This report describes the decision-making process and problems encountered during the 48 months it took to establish a new university, California State University at Monterey Bay, on the site of Fort Ord, a recently closed military base. After an introduction, the report is organized in four sections, one for each phase of the process. The first section, on the opportunity development phase, briefly reviews the decision to close the base. The second section, covering the recognition-of-opportunity phase, reports the genesis of the idea at San Jose State University and the idea's transition from an off-campus center to a full-service university. Details of the selection, modification, and adoption process are covered in the third section. These involved activities such as decision making by Cal State, legislative involvement, a needs assessment, and scheduling. The fourth section covers the implementation and monitoring phase. A conclusion identifies problems associated with the rapid pace of the transition, including pressure on the usual system of orderly checks and balances, failure to plan for facility maintenance, and the unclear role of the new residential campus in the California State University system. An appendix provides a detailed chronology of the conversion. (Contains 61 references.) (DB)
A VISION IN PROGRESS

The Decision to Establish a Public University at Monterey Bay

By William Chance

An Occasional Paper Published by

THE CALIFORNIA HIGHER EDUCATION POLICY CENTER

June 1997
A Vision in Progress

The Decision to Establish a Public University at Monterey Bay

By William Chance

Prepared for
The California Higher Education Policy Center

June 1997
# Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................. iii

Background ................................................................. 1
Opportunity Development ................................................. 2
Recognition of Opportunity ................................................ 3
  San Jose State and the Genesis of an Idea ........................... 3
  From Off-Campus Center to Full-Service University ................. 3
Selection, Modification and Adoption of the Preferred Alternative ............................... 5
  Resolution of Details .................................................. 6
The Prospect of Innovation ................................................ 7
Cal State’s Letter of Intent to Expand ................................... 7
Cal State’s MOU with CPEC .............................................. 7
CPEC’s Acceptance of the Letter of Intent to Expand ................. 8
The Developing Concept and Schedule .................................. 10
The Tomas Rivera Center Needs Assessment .......................... 11
The Bakersfield and San Marcos Experiences .......................... 11
The Cal State Needs Study: A Proposal for Cal State Monterey Bay .................................. 12
The Legislative Analyst’s Report ......................................... 13
CPEC’s Analysis of the Proposal to Create Cal State Monterey Bay .................................. 14
Educational and Other Planning at Cal State Monterey Bay ......................... 15
Implementation and Monitoring ......................................... 18
Conclusion ........................................................................ 20

Appendix: Chronology of the Conversion ................................. 25
Notes .............................................................................. 29
About the California Higher Education Policy Center .................. 36
Introduction

In 1991, when the U.S. Army decided to vacate most of Fort Ord, a moderate-sized base situated about six miles north of Monterey, the conversations about converting the base soon converged on high-tech research, clean industry and education. In a comparatively brief period, a California State University residential campus—Cal State Monterey Bay (CSUMB), soon to be known as “the 21st campus (of the CSU system) for the 21st century”—arose as the phoenix that would bring new educational and economic life from Fort Ord’s ashes.

Statutory authorization for the CSU system to establish this new institution was completed when the Governor signed the authorizing legislation late in 1994. Students began classes at Cal State Monterey Bay in September 1995. The elapsed time from the base-closure decision to the opening of the new university spanned about 48 months.

An economic downswing, reduced higher education budgets, and Cal State service cutbacks notwithstanding, pressures on the statewide CSU system in the form of future enrollment demand are expected. Cal State university administrators anticipate an increase of more than 100,000 students between 1995 and 2005.

Even before this need became clear, however, the prospect of a gift of facilities and real estate by the U.S. Department of Defense was an irresistible one. The value of the land and buildings—with waterfront and vistas—was quickly set at about $1 billion. While it is possible to retrospectively criticize aspects of the decision-making process regarding the new campus (as this report does), it is also easy to understand that discussions about whether or not to accept a gift of this magnitude would be over almost before they began.

Warmed by the promise of oceanfront property in the heart of one of California’s vacation spots, the interested groups and authorities that usually provide the checks and balances necessary to ensure a thoughtful decision-making process soon fused into a coalition of allies: Democrats and Republicans, civilians and soldiers, locals and legislators, community colleges and universities, private and public institutions, governors and senators, coordinating boards and university systems.

While it is possible to retrospectively criticize . . . it is also easy to understand that discussions about whether or not to accept a gift of this magnitude would be over almost before they began.

From the beginning, the various anxieties and interests awakened by the base-closure announcement and benefaction induced, shaped, and drove the search for evidence of need for a new higher education enterprise in the region, the resultant institutional concept, and most of the more creative aspects of the review and authorization processes. As a vision of a new campus developed, uncertainties about needs and costs were dismissed almost as rapidly as they arose.
When all of this started, Cal State Monterey Bay was, in the idiom of academia, lacking a theoretical base; the body of knowledge that formed in its support paralleled the decisions to seek and justify the gift of land and facilities. Such concerns as the conditions of the conveyance, the institutional concept and role, the system and state approval processes, and the search for funding soon entwined in an improvisational \textit{pas de trois} wherein each performer's next step was determined by another's last, in time with an original score that was being composed as it was being played.

Support from California State University for the new enterprise, slow at first, accelerated quickly. But there had been no case made for a new campus in Monterey County prior to the federal decision to depart Fort Ord, and there was no a priori image of a new institution—a Monterey Athena that would spring forth fully conceived from the forehead of a Long Beach Zeus. Indeed, the concept was still forming even as this report was being written.

Much of the case for the new campus has rested on the premise that it would alleviate the system's impending demographic pressure, although that reason came later. Full-time enrollment at the new campus was at first predicted to reach approximately 25,000 by the year 2010. Early in 1996 this estimate was cut by two-thirds (to between 5,000 and 8,000 students) because of newly discovered problems with water requirements (Cal State officials continue to adhere to the 25,000 figure but explain that this will require most students—many of whom may never actually visit the arid campus—to take courses via computer and other distance-education media).

A few concerns have been present from the beginning. Some residents of the area worry about the effects of the new university on the Monterey way of life. The talk of a "21st-century campus" that emphasizes "futuristic and problem-solving education," academic clusters, and the use of two-way television and other technologies summons uneasy local references to UC Santa Cruz—the place "where Volkswagen buses go to die." Others worry about the effects of the new institution's presence on other area institutions, especially community colleges, several of which experienced enrollment reductions following the base closure. Cal State Monterey Bay's commitment to offering lower-division courses has aroused concerns that subsequent interlocal agreements have not fully assuaged.

Officials at private institutions in the area seem to have accepted the new campus as a fait accompli and are participating in collaborative planning efforts, but they also hope, with some concern, that the new institution will not replicate their established program emphases.

For their part, CSU system officials speak of close working relationships with local community colleges and the UC Santa Cruz research center at Fort Ord. The military's Defense Language Institute, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Monterey Institute of International Studies also are considered potential partners.

Unless Californians want a lot of residential campuses in their state university system, and want their future university and college campuses to be located regularly on the sites of vacated military bases (places chosen not for educational or demographic reasons), a review of the approval process that led to the creation of Cal State Monterey Bay seems essential.
Cal State’s emphasis on promoting the new campus as a residential university rather than as a commuter campus was and is crucial to the demographic case for the new school. The Monterey Bay area is relatively free of strong population growth (indeed, concerns about a population decrease associated with the base closure stimulated community resistance to the military’s decision to leave), and there is not a sufficient local population base to justify a full-fledged commuter university. The resultant case for a residential campus, therefore, sounds a bit like a self-fulfilling prophesy: the presence of the university will contribute to local population growth, which will in turn enhance the need for the campus.

While acknowledging the system’s future need to accommodate new students, it is nonetheless fair to ask whether pressure will be manifest in the Monterey region. Cal State officials have argued that since the new campus will be a residential one, it will draw students from across the state and thereby relieve pressure on statewide enrollment demand. By this reasoning, tri-county (immediate region) population projections, which are modest, are not terribly important. But this argument seems strained, a product of the a posteriori reasoning that followed the decision to establish a new campus even though regional growth projections were not sufficient to justify it.

For the residential concept to work, many potential Cal State students will need to be encouraged to break their localized commuter habits, move out of their home cities, and relocate to places such as the Monterey area. In other words, students from other demographically impacted regions of the state are expected to arrive at the residential campus, increase the population base in the Monterey area and thereby both relieve the statewide demographic crunch and leave local tri-county graduating high school students to the community colleges (while adding other new students to these institutions’ potential clientele through joint arrangements with Cal State Monterey Bay).

The physical beauty of the Monterey area and the promise of low-cost student housing, made possible by the absence of need for capital outlay for residence facilities, are the high cards in the state university system’s hand; the comparative remoteness of the area, the scarcity of employment opportunities for students while in school, and the recently revealed water-supply and infrastructure problems are some of the lower ones.

There is an important federal interest in all of this, although the persistence of federal resolve would be difficult to measure. Federal authorities would like to accomplish an exemplary base-conversion effort to demonstrate the nation’s commitment to peacetime pursuits and validate a model for other localities that may face comparable situations in the future.¹

In a perfect world, the Pentagon’s and Cal State’s interest in an exemplary base-conversion demonstration project would have included consideration of costs as well as benefits. So far, much more attention has been devoted to extolling the bargain than identifying the real costs. Yet the case for further reflection draws from the same economic and demographic conditions as the arguments for hasty action. Other military bases are slated for closure. Unless Californians want a lot of residential campuses in their state university system, and want their future university and college campuses to be located regularly on the sites of vacated military bases (places chosen not for educational or demographic reasons), a review of the approval process that led to the creation of Cal State Monterey Bay seems essential.
Larger questions also arise. If the Cal State Monterey Bay case is any indication, California has returned to conditions similar to those that existed at the time the state’s Master Plan for Higher Education was created in 1960. Then a pressing concern for the universities was the growing politicization of decisions about the need for and placement of new campuses. The Master Plan called for processes to inform those decisions and ensure a separation between higher education and politics.

The conversion of Fort Ord to a university campus may not reflect all the features of the Oklahoma land rush, but few could insist that the decisions were shaped solely by a list of educational priorities. The procedures put in place by the Master Plan were largely disregarded, and the lack of discussion over the ramifications of that for future governance is disconcerting.

The recent history of education planning in California grew out of a confidence in systematic needs and cost-benefit analyses that began to form at the end of World War II, when the prospect of millions of veterans descending on undercapitalized campuses evoked concurrent jubilance and perplexity among college administrators and state legislators.

Over the next decade and a half, an implicit commitment was made to a comprehensive decision-making process that would stress planning, explicitly identified criteria and priorities, and the inclusion of managerial oversight and statewide planning agencies to ensure that changes were monitored and decisions were justified by strong evidentiary need. In most aspects of this model, California led the western states and perhaps the country. Analysis replaced politics, and priorities replaced boosterism, or so it seemed.

The particular aspects of the situation that prompted the model outlined in the 1960 California Master Plan for Higher Education have been described by Clark Kerr as follows:

We in the University of California became nervous. Was the Legislature going to take over? We were particularly sensitive to Turlock and Sonoma because in 1944 the state Legislature had given the University—not requested by it—the Santa Barbara State College, which later on (after 1958) became a great asset to the University, but in 1944 it was imposed on the University. We were not anxious to see such intrusions by the Legislature into what we considered the internal affairs of higher education happen again. We were all very conscious then of our claimed autonomy. We were deeply concerned by any indications that the political process was taking over. ²

The Master Plan called for a system of coordination to be added to the governance structure, itself a model of professionalism with its two university systems and system offices. The coordination component is represented in the present California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC). Under this new structure, the purposes of university systems and the roles of a statewide coordinating board were to be accomplished through a more objective treatment of what otherwise would be political decision processes.
The events that led to the creation of Cal State Monterey Bay, however, suggest that politics never really relinquished its traditionally dominant place in the process, and it is difficult to avoid an impression that the accoutrements of rationality that developed during the decades since adoption of the Master Plan never fully took hold. In this respect the situation is not much different from the political decisions that resulted in the placement of public universities in unexpected locations before the Master Plan.

