likely to consume — education, health care, public safety, etc. — are paid by state and local governments. The federal government’s income tax is the nation’s premier tax collecting system — even middle class Americans often do not pay enough in state and local taxes to cover the cost of the local services they consume.

The real question is how much immigrants will earn and how much federal income tax they will pay over their lifetimes. Another way of saying this is that the real question is the economic mobility of immigrants and their children. And the key to economic mobility for many immigrants is learning English.
One of the rare points of agreement in the immigration debate is that learning English is the key to upward mobility in America. Most immigrants arrive in the United States not speaking English. In the past, it was not until the third generation that immigrants’ children were completely at home in English (Fuchs 1990).

The shift to English may be speeding up — today, many second generation children have mastered English. Nevertheless, in today’s information economy, even the immigrant generation needs to be bilingual if it is to have above-poverty-level incomes. It may be that our expectations have changed more than immigrants have changed — we are no longer willing to have an immigrant generation, nor their children, consigned to lower-than-average U.S. earnings (Piore, 1979).

The presence of large numbers of immigrants raises important questions about what it means to be an American and how immigrants can and should integrate into U.S. society. Most immigrants do not become naturalized citizens, even 10 years after their arrival (they must be here five years before applying for citizenship).

Naturalization rates vary by country of origin. They are lowest for immigrants from countries closest to the United States, such as Mexico (16% of those who arrived in the 1970s were U.S. citizens in 1992) and Canada (14%). They are highest for those from distant countries who do not intend to return to and from which they hope to bring family members, such as Vietnam (86%) and China (65%).

In all of fiscal year 1994, 558,139 naturalization applications were filed, while in the first quarter of fiscal year 1995 (October-December 1994), 234,000 applications were already filed — a pace of almost one million-a-year. The Los Angeles INS district has been receiving 1,500 or more naturalization applications every day in 1995, double the number in 1994 (about half of California’s naturalization applicants are believed to be in the Los Angeles area).

Whenever immigrants and U.S.-born residents interact, both change. The actual effect is somewhere in between two extremes: from complete assimilation of immigrants into American culture to pluralist or multiculturalist arguments that immigrants should retain their cultures in the United States and that Americans should accept both immigrants and their cultures. A middle ground is represented by the concept of “pluralistic integration” — the idea that all Americans must respect a common civic culture, but minorities should be free to preserve their own culture. Scholars across the admissionist-restrictionist spectrum worry that there is too little interaction between Americans and immigrants today.

A FINAL NOTE

The debate over immigration and its effects on American society is not new, and assertions that everything will work out for good or bad have usually proven wrong (Higham 1984, Archdeacon 1983). For example, Benjamin Franklin worried that German immigrants arriving in 18th century Pennsylvania would be a stubborn, indigestible lump: “Instead of learning our language, we must learn theirs, or live as in a foreign country.”

On the other hand, it is also true that, by the time we know for sure whether today’s newcomers will be a benefit or burden, it may be too late to act (Bouvier 1991). Uneasiness arises from the fact that demography can shape a society’s destiny, a point is well-illustrated by the probably apocryphal story of the dying American Indian chief who, in the 1880s, was asked by his young braves to name the major mistake of his generation. His reply was simple: We failed to stop the illegal immigration of the white man.
REFERENCES


SIDEPOINT

MANUEL GAMEO, 1930

In view of the poverty, timidity, and general inexperience of the immigrants, and the racial prejudice which exists against them in the America border states, illegal entrance would not be so prevalent were it not for other and more decisive factors. The real forces which move illegal immigration are, first of all, the smugglers or "coyotes" who facilitate illegal entrance to Mexican immigrants, and the contractors or enganchistas who provide them with jobs. The smuggler and the contractor are an intimate and powerful alliance from Calexico to Brownsville. Second, and indirectly, but logically and fundamentally, the origin of illegal immigration is to be found in the farmers and ranchers, and railroad, mining, and other enterprises to which Mexican labor is indispensable.

Immigration is not only powerfully drawn from the United States but is likewise propelled by conditions in Mexico. The real impulse began just before 1900, when conditions which it is not necessary to detail here obliged Mexicans to leave their country in increasingly large numbers in search of better wages and conditions. (pp.11)

The Mexico-U.S. border extends for 2,000 miles. It was carved out of Mexico in 1848 and delineated as a product of military action and political convenience. As a result the border has divided families and cultures in an arbitrary fashion. As we move toward the year 2000, the governments of both countries are actively trying to enforce the border, while, at the same time, redefining the meaning of the border through the North American Free Trade Agreement.

This essay explores some of the implications of the contradictions inherent in the process of redefining the border, most recently with NAFTA. While the border is by definition a division, the Mexico/U.S. border is in many ways very porous. People, music, television programs, toxic pesticides, trade, drugs, and water flow across the demarcation line, often unregulated. As a result, it could be argued that there are many borders (social constructs) that vary depending on the differing perspectives of people at a particular time or place.

At the same time, the Mexico/U.S. border, is a magnet attracting people. The border cities have been among the fastest growing urban areas in both countries. Taking advantage of their strategic locations, resources in the neighboring country, and binational policies, such as the Border Industrial Program, border cities exploded in growth.

These cities serve as a node from which people cross the border, for temporary as well as more permanent stays on the other side. In 1994, an estimated 43 million people crossed the border. Many of them live in the border region that integrates both sides through de facto rules (Jamail 1985, p. 111) — that is, there are unwritten, unofficial ways of dealing with border regulations that would otherwise complicate, rather than facilitate, everyday life in the region. Jamail points out that these “rules” cover everything from migration to trade.

Migration extends the border region to the north. Families and communities create and maintain special ties unconstrained by geography. A very high percentage of families in the border region have nuclear and extended family members living on the other side. In some cases, this means in a neighboring city, but in others it means as far away as Chicago or Lansing. A factor that accounts for the diversity found among border regions is that each is connected with differing degrees of intensity to various specific regions in the United States.

Critical natural resources also cross borders generating major conflicts between the United States and Mexico. Because the border region is arid, water is an especially scarce resource that historically has generated immense competition between the United States and Mexico. The two major rivers, the Rio Bravo and the Colorado, provide water for agriculture and urban use on both sides of the border.

The Colorado River, in particular, has been key in the development of the U.S. West and as well as northern Baja California. Legal battles over who should receive how much water of what quality have marked the recent border history of the region.

The two countries developed the International Boundary and Water Commissions in 1944 to handle issues of resource sharing, but major conflicts have emerged. In the late 1950s, Mexico and the United States bitterly disputed the highly saline water dumped into the Colorado by farmers on the U.S. side — saline water practically destroyed agriculture in Mexico’s rich Mexicali Valley (Whiteford 1986, p. 25). Negotiations led to new regulations, but conflicts have continued over flood control, water quality, the pumping of ground water, and, most recently, pollution.

NAFTA imposed on this matrix of relationships and subregions, a heightened sense of unity between Mexico and the United States as it promised to greatly increase legal economic activity. New investment from the United States accompanying the massive Mexican privatization program, is generating greater trade. And much of this new commerce passes through the border region.

What NAFTA means for the various peoples in the three countries is just beginning to be played out, but for the border regions it has intensified trade activity. However, for many border residents, travel back and forth has
become more difficult, in part because of greater border enforcement by the United States, but also due to pressures leading to outcomes, such as California’s Proposition 187. Thus, while NAFTA facilitated the flow of capital and products across the border, up until 1995, it has not enhanced the movement of people across the border.

The NAFTA negotiations, coupled with a growing environmental movement in both Mexico and the United States, led to a bilateral commitment to address health and environmental problems of the border region. The three NAFTA countries also created the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) with a governing council, a secretariat and a joint advisory committee. But border organizations are concerned that NACEC is a closed decision-making structure, not open to public participation. Nor does it have authority to make binding recommendations to the governments. Kelly (1994, p. 19) feels that it is not clear whether “the new institution will empower or disenfranchise residents of the border region” or whether it will unify or divide people living on either side.

Before NAFTA, the United States and Mexico had created the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADB). BECC was charged with reviewing proposed environmental border projects and deciding whether they should be funded by NADB. Community-based public input should be critical in decisions on which projects should receive highest priority for funding. The first projects will focus on water, wastewater, and municipal solid waste.

Because of the pollution issues raised by the various environmental non-governmental organizations, both the Environmental Protection Agency and the Secretary of Social Development have taken a major initiative to address the major problems and enforce environmental laws in both countries.

The NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement raises important issues about sovereignty. While each nation’s right and obligation to protect citizens and conserve the environment are recognized in the agreement, natural resources are beginning to be understood, at times, as shared resources that both countries must manage together, thus recasting the traditional concept of sovereignty. While this joint stewardship is just evolving, it does reflect a change in how people and governments understand the border region.

In conclusion, NAFTA has the potential to be a powerful force changing the way people of Mexico and the United States view the border. NAFTA has led to a new set of institutions designed to deal with the border from a binational or trinational perspective. At the same time, increased migration, fluctuating capital flows, new communication technologies, domestic politics of both countries, and commercial trade are creating new perspectives on the role of the border and what it means to people on both sides.

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The findings of this research suggest implications for immigration policy. Current policies are based on the old view that migration is merely a movement of people from place A to place B, and that regulating this flow simply requires reducing the expected economic gains to migrants while increasing their risk of failure. This is the rationale that underlies employer sanctions and increased border enforcement to deter illegal immigration and, more recently, voter passage of Proposition 187 in California.

Regulating migration is more complicated than that. Through migration, the village in Mexico, the immigrants in the United States, and, indeed, the economies and societies in which immigrants live and work become part of a transnational organism. Policies may have a marginal effect, by pushing at this organism around its edges. But they are not likely to change the fact that village economies in Mexico are structurally intertwined with the U.S. economy through migration.

Migration is woven into the fabric of societies on both sides of the Mexico-U.S. border. Nowhere is this more evident than in the economies in Mexico from which migrants come. Migration links villages in Mexico to the U.S. economy so pervasively that the two form a single economic space that transcends the political border. Researchers who have done field work in rural Mexico realize that no economic survey of a Mexican village is complete without gathering data on the village's community of migrants in the United States.

The activity of migration and the income migrants remit back to their villages are structural features of village economies in Mexico. Because of this, a change in almost any aspect of economic policy in Mexico has implications for Mexico-to-U.S. migration. This fact has not been lost on researchers and policy makers in Mexico and in the United States, who fear that market reforms brought about by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) will create new pressures for migration from rural Mexico (e.g., see Martin 1993). As migration links villages with the global economy, Mexico's rural economy is increasingly influenced by the international economic environment. The research findings presented below suggest that Mexican village economies may be more sensitive to international exchange rates than to corn prices.

Over the past five years I have been developing village economic models to explore socio-economic impacts of international market reforms in rural Mexico. In the past, villages have largely been viewed as the domain of the anthropologist, not the economist. Yet the rural economy in most developing countries is organized around farm households clustered together in villages. Understanding the impacts of external changes on the rural economy requires understanding first, the economic behavior of household-farms; second, the linkages among household-farms within villages; and third, the ties between villages and the outside world.

The Model

The analysis of migration and development in this paper is based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) techniques developed to model the impacts of policy, market and environmental changes on village and village-town economies (Taylor and Adelman forthcoming). Village economy-wide models overcome the limitations both of micro, household-farm models and of linear, fixed-price multipliers. They offer a "micro" complement to aggregate CGE models for policy analysis by highlighting local economy-wide impacts of policy changes. This approach is increasingly being used to model economies that extend beyond the village; thus, it is now accurate to call

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1I am greatly indebted to the Hewlett Foundation, the Pacific Rim Research Institute, the National Science Foundation, and the University of California Consortium on Mexico and the United States (UC MEXUS) for their valuable support of this research.
it "micro economy-wide modeling."

Micro economy-wide models occupy a middle ground between household-farm models and aggregate, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models for policy analysis. Like aggregate CGEs, they capture complex linkages and general-equilibrium feedbacks of production and expenditures in the economy. Like household-farm models, micro economy-wide models are rooted in the micro economy and are constructed "from the bottom up," using household-farm survey data. Simulations using micro economy-wide models offer a ground-level view of the likely impacts of exogenous policy and market changes on local economies. Such a perspective is critical for understanding the interactions between international migration and economic development in migrant-sending economies, yet it is generally unavailable from existing studies.

Micro economy-wide models are distinguished by their micro approach to economy-wide modeling. This is in contrast to aggregate CGEs, which have their roots in the macro economy. "Macro" CGE models are built from the top down, using aggregate data supplied by government statistical bureaus. Estimation of microeconomic relationships using survey data is not central to those models. Often, required parameters cannot be estimated from available aggregate data; hence, there tends to be a reliance on guesswork and sensitivity analysis. High levels of aggregation tend to blur microeconomic interactions that are critical for policy analysis.

Micro economy-wide models of rural areas begin with a complete micro model of household farms and, in the case of nonagricultural activities, household firms. This modeling departs somewhat from the traditional household-farm modeling approach in its focus on different groups of households, delineated for example by socioeconomic status or other variables of interest, instead of on a "representative" household farm. It also emphasizes the diversity of economic activities that typically characterize the economies of individual household farms in less developed countries.

Once the production and expenditure sides of the household-farm model have been estimated econometrically for each household-farm group, a CGE framework is used to link together household farms (and household firms) within the economy of interest (for example, the village, village-town, county or region), highlighting interactions both among family production units and other institutions within the local economy and between the local economy and the outside world.1 If some production is carried out separate from household units (e.g., a plantation, factory or other purely production enterprise), mixed models highlighting the interactions among households, household farms and firms are possible.

The integration of production and household units into a CGE framework is accomplished by imposing local general-equilibrium constraints on markets for goods and factors; by including local institutions besides households, firms and household production units; and by incorporating models of capital markets and trade. In the case of nontradables, for which local economies (or some group of households within them) are cut off from outside markets, the general equilibrium constraints determine vectors of local prices and quantities (e.g., farm-consumed corn). In the case of tradables, prices are exogenous, determined by outside markets. General-equilibrium constraints then determine net exports from the local economy to the rest of the world. These net exports are a local-economy analog to the marketed surplus in neoclassical household-farm models with perfect markets. They represent surplus production not demanded by other households within the local economy. Because of this, they are a more accurate representation of the supply of agricultural output available to nonagricultural households than the marketed surplus concept in household-farm studies.

The stylized model of a village economy in Mexico is estimated with data from a household-farm survey carried out in the state of Michoacan in 1989. In it, migration is treated just like any other economic activity to which families allocate their labor and other scarce resources. Most families in the study area are engaged in corn and beans production using fairly traditional methods based on family labor and often, ox-and-plow technology. But, as in other parts of Mexico,
these are diversified economies. Families spread their limited resources across a portfolio of activities inside and outside the village that include crop production, livestock, handicrafts, construction — and migration. When I first visited the study area in 1983, both internal and international migration were important sources of income to village households. With the collapse of Mexico's urban economy in the 1980s, though, the role of internal migration all but disappeared, and that of Mexico-to-U.S. migration increased. Today, when we speak of migration in this area, it is international migration to which we refer. Land in the survey area is ejido, or state land. The average ejido holding in the sample is 8 hectares, slightly larger than the national average of 6 hectares. The range is from less than 2 hectares to slightly more than 35 hectares.

Because individual households are involved in a diversity of economic activities, a given percentage change in, say, the price of corn typically results in a much smaller percentage change in total income than were they not so diversified.

The village model has five production activities that use family labor, some hired labor, physical capital and land. Migration competes with these production activities for family labor. There are three household groups: subsistence, small holder and large holder. Details of the model appear in Taylor and Adelman (forthcoming). One distinguishing feature is that family time is in limited supply, and there is no perfect substitute for family labor in production activities or, of course, in migration. Thus, unlike other goods, family time is a good for which there is not a market outside the household. The value of family time - unlike the price of hired labor - is not given by the market. It is an unobserved "shadow price" or "virtual wage," determined by the competing demands for the family's limited time in economic activities inside and outside the village. This means that there is a tradeoff between migration and production, and between both of these and leisure. Such tradeoffs typically are not recognized in models of farm household economies. Also, all investments in the village must be self-financed, in the absence of well-functioning regional credit markets.

The Mexico model is part of a larger comparative village project that has generated models of villages in five countries and on three continents, from Mexico to Senegal and Java. One of the most robust findings of this research is the extent to which migration — whether internal or international — plays a structural role in the economies of villages in vastly different geographic, cultural and economic contexts. See Figure 1 on the next page.

**Policy Experiments**

An extensive set of migration and policy experiments has been carried out using several variants of the basic Mexico village model (Taylor 1995, Taylor and Adelman, forthcoming). Findings from two of these experiments are presented below to illustrate the role of migration in structurally linking village economies in Mexico with the global economy. The first is a corn-price experiment. It simulates the impact of a drop in the price of Mexican corn, as called for by NAFTA. The vast majority of Mexico's village population is involved in the production of corn. Because of this, some policy makers and researchers have predicted that a drop in the corn price under NAFTA will lead to the collapse of Mexico's small-farm economy, and to massive out-migration. However, the alternatives to corn production dampen these impacts of corn price changes on income and migration.

The second experiment explores the short-term impacts of a peso devaluation on the village, including both positive remittance and negative lost-labor effects from Mexico-to-U.S. migration. A change in the value of the Mexican currency vis a vis the U.S. dollar alters the returns to migration for village families. I hypothesize that village incomes and employment are at least as sensitive to this macro-economic variable as to corn prices. The exchange-rate experiment elucidates the role of migration in the village economy.

**Corn Price Experiment**

The corn-price experiment was modeled on Mexico's 1983 agricultural policy reforms, which are connected to NAFTA and to an ongoing liberalization of domestic markets since the late 1980s. It examines the impact of a 10 percent
Figure 1. Basic Economic Flows in Village Economies at Intermediate Level of Market Development

- **Intermediate "Imports"**
- **Village Commodity "Exports"**

**Production and Consumption Units (e.g., households)**
- Family Inputs
- Purchased Village Inputs
- Village Factor "Exports" (e.g., labor)
- Subsistence Output
- Surplus Marketed in Village

**Subsistence Production**

**Diverse Commercial Production**

**Village Commodity "Imports"**

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decrease in the corn price. This simulated drop may be quite modest in light of actual impacts of Mexico's new policy on staple prices. The price of maize, far and away Mexico's major staple crop and a mainstay of most farm families, has been supported at levels equal to nearly twice the world price in recent years. NAFTA calls for a 15-year phase-out of these grain price supports. Mexico's agricultural reforms, however, are more ambitious, calling for an immediate elimination of price supports.

The results of the decrease in staple prices are summarized in the first column of Table 1. In this model, staple prices in the village are assumed to be set by policy, and the elimination of price supports is transmitted directly to the village. The reduction in staple prices triggers a reallocation of household-farm resources out of staple production into other income activities, including migration. Staple production falls by 7.8 percent, implying a supply elasticity of 0.78. This is a total elasticity, including the general-equilibrium effects of changes in labor demand on the family wage, which influences production together with the change in the output price. As staple production falls, nonstaple output increases. The price reform has a small positive effect on livestock production (0.3 percent) and a larger positive effect on the two nonagricultural production sectors (1.2 percent).

Lower demand for family labor in staple production reduces the family wage, or the opportunity cost of family time in the village (by 2.7 percent). This, in turn, stimulates migration (by 1.3 percent). These results illustrate neatly the ways in which changes in government policies influence migration. Most of this migration is international. That is, migrants transmit the impacts of Mexican agricultural policy changes to the United States.

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3 Recent devaluations of the Mexican peso eliminated Mexico's corn-price subsidy by closing the gap between domestic and world prices in dollars. It remains to be seen whether the Mexican government will raise the domestic price of corn to pre-devaluation dollar levels.

4 In real life, high transactions costs in corn markets insulate many villages from the effects of government price policy; see Taylor (1995).
Predictably, the total nominal-income effect of lower staple prices is negative. It is small relative to the change in the staple price, however. The 10-percent reduction in staple price results in a 0.9-percent fall in total village income. The real-income effect is smaller: 0.1 percent. These results reflect the high degree of diversification of village incomes; there is far from a one-to-one correspondence between income from staple production and total village incomes. Both are also shaped by the responsiveness of household-farm resource allocations to policy changes. By redirecting resources away from staples, household-farms buffer themselves against the decreased profitability of staple production. They do this partly through migration, but also by increasing their exposure in other village production activities. The near-zero effect of the price fall on real incomes reflects the importance of staples in village consumption. As consumers, households benefit from lower staple prices.

The heterogeneity of household-farms in the village creates an uneven distribution of the impacts of price-policy changes. Landless households benefit from lower staple prices. Their nominal incomes fall; increased income from nonstaple production is unable to compensate for the decreased flow of value-added from staple production into this, as other, household groups. Nevertheless, as net purchasers of staples, this group benefits in real terms. Real incomes of small-holder and large-holder households fall by 0.3 and 0.1 percent, respectively. They are more heavily engaged in staple production than are landless households, and staples constitute a relatively small share of their expenditures. Nevertheless, these two household groups gain from their involvement in nonstaple production, especially livestock. Livestock production benefits from lower staple prices in two ways: first, because new resources are channeled into livestock production, and second, because the cost of animal feed, which includes corn, decreases.

The price-policy reform weakens trade linkages between the village and the outside world. Lower staple prices stimulate local staple demand (by 10.4 percent), reducing the village's marketed surplus of staples (by 9 percent). Lower

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<th>Table 1. Corn Price and Exchange-Rate Experiments*</th>
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<td>Sector</td>
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*The numbers in the table represent the effects of a 10% increase in expected per-migrant remittances in the three models and the effects of a 10% decrease in corn prices.
incomes, especially in the small-holder group which has the highest import propensity, reduce the village demand for imported manufactured goods (by 0.9 percent). The staple price liberalization has a negative effect on rural-urban growth linkages.

**Exchange-Rate Experiment**

The exchange-rate experiment explores the village-wide impacts of a 10 percent devaluation of the Mexican peso. Because migrants are the only "export" for which village households receive income denominated in foreign currency, this is equivalent to increasing expected remittances from migrants abroad, as might result not only from a depreciation of the Mexican peso but also from an improvement in migrant labor market conditions, a reduction in migrant costs, or generally improved access to U.S. migrant labor markets. This experiment is germane in light of the increasing integration of villages around the world with outside labor markets through migration and the rapid expansion of formal and informal migrant-assistance and information networks that dramatically lower migration costs and risks. It is also relevant in the context of recent currency devaluations in Mexico and border-enforcement efforts in the United States, which may influence the returns to Mexico-to-U.S. migration.

In a village CGE model, an increase in expected remittances has two immediate effects in the short run. First, there is an income transfer effect. Higher remittances increase local income in households with migrants. Second, increased returns to migration create an incentive for families to allocate more time to migration work. In combination, these two effects produce an income increase in migrant households and also an increased demand for family time in migration. Because leisure is a normal good, rising income, ceterus paribus, also increases the demand for leisure. The interaction of these transfer and migration effects results in quantitatively different outcomes in the three models.

Increased migration and leisure demand for family time drive up the opportunity cost of time (the family wage) in the village. This negatively affects local production, which competes with migration for scarce family labor. It also dampens, or even reverses, the positive leisure responses to higher income, because the family wage represents the opportunity cost or price of leisure.

