This document describes a crisis in enrollment, funding, and governance that occurred in the Los Angeles Community College District (LACCD) between 1981 and 1987. Following introductory materials, chapter 1 reviews the history of the LACCD and the effect of funding reductions caused by 1978's Proposition 13. The next two chapters review the beginnings of the crisis from 1981 to 1983 and the continuance of the crisis from 1983 to 1985, highlighting the effects on District colleges and employees of state funding cuts, enrollment fluctuations, controversy over the appointment of a new vice chancellor, and controversial salary cuts and layoffs. Chapter 4 discusses the climax of the crisis from 1985 to 1986, highlighting three evaluations that were undertaken of District finances and management, a controversial decision to layoff 147 faculty, and the decision to replace two District college presidents. The next chapter explains how the crisis subsided in 1986-87, describing improvements in enrollment and finances, the attainment of a balanced budget and reversal of previous deficits, and sweeping changes in the Board of Trustees. Chapter 6 reviews the changes in staffing, funding, programs, recruitment, and institutional planning during the crisis years of 1985 to 1987, while chapter 7 addresses the impact of the crisis from 1987 to 1989, including the resignation of the District Chancellor, and ongoing problems from 1989 to 1996. Contains 468 references. (HAA)
The Los Angeles Community College District Crisis 1981-1987

by

Lowell Janes Erickson, Ph.D

Los Angeles Valley College 1997
Preface

Long and detailed studies have been written about many major American universities and four-year colleges. Few studies have been made of the community college counterparts to these other higher educational institutions. The current work is an attempt to describe a crisis in the largest community college district in the nation, and, indeed, in the world.

The present study, The Los Angeles Community College District Crisis, 1981-1987, is part of a larger project, on which I have been working since 1985. The project has resulted in two other studies besides this one:


The purpose of the total project was to analyze critical developments within the Los Angeles Community College District, while at the same time placing this large local district within the perspective of the state of California. The period analyzed most closely was 1981-87, and the factors receiving the greatest attention were those of mission, governance, funding and enrollment.

The present study, in keeping with the purposes of the larger project, concentrates primarily on the crisis years from 1981 through 1987, with brief descriptions of the periods both prior to and following these years. Even so, the reader will be able to discern the major developments throughout the history of the District.

While most attention has been directed at the district level, the developments at the nine colleges of the District have not been overlooked. They are presented in a section at the end of each chapter, except for 1985-87, when a separate chapter was required.

Lowell Janes Erickson, Ph.D.
Van Nuys, California
March, 1997
Table of Contents

Preface ................................................................................................................................. iii

Table of Contents ................................................................................................................... v

Table of Figures ...................................................................................................................... vii

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................. ix

CHAPTER ONE
Background to the Crisis, 1929-81 ....................................................................................... 1
   I. The Early Years, 1929-45 .................................................................................................. 2
   II. From World War II to the Master Plan, 1945-60 .............................................................. 2
   III. Separation from the Public Schools, 1960-69 ................................................................. 3
   IV. From Independence to Proposition 13, 1969-78 ............................................................... 4
   V. Proposition 13 and Its Aftermath, 1978-1981 ................................................................. 7
   VI. Los Angeles Community College District, 1981 ............................................................. 11
       A. The District and the Colleges ....................................................................................... 12
       B. Planning .................................................................................................................... 13
       C. Programs .................................................................................................................. 15
       D. Enrollment ............................................................................................................... 16

CHAPTER TWO
The Crisis Commences, 1981-83 ....................................................................................... 19
   I. Board of Trustees Election, 1981 .................................................................................... 19
   II. Funding, 1981-82 ........................................................................................................... 21
   III. Planning, 1981-82 ........................................................................................................ 24
   IV. Programs, 1981-82 ........................................................................................................ 26
   V. Funding, 1982-83 ........................................................................................................... 27
   VI. Planning, 1982-83 ........................................................................................................ 32
   VII. Programs, 1982-83 ...................................................................................................... 33
   VIII. Board of Trustees Election, 1983 .............................................................................. 34
   IX. Enrollment .................................................................................................................... 35
       A. Students Who Transfer .............................................................................................. 35
       B. 1981-82 ..................................................................................................................... 35
       C. 1982-83 ..................................................................................................................... 36
   X. The Colleges .................................................................................................................. 38
       A. Funding ...................................................................................................................... 38
       B. Programs .................................................................................................................. 39
       C. Recruitment ............................................................................................................. 41

CHAPTER THREE
The Crisis Continues, 1983-85 ....................................................................................... 43
   I. The Senior Staff and the AFT President, 1983-84 ............................................................ 43
   II. Funding, 1983-84 .......................................................................................................... 45
   III. Planning, 1983-84 ........................................................................................................ 52
   IV. Programs, 1983-84 ........................................................................................................ 56
   V. Funding, 1984-85 .......................................................................................................... 58
   VI. Planning, 1984-85 ........................................................................................................ 64
   VII. Programs, 1984-85 ...................................................................................................... 66
   VIII. Board of Trustees Election, 1985 ............................................................................. 68
Table of Figures

Figure 1. Board of Trustees, 1969-81.................................................................18
Figure 2. Board of Trustees, 1981-87.................................................................42
Acknowledgments

First I want to acknowledge the Chancellors and the Members of the Board of Trustees of the Los Angeles Community College District, without whom this study could never been made, in more ways than one. First, it was Chancellor Leslie Koltai and the Board Members during the early and mid-1980's who are the main subjects of the study. Equally important, however, was the generous support I received from Dr. Koltai and Chancellors Donald Phelps and Neil Yoneji, as well as Interim Chancellor Thomas Fallo, and the various compositions of the Board over the years. They cooperated fully, both in terms of giving their own time when requested, and providing me the time off to research and write the study.

No doubt my most heartfelt thanks go to my old friend, Dr. Edwin T. Williams, professor of Spanish language and literature and now associate dean of humanities, at San Francisco State University. He spent countless hours editing the entire manuscript and not only used proof reader's marks, but made numerous comments on matters of language, format and content. Please do not blame Eddie if, even with all his efforts, the manuscript still contains tortuous syntax and curious grammatical constructions, not to mention typographical errors.

I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. David Wolf, executive director for community colleges, Western Association for Schools and Colleges, who introduced me to organizational theory and whose faith in my completing the project never failed. David also shared with me the wisdom he had received from former trustee and UCLA professor, Dr. Ralph Richardson, who said that by writing a dissertation we would learn even more about ourselves than about our topic. This was certainly true, and the revelations, though not always to my liking, have been significant to my life.

I am especially pleased to express my thanks to the leaders of the AFT, who have always treated me as though I were one of their own, not as an administrator. Hal Fox, then AFT president, and Marty Hittelman, then executive secretary, opened the union's files on the layoffs and the archives of Read-On for my complete and unlimited use.

I want to express my thanks to many other friends and associates who helped out in a multitude of ways: to Ginger Hoffland, resource development consultant, who used her vast knowledge of the Los Angeles District to help me; Nancy Conrath, educational consultant; Dr. Virginia Mulrooney, professor of history at West Los Angeles College; and Larry Serot, vice president of business services at Glendale College, who read parts of the manuscript and made helpful comments; to Claire Myers and Lupe Gonzalez, secretaries in the chancellor's office, who helped me to find what I wanted in a great mass of materials; to Jim Austin, Shari Borchetta, Fred Obrecht, and Janine Severance at Los Angeles Mission College who were always interested in and helpful to my project; to Chuck Dirks, a political science professor and practitioner who, along with everything else, studied Chinese and introduced me to the paradoxical meaning of the character for "crisis"; to Izzy Rosenberg, who dubbed himself my "nudge" and lived up to the part through a constant barrage of missives during my years at Pierce College and afterward; to the members of the Chancellor's Cabinet, some of whom were characters in this drama and all of whom are characters in real life, but especially to Dr. Cedric Sampson, now president of College of the Redwoods, who shared materials with me; and to Thomas Stevens, president of Los Angeles Trade-Technical College, now emeritus, who also shared materials and read a preliminary draft. Finally, my thanks to all of those administrators and faculty leaders I
interviewed back in 1981, because even though their interviews were never formed into a dissertation, they provided me with a valuable background for the current study.

I have not acknowledged the individuals I interviewed, because my agreement with them was that I would exchange anonymity for their complete candor. I know this is a controversial issue among social science interviewers, but I decided that getting the full cooperation of the subjects was more important than identifying them.

Finally, I want to acknowledge three close friends who expressed mock cynicism about my ability to finish the project, but who were always ready to discuss it and give suggestions: Robert Hencey, director of communications at the Kellogg Foundation, who kept encouraging me to write the book I wanted to, instead of just a dissertation I thought I could get approved by my committee; Joe Hinojosa, Los Angeles Trade-Technical College printing professor, now emeritus; and Neil Farren, Los Angeles Mission College philosophy professor, now emeritus. Perhaps if I had not spent so much time with Joe at Julie's Restaurant and with Neil at El Cariso Golf Course, I would have completed this project sooner; but, who knows, I might not have finished it at all.
CHAPTER ONE
Background to the Crisis, 1929-81

On October 14, 1981, Dr. Leslie Koltai, Chancellor of the Los Angeles Community College District, delivered his “State of the District Address” to a packed meeting of the Board of Trustees. During the nine years he had served as the administrative leader of the world’s largest two-year college system, Koltai had established a tradition of giving this annual presentation on the accomplishments of the District and the prospects for its future.* Three years had elapsed since the passage of Proposition 13, the California tax reform measure that cut deeply into the local property tax revenues of community college districts and shifted much of the burden of their financing to the State.

Every year Koltai’s “State of the District” message was anticipated with a good deal of interest by board members, administrators, and faculty leaders. He used the occasion to dramatically announce his latest plans for the District, which in past years had included “New Dimensions,” a district-wide non-traditional educational unit; a new tenth college; and an innovative system of “High Technology Centers.” As one Faculty Senate leader put it, “I always tried to be there, because it was like waiting for the other shoe to drop.”

Koltai did not disappoint his listeners with his Fall 1981 presentation. He was bold, creative, and forward-looking. He observed that enrollment was at an all-time high of 145,000 students at the district’s nine local colleges and the newly created Metropolitan College, which served armed forces personnel from Korea to Iceland. After Proposition 13, he said, the challenge had been one of survival, but today he wanted to discuss “the challenge of quality.” He pointed to a University of California study that described “a steady and escalating decline in the proportion of total enrollment” transferring to the senior institutions. He spoke of revitalized counseling services and of higher standards for students and faculty. His major announcement was the creation of a Commission on Transfer Education, with each college to establish its own committee on transfer programs and services. He also announced the formation of a Center for Professional Development, “to initiate and coordinate training activities.”

Finally, he said:

... we have few illusions left about our fiscal future. We know we are still in a period of transition... maintenance of the status quo is no longer an option. It is not a matter of choice whether or not to adapt to change—change is coming about with increased frequency; our only choice will be in determining the effectiveness with which we deal with that choice. ... it will be incumbent on us to initiate change—to be active rather than passive responders to the conditions which will be coloring the public education picture in the state, in Los Angeles, and indeed in the country (Koltai, 1981; 1-16).

Six years later, in the fall of 1987, Koltai did not deliver his “State of the District” address. After a long crisis a new majority on the Board of Trustees had taken power, and Koltai was fighting to maintain his chancellorship. Within a short time, Koltai, his entire senior

* The speech in its published form was variously titled “The State of the District” and “State of the District Address,” sometimes with the year as part of the title. The title for each year’s address appears here as it was originally published.
staff at the District Office, five of the seven board members, and even the president of the
teachers union would be gone from the District.

The present chapter describes the background of the Los Angeles Community College
District from the beginning in 1929 to the crisis in 1981.

I. The Early Years, 1929-45

The Los Angeles Community College District grew to be the largest public two-year college
district in the nation, with ten colleges and an enrollment of 145,000 by 1981. The seeds
from which this massive system grew were planted seventy years before when high
schools in the Los Angeles High School District began offering a few post graduate
courses. While these early efforts were soon abandoned, from 1929 on, the junior or
community colleges in Los Angeles expanded rapidly, serving one of the fastest growing
cities in the nation. This system of two-year college education was established and
developed in an environment of increasing numbers of students, employees, programs, and
facilities.

The Los Angeles City Board of Education founded and administered junior colleges from
1929 to 1969. The first institution, Los Angeles Junior College (renamed Los Angeles
City College in 1938), was established in 1929 under the provisions of the 1917 Ballard
Act, which made the college essentially a junior college department of the high school
district. (Erickson 1976b: 5) This arrangement was somewhat altered in 1931 when the
Board of Education, recognizing the fiscal advantages of the 1921 Deering Act, created the
new Los Angeles Junior College District. The new district’s boundaries were coterminous
with those of the high school district. All control continued to reside with the City Board
of Education and would remain there for nearly a quarter of a century. The new district
included only one college until 1945.

II. From World War II to the Master Plan, 1945-60

During the immediate post-war period, 1945-1950, enrollment pressures caused the Los
Angeles Junior College District to add six more colleges: East Los Angeles College
(1945), Pierce College of Agriculture (1947), Los Angeles Valley College (1949), Los
Angeles Harbor College (1949), Frank Wiggins Trade School elevated to junior college
status as Los Angeles Trade-Technical College (1950); and Los Angeles Metropolitan
College (1950). During World War II, City College had expanded its offerings into the
evening hours and had initiated adult education classes. Each of the new colleges also
adopted these practices, which placed the junior colleges in competition for adult learners
with the Adult Schools of the High School District. By 1952, with the expansion of
evening, vocational and adult programs, the junior colleges had grown larger than the
adults schools and had a more expansive financial structure (Erickson, 1976; 7-8).

A territorial realignment was also occurring. The cities of Beverly Hills (in 1936) and
Culver City (in 1949) established their own unified school districts but remained in the Los
Angeles Junior College District. This made the district larger in area than either the Los
Angeles elementary or secondary districts. The Junior College District’s geographic
expansion continued into the 1960’s, with the addition of five more school districts (Palos
Verdes, Las Virgenes, Burbank, Montebello and Alhambra) resulting in an 882 square-mile
college service area, 55 square miles larger than the Los Angeles Unified School District.1

1 In California, "unified school districts" combine elementary and high schools into one
In the early 1950’s, the Los Angeles Board of Education presided over a huge domain, comprised of 450 schools, 22,000 teachers and other employees, and over 400,000 students between kindergarten and 14th grade. It governed three separate districts: elementary school, high school, and junior college. Administrative functions were divided into three operational divisions: Elementary Education, Secondary Education, and Extension and Higher Education. Within the latter were the Junior College Central Branch and the Adult Education Branch (Erickson, 1976; 9).

Like many other public two-year colleges across the country, the Los Angeles junior colleges continued to expand their vocational and adult education programs. This led to heated competition between the junior colleges and the adult schools and a concern over duplication of effort. The response to this by some in the junior colleges was to call for their separation from the Board of Education.2

Because of a flurry of higher education legislation introduced in 1959, the Legislature authorized the preparation of a master plan for higher education to meet the needs of the state during the following decade or more. Dr. Arthur G. Coons, president of Occidental College and chairman of Master Plan Survey Team, has written that the Master Plan was “a direct result of the unresolved problems of rivalry, tension, and struggle over several decades among the three public segments of higher education and also among and between them all and the private or independent segment” (1968, 3).

The Master Plan sought to differentiate the functions of the three segments of higher education and to establish a more effective method of planning and coordinating all of higher education. The major recommendations in the Master Plan were passed into law in 1960. Junior colleges were to continue to be governed by local boards, with general supervision given by the State Board of Education. A Coordinating Council for Higher Education was established, comprised of public members and representatives of each of the three segments. The Coordinating Council was to advise the governing boards and the appropriate state officials on “development of plans for the orderly growth of higher education and making of recommendations to the governing boards on the need for and location of new facilities and programs” (Master Plan, 1-3 and Coons, 1968; 62-70).

III. Separation from the Public Schools, 1960-69

In the early 1960’s, the campaign for separation intensified, and 1965-67 became a crucial period for the future of the governance and administration of the Los Angeles Junior Colleges. Both the California Junior College Faculty Association and the American Federation of Teachers proposed legislation for separation at the local and state levels; and the California Coordinating Council for Higher Education reported: “The trend at the local level is definitely toward separation of the junior college districts from the high school and unified districts.” Several bills for separation were introduced into the legislature, and college faculty members and administrators continued to press their case. By 1965, their primary argument for separation was the unwieldy size of the Los Angeles Unified School district and should not be confused with “union” districts, which consolidate what were formerly separate districts of the same level of education, such as high schools. A single board, such as the Los Angeles City Board of Education, could operate both elementary and secondary districts, as well as a junior college district, and these districts were not required to have the same boundaries.

2 For an excellent description of the relationship between the adult schools and community colleges in Los Angeles in the 1950’s, see Burton R. Clark, Adult Education in Transition: A Study of Institutional Insecurity, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA., 1956; 130-141.
District, which then encompassed seven colleges, 28 adult schools, 126 secondary schools, 438 elementary schools, 42,000 full-time employees, 765,000 students, and 20,000 classrooms. The unified district's budget was approximately one-half billion dollars, and its enrollment constituted 15% of the total school enrollment in California. As one board member said, "The jc's were lost in the hierarchy." (Erickson, 1976: 25-28)

During the entire separation campaign, the Board of Education, while entertaining reorganization plans, stood in opposition to the establishment of a separate junior college district. Between 1965 to 1967, however, several events gave impetus to the independence movement. The board member who had been the arch supporter and protector of the adult schools resigned, and two Valley College instructors filed suit against the county to order a special election within the junior college district to establish a separate board of trustees. At the same time, a City College political science faculty member was working closely with a California assemblyman to develop strategies for separation legislation.

Senate Bill 128, which applied only to the separation of the Los Angeles District, moved successfully through the legislature in 1967. The Board of Education went on record opposing the bill and lobbied against it, while the teachers' organizations, whose power and ability at political maneuvering had increased greatly during the 1960's, lobbied for the bill. It was passed by the legislature and then was signed into law on June 26, 1967, by Governor Ronald Reagan. Companion legislation was passed in 1968, and on July 1, 1969, the new independent Los Angeles Community College District became a reality.

Faculty and administrators supported the separation from the Unified District for numerous and varied reasons, depending on what the individual or group hoped to gain from an independent community college district. Most felt that the Board of Education, confronted by all of the problems of the high schools and elementary schools, had little time to devote to the needs of the community colleges. In the interest of maintaining uniformity throughout the system, the Board had the same salary schedule for teachers at all levels. Community college instructors and administrators considered themselves on a par with the rest of higher education and were discontent at discovering that salaries at independent community colleges were outdistancing their own. Administratively, the same District personnel who handled the lower schools also handled the needs of the colleges, and many in the community colleges felt that administrators who were insensitive and inexperienced with regard to the colleges were making decisions that greatly affected them. Worse still, the colleges were charged for ten percent of the District's administrative costs, when they had only about six percent of the total ADA, and faculty and administrators were convinced they were receiving an even smaller portion of central office services.

Community college faculty and administrators resented being too closely related to the high schools in terms of governance, administration, and public image. They felt the full potential for providing community college services to the large district was not being realized. They looked forward to an independent district, respected as a part of higher education, governed in a way that devoted more time and understanding to community college needs, and run by a more efficient administrative structure.

IV. From Independence to Proposition 13, 1969-78

The first Board of Trustees for the new Los Angeles Community College District was elected on May 27, 1969. The primary had elicited considerable political interest and produced 133 candidates for seven seats on the new board. Fourteen candidates on two
slates—the liberals and ‘law and order’ conservatives—survived the primary to engage in a heated runoff contest over student unrest and fiscal responsibility\(^3\).

The new Board of Trustees, as prescribed in the Education Code, assumed responsibility to provide for orderly growth, set all policies for educational programs, determine the calendar, maintain academic standards, control the budget and district property, set fees, employ all personnel, receive gifts, grants, and federal and state special funds, and act as the negotiating council to meet and confer with employee organizations. The Board’s newly independent District served a population exceeding four million, had an assessed valuation of over $11 billion, and generated ADA that was four times that of the next largest community college district in California (Hoffland, 1976; 37).

None of the new Board Members had previously held public office nor had any experience on a school or higher education board. The early years were dominated by uncertainty and conflict. Issues that in the past had been handled routinely became points of contention between the Board and the administration and faculty. John Lombardi later commented, with some irony, that “Those who favored the separation from the Board of Education wanted a governing board that would pay more attention to the community colleges. They certainly got it.”

Unlike positions on most educational boards, membership on the Los Angeles Community College District Board became a platform from which members who aspired to higher office could launch their careers. Within the first year and a half, two of the original board members had resigned to assume positions in state government: Edmund G. Brown, Jr. was elected Secretary of State and Robert J. Cline to the Assembly. Both resigned their Board positions as of January 3, 1971. Two years later, Michael D. Antonovich was elected to the Assembly and resigned from the Board on January 7, 1973. Ira Reiner, elected in 1975, served only two years of his term before leaving to become City Controller, and Gwen Moore, elected in 1977, was on the Board for a year and a half before departing to take up her new position in the State Assembly. Several other Board Members ran for political office without success.

Of the ten individuals elected to the Board of Trustees by 1981 and who were no longer serving by that date, five had moved on to other political offices, three had been defeated in office,\(^4\) one had retired voluntarily, and one had resigned to become the president of the Community College of San Francisco. As one observer stated, “We always had the feeling that most of the Board Members had one eye on the District and the other eye on another elective office.” The most successful alumnus of the Board was Jerry Brown, who after serving as Secretary of State became Governor from 1975 to 1983 and continued to cast his eye on an even higher office.

When the administration for the new district was established in 1969, much in the way of day-to-day procedures, and even the personnel for its District Office, were transferred from the Unified School District. Well into the 1970’s, forms that had never been revised—used to process the paperwork for procedures that had never been changed—still bore the identification of the Unified District. Regardless of these carryovers from the past, or perhaps because of them, the Board of Trustees wanted to move quickly in the creation and evolution of an independent district. Important to such a process was the selection and retention of key personnel, and the Board had some its worst problems in this area of its responsibilities.

---

\(^3\) For the names and terms of the Trustees, see Figure 1, “The Board of Trustees, 1969-81.”

\(^4\) One of these three, Marian LaFollette, was later elected to the California Assembly.
During its first three years, the new district’s top administrative leadership was in a constant state of change. The first superintendent, Dr. T. Stanley Warburton, was inherited from the Unified School District, where he had been associate superintendent for junior colleges since 1959. His relationship with the Community College Board proved to be full of conflict. Early in 1970, Donald Click, formerly evening division dean at Los Angeles Valley College, was selected as deputy superintendent and then quickly became superintendent after the departure of Warburton. Click’s relationship with the Board soon deteriorated, and within a year and a half he was terminated. William Spaeter was then named acting superintendent. The Board’s relations with campus administrators was no better than they were with the district leadership, and between 1969 and 1973 the eight colleges had no fewer than eighteen presidents. Because of the constant conflicts and changes in leadership, the administrative structure could not evolve and problems were handled on a “crisis-by-crisis” basis.

On December 1, 1972, Leslie Koltai assumed the top administrative post. Still in his early forties, Koltai brought to the position unique qualifications. He had left his native Hungary after participating in the 1956 revolution and went to Los Angeles, where he earned a doctorate in higher education at the University of California, Los Angeles, and taught and began his administrative career at Pasadena City College. In 1968, he left Pasadena to assume the top position at Metropolitan Junior College District in Kansas City, Missouri. During his five years there, he transformed a crisis-ridden, single-campus junior college into a three-institution community college district.

Koltai’s appointment as chancellor of the Los Angeles Community College District represented a compromise between the liberals on the Board, who favored him, and the conservatives, who desired a leader more closely aligned with their own political views. The compromise involved creating a new position, executive vice chancellor, for City College President Louis Kaufman, at the same time Koltai was appointed. The conservatives on the Board expected Kaufman to serve as a counter-balance to Koltai, and perhaps after a time to be a ready replacement for him if the liberal’s appointee proved unsuitable. Both Kaufman and the conservative Board members vastly underestimated the wily freedom fighter and, after only two years, a combination of missteps by Kaufman and maneuvers by Koltai brought down the executive vice chancellor, leaving the Chancellor free to administer the District unhindered by a conservative watchdog.

Under Koltai’s leadership, the Los Angeles Community College District began to form an administrative structure more appropriate to a large and growing higher educational system. Major administrative activities were placed under distinct operating divisions: Educational Planning and Development (later Educational Services), Personnel Services (later Human Resources), and Business Services. New functional offices were established to oversee expanding community college programs and services: Research and Analysis, Occupational Education (including disabled student programs), Instructional Development, Human Development, and Legal Affairs. The Offices of Public Information, College Relations, and Community Services were expanded. Koltai formalized the district-wide structure by forming a Chancellor’s Cabinet, comprised of the District senior staff and the college presidents.

The leadership crisis of 1969-72 was followed by relative stability in the early Koltai era from 1972 to 1978. This was possible for a variety of reasons. The Board had lost some of its most difficult members prior to or just as the Koltai period began. The remaining Board members and the new replacements were gradually learning to work together more effectively. They were eventually motivated to cooperate with their choice of a chancellor by the difficult experience of the previous period, when the Board was almost constantly

\[5\] With this appointment, the Board of Trustees dropped the public school designation "superintendent" and replaced it with "chancellor."
involved in selecting a new chief executive or getting rid of the one they had. Above all, Koltai knew that a positive working relationship with the Board was essential and he was willing to devote unlimited effort (and not a little talent) to achieving it.

The faculty, for its part, struggled to assert itself politically during these years of upheaval and change. The instructors were the primary force behind the District's independence in 1969, and once that took place, they were severely disappointed with the outcome. They felt the Board and administration had assumed all of the power and that the concept of shared governance was neither understood nor endorsed. They found the new board to be ultra conservative and insensitive to their needs.

Faculty involvement in salary and other decisions was regulated after 1965 by the Winton Act. Each faculty organization was represented, in proportion to the size of its membership, on the Certificated Coordinating Council. This group engaged in "meet and confer" sessions with the Board or its representatives, but the Board remained free to accept or reject the faculty position on any issue. Moreover, the faculty in the Los Angeles District were members of three different faculty organizations, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) College Guild, the Los Angeles California Teacher's Association (LACTA), and the California Vocational Association (CVA), which made it difficult for the teachers to agree on a united stand or to carry out a concerted course of action.

In 1976, after years of lobbying by the state's powerful teachers' organizations, the Legislature passed the Rodda Act, which granted collective bargaining rights to teachers in public schools and community colleges. Collective bargaining made several major contributions to centralizing and increasing faculty power. First, collective bargaining mandated that a single organization represent the faculty and serve as their bargaining agent. Second, the bargaining process was established in law and overseen by the Public Employee Relations Board (PERB). Third, the end result was a contract that had the force of law behind it. Fourth, while the Rodda Act limited the scope of collective bargaining to wages, fringe benefits and working conditions, this latter term could be broadly interpreted to include the governance issues with which faculty were so passionately concerned.

In the Los Angeles District a hard fought battle between AFT and LACTA resulted in the faculty selecting the American Federation of Teachers—College Guild #1521 to be their exclusive bargaining agent. The first contract, covering the years 1977-80, was negotiated over a long period of time and ratified in December, 1977. The contract was considered a model for other certificated bargaining agreements.

Collective bargaining was not the only strategy used in the faculty's quest to achieve greater power and involvement in the important decisions affecting the District. Another was the attempt to secure the election of Board Members who understood and were sympathetic to the faculty's interests and positions on issues. Otherwise, little could be accomplished without bitter and often fruitless conflicts with the Board. So, during the 1970's the faculty became increasingly involved in the selection and support of candidates for the Board of Trustees. When the AFT became the exclusive bargaining agent, this political activity was centered in that organization.

V. Proposition 13 and Its Aftermath, 1978-81

Higher education expenditures in California were growing rapidly during the mid-1970's. Even so, these costs were expanding at only a slightly greater rate than other state and local spending. The ballooning public expenditures were funded by property and other taxes that rose because of economic prosperity and runaway real estate values. A taxpayers revolt in California had been fermenting for some time, and it exploded on June 6, 1978 with the overwhelming passage of the Jarvis-Gann Initiative, known as Proposition 13.
While this one proposition has come to symbolize and lend its name to the taxpayer's revolt, it was only the first and the most dramatic of a series of developments that would have important consequences for the entire public sector and specifically for community colleges in the 1980's. Other actions included passing Proposition 4 in 1979, which further limited public spending, indexing of the State income tax, and electing legislators and state officers who were committed to fiscal constraint. Even many incumbent officials who had not originally supported the tax and finance control measures quickly became converts to the popular new "Spirit of 13."

Proposition 13 limited property tax to one percent of the 1975-76 assessed valuation and restricted annual increases to two percent. At the local level, new taxes or tax increases now required a two-thirds vote of the electorate, and state-level tax law changes could only be enacted by a two-thirds vote of the legislature. Approximately $7 billion was eliminated from expected 1978-79 property tax revenues, a 57 percent statewide reduction in this major source of public funds (Bell and Price, 1984; 362-63). The overall financial impact was summarized by a higher education official: "In one day the government of California lost one-fourth of its expected revenues" (Pickens, 1981; 55).

Among all the segments of higher education, community colleges had the most to lose, because theirs was the only segment that received property tax funding. With the Legislature now responsible for distributing these revenues, Proposition 13 destroyed the core of the finance system for the community colleges. Fortunately the State had amassed a huge surplus of funds and was able to bail out the two-year colleges with legislation hastily put together after the election. Senate Bill 154 provided a block grant system that assured each district of at least 85 percent of its 1977-78 revenues, regardless of enrollment.

Proposition 13 caused a major shift in the sources of community college revenues. While in 1977-78 the State provided 38 percent and local property taxes 62 percent of community college funding, in 1978-79 the State's costs increased to 78 percent and the share from local taxes fell to only 22 percent. Community colleges moved from last place to first among the three segments of higher education in terms of State revenues appropriated for current operations (Keating, 1985; 3 and Pickens, 1981; 57).

The Los Angeles District was particularly vulnerable to the uncertainties of the taxpayer's revolt because of its size, range of services and wealth. It supported nine colleges, 4,600 employees and 130,000 students per semester with a total budget of approximately one quarter of a billion dollars, 80 percent of which came from local property taxes (McCuen, 1979; 48). Four months before the June election, Koltai organized a contingency planning committee to develop options for dealing with budgetary limitations in case the tax cutting measure passed. The fiscal impact was so unpredictable that the committee developed plans based on scenarios that included having to practically close the District down altogether, offering only minimal educational programs, and continuing at normal funding levels. Various cost cutting measures were instituted in anticipation of the vote, such as freezing all hiring, supply and equipment purchases, and conference attendance. Because state law required teachers to be notified of possible layoff by March 15 of the school year prior to the year the termination was to take effect, the Chancellor recommended that the Board of Trustees authorize notices of intent to dismiss all instructors in the District. Without this action, the District would have no legal basis for reducing the full time faculty, regardless of whether it had any funds to pay them. The action was narrowly defeated by the Board of Trustees, on a three to four vote (Koltai, 1978; 24-6 and Minutes, Los Angeles Community College District Board of Trustees, March 8, 1978).

Even after Proposition 13 passed, the District did not know what financial resources it would have. Only three weeks separated the election from the start of the new fiscal year. The Board's first action was to cancel the summer session. Then, as the State's bail out provisions became known, the District slashed its budget for 1978-79 to 15 percent below
the 1977-78 budget and made immediate decisions that would have long-range consequences. These included reducing dean positions by over 15 percent; eliminating the Office for New Dimensions, a nontraditional outreach program; placing cafeterias, bookstores and community services on a self-supporting basis; freezing non-emergency travel; dismissing part-time instructors; and drastically cutting funds for student workers, supplies and equipment. The 15 percent reduction in total budget could not be made evenly among all expenditure accounts; some were cut by more than half. One commentator wrote: “Thus, a 15 percent cut, which on the surface appears minimal, could in reality gut a program” (McCuen and Hoffland, 1978; 48-49).

Both Koltai and John T. McCuen, vice chancellor of educational planning and development and chairman of the contingency planning committee, wrote Proposition 13 articles for national publications. The titles evoked the images of catastrophe: “Taxquake in Los Angeles” by Koltai and “Jarvis Fallout” by McCuen. Both expressed concern about the long-term effects of the taxpayer revolt. The Chancellor observed that although government officials gave assurances that maintenance of local control was essential, the Governor tended to assume that the power Proposition 13 had placed in the hands of the State would remain there. In his article, McCuen concluded that the most severe long-range consequence of the passage of Proposition 13 was the loss of local control. His cited as examples State interference with collective bargaining contracts that would prohibit local agencies from honoring previously negotiated cost-of-living salary increases and State mandates that preserved a certain portion of the surplus for child development centers. This latter provision suggested that special interests with effective lobbies were receiving preferential consideration. Another concern was what he termed “the legal chaos” triggered by the initiative. The District’s legal counsel had identified 35 separate legal issues raised by Proposition 13 and the District itself was a party to a law suit to invalidate the initiative on the grounds that it was in violation of both the California and the United States Constitutions (Koltai, 1978; 24-28; and McCuen and Hoffland, 1978; 48-49).

Koltai and McCuen were in agreement that the mission and functions of the District needed to be reexamined. Koltai wrote that this was necessary because “our prior mission statement was outdated by the new fiscal environment in which the Los Angeles community colleges would be operating.” A new statement was vital to establishing priorities “in anticipation of a day when, we feared, we might be facing decisions about which classes to cut.” (Koltai, 1979; 24). McCuen’s article stated:

The overall mission of the Los Angeles Community Colleges and the master planning process have been brought into serious question. Estimates of the magnitude required by such a tax initiative simply cannot be made without an updated, workable, operational master plan and mission statement—on both the local and state levels. The noted California Master Plan for Higher Education has now been rendered hopelessly obsolete. The colleges can no longer be all things to all people, and far-reaching questions will have to be examined in a new and uncomfortable frame-work (McCuen and Hoffland, 1978; 49).

Koltai’s 1978 “State of the District” address, given on September 29, less than four months after the Proposition 13 vote, took on the tone of a lament. Progress and accomplishments were no longer described in the lexicon of expansion, but rather in terms of stabilization. He described the post-Proposition 13 environment as “one during which all of our assumptions about community college education will be pulled apart and then reassembled into what must be a meaningful whole.” He referred to the budget process as an “equitable distribution of dissatisfaction.” He gave several examples of difficulties the District had experienced with State government, including the Board of Governors of the California Community Colleges. Appearing before that board, Koltai reported he found “little sensitivity at that level, perhaps because it quickly became evident that the passage of
Proposition 13 could do nothing but strengthen state control.” He described the District as “living with the unknown,” “planning by contingency,” “operating in the midst of severe credibility gap between local agencies and state government,” “fearing special influence measures being built into legislation with very little local input,” facing “the attempt by state agencies to influence governance, programs, finance, and mission” and seeing “education in California changing from a local system into a state system.” The primary issue for the Chancellor in September of 1978 was “the survival of the District versus the dramatic increase in state control” (Koltai, 1978; 1-16). Once again, Koltai asserted his commitment to planning:

Our goal will be to maintain our effectiveness while we are in a financial no-growth posture. Good judgment will become more important than ever as resources dwindle. And the danger, as I see it lies in following a reactive approach to planning. We must remain vigilant lest we find ourselves moving from and reacting to one crisis after another, taking little time to look at the long-range implications of our decisions... There will be many competing, dynamic forces influencing the shape of the choices we make. And the fact that we don’t yet know what the future holds cannot help but create apprehension for all of us in the community college field (Koltai, 1978; 1).

As a direct result of proposition 13, the District instituted a project to revise its goals, by establishing a districtwide Mission and Functions Committee in Fall 1978. The dynamics of this committee and the revised statement it developed were studied in detail by Wolf (1984). The Mission and Functions Committee, over its three-month existence, became a microcosm of the conflicting factors and forces at work in the District immediately after Proposition 13. These included the emergence of the AFT College Guild as a more influential element in district policy formation; the competition between special interest groups; the growing influence of the State Legislature and executive agencies on local educational policy; and the widening gulf between McCuen, who was responsible for the work of the committee, and Koltai, who “never gave the goal search his whole-hearted support” (Wolf, 1984; 245-47). The completed Statement of Mission and Functions incorporated a detailed list of college functions, and designated each of them as either “essential,” “important,” or “desirable.” This list of differing priorities became the bone of contention between the supporters of the statement and its opponents. The union favored the general goal statement but lobbied hard against the prioritization of functions. The final outcome of this effort was that, after years of review and delay, the revised Statement of Mission and Functions failed to receive majority support by the Board of Trustees on February 25, 1981.

The Chancellor’s change of heart concerning planning and the Board’s lack of support for it may be explained by the climate of the District in 1980-81, the third year after Proposition 13. That year the District’s General Purpose Budget ($197 million) was slightly more than the budget for 1977-78, the last year before Proposition 13 ($193 million), an increase of about two percent. When adjusted for inflation, however, the 1980-81 budget was the equivalent of $145 million in 1977-78 dollars, which was a 25 percent decrease (Fallo, 1980; 1).

Koltai’s state of mind was expressed in an article entitled, “The Agony of Change,” published in June, 1980:

The future holds little in the way of relief. We can now only see a chorus line of question marks lining up before us. We don’t know whether or not the shortfall in taxes in one area will be made up by the imposition of increased taxes in another. We don’t know where education will be placed when the statewide list of budgetary priorities is drawn up. Nor do we
know how we will fare when our institutions are subjected to intense scrutiny by the legislators, as well as the special interest groups, which will undoubtedly be trying to influence those lawmakers. The luxury of long-range planning is simply not available to us.

... This, then, is the true agony of change—the nearly constant climate of uncertainty in which we find ourselves making decisions, reordering priorities, and evaluating programs (Koltai, 1980; 1).

The union, realizing how vulnerable employee salaries and working conditions were in such a climate, had become increasingly strident in its relationships with the Board and the administration. Negotiating the teachers' 1980-83 contract took eight months, 73 bargaining sessions, and more than 300 hours at the table before a settlement was reached in September. At the meeting where the union ratified the contract, Virginia Mulrooney, chief negotiator and executive secretary of the union, stated: "The attitude of the district's bargaining team was that any improvements in the faculty contract meant—somehow—a defeat for administration." She was not certain whether this attitude was shared by the majority of the administrators, but she was sure that it did not permeate the majority of the Board. "If it did, we might still be at the table—or on strike." As a result of the negotiations the union won a ten percent pay increase for each of the fiscal years, 1980-81 and 1981-82. This seemed like a generous pay increase for a district burdened with severe financial problems; however, the rate of inflation was so great in the early 1980's that the teachers would have gained several percentage points had they opted for an automatic cost-of-living adjustment instead of the flat ten per cent. Another provision in the contract called for a reduction from 25 to 21 hours in the weekly workload for the instructors at Trade-Technical College who taught "block programs." This meant the district lost four hours of teaching time from each instructor, yet still paid the same salary (Los Angeles Trade-Technical College, 1984 and Read On, September 23, 1980; 1).

The union also sought more involvement in the budget formulation. During early 1981, the Board for the first time held open committee-of-the-whole meetings, where district organizations and the public could comment on the budget. This was primarily the result of efforts by Harold Garvin, a political science instructor at Harbor College who had retired from his teaching job after winning a position on the Board of Trustees in 1979. Since coming on the Board, Garvin had pushed for an analysis of administrative costs at the District Office and the colleges. The union performed such analyses and made dramatic presentations to the Board showing the comparative increases at the District Office as compared to the campuses. The Chancellor and the District Controller vehemently denied the accuracy of these presentations. What could not be denied was that the union was determined to become more involved in the important decisions of the District (Read On, February 9, 1981; 1 and May 11, 1981; 1).

VI. Los Angeles Community College District, 1981

Previous sections of this chapter have dealt with the development of the Los Angeles Community College District from the beginning to 1981. The present section describes the District and its nine colleges, planning processes, student enrollments, and programs offered by the colleges to attract students. By 1981, the colleges of the Los Angeles

6 The cost of living from May to May, using the Bureau of Labor Statistics Los Angeles-Long Beach Consumer Price Index, amounted to 18.93 percent for 1980-81 and 7.17 percent for 1981-82, which meant that the cost of living outpaced the pay increase by an average of three percent per year for the two-year period.
Community College District were offering programs and attracting students to an extent that the District’s enrollment was the largest in the nation.

A. The District and the Colleges

In 1981 the District operated nine colleges within its boundaries, as well as Metropolitan College, which offered programs to armed services personnel throughout much of the world. The local colleges were spotted throughout the 882-square-mile district to make them as convenient as possible. Their physical plants represented a capital investment of tens of millions of dollars, most of which had come from local property taxes rather than from State capital outlay allocations. In addition to offering classes on the campuses, the colleges also operated scores of outreach locations in rented facilities, making the programs even more accessible to students.

The nine colleges served areas that were culturally and economically diverse but not always geographically distinct. Los Angeles City College was surrounded by the most culturally mixed area of any of the colleges and used its location in Hollywood to emphasize radio, television, cinema and theater arts programs. East Los Angeles served several cities and an unincorporated area that for decades had been home to the heaviest Hispanic population in the District, but which now were attracting more and more Asian residents. Located in the midst of international shipping, commerce and oil refining industries, Los Angeles Harbor served a combination of port communities and ocean side residential neighborhoods. Los Angeles Mission College, opened in 1975 in the northeast San Fernando Valley, shared more characteristics with the inner city than the affluent Valley communities to the south and west. Los Angeles Pierce College began as an agricultural college in the western part of the San Fernando Valley, now an area of residential neighborhoods and aerospace, electronics and computer-related industries. Los Angeles Southwest College, opened after the Watts riots, at first served an almost completely black area, now becoming increasingly Hispanic. Los Angeles Trade-Technical College grew out of a trade school and merged with the old Metropolitan College to become the most distinctively vocational of all the colleges. Los Angeles Valley College served the southeastern part of the San Fernando Valley, comprised of commercial and bedroom communities whose minority population was growing. West Los Angeles College was opened in 1969, just prior to the founding of the separate District, and its service area was attracting an increasing number of minority residents.

While larger in area than the Unified School District, the Los Angeles Community College District did not include all of Los Angeles County, and had a population in 1980 of slightly more than 4.3 million of the county’s seven million residents. The District was surrounded by other community college districts, and would suffer a loss of students to these neighboring districts.

When Proposition 13 passed, the District had under way a $30 million capital development program, with major construction projects at several campuses. Because these buildings were already planned or under construction and their funding was largely in place, the projects were able to proceed. They included new learning resource centers at East Los Angeles College, Trade-Technical College, and West Los Angeles College; a new Nursing Building and major improvements in the Music Building at Harbor College; the completion of the College Theater at Southwest College; a Performing Arts Center at Pierce College; and, most expensive of all, City College’s $8 million Communications Building, to house radio, television and cinema programs (Koltai, 1980; 1-3). All of the projects were completed by 1980, and while the District would benefit from the improved services these structures provided, it also incurred the liability of greatly increased maintenance costs and operating expenses, without any certainty that these facilities would boost enrollments in proportion to the additional costs.
In spite of this major building program, serious deficiencies remained in the District's capital plant. The oldest campus, City College, had several buildings badly in need of repairs and renovations. The two newest permanent campuses, Southwest and West, were not yet completed and lacked such basic facilities as gymnasiums and vocational education buildings. Each of the other colleges needed additional facilities, had buildings that required major work, or both. Throughout the District colleges were still using scores of temporary structures that were supposed to have been replaced many years before. Mission College had operated out of leased facilities since its founding, though the Board proceeded with plans to develop a permanent campus for it. In May, 1981, the Board voted to purchase a site for Mission's permanent home (Daily News, May 7, 1981).

B. Planning

The present section provides a general background to planning for the community colleges, beginning with the years when the colleges were under the public school system and proceeding up to 1981. The next section will describe the programs of the District in 1981 and program development taking place during this time. The distinction between "planning" and "program development" is an important one to make at this point, because this distinction will be used not only in these two sections, but in the chapters that follow. The difference between them must be somewhat arbitrary, but planning is the broader, more general term, which, to a certain extent, incorporates program development. Ideally, program development grows out of planning and is based on it. A true planning process involves periodically reevaluating the mission or basic purposes of the organization and establishing or revising the major goals the organization intends to use in order to accomplish those purposes. The process then involves making specific plans for new colleges, facilities, and programs and for the growth and improvement of existing colleges, facilities, and programs, at least during times when the organization is growing. When an organization is experiencing financial problems, the leadership should reduce support for colleges, facilities, and programs, and if necessary, eliminate of certain of these by using a planning process that is based on the institutional mission and goals, as well as priorities established for the various functions. The final step in the planning cycle is evaluation, to determine how well the organization has done at achieving its purposes and goals.

Planning is also central to the governance of a large and complex organization, such as a multi-college district. If planning is to provide guidance for the important decisions that determine the organization's future, then all of the major elements within that system must be involved in the process and should have a sense of "ownership" about the plans and priorities that result. Planning is also one technique for coordinating the disparate parts of a complex organization. Funding, the process by which financial resources are distributed within the organization, should be based on the goals and priorities established through planning. And, finally, since service to the student is the basic purpose for any educational organization, enrollment is the most important factor upon which plans are based and for evaluating the effectiveness of those plans.

Broad, general planning for the Los Angeles community colleges until 1981 had been carried on in a variety of ways. During the period community colleges were under the Board of Education, major decisions about the future development of the colleges were made in the same way that similar decisions were made for the other levels of education. Plans for new college campuses or major building projects were handled by the School Planning Office, which also made the plans for new elementary, junior high, and high schools. The office of the assistant superintendent for community colleges worked with the various staff offices of the school district headquarters, as well as with the administrations of the several colleges, to undertake whatever planning was necessary.
These plans were then forwarded for approval to the Superintendent of Schools and the Board of Education.

When the community colleges were separated from the Unified School District, the new community college district needed to develop its own processes for making major policy and planning decisions. Usually, this was handled on a project-by-project basis, with special study committees appointed to formulate recommendations for major undertakings. An example is the committee that recommended a new college for the northeast San Fernando Valley, Los Angeles Mission College. For several years during the mid-1970's the District required that each college produce a five-year Master Plan. This elaborate process produced hefty volumes of college goals and intricately detailed objectives. Colleges complained that Master Planning was an exercise in futility, since, even in those times, which in retrospect would seem bountiful, the District was unable to fund all the colleges' ambitious schemes for future development.

A District-wide, long-range plan was being written just prior to Proposition 13. The plan was based on three scenarios that assumed various degrees of economic optimism. Unfortunately, even the worst-case scenario did not anticipate a catastrophe comparable to the reality of the late 70's. The long-range plan was shelved.

Immediately after the passage of Proposition 13 both Koltai and McCuen supported the necessity for goal-setting and planning and established the Mission and Functions Committee. McCuen had been exasperated by his assignment to develop contingency plans in anticipation of the tax reform measure. He realized that the decision about what to save in an emergency should be based on clearly stated priorities for the numerous functions of the community colleges. We are reminded of a contrast made by Sussman (1977) concerning the New York City financial crisis in the mid-1970s between “the benign, sometimes accidental process of program building” with “the intense process of setting rigorous priorities for program reduction.”

Both the reprieve from catastrophe—thanks to spending down both District and State reserves—and a feeling that long-range planning was an unavailable luxury must have influenced the Chancellor and the Board to shun this “intense process of setting rigorous priorities.” In any case, the revised Statement of Mission and Functions was never adopted. During 1978-81, planning for major projects in the District continued as before Proposition 13 to be largely ad hoc. One way this took place was by the Chancellor announcing, in his annual “State of the District Address,” one or more proposed major projects. These usually involved appointing special project committees to study the proposals and formulate plans and recommendations for implementation.