The experience also suggests that the organizations established to ensure objectivity and perspicuity in what are intrinsically political matters—in this case, state coordinating boards vested with the authority to approve or reject proposals for new college campuses—are constitutionally unsuited to the task. Their delegated powers prove illusory in a politically charged situation. In view of the inherently political nature of such matters, should the state higher education coordinating board even have campus approval authority? Or should the responsibilities of such boards in such matters center on the specification of criteria, the objective assessment of costs and benefits, and the communication of findings to the Legislature? These, however, are comparatively minor questions. The more important questions are these: Should the organizational systems of the state universities be reconsidered in light of California’s present and projected needs? Are conceptions from 1960 of residential/commuter and teaching/research universities and university systems appropriate for California’s 21st-century needs? Does the case of Cal State Monterey Bay argue for either revisiting or finally burying the Master Plan?

Different perspectives persist. The most popular one is that the CSU system was given a lot of land and buildings and the promise of additional money to convert barracks, orderly rooms, service clubs, dispensaries, and PXs into university classrooms and ancillary facilities. If the gift truncated certain established processes, reordered campus priorities and frustrated the discipline the systems ostensibly have come to accept as part of the state’s Master Plan, so be it.

A more subtle position is represented by the question, “Is this really what California needs?” This report reviews the steps by which authorities at all levels did not adequately address that question.

This much seems certain: Cal State Monterey Bay is a foregone conclusion. The university is there, and that will not change. Still, something might be learned from the experience. This report proceeds from that possibility.
Background

This paper describes the process leading to the establishment of Cal State Monterey Bay in four stages:\(^5\)

- Opportunity Development
- Recognition of Opportunity
- Selection, Modification and Adoption of the Preferred Alternative
- Implementation and Monitoring

These four stages overlap. Generally, however, "Opportunity Development" includes the decision to vacate the base and the events that immediately attended it, including initial community efforts to organize against base closure and reactions to the official closure announcement. Chronologically, this period was brief, spanning the period between early 1990 and June 1991. (See the appendix for a chronology of important events.)

The "Recognition of Opportunity" phase was also compressed, encompassing the period that commenced when officials at San Jose State University took an exploratory look at the possibilities of moving their Salinas off-campus center to Fort Ord. Also, during this phase, the California Postsecondary Education Commission was formally notified of what soon became CSU interest in acquiring a portion of Fort Ord.

“Selection, Modification and Adoption of the Preferred Alternative” composes the lengthiest stage of the decision process, culminating in the transfer of ownership and the selection of the new president. This period lasted from January 1992 to December 1994.

In many respects, although students have arrived on campus and classes are under way, the "Implementation and Monitoring" stage is still continuing. In terms of what has been accomplished thus far, this most crucial part, making the campus operational, was abbreviated—at least in comparison with many other such planning efforts.\(^6\) It involved the processes of faculty hiring, curriculum planning and establishment, and student admission that commenced with the arrival of the campus president in January 1995.\(^7\)
Opportunity Development

The earliest significant event in the Fort Ord conversion process was the announcement in January 1990 of then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's "Proposal for Installation Closures and Force Realignment," which included the Pentagon's plan to close Fort Ord and move the Seventh Infantry Division to Fort Lewis, Washington.

Then-Congressman Leon Panetta immediately appointed a community task force to assist in evaluating the proposal's repercussions on Monterey County. The task force's leading recommendations, in a report presented two months later, were to remove Fort Ord from the list of base closures and postpone the movement of the Seventh Infantry Division pending further study. A number of recommendations were related to the economic reverberations of the base's closure; others called for the Defense Department to improve the base's capability to handle large aircraft (which would offset one of then-rival Fort Lewis' advantages, albeit at a cost of $60 to $120 million). The task force also stated that base closure "would require extraordinary up-front funding ranging from $116 million to $357 million to support environmental restoration efforts." Finally, it quantified the economic effects of closure on the community as follows: $731 million in lost salaries, $78 million in lost service and minor construction projects, $77 million in lost major military contracts, loss of 2,773 Army jobs, loss of 25,300 private-sector jobs, and reduction of personal income totaling $277 million.

In terms of keeping Fort Ord active, these efforts were unavailing. Congress' passage of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 and the addition of the President's signature in November put the actual closure process on a formal track. The Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) was established and ordered to make its recommendations on military base closures to President Bush by July 1, 1991. The Base Closure Act in effect depoliticized a highly charged issue, the closure of military bases throughout the country. By reducing the probability of political selectivity—the BRAC list of base closures would have to be accepted or rejected in its entirety—the Base Closure Act made conceivable what many had previously considered improbable: closure of a military base of significant size.

The military also was obliged to make its own official recommendations to BRAC. This was accomplished with the Pentagon's delivery of its list in April 1991; Fort Ord was the largest Army base on the Pentagon's list. The Pentagon's offer was accepted in July, and Fort Ord was placed on the BRAC list of base closures.

There were no voices calling for a new university in Monterey County at this point, nor did such an institution appear near the top of any list of priority sites in California, but it was not long before the idea began to materialize.
Recognition of Opportunity

Almost immediately following the base-closure decision, the Fort Ord task force, which had focused its energies on keeping the base open, met to begin studying alternatives for the future use of the property (it also carried on with its efforts against closure). According to the San Francisco Chronicle, "Ideas include the fanciful, such as luxury hotels along the fort’s scenic coastline and even an amusement park on the scale of Disneyland, and the mundane: industrial parks, office buildings, and recreational areas along the coast." The article also explained some of the urgency behind the search for a solution: "The biggest worry for the towns surrounding the base is that the Army could pull out starting in 1993 and not dispose of the land for four years, leaving Monterey County with an $809 million hole in its economy."

San Jose State and the Genesis of an Idea

The idea of a higher education facility at Fort Ord appears to have originated at San Jose State in the form of an inquiry into the feasibility of moving the Salinas off-campus center to the base. The president of San Jose State and members of his administration met with Congressman Panetta to discuss possibilities early in July 1991. At that time, San Jose State’s interest involved about 700 of the base’s 28,000 acres, a site considered sufficient to accommodate about 15,000 students. (Approximately 800 students were enrolled at the Salinas off-campus center, and San Jose State’s lease in Salinas was due to expire in about four years.)

The potential for higher education at Fort Ord received its initial boost from off-campus center to full-service university almost immediately in the form of an article in the Monterey County Herald: "No final decision is near, but it was reassuring to learn last week that a major university [emphasis added] is one of the possibilities for the sprawling military facility."

The notion of a new university campus qua economic solution spread quickly. The Herald quoted Congressman Panetta as saying that "San Jose State University’s proposal should be examined seriously," and it continued with this assessment: "He was not underestimating matters . . . when he called it ‘a very important and exciting proposal. . . . It could help replace some of the economic loss resulting from the closure of Fort Ord and serve as an attraction of the private sector.’"

Most of the press coverage demonstrated enthusiasm for the proposal, but some of it also referred to the cleanup problem: "Still, long before any usage of Fort Ord can be decided upon, the nagging issue of the toxic waste problem at the base remains to be solved. An effective cleanup obviously is required."

From Off-Campus Center to Full-Service University

During the next few months, the concept began to evolve as the Cal State system joined the ranks of those who were beginning to display interest. In September 1991, the chancellor of
Cal State and representatives of the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC) visited Fort Ord at the invitation of State Senator Henry Mello of Watsonville. A couple of weeks later, CSU officials formally notified CPEC of discussions about using a portion of the property.\textsuperscript{16}

Most of the press coverage demonstrated enthusiasm for the proposal, but some of it also referred to the cleanup problem.

In October, the CSU Board of Trustees adopted a resolution endorsing exploration of the possibilities at Fort Ord.\textsuperscript{17} In the Board’s resolution, the opportunity was still defined in terms of an off-campus center, although the possibility of future expansion into a full-fledged institution—but not yet a distinct university campus—also was introduced.

At this point, San Jose State was still an active participant and the most visible contender for space at the base; by November, its Fort Ord site requirements had increased from 700 to 1,000 acres (“including houses, barracks, and other facilities”) for what was still envisioned as a satellite campus.

Free land and the active San Jose State initiative also began to alter Cal State system priorities; the San Jose State bid elevated the Monterey County campus request ahead of the Ventura area on Cal State’s expansion list. The potential availability of free facilities also began to affect the institutional concept. To the extent that educational planning had been a consideration, the continued dominance of the vision of an off-campus center implied a concomitant continuation of the programming of the Salinas and main campuses of San Jose State—requiring an emphasis on a commuter institution. About this time, however, the prospect of barracks that could be converted to dormitories and the weakness of the region’s demographic projections began to influence the institutional vision. While a new approach to educational programming (i.e., a university of the 21st century) was still in the future, the San Jose State prospect anticipated the further metamorphosis into a full-fledged campus of some sort, as is reflected in the following statement: “For the first five years on the post, the university expects to maintain its upper-division and graduate programs (i.e., in the manner apparent in the Salinas center). Eventually the campus is to offer a four-year degree program, including lower-division classes.”\textsuperscript{18}

The local economy and the availability of free land and facilities—rather than unmet educational needs and imaginative programming—were still the central considerations.
Selection, Modification and Adoption of the Preferred Alternative

In January 1992, less than six months after the formal decision to move the Seventh Infantry Division and close the post, events began to proceed in earnest. The locus of CSU interest and action began to shift from San Jose to Long Beach, and from an off-campus center to a new full-fledged campus of the state university system. With these changes, momentum began to build.

Early in March 1992, a community task force subcommittee presented a report that called for the creation of an education complex at Fort Ord. According to local press coverage, the system was taking the proposal very seriously and had requested $500,000 "to fund cooperative planning with the University of California, Santa Cruz, for an environmental science and technology center." 19

Demonstration of the CSU system's interest also was displayed later that month (March 1992), when the chancellor contacted the U.S. Department of Education. As a federal agency, the department had prior claim over state and local agencies to surplus federal property. But it could acquire title and then transfer it to the CSU system. Congress also could pre-empt that process and grant the land and facilities directly to the state university. Two bills—S. 365 (Feinstein/Boxer) and H.R. 531 (Panetta/Dellums)—were under consideration in Congress to do just that.

The magnitude of the property request, as reflected in the chancellor's communication to the Department of Education, by now had increased to 2,000 acres, which would "serve an ultimate student population of between 20,000 and 33,000 head-count students (15,000 to 25,000 full-time-equivalent, or FTE, students). The system's preliminary enrollment projection was also refined; it now called for 2,000 [FTE students] in 1995; 5,000 in 2000; and then 1,000 more per year to a total of 20,000 in 2015." 20

About two weeks after the chancellor's letter was sent, the Governor's expression of support for a new campus at Monterey Bay was conveyed to the Secretary of Education, "provided any problems with toxic wastes could be solved, and that sufficient State operating funds could be found to support the project." 21

Effectively, the decision to abandon the concept of an off-campus center in favor of a full-service university at Fort Ord was made sometime during the five months between the CSU Board of Trustees' resolution in October 1991 and the chancellor's formal approach to the Department of Education in March 1992.

