A foreword and 11 articles discuss the nature and structure of public scholarship. The contents include: "Foreword" (Deborah Witte); (1) "Public Scholarship: The Dissemination of Knowledge" (Jean Cameron) which maintains the public has claims on higher education as a creator and disseminator of knowledge; (2) "Daring to Be Unprofessional" (David W. Brown) which suggests the professional ethos is often at odds with the needs of students and other realities on campus; (3) "Towards an Ethic of Academic Discourse, Or, Why Do Professors Talk the Way They Do?" (Bennett Ramsey) which considers the need to balance academic research and academic accessibility; (4) "Pedagogical and Civic Response-Abilities" (Stephen M. Johnson) which examines open-ended learning and multicultural classrooms; (5) "An Agenda for Involving Faculty in Service" (Deborah Hirsch) which proposes service learning as a form of faculty professional service; (6) "The Promise and the Flaws of Public Scholarship" (Alan Wolfe) which presents public scholarship as an obligation to share knowledge; (7) "Public Scholars: In Search of a Usable Present--A Reply to Alan Wolfe" (Jay Rosen) which stresses the need to disseminate knowledge and create it in a group fashion; (8) "Public Scholarship and the Land-Grant Idea" (Scott J. Peters) which notes the legacy of partnership between university and community; (9) "Civic Education in a New Key" (Bernard Murchland) which urges the centrality of educating for a healthy civic society; (10) "Public Deliberation: A Resurgence of Scholarly Interest" (Dennis Gilbert) which notes that public deliberation strengthens the legitimacy of public institutions; and (11) "The Public and the Academy" (David Mathews) which offers a broad look at the relationship between institutions of higher education and the civic realm. (Papers contain references.) (JLS)
EDUCATION EXCHANGE

HIGHER
CONTENTS

Deborah Witte
Foreword 2

Jean Cameron
Public Scholarship: The Dissemination of Knowledge 5

David W. Brown
Daring to Be Unprofessional 10

Bennett Ramsey
Towards an Ethic of Academic Discourse, Or, Why Do Professors Talk the Way They Do? 14

Stephen M. Johnson
Pedagogical and Civic Response-Abilities 26

Deborah Hirsch
An Agenda for Involving Faculty in Service 33

Alan Wolfe
The Promise and the Flaws of Public Scholarship 37

Jay Rosen
Public Scholars: In Search of a Usable Present — A Reply to Alan Wolfe 44

Scott J. Peters
Public Scholarship and the Land-Grant Idea 50

Bernard Murchland
Civic Education in a New Key 58

Dennis Gilbert
Public Deliberation: A Resurgence of Scholarly Interest 65

David Mathews
The Public and the Academy 71

ERIC
The idea of public scholarship is a jigsaw puzzle. That thought came to me the other day as I was struggling with a very real 1,000-piece jigsaw puzzle on a table at a friend’s house. The border had already been put together. Those border pieces are the easiest to recognize, don’t you agree? Now I was left with a walkway bordered with flowers and the tiled roof of a garden house against a blue cloud-filled sky. I worked a few minutes at a time, finding a few pieces that fit, leaving the puzzle for other pursuits, and then returning to piece together a few more. Little by little the picture on the box began to appear in vibrant color on the table.

And so it is with public scholarship. In this issue of the Higher Education Exchange we have gathered a number of pieces we think make a picture of public scholarship. There are the theoretical pieces that form the border and help define the parameters within which we examine the idea. Stories of practice, the flowers that bloom in all colors, fill in the main picture. Let me tell you how the puzzle is revealed to me by this collection.

Jean Cameron in “Public Scholarship: The Dissemination of Knowledge” maintains the public has several claims on higher education, namely as creator and disseminator of knowledge; as creator of citizens; and as a provider of “service” — which when combined with the dissemination of knowledge in the public arena fulfills two of the three claims by the public on higher education.

David Brown, the editor of Higher Education Exchange, in “Daring to Be Unprofessional” asks us to rethink what it means to be a professional in higher education before others try to do it for us.

The essays that follow respond to this call with stories of inquiry and struggle.

Bennett Ramsey in “Towards an Ethic of Academic Discourse, Or, Why Do Professors Talk the Way They Do?” prefaces his piece by saying, “I am not out to convince you of something but rather just to offer a few thoughts in order to elicit some responses from you.” Let me echo Professor Ramsey and
urge you to read and consider the questions he asks. He makes us privy to a conversation he had with his class about academic writing and academic accessibility. His students decry the need to switch allegiance if they are to succeed academically. And Ramsey himself realizes the toll his loss of identity has taken, and the price he has had to pay to be considered a “professional.”

Stephen Johnson in “Pedagogical and Civic Response-Abilities” also shares his experiences as an academic and professional committed to open-ended learning and multicultural classrooms, committed to multiple voices of difference and diversity. He relates his struggles to enhance the civic components of his teaching.

Deborah Hirsch in “An Agenda for Involving Faculty in Service” describes the role of the New England Resource Center for Higher Education (NERCHE) in promoting service learning as well as faculty professional service. She asserts that service should not be separate from what faculty do but be woven into how faculty already organize their work. The January/February 1997 issue of Change magazine, edited by Zelda Gamson, director of the center, offers additional articles and essays that will be of interest to you. I recommend it enthusiastically.

Alan Wolfe, in a thoughtful essay, presents a view of public scholarship as an obligation to offer the public what he knows, “knowledge discovered by retreating into private space.” “As a scholar,” he says, “I have only one obligation: to my quest for understanding.”

Jay Rosen replies to Wolfe in “Public Scholars: In Search of a Usable Present” by contrasting his notion of public scholarship to Wolfe’s. He sees a public scholar as one who is in the business of inquiry, but not as a solitary venture or a professional mission with other academic professionals, as Wolfe does, but as “public work.” He points out the need for dissemination of the knowledge that the academy creates. He sees this “public work” at the heart of the identity of intellectuals in society, a way in which a scholar may become more useful to the nation.

Scott J. Peters in “Public Scholarship and the Land-Grant Idea” explains the cooperative extension system, its civic mission, and its link to public scholarship. He reminds us of the history of land-grant institutions, whose mission is that of active partnership and shared responsibility with agricultural and rural life in the late nineteenth century. He sees the present-day cooperative extension...
as capable of producing results and knowledge, contributing both to the practical concerns of local citizens and the scholarly goals of university faculty.

Bernard Murchland’s “Civic Education in a New Key” is the story of the National Collegiate Honors Council (NCHC) and their reaction to the Pew report “To Dance With Change.” NCHC seized the opportunity for action and accepted the challenge to begin a dialogue on the gap between higher education and the public. Murchland’s article outlines the steps NCHC made to engage the public in dialogue. We await the outcomes of these deliberative forums to be held across the country.

On the topic of public deliberation, we offer Dennis Gilbert’s short reviews of recent books by Michael Sandel, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, and James Bohman. While these authors all approach the subject of deliberation from different and often contradictory viewpoints, they all share the conviction that the legitimacy of political and community decisions depends on the collective judgments of citizens and that deliberation is a way of learning what that collective judgment is. Deliberation opens a way to bridge the gap between the academy and the public.

The issue ends with a piece by David Mathews. He calls for a reevaluation of the academic structure to encourage a new emphasis in “practical wisdom”; create networks essential to civil society; examine civic education and civic leadership; and reconnect institutions to the public.

I hope this brief glimpse of the articles in this issue allows you to see an emerging picture of public scholarship. The picture is far from complete though, for it is a 10,000-piece puzzle and the missing pieces could very well be your story or your exploration of public scholarship and the relationship between the public and the academy. In the spirit of this journal, in an effort together to make sense of what the possibilities are, we encourage you to be part of the exchange by submitting your piece of the puzzle. Unlike a jigsaw puzzle, the pieces of public scholarship are not precut. They are in the making. . . .
Society has agreed to pay for higher education, whether public or private, because the community is aware that higher education is a good, not only for those who directly receive an education, but also a good that accrues to the community at large in many ways. Taxes support public education directly and through grants; the payment of tuition bills by students and their parents provides support for private colleges; foundations make grants and donors give large and small gifts to both public and private institutions. All of these support systems are provided because of the goods society realizes in return: an educated citizenry; research, both applied and that which undergirds teaching; service which strengthens and undergirds the community.

However, the usual tensions between “town and gown,” or society and the higher education community, have grown more troublesome in recent years, because of changes in society and society’s resultant perception of a need for change within the higher education community. The larger public recognizes a continuing transformation in its needs, and calls for a response from the academy; but believes that the response is not forthcoming. One transformation that is driving its interpretation of the world is the larger percentage of the population who wishes to receive a college education.

Indeed the transformation we are now undergoing has been building since the Second World War changed our thinking — by changing our practice — relative to who should be eligible to receive a higher education. No longer was higher education to be...
largely limited to those born to rule. The institution of the GI Bill expanded the expectations of large numbers of men, often those whose family would never heretofore have expected them to go to college. The war also saw unprecedented numbers of women and minorities working in factories and, in so doing raised their expectations of control of their future. They all recognized that education was the key to that aim. The trend has continued, and we continue to have many coming to college whose parents did not do so. This gives more and more parents and children alike a more personal stake in higher education, as larger and larger segments of society participate in higher education and recognize its potential. Society will no longer tolerate the equivalent of patronizing statements “not to worry their pretty little heads” about higher education and to let those who understand such things deal with the situation. The public is better educated about higher education, and members of the public intend to be involved in questions and answers relating to education. They will no longer tolerate the separation of town and gown.

As an example, in recent days the discussion of the future of tenure in higher education has become a much discussed topic, with letters to the editor of local papers, faculty, boards of regents or trustees, and legislators weighing into the discussion. At the University of Minnesota, for instance, the chair of the board of regents proposed that a study be done looking into whether the tenure code of the institution should be changed. The study was undertaken and the ensuing uproar caused not only the resignation of the chair, but a vote on collectivization by the faculty. The vote came very close to passing, and had it passed, the complexion of the University of Minnesota would have changed immeasurably. Debate on tenure centers around the need for tenure to preserve professors’ ability to conduct research in whatever areas their interest leads them. Whether or not that need and the requirement of the protection provided by tenure is accurately perceived is hotly contended. But perhaps the public’s apparent antipathy toward tenure results because of the belief that part of the purpose for research has been forgotten: not only the creation, but also the dissemination of knowledge.

Today, the academy stands aghast at suggestions tenure could be altered in any way. Yet the larger community now expects a return from its investment in higher education, and will not be
put off by touch-me-not claims of immunity from those who would create their knowledge in a vacuum to be critiqued only by other scholars, and put to no easily observable use.

The changing climate toward discussions of tenure underscores the public's claim on higher education. Our communities founded and support educational institutions for two purposes. Society at large was and is interested in the creation of knowledge and in the dissemination of knowledge. The creation of knowledge is perhaps the usual understanding of the meaning of research; it is dissemination of knowledge, however, that is the way in which the public reaps its gains from supporting higher education. The public looks to institutions of higher education for education of citizens, and this is perhaps the community's strongest impetus for supporting educational institutions. In addition, the community expects that researchers will publish their newly created knowledge in journals and at conferences where the knowledge will be criticized and thereby improved by other experts in the field. Then society looks for applied research to be tested as it is applied and put to use.

Lastly, society expects to be able to use the research directly in support of society's needs. This effort is often referred to in tenure codes as "service." Service — usually cited last in the list of requirements for professors — is expected to be given to the institution, to one's profession, and to society at large. Even more difficult to measure than excellence in teaching is held to be, service is usually largely overlooked in tenure considerations, and often only lip service is paid to it in any subsequent reward systems in the academy.

However, although service can be undertaken in many ways, it is apparently not as evident to those in academe that it is through the dissemination of one's specialized research in the public arena that service becomes usable by society. It is not through publication in a rarified professional journal that knowledge becomes widely critiqued. Most often, the opposite is the result. Those few who are interested in the arcana and conversant in the jargon read and respond to the publication, and its value, if any, is lost to the rest of the world.

Yet the public has come to realize that scholarship undertaken with and for the public brings the richest rewards to the very community that supports academia through its public and private
dollars and its approbation. Such scholarship supposes that the scholar's work will be enriched by cooperation and debate with the public, and that a wider critique of one's work will be valuable in enriching it early in the process. Furthermore, scholars who conduct such scholarship find their own assumptions challenged in ways that deepen and strengthen it. The community gains such interaction, and a less ephemeral contribution is made.

Thus society's increasingly louder insistence on public engagement in the debates of the day does not at all call for what used to be termed public intellectuals. Public scholarship has the same relationship to public intellectualism as systematic change has to a soup kitchen. Those who are willing to give of their time to "help" a group in need of their expertise but see no further responsibility do not recognize that they too are part of the community, not apart from it. There is, however, a reason to become a part of the community and to make one's scholarship integral to the community. That reason is that the academy can no longer hold itself apart from the rest of society, if only because society will no longer allow it.

Public scholarship may consist in working with a group in the local community to incorporate one's expertise into the problem solving that is taking place. Such scholarship is often what is meant by public scholarship. However, it is now necessary to take the next step, which is incorporating public needs into scholarship, by working with society and in society to assess public needs, and then attempting to address them.

In working with the community through one's scholarship then, the concept of service becomes incorporated into and consolidated with that of the creation and dissemination of knowledge. By finding ways in which to enrich the public through scholarship and enrich scholarship through research, the concept of community, of pulling together, of working together for a common cause, is served in ways that have often been forgotten. Society is thus no longer treated as something outside the academy, but rather something of which the academy is a part.

Society has indeed shifted in its view of itself. It fights might-
ily against class distinctions and elitism. It will no longer be willing
to be told what it should find useful or what it should think. It
will not be left out of the dialogue. It behooves scholars likewise to
shift their thinking and to become inclusive, inviting those outside
academe into the scholarship of the day, and to recognize their
reality as part of the public by inserting themselves into the wider
discussions.
Professionalism in higher education, whether academic or administrative, is like the air we breathe, indispensable but rarely examined. Professionalism and the professionalization of knowledge is a century-long story, too rich and complex to be retold here. I have argued elsewhere, however, that professionalism has been essentially a way of organizing in an America where an individual's status is usually hard-won and precarious. Philip Slater has noted that most Americans have no settled rank given to them by birth or class so they have to make a "place" for themselves. To get ahead in a society more egalitarian than most others, one obvious way to distinguish ourselves has been to organize a plethora of professional guilds, so to speak, in order to separate and even elevate us from a lay public we are otherwise indistinguishable from.

To be sure, this organizing of "professionals" emerged in the nineteenth century not just to ensure individual distinction, but as a natural and pragmatic response to the need for a division of intellectual labor to cope with a rapidly industrialized and urbanized society. Our universities have spawned new disciplines and reshaped old professions; they have cast their nets wide enough to flatter and capture every kind of occupation, and then divided all of them into increasingly narrow specialties to enhance productivity and performance.

We know the sequence — a body of knowledge takes shape that produces a department or school of experts who seek students who will ultimately practice a specialty often licensed by the state but, in part, self-regulated by each respective profession with its own code of ethics and national association. In 1930, the
Astronomical Union named the constellations. Similarly, for more than a hundred years of organizing knowledge and practice, we have been naming our professional constellations, and I'm sure the naming will continue as we divide and subdivide new knowledge, new practice.