Results of the exchange-rate devaluation experiment appear in the second column of Table 1. On the production side, the higher family wage induces households to reallocate their resources away from the most labor-intensive production activities and into migration. Migration increases, with a remittance elasticity of around 0.7. To the extent family and hired labor are substitutes, family members can allocate more time to migration and leisure while hiring workers to take their place in household-farm production, as in a neoclassical household-farm model. Because family and hired workers are not perfect substitutes, however, a reduction of family labor in production implies some loss in output. At the same time, higher family income from migration increases the demand for staples. The combination of lower output and higher demand for staples can be expected to negatively affect village marketed surplus.

The increase in local value of remittances raises the family wage by just under 8 percent. On the production side, higher returns to migrant "labor exports" produce a classic "Dutch disease" effect within the local economy. Production of village tradables falls across the board: output of livestock, the least labor-intensive activity in the village, falls by less than 0.5 percent, but staple production decreases by more than 2 percent, and output from the two nonagricultural sectors plunges by 8 percent. Lower production results in a decrease in village value-added, and hence in family incomes from local production.

Migration more than compensates households for these negative short-run production effects. Total village income increases by just under 3 percent (i.e., the remittance elasticity of income is 0.3). Predictably, income gains are unevenly distributed across households. The largest, by far, accrue to small-holder households, whose income increases by

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5 A positive migration elasticity with respect to remittances does not necessarily hold in a micro economy-wide model. In a Javan village studied by Taylor and Adelman (forthcoming) there is evidence of a backward-bending migrant-supply curve, due to relatively high per capita incomes and a concentration of migration in high-income households with a high marginal utility of leisure.

6 These are short-run results. In the medium-to-long run, migration may influence migrant-sending economies in positive ways by promoting the accumulation of productive assets; see Lucas (1985) and Taylor (forthcoming).
nearly 4.5 percent. This group receives the largest direct benefits from migration. Incomes in the landless and large-holder groups increase by 1.9 and 1.7 percent, respectively.

Higher incomes stimulate villagers’ demand for consumer goods and, given the village’s close integration with outside markets, village trade. They also generate savings and investment. Unlike in village SAM-multiplier models (Taylor, 1995; Adelman, Taylor and Vogel, 1988), increases in consumption and investment demand for goods produced in the village do not necessarily stimulate production in this village CGE experiment. Production is determined by the conditions for profit maximization. These conditions are functions of production technology, capital inputs, and input and output prices. Unless there are changes in one or more of these ingredients in household-farm production decisions, village production levels remain the same as before the increase in returns to migration. In the case of tradables, prices are determined in markets outside the village. Changes in village consumption or investment demand, other things being equal, are satisfied through trade with these outside markets, not through higher production in the village. Increased demand is met through imports (or lower exports). Decreased demand is accommodated through higher exports (lower imports). Household expenditures alter the village’s net marketed surplus of goods, but not its production. In short, trade enables villages, like households and nations, to decouple their production from their demand patterns.

These predictions are borne out in the bottom part of Table 1. Increased income from migration stimulates the demand for staples and manufactures. To meet this demand, imports of final goods increase (by 7 percent), and marketed surplus of village-produced goods declines (by 2.5 percent). Intermediate-goods imports fall as village production contracts, but the total effect on village imports is positive (1.1 percent). That is, migration increases linkages in goods markets between the village and the outside world.

A comparison of columns 1 and 2 in Table 1 reveals that, overall, the impacts of exchange rates on village economic activity and incomes are larger and more pervasive than the impacts of corn prices. The magnitude of the total income change is much greater (in absolute value terms) in the exchange-rate experiment than in the price-reform experiment. Migration makes the village economy more sensitive to the international exchange rate than to corn prices.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The migration and policy experiments presented in this paper illustrate a few of the potential uses for village economy-wide models. The migration experiment provides a window into the often complex impacts of migration on migrant-sending economies, and the policy experiment offers a ground-level perspective of the likely impacts of recent agricultural price reforms on rural Mexico and, via Mexico-to-U.S. migration, on the United States.

Migration influences local economies in ways that are usually overlooked by migration research. The micro economy-wide approach used in this village modeling highlights economic linkages which transmit the impacts of migration from migrant to nonmigrant households. Because of the importance of these linkages, studies of migrant households are likely to offer a limited and distorted picture of the impacts of migration on migrant-sending economies in Mexico. Migration and remittances unleash an array of income and price effects which tend to transform village production and impact incomes in households that do not contain migrants. As a result, many and perhaps most of migration’s impacts on local economies are not found within the migrant households themselves. These economic linkages illustrate the ways in which Mexico-to-U.S. migration reconfigures rural economies in Mexico, structurally linking them to the U.S. economy.

The findings of this research suggest implications for immigration policy. Current policies are based on the old view that migration is merely a movement of people from place A to place B, and that regulating this flow simply requires reducing the expected economic gains to migrants while increasing their risk of failure. This is the rationale that underlies employer sanctions and increased border enforcement to deter illegal immigration and, more recently, voter passage of Proposition 187 in California.

Regulating migration is more complicated than that. Through migration, the village in Mexico, the immigrants in the United States, and, indeed, the economies and societies in which
immigrants live and work become part of a transnational organism. Policies may have a marginal effect, by pushing at this organism around its edges. But they are not likely to change the fact that village economies in Mexico are structurally intertwined with the U.S. economy through migration.

Because of this, any change in migration due to NAFTA or to new immigration policies will be incremental. That is, it will be on top of what certainly will be a very large base of Mexico-to-U.S. migration in the 1990s.

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In this chapter, I conceptualize a framework for assessing job competition in a local immigrant-receiving community and present four ways in which immigrants may contribute positively to economic development and job growth.

Immigration to California, and Los Angeles in particular, is transforming the region's population from white to non-white and U.S.-born to foreign-born. Ethnic conflict in the region has been redefined from a white-black dichotomy to one that is increasingly multi-racial and multi-ethnic. In Los Angeles and other Californian cities, conflict among marginalized groups over scarce resources, a poor economy, and limited job opportunities has vented the frustrations of a general populace bent on halting immigration, dismantling affirmative action programs, and curtailing welfare. Something new besides white on black racism is permeating California and Los Angeles, and it threatens other parts of the nation experiencing similar demographic changes.

By the 1992 Los Angeles civil unrest, race relations and conflicts had become complex and violent. Tension leading to the riots was predominantly between white and black groups, started by white police officers viciously beating a black man, Rodney King, before the eyes of America. The resentment within the African American community over the lack of justice for blacks in the legal system reared to life. What followed, however, soon expanded from this white-black picture — the riot that began over race was as much over bread. And the rioters were from several races, including Latino, black, Asian, and white.¹ The violence was not confined to Watts or even the larger south central area of Los Angeles, but also included parts of downtown, Hollywood, Koreatown, and areas of San Fernando Valley and Long Beach. Indeed, subsequent data collection and studies showed that the ethnic composition of the most damaged areas included a large portion of Asian, Pacific Islander, and other ethnic groups (Pastor 1993, Ong and Hee, 1992). Unlike contemporary and popular notions of race relations, in general and certainly of the past, the unrest broke out of its older black-white framework, ending in a complex mosaic of races and ethnicities that, not coincidentally, configures Los Angeles's urban reality.

It would be tempting, but much too simple, to interpret the 1992 civil unrest and the new race relation situation as just another version of white dominance and minority subordination, with the latter now being multi-racial. Such an update of our conceptualization of the racial paradigm, however, would miss the racial conflicts and competition that occur among minority groups. Increasingly, inter-minority conflict in Southern California involves competition between Latinos (U.S.-born and immigrants) and African Americans over housing, public goods, political power, and jobs (Johnson and Oliver 1989).

This chapter looks at the issue of job competition between immigrant and U.S.-born workers: To what extent is there job competition? Who is involved? How are local communities affected? Specifically, the paper will provide: (1) an overview of the job competition literature and what it says about job displacement by immigrants; (2) a review of an emerging group of regional studies that challenges this earlier group of studies; and (3) a discussion of how job competition and other economic factors may positively impact local areas, including immigrant and nonimmigrant (e.g., African American) communities in Los Angeles.

Before we can reassess the debate surrounding job competition and its outcome in local communities, we must attempt a theoretical and empirical understanding of the nature and extent of competition for jobs, particularly as pertaining to the employment of immigrants and U.S.-born workers. Studies done in the 1980s on the effects of immigration during the 1970s show very little or no adverse impacts. However, the validity of these studies has recently been called into question on methodological grounds. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that

¹ According to records, 51 percent of those arrested were Latino, 36.2 percent were African American, while whites, Asians, and "other" constituted the rest (Pastor 1993).
Abel Valenzuela, Jr.

The debate on job competition is increasingly racialized because it tends to single out African Americans and other racial/ethnic U.S.-born minority groups as the primary victims of an increase in immigration mostly from Latin America. Indeed, most of the literature on this topic focuses on the impact of immigration on African Americans, other minority groups, earlier immigrants, and women and teenagers. These studies are comprehensive in geography (national or regional), span an array of methods (from econometric modeling to industrial and occupational case studies), vary in sample size and data, and often rely on institutional economics to study the labor market impacts of an increased supply of immigrant workers.

Two basic concepts help us understand how unskilled immigration affects the labor market: (1) the wage that must be paid for low-skilled labor and (2) how a change in the wage paid for one group (e.g., low-skilled immigrants) affects the demand for other types of labor such as higher or even lower-skilled workers (Killingsworth 1986, Greenwood and McDowell 1986). This labor market approach examines the interaction between supply, demand, and choices made by workers and employers.

Low-skilled immigrants who increase the supply of all workers — especially those at the low end — will substitute for U.S.-born labor because of their willingness to work for wages below the minimum standards of the latter. Based on the economic substitution effect, immigrants

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Table 1. Percentage of Total Immigration Received, by Metropolitan Statistical Area of Residence, 1984-1992

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Los Angeles area</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>Houston</th>
<th>Miami</th>
<th>Total to these areas</th>
<th>Total immigration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>11.36%</td>
<td>16.93%</td>
<td>4.11%</td>
<td>1.38%</td>
<td>2.09%</td>
<td>35.86%</td>
<td>543,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>12.18%</td>
<td>3.93%</td>
<td>3.91%</td>
<td>1.32%</td>
<td>2.37%</td>
<td>23.70%</td>
<td>570,009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>12.88%</td>
<td>16.21%</td>
<td>3.37%</td>
<td>1.90%</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
<td>40.65%</td>
<td>601,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>15.91%</td>
<td>14.48%</td>
<td>3.29%</td>
<td>1.73%</td>
<td>5.95%</td>
<td>41.36%</td>
<td>643,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>27.44%</td>
<td>10.69%</td>
<td>5.53%</td>
<td>3.18%</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>49.09%</td>
<td>1,090,924</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>28.65%</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
<td>4.76%</td>
<td>3.79%</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
<td>50.34%</td>
<td>1,536,483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>17.30%</td>
<td>8.92%</td>
<td>3.32%</td>
<td>2.94%</td>
<td>3.22%</td>
<td>35.70%</td>
<td>1,827,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>16.86%</td>
<td>13.13%</td>
<td>3.84%</td>
<td>2.78%</td>
<td>3.25%</td>
<td>39.86%</td>
<td>973,977</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The L.A. metro area includes the Los Angeles-Long Beach SMSA and the Anaheim-Santa Ana SMSA.

of similar or identical skills but with lower reservation wages will replace U.S.-born labor, mostly because they’re cheaper to hire. Besides this, however, other attributes make immigrants attractive to employers. Clearly, employers see in immigrants a vulnerable labor force that is responsive to their dictates and demanding work schedules and tasks, and that is unwilling to organize for collective bargaining or other employee benefits.

The opposite possible outcome from increased immigrant labor is the complement effect. Complementarity occurs when the immigration of low-skilled workers positively affects other groups of workers, including high-skilled domestic laborers. A decrease in the wages received by one group (e.g., low-skilled workers) can lead to increased employer demand for other workers, especially those from other skill groups. This happens when two types of workers are closely related in production, that is, they complement each other.

In summary, an increase in the supply of low-skilled workers due to immigration tends to reduce their wages and to raise total employment of such workers, including U.S.-born and immigrants. If high-skilled and low-skilled workers are complements in production (e.g., janitors and janitorial supervisors), then the increase in the demand for the low-skilled will be accompanied by an increase in demand for complementary high-skilled labor. On the other hand, if high- and low-skilled workers are substitutes for each other, the increase in employer demand for the low-skilled will hurt high-skilled worker group because employers will attempt to substitute toward the cheaper labor.

In fact, however, the substitution-complement effects can take on many forms, including situations in which the labor market simultaneously exhibits both effects — that is, some jobs that are immigrant rich may complement native labor, on the one hand, and substitute for it, on the other. In addition, a drop in the income level of U.S.-born laborers may be more than offset by an increase in income from capital brought by immigrants (Usher 1977). And if the immigration of new workers increases the total amount of resources available to the economy, total real output will rise, to everyone’s benefit (Killingsworth 1986).

Lastly, immigrants are crucial to the replenishment of regional labor markets, providing opportunities for business expansion and global competitiveness in a wide range of lower-wage industries. They function as local and regional agents of job creation. And, immigrants replace low-skill, bottom of the ladder jobs left behind as minority groups and earlier immigrants move up to better jobs (Waldinger 1987-88). At the same time, immigrants generate the demand for numerous support-related employment opportunities in health care, education, government, retail, and other occupations and industries.

**Job Competition Reassessed: New Evidence from Los Angeles**

Past studies on job competition show that the net outcome of substitution and complementarity effects is either insignificant or minor. Displacement of native laborers is mostly negligible, according to the findings of several national, regional and metropolitan, and sectoral/industrial studies. Overall, immigrants tend to complement native laborers according to these labor market studies. Nor do immigrants seem to affect the average wage of native laborers in any significant manner. The majority of national, regional, and metropolitan studies conclude that immigrants impact wages of native-born workers only slightly. Only native-born workers with few skills are likely to be harmed, but even here, the impacts are relatively small.

Unfortunately, it is unclear whether the findings from these studies apply to the 1980s and 1990s. Most were written about the 1970s and rely on large national data sets (e.g., the decennial census) or single case studies of an industry or occupation. Those studies using more recent data often rely on samples that are too small. Underlying theory cannot predict any particular outcome, so as conditions change, it is quite possible that outcomes also change. Analysis of...
more recent data and qualitative research approaches indicate that the impact of immigration has become greater, particularly among earlier immigrant and minority subgroups. The question of what happened to induce this apparent new competition among immigrants and nonimmigrants, however, cannot be explained only by immigration. Other variables must be considered and incorporated, such as continued discrimination in hiring, secondary occupations that continue to have disproportionate concentrations of women and minority workers, a restructured economy that provides few opportunities for low-skill workers, and the low levels of human capital found among minority and immigrant workers that result in their concentration in the secondary sector.

Below, I discuss these factors, while also reviewing some of the recent literature on job competition in Los Angeles. These studies suggest a more nuanced and complex array of labor market dynamics among employers, workers, and jobs that point to instances of job competition — some at the expense of U.S.-born minority workers — and to other instances of job competition that benefit domestic labor.

**DISCRIMINATION AND RACE IN THE LABOR MARKET**

Los Angeles provides us with a rich case study from which to analyze factors that contribute to increases in job competition, particularly among low-skilled immigrant and minority populations. The area has undergone dramatic demographic changes during the last three decades, including massive immigration patterns not experienced since the turn of the century. Table 2 and Figure 1 portray the change in Los Angeles County’s population by nativity, race, and ethnicity over several decades. The percentage of immigrants in Los Angeles County increased to one-third of the total population in 1990, surpassing that figure by 1994. Even more significant was the county’s change in its race and ethnic composition (Figure 1). The most striking observation is the change from a majority white non-Hispanic population (82%) in 1960 to a minority white non-Hispanic population (36%) in 1994 — a 56 percent decrease over the span of 34 years. During the same time period, Hispanics increased from 8 to 44 percent of the county’s total population.

The influx of mostly non-white immigrants, coupled with an older but firmly rooted Anglo population and a less secure, but nevertheless, significant African American population, has strained inter-group relations. The strain is perhaps most acutely felt in the increasingly racialized division of labor for the city’s low-end jobs. To be sure, discrimination against African Americans has long hurt their ability to enter many kinds of jobs and to earn pay equal to that of whites, but rarely has discrimination been a factor in blacks’ competing for bottom-rung and lower-skilled occupations.

However, in the reconfigured Los Angeles of the 1980s and 1990s, discrimination plays a role in the hiring of black, Latino, and immigrant workers. Even after controlling for education, experience, and skill, race continues to stratify, unequally, Latinos and African Americans. Income, wage, employment, and hiring differentials by race are as pronounced today as ever. However, how discrimination is played out in the low-skilled labor market is perhaps more telling of this situation than group outcomes. It certainly presents us with a more complicated picture of inter-group and employer-employee dynamics that gives a different meaning to job competition, race, and segmented labor markets.

Unlike the violent and blatant racial bigotry of the past, part of today’s labor market discrimination is based on stereotypes, with African Americans often perceived in a negative; immigrants, in a positive fashion. For example, Chicago-based researchers found that employers preferred to hire those who do not belong to a particular racial group, class status, or residential area. Specifically, these employers typecast African Americans as unskilled, uneducated, illiterate, dishonest, lacking initiative, unmotivated, involved with drugs and gangs, not understanding work, lacking personal charm, unstable, lacking a work ethic, and having no family lives or role models.

On the other hand, a study using a similar methodological approach for Los Angeles found that employers view immigrants much differently than they do African American or white workers. Immigrants are typecast as hardworking, uncomplaining, and resourceful.

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Table 2. Los Angeles County Population by Nativity, 1980, 1990, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Immigrant</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>5,812,710</td>
<td>77.74</td>
<td>1,664,793</td>
<td>22.26</td>
<td>7,477,581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,968,098</td>
<td>67.34</td>
<td>2,895,066</td>
<td>32.66</td>
<td>8,863,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>6,277,473</td>
<td>65.92</td>
<td>3,245,472</td>
<td>34.08</td>
<td>9,523,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


job getters, without threatening union organization and abiding by employer dictates however harsh (Waldinger 1995). While presenting evidence that blacks and immigrants do not apply for the same low-level jobs at comparable rates and that the reservation wage of black and white workers exceeds the going wage for immigrants, and, also, explaining the important role played by networks in promoting segmented labor markets, Waldinger argues that employer attitudes towards workers are much more favorable to immigrant labor. He further contends that uneven social structures that facilitate job search, hiring, recruitment, and training prevent black workers from enjoying the same employment opportunities that immigrants have. One distinction between Waldinger's study and others on job competition, is its refusal to unequivocally describe job competition in terms of either/or — either immigrants are competing with U.S.-born workers and displacing them or they are serving as agents of complementary job growth. Instead, Waldinger argues that some labor markets may be more conducive to direct job displacement between immigrants and black labor while others may not.

Waldinger (1995) concludes that job competition depends on several factors, but most importantly, on the concentration of immigrant and nonimmigrant workers in segmented labor markets. Similarly, Valenzuela (1993) found that there was job competition in Los Angeles during the 1970s but with more instances of complements than displacements from increased immigration. Using census data, and controlling for economic growth or decline and the skill level of workers, Valenzuela identified which occupations and industries showed instances of displacement and which complementarity — a finding that also refutes the either/or framework dominating earlier studies.

Nevertheless, most earlier studies on this topic did not look at the effect on job competition of concentration in the secondary labor market.

Figure 1. Proportional Composition of Racial and Ethnic Groups


Immigration Issues, Economics, and Politics
As data clearly show, immigrants are still largely concentrated, along with African Americans and other minority groups in the secondary labor market, a situation that undoubtedly increases the probability of competition between immigrants, African Americans, and others.

In another recent study on job competition, Ong and Valenzuela (1995) look at the issues of immigration, race, and segmented labor markets in explaining disparate employment and earnings outcomes for African American youth in Los Angeles. Through the use of multivariate modeling, the authors estimate how immigration affected blacks in Los Angeles relative to their counterparts in other metropolitan areas. They found that immigration increases joblessness among African Americans, with a larger net impact coming from the presence of Latino immigrants with limited education; however, they found no detectable net impact on earnings. This study, focused on less-skilled male youth, supports the notion that instances of job competition need not be confined only to displacement or complementarity. Instead, they find that, in some instances, immigration appears to widen, and, in other instances, narrow, the economic gap of African Americans. Their findings of increased joblessness with no earnings effect are consistent with the hypothesis that when imperfect racial segmentation exists, increased immigration works to the disadvantage of African Americans. That is, when there are substitutable immigrant workers, employers prefer to hire them, so prevailing wages tend to fall below the normally acceptable rate for African Americans, producing joblessness for them. On the other hand, those who remain employed are either unaffected by this change or benefited in terms of greater employment opportunities and higher wages.

Implicit in past studies of job competition is the assumption that the labor market is one monolithic entity in which labor, information, and capital are freely exchanged. What resulted were studies that did not take into account the rich particulars and dynamics evident in a very nuanced and complex labor market where levels of information and hiring strategies are uneven and unfair. The advent of global economies, the international division of labor, and U.S. economic restructuring have all greatly changed the topography and processes of the labor market, including wages and earnings, unions, type of industry and occupation, who works, how they work, where they work, and how they obtain jobs. Below, I discuss why any analysis of job competition is incomplete without considering the role of economic restructuring and segmented labor markets.

**ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND SEGMENTED LABOR MARKETS**

Segmentation theory divides the labor market into two parts — the core and periphery, or the primary and secondary sectors. In the core, firms have oligopoly power (small number of large firms) in product markets, employ large number of workers (who are likely to be unionized), have vast financial resources, and are favored by government regulations and contracting. Jobs in the core offer a clear path for advancement, are better paid, and have a well-defined occupational structure.

Firms in the periphery are smaller, have less influence over product markets, lack access to financial resources, and are usually dependent on subcontracting or retailing for larger firms. Jobs in the peripheral sector are low-paying, nonunion, and exhibit high levels of turnover. Secondary jobs employ less educated workers, mostly minorities, immigrants, and women, under bad working conditions, and offer very little upward mobility.

Segmented labor market theory helps us understand job competition between immigrants and other groups in several ways. First, the concentration of African Americans and immigrants in the secondary sector can create intense competition between the groups, for an increase in the supply of workers (as when immigrants enter) can lead to downward pressure on wages and increased unemployment (Bergman 1974). However, this concentration does not always mean substitution or negative competition, because, depending on where blacks and immigrants are located, it can have complementary, positive effects.

For those in protected core labor markets, job location makes little difference because the horizontal dimension of labor markets dominates the determination of employment conditions and
salaries. However, for those in the unskilled or unprotected periphery labor markets, occupational location is very important. Depending on recruitment and promotion practices and institutions in a given industry, unskilled workers may (or may not) be protected from direct competition with immigrant labor. U.S.-born workers are protected from competition if institutional barriers such as unions, internal labor markets in large corporations, or patronage in government employment prevent immigrants from entry. The effects of immigration on unskilled native employment depend on the specific job market in which they are located. Other things equal, native workers located in protected labor markets within the secondary sector are not affected by job displacement, while the opposite should be expected in unprotected segments.