This first stage of the process seems to have occurred with unusual alacrity for what had come to be regarded a rather staid bureaucracy, especially since evidence of crisp demographic or educational planning at this point is sparse. Just as the size of a vacuum determines the volume of air that can flow into it, the vision of Fort Ord land and facilities—rather than enrollment levels, potential utilization rates, program specifications, and conversion costs—appears to have been the principal determinant of the ultimate size of the new university and of the parcel that would be available for development.
required for the new campus (the estimates of the land required had nearly tripled).

At this time, the Legislature also seemed to be playing a game of catch-up, at least with respect to the full-service university idea. Shortly after the Governor’s statement of support, the Legislature approved $1 million for preliminary studies to support research on a proposal to move San Jose State University’s Monterey (Salinas) campus from its Blanco Road location to the military post.22 As events transpired, this was virtually the last general reference to San Jose State and its off-campus center in relationship to Fort Ord.23

The transmutation from an off-campus center to a full-service university campus was made official by a resolution adopted by the CSU Board of Trustees on July 15, 1992. A new addition to the plan, reference to a “residential” university “to serve the region and the state,” was also rendered as an official goal by the Board’s action.

The Board’s resolution concluded with the incorporation of this provision:

If the California State University is unable to place the property into use within the time limitations indicated . . . it is understood that the California State University will pay the Department for each month of nonuse beginning 12 months after the date of the deed, or 36 months where construction or major renovation is contemplated, the sum of 1/360 of the then market value for each month of nonuse.

This is speculative, particularly since no definition of “nonuse” was provided in the resolution, but while considerable slack was allowed (the keys to the base were not handed over to the new owners until July 1994), the prospect of penalty payments for nonuse might explain some of the pressure to render the new campus operational as rapidly as possible, although that is not cited as a major impetus.

Resolution of Details

By September, the matter of housing on the base had arisen and quickly become crucial. The issue was brought to public attention during a speech by San Jose State President Handal Evans to Monterey Peninsula (Community) College students on September 11, 1992. Noting that officials needed to get buildings on the post that could be used for student dorms and faculty housing, he said, “If that does not happen, we [CSU] will not come here.”24 It also was reported by President Evans that if everything continued according to plan, students would begin taking classes on the Fort Ord campus in the fall of 1995.

The prospect of a distinct sort of institution began to form at this time, as President Evans described the new university as different from most of the other 20 universities in the system, although not in the sense the term has come to acquire. According to an account of his speech in the Monterey County Herald, “Students, he said, would come from all over the state, and costs would likely run higher because of the need to seek housing on or around that campus. In addition, he said, the university is expected to offer some graduate programs unique to the system, such as fine arts, languages, international studies, and oceanographic science.” He noted that the new university would be expected to operate on an annual budget of about $200 million “and would spend millions more in construction, and much of the money would be spent in the local community.”25

In September 1992, a planning office for the new university was established in Seaside, a community adjacent to Monterey and the base. An interim provost and a director of operations, planning and development were
appointed by the chancellor to manage academic and facility planning.

The Prospect of Innovation

The possibility of a different institutional emphasis at the future Cal State Monterey Bay also began to ripen at this time. “It will be fundamentally different from scratch,” Chancellor Barry Munitz said of the proposed campus. “We’ll have touch-tone registration, an entirely new library concept, fax machines to distribute articles instead of subscribing to expensive periodicals, and much more.”

Reflecting on the concept-maturation process during a panel presentation at the national conference of the American Association for Higher Education held in March 1995, Cal State Monterey Bay then-Provost Steve Arvizu credited the surrounding communities for many of the ideas for the emerging curriculum. The specialty clusters Cal State Monterey Bay is pursuing, for example, “grew out of community input, from what they thought they would like to see.”

Another CSU official cited the report from the community task force as an important motive for innovative programming, along with the fact that the “CSU Academic Senate also was having these conversations—because how could you justify a traditional institution in the year 2000? It was no single thing but a variety of things that coalesced.”

Cal State’s Letter of Intent to Expand

Early in November 1992, Cal State’s Letter of Intent to Expand was sent to CPEC. This statement was general in its description of progress, acknowledging the presence of CPEC staff in ongoing meetings, stating that “CSU’s concepts have evolved and will continue to do so,” advising that the system was about to enter a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with UC Santa Cruz “reflecting commitments to work together in a cooperative fashion,” and reporting that “conversations had been held with local community colleges and will continue to identify areas of mutual interest, coordination, and cooperation.” The letter contained this paragraph regarding its purpose:

Although the content of this and previous indications of CSU’s intent may not completely fulfill CPEC’s Guidelines for a “Letter of Intent,” CSU believes that it is fulfilling the spirit intended in the guidelines and will fully endeavor to provide additional information as it becomes available.

A Cal State MOU with UC Santa Cruz was signed on December 7. In this agreement CSU stated its intent to create a comprehensive campus and UC indicated its intent to create a research center on a 1,200-acre site adjacent to the CSU claim. They also agreed “to joint planning in areas of mutual concern.”

Cal State’s MOU with CPEC

A second MOU was consummated a few days later, in this case between Cal State and CPEC. It represents one of the more debatable actions taken in the overall process. The CPEC report, Creating a Campus for the 21st Century, describes the event as follows:

Ten days later [December 17, 1992], the Memorandum of Understanding was finalized between the State University and the Commission that specified the intent “to cooperate and collaborate in a joint planning effort, where possible, for general and specific areas of mutual interest” and to generate various “feasibility studies associated with the Guidelines document of CPEC.” Among the specified outcomes were enrollment studies and reports, a report on innovative educational delivery systems,
and an outline of a planning process that might be useful in future studies.\textsuperscript{31}

Cal State also agreed to “provide $70,000 for CPEC to draw upon in 1992/93 fiscal year for joint planning purposes.” In effect, this meant that a system proposing a new campus was providing funds to the state agency responsible for reviewing and approving the proposal to allow it to expedite the review and approval process. Some awareness of the delicacy of this situation may be inferred from the following paragraph of the CPEC report:

Although a Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and one of the higher education systems is unusual, the policy of cooperation, collaboration, and joint planning is consistent with both the intent and the spirit of the Commission’s Guidelines. In all past reviews of proposed new campuses and centers, the Commission has worked cooperatively with the segments in an effort to develop better proposals, and to ensure that all proposals serve the needs of California residents. In some cases, it has been determined that a proposal contains conceptual inadequacies sufficient to prevent it from satisfying the Commission’s criteria, but in most cases, cooperative planning has produced welcome improvements, and a better planning process.\textsuperscript{32}

CPEC’s Acceptance of the Letter of Intent to Expand

Progress on planning and the mechanics of establishing the new campus occupied much of 1993, and various pieces (preliminary enrollment projections, etc.) were added to the growing body of information about the new campus. From the perspective of academic planning, an important event occurred in June with Cal State’s distribution of a progress report entitled, “Ft. Ord—Plan for Planning and Vision Statement.” The vision of the new university centered on the following goals:

- to be a prototypical university for the next century;
- to advance innovative approaches to traditional educational problems;
- to attract a prestigious faculty;
- to provide a model for the way education must adjust to meet the challenges of a new century;
- to develop academic programs that transcend traditional walls and shape the institution; and
- to create an institution of distinction in its commitment to teaching, research and public service.\textsuperscript{33}

Substance would be added to the goals through the work of three Fort Ord planning committee task forces (on educational mission, institutional advancement and educational environment); a fourth task force on technology was posited as a future possibility. In August 1993, the provost indicated the curriculum would be organized around academic clusters rather than departments. The clusters would emphasize:

- the sciences (especially marine, atmospheric and environmental);
- the visual and performing arts;
- languages, cultures and international studies;
- futuristic education; and
- international business.

The economic impact of the base conver-
A VISION IN PROGRESS

A vision remained an important consideration. Continued community interest in the conversion is demonstrated by the September 1993 forum paper, “Renewing the Region: Vision and Strategies for Shaping the Monterey Bay Region’s Economic Future,” prepared as part of the Monterey Bay Region Futures Project. The paper stated that with the downsizing of the military base, education and research “will arguably become the Monterey Bay region’s third largest ‘industry’—after agriculture and tourism.” The economic impact of education on the regional economy was estimated to exceed $500 million, accounting for between 6,000 and 12,000 jobs. The paper also stated that the region had the potential to become “one of the few truly international education and research centers of marine and environmental sciences and languages.” It also noted that “plans are under way to develop a center for science, technology, education, and policy on the former military base. . . . Areas of potential focus include environmental remediation, agriculture/aquaculture, scientific instrumentation, global climate prediction, and marine sciences and biotechnology.”

Among the priority areas for action identified in the paper was promoting the region as an international education and research center. Specific steps in this respect included “developing an international languages center at Fort Ord; promoting international tourism linked to languages and environmental strengths; examining the feasibility of integrating multi-media into international offerings; identifying private sector organizations to expand into the Monterey Bay region; and creating an international teleconferencing center in the region.”

In September, Cal State notified CPEC of the Department of Education’s approval of its application for conveyance of the property. In October, CPEC formally approved the state university’s Letter of Intent to Expand.

It is easy to become bogged down in detail at this point, but the relationship between Cal State and CPEC on this matter is unique, and an understanding of some of its manifestations can be instructive.

Chapter 4 of the report CPEC prepared on the Cal State proposal provides an analysis of the material contained in the Letter of Intent. It opens with the observation that the CPEC 1992 “Guidelines for Review of Proposed University Campuses, Community Colleges, and Educational Centers” require that a Letter of Intent to Expand be submitted “no less than five years prior to the time the first capital outlay appropriation is anticipated.” The Guidelines also require a considerable amount of detailed information, including a ten-year enrollment projection from the campus’ opening date, reasons for prioritizing the proposed university campus ahead of other new institutions, a tentative ten-year capital outlay budget, maps, etc.

Cal State’s Letter of Intent was remiss with respect to these particulars, although it contained a promise to try to provide such information as it became available. There was also no request for a waiver of the five-year advance notification.

CPEC’s treatment of the situation was accommodating. Its report states:

In writing guidelines, of course, the situation invariably arises that does not quite fit the mold, and the proposal to establish California State University, Monterey Bay certainly falls into that category. For one thing, military base conversions were not anticipated when the Guidelines were written, nor was it anticipated that an entire campus might come into existence without the need for State capital outlay
appropriations. In the specific case of Fort Ord, and the State University's current plans for its development, the very idea of a statewide campus for that system was not anticipated, nor was there a thought that any State University campus would be predominantly residential in character.\textsuperscript{35}

According to this line of reasoning, the Guidelines would not be expected to apply in instances of military base conversions because such conversions were not what the framers had in mind when they wrote them; they would not apply in cases where state appropriations for capital construction or renovations were not initially anticipated (although the military might elect not to pay all of the promised reconstruction costs after the first few years, or the costs could exceed even the funds promised); and they would not apply in situations of significant unanticipated role and mission changes (e.g., CSU establishing a statewide campus). They would not apply because none of these situations were envisioned when the Guidelines were written.