In his September 26, 1979, “State of the District Address,” Koltai observed that a gap had existed in the range of programs and services the District offered since the Office for New Dimensions had been disbanded shortly after the passage of Proposition 13. He requested that the Educational Services Division make a “recommendation regarding the establishment of our tenth college... the Los Angeles Metropolitan College (for Non-Traditional Studies) which would continue our efforts to deliver a variety of programs in non-traditional modes” (Koltai, 1979; 9-10). By the time Koltai got the Board to approve the new college on December 5, 1979, he had run into considerable difficulty in getting support for a full range of non-traditional programs and services; consequently he limited the scope of the college to military education, a learning materials production unit, and an international education unit for civilian classes to be conducted abroad. The military education program was one part of the New Dimensions operation that had continued even after Proposition 13. By the time Koltai went to the California Community College Board of Governors for approval of Metropolitan College in June, 1980, the new institution was serving 30,000 armed services personnel at 60 bases worldwide (Koltai, 1980c; 1). The Board of Governors approved Metropolitan College in December, 1980, and the college

Regardless of the fate of master planning in the District, the Business Services and Educational Services Divisions required that budgeting be supported by at least short-term planning, with some encouragement to colleges that they keep in view the long-range perspective as well. College budgets had to be accompanied by what was called the "Operational Plan." Thus, the college's requests for resources were to be related to college goals and plans for a period of at least one fiscal year. As part of what was called the Planning-Budgeting-Reporting Cycle, the Educational Services division worked with the colleges to produce annual reports. Operational Plans indicated the programs and services colleges intended to offer during a given year; the annual college operating budgets set forth the fiscal resources the colleges sought, which were then adjusted by the District into a balanced district-wide budget; and the annual reports recounted the colleges' achievements and problems.

By 1981, the District had proven less than successful at developing anything approaching a long-range or master planning process. The mission and functions statement had failed to receive Board support; major projects continued to be the one-man preserve of the Chancellor, as announced in his "State of the District Address"; and whatever short-term planning that was done was incorporated into the yearly cycle of operating plan, budget, and annual report.

C. Programs

Most of the educational programs of the District were planned and initiated at the college-level and then reviewed and approved by the District and the State. By 1981, the colleges were offering over 4000 different courses in about 200 subjects and programs, which according to the annual Directory of Educational Programs and Courses, ranged from "accounting" to "zoology." Many were basic arts and sciences disciplines and common occupational programs that were offered at all or nearly all of the colleges. But some were offered by only one college, such as nearly 70 programs offered exclusively at Trade-Technical College, ten allied health programs taught only at City College, or the agricultural programs that were the particular specialty of Pierce College. Others were liberal arts disciplines for which there were local needs, such as certain foreign languages, or less common occupational programs offered by a few colleges (Division of Educational Services, 1982; iii-vi).

In addition to college-based program development, some programs were district-wide in nature or affected several colleges and were instituted at the District level, usually by the Chancellor. For example, in his 1979 "State of the District Address," Koltai announced "The Great Art Search," which included grants to the nine colleges "for the purpose of developing, refurbishing, and upgrading their galleries and fine arts programs" (Koltai, 1979; 8-9). In the following year's "State of the District Address," delivered on October 15, 1980, he was able to report that art galleries were operating at all campuses and "awareness of—and interest in—the arts has been heightened among faculty, staff, students, and members of the general community." In this speech, Koltai also spoke of the need to enhance technical education in the San Fernando Valley and discussed the possibility of a technical institute for this purpose. In March, 1981, the Board of Trustees authorized a feasibility study of the options for strengthening occupational and technical education not only in the Valley, but throughout the District (Division of Educational Services, 1981; 1).
D. Enrollment

Dramatic changes took place in the ethnicity of the general population in the District during the 1970’s and of the District’s students from 1972 to 1981. College Annual Reports, 1981-82 provided a description of these changes:

The enrollment of whites declined 26% from Fall 1972 to Fall 1981, while the number of whites in the population decreased 17% from the 1970 to the 1980 census. Minorities were 63% of Fall 1981 enrollment, exceeding their 55% representation in the 1980 census population.

The population increased 13% from 1970 to 1980, with whites reduced from a majority to a plurality (45%). Hispanics, who made up nearly a third (32%) of the population in 1980, are projected to become the area’s new majority by 1990. Asians, though fewer in number, are expected to maintain their exponential growth rate (165% from 1970 to 1980), as immigration and international trade expand. Blacks, who increased their numbers apace with overall growth, comprised a sixth of the total 1980 population.

. . . District colleges attracted more Asian and black students and fewer Hispanic and whites than were represented in the population as a whole. Asians were seven percent of the 1980 population and 12% of Fall 1981 enrollment. . . Making up only 15% of the population, blacks contributed 26% to District enrollment. . . . Hispanics . . . were 23% of the District enrollment. White students [were] 37% of the District total (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983b; 1).

Fall 1981 total enrollment for the District was 139,168 students,7 which represented three percent of the District’s population. This was an increase of 36 percent since Fall 1972; however, it was the first time District enrollment exceeded the peak figure reached in 1975. The State cap caused enrollment to drop in Fall 1976 and Proposition 13 brought about another decrease in Fall 1978. Enrollment since that time had been steadily increasing.

Student characteristics had changed over the previous decade, with increasing numbers of women, minorities, and older students. Women represented 44 percent of the enrollment in Fall 1972, became the majority gender in 1977, and constituted 54 percent of Fall 1981 enrollment. Minority students, who made up 43 percent in 1972, had grown to 63 percent of the total by Fall 1981. Students under 20 years old declined from 30 percent to 20 percent of the total, while students 35 years and older increased from 16 to 23 percent (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983b; 2-3 and 20-24).

Part-time students accounted for much of the growth in enrollment during the period, increasing from 65 percent to 75 percent of total enrollment. While full-time students fell as a percentage of total enrollment, the actual numbers declined by only three percent. What was still true in 1981 was that “Full time day students, typically younger, represent the bulk of the instructional workload; they enroll in three to four times as many classes as older, part-time evening students. The expanding number of part-time students inflates total enrollment and average-age figures” (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983b; 3).

---

7 This figure does not include the enrollments in the Metropolitan College military education programs, which was on a five-term basis, rather than offering fall and spring semesters and a summer session, as the other colleges did.
The three-year period following the passage of Proposition 13, from 1978 to 1981, gave the appearance of "business as usual" in the Los Angeles Community College District, even though this ran counter to Koltai's published laments about State control and the impossibility of long-range planning. An attempt to establish priority categories among the many functions of the district failed to win the support of the Chancellor or the official endorsement of the Board of Trustees. Annual, double-digit pay increases were awarded to employees for two years. Credit course enrollments increased after the initial setback from the tax initiative, and community services classes were thriving on an almost self-supporting basis. A major capital development program was carried to completion and a permanent campus was purchased for Mission College. One of the major casualties of Proposition 13, New Dimensions, was at least partially resuscitated, this time as a separate college for military education. A feasibility study was undertaken to determine how vocational education could be improved and expanded. Funds were even available to upgrade the appreciation and display of the arts on each campus. Despite a 25 percent decline in real operating dollars during these years, the District was able, at least temporarily, to resist some of the anticipated drastic effects of the taxpayer revolt.
### FIGURE 1.
Board of Trustees, 1969-81

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Office 1</th>
<th>Office 2</th>
<th>Office 3</th>
<th>Office 4</th>
<th>Office 5</th>
<th>Office 6</th>
<th>Office 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resigned 1/3/71</td>
<td>Resigned 1/3/71</td>
<td>Elected</td>
<td></td>
<td>Resigned</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elected to State Assembly</td>
<td>Elected Secretary of State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elected to State Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-73</td>
<td>Monroe F. Richman</td>
<td>Arthur Bronson</td>
<td>Resigned</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td>Resigned</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td>Relected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Elected to unexpired term 6/15/71</td>
<td>Elected to unexpired term 6/8/71</td>
<td>1/7/73</td>
<td></td>
<td>6/13/73 Elected to State Assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973-75</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td>Ralph Richardson</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elected to unexpired term 6/13/73</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975-77</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td>Gwen Moore</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977-79</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td>Gwen Moore</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979-81</td>
<td>Relected</td>
<td>Hudson</td>
<td>Retired</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Elected to full term</td>
<td>6/30/81</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Odd numbered offices were originally elected for a two year term; otherwise all regularly elected terms of office are for four years.
CHAPTER TWO

The Crisis Commences, 1981-83

By 1981 the surplus, which had enabled the State to restore most of the lost property tax revenues for local governments and school and community college districts, was depleted. To make matters worse, the economy of California, along with that of the rest of the nation, was suffering from the worst recession since World War II, and tax revenues fell well below expectations. Two strategies were available to help protect the State treasury from the growing costs of supporting community colleges. One was to shift part of the burden to an alternative source, and the other to restrict the services of these colleges in some way, so that enrollments and thereby State appropriations would be reduced.

During 1981-83 the State debated both options and adopted one of them. Because Proposition 13 had made an increase in property taxes an unrealistic option, state government looked to another source of funds already used for community colleges in the rest of the nation and for the other two segments of higher education in California: the students. While advocates of mandatory student fees for community colleges avoided acknowledging the fact, this proposal was actually a combination of both strategies. Some costs would be shifted to the student and, based on the experience of other states, student enrollments would decline. The latter effect was the primary argument used by opponents to student fees.

Mandatory fees were not adopted during 1981-83, but what the Legislature authorized reduced both services and enrollments at community colleges. A group of courses that met certain criteria were "defunded" in 1982. Local districts were allowed to continue to offer the courses on a fee basis, but the State would not underwrite their expenses. In the past the State had paid a lower rate for defined adult classes and enrollments than for other enrollments, but never before had it withdrawn funding from an entire category of community college classes.

I. Board of Trustees Election, 1981

In July, 1981, Dr. Ralph Richardson retired from the Board of Trustees, the only person ever named President Emeritus of the Board. Richardson was unique among Board Members, because when elected to the community college board in 1973, he brought with him twelve years of experience as a member of the Los Angeles Unified School District Board of Education, from 1957 to 1969. He was the only person ever elected to both boards1 and had been the only member of the Board of Education who supported the separation of the community colleges from the Unified School District (Faris, September 13, 1981).

Richardson announced his retirement early enough to allow his post to be filled in the Spring election. Eleven candidates competed for his position, and the AFT Executive Board, after two days of interviewing candidates, voted to support Richardson's endorsee, Lindsay Conner. A student leader while at UCLA, Harvard Law School graduate, and attorney with a prestigious law firm, Conner at age 25 secured an impressive set of

---

1 Letitia Quezada was appointed to the LACCD Board in 1985 and then won election to the Los Angeles Unified School District Board of Education in 1987.
endorsements in his first campaign for elective office. The AFT also endorsed the two incumbents in the election, Wallace Albertson and Arthur Bronson. Albertson, a writer and instructor at UCLA, was elected to the Board in 1977 and also had served on the Board of Trustees of California State University since 1978. Bronson, a retired oil company executive, was elected to the Board of Trustees in 1973 and again in 1977. Both incumbents were active in Democratic political organizations (Read On, January 19 and 26, 1981).

Albertson, Bronson, and Conner, quickly dubbed the "A B C" slate, were opposed by numerous candidates, among whom were three conservatives endorsed by the Los Angeles Chapter of the California Teachers Association. The conservative candidate opposing Conner for Richardson's post was James William Orozco, an original member of the Board of Trustees who had been defeated in 1979 by Harold Garvin. The conservative group claimed that "financial mismanagement, combined with reduced government support, is driving the college district to the brink of fiscal disaster." In the April 14 election, Bronson received 55.9 percent of the votes for the four candidates running for Office 2 and Albertson tallied 52.1 percent of the votes for the four contestants for Office 6. Conner garnered 27.1 percent of the votes in the crowded contest for Office 4, and Orozco came in second with 16.1 percent, which meant the two candidates would face each other in a June run-off election.

In the general election campaign, Orozco repeated the charges of financial brinkmanship, along with calls for closing Metropolitan College and discontinuing the permanent campus for Mission College. He said he wanted to return control of the college board to the taxpayers and reduce the influence of the AFT. Conner countered these charges by citing that only five percent of his campaign funds had come from the AFT and that his broad base of support protected him from undue influence by any one group. The Los Angeles Times editorial endorsing Conner said that Orozco "claims to be for fiscal responsibility but actually represents the forces of retrenchment—those who seek only to cut budgets rather than look for creative solutions that balance human needs with financial considerations." Conner won the June 2 election with 53 percent of the vote. However, considering Orozco's distant second place in the primary and the fact that Conner had a much larger campaign fund, it was clear that Orozco's financial gloom and radical cut-back rhetoric had appealed to a large percentage of the voters (Ballenger, March 18, 1981 and May 30, 1981; Courier, June 15, 1981; 1; Faris, April 16, 1981; Los Angeles Times Editorial, May 21, 1981; Los Angeles Times, May 31, 1981).

With the election of Conner, the membership on the Board of Trustees was basically established for the period from 1981 to 1987. The only change until the election of 1987 was when Frederick B. Tuttle resigned in 1985, after being elected as City Controller, and Letitia Quezada was appointed to replace him. The four incumbents not up for reelection in 1981 were Harold Garvin, Marguerite Archie-Hudson, Monroe F. Richman, and Tuttle. As indicated in Chapter One, Garvin was a political science instructor at Harbor College who had retired from his teaching job after winning a position on the Board of Trustees in 1979. Archie-Hudson, who held various positions in education and politics, was appointed to the Board in 1979, and later that same year won election for a full term. Richman, a physician in private practice, was elected to the Board in 1971, 1975, and 1979. Tuttle, a Student Affairs Officer at University of California, Los Angeles, was appointed to the Board in 1977 and elected to a full term in 1979. The Board Members who in 1981 were facing a critical period for the Los Angeles Community College District, already had an average of over four-and-one-half years of experience as Trustees.

2 See Figure 2, "Board of Trustees, 1981-1987."
II. Funding, 1981-82

When Koltai delivered "The State of the District" address on October 13, 1981, he made no mention of the conservative slate's major issue in the recent Trustee election—that the District was on the brink of financial disaster. On November 19, a month after Koltai's speech, Thomas Fallo, acting vice chancellor of business services, presented the Board an innocuously entitled report, "Financial Issues for the Mid 80's." Most of the Trustees had not paid the report enough attention to even be able to recall having seen it a few years later. This was unfortunate, because the publication contained what would prove to contain some of the most important financial analyses and projections ever issued by the District. The report warned that "the District has reached a point at which important decisions must be made about financing educational services." This was necessary because of two factors in the financial environment, the dominant role of state funding and the "generally sluggish condition of the State's economy and the consequent limitation in state financial support for community college education. As a result, the problem of adequately financing the District's programs for the immediate future has assumed serious proportions, beginning with the 1982-83 fiscal year."

The report said that "If current expenditure and revenue trends continue, the probability is high that the District will find it necessary to make reductions in both instructional and non-instructional programs, beginning in 1982-83." The primary problem was the "General Fund" where expenditures were expected to exceed revenues by approximately $7.7 million during the 1982-83 fiscal year (see Figure 5). This fund represented 90 percent of the District's appropriations and supported most of the District's educational programs and services. The report explained that the revenue available for appropriation during any fiscal year consisted of the income received plus the unrestricted balances carried forward from the previous year. Expenditures had exceeded income in the 1980-81 fiscal year, which had reduced the balances carried over into 1981-82. Based on present trends in income and expenditures, the balance would be depleted in the current fiscal year, and "a negative beginning balance (a debt) is projected for fiscal 1983-84."

The report pointed to the factors that had increased expenditures, such as prolonged inflation, negotiated pay increases, and declining productivity caused by provisions included in union contracts and a lack of adjusting "the way the work is carried out." An analysis of how expenditures could be reduced indicated the following: Non-personnel accounts represented a small portion of the budget, reduced maintenance would lead to greater repair costs in the future, and a minimum level of such expenditures were necessary if personnel were to continue to be productive. "Consequently, systematic and planned reductions in expenditures for personnel must be a prime consideration," the report stated. Normal attrition would not produce enough savings to offset the expected deficit, nor would the elimination of those position deemed as not critical to the functioning of the District. "Any strategy for effecting savings in personnel costs must include a selective consideration of programmatic priorities, not an across the board reduction." In analyzing the option of increasing revenues, the report found that additional State apportionment offered little hope because the State's current financial situation meant that unlimited ADA growth cannot and will not be financed by the State. . . . Nevertheless, efforts to maintain or even increase apportionment income should not be abandoned. . . . Alternative sources of income must assume an increasingly vital role in District operations. It is essential that the major portion of these funds finance programs which the District considers vital to its mission and functions as articulated in the Master Plan.

The report concluded with "Comments on Developing Strategies," which was long on generalities and devoid of specifics (Office of the Vice Chancellor, Business Services,
1981b; 1-16). While the report contained certain ideas and conclusions contained in the retrenchment literature of the time, no references were made to those sources and no internal evidence in the document hinted that the staff who prepared it had benefited from that literature.

The 1981-82 "Final Budget," approved by the Board the previous July 29, well before the "State of the District" speech, had discussed some of these problems. The chancellor's transmittal letter to the Board said, "... the 1981-82 General Fund budget is the most restrictive since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978." Further, it portends an even more serious situation in 1982-83." The District traditionally had carried over large balances in the General Fund from one year to the next. This was achieved by savings from unfilled positions and in many other accounts where the colleges and District Office did not spend all of the funds allocated to them. For example, in 1978-79, the year after Proposition 13, revenue was approximately $189,900,000 and expenditures were approximately $147,100,000, with a balance of $42,800,000 carried over into fiscal 1979-80. These balances were used during the three fiscal years, 1978-81, to make up for income that did not match expenditures (Office of the Chancellor, 1981; July 27, 1981, Chancellor's Letter to Trustees; and Business Services Division, 1982; 1).

The problem with the 1981-82 budget was that the previous year's expenditures had exceeded income to the point that a much smaller than usual carry-over was available to help fund the current fiscal year's budget. The budget document said that steps had to "be taken to conserve resources in 81-82 to insure reasonable balances for the 82-83 fiscal year." Income for that year would be less than adequate "to support reasonable appropriation levels. Only through the prudent use of dwindling balances will the District be assured of a stable budget for 82-83." Another problem was that the District had balanced its 1981-82 budget by taking $5.5 million from its general reserve to use for operating unit allocations. The document warned that "... the District is operating off its reserves and that these reserves will be consumed in the immediate future" (Office of the Chancellor, 1981; i-iii).

The ten percent "cost of living" pay increase for the faculty had been established in the two-year agreement negotiated the previous year. The same pay raise was also extended to most other employees, except that certain classifications received from 12.75 to 17 percent in order to bring these employees up to a salary level comparable to that paid in the surrounding area. These pay increases pushed personnel costs, including benefits, to over 90 percent of the total budget. Two years before, the salary appropriation amounted to only 78.5 percent. In addition to ballooning personnel expenses, the cost of maintaining and operating plant facilities were accelerating, with increased utility rates a major factor. The "1981-82 Budget Report" concluded that "Externally imposed fiscal limitations, the effects of inflation and the realization that personnel and plant operation costs represented an overwhelming portion of the budget seemed to leave little room for decisions regarding resource allocations" (Office of the Vice Chancellor, Business Services, 1981a; DW2-3).

During Spring 1982 the development of the 1982-83 budget and other matters provoked expressions of concern by several employee groups. The AFT complained that the Business Services Division made the most conservative estimate possible of District revenues and then used the low figure as a basis for budget formulation, "causing havoc on the campus, and ending up with higher figures later" (Read On, February 2, 1982; 1). On March 3, the Board of Trustees authorized March 15 notifications for 23 certificated administrators. These proposed actions involved reducing the length of annual assignments for nine administrators, returning nine to teaching status, and placing one in a vacant administrative position. At that meeting the classified administrators appeared before the board and asked that all Certificated administrators receive March 15 letters, in

---

3 The original document incorrectly gives the year as "1977."
order to give the Board the flexibility it needed to deal with the disparity that the classified administrators claimed existed between the salaries of the classified and Certificated administrators. The classified administrators’ protests were based on a study that concluded certain administrative positions in the District were overpaid and others were underpaid. In June the Board referred the study to a committee for review and recommendations. (Read On, March 8, 1982; 1-2; and Faris, June 20, 1982). The Administrators Association, which represented the certificated administrators, was concerned about the March 15 notices for its members and the attacks by the classified administrators. It began to make veiled threats of unionization because the Board was taking actions without consulting them. The Rodda Act defined administrators as having “significant responsibility” for the development of educational policy; without this responsibility, they were eligible to organize as a supervisory unit (Read On, April 13, 1982; 2).

The District administration became increasingly apprehensive about what it described as a budget crisis for 1982-83 and decided to pare down the 1982 summer session budget from $3 million to $2.25. In response, AFT President Cedric Sampson and Executive Secretary Mulrooney visited the college campuses to give AFT members the union’s perspective on the financial situation: There was no crisis for 1982-83 and the District’s attempt to “solve” the “crisis” by reducing the summer session was unacceptable to the AFT. There was a crisis for 1983-84, which would require that either expenditures be reduced or income increased, so the union members were encouraged to work for increased tax funds (Read On, April 27, 1982; 1-2).

Koltai was attempting to lower the District’s personnel costs and pruning the summer session was one way to do it. Many of the surrounding districts paid instructors hourly rate for summer sessions, about half what was paid for regular instruction. The Los Angeles District, however, compensated summer instructors at the regular salary rate. With limited funds for 1982-83, the $750,000 reduction in the summer session budget could be more efficiently used to pay for hourly rate instruction in the fall and spring semesters. Attempts were made to convince the AFT to redesignate the summer session as an “intersession” and consider it as part of the regular faculty’s work load, or to pay at least some of the summer instructors at the hourly rate. But the union realized that if this “crisis” were used to alter one part of their compensation or work load, it could be used to justify changes in other parts as well. Over a hundred faculty members attended the April 29 Board meeting to applaud their leaders’ arguments against the summer session budget reduction. The Board, nevertheless, supported the administration’s position (Read On, May 5, 1982; 1).

On May 19 the Board held a special meeting to receive the public’s views on the 1982-83 budget. Armed with charts and graphs, nine AFT speakers made a two-hour presentation. The union challenged the District administration’s data and analyses concerning small classes and “Program Vitality.” Its speakers described how the newly opened and much expanded college libraries were starved for operating funds, the General Fund was being drained by community services, and money for equipment and instructional aides was far from sufficient. AFT Executive Secretary Mulrooney called for 80 administrative positions to be “red flagged,” so they could be eliminated as they became vacant, and she reaffirmed the union’s opposition to dismissing any current employees. AFT President Sampson

---

4 Under California law, community colleges employed two kinds of administrators, certificated and classified. The certificated administrators were required to hold certification from the State for both instruction and supervision and to occupy positions that were to relate directly to the academic programs of the college or district. The classified administrators were non-academic employees and as such were under a different personnel system; they did not, for example, enjoy the protection of the March 15 notification.
characterized the budget as a "statement of educational philosophy" and thought it incredible that "25,000 hours of instruction needed to maintain our current year's ADA level is not important enough to be funded. This budget says other things are more important to put into the budget than instruction for students" (Read On, May 26, 1982; 1-2 and Board of Trustees, Minutes, April 19, 1981; 2-4).

The Administrators Association's displeasure with the budget was expressed by its executive director, Hope Holcomb. She told the Board that cuts had fallen disproportionately on certificated administrators. These positions had been decreased from 216.25 in 1976-77 to 179 in 1981-82, a loss of 17 percent. The plan for next year called for the elimination of another 18.8 positions, making a total reduction of 57, or 26 percent of all certificated administrators, in six years. The salary differential had diminished to the point that many faculty could not consider taking administrative positions because they could not afford the cut in pay. The administrators' workload had increased because fewer administrators were now available to do the work, the number and complexity of reports had increased, and collective bargaining demanded more of the administrators' time. All this was being attempted with fewer classified employees to assist (Holcomb, 1982; 1-5).

When the Tentative Budget was presented to the Board of Trustees on May 26, Read On, the AFT College Guild Newsletter, approvingly reported that "With a flurry of motions in a session which lasted from 1:30 to 11 p.m., the Board amended the Budget in significant positive ways and in effect exerted strong leadership in establishing budget priorities." The motions included removing the mandatory student health fee, directing the administration to review printing and membership budgets and give the Board suggestions for administrative cuts, reinstating the 25,000 hours of instruction, and paying for the changes by using funds from the Special Reserve Fund, the Workers Compensation Fund, and rentals to be charged to the campus bookstores. Read On commented that "the budget crunch is still on" and that the budget "is precariously balanced" (Read On, June 8, 1982; 1-2). If the union could not bring itself to refer to the financial situation as a "crisis," at least they were now willing to call it a "crunch."

III. Planning, 1981-82

The following statement appeared in the "Final Budget, 1982-83," the first "Quarterly Budget Report," and the "Second Quarter Budget Report":

For the four years since the passage of Proposition 13, the District, in an effort to maintain the quality of its educational programs, has supplemented its income by spending down reserves which had been accumulated over a period of many years. It was the intent of the Board of Trustees to utilize these balances to allow time to reduce expenditures, in a planned and organized manner, to a level commensurate with the District's income. However, as a result of various external factors, the balances were consumed far more quickly than anticipated (Office of the Chancellor, 1982; i; Business Services Division, 1982; 1; and Business Services Division, 1983; 1).

This statement raises the following question: What method was the Board expecting to use "to reduce expenditures in a planned and organized manner"? Retrenchment literature suggests that institutions must decide which functions are most essential to their educational missions and use the resulting priorities as a basis for retrenchment. We have already seen

---

5 By the "Third Quarter Budget Report," this statement and the whole historical section that had first been presented in "Financial Issues for the Mid 80's" were no longer repeated.
that in February, 1981, the Board of Trustees had failed to approve the prioritization of functions included in the revised Statement of Mission and Functions. What planning process was, in fact, used during this critical period?

One technique, already described in Chapter One, that might be considered as District-wide planning was the announcement by Koltai each year in his “State of the District” address of one or more major projects. We have seen this process at work in relationship to Metropolitan College, High Tech Centers, “The Great Art Search,” and transfer education, but more will be described for this period in the sections below on “Programs.” One problem with this approach was that it was not systematic and tended to be idiosyncratic, even though Koltai spent months asking for suggestions and trying out ideas for the speech, including the major projects he would announce. Another problem with this technique was that it could add the additional cost of new programs and services to the District (even though some projects brought new sources of revenue with them), but it accomplished nothing toward introducing ways in which to reduce expenditures.

The District Office of Educational Planning and other units of the Educational Services Division were involved in a range of activities that could contribute to the planning process. These included reclassifying courses, working with colleges to develop and then to review new program applications, revising the general education requirements as mandated by the Board of Governors, conducting district-wide studies on topics such as health occupations, and performing analyses such as program vitality. The division also participated in and provided staff services to the special committees appointed by the Chancellor to develop his projects.

By 1981-82, the need for organized, consistent, District-wide planning had become more than apparent. Early in the year, the Educational Services Division was at work on a new District Master Plan. College and District administrators visited Miami-Dade Community College in Florida, which had gone through a considerable revision of its educational programs and was considered to be a model of standards, quality and automated systems. In December, Koltai, after reviewing a new program evaluation and approval process, wrote the members of the Chancellor’s Cabinet that “we do not currently have in place an effective system of decision making which ties in our educational planning with our fiscal, facilities, and personnel planning.” He declared a moratorium on processing new educational program approvals and assigned the Vice Chancellor of Educational Services “to develop a system for evaluating and making recommendations concerning the discontinuation and transfer of existing programs and the approval of new educational programs” (Pimentel to Koltai, September 1, 1981; Fernandez, 1981; 2-5; Koltai to Cabinet, December 2, 1981).

Shortly thereafter, the director of educational planning recommended to Koltai that a revised Mission and Functions Statement should be passed by the Board, that each college should specify how its goals related to the District statement, and that a single District-wide Master Plan should be developed and then used as the basis for all professional development, facilities, operational, and staffing plans. He further recommended that a computerized modeling and forecasting system be developed to analyze and project the costs of salary and other proposals in employee negotiations and for decisions concerning educational programs and policies (Erickson to Koltai, December 15, 1981). Still, as the critical year of 1982-83 opened, no general planning system was yet in place. The director of educational planning was appointed president of struggling Mission College, though whether this was intended as a reward for outstanding services or as banishment to the hinterland cannot be determined.
IV. Programs, 1981-82

Even without a general planning system, a great deal of analysis and preparation for program development took place in 1981-82. This took the form of reports on health occupational needs, technical education needs, and counseling services, as well as the appointment of a transfer education commission.

In July, 1981, the Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development published a report on “Health Occupational Program Needs.” The study was to serve as the “basis for establishing a districtwide master plan for the development of health occupational educational programs.” All the colleges in the District, except for Mission College, had registered nursing programs in place and Mission was planning one. Other allied health programs were also offered by colleges. The RN program was one of the more expensive programs the District offered, and the study found that the greatest need in the health occupations was training more registered nurses. (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1981; vii-viii, 47-49).

Koltai announced the Commission on Transfer Education in his 1981 “The State of the District” and asked that each college also organize a transfer committee. The purpose of these groups was to “substantially increase the ratio between students who say they want to transfer and those who actually do.” Six weeks later, on November 25, the Chancellor appointed the ten member commission, with Gene Pimentel, who had replaced John McCuen as vice chancellor of educational services, as the chairman. The other members were three college presidents; Sampson, president of the AFT; Pat Blakesley, president of the District Academic Senate; two instructors; and a counselor (Koltai, 1981; 5-6 and Courier, December 14, 1981; 1).

The Chancellor’s Counseling Advisory Committee completed its work of analyzing current counseling practices. In December, 1981, the committee issued a report and recommending that some of the tasks then being performed by counselors should be shifted to paraprofessionals and peer counselors, that a district-wide placement program should be instituted, that academic advisement should be a joint responsibility of faculty and counselors, that services for transfer students should be expanded and improved, and that, with some exceptions, orientation should be mandatory (Thrusting, 1981; 1-6).

The feasibility study on establishing a high technology institute was presented to the Board on September 23, 1981. The study found that local business and industry needed trained technicians and that students were interested in taking such training, but the colleges had not been able to provide it. The creation of such an institute, to be located somewhere in the San Fernando Valley, was opposed by the teacher’s union. AFT President Sampson said, “All innovation, growth and administrative attention would be focused on the institute. Programs at other colleges would wither on the vine.” By January, 1982, with the possibility of major state funding on the horizon, the director of the study, Linda Thor, expressed a changed point of view on the part of the administration: “The institute will not be independent, and it will not be accredited, but it will offer programs through all of the colleges.”

In April, 1982, a $3 million grant was awarded by the State under the California Worksite Education and Training Act (CWETA). The grant funded the training of 1,000 people during a 30-month period. The CWETA projects would “provide state-of-the-art, competency-based training in computer fields and electronics.” At the same time the Board accepted the grant, they authorized the establishment of an office in the Educational Services Division to develop and administer the CWETA projects. The new office began operations on July 1, 1982, with Thor as director. Originally called High Technology Centers and Services, the name was later changed to the Office of Occupational and Technical Education. It was mandated to strengthen the existing college technical
programs and respond to industry’s need for skilled worker training, without being dependent on the District’s general fund (Courier, October 12, 1981; 1 and May 10, 1982; 1-2; Division of Educational Services, 1981b; Faris, October 18, 1981; and Faris, January 21, 1982).

V. Funding, 1982-83

The District was hard hit by the State’s defunding of courses in June, 1982, just at the time it was trying to delicately balance expenditures and revenues. When Koltai transmitted the “Final Budget, 1982-83” to the Board in August, 1982, he said the budget was not “an end product . . . Rather, as a result of action by the state to eliminate annual cost of living adjustments and funding for certain recreational, self-help and avocational programs, the Final Budget represents a series of proposals to balance the budget through actions taken during the fiscal year.” General Fund appropriations exceeded revenue by $23.3 million though “a number of steps have been taken to reduce this revenue shortfall by $17 million.” Further action would have to be taken by the Board to reduce appropriations by an additional $6.3 million. The defunding of courses had cost the District about $2 million, but other State actions had caused even greater reductions in funds appropriated to the District. The State instituted an equalization factor, whose purpose was to increase funding to districts with relatively lower ADA costs and decrease funding to higher cost districts such as Los Angeles. Over a two-year period, this meant that the Los Angeles District would lose $7 million. In 1980-81 the cost of living adjustment had been 8.9 percent, which was cut to five percent in 1981-82 and eliminated entirely for 1982-83, costing the District $8 million.

Koltai described the actions that had already been taken to balance the budget: Reducing allocations for supplies, equipment replacement, and student employees; eliminating classified positions, with the affected employees to be transferred to vacant positions; cutting assistant dean and coordinator positions, amounting to $900,000; decreasing support for community services from $1.1 million to $100,000; and approving a $10 per semester parking fee, which, it was hoped, would generate $900,000. Most significant was the transfer of $15 million from the special reserve to the General Fund, which all but eliminated the funds accumulated over the years to construct and repair facilities (Office of the Chancellor, 1982; letter to Trustees from Chancellor and i-iv).

The General Fund budget represented a 4.3 percent reduction from 1981-82. All colleges suffered decreases, both in absolute dollars (from $129,400 at Mission to $1,251,300 at Pierce) and in percentage reductions (from 1.2 percent at Trade-Technical to 6 percent at Harbor). Personnel was cut by $6,104,500 or 4.3 percent; hourly rate instruction was reduced by 63,000 hours; and 63.6 certificated and 113.6 classified positions were eliminated, for a total of 177.2. The budget could be considered as balanced only if three conditions could be met: (1) that enough ADA could be generated to receive full funding from the State, (2) that this would be achieved at less cost than in previous years and (3) that salary savings of at least $2.2 million could be realized from unfilled positions (Office of the Vice Chancellor, Business Services, 1982; DW 1-2).

The second year of the two-year salary increase for the instructors ended in June, 1982, and salary negotiations for 1982-83 stalled in Fall, 1982, because the District refused to consider a pay increase. At the first Board meeting of the new academic year 200 teachers staged an AFT protest while Mulrooney announced the union’s initial demands: An across-the-board pay increase of 7.35 percent, to match the coming year’s estimated rise in the cost of living, and a retirement incentive bonus for faculty. The Board’s interest, however, was not in raising wages, but in reducing them. Read On bitterly observed that at this meeting the Board approved a new 1982 Oldsmobile to replace the Chancellor’s 1980
model, "one of the salary perks of high officials." The union newspaper also pointed out that faculty salary increases of 54 percent since 1977-78 hardly matched the soaring cost of living during this period, which rose more that 71 percent (September 21, 1982; 1-2). The eventual outcome of the salary negotiations was that the employees of the District received no annual pay increase for 1982-83.6

Koltai's "State of the District" address on November 2, 1982, differed from the one he presented the year before. While he talked of the accomplishments in transfer education, high technology and other areas, he also discussed what he called "The Ecology of Funding." He said, "We can no longer make long-range decisions that depend on continued state support." The State's inadequate funds for community colleges had resulted in no COLA and the reduction in State apportionment by $30 million through the reclassification of courses. The District had seen its ending balances reduced by $15 million in 1980-81 and by a further $22.1 million in 1981-82. Fifteen million dollars in Special Reserve funds had been consumed and estimates foresaw no carry-over balance for the current fiscal year. Worse still, the District was experiencing cash flow problems for the first time in its history. This was caused by the small year-end cash balance of the District, combined with slower apportionment payments by the State. Leslie Koltai said, "..we must face the fact of retrenchment. One of our biggest problems in the process will continue to be: What are we going to be able to do for our employees who are being asked to do more with less? It is our goal to minimize layoffs in these austere times and use every means possible to reduce the ill effects of retrenchment on our employees." A double entendre immediately swept through the District: "We are being asked to do more with less."

On December 1, 1982, Vice Chancellor of Business Services Fallo delivered the first of the Business Services Division's "Quarterly Reports," which was mandated by the Board when it passed the budget and which would become a regular means of informing the Board about the District's fiscal condition and about future problems. Fallo said that through various cost cutting actions, partially offset by revenues that were not matching expectations, the District had eliminated all but $2.54 of the 1982-83 deficit. His was concerned that the State was projecting a continuing deficit this year and might take actions to further reduce the District's revenues. If the economy did not improve or taxes were not raised, the State faced a 1983-84 budget deficit of $2-3 billion, and projections indicated the District's budget could be out of balance by some $29 million, a shortfall of nearly 15 percent. Fallo warned that a reduction of such magnitude might require the layoff of several hundred employees (Business Services Division, 1982; 1-30; and Werkman, December 3, 1982).

Immediately following its story on Fallo's presentation, Read On reported that the Board had unanimously approved a Los Angeles Community College Program in Spain, which would provide college degrees to citizens of that country. The teachers in the program were under contract to a private agency and would not be represented by the AFT. "'It was one of the most disgraceful moments in the history of the District and this Board,' a clearly angry Mulrooney7 reported later" (Read On, December 7, 1982; 1-2).

---

6 Annual increases refers to the COLA negotiated by the unions for employees in the collective bargaining units, plus those that were determined by the Board of Trustees for the unrepresented (administrative and confidential) employees. In addition, employees not yet at the maximum salary for their classification received "step" increases, based on years of service, and certificated employees on the "preparation salary schedule" also got increases based on the number of educational units completed. Other than the COLA, these increases remained.

7 Mulrooney was elected president of the AFT after Sampson chose not to run for reelection. She took office on June 4, 1982, and James Hardesty, a mathematics instructor
The Los Angeles District had established itself as a leading opponent of general student fees, long before Governor George Deukmajian proposed this measure as part of his 1983-84 budget. When the State Senate had considered such fees in April, 1982, Trustees, administrators, and faculty leaders joined in a news conference to express their opposition. On December 15, just before Deukmajian took office, the Board reaffirmed its opposition in reaction to a bill introduced in the Senate. But, when the new Governor included the fees in his January 10, 1983, “Budget Message,” the Los Angeles District’s response was immediate, unequivocal, and in the eyes of some intemperate, considering the circumstances. Reacting to the Governor’s proposed budget for community colleges, Koltai said:

It’s a disaster. One week after an inaugural address in which he said he wanted to rebuild the state’s educational system, the governor has taken the first steps toward dismantling it. He has consistently said that he would not impose any new taxes. However, by supporting tuition, he is in fact supporting the most regressive tax of all, a tax that would seriously affect those least able to deal with it, the low- and middle-income student. In addition, the tuition proposal will only replace existing revenue.

A month later at a news conference, Trustee Richman described the fee as an “obscene tax on students.” He said that half the funds raised by the $100-a-year per full-time student fee would be needed just to collect it. “That’s stupid. That’s poor government.” Mulrooney said that Deukmajian’s proposal “represents treason” to California’s history of tuition-free community colleges (Savage, January 11, 1983 and Werkman, January 14, 1983 and February 11, 1983).

The District’s harsh reaction to the budget and fee proposal are understandable. The loss of students caused by the fee, without any compensating increase in student aid, was feared to run as high as 10,000. The resulting drastic decline in revenue, at a time when the District was already experiencing a critical shortage of funds, would only be made worse by the Governor’s budget proposal. The District’s leaders may have been piqued at having to deal with the man who had defeated their close friend and ally, Mayor Bradley, long seen as a leader who would have supported the community colleges in this difficult period. The sharply negative reaction by the Los Angeles District leaders, however, resulted in a poor working relationship with Deukmajian and his staff for years to come.

The Board of Trustees meeting on February 2, 1983 was of particular significance for the repair of the unbalanced budget and the preparations for the next, even-more-austere fiscal year. Three major events took place: Fallo presented the Second Quarter Report, an administrative reorganization was approved by the Board, and the Trustees presented their initial bargaining proposal for the 1983-86 contract.

The first “Quarterly Budget Report” was based on insufficient data to allow accurate projections of expenditures and income through the remainder of the year. The “Second Quarter Budget Report” used expenditures through December 31, 1982 and projected an ending balance of $5.6 million. Only $3.5 million of this represented an unrestricted

---

8 The closeness of this relationship was demonstrated when, in December, 1981, Bradley was named an honorary member of the Chancellor's Cabinet, the only person ever to receive this honor (Courier, February 1, 1982; 1).

9 In April, 1986, the Governor's consultant on higher education, William Cunningham, meeting in his office in Sacramento with a delegation from Mission College about campus funding, informed them that there were individuals from the Los Angeles District whom he would not have allowed through his door.
balance, however, and further cuts in State apportionments were still a possibility. The reduced expenditures had been achieved through a variety of measures: eliminating substitute and relief workers, decreasing hourly rate instructors and student workers, freezing purchases and hiring, filling vacancies from within the District, and cutting classified overtime. Expenses compared to income in community services showed a positive balance, though four colleges were still in the red. Options were outlined for reducing the projected 1983-84 deficit, including selling District-owned real property, not replacing retiring faculty, increasing instructor load and class size, reducing administrator positions, leaving classified vacancies unfilled, cutting non-salary accounts, and making changes in summer session compensation. The impact of the Governor’s fee proposal on the District was projected to be $8,570,000 (Business Services Division, 1983; 17-44).

We have seen previously that 23 certificated administrators had been reassigned to teaching or had their length of assignment reduced, effective in fiscal 1982-83. As the financial situation deteriorated and the possibility that certificated and classified staff would have to be laid off, Koltai knew that he would have to take further action to cut the size of the certificated administrative staff. For several months prior to the February 2 Board meeting, he had been working with the Chancellor’s Cabinet and others to plan a major reorganization that would reduce the administrative staff. The reorganization presented to the Board on February 2 would reduce second-level administrators at colleges from three deans (instructional, student, and administrative services) to two vice presidents (academic affairs and administration). The duties of the dean of student services were to be transferred primarily to the vice president, administration. The position titles for other administrators would also be adjusted up one level, so that assistant deans would be called deans, and so forth. The elevation in position titles would be accomplished without any increase in salary for the individuals involved, and the plan proposed the elimination of several administrative positions. Koltai had consulted with college presidents to determine which two deans at each institution would become the new vice presidents and which administrative positions would be discontinued. Most of these changes worked out by the top administration were acceptable to the Board, but in a few instances the Board rejected the administration’s recommendations. In cases where a dean was not to become a vice president nor was to be transferred to a teaching position, the administrator would receive what was called a “starred rate”; this meant the employee’s salary would not be lowered but would remain the same until the salary of the new, lower position reached the level of the employee’s salary.

At the Board meeting, Vice Chancellor of Personnel Services William Spaeter presented a review of administrative reductions and reorganizations since 1978. Certificated administrative positions had been cut back from 209.3 to 164.8. The adoption of the proposed plan would further reduce the administration to 139 positions, a decrease of 70.3 positions or 33.6 percent in five years. The Administrators Association opposed the arbitrary method of filling the two new vice president positions on the grounds that new duties and responsibilities had been added and the regular selection procedures should be followed. The Board passed the administrative reorganization plan unanimously. It also authorized an administrative employees’ retirement severance grant, the amount of which would increase depending on the total number of administrators who retired (Board of Trustees, Minutes, February 2, 1983; Faris, February 3, 1983; and Werkman, February 3, 1983).

10 Read On reported the "new-found" ending balance moneys without mentioning any of Fallo’s qualifying statements and recommended the funds be plowed back "into personnel and personnel benefits" (February 9, 1983; 1).
11 Similar retirement incentives were also authorized by the Board for faculty and for classified staff (Courier, March 7, 1983; 1).
The District's initial proposal to the faculty was unveiled at the February 2 Board meeting. Proposed were a ten percent pay decrease, an enlarged work load from 30 to 40 hours per week, an increase in class size from 35 to 45 students, and a change from fully paid fringe benefits to one-half being paid by the teachers. Mulrooney said the proposal constituted "a 67% increase in the workload combined with a 10% cut in pay." At its February 9 meeting, the AFT Executive Board adopted a resolution that called for picketing the February 16 Board meeting to urge the Board to reject the "anti-union, anti-teacher" proposal, and for union members to prepare for a possible strike in the fall. Mulrooney said after the vote, "Strike is a dirty word and no one wants to contemplate one... The best way to prevent a strike is to be prepared to conduct one" (Faris, February 3, 1983 and Read On, February 16, 1983; 1).

At the next Board meeting, on February 16, about 200 teachers picketed outside the District headquarters and as many as could fit then packed the Board meeting room. AFT leaders denounced the District's initial proposal as "outrageous" and "insulting." The union had originally requested an 18 percent raise, but now sought only 7.35 percent, without any change in the workload or the average class size. The Board was precluded from commenting on the initial proposal on February 16, but at the next Board meeting it approved forwarding the proposal as originally submitted to the bargaining table. In explaining the widely diverging initial proposals, Vice Chancellor Spaeter said: "Initially, each side says what it would really like to have. At the table, they say what they need. And they leave with what they'll settle for" (Faris, February 17, 1983 and February 27, 1983).

During the remainder of the fiscal year, the Board wrestled with a variety of cost cutting measures to deal with the estimated $28 million deficit for 1983-84. Across-the-board pay cuts for the 10,000 employees; regionalization of academic programs by merging them at selected colleges; conversion to a three-semester system, with each faculty member teaching two of the trimesters each year; unpaid furloughs of a week or more for all employees; and a reduced work year for some administrators were all considered. The primary concern was to avoid a downward spiral of declining enrollments and corresponding reductions in State funds that had afflicted other districts. As these districts cut back on programs because of financial problems, they lost students, which in turn resulted in further declines in State support. "We will do all we can to keep the academic program in tact," said Trustee Conner, "not just because we're funded on the basis of enrollment but also because that's the purpose of a community college." Koltai, less sanguine, did not believe that losses in enrollment could be avoided the next year.

Regardless of Koltai's assurances in his 1982 "State of the District," some employee cuts were considered inevitable. The one cost-cutting avenue the Board rejected during this period was laying off any of the District's 1800 contract faculty. Four of the seven trustees were up for reelection that Spring and one board member who was not running told the Los Angeles Times the decision not to send any March 15 notifications was tied to reelection bids. Wallace Albertson was quoted as saying that union support, and particularly that of the AFT, was "very important." She said the union "provides the money for the campaign and has a captive audience of voters. They're concerned and they vote." Garvin, Hudson, Richman, and Tuttle were running as a slate and all were endorsed by the AFT. They denied politics had any part in their aversion to teacher layoffs, but said preserving the District's core of full-time faculty was needed "for the sake of the academic program and maintenance of a college atmosphere" (Ferris, February 27, 1983).

By June, Koltai publicly accepted retrenchment. He told the Los Angeles Times: "Like the auto industry, we are going through a 'down-sizing' process. I applaud the change. The adult education, the continuing education, was taking a tremendous amount of effort away from the basic task of the colleges" (Trombley, June 12, 1983).
VI. Planning, 1982-83

In Fall, 1982, Koltai decided to use a two-pronged attack on the planning issue. The budget situation was so critical that decisions having broad and long-term impact, appropriately involving a planning process, needed to be made and implemented immediately. In his 1982 “State of the District” speech he announced the establishment of a “Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Institutional Reassessment,” comprised of representatives from collective bargaining units, administration, management, and students. “This group,” he said, “should be an active participant in representing the needs and concerns of the various segments of the college community, and assist us in communicating to the various constituencies about internal and external considerations that affect us” (Koltai, 1982; 12-13).

Koltai knew that organizing such a group would take too long to provide much assistance with current budget problems, so he also organized the Chancellor’s Cabinet into committees for a more immediate response. The colleges were divided into three regions: North (Mission, Pierce, and Valley), Central (City, East, and Trade-Tech), and South (Harbor, Southwest, and West). Three committees were appointed, each with a vice chancellor as chair and college presidents representing the three regions on each committee. The Administrative Staff Committee was charged with developing a new administrative structure to reduce administrative personnel and with establishing criteria for classified staff reduction. The Educational Planning Committee was responsible for establishing criteria for prioritizing educational programs and services and evaluating which could be reduced, eliminated, or regionalized. Finally, the Fiscal Services Committee was to formulate the 1983-84 budget process and identify administrative and support services for centralization or regionalization. The internal document that laid out this structure was impressively entitled, “A Management Proposal for Organizing Retrenchment Strategies: An Interdependent Decision Process” (Educational Services Division, 1982). Fallo claimed in the “Second Quarter Budget Report” that the recommendations of these committees were used to develop several of the options being considered to balance the budget, but some committee members felt that much of their time and effort had not been productive and that most of the options came from District Office staff and top administrators (Koltai, 1982; 12-13; Business Services Division, 1982; 35-39; and Business Services Division, 1983a; 45).