Despite our hard-won status as professionals, we are still egalitarians to the extent that we believe in leaving a place for the other person just so long as the division of intellectual labor is maintained. There is room for everyone with the proper credentials. Our golden rule as professionals is "defer unto others as you would have them defer unto you."

My sketch of professionalism thus far is an attempt to make visible an organizing impulse, an accommodating rationale for enlightened self-interest that nonetheless is meant to serve larger public interests. No doubt, we are all enmeshed in a host of individual and collective problems which absolutely require professional attention. Why then, would I be so impolitic as to title my remarks, "Daring to Be Unprofessional"?

The burden of my argument is that professionalism is both a blessing and a curse and that, in particular, the professional ethos in higher education is often at odds with the needs of students, the fiscal squeeze on campuses, and building better relations with an increasingly cynical public. I also want to explore with you how as professionals we might realign our practices to address these challenges — in our classrooms, our campuses, and our communities.

Finally, and most important, I want to pose the question of whether there are enough professionals on your campus or mine willing to reexamine the orthodox tenets of professional life and dare to be unprofessional. For that requires a kind of leadership that involves personal risk. The safe haven of professionalism where our immediate interests are organized and well-served is very attractive. Being "professional" is largely a state of mind in which you and I set the terms of our own confinement. If we chose to leave our professional sanctuaries, no doubt we would become vulnerable again.

Nonetheless, let me outline what I think some of the possibilities for leadership are and then let you consider what your own professional possibilities may be.

The professional ethos in higher education thrives on "ignorance." When the historian Laurence Veysey made this observation, he was reminding us that the division of intellectual and administrative labor on our campuses gives each of us a cer-
"... the professional ethos in higher education is often at odds with the needs of students, the fiscal squeeze on campuses, and building better relations with an increasingly cynical public."

tain autonomy that we prize and practice. As professionals each of us knows more about a specific subject or does better at practicing a particular skill than most everyone else around. Our relative ignorance about what others know or do and their ignorance about what each of us knows or does creates the space all of us need to make our special "professional" contributions. That is a blessing of sorts for our own development and those subject to our tutelage and care.

What then is the curse of this arrangement? I would argue that there are several. First, professional organizing bends our primary loyalty not to the institution that employs our academic or administrative talents but to the profession that certifies our competence. Our status from the outset and to a substantial extent throughout our careers is derived from our membership in a profession, not from our membership in the academic community where we practice. We, therefore, frequently make choices as to professional advancement that slight the interests of the communities we are asked to serve.

Second, our habit of deference to other professionals on campus also serves as an excuse for not getting involved with students as whole persons. We assume that other professors, other administrators, will each take responsibility for a piece of a student, for a piece of his or her problems. Tell her to see a counselor; tell him to get help from the remediation lab; refer the matter to such and such dean, etc. Whether we admit it or not, this can be a very expensive proposition for students. They must pay for all these fragmented services, albeit professionally rendered. At a time when the cost of higher education is being questioned not only by students and their parents or spouses but by legislators, the expense that goes with our professionalized campuses calls into question whether there will continue to be adequate support and resources to sustain such a system. Our habit of deference, which delegates to others problems that we are often quite capable of addressing ourselves, calls into question whether students can afford, and whether professionals themselves can ultimately afford, a continuation of the status quo.

Third, our specialized methods that produce such an abundance of professional information and knowledge too frequently appear to be closed systems that limit collaboration with students and shun reasoned discourse with lay publics seeking to be active participants in problem solving. It is little wonder that public funding for our professional enterprise is increasingly being chal-
lenged at a time when scholarship seeks no wider audience; professional language remains excessively obscure; and serious societal problems are not being adequately addressed.

How then do we realign our professional practice to better serve students, the fiscal squeeze on campus, and a suspicious angry public? I know there are already many attempts in many quarters. I hope that you will share your ideas and learn from others about what can be done, for example, developing civic training centers where lay publics and higher education professionals come together as equals to work on mutual problems, or establishing the arts of democratic practice as a subtext in the classroom; or creating public spaces “where diverse groups of people can meet to discuss issues of common concern”; or working out-of-title, so to speak, on those student problems that require more than a “professional” response. Whether institutions will be remade from within or whether a movement of individual professionals across campuses will eventually remake institutions from without, leadership will undoubtedly be important.

I have remarked elsewhere that “Professional reputation is, and will remain, the reference point for those in the academy.” That is why we must find a “professional reason” for being more attentive to civic culture — on our campuses and in the larger communities that our professionalism is ostensibly meant to serve. I might suggest that the most obvious professional reason for realigning our practices is that if we don’t, legislators or regulators using incentives or coercion, or a combination of both, will do it for us. Wouldn’t it make more sense if such realignment was initiated by professionals themselves so that leading by example and daring to be unprofessional eventually will redefine what it means to be professional? Isn’t it time we consider getting organized . . . again?

This article is taken from edited remarks made at the “Visions of Leadership” conference of the Campus Compact Center for Community Colleges, May 31, 1996.
TOWARDS AN ETHIC OF ACADEMIC DISCOURSE, OR, WHY DO PROFESSORS TALK THE WAY THEY DO?
By Bennett Ramsey

She said, as we returned from a break in the class: “Can we start by talking about the book?”

“That would be nice,” I replied.

“No, not that way. I mean, I want to talk about the whole book. As a book.” She paused for a second, looked around for her support among three or four other women in the class. It was clear that this had been the topic of conversation downstairs in the bathroom during the break, and that we were about to embark on a discussion that would be not just analytical but also political. I motioned to one of the students at the other end of the room to get up and close the door.

She continued: “And most of the other books that we read in class. Why do academics write the way they do?”

“What way?”

“In meta languages. So that you can’t understand what they’re saying.”

“Maybe you just answered your own question.”

“All right. But still?” she said. I admitted to her that I was being somewhat difficult.

“Can I say something?” another of the women asked. “Because I think there’s something very strange going on here. For example, you spend all your time in here when you’re teaching doing translation work. Helping us decode what these books are saying. But I imagine when you write, you do it in the same way as the people who write the books we read. You make it all inaccessible. Why is that? Why not just write out what you say in a way we
can understand? Then we could do something else in class besides decode."

"Let me make sure that I understand you," I replied. "You aren't asking why these books are difficult, hard to read, are you?" To which she responded no, that it did not have to do with levels of difficulty. Indeed, she found those books written by academics specifically for the student reader to be, for the most part, simply insulting. Rather the inaccessibility had to do with the books being out of reach, almost as if intentionally written so that one could not get at the words, could not make them mean anything, in effect could not bring them down to earth. "The words never take place," I thought, while she was talking. However, I did not say anything because at the time the statement did not make enough sense to me to follow it out. But it stuck with me, somewhat uncomfortably; nagged at me from the corner of the conversation. "Maybe the writing's not accessible just for that reason," added a third student. No one, including myself, had any idea what he meant by "that reason." Which was usual for him, by the way. He was one of those students who tended to wander away from his ideas, for whom one had to function more like a border collie than a teacher, constantly herding him back to what he was thinking. Usually the effort was worth it. For most of the time his ideas were good ones, provoking ideas that led others not just to talk about them but through them. And so I asked him to explain what he had in mind.

"Sort of like it is with the Catholic Church and the Eucharist. You know, that's what authority is made up of." He looked around. We still were not clear what the point was. "Look: universities are pretty much a product of the Middle Ages, and in that way they're like the medieval church. Okay?" I told him yes, okay, but he was going to have to say more. "Well, except for all the corporate influence, I guess. But that's still pretty new. Anyway, universities are like the church because their wealth — books and knowledge and all of that — is distributed, but..."

And with that he stopped. He had done it, wandered off. And lost now, he just sat down on his thought. "But what?" I asked. "I'm not sure, it's too confusing here."

"No it's not," I said, although that was pretty much of a hunch given that I still did not know what he was trying to say. "Slow down. Go back to universities as medieval institutions and
start there again."

"Right. The kinds of places where knowledge is distributed, and it is! That's part of what's medieval about them, because knowledge in universities and schools is distributed. And not just for sale like a consumer good, even though that goes on; there's still some regular old distribution going on too. But it's distributed, — now I know what I wanted to say! — on the basis of making knowledge accessible by first making it inaccessible. Like taking bread and wine, turning them into mysteries that nobody can handle except the priests giving them out again. That's a weird kind of power. And it breeds a kind of authoritarianism. It's awfully undemocratic."

"Don't analyze it so much, that's what I think," came a response from the back of the room. "I mean me personally, I just don't think any of them know how to write. And that's all there is to it!"

"That's probably fair," I said, "although it might have more to do with cannot write than with do not know how." And I told them about some of my own difficulties writing, about how daunting it was just to face the fact of writing, in turn how easy it was, if also extraordinarily childish, to stay caught between arbitrariness of words and their definiteness, the way that each word seemed to constitute a kind of closure. And I explained how destructive so often were my attempts to move beyond that catching place, so that even when I resolved not to worry about getting it right, still I would break down each sentence as I began to put it together. Tear the words apart. Make sure one way or the other that what I wrote in the morning I destroyed by the end of the night. "So there is a clue about that nagging phrase," I thought to myself; although this had to do only with the phrase taken at its most literal level. "That the words do not take place because I cannot stand the thought that they will always be only my own, and not the truth. And that the few words that I do write down are for the most part little more than temper tantrums, verbal fits and starts, self-destructing protests at my sorry state, that I cannot speak like the gods. Where did I get the idea that I could speak that way in the first place?" I asked. "Or should?" And now that thought nagged at me too.

"But some people do write well," said one of the graduate students in the class. It was apparent to everybody that he had a
stake in the point he was making. "And clearly. And there are some
people who are trying to develop new languages, say things that
others have not said and with new words. Maybe that's part of it
too?"

"Yeah," she said, "and some people are just covering up for
the fact that they just don't have anything to say. Admit it. Yes, I
know, you all have to do it, don't you? To keep your jobs. But why
in the world do you have to do it like that?"

"How about this?" another student said. He was sitting in the
window well in the back of the room, off on the margins. "Maybe
it's got to do with ideology; notions like that there's got to be
something different between teachers and textile workers, say. You
know. And that teachers don't want anybody to see — maybe they
don't want to see them-
selves! — and they're just
workers too. I mean, they
can't be workers really, can
they? Because that would
blow the myth wide open
that the working class
deserves to be economically dependent
because it is full of ignorant folk, uneducated people. And so
there's this so-called higher language scholars use to help them
make the distinction?"

"Some of that is changing," the graduate student interjected;
"although you're probably not far off. But there are a lot of us
teaching and writing now who come from what, for academics, are
not your typical social locations, working-class backgrounds, and
such. And we know very well what class teachers are in."

"And I'll bet you get caught in a bind when you have to
write," came the reply. "Have trouble keeping your voice. I know I
do, every time I have to write a paper. I feel like I'm supposed to
show that I don't want to talk to my own community anymore;
prove in writing that I've switched my allegiance or something."

"That's it," answered one of the four women who had con-
spired the conversation; "it all amounts to power and social
stratification. Like all of these left-wing professors who talk about
social justice and redistributing the wealth, and all of that. But
when you read their books, what do you get? No ideas being redis-
tributed here!"
"They’re not Marxists, they’re Stalinists,” added another. "Academic Stalinists. You can tell by the way that they run their classes.” She looked across the table: “Like what you said about the Church, they keep all the authority centralized.” He, of course, had wandered off again, and so missed the distinction between her point and his. He looked back somewhat blankly. “Yeah, I guess,” he responded.

Something of a free-for-all ensued at this point in the conversation: a spirited interchange; the academic equivalent of talking trash. And so now I wandered off too, back to my own nagging questions, but also to the comment just made about losing one’s voice. For there was something beyond the childish response to arbitrariness that occurred when I tried to write, something that had to do with that woman’s comment. And it kept my writing, long after the angry voices had died down, from coming to any sort of fruition. However, it did not have to do just with issues of social class, although that probably played its part in my words not taking place. What then?

“How have we men gotten so tenuous in our connections to our own words and voice?” I asked myself. “Particularly those of us who do academic writing?” But I could not get any further along those lines. And then a new series of questions arose, questions that moved the issue of that nagging phrase beyond its literal level, questions, in turn, that moved me closer to the specific problem of the strangeness and incomprehensibility of academic writing that the students were trying to address.

“Okay,” I said to myself, “it is clear enough now that your words do not take place. But what is it that they are doing? For, as you just said, it is not just the case that you don’t write or speak; you do both quite often, too often, as you put it.” And then a rather odd follow-up question. “Has it occurred to you that maybe your words do not take place for a reason? Because they have been replaced? As it were by the words of another?” “All right,” I thought, “those are, indeed, odd questions. But they seem to have their point.” That was about as far as I would let myself wander into them, however. I had to get back to the class.

“They’re not Marxists, they’re Republicans. Reaganites.” The trashin was still going on. “You know, trickle-down theory and all of that except with knowledge.”

I finally broke in: “Enough. I get your point. Anything else?”
“Men,” the fourth of the women said. “I know it’s got something to do with men. And I say that because there’s something different between the readings we do by men, and those by women.” Some of the students looked skeptical. She continued: “Okay, not all of the time. Because there are some women who are as male-identified as men are. But those women who write . . . I don’t know . . . maybe it’s like one of the books that we read in here put it, with an awareness of woman’s place in history; those writings are different. It’s hard to say what it is. It’s like they are more experiential, more grounded.”

“But we’ve said everything that these women are saying,” said one of the men in the class. “I mean, I’ve read these women you’re talking about too; it’s all Hegel, and process thought, open systems theory and stuff.”

“Maybe,” she responded, and did so, I thought to myself, surprisingly calmly given what had just been said. “But I don’t think that’s entirely fair. But even if it is the case, still, with women, it is said differently; it’s like it’s written from what goes on with women everyday. And that makes a tremendous difference, at least to me.”

“So, what are you saying?” he said back. And now I thought, here comes the inevitable comment. “That men are different from women? Give me a break.”

“I’m not sure,” she said, “but I certainly hope not.” And then she looked up at me and asked: “What do you think? You’re a professor, and you’re a man. Tell us what it’s like for you when you write.”

I had expected, of course, that sooner or later I would be called on to bear the brunt of the conversation. And one might assume, given what I was just thinking through, that I might have an answer ready. But I was caught off guard somewhat by the timing of the turn to me, also by the closeness of the conversation now to my own thoughts. And so I backtracked a bit, returned to the issue of power with which the students had previously been engaged. I said something about having to pay one’s debts to the scholarly guild and, that yes, that was some part of why men, and some women too, wrote the way that we did; and that yes again, both of those did have something to do with power, earning one’s place among a professional elite and so forth. And I added out of that how there were also some good reasons for the kind of academ-
Part of what it means to do scholarly writing is to deal with things in their complexity.

No one was particularly impressed. Out of respect, however, they let me go without further pursuit. But one of the women in the group did say this: “But when you’re in class you seem able to explain things straightforwardly.” She stopped for a second, and then added: “And although you never do really tell us what you think, but just what the books are saying, you do seem committed to explaining things in ways that are clear to us, and to helping us ground what the books are saying in terms of our own experience.”

Now, I might have taken that as a compliment, but at that moment I did not. Rather, I found myself with a somewhat peculiar, although not unfamiliar reaction, — doubting my abilities as a teacher, checking to make sure that the door to the seminar room was still closed. And I imagined a colleague passing by in the hall, hearing the conversation that had just taken place, particularly that woman’s last comment. He was horrified by what he heard. Finally, I found myself getting slightly irritated, angry at the direction things were taking. And so I said, “Look, right now we need to get back to work. But if you really want to, we can finish up this discussion at the beginning of class next week.”