**The Developing Concept and Schedule**

The prospect of the new campus was becoming a reality to the Monterey community as additional flashes of what the new program would look like began to appear with greater frequency. At a CSU Board of Trustees meeting in February 1993, Chancellor Munitz introduced the concept of “charter campuses,” where “administrators, teachers, and students would have a free hand to change everything, including degree requirements, faculty hiring, and teaching techniques.” He said he would try to implement the idea at the new campus being planned on the site of Fort Ord and at either Humboldt State or Cal Poly. He also said that one idea to be considered was whether a three-year undergraduate program could be set up at the new campus; another idea “is to set aside $13 million of $130 million in promised federal funds to hire prospective students as ‘junior carpenters’ or ‘junior electricians’ to work on turning the Army base into a college.”\textsuperscript{36}

Potential tension between the proposed statewide focus of the new university and community expectations was apparent in comments expressed about this time by some of the political figures who were active in the conversion effort. According to a “21st Campus” needs assessment produced by the Tomas Rivera Center, Congressman Sam Farr insisted that the “CSU campus, in contrast to UC Santa Cruz, should be relevant to the community. ‘So many people in Santa Cruz do not believe that the UC campus is meaningful to their lives.’ ” State Senator Mello concurred with aspects of this view: “Mello noted that UC [Santa Cruz] was not practical. It had little positive effect on local need. He noted that the Santa Cruz campus was too out of touch with the community and this had created problems in the past. Even some type of athletic program would help.” Mello also referred to the importance of recruiting minority students. “Communities like Watsonville, he noted, were rich with potential minority students. But efforts had to be made to get to these students early while still in grade school and high school.”\textsuperscript{37}

On November 10, 1993, Congress approved the $15 million requested from Department of Defense appropriations to begin the Fort Ord conversion into a CSU campus. The possibility that Cal State would not get all of the federal support it sought (figures vary between $130 million and $150 million) also emerged about this time. In an interview on February 15, 1994, Cal State Monterey Bay Vice President for Administration Richard E. Hendrickson stated that the system planned to develop the new campus “regardless of whether [it] gets the $130 million in federal money that it wants. . . . We want to get federal support and we need it. But if we don’t get it, it won’t keep us from doing something we
need to do. We believe we cannot afford not to take advantage of the opportunity at Fort Ord.”

The Tomas Rivera Center Needs Assessment

Meanwhile, the first of two CSU needs assessments—“The 21st Campus for the 21st Century”—was produced by the Tomas Rivera Center in February 1994. This incisive report did not figure prominently in subsequent stages of the review process (if it had, Cal State Monterey Bay would be a much different institution). It speaks essentially to the new institution’s contiguous service area, avoiding the emphasis on a residential university and the application of statewide demographics. It does, however, show evidence of local need and interest. Among some of the more immediately relevant findings, researchers determined that 69 percent of the students at the four area community colleges polled would attend Cal State Monterey Bay if it opened in time. Thirty-one percent, however, “expressed a preference for programs other than the five clusters suggested by CSUMB. . . . Significant interest was expressed for health-related majors, especially encouraging CSUMB to establish a four-year nursing program and physical therapy majors.” Low-cost housing on campus and child care ranked high among the requested support services, and “significant” interest in a sports program was expressed.

The Bakersfield and San Marcos Experiences

The “21st Campus” needs assessment also contains an interesting section on the Cal State Bakersfield and Cal State San Marcos experiences under the rubric “Lessons Learned.” Certain aspects of this material are pertinent to the Cal State Monterey Bay situation.

When CSU [Bakersfield] opened its doors [fall 1970], it was not expected to be an ordinary university. The original plan was to develop a campus that would provide a high level “Ivy League” type of liberal arts program in which there would be close student-faculty interaction. This interaction would be possible because of the creation of Academic Villages, which were to be a complex of lower division dormitories that “would be the intellectual home for lower division students and some faculty assigned as Village Fellows.” . . . All students admitted to CSUB would be required to participate. There were no special accommodations for under-prepared students nor for cultural interests of minority groups.

The Academic Village concept, also referred to as living-learning centers, was a colossal failure. . . . A campus that was supposed to attract students from across the state, and even the Nation, turned into a commuter campus, within two years. The resident to commuter ratio was 1 to 10. Upper division and graduate students were admitted to the dorms to fill the rooms. Nearly 25 years later, there are less than 300 dorm students at CSUB, a far cry from [the original] plan . . .

As a result of this disconnect in planning, CSUB looks nothing like the campus which was initially designed to be an innovative pace setter in higher education in California. Unfortunately, CSUB has not been the only example of difficulty in planning within the CSU system. Stanislaus State, Cal State San Bernardino, Cal State Dominguez Hills, and some would add the more recent Cal State San Marcos, are also suggested as examples of conceptual development which did not fully realize ideals.38

The report also critiqued Cal State San Marcos, which was the most recent member of the state university system until Cal State
Monterey Bay. Like Cal State Monterey Bay, San Marcos, which opened in 1990, devolved from an off-campus center, in this case a San Diego State center in San Marcos, and it developed during a time of scarce resources. The report presents a list of things that went wrong and concludes with this observation:

*Adequate time and resources are necessary to realize the full creative potential of building a new university. The distinctive qualities of an institution are a function of regional assets, state priorities, institutional mission, the potential of land-facilities-infrastructure, and personnel. Team building and community building require attention to communication, collective learning within the organization and integration of administrators, faculty, and staff into a cohesive whole.*

The advice of the needs assessors for people involved with Cal State Monterey Bay was as follows:

*At CSU Monterey Bay the vision is for a comprehensive campus which will offer lower division, upper division and graduate programs from the very beginning because of the needs of the State and the vision outlined for the institution... Because of the statewide mission of the institution, the new campus will need to cooperate with existing CSU campuses especially to serve historically underserved communities and to maximize use of already developed strengths within the CSU. To serve the State well, the campus must start by serving well the people within the tri-county region.*

**The Cal State Needs Study: A Proposal for Cal State Monterey Bay**

The second CSU needs analysis, “CSU Monterey Bay—Planning for a New University at Fort Ord,” is dated March 1994 and was prepared by the CSU system office; it played a far more prominent role in the review and approval process than the more localized Tomas Rivera Center study. Moreover, the CSU needs analysis served a dual purpose: it represented both a response to the required needs study and the system’s official proposal for the new campus. Thus, the introduction describes a series of dilemmas confronting the campus planners and seeks thereby to explain the need for some of the departures from new campus review requirements. Paramount among the dilemmas were the recurrent budget crises that “have forced public educational institutions to plan dramatic alternatives to their traditional structure.” The authors argued that the situation required departures from the “kind of traditional campus planning to which institutions and CPEC are accustomed.” Specifically, it required answers to a new set of questions: “What kind of substantive educational resource for the entire state would a new campus site provide? Could conversion sites provide a context to create revolutionary forms of educational delivery, otherwise far more difficult to bring forth at existing campuses? Could this location allow CSU to experiment with new forms of joint ventures, especially given the richness of intellectual resources in the area?”

The proposal presents a vision statement for the new campus: “In California State University, Monterey Bay, we envision a model pluralistic academic community where all learn and teach one another in an atmosphere of mutual respect and pursuit of excellence.” It states that the program would be organized around specialty clusters—marine, atmospheric, and environmental sciences; visual and performing arts; languages, cultures and international studies; and professional studies—all of which were to be regarded as interdisciplinary hubs “that will promote synergistic approaches to teaching, learning, and scholarship.” It describes regional and
statewide roles: “Monterey Bay will dynamically link the past, present and future by responding to historical and changing conditions, experimenting with strategies which increase access, improve quality, and lower costs through education in a distinctive CSU environment. University students and personnel will attempt, analytically and creatively, to meet critical State and regional needs, and provide California with responsive and creative leadership for the global twenty-first century.”

In the concluding section, the writers seem to counter a too-literal adherence to procedure: “In the midst of the budget crisis, while every natural tendency is to protect turf and prerogative, students-faculty-staff are actually imagining a new place to learn, to live, and to work. In that environment it is treacherously simple to call for greater analysis, to point out areas of risk, to ask for earlier approvals, to seek guarantees of success, even to suggest alternative strategies—all necessary and legitimate considerations—while the real challenge is to bring that miracle to life, to provide stronger education, to more people, at lower cost.”

The Legislative Analyst’s Report

In February, as the Cal State needs study was being written, the state Legislative Analyst’s Office released its analysis of the 1994–95 budget bill and included a section about the proposed CSU campus at Fort Ord.

Noting that the state university system planned to seek legislative authorization for the new campus in the near future, the report stated that additional information was necessary before an informed decision on the statewide and regional implications of the new campus could be made: “While there is certainly an opportunity to acquire a large amount of land and facilities, it is not clear how the acquisition and development of a CSU campus at Fort Ord meets the Legislature’s goals, objectives, and priorities for the CSU system in particular and the state’s higher education system in general.”

Specific questions posed in the Analyst’s report were as follows:

Is a new campus needed to accommodate future enrollments?

“In the 1990–91 Budget Perspectives and Priorities, we found no demonstrated need to plan for any new CSU campuses based on Department of Finance Demographic Unit enrollment projections and the CSU capacity projections through 2005–06. Since that time, DOFDU has revised its enrollment projections for 2005–06 downward by five percent.” Community college campuses in the area “could accommodate 9,000 more FTEs in 1994–95... Based on [such] data, we conclude that no additional lower-division capacity is needed in the area until after the turn of the century.”

How does Monterey Bay fit within existing and potential capacity at other CSU campuses?

“CSU plans to continue expanding the San Marcos campus and has proposed to establish a new campus in Ventura County around the year 2000... The CSU also owns a 380-acre site in Contra Costa County, which is currently the site of a CSU-Hayward off-campus center.”

What are the potential short-term trade-offs with regard to student access?

“The development of the proposed new campus could significantly limit [emphasis added] the CSU’s ability to provide access to additional students in the near future. For example, the CSU estimates that it will need $21 million in 1995–96 to serve 1,000 FTE students at the proposed campus. The same funding level could be used to
support roughly 4,500 students on existing campuses, because support services already are in place.” The situation was expected to escalate in 1998–99, when the funding for 4,000 FTEs at Fort Ord would support 10,000 FTEs elsewhere in the system.

What are the state’s capital outlay costs for the new campus?

If the federal government did not provide the outstanding 90 percent of the renovation costs, Cal State Monterey Bay would then be competing with the rest of the system for limited state capital outlay funding.

Does the Monterey Bay enrollment plan and “vision” meet state needs?

“Several CSU campuses—most notably Chico State—use educational technology extensively and could already be considered ‘models.’”

In April 1994, several weeks after the release of the Legislative Analyst’s report, Cal State Monterey Bay campus planners announced that the new campus would open with fewer students than had been anticipated (the new expectation was 630 FTE—between 900 and 1,300 head-count students, many of whom would attend part-time). The explanation for the change was that an initial assumption had been that the system would get more money than the $15 million transferred from the federal government the first year.44

On May 2, 1994, “the last piece of an ambitious plan to convert sprawling Fort Ord into a center for education and research was put in place by a bill sent by Governor Wilson to the Legislature.” The bill was sponsored by Senator Henry Mello of Watsonville.

CPEC’s Analysis of the Proposal to Create Cal State Monterey Bay

Meanwhile, the CSU needs study (and new campus proposal) was under review by CPEC. According to the resultant CPEC report, the situation was complicated by the absence of its statewide higher education plan (which was still under development). In the absence of this plan, “the primary issue is whether or not to accept a sizable gift of land and buildings from the federal government. Almost all of the other issues surrounding the proposal, those of academic planning, enrollment levels, intersegmental relations, the provision of student services, and related concerns, are secondary to this consideration, even though they are extremely important in their own right.”46

The report proceeds through each of the ten CPEC criteria governing reviews of proposals for new university campuses. Sometimes the criteria were considered to have been met; more often it was conceded that they had not. Exceptions were usually justified on the grounds that the CPEC Guidelines had not anticipated such a unique circumstance as Fort Ord.