Second, the relative human capital levels of various groups of workers have not been systematically analyzed by job competition researchers. Most analyses assume the U.S.-born and immigrant workers to be either skilled or unskilled, with no differentiation among workers in the unskilled or secondary labor market. Rarely do researchers look deeper to consider whether differing degrees of skill levels among un- and low-skilled workers make a difference in job competition outcomes. Controlling for skill level or by occupational segment allows us to explore a more complex array of employment substitutability and complementary among different labor markets.

Third, most analyses of immigrant impacts on U.S.-born laborers fail to account for critical factors inherent in segmented labor markets, such as continued discrimination in hiring, secondary occupations with disproportionate shares of women and minority workers, a restructured economy that provides few opportunities for low-skill workers, and the low levels of human capital found among minority and immigrant workers. Even Waldinger (1995), Ong and Valenzuela (1995), and Valenzuela (1993) were unable to predict or show with confidence the impact of increased immigration, isolated from these and other variables, on job competition. The verdict on this issue is still out, for these new studies present instances of both substitution (displacement) and complementarity (job growth) as a result of increased immigration.

Though the evidence on job competition is far from conclusive, immigration policy and politics function under a zero-sum notion that an increase in immigration leads to the displacement of U.S.-born labor — for example, when the Immigration Reform and Control Act was debated and passed in 1986 and when California overwhelmingly supported Proposition 187 that prohibits undocumented immigrants from participating in various publicly funded programs. In addition, studies that emphasize the costs of immigration have supported various efforts to curb its flow under the same assumption that immigration is costly and detrimental to the native-born worker.15

Because immigration has been blamed for increases in unemployment, especially among African Americans, worsened poverty conditions and other urban malaise in minority communities are also attributed to current flows (Borjas 1990, Chavez 1991, Miles 1992). In contrast to African American neighborhoods, however, impoverished Latino immigrant communities tend not to manifest the joblessness and extended welfare dependency portrayed in Wilson's (1987) underclass model. This suggests that, despite the dramatic economic, social, and demographic transformations in the Los Angeles region, Latino immigrants may actually provide a buffer that alleviates poverty conditions and serves as a productive economic factor to the local and surrounding region.

As I summarized earlier, nearly all studies on the impact of immigration on job competition are either national, regional, city-wide, or industry specific. Immigrants and their various characteristics are treated as one side of an equation with wages on the other, while extraneous factors are either ignored or peripherally addressed. To be sure, research in this area has developed a rich array of findings mostly emphasizing no wage or employment effects as a result of immigration to instances of either positive or insignificant negative wage and employment impacts. These findings suggest that whatever impact immigrants have on local communities will also be somewhat mixed — that is, we might find instances of displacement in one area and instances of complementarity in another. This conclusion, however, is drawn from more

macro-level analyses and may not hold for local immigrant-rich communities. To look deeply at a micro-level immigrant community, such as Los Angeles’ Pico Union, Oakland’s Fruitvale, or San Francisco’s Mission District, will require several alternative considerations.

First, in local settings, it may not be appropriate to analyze the impact of immigration simply in terms of “job displacement” or “job creation.” There are other relevant factors not captured by the complement-substitute framework. Not only is there some evidence that immigrants directly and indirectly contribute to local job growth, but also communities with a large presence of immigrants benefit in ways other than new jobs, such as specialty store services, church activities, community programs, and social job networks. These benefits aid immigrants and nonimmigrants alike in fostering a basic standard of living that provides stability, continuity, growth, and opportunity—all factors that aid community residents in functioning as productive citizens.

Second, any community analysis of job competition needs to differentiate between predominantly black, predominantly Latino, or a mixture of both, in assessing the relative impacts of increased immigration. Immigrant flows to concentrated Latino areas, such as Pico Union, South Gate, and Huntington Park in Los Angeles, may have a much different impact than immigration to areas with large black populations, such as Compton and Watts in Los Angeles. While job competition may exist in Latino communities, it is likely not as pronounced where recent immigrants, earlier immigrants, and nonimmigrants (U.S.-born Latinos) intermingle and work alongside each other. In contrast, anecdotal evidence describes severe tension between Latino immigrants and established black residents in south central Los Angeles over public health and hospital services, housing, and other public programs.

In poor communities, where public services are not particularly abundant, increased flows of new immigrants may exacerbate pre-existing tensions. However, it is important not to confuse the historical and contemporary causes of impoverished communities and not to place the blame merely on current immigrant groups. Wilson (1987) and other important scholars (Danziger and Gottschalk 1993, Ellwood 1988, Goldsmith and Blakely 1992, Murray 1984, Mead 1992, Jencks and Peterson 1991) have convincingly and thoroughly, while spanning different political spectrums, promulgated many causes and theories for the growth of inequality and the urban poor without ever advancing immigration as a factor.

Finally, an analysis of job competition in a local community needs to reformulate notions about job competition which are mostly derived from regional or national contexts. While Latino immigration to black communities may lead to various types of conflict over increasingly scarce resources, it is not readily apparent how job competition will play itself out in a local setting, considering the regional and segmented context of jobs, the fact that most workers in Los Angeles commute a substantial distance to their workplace, and that few local communities have an industrial base from which to draw their employment.

In Los Angeles, space and geography determine to a very large degree where one lives, but they do not necessarily dictate where one works. One- to two-hour work commutes are not unusual for many Angelino workers, to jobs both in the core and the secondary sectors. Preliminary data collection for a research project on day laborers who solicit work at highly traveled street corners, documents worker commutes of up to 1.5 hours on public transportation from one side of Los Angeles (eastside) to the other (westside) merely for the opportunity to seek work (Valenzuela 1995). Given the highly dispersed nature of jobs, place of residence, and Latino and immigrant concentrated communities in Los Angeles, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to assess only the impacts of job competition on a local community.

**BEYOND JOB COMPETITION:**

**IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION ON LOCAL COMMUNITIES**

Here, I argue that, rather than exacerbating poverty conditions by displacing native labor, immigrants act as a positive, or productive resource for many of Los Angeles’s communities. Immigrants function as producers, consumers, workers, and entrepreneurs, in their immediate localities and the surrounding region. Without immigration, poverty in Latino barrios might perhaps duplicate Wilson’s underclass neighborhoods with high levels of crime, welfare dependency, single-headed households, and a concentrated group of poor unemployed people.
Some preliminary work provides evidence to suggest that Latino immigrants, rather than creating a dependency drag on their residential communities and the regional economy, play a crucial role in revitalizing declining neighborhoods, by providing entrepreneurial growth, and supplying a labor force that would otherwise be unavailable.

As immigrants continue to flow into Southern California, data indicate that they are regular participants in almost all sectors of the economy (Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1994; Valenzuela 1991, 1993). However, regional economic descriptions fail to look at the local involvement of immigrants as job creators — both directly as entrepreneurs, and indirectly, as residents and consumers who, through their buying power contribute to the local and regional economy. In this sense, they are acting in a complementary fashion with regard to job competition. In addition, analyses rarely recognize the filter effect that immigrants have on their neighborhoods when they replace other lower-tiered and lower-paid workers who advance to better paid jobs — another indirect form of complementarity. In their communities, immigrants act as agents of change as they replenish low-paid jobs, involve themselves in the informal economy, create unique search and job network strategies, and support vibrant social and cultural activities that are critical to economic development.

Four types of productive economic roles played by Latino immigrants are listed in Table 3 and described in the accompanying text.

**IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS AS ENTREPRENEURS**

The contributions of Latino immigrants to business activities in their communities range from investment into existing businesses to small business startups and microenterprises, including those in the informal sector. Research on other ethnic immigrant groups, for example, on Cuban immigrants in Miami (Portes, Clark, and Lopez 1981; Portes and Stepick 1993) and Koreans in Los Angeles (Light and Bonacich 1988), shows how important entrepreneurial activities are to local economic development, but perhaps more importantly, to the creation of new jobs.

In addition to jobs that entrepreneurs create for their coethnics — often a large portion of total group employment — coethnic entrepreneurs, through their economic participation, lay a forceful claim to social recognition in society. Entrepreneurial resources (e.g., human capital, money to invest, unique ethnic cultural endowments, industrial paternalism, solidarity, social networks, ethnic institutions, and social capital) that differ by immigrant group, affect aggregate economic development of society, as well as the economic chances of individual groups and communities within it (Light and Rosenstein, 1995).

**IMPACT OF IMMIGRANT LABOR FORCE SUPPLY**

What is the economic impact of the expanding Latino labor force in the regional economy? Apparently, only nondurable manufacturing in Los Angeles has withstood the setbacks experienced by the rest of the manufacturing sector, especially heavy durables and aerospace. And it is employment in nondurable manufacturing that was nearly two-thirds Latino in 1990, although Latinos made up only one-third of the total labor force in Los Angeles. A number of other industries in the region also rely on the Latino labor including private household work (76 percent), textiles (75 percent), furniture (74 percent), apparel (72 percent), and paper (61 percent) (U.S. Bureau of the Census).

An expanding Latino immigrant labor force, I argue, has provided the fuel of expansion for certain industries, such as apparel, health administration, education, and government occupations. In addition, immigrants provide "breathing room" for a number of light manufacturing industries that would otherwise have departed the region for offshore, low-wage sites. Instead, the region has been able to retain and upgrade these industries by improving production processes, enhancing product mix and marketing strategies, and increasing the skills of the labor force.

Immigrant Latinos provide not only low cost goods to their immediate communities, but also low-wage labor (often as part of the informal economy) in (1) home services — house cleaning, child care, elder care, other forms of care, as well as landscaping and gardening; (2) construction work, particularly in housing and home improvement; and (3) hotels and food services (basic components of the tourist industry that is dependent on immigrant labor).

There are some difficulties sorting out data about Latino immigrants from information on the rest of the Latino population, so analysts must make certain assumptions.
Abel Valenzuela, Jr.

### Table 3. Productive Roles Played by Immigrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Community Impact</th>
<th>Regional Impact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Impact of immigrants as entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Self-employment, small business startup, job creation</td>
<td>Job creation, demand for business services, investment in existing businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of immigrants as labor force</td>
<td>Replacement workers for residents moving out of community, affordable workers for startup businesses</td>
<td>High labor force participation in key service sectors, labor allowing light industries to remain in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of immigrant economic networks</td>
<td>Mechanism which provides for rapid incorporation of residents into productive economic activity, provides linkages to enhance entrepreneurial activities</td>
<td>Facilitates linkage by workers and businesses with larger economy, Serves as buffer for market failures, reduces public costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact of immigrants as consumers</td>
<td>Supports economic activity in the community</td>
<td>Added purchasing power resulting in increased business activity, purchasing translates into increased revenue collection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ROLE OF IMMIGRANT ECONOMIC NETWORKS**

The ability for immigrants to settle and secure employment in a new country depends to a very large degree on their economic and social network systems. These systems not only steer immigrants towards specific jobs, but also serve as a stabilizing factor and information clearinghouse for their other settlement requirements such as housing, schooling, legal services, and social programs. Their successful integration is crucial if they are to contribute to the economic and social stability of the United States. Well functioning networks provide decisive assistance in this process.

Immigrants, by enhancing the scope and integration of social networks, confer important business and employment resources to their respective communities (Gold 1992; Waldinger, Ward, and Aldrich 1985; Portes 1987; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). First, immigrant networks often carry business or employment-related information that allows coethnics to obtain accurate and prompt news of economic opportunities. Social networks also encourage mutual aid among business owners supplying advice on preferential hiring and purchasing (Waldinger 1986, Kim and Hurh 1985). By contributing to the viability of individual firms, mutual aid increases the ability of immigrant populations to support numerous business firms (Light and Rosenstein 1995).

**IMPACT OF IMMIGRANTS AS CONSUMERS**

Because immigration directly adds to the number of consumers in a receiving region, it can stimulate business growth and production in all types of sales and services, ranging from local convenience stores and beauty shops to regional malls and legal services. Thus, Latino immigration has expanded the demand for goods and services in the region and concomitantly increased tax revenues.

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For poor immigrant women, social networks (e.g., child care, voluntary organizations) often provide the only way of facilitating their settlement process and job procurement (Hondagnew-Sotelo 1994). Men's settlement processes and employment strategies differ from women's, but are also directly related to their social network systems, for example, to soccer and card clubs (Massey, Alarcon, Durand, and Gonzalez 1987).
CONCLUSION

The contention that immigrants displace U.S.-born workers, and, in particular, native minority workers, is at the heart of the immigration debate. In Los Angeles, competition over housing, public services, and education also figures in the popular debate over immigration; however, it is job competition that captures most of the attention. Early research on job competition is unequivocal in showing negligible or minor impacts (except there is some evidence of downward pressure on wages) as a result of increased immigration. However, more recent research is challenging these conclusions not only by finding greater impacts of immigration on job competition but also by pointing to other complex factors that mediate job displacement, such as discrimination, a segmented labor market that concentrates low-skilled native and immigrant workers in the secondary sector, a restructured economy that provides fewer opportunities for low-skill workers to advance, and the demise of organized labor.

Just as national and regional studies point to minor or no effect on earnings and employment as a result of increased immigration, negative local community impacts, I argue, are also minor or do not exist. To support this contention, I discuss four ways that immigrants contribute to positive economic outcomes for local communities and their surrounding areas. While immigrant contributions to local communities through entrepreneurial growth is evident and well documented for the Korean population in Los Angeles, it is far from conclusive that a small business or entrepreneurial development strategy will reap the economic and community benefits for Latino-concentrated communities.

The causes — cultural, political, class, and historical — for entrepreneurial success differ greatly by immigrant group, but few studies tell us to what extent Latino immigrants are faring in this regard.

Job growth and the role of social networks in facilitating immigrant incorporation into the labor market are evident in immigrant and surrounding communities and contribute positively to an area’s social and economic stability. Regional studies and basic economics tell us that the multiplier effect on consumerism grows as a result of increases in population. What is not well known, however, is the effect that immigration has on a local community’s consumption and commodity purchasing patterns. Further exploration on the filtering of dollars in a local immigrant-concentrated area may yield positive turnover rates, suggesting strong economic development potential and opportunities for outside investment.

As California and Los Angeles have changed from a mostly white population to a mostly Latino, Asian, and African American population, the politics of fear and uncertainty have resurfaced. Anti-immigrant political rhetoric and mean-spirited and unconstitutional policies and propositions, as well as increased violence, are as much targeted against undocumented and legal immigrants as they are against dissatisfaction with California’s deteriorated lifestyle and poor economic status. Indeed, placing the blame for California’s fallen economy and increased joblessness on immigrants ignores empirical data, and, perhaps more importantly, distracts attention from the ineptitude of current and former state and local government officials and poor public policies.
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Immigration Issues, Economics, and Politics
PURPOSE AND PLAN OF THE REPORT

In most cities of the Los Angeles area, the use of Latino day-workers, esquineros (those who seek jobs at street corners), has been increasing since the 1960s. Throughout the Los Angeles area, day-labor curb-side sites now number around 40, some extending for a mile (Vidal 1992, pgs. 3, 10), with from 3,000 to 6,000 esquineros frequenting them each day (Grossman 1989, p. 13; Amado 1990, pgs. 25-27). At some esquinas (corners) only a handful of laborers wait, while at others, hundreds of hopefuls gather each morning.

Although this human phenomenon is frequently discussed in the press, it has never been studied in any depth by social scientists. This effort strives to fill a research gap by analyzing in detail the social organization found at two such day-labor sites — one in downtown Los Angeles at Pico and Main; the other in west Los Angeles at Sawtelle and Santa Monica.

The report first describes the research methods and sites and those who come there. Then, some background on day-labor markets and migrant labor is given, followed by a definition of an unstructured labor market.

At first glance, day-labor markets seem completely disorganized, even chaotic — fitting the description of such a structureless market. No clear boundaries exist, no entry or exit requirements are in place, no apparent rules or norms prevail, and no status hierarchies are obvious. The labor supply is elastic and competition is keen. Wages are apparently arrived at as in financial markets — that is, every market participant knows the bid and offer terms and may alter proposals in light of this information. In short, the day-labor markets could be considered completely unstructured.

However, when the results of analysis are presented, they show that while the Los Angeles, Latino, street-corner hiring sites meet some of the criteria for a structureless market, they fail on several counts. Beneath surface appearances there is, at least, an informal social organization that imposes considerable structure on the market. Institutional forms are shaped by the market participants into an organization within which the buyers and sellers operate.

RESEARCH METHODS AND THE SITES

This chapter is based on fieldwork conducted as two day-labor sites over two periods: from September 1990 through December 1991 at Pico and Main in downtown Los Angeles and from January 1992 through April 1992 at Sawtelle and Santa Monica in west Los Angeles. The research required entering the social world of the esquineros to understand the organization of day-labor markets.

Although I am of the same ethnic group as the esquineros, gaining entree posed problems. Due to the illegal status of many esquineros, together with the fact that fellow ethnic group

The Setting

The scene is a day-labor site in downtown Los Angeles. At 6:30, the morning light is just a grayish tinge in the sky. Twenty-two men, bundled up against the cool fog, are standing in front of a hardware store at the esquina (corner) of Pico and Main. For blocks around, other men trudge toward the esquina as the rush-hour traffic blurs past.

Every morning, rain or shine, hundreds of would-be laborers gather on corners like this one, risking arrest, fines, and deportation, in hopes of finding work. These men who wait at corners — esquineros — are mostly young, male, non-English speaking, undocumented Latino migrants from Mexico or Central America.

They come as early as six in the morning and wait until about three in the afternoon. Waiting and more waiting is the norm. While they wait, they talk and listen to the advice of the more experienced esquineros. At the esquina, they become friends, gamble by tossing coins, exchange valuable information about living arrangements and the hiring process, read La Opinion, whistle at passing morras (young women), and dream about finding full time work. Whenever a car pulls over to the curb, they rush to compete for the job being offered.

From the safety of their cars, often with windows rolled up and doors locked, passersby can see the esquineros leaning against the fenced parking lot of the hardware store or squatting. Those on foot hurry past, feeling intimidated. Police drive by, usually glancing with indifference.
members at times cooperate with the authorities, they are as suspicious of an inquisitive Latino investigator as of anybody else. So, as I began to "hang out" at the hiring sites, I was regarded with suspicion and questioned.

Esquineros are in a vulnerable position, living with the fear of being deported by la Migra (the Immigration and Naturalization Service) as they await work offers. Over time, they became used to my being there, and I made some acquaintances who later introduced me to other participants in this world. Gradually I was trusted as I became familiar with the common day-to-day activities of the esquina, the social rules, and the "do's" and "don'ts." Over several months I spent many hours with these men, observing and listening to the way they went about getting jobs, establishing networks, disseminating information about living arrangements and counterfeit documents, learning the ropes of day-labor work, and more. Although I was acquainted with many esquineros at both sites, my closest relationships were with six individuals at Pico and Main and an equal number at Sawtelle and Santa Monica. I was able to extensively query these men on an array of subjects.

**PICO AND MAIN**

I first conducted my field work at an important day-labor site — one of Los Angeles' oldest and most frequented — along a busy one-block strip on Pico between Main and Broadway in downtown Los Angeles, on the outskirts of the garment district. Latinos predominate; almost everyone speaks Spanish, though creative mixes of Spanish and English are also heard. On average, from 60 to 70 esquineros converge here; the range is from 20 to 120, depending on the weather, police activities, economic conditions, and other factors. I estimate that half the esquineros are Mexican; the rest are from Central America. On a good day, 22 will be hired for temporary jobs, but the average is closer to 11 or 13. Employers are Anglos, Asians, or Latinos, but the esquineros prefer Anglos.

Between the two corners is a hardware store and a fenced parking lot with an entrance on Pico and another on Main. Around both entrances, clusters of five or six young men gather, motioning to passing cars with an index finger, indicating that they are available for work. Others gather along the strip. Esquineros are hired on weekdays, between 6:00 am and 3:30 pm; on Saturdays, until around midday, but on Sundays very few show up.

In sight from the esquina is a travel agency that posts a big sign: Viajes Baratos en Autobus a Mexico (Cheap Bus Fares to Mexico), reminding the esquineros of the destiny that awaits them if they do not find a job soon. And going back home, without having sent back enough money to at least cover the expenses of the trip, spells failure.

A few doors down from the travel agency is a Korean-owned store that sells purses; on down the street is a small burger stand that caters to the esquineros, a mercery, and, beyond, a store where cloth is sold. Across the sidewalk on Pico, the Osorias lunch-truck arrives at 7:00 o'clock every morning, staying until 2:00 in the afternoon when most workers are either about ready to leave for home or have been picked up for work. The lunch-truck owner has a lucrative business that profits from the day-laborers. Some esquineros bring their lunches but purchase a soft-drink or coffee. The driver of the truck, la Chaparrita, plays an important role at the esquina because she can either grant or deny credit. The amount owed is usually paid at the end of the work week.

While the vast majority of the men who go to the esquina are looking to be employed for day-labor, I learned that there are some who use the corner for other purposes. For example, some work during the night and come to the corner to interact socially. There are others there to sell cigarettes, alcohol, and other items. And finally, there are a few who are usually drunk and neither have a job nor want one.

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1 The esquinerо men claim that la Migra (the Immigration and Naturalization Service) hires Mexicans or Mexican-Americans as special agents to locate undocumented migrants and turn them in. They said that officials pay a bounty for each migrant apprehended. See Whyte (1979).
SAWTELLE AND SANTA MONICA

The second research site is at the busy intersection of Sawtelle and Santa Monica, five minutes south of the UCLA campus, close to the 405 freeway. This corner attracts from 55 to 60 esquineros, all seeking a day’s wage. Although there are a few drunks, very few people show up at this corner just to socialize. On any given day, about 20 or more of those who come will earn a wage. In contrast to the Pico site, hiring at Sawtelle and Santa Monica takes place seven days a week.

Most are Mexican (especially from Oaxaca, Mexico City, and Guanajuato) or Central American. As they approach, some, who can afford to, buy coffee and croissants or bagels from a shop that is part of a mini-mall complex that includes a 7-Eleven. It is on the corner of this busy intersection that most of the esquineros congregate, though some position themselves at the other three corners, with a few grouped a half a block away. At all of these locations, a substantial number of customers come to shop, conduct business, socialize at the several coffee shops, or wait for public transportation.

A good number of the esquineros who live in nearby pool-rented apartments on Sawtelle walk to the site, as do a few who live under the 405 freeway. Other use public transportation to get to the esquina.

DESCRIPTION OF THE ESQUINEROS AT THE TWO SITES

Although there are some esquineros who are U.S. citizens or permanent residents (green card holders), most entered the United States illegally. Most are men in the 20s or 30s. Many are unmarried, but those who are, tend to leave their spouses behind in the home country. They come from Mexico and Central America (especially El Salvador and Guatemala). With the exception of Guanajuato and Michoacan, Mexican migrants come from non-traditional migratory areas such as the Mexico City metropolitan area, Morelos, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, and Yucatan. This broadened distribution of sending areas suggests that migration patterns are changing from a regional to a national phenomenon (Cornelius 1990).