“How about you give us something in writing next week?” came the response from the woman who had started the conversation. “Tell us what you think the problems are in all of this academic writing. Tell us who’s at fault.”

“In writing.”

“Yes. That way you won’t forget to bring it up, like you usually do when you tell us we’ll come back to something next week. Besides, if you put it in writing, we won’t have to take so much time away from our ‘work,’ as you put it.”

“Nice try,” I said, but there was little left that I could do but assent to the proposal. “All right, I will write something down for you about all of this.”

With that we returned to the book that I had assigned for the week. I got up, went over to the door, opened it, sat down again, asked what people had to say about the material, what they need-
ed. There were a few, tentative comments, interspersed among increasing spells of silence. No one seemed to know what was going on in the book. And as was usually the case when the class got itself caught in a silence, everyone began to get tense. Finally, after a particularly long period where no one said anything, I took over. I spent the remainder of the class lecturing on the material, explaining the text.

Now, I did fulfill my promise to write something for the class. Or at least I tried to. The whole thing came off rather badly, because I continued to avoid the issues that the woman in the class had raised when she asked me about my own work. I settled for tracing out only the surface lines of the fault that ran between the students and the writings they were trying to read, that produced in them that familiar, too often repeated statement of self-defeat; “This is over our heads.” What a shame, I thought as I wrote, that we who do academic work do so in a way that so frequently breaks people down. Diminishes them. Makes them believe that there is a lack of integrity, an inferiority to their own experience and abilities. And all the time no one reads off the list of crimes that belongs to us, whose words soar over their heads?

But I did not say that. Rather I pointed out how part of the fault, although not all of it by any means, ran through them, or at least to the extent that they were socially and culturally constructed. I explained that they existed in a society with generally bad educational systems, systems that produce citizens barely able to read a newspaper or medium that, again systematically, seems bent on reducing reading comprehension capabilities to a grade school level, writing capabilities to nonexistence. Finally, I explained that they had been led by a cultural economy into a life of civilizational laziness when it came to understanding others’ experience, indeed even their own, a laziness bred by a promotion of the desire not to know coupled with an overingestion of images in the place of words, more lately, feelings at the expense of thoughts and ideas. This was not to say, I added, that words or thoughts were somehow more important than images and feelings, they were not. But human experience demands metaphor if it is to be understood, I told them. And there can be no metaphors without a connection between what we see, what we feel, and what we think and say.

All of that may have been to the point, I believed at the time, and still do I suppose, that it was. But was it fair? For certainly I knew from my own experience that most people struggle to over-
come, and to a large extent succeed in overcoming those systematically inherited and inbred diminutions. That people are not simply virtual reproductions, mere captives of false consciousness and such. That somehow in the midst of all of this social and cultural push and shove they find a way to keep their wits about them, get what they need to know and then some. It is a matter of survival, after all, and people do survive. Indeed, and despite the pressures, they often thrive, for again I knew from my own life that there is a savvy, a depth and breadth of general thinking, analysis and understanding afoot. And so surely I must have known as well that it is mostly a defense to try to claim that people cannot understand scholarly writing because they lack the critical skills, thinking skills, whatever? So why did I not say any of that to those students? Indeed, why, at the time, did I not even remember my own experience, what it had taught me?

“Memory knows,” wrote Faulkner, “before knowing remembers.” There are, thankfully, at least occasional tender mercies. And so there was then a memory, quite familiar. It was nothing dramatic, by the way, which is probably why I did not write it down for the students to read. Rather just a line, embedded in an image. The line, first, one of the psychological rules of thumb, a line about the child king and how he must become unutterably sad before uttering his first words. And the image surrounding it, of a family’s chronic depression; hours sitting together in a living room without any words, or words and sentences filled with breaks, elisions, empty gaps; at the same time a constant playing with word games — crosswords, Scrabble, the anagrams and such in the evening newspaper — in silence. But then sitting together at the kitchen table, now all face to face. Suddenly, a breakout of a brilliant hyperlucidity; jokes, puns, palindromes; words tumbling over words, flying so high overhead that no one sitting there could see them trip, entangling, turning but then falling, fragmenting, breaking into pieces as they hit the floor. No webs woven, no connection. Not able to convey. Dinner as manic defense.

Now telling them all of that would have gotten them somewhere, for in that image and that line, the fault became both apparent and concrete. And it no longer ran just on the surface, where the cause of the lack of understanding belonged to the students. Rather, within the depressive position of the image there appeared now that peculiar defensiveness that one finds so often in academic writing. Where words seem to be thrown up not as invi-
tations but as stumbling blocks to knowledge and understanding. Where lines and sentences and paragraphs create rather than cross over gaps. Indeed where they appear as gaps, fault lines, words with only the narrowest of meanings or split off altogether from any bodies of meaning, anybody's meaning. They thought, those students, that verbal mastery meant an ability to communicate ideas. And so when, while reading, they found themselves with no idea what the writer was saying they assumed that the fault lay within themselves. Here maybe for once they could see something of the fault line on its farther, other side. And maybe see as well how verbal mastery can constitute a disavowal of ideas. For ideas are forms of connection. And the masterful display has control as its intention, which is to say, the denial of any connections trying to take place.

But could they follow all of this? I thought for a moment, and then thought again; can I follow it, and do I want to? Common sense said that of course they could, and that I could as well, although yes, there might be reasons why I would not want to. The fault line, after all, ran not just through the image but through it straight back into the class, more to the point, back to that last part of the class after I had cut off their conversation. Look at the image! Look at the line! There is the class, domesticated a bit but right there. The silence. Or leafing through the pages for a phrase, one line, anything that might provide a key, compel a conversation. And there we are, all of us gathered around the classroom table. No one saying a word. No one able to say a word? At any rate waiting. Increasingly uncomfortable with the intimacy, the face to face. Everyone frozen in place.

Finally, somewhat suddenly, the image moves as I give in and begin to speak. Or rather not I but the child king, my familiar self-possession and self-protection. Whom I seem so often to become. Who comes to the rescue when, as here, the closeness of others threatens. Anyway, it is he here who marshals the words together. Moves them out. Takes command of the situation as he begins to hold forth, bursts out loud with a flood of words. Everyone watches attentively, even with a bit of fascination, although not really able to understand and thus unable to listen. And no one dares to
interrupt for they all realize, or at least sense, that in part he is using his words as weapons. He holds forth in this fashion for quite a while, for most of the last half of the class, until the class is over. Suffice it to say that he gets rather caught up in his lecturing, at times disappearing behind the words. Which is part of the flooding, of course. To remove himself from the group, gain some relief from the pain in the intimacy of the silence. And to attain that sensation he is seeking, the verbal high that he gets when the words rush over him, carry him away.

On the way out the door after the class one of the students whispers to another, “Did you understand what he was saying?” “No,” comes the response from one of the men in the class, “but it was brilliant. I mean, did you notice that he didn’t use any notes or anything? I was amazed.” And the child king is pleased, at least momentarily. Pleased at the recognition of his verbal abilities and command. Pleased more deeply also, for the comment confirms his belief that his magical omnipotence is still intact, also that his outward purpose in speaking has been achieved, namely, to secure his hold over his little classroom realm. The pleasure is short-lived, however, for as he sits there, leaning back in his chair, there comes to him a third comment, from another of the students grouped outside the hall. “He made me feel like an idiot,” she says. “As if nothing that I think about has any worth, anything to do with what he is saying.”

Something about that remark strikes him, catches him off his guard, pushes through his self-absorption. “That’s her problem; she’ll get used to it,” he says to himself; “that’s the way academics is.” But the line does not work this time. He gets up and walks over to the window, sits down on the windowsill. The missing identity aches. For he does, after all, know what it is like to be that student, although he remembers it, now, a little late. Remembers his own humiliations at the hands of teachers as they trained him, forced him to go beyond his everyday, generalized thinking, broke him of his normal speech, his usual words. In small ways, mostly; a mark through a line on a college term paper, crossing out the words “I feel”; a sharp comment in a philosophy class concerning the use of the phrase “it seems,” followed by a warning that reality was not to be construed as seeming; lessons about never using personal examples or even personal pronouns, and about the need to work dispassionately with one’s words. Were they small ways
because his mentors were all kind? Hardly. Or as they were, it was because there was no need for much more than a kindly reminder. For how long had it been since he had written or spoken his own words with any regularity?

Now. When will the child king learn? Learn what? That all of his training, his increasing specialization, his expertise serve him ill and serve others, which after all is their point, even worse? And that they do so serve because they produce in him and in his work a narrowness of thinking; a narrowness, moreover, that has become now so disproportionate to the breadth of general thinking as to be split off? From general readers. From students. Even from other coworkers in other disciplines, other fields. And when will he see that working in these accustomed ways does not produce knowledge, or if it does so it then turns the knowledge into a hoard? For, worked in the traditional ways, his words and his writings can at best be abstract, loosed from the broader body of people's thoughts and words and deeds. Like words coming from somewhere outside, above people's heads. Like disembodied voices, frightening in their incomprehensibility, yielding humiliation rather than knowledge. Finally, when will the child king see that not only is he the child king but that the child king is he? That the symptoms of his academic narrowed and incomprehensibility mirror the way that it is to be he. And that the fault line runs very far back indeed, not just in time but in identity. To who he is? He who is? So. When will the child king learn, and in learning begin to see? Maybe when he addresses himself directly to the statement that the student made out in the hall. And directs himself to the pain that she expressed, admits it as his own internalized pain as well. Finally, however, the child king will learn, and see, only when he does both of these and with them one thing more. When he directs himself to her and to himself and says to both: "This is not good; I will learn how not to do this anymore."

"... that the fault line runs very far back indeed, not just in time but in identity."
PEDAGOGICAL AND CIVIC RESPONSE-ABILITIES

By Stephen M. Johnson

For a quarter-century, I have resolutely kept all personal faith, politics, and preferences out of my classroom's manifest content and process, simply and strictly on the grounds of nonproselytizing professionalism.

I have been teaching academic studies of religion in a state university. In discussion with individual students after class, I might expose some personal opinions, but when students asked "What religion are you?" I urged them to hold that question. My religious stance is irrelevant, I explained; "my job in a state school is to teach, as well as I can, different and opposing positions." Thus, in "Introduction to Religion" courses I would successively role-play Luther, Gautama, Freud, Malcolm, and Judith Plaskow's Lilith among others. I didn't want students' personal reactions to my personal reactions to affect their learning historically important positions, so I told them to save the personal questions till course's end. Only a few followed that up, and all were pleased with the approach. I so contextualized, explained, and put myself into each "role" that the students gained no clue of (and most lost interest in) my own position. They thanked me for unbiased, spirited introduction to such important options, and I valued their gratitude.

In terms of explicit religious affiliation and ultimate faith, I still take this approach. If some peers think me a cultural dinosaur, my students are grateful for "a course where you can learn some stuff" rather than "another circle class." But in one area I do repent. I now fear that my long commitment to nonmanipulative (and therefore self-excluding) education has contributed to the unraveling of American civic culture, tolerance, and hope. And so my confession and questions to fellow professors in American higher education. . . . Confession: I have started making room in my syllabi for both explaining and urging the values of American civic tradition. Questions: Shouldn't we all be doing this, and helping each other do it better than my belated first attempts? How?
Civic Tradition and Pedagogical Context

The greatest difficulty for many of us now steeped in post-modern irony is imagining anything like “good” patriotism or liberatory “civil religion.” Yet just as the Bible’s most revealing words have inspired ever newer readings and truer understandings, so have the most powerful words and ideals of our secular national scriptures — as read through the governance, cultural history, and social struggles responsive to them.

The default values of an American generation and society left ignorant of this civic inheritance turn out to be king-of-the-hill personal consumerism with my-gang-against-yours for social identity. We must expose these as insufficient, not simply on behalf of women or minorities or gays, but in the name of common sense.

Thus, though academics may newly interpret the process, American identity and shared national context still require equipping our students to understand and exercise citizenship. To understand how the civic ideals that the least of us are “created equal” and thereby equally entitled to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” do (not without struggle) promote both community and its opposite. To learn why in this national community it is acceptable “for American Jews to think of American Christians as Gentiles, for American Christians to think of American Jews as unconverted, or for American Muslims to think of both as infidels,” but utterly unacceptable for any of them “to think of [or treat] the others as un-American” or less entitled.

More bluntly, producing graduates unappreciative of the Gettysburg Address — its historical occurrence and enduring importance for our many peoples’ present — contributes neither informed citizens nor critical thinking toward a better future. If the names of Jefferson and Lincoln, Harriet Tubman and Harriet Beecher Stowe are not worth remembering, neither is King’s or Malcolm’s or the name of today’s student. We need to teach our children not just how our civic ancestors failed, but what they did well. What accomplishments of theirs we do or might treasure, including their values surviving in our own automatic assump-
Our students can neither appreciate nor critically think about nor improve what they're unaware of. And we are foolish to presume they know anything historical if we are not teaching it.\textsuperscript{6}

**Attempting Civic and Pedagogical Response-Ability**

Painfully struggling against temperamental shyness and my deep-rooted sense of nonproselytizing professionalism, I have recently started educating to the multiple realities of "civil religion" and civic tradition in my courses, first in my one-semester history of American religions. With this course, as others, I used to just lay out the materials nonsubjectively, and in the 1970s that seemed to work. The critical materials of my course-opening Native American section, my then-penultimate section on Black American religious history, and my closing section on (then Bellah's) civil religion all seemed to "speak to" the students. They readily understood the materials, and the sharper ones well read the implications.

No more! In the fall of 1992, dusting off and postmodernly spinning old Bellah themes for a public lecture and discussion of the presidential campaign, I learned from student reaction that his key insights had become incomprehensible. A graduate of my own recent "Religion in America" course wistfully said that "If America ever did stand for something, I don't have a clue what that might be!" Asked for examples of "great Americans," not one person under 30 could think of anyone. Their faces made clear it was an empty category (or bad joke). They could easily name great American athletes or entertainers, but not one possible great American past or present. "Even Martin Luther King was just for his people," said one, approving and "reminding" us of what she took to be obvious.

So the next time out with "Religion in America," I restored a closing "section" on American civic tradition. But that proved insufficient. Except for the occasional Buchanan clone who urged narrow, oppressive patriotism, essays and discussion showed most of my (Northeastern urban and suburban) students still assumed all nationalism must be oppressive and therefore wrong. Patriotism could only be stupid or oppressive, or cynical and manipulative. Far from being obvious, the content and contours of critical patri-
otism were not comprehensible even as theoretic possibilities. Many students saw the centrifugal proclivity and destructive possibilities of differing religious and other tribal faiths, but they simply hoped for the best (or fatalistically feared the worst). Either most Americans would automatically remain tolerant, or there was nothing to prevent our becoming a big Bosnia.

So I had to change the course more drastically. I tried to apply to American civic tradition the kind of syllabic or curricular cure that David Will, Mark Noll, and Charles Long have urged for American racism. Neither is mere episode, both are recurring (and contrarily related) features. More than segments or theme-weeks of the course, each or both might rightly be made the central narrative of our national stories, the course’s framework.