In some cases this led to dismissive treatment of CPEC’s own criteria. For example, in considering the systemwide enrollment projections, the report identified the planned enrollment capacities of the 20 existing campuses as 371,087, which could be raised to a maximum ceiling of 389,000 (the Demographic Research Unit’s projected demand by the year 2010 was 399,375), still leaving a shortage of space, but for only 10,375 FTEs. While this figure represented unmet need, it probably would not have been sufficient to warrant the establishment of a new campus. Thus, if the Guidelines’ insistence on adherence to system-identified planned enrollment capacities had been followed, the case for a new campus would be reduced substantially.
For CPEC, the problem was its Guidelines’ reference to “planned enrollment capacities.” In the wording of the CPEC report, “These [planned enrollment capacities], however, are theoretical limits that will be reached only after the expenditure of billions of dollars in construction funds.” It would be better to look at present physical capacity (260,000 instead of 371,087 FTE students), which would result in a need for additional space for about 140,000 (rather than 10,000) more FTE students “in the next 15 to 20 years.” The report then explains, “It is more prudent to compare enrollment projections to existing and scheduled physical capacity than to theoretical planned enrollment capacities that may or may not be reached at some time in the future.”

Thus, the CPEC analysis substantially undermines the relevant CPEC criterion:

> For a new [CSU] campus, statewide enrollment projected for the State University system should exceed the planned enrollment capacity [emphasis added] of existing State University campuses and educational centers as defined by the Board of Trustees.

In considering alternative sites, the CPEC report argued that this issue is irrelevant, since there is no comparable situation to the gift of land and facilities elsewhere in the state. It does note, however, that if future federal “appropriations [in addition to the $15 million received for renovation and retrofitting] do not materialize, this alternative should then be revisited and considered more seriously.”

This part of the analysis also challenges the assumption that new campuses should be built only near major population centers. It is not clear who might be arguing otherwise, but the report’s conclusions on this subject are that “building only in urban areas would not serve the best interest of California’s residents for a number of reasons.” These include the greater costs of urban land; the possible preclusion of some future gifts of land and buildings that happen to be in rural areas; negative urban environmental circumstances that may not constitute “a healthy educational atmosphere”; the inconvenience of city campuses to rural students who wish to attend college near home (nothing is said about the effects of rural campuses on urban students who wish to attend college near home); and the decreasing importance of “proximity to population concentrations” in the “coming age of the information superhighway” (which also may mean that residential college campuses will be less important than they are today). Whatever else, this section is rife with ramifications that should spark a broader public conversation.

The report concludes, “The issue for the Commission, and for the state university as well, is whether a campus in Monterey is needed and fiscally feasible.” Assuming that these two conditions were met, a staff recommendation to approve was presented to and adopted by the Commission.

**Educational and Other Planning at Cal State Monterey Bay**

If the review process outran the campus planning process from time to time, that does not mean campus planning was restrained. Considerable emphasis was placed on a consultative university planning process. In view of the unconventional form of the envisaged academic program, systemwide faculty consultations were considered particularly important. These followed two primary paths: presentations to the CSU Academic Senate, which placed the planning and future development of Cal State Monterey Bay at the head of its February 1994 annual retreat agenda; and contacts with the California Faculty Association (CFA).

A Memorandum of Understanding, com-
prprising an understanding of principles and a letter of agreement, was signed by Cal State and the CFA in January 1994. The MOU was described as "the first instance in the history of American higher education where a faculty union is formally enlisted as a founding partner in the creation of a new campus." Among the principles were commitments to work cooperatively and consult regularly in such matters as planning, funding, multiculturalism in faculty and staff acquisition, and the search for political and financial support. By virtue of the letter of agreement, Cal State and the CFA formed a joint committee to consider contractual and other issues involved in the founding of the new campus, including exceptions to existing collective bargaining arrangements. (According to the letter of agreement, "Neither party wants the current agreement to block an exploration of new and imaginative ways of teaching and learning; both parties believe that California can benefit from new forms of university and work.") The discussion of issues concerning Cal State Monterey Bay was to be "insulated from systemwide contract negotiations conducted during the coming year."

Consultations with other local institutions—community colleges and independent institutions—presented another potentially thorny issue. The approach in this case also involved MOUs. A liaison committee was formed with the four local community colleges (Monterey Peninsula, Hartnell, Cabrillo, and Gavilan) to identify and resolve issues of concern. (Officials at each of these institutions were interviewed in connection with the present paper.) Anxieties over the new campus varied in direct proportion with distance from the new campus. Initially, the anxieties were apparent in their most vocal form at Monterey Peninsula College (MPC). But by early 1995, representatives at each of the four expressed satisfaction with the progress that had been made.

It is a little ahead of the chronological order of this narrative, but an MOU between Cal State Monterey Bay and MPC on the subject of lower-division coursework was signed in August 1994. The agreement stressed the collaborative integration of Cal State Monterey Bay with other local institutions in the form of partnerships and arrangements for "sharing courses, curricula, faculty, students, and facilities." Under the terms of the agreement, for the first three years, MPC and CSU faculty would "work together to plan, implement, and offer lower-division coursework for CSUMB students." The agreement distinguished between "traditional general education coursework, which would be delivered by MPC," and "experimental lower-division offerings related to CSUMB's specialty cluster areas, that emphasize service-based learning and that serve a statewide student population which includes historically under-represented learner populations."

For the first three years, there would be a lower-division cap of 25 percent (of the total instruction at Cal State Monterey Bay) to minimize the possibility of additional enrollment declines at MPC. Presumably, these lower-division CSU courses would be those of the second sort (in specialty areas, serving the statewide student population, etc.), although this is not specified in the MOU. If lower-division courses were needed that were not offered by MPC (it is difficult to imagine what these might be, since MPC offers a full range of general education coursework), other local community colleges would be invited into its legal service area to provide them. During the initial three years, lower-division CSU students taught by community college faculty would be counted as community college students for fiscal purposes.

Perhaps one of the most promising features of the MOU resides in this clause:

The collaborating institutions will coordinate pre-admission procedures so that
CSU-eligible students attending any of the community colleges in the Tri-County region can be pre-admitted to CSUMB and, upon completion of a transfer curriculum acceptable to CSUMB, be guaranteed admission to CSUMB at the upper-division level.

As noted, the agreement appears to have quieted earlier inter-institutional apprehensions over a new public university offering lower-division instruction in the area.

The Monterey Institute of International Studies is an independent local institution that offers upper-division and graduate courses (to the master's level). People there also have adopted a "let's see what happens" attitude. Officially, they have accepted in principle the presence of a public four-year university for Monterey Bay, as they believe the area would be disadvantaged without it. Problems for them stem from a worry that Cal State Monterey Bay will enter into undue competition with them in their program area (international studies). In this respect, they would prefer to see the public sector explore the possibility of using some of the unused capacity at the Monterey Institute.

One of the Monterey Institute's administrators who was interviewed reported that the institute is establishing, contingent on funding, a center for international languages and culture. He stated that Cal State Monterey Bay has provided a building for them on the Fort Ord campus. This is seen as emblematic of cooperation between the institutions.

Throughout this period, academic planning on campus at Cal State Monterey Bay was also under way through the work groups that had been appointed by the provost. The specialty-cluster concept remained at the hub of the approach. Specific programs of study were to emerge from the multidisciplinary fields, with the objective of blending "liberal learning with professional and technical preparation."

By mid-1994, the future shape of the institution had coalesced around these premises:

- Cal State Monterey Bay would be a residential campus housing 80 percent of its students.
- It would emphasize career preparation in "marine, atmospheric, and environmental sciences; visual/performing arts and related humanities; languages, cultures, and international studies; professional studies in education and business; and behavioral and human sciences."
- The education programs would integrate the various disciplines, modern technology and pedagogy, work and learning, and "service and reflection"; they would emphasize "the topics most central to the local area's economy and ecology and California's long-term needs"; and they would constitute a "multicultural, gender-equitable, inter-generational and accessible residential learning environment."
- The new university would provide a new model of organizing, managing and financing higher education.
- Governance would be exercised "with a substantial amount of autonomy and independence within a very broad systemwide policy context."
- Accountability would emphasize careful evaluation and assessment of results and outcomes.

This phase of the process concluded when the CPEC recommendation was acted upon and the new campus was authorized. At a ceremony on July 8, 1994, the keys to the base were handed over to system representatives.
Implementation and Monitoring

The pace of education and facilities planning intensified with the arrival of the new president (Dr. Peter Smith) in January 1995. (This report will not address the planning efforts that continued under his administration, as these are not aspects of the new campus review and decision process.)

During a visit to the campus and interviews with members of the staff in March 1995, opinions were expressed that the planning was proceeding apace, faculty positions had been advertised and applications were arriving, students were applying, and people were very busy. The necessary first-phase buildings were to be renovated during summer 1995, and contracts had been signed to that effect. The administration and "founding faculty" were going about the business of getting the new institution up and running. A chart in the president's office served as a quick reference to whether events were on track and schedule, as well as a promise of where they were headed and when they would get there. In the words of one campus administrator, "The first year won't be pretty, but we're going to get there."

And so it has been, which explains the frequency with which the expression "work in progress" is heard. The new campus was officially dedicated by President Clinton at a ceremony on Labor Day 1995, an occasion observed by many of the 659 students who enrolled that term. Transfer students boosted the total to 775, of which all but 35 were expected to return after the first year. In May 1996, near the end of the first school year, university officials were anticipating 1,300 students the second year.

With respect to hopes for continued funding, shortly after the campus dedication ceremony Governor Wilson signed Senate Bill 1036 (sponsored by State Senator Mello), thereby authorizing the Fort Ord Redevelopment Agency to use property tax increment funding to finance UC and CSU facilities on the base. Reportedly, this funding source will allow Cal State Monterey Bay to decrease its reliance on state general fund resources to continue its progress and growth.

The federal contribution to the base-conversion effort, starting with the $15 million Congress appropriated in October 1994, increased to $29 million with an appropriation of $14 million in October 1995 (this second appropriation was personally announced by President Clinton as part of the dedication ceremony).

The conversion process has not been exactly problem-free. The Army's buildings,
erected in another era, did not meet the state’s rigorous seismic codes or more recent federal standards for disabled access. According to estimates released shortly before the first school year started, 84 buildings would need to be demolished, and an additional 21 buildings may or may not be renovated, depending on cost. Roads need widening, the telephone system needs replacement, and electrical transmission lines need to be buried.

An unexpected problem with particularly vexing overtones was revealed in the announcement that the base’s water supply is sufficient for only about 13,000 students, the enrollment level anticipated for the year 2010. To reach the hoped-for figure of 25,000 students, campus officials believe they will need to implement water-saving technologies or build a desalinization plant. Even these figures seem optimistic in the context of President Smith’s announcement in January 1996 that the water supply would be sufficient only for a campus of 5,000 to 8,000 students. Nevertheless, the campus was still holding to the 25,000-enrollment goal, although acknowledging that meeting that goal might require having most of the students take courses via computer, perhaps never setting foot on the former military base. On the other hand, the reduction in aspirations was somewhat offset by the observation that “such a large campus [25,000 students] would probably overwhelm the surrounding communities and be an inappropriate presence in such a rural area.” According to President Smith, “If you dump a university of 25,000 people—is that really the dream? I don’t think it is.”
Conclusion

A newspaper article that appeared shortly before the first students arrived at Cal State Monterey Bay described this impression of what they would find:

The barracks are empty, the windows boarded up. The soldiers have vanished, leaving a legacy of swords, daggers and snakes painted on the buildings they once occupied.

"Think War," says a mural on one wall.

Soon, a different breed of thinker will take command of this sprawling Army base just north of Monterey.