Most reported that it was their first time migrating and that they had only recently arrived. Because these people are not tied into established networks that help them find jobs, counterfeit documents, housing, etc., most literally take to the streets. Some work as street vendors, hawking fresh produce or flower; others, doggedly show up at the day-labor sites.

Most men at the esquina have completed at least six years of schooling. This is above the average educational level (five years or less) reported for male migrants in the late 1970s (Bustamante and Martinez 1979). The reason is that now more migrants come from urban areas. That they come from modernized social groups, live in cities, and have above-average education (Portes and Rumbaut 1990), counters the common impression that Mexican undocumented migrants are mostly rural workers (Samora 1971, North and Houstoun 1976), but agrees with Massey et al. (1987). Prior to migrating, most of the men I met were manual workers in urban-based occupations and with no intention of pursuing farm work in the United States. However, most cannot speak or read English, severely restricting their access to desirable jobs.

The dominant image of undocumented migration is “impoverished masses overwhelming the border” coupled with the idea

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[1] Enrique, who lives in Boyle Heights, spends $3.10/day on taking three buses each direction. On his way, he passes several informal hiring sites but prefers Sawtelle and Santa Monica because “the police don’t bother us and no one will work for less than $5/hour. And fewer low-paying Chinos (Asians) and Hispanics are at this esquina. Most of the employers are Anglos or Middle Eastern immigrants.”

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In the afternoon, a black Toyota pick-up drives up. A Chicano at the steering wheel toys with an unlit cigarette; while his passenger with a sparse but long mustache, calls out, Necesito seis trabajadores fuertes para un jale a cuatro bolas la hora (I need six strong men for a gig at $4/hour). Cinco bolas! shouts the group of potential workers.

The employer agrees, showing that he accepts by stretching out his hand extending five fingers.

Meanwhile, all potential workers converge on the pick-up. About 15 jump onto its bed, while others ask where the job site is. The driver opens his door to study those who have jumped in back. He points, tu... tu... until he gets to five, el resto, bajense (you... you... the rest get down).

About three o’clock, those remaining at the esquina begin breaking up. Chespirito says he’s going to a mission that provides food and a place to sleep. He bids farewell to his companions, shaking their hands and remarking, Mañana sera otro dia (Tomorrow will be another day).
that those who cross the gates to the land-of-plenty, do so never to return (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). But other research suggests that many undocumented migrants do return and that the process is a complex one involving cyclical entries and departures from the United States (Cornelius 1978, Garcia y Griego 1980, Bustamante 1983). This pattern of back-and-forth migration more accurately describes the way of the esquineros.4 They plan to stay in the United States a short time; their participation is in an international labor market (Cornelius 1978, Piore 1979). They "target" the United States to earn money and then return to Mexico (Portes and Bach 1985). Their attitude is one of a sojourner (Piore 1979),5 neither considering settling permanently in the United States nor remaining a life-long esquinero. Rather, day-labor is conceived as a job to do for the time-being — the sooner it can be exchanged for a better paying, more stable job, the better. Even those esquineros who enjoy steadier relationships with certain employers and report being relatively satisfied with their jobs, do not view them as a long-term vocation.

Thus, these esquineros are migrants, not immigrants. Typically they are young males of modest means — neither so poor that they lack the money for the trip, nor so rich that a risky trip is unattractive. They usually enter the host country without dependents giving them a better chance of attaining their economic goals promptly. Although many come to help their relatives at home, they do not face the same pressures as those whose dependents come with them. They can send remittances back home while retaining some money for their personal needs.

**BACKGROUND**

The tradition of street corner labor markets is not new in the United States. In New York, in 1834, the statute books show that a “place was set aside on city streets where those seeking work could meet with those who wanted workers” (Martinez 1973, p. 8). Men would stand on one street; women on another (looking for domestic work). Whyte (1955), Liebow (1967), Suttle (1968), and Anderson (1978) also provide studies of street-corner hiring.

Day-labor markets have operated in California, Texas, New Jersey, Florida, and other states for many years (Fujimoto 1968). Pickup points are generally informal meeting places without any government involvement.

Historically, especially in California, day-labor sites were for those seeking work in agriculture. Agricultural workers were once drawn largely from skid row and wino row (Fisher 1953, Fujimoto 1968). Besides a congregation of alcoholics, hoodlums, and other outcasts, skid row once served as an important depot for labor. Families and single workers without transportation sought employment from contractors who recruited at these sites.

Schmidt’s (1964, p. 38) description of a day-labor site in Los Angeles in the 1960s is typical: Essentially, it is an “on street” location in the central part of Los Angeles having several all-night cafes where workers can linger while labor contractors assemble to transport them from the city (between 4:30 and 6:30 am) to the agricultural areas. The contractors or their drivers, the producers or their foremen, circulate among the workers describing the job, the rate of pay, the conditions of the field, and the distance from town.

Harrington (1962, p. 53) describes a similar phenomenon in Stockton, California: ...the workers “shape up” at three o’clock in the morning. There is a milling mass of human beings down by skid row, and they are there to sell themselves in the market place. Those who are lucky enough to get work are crammed into unsafe pick-up trucks and transported like cattle to the work site. As agricultural areas located further from the heart of the cities, an earlier departure was required.

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4 This is less true of the Salvadorians I met who consider it very difficult to return home. The others from Central America did plan to return.

5 Piore views the return to the sending country as part of a normal patterned sequence of labor displacements. He contends that permanence in the receiving country is not really a sign of migrant success.

9 There are exceptions: In response to the proliferation of street corner hiring sites, since 1989, some city-operated, hire-by-lottery sites exist in Los Angeles, Glendale, and Costa Mesa (where work permits are required).
Meanwhile, the U.S. labor market for migrants from Mexico and other Latin American countries was changing (e.g., see North and Houstoun 1976). Migration between 1942 and 1964, the period of the Bracero Program, was predominantly to work in agriculture. Since then (although many still come to work in agriculture), Latino migrants are increasingly seeking urban destinations and employment in industry, construction, commerce, and the services (Cornelius 1978; Sassen-Koob 1985, p. 301; Papademetriou 1989, p. 159).

Structural changes in the U.S. economy and urban populations have generated a growing number of low-paying, unskilled jobs for migrants. Large controlling centers of a worldwide economy, like Los Angeles, tend toward a polarized occupational structure where, at the one extreme, are offered large numbers of low-paying jobs in labor-intensive services or in sweat-shop-type production (Sassen-Koob 1985, pgs. 255-265). (The demand for labor-intensive services is increasing even faster than that for labor-intensive goods.) Large companies compete savagely to keep the costs of goods and services down. Restaurants, garment workshops, and assembly factories, cope with fluctuations in demand for their products or services by taking on and shedding labor as needed.

Such jobs that do not offer stable income with which to meet family obligations are apparently not attractive to many others in the economy. Rather, they are filled by temporary Mexican labor — migrants who stay while the jobs last and leave if no other work is available. Single migrants, prepared to lodge with friends or relatives or to share a small apartment, have low subsistence requirements (Piore 1979, Diez-Canedo 1984) making it possible to survive on wages earned. Moreover, the political vulnerability of the migrant worker, especially those here illegally, who face constant threat of deportation, means that the traditional defenses provided by labor unions are usually inaccessible (Castles and Kosack 1975). Thus, the economies of cities like Los Angeles, are structured to promote temporary labor migration. While some Mexican migrants find more permanent jobs and stay on, most will return to Mexico."

The esquineros do many kinds of manual labor, including painting, construction, dry-walling, hauling, gardening, cleaning (of offices, houses, yards, pools, factories, and construction sites). They also work in roofing, installing carpets, for moving companies (especially on weekends), and for small landscapers.

Today, day-labor markets effectively bring together prospective employers and seekers of work. They offer Latino undocumented migrants a chance to gain a foothold in the urban economy. For some, day labor is their first job in the United States; for others, it offers an opportunity to earn some money while temporarily laid off from a regular job; for still others, it is a way to complement a low salary earned in another job. The location of these day-labor sites (often at street corners) is easily found out, and they are accessible to all who are willing and able to fill the jobs being offered.

**The Structureless Labor Market Model**

Labor markets differ in size, composition, character, and most importantly, structure. Phelps' (1957) definition of an unstructured labor market is particularly useful: "one which contains few, if any, established institutions by means of which people obtain market information, move into and out of jobs, qualify for advances in rank or pay, or identify themselves with any type of organization — either employer-sponsored or employee sponsored — for purposes of security or self support" (p. 403).

An unstructured labor market lacks any degree of security relative to either income or employment. Employment is sporadic and transient; the wages for hours worked fall at or near the minimum; few benefits are granted; there is an absence of labor unions; laborers frequently work under unhealthy and unsafe conditions; and total income is lowered by extended periods of unemployment between jobs. The overwhelming majority of workers in these markets are unskilled. These temporary hands are employed in agriculture, artisan production, small industries, petty commerce, personal and domestic services, construction and...
day-labor work, and such, but they perform useful and often essential tasks for the economy.

Fisher’s The Harvest Labor Market in California (1953) is the classic study of unstructured labor markets. Fisher defines five traits for the absence of structure (pgs. 7-11):

1. No unions, seniority hiring, or other limitations on access to the labor market;
2. No personal relationships or obligations between employer and employees, that is, employment is mediated by a third party such as a labor contractor;
3. Uniformly unskilled employment accessible to a large, unspecialized labor force;
4. Predominance of piece-rate payment schemes;
5. Little or no capital in machinery.

The structureless labor market, Fisher argued, was ideally suited to the needs of agricultural firms. Without restrictions on access to work or differentiation in the skills required for harvesting, workers could be drawn from various sources to meet the highly seasonal and variable needs of agricultural employers.

**Are Day-Labor Markets Unstructured?**

The esquina day-labor market fits several of Fisher’s criteria about an unstructured market. First, there are no unions, and there is no rule that might block access to the market. In contrast, with unions, entry is controlled through some device such as a hiring hall, and a seniority system is generally in place.

Second, in the day-labor market there is little attachment between employer and employee. The most common practice is an employer’s hiring esquineros directly. Although there are just the two parties involved, the relationship lacks any established obligations. An esquinero is simply offered a job by someone he does not know and to whom he has not been recommended. It is common for esquineros not to know the name of the employers for whom they have worked. There is literally no relationship upon which a claim to regular employment might be built. Therefore, there is little opportunity for promotion or job security.

Another form of hiring day-laborers does involve a third party, usually a crew foreman. Typically, employers deal only with the foremen, removing them even further from the workers.

However, not fitting with Fisher’s second criterion is the fact that some esquineros have established a relatively steady relationship with an employer or a foreman. They can count on more regular employment than those who do not have such an arrangement.

With regard to Fisher’s third point, at any given time, almost anyone willing to work at the going wage can be hired. In fact, during a recession, increasing numbers of Anglos and Blacks show up at the hiring corners seeking work (Ballesteros 1992, pgs. 3-4; Dunn 1992, pgs. 1-2). Nor does age seem to be a factor keeping workers from coming: There are esquineros as young as 16 and some as old as 58 (Grossman 1989, p. 11). Blind hiring of workers with unknown productivity characteristics, along with the large variability in labor demand, results in a highly casual labor market. Most are employed in unskilled general labor doing tasks requiring little learning or judgment.

The esquineros, unprotected by law, find themselves at the mercy of their employers. These workers, afraid of being reported to authorities, are often willing to work long hours under unhealthy conditions and even abuse at the work site, without social security, workers’ compensation, or old age security.

Fisher’s fourth characteristic of an unstructured market does not generally apply to the day-labor market — that payment be based on a unit of output rather than on an hourly basis.

Fisher’s fifth and final requirement — that the operation employ little or no machinery does apply. Machinery use automatically imposes a structure or skill requirements on a labor market.

Despite a fairly close fit with Fisher’s criteria of an unstructured market, some structure does, in fact, prevail. First, although most jobs are open to anyone who comes along, women are excluded. These are definitely men’s jobs. Second, there is an informal, though distinct division between those who have “regular” employers who rehire them frequently and those who are hired on a one-job basis only (or are not hired at all). Instead of a completely fungible labor pool, substitutability is reduced sharply, imposing structure.

Thus, the day-labor market violates some of the assumptions of Fisher’s model. There is an informal structure that provides an organizational basis for bringing together employers and seekers of work. There is both occupational structure and occupational culture. The former serves to differentiate workers, while the latter binds them together.
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE

The day-labor market is informally organized by a status hierarchy among the esquineros, determined by the type of employer. This, in turn, determines how often an esquino will be employed and what he will earn.

When I first began observing the esquineros, I assumed that there was only one way to get hired — luck, plus the ability to fight through the mob of competing workers. After some time at the sites, I realized there were two distinct ways of being hired (see box).

The more common type of hiring takes place when an esquino is offered a job by someone he does not know and to whom he has not been recommended. These "unclaimed" employers usually need a couple of workers for a day or two. For the most part, they are home or small business owners able to spare a few dollars for help around the house or business. The work involves such tasks as painting, moving heavy objects (especially on weekends), landscaping, or gardening. These "unclaimed" employers do not come on a regular basis, but there are always some who come.

The competition among esquineros is keen. And besides this intense competition, is the uncertainty about pay. Employers may offer as much as $80/day, but pay much less after the work is done; others pay with a check that bounces. A few pay workers only in terms of meals or clothing rather than cash, and still others avoid paying the workers at all. Although such practices are unethical and illegal, the law is seldom enforced. Moreover, the esquineros are constantly fearful that their employers could turn out to be la Migra.

Second, some esquineros wait at specific areas of the esquina, away from the crowd, expecting to be picked up by an employer with whom they have an arrangement. This type of worker-employer relationship usually originates after an esquino, on his first job, impresses the employer with an effective tireless performance. After another repeat performance, this worker may be in regular contact with the employer. If work is available, the employer will agree with the esquino on the date, hour, and location to pick him up. Because work sites change rather frequently, the esquina continues to serve as the pickup point, even for esquineros working for "regular" employers. Because the esquineros know the employer, underpayment is much less likely, especially for those who are on good terms.

Thus, there are two types of esquineros — those hired by "unclaimed" employers and those hired by "regular" employers. This distinction results in differences in earnings, in attachment to the corner, and in their respective social status. Of course, some esquineros are in between in that they work for both types of employers.

Esquineros who are only hired by "unclaimed" employers will need to seek other job opportunities to compensate for the unstable employment found at the day-labor site. They may be able to secure a variety of short-term, for-cash, odd jobs in the service sector, such as a mechanic's helper in an auto body repair shop, a warehouseman, a cook, a musician. Such supplementary employment is necessary for their economic survival.

In contrast, the work of esquineros hired by "regular" employers is somewhat more stable. Still, they are confronted with seasonality of demand and temporary layoffs due to the weather, particularly in roofing and construction jobs.

The money earned further distinguishes the two types of esquineros. On average, those working for "regular" employers work three days a week for eight hours a day, at $5/hour. Because some of them have two or more regular employers, they may sometimes work as much as seven days a week.

In contrast, those seeking jobs with "unclaimed" employers are hired only irregularly. Occasionally, they may go for weeks without being hired. Many of them are seen as "still learning" and are considered weak and inexperienced, while those employed by "regular" employers have "seen it all and done it all" and are regarded as knowledgeable and experienced. As such, they are expected to "socialize" the less experienced into the informal organization at the esquina. Deference at the corner is granted to those employed by "regular" employers and to those who display an extraordinary ability at their work; they are respected and may receive preferential treatment in the job hiring process.

While this definite occupational structure tends to differentiate the esquineros, there is a also culture at the corner that links them together, as they help one another. This, too, imposes structure on the market.
OCCUPATIONAL CULTURE

Becoming an esquinero is usually not a deliberately planned, self-initiated move. Rather, it comes about as various acquaintances or friends suggest the possibility (see description on the next page). Many hear of the day-labor sites for the first time while living in temporary shelters in downtown Los Angeles (Diez-Canedo 1984).

During their first few weeks in the United States, migrants search for regular work, but due to their undocumented status and lack of networks, most I interviewed were having a difficult time. Consequently they rely on casual day labor to survive (see Cornelius 1988, pgs. 1-2).

The main attraction of the esquina is its ease of entry. To participate, a man must merely drop by and make his presence known. At first, the esquineros are cautious — their suspicion of outsiders is pronounced — but after observing a newcomer’s behavior for a short period of time, discussing his background, and finding him acceptable, the group absorbs him.*

Another attraction in becoming an esquinero is that with the “sweat shop” alternative, they may not even earn the minimum hourly wage, whereas the going rate at most esquinas is $5/hour for a minimum of four hours. Those with experience can earn $50 or even $80/day.

Many esquineros were not aware that day-labor exists as an alternative for work before they came to the United States, and most have very little idea about their employment future beforehand. Diez-Canedo’s (1984, p. 98) research showed that a substantial number of Mexican migrants to the United States are “free floaters” — workers who move toward the industrial area with no particular job in mind and no networks to rely on.

Newcomers have only vague expectations about the role of esquineros. What little knowledge they have derives from their participation in the informal economy back home, their acquaintances with esquineros or ex-esquineros, information from friends or kin who have had some interaction with esquineros, and brief glimpses of the actual day-labor sites.

As is the case with most peripheral occupations, day-labor provides no formal on-the-job training. A novice learns to become an esquinero only through informal social interactions, mostly at the esquina while waiting for employers to arrive. A major form of training consists simply of watching other esquineros and learning from them. Neophyte esquineros indicated that they spend considerable time watching the established members or veteranos in action in order to pick up cues that will help them be more effective at being hired. Besides being watched by the newcomers, veteranos also give direct advice, mostly in casual conversations.

This informal training has two broad interrelated dimensions — one philosophical, the other interpersonal. The first imparts a value structure; the second, the “do’s” and “don’ts” of relating to employers and to other esquineros.

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*Not all arrivals are welcomed; particularly unacceptable behavior is drunkenness that attracts police to the esquina and gives the corner a bad reputation, crippling hiring probabilities. Drunkards are ostracized by the esquineros and overtly pressured to leave, though not always with success.
Value Structure

The value structure that is transmitted constantly reminds the novice that he is undocumented and, therefore, in a vulnerable position, always facing threat of apprehension and deportation. This vulnerability increases at the day-labor sites where the chances of being apprehended by the INS are increasing dramatically (Hernandez 1988, pgs 1-8; Robles 1990, pgs 1, 12; Vidal 1992). Besides the INS, esquineros have to deal with the police who disperse them and cite them for loitering, and with angry merchants who complain that they block traffic, chase away business, and leave trash in the streets.

The vulnerability and uncertainty about being paid persists after a migrant is hired. A worker for an “unclaimed” employer seldom knows the type of job he will be doing or where he will be taken to do the task.

There are instances of nonpayment, but payment of subminimum wages is somewhat more common. Grossman (1989, p. 12), an immigration attorney, reports that 25 percent of the day-laborers earn less than the minimum salary. Payment is always after completion of the task; no one demands or even suggests getting money up front.

The feeling vulnerability among esquineros about their illegal status and uncertainty about getting employed and paid, creates a sense of unity among the workers — a feeling that “we’re all in this together” — an in-group solidarity. The fact that an esquinero has varying degrees of anxiety throughout the whole day-labor experience fosters a dependency upon co-workers. But this sense of solidarity serves to reduce individual anxiety. A common bond is formed as they share similar experiences — the hard work they endure, danger on the job, waiting to be hired for long hours on end, and dealing with the police.

An important manifestation of solidarity at some esquinas (e.g., Sawtelle and Santa Monica) is the informal agreement that no esquinero undercut the asking wage — the currently agreed-upon $5/hour. Experienced workers always immediately negotiate the pay when entering an employer’s vehicle. If below $5, the employer is informed that no one will work below $5/hour and for at least four hours. If refused, the unwritten code is that the esquinero should ask to be dropped off at the next corner.

However, at Pico and Main, the large and constantly changing population of esquineros makes it more difficult to organize around an established rate of pay. Some will work for as little as $3/hour from this site. Despite considerable indirect pressure to accept this value structure of no-wage-cutting, some reject it, especially those only loosely connected with and not well established at the esquina. Enforcement of the established pay rate is virtually impossible because the agreement usually takes place in the employer’s vehicle.

Interpersonal Relationships

To be able to perform adequately at the esquina, one must learn the “rules” of interpersonal contact — the “do’s” and “don’ts” of relating to employers and to other esquineros. Several rules pertain to interaction with fellow esquineros. The first is to honor established worker-“regular” employer relationships. Naturally, other esquineros covet these relationships that hire regularly, pay $5/hour or more, allow reasonable break periods, and even provide meals for the workers. But there is an unwritten law against stealing a good, “regular” employer.

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9 Although few employers who hire from the corner ask for papers, the esquineros feel that the number asking for work permits is on the increase. Cornelius (1988, p. 1) reports that “one-third of the most recent arrivals looking for work on street corners had acquired... [fake documents]. Likewise, in a nationwide study of employer sanction enforcement, Bach and Brill (1990) found that the use of false documents among migrants is very common. These authorities observed that for unauthorized migrants today, the U.S. labor market experience routinely includes the search for and acquisition of fraudulent documents. McDonnell (1990, pgs. 1, 34-35), also reports that would-be migrant workers must resort to using fraudulent documents. Bogus documents usually cost from $30 to $50, depending on who sells them. There are Latinos, Whites, and Blacks in this business. It is well-known among esquineros that forged documents are easily available; in fact, they can be purchased practically overnight. Some borrow or rent the required documents.

10 Tickets require esquineros to appear before a commissioner at the arraignment court where they are frequently forced to pay without fully understanding why. Since most are seeking employment but are not actually employed, paying $15-$30 for a ticket may not be possible. Failure to appear results in arrest warrants, criminal charges, and severe fines or jail sentences.

11 Aggressively stealing a “regular” employer from an experienced esquinero is by no means common. Instead, an esquinero will seek new “regular” relationships from the employer pool that includes regulars-to-be — those who do not yet have a steady relationship with anyone.

Immigration Issues, Economics, and Politics
A second rule is the acknowledgment that certain areas of the strip belong to particular *esquineros* and that others cannot use this place as a hiring position without permission. It was not uncommon to hear of “Perico’s place” or “Armando’s place.” These spots are usually occupied by those *esquineros* who have “regular” employers who pick them up in the usual place, thus avoiding the mob at the corner where “unclaimed” employers pull up.

Third, there is an implicit understanding among the workers that there is to be no fighting during the swarm towards an employer’s vehicle. Being unintentionally bumped or stuck by an elbow is “just part of the game.”

There are also rules governing the interaction between *esquineros* and employers that serve to limit the *esquineros’* vulnerability in the face of potential employer cheating. *Esquineros* are exhorted to clarify the wage with an employer as they are picked up. Such an agreement, established before doing the work, makes it less probable to receive subminimum wages. Also, *esquineros* learn not to accept payment by check — they insist on cash — because some contractors give “hot” checks. And when *esquineros* are asked if they have specific skills for a job, they are admonished not to lie. If they do and then are unable to perform, it gives the corner a bad name. Besides workers can get hurt when they lack knowledge or experience in operating equipment.