Making tough cuts in syllabus materials (a one-semester course in the history of American Religion!?), I now include in background/introduction to the Protestant Reformation some “compensatory-education” in old European presumptions of divine right of kings, social hierarchies, and national enforcement or support of one religion. I make it explicit that most of the American colonies naturally followed course. I show why, had the colonies become independent states without progressive Enlightenment influence and secular adaptation of insights gained in New England’s Puritan/Separatist struggles, we might today be like Bosnia or Northern Ireland. I teach how America’s “separation of church and state,” Constitution, Bill of Rights, Amendments 13, 14, 15, and 19, and later civil rights legislation were secured through bitter, bloody struggle and continuous hard work.

Now students who come to me already feeling exclusion’s wrongness, aware of American hypocrisies and failures, start learning that our felt right to protest these wrongs has been a product of long and specifically American struggles and evolving traditions. Now by course’s end the students are gaining a sense of hard-won liberatory progress. A sense that even while damning dreadful American realities that contradict American ideals, there is need to affirm the roots and vectors of our civic culture — if only to argue its proper fruits and realignment.

The next pedagogical step was to make similar adjustments to my course in the history of “Western Religions and Culture.” The first half of the course is still the history of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and their interactions with each other as well as with broad-
er Euro-American currents, up through the Reformation. From there I still jump to the Americanizing of Protestantism, the Enlightenment, and the emergence of nineteenth-century humanisms and their critiques of religion. But now I give the final three weeks to sharply contrasting several different civic cultures functioning as their citizens' secular religions: Soviet Communist from 1917 till 1991, Nazi Germany of the Third Reich, and historic American ways of democratic struggle and civic faith. Now, when we close with a look at contemporary life and faith, my students better appreciate multicultural inclusiveness and postmodern criticism as historically evolved *achievements*. As contingent conditions, culturally mediated assumptions and rights that "could have not been" and could cease to be.

**Implications and More Questions**

Obviously, I think these results as good as they are hard won. But I am aware that to get them I have come a long way. It was one thing in the mid-1980s to start using video regularly and effectively. And I was still following my self-excluding pedagogical traditions when I started giving ever-larger chunks of classroom time and explanatory "comp-ed" energy to historical and geographical materials that could once have been presumed of students. Such changes I made readily, even in my most basic "Intro to Religion" course, lest all references convey nothing.

My recent conversion, to compensatory education in the dynamics (both bad and good) of civic faith and practice, has been more difficult and question-laden. I am clearly *endorsing* American civic faith — at least over Soviet one-party or Nazi genocidal — in a way I never would any traditional religion over others (or over secular humanism). Should this trouble me?

Even if untroubled, how many courses can I properly "use" this way? I can easily make room in my "Intro to Religion" or "Religions of the World" for a late day or two similarly focused. But experience suggests such added focus will bear no fruit without such earlier "seeding" through many weeks as I now do in my Western and American historically oriented courses. Is it only in courses where we share subject-turf with historical or poli-sci departments that academic religionists and others can help nourish
the civic culture in which all our careers and lives and families are embedded?

Personally and professionally, I abhor simplistic assumptions that all human “faith” is reducible to tribal assertion or that all human commitments tend inevitably toward cultural and religious warfare. Pedagogically, I need help in countering them.

Dale Irvin has recently written that while no one person can speak adequately for a group as a whole, we can try to help each other speak more adequately from our own historical locations. “Every person participating in a classroom” he correctly sees as “potentially a member of a community not yet fully defined and a source of an equally immense body of knowledge and understanding.” Yes, I agree — if we are committed to open-ended learning and multicultural classrooms. Then, as with the “better angels” and practice of American civic tradition, the “multiple voices of difference and diversity can be empowered to arise from within” our pedagogical and national communities.

Self-disclosure and actualization seem meaningless except in community, which means in history. Americans are fortunate that their history and jurisprudence, praxis and rhetoric impel them toward ever-more-inclusive empowerment of the previously marginalized. Certainly the only “at-one-ment” with each other that the many peoples of a pluralistic nation will today accept is a unity that leaves them free to be also their distinctive selves, that empowers their mutual thriving. American liberals and multiculturalists must fight for bringing this about, and American conservatives and traditionalists must work to accept, that the national meaning of e pluribus unum becomes in uno, plures. But these words will mean little, and their practice be increasingly subject to political and cultural distortion and overthrow, if we do not learn how actively to teach and display their relevant history and present import.
If the following leaves some philosophical colleagues convinced I'm still wedded to "the Enlightenment Project's foundationalism," I reply it might look that way to recovering Platonists. Those not consumed by such recovery can more easily see that neither pure universality nor pure localism is possible. Speaking as if they were deals un-historically with real people. Academics should not become so enchanted by metaphorically describing everything as "text" and every context or cultural message as a "narrative" that we fail to appreciate the specificity of actual historical narratives, the flesh-and-blood traditioning of our individual and collective autobiographies.

See most of the contributors to the forum on patriotism and cosmopolitanism in the Fall, 94 Boston Review (XIX.5). More astute were the contributions by Benjamin Barber, Sheldon H. Hackney, Charles Taylor, Anthony Kronman, Leo Marx, and Michael Walzer.


6 Such education to citizenship is no call for "master narratives," but for telling how in this country we: have gradually learned to become more than one or a few privileged groups; are trying to learn sharing of many narratives in one civic place; and still face huge problems with all this, needing the next generation's help. Invoking our youth in these realities and questions may yet prove the best possible way to earn and engage their attention — empowering and motivating their critical thinking and real learning.


References
AN AGENDA FOR INVOLVING FACULTY IN SERVICE

By Deborah Hirsch

Martin Fletcher, a college sophomore, is teaching science at an inner-city high school as part of one of his biology courses. Dr. Susan Banker, a faculty member in the management department, is helping a community organization develop a strategic plan. How are these two activities related? How do they fit with the university's mission? The two activities — service-learning in the first example, faculty professional service in the second — are two ways that a college or university might address public needs and the common good. Both raise issues — standards of excellence, methods of documentation and evaluation, incentives and rewards — that campuses must resolve before they can institutionalize approaches to community outreach. To help with that, the New England Resource Center for Higher Education (NERCHE) has convened various groups of scholars and leaders at the forefront of the movement to create a more engaged academy.

Difficulties of Context

Service-learning and professional service share a common problem of nomenclature. The term “service” presents difficulties because of the various meanings associated with it. There is a distinction to be made between activities that fall under the rubric of good citizenship — philanthropic work, volunteering, committee work on campus and in one’s discipline — and those that draw on the special expertise of a college or university — courses that use service to enhance and deepen theoretical frameworks, or action research that yields practice-based knowledge. The University of Minnesota’s Harry Boyte has suggested an operative term that might work better; rather than “service,” he talks about “public work” as the way faculty and/or students link their work with others.

The difficulty of defining terms is compounded by institutional issues of recognition and reward. Many faculty have little experience in documenting their work in applied settings, especial-
ly when that work is “of service” to others. The lack of procedures for describing service in a way that connects it to a faculty member’s teaching and research, or to the college or university mission, makes the process of evaluating such activity difficult as well. Not surprisingly, the current system of promotion and tenure is not set up to recognize and reward service-based scholarship. The “solution” in many cases seems to be to leave it out, or to append a list of agencies or organizations with which the faculty member has worked; this at least avoids the trap of trying to evaluate professional service with criteria developed for evaluating research and/or teaching.

Change Is in the Air

Today, a number of individual faculty, certain departments, and some colleges are trying to change this. Timing is everything and seems in their favor. The climate of receptivity for change in higher education is at an unprecedented level because of forces both external and internal to the campus.

Outside of academe, public dissatisfaction with the irrelevance of the “ivory tower,” coupled with the mounting problems in neighboring communities and society at large, call for faculty and students to focus on socially useful subjects and actions. Institutions of higher education represent vastly untapped intellectual resources for solving these problems. And within the academy, Ernest Boyer’s Scholarship Reconsidered has become the most widely read and discussed publication on today’s campuses. Boyer challenged the academy to discard the old model that separates research, teaching, and service for a more seamless view of faculty work and of the scholarship that cuts across that triad. The result will be an engaged campus that involves both students and faculty in community outreach as part of institutional mission. An academic culture that links theory with practice, where service or outreach enhances and supports research and teaching, will be an engaged and vital one.

Clearly, any approach that deals with change must be tailored to meet campus culture, mission, and type. However, there are
strategies that can be employed across many institutional types. One of these is to view the campus from all levels — institutional, departmental, and disciplinary — and find entry points for service at each of them. Another strategy is to observe how change has occurred in other areas, such as collaborative learning, learning communities, and interdisciplinary studies, and then use the levers for change that have worked for those innovations.

Change levers exist at all levels of the institution. One of the best starts with commitment and encouragement from the top. Presidents and top academic administrators must ground their institutional missions in realistic policies for student admissions and faculty hiring; in faculty incentives such as released time or special appointments; in rewards such as student financial aid and scholarships, and special recognition awards for faculty and students; and finally through promotion and tenure guidelines that incorporate service as a legitimate arena for faculty scholarly work.

Once faculty experience it, whether through service-learning or professional service, they quickly find that the service yields intrinsic benefits. These include reenergized teaching and research, enthusiastic student learners, deeper understanding of the course or discipline, and a means to integrate citizen, parent, teacher, and researcher roles.

**Joining Forces**

Ultimately, the aim of service proponents must be to relate it, whether in curricula or through field projects, to what drives the university; teaching and learning, research, and the dissemination of knowledge. This means that advocates of service must be able to translate service-related activities into categories of activity that faculty are familiar and comfortable with. Faculty lives are already too busy and frayed to accommodate an additional load, the challenge is to weave service into the fabric of how faculty organize their work.

All this will best be done if those advocating professional service join forces with those who have a service-learning agenda. Besides the pragmatic motivation to work together in order to avoid duplication of effort, burnout, and risk of marginalization, there are other good reasons to do so, including the ability to (1) apply the discipline in real-world settings, (2) exploit the intellec-
tual resources of the campus to help the community, (3) motivate students, and (4) reinvigorate an academic community that has often lost touch with its sustaining intellectual culture.

What might be the next steps in making this collaboration happen? One of the best ways is to collect lively cases of faculty professional "public work," or service, especially that which is connected to teaching through service-learning applications and to research through publication. Most useful would be examples of collective initiatives in departments. Out of these case studies, one might develop principles for practice with implications for how faculty might carry out professional service that is connected to teaching and learning.

Another avenue for collaboration is to develop professional portfolios that capture the richness and complexity of faculty work. We need language and mechanisms for documenting and evaluating faculty professional service and service-learning. And finally, advocates for service should work with departments, and especially with department chairs, to bring about a shift from individual to collective responsibility for carrying out the various tasks of teaching, institutional citizenship, and professional public service.

We need a seamless view of outreach, where divisions between research, teaching, and faculty professional work in the community fall away such that we are able to harness student and faculty talent and institutional resources.

Howard Cohen, of the University of Wisconsin-Green Bay, offers the following suggestion to those promoting the service agenda. Faculty should follow the rule of rock climbing, "Don't let go of one foothold until you've got hold of another." Thus, until we can create something that offers faculty creativity and stature comparable to the present system, we can't expect them to let go of the frameworks that have defined their intellectual and organizational lives.

Our challenge is to create that new foothold.

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THE PROMISE AND THE FLAWS OF PUBLIC SCHOLARSHIP

By Alan Wolfe

Whether they work in public or private universities, academics are paid, ultimately, by the general public. It’s an odd relationship on both sides. The public thinks it is paying for teaching and office hours and seems surprised to learn that academics do research. And academics think they have a right to do whatever research they want, as if there were no one paying the bills.

Some academics have sought to bridge that gap in recent years. Under the rubric of public scholarship, they have tried to formulate their ideas in a dialogue with the public and then write in ways that will serve the public. Many aspects of public scholarship are admirable but, fundamentally, it is a flawed concept, and it may not correct the real problems that it sets out to confront.

Public scholarship has its roots in public journalism, a movement premised on the assumption that something has gone very wrong in the way the press reports, and the public responds to, the news. Journalism “cannot remain valuable unless public life remains viable,” as Jay Rosen, a New York University journalism professor, has written. Inspired by such philosophers as John Dewey and Jürgen Habermas, Rosen argues that journalists must “recognize the duty of the press occasionally to intervene in public life in the interest of strengthening civic culture.” The journalist, while taking a position of neutrality on the political issues of the day, cannot take a position of neutrality on the vibrancy of civil society. “If silence is heard where dialogue should be,” Rosen writes, “if the vitality of public life dissipates, neutrality develops into a meaningless pose.”

Scholars, Rosen believes, also ought to recognize that they have a stake in the health of our public discourse, but most of them do not. He tells the story of the time he met with six newspaper editors and six social scientists who were experts in public
opinion research. The journalists came expecting to learn something about such topics as voter alienation and low turnout. The academics treated the affair as a professional meeting, talking to each other in jargon that left everyone else speechless — and angry. What kind of scholarship, Rosen wants to know, can be produced by academics so wrapped up in their own expertise that they have no audience to which they can speak?

Academics certainly tend to their affairs as if the public barely exists. Tenure — not the fact of its existence, but the way it is defended — is a clear part of this haughtiness. Academics should be perpetually grateful to have the wonders of job security for life at a time when the rest of the American middle class is preoccupied with downsizing. But let a legislature or a board ask perfectly reasonable questions about tenure — What, exactly do professors do with it? Should we have it forever when there is no compulsory retirement? Are there alternatives to it? — and academics go into a no-holds-barred, we-absolutely-refuse-to-give-an-inch, even-to-talk-about-the-issue-is-wrong mentality. Only a professoriate that has forgotten its public obligations could think in such a way.

Then there is the kind of scholarship produced in the university these days. Determined everywhere to reproduce a model of the research university, academics insist on the priority of publication over teaching — even at institutions whose clear mission is to teach. In itself this is not necessarily improper; if the benefits of scholarship are great, everyone should share them. But the democratization of the research model has not worked that way in practice. Spread too thin, the culture of research spawns endless journals of no particular interest, a system of peer review in which anything gets published somewhere along the food chain, professional associations more concerned with expanding their membership base than with upholding academic standards, and the publication of more books than any human being could ever read. Those who succeed in all this are skimmed off to the best universities, leaving second-tier campuses in less-than-prestigious state university systems with professors whose jobs ought to be working with students, cultivating ties with the local community, and figuring out what kinds of knowledge are appropriate to the particular place in which they work. Instead, their eyes are always on the plane schedule for the flight that they hope will get them out — forever.
Choosing one’s discipline over one’s university is a further way of favoring the private over the public. The embodiment of a discipline, its professional association, can in some ways be considered a public institution. Most associations have their headquarters in Washington, lobby Congress, and sponsor large annual meetings that take on the appearance of public carnivals. But professional associations sustain themselves by meeting the private needs of those who join them: for jobs, for recognition, for a break from the routine. Guildlike in their structure and organization, academic disciplines encourage a withdrawal from a heterogeneous world of difference into a homogeneous one of insularity. One of the reasons English professors tend to be shocked when the press makes fun of a Modern Language Association meeting is that they are so comfortable in their private relations with their colleagues that they forget how their narcissism appears to the general public.