The Committee on Institutional Reassessment was not appointed until February, 1983. Its chairman was the Director of Budget, Larry R. Serot. This was an appropriate selection, since the purpose of the committee was “assessing the effects of decisions made relative to and necessitated by the 1983-83 budget”; even so, the level of committee leadership within the District hierarchy was interpreted as indicating how seriously the Chancellor felt about the work of the committee. By April, the committee recognized it could not significantly affect the 1983-84 budget, because of the impact collective bargaining provisions would have on the budget. “The decision was made to turn instead to an issue which had been raised repeatedly, the need for an improved process for long-range planning.” The final report of the committee was submitted on June 30, 1983 and included “A Proposal for Long-Range Planning.” The proposed process called for “district-level committees, task forces and staff support which are expected to influence and provide direction for planning within colleges and the District Office.” The expected outcomes were District and college five-year master plans that would tie in with the reports and analyses of task forces organized according to functional areas. “This proposal attempts to improve planning by structuring a process that is responsive to change and encourages consensus” (Committee on Institutional Reassessment, 1983; 1-3, 6). At the end of the 1981-83 period, District-wide long-range planning had not been implemented, but remained as committee recommendations.
VII. Programs, 1982-83

In his 1982 "State of the District" speech, Koltai pointed with pride at the progress realized on transfer education in the District. The Commission on Transfer Education had identified significant issues and had recommended the formation of a District Assessment and Placement Task Force, with one of its purposes to determine "what level of minimal basis skills are desirable for entry level courses in the various disciplines." The Commission made recommendations concerning general education and improving articulation with four-year institutions. The greatest number of recommendations related to counseling, and Koltai said he planned "to bring counseling closer to the mainstream of our educational efforts." Transfer committees had been formed at each of the colleges and special transfer workshops held. Three of the colleges—Harbor, Mission and Trade-Technical—had started a pilot transfer project in cooperation with the American College Testing Program, called Project ASSET (for Assessment of Skills for Successful Entry and Transfer). The three colleges involved were already administering an assessment instrument for their entering students. In summary, Koltai said the District was "becoming more directive, more supportive, and more demanding of our students so that they can be more successful in their transfer plans" (Koltai, 1982; 1-3).

In looking toward the future, Koltai described the serious skills deficiencies students brought with them to the community college and the cornucopia of curriculum choices that confronted them after they arrived. He quoted from the just-published book by Cohen and Brawer, The American Community College: "... for too long we have accepted the pernicious notion that students will define their own best learning paths, plan their own curriculums, spend time on what is best for them. [But] as professional educators, we have the responsibility to tell people what they should know, for their own good and for the good of society." Koltai told of the Faculty Institute for Basic Skills, developed jointly with California State University and involving 200 faculty participants in activities the past year, including a workshop on English-as-a-second-language. He called for strengthening basic skills teaching at the colleges and announced the establishment of a Commission for the Advancement of Teaching. The commission was to deal with issues such as developing and applying new teaching technologies and appropriate principles for teaching basic skills, teaching computer literacy, and renewing leadership skills in classroom management (Koltai, 1982; 6-10).

On January 19, 1983, the Board of Trustees passed revised graduation requirements that considerably increased the number of general education units many students would have to take. The revision was in response to changes mandated by the Board of Governors, but the District's package went far beyond what was required by the State. Students were given two options: (A) eighteen units in the major discipline and thirty general education units, and (B) 36 units in the major discipline and eighteen units in general education. The two-option scheme enjoyed the support of the AFT and the District Academic Senate, but others opposed it. Some said that it represented a tracking system that distinguished between academic and vocational students. Others felt the 30 units of general education in option A were far too many and pointed to the fact that out of 135,000 students enrolled only about 7,300 students completed the less demanding requirements then in effect (Faris, January 21, 1983 and Read On, January 12, 1983).

In June, 1983, Metropolitan College, which was accredited as a separate college in March 1981, lost its largest military education contract. The college had been offering classes from Japan and Korea to Iceland and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and even on tiny Diego Garcia Island in the Indian Ocean, with total revenues of $6 million per year. The programs were supported by contracts with the United States Armed Forces, but the largest by far with some $4 million in revenues was with the Pacific Air Command—Air Force (PACAF), covering all of the college's military programs in the Pacific Ocean area. The
contracts came up for renewal periodically and Metropolitan had to bid against other institutions for renewal of the agreements. PACAF decided to award its contract in 1983 to Central Texas College. This meant that two-thirds of Metropolitan's revenues would be lost by the end of the year and raised the issue of whether the institution had sufficient critical mass to continue as a viable operation (Trombley, June 22, 1983).

VIII. Board of Trustees Election, 1983

The election of Spring 1983 decided four of the seven positions on the Board of Trustees. It was played out against a backdrop, on the local scene, of struggles against District budget deficits for both the current and coming fiscal years and, in Sacramento, of the early months of controversy over the economic crisis and the Governor's proposal for general student fees. Twenty-two candidates, including the four incumbents, entered the field. And yet, from the beginning, the election suffered from a lack of voter and organizational interest. The incumbents came together as a slate, all with AFT backing, including Richman, who had never before been endorsed by the teachers' union. Archie-Hudson and Tuttle were considered to be safe in their reelection bids; Richman faced a crowded field of seven challengers; and Garvin was opposed once again by Orozco, whom he had unseated four years earlier. The Los Angeles Times said, "The only real excitement has been generated by a group of candidates running as part of a national movement by political eccentric Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr." These candidates "used their time at campaign forums to urge support for an outer space-based laser beam weapon system." All of the incumbents were endorsed by the Daily News, the Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, and the Times, and all were able to achieve at least fifty per cent of the vote in the election on April 12, except Garvin, who was thrown into a run-off with Orozco (Roderick, 1983; Daily News, April 10, 1983; Herald Examiner, April 11, 1983; and Times, April 3, 1983).

The June election was not only a political contest, but a financial drain on the hard-pressed District. The only other races on the ballot were two sub-district elections for the Los Angeles Unified School District Board of Education, so that the Los Angeles Community College District would have to pay the brunt of the election expenses, which were expected to be around $1.4 million. The Board members, who could count among their predecessors the holders of major state and local offices, were now reduced by the Daily News to occupying "one of the most obscure elected offices in the country."

The two run-off candidates differed sharply on how to deal with the District's financial problems and on faculty influence. Orozco said all that was needed was "to tighten our belts." He criticized ten years of administrative mismanagement, and repeated charges made in his campaign against Conner two years before by accusing Garvin and the other six Board members of being "bought" by the AFT. Garvin said the Legislature needed to raise more money for education and that "the fat has been cut" in the District. He claimed he would not have received the support of administrator and other non-teaching employee groups, "if they thought I was only a Guild candidate." On June 7, Garvin beat Orozco, 55.7 percent to 44.3 percent. The election attracted the lowest voter turnout in Los Angeles history, with only 122,466 people, or eight percent of the 1.5 million registered voters, showing up at the polls. The fate of the District for the next four years was at least partially determined by voters who numbered fewer than the students enrolled at the District's colleges that Spring (Ballenger, May 8, 1983 and June 9, 1983; and Ferris, June 3, 1983).

12 The reader can undoubtedly discern the incongruity of such a proposal in an educational governing board election; however, in looking back on this scheme after having experienced the Reagan administration's obsession with the "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative, the reader may not fully appreciate how outlandish the LaRouche candidates seemed to the voters in 1983.
IX. Enrollment

A. Students Who Transfer

In the opening to Chapter One, we described how Koltai, in his October 14, 1981 “State of the District” speech, announced a major re-emphasis on the transfer function. We did not include the transfer statistics Koltai cited which were to focus state and even national attention on the transfer problem. The Los Angeles District had gone from 3.8 percent of its total enrollment transferring to a senior institution in 1975 to a low of just three percent in 1979, the latest year for which data were available. He pointed out that transfers to the University of California had declined by about 19 percent during that period, while transfers to the California State University went down only about four percent. He also reported that a survey conducted the previous fall found 40 percent of the District’s students indicated their primary purpose in attending college was to eventually transfer to a four-year institution (Koltai, 1981; 3).

Koltai also revealed that only about five percent of vocational students completed their programs, and this, combined with the three percent who transferred, meant that better than 90 percent of students were not completing any program. While Koltai dramatized the issue with statistics such as these, other community college leaders in the state clarified them and took exception with respect to their own institutions. The statewide figures for those transferring were higher, at about six percent. State Chancellor Hayward explained that while transfers had decreased from 96,000 to 74,000 students and total enrollments had increased from 710,000 to 1.39 million since 1972, the number of full time students in community colleges had only increased from 282,000 to 295,000. Most of the increase in enrollments had come from vocational and part-time adult students, and neither group contributed much to the transfer figures. John McCuen, now chancellor of the Long Beach District, wrote that, if only full-time students were considered, 17 percent had transferred just to the CSU system from throughout the state in 1980 and that at his institution the figure was 21 percent (Elias, January 24, 1982; Ingwerson, November 19, 1981; McCuen, November 14, 1981; and Roark, May 2, 1982).

Thus began the “great debate over the divisor,” that is, what figure should the number of students who transfer be divided by, in order to arrive at a meaningful percentage of community college students who transferred to a senior institution. Significantly, McCuen used the percentage of full-time, rather than total, students. Others agreed, observing that with three-fourths of the students being part-time—which required many years to complete a program or to transfer—using the percentage of total enrollments indicated little. Even this approach presented problems, because among full-time students, only those who were sophomores were expected to possibly transfer in any one academic year. Thus, including the full-time freshmen in the divisor was also problematical. This issue was part of the larger controversy over the mission and functions of the community college. The debate would continue for many years to come.

B. 1981-82

We have already noted that the Fall 1981 enrollment of 139,168 students was the largest in the District’s history. It represented an increase of 3.4 percent over the previous fall, though the growth in WSCH was only 1.2 percent. Enrollment increases varied considerably by college, with Mission (24.4 percent) and Southwest (15.1 percent) experiencing the greatest percentage growth, Valley (0.9 percent) remaining practically the same, and West (-4.8 percent) losing enrollment. The other five colleges hovered around the District’s average (from 3 to 6.6 percent). In terms of WSCH change, Mission
achieved a 16.7 percent increase and Southwest had 13.3 percent. Trade-Tech (-0.9) and Valley (-3.3) joined West (-9.1) with negative changes. The other four colleges grew between 1.0 to 7.5 percent ("Board Reports," January 6, 1982).

Because students tend to begin their college work in the fall, and because some drop out during or after this semester, spring enrollments usually lag behind those in the fall. Spring, 1982 enrollment followed this tendency by falling short of Fall, 1981; still, with 132,755 students, it was larger than any previous spring semester. A District increase of 3.8 percent over Spring 1981 was achieved, with Mission (30.2 percent) growing even more than in the fall, but Southwest (1.3 percent) with very little growth, and Pierce (10.1 percent) now experiencing the second largest increase. The significance of Pierce's growth was that, being the largest college in the District with 23,117 students, it had over twice the combined enrollment of Mission (4,305) and Southwest (6,892), the two smallest colleges in the District. Both Trade-Tech (-0.1 percent) and West (-8.3 percent) lost enrollments, and the other four colleges grew between 1.3 and 8.8 percent. The change in WSCH showed that Trade-Tech (-5.7 percent) and West (-16.1 percent) had lost more WSCH than enrollment. Pierce's 6.4 percent growth was not as great as East's 10.1 percent. Mission's increase of 27.8 percent was consistent with its enrollment growth, and the other four colleges' increases varied between 0.5 and 3.5 ("Board Reports," April 28, 1982).

One of the most significant changes that took place in 1981-82 was not even mentioned in the enrollment reports that went to the Board of Trustees, but was observed in Read On. For both semesters, growth took place among day students, not those attending in the evening. For Fall 1981, day enrollment went up by 5.8 percent compared to Fall 1980, while evening enrollment barely rose, with only a 0.2 percent increase. The WSCH in the day grew by 2.1 percent, while the evening WSCH declined by .7 percent. In the cases of East and Pierce, evening enrollments and WSCH actually decreased and the totals were positive only because of large increases in day enrollments and WSCH. This reversed a trend begun in 1976. Since then, evening students had increased each year as a percentage of total enrollment, until 1981-82. The phenomenon was even more pronounced in the Spring 1982 semester. Day enrollment grew by 9.9 percent over Spring 1981, while evening enrollment declined by 4.3 percent, and the WSCH figures showed an increase of 4.4 percent for day and decrease of 4.9 for evening. Again East provides a dramatic instance of the general trend. That college lost 18.8 percent in enrollment and 18.5 percent in WSCH in the evening program, though it had the third largest total growth in enrollment (8.8) and the second highest increase in WSCH (10.1), because day enrollment grew by 32.8 percent and WSCH by 27.2 percent ("Board Reports," January 6, 1982 and April 28, 1982; Read On, May 5, 1982; 1; Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983b; 29-30 and 1983d; 30-31).

C. 1982-83

In Fall 1982 the total enrollment was 135,644, a decrease of 2.5 percent from the previous Fall and in fact the first decline in Fall enrollment since 1978. All the colleges lost enrollment, except for Mission, which grew by 14.1 percent. Pierce was down only 0.2 percent and East by 0.4 percent, but Southwest suffered a decrease of 11.0 percent and the other colleges' losses varied between 1.4 and 6.0 percent. WSCH also fell for the first time since 1978, but only by 0.7 percent, compared to Fall 1981. Mission was up by 23.7 percent. Harbor (1.0), Valley (1.2) and West (2.8) had small increases, but Southwest declined by 11.9 percent, and the other four colleges lost between 0.4 and 2.8 percent. The Board Report said that "Fewer class offerings, as a result of the State withdrawal of funding for avocational, recreational, and personal development courses . . . were a major factor contributing to these declines in enrollment and WSCH" ("Board Reports," November 17, 1982).
Again in Spring 1983 the enrollment fell by 3.7 percent and WSCH by .3 in comparison with Spring 1982. The enrollment losses were largest at Harbor (-13.0), Pierce (-8.2) and at West (-6.5), while Mission barely had a positive change (0.5), and the other five colleges declined from .9 to 4.2 percent. In WSCH, six college experienced losses, with the worst being at Southwest (-6.3), Pierce (-5.0) and Harbor (-4.4). Three colleges grew: Mission (3.3), West (5.3) and Trade-Tech (7.8).

The most significant growth figure was that of Trade-Tech, which had a total WSCH of 199,798. This was higher not only than the WSCH enrolled in Spring 1982, but also that of Spring 1981 (196,619). The day enrollment growth was even greater, with 148,434 WSCH for Spring 1983 and 137,870 for 1981, an increase of 10,564 or 7.7 percent. Spring 1983 was the fourth semester in which Trade-Tech scheduled the day vocational block programs for 21 hours-per-week and Spring 1981 was the last semester that the block programs were scheduled with 25 hours. The college's 1981-82 Annual Report had stated that 95 percent of the vocational WSCH had been maintained, but by Spring 1983 all this WSCH had been regained, plus some. What is remarkable here is that the Spring 1982 Board Report explained that Trade-Tech's apparent loss in WSCH that semester could be attributed to a mistake that had been made in Spring 1981, when students who were no longer attending class had not been excluded from the figures. If the Spring, 1981 WSCH total was artificially inflated, then the growth for Spring, 1983 is even more significant. This indicates that by the second year the reduced hours in the block program had been more than replaced by increased enrollment in either vocational or other day classes ("Board Reports," April 28, 1982 and May 4, 1983; Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983a; 95).

A comparison of day and evening enrollments and WSCH for 1982-83 shows that day classes were holding their own, while the decline persisted in the evening programs. Fall 1982 day enrollment increased by 0.3 percent, while the evening enrollment was down 9.8 percent. The WSCH figures were a 2.6 percent increase for day and 6.7 percent loss for evening. For Spring 1983, the figures were a 1.9 percent increase in day enrollment and an 8.7 percent decline in the evening. The WSCH comparisons indicated a 1.1 percent increase in day and a 4.9 percent loss in the evening. Again, no comment was made in the "Board Reports" about the second year of this trend reversal. The District does not have statistics on the extent to which the decline in number of classes offered took place in the day or in the evening. Since day classes are generally taught by full-time instructors and evening classes by hourly rate instructors, however, the apparent cause of the lack of growth in 1981-82 and the loss of enrollment and WSCH in 1982-83 in the evening programs seems to be that the colleges were not scheduling as many classes then. With the exception of not replacing full-time instructors who retired, the only flexibility colleges had in faculty assignments was in the area of hourly rate instruction. Certainly, some full-time instructors could have been assigned evening courses as a part of their regular load, but since the day classes were growing or at least holding their own during this period, there would be no reason for such a reassignment.

In summary, then, enrollments in 1981-82 tended to increase during the day while holding steady in evening programs; in 1982-83, evening enrollments and WSCH began to fall, while day enrollments barely remained the same. We can only speculate that much of this difference in the day and evening enrollments was caused by reduced hourly rate instruction, which is primarily in the evening program.
X. The Colleges

A. Funding

We observed in Chapter One that the College Annual Reports 1980-81 did not make many comments about limited funds, but such observations were more frequent in the 1981-82 reports and even more so in 1982-83. The “Overview” to the 1982-83 reports said: “Annual Reports this year were framed by the unwelcome reality of reduced budgets, personnel shortages, and unprecedented uncertainty regarding fiscal support in 1983-84. Again and again, accounts of achievements were prefaced with the phrase, ‘In spite of budget reductions and staff losses—.’” In 1981-82, the District’s general fund had a slight increase of three percent over the previous year (though not in terms of constant dollars), but suffered a decrease of eight percent in 1982-83. The Pierce College Annual Report began: “The 1982-83 academic year was the first since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978 that the full impact of reduced funding was felt. Every function of Pierce College was affected, and the college was challenged to maintain its high standards and to fulfill its mission under the serious pressure of this new and constrained environment” (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983c; 1, 71 and 1983d; 81).

Colleges were affected differently by the crisis and responded to it in various ways. In Spring, 1982 Southwest closed its off-campus program, comprised of 20 courses offered at 12 sites, but then experimented with a Weekend Program, offered at the main campus on Friday evenings and Saturdays. Colleges planning new programs discovered that they lacked the funds to do so. Trade-Tech could not initiate new high technology programs and Southwest could not afford to begin the business machine repair and computer operations programs already approved by the State. In 1982-83, Valley decreased course offerings by ten percent, though “class offerings were more efficiently and effectively scheduled” which held the Weekly Student Contact Hour (WSCH) loss to 0.2 percent. Pierce College had to reduce the total number of classes by eight percent. Few colleges made specific reference to the impact of the State’s defunding of courses for 1982-83, perhaps because so many classes had to be reduced that the State’s action could be considered as only one of many factors that forced the colleges to curtail their offerings. Still, Districtwide, the impact of course defunding was a reduction of $2.1 million in revenues and the elimination of 118 courses. “We can expect these cuts to adversely affect more than 7,000 students and some 91 instructional personnel,” said Koltai (Courier, September 13, 1982; 1 and Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983a; 80 and 1983c; 72, 89,103, and 117).

The 1982-83 budget reductions districtwide ranged from the low end (certificated administrator accounts down five percent and budgets for instructors off six percent) to the high end (books and supplies reduced 38.5 percent and equipment taking a 47.6 percent cut). Libraries were particularly hard hit because of the reductions in budgets for books, periodicals and media materials. Pierce College reported that a 40 percent reduction in the book budget and 20 percent for periodicals, though the actual reduction in book purchases and subscriptions was much greater, because of rapidly increasing prices. Pierce also complained about the escalating costs for utilities that were consuming the maintenance and operations budgets, increased workloads, and a depletion of staff in admissions and records which “resulted in a serious and threatening loss of services.” The position of school nurse was eliminated at all colleges as of the end of the 1982-83 fiscal year (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983a; 67, 75 and 1983c; 62, 80).

At the same time the District was seeking out military education and CWETA dollars, colleges were aggressively pursuing special funding for their programs and were doing it when most of the staffing for “college development” had been discontinued. One technique
for doing this was to use college foundations as vehicles for private fund raising; colleges either reactivated existing ones or were in the process of forming new foundations. Trade-Tech secured "seed money" for its new foundation by borrowing $150,000 from the Associated Student's Organization. Colleges utilized their contacts with the business and civic community as sources of foundation leadership, contributions of equipment, and professional advice on occupational courses. College presidents and other administrators became more actively involved in chambers of commerce, industry councils and other community organizations. Several colleges reported that they had reorganized and were more fully utilizing their occupational program advisory committees. During this period, colleges increased the number of classes funded by employers. East developed an Emergency Medical Technician program in conjunction with the Los Angeles City Fire Department to train 2,700 firemen prior to the 1984 Olympics (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983c; 28, 66, 78, 93, 94, and 107).

B. Programs

Koltai's theme of improving transfer programs hit a responsive chord with the colleges in 1981-83. Almost all the reports for that year described the activities of the college transfer committees. Harbor's report observed: "Both State and District chancellors admonished community colleges to increase the numbers and success rates of transfer students through early identification and assessment, more effective preparation in basic skills and lower-division coursework, and better articulation with high schools and transfer institutions." Its committee was planning "a comprehensive set of activities to strengthen the transfer function," and inaugurated these activities through grant funds. Harbor also established the Project for Adult College Education (PACE) program, which provided the opportunity for students employed full-time to complete the associate's degree in five semesters by attending class one evening per week and alternate Saturdays, along with viewing televised educational materials. "Team taught and using an interdisciplinary approach, thematic courses provided a unifying framework which encouraged more than 85 percent of participants to complete a full-time program each semester." Valley's Transfer Committee had 50 members drawn from faculty, students, administrators, and the community and it developed and published a packet of transfer materials for distribution to high school students and others. West developed an honors program for transfer students and used a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities to strengthen instruction in the humanities. In 1982-83, East and Mission reported that they had created transfer centers where representatives of the senior institutions gave specialized counseling to students (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983a; 22, 37, 39, 49, 53, 66, 81, 109, and 124).

Koltai had said that "we plan to re-vitalize counseling . . . for transfer students, with focus on orientation, assessment, counseling, and other forms of on-going guidance assistance." James Heinselman, president of Harbor College, led the District-sponsored Project ASSET, which, besides his own college, involved Mission and Trade-Tech and has already been described. Other colleges were not waiting for the results of this pilot project, but instituted their own assessment, orientation, and placement programs. City fully implemented its College Placement Examination program in 1981-82. East had an assessment committee and instituted a new registration process in Fall 1982, involving assessment, counseling, and placement. Pierce required all students whose native language was other than English to take a placement test, and by late Spring, 1983, the Transfer

13 While not mentioned in the Annual Reports, the PACE program was strongly supported by the AFT and many of its students were union employees of city and the county governments (Read On, November 10, 1981).
Committee recommended to the college president that all new students participate in assessment and orientation. Southwest enrolled 2500 of its total of 8000 students in developmental courses and tests of entering students indicated that basic skills levels were still declining. Valley’s assessment program helped to identify students who needed assistance. West adopted a policy in May, 1982, that “all new and returning students will be required to go through an assessment program after enrolling in the college,” and the program was implemented with the Spring, 1983, semester. Certain features distinguished Project ASSET from these other activities: (1) it was eventually intended to be used by all of the colleges, (2) it involved the development of a new assessment instrument by the American College Testing Service, and (3) it was a more complete program of assessment, placement, student data gathering and analysis, following up on students, and special counseling. The question was whether in a time of declining resources the District would be able to implement such an ambitious matriculation program (Koltai, 1981; 5; and Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983a; 9, 26, 37, 67, 73, 84, 97, 110, and 128; and 1983b; 137).

The colleges were also revising, deleting, consolidating, and improving their occupational programs. East reviewed and upgraded its nursing program, including the implementation of a computer-assisted learning center. The revitalized program boosted the success rate for passing the State Board of Registered Nursing examinations from 35 percent in 1980-81 to 84 percent in 1982-83. Harbor “completed a two-year plan to reorganize and modernize occupational offerings,” with the result that over a total five-year period 40 occupational programs were reduced to 23, through deletion or combination with related programs. Mission implemented a new Diesel Technology program and applied for approval of an alcohol studies program, though its proposal for a nursing program was turned down by the State Board of Registered Nursing. Pierce revised its agricultural program by instituting a core curriculum which all students took before they moved into specialty fields. Trade-Tech began operating its block programs 21 hours-per-week rather than 24, as mandated by the union contract. This caused a 12.5 percent drop in the number of vocational course hours offered, though 95 percent of the vocational WSCH was able to be maintained. The college also phased out telephone PBX, auto body and fender, and psychiatric and surgical nursing programs. Valley phased out the dietetic assistant program because of low vitality, but also initiated a new program in microcomputer service and repair. West integrated electronics and aircraft electronics technology.

Colleges were also developing new occupational programs in conjunction with the District Office of Occupational and Technology Programs and funded through training grants. City implemented new program options in electronics and cable television technology and Pierce was developing programs in microwave, laser optics, and office automation. West initiated two programs under CWETA, one in nursing with Kaiser Hospital and one in machine tool training with Rockwell International (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983a; 22, 36, 54, 67, 95, and 125 and 1983b; 7, 23, 41, 58, 80, 103, 116, 118 and 132).

As colleges were adjusting to reduced resources, renewing emphasis on transfer programs, and meeting the evolving needs for occupational education, they also were required to make major changes in general education certification, graduation requirements and disqualification and probation regulations. California community colleges were authorized to certify that their students transferring to California State University had completed the University’s general education requirements, as long as CSU approved the lists of courses required to satisfy this requirement. CSU had recently revised its general education requirements, so that all of the colleges were in the process of developing and submitting

14 See Section IX for more on the impact of the reorganized block programs on Trade-Tech’s enrollment.
revised lists to CSU. In addition, as we have seen, the Board of Trustees had completely revised the graduation requirements, and the colleges had to review and revise their lists of courses taken by the students under the new set of degree requirements.

A greater and more immediate impact on the colleges was caused by the Board of Governors’ requirement, effective in Fall 1981, that the regulations on student disqualification and probation to be tightened. Student records had to be analyzed to determine which students were affected, letters sent to the students to inform them of their disqualification or probation, procedures established and implemented for student appeals, and special counseling services provided to the students affected. Regardless of how much these tougher regulations might be lauded as contributing to higher standards, they had a serious effect on the workload of the colleges and eventually on the enrollments and revenues of the District. Thousands of students were involved. To take but one example, Valley evaluated 855 students subject to disqualification and 2,061 students on probation in Fall, 1982. During Spring, 1983, 1,009 students were subject to disqualification and 2,541 were placed on probation. As the Pierce report stated, “the administration of the probation/dismissal procedures has proven to be extremely time consuming and is being provided at the expense of other operations” (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983a; 22, 53, 66, and 109 and 1983b; 21, 40, and 117).

C. Recruitment

The colleges were quite active in marketing and recruitment activities during this period. Slide/tape, video, and cable TV presentations were created for community relations and recruitment purposes. The quality of class schedules and college catalogs was improved. Tabloid inserts were distributed through daily newspapers and class schedules and community services announcements were mailed to the homes of area residents. Advertisements were placed in area newspapers and commercials aired on radio stations. Emphasis was placed on recruiting high school seniors by making presentations at the area institutions and using direct mailings to these students.

In 1981-82, Pierce undertook a pilot project with three high schools to determine the best means to encourage their graduates to attend the college. In 1982-83, Valley held two “Senior Days,” which 531 high school seniors attended. Mission initiated a program of registration by mail and telephone, in the classroom, and at outreach centers. Valley and Trade-Tech published newsletters in 1982-83 to report progress at the colleges and the achievements of students, faculty and staff to the community, though Valley’s monthly Upbeat became a casualty of staff cuts at the end of the year. Harbor’s 1981-82 Report indicated that the college’s enrollment growth of 6.6 percent, which was 2.8 percent above the District’s average increase, “is attributed to the extensive marketing efforts carrying the ‘quality’ message to the community.” The following year, Harbor’s report stated that the college’s six percent enrollment decline, which exceeded the District’s average enrollment loss by four percentage points, was attributed to “the failure to mail out class schedules, inadequate publicity, and a breakdown in the registration procedure.” Thus, one college learned a bitter lesson about the difference marketing techniques made (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1983a; 42-43, 57, 68, 90 and 101 and 1983b; 39, 88, 90, 109, and 125).
## Figure 2.
### Board of Trustees, 1981-89

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Office 1</th>
<th>Office 2</th>
<th>Office 3</th>
<th>Office 4</th>
<th>Office 5</th>
<th>Office 6</th>
<th>Office 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981-83</td>
<td>Monroe F. Richman (Incumbent)</td>
<td>Arthur Bronson Reelected</td>
<td>Marguerite Archie-Hudson (Incumbent)</td>
<td>Lindsay Conner Elected</td>
<td>Harold W. Garvin (Incumbent)</td>
<td>Wallace Albertson Reelected</td>
<td>Frederick B. Tuttle (Incumbent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983-85</td>
<td>Reelected</td>
<td>Reelected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reelected Resigned 7/1/85 Elected City Controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-87</td>
<td>Reelected</td>
<td>Reelected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Letitia Quezada Appointed 7/25/85 Retired 6/30/87 Elected to LAUSD Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987-89</td>
<td>Wallace B. Knox Retired 6/30/89</td>
<td>Julia L. Wu</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Retired 6/30/89</td>
<td>David Lopez-Lee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989-91</td>
<td>Patrick F. Owens</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER THREE

The Crisis Continues, 1983-85

On July 21, 1983, one of the Los Angeles District college presidents was on vacation in Hawaii and picked up a day-old Los Angeles Times at the airport to catch up on the news during the flight back to Los Angeles. He was elated to read that the California Legislature had included in the 1983-84 budget a $124 million increase in appropriations for the community colleges, covering cost-of-living, growth and equalization. A few hours later, after he had landed in Los Angeles and read the current edition of the Times, he was shocked to learn that the Governor had not only vetoed the increase, but had cut back the appropriation by an additional $108 million, which gave the community colleges 7.7 percent less than the year before. The Governor said the decrease could be regained by an enrollment fee of $100 per year for full-time students and $50 for part-time students. Thus, the 1983-85 period began with the community colleges’ worst possible fears realized: They were the victims of a stand-off between a Governor intent on instituting enrollment fees and Democratic legislators determined the fees would not be charged.

I. The Senior Staff and AFT President, 1983-84

The most powerful administrators in the Los Angeles Community College District were the Senior Staff. These were the top District Office leaders and consisted of the Chancellor; the vice chancellors of business services, educational services, and personal services; and the legal counsel. These five administrators—along with the college presidents and assorted other District Office administrators at various times—made up the Chancellor’s Cabinet, but the Senior Staff wielded power more effectively than the full Cabinet. They could meet and work together more frequently than did the Cabinet, so that they made many of the important decisions for the District.

During 1981-83 the only change in the Senior Staff occurred in August, 1982, when Dr. Kenneth Washington, president of San Francisco City College, returned to the District as vice chancellor of educational services to replace Gene Pimentel, who retired. On December 14, 1983, two Senior Staff appointments were made on an acting basis, but they later became permanent, after selection processes were completed. Mary L. Dowell, associate legal counsel, became general counsel, to replace Robert Henry, who had resigned to establish a law firm in Northern California. As general counsel, Dowell was the chief legal advisor for the District. She conducted litigation, prepared pleadings, and represented the District in trials when authorized to do so by the Board. The other appointment was the most significant one ever made in the District, except for those of chancellors. Virginia Mulrooney, president of the AFT College Guild and president of the Community College Council of the California Federation of Teachers, was named to replace William Spaeter as vice chancellor of personnel services. Spaeter was retiring after 33 years of service, and had held his present post since 1970, except for the time he was acting chancellor in 1972.

After Mulrooney’s appointment was announced, Koltai acknowledged it was “unorthodox,” but rejected the suggestion it could be compared to naming the president of the United Auto Workers as a vice president of General Motors. “We are a teaching institution,” Koltai said, and justified the selection by pointing to Mulrooney’s intimate
involvement in the District’s personnel matters as president of the faculty Guild. He described the appointment as evidence of “our continuing willingness to listen to new ideas and examine new perspectives. Dr. Mulrooney is a very knowledgeable individual and is well-known and respected throughout the state. She will be a tremendous asset to our district.”

Representatives of the Administrators Association met with the Board in executive session to register their objections to the appointment. Hope Holcomb, executive director of the association, told the Board in open session that a “blatant disregard” had been shown for normal selection processes and that the appointment had been “cloaked in secrecy.” Jack Smith, vice president of academic affairs at Harbor College and a former president of the association, commented that the appointment was “a slap in the face” to administrators who were not considered for the position. He said a common reaction by administrators was “sheer astonishment that the leader of this principal adversarial group would take her first administrative post as vice chancellor” (Courier, January 3, 1984; 1,3; Werkman, December 15, 1983).

This was not the only time, however, that Koltai had catapulted a faculty member over the heads of experienced administrators and into a high administrative position. Several years before he had promoted Arthur Avila, a Spanish instructor at Valley, to be the president of East Los Angeles College. Koltai had also previously enticed top union leadership to work for him at the District Office. Sampson, who, instead of running again for AFT president in 1982, had chosen to take a sabbatical leave during the 1982-83 academic year, returned after the sabbatical to serve as a faculty assistant to Koltai. Nor was this the first time that Mulrooney had demonstrated her interest in an administrative post. In 1981, she had applied for the position of president of Valley College, where she had begun her teaching career and had continued to teach part-time after assuming full-time union responsibilities. That she was not chosen as president can be attributed as much as anything to opposition by her fellow teachers.

Mulrooney had achieved considerable success as the executive secretary and then president of the union, and was eager to move onto something new, whether in the district administration or elsewhere. In her final months as union president her leadership helped to accomplish two victories which increased both the power and finances of the AFT. The first, during summer 1983, was the decertification of the California State Employees association as the bargaining agent for the 1200 classified clerical and technical employees and the subsequent victory of AFT to represent them. While the clerical-technical employees had their own “Staff Guild,” officers, and executive secretary, the two AFT Guilds worked together as a powerful new labor bloc in the District. The second victory was the adoption of an agency shop by a faculty vote in November. About 60 percent of the District’s 3,700 full- and part-time instructors were already AFT members, but the vote required that all teachers pay dues to the union. Mulrooney was leaving the AFT in a position of considerable strength in a period of great strife and now would confront, from the management side of the bargaining table, the union power she herself had helped to build (Read On, September 2, 1983 and October 21, 1983; and Daily News, November 18, 1983).

Many union members, after learning of Mulrooney’s appointment, accused her of “selling out” and being co-opted by management. Her reaction was that it was “an erroneous response” to think that she had sold out by joining the District management. She would “work in the interest of all employees of this district.” Martin Hittelman, AFT vice president who would act as president until the regular election in May, said the reaction by union members was mixed: “Some are happy that we have an administrator who is pro-faculty, some think that she’s sold out and others are frightened because she is so
competent." Read On, which was now being edited by Hal Fox, an English instructor and union leader at East, described the AFT Executive Committee meeting at which Mulrooney stepped down as president: "She stated that her continued professional position will be one of collegiality," and that she would continue to be concerned primarily with education in her new position, just as she had in her union posts. Read On commented: "No one in the group seemed to doubt that Virginia Mulrooney will do a good job as Vice Chancellor of Personnel. Perhaps a more relevant question is what a ‘good job’ as Vice Chancellor of Personnel means...will the appointee use her persuasive powers to reconcile differences between the Chancellor and the Guild? With whom will she be most persuasive?" (Read On, December 27, 1983; Bentley-Adler, December 15, 1983; Hernandez, December 15, 1983; and Werkman, December 15, 1983).

By the time the AFT election was held on May 23, Hittelman had enlisted the endorsements of many campus union leaders and was considered to be the front runner. Of the other four candidates, Hal Fox was thought to be Hittelman’s most serious challenger. The main issues in the campaign were the lack of a pay raise for the last two years and whether the union leadership had become too cozy with the District administration, as demonstrated by Mulrooney’s defection to management. Long-time union members considered the election to be the first real contest during the two-decade history of the Guild. Fox scored an upset victory, attracting 652 votes to Hittelman’s 468. The new AFT president interpreted his triumph as indicating that teachers “want a raise and they want a good one” and that the union “has to separate from the district office, particularly Virginia Mulrooney” (Connell, May 23, 1983; and Los Angeles Times, May 26, 1983).

Even with all of her tough posturing and harsh language in public as a union leader, Mulrooney had demonstrated a willingness to meet with the Board and the Chancellor to work out problems reasonably. Koltai had appointed her as vice chancellor because he thought she could help him with the union, but her appointment resulted in alienating rather than coopting the AFT. Significant consequences would accrue to the Mulrooney appointment and the subsequent defeat of her vice president by a candidate who wanted to distance the union from the administration and from the new vice chancellor of personnel.

II. Funding, 1983-84

The response by the Los Angeles District to Deukmajian’s July 21 veto of $232 million in community college funding was strong and immediate. “I think he has a great contempt for community colleges because they represent the poor and minorities,” said Board President Archie-Hudson. She and Koltai jointly issued a statement that said, “In one simplistic action, the governor of California has ruined the finest educational system in the country—California’s community colleges.” The first practical response to the cut was the cancellation of the second session of summer school, which the District had scheduled in hopes that it would help maintain ADA levels. The District was in financial trouble before the Governor’s reduction, with a $15 million deficit projected for 1983-84. The District’s share of the Deukmajian cuts was first estimated to bring the total deficit to approximately $25 million, but was revised upward to $29 million. Many possible cost cutting measures were discussed, including not filling the 128 vacant faculty positions which occurred because of the retirement incentive awarded the previous year.1 Canceling the classes

1 The total number of retirements from the District as of June 30 was 380, representing six percent of the total 6085 employees and by far the largest contingent ever to retire in one year. The numbers by category were 229 classified staff, 133 certificated, and 18 certificated administrators. The difference between the 133 certificated retirements and the
taught by these positions plus cuts in part-time faculty could affect as many as 30,000 students. Vice Chancellor of Business Services Fallo disclosed at a Board meeting on July 27 that District officials were investigating what would happen if the District were forced into bankruptcy. Later, laying off 700 classified staff and furloughing all employees for three weeks without pay was considered. On August 11, a press conference was held to announce the formation of a “Committee to Save the Los Angeles Community Colleges.”

The group was organized to lobby in favor of replacing the lost funds and was made up of representatives of government, business, labor, and civic organizations. Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley, one of the committee’s four co-chairmen, accused the Deukmajian administration of committing “blackmail” by lobbying community college presidents to support mandatory student fees (Werkman, July 22, 1983; July 24, 1983; July 28, 1983; August 11, 1983; August 12, 1983).

When Koltai submitted the 1983-84 Final Budget to the Board of Trustees on August 26, he said general purpose revenues for the fiscal year were $32.9 million less than for 1982-83. This was caused by the loss of $12.3 million through the Governor’s cuts, the unavailability of $17.4 from reserved funds which had been used in 1982-83, and a reduction in the beginning balance of $2.5 million. Appropriations had already been reduced, which brought the deficit down to approximately $29 million. Koltai said the Governor had refused to support an extension of the filing deadline for the annual budget until the close of the legislative session. This meant that if funding were restored, some of the Board’s actions would prove to be unnecessary (Koltai Letter to Board of Trustees, August 26, 1983; in Office of the Chancellor, 1983).

The budget “Overview” stated 1983-84

was the third year in a row that the Los Angeles District has been required to develop a budget in the face of declining revenues. . . . It is the second year that personnel reductions have been necessary and no salary increase possible. Moreover, the 1983-84 fiscal year is the first year that salary reductions and personnel layoffs have been considered essential to the continued effective operation of the District.

Six budget reductions that would generate the necessary $29 million were recommended to the Board for adoption. Four of these were interfund transfers; selling parcels of District-owned property, which would require State legislation; cutting back on material support; and reductions to the certificated service. The cut in faculty costs would be accomplished through incentives for mid-year retirements, an increase in the faculty load for Spring that would have to be negotiated, and reductions in hourly rate faculty, which would result in a loss of ADA. The hourly rate reduction was to take effect immediately with the cancellation of 600 classes; an additional 1800 classes would not be offered in the spring semester. The budget’s last two recommendations were bomb shells: a five percent salary reduction and laying off 500 classified employees as of November 1, for the last nine pay periods of the fiscal year (Office of the Chancellor, 1983; 1, 8).

The Board approved the budget on August 31, just a week before the statutory deadline of September 7 and with only two weeks remaining in the legislative session. Little progress was being made on resolving the State crisis, but the Board and administration still hoped additional funds would be provided that would enable them to avoid some of the cuts. The District’s spending package totaled $197 million, or only 86 percent of the funds for the 128 vacant positions reflects five positions that had already been filled (Board of Trustees, Minutes, October 19, 1983; 7 and Courier, September 12, 1983; 1).
previous year. Board members described it as “catastrophic” and “disastrous.” Koltai presented the budget, but said he could not recommend a plan “that so deeply affects the lives” of students and employees. Fallo warned the Board that some of the actions would result in reduced enrollments and therefore State aid, which in turn could lead to bankruptcy the following year. Mulrooney, who was still president of the AFT at this time, described the budget as “evil” because it preserved “things over people.” Paul Worthman, who had been hired as the union’s assistant executive secretary to analyze the budget, claimed the deficit was only $12 million. He had previously presented the Board with an alternative budget that required no increase in workload, no reduction in salaries, and no layoffs of personnel. Fallo responded that the AFT “got a lot of numbers wrong” and that much of the savings the union claimed did not exist. The Board approved motions by Bronson and Garvin that cut an additional $819,000 from non-personnel accounts and saved some of the classified jobs. The budget was approved by a five to one vote. Garvin, the lone dissenter, said he was unable to vote in favor because of the layoffs (Connell, September 1, 1983; Courier, September 26, 1983; and Read On, September 2, 1983).

To put the layoffs into effect the Board had to take a personnel action naming the exact positions to be reduced. The layoffs would have to take place by November 1, or even more positions would be included to achieve the savings indicated in the budget. On September 14 the Board debated a resolution that authorized reduction of the classified service by 410 positions, and specified the number involved in each classification. Since the specific positions involved would not necessarily be held by employees with the least seniority in that classification, employees with greater seniority could exercise their “bumping” rights to secure another position not being discontinued. This would lead to a massive number of employees being involved in the dismissal in one way or another, with the estimates ranging up to 1000 employees.

A large crowd turned out for the Board meeting and 15 individuals made presentations to the Board on the resolution. Spaeter introduced the issue by stating that the resolution confronted the Board with the most difficult decision in the history of the District. He described the process used to determine the list of eliminated positions. This involved on-site studies by the Workforce Analysis Unit established in 1982 and a contingency plan by the Classified Reorganization Committee of four college presidents and vice chancellors formulated in Spring 1983. A committee of vice chancellors discussed work force priorities and needs with each college administration. Spaeter stressed that a reduction of forty percent of the work force would have serious consequences. President Archie-Hudson presented the latest news from Sacramento. Several speakers recommended that other cuts be made instead of the classified reduction. AFT Vice President Hittelman said, “If your consideration is political, then you must be forced to understand that you are playing with human lives in this political battle. You have already caused great personal suffering . . . to over 500 human beings—some of whom are here today.” General Counsel Henry explained the process under the Federal Bankruptcy Court that authorized community college districts to submit a plan for reorganization of their debts. Koltai broke into the deliberations, to report that the negotiations in Sacramento had collapsed when the Democrats turned down the Governor’s final offer. Since these negotiations were to resume the next day, the Board recessed to 3 p.m. the following day to see whether a compromise had been reached (Board of Trustees, “Action,” Communication No. 6; Board of Trustees, Minutes, September 14, 1983; 3-8; Hittelman, “Remarks,” in Minutes).

When the Board reconvened on September 15 Koltai said, “I am able to report to you at this time that a compromise agreement has been tentatively reached among all the parties in the capitol.” While the compromise was not final, Koltai’s best information was that it would be ratified. He recommended that the motion for classified reductions be
withdrawn, which the Board did. Fallo estimated that the District would receive $12.3 from the funding compromise plus an undetermined amount from the imposition of mandatory fees. Koltai’s information was accurate at the time he received it, but that evening the liberal Assembly Democrats held firm on the fee issue. They defeated the fee bill and the community colleges lost the funding for that session of the Legislature (Werkman, September 16, 1983). This was the second time in less than two months that the situation in Sacramento had been reversed overnight, to the community colleges’ detriment. The first occasion was the Governor’s veto of the $232 million and now the liberal Democrats had sabotaged a compromise, the terms of which proved to be as good as they would get. In the meantime, districts like Los Angeles, to use Tom Fryer’s phrase, were left to “twist slowly in the wind.”

At the same time as the layoff controversy, the District was also faced with a potential strike by the teachers union. Negotiations on the 1983-86 contract had been going on since November, 1982. In mid-August 1983 the Board met with union representatives, seeking some progress in the negotiations. The union resented management’s attempts to take back things already granted in previous contracts. On September 12 an AFT general membership meeting considered the options and voted to delay a strike vote until September 29. They also passed a resolution censuring the Board for passing a budget that required salary reductions, layoffs, and workload increases and another resolution that censured the Governor for vetoing additional State money for the community colleges. Two weeks of intensive negotiations resulted in an agreement on the evening of September 26. The settlement was announced jointly by Koltai and Mulrooney the next day, just two days before the strike vote was to be taken. The agreement came too late to prevent the preparation of strike materials. Mulrooney, during her news conference, punctuated the AFT’s resolve to carry out its threat by holding up a picket captain’s T-shirt and a strike placard.

The agreement did not provide a pay increase, but neither was there a salary reduction as called for in the budget. This part of the settlement cost the District $3.8 million of the $6 million in total savings budgeted for decreased employee compensation. Salary negotiations would be reopened if additional funds were provided by the State. The District won agreement on a “flexible” teaching load; some instructors would teach an extra class in the spring semester in return for a lighter teaching load or payment at a later time. This was expected to salvage perhaps 600 of the 1800 classes canceled for spring. Average class size was increased from 33 to 34 students. Departments achieving this average could schedule small advanced classes if they maintained the required average. The contract also included an “early start” calendar for the 1984-85 academic year.

At the union meeting on September 29 Mulrooney presented the contract by describing it as “merely satisfactory, but it is the best we could do at this time.” Some speakers advised rejecting the settlement. One instructor said that legislators had told him that they did not “hear any pain from Los Angeles” and did not “think you people are really hurting.” He warned that ratification would mean that community college funds removed from the State budget would not be restored. The overwhelming majority of the teachers present, however, agreed with Mulrooney’s assessment of the situation and voted for approval (Greenwalt, September 13, 1983; Read On, October 4, 1983; Trombley, September 28, 1983 and September 30, 1983; and Werkman, September 28, 1983).

On October 19, the Board once again considered the reduction of classified staff. This time, however, 500 full time positions were required to produce $6 million in savings, because the layoffs would not take effect until around January 6, 1984. The Board resolution quoted a letter from State Chancellor Jerry Hayward to superintendents and presidents that in his best judgment the districts had gotten all the funds they were going to
receive for the fiscal year and that they should make adjustments in their spending plans accordingly. The crowd that gathered that day was described by one spokesman as the largest and angriest he had ever seen at a Board meeting. Koltai introduced the item by observing that the District’s classified staff had already been reduced from 2300 in 1978 to 1900 and that these further cuts would lower the total to 1400 employees. Telegrams would be sent to the Governor asking him to restore the base funding of $108 million in light of a State surplus estimated to reach $1 billion by the end of the fiscal year, and to the Board of Governors requesting that they reconsider their endorsement of “tuition” for the same reason. Forty-two individuals spoke to the resolution. Most urged further attempts to resolve the funding issue and further discussion of alternatives to avoid the layoffs. Fallo explained that some of the savings used to balance the budget were now doubtful. The $5 million from the sale of parcels of land would require rezoning, which probably could not be accomplished in time to receive the funds this fiscal year. Salary reductions, budgeted at $6 million, were not included in the faculty agreement and negotiations with other unions had not yet been concluded. All of the Trustees said that they deplored the classified employee reductions and blamed them on the Governor’s intransigence. After six hours of testimony and discussion, the Board voted to authorized the layoffs by a vote of six to one, with Garvin once again casting the only “no” vote. He explained that his 31 years of teaching in the District enabled him “to know the value of the classified workers. This district simply cannot function, firing 500 of them” (Board of Trustees, “Action,” Communication No. 1; Board of Trustees, Minutes, October 19, 1983; 1-9; Smith, October 20, 1983).