Besides these “don’ts,” there are some ‘do’s’ in a would-be worker’s relationship with an employer. For example, some recommend standing in a small group of three or four men rather than a crowd and including someone who speaks English to attract patrons. Others suggest making eye contact with employers who go into the hardware store for materials. Some feel it is important to dress appropriately for work by wearing work boots or tennis shoes or wear a paint-splattered shirt to indicate availability for a painting job. Others feel that dress is not that important. Just looking strong is sufficient to get hired for some jobs.

Established *esquineros* are willing to give important advice to a novice as part of their “socialization” process. One might expect the established *esquineros* to guard the secrets of their success from potential competitors, but, for several possible reasons, they do not. A *veterano* may be asserting his social status by boasting about his “regular” employers and commenting on how he acquires these good jobs. Or he may be revealing information to protect himself. By sharing trade methods with new *esquineros,* he may make them feel indebted to him, thereby discouraging them from attempting to steal his “regular” employers.

As newcomers are informed of the difficulties of being an *esquinero,* they are gradually absorbed into the organization at the *esquina.* Once this

An *esquinero* described the casual nature of his initial involvement in the day-labor market:

As I was passing by a mechanic’s shop, I saw a group of four Hispanics talking and smoking in a leisurely way. In front of each was an open lunch box and plastic plates containing remainders of food. I asked them where I might find work. “Gigs are scarce,” said one. “But if you look, buddy, you’re bound to find something.”

“You should have come around a few minutes sooner. At least we’d have invited you to chow,” another said. Another digs into his lunch pail and brings out three flour tortilla tacos stuffed with eggs and chorizo and offers them to me.

“Why don’t you go to the esquina and try to get some day labor?” the first one asked. They told me about who does this type of work and the money. I figured I would give it a try. The next morning I was at the curbside hiring site where migrants gather to seek work.

“But what can we do? Without papers, there is no work!” explained Manuel, who obtained a counterfeit green card after being turned down at the esquina for not having proper documents.

When Ernesto arrived from Oaxaca, Mexico, without family, friends, or documents, his future looked bleak. Everyone asked him for papers and a work permit, so the route to employment seemed hopeless. So when someone told him about the esquina where hardly any employer asks for papers and no recommendations are needed, Ernesto gave it a try, starting at Pico and Main and experimenting from there.
happens, a worker can say, "I'm an esquinero." He has earned the label.

**CONCLUDING REMARKS**

A major task for economists and sociologists is to analyze the nature, causes, and effects of departures from theoretical market models. By focusing on a previously unexplored occupational setting, this study contributes to the conceptual and theoretical understanding of undocumented Latino workers in the U.S. labor market. The characteristics of the unstructured labor market model as applied by Fisher (1953) were used as a framework to view day-labor markets. While the esquinas at first appear unorganized, even chaotic, and do meet several of Fisher's criteria, they by no means fulfill all of his conditions. In these departures, we come to realize that beneath surface appearances, there is, indeed, considerable structure and informal organization in the day-labor markets.

A variety of structural forms provide the basis for bringing together prospective employers and seekers of work. Like all other markets that persist over time, the one for day labor has developed customs and rules as their participants seek efficiency in their dealing with one another. The rules at the day-labor site are unwritten and are based largely on practice or precedent, but they govern many aspects of the work relationships, including wages. Although not everyone conforms to these standards, they are the recognized norms.

Day-labor markets respond less to competition and more to informal work rules and the role of customary relationships. In particular, these rules restrain the temptation to bid down wages. Instead, esquineros operate under an agreed upon, "just" wage. The establishment of a socially-accepted minimum wage counters the thrust of the migration literature suggesting that in a market dominated by migrants whose attachment to work is temporary and where there is high turnover, there would be no such minimum wage.

Much of the migration literature focuses on the functioning of networks and how they facilitate the migration process. Here, by studying those who come without kinship and friendship ties, we see another side of the migration phenomenon. The migrants at the drive-by day-labor sites, most of whom are without authorization documents, come to the United States as free floaters. They are like those, whom Diez-Canedo (1984) describes, who migrate toward industrial areas with no particular job in mind and no networks to rely on. Because these people are not tied into established networks that assist in finding jobs, counterfeit documents, housing, etc., most literally take to the streets, congregating at the street-corner, drive-by labor markets.

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Unpacking 187: Targeting Mejicanas

Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo

It is an unfortunate, but nevertheless historical truism that economic downturns spark nativism and anti-immigrant campaigns. But California’s Proposition 187, which is intended to deny public school education and health care to undocumented immigrants and their children, appears to be more than just a replay of the past. An examination of the language used by contemporary proponents of 187, and an analysis of recent Mexican immigration patterns lead me to argue two points. First, the rhetoric animating the current wave of anti-immigrant hysteria reflects a distinctive shift in emphasis from what we have seen in recent decades, approximated perhaps only by that aimed at Mexicans and Mexican-Americans during the Great Depression. Unlike the xenophobia of recent decades, the current rhetoric relies on both racist and sexist imagery.

Second, this narrative shift — and the emphasis on women and public resources — can be seen as a reaction to the transformation of Mexican migration from a predominantly sojourner or temporary pattern, to the widespread establishment of Mexican immigrant families and communities throughout California. Contemporary xenophobia targets women and children because it is they who are central to making settlement happen. Viewed in this manner, the 187 campaign is less about illegal immigration and more about rejecting Latino immigrants and their U.S.-born family members as permanent members of U.S. society.

I begin by examining the narrative devices that framed and fueled the anti-immigrant 187 campaign, and I draw some comparisons with the expulsion campaigns of the early 1930s. Next, I look at patterns in Mexican immigration to the United States, contrasting sojourner and settler migration patterns, and examining coercive systems of labor and their implications for family organization. Under slavery, and systems of contract labor in the United States, family life was in effect, legislatively outlawed. I suggest that contemporary xenophobic rhetoric is animated, in part, by the assumption that Latino immigrant work life should be severed from family and community life.

Anti-Immigrant Narratives

Language is a powerful political tool, organizing thought, emotions and actions. The postmodern turn in the social sciences has put the spotlight on forms of language, representation, and symbols, entertaining the notion that multiple subjectivities and fragmented readings result from any given text, and suggesting, in some cases, that "the text" is the reality.

While I agree that verbal or representational constructs do not directly correspond to political or economic realities, I maintain a modernist’s skepticism about the disjunction between the two realms. I suggest that the forms and assumptions exhibited in anti-immigrant narrative reflect racialized anxieties prompted by current immigration patterns. In our media-driven society, these images and "stories" saturate experience, funneling public perception so that the stories often become more real than either experience or statistical documentation. People reinterpret their experiences and any other evidence into the framework of the dominant narratives. These narratives, however, do not appear out of thin air. They reflect, in an admittedly distorted fashion, contemporary political and economic reconfigurations.

Historically, xenophobic narrative in the United States has revolved around three claims — Economic, Cultural Differences, and Government Resources Drain. While the three claims or stories are typically used in tandem, in any particular anti-immigrant campaign, usually one rises to the foreground. (See the next page for a summary of these "stories.")

These are caricature-like renditions, but xenophobic claims succeed in galvanizing support precisely because of their simplicity. The three narratives feature different story lines, but they share a common, and clear-cut villain. The demonization and removal of this villain promises unequivocal resolution.

1My conceptualization of xenophobic claims as a series of "stories" is inspired by a talk delivered by Judith Stacey at the University of Southern California on March 9, 1995. Stacey views the national family values debate as a series of projected fables (Stacey forthcoming).
Anti-Immigrant Narratives

Job Competition

Immigrants are impoverished in their poor, preindustrial, backward countries, where they are oppressed and exploited by a small elite. The poor, however, are hungry and willing to work hard, so they come to the land of opportunity — the United States — to work long hours at back breaking jobs, forfeiting comforts in order to better their lives. The problematic in this story line emerges when the immigrant workers take the jobs that rightfully belong to U.S. citizens, and when their willingness to work for low pay depresses the wages of U.S. citizen workers. Unfair economic competition is the central motif, with immigrant workers raising unemployment rates and dragging standards down for everyone.

Cultural Differences

Immigrants again originate in poor, backward countries, usually rural areas. With them they bring their cultural traditions, their cuisine, their foreign language, their different religious beliefs and practices, and perhaps, their distinctive racial features and colors. When they blend into the mainstream, their cultural traditions and practices contribute “spice” to one huge caldron. The flavor, however, sours when they don’t learn English and fail to pick up their new society’s ways. When they remain distinctive and unassimilable, they threaten to tear apart the whole.

The Government Resources Drain

Immigrants once again hail from impoverished places. They come to the United States planning to make a better life for themselves, but they are ill-equipped to do so. Lacking discipline, moral values, proper education and perhaps literacy skills, their only alternative is to make do with what the system offers. And it offers them plenty. The women bear many children, secure in the knowledge that their obstetrical care will be covered, and that their children will get free vaccinations and go to good schools, with hot breakfasts and no tuition fee. They don’t pay taxes. Their youth drop out of school, their daughters getting pregnant and their sons getting into gangs and filling the jails. Here, immigrants and their children drain the government coffers fed by U.S. citizen taxpayers.

The anti-immigrant rhetoric has changed dramatically in the last decade. As recently as the early 1980s, the principal claim fueling immigration restriction was that undocumented immigrants steal jobs from U.S. citizens and depress wages. From the late 1970s, when employer sanctions measures were first proposed, until passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, the stories of job displacement and diminishing wages fueled anti-immigrant sentiment and restrictionist legislation. Especially during the recession of the early 1980s, politicians and newspaper editorials commonly scapegoated immigrants for causing lagging economic conditions. Anti-immigrant groups such as the Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, never a neutral voice in these national discussions, fueled the fires. One of the INS’s more memorable efforts was when then western regional director David Ilchert orchestrated “Operation Jobs,” a series of work place raids followed by sensationalistic press conferences announcing the number of jobs — and the corresponding hourly rates — opened by deportations.

During this era, restrictionist lobby groups achieved national prominence, as their leaders warned that new immigrants and refugees were causing a hodgepodge of social problems, including high taxes, crime, and even California’s notorious traffic jams and air pollution. While the job competition line dominated, the “cultural differences” story, with its focus on literacy and linguistic abilities also mobilized anti-immigrant sentiment. Witness the campaign of the well-funded national organization, U.S. English, against the implementation of bilingual education programs and election ballots.
Mimicking the allegations voiced by their predecessors about immigrants from southern and Eastern Europe in the early 20th century, these restrictionists argued that the new immigrants from Asia and Latin America were after all “too different” and ultimately unassimilable. Continuing immigration signaled, as Senator Alan K. Simpson, a major proponent of restrictionist legislation, put it, the cultural and linguistic “Quebecization” of the United States.

The prevalence of the economic and cultural stories peaked in November 1986, when IRCA was passed and when California voted to make English the official language of the state. By the early 1990s, with the 187 campaign, the dominant narrative shifted to public resource depletion, muffling, rather than silencing, the claims about jobs or language and culture. Replacing the hardworking, but impoverished immigrant workers and the culturally and linguistically “different” newcomers as the protagonists in this scenario are poor, pregnant immigrant women who, with their children, come to the United States to give birth in publicly-financed county hospitals, allowing their newborns to become U.S. citizens, and all their children to receive public assistance, medical care, and public school education. These new immigrants and their children constitute a rapidly expanding underclass draining education and medical resources in the United States. As Harold Ezell, the former INS commissioner and co-author of 187, put it in his Jess Jackson-inspired parlance, “How many illegals can we educate, medicate, compensate, and incarcerate before California goes bankrupt?”

The new campaign’s focus on welfare dependency and the targeting of women and children reflects less about immigrants’ actual use of public assistance, I argue, and more about the public’s recognition and anxiety about the rapidly increasing Latino immigrant population in California. Latino settlement outcomes are inescapably etched throughout California, and visible to even casual observers. In Los Angeles, the most widely listened-to radio station aimed at a primarily Mexican immigrant audience, plays the newly popular banda music. The expansion of Spanish-language marketing, mass media, and bilingual education, and the reapportionment of voting districts all testify to the flourishing Latino, mostly Mexican, communities.

PARALLELS WITH THE 1920S AND 1930S

The contemporary xenophobic narrative departs from earlier 20th century anti-immigrant narratives, approaching arguments not heard so vociferously since the Great Depression, when the public resources claims, added to the economic claims, offered the rationale for deportation.

The Great Depression prompted the expulsion to Mexico of as many as half a million people, a group that included Mexican undocumented immigrants, legal permanent residents, and U.S. citizens of Mexican descent (Hoffman 1974, p. 126). Anti-immigrant citizens groups, allegations about Mexicans’ use of public relief, and the active intervention of social workers and relief agencies played an important part in this mass deportation and “repatriation.”

Beginning in 1931, local government and relief agencies threatened to cut Mexican families’ public relief, and sometimes paid for the families’ return transportation to Mexico. Like the 187 campaign, these efforts were concentrated in southern California. In Los Angeles, local welfare agencies aggressively promoted the repatriation of men, women and children (Kiser and Kiser 1979, Hoffman 1974). Thousands of Mexican families with their accumulated possessions loaded automobiles or boarded trains bound for the border.

Guerin-Gonzalez (1994) recounts how the director of the Los Angeles Citizens’ Committee on Coordination of Unemployment Relief worked to organize the removal of Mexicans from
California during the early 1930s. This citizens group was involved in implementing raids with police and federal immigration agents, but it also coordinated efforts with social workers and public relief agencies. For example, working with the Los Angeles Department of Public Charities, the group persuaded legal Mexican immigrants and U.S. citizens of Mexican heritage who received public assistance to repatriate voluntarily or be deported. According to Guerin-Gonzalez (p. 83), these efforts targeted in particular, settled immigrants and Mexican-Americans. The deportees, reflecting the increase in family migration during the 1920s, included substantial numbers of women and children. In fact, Carreras (1974) reports that between 1931 and 1933, two-thirds of the deportees were women. So successful was the campaign that by 1940, the Mexican population in the United States had declined to about half of what it had been in 1930 (Gonzalez 1983).

The 1930s expulsion campaign followed a period when families made up a much larger portion of Mexican immigration than ever before. The economic disruption and violence of the Mexican revolution (1910-19), and of the Cristero Rebellion in the central western area of Mexico (1926-29), prompted the migration of people with strong motivation to remain in the United States. During the 1920s, the booming U.S. economy provided both urban and rural jobs, and Mexican families settled into the growing barrios of Los Angeles, El Paso, and San Antonio. These urban-based, segregated, settlement communities served as labor-distribution centers for Mexican workers who were recruited for agricultural work, and for jobs in growing urban centers (Romo 1983).

There are at least four points of congruity between the present and the events of the Great Depression:
- The 1930s expulsion program came on heels of a period of Mexican migration characterized by increasing permanent settlement of families.
- The “draining public resources” narrative was effectively used to rationalize expulsion, with social workers and relief agencies taking an active role in enforcement, targeting women and families.
- The activism of civilian anti-immigrant groups, not just government agents, played a key role in the campaign.
- The 1930s repatriation occurred during a period of national economic reorganization, just as contemporary events correspond to capitalist realignments at a global level.

**BACK TO THE FUTURE: TRYING TO UNDO THE SETTLEMENT THAT WOMEN CONSTRUCT**

In the early 1990s, proponents of immigration restriction successfully switched the anti-immigrant narrative from the “job displacement” and “linguistic and cultural deficiency” arguments to “draining public resources.” Perhaps the sudden switch reflects exhaustion and ineffectiveness of the old anti-immigrant narratives. By the early 1990s, California voters readily acknowledged that most new immigrant jobs — in the lower end of garment manufacturing, food processing, construction, services and agriculture — were not really very desirable jobs. Politicians recognized that the job displacement platform could no longer assure re-election. Similarly, the issues of cultural and linguistic homogeneity, as much as they had inspired patriotism and righteous exclusionist sentiment, were not salient enough to animate restrictionist drives or expulsion.

Or, perhaps, these arguments, especially the language-cultural one, appeared too overtly racist. Viewed from the context of national politics, 187 can be seen as part of a more general racialized attack on the welfare system, where poor women of color are demonized.

So, for various reasons, the stated rationale behind immigration restriction is no longer jobs and language, but the resources that it takes to sustain everyday family life. And the rhetorical shift reflects more than expedient ploys by political consultants and desperate politicians. It

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3 Sanchez (1993) offers a divergent or qualified view of the repatriados departing Los Angeles. He claims that (p. 221): “The single male migrants to the city were among the first to leave, since they had fewer familial obligations and generally had not invested in real estate....Those that remained in the city in 1933 tended to be members of a family unit, to be property owners, and to be residents in the city for at least a decade.” Sanchez states that well-established families were among the most anchored of Mexicans in Los Angeles, but this does not necessarily contradict the conclusion (Carreras 1974, Hoffman 1976, Guerin-Gonzalez 1994) that entire families and women were well-represented among the repatriados.
reflects, I believe, a profound historical moment, and a muted acknowledgment that there has been a transformation from a predominantly sojourner or temporary pattern of Mexican undocumented migration, to a widespread establishment of Latino immigrant families and permanent settlement communities throughout California. As Latino immigrant neighborhoods multiplied and expanded beyond rural areas and urban enclaves, growing even in suburban locales, local city councils, business leaders, and the media registered their anxieties with the 187 campaign.

Certainly Mexican immigrant settlement is not a new occurrence. As many as 80,000 to 100,000 Mexicans were well established in the Mexican territory conquered and claimed by the United States in 1848. But Mexican workers who migrated north for work in the late 19th century, and later in the first half of the 20th century often did not set down permanent roots. The prevailing “ebb and flow” or “revolving door” pattern of labor migration was calibrated by seasonal labor demands, economic recessions and mass deportations (Bustamante 1975, Garcia y Griego 1983, Portes and Bach 1985, Cockcroft 1986). Although some employers encouraged the immigration of Mexican women and entire families in order to stabilize and expand an available, exploitable work force, many other employers, assisted at times by government-sponsored “bracero programs,” recruited only men for an elastic, temporary labor supply, a reserve army of labor that could be discarded when redundant. Employers did not absolutely command the movement of Mexican workers, but employers’ needs constructed a particular structure of opportunities that shaped migration.

By the 1970s, both undocumented and legal Mexican immigrants had established a significant number of permanent settlement communities in the United States (Browning and Rodriguez 1985). These have been referred to as “settling-out” processes (Cornelius 1992), as “daughter communities” (Massey et al. 1987), and by the unfortunate, but perhaps illustrative, term sediment communities (Portes and Bach 1985). Women and families played a key part in building these communities (Browning and Rodriguez 1985). Research conducted during the 1970s and 1980s recorded a significant presence of women in the population of Mexican undocumented immigrants. While Mexican women also participate in seasonal or sojourner undocumented immigration (Guendelman and Perez-Itriaga 1987, Koussodji and Ranney 1984, de la Torre 1993), they concentrate in the settler portion of the undocumented population, where they are evenly represented with men (Cardenas and Flores 1986, Passel 1986).

Since the late 1960s, increasing numbers of Mexican undocumented immigrant men, women and children have challenged the historical pattern of sojourner migration, and have found themselves, through their daily activities, increasingly committed to building family and community life in the United States. Contemporary nativism, exhibited in the 187 campaign, mobilized support not so much against immigrant workers or illegal immigration, as against the permanent integration of Mexican immigrants into U.S. society.

**Sojourner and Settler Patterns Contrasted**

Marxist-informed studies have noted that sojourner migration is characterized by the physical separation of employment and family home residence, as well as by the separation of the costs of maintaining and reproducing labor (Burawoy 1976, Glenn 1983, 1986). These separations allow for the maximum exploitation of immigrant workers, who receive resources necessary for their daily maintenance in the country of destination, while the costs of sustaining and bringing up new generations of workers (or reproduction costs) are borne in their country of origin.

Settlement, as defined by the unification in the new society of family residence and employment, and of the maintenance and reproduction of labor, reverses this arrangement, since it hinges on the presence of immigrant women and entire families. In settlement, the children of immigrant workers — the next generation of workers — are raised in the United States. Immigrant families soon discover that they must purchase resources necessary to sustain daily family life and reproduction at considerably higher prices than those in the economy from which they came.
TARGETING MEXICANAS

Although scholarship highlights the major contributions that women make to urban settlements in Latin American cities (Logan 1990), women have an understated presence in the literature on Mexican immigration and settlement. Putting women and their activities at the center of analysis highlights their contributions in three arenas that are key to settlement: (1) creating and helping to sustain permanent, year-round employment, (2) building community life, and (3) provisioning resources for daily family maintenance and reproduction. Below, I draw on research that I conducted in a northern California Mexican immigrant barrio to suggest women’s participation in constructing settlement. Because of the focus of this paper, I emphasize their provisioning of resources and use of public assistance.

First, metropolitan and urban areas are conducive to settlement because they offer a diverse array of relatively stable, non-seasonal job opportunities for immigrant women (Browning and Rodriguez 1985, Massey et al. 1987). So, besides immigrant women’s physical presence that allows their men to work at stable jobs without the interruptions of family visits to Mexico, they contribute importantly to settlement by their own employment.

Second, women build community through their interaction with one another, and, indirectly, through the activities of their families, thus spawning a multiplicity of ties to other families, friends, and institutions. These strong community ties both emerge from and foster family settlement. Those who regularly interact with organizations and other people are much more likely to remain in the United States. Women are also central to establishing family connections with secondary associations and organizations. Many long-term resident, undocumented immigrants are directly involved with some formal community or volunteer organizations, usually ones associated with schools, churches, and self-help groups.

Third, the provisioning of resources necessary to sustain daily life also plays an important role in settlement. Undocumented immigrant families with young children face particularly high living costs, since mothers and their infants require pre- and post-natal care, and children need medical attention, child care, and schooling (Browning and Rodriguez 1985). The initial stages of settlement require substantial investment; renting a place, and getting together a minimal amount of furniture, clothing and utensils are expensive projects (Chavez 1988, 1991; Villar 1990). The burden of supporting non-income earning dependents and unexpected breaks in employment can quickly lead to poverty.

To cope with these circumstances, undocumented immigrant families combine strategies. They try to cover expenses by employing as many wage earners as possible, by sharing residences with other families, or by taking in boarders and lodgers who sleep in living rooms and garages. Individuals and families share resources with close friends, relatives, or comadres and compadres (co-godparents) in their social network, and they may rely on older women kin for relatively inexpensive child care.

Immigrants share resources, but they live in a consumer-oriented, capitalist market economy. The basic package of necessities — housing, clothing, medical attention, transportation, household goods — are available primarily on a cash basis. Reciprocity among immigrant kin and friends may stretch scarce resources, but it does not produce them. They must be purchased in a capitalist economy.

Due to undocumented immigrant workers’ low wages, the high cost of living in the United States, and the burden of supporting non-income earning dependents, family settlement sometimes requires reliance on institutional forms of public and private resources, including credit and installment purchases, assistance from private charities, and public assistance. Through my research I found, as have other researchers (Chavira 1988, O’Conner 1990), that it is primarily women who become adept at utilizing and seeking out these resources in the United States, and I argue that this is one of the ways that women advance settlement.