The scholarship produced by this system can best be described as “self-referential.” Far too many academics write to be judged by other academics who are remarkably like themselves. Narrow disciplines are split into even narrower subfields, as fewer people constitute the audience for whom scholarship is written. There would be little wrong if this winnowing produced valuable knowledge, as it often does in the sciences. But in the humanities and the social sciences, the system often produces perverse results. Instead of sharpening knowledge, specialization of this type dulls it; the audience, being small, also feels beleaguered and rushes to the defense of anyone in the circle. Sharing a tiny corner of the world, scholars of this sort have little need for the rigorous clarity imposed by the need to make one’s ideas available to outsiders.

If academics have indeed lost touch with the public, is public scholarship the cure? That was the question put to a group of scholars and journalists convened by the Kettering Foundation a few months ago. The tales of pompous academic self-importance told there struck such a real-life note that I was surprised to find myself unable to agree with the remedy.

Consider my skepticism about public scholarship a legacy of the 1960s. As disastrous as it may have been, the scholarship that
government officials used to justify aspects of the war in Vietnam was, in its own way, public scholarship. Is the situation any different if the publics with whom the scholar works are not foreign policy experts but poor people, or community-based political movements, or the underrepresented?

Those for whom politics and scholarship mean the same thing will see a difference: It matters greatly with whom the scholar works because it matters greatly, as the old Left put it, which side you are on. But if the objection to scholars serving the Cold War is not only that they were on the wrong side, but also that they were on any side, then there is no fundamental difference over whom the scholar serves. Something would be lost in either case.

How one feels about public scholarship depends on what that something is. Jay Rosen suggests that what the scholar might lose by working with the public, he or she is better off without: arrogance. “Public scholars,” he notes, “begin with the realization that they don’t know something, and the something can be known in only one way: through a process of inquiry conducted with others in public.” The public is viewed, in John Dewey’s term, as “inchoate.” By trying to bring the public to life, the scholar discovers something both for himself and for those to whom he speaks, Rosen argues.

On the contrary, what the scholar would lose if he were to follow that advice would not be arrogance but a proper sense of responsibility. My obligation to the public is to offer it what I know: knowledge discovered by retreating into private space, the product of my particular approach, work habits, insights, presentation, and interpretation of the thoughts of others. As a citizen, I am responsible to and for others. As a teacher, I have obligations to my students, and not only because they or their parents pay my salary. As an academic professional, I have obligations to my colleagues. As a writer, my duty is to present my ideas as clearly as I can. But as a scholar, I have only one principal obligation: to my quest for understanding.

The public may not want me to have this obligation, and it has many ways at its disposal to prevent me from fulfilling it. One of them is to ignore me, but another, equally problematic, would be to embrace me. To owe the public something, I must spurn both its lack of interest and its attention. That does not make me an academic mandarin, shut off from the public altogether. If I
want to take the public seriously, I ought to demand that it take me seriously, and demand that it recognize that I am striving to produce the best scholarship I can.

Scholars also owe the public their respect. If I ask people to work with me so that together we might figure things out, I am flattering and consulting with the public, but I am not giving the public the respect of challenging it, disagreeing with it and, most important, accepting its views as already formed and coherent. What more insulting word can one choose to describe the public’s views in a democracy than “inchoate”?

There is an American public already in place, quite comfortable about making its views known via talk radio, letters to the editor, and electoral activity. Asking scholars to “enlarge public understanding” — Rosen’s words — is a way of saying that scholars do not like the understandings the public already has. This is why relying on the ideas of John Dewey, one of our most idealistic philosophers, is always a bit troubling; Dewey preferred a public that did not yet exist to the one whose influence could be felt everywhere around him. As a result, Dewey’s democratic instincts, always so palpably clear in his writings, can easily become undemocratic in the hands of social engineers convinced that the public’s understanding leaves something to be desired.

Dewey had his politics, and so do advocates for public scholarship. Public scholars cannot be neutral toward the issues of the day while taking sides on the question of how engaged the public should be, precisely because the question of the public’s engagement is one of the pressing issues of the day.

A significant number of Americans hold views on such topics as abortion, prayer in schools, homosexuality, and loyalty to one’s country — all premised on deep faith and the acceptance of traditional authority. An academic who seeks to bring them into a public dialogue with others of differing views does not pose a problem for those who like to argue, but that same scholar violates the desires of people who want to keep some issues off the public agenda entirely. Public scholarship’s commitments to openness, tolerance, intelligence, and fairness place it squarely in the liberal tradition. All of which is fine — I am a liberal myself. Let’s just not be surprised if the public, or at least the conservative portion thereof, remains a bit suspicious of the scholars who come asking for cooperation in deciding what we ought to value.

Any inklings I might have had that public scholarship is poli-
tics by other means were confirmed at the Kettering meeting by an example offered in a positive light by Kettering's president, David Mathews. Alejandro Sanz de Santamaria teaches economics at the University of the Andes, in Bogotá, Colombia. In undertaking a project to examine how migration patterns in a peasant community called García Rovira were affecting economic development, Sanz was overwhelmed by the rich diversity and human characteristics of people generally lumped together under the designation "peasant," and he found himself unable to produce the abstract knowledge demanded by traditional scholarship.

That kind of thing does happen in social research, perhaps not often enough; it is difficult to study real people without being impressed by their determination to lead their own lives. But to go from that discovery into an existential crisis — along the way invoking names such as Paulo Freire, Michel Foucault, and Alan Watts — is, I think, a bit of an overreaction. Only someone who was naïve about the real world in the first place could conclude, as Sanz does, that "the broader, most profound implication of this research experience as I have lived it — and made sense of it — is political: It has revealed to me the totalitarian nature of the exercise of social power that is ingrained in the conventional forms of producing and using economic knowledge."

And when Sanz goes on to describe his remedy "a continuous, endless practice in exploring new specific ways to relate to people in the classroom, in my research" I shudder. Endless politics, no thanks — I would rather see people carve out a private sphere in which they could remain free of those who intend to engage them around the clock in ways that strike me as eerily similar to the "totalitarian" power being denounced.

If veterans of the 1960s ought to have absorbed one lesson from the past 30 years, it is that truths seemingly established at one point in time look very different at another: people who strongly believed in color-blind principles are now enthusiastic about affirmative action; some feminists who once thought women were fundamentally different from men may now believe they are fundamentally the same; the right to privacy looks good when abortion is the issue but looks bad when domestic abuse is the issue.

When intellectual trends go in and out of fashion, Americans also need to know that those who put their knowledge in service to the public are worthy of the public's trust. When I write, I do not
expect my readers to agree with me. But I want them to believe that the ideas I am offering have some relationship to the empirical data I have collected, are the product of sustained reflection, and are not being advanced today to be retracted tomorrow. If I want to serve the needs of the oppressed and the downtrodden, the best I can offer them is the same truth I would offer the policymakers and the powerful. That is where my obligation to the public begins. And it is also, I think, where it ends.

Jay Rosen and the other participants at the Kettering conference and I agreed that a lot of academic scholarship is trivial. At least in the social sciences, we would also agree that such triviality is caused by the fact that academics have lost touch with the public they study. For me, however, this is not a symptom of “private” scholarship to be improved by going public, but an indication of bad scholarship to be cured by making it better. For all the ills of modern scholarship, the best remedy is still the most old-fashioned: Do your job as best you can, put out your results as clearly as you can, and argue with and try to persuade those who remain unconvinced.
In a 1932 essay, “The Scholar in a Troubled World,” Walter Lippmann pointed to a “special uneasiness which perturbs the scholar.” On the one hand, the student of human affairs “feels that he ought to be doing something about the world’s troubles, or at least saying something which will help others to do something about them.” On the other hand, “the voice of another conscience,” that of the scholar, urges “a quiet indifference to the immediate and a serene attachment to the processes of inquiry and understanding.” Lippmann continued:

Thus his spirit is divided between the urgency of affairs and his need for detachment. If he remains cloistered and aloof, he suffers in the estimation of the public, which asks impatiently to know what all this theorizing is good for anyway if it does not show a way out of the trouble. If he participates in affairs, he suffers no less. For it will quickly be revealed that the scholar has no magic of his own, and to the making of present decisions he may have less to contribute than many who have studied his own subject far less than he. But most of all he suffers in his own estimation: he dislikes himself as he pronounces conclusions he only half believes; he distrusts himself, and the scholarly life, because, when the practical need for knowledge is great, all the books in all the libraries leave so much unsettled.

While Lippmann acknowledged the lure of engagement — and, indeed, succumbed to it in his own career — in 1932 he came down on the side of “quiet indifference.” His reasoning is instructive. At “the point where knowledge is to be applied in action, there is a highly variable and incalculable factor.” This factor is “public opinion,” which
Lippmann held in rather low esteem. The need to figure in the “particular mixtures of understanding and ignorance, partisanship and propaganda, national, sectional, sectarian, and class prejudice, then prevailing among the people” lends an “immense uncertainty” to public life.

On a “foundation of merely transient opinions derived from impressions of the moment, undirected by any abiding conception of personal and social values,” no workable science of politics can be built. It takes a different kind of animal to cope with this unpredictable force, a “man of affairs” who understands the shifting moods of the masses. “Those who have this gift must be immersed in affairs; they must absorb more than they analyze; they must be subtly sensitive to the atmosphere around them; they must, like a cat, be able to see in the dark.”

Lacking this kind of animal sensitivity to the mind of the public-as-herd, the scholar must find the “courage to preserve that detachment which his instinct demands.” Thus, courage, long held to be among the political virtues, is here equated with a reasoned withdrawal from politics. Defending the enterprise of mind against the tyranny of the moment, the wise scholar “will build a wall against chaos, and behind that wall, as in other bleak ages in the history of man, he will give his true allegiance, not to the immediate world, but to the invisible empire of reason.” So ran Lippmann’s advice on how to live the life of the mind in the depths of the Great Depression.

I’m reminded of these thoughts of Lippmann’s in forming a reply to Alan Wolfe’s wise and challenging essay, “The Promise and Flaws of Public Scholarship.”

Not that Wolfe is heir to Lippmann’s dismissive treatment of the average citizen’s abilities. On the contrary, he wants scholars (and “public scholars”) to respect the public and its ideas in a way that Lippmann did not. And he has no use for the cult of expertise that is so sharply visible in Public Opinion (1922) and its sequel, The Phantom Public (1925), Lippmann’s classic works on the problems of modern democracy.

In Wolfe’s view, the scholar has no business trying to improve the people who are the public, or to “engage them round the clock” in deliberations they may not want or need. For to do so is to treat their understandings as somehow inadequate, merely on the scholar’s say-so; it is to interfere in their opinions because one does not favor those opinions; it is to reject people’s right to avoid
the public square when they choose to tend to their own lives. This is not respect, says Wolfe. It is condescending, or, worse, manipulative. It may even become "totalitarian" in the wrong hands.

Respect to Wolfe means two things: first, accept the public and its views for what they are, not as we wish them to be; and then, speak truth to the public — and simultaneously to power. The kind of truth he has in mind comes with patient study, scrupulous data, clear writing, and the determination to be heard. This, Wolfe says, is good scholarship, the kind we now need. But there is no need to label it "public" scholarship, a term that may lead in dangerous directions.

When Wolfe says, "as a scholar, I have only one principal obligation: to my quest for understanding," I want to say: yes, but with whom is that quest to be shared? When Wolfe writes approvingly of "the rigorous clarity imposed by the need to make one's ideas available to outsiders," I want to ask: but what about making those "outsiders" available to one's ideas? Similarly, when Wolfe describes public scholarship as "politics by other means," I want to query him: what meaning of "politics" does he imply?

It cannot be the one Michael Sandel advanced in the majestic and final line of his book, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*: 
"... when politics goes well we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone." For that is the kind of "political" work that scholars can, I think, start doing, without condescending to the public, imposing on it their utopian dreams, or losing all claim to independent and truth-seeking status.

Wolfe seems to think that what we mean by "public" scholarship is politicized work. Thus, he writes:

As disastrous as it may have been, the scholarship that government officials used to justify the war in Vietnam was, in its way, public scholarship.

He anticipates that our objection to this provocative remark will show us taking up sides. "No, no," he imagines our saying, "We don't mean scholarly work that helps the government in prosecuting an unjust war. We mean work that aids the poor, the marginalized, the silent, and the oppressed." In other words, public scholars are would-be liberals seeking liberal reforms, and the scholarship they propose is work that is politicized in service of "good" rather than "bad" causes.

That is far from the way I see it, although I have no automat-
ic objection to politicized scholarship save the mighty risks it entails when intellectuals lend their talents to a "cause." What I mean by public scholarship is something different because "public," for me implies something different than it does for Wolfe. A public scholar is neither a scold nor a servant of the polity. He or she is in the business of inquiry: trying to learn something that is hard to learn without investigation, patience, and a commitment to truth-telling, including the hard truths that polities and politicians may wish to avoid. But instead of seeing inquiry as a solitary venture, or a professional mission undertaken with academic colleagues, or the sort of truth-on-demand that policymakers expect from their hired hands, the public scholar views the work to be done as "public" work.

This means a number of things: first, the scholar's work is made to be shared with others outside the professional domain of academic inquiry; second, the quest to know originates in some problem or challenge that could usefully be called "public" business; third, the others with whom one is inquiring are not limited to experts, policy professionals, academics, or government officials seeking technical advice, but may include all manner of people: neighborhoods trying to build their capacity to work together and achieve common aims; journalists seeking a stronger civic identity; communities facing mounting problems that require people to deliberate and cooperate in novel ways; parents, teachers, administrators, students, and concerned citizens wondering why the latest "fix" failed to solve the problems of their schools; police departments and the people they're pledged to serve who want safer streets but no longer believe they can be bought with budgets; librarians who want public libraries to gain a more vital role in the life of the community.

In all of these cases, scholars seeking a more "public" role for themselves may prove invaluable to various publics — if they can use their skills to name and frame problems so that others can "own" them; if they can translate among civic dialects and find a shared language that all can profitably speak; if they can lend to the discussion a conceptual clarity that excludes no one while adding to the intellectual capital all can draw on as they grapple
with civic challenges; if they can share their deep understanding of the roots of public problems in a manner that speaks to everyday experience without trivializing the difficulties involved; if they can exercise their civic imaginations in a way that nourishes the “possibility of Possibility,” without which no public can labor for long; and if they can undertake all of these tasks with a decent respect for the views and interests of others with whom they may disagree on many things.

Now these are challenging tasks for which scholars are well equipped. Or rather, they can begin to equip themselves for such work if they see it as central, rather than peripheral, to their identity as intellectuals in a democratic society. None requires the learned mind to cave in to public prejudices, or climb aboard the bandwagon of this or that politician. None is equivalent to the forms of address favored by those we call “public intellectuals,” who write for a general audience on matters of the moment. And none will seem important to the scholar who, with Lippmann, builds a “wall against chaos” and gives allegiance, “not to the immediate world, but to the invisible empire of reason.”

To be sure, we need people who can withdraw to a life of serious contemplation, and return with the advanced forms of understanding by which scholarly knowledge develops. We need civic-spirited intellectuals like Alan Wolfe, who feel they owe the public their best estimate of what’s happening and why. But we also need people ready for a different kind of work — done, not for the public or its elected officials, but with people who are trying to become a public, a community able to know in common what its members cannot know alone and to imagine the possibilities their democracy may yet afford.

And this other kind of work — which we have called, in the spirit of inquiry, “public scholarship” — over time does its work upon the scholar, who may find that what seemed like an adequate understanding (when the understanders were fellow professionals) is in need of a revision and renewal that is ultimately personal. It is personal because it involves the meaning of one’s life and work as a trained mind among other minds, trained by their own experience — fellow citizens, in other words, struggling, in their diverse ways, to grasp and treat the problems of a shifting and troubled world.