A week later Koltai delivered his “1983 State of the District Address.” In discussing the Board’s layoff action, he said “There are no words that can express my sorrow at the series of events, which brought us to that unprecedented, but unavoidable, personnel action.” He reviewed the events of what he called “The Year of Turmoil” and the District’s continuing attempts to resolve the funding crisis. He described the impact of reduced funding on the District. This included the virtual elimination of capital construction and facility maintenance, a loss of 300 certificated positions and 427 classified positions (before the 500 cut) since 1979, and the cancellation of 652 fall semester classes that meant 33,000 students could not take the classes of their choice. Staffing and acquisitions in the libraries were reduced, 11 percent of counseling positions were lost since the previous year, health services were eliminated, and disabled student services funding was cut by 25 percent and child care by 20 percent. “The struggle over principles is an expensive one,” Koltai said about the student fee battle. “It is important to realize what the principles are, for they are deeper than the tuition/no tuition issue. . . . The real issue is access, for which tuition is only a symbol. The great legislative struggles being waged in Sacramento are really about who our students are or who they should be. In short, the struggle is over the soul of the community colleges in California.”

Koltai said preliminary findings of a study currently under way indicated that “it would take more than more than $178 million just to be where we were in 1977.” Cost of living adjustments alone would need an additional $104.3 million, while growth would require another $23.6 million and unfunded capital construction projects amounted to $53.1 million since 1977-78. Though he normally used the State of the District address to announce new programs and activities, this year, “our highest priorities are the survival of our colleges and the educational services they provide.” He declared, “[We are] in the midst of the greatest crisis ever to confront California’s community colleges. [However, w]e must not become so discouraged that we give up our commitment to quality education for our students, nor our pride in our colleges. We must value what we do.” He felt that better times would come and that the District “must be prepared to rebuild our faculty, staff, and programs” (Koltai, 1983; 3-7 and 13-14).
Earlier that same day the Assembly Special Committee on Community Colleges met at East Los Angeles College in the first of several hearings scheduled at locations around the State. Originally the committee had planned to hear just from State officials Patrick Callan and Jerry Hayward, but, according to Read On, Mulrooney had prevailed upon it to use the occasion to receive limited testimony from some of those who attended. Over 500 faculty, staff, and faculty crowded into the campus center building and hundreds more stood outside and listened to the proceedings over a public address system. For three hours the committee heard testimony in what Read On called “one of the largest meetings of concerned community college staff in the state’s history.” Several students—white, black, Hispanic and handicapped—attacked the student fee proposal. Faculty members protested the layoffs that would be voted on that afternoon by the Los Angeles Board. Mulrooney urged the Legislature to restore the funds by using the surplus or through any means necessary. She paid more, she said, for automobile insurance than for property taxes. “Earlier today Mr. Callan suggested we need to look at priorities. What kind of priorities exist when I pay more to a private insurance company to insure my car than I do to government for police and fire protection, schools, flood control, and water. I pay $1.17 per year to support the community colleges in Los Angeles” (Hernandez and Trombley, October 27, 1983 and Read On, October 31, 1983; 1-2).

On December 14, 1983, Fallo presented the Board with the “1983-84 First Quarter Budget Report.” After four months of operation, revised budget projections and a new estimate of the revenue shortfall were possible. Fallo gave the status of the $28.8 million in actions the Board had approved in August to bring the Final Budget into balance. The interfund transfers had been completed; the sale of property was being investigated; reductions in material support had been effected; mid-year retirements were expected to be fewer than predicted; the fall semester hourly rate reductions had been completed, but because of a loss of enrollment, spring semester hourly rate was being reviewed; salary rate reductions had been canceled; and the classified layoffs had been postponed until February 5, 1984. This latter action was able to be taken by the Board on November 30, because of savings that had been accrued through the resignations and retirements of classified employees who did not wish to wait until they might be dismissed. The postponement also allowed time to see whether a compromise could be worked out early in the 1984 legislative session.

The additional four months of experience allowed for revision of the estimates, but the revenue shortfall still stood at $19.3 million. Fallo also reported on other actions and savings and income that affected the shortfall. These consisted of additional income; a possible loan from the State; not budgeting part of the expenses for the next year’s election; savings from certificated leaves, sabbaticals and vacancies and from classified leaves and vacancies, as well as the related benefits; unused fall hourly rate funds; elimination of the salary reserve that was found to be unneeded; savings in substitute and relief employees funds; and miscellaneous salary savings. Not all of these were certainties, but if all were realized, the shortfall would be reduced to $3 million (Business Services Division, 1983; 7-10 and Read On, December 7, 1983; 1).

When finally the Legislature passed the compromise on January 25, 1984, and the Governor signed it on January 26, timing was once again a problem for the Los Angeles District. The Sacramento imbroglio had used up precious weeks in January, and the resolution came just days before the beginning of the spring semester and the deadline for the layoff of hundreds of classified employees. Colleges needed to know whether or not they would be able to offer classes and employees needed to know if they still had jobs. The Board met on January 25 and even though the compromise was not yet final, they “postponed indefinitely” the layoffs scheduled to occur on February 5. Fallo estimated that the District would receive about $11 million out of the $96.5 million to be added to the community colleges statewide.
When the year-long controversy between the Governor and the Legislature was finally concluded the next day, the union and the employees were relieved that the layoffs had finally been canceled. Sandra Lapore, executive secretary of the AFT staff guild, said that there was "no real sense of celebration. It's been too long in coming. The damage has already been done."

The compromise Sacramento wrought also included the first-time imposition of general student fees, and the District had been down to the very end a leading opponent of them. Students were apprehensive about whether they could afford the fee. Administrators feared that the small initial charge would grow quickly and have devastating effects on enrollments and on access to higher education for the population served by the District. Koltai observed that the mid-year augmentation only brought the District back to the previous year’s level of funding and said that "Our struggle to achieve fair and equitable funding levels will continue." (Courier, February 14, 1984; 1; Deleski, January 27, 1984; Hernandez, January 29, 1984; and Werkman, January 26, 1984).

In February Fallo was able to report to the Board in the “1983-84 Second Quarter Report” that the projected deficit had been eliminated. This had been accomplished because the State had “returned” $11.4 million in funds, estimates of local tax revenues had been revised, and estimated expenditures had been reduced. Many of the items discussed in the previous report could now be estimated more accurately. Some of the measures previously contemplated were no longer deemed realistic for the present fiscal year (for example, the sale of real property was not an immediate possibility, though plans were to sell the parcels eventually). The loan from the State was no longer included. One of the major reasons for reduced expenditures was that vacancies were being left unfilled. As of January 9, 1984, the net reduction of classified positions was 195.6. The report concluded:

> The release of the $11.4 million to the District resolves the critical issue of the deficit for 1983-84. However, it by no means solves the District’s fiscal crisis. As a result of a number of factors, among them the uncertainties of fees and funding for the community colleges, enrollment has declined sharply. This decline has serious implications for the 1984-85 fiscal year and possibly for 1985-86. ... The District should begin planning for reduced enrollments and a downsizing of our educational programs (Business Services Division, 1984a; 1-5, 9, and 18-19).

In the “1983-84 Third Quarter Report and 1984-85 Budget Projection,” Fallo said the additional $11.4 from the State had four major results: (1) ending the immediate fiscal crisis facing the District; (2) allowing the reopening of negotiations on 1983-84 salaries; (3) enabling the District to appropriate funds for a summer session; and (4) providing for “an aggressive consumer information campaign for the fall semester.” The educational program was being “repaired” in a number of ways: The requirement that faculty teach overload assignments in the spring semester was not being implemented. Staffing tables and standards were being established to redirect the diminished workforce and to guide hiring, so that positions would be used to maximize the benefit to the educational program. Training programs were being established to assist employees in transferring from non-critical to high-demand classifications. Hiring continued on an extremely selective basis. Student recruitment programs were funded in an attempt to reestablish the 1982-83 enrollment levels. Registration, admissions and financial aid functions were strengthened through redistribution of staff and resources and allocating additional funds. More funds were also redistributed to material support, for which a survey had identified needs of over a half million dollars. Funds for these programs were coming from the additional state allocation and from unanticipated increases in other revenues, as well as by reallocating existing appropriations. The savings were made possible by vacant positions and a recent
reduction in the District Office budget. The District would end the year with positive balances, though the effect “of the fiscal crises on the educational program, students and employees” would take some time to assess.

In pointing toward 1984-85, Fallo said that implementation of AB1XX would mean that the student fee revenue, except for two percent that could be retained by districts for administrative costs, would be treated like local property tax revenue for calculating state apportionment. Materials fees would no longer be collected by the District, which meant a loss of $870,000. Finally, districts would be allowed the entire 1984-85 fiscal year to restore enrollment to the 1982-83 levels. The Governor’s budget currently under consideration by the Legislature did not fully fund the provisions of SB 851. It provided for the cost-of-living increase that had not been included in the 1983-84 appropriation, but not for an additional 1984-85 cost-of-living adjustment. This meant the Statewide funding was $100 million short of the statutory level. The Governor’s total community college budget was six percent greater than for 1983-84, but the funds being provided by the State were actually less than in 1983-84, because of increased local taxes plus the new enrollment fee revenues. Additionally, the Governor’s budget might have overestimated student fee income by $20 million, so that the budget could have a built-in deficit.

The major impact on the District would come from enrollments. To avoid a loss in revenue, the District would have to regain during 1984-85 the 11 percent in ADA lost in 1983-84. This would be unlikely even under normal circumstances, but given the implementation of the enrollment fee and the still inadequate financial support from the State, returning to the 1982-83 level of 69,000 ADA was most uncertain. The District was pursuing “hold harmless” legislation that would mean it would not be penalized if it was unsuccessful in recapturing the enrollment during 1984-85. Such an action would provide additional income for that year, but then would reduce funding for 1985-86 (Business Services Division, 1984b; 1-4, 5-9,13-14).

A year that had been largely taken up with considering, approving, and retracting massive classified layoffs ended with awarding all employees a small salary increase, the first in two years. On June 20, the Board approved a 3.5 percent raise for certificated employees and administrators and 3.75 percent for other employees, retroactive to March 25, 1984 (Board of Trustees, “Action Report,” June 20, 1984).

III. Planning, 1983-84

The planning question that confronted the Los Angeles District in Fall, 1983, was, “What should we plan for?” The State’s community colleges were held hostage by the controversy between the Governor and the Legislature, hardly a situation that an organization includes in its contingency planning scenarios. The planning in the previous period had been tightly linked with specific program development and the need to take fiscal action immediately. Now Koltai decided to support the recommendations of the Committee on Institutional Reassessment and to take a different approach.

In his October, 1983, State of the District Address, Koltai said that “Our planning must change from crisis management to long-range planning.” The Committee on Institutional Reassessment had the previous year “developed the criteria for district-wide long-range planning. Key elements of this planning process are an assessment of educational needs, the integration of educational and budget planning, and increased participation in the planning process.” Regardless of his support for the principle of broad involvement, he said that an all-administration committee was developing a “white paper” on the needs of the District. Named the “Committee on Community Colleges: Commitment to Access and...
Excellence,” the group would “deal not only with the need to recover diminished educational programs and services, but also with the need to alter, develop, enhance and expand these functions.” As we have already seen, the committee had estimated that $178 million would be required to get the District back to where it was in 1977 (Koltai, 1983; 12-13).

Instead of turning to the District Office administration for leadership, as he had with Budget Director Serot for the previous committee, Koltai appointed two college presidents, Arthur Avila of East Los Angeles College and Thomas Stevens of Trade-Technical College, to be co-chairs of the new committee. The 20 members were college presidents and vice presidents, except for four District Office administrators. In January, 1984, just as the standoff in Sacramento was ending, the committee issued its report, “Educational Needs, Goals, and Resources: Planning Issues for the Los Angeles Community Colleges, 1984-89.” The “Introduction” stated that

the basic aim of this paper is to draw into focus the educational needs of potential Los Angeles Community College students during the next five years. . . . Recent fiscal shortfalls have diverted attention away from changing educational needs to fiscal and personnel resource management. This paper seeks to restore the perspective of educational needs, community college purposes, and institutional planning to the management and development of resources.

The report made a variety of recommendations, including raising enrollment ceilings to accommodate population growth and college educational needs, providing a comprehensive matriculation program for entering students, enhancing the value of the associates degree to both employers and transfer institutions, expanding contract education, developing learning “packages” which addressed the common educational needs of different student groups, and designing general education curricula to offer students common learning experiences that recognize the values of a pluralistic society. The paper assessed the educational needs of the District by stating that transfer education needs would increase as larger numbers of minority students sought a baccalaureate education; preparatory vocational education needs would grow slightly, with a shift from trade to technical skills; retraining and reentry needs would increase, as career goals and job opportunities altered more rapidly; and the need for pre-collegiate basic skills would continue to expand. As to staffing needs, the report stated:

As funding is restored, the immediate need to replace staff vacancies will be urgent, with vacant positions since fall 1982 numbering about 225 among faculty, nearly 500 among classified staff, and 30 among administrators. . . . In the aftermath of staff reductions, a thorough analysis of staff needs will be essential to achieving planned changes in educational programs, student services, and institutional support. . . . as funding is restored, the District will have a rare opportunity to restructure operational and support staff.

The report reviewed the developments at the State level regarding community college mission and functions, and then stated the conviction of the committee: “that the mission and functions of community colleges should remain comprehensive, offering a balanced curriculum responsive to local needs and educational resources.” What was necessary was “the development of statewide and local priorities,” which would allow State agencies and local colleges to “respond to changing fiscal and environmental conditions without dramatic surprise and hasty adjustment.” As to priorities, “The committee views transfer and

2 The committee was generally referred to by the shorter name, "Committee on Access and Excellence," which will be used in this study.
occupational preparatory programs as the heart of the community college curriculum, with remedial and continuing education extensions of them, necessary but variable among colleges and with changing conditions.”

The committee felt that the need for a more stable funding mechanism was critical and recommended a five-year system. Local control over fiscal resources should be increased and alternatives to the predominant state funding should be developed. Local sources might include sales or income taxes, support from business and industry, and contract education. The report concluded with three priorities for planning: (1) “to restore deficits in cost-of-living salary adjustments, staffing, equipment, supplies and facilities maintenance,” along with “a strong staff development program to improve utilization of existing staff in high demand programs and services;” (2) “to expand and develop existing programs and services in which growth in response to need has been curtailed by funding reductions;” and (3) “to extend existing programs and to develop new programs which are responsive to demographic, socioeconomic and technological change.” Planning must proceed regardless of fiscal uncertainty and the colleges “must be ready to implement changes as funding does become available, or as personnel turnover allows for change.” The colleges must direct their educational planning toward long-range educational needs as they prepared their 1984-85 budgets and “develop appropriate structures for long-range educational planning as well as budget planning” (Committee on Community Colleges: Commitment to Access and Excellence, 1983; 1, 5-6, 8, 14-23, and 31-37).

The fiscal crisis of 1983-84 was so severe that the preparation and management of the budget had been centralized at the District Office. In February, 1984, the 1983-84 Second Quarter Report indicated that this experience had resulted in the realization that “operating budgets must be prepared within the parameters of District goals and objectives.” The preparation and management of the 1984-85 budget were being returned to the colleges, but “the requirements for a greater districtwide perspective in budget development must be recognized.... Comprehensive long range planning improves the District’s ability to respond to change by developing better information to support budget decisions. It is anticipated that by the beginning of the 1985-86 budget cycle, a restructured planning process will provide an integration of master planning and budget planning” (Business Services Division, 1984a; 13-14).

The work of the Committee on Access and Excellence was the first step in this integrated planning process. What the committee had not yet addressed was what Koltai dubbed the “add-on” syndrome in a speech delivered to a group of community college researchers on April 11, 1984. He said that in the past if community colleges had a problem that could not be solved using existing facilities or programs, “then we added more to deal with the situation. That will no longer be possible—we will now have to delete something each time we chose to add something else—a new experience for community college leaders, to be sure” (Koltai, 1984; 14). Throughout the “Educational Needs, Goals, and Resources” report, phrases like “as funding is restored” were used, which assumed that at least in terms of long-range planning, community colleges would be provided with additional funds to perform at the current level and to expand services. Another assumption the report made was that personnel turnover would be sufficient to allow changes to be effected. Recent District experience, however, had shown that employee turnover was hardly adequate to produce savings sufficient for budget balancing, let alone provide a margin for change. The Report’s one recommendation that would enable personnel to be assigned to more productive functions was to increase staff development and retraining.

The report of the Committee on Access and Excellence was issued in January, but the Board did not discuss it in public session until April 25, 1984. This Board discussion came just a week after the Board of Governors had approved the Student Matriculation
Plan. The Los Angeles Trustees said the goals set by the committee could be crucial to maintaining local control of college priorities. Trustee Conner warned that there were “others in the state who apparently are anxious to outline the missions and functions which they feel are appropriate to the community colleges. They are rushing to fill any vacuum they perceive exists. I am afraid if we don’t articulate our view of our mission and function in 1983-84 others will do it for us.” Koltai said that until the District set its goals and made them clear to the State, long-term finances would not be provided. He thought that the District was large enough to influence State decision making “if we have the ideas we can agree on. Our survival depends on our ability to present an appropriate mission statement to the external agencies.” Koltai was apparently working at two different levels simultaneously. In speaking to the state community college researchers, he was giving advice on how to deal with the present realities; but, in sponsoring a report on “Educational Needs, Goals, and Resources,” he was attempting to make a statement on what the community colleges should be and what was required to get them there. Beside the Board meeting discussion, the report was presented at a meeting of the California Community College Board of Governors and was the subject of two forums for District faculty and staff held in the spring (Board of Trustees, Minutes, April 25, 1984; 1-3; Committee on Community Colleges: Commitment to Access and Excellence, 1984b; 1; and Palermo, April 26, 1984).

The District still needed to translate long-range plans into practical decisions on funding, staffing and programs. It needed to set priorities that were useful in determining which functions were most necessary in allocating limited resources. Koltai discussed priority setting at the state level in an article he wrote for the Los Angeles Times in May, but the same principle applied to the district level:

Perhaps the best argument for developing a consensus on priorities is the consequence of not setting priorities: The hodgepodge of college activities will proliferate, each receiving as much attention as another. When the educational pie is sliced in equal parts, everyone gets a small piece, but not everyone gets an adequate piece. Setting agreeable priorities would be a more efficient and equitable method (Koltai, May 14, 1984).

The Committee on Institutional Reassessment had recommended a districtwide, broadly representative task force structure and the Committee on Access and Excellence implemented this recommendation during Spring, 1984. Eight short-term task forces were organized to focus on activities which could be handled during the 1984-85 fiscal year. Each task force dealt with a major institutional function: counseling, educational programs, community services, instructional support, student services, institutional support, facilities, and financial resources. Within the educational programs task force were subgroups on remedial, transfer, general and vocational education. The short-term task forces included about 80 faculty and administrators and performed their duties in a brief, two-month period. Published in July, 1984, the reports included over 100 specific recommendations in three categories: “those that addressed internal concerns for reorganization, coordination or focus which do not require additional funding but a redirection of existing resources; those that require additional permanent staff or continuing budget allocations, which are dependent on fiscal resources . . .; and those that require further definition through studies and pilot models.” Eight “mid-term” task forces were recommended to continue the work during the coming fiscal year, by studying planning issues which might be addressed in 1985-86. These new task forces would be working on the twenty recommendations that fit into the third category, which required temporary funding to complete the necessary activities. Planning, even for the short-term, continued to be additive, while, as we have
seen, budgeting for 1984-85 would be subtractive (Committee on Community Colleges: Commitment to Access and Excellence, 1984b; ii-v, 1-14).

III. Programs, 1983-84

In his “1983 State of the District Address,” Koltai said that in the past he had usually used the occasion to announce new programs and activities of the District. “This year, however, there have been few such activities to announce. Quite simply, our highest priorities are the survival of our colleges and the educational services they provide.” He did report on the progress made on major projects announced in the past. The District had pioneered in a nationally recognized program, developed cooperatively with the American College Testing Service. Originally called Project ASSET, it was now known as Project ACCESS. Approximately 24,000 students had already participated in the program, which was at that time being used at six colleges. The program involved “carefully prescribed, mandatory orientation and assessment, along with course placement, for incoming, first-time students.” It provided “data to direct students to courses in which they have the greatest chance of success and incorporates active counseling intervention to help them succeed.” A study of a pilot group had produced preliminary findings that students improved their retention within and between semesters, attempted and completed more units, and added and dropped fewer courses. Koltai said that “we have seen greater student success, as well as more efficient use of college resources, at the participating colleges.”

The Chancellor reported on a joint effort with UCLA that had become a national model of inter-segmental cooperation. More than 150 faculty members had participated in seminars on geography, reading, and writing instruction, as well as the writing-across-the-curriculum project. LACCD faculty had cooperated with UCLA staff to produce a guidebook entitled, The Shortest Distance to Learning, describing successful instructional experiences among the faculty. Forthcoming seminars would highlight the use of this text, as well as the use of composition assignments for English-as-a-second language instruction. The Ford Foundation had recognized the District’s efforts to help urban students transfer by awarding a grant of $100,000 to four colleges to improve their transfer programs. Another significant development Koltai described was a nationwide study on the redefinition of the associate degree, funded by the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Koltai had chaired the study (though he did not mention this), which recommended “competency standards and testing for students seeking the associate degree, better university liaisons for the improvement of teacher preparation, and closer ties with business and industry to insure the value of the degree.”

Koltai reported that the Commission for the Advancement of Teaching, proposed in the previous state of the District speech, had been established and had made such significant progress that he believed it would serve as a national model. Cedric Sampson, who now served assistant to the chancellor for faculty affairs, was the chairman of the commission. The District was also in the forefront cooperating closely with business and industry. The Office of Occupational and Technical Education “has been actively involved in extending our programs to the work site, while strengthening existing programs on-campus through faculty retraining, curriculum development, and acquisition of much needed equipment.” Among the major grants received by the office was a $4 million agreement with the Employee Training Panel. During the previous year and a half, approximately 2,500 people had been trained, re-trained, or had their job skills upgraded under the grants received. The relationship with business had been a two-way street with corporations providing both financial support and management “know-how.” For example, a
Lockheed-California Company agreement, valued at nearly $700,000, restored certain engineering programs slated to be discontinued and strengthened others. Several corporations provided administrators "hands on" opportunities to learn "strategic planning, human resources and property management and other areas vital to operating our District more efficiently" (Koltai, 1983; 8-12).

The Office of Occupational and Technical Education continued to achieve unprecedented success. On February 22, 1984, the Board of Trustees accepted the largest training grant ever awarded by the State to a community college. The $5 million agreement with the Employment Training Panel provided training in aerospace, telecommunications, health, manufacturing and other growth industries to approximately 1250 persons over a two-year period. The District would work with the Los Angeles Business-Labor Council to identify and develop projects and then train participants who were unemployed or who might be displaced from their jobs if not retrained. The grant brought to $14.5 million the amount of job training funds received from various State and Federal sources during the previous two years. Approximately 3200 people had received or would receive job training under these programs (Courier, March 19, 1984; 1 and Werkman, February 23, 1984).

In discussing Metropolitan College in his 1983 "State of the District" address, Koltai said "we are now re-evaluating the range of its programs," without mentioning the loss of the major PACAF contract a few months earlier. He said that several prospects were being discussed and that he hoped to bring the Board proposals for its consideration in the next few months. On December 7, six weeks after Koltai’s talk, the Board of Trustees authorized staff “to take such steps as are necessary to suspend the activities of Los Angeles Metropolitan College, effective January 1, 1984.” The Board “Action” said that "loss of the PACAF contract has made untenable the continuing operation of the remaining overseas programs through a separate college.” Closing down a college involved a variety of activities, including reassigning current employees, terminating the remaining contracts as soon as possible, and consulting with the Board of Governors and the accrediting association as to the necessary processes for suspending the college’s operations. One of the most difficult problems and a permanent one was to maintain over 100,000 records on students who had earned credits with the college and to continue to provide services such as producing transcripts. This function, along with its employees, was transferred to Mission College, which receive a special budget allocation indefinitely to provide student records services. The three-year experiment in operating military education programs through a separate college organization had ended, but the legacy of maintaining its student records would remain with the District in perpetuity (Board of Trustees, “Board Action,” Communication No. 1 and Minutes, December 7, 1983; 4 and Koltai, 1983; 8-12).

The April 30, 1984 edition of the District’s newsletter, Courier, announced that transfers from California community colleges to public universities had increased in Fall 1983, for the second straight year, reversing the decline that had taken place from 1977 to 1982. The combined number of transfers to UC and CSU had grown in 1982, though Fall 1983 was the first term since 1975 that transfers to both university systems had risen simultaneously. The information was from a CPEC report, which also stated that “significant increases in total transfers” had come from 30 percent of all community college districts, with only four percent having significant losses. The Courier story stated that “The Los Angeles Community College District showed an increase in transfer to UC, but a drop in transfers to CSU.” What the article did not report was that two years after Koltai’s call for greater emphasis on transfer education, LACCD’s transfers to UC had risen by only 18, and the decline in transfers to CSU was 166, for a combined total of 148 fewer transfers than in 1982. The following year the annual decline was even greater, with a downturn of 99 for UC and a reduction of 132 for CSU, a total loss of 231. These figures were disappointing, but had to be considered in the context of the District’s total enrollment decline, which will
be described in Section IX (Courier, April 30, 1984; 1-2; Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984b; 75; and 1986b; 77).

V. Funding, 1984-85

When a newspaper reporter went to her editor in mid-August to remind him that the usual community college beginning-of-the-school-year story should be written in a few days, the editor could not imagine what she was talking about. She had written several stories, which he had edited, that told about the unusually early start of the semester, but he had forgotten about it. When opening day rolled around on August 20, students had forgotten about it, too. Perhaps the students had decided they could not or would not pay the fees; perhaps they had children whose schools did not begin for another three weeks; but, whatever the reason, thousands of students did not enroll that fall semester. Considering the attendance-driven funding system for community colleges, the continuing enrollment loss in the Los Angeles District meant deepening financial problems.

The 1984-85 Final Budget of $220 million passed by the Board of Trustees on September 5 reflected a $15 million loss of State funding based on declining enrollment. If the projected 10 to 15 percent enrollment slump took place, then Fallo estimated an equal drop in funding for the next year. For the current year, the District had received $160.9 million in base funding from the State, but that would have been $15 higher if the District had matched in 1983-84 the ADA produced in 1982-83. Fallo indicated that a variety of factors had caused the enrollment decline: “The negative publicity concerning the 1983-84 fiscal problems of the community colleges, combined with the onset of the first-time enrollment fee and the district’s new early start semester, have turned students away.” Funding prospects for the following year were similarly grim. Fallo warned that in 1985-86, “unless we get changes in the current funding formula, the revenue loss will be devastating for this District. I don’t know how we could cut that much money from this budget.” In cooperation with the State Chancellor’s Office, the District was “exploring a number of options to reduce the impact on revenues of ADA decline for both 1984-85 and 1985-86.” The District will give the greatest emphasis to the establishment of an ADA floor below which no fiscal penalties will occur.” Koltai said that the District “has embarked on an aggressive campaign to develop alternatives to the traditional semester system.” These could include a variety of special sessions, including winter and spring intercessions (Courier, September 24, 1984; 1; Koltai to Trustees in Office of the Chancellor, 1984; Office of the Chancellor, 1984; 1-5; Palermo, September 8, 1984).

Koltai took a long-delayed vacation that fall and did not deliver his traditional State of the District Address. Nor was he present at the October 10 Board meeting when hundreds of employees took to the street in front of the downtown office building that housed the District Office. The placard-bearing faculty and staff members chanted, “What do we want? Money. When do we want it? Now.” Six hundred demonstrators packed the Board Meeting Room or stood outside to hear 25 speakers lambaste the Board for not acting quickly enough on the union’s salary demands. Consuelo Rey of the East Los Angeles College faculty, said, “We are here to demand . . . a significant raise. We don’t want any excuses. We don’t want any sad stories.” The union had asked for a 13.8 percent increase and contended that the District was holding $12 million in reserve. The District had offered only a 2.5 percent raise. Mulrooney, who was now part of management, replied in her typically emphatic style, “I don’t see where they’re going to find the money. Even their own figures do not yield a 13.8 percent increase.” AFT College Guild President Fox challenged the Board: “We have been your friends; we would like to be your friends.” He said that the test of that friendship could be met by directing
the administration to negotiate “before this week is out . . . an adequate salary increase for both units [the Faculty and Staff Guilds]” (Read On, October 16, 1984; 1-2; and Palermo, October 11, 1984).

On November 7, the agreement between the two AFT Guilds and the District was announced. Instructors would receive a six percent increase and staff members would get a raise of from six to ten percent, in order to bring some classifications closer to competitive salaries in the surrounding community. Both increases were retroactive to July 1. Agreement was also reached on the first contract negotiated for the clerical-technical employees since they were represented by the AFT. This contact provided for new transfer and overtime procedures, a stronger grievance process with binding arbitration, and an agency shop. AFT Staff Guild President Barbara Kleinschmidt said the agreement “will bring the classified staff into the 21st Century as they so well deserve.” The membership of each unit approved the respective agreements and the Board ratified them on November 21. At that meeting, Fox expressed concern about the reduction in budget for spring hourly rate instruction from $5.5 million in 1984 to $3.9 million in 1985. One Board member responded that such cuts could be expected when the District made salary increases a top priority. The next issue of Read On reported this exchange, as well as comments by administrators on several campuses who “blamed this kind of ‘cut’ and others on the salary increases for faculty and staff.” Read On claimed that “the District income for this year was sufficiently large to afford the salary increases which faculty and staff have received” (Palermo, November 8, 1984; Read On, November 13, 1984; 1; November 20, 1984; 1; and November 27, 1984; 1-2). On December 7, Koltai appeared before the State Board of Governors to call for immediate action to end “a fiscal crisis which brings into question the integrity of the community colleges as an educational institution.” He was speaking in behalf of the Community College Urban District Association (CCUDA), whose four districts served 226,000 students and included 26 percent of the state’s population within their borders. He said that Los Angeles and Peralta were going to have to make “dramatic cutbacks,” including whole programs, if the decline in enrollment were not stopped. Forty-seven districts in the state had not reached their ADA target and as a result would lose revenue in 1984-85. Possibly a dozen of those appeared to have a serious problem, but Los Angeles and Peralta had experienced, respectively, 25 percent and 23 percent declines and together accounted for one-third of the expected statewide enrollment loss. Koltai requested the Board to take whatever steps were necessary to provide fiscal relief to the districts in serious financial need. Thirty-six districts were reporting ADA decline from the 1983-84 levels, which would result in revenue losses for 1985-86. Koltai also asked the Board to revise its budget requests to include a substantial funding increase for that year (Courier, January 31, 1985; 1-2; and Business Services Division, 1985a; 1-5). Vice Chancellor Fallo did not deliver his “1984-85 First Quarter Budget Report” in December, as he usually did, but delayed it until January, 1985. He reported that the revenue picture had improved somewhat since the budget was passed. General revenues had increase by $2.1 million because of an anticipated higher funding of the inflation allowance and a recalculation had brought about a slight increase in the ADA for 1983-84. The appropriation situation was not so positive. Fallo said that in the 1984-85 Final Budget:

no funds were set aside for a cost of living increase for employee salaries. With the receipt of additional revenue and approval to manage classified salary savings to a limited degree, the District was in a position to offer a 3% salary increase without seriously disrupting ongoing operations. For a variety of policy reasons the final settlement called for a 6% salary increase for most employees with additional
increases for specific classified positions. The projected cost of this increase is estimated at approximately $8 million.

Nearly six million dollars, over and above the additional revenue, had to be found to fund the employee raises. This was done by using $1.6 million that had not yet been appropriated to operating budgets, such as funds used to match State money for deferred maintenance; $2.5 million in savings from classified salaries, by limiting the hiring of replacements and the use of substitute and relief funds; and by setting aside $1.5 million from non-salary accounts at each location, so that they could be released quickly if other funds became available. Fallo stressed that the savings in salary and non-salary accounts “was not based on equity... Reductions were based on which budgets had the funds to reduce,” after an evaluation of balances as of October 31. Fallo described how resources had been allocated in an attempt to counter enrollment losses. These included a coordinated recruitment plan, improved registration, a full schedule of fall classes, and increased offerings on Saturdays and at off-campus locations. Forty regular contract instructor positions were added and the hourly rate expenditures for Fall 1984 were expected to nearly equal those for the previous Fall. Despite all these efforts, “Fall WSCH fell fifteen percent below that of Fall 1983 and twenty-four percent below Fall 1982.” Spring hourly rate was projected to total $4.9 million, which represented a Districtwide decrease from Spring 1984 of only three percent.

Fallo also gave an update on the “Component II” classified positions. Personnel Services had developed a staffing plan during Spring 1984 that included all positions considered essential to college and District office operations. These positions were included in the regular funded budget for 1984-85, but 125.5 filled positions were excluded from the plan. These were placed in Component II, comprised of items which should be funded, but which could not because of limited revenues. Because employees currently held these positions, funding was provided. Even so, a total of 63.5 approved but vacant staffing plan positions were “traded off” against the Component II positions and removed from the budget. In addition, by the end of December, 16 Component II positions had been eliminated by resignation of the incumbent or by administrative transfer. The staffing plan was also to be used to determine hiring during the year. Hiring policies were revised, however, after salary increases were approved in November, in order to realize the necessary $2.5 million savings in non-certificated salaries. “[E]ach location was allocated an amount by which to reduce their budgets,” which was again determined, not so much on equity, but on current vacancies and a projection of expenditures.

The report concluded with charts comparing the Los Angeles District and eight neighboring districts. The comparisons were based on 1982-83 data and the report said they should be used very cautiously. The charts showed that the District spent a higher percentage of its money on employees, a smaller percentage on instructor salaries, by far the largest on benefits, substantially less on non-salary items, and a greater percentage on student services than all but one of the districts. The Los Angeles District had the smallest percentage in ending balances; its faculty was not as productive either in terms of ADA or weekly faculty contact hours; and it had more faculty per administrator than all but two of the other districts (Business Services Division, 1985a; 5-6; 8-17, and 24-30).

Koltai’s “1984-85 State of the District Address” was unique, not only because it was delivered in the spring rather than in the fall, but because it was delivered twice, once by Fallo on March 1 and again by Koltai on May 15. When first presented, Koltai was in the hospital having surgery and Fallo read the address at the final session of a three-day meeting on academic renewal for faculty and administrators. At a Board meeting two and a half months later, Koltai delivered a somewhat revised version, entitled, “Status Update on the State of the District.” In both versions, Koltai said that “community colleges in the
State of California have been going through a period of unprecedented turmoil. . . . The new realities of community college life are known to us all: a restricted educational mission, reduced funding and reduced numbers of students.” He quoted Patrick Callan, that “the mission of the colleges has been defined by exclusion—what the state won’t fund . . . rather than by any statement of statewide interests and priorities.” Koltai said that in the three-year period from 1981-82 to 1983-84, District operating revenues fell 14 percent from $202 million to $174 million and that the impact on the programs of the District was a 12 percent decline in enrollment in 1983-84. “In 1984-85, the fiscal effect of that enrollment loss combined with a first ever experience with tuition, led to a further enrollment decline. The result was that in 1984-85, even though there was an 8 percent increase in state funding for community colleges, the District’s budget increased only 3 percent. . . .”

Koltai expected that even greater financial losses would take place in 1986-87, when the District would be funded according to its actual enrollments. He said the question was, “What must we do to meet the reality we will face in 1986-87?” He suggested that there were two alternatives. One was the drastic approach of downsizing the operations “sufficiently to live with whatever revenue the state will allot to a district with 100,000--or fewer—students.” The other was the more desirable alternative and that was “to increase our enrollments enough to pay for our current level of operations,” but he did not believe effecting such a rapid recovery was realistic. His solution was a combination of both approaches, continuing the process of organizational change and doing everything possible to increase enrollments. During the course of his speech Koltai began talking about “the new college.” He did not draw any special attention to it, but merely incorporated the phrase into the text. He said that there must be “areas of change” for the colleges to relate to the ways in which society was changing. First, the new college must become more competitive, and one requirement would be a thorough curriculum review. Second, the revival of the work ethic would mean that “The greatest challenge for the new college will be to find out the future of its community and to plan programs to prepare students for the jobs that are available.” Third, “the new college will have as one of its central values the personal and professional growth of its employees, and the quality of their work environment.” In the original version of the speech Koltai left the faculty with a charge: “. . . only you, the faculty, have the power to shake up the curriculum and mold it into the kind of instrument the new college will need. Only you can provide the kind of mentorship which will attract and hold students.”

Perhaps it was the difference in the audience for which the two versions were intended, or perhaps it was his further experience with the District’s financial condition. In any event Koltai’s “Status Update” was much more practical and specific in discussing how to get ready for the coming fiscal years. He said that the District had “become personnel heavy,” with “88 percent of our budget devoted to personnel costs.” Some staffing imbalances had developed, with “excess staff in some areas and not enough in others. The question for the coming year is not only how we correct the imbalances. The question is how we cut further.” He then reviewed the reductions in staff that had taken place since 1981-82. He pointed out that total faculty had declined 15.6 percent (24.7 percent in part-time and 11.2 percent in full-time); classified staff had reduced by 27 percent; certificated administrators by 25.9 percent; and classified administrators by 21.7 percent. “If you compare these percentages with the 26 percent drop in our enrollment, you will note that they are roughly parallel, with the exception of full-time faculty. The lag between the 26 percent decline in students and the 11 percent decline in faculty shows up in significantly lower class sizes, which have been . . . declining for several years” (Courier, April 10, 1985; 1; Koltai, 1985a; 1 and 4-11; Koltai, 1985b; 2-14).
On April 17, in place of the Second and Third Quarter Reports, Fallo delivered a “1984-85 Fiscal Update.” The Second Quarter Report had been skipped, in order to allow more time to assess the District’s fiscal situation. The “Fiscal Update” represented the financial status as of the end of February, 1985. The report indicated that projected expenditures were $2.85 million in excess of revenues, due primarily to the following factors: (1) an underestimation of the cost of salary increases; (2) an overestimation of potential salary savings; (3) an over expenditure of hourly rate instruction in both fall and spring semesters; and (4) difficulty in reducing non-salary accounts to the extent requested without seriously hampering District operations. The report warned that the District must eliminate this deficit, as well as build sufficient balances to cover open encumbrances that would be carried into the following year. Otherwise, the already inadequate 1985-86 budget would be burdened with the costs of the current year. Actions proposed to eliminate the deficit were earlier deadlines for routine purchases of supplies and equipment, reviewing and rescinding many of the approvals to fill vacant staffing plan positions, restricting the filling of new vacancies, and eliminating most non-regular classified assignments. Fiscal relief from the State, considered a possibility at the time of the First Quarter Report, was no longer anticipated. Decline in enrollment had continued in the spring semester, with a decrease of 17 percent in WSCH and 18 percent in enrollment.

Estimated revenues for 1985-86 were $181,273,000 and for 1986-87 were $181,511,000, compared to $184,273,000 for the current year. The decline in revenues was attributed to the elimination of the beginning balance for the next two years. Most of the beginning balance for 1984-85 was restricted to fund the 1983-84 pay increase for a full fiscal year, so that the lack of a beginning balance for the coming two years would force operating locations to absorb that pay increase, as they would have to do with the 1984-85 pay increase. The District had been actively involved in getting a “stabilization fund” included in the Governor’s budget. For 1985-86 the District was to receive $10.5 million of the $31 million fund, established to assist districts experiencing ADA decline. Under this plan, two thirds of the funds districts would otherwise have lost because of enrollment declines would still be allocated to the districts (Business Services, 1985b; 1-4, 9-11, and 14).

The April issue of P.S., the newsletter Mulrooney initiated after becoming vice chancellor of personnel services, observed that more funds had been allotted to classes than was justified by the number of students enrolled in them in 1984-85, resulting in a higher cost per student and serious fiscal problems. The Personnel Services Division had “conducted the first thorough analysis of certificated staffing in the history of the district and concluded that we have to make major adjustments in order to match our staff with student needs.” Several changes were under way or in the planning stages to deal with the problem: (1) the first administrative transfers of faculty between colleges had been announced; (2) the Office of Staff Development Programs and Services would now accept faculty proposals for retraining in any discipline, even though previously retraining had been concentrated in physical education; (3) in order to make funds available for other purposes, hourly rate positions were being reduced for the fall semester; and (4) underutilized faculty were encouraged to avail themselves of a retirement system incentive program. Mulrooney noted, “If we can get our enrollment --particularly our average class size—up, we may avoid all these alternatives.” If these actions did not work, however, even more drastic alternatives might have to be considered for 1986-87 (P.S., April, 1985; 1,3).

The District was not able to effect the savings necessary to make up the deficit during the short period remaining in the fiscal year. On June 5, Fallo told the Board of Trustees that the District needed $5 million in emergency funds to meet the payroll in two days. The District was requesting that the County immediately authorize tax and revenue anticipation notes, followed by a State advance on apportionments. The announcement of the District’s deficit and the need for a loan unleashed a political maelstrom. Two trustees had won
elections the previous day: Tuttle to the post of City Controller and Bronson to another four-year term as Trustee. Accusations were made by legislators and committee aids in Sacramento that word of the budget shortfall had been withheld to avoid damaging the election bids by the two trustees. One legislator revealed that District lobbyists “said they were told to keep quiet about it. After all, how can you run for reelection on a platform of fiscal responsibility when you’ve just run up a huge deficit?” Tuttle said, “I just heard about it this morning. If someone made that decision [to withhold the announcement], I didn’t know anything about it.” Bronson said he “was aware there was a cash-flow problem, but nobody asked me about it. The seven of us on the board knew we had a problem and the staff knew it, so it wasn’t a secret.” Trustee Richman said, “I think we made a mistake. We knew what we were getting in to. . . . I think this action raises serious questions as to whether the administration and the Board made all the correct decisions. We’re in for long-term difficulties.” Trustee Archie-Hudson said the District’s predicament was due to poor management by District administrators and that “the Board is at fault for not holding the management of this District accountable.” In Fallo’s presentation at the Board meeting, he said his staff was unable to save enough to balance the budget. His budget report said that “The salary increase for employees was approved even though the District did not have the funds appropriated to pay for it.” State Chancellor Jerry Hayward said that for the District to receive an emergency loan, it would have to undergo an independent audit, set up a repayment plan, and get the approval of the Legislature and the Governor (Savage, June 6, 1985 and Washington, June 6, 1985).

The next day the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors unanimously approved the tax and revenue anticipation notes for the District, with a County official explaining that the supervisors lacked legal authority to reject the request for a bail-out. Still, the supervisors used the occasion to castigate the District for the way in which the request was handled and the “mismanagement” that made the bail-out necessary. Former Board member and now Supervisor Michael Antonovich said that information about the District’s lack of funds “was put under the carpet and hidden from public discussion.” While no official of the District attended the meeting, some members of the Board were quoted in the press as saying that they thought the $2.8 million deficit, reported to them in April, was being corrected by actions of administrators. Garvin said that he had heard about the $5 million deficit only this week, as did the other Trustees, though he suspected administrators knew about it earlier. “We should have been notified sooner” (Gilson and Washington, June 7, 1985 and Vollmer, June 7, 1985).

The District’s request to the State for an advance against apportionments was amended into a bill providing $4.8 million in loans for three other districts that had already passed the Assembly. This opened up a barrage of criticism by legislators against the District. At the June 12 Senate hearing Republican Senator Edward M. Davis, part of whose district was in the LACCD, said, “We ought to have the right to fire the local presidents and chancellors who can’t run their districts.” He criticized districts in which “teachers unions elect trustees” who then “pay off” the instructors during salary negotiations. “We shouldn’t bail them out” (Werkman, June 11 and 13, 1985).

On June 19, the Trustees authorized the Chancellor to request an advance on apportionment, not to exceed $5 million, and adopted “a plan to bring District apportionments in line with anticipated revenue, including an offset for the repayment of the apportionment advance plus appropriate interest, for a three-year period beginning fiscal year 1985-86.” A report presented to the Board, prepared by Business Services Division, gave an analysis of the reasons for the deficit. These included some which had not been included in the First Quarter Report and Fiscal Update. Savings from employee turnover was less than anticipated because the salary increase had a positive effect on employee retention and many of the vacancies were in classifications that were most essential to
operations. The deficit was now $3.25 million, even greater than in April. Interest income was less than projected because of the general revenue shortfall and the early semester start had moved the first salary payment up by a month. Unanticipated expenditures occurred late in the fiscal year, including over-spending on spring semester hourly rate instruction, increased cost of liability insurance, and an early start of the summer session at several colleges. The salary increase had proven more expensive to the general fund than anticipated, because the general fund had to subsidize special fund programs such as child development and community services, which did not have sufficient funds to pay the increased salaries and benefits (Board of Trustees, “Action,” Communication No. 6, June 19, 1985 and Business Services Division, June 19, 1985; 5-10).

On June 26 the Senate passed the four-college bail-out legislation, with a requirement that the Los Angeles District hold an election to fill the vacancy on the Board of Trustees left by Tuttle. This election provision had been sponsored by Senator Alan Robbins, Democrat from Van Nuys in the San Fernando Valley area of the LACCD. Robbins released a letter written by the District’s lobbyist, Patricia S. Hewitt, to Assemblywoman Maxine Waters, a Democrat from Los Angeles. In the letter, Hewitt had threatened to use the District’s political influence to defeat the whole bill, including the loans for the other three districts, if the legislation was not acceptable to the Los Angeles District. The District wanted to avoid filling the Trustee vacancy through a special election, estimated to cost $3 million. The next day, the Assembly rejected the Robbins amendment, and after a joint Assembly-Senate conference committee removed the amendment, the bill was quickly passed by both houses of the Legislature (Werkman, June 27 and 28, 1985).

VI. Planning, 1984-85

The reports of the short-term task forces were published in July, 1984, and called for eight new, mid-term task forces. One addition to the 1984-85 budget was $60,000 to support planning projects recommended by the short-term task forces. Funded projects included computer-assisted instruction for remedial English, on-line student information, tutoring services study and development, and a pilot student retention program at Harbor and West. During Fall, 1984, Committee on Access and Excellence Co-Chairmen Stevens and Avila appointed “mid-term” task force chairs, who then appointed committee members, except for AFT and Academic Senate representatives, who were selected by those organizations. What were called “focal planning themes” were assigned to the mid-term task forces, to guide their work of studying the planning issues and making recommendations for 1985-86 and 1986-87. The themes included marketing and college/community relations, student flow, technological support, curricular revision, and integrated planning. The Committee on Access and Excellence was supposed to review the results of these planning efforts in January, 1985, and propose a system for long-range strategic planning. Though the mid-term task forces held meetings with varying degrees of regularity and produced some drafts during 1984-85, none of them had produced final reports by the end of the fiscal year (Avila and Stevens to Distribution List, January 30, 1985 and July 1, 1985; Division of Educational Services, “A Brief Review of Planning Activities,” Attachment 8 in Division of Educational Services, 1985a).