By the fall of 1995, Ft. Ord will be transformed into [Cal State Monterey Bay], the 21st campus in the state university system.

Army barracks will be reborn as classrooms and dormitories, mess halls will become dining commons, and the soldiers' sports club will be turned into a student union. Some day the campus may hold as many as 25,000 students.

"It used to be we were educating people to survive war" [said a campus administrator] "Now we're going to be educating people to survive the 21st Century."58

The two sides of the sword being beaten into a plowshare are evident in the blush of success and enthusiasm of the people who have been associated with the effort to establish the new university, on the one edge—and the shaky nature of some of the conversion tasks and their costs, on the other.

From the start, the brightness of the bounty was dazzling: a new university campus for a region that, for a while at least, was overwhelmed by the prospect of economic disaster; a high-value public use for a military branch that was desperately seeking solutions to base-closure quandaries; a new university campus for a system hit hard by budget cuts and criticism.

At the beginning no one realized that each of these agendas might eventually impose opposing demands. The local business community craved rapid answers to expected economic problems. For them, the worst-case scenario would be to delay the base-conversion process. The Defense Department wanted out as rapidly as possible to reduce its costs, which constituted the reason behind the decision to vacate in the first place.

Rarely is speed a friendly ally of decisions about real estate or of defining university purpose and design. But in the Fort Ord–Cal State Monterey Bay transition, it offered certain advantages to its advocates. Indeed, some would hold that without a constant sense of urgency, the university as it is presently conceived might never have happened. Actually, that conception may be changing anyway, as unanticipated limitations and consequences emerge more slowly.57

Competing exigencies created a paradox. In the first case, the military's desire to effect a rapid and successful base conversion and the state university system's impulse to seize the opportunity demanded speed, innovation and creativity in the search for alternatives and in
the review and approval processes necessary to realize them. But these same needs were fundamentally antithetical to the deliberation and debates in the legislative, higher education, and public arenas that ideally were needed to create understanding, support and lasting commitment for the new institution. Ironically, there seemed to be a fear that any prolonged deliberation would reduce the probability of establishing the university.

The paradox is consistent with the realization that the educational vision for the new campus was formed in the maneuvering involved in the quest for approval. Contending interests led to conflicting goals. These also magnified the enormity of the task of the campus administration and founding faculty, who had to give life to the misty vision that awaited them when they arrived to fashion Cal State’s “21st campus for the 21st century” in about nine months (the period between the arrival of the new president and the arrival of the first students). The people constituting the founding cadre of the new university have the vision they inherited to guide them. The lists of “what went wrong” at Bakersfield and San Marcos may prove instructive here.

On another level, if the state’s established new-campus review and approval procedures have not been completely undermined, they have at least been seriously challenged. The variety of resourceful exceptions that were granted in the Cal State Monterey Bay case are antithetical to the system of checks and balances designed to ensure substantiation and reflection.

In effect, when put to the test, the processes put in place by the Master Plan to ensure a separation between decisions about new campuses and politics did not hold up, creating serious questions about their strength and efficacy. In this respect at least, California is not very far from where it was 30 years ago, when the decisions on Sonoma and Turlock were made and Clark Kerr expressed his concern about the politicization of new-campus decisions. Politics played no less a part in the decision to establish Cal State Monterey Bay than it played then—despite the rational review processes that had been created and supported by the university systems.

Perhaps the more important question is how the precedents thus established will play out in future instances of land and other gifts for new campuses. The prospect of other military base closures in California as the cold war becomes colder is a real one.

The question may prove academic if the Pentagon and Congress, which were obliged in the case of Fort Ord to transfer a number of housing units of commercial value and pay for renovation, retrofitting and site cleanup (along with perpetual security around artillery impact areas), begin to wonder where the cost savings are for them. The dawning of such a realization may come sooner than the bargaining sessions connected with the next base closure; at this point, the balance of the $150 million or so federal-fund transfer to convert Army build-

**If the state’s established new-campus review and approval procedures have not been completely undermined, they have at least been seriously challenged.**

ings into university facilities seems problematic. At the local level, there appears to be no plan in place to contend with that contingency. Perhaps the reduced enrollment expectations resulting from the recent discovery of water-supply limitations will also mean reduction in the estimate of the needed federal funding (conversely, it would seem, the costs of a desalinization plant may increase them).

In any case, the payments and the reconstruction plan need to be kept on a fast track, since state funding depends on enrollment lev-
els, and enrollment levels, on campus at least, depend on support and construction. As long as enrollment levels are low and state support costs are high, Cal State Monterey Bay will be an expensive campus to operate. If the water supply is not expanded and other infrastructure improvements are not made, the campus may find itself among the special group of CSU institutions with permanently small on-campus enrollments. Innovative plans to augment these with distance-education arrangements are certain to face competition from other campuses that are considering similar possibilities.

During an interview, a legislative staff member stated that with Fort Ord, the CSU system inherited an "old" campus (i.e., one built many years ago) with little money to upgrade and a weak maintenance base (e.g., old plumbing, water mains, etc.). In his words, the new campus will be "an albatross on CSU for years to come. The system already has small campuses that are killing them—San Marcos, Stanislaus, Humboldt, Bakersfield. The state university system has been described as a highly competitive environment, and the likelihood of permanent acquiescence among other campus presidents to persistent funding imbalances in favor of Cal State Monterey Bay is remote.

They hurt the system because they are so small they are too expensive to operate. It will be a long time before enrollments cross the curve and create demand for still another one. Legislative estimates are that it will cost about $300 million to fix all of the buildings at Fort Ord. If the federal government doesn't renege, at best we're looking at around $150 million from them." This observation was made before the discovery of water-supply limitations and talk of a desalinization plant.

If the "21st campus for the 21st century" vision as presently conceived is pursued, it may prove to be relatively expensive to operate in any case. The number of "nontraditional" institutions in American higher education is not great, but those that do exist tend to be costly (in this case, "nontraditional" refers to curriculum rather than delivery systems—once universities identify their purpose and place on the information superhighway, all are likely to become somewhat "nontraditional"). Unit costs at the Evergreen State College in Washington State, a nontraditional institution that opened its doors in 1971 and that has remained relatively true to its vision (and consistently below its initial enrollment aspirations), have run higher than those of its sister institutions (Central, Eastern, and Western Washington State Universities) from the beginning. Its costs per undergraduate FTE student are comparable to the University of Washington's and greater than Washington State University's (the state's two public research universities). They are about 30 percent more than the average of its three sister institutions (comprehensive universities). An apparent willingness to consider charging higher tuition at Cal State Monterey Bay may indicate some early appreciation on the part of CSU officials of the possibility of the higher costs associated with the program to be offered there.

Effects on other campuses in the CSU system in the form of altered priorities have been mentioned. Systemic effects can run the other way as well. The state university system has been described as a highly competitive environment, and the likelihood of permanent acquiescence among other campus presidents to persistent funding imbalances in favor of Cal State Monterey Bay is remote. It has been argued that the Cal State system imposes centripetal organizational forces that militate against innovation and deviance from system norms. In the words of one proponent of the view, who is also a CSU campus official, "You can't have an aberration in a system for long
before the rest of the system forces it to change.” He added that pressures also will come from students, “who will demand something like [that which] exists elsewhere [in the system]. This is particularly so for community college transfers. The community colleges will have to prepare their transferring students for what is planned as an unorthodox program at [Cal State Monterey Bay], and they may not be able to do it, and their students may not want it if they can.”

The other crucial dimension of the institutional role, the new university’s assumption of residential status, prompts considerations of another sort. In this case, CSU visionaries speak of Cal State Monterey Bay as a residential campus for the middle class (“the blue-collar family”). They argue that these families are being priced out of other residential institutions in California; the “average family income at UCLA is more than $85,000.” According to this view, residential institutions in the CSU system will provide an alternative for lower- and middle-income people in California.

Certain aspects of the case are intriguing. One CSU administrator contemplated, “Why would we reach the place when minorities are at the point where their kids can go away to school and we believe they’ll be satisfied with staying at home? In this sense, Monterey Bay is a good deal.” It is difficult to evaluate such perspectives without further substantiation, but they represent important role and mission departures. In either case, they imply a dubious role for the University of California. If the UC system is to be conceded a role as the designated higher education center of California’s upper-income classes, people in California should be invited to participate in the decision. The basic question is whether the widening gap between increases in the cost of attendance and increases in family income, which is not just a California phenomenon, is to be confronted head-on or whether it should be accepted and accommodated through a de facto relegation of the UC system to the upper-income classes, with the CSU system reserved for those of lesser economic means.

Still other role discrepancies may result from the residential-campus status that is essential to Cal State’s case for the new institution and for tri-county residents’ interest in a nearby university for “their” students. According to another campus official, this situation dictates a variety of opposing agendas: emphases on close faculty-student contact, the campus learning community, long-distance learning, global awareness, cutting-edge technologies, and serving minorities and at-risk students, especially in the tri-county area. His greatest concern was for the last of these: people, especially Hispanics, who live and work in the region: “They say they [CSU] will do something special for them, but what? The approach doesn’t seem to fit. These people need a lot of structure and support services. These people come from close families. If their parents are going to send them to Fort Ord for a college education, they will want to be sure they are getting a first-rate education that will qualify them for a future career. They won’t have a lot of patience for some half-baked academic experiment.” He went on to suggest that it may have been too soon to think about closing down San Jose State’s off-campus center in Salinas.

All of this places a lot of pressure on campus planning, and, as noted, not much time has been allotted for that. The planning process for the Evergreen State College transpired over four years before the first students arrived, and even then there were problems (students took classes in private homes, local churches and community centers; there were no faculty in some fields, etc.). Planning for Florida Gulf Coast University, currently under way, began when the president was hired in 1993. Its annual operating budget for the planning phase
is $4 million. The doors will open for students in 1997.

People at Cal State Monterey Bay will not have anything approaching such resources and time, for reasons that essentially are fiscal and political. This is the legacy of the central contradiction of the approach chosen by Cal State. Students had to be brought aboard as rapidly as possible; thus, the curriculum was being planned, faculty were being hired and students were being admitted before much in the way of a program had been established. Faculty were being selected to teach classes in programs and sequences that had not yet been installed. The auguries were not good, but people rose to the occasion. Even so, what was done in crisis may well shape what happens for a long time.

Although allegiance to some of the same assumptions that helped to configure the process remains, the economic facts of the region may have changed. In July 1995, fears of a crippled Monterey economy were laid to rest when an economist advised the local Chamber of Commerce that the “1991 predictions of a crippled economy for the County over the next five to 25 years because of Fort Ord’s closure have turned out to be ‘horse puckey.’” 61

In the end, time will tell. According to a CSU observer, it is a matter of a short- or long-term vision: “In the year 2020, people will congratulate Barry Munitz for picking Fort Ord. But for the next decade, Monterey Bay will be a drag, an excess. It will not be [such a drag] 30 years from now. . . . If you ask the question, ‘Are there many people in the [Monterey] area?’ the answer is no. The people there are around Salinas, and they still don’t have a campus. But if you ask, ‘Will California need a new campus in the 21st century?’ the answer must be yes, a residential campus. If you believe in the need for a residential campus, Monterey Bay will be very successful.”

This paper ends on that note and with a hope that it may add to the expectations for delivery on the promises made. Doing so will not be easy, and it will not be cheap, but a number of people are working to make it happen. There are few other examples of campus establishment efforts that begin to approach the complexities of this task, but the decision to create a new campus at Fort Ord has been made. The university is a reality, and once formed, few universities ever go away. Perhaps this report will lead to further understanding and some permanent material support to help make Cal State Monterey Bay the successful institution the people of California expect.
The Creation of a University Campus: 
Chronology of the Conversion

I. Opportunity Development (January 1990 to July 1991)


Feb. 3, 1990 Congressman Panetta encourages formation of local task force to oppose Fort Ord closure.