“My obligation to the public is to offer it what I know,” says Alan Wolfe. But I believe we are speaking less of obligation than of
opportunity: to begin knowing in a way that offers the scholar a broader field for understanding than the understanding of one's "field" that now prevails in the American university. Public scholarship, by whatever name it comes to be called, partakes of the grand tradition of experiment on which the country was founded. It asks scholars to experiment on themselves and their ways of knowing, to see if they can't become more useful to a nation that is still in search of usable present.

Call it "political" work if you wish; but to assume that it must be politicized is to end the experiment where it properly begins.
In a brief article in the 1996 issue of the Higher Education Exchange, William Sullivan calls for a new kind of expertise, more civic than technical in orientation, which will seek to tap new energies, insights, and knowledge through engaging people in creating together a new definition, analysis, and evaluation of key issues and problems. This new kind of expertise, Sullivan writes, will require a “reinvention” of a public orientation to intellectual life within higher education. It will require moving beyond the insularity of the “applied research” model of the post-World War II era technocratic university, toward a new model of “active partnership and shared responsibility in addressing problems whose moral and public dimensions are openly acknowledged.” Given the entrenched nature of the applied research model, this will, as he notes, not be an easy task. Yet recent efforts at civic engagement, both inside and outside higher education, are helping to make the environment fertile for such a move.

Sullivan and others who are calling for “public scholarship” as one means for addressing America’s current civic crisis have struck on a powerful idea with deep but mostly forgotten roots. The seeds of a model of active partnership and shared responsibility in higher education were planted in the late nineteenth century in the rich soil of America’s land-grant colleges and universities. These institutions were once understood, in Charles Kendall Adams’ words, as “creations and possessions of the people.” Resting on something called the “land-grant idea,” they emerged from a conscious shift in American higher education toward public rather than private purpose: toward the ideal of a higher education “of, by, and for the commonwealth.”

The land-grant idea carried with it an important democratic
promise which went far beyond expanding opportunities for social and economic mobility in pursuit of the Jeffersonian ideal of America as a “democratic” meritocracy. The larger democratic promise involved a conscious effort to forge connections between work, education, and citizenship. It took its most dramatic form in the rise of agricultural extension, which was turned into a national Cooperative Extension System under the Smith-Lever Act of 1914.

The Smith-Lever Act launched an ambitious experiment in higher education through the creation of a system of partnerships between a federal government agency (the United States Department of Agriculture), land-grant institutions, state and local governments, and the general citizenry. This system would eventually place at least one educator tied to a land-grant college or university in every county in the United States. By the 1940s, the Cooperative Extension System had become the largest rural adult education agency in the world. Initially focused exclusively on agriculture and rural life, it gradually expanded its work to a wide range of issues in urban as well as rural areas.

A striking historical parallel to Sullivan’s call for a new civic expertise and a public orientation to higher education can be found in the establishment of this system, especially in the writings of one of its most important architects, Liberty Hyde Bailey (1858-1954). Bailey, an accomplished and remarkably public-spirited scientist, served as dean of the New York State College of Agriculture at Cornell University from 1903 to 1913. Though he is not widely known today, he was arguably one of this century’s premier public intellectuals, devoting his abundant talents and energy to broad public work, including serving as chair of President Theodore Roosevelt’s 1908 Commission on Country Life.

In his many books, speeches, and articles, Bailey emphasized the need to understand the limitations of technical knowledge and expertise in addressing the problems and challenges of rural life. He repeatedly argued that the “great rural interests are human rather than technically agricultural.” In a 1904 essay on the meaning of agricultural education, Bailey wrote that the word “agriculture” had “taken on a new and enlarged meaning.” He wrote that farmers were not only producers of commodities, but also “citizens, members of the commonwealth.” Because of this, Bailey felt that their education must deal “not alone with technical farming, but also with all the affairs that make up an agricultural
community.” This view carried significant implications for landgrant colleges and universities. In a key speech in 1907, Bailey declared that it was time for these institutions to take on a much larger scope of work. Rather than focusing only on increasing agricultural efficiency and productivity, they needed to “deal also with the farm as a part of the community and consider farming interests with reference to the welfare and the weal of the commonwealth.”

While Bailey’s calls for enlarging the scope of work in landgrant education have been linked to the creation of a new academic specialization — rural sociology — that was not his central goal. Rather, Bailey wanted to reshape teaching, research, and extension practices in higher education such that they would contribute to developing an active citizenship which might help build a vital rural society. In one of the most powerful articulations of his educational views, Bailey wrote:

It is not sufficient to train technically in the trades and crafts and arts to the end of securing greater economic efficiency — this may be accomplished in a despotism and result in no self-action on the part of the people. Every democracy must reach far beyond what is commonly known as economic efficiency, and do everything it can to enable those in the backgrounds to maintain their standing and their pride and to partake in the making of political affairs.1

Here, Bailey gave voice to what the late Christopher Lasch called the most important choice a democratic society has to make. In Lasch’s words, this choice was “whether to raise the general level of competence, energy, and devotion — ‘virtue,’ as it was called in an older political tradition — or merely to promote a broader recruitment of elites.”2 With the founding of cooperative extension, a new means for pursuing the former of these was brought into being.

The Cooperative Extension System in its first few decades incorporated Bailey’s vision in its deeply civic mission. The shape of this mission was captured in the opening paragraph of one of the first major books on cooperative extension, authored in 1930 by Clarence Smith and Meredith Wilson:

There is a new leaven at work in rural America. It is stimulating to better endeavor in farming and home making, bringing rural people together in groups for social inter-
course and study, solving community and neighborhood problems, fostering better relations and common endeavor between town and country, bringing recreation, debate, pageantry, the drama and art into the rural community, developing cooperation and enriching the life and broadening the vision of rural men and women. This new leaven is the cooperative extension work of the state agricultural colleges and the federal Department of Agriculture, which is being carried on in cooperation with the counties and rural people throughout the United States.  

Smith and Wilson felt that one of the most “significant and distinguishing” principles of cooperative extension work was the principle of a full partnership between citizens and government. They wrote that cooperative extension had “begun a new experiment in government, where federal, state, and county government and local people all cooperate in financing, planning, and carrying out a great constructive movement in rural education and progress.” The principle of a full partnership meant that in extension work the knowledge, experience, ideas, and values of community members were to count at least as much as those of the faculty, specialists, and administrators employed by the universities and the government. They wrote:

Important and helpful knowledge is resident in every community that, if generally applied, would greatly improve agriculture there. This local knowledge may be as significant for the up-building of the community as anything the government may bring in from the outside. The county agent and other extension forces find out and spread this local knowledge.  

Smith and Wilson called for citizens and the “agents of government” to meet around a “common council table” where they could systematically discuss problems and needs. In such meetings, specialists would “bring to the conference their technical knowledge . . . while the farmers and their wives [sic] bring their experiences of the years in the community and knowledge of what has succeeded, what is likely to succeed and what may fail.” Out of these meet-
ings there would arise a “common plan of work for the benefit of the community.” Cooperative extension work in these terms was understood as a kind of public work, where the visible, creative efforts of a mix of people would produce things of lasting public value not only for local communities but for the nation as a whole. Engaging citizens in the cocreation of knowledge through what can be called “public scholarship” was clearly a key part of this work.

There is, however, another side to the story of the development of cooperative extension work. From the very beginning, there was significant debate and disagreement over exactly why a national system of cooperative extension was needed, what it was specifically supposed to accomplish, and how it ought to go about accomplishing it. The center of the conflict involved a disagreement over whether cooperative extension work was to be devoted to purely technical and economic ends — specifically, to increasing the productivity and efficiency of agriculture through the spread and adoption of scientific knowledge, methods, and technologies — or whether it was also to be devoted to enhancing and developing other aspects of rural life, including its civic, cultural, social, and even spiritual dimensions. This is a crucial conflict with major implications for the broader meaning and promise of land-grant education as a whole. It reflects an ongoing struggle over the relative importance and interpretation of the two kinds of education land-grant institutions are supposed to provide.

The land-grant system's founding legislation, the Morrill Act of 1862, called for the creation of a system of higher education devoted to both a “liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions in life.” As Wendell Berry eloquently argued in his important book, The Unsettling of America, the key to the promise behind this idea depended on an understanding of this formula as referring to a unity of liberal and practical elements in one education. The dividing of the formula in practice into separate tracks or options — a liberal or practical education — has, according to Berry, corrupted the promise by setting liberal and practical elements against each other as opposing rather than unifying ideals.

Liberty Hyde Bailey, along with Smith, Wilson, and many others, stood for the establishment of a cooperative extension work which would model a unifying of liberal and practical aims. There were others, however, who felt that the “practical” (i.e., economic)
aim of increasing agricultural productivity and efficiency was what really mattered. Attention to civic questions began to be viewed as a distraction from the work of pursuing economic progress and technical efficiency through applying science to farming and what was then called “home making.” This view grew in part out of the rapid development of specializations in agricultural science, which increasingly took on the insular and narrow character of the technocratic applied research model. It was given added weight by the gradual shift in rural life in the twentieth century from a “producerist” to a consumer culture.

The shift to a consumer culture involved a narrowing of understandings of the sources and nature of wealth, along with an erosion of the civic or public meanings of work. The severing of the relationship between work and citizenship was reflected in the teaching, research, and extension practices of land-grant institutions. The old idea that farming was a “way of life” carried with it civic overtones that had informed the nature and scope of higher education’s role. The new idea promoted by land-grant institutions, that farming was merely a “business,” stripped away civic meaning, leaving the pursuit of technical efficiency and economic growth as these institutions’ main objectives.

In its simultaneous pursuit of scientific expertise, technical efficiency, and active citizenship, cooperative extension mirrored the contradictory tendencies of progressivism. Over time, the pursuit of scientific expertise and technical efficiency became the dominating force in cooperative extension, pushing its civic mission to the margins. This civic mission was never entirely lost, however. It was pursued by many over the years, leaving a great legacy of public work which continues into the present. A “public scholarship” built on active partnerships and shared responsibilities between university faculty, extension educators, and community members has been and continues to be an important part of this legacy.

There have been numerous projects and experiments in recent years which have begun to demonstrate the potential power of cooperative extension as a force for “reinventing” the public orientation of intellectual life in higher education in our time. One of the most interesting of these is a collaborative, community-based research project connected to Wisconsin Cooperative Extension called the “Teen Assessment Project” (TAP). Created in the late 1980s by Stephen A. Small, a professor and extension specialist...
from the Department of Child and Family Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, TAP provides a means for communities to collaborate with extension educators and university faculty in conducting their own research on the needs and problems faced by adolescents.

TAP grew out of an important and somewhat painful lesson Small learned in his experience working with county extension educators. He discovered that the standard approach of the university to helping communities address issues related to adolescents — which mainly involved disseminating the findings of empirical studies designed and implemented by professional researchers — was ineffective. Community members were often skeptical of professional research findings, for the good reason that they often did not reflect local experience. In addition, since communities typically had no involvement in designing or producing such studies, the approach did little to generate or tap local knowledge, and little to effectively spur community action. Frustration with this situation led Small and others to consider adopting an action research approach in their work with communities. Thus, out of firsthand experience with the weaknesses of the standard applied research model in mind, Small and his colleagues created TAP.

Through a local steering committee composed of parents, youth, public officials, clergy, teachers, and others, communities participating in TAP generate questions about their young people that they would like to have answered by a survey. They partner with the university in designing survey measures, and in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating data. The whole process involves a diverse range of people working together in an open, public setting. It produces results and knowledge that contribute both to the practical concerns of local citizens and the scholarly goals of university faculty.

More than 200 Wisconsin communities have participated in TAP, and the program process has been replicated in 12 other states. Results of TAP surveys have been useful in shaping numerous school and community policies and programs. TAP has also sparked the creation of several community coalitions and task forces addressing issues uncovered by the local surveys. In Wisconsin, it has led to other initiatives that have expanded and deepened university-community relationships.

TAP and other initiatives have shown the continuing power of cooperative extension as a "leavening" agent in local commu-
ties. But they have also demonstrated cooperative extension’s role in “leavening” higher education. To “leaven” is to “permeate with a transforming influence.” By providing an internal means for forging collaborations between communities and faculty members on matters of public concern, cooperative extension is helping to transform academic culture. At their best, these collaborations are vehicles for public work, where a mix of people together create meaningful public products, tap and catalyze diverse resources, and cultivate and develop key democratic skills.

On the national level, the mission of the Cooperative Extension System is to “enable people to improve their lives and communities through learning partnerships that put knowledge to work.” As a part of the Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service, the Cooperative Extension System brings together a tremendous range of resources, including hundreds of millions of dollars of research funds, 105 land-grant colleges and universities, over 9,600 local extension educators, 9,500 scientists, and more than 3 million volunteers nationwide. While this system is still dominated by the applied research model, and while it is still fraught with the dilemmas and tensions created by its contradictory pursuit of scientific expertise, technical efficiency, and active citizenship, space is beginning to open to make it a powerful force for the shaping of a new public scholarship for the next century.

References
4 Ibid., p.20.
5 The use of the phrase, “farmers and their wives,” suggests that all farmers in the first part of this century were men. This was not the case. According to USDA statistics, in 1920 there were more than 260,000 farms in the United States which were being operated by women. See William A. Lloyd, County Agricultural Agent Work Under the Smith-Lever Act, 1914-1924 (Washington, DC: USDA, 1926).
CIVIC EDUCATION IN
A NEW KEY

By Bernard Murchland

This story begins with the publication of a Pew report entitled "To Dance With Change," which appeared in April 1994. It focused on the driving forces in American society that are changing the face of higher education.

The report identified the three most important of these forces as: a rising anxiety about jobs and careers among Americans of all ages; the emergence of technologies that are creating new markets for and new providers for higher education; and the trend on the part of policymakers to rely on marketlike mechanisms to define the public good. These forces are of such a magnitude, the report stated, that "no institution will emerge unscathed" from this external environment that is not only significantly different from times past but is more hostile as well to colleges and universities.

There is no doubt that the public at large holds a deep animus toward higher education. There is a big anger out there. Why is this? Why has it become politically popular to put down universities? Why are there so many bestsellers bashing education? The Pew report wrestles with these questions and parades all the usual suspects before us: the tenure system, abstruse research, light teaching loads, the bogs of political correctness, loss of community and retreat from the public. There is a sense among policymakers, the report states, that higher education has not met its obligations to the society of which it is a part. "What troubles public officials, commentators, business leaders, and policymakers is their sense that too many institutions too regularly graduate students without sufficient skills to be either effective workers or informed citizens. Even the best and the brightest, they argue, too often exhibit a self-centered aggressiveness rendering them incapable of working with others... a sense that today's graduates cannot collaborate but only compete."
The report concluded with three recommendations for change, namely: a shift of funding from faculty salaries to technology to bring funds for the former closer to 50 percent of the total E&G budget instead of the present 80 percent; changing the curriculum away from specialized topics taught in small classes to core courses taught in large-lecture and/or computerized and distance-learning formats; and finally, a redesign of academic departments as instructional "collectives" where teaching, research, and service are collective rather than individual responsibilities.

Our story now moves to New Orleans, April 1995, where the National Collegiate Honors Council (NCHC) gave its annual meeting over to a study of the Pew report. In general, the NCHC membership agreed with the Pew analysis. They were experiencing those changes, sometimes keenly, on their own campuses. All in all, NCHC reacted to the Pew report in a positive manner, accepting it as a challenge to improve their own programs.