In May, 1985, the Division of Educational Services issued “A Proposal for Strategic Long-Range Planning at the College Level.” It said that Committee on Access and Excellence task forces have been effective in identifying planning issues and prerogatives, but implementation has been hampered by abstraction. As the Educational Needs paper indicates, strategic long-range planning must be implemented at the college level,
where effects are more closely linked with planning objectives. At the same time, effective college planning can be expected to contribute toward districtwide planning priorities.

The paper said that during the last two years accreditation teams had been critical of college planning processes. This criticism could partly be ascribed to (1) long-range planning being replaced by contingency planning because of the rapid changes in funding and the policies affecting funding and (2) the emphasis placed on interim planning by the Committee on Access and Excellence. Now, however, all colleges would participate in a new planning structure. Each would select a planning facilitator of dean's level or higher and would encourage participation by faculty and staff. Trained in strategic planning and the use of data, the facilitator would be given sufficient time to coordinate the college planning activities and synthesize the results into a collegewide planning document, subject to constant revision. The college planning committee would be chaired by either the college president or the planning facilitator. Task forces would evaluate the environment and each institution's functional components by studying data, identifying planning issues, and preparing a report for the college planning committee. The task force evaluations would be synthesized by the planning committee into six to ten strategic planning objectives, which would be widely reviewed throughout the college in order to arrive at a general consensus. Task forces would then use the strategic planning objectives to specify short-term, mid-term, and long-term objectives for each functional area of the college. The results of this strategic planning would be brought together in a brief document, which was to be completed in February, 1986 (Division of Educational Services, 1985b; 3-6).

To assist colleges with this project, the Division of Educational Services prepared a document entitled, "Coping with Change: Strategic Planning Issues for Educational Programs and Services in the Los Angeles Community College District, 1985-87." This publication brought together a considerable amount of data and analysis on the environment, the District and each college, as well as attachments describing previous planning activities in the District. "Coping with Change" was written for a different audience and a different purpose than had been Educational Needs, Goals, and Resources. Its style and message were different, and it referred in specific terms to the realities of the District's dilemma: "Without reserves or long-term fiscal planning, budget management has no option but to internally reallocate resources, cultivate and utilize external funding, and adjust annual expenditures to annual income."

The document's author, Director of Research, Planning and Development Nancy Conrath, did not mention that she had advocated significant reorganization of the colleges' programs since 1982. The publication only said that since 1982-83, "efforts have been made to consider consolidation of programs within and among colleges, through regionalization, joint programming or restricting low demand, high cost programs to a single or reduced number of colleges" and that there was "a point at which programs can no longer be thinned; they must be phased out and deleted." Conrath's office had devised a decision support system (DSS) to assist colleges to analyze programs for their curricular planning. The DSS provided WSCH trends and staffing patterns, and from these derived vitality scores for every discipline and college. It was used by the District to evaluate requests to fill faculty positions and to develop a model for estimating faculty requirements at each college. The use of the DSS as a basis for staffing decisions became quite controversial, but regardless of the specific factors used or the weight given to each, some analytical model needed to be applied if the District were going to make the reductions required at the end of the 1983-85 period. "Coping with Change" described the planning problem faced by the colleges": 
It is in the best interests of currently employed staff to further the continuance and advancement of their programs and services; pruning is difficult. Downsizing the scope of institutions is therefore painful, particularly when shifts in educational needs and the characteristics of students are out of synchronization with established functions (Division of Educational Services, 1985a; 2, 5-6, and 10).

During 1983-85 planning proceeded logically and slowly from the Committee on Institutional Reassessment, to the Committee on Access and Excellence, through the Educational Needs, Goals, and Resources report, to short- and mid-term planning task forces, and finally to a proposal for college strategic planning, along with a source book for college planners. Perhaps now, as the college planning proposal stated, planning would be less “hampered by abstraction” and moved to where “effects are more closely linked with planning objectives.” But whether the District’s planning activities could contribute meaningfully to the needs of an organization that was becoming ever more deeply immersed in crisis would have to be seen.

VII. Programs, 1984-85

After a substantial enrollment drop for both fall and spring semesters of 1983-84, the District launched an unprecedented $200,000 recruitment drive. In May a $100,000 media campaign to boost summer session enrollment consisted of hundreds of radio spots and advertisements in daily, high school, and college newspapers. The ads stressed that the summer session was the last chance to take classes without paying fees. In late summer a similar $100,000 effort focused on fall enrollment. It stressed that the community colleges, with fees of only $50 per semester, were a good bargain compared with other institutions. The early start of the semester and the Summer Olympic Games taking place in Los Angeles during the registration period presented some unusual obstacles to fall registration. The summer session campaign contributed to a particularly successful enrollment increase of 50 percent over the previous summer, though the promotional campaign for fall was not enough to turn around what was becoming a devastating downward trend in enrollment (Connell, April 12, 1984 and Division of Educational Services, 1986b; 63).

For a variety of reasons, including problems with Federal audits at some colleges, the District administration and Trustees decided to centralize all financial aid for the Fall 1984 semester. With general student fees beginning that semester, more students required financial aid than in previous years. The new centralized system, designed to tighten enforcement of complicated regulations, appeared to be far slower in processing financial aid requests than had the college-operated programs. In October students and instructors began to present the Board with descriptions of applicants’ financial woes and demands for faster processing. Trustees were concerned with the students’ plight and demanded to know why funds were not being paid out in a more timely manner. District administrators explained that much of the problem was the result of incomplete paper work being submitted to the central unit, but also admitted that unfilled positions and new and inexperienced staff of the central unit were a factor. Other problems that did not attract much attention at the Board meetings included changes in the nationwide processing procedures, increased complexity caused by the enrollment fee, and an automated system that was not ready for use.

The financial aid problem continued past the end of the fall semester, and at a Board meeting on January 23, Koltai put forward a plan to improve the situation. It involved hiring and training student financial aid workers, setting up college committees to advise
applicants, and producing audio-visual presentations to explain the process. Koltai also attributed the problem to the financial aid workers' attitudes, because cooperation between the campus employees and those in the centralized headquarters had been problematical. According to District records, out of 9,978 aid applications submitted by students during the fall semester, 5,601 had been forwarded to the central office, and only 1,736 had been awarded. The first semester of the centralized operation had produced severe problems at the same time that the District's attempts to turn around the enrollment decline were being thwarted by a variety of other factors (Financial Aid Annual Report, 1984-85; 13-14; Palermo, November 8, 1984 and January 24, 1985).

Koltai's "1984-85 State of the District Address" included this upbeat assertion: "We should not let our problems obscure the many good things that we have accomplished." He told about the establishment of the District-wide Curriculum Planning and Development Committee; the 1985 "Keeping America Working" award from the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, based on a proposal developed by the Office of Occupational and Technical Education in cooperation with East, Southwest, and Valley Colleges; and the $5 million Employment Training Panel grant, which we have already described. Much of Koltai's report that day, however, concerned college projects: a test construction and evaluation system at Pierce, a language laboratory at West, honors programs at some campuses, and a microcomputer-based transfer information system developed by Harbor in cooperation with UC Irvine. The problems may not have obscured the accomplishments in that State of the District Address, but they certainly over-shadowed them (Koltai, 1985; 2-3).

At the same meeting where Fallo read Koltai's State of the District Address, Sampson presented the "Report of the Commission for the Advancement of Teaching." While considered the final report of the commission, the document was labeled "Part One," because it was meant to be an initial study of the issues, and "professional development should be a continuing, enduring process." The 18-member group had identified, debated, and prepared discussion papers on a broad range of issues. The commission had decided not to limit the scope of its deliberations because of fiscal difficulties, in the same spirit as the Committee on Access and Excellence: "When the financial picture improves and the District takes up the task of rebuilding its staff and programs, it will be possible to fund areas which were previously cut, but it will also be possible to do new things." Nor did it restrict itself to local matters, but made recommendations that could only be effected by the State. The commission placed the question "Will it improve teaching?" at the center of its deliberations.

The report was divided into six sections and included numerous recommendations, some of them costing nothing, some costing little, and others that would have to wait until "the problem of permanent financing of the community college system is solved." The sections ranged from "Professional Growth and Development" to "Mission, Leadership and Teaching." Recommendations included establishing a Teacher Center on each campus to initiate and coordinate local staff development activities, initiating an Employee Assistance Program to provide counseling and crisis intervention for troubled teachers, continuing the development of District-wide discipline committees for inter-campus communications, pilot testing a computerized academic unit, and beginning a comprehensive staff development program in computer technology.

The final section on "Mission, Leadership and Teaching" moved away from the specific program proposals of the previous parts of the report and into the broader issues of institutional goal-setting and planning. A particularly significant observation was that even though the revised "Statement of Mission and Functions" was not passed by the Board in February 1981, the cuts which had been made since that time generally conformed to the
statement's priority ranking. The functions which received lower priorities “included community services programs, health services, instructional media production services, job placement, services to special need groups such as returning adults, veterans, and parents with pre-school children, all of which have been eliminated or greatly reduced.” The commission warned, however, against being too compliant about cutting back the comprehensiveness of the mission in times of fiscal distress because when finances became plentiful again, districts “would have the difficult political task of asking simultaneously for a change of mission and the increased funding to pay for it.” The section concluded: “There must be a clear, shared, coherent vision of what community colleges are to be in our society; and there must be leadership, whether titular or not, to get us there.” Recommendations in this section included one that college presidents should establish forums for re-examining the college mission statements and another that they should articulate their goals in annual State of the College Addresses. The District was advised to review its mission and functions statement, establish a policy position for the coming statewide debate on the Master Plan and prepare a strategy for advancing that position, and to “move as quickly as possible from the crisis mode of the past year to a more stable mode of operation based on short and long-range planning” (Commission for the Advancement of Teaching, 1985; “Preface,” 5-7, 24, 33, 42, 46, 63, 71-72, and 76-77).

VIII. Board of Trustees Election, 1985

In Spring 1985 the first Board of Trustees election was held since Mulrooney had left the AFT presidency and Fox had taken over as leader of the union. The AFT Committee on Political Education (COPE) once again interviewed the candidates, and the January 22 issue of Read On carefully explained to the membership why COPE and the Executive Board had endorsed the three incumbents: Albertson, Bronson, and Conner. “Since 1977, we have had a Board of Trustees who have shown commitment to community college education and to the faculty and employees and staff who work here.” The contracts and pay increases since then demonstrated this. The funding collapse in 1982 and its consequences were unanticipated and “our District’s political leadership had to deal with conditions that had never existed before.” The Board had twice prepared for a layoff of classified employees, but they postponed the action both times and finally voted against it, “when they were convinced by the Union that such layoffs were unnecessary and unwise.” The three incumbents had “steadfastly opposed March 15 notices despite the decline in funding.” They and the other Board members had “worked hard to assure that we got the raises we received” and “to make sure that the Unit 1 classified employees got the best contract for classified employees in the country.” Read On concluded that “there’s much for the Board of Trustees to do to improve the working conditions of our campuses,” but “the best candidates to do this job” were the incumbents (1-2).

Some District teachers encouraged perennial Board candidate J. William Orozco and former U.S. ambassador to Mexico Julian Nava to run for the Board, but neither of them filed petitions. Instead of candidates associated with Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr., who had run in 1983, this time the tiny Peace and Freedom party fielded opponents to each incumbent. The party seemed as interested in establishing chapters at the colleges as in getting its candidates elected. Its only serious contender was Julia C. Wrigley, a UCLA School of Education instructor, who was Albertson’s sole competitor. Bronson was facing three challengers, the best known of whom was former Unified School District Board of Education member, Richard Ferraro. Conner’s first bid for re-election was opposed by six candidates, one of whom was Kenneth Palmer, a Valley College administrator who had retired after the 1982 administrative reorganization. The Los
Angeles Times pointed to the illustrious group of politicians who had earlier moved up from positions on the Board of Trustees and said that possibly because of the District’s recent financial and enrollment problems, “fewer and fewer local politicians are seeking spots on the community college board, and none of the incumbents has used it of late as a springboard for higher office.” However, one Board member, Tuttle, whose Trustee position was not up for election, was making a bid for Los Angeles City Controller (Palermo, January 17, 1985; Savage, February 24, 1985).

The central issues of the campaign were the Board’s handling of the fiscal and enrollment crisis, the problems growing out of the centralization of financial aid, and the incumbents’ relationship with the teachers union. Wrigley said that she was running because of the crisis and that “The current board, although well intended, has adopted essentially a passive point of view. I don’t think the trustees have a vision of how any kind of rebuilding might occur.” Albertson said that the challengers had a right to be dissatisfied with certain matters, “But it’s not fair to lay it at the feet of the board. They just don’t know how near we have come to closing the whole thing down.” Conner said that “those challengers who say the board did not do enough simply do not know what they are talking about. We’ve worked very hard, directly and through our lobbyist in Sacramento, to maintain our funding.” When one of his rivals said the Board should raise money from private sources, Conner listed more than $17.5 million in grants that the District had received for job training. “Our district is the leader in the state in seeking outside funding from other governmental sources and the private sector,” he said. Ferraro, a conservative who had led the fight against mandatory busing while on the Los Angeles Unified School District Board, said he came out of retirement because he was disturbed over the decline of the community colleges. He claimed that the Board was not concerned enough about the students and the quality of the colleges and wanted to blame everybody else for its problems. “The unions own that board—all seven of them—but they wouldn’t own me,” said Ferraro. Bronson pointed to Ferraro’s stormy career on the Unified Board, where he had been censured by his fellow board members. Bronson was also concerned that voters would confuse his opponent with Los Angeles City Councilman John Ferraro who was making a bid for mayor in the same election (Savage, February 24, 1985; Palermo, March 25 and March 26, 1985).

No incumbent had been defeated in running for the Board of Trustees since Garvin unseated Orozco in 1979, and the 1985 election was no exception. Albertson defeated Wrigley by 65.7 percent to 34.4 percent in the April 9 primary election and after a long night of vote counting, Conner was declared the victor over his six challengers, with 52 percent of the votes. Bronson was forced into a runoff with Ferraro in the June election, though for a week the outcome was not known. The initial results indicated that Bronson had barely more than the 50 percent plus one vote necessary, with an unusually large number of absentee ballots yet to be counted. When those votes were tallied, along with some other ballots that had not been initially included in the totals, Bronson received 49.78 percent of the 518,610 votes cast, missing victory by only 917 votes. Ferraro received 27.1 percent, with the remainder divided between the other two candidates. During the general election campaign, Ferraro repeatedly challenged Bronson to debate. Bronson declined the invitation and cited Ferraro’s tendency “to get hysterical.” In the June 4 election Bronson defeated his outspoken opponent by 53 to 47 percent. Tuttle, who had also been thrown into a runoff race for City Controller, was victorious over his competitor, which would result in a vacancy on the Board of Trustees as of July 1 (Chandler, April 18, 1985; Cohen, June 6, 1985; Connell, April 18, 1985; and Savage, May 21, 1985).

---

3 For a discussion of this issue, see Section VII.
IX. Enrollment

Community colleges nationally experienced enrollment losses in Fall 1983 and 1984, the only time this had happened for many years, with the exception of a less than a one percent drop in 1978. Enrollments in over 1200 community, technical, and junior colleges declined by a bare 0.33 percent in 1983 and by a more substantial 2.25 percent in 1984. In California, this mid-1980s enrollment slump started a year earlier and was exacerbated by the fiscal crisis and the imposition of student fees. California community colleges declined 5.7 percent in Fall 1982, 7.9 percent in Fall 1983, and 5.4 percent in 1984, for a cumulative loss of 18 percent in three years. The larger urban districts in Oakland, Sacramento, San Diego, San Francisco, and San Jose suffered even greater enrollment declines since 1981, with an average of 22 percent. Grimmest of all was the enrollment picture in the largest district in the state, with a 26 percent enrollment decrease in Los Angeles (American Association of Community and Junior Colleges, 1987; 68; Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1986a; 1; and Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1986b; 38-39).

A. 1983-84

Total District enrollment peaked in 1981, decreased by about two percent in 1982, and then declined precipitously in both 1983 and 1984. The Fall 1983 First Census enrollment was 119,569, a loss of 16,075 students or 11.9 percent since Fall 1982.4 This decline was by far the largest in the 15-year history of the District. In one year the enrollment of the District had been decreased by approximately the same number of students that had enrolled at Trade-Technical College the previous year; the loss exceeded the total enrollment at of each of the four smaller District colleges. Every college shared in the decrease, with a range from Trade-Tech’s 9.5 percent to West’s 17.6 percent. Mission, which had achieved a large increase (14.1 percent) in Fall 1982, when all of the other colleges were beginning to lose enrollments, now had one of the largest decreases (16 percent). Southwest, which had the largest decline the previous fall (11 percent), experienced another sizable loss of 12.8 percent. The drop in Weekly Student Contact Hours (WSCH) averaged 10.7 percent for the whole District, varying from 5.4 percent at East to Mission’s 18.5 per cent. The report to the Board said the most important reason for the decline in enrollment and WSCH given by the colleges was “the decrease in class offerings.” Other factors included “negative publicity regarding budget cutbacks and possible tuition,” as well as enforcing disqualification because of lack of academic achievement and progress. The loss of

---

4 While the Fall 1983 figures were announced publicly and published in Read On as early as October 31, 1983 and in the Los Angeles Times on November 2, the official report to the Board of Trustees was not made until its meeting of February 22, 1984. The Spring 1984 enrollment figures were reported in the press in March 1984, but no record could be found in the Board’s files or in the files of the Office of Student Services (responsible for developing the report) that an official report of these statistics was ever made at a meeting of the Board of Trustees. This was the only instance during the period from 1981 to 1987 that a semester enrollment report was found not to have been presented. No reason for the exclusion has been discovered. The figures given here for spring were provided by Office of Student Services, though the analysis which normally accompanied these reports was not available (Board of Trustees, "Reports," Communication A, February 22, 1984; 1-3; Office of Student Services, "Final First Census," March 20, 1984; 1-2; Read On, October 31, 1983; 2; Trombley, November 2, 1983; Werkman, March 9, 1984).
enrollment was even greater in the spring semester, with a decline of 14.3 percent. The decrease ranged from 6.3 percent at Mission to over one-fifth (21.5 percent) at Southwest. The decline in WSCH was larger still. The total District loss was 15 percent, and went from 7.2 percent at Mission to 26.2 percent at Southwest (Board of Trustees, "Reports," Communication A, February 22, 1984; 1-3; Office of Student Services, "Final First Census," March 20, 1984; 1-2).

The slight decline that was experienced in 1982-83 had been in the evening classes. The massive enrollment loss in 1983-84 was somewhat larger in the evening than in the day during Fall 1983 (14.6 percent compared to 10.1 percent), but by Spring 1984, the day classes were losing students at an even faster rate (15.2 percent) than were the evening offerings (12.8 percent) (Board of Trustees, "Reports," Communication A, February 22, 1984; 1-3; Office of Student Services, "Final First Census," March 20, 1984; 1-2).

The 1983-84 Annual Reports said that the District was beleaguered by fiscal reductions and indecision regarding tuition and funding that continued well into January. Prolonged legislative haggling over community college funding worked to the detriment of confidence in the system; statewide enrollment fell 11 percent. At the same time, efforts to reform the system escalated. General education requirements and probation standards were tightened; courses regarded as recreational were no longer funded; entering students were increasingly required to take assessment tests and follow course placement recommendations (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 1).

B. 1984-85

The eyes of the world were trained on the Los Angeles Olympics in the summer of 1984, and the District's colleges were involved in a variety of ways. The field hockey events and other activities took place at East Los Angeles College, and contributions of over $3.4 million renovated the stadium, auditorium, and tennis courts and improved the landscaping and grounds. Southwest College was used for training by the Olympic athletes and it now boasted a new practice track. Fifteen thousand visitors from around the world attended a food fair at Trade-Technical College, which culminated with an international banquet.

At the same time as the colleges were participating in a phenomenally successful Summer Olympics, Koltai and many others in the District were carefully watching the enrollment statistics for the fall semester. The Olympics took place in the middle of the registration period which had been moved up because of the early start of the semester. The colleges were about to collect mandatory enrollment fees for the first time, and financial aid was being centralized, not into the downtown District Offices, but into space being vacated by Olympics personnel after the events were completed. Registering students and enrolling them in classes became more complicated now that all colleges were on the Project ACCESS system. Many actions were taken to head off a further enrollment loss in 1984-85, which would spell financial catastrophe for the District. Continuing students were encouraged to register by mail at the end of the previous semester. The registration period was extended by two weeks so students could enroll before the Olympics began. The District’s $100,000 promotional campaign used newspaper and radio advertisements to

---

5 This figure was based on incomplete reporting and the final decline was put at 7.9 percent (Department of Finance, 1984;1; and 1985; vii; Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1986b, 39).
promulgate the message that fees at the community colleges were a fraction of those at neighboring institutions. College schedules and brochures were distributed to area homes. Plans were under way for selected courses to be taught on an accelerated basis, beginning in September, to catch the summer stragglers. Even after the semester began, the registration period was held open later than usual to allow students to enroll in the regular classes (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1986a; 20,31,90, and 119).

When enrollments were tallied after the fourth week of the fall semester, the results were worse than the year before. District enrollment fell from 119,569 to 102,313, a loss of 17,256 students, or 14 percent. For the first time the enrollment report to the Board of Trustees included a comparison with the two previous years, instead of only one. In 1982, the District enrolled 135,644 students, so that the two-year loss was 33,331, a decline greater than the total number of students enrolled in a large majority of state systems. The Los Angeles District in 1984 had only three-quarters of the student enrollment for 1982. The smallest one-year percentage decline was that at Pierce, with nine percent and the largest was at Southwest, with 29 percent. For the two-year period, once again Pierce had the least percentage drop (19) and Southwest had the greatest (38 percent). Other large losses since 1982 were suffered by West (30 percent), East (29 percent), and Mission (27 percent). Total WSCH decline was commensurate with enrollment change. The whole District decreased 15 percent since 1983 and 24 percent since 1982. Where a dramatic change took place was in the difference between losses in day enrollment and WSCH (16 percent compared to six percent) and evening enrollment and WSCH (12 percent against 36 percent). The day students were, on average, taking more classes and the evening students fewer. The report to the Board gave as a reason for this the number of class units students could take under the new fee structure. Day students, who typically took three to four classes, were using the fixed $50 fee for six or more units to their advantage by adding an extra course or two at no extra charge. On the other hand, evening students, many of whom traditionally enrolled in two classes, tended now to take only one class for $15, rather than two classes for $50 (Board of Trustees, “Board Reports,” Communication No. A, October 24, 1984).

Spring 1985 enrollment figures, compared to the previous year, were lower than those in the fall. Enrollment had declined from 109,229 students to 90,229, a drop of 19,290 or 18 percent. Over a two year period, the loss was 37,561 students or 29 percent. Pierce and City tied for the smallest enrollment drop (12 percent), and Southwest once again had the largest decrease (33 percent). District WSCH had declined by 17 percent since Spring 1984 and by 30 percent since Spring 1983. Pierce had the smallest decrease in WSCH (12 percent), closely followed by City and Trade-Tech with 13 percent declines. Southwest’s WSCH loss of 31 percent closely matched its drop in enrollment. The differences between enrollment and WSCH for day and for evening students had disappeared. The gap between them was only one percent for day and two percent for evening, which indicated that student enrollment patterns had returned to normal after only one semester (Board of Trustees, “Board Reports,” Communication No. A, March 6, 1985).

C. Interdistrict Agreements and Free Flow, 1983-87

One characteristic of a local, special-purpose district is that, unless allowed by state law or agreements between districts, the residents of one district are restricted to using its services and may not use those of another district. The reasons for these restrictions are clear. The district’s residents pay for the services through their special district taxes and the district
makes plans and builds facilities based on the projected needs of its own residents. This limitation can result in some unreasonable situations, such as a fire station situated across the street from a burning house, but whose staff and equipment cannot fight the fire, because the district boundary line runs down the middle of the street. Just such circumstances have caused districts to make reciprocal agreements to share services with each other.

With the State's assumption of the major portion of California community college funding in 1978, State policy generally had been to encourage the free flow of students across community college district boundaries. Los Angeles had established interdistrict agreements with the surrounding districts that allowed all students taking fewer than ten units to attend colleges in other districts, though students taking ten or more units were required to apply for interdistrict permits. In 1981, the Santa Monica District got the local assemblyman to sponsor legislation that enabled its college to enroll the equivalent of 5000 full-time students from Los Angeles each semester, through June 30, 1986. In May, 1983, the Los Angeles District notified the nearby districts that it intended to "terminate existing interdistrict agreements," which would allow the free flow of students among the community colleges. Later, Vice Chancellor of Educational Services Kenneth Washington explained that the District had believed this would eliminate the administrative costs of issuing the permits, while the flow of students both ways across the district's boundaries "would probably cancel itself out." The new arrangement took effect with the Fall 1983 semester, precisely when the Los Angeles District began its large decreases in enrollment and WSCH. During 1983-84, the District investigated the impact of the new free flow arrangement and found that the flow outward was increasing and the flow inward was decreasing (Landis, 1986; 1-2, 4; Office of Planning, Research, and Analysis, 1989; 2-3).

The Los Angeles District was shocked to discover the significant impact of a cost-cutting action that was not expected to have major repercussions. The action also had important results for the districts that gained enrollments, because the Los Angeles District residents who attended them helped to counter potential enrollment and funding losses. On August 16, 1984, the Los Angeles District sent notifications to eight neighboring districts that beginning with the Spring 1985 semester the District would restrict its residents from attending them unless new interdistrict contracts had been negotiated. The District had discovered that for the Spring 1984 semester the outflow was 26,848, while the inflow was only 6,686, a net loss of 20,162. While some 10,000 of these students were covered by the Santa Monica legislation, the others were not and they "represent a significant loss of ADA over which the District can exercise some control." A Board "Informative" on the issue estimated that for 1985-86 limiting the outflow could give the District a potential increase of 3,665 in ADA, or $6,230,500 in additional funding. District officials said they did not want to disrupt students already studying elsewhere, but Vice Chancellor Washington would not guarantee that currently enrolled students would be allowed to continue. He said that "It does not serve us to antagonize all of the other districts in Los Angeles County, but it does behoove us to survive." Koltai hinted that certain Los Angeles District colleges had lost so many students that one of them might have to be closed. State Chancellor Hayward said that the Los Angeles area was unusual, because most of the other areas of the state had no restrictions and this generally worked out well. He also observed that "Free flow is not really an issue as long as everyone has plenty of enrollment."

Even before the District allowed free flow, the number of Los Angeles District residents attending other District's colleges had been large. For example, in 1981, the outflow was 21,607 and the inflow was 5,930, for a net loss of 15,677. What shocked the District in 1984 was the sudden growth in outflow and decline in inflow that increased the net loss considerably and indicated an accelerating trend.
Several of the suburban districts banded together to seek legislation that would guarantee students the right to attend any college they chose. Pasadena City College President John Casey said that tactic would raise the debate "to a higher level and highlight this issue." The districts also threatened to take the matter to court (Board of Trustees, "Board Reports," Communication A; 1; Connell, October 25, 1984).

In early November the Los Angeles District and five of the neighboring districts worked out a free flow agreement. It called for limiting all students who were taking six or more units and who were not already enrolled at another college, unless they received a permit to transfer. Meanwhile, the situation for the Los Angeles District had grown worse. Media coverage of the issue seemed to encourage even more students to leave the District for nearby colleges. The outflow for Fall 1984 amounted to 30,538 students and the inflow to 6,372, for a net loss of 24,166, or a 32 percent increase since the previous spring semester. The particular configuration of the District in relationship to the other area colleges contributed to the problem. Just as in the fire station example used earlier, El Camino College was located on Crenshaw Boulevard, across the street from the Los Angeles District. El Camino had a large, modern campus, with tree-lined walkways and special facilities such as a planetarium and a sports complex. Four miles north was Southwest College, housed in a large, uninviting complex, along with the original temporary structures that had never been retired. It lacked such campus basics as physical education and vocational education buildings. El Camino's 26,000 students included 6,400 residents of the Los Angeles District, an increase of 60 percent since the restrictions had been dropped; Southwest had lost 45 percent of its enrollment in the last three years (Broersma, December 2, 1984; Savage, November 7, 1984 and March 25, 1985).

The suburban colleges chafed at the pressures applied by the Los Angeles District to agree to the new restrictions, which were more limiting than those before 1983, and put their hopes in free flow legislation recently introduced in Sacramento. On March 8, 1985, the California Community College Board of Governors sided with the suburban colleges and voted to support a statewide free flow policy, except in cases where a college would "suffer irreparable damage" by a sudden outflow of students. Such cases would be decided by the Board of Governors. Later, the State Board voted to support free flow legislation, even if it did not contain the irreparable damage provision.

While legislators generally supported the principle that adult college students should be able to attend any institution they wished, some legislators also saw this conflict as one more reason for their overall dissatisfaction with the Los Angeles District. Bill Leonard, an assemblyman from Redlands and sponsor of one free flow bill, lashed out at the administrators of the Los Angeles District. He said that they were "afraid that they will lose their jobs when word spreads that they have failed to produce a college that is good enough to attract students." Another reason legislators favored free flow was that Los Angeles was a high-cost district. The State had to pay $2599 for each ADA produced by Los Angeles, while Santa Monica cost $2,052 per ADA and El Camino was paid $2,132. In June, a bill carried by Senator Robert G. Beverly, a Republican from the El Camino College area, was passed by the State Senate, but failed to carry in the Assembly. Even without supportive legislation and with restrictive agreements, the exodus continued. In Fall 1985, the outflow was 32,477 and inflow was 5,112, for a net loss of 27,365 students, though the figures did not change much after that semester (Heffernan and Gladstone, June 14, 1985; Landis, 1986; 4; Leonard Letter to L.A. Times, November 10, 1984; and Savage, March 25, 1985).

Attendance by Los Angeles District residents at colleges in neighboring districts was a major problem and the LACCD handled it badly. It was a situation that had been developing for many years, with thousands of students in the Los Angeles District crossing
the boundary to go to the suburban colleges, and not nearly so many going in the other
direction. In a time of financial stringency, the Los Angeles District saved some money by
eliminating a small processing unit at the District Office and ended up losing millions of
dollars in funding. The District's heavy-handed attempt to turn off the outflow of students
only served to publicize the issue and give more students the idea of avoiding the District
colleges by seeking an education in the suburbs. The Los Angeles District had become
what one District report characterized as a "reservoir" for the neighboring colleges to tap
into, and this enabled the other colleges to limit their own enrollment and funding losses,
while exacerbating those of the Los Angeles District. This reservoir became an extremely
important source of enrollment for some of them, with Los Angeles residents representing
65 percent of Santa Monica's enrollments and 40 percent of Glendale's. After Los
Angeles opened up this opportunity and drew attention to it by trying to close it down, the
interdistrict restrictions did not prove effective. The outflow grew by 50 percent between
1981 and 1985, though after that it nearly leveled off, with only another two percent
increase by 1987. Regardless, it refused to be reversed.

Los Angeles made some attempt to characterize the phenomenon as a "white flight" issue,
similar to what had happened in large urban public school districts. The District's own
research, however, showed that the students who were "fleeing" to the suburban districts
were only slightly more white and Asian and slightly less black and Hispanic than typical
Los Angeles District students. From a broader social perspective, the result of the
interdistrict migration was that it made certain Los Angeles District colleges somewhat less
integrated, but the receiving districts more integrated. Eventually, by 1987, the students
who were crossing the District's boundaries were similar ethnically to those who remained.

The major problem with outflow concerned student characteristics other than ethnicity.
The Los Angeles area accounted for about half of all interdistrict attendance in the state; but
there the circumstances were different from other areas. Students crossed district
boundaries for a variety of reasons, but outside of Los Angeles, one of the main purposes
was to pursue vocational programs unavailable in the home district. In Los Angeles, the
interdistrict students tended to be younger, full-time, and pursuing transfer studies. These
were exactly the students whom the Los Angeles District could least afford to lose. They
took more courses and therefore produced more WSCH and were more likely to persist in
their studies and enroll in courses that were losing enrollment. The interdistrict students
who went on to senior institutions contributed to the suburban colleges' goal of transferring
students and reduced the Los Angeles District's ability to do so. As a Los Angeles District
study stated, "... the District is left with a more expensive student body to educate because
of the generally greater cost of vocational programs and the need to provide more remedial
or basic skills programming for these students." To use the terminology of one newspaper
analysis, the outflow from Los Angeles was not so much "white flight" as it was a "brain
drain" (Herald-Examiner, "L. A. Brain Drain," June 17, 1985; Kerschner Letter to
Members, Master Plan Commission, November 17, 1986; Office of Research, Planning
and Analysis, 1989; 4-14).

Los Angeles lost more than students over the interdistrict issue; it also lost additional
credibility with the State. Free flow legislation was being considered at the same time the
Los Angeles District was appealing to the Governor and the Legislature for a loan to bail it
out of its 1984-85 fiscal year-end deficit. From the Los Angeles point of view, the District
had the right and the responsibility to provide services to its own residents and be funded
for those services. But legislators saw the matter from a different perspective. State
appropriations were now paying the major share of the community colleges' bills.
Legislators made comparisons with the students' opportunity to attend any campus of
California State University. This would have been an appropriate argument if the
community colleges were a statewide system, but not when they continued to be locally
governed, special-purpose districts, regardless of the source of their funding. One Los Angeles District administrator told a legislator that he lived in the Los Angeles Unified School District and his child had to attend one of that district's schools. This was the case, even though they lived much closer to a suburban district school, because that district would not allow a transfer. He suggested that the same principle should apply to the community colleges. The legislator responded that the administrator was correct, but in Sacramento everything had to do with appearances. To many legislators and even to the Board of Governors, what appeared to be fair was that community college students, whose average age was the late 20's, should be able to go to whatever institution they wished, regardless of local districts and their financial problems. The Los Angeles District was able to exert enough influence to block free flow legislation in the Assembly. For many legislators and others this was an example of misuse of power by a high-cost district that could not keep its finances in order or operate colleges with enough appeal to prevent its residents from attending other institutions.

X. The Colleges

A. Staffing

The 1983-85 period presented the colleges not only with the same uncertainties that beset the State and the District, but also with changes and problems specific to that level. The administrative reorganization took effect on July 1, 1983, which meant that each college was administered with two vice presidents instead of the three deans and with 25 fewer administrators overall. The Annual Reports indicated that the changes in organizational structure were accomplished without great hardship, but more significant was the loss of personnel in all categories brought about by the retirement of 380 employees, most of whom were not replaced. Pierce College began 1983-84 with more than a quarter of its faculty and staff having retired and other colleges were also severely affected. The greatest reduction in administration took place at Mission, which after losing two administrative positions in 1983-84, lost vice president and assistant dean of student services positions the next year, bringing its certificated administrative staff to six, as compared to twelve just three years before. The centralization of the financial aid function caused most colleges to comment that reduced campus staff, combined with increased demand and long delays in centralized processing, cut into their services to students and eventually had a negative effect on enrollment. And, in October, 1984, the college public information officers, who had been reduced by attrition to only four incumbents, were brought to the District Office and each was assigned two or more colleges to serve. This was at a time when the colleges needed marketing and public relations services more than ever (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 5, 77; and 1986a, 52, 78, and 115).

B. Funding

The impact of the severe budget reductions were reflected in the Annual Reports, particularly in libraries and other instructional services. A special fund for books and materials acquisitions distributed to the colleges by the District helped the libraries some, but the constant increase in costs diluted the effect these funds could have. Valley College reported that the average cost of books in 1984-85 had risen to $31.96, almost $10.00 greater than the year before. Several colleges indicated that services and hours of operation had to be reduced because of inadequate staff and budget. Cutting the evening hours in the library at Trade-Technical College in Fall 1984 contributed to a 40 percent reduction in the
circulation of books, though the hours of service were reinstated in the Spring semester. Southwest added hourly rate librarians in 1984-85 which allowed an additional two hours of operation and increased book circulation. The Mission library operated only four days per week in 1983-84, but the return of a librarian from sabbatical leave the next year allowed the library to return to a five-day operation. City and Valley reported that insufficient staffing forced a curtailment of library services. Media centers, learning centers, foreign language laboratories, and tutoring services were also hard hit by losses in staff and funding (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 8, 53, 98, 114, 115, and 129; and 1986a, 9, 55, 75, 92-93, and 129).

Other seriously affected units were counseling, admissions and records, and maintenance and operations. Harbor indicated that a reduction of 30 percent of its counselors in 1983-84 meant that the evening hours could not be covered by professional staff and West’s loss of 29 percent of full time counselors and reduced hourly rate counseling staff resulted in fewer student appointments and no orientation sessions for Spring 1984. The heavy concentration of classified staff in admissions and in maintenance made them particularly vulnerable to personnel reductions. City stated that the loss of trained and experienced employees “had a drastic effect on productivity levels in the Admissions Office.” Pierce had a 28 percent reduction in admissions personnel in 1983-84 and further reductions in staffing the next year had forced the office “to consider reduction in fundamental functions, such as admissions, registration, and transcript production.” By 1984-85, West had experienced a 40 percent reduction in admissions staff, but was able “to maintain required procedures and handle the registration processes.” Besides the fact that fewer students were enrolling, two developments contributed to the admissions and records offices being able to continue to function even with major losses in staff. One was that the on-line registration system was in use at all campuses at this time and was working well. Another was that mail-in registration for continuing students had been instituted during this period, which Valley said had “significantly reduced the volume of in-person enrollment and its impact on the Admissions staff.” As for maintenance and operations, City had lost 53 percent of its maintenance employees and 26 percent of the custodial staff. Valley indicated that campus facilities were neglected because of the lack of custodial employees and resources and that thirteen months had been required to replace the night custodial supervisor. Pierce had a 60 percent reduction in groundskeeping and custodial staff levels. One area where maintenance costs continued to increase was utilities, which Pierce indicated had gone up 40 percent in two years (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 10-11,15, 25, 40, 55, 71, 74, 86, 117, 121, 130, and 131-32; and 1986a, 78, 82, 115, 131, and 146-47).

C. Programs

Instructional, student, and administrative services were not the only areas of the colleges affected by reduced resources. Particularly in 1983-84, the educational programs of the colleges suffered. The inability to replace 128 regular faculty and the necessity of cutting $1 million in hourly rate instruction in Fall 1983 translated into drastically reduced class offerings and lowered enrollment. Courses were cut in 90 disciplines, and 35 specialized programs were deleted at one or more colleges. While the regular assignments of almost all full-time instructors had formerly been only in the daytime, increasing numbers of them now had what was referred to in the AFT contract as “non-traditional assignments,” with classes in both the day and the evening. At Mission College, practically the entire instructional staff was on “non-traditional assignments.” By 1984-85, the full-time faculty at Trade-Tech had fallen from 253 in 1980 to 218. The Annual Report observed that the inability to hire new faculty not only reduced program offerings, but “thwarted plans for
program revitalization and new program development.” The Trade-Tech faculty’s average age was now 54 years, which meant that it had many highly experienced master teachers, but also had some faculty who had not updated their skills. The college had no opportunity to bring in younger, more recently trained instructors to rejuvenate those programs (Courier, October 17, 1983; 2; Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1986a; 84-85 and 112-13).

While colleges had practically no funds for equipment in their regular budgets, Vocational Education Act (VEA), Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), and Employment Training Panel (ETP) funds were furnishing major support to certain programs for equipment and other purposes. The Engineering Department at Valley was awarded grants totalling $1,653,202 from the California ETP, through the District Office of Occupational and Technical Education. Of this, $596,000 was for computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing (CAD-CAM) for the aero-space industries. Valley’s Office Administration Department received an ETP grant of $354,900 for an office automation program. Lockheed funded Computer Assisted Design facilities, software, and instructor training for programs at East and Southwest. Harbor was funded with $205,000 from JTPA for a Reemployment Center, to provide basic skills training. City College received a special grant to set up a Displaced Worker Training Center. West was able to establish a “state-of-the-art” language laboratory through several special grants. This special funding meant that some programs at some colleges benefitted from the latest in technology, while other programs were starving for funds. Trade Tech purchased a new $250,000 printing press from VEA money at a time when three-quarters of the audio-visual equipment at West was inoperable for lack of equipment repair funds (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 14; and 1986a, 2, 25, 40, 44, 128, and 143-44).

The colleges sought out other sources of funds. They continued to work with their community foundations and in June, 1985, the District announced that it was also organizing a foundation to secure special funding. Mission was transforming its community support group, the President’s Club, into a foundation, and Valley was organizing a foundation, while still relying on its Patron’s Association for some assistance. Pierce’s foundation was providing meaningful financial support to the college and Trade-Tech received $500,000 in donations of equipment and supplies from its occupational advisory committee members. Associated Students Organizations were making increasingly large contributions to the colleges to underwrite services the students were interested in, such as keeping the libraries open for more hours. The District began to more fully appreciate the financial potential of foreign student enrollments, because tuition for these students was set at an amount equal to the actual cost per student. In 1984-85 a new program with a full-time counselor was authorized at Pierce to encourage attendance by foreign students, resulting in a 45 percent increase in enrollment the first year (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 59-60; and 1986a, 79, 110, and 134; and Washington, June 10, 1985).

Regardless of the loss in the number of students transferring to the University of California and the California State University, the colleges continued to stress the transfer function. Transfer committees were active and colleges stretched meager resources to operate Transfer Centers. Representatives of four-year institutions made regular visits to the campuses to meet with students, help them with applications and financial aid materials, and arrange visits to the senior institutions’ campuses. Some colleges also arranged for former students, who had successfully transferred, to return to campus to give interested students encouragement and advice. Four colleges—City, Harbor, Mission, and West—participated in the national Ford-Foundation-sponsored Urban Transfer Project to increase the transfer rates of women and minorities. City College was chosen by the State Chancellor’s Office to receive a three-year grant to participate as one of sixteen colleges in
the state to establish a Transfer Center. In 1984-85, Harbor cooperated with University of California at Irvine to develop UNI-ASSIST, a microcomputer-based articulation program which enabled students to determine what courses they needed for transfer to specific programs at Irvine. The project was to be expanded into a regional model in 1985-86. Harbor, Pierce, Valley and West were selected to participate in UCLA’s “redirect” program. Faced with too many qualified applicants, the university guaranteed admission as juniors to students who completed the required courses at an authorized community college. While the program was met with considerable enthusiasm by the participating colleges, Valley noted that “the numbers of students anticipated did not materialize.” The PACE program at Harbor grew by 50 percent in 1984-85 and Mission prepared to offer the program in the northern part of the District in 1985-86 (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 7, 40, 51, 52, 67, 84, and 134; and 1986a; 8, 15, 32, 40, 42, 43, 53-54, 88, 94, 98, 135, 142, and 144).

The complexity of serving the increasingly diverse student body was pointed out in City’s Annual Report. The broad ethnic categories used by the District to determine student characteristics masked the true nature of the cultural and linguistic diversity of students. For example, “white” included Armenians, Croatians, and Middle Eastern peoples. “Asian” grouped together Japanese, Koreans, Filipinos, Vietnamese, Thai, and Mandarin and Cantonese speaking Chinese. Half of all entering students tested at City in 1983-84, more than 10,000, selected the English as a second language (ESL) form of the College Placement Examination. In indicating their educational goals, 43 percent of all responding students checked “undecided,” in contrast to ten years before, when only ten percent marked that response (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 3-8).

The colleges attempted to effectively serve this varied and largely undecided contingent of students. Project ACCESS was extended to all of the colleges during this period and the information it provided confirmed the need to expand developmental programs. City College paired academic courses with skills courses, such as Introductory Physics with Trigonometry; extended the use of test scores as prerequisites for enrollment in 44 courses in 11 departments; and expanded the Learning Skills Center. Trade-Tech secured special State funding to hire a new ESL faculty member, altered its ESL offerings, and made plans for a comprehensive program. Recognizing the increasing Hispanic population in its service area, Southwest revitalized its ESL program. The college found that many students tested at the fourth grade level and below, so that it expanded its developmental curricula in English and mathematics. An increase in the number of Limited English Speaking students and a decline in basic skills proficiency at Pierce led to an increase in remedial classes and greater use of the Study Skills Center. At East, the Learning Resource Center was reestablished and a director for all learning skill development and tutoring was named. Harbor’s leadership in Project ACCESS generated interest at the state level and its dean of students served as a consultant to the State Chancellor’s Office in the development of the Matriculation Model (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 40, and 41; and 1986a; 27, 74, 92, 98, and 111).

Declining funds and enrollments led to changes in the occupational programs of the colleges. Recommendations by the program advisory committees at Trade-Technical College in 1983-84 resulted in the complete revision of the culinary arts program, introduction of computer assisted design in drafting and air-conditioning, and the allocation of $250,000 to buy a new high technology printing press. In 1984-85, over 45 advisory committees reviewed programs and provided evaluations which were to be used to update the career programs in coming years. At East a robotics option in engineering was implemented and then curtailed due to a lack of funds, but at Southwest, the robotics option was initiated and the overall engineering discipline expanded, partially supported by the
Lockheed grant. Southwest also began new programs in administrative training, drafting training, and computer software technology. Enrollment in Pierce’s agricultural program declined to the point that plans were underway to downsize the farm operation. Mission College split business data processing away from the business discipline and into a separate program. New programs in electronics and alcohol studies were started, while two high-cost, low-enrollment programs, aviation electronics and diesel technology, were eliminated. The college's bilingual education aide program co-sponsored the first Statewide California Bilingual Education Conference with the State Chancellor’s Office and assisted Southwest College to implement its own program (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 52, 58, 82, and 83-84; and 1986a; 26, 54, 74, 89, 91, and 109-110).

Much of the special funding discussed previously was used to enhance the computer capabilities of the colleges. Southwest, Valley and Trade-Tech's movement into CAD-CAM required considerable investments in computer hardware and software. The three colleges also enhanced their computer usage in other ways: Southwest’s computer science department added new computer equipment, Valley received VEA funding for the beginning of a microcomputer lab for business administration, and Trade-Tech expanded the use of microcomputers in mathematics and science courses. Harbor emphasized computer competency in staff development and installed terminals of its mini-computer in each division chairperson’s office. The college’s computer laboratory was improved, but concerns were expressed about limited funds for maintenance, because the micro-computers were aging. City College purchased $40,000 of microcomputers for the first phase development of a centralized computer laboratory, to be used by several occupational programs. Pierce used VEA funds to upgrade and buy new computers for computer science, industrial technology, and office administration. West added computers to the travel program and expanded the computer science laboratory (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 14, 40, 46, 68, 97, and 113; and 1986a; 45, 74, 91, 109, 126, 127, and 142).

D. Recruitment

Each college mounted efforts to recruit students during this period, in addition to the District marketing effort which has already been described. The 1984-85 “Overview” summarized these activities:

Nearly all colleges reached out to feeder high schools with recruitment visits and efforts and efforts to articulate high school curricula with college programs. Students were encouraged to get on a college track as early as junior high. . . . Fall schedules were published in May, to alert students to the early start and accelerate the admissions process. Most colleges followed through with wide dissemination of the schedule throughout their service areas, accompanied by advertising and publicity campaigns.

Harbor college had a faculty marketing committee that recruited students during the first weeks of the semester with telephone calls and letters. West developed a coordinated marketing campaign, with a unified message presented through the art and text of all marketing materials. Colleges distributed hundreds of thousands of illustrated brochures promoting their programs and services through the daily newspapers and the mail (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 130; and 1986a; 1, 41, and 135).
E. Planning

While the District did not develop a formal college planning process until the end of this period, several colleges undertook long-range planning projects of their own, sometimes motivated by the increased emphasis placed on college planning by accreditation teams. In 1984-85, Pierce President Herbert Ravitch organized a college-wide advisory group, the Planning and Development Committee, which spent months of reading and discussion to produce a series of statements on mission, values, functions, and goals. These statements were reviewed by the college community, revised by the committee, and submitted for approval to Ravitch. The Annual Report commented that the process “brought together representatives of all segments of the College and achieved a level of interaction and collective endeavor not before experienced. . . .the crucial first step has been taken to determine where the College is and what direction it should take.”