Immigrants are considerably less likely than the native-born to receive public assistance. This is especially true of undocumented immigrants, who are excluded as beneficiaries from most programs, and who fear apprehension and deportation (Blau 1984, Tienda and Jensen 1985, Jensen 1988). Until passage of Proposition 187,
undocumented immigrants were technically eligible to receive restricted Medi-Cal coverage for emergency and pregnancy services, and Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) services. Under WIC, some undocumented immigrant women have received supplemental food and nutrition counseling for their families, as well as referrals to health care while pregnant, postpartum, or breast-feeding. Some undocumented immigrant parents who were themselves ineligible for public assistance, lawfully solicited assistance for their U.S.-born children to receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps, and Social Security Insurance (National Immigrant Law Center 1993).

**PROPOSITION 187: THE DESIRE FOR A LABOR FORCE WITHOUT HUMAN BEINGS**

The 187 campaign targets the use of public resources by Latina immigrant women and children, but the implications of the proposition go further, I believe, than expulsion of well-established Mexican and Latino families and communities. Ultimately, the proposition promises to reinstate a more coercive system of labor, one that rests on a restricted family life for Latino immigrant workers.

In an analysis of IRCA’s public charge exclusions and five-year ban on social services and public benefits, Chang (1994) argues that these provisions were formulated to keep immigrant women available for employment in subordinate jobs. While this thrust may also lie behind the 187 campaign, I believe that the impulse of the proposition goes much further than this: Coercive work hinges on the denial of family life for immigrant workers. There is certainly a strong historical legacy of U.S. intervention to maintain limited family life for workers of African, Asian, and Mexican heritage. As Dill (1994, p. 166) states in her historical overview, “race has been a fundamental criterion determining the kind of work people do... and social support provided for their families.” And in an essay on family, feminism and race, Zinn (1990, p. 74) notes that in the United States, “groups subordinated in the racial hierarchy are often deprived of access to social institutions that offer supports for family life.” These analyses, and a brief historical digression, provide an important point of departure for understanding the implications of the new xenophobia.

As I assisted Latino immigrants through the amnesty-legalization procedure in the late 1980s, various persons “confessed” to me that they had at one time — and, almost always, temporarily — received public assistance. In almost all instances, it was for women and children. Families with infants and small children are most likely to be in need of assistance, and families with U.S. citizen children are eligible for some public programs. Because of the sensitive nature of public benefits usage, I did not systematically collect information, but I did learn of past instances of use of public assistance by undocumented immigrant parents, usually women. One woman, for example, had accepted AFDC for her young infant during a time when she was not receiving money from her husband, and when she herself was unable to work due to illness immediately after the birth of her child.

Unlike European immigrants, most people of color in the United States were historically incorporated into the nation through coercive systems of labor. These systems — principally slavery and contract labor — were organized in ways that maximized economic productivity. And maximizing labor productivity meant that few supports were made available for sustaining family life. In some cases, family life was legislatively denied.

**African Americans**

Under the brutality of plantation slavery, African slaves were encouraged to form families as long as they stayed under the control and surveillance of the master (Dill 1994). Slave women, regarded as breeders of future slave workers, were encouraged to form families. These families, however, faced disruption due to sale or death, while marriages among slaves were not legally recognized. Sexual violence perpetuated by the masters on African American slave women went unpunished, and parents struggled to see their babies survive childhood. (When those children did survive, they were prohibited from inheriting the personal belongings of their parents.)

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*Massey and his collaborators (1987) showed that Mexican immigrants’ public service utilization generally increases with more years of migrant experience, but they did not reveal the gendered nature of this use.*

**Immigration Issues, Economics, and Politics**
That undocumented immigrants sometimes utilize public assistance first came to my attention during the early months of 1987 when I worked in the San Francisco Bay Area, with a grassroots, neighborhood group that organized a public informational forum on IRCA and the amnesty eligibility provisions. After a basic presentation, we divided the 350+ attendees into three elementary school classrooms where attorneys addressed special eligibility problems encountered by (1) agricultural workers, (2) persons with criminal records, and (3) prior recipients of public cash assistance. This third group risked being denied legalization, as immigration adjudicators might determine they would be likely to become a “public charge.” The session for past recipients of public assistance was attended by about 30 women, most of whom came with young children. Not one man was in attendance. These uncomfortable truths about poverty and gender deserve a wide broadcast, for they are at the heart of a new narrative about immigrant rights.

Asians
Both Chinese and Japanese men were initially brought to work in western agriculture as contracted laborers. Exclusion laws were deliberately set in place to restrict the migration of women and entire families. Although male Chinese workers began coming to the United States during the mid-1800s for work, it was more than a century before the second generation formed (Dill 1994). The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act and anti-miscegenation laws effectively prevented them from having the right to form families in the United States. For years, the only Chinese women allowed to enter the country were the wives of wealthy merchants or prostitutes whom the dominant society counted on to keep order in the Chinese “bachelor” communities (Chan 1991). Writing about the Chinese case, Glenn (1983, pgs. 38-39) notes that the profitability of coercive systems of labor rests, in part, on the separation of family life from work life: “The split household form makes possible maximum exploitation of the workers... The labor of prime-age male workers can be bought relatively cheaply, since the cost of reproduction and family maintenance is borne partially by unpaid subsistence work of women and old people in the home village.”

This history of coercive labor and family-denial has tremendous relevance for understanding Proposition 1987. Although the Mexican presence in California long precedes the establishment of today’s U.S.-Mexico border, one need only step back a few decades to appreciate the significance of the sojourner system in California and other states. For Mexican workers in the United States, the bracero program, a contract labor system in effect from 1942 until 1964, institutionalized both sojourner migration and the denial of family life. During those two decades, nearly five million labor contracts were issued to Mexican agricultural workers (most of them men), while many other Mexican men without contracts found seasonal work in the fields. These work stints required long family separations, ranging from months to years, and even decades, interspersed with brief visits (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994).

Eventually, these men used their developing social contacts to seek jobs in the growing cities and suburbs of post-war California. They were subsequently joined in commercial and residential areas by Mexican women, who also found jobs in diverse economic niches. Today, Mexican women and men are rejecting the long distance, long-term separation of work life from family and community life, and, in this process, it is primarily the women’s daily activities that are making this more seamless life possible.

The proponents of 187 seem to be operating on the belief that this pattern can and should be reversed. This is like wanting a labor force without human beings. But today, many undocumented immigrant workers and their families have developed strong personal, social, and economic ties in the United States. These families are firmly integrated and rooted here. When they’re not working, they go to PTA meetings, root for their kids’ sports teams, get together with extended family, and participate in various church and civic organizations. Moreover, the California economy is not just dependent on the labor of one sex — as it was during the tenure of temporary contract labor programs — rather, it appears to be about as equally dependent on the labor of Latina immigrant women as it is on men. But the remuneration of this labor remains substandard, especially for the purpose of sustaining family life, and this is why public supports are necessary.
in the courts, the facility with which it passed in the California ballots has rejuvenated anti-immigrant politics at a national level. Looming on the horizon are proposals to deny public benefits to legal permanent residents, and to strike out the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. Proponents of these measures argue that the 14th Amendment, initially introduced to reverse the Dred Scott decision and to guarantee citizenship to the children of slaves, now serves as a magnet for “illegals” to come give birth in the United States. However, the proposals against the 14th Amendment are less about addressing the motivating factors behind migration, and more about enforcing coercive labor that disenfranchises immigrant workers and their family members. Like Proposition 187, the proposals to deny public benefits to already legalized immigrants, or to deny birth-right citizenship — *jus solis* — to the U.S.-born children of undocumented immigrant workers, are fundamentally about further circumscribing as “outsiders” those who are of Latin American, Caribbean or Asian heritage.

Nations often change the way they define who belongs, but programmatic efforts to exclude membership may lead to counter currents. Latino immigrant workers in California continue to fuel the ranks of militant trade unions. In Los Angeles, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union Local 11 is well known for its creative actions, and Justice for Janitors, a component of the Service Employees International Local 399 claims 8,000 members and recently won a major victory with janitorial contractors (Mann 1995). Latinos were already the fastest growing group of voters in California (Pachon 1994), but the immigrant bashers have apparently helped to fuel the ranks of future Latino voters, as legal immigrants rush to naturalize (McDonnell 1995). And the backers of 187 have also unwittingly inspired a new corps of progressive, activist, Latino college and high school students.

To thwart future anti-immigrant assaults and discrimination, we need new political narratives and leadership that bring together fragmented activists into broad-based coalitions. The immigrant rights movement, rejuvenated by protest against the Simpson-Rodino bills in the 1980s, is today sustained by the efforts of a committed, hardworking core of legal service providers, labor organizers, and church and community groups. But it’s been working on the defensive.

The obstacles to organizing an effective proactive movement are daunting and too numerous to list here, but one important, missing link that has not been introduced into the debate is the moral issue of mandating the transnational separation of work and family life. We need new immigrant rights narratives that acknowledge and embrace some of the “uncomfortable truths” about undocumented immigrant usage of public school education and public resources, and that advocate for the right to some very basic human entitlements, such as the right to live with one’s family and community. We also need analysis that counters not only the racist, but also the misogynist imagery, used in the contemporary anti-immigrant campaign. Passage of Proposition 187 codifies an attack on Mexican and other immigrant families, but these people aren’t going home. California is home, and these roots can’t be sundered.

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*Anti-immigrant campaigns do not always succeed in producing their desired effect. Anti-immigrant hysteria and national proposals to restrict the legal rights of permanent legal residents are fueling a mad rush to naturalization, especially among Mexicans who are traditionally recalcitrant to naturalize. Citizenship applications are rising throughout the nation, but most acutely in Los Angeles. During April 1995, the *Los Angeles Times* reports that INS offices in Los Angeles were receiving about 2,500 citizenship applications daily, a tenfold increase from the rate just 18 months ago" (McDonnell, 1995). According to one commentator, some people are “being scared into becoming a U.S. citizen” (Ramos, 1995).
REFERENCES


Proposition 187 and Its Aftermath:
Will the Tidal Wave Continue?
Adela de la Torre


“On Nov. 9, 1938, Hitler’s Nazi regime officially sanctioned the destruction of Jewish shops and synagogues, a major step forward in his drive to solve the “Jewish problem” in Germany. On Nov. 9 this year, Gov. Pete Wilson announced his executive order to immediately enforce provisions of Proposition 187 affecting the health of the most vulnerable of the Latino community, pregnant women and the elderly. Wilson could have waited until the courts clarified the law, but, no longer a moderate, he has acquiesced to the right wing of the Republican Party, which demands not justice but tyranny, which values rhetoric over reason and which seeks to destroy rather than build.”

The article goes on to describe possible outcomes of this white voter backlash against immigrants, including taxpayers’ being “stuck paying millions of dollars in litigation costs with no guarantees of successful enforcement but with the certain outcome of dividing a state that can no longer afford to divide.”

I closed by informing my readers of the growing political clout of the Latino community — calling it a “silent revolution that will continue to grow, not only in the 14 cities that are more than 70% Latino in Los Angeles County, but also throughout the state where Proposition 187 has galvanized a new generation of Latino voters.” The result will be that Latinos “will be able to prevent enforcement of this racialized law. Even though pundits may dismiss Latinos as non-voters and passive participants in the political process, their permanent demographic presence in California cannot be denied. Soon Latino voices will be heard across the state.”

THE EMOTIONAL TIDAL WAVE

I quote from just a few of the pile of letters I received in reaction to this article:

Dear Ms. de la Torre:
“You act as though people who are breaking the law should be afforded the same rights as law abiding people. Let’s be honest, the word illegal does have meaning. They are not undocumented, they are illegal. That very fact should unite all people to support the very laws that were put in place to protect our national sovereignty. My question: What makes Latinos think that they are so “special” that they have the right to enter this country illegally and take advantage of all its benefits?”

Dear Ms. de la Torre:
“It’s obvious that affirmative action is alive and well in the State University System. How else could someone of your limited intelligence become ensconced in any position there?”

Dear Ms. de la Torre:
“You call yourself an economist; you might as well be another pond scum alien civil liberties union member — a defender of purulent and left wing interests. Prop 187 will prevail in the long run and illegals will be deprived of “handouts.” The fact that the bulk of these recipients used fraudulent documents and happen to be of your ancestry in obtaining illegal benefits is conveniently ignored which is typical of your kind... Only in your dreams will your ilk make a strong voting difference despite the fact that your kind breed like hell!”

The reaction to my LA Times article illustrates the ideological climate before and shortly after the victory of Proposition 187 in California. At first blush, one could easily compare this initiative with others in the past, i.e., in the 1950s Operation Wetback and in the early 1980s Operation Jobs — programs that also emanated from a period of recession and job insecurity. But unlike Proposition 187, these two earlier attempts to scapegoat immigrants came from federal, not state
levels, and constituted an extension of the enforcement responsibilities of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).

Furthermore, a major rationale for the state initiative was the belief that the federal government had abandoned its responsibility to adequately support the state for the costs of absorbing immigrants, both documented and undocumented. Governor Wilson's reason for supporting this initiative was articulated in the popular media as the failure of the federal government to address the fiscal crisis posed by undocumented immigrants. His frustration zeroed in on the lack of federal compensation for providing health, welfare, educational, and other social services to undocumented immigrants and the impact of these costs on the weakening state budget.¹

GRASS ROOTS ACTIVISM, POLITICAL OPPORTUNISM, AND IMMIGRATION REFORM

Yet, Governor Wilson was not the main instigator of this initiative, even though he may have been one of its major political beneficiaries. What makes Proposition 187 unique is that it was developed as a grass roots initiative, originating in largely white majority, Southern California counties, like Orange County.²

Nor could the initiative be labeled a Republican strategy with universal party appeal. For example, in Texas, which after California has the largest Mexican-origin population, recently elected Republican Governor Bush stated that while he favored hold-the-line efforts on the Texas-Mexico border, he opposed measures like California's Proposition 187 that denies benefits for undocumented immigrants. "I am not for 187. ... I'm opposed to not educating children who are already here." He supported former Governor Ann Richards and Attorney General Dan Morales in their lawsuit to force the federal government to pay for those services.³ Other key Republican national figures who spoke against Proposition 187 were former Republican cabinet members Jack Kemp and Bill Bennett.⁴

The lack of adequate federal reimbursement for immigrant services goes beyond the responsibility of the Executive Branch to the failure of Congress in shifting resources to states at risk from undocumented immigration. Moreover, since the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), the lack of timely appropriation funds, even for legal immigrants through State legalization Impact Assistance Grants funding, has been an ongoing problem for states like California.

LINES IN THE SAND

Despite the 59 percent victory of Proposition 187, there were clear divisions that resulted in at best a tenuous success. There were significant cleavages in the voter profile by ethnicity and race. For example, Latinos overwhelmingly rejected the initiative (only 30% of Latino voters supported it). Similarly, the majority of Asian American, Jewish, and African American voters also rejected it. Thus, early popular support for the initiative was not sustained on election day when Proposition 187 was rejected by all of California’s ethnic and racial minority voters.

COMPONENTS OF THE INITIATIVE

The five major areas covered by the proposition are public schools; state public higher education, including both community colleges and universities; public health services; law enforcement; and social services. The most politically vulnerable and legally contentious requirement is for public school officials to verify the legal status of enrolled students and ensure their lawful immigrant status. And by Jan. 1, 1996, the legal status of parents or guardians must also be verified, with the requirement that school administrators report any suspected as undocumented immigrants.

With respect to the state's public higher education, the initiative bars admission to undocumented individuals. This would amend the current practice whereby the University of California and the California State University

¹This theme was clearly expressed by Bill Stall and David Lauter in "Clinton Vows More Immigration Aid," Los Angeles Times, Nov. 7, 1994: "During the past year Wilson balanced the state budget on the hope of receiving nearly $3 billion from Washington — which almost certainly will not happen... The governor has said California would not have a budget deficit if the federal government lived up to its congressional mandate to compensate the state."


⁵A recent ruling by the state supreme court overturned the CSU practice of allowing undocumented students to pay in-state tuition. As of 1995, undocumented students enrolled at CSU must now pay non-resident tuition.

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systems allow enrollment of undocumented students but require that they pay non-resident tuition. Third, the initiative bars those without legal documentation from non-emergency health care. The day after the proposition passed, Governor Pete Wilson issued an executive order to immediately enforce part of this provision — preventing access to prenatal services and admissions to long-term in-home care programs for illegal immigrants. As in the case of public education, a lawsuit is underway to challenge enforcement of this segment of the law.

The law enforcement provision of the law requires greater cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and the INS. Officers must verify the immigration status of every person they arrest and forward information on suspected undocumented immigrants to the INS, as well as to the state attorney general's office.

And Proposition 187 further limits undocumented persons' access to social welfare programs. The list of ineligible benefits is extended to include "child welfare and foster care, family planning programs, and services targeting at-risk groups, including abused and parentless children, the elderly, blind, homeless or mentally impaired, and drug abusers." A final and less controversial provision of the law includes increased fines and penalties for smuggling undocumented individuals into the United States, as well as for falsification of legal documents. Current lawsuits against Proposition 187 do not prevent implementation of this segment of the initiative.

Despite the far reaching impact of the initiative with respect to immigrants' rights, the implementation of the key provisions have been blocked due to a preliminary legal injunction. Spearheaded by the Mexican-American Legal Defense Fund, American Civil Liberties Union, and several civil and consumer-rights law firms, these lawsuits have focused on the constitutionality of Proposition 187. Thus far, four areas have been carved out by 187's legal opponents. The first argument focuses on the state's preempting federal immigration law by attempting to regulate immigration. The second is the violation of due process: The legal status of suspected undocumented immigrants is illegally adjudicated by lay people, e.g., teachers or administrators; whereas, due process requires an immigration judge to determine a person's legal status. The third is based on the violation of individual civil rights: The vagueness of the law, i.e., identification of suspected undocumented immigrants, would result in illegal discrimination based on phenotype, last name, or language. The final argument presented by those challenging 187 is that it violates the precedent set by the Supreme Court decision of Plyer vs. Doe that upheld the Equal Protection clause for undocumented children with regard to public education.

The state attorney's office has countered the first claim by citing that the implementation guidelines of the law, currently under development, will not violate federal supremacy over immigration law. The federal court, under Justice Mariana Pfaelzer of the 9th District, provided the state the opportunity to draft implementation guidelines by a specific date to prove that they did not violate the supremacy clause. Unfortunately, the state was not able to provide these guidelines by the date requested, resulting in a probable summary judgment against the state. Depending on Justice Pfaelzer's response to the state's failure to comply with the date, Proposition 187 may be declared unconstitutional by Justice Pfaelzer or she may allow the state more time to prove its case. In any case, the enormous legal flaws in the written initiative make the state vulnerable to prolonged litigation even if Judge Pfaelzer provides more time for compliance.

Why California, not Texas?

First of all, the federal government has been responding, albeit slowly, to the desires for enhanced border enforcement just before the passage of Proposition 187. So, for several border states, the issue of immigration did not become the lighting rod for grass roots activism against undocumented immigration that it did for California.

Prior to Proposition 187, the federal government, under the Clinton Administration,
developed and implemented three major border enforcement efforts along vulnerable points of the Mexican-U.S. borders. This was in response to growing concern over undocumented immigration and to tactical strategies favored by several governors to increase manpower and financial support for border enforcement through the regional INS. In September 1994, Attorney General Reno introduced “Operation Gatekeeper” which provided funds for enhanced technology for detection, as well as 220 additional INS agents in the San Diego area for improved border enforcement and apprehension. In Arizona, Operation Safeguard, targeted at the Tucson and Yuma borders, increased border agents by 100, provided funds for improved detection and an automated processing system, and allocated $1 million to defray incarceration costs of undocumented immigrants. Along the border between El Paso, Texas, and Sunland Park, New Mexico, support was maintained for an existing border enforcement program, “Operation Hold the Line” (previously called to Operation Blockade). Like the other two, this program involves intensive use of agents patrolling a 20 mile stretch of the border.

Then there are several factors that make this a uniquely California initiative. First, California’s economic climate was significantly worse than other southwestern states. Massive economic restructuring of aerospace due to the end of the Cold War, had immediate and harsh impacts on Southern California’s defense industry, including enormous job losses.

Second, the participation of Hispanics in the state electoral process is less significant than in the other states. Despite Latinos’ growing demographic presence, the overall electorate is primarily white — only 15 percent of registered voters identified themselves as Hispanic, even though almost 30 percent of all Californians are Hispanic.

Third, the increased visibility of Latino immigrants in the public schools and public health delivery systems, combined with their intrusion into traditionally lower class white and African American enclaves, has heightened ethnic tension among these groups. This perceived displacement underlies much of the racist rhetoric that permeated the state elections, as well as popular thought during this period. Ideologically, recent Latino immigrants were depicted as parasites of California’s welfare system, even as criminals. Moreover, their presence was posed as a direct threat to the economic livelihood of native-born Latino and non-Latino citizens.

In summary, the net impact of these factors — California’s recession and economic restructuring, the low voter participation of Latinos at the state level, the increased public visibility of Latinos, combined with an effective ideological campaign depicting undocumented immigrants as predators of the system — was to successfully “racialize” this group and bring on the victory of Proposition 187.

WHAT’S NEXT?

The authors of Proposition 187, also known as the Save Our State Immigration Initiative (S.O.S.), were Alan Nelson, head of the INS during the Reagan Administration and Harold Ezell, former INS regional commissioner. Both recognized the legal vulnerabilities of this initiative but placed it on the ballot in hopes, not only of it passing, but also bringing forward a legal challenge to the Plyer vs. Doe U.S. Supreme Court decision that upheld the right of undocumented children to public education. Indeed, there was little doubt among the proposition’s proponents that it would be immediately challenged in the courts, for this five-page initiative went far beyond merely limiting entitlements to non-citizens to that of violating fundamental rights put down in both the U.S. and state constitutions.

There is no doubt that immigration policy — for both the documented and the undocumented — will surface as an issue in Congress, as well as in states with large new immigrant populations in their midst. However, the recent bombing in Oklahoma City, even though not linked to immigrants, may have served to shift the focus, at least for now, from economic to political refugees, particularly those with roots in countries in the Middle East with known terrorist activities. This shift could lessen the impact of Governor Wilson’s and various anti-immigrant groups’ strategies to make economic refugees, i.e., Latinos and Asians, a national campaign issue.

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In this new climate, proposals expected to receive wide bipartisan support in Congress are:*

- Establish special courts to expedite the deportation of suspected terrorists,
- Deny entry into the United States of anyone affiliated with a terrorist group,
- Provide the FBI and other federal investigators with broader surveillance and wiretapping authority, and
- Expand the penalties for aiding and abetting terrorists and their illegal entry into the United States.

Although the bulk of these proposals is targeted to anti-terrorist strategies, the first one that calls for accelerating the process of deportation is creating concern among civil libertarians, where issues of constitutionality of such measures are being raised.

However, even without the Oklahoma event, public attention and political support for 187 are waning in California. This fading enthusiasm is mirrored by polls suggesting that the support of many who voted for the initiative was intended more as a signal to the federal government to address immigration problems in California, than as a mandate to act on the specific provisions of the law.

Concurrent with the declining popular interest in 187 are the latest court rulings that work against speedy implementation of the law. For example, one ruling places jurisdiction of hearings in a federal, rather than a state, court. As the litigation drags on against specific provisions of the law, as well as on its overall constitutionality, proponents of 187 will be less likely to maintain the same level of enthusiasm for enforcing the law as they did for passing it.