But they had some serious reservations as well. In particular, they took umbrage at some of Pew's recommendations for the pedagogical applications of technology. And indeed, those recommendations were somewhat scary for traditional educators. For example, "The simple connection of e-mail makes possible a system of rapid and frequent interaction between students and those who evaluate and encourage their progress. The results can be improved student mentoring as well as an enriched form of Socratic inquiry." Socratic inquiry? Really!

Or again: "What telemarketing and phone banks did for catalog sales, what Quality Value Convenience Network, Inc. (QVC) did for home shopping, what ATMs did for banking, the information highway is about to do for distance learning and higher education." The Pew writers seem here to be unnecessarily overcome by the corporate ethos now running through the land like wildfire. Apples and oranges are being rather irresponsibly mixed in such claims and the NCHC understandably took exception.

As Ada Long, NCHC president, wrote in her report of the New Orleans retreat, "the student participants in the retreat were unanimous and emphatic in their insistence that the up close, personal, high touch components of education should not be sacrificed in the irreplaceable value of this personal connection"
between students and faculty works in creating excellent education." NCHC also resisted the bottom-line mentality that seemed to pervade much of the report noting that "the emphasis on earning power is a short-term, tunnel-visioned approach that ultimately undermines both individual and social development. "To follow such a recommendation too literally would result in uncreative and dreary learning communities."

But on the whole, NCHC agreed that the problems described in the report were both "real and serious" and they seized the opportunity to do something about them. To begin with, they accepted the report's challenge to join the national dialogue on higher education and make a serious attempt to bridge the gap between higher education and the general public. The NCHC was particularly sensitive to the report's charge that we are turning out students who are, so to speak, civically tone-deaf. The NCHC's resolution in this regard read as follows: "To address the misunderstanding and increasing hostility toward higher education among public policymakers and also the media and the public, the NCHC will develop local discourse forums on higher education. The purpose of these forums will be to create a conversation between the NCHC and the public in order to find a common ground to raise the level of discourse."

We now come to the third chapter of our story. As it happened Bill Gwin, a NCHC member and a professor at Auburn University, had been learning the techniques of deliberative dialogue in NIF forums in Alabama. He was quick to see a natural fit between NIF (a national network of more than 5,000 civic and educational organizations that sponsor local discussions on national issues) and what NCHC wanted to do. In due course, Gwin and a delegation from NCHC approached the Kettering Foundation for preliminary discussions. A mutuality of interests was soon established and a seven-step plan to encourage national dialogue on higher education was drawn up.

The first order of business was the NIF discussion book on higher education. Representatives of NCHC met in December of 1995 at the Kettering Foundation to frame the issue book. "We thought this would be a relatively easy step," Bill Gwin told me. "But we were wrong. It was hard going and we changed our minds many times and went through many different versions of the book." The difficulties NCHC encountered go to the very heart
of civic dialogue: issues must be formulated so as to elicit deliberation and responsible action; they must capture the tensions that exist in people's values; and they must seek the common ground that exists beneath the tensions and differences of opinion. "The point of the exercise," Gwin said, "is to pull together the wisdom of citizens and not their ignorance. When we think about the consequences of our choices then we have to be much more responsible about the choices themselves."

After a practice forum the NCHC group got down to business. Julia Conaway Bondanella, one of their NCHC representatives on the framing team, reported on the experience in the Spring 1996 issue of the National Honors Report. We began, she wrote, by defining and describing the publicly voiced concerns about higher education such as cost, scholarly research, the quality of instruction, faculty-student interaction, career concerns, the uses of technology, accountability, and the like. The group then considered how different constituencies (students, parents, professors, administrators, politicians, policy experts, the public) see these issues. In a next step what kinds of actions might be taken were considered in response to the different concerns of different constituencies. For each response the group analyzed who might be involved in the process of making and implementing decisions. Finally, the group set about organizing the concerns of all parties in light of the values and the different actors.

Three clusters were identified:
(1) the concerns of citizens and public officials about costs, efficiency, and accountability; (2) concerns of students, parents, and academics about quality or outcomes and whether the skills of liberal learning provide proper vocational skills; and (3) the concern for access and fairness in higher education on the part of the public.

When the issues of higher education were framed in light of the controversies that divide higher education and the public the following cluster emerged: (1) Get What We Pay For; (2) Pay for What We Need; and (3) Invest in What Should Be.
The first option addresses the worries of parents and students that costs are out of sight; the second pays respect to vocational concerns; and the third recognizes the traditional ideal of liberal education to prepare people not only for work but for a meaningful life.

And that was only the beginning! Different versions of the issue books were tested in over 50 forums and each test shed new light on the framing process. For example, Gwin said, “We soon learned that cost is not really what’s bothering people. Folks can find some level of education they can afford.” I asked him what was bothering people. He answered that one big problem was the motivation on the part of students. Another was problems in society at large, like parental noninvolvement in their children’s education and popular culture, that militated against quality education. Another was that people are not as narrowly concerned with jobs as the Pew report would indicate; people still want a better all-round life from their education.

Still another was the fact that the majority of students today are adults who are paying their own way. They are not traditional, rite-of-passage students. One conclusion seemed apparent to Gwin: “If the majority of our students are not traditional then we can’t educate them in traditional ways.” He told me a story from one of the forums. A participant said she had been sent to two colleges by her parents and dropped out of both. After some years in the work force she went back to college. This time she is paying her own way. “That makes all the difference,” she said. “When my parents were paying for it it didn’t mean as much.” Responsibility is an issue.

The forum experience led to yet further revisions of the issue book. The present version reflects the concerns of previous editions but in a new mix, with different emphases. The new book is entitled Preparing for a Good Future: What Kind of Education Do We Need after High School? All of us, the introduction says, want to be prepared for the future but how we prepare depends on what we think the future will be like. And it depends on what we want from the future. Preparing for a Good Future considers three scenarios or, in the language of the issue books, choices.

Choice #1 - Give an Appropriate Education. Not everyone should go to college. Resources might well be spent on a strong high school education or on technical and trade schools. The
implied criticism in this position is that there are too many students in college who ought not be there and the whole system suffers accordingly. We have to develop convincing alternatives to posthigh school education. The theme sounded here is “different folks, different strokes.” The challenge is to provide different kinds of education to match different talents and interests of different people. Europe is far ahead of us in this regard. The perhaps downside of this option is less monies for university-level education and no doubt fewer universities. This could be a good thing, if for no other reason than it will refocus attention on K-12 where our root problems lie.

Choice #2 - Educate for a New Economy. The anxiety about jobs is real and deep. There is no point in arguing with the public on this score. The economy is changing and the unprepared will be at a serious disadvantage. The high-tech global economy will be the backdrop to our educational efforts for the foreseeable future. The issue book does not call for job-specific skills because these change and no one knows what will be required in the future. What is called for is an emphasis on technology, math, and science skills. Here again, the U.S. lags behind other countries. Some quite radical curricular reforms are implied in this proposal.

Choice #3 - Educate for Life. This harkens back to the liberal arts ideal of educating the whole person for a full life, an ideal that has taproots in American culture and will not go away. The premise here is that we are members of a society, not just an economy. Instruction should be required in a core of courses covering such subjects as history, languages, music, and the arts. And don't forget ethics and philosophy. Perhaps the linchpin of this kind of education is some modern version of the civic humanism tradition. “It is a fact,” Bill Gwin told me, “that we educate selfish students who lack the skills of collaborative activity and who lack a sufficiently broad knowledge of politics and community organizing to be effective problem solvers in their communities.”

We cannot speak of a good future without at the same time talking about a good society. The equation is infungible. We can argue endlessly about what constitutes a good society. But whatever our views, it minimally means that we, the citizens, are responsible for that society. What is today as clear as a commandment carved in stone is that if we are going to solve our social
problems we are going to have to join together as citizens. We are
going to have to educate not just for jobs, not just for some
abstract good life, but for a healthy civic society. We know a lot
about what such a society looks like; we even know a lot about
what makes it work; what we don't know is how to educate for it.

That is where NCHC in association with NIF can make a
signal contribution. “We have a unique voice,” says Gwin, “and we
have a long tradition of excellence in higher education. What we
have to do now is turn our energies to the critical problems we
face. I have no doubt we can become a player on the national
scene.”

I conclude with a quote from Daniel Yankelovich who has
thought deeply about this problem. “My abiding conviction,”
Yankelovich told me in an interview I did with him some years
ago, “is that there can be no effective public policy without an
effective citizen role in shaping it. Policies cannot succeed without
the acceptance, cooperation, and understanding of the citizens.
Virtually every important domestic change in the United States in
recent years has been bottom-up. It has come from the public, not
the leadership. From civil rights to the women's movement to tax
revolt, this has been the case. To an astonishing degree the public
has been the leader and the leadership has been the follower. To an
astonishing degree, that is the story of America.”
Barometers of the public mood reveal that Americans possess distressingly high levels of distrust in institutions designed to embody the ideals of governance by the people. This growing disconnect between the public and the government strains the fundamental legitimacy of democracy in the United States: if people feel that they can have no impact on governance, the decisions that are made by government will lack the moral authority of collective judgment. As political analysts and theorists attempt to diagnose the cause of this profound sense of public unease, they hope to find new ways of dealing with the problems that threaten the legitimacy of our democratic system.

The arrival of several recent books signals a renewed interest in deliberation as a means of strengthening the legitimacy of government. Deliberation is becoming recognized for what it uniquely contributes to democratic discourse that other forms of discourse — opinion polling, debate, bargaining, advocacy — lack. Part of the explanation for this resurgence of interest in deliberation may be a backlash against the harsher, discordant forms of speech so prevalent in public life. Laments about the demise of civility can be heard daily. But more than a mere attempt to refine superficial manners and restore civility, deliberation plays a vital role in the functioning of a vibrant political sphere. Its heightened presence in academic political discourse suggests renewed consideration of the public as being part of the solution to our democratic ailments.

In *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy*, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1996), Michael Sandel, a professor of government at Harvard, traces the history of how deliberation, as a necessary ingredient in self-government, has
been gradually eroded from the political philosophy of the United States. Civic republican theory, once the dominant political ideology in the U.S., holds that liberty depends on the ability of citizens to share in active self-government. However, such an approach necessitates a formative socialization process that cultivates the civic virtues needed to participate in the political community. Certain qualities or virtues are more favorable to citizens' self-governing capacity than others. The civic republican model could thus be said to posit a definite picture of "the good."

The version of liberalism that has eclipsed civic republicanism in the twentieth century and currently dominates U.S. institutions prioritized fair, "neutral" procedures over particular ends, such as advancing a specific conception of the good. Liberty, under this philosophy, consists of the capacity of people to make their own choices. Citizens have increasingly come to understand their political identities as "bearers of rights," devoid of any obligations to their communities that they do not voluntarily assume. Sandel argues that, because this rights-based brand of liberty cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement needed for self-government, Americans have become increasingly frustrated with political reality — and sense that they have lost control over government and their collective fate.

According to Sandel, this purportedly neutral conception of citizens' liberty contributes to the discontent many Americans feel because it robs them of their capacity to participate in establishing the conditions of their governance. Freedom, from the civic republican perspective, is not the mere preservation of individual autonomy through the defensive assertion of rights-based claims. While the liberal perspective does protect political minorities from possible oppressions of majorities, the irony is that there is frequently no coherent majority to speak of — witness elections in which candidates win by mere pluralities, hardly a cohesive "mandate" for particular policy directions.

The fragmented and balkanized state of public life belies the historical realities of the United States. America has long cultivated an image of the rugged individualist, whether in political history, literature, or folk culture. This emphasis may do a disservice to the patterns of vibrant community life that actually characterized much of our heritage. To be sure, many communities of the past were composed of homogeneous groups, where there was no great
difficulty in coming to agreement because of the absence of a wide range of values. Some scholars, in fact, advocate a return to communities based on overarching values that define a community’s “general will.”

Civic republicans base the viability of self-governed community on a common moral bond, the responsibilities arising from “belongingness.” Liberty can only be realized within a particular context. While the liberal conception would have us bracket the moral and religious aspects of our lives when we participate in the political arena, civic republicans realize that this denies a fundamental aspect of how we live. We are not just the sum total of our voluntary choices; we acquire obligations by where we are born and where we live our lives.

Any conception of liberty, then, cannot treat individuals as isolated from each other, ignoring the reality of citizens’ interdependence:

Sharing in self-rule . . . means deliberating with fellow citizens about the common good and helping to shape the destiny of the political community. But to deliberate well about the common good requires more than the capacity to choose one’s ends and to respect others’ rights to do the same. It requires a knowledge of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake.

Sandel, along with many others today, warns that the loss of this “concern for the whole” is the cause of what troubles citizens about society. When citizens feel that they have less control over the institutions that govern public life, it fosters a democratic crisis of legitimacy.

Legitimacy is created, in a democracy, by the moral authority of collective judgments. Public deliberation is the process through which citizens reach these collective judgments. Princeton’s Amy Gutmann and Harvard’s Dennis Thompson, in *Democracy and Disagreement* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 1996), extend Sandel’s critique of liberalism by elaborating a theory of deliberation that strives to foster mutual respect among citizens with conflicting values. Their emphasis is on reaching acceptable decisions on issues where people disagree on moral grounds. Gutmann and Thompson acknowledge the improbability of reaching absolute consensus on a given issue, claiming that deliberative
agreements are provisional and shifting often. Such a characteristic is necessary within a theory that presumes learning is a continuous and ongoing process. Moreover, deliberation's "self-correcting capacity cultivates the possibility of moral progress in democratic politics." Civic republican arguments are naive, the authors say, because moral disagreements are inevitable even in a society where citizens have been inculcated with civic virtues.

Addressing the collective moral authority requisite for legitimacy, Gutmann and Thompson identify four justifications for deliberation's role in the political process:

- deliberation contributes to the legitimacy of decisions made under conditions of resource scarcity;
- deliberation creates forums in which citizens are encouraged to take a broader perspective than they might otherwise take;
- deliberation clarifies the nature of a moral conflict; and
- deliberation increases the chances of arriving at justifiable policies.

Describing a framework for an ideal process of deliberation, Gutmann and Thompson identify three principles that need to be embodied in practice. The requirement of reciprocity asks that citizens reason beyond their narrow, individual self-interests. Where this quality is at work, citizens can recognize that other positions on issues are worthy of respect even though they think those particular positions are morally wrong. The second element of deliberation involves publicity, or the requirement that moral conflicts take place in public forums. The more public forums that are added, the authors note, the more previously excluded voices are brought into the deliberative process. Deliberation should be extended, Gutmann and Thompson claim, into the everyday forums of "middle democracy," where people associate and air political views. Finally, accountability must exist between the agents (i.e., citizens and public officials) to whom and by whom reasons for policies are publicly offered.