The 1983-84 Mission College report said that the college was “faced with the same dilemma as other colleges in the District regarding long-range planning: how can an institution plan for its long-range future when it is constantly beset by problems that seem to threaten its immediate existence?” Spurred on by a conditional accreditation report, the next year the college instituted its Educational Strategic Planning (ESP) process, under the leadership of Vice President of Academic Affairs Raul Cardoza, who was also participating in the State Comprehensive Planning Pilot project. The entire college was involved in the activity, which analyzed the environment and established college goals and objectives, as well as strategies for achieving these.

At West, a campus-wide advisory committee produced a three-year master plan for career education and a committee of the Academic Senate worked with the administration to create “a creditable planning process” which was submitted to the college president. Trade-Tech completed the first draft of the Learning Resource Center Five Year Master Plan and the Program Evaluation Pilot Project developed a formalized system, to be initiated in 1985-86. At Valley College, the faculty and administration began developing a “tracking system” for transfer students, which would “allow for more efficient scheduling of classes and for better utilization of instructional faculty.” Southwest’s new occupational education dean produced the college’s first three-year plan for occupational education. Finally, the librarians of the District worked with Dean Robert Hays of the UCLA Graduate School of Library and Information Science on the development of a report and recommendations concerning college libraries (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1984a; 58; and 1986a; 42, 62-63, 80, 90, 113, 117-18, 133, 142, and 149).

F. Mission College’s Permanent Campus

Of all the District’s colleges, Mission was the most vulnerable in terms of surviving as a separate institution. The college was the smallest in the District and did not have a permanent campus, which made it a possible candidate for being reduced to an outreach center operated by another college or for being discontinued altogether. A campus site had been purchased in 1982, after years of delay, but the funds set aside to begin development had been used by the District for operations when reserve funds were transferred to the general fund in 1981. During 1983-85 Mission struggled to move the permanent campus development forward, so that its existence as a separate college would not continue to be so precarious, as its enrollment declined. Supporting the college in this struggle were Assemblyman Richard Katz, who represented the area and consistently sponsored
legislation to underwrite the new campus; the Board of Trustees, who voted overwhelmingly in favor of actions that needed to be taken; Koltai, who continued to push for the college’s development; and the community, which demonstrated its support for the college. Mission’s most serious detractors were those at other colleges and in the District Office who had never believed that the founding of the college was justified and now believed that the college represented an unnecessary drain on the District’s severely limited resources.

Katz got legislation passed that enabled the District to sell or lease the Northwest San Fernando Valley campus site and use the funds to develop the new Mission campus in Sylmar. The Board of Trustees committed the proceeds from such a sale or lease arrangement to the development of the permanent campus. As required by law, the Trustees placed the Northwest site up for sale to another governmental agency or non-profit organization before allowing private developers to bid. During the course of this process, they came under punishing attacks by the Northridge Little League that feared it might lose the 13 acres it had been leasing on the site; from a church group that wanted to buy the property without meeting the minimum bid requirement of $12 million; and from politicians who were supporters of the Little League, the church group, or both.

During this time the college was working with architects to completely redesign the plans for new campus facilities, as well as consolidating community support by holding Ninth and Tenth Anniversary Dinners and “friend-raising” luncheons. Because a ground breaking ceremony would be premature, the college leaders settled instead for a “campus site dedication” ceremony on October 25, 1984. Enrollment at the college had plummeted 27 percent since 1982, and the audacity of the occasion was summarized by the headline for the Los Angeles Times article on the event: “New Campus Flies in the Face of Decline in Pupils.” An editorial in the Daily News a month before, supporting the Little League’s claim on the property in the Northwest site, questioned why the Trustees were “building a new campus at all.” Supporters of the new campus argued that much of the enrollment loss was the result of scattered and inconvenient temporary facilities and that a permanent campus would save the District over $500,000 per year in rental expenses. By the end of the 1983-85 period, the Northwest site had yet to be offered for sale or lease to developers, CPEC still had to approve the eligibility of the new campus to receive State construction funding, and pressure was mounting for Mission’s permanent home not to be built at all (Connell, August 21, 1983; Daily News, Editorial, October 12, 1984; Neilson, June 28, 1984; and Savage, November 12, 1984).

* * * *

The prolonged State controversy over funding and fees and finally the imposition of general fees in 1983-85 had negative consequences throughout the state, but they had a devastating effect on the Los Angeles District. Funding and enrollment were both profoundly reduced and the dreaded “downward spiral” had taken hold. Admittedly, the District had made decisions that contributed to the enrollment losses, such as the early start of the semester, the poorly handled centralization of financial aid, and the opening and then attempted closing of interdistrict free flow. The District also made expenditure decisions that compounded its problems, such as a minimum six percent pay increase for 1984-85 that it could not afford. All of this caused the District to be insolvent by the end of the fiscal year.

The District made deep cuts in supplies, equipment, administration, classified staff, and hourly rate instructors. The one area not proportionally reduced was full-time instructors, who had gone from producing 501 weekly student contact hours per full-time equivalent
faculty member in Fall 1982 to 410 in Fall 1984. The symbiotic relationship between the Board of Trustees and the AFT had been criticized by unsuccessful opposition candidates for the Board of Trustee, by legislators and by the press. Toward the end of and immediately after the 1984-85 year, several not-so-subtle messages had been sent to the faculty concerning the need for instructional staffing adjustments. These were included in the second version of Koltai's 1984-85 State of the District Address, Mulrooney's P.S. newsletter, and in Peat Marwick's Annual Financial Statement.

On June 19, 1985, at the last Board meeting of the 1984-85 fiscal year, Fox told the Board that 37 districts in the state paid higher salaries than the Los Angeles District and that pay increases should be built into the budgets for the next three fiscal years. The Administrators Association responded through its Newsletter that most other districts had higher faculty productivity, the Los Angeles District had no secret reserves of money it could call upon, and that there had been insufficient funds for the last pay increase. The major problems of the District, the association claimed, were forced on it by the AFT. These included the early start of the semester, low faculty productivity, and deterioration in college services through reduction in administrative and classified personnel. The association questioned whether the AFT could continue collective bargaining negotiations while attempting to make management decisions, could accept fiscal responsibility for the actions they negotiated, and were “really acting in the long-range interests of their constituency—the faculty and classified staff?” The critical issues for the coming period had been set (Administrators Association Newsletter, June, 1985; 7-9 and "WSCH and Staffing Patterns, Fall 1980-Fall 1984“; 1-2).
CHAPTER FOUR
The Crisis Climaxes, 1985-86

I. Appointing a New Trustee, 1985

As of July 1, 1985, a Board seat became vacant, when Rick Tuttle assumed his new position as Los Angeles City Controller. The Board was under considerable pressure—from the press, elected officials and others—to fill the vacancy with a special election. The Daily News editorialized that the Board of Trustees was "a clubby, ingrown group that through administrative bumbling and excessive deference to the teachers union has managed to drive the district to the brink of the poorhouse (sic), and to drive a number of students clean out of the system." The editorial surmised that Board members were afraid that "an open election, involving no incumbents, would lead to freer discussion of their record than they might like, and could end with the election of somebody unwilling to engage in the same old familiar back-scratching." Senator Robbins had unsuccessfully attempted to make the election a requirement in order for the District to receive the loan it was seeking from the State.

The Board had already tentatively agreed to fill the vacancy by an appointment, because a special election would cost between $1.8 and $2.2 million. A run-off election would be a likely additional expense, because an election lacking an incumbent would attract a crowded field of candidates, without much hope that any would achieve a majority in the primary. Board President Bronson pointed out that the voter turnout had been only 3.9 percent for the previous month’s election in those parts of the District where the trustee contest was the only matter to be voted on. The appointment method, he thought, was "just as democratic as having an election in which nobody came and spending $3 million or $4 million in the process." The June election to which Bronson referred was his own, and he made this statement, seemingly unaware of its unintended irony. If it were just as democratic to appoint a trustee to fill the vacancy as to hold an election because of small voter turnout, the same point could be made for all special and run-off trustee elections. Richman was the only trustee who opposed making an appointment to the position, saying an election would be the best way to dispel any perception that the trustees were "in the pockets of the unions" (Daily News Editorial, “LACC Democracy,” June 17, 1985; Marelius, July 7, 1985; and Washington, June 20, 1985).

At the July 11 Board meeting, trustees approved a plan to fill the vacancy by appointment, through a three-stage process. The first stage was for potential candidates to file an application by July 19. The second stage was a Board interview of all of them on July 23. The final stage was the selection of ten or more for a last round of interviews and then voting until a new trustee was selected on July 25. Considerable interest was expressed in the post, not only by the 44 candidates who applied, but by various political leaders who tried to influence the Board in favor of the hopefuls they endorsed. Just how effective this attempted influence would be was difficult to determine. As Trustee Conner observed, with "so many elected officials backing so many different candidates... the political considerations tend to become less important. You know that no matter what you do, you’re going to disappoint a lot of people.” With more than a third of the district’s enrollment made up of Hispanic and Asian students and no one from these ethnic groups
on the Board, trustees expressed some interest in selecting a candidate who would represent one of these minorities.

After the initial round of interviews, 11 candidates were invited to return for the second session, and on the forth vote the trustees selected Leticia Quezada unanimously. The Board of Trustees had not had Hispanic membership since Orozco lost his seat in 1979, and Quezada was the first Hispanic woman ever to serve as a trustee. She was assistant community relations manager for the Carnation Company and was active in community groups. She received extensive backing from Hispanic office holders, and two Hispanic members of the California Assembly were at her side for the final Board meeting. Because of the required 30-day waiting period, Quezada was not sworn in and able to vote until September 4 (Moreland, July 12, 1985; Savage, July 23, 1985 and July 26, 1985; and Washington, July 26, 1985).

In addition to approving a method for selecting a new trustee at the July 11 meeting, the Board also elected officers. In selecting a president, the votes were evenly divided for three ballots, with Archie-Hudson and Garvin supporting Monroe Richman, and Albertson and Bronson joining with Lindsay Conner in behalf of his candidacy. Finally, on the fourth vote, Albertson broke the impasse by swinging her support to Richman, who was thereby elected as Board president for the next year. Besides being the only trustee who had favored an election to fill the vacant post, Richman had also strongly criticized the financial management policies of the district and had established a reputation over the years as an outspoken and independent member of the Board (Washington, July 12, 1985).

Quezada's replacement of Tuttle was the only change in Board make-up since 1981, and the membership was now set for the next two years. The trustees had hoped during each of the preceding four years that the worst was over, but with every new fiscal year the problems became more serious. As they looked forward to 1985-86, the trustees could find no reason to assume that the crisis had yet subsided. Richman, who had served as Board president once before in 1973, was facing the most challenging year any Board leader had ever known.

II. Funding, 1985

The $5 million loan authorized by the County in June, 1985, had to be repaid by October 1, and the District hoped the State would provide a loan that could be amortized over a three-year period. When Fallo had presented the repayment plan to the Board on June 19, he suggested a series of expenditure reductions for 1985-86 that would help bring the District into balance and make the first year's payments on the loan. The plan included a hiring freeze, eliminating administrative posts and part-time workers, as well as a layoff of 165 classified staff. At the beginning of the new fiscal year, the District was already acting on these adjustments and faculty were being transferred from colleges where enrollment was low to those where the District felt they would be more productive. The greatest losses were at Southwest, which lost six instructors, and Mission, which lost five. The largest gain was at Pierce, to which 11 faculty members were transferred. Mulrooney warned that if the financial situation did not improve, certificated staff might have to be laid off (Washington, June 30, 1985).

On July 9, Governor Deukmajian vetoed the portion of the bail-out bill that would have given the Los Angeles District a $5 million loan, even though he signed the remainder of the legislation that provided $4.8 million to three other districts. The Governor said he killed the funding for Los Angeles because he was concerned that the shortfall “may have
resulted from their failure to exercise prudent fiscal management.” Just as Robbins had tried to couple the loan with an election for the trustee vacancy, the Governor now wanted to tie the loan to the District’s acceptance of interdistrict free flow. The District’s supporters in the Assembly had just blocked Senator Beverly’s free flow bill in the Education Committee, and the Governor wanted the loan to become a part of that legislation. Deukmajian used the usual justification for free flow, saying that “community college students should have the same opportunity as students attending the University of California and the California State University to attend any school, regardless of where they reside.” The Governor was concerned that “reforms should be instituted to assure that this shortfall is not repeated.” One of his aids explained that “Students will have a choice, which will provide a greater incentive for the districts to manage themselves better” (Gladstone, July 10, 1985 and Hull, July 10, 1985).

The next day, the Los Angeles Board met in its first emergency session in more than a decade to determine its course of action after Deukmajian’s veto. The trustees were told that an override of the veto was highly unlikely. Still, they were determined, as one of them said, not “to knuckle under” to the Governor’s demand, contending that free flow would cost the District more than $20 million in the coming school year. Board members accused the Governor of attempting to “hold the District hostage,” of being guilty of “blackmail,” and of being “an extortionist.” Trustee Garvin observed that the Governor had provided no examples of the District not having “prudent fiscal management,” and emphasized that he had signed legislation granting loans to other districts. “I think the governor is just trying to get even because this district led the fight against the imposition of tuition fees,” Garvin said.

After each of the six members lashed out against Deukmajian, they began to look for ways to slash $6.8 million from the proposed budget in order to balance it and repay the emergency $5 million loan by the County’s October 1 deadline. District staff recommended about $4.5 million in savings, including increasing class sizes, reducing paid leaves and sabbaticals, leaving classified vacancies unfilled, and reducing administrative staff. Board members went even beyond these recommendations by suggesting the possible elimination of intercollegiate athletics, further cuts in administration and faculty, and closing the West Los Angeles College Center, near the Los Angeles International Airport. This last proposal would allow the Board to enter into a joint venture with a private developer and could result in the construction of an office building, part of which might house the District Offices after the lease expired in 1989 (Moreland, July 11, 1985).

During July and August, the Board and District administration developed and vetted a variety of options to balance the Final Budget by September 4. City College announced it would discontinue football. Its team had tied for state champion in 1976, but since the 1982 season had not won a game. Board President Richman, after learning of the continuing drop in enrollment, said in an interview that one or more of the District’s campuses might have to be closed. The Board requested that at the August 7 meeting the District administration present a series of proposals which could be used to balance the budget. The proposals were updated for review at the August 21 Board meeting, but by that time two developments had added another $1.4 million to the deficit, for a total of $8.2 million. The ADA figures for 1984-85 had been adjusted downward, for a loss of $800,000 in revenue, and a proposal by the U. S. Congress requiring all District employees to become contributors to Medicare meant a potential liability of $600,000, as the District’s share. At the August 21 meeting, the Board directed the administration to prepare a revised set of proposals for action at the September 4 meeting (Broersma, August 21, 1985; Keisser, August 16, 1985; and Office of the Chancellor, 1985; 2-3).
At a marathon ten-hour session on September 4, the Board of Trustees increased revenues and decreased expenses to produce a balanced budget of $216.3 million. Among the actions taken were the elimination of 53 positions declared as non-essential, the reduction and reorganization of administration, slashing supply budgets by 15 percent, pulling funds from vacant positions, authorizing sale of surplus property, increasing student parking fees, and instituting a first-time parking fee for employees. The Board considered increasing mark-ups on textbooks sold in college bookstores and imposing six-day furloughs for all classified and administrative employees, but did not, in the end, approve these measures. At one point in the deliberations the nine student-body presidents offered to help the District by loaning it $300,000 in student association funds.

The total budget was $4 million less than the previous year and $49 million below the 1981-82 budget. Trustee Conner said, "We are way past cutting the fat. We are cutting deep into the bone and muscle and it's hurting all of us." Vice Chancellor Fallo warned that the District's dwindling enrollments could result in an additional $10.7 million decline in revenues the next year. He said that to balance the 1986-87 budget, the District might have to lay off faculty and administrators and reduce and consolidate some educational programs (Courier, September 16, 1985; 1 and Moreland, September 6, 1985).

Koltai had this comment on the budget:

The central problem of this budget and the 1986-87 budget for our administration in a cutback climate is one of finding support for retrenchment actions from among the faculty—not just opposition or mere acquiescence. . . . I believe that without the involvement of faculty leaders, and without widespread knowledge among the faculty of the circumstances facing the District, retrenchment actions will be viewed as illegitimate and unnecessary (Koltai, "Comments on the 1985-86 Final Budget," 3-4).

The "Overview" section of the budget document identified four implications of the previous year's deficit for 1985-86 budget planning: (1) The over expenditures in hourly rate accounts indicated that the assignment of these instructors needed to be better managed; consequently, maximum instructor FTE levels were established by a certificated staffing plan for 1985-86; (2) the budgets for non-regular classified assignments were not only exceeded but funds were freely transferred from vacant classified positions, so that expenditures would now be controlled through a waiver system for hiring substitutes, relief and unclassified employees; (3) the Reserve for Contingency was inadequate and had been depleted by early spring, so that a reserve of $1 million was established; and (4) both community services and the Cafeteria Fund operated at a sizable loss, so that improved management and tighter fiscal controls would be critical for 1985-86 (Office of the Chancellor, 1985: 1-2). Although the budget document could hardly be expected to make such an observation, these problems gave some credence to the Governor's concerns and those of others about prudent fiscal management during the previous year.

At this meeting the trustees, along with making other cuts, reduced budgets for classified and part-time instructional employees, and the budget document outlined tougher financial controls being instituted to avoid the deficit of the year before. Koltai appealed for faculty support of these retrenchment actions, but what followed, when budget cuts and strong controls were implemented, was anything but faculty and union support. Both guilds of the AFT appeared before the Board repeatedly during the fall to protest the layoff of classified employees and the certificated staffing plan that would result in reduced hourly rate staffing.
On September 13, Mulrooney distributed to vice presidents for academic affairs, for purposes of discussion, a certificated staffing plan marked "draft." The union complained at the Board's September 26 meeting that the vice presidents were using the plan as the basis for drastic reductions in course offerings and hourly rate assignments in the spring semester. Mulrooney stated that the plan was intended as a discussion paper and not a directive, and that vice presidents were thus acting on their own initiative. Read On said the formulas being used "have little to do with the real campuses and classrooms that we know," they "were indeed formulas for decline," and they were being used as though the pinching of dollars and cents "were more important than students and the employees who directly serve students."

At the October 1 Board meeting, five trustees voted to lay off 47 classified employees. Albertson remained true to her campaign promise and abstained, and new Board member Quezada voted against the layoffs. The union argued that in selecting the employees for dismissal the District administration revealed how little it understood about what effect losing these employees would have on the educational programs. In response to the AFT's claim that the action was being taken earlier than required for a January 1 termination date, Mulrooney said a period of 70 days was necessary because letters about the intended reduction in force would have to be sent not to 47 but 103 classified employees to take into account employee bumping privileges. Albertson and Quezada sought a delay in the action, but their motion failed. Read On called on union members to "prevent the erosion of the work force in our District. Today it is 47 classified employees and 1,580 hourly rate employees. Tomorrow it may be regular faculty from disciplines who have lost their support personnel and hourly rate staff." The newsletter reminded faculty that "March 15 is only a short time away" (Read On, October 8; 1-2; and October 18; 1-2).

On October 18, the Board sought to put an end to various speculations by passing a resolution to keep all colleges open. The resolution, which passed unanimously, stated that "The Board has always maintained steadfast support for each of its nine colleges." Mission and Southwest, the smallest two colleges, had long been rumored to be prime candidates for closure, but recent staff cuts at East Los Angeles College had caused students there to express fears that campus might be closed. The trustees also passed a resolution requesting the Board of Governors to give priority to funding Mission College's permanent campus. Mission was the only college in the District whose fall enrollment figures showed an exception to the general enrollment drop (Washington, October 20, 1985).

Employee and student dissatisfaction with the actions of the Board and administration culminated at the trustee meeting of November 13. A crowd of 150 angry protesters demonstrated in front of District headquarters and over 40 speakers addressed the meeting, blasting the Board's actions and demanding the removal of Koltai as chancellor. Both AFT College Guild President Fox and AFT Staff Guild President Kleinschmidt argued that reducing classified or faculty positions would damage the instructional programs even further and that the staff and part-time faculty layoffs should be rescinded, since earlier budget cuts had made them unnecessary. Other speakers accused the administration of mismanagement and demanded more control at the college level. While Koltai did not respond to the demands that he be replaced, several trustees said that Governor Deukmajian, not the chancellor, was to blame for the District's problems. Board President Richman told the angry crowd to take their signs to Sacramento to "see what the governor says to you. That's where the money is coming from." After six-and-a-half hours of listening to speeches and giving responses, the Board agreed to review the list of classified dismissals on an individual basis in executive session. The Board also approved an agreement that had been negotiated with the unions giving no pay increase for the fiscal
year, amending fringe benefits, and providing an $8,000 severance grant for teachers who retired by January 4, 1986 (News Pilot, November 25, 1985; Read On, November 27, 1985; and Woo, November 14, 1985).

Two weeks later, Vice Chancellor of Business Services Fallo presented the “1985-86 First Quarter Budget Report” to the Board. As usual, the report came too early in the fiscal year to project with any certainty the effects of the Board’s expenditure cuts and revenue increases. Fallo said that, without any additional actions by the Board, the fiscal year could end at worst with a $2.46 million deficit and at best with a $1.32 million carry over. He urged the trustees to take precautionary measures in advance to avoid any potential disaster. Trustee Conner stated: “To my way of thinking, the day of the deficit is over in this District. [We need to] manage affirmatively and aggressively. I don’t think we can be lured into believing the current budget is O.K.” (Bates, November 27, 1985 and Washington, November 28, 1985).

The report said lottery income was greater than expected by from $1.1 to $1.8 million, though continuing cash flow problems caused the interest income projection to be reduced by $1.3 million. Revenues from the proposed employee parking fee, still under negotiation with the unions, had to be adjusted for less than a full year of collections. Use of the certificated staffing plan had reduced fall hourly rate expenditures, and the retirement incentive was also expected to produce savings, but these depended on how many retirees were replaced with hourly rate instructors. Countering the positive factors was the fact that budgeted salary savings were now expected to be less than originally projected. In classified salaries, vacancies greater than anticipated were saving funds (while creating hardships on remaining employees and on the level of services), and even though the Personnel Services Division was closely scrutinizing expenditures for non-regular classified assignments, these costs were increasing. The renegotiated medical and dental benefits and the cancellation of maintenance agreements were generating fewer savings than hoped for. Community services, cafeterias, and bookstores were all operating at projected losses, though the bookstore fund had enough reserves to cover the negative balance.

Fallo asked that the trustees consider further cost cutting: Approve the proposal to issue Tax and Revenue Anticipation Notes¹, which would increase interest income by $100,000 to $150,000; increase the student parking fee for spring by $10 instead of $5, which would bring in $200,000; and furlough all management and classified employees for one week in the spring and another week in the summer, which would save $1.38 million (Business Services Division, 1985; 2-10).

At the next Board meeting, on December 11, the Board approved two of the cost-cutting recommendations and turned down the third. The two-week furlough, which translated into a 3.8 percent pay cut, was approved for administrative and other non-teaching employees. Up to $26 million in Tax and Revenue Anticipation Notes were authorized. The additional increase in student parking fees, however, was not approved, after the student trustee argued that the higher charge would be detrimental to student recruitment. The Board also wanted a one-week unpaid vacation for the faculty, which would produce $1.4 million, a measure that would have to be negotiated with the union. Fox said AFT members had agreed to no salary raise for this year, but would not accept a pay cut. This was a contractual matter the union did not intend to negotiate (Courier, December 23, 1985; 1 and Savage, December 12, 1985).

¹ These notes allowed the District to borrow funds at low interest rates and then invest them at higher rates of interest. The purpose of the notes was to help districts to manage cash flow problems, but they could also be used to enhance the district's interest income.
The annual audit for the 1984-85 fiscal year was presented to the Board at the same meeting. The auditors, Peat Marwick, observed that the balances in the General Fund had fallen from $41.4 million on June 30, 1980 to an accumulated deficit of $2.3 million as of June 30, 1985. The Annual Financial Statements indicated that general fund expenditures had exceeded revenues by $11.9 million for 1984-85. "Current proposed budgets indicate significant operating deficits for fiscal years 1985-86 and 1986-87." The auditors placed a qualification on the District's financial statements "due to the uncertainty of the District's ability to continue with its educational programs and other activities and meet its obligations as they come due."

The auditors discussed the "Retrenchment Process" in the District:

In attempting to assure that its limited resources are utilized effectively and that important programs are not sacrificed, the District needs to aggressively identify its strategic priorities. More importantly, it should identify areas where retrenchment can occur. The District has already eliminated most of its funding for discretionary nonpersonnel costs. Reduction of clerical and other administrative positions has progressed to the point where further reductions may imperil the District's ability to provide important support services and properly control its operations.

While the current diversity and depth of its course offerings may be praiseworthy, the District must determine how to operate within its financial means while maintaining the core of its course offerings. With the exception of specific areas where course offerings must be maintained to preserve a program, classes that have insufficient enrollment should be eliminated. Teaching staff levels should be reduced to assure that certificated personnel are utilized most efficiently.

The auditors followed this with a short list of "Future Actions," the first of which was, "Retrenchment plans to reduce staff payroll costs and 'scale down' operations to reflect reduced student demand should be developed" (Peat Marwick, 1985; 1-3).

Immediately implementing one recommendation of the auditors, the Board unanimously adopted a resolution that committed the District to establishing and maintaining a balanced budget throughout the fiscal year. The resolution stated that, at least quarterly, the Chancellor or his representative would continue to give reports to the Board that would indicate the existing financial condition of the District and project its financial condition for both the short-term and the long-term. The resolution directly addressed a complaint voiced by some trustees when the District's deficit had been announced in June: "That the chancellor or his designee shall report forthwith to the Board if at any time they determine or estimate that the district's operations will, absent corrective action, incur a deficit for the current fiscal year, so that the Board may take prompt corrective action to insure that no deficit will occur." Board President Richman said, "We are committed to taking strong action to ensure that we will not have any repetition of the financial strains experienced last year" (Courier, December 23, 1985; 1).

III. Three Studies of the District

At the same time the Board and administration were working to keep the 1985-86 budget in balance and to prepare for an even tighter budget the next year, the District was being studied more closely than perhaps any community college organization ever had been. On
the state level, the Commission for the Review of the Master Plan and the Joint Legislative Committee were carrying on their analyses of community colleges. The Little Hoover Commission was investigating the four districts with negative balances, and directing much of its attention at the Los Angeles District. Simultaneously, two other major reviews of the Los Angeles District's finances and management were taking place. The Board of Trustees had contracted in July with Peat Marwick to do a "Management Review," and the County Grand Jury, which had been informally studying the District since September, announced in December that it had hired Arthur Young Company, another audit firm, to conduct a major investigation of the Los Angeles District. The same people in the District responsible for managing its fiscal and human resources were also devoting much of their time to providing documents, testifying at hearings, and being interviewed, in order to explain to three different groups of investigators why the District had needed a loan to survive. While two of these reports were issued in February and the last in early June, the three studies were being conducted at roughly the same time. Even before the studies were published, the general direction in which the investigators' were heading could be discerned from the questions they asked, the data they requested, and the comments they made. The results of all three studies are presented now, before describing the important decisions made by the Board and administration from January to June, 1986. While it is impossible to determine what influence the experience of being investigated and knowing roughly what recommendations the investigators were going to make had on the Board and District administration during the first half of 1986, we believe the reader will benefit from learning the results of the investigations at this point.

The Little Hoover Commission held two public hearings in Los Angeles during the fall, and received testimony from representatives of higher education and the community colleges statewide, as well as from some local districts. The Los Angeles District was required to prepare detailed answers to the Commission's questions and to provide extensive supporting materials. Koltai and Fallo testified at both the October 2 and November 21 hearings and were joined at the second by Trustee President Richman and Vice Chancellors Mulrooney and Washington. Testimony by both present and retired employees of the District was also heard.

The District's statement to the Commission was presented in writing but never orally at the hearing on October 2. The statement said the District had "responded to the continuing fiscal crisis by downsizing and reorganizing its operations in as responsible manner as possible. The challenge in recent years has been to match our staff size and budget with our enrollment." It mentioned some of the actions the District had taken and described the large reductions in personnel: Faculty were down by 15.6 percent (24.7 percent part-time and 11.2 percent full-time), classified staff by 27 percent, classified administrators by 21.7 percent, and certificated administrators by 25.9 percent. Budgeted positions in the District Office had been reduced from 455 in 1980-81 to 357 in the 1984-85 final budget, or by 21.5 percent. Funding for the District Office had fallen from 10.9 percent of the total budget in 1980-81 to 9.4 percent in 1984-85, and had been cut once again in June by approximately 10 percent. The report said "by the end of the coming year the District must have new institutions in place if it is to successfully deal with the new realities," and described "the new college" that Koltai had introduced in his State of the District address the previous spring.

In discussing the relative roles of the Board of Governors and the local districts "in dealing with a fiscal crisis," the statement said that all state and local community colleges understood "the solution to any fiscal crisis resides in the Legislative and Executive branches of government." After the State had taken over major funding for community
colleges, the Legislature had demanded accountability for the funds through its oversight agency, the Board of Governors. "What had been a regulatory agency was now expected to act as a line authority to the seventy districts on the model of CSU and UC." The report concluded that

Community college districts have for a number of years been required to operate in an environment that would be considered intolerable in the business world. First, our mission is unclear. Community colleges receive conflicting messages about State priorities. Second, our funding mechanism changes frequently, and delivers funds after the academic year has begun and commitments to schedules have been made.

Reforms in the funding mechanism and in educational matters, such as matriculation, had been delayed until the work of the Master Plan Commission was completed, which now appeared would not take place until too late to affect the next year's budget. Community colleges would "have to wait another year for clarification of their mission and relief from the underfunding crisis" (Los Angeles Community College District, 1985; 10-14).

At the first hearing, two Los Angeles District faculty members gave examples of what they considered to be questionable management decisions and the absence of accountability. Between the first and second hearing, the District provided the Commission's staff with numerous documents, answers to nine questions, and comments on ten key issues. In opening the second hearing, Chairman Nathan Shapell said that, since the two faculty members had testified, "others have come forward and presented dozens of additional allegations of poor management and accountability . . ." These allegations included excessive growth in administrative staff and expense, awarding sole source contracts and other contracts at excessive costs, and mismanagement of community services and other special funds. While the exact tone of the hearings is difficult to determine after the fact, their verbatim transcripts suggest that Commission members questioned the representative of the Los Angeles District quite sharply, something not apparent in their questioning of the critics of the District. Some Commission members seemed to be more interested in expressing their own opinions on the issues than in soliciting information from those who were testifying. (Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy, October 2, 1985; 32-59; and November 21, 1985; 3-56).

The Commission's report, "Inadequate Financial Accountability in California's Community College System" was issued on February 6. Regarding the Los Angeles District, the Commission observed that in each of the last five years its expenditures had exceeded revenues.2 "During this same period of time, the district expended funds for purposes that, in the view of our Commission, seem imprudent and inappropriate in light of its financial condition." These included "redecorating the office of a contract lobbyist, providing parking and bus passes for employees, subsidizing a training retreat, and approving cost of living increases for faculty," even though the Board had been advised that funds might not be available for the pay raise. "In each of these instances," the report continued, "the management of the district did not make the hard management decisions that lead to a balanced spending plan."

2 This was inaccurate. In 1983-84 the District had $193 million in general fund revenues and $189 million in expenditures. The delay in settling the conflict between the Governor and the Legislature meant that additional funds were received too late in the fiscal year to be effectively applied to that year's operations (Peat Marwick, 1985; 1).
The Commission report devoted an entire chapter to "Allegations Concerning Management Practices at the Los Angeles Community College District." The charges received by the Commission had been categorized into 11 areas. Seven of these had been or were being resolved to the Commission's satisfaction, with the remaining four possibly requiring further investigation. The resolved allegations included commingled funds, unallocated funds, and the selection of a life insurance carrier. With respect to the allegation that Mission College had a full complement of administrators to serve only 2,000 or fewer students, the commission found that Mission's enrollment had grown from 3,353 in 1984 to 3,419 in 1985, and was the only college in the District to show an increase. The administrative staff had been reduced from eight to five during that time and the ratio of administrators to students was one to 683.8, a higher, and therefore better, ratio than three other colleges. The Commission was more concerned about Southwest, which had only 255.3 students per administrator. Regarding a complaint that the Chancellor's salary was excessive, the Commission found that "given the responsibility for educating 100,000 students per year, administering a $200 million budget, and the cost of living in Los Angeles, the Chancellor's salary does not necessarily appear to be 'unreasonable.'"

As to the unresolved allegations, the Commission found that considerable progress had been made in processing financial aid, but it believed that "the number of awards to students must be greatly increased and the period of time from initial application to award must be reduced." Concerning a charge that some library furniture had been purchased from a sole source vendor, the report found no evidence that the District had violated the law. Nevertheless it recommended that "to alleviate concerns regarding the district's contracting practices, a management audit of this area may be desirable." The Commission stated "the community services program is not self supporting and departmental facilities and equipment are utilized without any direct contribution from the Community Services Program. However, we do not believe that the Community Services Program negatively impacts the enrollment in the regular program." The Commission found no support for an allegation that custom furniture had been purchased for a computer laboratory, but did find that equipment had been stored and not used for a period of time after it had been received.

Numerous other charges had been received that could not be put to rest, because they were incomplete or vague. Certain issues submitted to the Commission "involved actions by the district and campus administration that were clearly within their authority." Examples of these charges were reductions in employee positions at the colleges, which the report said were always painful and even damaging to campuses in the current financial circumstances. However, such "staff reductions were and may continue to be a necessity" and there was no way to determine "whether these positions should or should not have been part of the District's cost cutting decisions."

The chapter concluded:

Although our investigation did not uncover significant nonfeasance, the Commission continues to be concerned with the number and the types of charges submitted during our review... It is clear that channels of communication between the District administration, the campus administration, and the faculty must be improved to enhance the credibility of the administration and the morale of the faculty.

These interrelated issues of credibility and morale were indeed genuine problems, yet the Commission seemed not to realize that its own judgments on at least two counts would have made matters worse. Had the District followed the Commission's recommendations against a pay increase and free parking, the degree of dissatisfaction among employees...
would have been extreme, and hardly susceptible to improvement through better "channels of communication." The solution to the problems of administrative credibility and faculty morale lay much deeper than suggested by the Commission.

The Peat Marwick "Management Review" was presented to the District in late February. The purpose of the report was "to offer guidance to the Board and the District staff in looking at the organization, management, and strategic planning issues that will strengthen the academic quality and financial viability of the District." The audit firm's team of management consultants had examined the District's documents concerning budgeting and planning; had interviewed the trustees, administrators and support staff; and had reviewed the literature on organizational theory and accountability. The report was a brief, focused example of the rational approach to organizational management.

In reviewing the fiscal condition of the District, the report stated the financial situation had reached its lowest point when expenditures exceeded revenues by $11.9 million in 1984-85, leading to a deficit balance of $2.3 million at the end of the year. A major cause of the financial decline was the serious drop in enrollments, amounting to a 32 percent loss from Fall, 1981 to Fall, 1985. The Board and the District staff devoted much of the current fiscal year to bringing expenditures into line with revenues, so that by June 30, 1986 an unexpended balance of between $440,000 and $2.8 million was projected. The projections for 1986-87, however, indicated another difficult year, with ADA expected to drop an additional seven percent.

The consultants found that decisions have frequently been made in a crisis mode, such as when mid-year budget reductions are required. Often decisions have been influenced by special interest groups, such as faculty union demands for salary increases or protection from layoffs. Consequently, the College presidents have not been able to operate their educational programs based on sound, rational planning decisions but have been asked to shrink retroactively their operating budgets after the academic year has begun.

... there is no overall set of long term strategies that drive the academic program, fiscal resources, or staffing levels for the Colleges. The District has not been able to effectively downsize the instructional work force to meet the reduction in enrollments. The recent termination notices to 143 certificated staff is the first action taken by the Board to terminate certificated staff. Reductions have been made in the District Office and College support staff, which have resulted in an imbalance in support services at the District Office and at the Colleges.

The report noted that since Proposition 13 authority had been shifting from the colleges to the District Office, with more decisions being made centrally because of collective bargaining, funding limitations, and management style. The college presidents' power to manage the colleges' affairs was lessened by the requirement that the District Office approve not only the hiring of employees, but even such personnel matters as changes in shift or assigned hours. Administration and staff had been cut to the point that they were hampered in their ability to develop timely and relevant information, which was necessary for analyzing the impact of reductions in enrollment and staff. During times of retrenchment, the organization should institute strategies and allocate resources to protect its

---

3 This action will be described in the next section.
very raison d'être, to serve the needs of students, and to look for and market new programs that would eventually increase enrollments and strengthen the financial condition.

The consultants recommended the appointment of a Strategic Planning Advisory Committee to the Chancellor. The purpose of the committee would be “to assess the educational environment . . . and, based on that assessment, to develop and recommend program, fiscal, and staffing strategies that will guide the District and college operations for the next three years.” In doing this, the committee would determine the educational needs of District residents, focus on the program capabilities of each college and department, and develop a set of academic program strategies that would match these capabilities to the educational needs. Realistic enrollment projections would be established and staffing and budget strategies would be developed, based on the academic program strategies. The authority of the presidents to manage the colleges would be strengthened. The consultants felt that a major benefit of developing a longer term strategic approach would be the alleviation of the tension and pressure that existed because of a sense of lack of direction.

The “Management Review” said the ADA projections had not taken into account possible enrollment declines and the District held unrealistic expectations about fiscal relief from the State. It observed:

Prior to 1985-86, the District has consistently used the most optimistic revenue projections and most conservative expenditure projections, which has caused mid-year budget cuts that have been disruptive to academic program operations.
The budget actions taken by the Board in the past six months have stabilized the District’s financial condition. However, actions are now required to increase enrollments and provide balanced educational and support services programs for all colleges.

The report recommended that budgets should be based on Board-approved strategies and that the Chancellor and college presidents should recommend targeted staffing levels based on educational and WSCH standards. Fiscally conservative projections should be used and an operating reserve of at least three percent of the general fund income (approximately $6 million) should be established to provide fiscal flexibility and a buffer for unanticipated financial reverses.

The report concluded by recommending the use of an accountability model. This recommendation included suggestions for clarifying and delineating the responsibilities of the Board of Trustees, Chancellor, vice chancellors, and college presidents. It also supported improving the performance criteria and appraisal processes of the District’s mission, goals, and strategies and the top administrators responsible for them (Peat Marwick, 1986: i and I-2 to IV-10).

The 1985-86 Los Angeles County Grand Jury got off to a bad start when its foreman, Sam Cordova, announced he planned to undertake an investigation into the death of actress Marilyn Monroe. District Attorney (and former LACCD Board member) Ira Reiner protested the investigation, and the grand jury foreman was removed. Cordova had ties to the Los Angeles District and had founded the Mission College support group, the President’s Club. The suggestion has been made that another reason for dissatisfaction with his leadership was that Cordova was opposed to undertaking an investigation of the Los Angeles District, even though some grand jury members were determined to pursue such an inquiry.
What was called a “phase one audit” of the District’s management practices had begun as early as September, but the official announcement of a full scale investigation by the grand jury was not made until December 16, 1985. The new foreman, Charles T. Richardson, was careful to explain that Grand Jury Member Richard Ferraro had no part in the decision to conduct the audit. Ferraro had been defeated by Bronson in the June Board of Trustees election and was an outspoken critic of the District’s management. Johnson said, “We were aware of the potential criticism that might develop, so we kept him from being involved in any way.” The probe would not be a criminal investigation, but was part of the grand jury’s civil responsibilities. It would seek to determine whether administrators for the District were wisely spending the $216 million budget. A press release explained that “This investigation was initiated because of numerous articles in the media as well as complaints made by concerned citizens.” Trustee President Richman said he did not think that management had caused the fiscal crisis, and he believed the layoff of instructors was “inescapable.” The Daily News editorialized: “If any public entity in Southern California needs scrutiny of its administrative structure and advice about efficiency, it is the financially and politically beleaguered LACCD” (Bates, December 17, 1985; Daily News Editorials, “Not-So-Grand Jury,” November 6, 1985, and “A Timely Audit,” December 18, 1985; Palermo, December 17, 1985 and Washington, November 1, 1985).

The Arthur Young auditors worked for many months on their “Management Review” and on May 27 the massive study was submitted to the grand jury, which made the report public a few days later. Grand Jury Foreman Johnson said, “The most damaging fact is that the district didn’t respond to the financial troubles they were in and that they should have recognized.” The auditors stated that it appears that had the District’s Board of Trustees and management exercised prudent judgment in the financial management of the District’s affairs, the current financial crisis and the subsequent erosion of its educational programs could have been prevented. Our analysis indicates the District could achieve savings in the range of $14-22 million annually through improved deployment of its resources.

Furthermore, the auditors warned that if “significant changes” were not made, the District would continue to experience severe financial problems that would impair its ability to serve students and the taxpayers.

The auditors had analyzed the District’s financial and other records, employee collective bargaining agreements, and accounting and budget procedures. They interviewed key personnel at the District Office and at the colleges and conducted a survey of other community colleges concerning their operations. The auditors determined that “four key issues... greatly influenced all aspects of the District’s operations and significantly affected the District’s current state of affairs.” The first was “Lack of long-range strategic direction.” The District had no set of clearly defined “measurable goals and objectives that could serve as a guide for the Board of Trustees in formulating policies and measuring the effectiveness of District management.” Without this mission statement, college management could not effectively develop and implement long-range plans and District

---

4 The main function of grand juries in California originally had been to return felony indictments; however, this responsibility was largely removed when a state Supreme Court decision mandated Municipal Court hearings for all felony indictments. What was left to grand juries was to primarily concern themselves with investigations of local government agencies.
resources could not be allocated on a rational basis. The need for a mission statement was especially great when resources were limited. For example, the Board continued to construct new campuses when some existing ones were incomplete and nearly all were underutilized. The report pointed to the Board’s failure to pass a statement of mission on three occasions several years before, after a lengthy study. Stated briefly, “specific and definitive overall policies are needed to provide meaningful direction as to how and where the District allocates its limited resources.”

The second key issue was “Absence of fiscal accountability and responsibility.” Because the District did not designate each college as “a separate administrative cost center,” costs and revenues associated with the educational services at each college were impossible to define. The General Fund was used to cover excess expenditures in other, non-instructional funds, such as bookstore, cafeteria and community services. These expenditures had not been reduced in proportion with drops in enrollment and revenue. Increases were approved even though faculty salaries already exceeded the state average. These raises, coupled with continued inefficiencies of operation and the failure to reduce certificated staff, were major factors in the current financial crisis. The Board had managed by relying on personnel attrition and the by reducing classified staff. The auditors doubted that the faculty layoffs, taken that spring, would be effective: “It would not be surprising if only a few faculty were actually laid off. It is unlikely that fiscal soundness can be restored by laying off less than one percent of the certificated faculty.” AFT President Fox, in responding to this part of the Arthur Young study, pointed out that large numbers of faculty positions had been reduced by not filling vacancies created by resignations and retirements. In addition, hundreds of FTE in part-time faculty had been eliminated.5

The third factor was “Ineffective and inefficient organizational structure and service delivery systems.” The auditors had expected to find that a large multi-college district would have a decentralized management structure, and instead found a highly centralized system they regarded as inefficient and ineffective. At the District Office, the responsibility for coordinating educational programs and curriculum planning was fragmented. Three entities had responsibility for various aspects of this activity and no one person or unit was responsible for integrating the whole process. Staff productivity was low, and tasks were performed redundantly at both the District and colleges. Unnecessary and inappropriate controls were exerted over college staffing, even down to student workers. Rather than colleges managing within District-specified control limits, the District Office determined budget and staffing levels. College presidents had little discretionary power in these decisions. College administrations were not organized consistently, the scope and responsibilities of similarly titled positions varied widely, and the size of support staffs differed greatly.

The final factor was the “Influence of collective bargaining.” While educational policy was developed by academic senates at four-year universities, these policy issues at the community colleges had, by default, become the domain of collective bargaining organizations. Included were policies regarding the appointment, evaluation, and promotion of instructional employees. What few management prerogatives had been left to the District by the Legislature, District management appeared to have bargained away to the faculty union. The District’s management and the union appeared to be “more concerned about the contract than the overall educational program.” As an example, the study cited the delay in

---

5 Both the Arthur Young and Peat Marwick "Management Reviews" chose to disregard part-time faculty as part of certificated staffing, when analyzing reductions in this category.
establishing beginning dates for the summer session and the fall semester. These were not
decided until mid-April, when other districts were already enrolling students. The late
publication of class schedules, the consultants assumed, would hinder enrollments. The
auditors were told many times that the issue was not the start date, but a means to make a
procedural point: "The union did not want the District to unilaterally make a decision
regardless of its scope or consequences." The report concluded that the faculty union "was
able to exert undue influence over the Board's actions." The union's power had been
enhanced by prerogatives transferred to it, the failure to lay off instructors, and continued
pay increases for faculty (Arthur Young, 1986; iii-vii and 4; Robert D. Tyre Letter to D. A.
Johnson in Arthur Young, 1986; and Woo, June 4, 1986).

The report contained 40 recommendations. Those on "Policy and Strategic Planning"
urged development of District and college mission and goal statements, the consideration of
electing Board members by districts, and developing and maintaining on-going strategic
planning. The functions of the District should be placed in priority order and goals stated
in quantifiable terms. Board members were elected by such a small percentage of the
electorate that trustees should either be elected in even numbered years (as the Master Plan
Commission had recommended) or should be elected from specific areas within the District
(as the Los Angeles Unified School District had recently done), rather than at-large. The
District should integrate its business, educational, and personnel long-range planning and
the process should include input from the college presidents.

Regarding "Financial Position," the study noted that

four out of the nine colleges (Harbor, Mission, Southwest and West Los
Angeles) have consistently had expenditures exceed revenues in each year
since 1980. Together they have accounted for approximately $62.3 million
in accumulated operating losses over the last five years. The cost per
student at Mission and Southwest Colleges is approximately twice the
District's average cost per student at the other seven campuses.

City and East Los Angeles Colleges had expenditures that exceeded revenues to a lesser
extent and were responsible for $9.4 million in losses. On the other hand, Pierce, Valley,
and Trade-Tech consistently operated with revenues that exceeded expenditures, and
accounted for $19.3 million in excess revenues. The report suggested that the District
establish an accounting system that would treat the nine colleges as separate cost centers.
The consultants felt that the current practice of aggregating expenditures and revenues into
singular funds limited the administration's ability to control its costs.

Under "Educational Services," the report estimated that $13.7 million could be saved if the
certificated staff were reduced to a level commensurate with the current student enrollment
and the workload standards used in other Districts. In the Los Angeles Community
College District, full time instructors represented 70 percent of all faculty, a figure that
contrasted with the statewide pattern of 40 percent and an average 36 percent full time at the
eight adjacent districts surveyed. In 1984-85, the average teaching load was over two
hours less than the statewide average, i.e., 14.1 vs. 16.3.

The consultants conducted three analyses of certificated staffing levels by discipline, based
on the Fall, 1985 WSCH data and the current number of full-time faculty. The first was
based on a maximum class size of 34. The second varied class size between 15 and 34,
depending on the discipline and the college. The third analysis increased the teaching load
for all occupational faculty to 21 hours per week and for all English instructors to 15 hours
per week. This last option resulted in the largest savings because it produced the greatest amount of "overstaffing," for a savings of $13.7 million annually.

In their analysis of faculty layoffs the auditors found the Board had been inconsistent. That spring the Trustees had not laid off faculty in art, music, theater arts, biological science, journalism, and media communications, which the Arthur Young analysis indicated had considerable surplus faculty. Overstaffing in certificated positions had existed since at least 1982, and if the District had "reduced its certificated staff according to the contract specifications agreed to by the Faculty Bargaining Unit, the District would have achieved a significant savings in personnel costs and thus possibly precluded disruptions and many of the financial difficulties currently confronting it." The report recommended reducing faculty in overstaffed disciplines and increasing faculty workload to the levels of adjacent districts. The District should adopt a plan for determining the number of full-time positions needed by each discipline and develop a mechanism for implementing revisions annually to meet changing student demands.