There is no doubt, though, that Proposition 187 sent a strong message to President Clinton and Congress about the decreasing tolerance for the current U.S. immigration policy. The Clinton Administration has responded to these concerns through increased funds for border control to the INS, as well as greater interest in enforcing employer sanctions. Congress has also responded by reexamining entitlement programs, not only for undocumented, but also legal immigrants who are not citizens. However, we learned from the failures of IRCA that authorization without appropriation of funds results in ineffective enforcement. During this period of fiscal conservatism in Congress, it is highly unlikely that the rhetoric of immigration control will be matched with needed funds to enforce existing or future immigration laws.

Concurrent with the federal government’s acknowledgment of the voting public’s increased frustration about immigration is its awareness of declining public support for overall welfare programs for the underclass in American society. As the pendulum continues to move to the right — all social programs, independent of the legal or citizenship status of recipients, are up for grabs. It could be that the nation’s shift to examining the more general welfare population may lessen attention on the undocumented, allowing them to ease into American society once again as personas non grata. On the other hand, as the federal government makes overall cuts in federal entitlements to all the poor, the undocumented will surely be among the victims.

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The Mexican descent population's spearheaded a drive for political representation in Guadalupe, California. This paper examines their struggle and, at the same time, challenges the erroneous public opinion that portrays Mexican campesino (peasant) immigrants as politically apathetic in their new homeland. Many believe that those immigrants who keep their Mexican citizenship and are, therefore, not eligible to vote, have no interest in the political affairs of their U.S. community. On the contrary, I demonstrate that immigrants do take an interest in local politics, especially at the school district and city government levels. They have developed various strategies to overcome their limitations in the political arena, and now play a key role in local affairs.

GUADALUPE

Guadalupe is a small community of almost 5,500 inhabitants occupying about 1 square mile in the midst of agricultural fields of the Santa Maria Valley. The town is 10 miles west of Santa Maria, the valley's largest city, about 5 miles from the coast, 45 miles south of San Luis Obispo, and 65 miles north of Santa Barbara. The surrounding fields of vegetables and strawberries offer year-round employment for some.

Guadalupe is no longer the prosperous community it once was, when it was home to local farmers and a major packing and shipping point for the valley. Today, it is a farmworker community in blight. The packing sheds, once an important source of local employment and tax revenue, lost out in the technological change to in-field packing in the early 1980s. The city's ability to provide public services was weakened by the resulting strain on the tax base. Even worse, Guadalupe's resident field workers were replaced by migratory harvesters who follow the field-packing companies from one harvest to another, leaving local workers without gainful employment. As a result, many of them now face unemployment and poverty.

THE HISTORY OF THE COMMUNITY

Mexicans have long been a part of Guadalupe's history. In the 1860s, before there was a town, Mexicans lived and worked in the Rancho of Guadalupe (García 1992). The town itself was founded in 1872; about 20 years later the ranch acreage was subdivided into farm parcels and sold to white farmers.

In the 1920s, Mexican immigrants were recruited to work in local agriculture. Most lived in labor camps situated outside of town, but a few joined the small number of their compatriots who lived in town. In the 1940s, hundreds of temporary workers recruited through the Bracero Program came to the area. They increased the numbers living in nearby camps, leaving Guadalupe primarily inhabited by local merchants, farmers, and nonagricultural workers and their families (García 1992).

After the termination of the Bracero Program in 1964, the community witnessed its first large influx of Mexican immigrants. Fearful of a labor shortage, many local growers encouraged and assisted ex-bracero workers and their families to settle in the area. This time, many came to town where affordable housing and schools were available. Over the decades, the ex-braceros sponsored the immigration of their kin from back home. Today many of Guadalupe's inhabitants were originally from the Mexican states of Guanajuato and Jalisco (García 1992).

The ex-bracero immigrants and their families, together with other Mexicans, who joined them in the following decades, rapidly changed the ethnic composition of Guadalupe from 18 percent

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1The Mexican descent population includes residents, whether U.S. citizens or not, who trace their origins to Mexico, plus their U.S.-born children.
2"Blight" is used to describe poverty that cannot be solved with local resources alone. The Redevelopment Agency of Guadalupe (1985) defines blight as "an area characterized by physical, social, economic, and environmental conditions which cause an improper utilization of an area to such an extent that it constitutes a serious burden on the community that cannot be alleviated by the private sector acting alone."
3The Bracero Program began in 1944 as an emergency bilateral labor agreement between Mexico and the United States, whereby Mexican labor was provided to U.S. agricultural industries during World War II. Under the auspices of Public Law 78, the program continued until 1964. Mexican laborers, many of them peasants, were contracted by U.S. growers, as well as railroad companies.
Victor García

Mexican in 1960 to 83 percent in 1990 (Table 1). With the population remaining almost constant for two decades before increasing in the 1980s, the data show both the influx of Mexicans and a white exodus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Percentage Mexican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,632</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>5,479</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Guadalupe is not the only community in California to undergo this population change over the last three decades. In fact, an additional 130 communities in farming areas throughout California have been identified as experiencing a similar change (Palerm 1991).

**“Newcomers” versus “Natives”**

On the surface, it appears that the most basic division of Guadalupe’s populace would be between those of the Mexican descent, now the majority, and the rest, mostly whites. However, in reality, the division is more along occupational and political than ethnic lines. A better division might be between, what I will call natives and newcomers.

Natives are residents who were born in the United States. They were not necessarily born and raised in Guadalupe, though some were. Some “natives” are even from the ranks of the Mexican descent population. Their distinguishing feature is that the natives are not from farmworker backgrounds — they work at other occupations or run businesses of their own, and financially, for the most part, they are doing relatively well.

The “newcomers,” some who have been in Guadalupe since the 1960s, are post-Bracero Mexican immigrants and their Mexican- and U.S.-born children. While technically their U.S.-born children could be thought of as natives, their cultural orientation is toward their parents and other “newcomers.” Although “native-born” they do not associate with nor align themselves politically with the old guard. And this old guard considers these U.S.-born children and young adults as outsiders. The distinguishing characteristics of the newcomers are their farmworker background and that, financially, they are not doing well. Their agricultural wages have declined over the years, and many are no longer gainfully employed.

The newcomer group also includes a small number of Filipino families who settled in Guadalupe in the 1940s and 1950s. They, too, were once agricultural workers.

Local natives — those born in Guadalupe some of whom can trace their origins two or three generations back — consider the community theirs. They believe that Guadalupe should return to the quaint agricultural town of the past, before the arrival of the Mexicans, whom they blame for the community’s ills. Then, in the 1980s, these locals, who were diminishing in numbers as a result of white flight, were joined by senior citizens from other areas who moved to a new retirement community, Bonita Homes. These two groups established a political alliance to maintain and further their interests. The local “insider” natives wanted to return to the Guadalupe of the past, while new “outsider” natives wanted a community free of the “Tijuana look” — a Guadalupe without farmworkers and poverty.

The newcomers also consider Guadalupe as their home town. The first-comers of this group are naturalized U.S. citizens and home owners, purchasing homes when housing was affordable in the 1960s and 1970s. In most cases, they sold or gave away their homes and landholdings in Mexico. Newcomer parents insist that their children — Mexican and U.S.-born — learn English and the “American Way of Life,” without forgetting their Spanish. In short, newcomers see themselves as bone fide members of the community. They are quick to point out that they have lived in the community since the 1960s, and that through their hard work they have contributed to the development of local agriculture. Their interests are similar to those of many working-class people in the United States. 

1 Bonita Homes consists of 106 units constructed in the late 1970s as senior citizen housing. Nearly all are owned and occupied by “outsiders,” seniors who came to Guadalupe only recently. Many are retired professionals and are very active in local government.
they want a good education for their children, job opportunities, and affordable housing.

The interests of the natives and newcomers are in conflict. Natives, remembering the prosperous community of old, blame the Mexicans for Guadalupe's blight. As some of them put it, "Everything was fine until they (the Mexicans) arrived." They would like to entice people of financial means to Guadalupe to counterbalance its impoverished population. Their thinking is that, if such a preferred group were to settle locally, the socioeconomic characteristics of the population would change, and gradually the community would prosper once again. This belief manifests itself in the natives' push for up-scale housing to attract outsiders with money — housing that most of Guadalupe's residents could never afford.

Meanwhile, the newcomers are also making their interests known. They, too, want to better their community. They agree with the natives that improvements are needed, but they believe that solutions lie in expanding the local business base by recruiting companies to open shop in town. Success could eventually bring social service programs, like job training and affordable housing.

**The Newcomer Quest for Political Representation**

From 1946, when Guadalupe became incorporated as a city, through the 1970s, natives controlled the political institutions. They held all of the seats in the school board, city administration, city council, and commissions, such as the planning and recreation commissions. They had the resources, knowledge of the local political system, and constituted the majority of the community's voters. They maintained control over three decades without opposition from newcomers who were unable to organize a viable political challenge. Many newcomers, not being citizens, could neither vote nor seek public office. Recent arrivals did not understand the workings of the local political system. For a long time, their U.S.-born children were too young to vote. Newcomers were stymied when it came to launching a campaign or sponsoring a candidate.

Still, newcomers did not let their weak political status in the community stop them from fighting for justice. Whenever they saw an injustice, they spoke out. Initially, they fought their major liability in the local political arena — the lack of U.S. citizenship — by engaging in grassroots politics, such as organizing and holding rallies and marches. By the 1980s and 1990s, some of them who became citizens could complement these grassroots efforts by voting.

**The First Native-Newcomer Clash**

The newcomers first challenged the political power of the natives in the 1970s, when their children had become the majority of the students in the Guadalupe Union School District. As always, schools were major socialization institutions in the community. Schools not only educate the young and inculcate beliefs and values of society, they also serve as the major integrative force in the community.

In the 1970s, because of newcomers' concerns about their children's education in the local schools, they established El Comité Consejero de los Padres de Familia (Parents' Advisory Committee). While the committee's membership varied, it consisted of 20 members, including some who also belonged to organizations such as the United Farmworkers Union (UFW), Pueblo Unido, Comite del Valle, and the California Rural Legal Assistance. These organizations supported the Parents' Advisory Committee by providing advice, resources, and political support (González 1987).

Newcomers had two major concerns about their children's education. The first was language difficulties. Many of their children were monolingual Spanish-speakers and were having difficulty comprehending monolingual English-speaking teachers and the English language curriculums. Because of their language-caused learning difficulties, they were being tracked into learning-disability courses. A second serious concern was their children's complaints about being corporally punished. They claimed they were punished, even struck, by teachers, because, for example, of speaking Spanish on the school grounds (González 1987).

Organized by the Parents' Advisory Committee, parents attended school board meetings in large numbers, voiced their concerns, and demanded changes. They called for bilingual/bicultural principals, teachers, and curriculums and for an end to corporal punishment. To make their point, the Parents' Advisory Committee circulated petitions, held strategy meetings, marched and protested, and requested a boycott of local schools until their demands were met by the school board. During the boycott, newcomer
parents were encouraged to send their children to alternative classes, organized by the UFW, in the homes of members of the Parents' Advisory Committee (González 1987).

In 1972, 10 members of the Parents' Advisory Committee were arrested by local authorities at a special school board meeting, falsely charged with disturbing the peace and inciting a riot. The Guadalupe Ten, as they were later called, were convicted and given sentences ranging from three to six months in the county jail, all with three years probation.

At the request of the American Civil Liberties Union and the California Rural Legal Assistance, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission investigated claims of human rights violations in Guadalupe. The commission found evidence of corporal punishment in the schools and intimidation of the Parents' Advisory Committee. In the commission's report Guadalupe's political system was depicted as "feudal," and the town's system of education and administration of justice were denounced for failing to enforce the civil rights of the Mexican and Mexican-American population (Comité Estatal Asesor de California 1974).

The activism of newcomer parents, together with the investigative findings of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, brought real changes to the schools. Humiliated, the majority of the school administrators and teachers resigned and joined the white flight of other natives. The school board now listening to and working closely with newcomer parents, filled vacancies with bicultural/bilingual administrators and instructors recruited from outside of the community.

Satisfied with the changes in the local schools, the Parents' Advisory Committee disbanded, and newcomers turned their attention to improving their socioeconomic plight in the community. During the remainder of the 1970s, many joined the strikes and the boycotts organized by the UFW. The efforts of the UFW paid-off for a short time. From the late-1970s to the early 1980s, many growers in the Santa Maria Valley increased farm wages and improved working conditions on their own to keep the union from gaining ground in the valley.

NEWCOMER ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL REPRESENTATION

By the mid-1980s, Santa Maria Valley growers defeated the UFW by replacing resident workers with migratory laborers. Vocal members of the newcomer group, who were active in the union, were black-listed by growers. Others, fearing reprisal, abandoned the union.

But all was not lost for the newcomers in the 1980s. Two newcomer leaders emerged who changed the political climate (see sidebars). Both were ex-braceros who settled in Guadalupe in the 1960s with their families. Both had been politicized by the activities of the Parents' Advisory Committee and the UFW. In fact, they worked closely together as union organizers in the 1970s, but later parted due to differences in opinion, adopting separate approaches in the struggle for political justice and representation in the community.

In the 1980s, as immigrants became citizens and their children became old enough to vote, the number of newcomer voters increased, making up from 10 to 20 percent of total voters. In spite of their growing numbers, however, gaining political representation in city government proved difficult, for they were not yet organized. They had never sponsored their own candidate and lacked a coherent political platform. And they still lacked a strong voting block. Many immigrants were not yet willing to become U.S. citizens, and many young Chicanos were not really interested in voting, thinking that their vote would not change anything.

Another problem compounding the difficulty of newcomers' gaining representation was the city's at-large electoral system. That is, the city is not divided into political districts; elected officials can live anywhere in town. Consequently, candidates with the highest number of votes win. As pointed out by Menchaca (1988, 1994) and Takash-Cruz (1990), this type of system allows dominant groups in the community, who do not represent the interests of competing groups, to control city councils.

Nevertheless, the newcomers flexed their electorate muscle in the 1980s, creating political alliances and voting in blocks with others. In fact, these efforts paid off in 1981, when a progressive Filipino-Mexican American was elected to the city council. Later, another Filipino-Mexican

Menchaca found this to be the case in Santa Paula, California, while Takash-Cruz studied Watsonville.
American was elected mayor. These two successful politicians were very active in addressing newcomer needs. For example, the first was, and continues to be, the director of the Guadalupe Community Health Center, a major health care provider of the newcomers. He also pushed for and passed ordinances requiring absentee landlords to repair dilapidated rentals, many of which were rented by the newcomers.

Newcomers Gain Representation in City Government

The political maturity and voting power of the newcomers finally became manifest in the 1990s. Their voting numbers increased to about 30 percent of the total, due largely to citizenship drives and newcomer children reaching voting age. (However, the under-18 age group of newcomers still accounts for 40 percent of the community's total population.)

In 1992, as in the 1970s, newcomers were organized — this time into the Familias Unidas (see the sidebar). The objectives of this grassroots group were, and continue to be, the development of affordable housing for non-home owners and training programs and recreational facilities for young children and teenagers. Including all family members, the group represents nearly 2,000 persons. Members attend city council meetings and voice their needs. They also contact nonprofit organizations, such as the Peoples' Self-Help Housing Corporation, to solicit assistance in developing additional affordable housing. Well aware that local government only listens to voters, they work on citizenship and voter registration drives. They fund their activities by collecting dues and holding fund-raisers, such as dinners and raffles.

Like many other Mexican immigrant groups in California, Familias Unidas was outraged by Proposition 187 and organized to defeat it (Prop 187 is described on the next page). Also in 1994, there were two city council seats to be filled. For the first time, the newcomers, through Familias Unidas, sponsored their own candidate (see box). Months before 1994 election, the newcomers, under the auspices of Familias Unidas, adopted the grassroots tactics of the past. They held rallies and marches in town, protesting the proposition and denouncing its proponents, including Governor Pete Wilson. Unlike the efforts of the 1970s, they also stepped-up voter registration drives and raised funds to finance their candidate. Weeks before the election, they covered the community, knocking on doors and distributing flyers, and mailing campaign literature.

Overall, voter turnout was average. In a city of 5,479 residents and 1,747 registered voters, 993 votes were cast (18 percent of the population; 56.8 percent of the registered voters). It appears that many of the natives did not vote. Besides general apathy, this could have been due to all the negative campaigning associated with the statewide elections.

Thus, the political efforts of Familias Unidas paid off. The newcomers accounted for 541 of the votes or 54.4 percent of the total. Of the four candidates running for city council, the newcomers' candidate came in second, receiving 541 votes. In addition, Proposition 187 was defeated in Guadalupe, 541 to 421, while passing by a wide margin statewide.

Thus, for the first time since their arrival around 30 years ago, the newcomers succeeded in gaining true political representation in a community where they had become the majority 20 years ago.

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*Personal communication with Ariston Julian, Director, November 1994.

Don Manuel Magaña, born in Uriangato, Guanajuato, became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1980 and encouraged other immigrant compatriots to do the same. He was politically active in local government, voting and attending city council meetings on a regular basis. Eventually, he was appointed to the city's planning commission, a position that allowed him to represent newcomers and to speak on their behalf. Through the Comité Cívico Mexicano and other local organizations, he urged newcomers to attend city council meetings, and organized citizenship and voter registration drives to increase the number of newcomer voters in the community.
Don Jesús Saucedo, born in Gachupines, Guanajuato, became a political broker long before gaining his U.S. citizenship in the late 1980s. In the early 1970s, with the help of the Orcutt Presbyterian Church, he established the Guadalupe Community Service Center and became its director. The center provided the needy of the community with food, job placement, and legal services. Those who had been helped, supported Don Jesús in his efforts to build a political constituency. They attended meetings at the center, where Don Jesús organized them into groups to attend public meetings and to voice their concerns and make demands. Candidates for public office, regardless of their political affiliation, were invited to speak at the center. If they agreed to support the political efforts of the newcomers, Don Jesús and his people would campaign for them.

One candidate was Don Jesús’ oldest son, Javier Saucedo, a newcomer in his own right, being born in Gachupines, Mexico. Together with four siblings (out of eight), he immigrated to Guadalupe with his family in the late 1960s. While Javier was attending high school and immediately after graduation, he harvested crops for local growers, often joining his father in the fields. A few years after graduation, he obtained full-time employment outside of agriculture, painting air planes for a company in Santa Barbara. This position provided Javier with a regular income, substantially higher than what he had made as a farmworker, enabling him to establish credit and purchase a house in town. Today, he lives in Guadalupe with his wife and children, where he works for the Guadalupe Community Health Center as a community outreach worker.

CONCLUDING AND SUMMARIZING COMMENTS

The objective of Proposition 187, according to its proponents, is to save California money by preventing undocumented residents from attending public schools and receiving public-funded medical services. The initiative requires that, except in an emergency situation, as defined by federal law, health care providers must verify the legal status of a patient before providing care. People who cannot verify their citizenship or legal status will be denied care. The proposition provides that “no public elementary or secondary school shall admit, or permit the attendance of, any child who is not a citizen of the United States, alien lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, or a person who is otherwise authorized under federal law to be present in the United States.” Moreover, it requires that each school district verify the legal status of each child already enrolled and in attendance in order to ensure that those in attendance are not undocumented residents.

In spite of their immigrant stock, the newcomers to Guadalupe were neither apathetic nor powerless. As a group, they recognized the importance of political activism from the outset and participated in the political affairs of their community.

Initially, noncitizenship and a high number of people below the voting age, together with an at-large electoral system, hindered their move from grassroots political tactics to effective voting.
activity. Nonetheless, the newcomers did succeed in reforming the community’s educational system in the 1970s. Changes were introduced peacefully in the Guadalupe Union School District. Although they could not yet institute reform through the vote, they used grassroots tactics, such as rallies, marches, and boycotts.

In the 1980s and 1990s, many newcomers to Guadalupe became citizens while their young reached voting age. They struggled for political power and representation in city government, by organizing into an interest group, Familias Unidas, and voicing their needs at city council meetings. They also worked on becoming a viable voting block, through citizenship and voter registration drives. However, it was not until Proposition 187 that they really became a power to be reckoned with. Ironically, Proposition 187, designed to dispossess undocumented immigrants from educational benefits and social services, galvanized the newcomers and helped place them in city government.

REFERENCES


Other Important Points —
Enrique Figueroa

While not in criticism of all that has been presented and discussed at this conference, I want to bring up some important aspects not yet expounded upon or even identified here. These issues need to be addressed if we are to begin the process of understanding the social-economic conditions of Latinos in America.

A NATIONAL ID CARD
I heard no one mention today the probability of our country’s embarking on a national ID card system or some sort of registry of citizens. The commission chaired by former Congresswoman Jordan (Texas) recommended to Congress earlier this year, a pilot program for citizen status verification. We, as scholars interested in Latino communities, need to address this issue and thereafter attempt to formulate some sort of policy statement with respect to it. No doubt, within our scholarly community we will have differing positions on the issue, but in my view we should be pro-active and put forth a position paper that presents a thorough analysis of the pros and cons of such a registry system.

ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE IN LATINO COMMUNITIES
Again, no one addressed this difficult, but relevant, issue for Latino communities. Within the farm labor force, alcohol abuse has historically been a problem, and because the labor force is now primarily comprised of single males, the problem has been getting worse.

NEEDED: A STRATEGY FOR ADDRESSING RURAL VERSUS URBAN ISSUES
Most Latinos reside in urban communities, so the focus of national public policy makers is there. However, rural Latino communities have specific concerns and issues that an urban-based policy will not adequately address.

THE LACK OF LATINO LAND OWNERSHIP
Most of us recognize that property ownership — particularly farm and ranch land — empowers individuals in rural communities, both politically and economically. To what extent are rural Latinos in America property owners? What factors can or will contribute to greater Latino ownership of farm and ranch land? What factors impede Latinos from owning land? Over the long term, low land ownership rates by Latinos in rural communities will continue to serve as a significant impediment for political and economic empowerment.

STRUCTURE OF RURAL VOTING DISTRICTS
This year the Supreme Court will hear arguments in two cases which dispute the procedure used in creating congressional voting districts. In both cases, the plaintiff(s) allege some sort of “race-based” criteria for the establishment of the districts in dispute. I raise this issue, in the context of our conference, because Latinos living in rural communities will likely not have districts created to assure a “Latino” representative. I base this assertion not on a successful outcome of the above cases, but rather on the relatively low numbers of Latinos living in rural areas. Therefore, the relevant question for us at this conference is: How do rural Latinos achieve greater political influence at the state and federal levels?
PROPOSED GUEST-WORKER PROGRAM
There is a distinct possibility that Congress will consider some type of guest worker program, mostly to meet agricultural sector concerns regarding labor shortages. As with the issue of the national ID card, we need to be pro-active and generate a credible set of analyses. As scholars of issues relevant to Latino communities, most of us will likely find it easy to agree that a guest worker program makes no sense.