Idealized conditions of deliberation, however, are often criticized for their apparent inapplicability to modern life. The realities of a highly pluralistic society such as ours seem to dictate against the feasibility of collective agreement on issues. Public deliberation, critics suggest, is only possible in a society with a limited range of values.
James Bohman, a student of Jürgen Habermas in Frankfurt, Germany, argues to the contrary in Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1996): “It is through public deliberation that we can best preserve a cooperative, tolerant, and democratic form of pluralism.” Like other democratic scholars, he sees the legitimacy of political decisions as dependent on the collective judgment of citizens. To him, deliberation is a dialogical process, involving an “exchange of public reasons.” Through dialogue — the public testing of ideas through assertion, response, and shifting perspectives — diverse capacities for deliberation become jointly exercised among free and equal citizens. Freedom and equality are, in fact, the primary tests of public reason. Not only does public deliberation make democratic decision making legitimate, it tends to improve the quality of the decisions reached by subjecting ideas to a wide range of diverse opinions. The success of deliberation is determined, not by reaching consensus on an issue (that is realistically improbable) but by reaching a decision whose reasons motivate the continued cooperation of the citizens who are deliberating. The ongoing nature of deliberation is thus a fundamental criterion for its success.

For deliberation to work in a pluralistic society, it requires government not to presuppose a single public or a single impartial point of view. Political theories oriented to procedural fairness, like the liberal conception of freedom described by Sandel, actually posit a specific perspective of ostensible neutrality that imposes nondeliberative solutions. Rights-based liberalism, in setting up strict boundaries for moral conflict, does not provide incentive for future cooperation among citizens and thus does not, according to Bohman, offer a self-justifying process. Such a rigid framework contradicts the need for conceptual movement that exists through dialogue. Through the shifting of perspectives in the interchange of ideas, novel reinterpretations merge; public deliberation is thus a dynamic open-ended process of reflection and revision. Its focus on practical decisions in response to problems augments its capacity to legitimize political decisions.
Bohman offers a conception of the public sphere as more than a collection of forums; it also encompasses "a set of self-understandings by which a group of persons see themselves as a public."

The connections among these three works get at the fundamental sense of what is thought to be missing from politics today. The perceived crisis of legitimacy, where people feel powerless to influence the conditions of their governance, leads to an exploration of ways to express the underlying convictions that drive political life. It is a moral language, but not "moral" in the sense of rigidly defined rules of conduct. Rather, it is an openness to have our own sense of what is valuable tested against others' perceptions. It is a desire to belong to something larger, connected to the recognition that interdependence is the norm. The principles of deliberation address the tensions that exist among our diverse experiences and understandings of justice. Public deliberation, not voting, is the beginning of legitimacy in a democracy. It offers a means of discovering the things that most need expression in our common life.
I would like to end this exploration of scholarship and public life with a broader look at the relationship between institutions of higher education and what is happening in the civic realm. My guess is that the scholars who are going public could be part of a larger effort to rethink the place of colleges and universities in American public life. Deborah Witte's jigsaw may be part of a still bigger puzzle.

Today, higher education's relationship with the public is shaped by its three principal functions: research, instruction, and service. Institutions add to the store of human knowledge, transmit that knowledge to students, and make it available to those outside of academe through technical assistance. The public is not only the recipient of expert or professional knowledge, it is also a source of knowledge for some academics — sociologists and political scientists, for example.

The three activities are essential and have served the public interest well. Certainly the country will benefit if higher education provides first-rate research, instruction, and service. Yet, these three roles may not exhaust the possibilities for the work of colleges and universities in a democracy.

In the course of our history, the way institutions of higher learning have understood the public and positioned themselves in public life has changed considerably. Colonial colleges saw their mission as bringing civilization to a wilderness; they stamped public life with piety and classical culture. Institutions founded in the aftermath of the Revolution were intent on educating leaders for a new republic. Following the Civil War, practical education, a powerful imperative led to the creation of new land-grant institutions known as...
“people’s colleges.” Later, we imported from Europe a fascination with positivism and scientific research, which we institutionalized in research universities, charging them with responsibility for educating a new class of “professionals” to serve the true public interest and protect society from the overly emotional, often uninformed pressures of the populace. After World War II, concern that higher education was still not accessible to all prompted the expansion of community colleges. And, since midcentury, the role of our institutions has been shaped by the demands of the Cold War.

The Challenges of Civic Renewal

Now, at the end of the twentieth century, the country is facing rather different challenges. The post-Cold War world is a new world. The threat of nuclear war is not as great as it was, but threats to family and community seem far greater. Our civil society is less than civil on occasion and shows signs of deep divisions separating Americans from each other. Some say we are bowling too much alone but blowing up too much together (a reminder that all civic associations are not necessarily democratic or beneficent). We are voting less but delegitimizing our institutions more. Programs have proliferated but problems remain, like the bugs that have become resistant to our laboratories’ most powerful insecticides. Our pathologies mock expert solutions with implacable human realities.

America’s ability to respond to these challenges is undermined by a concept of democracy that some scholars describe as weak. We have turned once-sovereign citizens into insatiable consumers, who have lost much of the feeling of civic responsibility that accompanies a sense of sovereignty. Our idea of service, while admiringly promoting individual altruism, too often fails to include an appreciation of the necessity for collective action. Our major institutions, along with the professionals who serve them, are sometimes so estranged from the public that they cannot lead effectively. While properly accountable, their concept of the public is often too abstract for them to account for much of what really goes on in public life. It is particularly easy to miss what citizens are doing beyond volunteering — what they are doing to act on the causes of the problems that volunteers try to alleviate as political actors to create common ground, to promote common action, and to reinvigorate common life.
For example, it is easy to miss the unique way citizens learn and know how to act effectively in healthy civil societies. People are rediscovering the importance of those ways of knowing that lead to the creation of "practical wisdom," that ancient form of judgment that tells us how we should act when we have to choose among the many things we value.

What Is Higher Education Doing?

Although this edition of the Higher Education Exchange demonstrates that particular scholars and faculty members are in the front ranks of those trying to help our democracy take on new form and life, where are the institutions of higher education in this revitalization of American public life? Encouraged by a recent issue of Change magazine on the state of our civil society, the American Council on Education is moving ahead with a new project to reexamine civic responsibilities. And a group of faculty members and students in honors programs from the NCHC are already in the field with an unprecedented project to talk directly with the public about the hard choices that must be made on policy issues of mutual concern. They are being joined in sponsoring forums by the Association of Governing Boards and the Council for Advancement and Support of Education. These are a sign that some leaders of the academy are rethinking the way their institutions respond to the public and its problems (to borrow a phrase).

The potential for higher education to play a greater role in civic renewal is being enhanced by changes deep within the intellectual foundations of institutions. Just as citizens are rediscovering old ways of knowing, so are academics. Perhaps a consequence of natural scientists breaching the narrow confines of "objective" science, the technical rationality that has been so much in vogue may now have to share top billing with ways of knowing that grow out of interrogating shared human experience. That calls for the exercise of moral reasoning Aristotle and Isocrates wrote about and what today Jürgen Habermas calls communicative reasoning, or what citizens might describe as practical reasoning. While public scholarship is a deeply personal quest of academics who want to live public lives, it draws from the shift in what is considered valid human knowledge. Public scholarship has to produce the kind of knowledge needed in public life, which consists of those things that we can know only when we are together and never alone. That means public scholars have to find ways to become part of
the intense human exchanges needed to create such knowledge. (See page 74 on the experiences of Tom Michaud and others in public forums that provide some idea of what happens when scholars join citizens in generating knowledge rather than dispensing it.)

Rethinking how we know has powerful implications for higher education, particularly for research and the way institutions prepare "scientifically trained professionals." It couldn't come at a better time because deference to experts is declining, and the perception that professionals know best is being replaced by growing skepticism.

In order to respond more effectively to the challenges of civic renewal, institutions might also listen to what their own scholars are saying about what it takes to make a democracy work as it should, focusing particularly on their ideas about the role of the citizenry. The conventional wisdom about who constitutes the public and what it can do, captured in Walter Lippmann's obituary for a "phantom public," is open to question. In the 1990s, supposedly apathetic and happy to be led by professionals, citizens are showing themselves to be frustrated, angry, and capable of obstructing, if not destroying, what governments and other institutions are trying to do. At the same time, a new scholarly literature on public life has emerged, beginning in Europe with the writings of people like Habermas. This scholarship argues that we need a "stronger" democracy, in which citizens join in public work, deliberating over conflicting moral claims about how to act in their collective interest. (See the writings of Benjamin Barber, Harry Boyte, James Fishkin, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson, among others.) Also, critics like John McKnight of Northwestern University are challenging the prevailing assumption that the public is a body of consumers, patients, and clients, defined by needs more than by capabilities.

**New Concepts, New Structures**

If what I am suggesting is worth considering at all, it has implications for institutions as a whole, not just for one field of scholarship or one division of a university. In saying this, I am certainly not making the case that everyone should see the public world as I have presented it or reach the same conclusion about how to relate to it. I confess to Alan Wolfe that I, too, sometimes like to contemplate in solitude.
Humanities and Public Deliberation Project

To examine the role of the public scholar in the social construction of knowledge, five humanities scholars recently participated in a research project focusing on the interdependent relationship between the humanities and the public. The scholars attended National Issues Forums and other deliberative discussions as fully engaged participants, reflecting afterward on their roles as both citizen and scholar in the deliberative process. In this project, scholars considered not only the contribution of the humanities to public discourse, but also the contribution of the public to the scholar’s exploration of the humanities. An excerpt from Tom Michaud’s final paper from the project provides an example of this connection. He writes: “My work as an academic philosopher and professor was mostly segregated from my responsibilities and obligations as a citizen. What I wrote and published, what I taught and assigned to students, had little, if any, explicit relation to what actually concerned me as a citizen and actually concerned citizens in my region and throughout the nation. My voice was only an intramural echo within the academy, barely engaging, and certainly not fostering the kind of civic discourse which is vital to the successful maintenance of our democratic republic. The Humanities and Public Deliberation Project showed me how I could and why I should merge my scholarly and pedagogical work with my responsibilities and obligations as a citizen. The project showed me that my training and skills as an academic philosopher and professor can be exercised and actualized as a ‘public scholar,’ a scholar whose thinking, writing, teaching can serve the public’s attempts to understand, deliberate about and resolve some of the most confounding and challenging issues of our times.”

Besides Tom Michaud, professor of Philosophy at Wheeling Jesuit University in West Virginia, other scholar/participants in the project were William Kloefkorn, professor of English, Nebraska Wesleyan University; Dan Shilling, executive director of the Arizona Humanities Council; Peggy Prenshaw, professor of Southern Studies, Louisiana State University; and Nancy Martz, professor of Humanities, Aims Community College in Colorado.

Betty Knighton
Project Coordinator
Humanities and Public Deliberation Project
My conclusion is that, if academic institutions expect to develop a new dimension in their relationship to the public, they must have more public spaces. They need space for something beyond what we have traditionally considered teaching, research, and service. This space should be open to everyone in the institution, as well as to public citizens. It might take the form of an institute or center, but whatever structure is used, it should:

- Develop research that will generate “practical wisdom,” knowledge produced with rather than for the public. Subjects for investigation should be easy to find. For example, faculty in new institutes who are teaching ways to produce public knowledge can begin by learning from what their students are learning. After all, research is, in the best sense, learning. Or, for a case study of what can happen when scholars become involved with a community in the coproduction of knowledge, see Alejandro Sanz de Santamaría’s “Education for Political Life,” in the Winter 1993 issue of the Kettering Review.

- Establish a different relationship with the public by building ties to the networks and the civic associations that scholars like Robert Putnam of Harvard University have found essential to democratic civil society. Citizens typically come to academic institutions to gain information or to serve on an advisory board. Typically, institutional communications market conferences, solicit support, or provide news. There should also be communications that build community, connecting citizens with one another and with ideas about citizenship.

New public space should also provide opportunities to deepen the country’s understanding of all that is involved in civic renewal. Otherwise, all the good work at civic renewal will produce nothing more than platitudes and its own jargon. That deeper understanding should lead to a new curriculum dealing with such issues as how people become involved in public life, accept responsibility, form “public relationships,” make choices, act together, and learn from the results of their action in ways that allow them to make their second efforts more effective than their
first. This kind of instruction would require an appropriate peda-
gogy; after all, people can't be lectured into citizenship. And it
would require rigorous assessments, not of but with participants, to
find out more about how people best learn the skills of democracy.

This curriculum should be appealing to a wide range of civic
organizations, such as leadership organizations focused on civil-
society building and what Ronald Heifetz of Harvard University
calls “marshaling the resources for change” (Leadership without
Easy Answers, 1994).

Colleges and universities can also use public space to give our
leading institutions and the professionals who staff them opportu-
nities to restructure their relationships with the public. It is no
secret that many of our institutions, including academic institu-
tions, are losing legitimacy in the public's eye. People no longer see
them as theirs. While citizens have a variety of criticisms, a num-
ber center on the poor quality of the relationships they have with
institutions. Americans complain that leaders and professionals
don't understand the reality of their lives, and leaders and profes-
sionals argue that all they see in the public are self-serving interest
groups and uninformed constituents. New forms of public space
can give officials and professionals a chance to experience the pub-
lic as something other than clients, customers, and special
interests. An example of what I am suggesting follows.

First, I want to recognize that new ventures are difficult to
undertake and sustain in today's climate, where the emphasis is on
doing more with less. Still, I am convinced that we need more
public space in new institutional structures (centers, institutes)
with the staying power to be effective. Prospects for their long-
term viability can be improved by locating their mission in the
self-interest of the college or university. Hammering out goals for
these institutes or centers that connect directly with those of the
parent institution is protection against their becoming academic
orphans. Of course, for any new venture to succeed, there must be
a core of faculty members committed to teaching and doing the
research. This group might find allies in campus leadership and
honors programs. In order for the new academic structures to
flourish, they also need to have a public constituency providing
outside support. A citizens' board with heavy alumni representa-
tion might be helpful. So might close working relationships with
news organizations, government agencies, businesses, and civic
associations.
To the seasoned administrator, any new venture in this era of budget cuts may seem like a pipe dream. Given all the other pressures on academe, responding to the challenges of public life can be such a low priority that it gets no more than a nod, if that. Yet, more than 20 institutions — from the University of California at Davis to Gulf Coast Community College to Purdue University, and others in between have created public space in their summer institutes and public policy centers that have moved in the directions I have suggested (see sidebar). My speculations merely follow their lead. For example, a new institute created by the Center for School Study Councils at the University of Pennsylvania is helping to reconnect the public with the public schools. This institute is bringing board members, administrators, and teachers together with citizens in deliberative forums on issues that are community-based but school-related, such as drug abuse and juvenile violence. Purdue is doing much the same thing with law enforcement agencies.

Encouraging these kinds of experiments and starting others isn't as unrealistic as it might seem. The 20-some institutes already in operation would be the first to say that there is still a lot of room at the starting gate. No one has imagined all the possibilities for creating more public space in higher education.

New institutes or centers that are creating more public space in their institution can be found in Alabama sponsored by a consortium of Auburn University, Stillman College, Shelton State Community College, and The University of Alabama. They can be found at the University of California, Davis; University of Delaware; College of DuPage, Illinois; Gulf Coast Community College, Florida; Hofstra University, New York; Kent State University, Ohio; University of Kentucky; Michigan State University; University of North Carolina at Pembroke; University of Oklahoma; University of Pennsylvania; Purdue University, Indiana; University of South Carolina; University of Tennessee, Chattanooga; Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University; Wayne State College, Nebraska; and in the Pacific Northwest at Portland Community College, Oregon. Other institutions besides universities also hold institutes. They are the West Virginia Humanities Council/University of Charleston; the Topeka Association of Neighborhoods, Kansas; and the National Council for the Social Studies, D.C.
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