In "Personnel Services," the report identified certain critical items that needed to be renegotiated with the AFT. These included increasing English teachers workload from 12 to 15 hours per semester, raising the teaching load for occupational programs (other than Trade-Tech's) from the current 15-18 hours to 21 hours, increasing enrollment minimums for canceling classes from the current 15, changing the summer session compensation from full-time pay to hourly rate, and imposing limitations on sabbatical leaves. To achieve these changes might require strong action by the Board, "which possibly may lead to a subsequent job action by the faculty bargaining agent. However, we believe it is critical to the integrity of the District and will ultimately be supported by the public taxpayer and the dedicated faculty members."

The report also recommended the District seek legislative relief in selected areas. "Between the State and the unions, the District's Board of Trustees has little room in which to effectively render policy decisions for the colleges." The auditors suggested removing from State control the following: certification requirements for administrators, limitations on the percentage of part-time instructors a district could hire, restrictions on contracting out non-instructional services such as cafeterias, district-wide seniority in multi-college districts, and restrictions limiting fees for credit classes to only the general student fees.

Concerning "Campus Operations," the report said the District Office was responsible for making major decisions like negotiating and implementing faculty layoff policies. Because of this, "the college president has limited discretionary authority and is placed in the untenable position of meeting both campus needs and the District's perception of staffing needs, which often are in conflict." The auditors recommended presidents be given the authority to allocate the resources assigned to the college by the District in a way "consistent with established goals or perceived needs. If the president fails to achieve the desired outcome, then the Board is free to take appropriate action."

One recommendation immediately seized upon by the press and advocates of its point of view was that "The Board of Trustees should close Mission College." The auditors said Mission should be reorganized into a satellite campus of Valley College, by offering some outreach programs at high schools or other public sites where the rent would be less than the $450,000 in annual leases for the current storefront facilities. The number of needed administrators would drop from five to two and the site for the permanent campus could be sold for at least its $900,000 purchase price. This would allow the District to use the $12 million received from the sale of the Northeast Valley campus site for construction of facilities at other campuses. "Several campuses lack the basic core facilities deemed
necessary for the delivery of comprehensive educational programs, i.e., permanent laboratory facilities, theaters and athletic facilities.” The report argued that the District did not have sufficient resources to continue to support Mission nor the funds to construct the permanent campus. If the campus were built, it would become another college with inadequate facilities. The auditors also recommended that the District reevaluate its commitment to Southwest College and either allocate the resources to complete the campus or to close the college...” (Arthur Young, 1986; 9-31, 36-38, 59-61, 87, and 101-2).

After the release of the report, Board President Richman said the charge that the District had not responded to the fiscal problems was “nonsense” and that financial difficulties were caused by the State. He said, “The real question I would ask is why did the grand jury come along now and do this?... There is something politically inspired in this whole thing.” He would not comment further on his suggestion of political influence, but other trustees have indicated privately that they felt County Supervisor Michael Antonovich, one of the original conservative members of the Board of Trustees, was behind the investigation. Koltai’s response to the grand jury’s recommendation to close Mission College was, “I stand by Mission. The mission of the community colleges is to give access to all who are in our service area. If we closed Mission College, we could not do that” (Washington, June 5, 1986 and Woo, June 4, 1986).

Two months after the report was issued, the Los Angeles Times questioned whether the grand jury was an effective method of investigating local government. Many public officials and former grand jury members who were interviewed said that grand jury members “often lack the resources or the skills needed to carry out their responsibilities, and that they frequently do not clearly understand what they are supposed to do. As a result, their recommendations too often are of little value and much of their work is ignored.” The members of the Los Angeles County Grand Jury, the article said, were proud of their study of the Los Angeles Community College District. “Like many of the reports cited for their thoroughness and thoughtfulness,” it was the work of a private accounting firm. District Attorney Reiner said that the function of the grand jury could be performed much better by an auditor general or an auditor controller. California was one of only two states that used the grand jury to look into the operation of local government (Stewart, August 5, 1986).

The District spent several months developing answers to the grand jury report, and by December, 1986, it had prepared a 68-page “Response to the 1985-86 Grand Jury Management Report,” together with extensive appendices. The response, quite moderate and conciliatory in tone, was never published nor submitted to the grand jury, which by now had been disbanded and replaced by its 1986-87 successor. Koltai chose to let the response lie in the files of the District Office, rather than to call attention to criticisms and recommendations contained in the Arthur Young report. The paper is of historical interest, however. It demonstrates that many of the concerns of the grand jury’s auditors were not summarily dismissed by the District, but indeed taken seriously. For example, many of the points made in Koltai’s 1986 “State of the District Address” were directed at criticisms contained in the grand jury report, though Koltai did not mention this fact in the address itself (Los Angeles Community College District, 1986).
IV. Faculty Layoffs and Funding, 1986

The District administration interpreted the balanced-budget resolution passed in December to mean that the Board “does not wish to be presented with a budget that is out of balance or balanced on some future, and therefore uncertain, action.” In keeping with this interpretation, Vice Chancellor of Business Services Fallo presented a “1986-87 Budget Planning Briefing” to the Board on January 22, 1986. The Governor’s budget had been transmitted to the Legislature on January 10 and gave some idea of potential revenues, but uncertainties about revenues and appropriations were “significant enough that the task of developing a budget for 1986-87 remains an extremely difficult task.” The deficit was estimated at between $4.5 million and $8.5 million. Fallo’s report said:

... District actions over the past several years have resulted in an imbalance in the distribution of resources. On the institutional level this appears as an imbalance among colleges, between numbers of faculty and support staff, between sizes of instructional disciplines, in the composition of the classified work force and between salary and non-salary costs. The stabilization fund established in 1985-86 and proposed by the governor to be continued for 1986-87 provides one time funding to offset the fiscal impact of enrollment decline. It is designed to allow districts an opportunity to plan for reduced operations. As such, the District must work to permanently reduce appropriations in order to match expenditures with ongoing revenues. When the stabilization funds have been phased out, the District must have prepared itself to operate at the level supportable by revenue from actual ADA.

The report gave revenue and appropriation projections for 1986-87, and also introduced a revised budget process. The greatest impact, however, came with the presentation to the Board of a series of options for balancing the budget. The Trustees were to select from among them and the administration would then develop detailed proposals. Rough estimates of the cost savings were provided. Considering the fact that only three months before the Board had passed a resolution declaring its steadfast support for all nine colleges, the first two options were remarkable. Part of a group of alternatives called “Institutional Reorganization,” they were to “[t]emporarily convert Mission College to an instructional center attached to Pierce College” and “[t]emporarily convert Southwest College to an instructional center attached to Trade-Technical College.” The explanation stated that the principal savings would come from “reduced administrative costs and a scaling back of the instructional program.” The report cautioned that future State funding for Mission’s permanent facility could be jeopardized and strong negative political reactions might come from Southwest’s community. Trustee Archie-Hudson responded that to take these actions would be “suicidal.” Southwest College served the educational and economic needs of its area and Mission College’s enrollment was on the upswing. Other options for institutional reorganization were to move several District Office functions to one or more college sites and sublease the vacated space, to replace certificated administrators with classified managers or technical personnel, and to reduce staff in food services and bookstores.

Under “program reorganization,” the report included reducing the general education curriculum at the small colleges, regionalizing programs that had become too costly, and reducing the size and number of high cost programs, with nursing the only example given. “Personnel cost reductions” consisted of laying off employees and reducing the work week, or work year of certain employees; instituting classified and administrative furloughs.
and unpaid faculty vacations; reducing pay; increasing work assignments; changing compensation policies (e.g., discontinue paying for excess accrued vacation); and limiting the District contribution to employee benefits.

The report cautioned that many of these alternatives could interact with each other, such as reducing the number of employees would limit savings from furloughs. Three examples of how the actions could be combined were provided. One example assumed 113 faculty layoffs, while the other two called for a reduction of 63 faculty. In the item, "Faculty reduction through additional cutbacks in hourly rate instruction and layoff of regular faculty," the report said: "Reduced enrollment, reduced average class size, the large number of small classes and proposed program reductions or elimination all indicate justification for this action" (Bates, January 22, 1986 and Business Services Division, 1986c; 1-3 and 11-24).

Pressures on Board members to take action against the permanent certificated staff had been building for some time. Candidates opposing the incumbent trustees, newspaper editorials, Republican politicians, Peat-Marwick, and members of the Little Hoover Commission and County Grand Jury all felt that the relationship between the Board and its AFT supporters was too cozy. This had resulted in the full-time instructional staff being protected from staffing adjustments that would match the enrollment decline. (As noted previously, groups making such accusations often overlooked completely the sizable cuts already made in part-time faculty.) Indications that layoffs might be necessary, however, came not only from outside the District. The possibility had been discussed by Koltai in his State-of-the-District Address the previous spring, by Mulrooney in her P.S. newsletter, by Fallo in his budget presentations, and by Richman in his comments to the press.

Just how the most fateful decision in the history of the District was made is difficult to reconstruct. The process involved meetings of vice presidents of academic affairs, college presidents, and the senior staff. Both personnel services and educational services collected data and performed analyses which could be used as a basis for determining which disciplines and faculty members might be laid off. Conrath's paper, "The Role of Research and Planning in a Period of Retrenchment," describes how the Office of Research, Planning and Analysis (ORPA), formerly the Office of Educational Planning and Development, was involved in the process:

The role of the ORPA unit became critical in the preparation of recommendations for lay-off, including the development of criteria and specific reductions of regular faculty by discipline and college. Materials were prepared in a matter of weeks—a time limitation that could have only been surmounted by having the DSS\(^6\) in place, in having had several years of dialogue concerning program vitality, and by working in close coordination with District personnel and legal staff (Conrath, 1987; 1-2).

The final decisions about the disciplines and number of faculty positions to be included were made by the Board of Trustees at two executive sessions held on Sunday, January 19 and on Wednesday, January 23 (the day Fallo made his report on the 1986-87 budget). The Board voted on disciplines identified as likely candidates for elimination or for reductions in services. Some disciplines, such as journalism, escaped the Board's list; a great many others did not. Board members had concluded that further attempts to secure

---

\(^6\) The Decision Support System (DSS) used trend information on enrollment and staffing and then incorporated alternative decisions and assumptions in the calculation of projections.
union agreement on any layoff compromise were futile. While Peat Marwick had concluded recently that the Board was finally taking the kind of strong action required, AFT President Fox and other union leaders believed that the Board was over-reacting and going too far. They repeatedly said the Board should wait, particularly concerning classified layoffs and reductions in hourly rate instruction, until the financial situation for the next fiscal year was more certain.

Other districts had discovered that layoffs were complicated and frustrating and, in the case of the Coast District, resulted in dire consequences for the Board of Trustees. State law did not allow reducing faculty because of financial limitations, but such an action had to justified in terms of eliminating or reducing services. All part-time instructors had to be dismissed in a discipline before any full time teachers could be laid off and all terminations were based on seniority. Instructors receiving March 15 notifications, who had certifications in other disciplines and were "competent" to teach them, had the right to be reassigned to teach any of those disciplines. Since the District had never defined what competency to teach in a discipline meant, instructors were presumed to be competent in all disciplines in which they held certification, unless the District could prove otherwise. Some teachers in transfer subjects had vocational certifications through past experience, in addition to certifications achieved by virtue of course work. Some instructors had what were called "General Secondary" credentials, a certification carried over from unified school district days, when high school teachers were considered able to teach any discipline. All of these factors meant that the number of March 15 letters issued did not necessarily indicate how many teachers would actually lose their jobs.

At the January 23 Board meeting the Trustees said that they had no choice but to make faculty cuts. Richman said, "This is strictly a question of responding to what is necessary. We have many programs that don't enjoy much student support, so we have had to make some very hard decisions." Conner explained, "This should be seen as part of an overall educational restructuring of this community college district. We have to more closely align the faculty with student demand. That is critical for us to compete effectively with surrounding colleges" (Savage, January 24, 1986). When asked later about the purpose of the layoffs, trustees and others involved in the decision were not always consistent. One trustee said, "We never envisioned anyone would end up on the street." Another participant said originally the purpose was to save money and the idea of reorganizing the district came late in the process. One trustee ascribed the action to "the general climate":

We were in a rough financial period, with a deficit the previous year, a tight budget in the current year, and looking forward to an even tighter budget in 1986-87. We had a substantial drop in enrollment and knew that some disciplines were turning away students because we did not have the funds to offer all the sections needed. The Little Hoover Commission and the grand jury were making comments that we were overstaffed and they were pushing for faculty reduction. We had made severe cuts in classified staff and administration, but the full time faculty were unscathed.

---

7. After the the five-member board of the Coast Community College District in Orange County laid off 68 instructors, three new trustees, backed by the teachers union, were elected. The new board members immediately voted to hire the teachers back.
8. "Notices of Recommendation not to Reemploy" were required to be sent on or before March 15, and were therefore commonly referred to as "March 15 letters" or notifications.
The January 29 Read On said it understood the Board was proceeding with large-scale faculty layoffs in the range of 140 to 300 teachers. It commented that the possible Board action was “viewed by the AFT College Guild as one of the worst mistakes they will have ever made if they go ahead with it.” The union membership was advised to mark February 5 on their calendars and “be available to demonstrate your dismay and anger should the Board of Trustees run rampant under a misguided and willful leadership” (Read On, January 29, 1986; 1).

At the February 5 meeting, the Board took its fateful step. By a vote of six to one, with Garvin in opposition, the Board authorized the Chancellor “to send notices of Recommendation Not to Reemploy” to 147 certificated employees of the District.” The resolution said that “it is in the best interests of the District that the number of certificated employees in the District be reduced consistent with the reduction of particular kinds of service.” The action was to take effect at the beginning of the following school year. Employees who received notices of intent to dismiss would be “given the opportunity to request a hearing to determine if there is cause not to reemploy them” and they also had certain reemployment rights.

The layoffs affected 30 of 185 disciplines offered by the District and represented about 7.5 percent of the full-time faculty. The physical education, health, and recreation discipline had the largest number of teachers involved (39), followed by nursing (20), psychology (15), and history (13). In other disciplines, between one and five instructors were included. Nursing programs at City College and West would be phased out. Other vocational programs (dental assistant, dental technician, motorcycle repair, nuclear medical technology, occupational therapy, optics, vending machine repair, and vision care technician) would be discontinued altogether. In addition to full time instructors, part-time instructors representing 70 FTE were affected. The reduction of full-time and part-time instructors was expected to save about $5 million, but at the same time the Board announced a plan to spend an additional $4.6 million in high demand disciplines and filling vacant support staff positions. Disciplines in which more classes were needed included English, mathematics, and computer science. Richman explained that the action “was not a matter of balancing the budget. It is a question of putting our money where the students are.”

Koltai said he made the recommendation to the Board with “a heavy heart, but I believe I must recommend it.” His statement reiterated the losses in enrollment and the reductions in the various categories of employees, thus demonstrating, in his eyes, that full-time faculty had not contributed their fair share. An analysis of Fall, 1985 classes with fewer than nine students indicated that 23 percent of these had been retained because no other teaching assignment had been available for the faculty. Koltai stressed the need for flexibility in times of fiscal duress:

The need to reduce regular faculty comes not only from fiscal constraints but also from continuing shifts in the needs and interests of our students . . . We must adjust our curriculum, modify our systems of delivery and redistribute our faculty resources in response to change. We do not have the means to adjust our curriculum by adding faculty in high demand areas without reducing low demand areas.

He claimed that the negative impact on colleges, students, and other faculty would be minimized whenever possible. The criteria used in determining the reductions included high cost, low demand, minimal impact, access to other programs, and facility utilization. Educational needs, educational quality, and institutional balance were considered in determining which programs to retain.
The local AFT was joined in its protest by representatives of other local labor organizations and the state AFT. According to Fox, the Trustees were about to destroy the District. They were panicking in reaction to criticism, and their frantic efforts would fail to win the respect of hostile critics. Their action would have "catastrophic consequences" for the District, its faculty, and above all to its students. The Board was reneging "on a promise of security that you have constantly proclaimed as a policy for the last eight years." Fox concluded that the action was "a present wrong action of a whole series of wrong actions in which you have targeted both classified and faculty since last summer." Raoul Tielhet, director of the California Federation of Teachers, told the Board that "A college is a fragile institution. It depends on a satisfied and loyal staff." By "declaring war" on the faculty, "you will lose the heart and soul of the colleges."

Garvin explained why he had cast the lone "no" vote. His proposals over the last six years to regionalize programs had generally been opposed and no action had been taken. He would support layoffs only that were a part of regionalization, even though such proposals, if adopted now, would be long overdue. He would also supported layoffs to close out programs no longer viable, in order to liberate funding for more successful ones. He felt that lottery revenues and the Governor's proposed budget for 1986-87 were "changing our financial situation dramatically and, therefore, extremely drastic employee cuts to save us from bankruptcy are no longer appropriate." He had proposed other cuts that would save money without affecting class offerings. These included changing the election date from odd to even years, moving the District Office to campuses, eliminating administrative positions at Mission and Southwest Colleges, reducing most administrators and classified employees from 13 to 11 pay periods, and converting some District administrative positions from certificated to classified. He viewed as arbitrary and unreasonable using an average class size of 34 as a basis for the faculty cuts. The proposed layoffs, he believed, would lose more WSCH and State support than had been estimated, and many students might leave the District because of the cuts in classes (Board of Trustees, "Minutes," February 5, 1986; Courier, February 10, 1986; 1; Read On, February 13, 1986; 1; and Savage, February 6, 1986).

The Board's layoff authorization caused shock and anger among faculty and staff. For some time the college community had anticipated and feared the dismissal of full time faculty. Now these fears were real. Disciplines targeted for reduction or elimination were named, and, on February 7, faculty members received notices of impending dismissal. The fate of instructors with identical seniority was determined by lottery: One of four anthropology instructors hired the same day faced layoff, as did one of two history instructors, and in physical education eight of nine were to go. The loser in history was Shannon Stack, Valley College's history department chair and a veteran instructor of 15 years. Her husband, another Valley instructor, Edwin A. Irwin, had to draw for her because she was recovering from surgery, and he termed the layoffs "despicable." Fox had warned the Board that taking this action would affect "the new, the young, the fresh, the inspired, the hopeful," as well as minority and female instructors. But the layoffs cut so deeply into some disciplines that those affected were not so new and young. Robert L. Pence, after 17 years of teaching at Pierce, lost the anthropology drawing.

At the next Board meeting on February 19, Henry Early, president of the Black Faculty and Staff Association and one of the two faculty members who had testified before the Little Hoover Commission in October, assessed the damage of the layoffs to affirmative action. He said that of those scheduled for dismissal, 68 were female, 31 were black, 11 were Asian, nine were Hispanic, one was native American, and one was Filipino. Early blamed administrators for the "downward spiral" in enrollment that had caused the District's
financial problems. He said the Board had received "bad advice" from top administrators, including Chancellor Koltai. Trustee Archie Hudson responded, "We are losing some of our very best faculty and retaining some of our mediocre faculty. Because of seniority, the oldest stay, regardless of quality." AFT Executive Secretary Hittelman defended the seniority system, maintaining it was the only way to protect faculty from being fired for their political views or because of personal favoritism. Hittelman also estimated that 12 percent of classes for the following year would be cut because of loss of faculty. This included what he estimated to be the layoff of between 200 and 300 part-time instructors, 59 retirements, and ten resignations or deaths (Washington, February 20, 1986).

The next day Koltai announced that he had decided to call off the first week of furlough for administrative and classified staff, scheduled for the spring break, March 24 to 30. The second week of the budget-balancing furlough, which was to take place after the end of the school year, might yet have to be imposed. Larger-than-expected revenues from the state lottery were the reason given for cancellation. Originally estimated to provide the District with $2.9 million for the fiscal year, the lottery was now projected by Fallo to produce $4.5 million. The AFT Staff Guild had already filed a law suit challenging the furloughs as illegal and AFT Staff Guild President Kleinschmidt said the union would wait to see what happened before withdrawing the legal action (Washington, February 21, 1986).

By late February the AFT had made its plans for attacking the layoffs. Seven groups of faculty organized to work with individual Board members to persuade them to change their positions. The AFT and the Labor Council formed a citizens' committee to inform the community of the damage the action would cause, and data were collected to demonstrate the layoff's ill effects. Legislators were encouraged to hold hearings on the action. Candidates for the Board election in the spring would be interviewed and funds would be raised. Representatives of the affected disciplines were organized to speak at successive Board meetings. Legal action would be pursued and the AFT's legal counsel would work with the recipients of dismissal letters to prepare their individual cases, if hearings were necessary. Union members were asked to wear black armbands two days a week, to lobby their political representatives, to establish publicity campaigns informing students and community members, and to write letters to trustees and political leaders. Forms were distributed on which the AFT members were to indicate which actions each of them was prepared take (Read On, February 27, 1986; 1-2).

On March 2, the AFT published an analysis that took to task the variables that Conrath had used in her "Preliminary Report of the Fall 1986 'Program Alert.'" The analysis said that the five variables reflected "the effect of past decisions by the District more than they describe the intrinsic strength of any programs." The first variable was long-term change in WSCH between Fall 1982 and Fall 1986, which Conrath had used to measure changes in demand during this period. The AFT said, "WSCH change is a product of many variables including, if not most importantly, the number of classes offered during each period of time." It gave as an example the agricultural program, in which WSCH had declined, but whose faculty FTE had also been reduced. The report suggested that loss of faculty FTE might have been the cause of the loss in total WSCH, rather than a change in demand. The report also challenged the other four variables. It concluded that Conrath's report did not "seem to reflect the fact that correlation measures association and is not the same as causation." Conrath had not explained the changes in individual disciplines. "The use of the five variables mentioned above and the District's failure to analyze the causes of changes in the variables leads to the kind of inaccurate results that we find in the Conrath report. . . . One would hope that decisions are not made based on any of the findings in the Program Alert document" (AFT College Guild, 1986a; 1-5).
The Board meeting on March 5 came exactly one month after the layoff vote and was attended by 300 people who protested the layoffs and program closures. About 50 students were picketing in front of the District headquarters, chanting, "Save our schools," "We need our teachers," and "Koltai must go!" The Board meeting room was filled to overflowing. One student was arrested for disturbing the peace and was refused bail because of a $15,000 felony burglary warrant from Sacramento. At the meeting the Board announced that 60 of the faculty who had received layoff notices would instead be transferred to other disciplines in which they were certificated. Instructors with less seniority in the receiving disciplines, however, might have to be let go if their enrollments could not justify the additional instructors. Richman also told reporters that students already enrolled in disciplines slated to be discontinued would be allowed to complete their programs. The programs were dental assisting, motorcycle repair, occupational therapy, optics/vision care, physical therapy, and vending machine repair. No new students would be allowed to enroll in the targeted programs, Richman said. The nursing programs at City and West, however, were still to be closed in May, and the students enrolled in them would have to transfer to nursing programs at other colleges (Washington, March 6, 1986).

This was also the meeting at which Koltai delivered his "1985-86 State of the District Address," doing so in the spring for the second year in a row. Koltai said that the shift away "from the beginning of the academic year and to the beginning of the budget cycle is highly symbolic." The fall semesters in recent years had been filled with uncertainty and crisis, rather than times of fresh commitment and enthusiasm. "When institutions are forced to shift their time and attention away from their primary activity to questions of basic survival, . . . they must make extraordinary efforts to remember their mission and purpose and to hold to their educational principles." He pointed to the fact that 70 percent of California's college districts required special funding to stabilize their operations, indicating that "the financial health of the whole system can be said to be in serious danger." The central problem confronting the District, and the entire system, was underfunding. Expressed in constant dollars the Los Angeles District had lost 38 percent of its spending power since 1978, and at the same time was "in the midst of a momentous shift in our mission."

Koltai said outside agencies had affected all the districts in the state, but particularly the Los Angeles District. He referred to the Little Hoover Commission study and the many allegations of mismanagement made against the District. He noted with some satisfaction that "of the eleven specific areas analyzed, the Commission's investigation did not uncover a single instance of nonfeasance." The Commission had called for a stronger Board of Governors and was critical of districts that did not maintain reserves. He said it was ironic that only a few years before, those districts with reserves were criticized for having them and were threatened with their loss. "The lessons for local districts appears to be that investigative bodies are free of both history and responsibility, a luxury not available to trustees and administrators."

Koltai referred to his Status-Update address of the previous May, when he had set an immediate goal of reducing administration by ten percent. The 255.5 management positions as of last spring were reduced by even more than the ten percent goal of 26, to a total of 222.5 positions now. The Cabinet's Administrative Organization Committee, chaired by Trade-Tech President Tom Stevens, developed a staffing plan for 1986-87. This plan would achieve an additional ten percent reduction, bringing down the administrative staff to 206.5 positions and accomplishing the two-year goal of a 20 percent reduction. College staffing would be based on size. The plan allowed large colleges to maintain current levels, with reductions coming from smaller campuses. Changes in
administrative staff “were the necessary precursors to the restructuring of the District’s educational programs.”

When Koltai had presented the budget to the Board on September 4, 1985, he had said that the central problem for administration was “finding support for retrenchment actions from among the faculty—not just opposition or mere acquiescence.” Koltai regretted that “the district was not able to develop a consensus on the depth or seriousness of the need for retrenchment. And, yet, the imbalances in resources, staffing and programs remained to be dealt with.” The District had already used the available mechanisms to deal with the overstaffing problem, such as offering retirement incentives that had been accepted by 232 full-time faculty over the last three years. In making the difficult decision to send layoff notices to 142.5 regular faculty members, the Board had “seized the only option remaining to revitalize the educational program, to meet student demand, and to become more competitive.” The action was unquestionably painful to the faculty involved and to their families, colleagues, and students, but Koltai hoped that “the actual number of faculty layoffs will be significantly fewer than the 142 who received notices.” Some reductions would be possible by assigning faculty with additional credentials to high demand disciplines and the District had made every attempt to do so.

Koltai said the Board had been clear in its direction. The first priority was the requirement that the budget remain in balance, which reflected the Board’s commitment to fiscal responsibility. “The second objective of the Board, and the highest priority for the college and district administrations, is the increase in enrollment in Fall, 1986.” Koltai had established a goal of an additional 4000 students and the district and college administrations would be evaluated on the basis of growth objectives set for each college. The Chancellor concluded: “The district is at a turning point in its history, the point at which we no longer have to look down, but can look up. . . . Today the Los Angeles Community College District is poised for the future and committed to growth. . . . we are on the verge of a new era for our colleges and a new era for the district” (Koltai, 1986; 3-6 and 10-16).

On Monday, March 10, just five days before the dismissal deadline, letters were sent to an additional 13 teachers. This second round of layoffs brought the total to 157. The action was taken because 60 or more of those initially dismissed already held or were receiving credentials in other subjects. Some of these instructors were transferring into disciplines expected to expand, but others were moving into subjects that the District believed would become overstaffed if instructors with less seniority were not laid off (Washington, March 12, 1986).

The March 19 Board meeting brought out more protesters than ever before, with hundreds of them demonstrating outside the District headquarters. Because 135 people had signed up to speak, the District police allowed into the building only those who were to address the Board. Among the demonstrators were athletic teams in full uniforms, white-clad nurses, and cheerleaders sporting their college colors. Speakers warned that the entire athletic department at Southwest College was in jeopardy. A hospital spokesperson said the nursing shortage was so drastic the hospital was willing to talk about community funding proposals to retain the nursing programs. Minority and older nursing students told about the promising careers for which the nursing programs prepared them. Koltai responded that the programs marked for elimination would be studied again to determine whether any of them could be saved.

After all the descriptions of dire consequences from dismissing faculty and closing down programs, Business Vice Chancellor Fallo was able to give some encouraging fiscal news. He reported that the lottery revenues and Board-mandated expenditure reductions might
leave the District with a year-end balance of $1.81 million, rather than the deficit reported earlier. He warned, however, that the expenditure projections remained tentative and efforts to control spending must continue. Fallo’s “1985-86 Second Quarter Budget Report” contained an “Overview” that placed the current and following fiscal years into historical perspective. Since 1981-82, the District had survived primarily through the use of one-time funds, first its own balances and transfers to the general fund from other funds, and now State stabilization money. Because these options would not be available in the future, the District had to reduce expenditures to the level of actual earned income.

Fallo said that Fall, 1985 was the first semester in four years when WSCH exceeded that of the previous semester. Spring, 1986 showed the usual enrollment drop from fall, but the seven percent decrease was the lowest rate of fall-to-spring decline since 1982-83. Because instructional staffing had not come down at the same rate as enrollment had declined, productivity suffered and the direct costs of instruction increased. The weekly student contact hours per full-time equivalent faculty position declined from 501 for Fall, 1982 to 414 for Fall, 1985, a 17 percent reduction. The college productivity losses ranged from 42 percent at Southwest to 12 percent at Trade-Tech. The improved enrollment for spring, plus the possible carry-over from the current year, changed the projected deficit for 1986-87 from approximately $6.5 million as projected in the First Quarter Report to only $1.7 million now. “However,” said Fallo, “the possibility of a deficit remains and options to increase revenues and reduce appropriations must be pursued.” As part of the effort to boost enrollment, plans were announced for fall classes to begin September 8, 1986, which would terminate the two-year experiment in early semester starts (Bates, March 20, 1986; Business Services Division, 1986a; 1-13 and 23; Long, March 20, 1986; and Washington, March 20, 1986).

As the layoffs proceeded, the union became more strident and threatening in its pronouncements. The April 21 Read On attacked both Board and administration. It complimented Garvin as “the single Board member who has stood back and assessed the situation like a person of character and independent thought.” The AFT did not always agreed with Garvin, “but he is not under the spell of a self-preserving District Administration nor is he caught up in the puritanic energy that drives the current Board President.” When the other five trustees joined with the president “in a compact of such destructive portent [as the layoffs], they give us little faith in the leadership that they promised or in the thinking process which the community has a right to expect from them.” AFT’s opinion was that District administration had over the years “created the climate we are in. It has been concerned, as it is still concerned, with the prerogatives of management rather than with the provision of services to students.” Read On’s “Final Analysis” was that “the District needs a new management and it needs a new Board majority that recognizes the role of employees in the District and the responsibility the District has to balanced programs and quality education on every campus.” The day after this Read On was published, Fox presented the concepts from the article to the Faculty Guild Executive Board and recommended that the Board approve those concepts. The Board “voted to campaign vigorously for the removal of the Chancellor, the three vice chancellors, and others of the District’s top advisors who contributed to the actions which have resulted in the virtual destruction of thirty disciplines and many more which have also been affected in this District” (Read On, April 21, 1986; 1-2; and May 2, 1986; 1).

Trustee Garvin, in the April 27 L.A. Times, presented a more complete and cogent statement of his position on the instructor dismissals than he had at the February 5 Board meeting. He said that in deciding to send layoff notices to 157 faculty members, the Board “has embarked on a course that will have disastrous effects on the educational programs of
the nine district colleges for years to come.” He enumerated the factors that had caused the trustees to face difficult times for several years. One of the “stumbling blocks” he described as confronting the Board was “a strong teachers’ union with a contract that includes provisions that seemed wise in an expanding educational market but restricts a board’s opportunities to respond to new problems in an educational climate of diminishing students.”

Garvin suggested that “If the layoff proposals had been directed toward areas of declining vitality, it would have made some sense. However, the majority of the instructors to be laid off are in areas where the enrollment is adequate and in programs that are vital to a college’s success.” Occupational programs were being closed even though the students completing those programs were “immediately hired in reasonably well-paying fields that provide service to citizens of our community.” The nursing programs at West and City Colleges were being dismantled on the assumption that the potential students would enroll at other colleges in the District, but Garvin predicted that they would attend nursing programs in neighboring districts. Laying off all the part-time coaches and many of the physical education instructors was “dealing a mortal blow to our interscholastic sports program.”

Garvin felt the most inexplicable decision of all was “to use an average class size of 34 students to determine how many teachers to lay off in some disciplines.” He said that this arbitrary number had come from the goal established in the teachers’ contract and was being used to lay off teachers in several fields, for which the class sizes at seven of the community colleges “are dragged down by the significantly low numbers at two others—Mission and Southwest.” Even worse the funds being saved by the layoffs could well be canceled out by the continuing loss of enrollment, the size of which no one could predict.

Garvin maintained that “The irony of this dreadful decision is that it is unnecessary. The unexpected surge of lottery funds, combined with the first reasonable state budget proposal for community colleges made by Gov. George Deukmajian, has put our finances in much better shape for this year and next.” Alternative methods of reducing expenses were available, but the administrative staff did not support his proposals and the Board had not pressed the issue. Garvin conceded “the need for some faculty layoffs and for the closing out of some unsuccessful programs... However, it is my judgment that we have made an enormous, terrible mistake, and should reconsider the whole decision” (Garvin, 1986). Garvin’s article bore out the union’s description of him as an independent thinker. In it he had put forward a middle ground that could have been pursued.

By late April more than 100 of the 157 instructors who had received March 15 letters had been transferred to other disciplines in which they held credentials. The six days of hearings for those teachers who were still to be laid off were conducted between April 21 and 28. AFT Attorney Larry Rosenzweig argued that the District’s actions were whimsical and arbitrary and should be overturned. He cited as examples the failure to notify disciplines of potential layoffs, misleading and nonexistent advice about retraining, improper and tardy lottery drawings for seniority ranking, confusion about the reasons for layoff (using ADA arguments when the announced reason was simply reduction in service), and reassigning instructors from higher WSCH disciplines like physical education to lower WSCH disciplines like geography. Administrative Law Judge Milford A. Maron presided over the hearings and presented the Board of Trustees with his opinion that only 35 teachers should be laid off. His decision was only advisory and the trustees were under no obligation to follow his proposals. The Board agreed with Maron about counting a death and a retirement as attrition and rescinded the dismissals of two teachers. On May 7, the Board authorized the final action to lay off 48 regular instructors. Once again the vote
was five to one, with Garvin the only trustee opposed. Rosenzweig announced that he would appeal the trustees' action in Los Angeles Superior Court within 30 days (Courier, May 21, 1986; 1; Read On, May 2, 1986; 1-2; and Washington, May 8, 1986).

The dismissals and program cuts generated a variety of opposition and support. Editorials in some newspapers complimented the Board, and the Daily News said the trustees were finally "coping responsibly with the crisis." It considered teacher layoffs as long overdue and encouraged the Board to "stick to its course," regardless of the pressure the faculty was exerting to avert the dismissals. Numerous letters were printed in the local press. Some criticized the Board's actions and some suggested that Koltai, not the teachers, be dismissed.

The transfer of instructors to disciplines where they happened to have enough credits to be certificated created some peculiar results. A Pierce College philosophy instructor wrote the Daily News that a "highly skilled" nursing teacher was being taken away "from her chosen field" and reassigned "to teach philosophy, a subject she minored in a quarter-century ago." Patricia Siever, president of the District Academic Senate, said that teacher transfers would reduce academic quality and integrity, and that "This is causing chaos in the district." She had been teaching history at Mission College for 11 years, but now would be teaching business, a discipline for which she had certification based on experience rather than college credits. A Los Angeles Times article cited examples of an optician instructor reassigned to teach humanities, a psychology instructor sent to the math department, and a dance instructor transferred to the speech department. A microbiology instructor at Valley wrote the Daily News to ask why "the district did not provide faculty members with as few as nine students [in their newly assigned course] with time to enroll themselves in retraining classes?" Assemblyman Mike Roos, a Democrat from Los Angeles, appeared at a news conference organized by a coalition of nursing educators and hospital administrators. He said he would not vote for any community college budget until the District explained to him why it had laid off 20 nursing instructors and eliminated the City and West nursing programs. Faculty and students staged protest rallies at several campuses. Taped messages decrying the layoffs were recorded on personal and departmental answering machines. Richman told the Times that protesters had "dogged his footsteps." Students carrying protest signs greeted him when he dedicated a new handicapped access ramp at Valley College. Richman said he sympathized with the students, but they had been "manipulated" and "gross misrepresentation had whipped up their fervor." Herbert Ravetch, who had retired as president of Pierce the year before, said that the strong reaction to the layoffs might be due to the fact that this was the first time ever that any regular District faculty had been let go. He said the Board had committed "an error of compassion" by delaying cuts as long as it did and that the furor over layoffs might have been avoided had they been introduced gradually, along with other cost cutting measures (Abrams, May 9, 1986; Bergquist to Daily News, May 2, 1986; Daily News Editorials, "Economics 101," February 7, 1986, and "Facing the Faculty," April 29, 1986; Gilson, May 3, 1986; McFerran to Daily News, May 2, 1986; Washington, May 28, 1986).

On May 21, Fallo reported to the Board that revenue and expenditure projections "indicate an improved fiscal picture for 1985-86." The unrestricted ending balance for the year was estimated to be between $2.5 million and $3 million. This was possible because the lottery would provide a third quarter of revenues during the current fiscal year and was expected to produce a total of $6.2 million. The other reason was an "aggressive fiscal management by the Board and the administration." While Fallo did not refer specifically to the four factors that had implications for budget planning and were mentioned in the "Overview" section of
the 1985-86 Final Budget, he covered most of them in this report. These had been overexpenditures in hourly rate instruction and in non-regular classified accounts, an inadequate reserve for contingencies, and sizable losses in the cafeteria and community services accounts. The use of hourly rate instruction had been controlled through the certificated staffing plan and improved management of assignments. While he did not mention non-regular classified expenditures, he said that 312.5 classified positions had become vacant and that 209.6 of them currently remained vacant. He attributed the minimal hiring to the waiver system and the Classified Staffing Committee (a centralized approach which had been criticized by Peat Marwick). A contingency fund of $613,000 was being maintained for emergencies. Finally, the Community Services program was again expected to have a deficit, this time of over $100,000, and the Cafeteria Fund was estimated to require a subsidy from the general fund of $574,000. Every cafeteria was operating at a loss, and Southwest showed a deficit of $97,000 on sales of only $50,000 (Business Services Division, 1986b: 1-9).

During May Koltai and others tried to work out ways to maintain the programs of the district and to minimize the number of instructors who would be left without assignments in the fall. The problems in physical education and athletics were particularly difficult because so many instructors had been dismissed, including all part-time faculty, many of whom coached intercollegiate athletics. An agreement was reached that allowed six physical education teachers to keep their jobs by giving some of the full-time instructors reduced teaching loads in return for their coaching duties.

Considerable concern was expressed that the faculty changes would result in even greater enrollment losses than if the reorganization had not been attempted. AFT President Fox said his big worry was that "the loss of students... will be so great that no reorganization can recapture them. The assumption of the district is that... students will bunch up in the remaining classes. But that is not our experience." Linda Escajeda, an East Los Angeles College student and recently elected student trustee, said she knew of students who had already left the District. She warned, "With the cutting of faculty and classes, students are going to take their $50 and go somewhere where those problems don't exist." Fox and other instructors claimed that class sizes in disciplines such as anthropology, history, physical education, political science, psychology, and sociology were larger than the District average of 26 students. Other disciplines having lower-than-average enrollments were not touched by the layoffs. These included art, biology, journalism and media communication, music, and theater; these disciplines had more faculty than needed, according to the grand jury report. The faculty also questioned many of the reassignments where instructors had been transferred from one supposedly low enrollment discipline to another.

Fox said that the District had "sent out 157 notices to lay off 40. They should have been concerned about the turmoil that would cause... But they really don't know what they are doing." Koltai said the major reason for the layoffs was not to save money, but to permit the restructuring of the curriculum. He told the Times, "Right now, we have the curriculum of the '70's. But the student demands and the university demands of the '80's are different." He claimed colleges were offering too many "esoteric" courses, and gave as an example the 50 different courses being offered in history. The University of California and California State University asked transfer students to take only introductory courses to fulfill the general education requirement and no more than two from a list of five or six courses as prerequisites for majoring in history. He suggested careful counseling would help students take only those courses they needed. "So, slowly, we will force the faculty
to offer more History 1 and less History 22" (Morgan, May 29, 1986 and Woo, July 6, 1986).

The first week in June demonstrated the contradictory signals the District was receiving about what it should do. On June 3, the Grand Jury Report took the District to task for not laying off enough instructors and not starting to do it years before. Two days later, the Legislature threatened to withold the District's stabilization funds unless it halted plans to lay off 40 instructors. The State's pressure on the District came in the form of an order by the joint Senate-Assembly budget committee to prepare a detailed study on the impact of the layoffs, faculty reassignments, and program closings. Assemblywoman Maxine Waters, Democrat from Los Angeles and long-time friend of the District, called for the action because of the many complaints she had received. Her motion originally called for the report to be approved by the joint budget committee, but the committee decided to let State Chancellor Joshua Smith determine whether the District's explanation justified the release of the stabilization funds. Committee Chairman John Vasconcellos, a Democrat from San Jose, said, "I really don't think we want to become the school board." The joint committee also included $8.9 million for the construction of a permanent campus for Mission College in its 1986-87 budget. Of course the grand jury report had recommended that the college should be closed and no permanent campus constructed. When the budget went to the Governor, he vetoed the funds for Mission's permanent campus, citing as one of his reasons the recommendation of the grand jury (Werkman, June 6, 1986).

At the Board meeting of July 9, "A Status Report on Program Reductions, Certificated Staffing and Curricular Adjustments" was issued. The report stated the layoffs' purpose was "to reduce costs, increase productivity and reallocate resources to meet changing student demands." The Board and the senior administration had never thought that "143 instructors would simply be eliminated." The efforts that followed the decision included "an evaluation of credentials which would permit the reassignment of faculty to other programs not being reduced, the phasing-out of programs to be deleted, and other staffing adjustments." In addition, the District gave "renewed support to in-service training and staff development, particularly to those faculty affected by the layoffs."

According to the status report, only 15.5 instructors would not be offered any employment in the Fall, 1986 semester. Another 12 terminations were rescinded or the instructors were reemployed in the same disciplines, 87.5 were transferred to other disciplines and 31.4 were provided short-term or part-time assignments. The permanent return to layoff disciplines was possible because of terminations or reassignments to other programs and because nine positions had been restored. The short-term and part-time assignments were offered to fill vacancies created by leaves, programs being phased out, and special programs such as PACE or the Curriculum Laboratory. The report warned, however, that unless additional vacancies occurred, the employment opportunities for faculty on the layoff list would diminish in future semesters as programs were completely phased out.

The total number of budgeted positions for regular faculty had been reduced from 1,543 in Spring, 1986 to 1,490 for 1986-87, a reduction of 3.4 percent. Hourly rate FTE totaled 638 in Fall, 1985 and was budgeted at 532 FTE for Fall, 1986, a decrease of 16.6 percent. This meant that total full-time and part-time FTE would be 2,022 for Fall, 1986, down 7.7 percent from Fall, 1985. An additional 18.4 FTE would be used for the phase-out programs and 16 positions were at least planned to be funded, which would bring the total FTE for Fall 1986 to 2,056, a reduction of 5.7 percent from Fall 1985. The report said that Fiscal and curricular benefits of program reductions and faculty reallocations will be limited in the short run by phase-out, program
development, faculty re-training and further adjustments in faculty reassignments. Anticipated savings for 1986-87 by category, and the budgeted cost of major expansion programs, show a net reduction in costs of $870,000.

Expansion plans included an English-as-a-Second Language Institute and a larger PACE program in the fall, the development of the Core Curriculum Laboratory and Counseling Core over a longer period, and increases in English, ESL, mathematics, electronics, business, foreign trade, and computer science offerings (Human Resources Division, 1986; 1-2).

V. Planning

During 1985-86 energies that earlier would have been available for planning were undoubtedly depleted by the challenge of simple survival. Much of the staff time previously devoted to elaborate plans and weighty commission reports was now consumed by gathering information and developing responses to the organizations studying the District and by preparations for faculty layoffs. Even so, Nancy Conrath, the perennial planner, worked with college representatives on strategic planning, and Tom Stevens, the perennial commission chairman, headed up yet one more District group that took aim at the future, in hopes that something could be done to prepare for it.

During July and August, 1985, Conrath organized a series of Strategic Planning Workshops for the planning coordinators at the colleges. She distributed as recommended reading for the workshops copies of pertinent articles and sections from books on strategic planning and marketing. Sessions were led by a futurist from the University of Southern California, a community college president noted for his planning acumen, an expert from industry, researchers from the campuses, and the research office staff. When the workshops concluded, Conrath and her staff provided as much research and planning services to the colleges as they could. But college planning was never made mandatory, so results were uneven among the campuses. Overall, college administrations felt that solving pressing problems with limited resources and recruiting and serving as many students as possible took priority over devoting much time to planning. Even so, all but one of the colleges engaged in master planning projects during this period (Conrath to Participants, Strategic Planning Workshops, July 16, 1985).

In Koltai's dual State of the District addresses in March and May, 1985, he had expressed considerable concern about the District's financial problem for 1986-87, because stabilization funding would end and enrollment was expected to decline even further. He wanted to use 1985-86 to prepare for "downsizing" the District. At the July 31, 1985 cabinet meeting, he appointed Tom Stevens, previous co-chair of the Access and Excellence Committee, to lead what Koltai called the "1986 Committee." Cedric Sampson, executive assistant to the Chancellor, was selected as vice chairman and the three vice chancellors plus Conrath served as resources for the committee. Membership was made up of college administrators, students, and representatives of the District Academic Senate, employee organizations, and the public. The purposes of the committee were to determine the consequences of enrollment declines and the effects of these on students, faculty, classified staff, administration, facilities, and operations; to develop ways of securing input from diverse sources both inside and outside the District and to communicate "the breadth and gravity of retrenchment issues"; and "to make recommendations for action as necessary." The committee's report was to be ready for the chancellor by January 31,
1986, a deadline that was not met (Thomas L. Stevens, Jr., to District Cabinet, October 25, 1985).

At the committee’s first meeting, on November 7, the chancellor was able to state his primary expectation of the committee quite simply and directly. It was “to downsize the District in order to assure the District’s survival.” The committee was divided into five subcommittees to develop reports on “Resources,” “Marketing/Retention,” “External Relations,” “Internal Relations,” and “Instructional and Support Services Quality.” These subcommittees submitted brief reports by early February, 1986, and the “Agenda” for the February 13 meeting included a one-page “1986 Committee Report Summary.” While the records of the 1986 Committee end abruptly with the agenda for this meeting, dramatic developments concerning layoffs, already described, dictated the fate of this planning effort. On February 5 the Board authorized the first round of March 15 letters for faculty. A process operating independently of the 1986 Committee had already determined how “to downsize the District in order to assure the District’s survival.” The efforts of faculty, administration, students, and the public to jointly develop a plan to deal with the challenges of the 1986-87 year were at an end (1986 Committee, February 13, 1986 “Agenda” and Subcommittee Reports; and Thomas L. Stevens, Jr., to 1986 Committee, November 20, 1985).

By the time Koltai gave his 1985-86 State of the District Address on March 5, 1986, he had become optimistic about enrollment growth, even though the District was in midst of layoffs. Rather than concentrating on downsizing the District, as he had in his previous State of the District address and as recently as his charge to the 1986 Committee four months before, Koltai was now saw the District “at a turning point in its history. . . we are on the verge of a new era for our colleges and a new era for the district.” The District administration would “continue its efforts to provide the Board with long- and short-range planning documents.” He pointed to the activities of the Access and Excellence Committee, which had “produced a number of important planning documents.” Many of these proposals had been implemented and others which were awaiting funding might receive it through the $4.6 million expansion fund. What was most significant about the address was the absence of any grand-scale planning projects. Koltai expressed optimism about the future, but he had either run out of schemes for preparing for it, or he felt that previous studies already held enough plans for what should be done when enrollment and funding turned around for the District (Koltai, 1986; 14-16).