Mar. 24, 1990 Task force recommends that Fort Ord be removed from base-closure list and movement of Seventh Infantry Division be postponed pending further study.

Nov. 5, 1990 President signs the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, which creates the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) and requires it to make recommendations on base closures by July 1, 1991.

Apr. 1991 Secretary of Defense announces official base-closure list, which includes Fort Ord.

July 1, 1991 BRAC announces its recommendations, which include closure of Fort Ord. County Health Director reports that industrial solvents and fuel are migrating under the post, and encourages Army to clean up unexploded munitions.

II. Recognition of Opportunity (July 1991 to December 1991)

July 3, 1991 San Jose State president meets with Congressman Panetta to discuss San Jose State's interest in moving its Salinas off-campus center to 700 acres of Fort Ord; Congressman Panetta reacts favorably.


Sept. 30, 1991 Cal State notifies the California Postsecondary Education Commission (CPEC) of discussions and CSU's interest in Fort Ord.


Nov. 18, 1991 Cal State notifies CPEC of the Board's action and the CSU interest in part of the property as a site for future expansion.
Dec. 5, 1991  Governor designates the Office of Planning and Research (OPR) as the state’s central contact on Fort Ord and forms California Base Closure Environmental Committee.

III. Selection, Modification and Adoption of the Preferred Alternative
(January 1992 to December 1994)

Jan. 2, 1992  First draft of new CSU campus concept paper completed.

Jan. 29, 1992  OPR notified of CSU plans regarding Fort Ord.


Mar. 25, 1992  CSU chancellor notifies U.S. Department of Education (DOE) of interest in 2,000 acres at Fort Ord.

Apr. 9, 1992  Governor notifies DOE of conceptual support of CSU proposal.

Apr. 14, 1992  DOE notifies Army of CSU interest.

Apr. 19, 1992  Governor formally notifies Secretary of Education of CSU interest in Fort Ord.

June 19, 1992  Formal process commences to obtain federal funding ($136 million) for conversion and renovation of Fort Ord facilities.

July 15, 1992  CSU Trustees adopt resolution supporting acquisition of Fort Ord site for a full-service residential campus.

Aug. 20, 1992  Cal State notifies CPEC of activities and progress.


Sept. 11, 1992  Commencement of discussions between CSU and local community college officials.


Nov. 4, 1992  CSU Letter of Intent sent to CPEC.

Dec. 7, 1992  CSU and UC Santa Cruz sign Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding their cooperative planning effort.

Dec. 17, 1992  MOU signed between CSU and CPEC to cooperate and collaborate in a joint planning effort; CSU agrees to pay CPEC $70,000 for joint planning purposes.
Dec. 18, 1992  Congressman Panetta asks for $100 million in earmarked Defense Department FY 1994 funds for CSU/Fort Ord development.


Jan. 27, 1993  CSU chancellor presents overview of plans for Fort Ord to Trustees. CPEC notifies CSU of receipt of Letter of Intent.

Feb. 15, 1993  CSU notifies CPEC of its general plans for developing a campus at Fort Ord.

Feb. 23, 1993  CSU applies to DOE for transfer of surplus property, including 1,300 acres of land and buildings.

Mar. 4, 1993  UC notifies Speaker of support for CSU intentions and its own plans regarding Fort Ord.

June 9, 1993  CSU presents initial plan and vision for Cal State Monterey Bay ("Ft. Ord—Plan for Planning and Vision Statement") to Fort Ord planning team.

July 1, 1993  Chancellor commits $3 million for new initiatives relative to Fort Ord efforts for 1993–94.

July 23, 1993  DOE notifies CSU of intent to approve application for transfer of property.

Aug. 18, 1993  CSU transmits preliminary enrollments projections for the new campus to CPEC.


Sept. 13, 1993  CPEC considers “Creating a Campus” report.

Sept. 20, 1993  CSU notifies CPEC of DOE approval of property transfer.

Oct. 25, 1993  CPEC approves “Creating a Campus” report and encourages CSU to move forward with its planning efforts.

Oct. 29, 1993  Cal State Monterey Bay and systemwide administrators brief Military Base Reuse Task Force on the project.

Nov. 10, 1993  Congress approves $15 million from Defense Department appropriations for renovation at Fort Ord.

Dec. 17, 1993  Monterey Bay Faculty Advisory Committee approves draft vision statement for Cal State Monterey Bay.
Jan. 1994  California Faculty Association and Cal State sign MOU and letter of agreement with commitment to work cooperatively and consult regularly.


Feb. 9, 1994  Citing base-closure effects on its enrollments, Monterey Peninsula College president formally encourages phasing-in of lower-division enrollments at the new campus.

Feb. 14, 1994  Cal State, CPEC, and local community college representatives meet to discuss matters of local concern, especially lower-division enrollments at the new campus.


Feb. 1994  CSU Academic Senate considers Cal State Monterey Bay at its annual retreat.

Mar. 1994  Second CSU needs study (also a proposal for CPEC approval of the new campus), “CSU Monterey Bay—Planning for a New University at Fort Ord,” completed.

June 1994  CPEC adopts report, Breaking Camp—Building a Campus, and recommends approval of the CSU proposal.

July 8, 1994  Formal ceremony conveying Fort Ord property and buildings to Cal State for its Monterey Bay campus.

Aug. 1994  Cal State Monterey Bay and the Monterey Peninsula College sign MOU regarding lower-division coursework.

IV. Implementation and Monitoring (January 1995 to Present)

Jan. 1995  President Smith assumes post as head of Cal State Monterey Bay.

Sept. 1995  Arrival of first students at the new campus.
Notes

1 In the words of the team that prepared a 1994 needs assessment of the new campus for the CSU system, “Of the hundreds of military bases that have been targeted for closure across the country in the last several years, Fort Ord is one of the four selected by the Federal Government to be a model for conversion to peacetime use. . . . The State of California, by responding to this opportunity, will be on the cutting edge of ‘converting swords to plowshares’ as the impact of the Cold War begins to affect the nation.” Gonzales, Lehner and Gonzales, “The 21st Campus for the 21st Century” (Tomas Rivera Center, February 1994), p. i.

2 “The California Master Plan of 1960 for Higher Education: an Ex Ante View,” in The OECD, the Master Plan and the California Dream, edited by Sheldon Rothblatt (Berkeley: UC Press, 1992), p. 50. Dr. Kerr also described the problems, in addition to “immense growth,” that higher education in California was facing, in the following terms:

Some of the state colleges wanted to become full-fledged universities. Some of the community colleges wanted to become four-year colleges. The private colleges felt threatened by what they considered to be the insensitive expansion of the public sectors. Would the university continue to be the sole provider of Ph.D. and high level professional training (medicine, law, engineering, architecture and other professions) and of basic research among the public sectors; or would it share these responsibilities? Would the university continue to have undergraduate teaching, and particularly in the lower division? How many new campuses would there be and in which of the public sectors and where located? What would be the admission requirements in each sector? How would the public sectors be coordinated—by the State of California or by themselves? . . . What plans could each of us make separately; or would the State of California tell us what to do? (p. 49)

3 Several who were interviewed suggested that only someone who is very naive would believe the rational-comprehensive model ever applies in campus-siting decisions in California. The following comment is typical: “Anyone who imagines that campus-building in California ever follows a plan is misinformed. There is no long-term, carefully scripted process, and politics is never fully out of the picture.”

4 An advisory committee composed of Drs. Lyman A. Glenny, Arturo Madrid and Virginia B. Smith graciously and helpfully reviewed drafts of this report and provided excellent advice. Their assistance is gratefully acknowledged, although responsibility for the content is entirely and exclusively the author’s.

The report is focused on the decisions that led to the new campus; there was never any interest in “looking over the shoulders” of campus administrators as they proceeded with the difficult tasks of implementing these decisions by preparing the campus to receive students in a highly compressed time frame. Thus, by agreement with them, the report does not delve into the educational planning that
constitutes the present phase of the implementation process. For the most part, the chain of events examined here ends with the arrival of President Peter Smith in January 1995.

5 This arrangement is loosely patterned on John W. Kingdom's description of the three processes by which agendas are set and alternatives specified, from his book Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984). Kingdom speaks of problem recognition, the accumulation of knowledge and perspectives, and the political as the three processes involved. All of these are in some measure relevant, but in the present case the issue extends beyond agenda formation, and the third and fourth stages—alternative selection and implementation—are also pertinent.

6 A CSU official who was interviewed noted that UC Santa Cruz and UC Irvine took ten years to plan (but he also criticized certain aspects of UC planning).

7 Some parts of this phase (e.g., community relations and understandings with area institutions) occurred as part of the proposal development process via the interim administration during 1994.

8 The task force was composed of “county supervisors, mayors, and community members with special knowledge of military issues.” “Summary of Task Force's Report on Fort Ord Issue,” Monterey County Herald, March 25, 1990.

9 The “21st Campus for the 21st Century” needs assessment described the effects of the base closure on the community as follows: “Various community and governmental organizations indicate that the total population loss as a result of the closure of Fort Ord is 47,950 military personnel, their dependents, and civilians affected by the closure. The Fort Ord Reuse Group estimates that as much as $526.5 million will be lost to the local economy on an annual basis.” Gonzales, Lehner and Gonzales, “21st Campus,” p. iv.

10 In its report Breaking Camp—Building a Campus, the Commission on Postsecondary Education (CPEC) draws an interesting comparison between BRAC and itself: “Congress assigned the job of base closure to a Commission [BRAC] because it realized that the infighting over military bases among its own members would create a process that would probably be unfair, and ultimately, unmanageable. The California State Legislature assigned the responsibility for making recommendations concerning public higher education expansion to [CPEC] for exactly the same reason, to make the process as fair and objective as possible.” CPEC, Breaking Camp—Building a Campus (Sacramento: 1994) p. 25.


12 During interviews, others suggested that the thought originated with State Senator Henry Mello; at the time Fort Ord appeared on the base-closure list, San Jose State was opening its off-campus center in Salinas. The boundaries of the tri-county region were 100 miles in any direction from a four-year institution; the off-campus center offered a convenient access point. Senator Mello reportedly contacted the main campus and asked if they would be interested in serving Fort Ord; the response was affirmative, but the prospect was envisaged either as another off-campus center or as a relocation of the present center from Salinas to Fort Ord.

At least one critic of the CSU approach to the decision to establish a university campus at Fort Ord stated that he did “not think the federal government came to San Jose State or to
CSU’s GHQ [general headquarters] in Long Beach and said, ‘We’re going to close Fort Ord; would you consider putting a college in?’ The whole affair was initiated by people in higher education here.”


14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 In a September 30, 1991, letter to Warren Fox, executive director of CPEC, University System Institutional Director David Leveille stated:

Among the ideas put forth by San Jose State University and Chancellor’s Office personnel are the relocation of the Monterey County off-campus center of San Jose State University (currently located in Salinas in leased facilities, serving approximately 500 students) and possible future expansion into a full-service campus to serve the region.

In addition to local officials, discussions are moving forward with state and federal officials to convey the ideas put forward. The concepts under discussion include 700–1,000 acres of the 28,000-acre base for future use by the university.

17 References to these events are contained in the chronology in Appendix B of the CPEC report, Breaking Camp. A similar chronology is presented in the CSU paper, “Planning for a New CSU Campus at Fort Ord” (January 25–26, 1994). See also the appendix of this report, which provides a chronology.