AGE DISPARITY BETWEEN ANGLO AND LATINO RURAL RESIDENTS
The demographics of Latinos in the United States indicate that they are a much younger group that most other U.S. residents. Especially in rural areas, Anglo residents are, on average, considerably older than the rest of America. Add to this the fact that most older Anglo citizens vote, while most Latinos do not. The combination of these facts leads to a very low probability of successful tax increases to support public schools (or any other local tax-based service) for mostly Latino children. Indeed, in a number of urban communities in the Northeast this situation has already manifested itself.

LATINO COMMUNITIES AT UNIVERSITIES IN THE NORTHEAST
In my estimation, the largest Latino community in central New York State is at Cornell University where Latinos number nearly 2,000 (including foreign students from Central and South America). I raise this point to highlight the need to provide Latino students with courses, say, on Chicano history, or any other relevant subject that will lead to empowerment of the members of this community.

A Final Word
We need to develop a “roadmap” to get where we want to go. A number of papers presented very good information and analyses, while others were more descriptive. What we lack is a synthesis of all that we have learned, as well as a strategy for moving forward. All of us individually will continue to press on with our work, but a strategic research agenda has not been articulated. How do we achieve such an articulation? How do we develop a strategic plan for empowering Latino communities, especially in rural America?
What is Needed?
More Interdisciplinary Work Drawing on the Humanities
Denise Segura

I would like to commend Refugio Rochín for organizing this exciting conference wherein researchers have shared their latest work on Latino immigration and ethnic communities. Both quantitative and qualitative approaches have produced a great wealth of information. But one area not included in the conference is interdisciplinary scholarship on Latino immigration and communities that draws on work in the humanities. Before elaborating on this point, I offer a few comments on the research that was presented.

Given my responsibility to speak from a "California perspective" and mindful of the large number of California participants, I will focus on two important political events in my home state, e.g., Proposition 187 and the Civil Rights Initiative.

García’s research on political participation, both traditional and non-traditional, emphasizes the potential for social change when people, in this case, Mexican immigrants, mobilize locally about their political concerns. Grassroots organization can blossom into involvement in other civic issues, as well as voter registration. It is possible that if more people would organize and be provided with appropriate information (e.g., on the pros and cons of Proposition 187) that anti-immigrant legislation would not pass or, at least, would not pass as easily as it did in California. García’s research points out the need for coalition-building.

Indeed, if we take the research presented one step further — challenging the researchers to put their findings in policy terms — we might see coalition-building as a strategy for creating both social programs and cultural discourse centered on Latinas/Latinos. The conference showed that past historical patterns such as nativism and immigrant-bashing have reemerged, even as the economic situation has worsened. Past solutions, including legal remedies and economic programs, are being challenged, for example by Proposition 187 and the Civil Rights Initiative that seeks to end most forms of affirmative action. Valenzuela and Taylor help us understand the economic restructuring that is currently occurring. Such restructuring puts pressures both on the local labor market (Valenzuela) and on the sending communities (Taylor). In other words, the “problems” associated with economic restructuring are global in nature, transcending individuals and the local community.

I would like to see researchers like Valenzuela and Taylor offer both local and international policy alternatives. When I think of the local possibilities, I see the need for going beyond conventional remedies, such as “more education” for immigrant and native-born Latino and other workers. Resources in the local communities, such as community-based organizations, churches, retired workers, and various businesses, could be mobilized to create new strategies to meet the challenge of economic restructuring. For example, vocational education might be revamped to include training in how to create and run a business. High school students and many of the underemployed have ideas with potential to turn into small businesses. Instead of teaching high school students how to be good child care workers, we might offer a curriculum that teaches them how to open a child care center. In addition to teaching students how to use a computer, we might encourage them to develop a word processing service. Students’ talents could be drawn out by enhanced programs run by the schools in coalition with other community resources.

Research presented here today described some of the tensions between the native-born and the immigrant. While it is important to understand how these tensions are played out (e.g., in conflicts or rallies), it is just as critical to understand how differences and tensions are interpreted. For, it is exactly in the construction/deconstruction of ideologies of culture, conflict, and the nature of political participation, that the seeds of change are sown. It is here that social scientists can utilize the paradigms unfolding in the humanities and arts, including literary criticism, Chicana/o literature, Chicana/o art, art history, and ethnomusicology.
While I understand the limitations imposed upon conference formats, especially by budgets, it is critical to develop dialogue across disciplines. Literature, art and music have a universality that cuts through cultural differences and disciplines, while, at the same time, offers insights into the life and customs of particular cultures at particular times. By sharing the common experiences revealed in the reading of literary texts or in a mural or song, we can experience our common bonds and sharpen our political and moral consciousness to challenge the existing hegemony that, at this conference has been revealed as latterday xenophobia and nativism.

In social science research, our society's "ism's" — racism, sexism, heterosexism, and classism — can be combated in the questions we ask, the data we gather, and the policies we recommend. In this we excel. But, I believe that we in the social sciences only tell part of the story of Latino immigration and community dynamics, overlooking much that is also relevant. For example, we find that the arts community responded in many ways to Proposition 187. Posters appeal to the heart and soul in ways a multiple regression simply can not.

This is not to suggest we not do statistical analyses, but rather that we also need to provide nuanced portraits of our community — or, I should say "communities," in as much as Saenz, Valdez, and others here have shown that there are, in fact, many more than one Latino community. How we go about deconstructing "the community" could be even more exciting if undertaken in concert with the theoretical frameworks of cultural studies as one of many possible points of departure.

In conclusion, I advocate the development of interdisciplinary approaches and theories to portray and interpret Chicana/o and Latina/o communities and concerns. This interdisciplinarity must be both local and international in scope. Coalition forming is one strategy for tapping the vast reservoirs of talent residing in our communities. But, as de La Torre and Garcia showed, cleavages are even now being defined that speak to the growing ethnic maturation within these communities. It is our challenge to create the interdisciplinary tools to both describe and predict these changes in ways that can also reveal policy recommendations for humane social change.
The Different Faces and Dimensions of Immigration: A View from the Midwest Reality

Manuel Chavez

Immigration has two dimensions — one that pushes migrants to move; the other that pulls them to do so. Emigration and immigration have a human dimension — individuals and families with dreams, rights, hearts, and will — they are the integral subjects of analysis and policies. But actual migrant voices have not been heard either in research or in policy. And immigration needs to be studied in a binational agenda context. Thus, immigration is a complex, multidimensional, and lately, extremely dynamic, social phenomenon.

These were among the important points discussed at this the conference. Yet, here I offer a further exploration of what was said — and not said — describe some distinctive issues of immigration in the Midwest, and point out the direction of the agenda for the near future.

CONFERENCE REVIEW

De la Torre recognized for us that immigration is being used ideologically by politicians. She also reminded us that this is not the first time in U.S. history that migrants have been used as political scapegoats for problems that the country was experiencing. In the early 1900s, migrants from Europe were blamed for deteriorating economic and social conditions. Likewise, today, all sorts of problems in education, overcrowded prisons, abuses in social benefits, and even increasing rates of taxation are blamed on migrants. Mexicans, the most visible migrants, are targeted. To add fuel to the fire is the perception that most enter the country illegally, for many portray a person’s lack of documentation as “criminal.”

To make things worse, these scapegoats have either no or only a limited voice in the public forum. Because of their status, inability to vote, and lack of political representation, it is easier to blame them for the current problems of states like California whose economy has slowed.

Philip Martin reminded us that the immigration debate is not new. In the early part of this century, it was the Germans who caused concern — the worry was about how and when they would be “assimilated.” But now Germans constitute the largest ancestral group in the United States. A second point was that for first time in U.S. history the Immigration Reform and Control Act included penalties for employers who use undocumented labor. Ironically, Mexico had already insisted several times that employers who exploit migrants or those who hire them illegally should be penalized.

Ed Taylor brought to our attention the importance of migrants’ remittances to their local communities. He found that a downward valuation in the peso to the dollar was a more important migration motivating factor than was a reduction in the local maize price. Another issue is the level at which remittances substitute for local public investment. Some states, such as Zacatecas, Mexico, have used remittances to stimulate local small business projects. The 1992 value of remittances to Mexico was from $3 to $6 billion; 60 percent went to the federal districts of Michoacan, Jalisco, Zacatecas and Guanajuato. There are significant indirect benefits on local and state economies (Lozano 1993). Many Mexican scholars contend that migration and remittances increase the potential for upper social/economic mobility.

With aggregate level immigration data, it is easy to lose track of the human side of the story. Behind the numbers, it is hard to see the faces of those who are giving the best part of their productive lives to the United States. Rogelio Saenrz reminded us that there are many differences encountered not only among “Latinos” in the United States, but also within groups, like the Mexicans.

Of the Latinos in Chicago, almost 65 percent are of Mexican descent and another 22 percent are Puerto Rican, while the rest come from various parts of Central and South America, including five Central American and seven South American countries. But among these immigrant groups are differences in class, education, background, and culture that need recognition. Just as there were differences among immigrants from northern and southern Italy in the early 1900s, so are there between those from northern and southern Mexico. Actually, there is often political and regional segregation in communities that are superficially perceived to have cohesive unity.

Dennis Valdes outlined migration as a process of international interdependence, underlining the significance of interactions of the
two countries, with emphasis on the kinships and relationships of same families divided by the border. Even in the now-global economy, the economic interdependency between the United States and Mexico goes so deep that each country must look at the other to understand itself. The two countries are in a process of regularization and normalization that began in the mid-1960s. Large U.S. manufacturing corporations are breaking new ground with their model for international division of labor (Sassen 1990). For any industrialized country, a supply of unskilled labor is always welcome with its low wages and in filling undesirable jobs (Piore 1979, Alonso 1987). From the other side of the border, an abundance of jobs is very welcome, especially in times of a slow or sluggish economy. Even more important, the labor supply mechanism generates frequent and deep social interactions that, in turn, lead to more complex economic, political, social, and cultural bridges. To put it simply, with or without NAFTA there is nothing that can weaken the connection that has been established between the two countries.

These levels of mutual dependency became especially clear in 1994 with two events. Increasing interest rates in the United States had immediate consequences for financial markets in Mexico where interests rates also increased, and monetary policies limited the money supply, making new investment in industry difficult. Second, political tensions in Mexico — in

Stories from the Midwest:

Pull factors are alive and well. Consider the Wisconsin service industry. Restaurants and packing industries employ most Mexican migrants who arrive in the city. In 1992, in interviewing workers and supervisors in Waukesha, a suburb of Milwaukee, I found 12 Mexican nationals living in a three-bedroom apartment near the downtown area. An acquaintance had hired them directly in the town of Tomotitlan, Jalisco. This contratador arranges transportation from Jalisco to Wisconsin; costs are deducted from the workers’ first two checks. A manager informs them weekly at which of 13 restaurants in the metro area they are to work. Half of these restaurants are open 24 hours a day; the kitchen staff and the bus boys are all Mexican.

Every two weeks a supervisor offers the workers alternative jobs in janitorial services in Milwaukee office complexes under the same ownership as the restaurant chain. Workers are paid 50 cents less than the Wisconsin minimum wage, receiving their pay for at least the first three to six months in cash in a sealed envelope. Most have few complaints, except for the glacial pace of and very small increases in their hourly wage. Three persons in three years have been arrested and deported to Mexico as they were attempting to return to work after spending time in Mexico.

Another active pull factor is a packing-cannery industry in a town 40 miles north of Milwaukee that employs around 150 migrant workers every summer. Two-thirds have worked in the cannery before; most are from southern Texas, in particular from the Laredo, Cotulla, and McAllen regions. All are either Mexican or of Mexican descent. One of these migrants had come back for 12 consecutive years. The remaining third of the workers is hired directly from Mexico, in the border cities of Tamaulipas and as far away as Veracruz.

The supervisor who has worked for the company for eight years, speaks both English and Spanish fluently. He is originally from Laredo and has family and friends in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. He begins recruiting in mid-spring on the U.S. side of the border, following up by hiring more workers in Mexico. He conducts the interviews and does the hiring personally, putting workers in contact with transportation that costs $200, paid in advance. Upon arrival, the migrants are situated in barracks-style housing that separates men and women, while families are accommodated in small two room apartments. The cannery operates day and night, so workers are scheduled by shifts. Legal minimum wages are paid, and some medical services are available when needed. The only complaint is about the limited number of bathrooms.

Most of the migrants get along with each other well, but tensions sometimes arise during bailes and fiestas when others arrive from different camps — for example, newly arrived Mexican nationals are sometimes harassed by Tejanos experienced in working for the cannery.
particular, the assassination of the PRI presidential candidate, Donaldo Colosio, sent a chill through U.S. financial markets. The day after the assassination, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 50 points, the most important loss in the first part of the year.

Migration is an extremely important part of the U.S.-Mexico interdependency, yet it is frequently ignored in the policy arena. A critical issue left out of the NAFTA negotiations, was the potential mobility of workers among the three countries. While the European Union agreed on a relatively free movement of labor within the community, NAFTA rules on labor mobility are very restrictive, allowing the movement only of corporation executives, company transferees, and professionals. No mention was made of semi-skilled or entry level workers.

An implication of the U.S.-Mexico interdependency is that no rational solution to the migration problem can be made unilaterally. Attempts made by one side, as was done with IRCA in 1986, are doomed to fail. Despite IRCA's employer sanctions, the demand for labor and labor recruiting practices remain active even 2,000 miles from the border in the Midwest (see stories nearby).

Besides the examples described on the next page, similar situations exist in Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. To put it simply, when labor is needed, neither 2,000 miles nor employer sanctions pose a serious obstacle.

We saw how citizenship is becoming more important to Latinos, for example, in response to California's Proposition 187. But will these new citizens, and, say, the 130,000 beneficiaries of the amnesty program in Chicago, ever have any political clout? Will Latinos ever be able to form alliances to create a platform? Instead, Gonzales described their segmentation. There is growing conflict among Mexicans themselves, for example, between old-timers and newcomers.

Many struggle internally with seeking U.S. citizenship, feeling that they are not being loyal to Mexico. Another factor is the proximity of Mexico allowing relatively low cost travel back and forth; consequently many see no need to become U.S. citizens (Moore and Chavez 1990). But sooner or later, Latinos will recognize that unless they become citizens and begin voting, they will never have a voice on issues of importance to them. The pragmatic solution of becoming a citizen is gradually winning out for more and more Mexicans who still have the lowest rate of citizenship among permanent U.S. foreign-born residents.

Concluding Questions

In conclusion, I wish to highlight several important aspects of the conference that have implications for policy. We discussed immigration from the U.S. perspective. But how do the sending communities perceive the phenomenon? We also looked at how various U.S. groups perceive Proposition 187, but no one asked what people in Mexico think about it.

Not much was said about human rights, especially the treatment of migrants by law enforcement agencies. Yet we know there are some who are repeatedly abused on both sides of the border.

What rationale is behind an individual's decision to migrate despite the risks and difficulties? And what are the local structural conditions that motivate migration?

Also, the demand side of immigration needs further study. Just how is it that the service sector absorbs and induces migration?

Tension has risen between settled communities and newcomers. New nontraditional areas in Mexico are now sources of migration. Another series of questions needs to be pondered: What is the official Mexican position on the movement of its nationals? What are migrants thinking before they move? What price do they pay to make the move? A binational agenda is needed to solve the immigration puzzle. For example, is binational citizenship an option for Mexico?

Future Directions for the Immigration Debate

Immigration policy needs to be made in light of several new realities:

(1) Migration is a transnational phenomenon and, as such, need binational remedies;

(2) Migration is in response to structural conditions on both sides of the border:

(3) Migration is dynamic, and rapid changes shape the origins, rationale, demographics, and areas of migration; and

(4) Migration is increasingly diverse.

An awareness of these conditions will serve to clarify the immigration debate. Above all, it is imperative to keep in mind the human context of migration and to include both sides of the border in our thinking about the issue.
REFERENCES
Biographies of Conference Participants

Rosemary Aponte is assistant director for administration and communications with the Julian Samora Research Institute at Michigan State University. She is a Ph.D. student in sociology at the University of Chicago, and has authored a number of research reports focusing on the health and education status of Hispanics in the United States.

Manuel Chavez is assistant director of the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at Michigan State University. A former Julian Samora Research Institute postdoctoral fellow, he received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He is also a visiting professor in MSU’s Department of Resource Development. His research interests include interdependency, urban public policy, Latinos in the United States, particularly recent migrants, and U.S.-Mexico border studies.

Adela de la Torre is professor and chair of the Department of Chicano & Latino Studies at California State University, Long Beach. She received her Ph.D. in agricultural economics at the University of California, Berkeley. She is an economics expert in health care policies and programs and a member of the Hispanic Business Board of Economists. Dr. de la Torre has written guest columns for various publications, including the Los Angeles Times.

Enrique Figueroa is associate professor in the Department of Agricultural, Resource, and Managerial Economics at Cornell University. His Ph.D. in agricultural economics is from the University of California, Davis. As a graduate student, he was selected Congressional Hispanic Fellow and has twice worked for the House Committee on Agriculture. Besides his research, teaching, and extension responsibilities, Dr. Figueroa has contributed to the development of the Hispanic American Studies Program at Cornell.

Víctor García is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology & Anthropology at Indiana University, Pennsylvania. He earned his Ph.D. in anthropology at the University of California, Santa Barbara. At Indiana University, Dr. Garcia teaches courses on cultural anthropology, Latin America, and peasant societies and economies. His research addresses labor immigration and migration from peasant communities in Mexico to agricultural regions in the United States, especially to California and Pennsylvania.

Steven J. Gold is associate professor of sociology at Michigan State University and senior fellow at the Wilstein Institute of Jewish Policy Studies. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, and has published numerous articles on immigrant adaptation, ethnic self-employment, and community development. Dr. Gold is currently involved in studies of ethnic philanthropy and Israeli immigrants in Los Angeles.

Juan L. Gonzales, Jr. is professor of sociology at California State University, Hayward. His Ph.D. is from the University of California, Berkeley. At CSU, Hayward, Dr. Gonzales teaches courses on race relations, sociology of the family, urban sociology, and research methods, and has written numerous research papers, articles, and books on race relations in the United States, farmworkers, and ethnic issues. Recently, he has been investigating the effects of California’s Proposition 187 on the lives of Mexican immigrants there.

Sherri Grasmuck is associate professor in the Department of Sociology at Temple University, Philadelphia, and has served as director of Women’s Studies there. Her Ph.D. is from the University of Texas at Austin. Dr. Grasmuck’s current research is on household structure, gender and micro entrepreneurs in the Dominican Republic.
Ramon Grosfoguel is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology at the State University of New York, Binghamton. His Ph.D. is in sociology from Temple University. His research has focused on comparing Caribbean migrations to Western Europe and the United States and on Caribbean world cities such as Miami and San Juan. During 1994-95, he was a Rockefeller fellow at the Center for Puerto Rican Studies at CUNY, Hunter College.

Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo is assistant professor in the Department of Sociology, at the University of Southern California. She received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California, Berkeley. Her research has focused on the intersections of gender and Mexican immigration. She is currently examining paid domestic work in Los Angeles.

Daniel Melero Malpica is a candidate for the Ph.D. degree in sociology at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he is also a research associate in the Urban Planning Department. He is currently participating in a project examining how grassroots organizations in the L.A. area contribute to the economic empowerment of migrants, and to their families and communities in their countries of origin. His research interests include Latino immigration to the United States, the social and economic conditions of Latinos in the United States, and the relationship between race and poverty.

Philip Martin is professor of agricultural economics at the University of California, Davis. He studied labor economics and agricultural economics at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, where he earned his Ph.D. Dr. Martin has published extensively on farm labor, labor migration, economic development, and immigration issues. He was the only academic appointed to the U.S. Commission on Agricultural Workers to assess the effects of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 on U.S. farmers and workers.

Carole Frank Nuckton is technical editor of the proceedings. Her Ph.D. is in agricultural economics from the University of California, Davis. From her home office in Bend, Oregon, she works on special projects that involve research, writing, and editing for universities, private industry, and other organizations.

Refugio I. Rochín was appointed the first permanent director of the Julian Samora Research Institute, Michigan State University, in September 1994. At MSU, he is also professor of agricultural economics and sociology. Dr. Rochín is professor emeritus in agricultural economics and Chicano studies at the University of California, Davis. His Ph.D. in agricultural economics is from MSU. Dr. Rochín’s research interests include immigration/migration, farmworkers, and rural populations.

Rubén G. Rumbaut is professor of sociology at Michigan State University and senior research associate at MSU’s Institute for Public Policy and Social Research and at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego. Born in Havana, Cuba, he received his Ph.D. from Brandeis University in 1978. Before coming to MSU, he taught at UC San Diego and San Diego State University. Dr. Rumbaut has published widely about Asian and Latin American immigrants in the United States.

Rogelio Saenz is associate professor in the Rural Sociology and Sociology departments at Texas A&M University. A scholar of the Julian Samora Research Institute, he received his Ph.D. in sociology from Iowa State University. Dr. Saenz is author of numerous journal articles, book chapters and technical reports in the areas of demography, human ecology, and racial and ethnic minorities, with special emphasis on the demography of the Latino population.
Biographies of Conference Participants

Denise Segura is associate professor of Sociology and director of the Center for Chicano Research at the University of California, Santa Barbara. She earned her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of California, Berkeley. Dr. Segura is best known for her research on gender roles and women's experiences in the labor market. She has written numerous articles on Chicanas/Latinas in the work force.

Edward J. Taylor is professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of California, Davis. His Ph.D. is from UC Berkeley. Dr. Taylor has had 10 years of fieldwork in rural Mexico and California. In his research, he uses computable general equilibrium techniques to study the links between Mexican villages and the U.S. economy.

Dennis Nodín Valdés is associate professor in the Department of Chicano Studies at the University of Minnesota, Twin Cities. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Michigan, with a concentration in Latin American history. Dr. Valdés has had academic appointments at universities throughout the United States and in Sweden and has authored a number of articles, books, and monographs with an emphasis on Chicano/Latino history.

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Scott Whiteford is director of the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies and professor of anthropology at Michigan State University. His Ph.D. is in anthropology from the University of Texas, Austin. He has published extensively in the fields of political economy, human modifications of the environment, and agrarian transformation. His research has focused on the U.S.-Mexican border region, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Argentina. He is currently establishing scholarly connections between Mexico and MSU.
“Since the publication of Los Mojados: The Wetback Story, the subject of Mexican immigration has been constantly in the press and the focus of wide ranging opinion, from those calling for greater understanding to others proposing stronger defenses against all immigrants. The current debate about immigrants has been characterized by an excess of rhetoric and misinformation. This book, Immigration and Ethnic Communities, brings both fact and the insight of experts to the discussion, elucidating the particularly turgid issues surrounding Latino immigration. It provides detailed statistics on the foreign born population in the United States, considers the economic patterns of transnational workers and their impact on U.S. communities, and explores both the human consequences and political ramifications of Latino immigration. Whereas much of the current attention has been focused on western states such as California and Texas, or the east coast states of New York and Florida, this book provides a much needed addition to the discussion — the incorporation of a midwest focus.

As with my first book on Los Mojados, I strongly encourage a careful reading of Immigration and Ethnic Communities: A Focus on Latinos. It, too, should stand the test of time as another important contribution to our understanding of Latino immigration.”

Julian Samora, Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Notre Dame

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