18 CPEC, Breaking Camp.


20 CPEC, Creating a Campus for the 21st Century (Sacramento: October 1993), p. 32.

21 Ibid., p. 33.

22 A comment on references to the value of the CSU conveyance may be appropriate here. The general assumption that its value was in the neighborhood of $1 billion operated throughout the decision process. A lesser estimate, however, appeared in a San Francisco Chronicle article on April 25, 1994: “The Army makes no bones about its desire to get out quickly, but officials note that the agencies wrestling over future uses are getting a tremendous deal. The value of the property that will be handed over to CSU, UC Santa Cruz and others has been estimated at as high as $400 million.” Cited in CPEC, Creating a Campus, p. 33.

23 With respect to San Jose State’s future involvement, San Jose State administrators reported during interviews conducted early in 1995, that they were assisting the new campus in every way possible. At the appropriate time, the library and other equipment located on the Salinas campus would be transferred to Cal State Monterey Bay. The center’s faculty, however, were to return to the home (San Jose) campus. They also noted that there has been no final resolution of how Salinas higher education needs will be met in the future. This cannot be resolved until there is a program “out of” Cal State Monterey Bay. Most of the present Salinas students either will complete their program in the near future or, if that is not possible, will complete it at the home San Jose State campus or soon on-site at the new Monterey Bay campus. The Salinas off-campus center offers liberal studies, a social sci-
ence major, a business program, and graduate teaching and social work programs. The center’s head count varies between 500 and 600 (300 FTE) students. Some 40 to 50 students graduate each year.

24 “Housing” now referred to more than the vacant troop barracks, which could be converted into dormitories and other forms of student housing. The term also included the civilian-style family dwellings that constituted the base’s Schoonover and Frederick Park housing areas.

25 “CSU Calls Housing Key to Plan at Ord,” Monterey County Herald, September 12, 1992. In fact, other institutions in the CSU system offered graduate programs in the areas referred to in President Evans’ speech; these, therefore, would not be “unique” to the new university.


27 This remark was made during Provost Arvizu’s presentation as a member of the panel on new and expanding institutions at the 1995 conference. It was taken from a tape recording of the panel meeting.

28 Conversation with officials at the CSU Board office, March 1995.


30 CPEC, Creating a Campus, p. 35.

31 Ibid.

32 A straw poll of past and some current coordinating board directors elicited generally negative reactions to a question about the propriety of an agency accepting funds from an institution or segment with a new campus or program proposal coming up for review. One said that his board would fire him on the spot if he even considered it. Others felt they might not be fired but considered the acceptance of any such contribution inappropriate. The consensus was that such an offer would be declined. There also was general agreement with the following statement on coordinating board roles from Patrick Callan’s chapter of the Sheldon Rothblatt book:

The role of these types of organizations is thought to be particularly important in times of unusually tight budgets and of growth and expansion. When confronted with such issues, states will often turn to an impartial, knowledgeable body to lessen unproductive institutional competition; to develop even-handed solutions to difficult issues; to depoliticize controversial questions, such as the location of new campuses; and to insulate political leaders from decisions that often have more negative than positive political fallout. (In Rothblatt, ed., The OECD, pp. 84–85).

It should also be noted that several people who were interviewed in California saw no problem with the situation. One of the CSU officials, for example, stated, “CPEC gets a lot of charge-backs from the systems they coordinate.”

33 These goals and the CSU planning and vision statement are described in CPEC, Creating a Campus, pp. 38+.

34 The paper (“Renewing the Region: Vision and Strategies for Shaping the Monterey Bay Region’s Economic Future”) was prepared by DRI/McGraw-Hill, under sponsorship of the Pacific Gas & Electric Company.

35 CPEC, Creating A Campus, p. 44. The report maintains that military base conversions were not anticipated. The Guidelines are dated August 1992, yet the initial Pentagon list designating Fort Ord as a candidate for closure
A VISION IN PROGRESS

was dated January 1990, and the BRAC list was released in April 1991.


38 Ibid., pp. 102–103.

39 Perhaps because of the nearness of its opening, the San Marcos experience was mentioned at some point by every CSU official who was interviewed for the present paper. Many seem to feel the state university system was burned by the experience, and it should not be allowed to happen again. Either San Marcos directly influenced thinking about doing things differently at Cal State Monterey Bay, or it served as a convenient example people did not wish to repeat. In either case, San Marcos was a factor in the Cal State Monterey Bay process.

The experience at Cal State Bakersfield was also brought up from time to time in the interviews, although with less frequency. One institutional official said that “if history is any gauge, a different institution at Fort Ord is unlikely. Cal State at Bakersfield was to be completely different from the other 18, but it had to abandon these plans pretty early because they did not meet the expectations of its clientele [e.g., its students and the community].” He continued, “Also, you can’t have an aberration in a system for long before the rest of the system forces it to change. The students also will demand something like what exists elsewhere. Santa Cruz has changed. They now have ‘boards’ [departments], and the teaching emphasis has been lost to research.”


41 Ibid., p. 106.

42 California State University, “CSU Monterey Bay—Planning for a New University at Fort Ord” (Long Beach: March 1994), pp. 1–2.


At the same time, however, a congressional committee that was meeting in Seaside was warned that it will take time and millions of dollars to dispose of the tons of unexploded bombs and shells still littering firing ranges on the Monterey Peninsula base. . . .

Surrounded by rolls of concertina wire, Fort Ord’s “impact range” contains tons of unexploded mortar rounds, grenades, rockets, and artillery shells, some dating back to 1917. There have been at least four recorded maimings of children who trespassed onto the site.

Also on the subject of unexploded ordnance at the base, David Wang of the California Environmental Protection Agency testified that the soil should be cleaned to a depth of ten feet to prevent explosives from rising to the surface. The cost would be at least $800 million.

46 CPEC, Breaking Camp, p. 26. For the CPEC reviewers, equally as daunting as the magnitude of the gift was the magnitude of interest in the proposal:

The Fort Ord proposal is the most complex [CPEC] has ever considered. The nuances
and subtleties of various policy options seem endless, and the number of people involved, virtually all of whom have large stakes in the outcome, is impressive. It is the first proposal the Commission has ever considered where virtually every conceivable level of government is involved, and with several subsets of each level. These include the Governor and the Legislature, several federal agencies, several State agencies, the University of California and the local community colleges, numerous constituencies within the State University, every city and county government in the region, all elected representatives in the region (and some adjacent to it), plus a host of independent colleges and universities, private corporations, public interest organizations, and activist groups. Many of these organizations have contradictory [i.e., opposing] agendas or purposes that lead them to desire the same property. Needless to say, there is no course of action open to the state university that will satisfy everyone.

41 CPEC, Breaking Camp, pp. 51-52.

48 The recommendation to approve is multifaceted and conditioned on the inclusion of specified housing and dormitories, federal responsibility for cleanup of toxic wastes (nothing is said about the cleanup of firing ranges and unexploded ordnance) and federal responsibility for renovation and retrofitting. Continued pursuit of inter-institutional collaborative agreements, resolution of lower-division instruction responsibilities, progress reports of an academic plan, and resolution of student-transportation and road-access problems are other features of the recommendation.


50 This institution experienced the most direct effects of the base closure of the four. According to the people who were interviewed at MPC, "They [MPC] knew Fort Ord was going to close and entered into a strategic planning effort in anticipation of that." Officials at MPC predicted a 30 percent drop in FTE students between fall 1992 and fall 1993. The college had offered courses on the base, and their students were about one-third military, one-third dependents, and one-third civilians. MPC had become dependent on that revenue. The college tried to continue offering courses for the public on the base, but this did not work. Overall, they lost about 1,300 students. Although they report that they have tried not to cut staff too much in anticipation of the base's development, they have cut staff about 15 percent. On balance, they feel the transition has gone well.

These officials are still the most reserved among the representatives of the local community colleges. Their attitude toward Cal State Monterey Bay was described as "cautiously optimistic." Their underlying concern continues to center on the development of lower-division courses at the new campus.

As an aside, all the community colleges reported enrollment drops because of the state's requirement of a $50 surcharge for students who had already completed a degree; although MPC officials cited this effect, they reported greater cuts because of the base closure.

51 This information and the accompanying quotations are contained in materials concerning Cal State Monterey Bay distributed at the Fort Ord Reuse Authority (FORA) meeting on January 26, 1995.


54 Ibid.
55 Of the 3,000 applicants—2,000 of whom were first-time freshmen—who listed Cal State Monterey Bay as their first choice, 70 percent were from outside the tri-county region and 30 percent were from within it. Student diversity was apparent in the applications (50 percent Anglo, 30 percent Hispanic, 5 percent African-American, and 10 percent Native American and Asian-American). These figures were provided by campus administrators during a visit to the campus in March 1995.


57 People recognize and accept this. As one CSU official stated, “It would have taken years and bucks to build the infrastructure to build a university. Fort Ord was an opportunity. People in California had rejected the last higher education [construction] bond. If we had stayed on track, it would be well into the next century before we could add a campus. We had to take advantage of a unique opportunity. We talk about roles and missions and planning, but life is different.”

58 Eleven other military base closures involving facility transfers were on the list with Fort Ord: Castle AFB (Merced), the Presidio (San Francisco), Moffett NAS, Sacramento Army Depot, Mather AFB (Sacramento), Hunter’s Point Annex (San Francisco), Hamilton Army Air Field (Novato), Long Beach NAS, Norton AFB (San Bernardino), George AFB (Victor Valley), and Tustin Marine Corps Air Station.

59 Washington Higher Education Coordinating Board, 1989–90 Education Cost Study (Seattle: November 1990). These are the latest published figures. The coordinating board is presently updating the series; draft versions of the report, which are not official, substantiate continuation of the pattern.

60 A reference to this possibility appeared in the Los Angeles Times article “From War to Peace”:

[Chancellor] Munitz acknowledged that students at other campuses where classes have been cut back are worried that money will be diverted to pay for Monterey Bay. But the chancellor pledged that he will “do everything possible” to keep that from happening. One proposal is to charge higher tuition at the new campus, he said. CSU is considering a two-tier system where higher fees would be charged at popular campuses, such as Humboldt State, Sonoma State, and Cal Poly San Luis Obispo. Monterey Bay may also create a service component, with students providing construction labor in exchange for tuition credits. “The hope is that the campus will pay for itself,” he said.

The California Higher Education Policy Center is a nonprofit, independent, nonpartisan organization created to stimulate public discussion and debate concerning the purposes, goals and organization of higher education in California.

Single copies of this publication are available from The California Higher Education Policy Center, 160 West Santa Clara Street, Suite 704, San Jose, California 95113. For an immediate response, please FAX requests to (408) 287-6709. Ask for Report No. 97-9.

Copyright, 1997, by The California Higher Education Policy Center. Copies may not be sold. The Center grants permission to copy and distribute this publication, with acknowledgment of The California Higher Education Policy Center.

Published by The California Higher Education Policy Center

CENTER REPORTS


36


OCCASIONAL PAPERS


TECHNICAL REPORTS


NOTICE

REPRODUCTION BASIS

☑ This document is covered by a signed "Reproduction Release (Blanket)" form (on file within the ERIC system), encompassing all or classes of documents from its source organization and, therefore, does not require a "Specific Document" Release form.

☐ This document is Federally-funded, or carries its own permission to reproduce, or is otherwise in the public domain and, therefore, may be reproduced by ERIC without a signed Reproduction Release form (either "Specific Document" or "Blanket").