VI. Programs

Koltai’s March 5, 1986, State of the District address was delivered in the midst of turmoil over faculty and other layoffs, but he still described the accomplishments of many District and college programs. He said the Educational Services Division had developed projects to bring high school students onto the college campuses, which would help relieve the overcrowding in the Los Angeles Unified School District. Nearly a thousand high school students were beginning to attend classes at City, East, Trade-Technical and Valley Colleges. The anticipation was that, after finishing their high school classes, the students would continue to take college classes at these campuses. The District was also developing

---

9 In his 1985-86 State of the District address, Koltai mentions the 1986 Committee, saying that “A report was prepared and presented to the Cabinet. That report will be a part of the ongoing discussions related to the coming year” (Koltai, 1986; 14). No copy of that report was ever located.
programs in order to become "the major provider of in-service training needs of unified school teachers."

In the vocational area, the District and colleges had received a total of $1.3 million in outside funding, a 200 percent increase. The efforts "to offer customized classroom activities for local business and industry have met with great success," and the concept of a Downtown Center, using the District Offices as a coursework location, was being developed. The unit handling Employment Training Panel programs was being moved out of the District Office to West Los Angeles College. Although not mentioned by Koltai, this latter action related to the appointment of Linda Thor as acting president of West.

A contract had been negotiated with the Santa Monica Community College District regarding student flow, without having the matter resolved by the Legislature. The agreement allowed students to enroll in either district, regardless of where they resided, with mutual reimbursement by the two districts. Koltai anticipated that the Los Angeles District would receive about $600,000 under the arrangement and these funds would go to West and Southwest to develop programs. Negotiations were still under way for a similar agreement with Glendale, which would benefit Valley and City Colleges.

Project ACCESS was still being developed in cooperation with American College Testing (ACT). A data base of over 90,000 students had been accumulated and was being analyzed to identify factors predicting success and failure, so students could be provided with appropriate services. Two other projects conducted with ACT related to high school orientation and a microcomputer software program for testing that would give campuses immediate access to needed information (Koltai, 1986; 9-11).

The District's International Education Program (IEP) was moved to the City College campus during 1985-86, though it remained a District-wide service. About 650 students were served by the study-abroad program through summer, semester, and short-term sessions in France, Germany, Mexico, and Spain. The IEP coordinated the Foreign Faculty Exchange Program and ten District instructors worked during the summer for a system of technical colleges in Mexico through an International Development Program (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 10-11).

The financial aid program was partially decentralized to the college campuses during the summer of 1986. Only two years before the system had been centralized because of problematic federal audits at four colleges. Under the centralized program, students had complained of long delays in receiving their financial aid. Garvin sponsored the resolution that was approved by the Board on May 7. The District Office worked out new procedures, under which applications would be screened and approved at each college rather than in the financial aid headquarters located at East Los Angeles College. Policy decisions, accounting, loan collections, and compliance with Federal regulations remained at the central office (Courier, May 21, 1986; 1; and Washington, June 1, 1986).

In his March 5 speech Koltai outlined his ideas for the expanded development of core programs throughout the curriculum and for three specific projects to advance this concept. In his remarks at the Tentative Budget presentation on June 11, he elaborated on his ideas and indicated that the three programs would be undertaken in the 1986-87 year. Koltai described the core concept as a group of related "skills that will culminate in a specific objective. We guarantee that a student who takes the core program will get the courses in a specified time, and at the end of it will be prepared for either further training or entry level employment." He cited PACE as an example of a core program already in operation. He felt that a core program appealed to students because it guaranteed both the availability of
courses and the end result; it reintroduced "an important element of authority into the educational process"; and it was focused on the student and on student needs.

The first of the new core programs was to be the Core Curriculum Development Laboratory, consisting of no more than five instructors, with appropriate administrative and staff support. Its purpose was "to develop the programs, work with the faculties and curriculum committees to institute them, and to monitor their success as academic delivery systems." The second unit was the ESL Institute, which was "charged with the task of developing a core curriculum to deal with the ever-increasing educational needs of non-native speakers." The final program was the Counseling Core, which was to be responsible for "focusing on counseling and matriculation issues related to each core program and to the curriculum in general." Koltai said that the District was entering "a new period of reconstruction. We must begin to think of new students, new programs, and new colleges. The core program concept and the three core units are the vehicles for the new thinking and the direct action required" (Koltai, June 11, 1986; 1-5).

VII. The Chancellor and His Cabinet

The nine college presidencies had shown remarkably little turnover from 1981 to 1985. No changes had taken place after Mary Lee was appointed president of Valley College in August, 1981, and Lowell Erickson became acting president of Mission College in July, 1982, and permanent president five months later. The next change took place July 1, 1985, when David Wolf replaced retiring President Herbert Ravetch at Pierce College. Thus, for 1985-86, two-thirds of the college presidents had more than four years of experience in the top leadership positions at their institutions. By contrast, three of the five members of the senior staff had less than a four-year tenure. Kenneth Washington had been Vice Chancellor of Educational Services since August, 1982, and Vice Chancellor of Personnel Services Virginia Mulrooney and General Counsel Mary Dowell had held their positions only since January, 1984.

The Chancellor's Cabinet was comprised of fourteen individuals with considerable variety in their backgrounds. Three cabinet members had come from the classified staff: Stevens, from the District Business Services Division, had served as Director of Budget before becoming president; Erickson joined the District as director of public information before moving into certificated positions in the Educational Services Division; and Vice Chancellor of Business Services Thomas Fallo worked his way up through the ranks of the division he now headed. As previously indicated, Avila had been a full-time faculty member immediately before assuming his college presidency, albeit with extensive union leadership experience, and Mulrooney had moved directly to vice chancellor of personnel services after many years as a full-time union leader. Washington was one of the original members of the Board of Trustees and then served as president of San Francisco City College before returning to the District as a vice chancellor. Fujimoto had been appointed at West after leaving the District to serve as president of Sacramento City College. James Heinselman served as acting president at Los Angeles City College before assuming the permanent presidency at Harbor. David Wolf was acting president during most of Metropolitan College's short life, though his position when selected president of Pierce College was vice president of academic affairs at Harbor. Stelle Feuers left the District to be dean of student and community services in the Coast Community College District before returning to assume the City presidency. Lee had come to the District from UCLA and became president of Valley College after only brief service as a dean at Pierce and a vice president at Valley. McIntosh moved to Southwest's top position from an assistant dean's post at
West. Dowell had served as acting general counsel and assistant legal counsel since 1979, before becoming the permanent General Counsel in 1984. Koltai now had 13 years of service as the chief administrative office of the District.

To summarize the positions held by cabinet members just prior to assuming their posts on the cabinet: four had been college administrators, three had been either acting or permanent college presidents, two had been certificated District Office administrators, two had been classified District Office administrators, two had been either faculty member or faculty union leader, and Koltai had been chancellor of another community college district. The Chancellor purposefully sought out diversity of backgrounds for his cabinet, so that the District leadership could benefit from it.

In contrast to the stability of the four previous years, the tumultuous year of 1985-86 would see extensive changes take place in the Chancellor’s Cabinet. Two college presidents would be transferred permanently to jobs at the District Office, a vice chancellor would retire, and another president would be assigned temporarily to duties at the District Office.

On February 19, 1986, two weeks after voting for faculty layoffs, the Board of Trustees met in executive session for eight and one-half hours, until early the next morning, to decide whether to remove two college presidents. That the Board was considering the ouster of Fujimoto from West and McIntosh from Southwest had been known for several days. Some observers speculated that two other presidents were also in trouble. At the Board meeting, which was packed with speakers protesting faculty dismissals, sixteen speakers who said they represented over 100 community organizations expressed their support for Fujimoto, calling him an outstanding administrator and community leader. One presenter said, “As the only president of Japanese-American descent in the California community college system, he is a role model, he is a symbol, and he is a leader.” Although some speakers charged that racism might have contributed to his dismissal, Fujimoto told a reporter that he chose not to interpret it that way. He spoke to the Board about the progress that had been made at his campus and said, “I have a role and a mission to fulfill at West L.A. College.” His supporters vowed to resist any attempt to remove him. Two other speakers urged the Board to retain McIntosh as president of Southwest College.

The Board decided by a vote of four to two, with trustees Archie-Hudson and Leticia Quezada opposed, to replace Fujimoto, who had been president of West since 1979. McIntosh, who had led Southwest since 1977, was removed by a vote of five to one, with only Quezada dissenting. Conner was absent from the meeting. Archie-Hudson commented that the removal of Fujimoto was a “mistake,” because Fujimoto’s problems with uncooperative faculty and enrollment declines were not a “clear failure” on his part. She believed that McIntosh was “adequate, very much involved in the community, but not successful” in overcoming the “drastic decline in enrollment” at Southwest. Other trustees, who had voted for the ousters, described the two presidents as able and dedicated, but that the Board was looking for “increased energy and vitality.”

The two dismissals were described as the beginning of a major overhaul of the administration that had been promised when faculty layoffs had been approved. Koltai said at a news conference the next day, “The object of the reorganization is to make our administrators more viable and to require our college presidents to improve our services to students.” While the District had lost 33 percent of its students since 1981, enrollments at the colleges headed by McIntosh and Fujimoto had declined more than the other colleges. Southwest had plummeted from 8,049 students in 1981 to 3,064 in 1985, a loss of 6,438.
students or 62 percent. West had declined from 11,085 students to 6,436 four years later, a reduction of 4,649 students or 42 percent. Garvin said the two presidents were “partially victims [of circumstances] beyond their control” but that changes were necessary “to give those colleges a chance to succeed.”

The Board acted immediately to give the two colleges new leadership. Named as acting presidents were Thomas Lakin, vice president of academic affairs at Trade-Technical College, for Southwest and Linda Thor, District director of occupational and technical education, for West. They were to take over on March 3, and their appointments were effective until June 30, 1987. During the executive session with the new acting presidents, the Board set goals of 20 percent increases in enrollment at the colleges. Lakin and Thor were to be given considerable latitude in selecting their administrative staffs. The Board recognized that if they were to hold the two new presidents accountable, they needed to set specific measurable goals and give the presidents some authority in deciding which administrators would assist them in achieving the goals.10

McIntosh was offered and immediately accepted the position that Thor was vacating. He said he had no disagreement with the District’s decision to “do whatever they have to do” to improve the college. McIntosh later acknowledged he was relieved to be removed from the quagmire of problems at the severely depleted college.

Fujimoto’s dismissal presented more of a problem for the District. He had enjoyed the continuing confidence of two trustees and a large and intense outpouring of community support for him to be maintained as college president. He was offered the choice of taking Lakin’s vice presidency at Trade-Tech or becoming a senior director of educational services at the District Office, with a third option being to request a return to classroom teaching. Fujimoto pointed out that he had not received the standard biennial personnel evaluation during the last four years, and he maintained that the District officials had acted with a “lack of dignity” in informing him of their intentions without first giving notice or warning. He said that Koltai had spent three weeks on the West campus making observations, but that the Chancellor “did not sit down with me and tell me what he had discovered.”

The issue was resolved at the March 5 Board meeting when Richman announced that Fujimoto would become an assistant to the Chancellor at his present salary. The announcement was made after a brief executive session in the midst of a meeting dominated by protesters outraged by program cuts, faculty layoffs, and the Fujimoto issue. One of the many protests against Fujimoto’s dismissal came in a letter from Assembly Speaker Willie Brown, dated February 28 and released to the press. Brown questioned the unorthodox process by which a leading role model had been ousted. He said press reports indicated that Fujimoto had been advised of his demotion just six days prior to the Board action, which led Brown “to wonder who really runs the Los Angeles Community College District.” After the announcement of Fujimoto’s new position, an option he had suggested to Koltai, Fujimoto was exuberant and said, “It feels good to battle and win.” Fujimoto was to be on leave until the end of the fiscal year and would take up his new duties on July 1 (Bates, February 20, 1986, February 21, 1986 and March 6, 1986; Clendening, February 20, 1986 and March 6, 1986; White, February 26, 1986; and Woo, February 20, 1986 and February 21, 1986).

10 Koltai claimed that the administrators who were reassigned to those two colleges in March, 1986, were hand picked by the new presidents, Lakin and Thor. However, the two presidents later described the process as one of compromising with Koltai over who would be the new administrators to help lead the colleges back from near collapse.
As the employee dismissal conflict heated up, two veteran reporters of the fray stood back and took long looks at the Chancellor who was central to the controversy. David Savage in the February 5 Los Angeles Times and Betsy Bates in the March 9 Herald-Examiner wrote lengthy personal profiles of the embattled Chancellor, based on extensive interviews with Koltai and many others inside and outside the District. Both reporters called attention to Koltai’s physical resemblance to Henry Kissenger, but Savage carried the comparison even further by writing that comments about Koltai “closely parallel the assessments of the former secretary of state. His admirers say his is brilliant, shrewd and a visionary thinker who is five steps ahead of his competitors. His critics portray him as arrogant, manipulative and ruthless.” Savage characterized him as a builder of new campuses, theaters, and libraries. “I built more libraries than anyone in the community colleges in the nation,” Koltai said. In recent years, the empire Koltai built had been shrinking, Savage observed, and “Koltai—the planner, the builder, the big thinker—has become a budget cutter who talks of shrinking the community colleges and ‘narrowing their scope.’”

Bates presented an image of Koltai as “diplomat,” “a master of Machiavellian control,” and a “puppet master to the world’s largest community college district, weathering crises with ease and always maintaining his grip on the puppet strings.” But, she said that “the question behind the scenes at the district today is whether his skill, intellect and personal charm will be enough for Koltai to maintain his position as leader of a district in chaos and under attack from within.” He had become what one trustee called “one big monolithic target” for archers aiming at the Los Angeles District.

At the state and national levels, Koltai was known as a perceptive and scholarly leader. Former California Community College Chancellor Hayward told Savage that Koltai was “one of the most thoughtful community college leaders not only in California but in the nation. He has an amazing grasp of where we ought to be heading.” Hayward also found Koltai to be “politically skillful. You’d have to be skillful to survive as long as he has with such a politically volatile board.” Current State Chancellor Smith indicated to Bates that he considered Koltai “one of the most powerful intellects I have encountered in the [nation’s] community colleges. . . . People have a great deal of respect for him.” But, Smith added, “When people are as bright and as capable as Les Koltai, it does intimidate people.”

Some interviewees said that “intimidation plays a vital, even a purposeful role in Koltai’s plan” and that in many parts of the District he was feared. Some described Koltai as “fair and forgiving” and others saw him as “ruthless.” Bates concluded that Koltai was “an enigma” and that there was “a mystique about Koltai among his thousands of employees and even the handful of close associates who know him well.” Trustee Garvin said, “I’ve known many, many politicians through the years, but I have never seen a man play politics like Les.” Koltai’s politics centered around the seven Board members, whom, Garvin said “he plays . . . like a harpsichord, myself included.”

Regardless of Koltai’s political skills, some Board members were talking openly of reevaluating him. Archie-Hudson said, “I think we will have to decide, and the chancellor will have to decide, whether the kind of unrest we’re seeing is pervasive, whether it will continue, and whether it speaks to a true lack of confidence in his ability.” She described Koltai as having an authoritarian personality. She thought that though Koltai was very knowledgeable about the issues of higher education as an academician, he was much less knowledgeable about the management of higher education as a practitioner. Board President Richman said that he and Koltai had made “a mutual commitment to transcend our problems from the past and to turn things around. We’ve worked well together and I think we’re making progress.” Richman added that as an educator he thought Koltai was
"superb, but as a chief fiscal officer, he leaves something to be desired, and I've told him that."

From Koltai's perspective, the problems facing the community colleges "are a national crisis. It's the conflict between mass education and quality." He said that over the years he had advocated a more structured academic program, with entrance tests and a greater emphasis on students transferring to four-year colleges. He had pushed for quality courses and libraries and was pleased that the tide appeared to be flowing in that direction. During this time of painful change in the District, he was forced to make unpopular decisions. Koltai said the instructor layoffs were "the most stressful event in my life." Bates observed that this was "a revealing quote," considering that at age 13 Koltai was a prisoner in a German concentration camp and that he, his wife, and young son had to pick their way through mine fields to escape from Hungary when the Russians crushed the 1956 revolution.

Regardless of demonstrations, speeches, and signs that urged the trustees to "Dump Koltai," the Chancellor had his supporters and those who sympathized with him. After visiting Pierce College, he received a letter from an instructor which said, "At times your job must seem thankless," and explained that most teachers did not agree with the attacks on him, "leveling by crank members of the faculty." One old timer observed, "I can remember normal men entering the district and exiting basket cases. It is no small miracle that Les Koltai has managed to remain Chancellor Koltai..." Mulrooney said Koltai had agonized over the sweeping changes that resulted in layoffs of teachers and axing of programs and that his least known character trait was his compassion.

What actions Koltai would take in the future to maintain his position could not be anticipated. One close associate said, "He's a jungle fighter, and he ain't through yet." Koltai confessed to Savage that more than once in the previous year he had thought of resigning, but decided against it. "I want to see this district through the bad periods as well as the good ones," he said. "I want to be here to turn things around" (Bates, March 9, 1986 and Savage, February 5, 1986).

On June 25, 1986, Vice Chancellor Washington announced that he would retire at the end of the month. He had returned to the District in 1982 because he wanted to expand the ESL programs for the growing immigrant population, to coordinate the career curriculum more closely with industry, and to give students more counseling, tutoring and financial aid. Instead, funds were not available for innovative programs and services, and "the professional rewards of doing the job were not there," he said. The Educational Services Division had been criticized for the way it had handled interdistrict transfers and free flow, the centralization of financial aid, and the role it had played in the faculty layoffs. Replacing Washington on an acting basis was Cedric Sampson, assistant to the chancellor for educational policy, who had himself been subject to layoff as an instructor of history (Washington, July 6, 1986).

The final change in the Chancellor's Cabinet during 1985-86 was the transfer of City College President Feuers to a special assignment to develop a new delivery system for District-wide community services programs. She was temporarily replaced by Louis Hillery, vice president of academic affairs at City (Courier, August, 1986; 7).

In a survey published in November, 1986, Koltai was chosen as one of the top 100 chief executives officers in higher education and the nation's seventh most effective community college leader. Financed by the Exxon Foundation, the study was based on the responses of 315 college chief executives, higher education officials, and scholars who studied college presidents. "Effective presidents are different. They are strong risk takers with a
dream,” said James L. Fischer, co-director of the survey. Respondents indicated that effective leaders in higher education commanded respect and took chances, rather than concentrating on being popular and friendly (Washington, November 9, 1986). Certainly, Koltai fit that description.

VIII. Enrollment

During 1985-86 enrollment in the Los Angeles Community College District continued to be more volatile than the state and national trends. In Fall, 1985 California community college enrollments leveled off with a bare increase of 0.1 percent, compared to Fall 1984, and nationally enrollments followed a similar pattern with a small decrease of 0.2 percent. The Los Angeles District continued its enrollment plunge of the last four years, down to 93,026 students, a decline of 9,287 or 9.1 percent below the previous fall. All the colleges lost students, except for Mission’s increase of 2.0 percent, due to its PACE program. The losses ranged from Trade-Technical’s 5.0 percent to Southwest’s astounding 31.2 percent decline. Enrollments continued to decrease overall in both day and evening classes, at 10.0 percent and 7.6 percent, respectively, though this was inconsistent among the colleges. Mission suffered a decrease of 5.0 percent in day classes, which was more than offset by the influence of the PACE enrollments, for a gain of 8.6 percent in the evening. The evening programs at two other colleges also gained, with Harbor at 7.8 percent and Trade-Tech at 1.3 percent, though the losses in the day classes offset the evening increases at these two colleges.

The District’s loss of WSCH for the one-year period was 8.8 percent, slightly less than that for enrollment. The full-time PACE enrollments boosted Mission’s WSCH by 8.9 percent and the other colleges lost between 5.6 percent at Harbor and 30.5 percent at Southwest. The day and evening WSCH breakdown followed that of enrollment, with a 10.3 percent loss in the daytime and a 5.6 percent decline in the evening. Harbor had an even larger increase in evening WSCH (10.2 percent), while Trade-Tech had a slight decrease (-0.1 percent). For the first time, Mission was no longer the smallest college in terms of enrollment, though it continued to be so in terms of WSCH, because of Southwest’s larger full-time enrollment (Board of Trustees, “Reports,” Communication A, “First Census Enrollment and Weekly Student Contact Hours (WSCH) Comparison for Fall Semesters, 1984 and 1985,” October 30, 1985; 1-4).

By Spring, 1986 the enrollment drop had slowed considerably. The number of students was 87,489, a loss of 2740 or 3.0 percent, compared to Spring, 1985. This was the smallest decrease since Fall 1982, eight semesters before. Mission College had accelerated its noteworthy growth to 13 percent by expanding in other areas besides PACE, and two other colleges about maintained their enrollments of the previous spring: Valley with an increase of 1.5 percent and East with the loss of a mere 0.8 percent. Southwest was once again the big loser, except that it dropped about an eighth of its enrollment (-12.8 percent) compared to the loss of nearly a third of its enrollment in the fall. Over all, day enrollment fell 6.0 percent, while evening programs grew or were stable at seven of the nine colleges, for an District-wide increase of 1.9 percent.

Total WSCH for the District was down 3.4 percent from the previous spring. The general increases at Mission, as well as its exploding PACE program, sent that college’s WSCH up by 25.8 percent. Valley grew slightly from the year before (+1.6 percent), but the other seven colleges were down, from 3.0 percent at Trade-Tech to 12.4 percent at Southwest. All the colleges, except Mission, contributed to the day WSCH decline of 5.4 percent,
though three colleges, in addition to Mission, were up in the evening, to make a marginal total increase of 1.5 percent. As notable as any enrollment pattern was a slight growth in part-time students, which reversed the downward trend of the previous few years (Board of Trustees, “Reports,” Communication No. A, “First Census Enrollment and Weekly Student Contact Hours (WSCH) Comparison of Spring 1985 and 1986,” April 9, 1986; 1-4).

The bottom of the enrollment decline was reached in 1985-86, and the next year enrollments once again began to rise.
CHAPTER FIVE
The Crisis Subsides, 1986-87

I. Funding and Faculty Layoffs

Within a short time after the no-longer-early start of the fall semester, three positive developments took place: (1) the books for the previous fiscal year showed that not only had the $2.3 million deficit from 1984-85 been made up but the 1986-87 fiscal year opened with an unrestricted balance of $3.6 million; (2) the summer session experienced a healthy expansion compared to the previous year, with enrollment up by 8.3 percent and WSCH by 14 percent, and all indications pointed to a hefty increase for the fall semester; and (3) expanded student demand meant that almost all of the laid off faculty were rehired, at least on a temporary basis. Each of these three developments contained the potential for problems, but the overall prospects for the District were quite favorable.

On September 3 the Board approved a 1986-87 budget of $242.4 million. The budget included $3 million in reserve funds, with $2 million in contingency reserves and $1 million in general reserves. The problem with this rosy financial picture was that in June the Governor had vetoed $34 million in stabilization funding, $11.1 million of which was slated for the Los Angeles District. Trustee Richman said, "With the $11 million, we have a solid, predictable program. Without the $11 million, we may have another year like the one we had last year when the chancellor recommended restructuring and we had to lay off people. I don't want to go through that again." The budget was approved by a 5-2 vote, with Richman and Conner opposed to including the questionable $11.1 million. They feared the conflict between the Governor and the Legislature might not be resolved by the time the legislative session ended on September 15. Richman urged the Board to delay approval until after the session closed, but the Board decided instead to modify the budget should it become necessary (Washington, September 4, 1986).

The "Overview" of the budget document stated that the unrestricted ending balance of $3.6 million had resulted from larger than anticipated revenues from the lottery, a year-end reserve for contingency and fire and liability losses, improved management of hourly rate instruction, and a continued turnover of classified employees combined with delays in filling approved staffing plan positions. The report said, "Equal in importance to the value of the unrestricted ending balance to 1986-87 revenues is the fact that the District spent less income than it received--something that has been accomplished only once before in the years since 1977-78." The most important factor in achieving the surplus was the much larger than expected revenues from the lottery. This meant that the positive financial standing of the District had resulted to a great extent from an action by the voters in 1984 (which the Governor had not supported) and the subsequent enthusiastic response by the state's gaming public.

The report described the financial impact for 1986-87 of the "certificated staffing and curricular adjustments." If all the positions for faculty who had received layoff notices had remained vacant (which had never been anticipated), the savings would have been $6.1 million. The hourly rate savings in these disciplines would have been $1.5 million, and the loss of revenue caused by program reduction was estimated to be $2.5 million, for a net saving of over $5 million. The report then described the factors that had reduced this

---

1 In July, Wallace Albertson had replaced Trustee Richman as president of the Board of Trustees.
theoretical maximum in savings. One of the most significant of these related to the athletic program. The agreement reached with the union changed compensation, significantly increased reassigned time for coaching, and guaranteed the return of six laid off physical education instructors, thereby reducing salary savings. All of this resulted in a proposed athletic program for 1986-87 that offered nearly a quarter fewer sports at a cost estimated to exceed by over a half million dollars the larger athletic program of the previous year. Additional factors related to faculty reassignment to other disciplines, restructured and/or expanded programs at some colleges, phasing out rather than immediately eliminating certain programs, and in-service training for some instructors assigned to new disciplines. The latest information indicated a net saving for 1986-87 of $2.7 million.

The report said student demand in large disciplines such as social sciences would be accommodated at less cost by careful scheduling and fewer duplicated classes. While this would reduce the sections required, the trend toward greater cost effectiveness would be offset in the short run by a larger ratio of full-time to part-time instructors, which would increase the average instructional cost per WSCH. The Board had set aside $2 million for classified staffing restoration and allocations were made to locations based on the current vacancy rate. Most of the 103 positions were in the clerical, custodial, or maintenance classifications (Business Services Division, 1986; 3-13).

When Fox predicted dire enrollment consequences from the teacher layoffs, he forgot, or chose to overlook, that the District had given itself the flexibility to still use its instructors by calling them back to teach in case they were required. As opening day of the fall semester approached and enrollments grew, five physical education teachers and 33 in other disciplines got their jobs back. Mulrooney said that “More than 100 instructors were removed in one way or another from areas that were overstaffed and placed in areas that were understaffed. It's not a total match yet. . . . But I think the problem is very small compared to the grave problem we had last year.”

Rehiring the physical education instructors was the result of the agreement reached with the union in June. The teaching assignments of instructors who also coached were reduced for the semester during which their sport was played, but the teacher-coaches also received release time during the off-season semester for recruiting and conditioning team members. The District had forgotten to include in its calculations the release time for the off-season, so instructors were teaching fewer classes than had been planned and additional positions were required. Reinstating all of the physical education teachers also meant that teachers outside the physical education discipline (including those who had been transferred out of it) could now coach, which had been barred as long as instructors were still laid off. The 33 teachers rehired in other disciplines left only two instructors who had not received jobs from the District and had neither retired nor found teaching jobs elsewhere.

These developments resulted in largely rescinding the layoffs for at least 1986-87, but considerable resentment remained nonetheless. “Nothing was accomplished,” said Marilyn Ladd, former athletic director at East Los Angeles College, who was rehired as a physical education and health education instructor at City College. “There didn't seem to be much need to lay us off in the first place. It shows the whole thing was kind of arbitrary.” Trustee Conner disagreed:

The fact is, this is the first time the district has undertaken the layoff process. No one had any precise expectation of how long it would take or what it would involve. . . . We had to reorganize our teaching program, which forced us to take certain actions that were not pleasant. That presented problems for us in athletics and physical education, but overall, the purpose of the layoff process has been well-served.
Conner said the increased enrollment for the fall semester was possible because more teachers had been placed in the growing disciplines (Morgan, September 11, 1986, and Morgan and Springer, September 12, 1986).

On October 1, Koltai returned to his traditional fall schedule for delivering the “State of the District Address.” Based on the symbolism he had expressed the previous spring, this return to the beginning of the academic year might indicate that uncertainty had been dispelled. He assured his listeners, however, that was not the case, because “the current crisis in California community colleges is not over.” The previous day, the Governor had vetoed most of the stabilization funds, which meant that the district would have only half or less of the expected $11 million, at least until January.

As in his previous State of the District speech, Koltai placed the District’s problems in a statewide perspective. He pointed out that the decline in the fortunes of the community colleges was not just an urban problem, because 49 out of the 70 California community college districts had decreases in enrollment in 1984-85, and 37 lost enrollment in 1985-86. Of the 13 districts in Los Angeles County, 11 had experienced declines this year and six had lost enrollments both years. For three years, the Los Angeles District had no choice but to manage decline, he said, but through it all, “we maintained our central focus on our educational mission.” Included on the Board’s agenda that day was consideration of a process for reviewing the District’s statement of educational mission. Koltai maintained that he could say with assurance that the District had not only “come through the storm, but that we have come through with our educational principles intact.”

Koltai said that the previous year the Board had charged the administration with two broad objectives. The first was to keep the budget of the District in balance, which was accomplished with a small ending balance for 1985-86. The second objective was to increase enrollment, and this had been done with summer enrollment up 5.4 percent and WSCH increased by 12.6 percent. In his previous “State of the District Address,” Koltai had set a goal to add 4000 students in the fall. The preliminary census figures showed that fall enrollment was 11.4 percent greater than the previous year and WSCH was up 7.3 percent. The District had enrolled 10,000 more students than in Fall, 1985, even though, because of the enrollment cap, the State would pay for only one in ten of those students.

Koltai then presented five planning objectives, four of which will be covered in the planning section of this chapter. One of his objectives, however, “to maintain the organizational vitality of the District while demanding and supporting quality in all phases of our operations,” was more of an administrative reorganization than a planning objective. He was changing the structure and operations of the District divisions, “which will make them more responsive and, we hope, will also allow us to reemphasize college autonomy.” The Educational Services Division was renamed the Educational Research and Development Division, “to focus attention on its activities related to generation and implementation of creative new ideas and educational strategies.” The Personnel Services Division would now be called the Division of Human Resources and the Affirmative Action Office was being merged with it.

Business Services Division would retain its name, but to strengthen the colleges’ business operations, Koltai was recommending a business manager at each college, who would be responsible for overseeing the total business operations of the college. He wanted to phase in the new position as soon as possible and have it in place at all colleges within three

2 While not mentioned in the address, the significance of this new position was that it would be classified and would replace the certificated vice president of administration post.
years. The Budget Office was to be expanded by adding administrative information systems, which would work with colleges to develop a system of management data; and operational systems auditing, which would integrate the existing internal audit operation with the District's planning process. In addition, the Budget Office would "create a fiscal management system that also includes planning, operations and evaluation tied together with management information" (Koltai, 1986b; 1-5 and 9-12).

The District was faced with a paradoxical situation in October, 1986. It had rectified many of the things for which it had been criticized by the Hoover Commission and grand jury. It had balanced its budget, established a reserve fund, increased enrollment, laid off faculty, transferred instructors to other disciplines, and rehired the dismissed faculty only on the basis of proven enrollment needs. The District's reward for taking these corrective steps was to confront a State funding mechanism that worked like a ratchet: It moved downward freely for enrollment losses, but would hardly budge upward when enrollments rose.

The Los Angeles District had plummeted in enrollment from 139,000 students in Fall, 1981 to 87,000 students in Spring, 1986 and was penalized by losing funding during the entire decline. Then, the District reversed the decline in Fall, 1986 and enrolled 104,000 students, an increase of 10,000 students over Fall, 1985 and 18,000 over the lowest point in the downward curve reached the previous spring. The dramatic increase now buttressed against the State's enrollment cap, which limited funding for growth to approximately one percent. The cap had been instituted in the early 1980's, when California's financial crisis made it impossible to fund the huge increases achieved by the community colleges. Since that time many districts in the State had lost enrollment. When enrollments began to turn around the districts viewed these gains not as absolute growth but rather a return to their previous enrollment level.

The Governor and Legislature had shown some benevolence in the midst of these fluctuations by creating the stabilization fund. Districts with enrollment losses were not financially penalized all at once, but had the funding reduction spread over two fiscal years. Even so, as soon as the Governor became embroiled with the Legislature over balancing the budget, he would quickly take the community colleges hostage by vetoing the stabilization funds. Koltai had characterized this situation by saying that the community colleges were always "the last hostages released" during financial crises. For Fiscal Year 1986-87, the Governor first did this in June, when the budget was sent to him. Then, when the Legislature again refused to reduce the State's contribution to PERS and sent legislation back to him that included community college stabilization and matriculation funds, Deukmajian vetoed most of the funds again on September 30. He reduced the $34 million in statewide stabilization funds to $6.1 million and said in his message that he would consider funding another $17 million of stabilization funds in January. Deukmajian claimed that he supported the stabilization provision, but "I am obligated to make these reductions in order to protect California's fiscal integrity." Community college people wondered aloud why the Governor, when he vetoed the funding in the first place, had not chosen to withhold some of the appropriations intended for UC or CSU, rather than once again reducing community college funding.

The District's portion of the released funds was $2.1 million, instead of the expected $11.1 million. The District was now a quarter of the way into the fiscal year and would not know for sure how much State support it would receive until half way through. When the Board had approved the final budget on September 3, they had elected to keep the $11.1 million of revenues in the budget. They thereby postponed any action to reduce appropriations, and did so with the concurrence of the County Superintendent of Schools. By the time Fallo delivered his "1986-87 First Quarter Report and 1987-88 Projections" in October, other developments had taken place that would affect the District's fiscal position. The
budget needed a $7 million reduction immediately, other potentially serious problems might later require reductions of from $300,000 to $2.8 million, and COLA increases were under negotiation. Lottery revenues, largely responsible for the District’s financial turnaround in 1985-86, were down for the first quarter by two-thirds from the previous year. Cost for medical and dental benefits were exceeding budget projections and an audit of ADA by the State could mean an adjustment in revenues of over $1 million. Fallo’s report concluded:

"... despite the positive trend in enrollment the District has not reached a point of fiscal stability. The actions begun in 1985-86 to restructure the District’s instructional program, Dr. Koltai’s reorganization of the District Offices in 1986-87, and proposals to revise the faculty contract to improve management flexibility must all be seen as part of an ongoing plan to restore the District’s fiscal strength and position ourselves for the 1990’s."

The District had the option of saving money by not serving all the students who sought to enroll, but this was undesirable for several reasons. First and foremost, the fundamental purpose of the District was to provide students with education, not turn them away. Second, the District hoped the cap could be removed for districts regaining previously lost enrollments. Koltai planned to appear before the Legislature to ask them to remove the cap. This was absolutely essential, because if it were not done, as Board President Albertson said, “It would take 25 years for us to get back to where we were in 1980.” Third, and perhaps as important as any factor, was the precariousness of the enrollment growth. The District could not be sure the summer session and the fall semester were harbingers of a trend. If present enrollments were not nurtured, the District might lose students again in the spring, and net ADA for the year could show a loss rather than a gain (Business Services Division, 1986e; 1-8 and 22; and Mullen, October 2, 1986).

In the First Quarter Budget Report, Fallo presented the Board with three options for cutting the budget by the required $7 million. These options varied according to whether funds were taken from reserves or operations. At the November 12 Board meeting, Fallo recommended the option that reduced reserves and operating budgets somewhat equally. After three hours of discussion, the Board approved this solution (Daily News, November 13, 1986).

In November, the Business Services Division published its “1985-86 Expenditure Analysis,” whose purpose was “to provide the Chancellor and the Board of Trustees a summary of expenditures and an evaluation of each location’s fiscal performance.” It was also to be used by college administrators in evaluating their budget management practices and identifying areas where improved performance could be achieved. Only two colleges had ended 1985-86 with general fund deficits, compared to nine colleges in 1984-85. One summer session program had a deficit, versus seven the previous year. The effort to make community services programs self-supporting was proving successful, with a net deficit of only $62,500, compared to $386,000 the year before. Six college programs experienced a loss, although all but one college either reduced or reversed losses or increased profits. Both bookstores and cafeterias improved in 1985-86. Bookstores had a loss of $226,000 compared to the previous year’s $454,000, but this could be absorbed by an existing balance in the Bookstore Fund. Cafeterias showed a loss of $455,000, compared to $579,000 in 1984-85, all of which had to be made up out of the General Fund (Business Services Division, 1986f; 1, 4-5, 51 and 57).

On February 2, 1987, the AFT College Guild issued an untitled analysis of the faculty layoffs and program reductions by the Guild’s executive secretary, Marty Hittelman. The paper began by quoting Koltai in the October 7, 1986 American Association of Community and Junior College Newsletter. Koltai had said, in part, that “... the district authorized the
elimination or reduction of 30 disciplines which had experienced continuing enrollment declines, and/or for which the job market or educational need no longer required the existing level of faculty." The analysis described the results of the layoffs:

By the fall of 1986, all but 29 of the 157 still had permanent positions with the District. Of the 29 persons actually laid off, only 3 persons were not offered temporary positions (one of these persons had chosen to retire) with the District. Two persons refused to accept permanent positions with the District. Three persons refused temporary positions with the District. The rest of the 29 are temporarily employed doing the same job that they had been doing prior to the layoffs. The entire operation has cost the District hundreds of thousands of dollars in legal fees, hundreds and hundreds of hours of work time, and the loss of the loyalty of its employees and accomplished nothing but pain, disruption, and a deterioration of morale.

The study said a total of 94 of the 157 were still teaching in the same discipline as before the layoffs. In addition, seven psychology instructors were teaching the same classes as before, but the discipline was now called “developmental communications” or “basic skills.” The report claimed that “All of those persons who were reassigned could have been reassigned using the section on reassignment in the Collective Bargaining agreement without any need for letters of termination.” Besides the 53 permanent instructors who were not teaching in their original disciplines, 44.86 FTE of part-time positions, or about 200 part-time teachers, were cut from the previous fall.

The report used the District’s own data to show that the total reductions in faculty positions slowed in Fall, 1986 as compared to Fall, 1985. Between Fall, 1984 and Fall, 1985 the number of FTE was cut by 234.7, though the reduction from Fall, 1985 to Fall, 1986 was only 35.7 FTE. Hittelman’s analysis overlooked the fact that the Board and administration’s avowed purpose in the layoffs was not so much to reduce the number of faculty, but rather to reassign them to more productive disciplines. The analysis then quoted statistics that showed that this had indeed been the result. An interpretation of the report’s own data reveals that not only had the number of faculty fallen between 1983 and 1985, but WSCH/FTE had declined as well. From Fall, 1983 to Fall, 1984, the faculty FTE went down by only 22.4, but the WSCH/FTE declined from 472 to 410, an astounding loss of 62. As we have seen, between Fall, 1984 and Fall, 1985, the decrease in FTE was 234.7, but WSCH/FTE increased by four, from 410 to 414, which would indicate a decrease in faculty that closely matched the decline in WSCH. For 1986, again as we have seen, faculty FTE went down by only 35.7 but WSCH/FTE increased by 40 to 454, indicating a much more productive use of slightly fewer faculty.

Hittelman questioned the validity of such an interpretation. He asked “whether the increase in WSCH/FTE from 1985 to 1986 has been the result of the decrease in faculty or a rearrangement of faculty or whether it is due to other considerations such as demographics and the increase in the PACE program.”3 PACE accounted for more than one-third of the total increase in WSCH and had an unusually large WSCH/FTE of 978.7. If the PACE figures were not included, the average WSCH/FTE in the District was 445 for Fall 1986. The report contended that the remainder of the increase in WSCH was “primarily due to an

---

3 PACE offered a humanities-oriented transfer program to working students, who could complete the associates degree in five semesters by taking course work in the evenings and on Saturdays. Harbor began its PACE program in 1981. Mission had such success with its program in the initial year of 1985-86 that four other colleges decided it could be a rich source of enrollments and began their own programs in 1986-87.
increase in enrollment, not to some intelligent rearrangements by the District.” The WSCH increase (seven percent) was not as great as the enrollment growth (11 percent), and the discrepancy is even greater when PACE, whose students carry a 12-unit load, is excluded from the calculations. The report said when that was done, LACCD’s WSCH growth was similar to the increase throughout the state, so that the WSCH increase could not be claimed to be the result of the faculty reorganization. With proper management, the WSCH should have more closely approximated the enrollment growth.

The report maintained that “The argument that the rearrangement of faculty resulted in higher WSCH/FTE is difficult to sustain when one looks at rearranged disciplines.” The report’s detailed analysis of the WSCH/FTE in anthropology at the different colleges led to the conclusion that “The results are all over the map. Increasing faculty increased and decreased the WSCH/FTE as did decreasing the number of faculty and leaving it the same.” An examination of the health discipline indicated that “the results are not at all consistent. . . each discipline has a different story as to what happened as a result of the rearrangement.” The report concluded that the District was clearly not successful in predicting which disciplines would do well and which would not do as well. . . . The District needs to change the way that it makes decisions concerning the pattern of offerings in the District and the staffing of these disciplines. Input from the campuses must be the first step . . . not a step left out as was the case in the ill conceived layoffs of the Spring of 1986. Consideration must be given to other criteria than simply numbers (Hittelman, 1987; 1-5).

On February 3 Koltai appeared before the California State Senate Subcommittee No. 1 on Education of the Budget and Fiscal Review Committee, in an attempt to retrieve the $9 million the Governor’s veto had cost the District. He said an enrollment of over 100,000 students “placed a serious strain on our operating capabilities even before the Governor’s action. Our operating budget was based on a one percent growth--our 'cap.' It is now struggling to service an 11 percent growth.” The crux of this issue was “the recognition that the stability, growth and future of the Los Angeles District is predicated on retaining these students and providing them with a quality experience that will encourage them to return and to encourage others to attend.” Reduced revenues had forced the District to cut its inadequate reserve in half, eliminate matching funds for deferred maintenance and instructional equipment, reduce certificated salaries by $290,000 and classified by $1 million, cut over one-half-million dollars in maintenance and capital budgets, and seriously reduce or eliminate special project funds, such as ESL and Core Curriculum development. Koltai said that the Governor had not kept his side of the bargain on stabilization funds: “I would rather have taken my cuts up front than to have been led to believe that the state would support an orderly downsizing of the District only to have the rug pulled from under our feet three months into the fiscal year.” He urged the committee to take the necessary actions to restore the stabilization funds “to allow us to complete the task of rebuilding not only the Los Angeles District but the community college system statewide” (Koltai, 1987; 1-3).

In the “1986-87 Second Quarter Budget Report and 1987-88 Projections,” presented to the Board on February 25, Fallo said “The fiscal picture. . . remains less than satisfactory” and “Actions to reduce expenditures may be necessary.” He placed the situation in historical and statewide perspective: “Since 1981-82 state support for community colleges (including property taxes, fees and lottery) has increased 23.8 percent while the University of California has increased 65.5 percent and the State University of California has increased 71.6 percent.” The implementation of the student enrollment fee bore out what studies and the experience of other systems indicated. It would cause a rapid drop in enrollments and
urban districts serving minority populations would have great difficulty in reversing enrollment losses. While the enrollment decline in the Los Angeles District could be anticipated,

the state had no plans to cushion districts from the fiscal impact of the decline and move to assist districts in recovering enrollment once students began to return. As a result districts such as Los Angeles were forced to reduce operating budgets, and educational program and services thereby compounding the enrollment decline. Once enrollment stabilized and growth occurred districts were faced with attempting to service returning students without adequate funding from the state.

If the District had been able to maintain its enrollment at the 1982-83 level, it would have had approximately $40 million more in 1987-88.

The ending balance for 1986-87 was now estimated to be $2.5 million. The District had ended 1985-86 with a balance of $8.9 million, $3.5 million of which was unrestricted; a balance of only $2.5 million would thus mean that expenditures would exceed revenues by $6.4 million in 1986-87. Since this balance was unlikely to fund all anticipated obligations, some would have to be covered by the 1987-88 budget. The main reasons for this unsatisfactory situation were the loss of the $9 million in stabilization funds and the reduction of $3 million in lottery revenues. The Board had already resolved the loss of stabilization funds, but these actions had greatly reduced its options for responding to the reduced lottery income. Sales of lottery tickets had declined after the initial surge and prior year revenues from this source had been adjusted downward by $700,000 because of an overestimation by the State in the fourth quarter. On the positive side, employee benefits would not increase as much as estimated because the payment schedule was adjusted from ten to twelve payments, giving the District a one year break. Worker's compensation payments, however, were being increased by $500,000.

The report said that the District's 6.8 percent increase in first census WSCH between 1985 and 1986 was accompanied by an even greater improvement of 10.4 percent in instructional efficiency, as measured by WSCH per FTE. "Every college except East Los Angeles shows a gain, the largest being Mission College's astonishing 62.7 percent rise from 284 to 462. . . Mission College, which until Fall, 1985 had shown the smallest average class size in the district, has now surpassed four of the other colleges in instructional efficiency." The colleges ranged from 508 WSCH/FTE at Trade-Tech to 319 at Southwest. Even though the District's average WSCH/FTE had increased over the year before, it remained 8.8 percent below that of Fall, 1982. The only college to achieve an increase during the period was Mission, which in 1982 had stood at 333 WSCH/FTE. Valley College, with 499 WSCH/FTE in 1982, had been able to match that figure once again in 1986. The changes at other colleges varied from West, which was now down 2.5 percent from 1982, to Southwest, which was 29.6 percent lower.

The Quarterly Report provided information about the results of the "certificated staffing reorganization." The regular and hourly rate positions in the thirty disciplines affected by the layoff decreased by 108.9 FTE. WSCH had declined slightly more than expected (19,080), but was a smaller percentage decrease than the drop in staffing. The average WSCH/FTE in these disciplines increased at each location except at East, and for the whole District were up by 11.9 percent, from an average of 401 to 448. Not unexpectedly these figures differed from those of Hittelman, but in terms of what was selected to be presented, not necessarily because specific data were in conflict.

The Quarterly Report discussed those disciplines that had grown:
The largest staffing increases occurred in English, mathematics and developmental communications, which showed a combined gain of 31.69 instructor FTE (9.1 percent). These three disciplines show a gain of 19,963 weekly student contact hours (13.1 percent), exceeding the WSCH lost through program reduction and elimination but generated at a lower cost. WSCH per FTE increased from 439 to 455.

In the section on 1987-88 Projections, the report said the problems were so great, "it appears that a balanced budget cannot be developed without consideration of reducing programs and services and eliminating a number of certificated employees." The budget process had been suspended "in order to once again develop a districtwide approach to the reduction in programs and services." Revenues for 1987-88 were projected to be down by approximately $13.27 million. This was a result of the loss of stabilization funds, decreased lottery funds, loss of a mandated one-time cost reimbursement for unemployment insurance, and lack of an unrestricted beginning balance. Using the 1986-87 Final Budget appropriations, which did not include any employee cost of living increases, and adjusting them for certain anticipated changes in expenditure requirements, indicated a revenue shortfall of approximately $14.73 million.

The report concluded that fiscal problems were now recognized as being greater than previously anticipated. "...the community college system cannot expect a stable funding environment as long as it is tied to the state for its principal source of funding" (Business Services Division, 1987a; 1-13 and 15-18).

On March 11, for the second year in a row, the Board of Trustees authorized the issuance of March 15 letters. The action involved 59 faculty positions in 20 disciplines. As the AFT noted in Read On, this time the reason was budgetary, while previously it had been for purposes of curricular reorganization. Forty-three faculty positions were from the same disciplines involved in the previous year’s layoffs. Particularly hard hit this time were physical education and health with 17 positions and nursing with thirteen. Disciplines not previously affected had 16 faculty positions involved and included music with three and art and respiratory therapy, each with two. A major change from 1986 was that the action was passed on a four to three vote, with Archie-Hudson and Quezada joining Garvin to vote against the motion (Read On, March 17, 1987; 1; and Woo, March 12, 1987).

The Board explained that the action was caused by “state governance decisions regarding the source, criteria and level of funding for community colleges.” Several trustees protested the District’s “Catch 22,” caused by the governor first supporting stabilization funds and then vetoing them. At the same time, the funding formula would not allow districts regaining enrollments to be fully funded for their growth. According to the trustees, appropriations proposed in the governor’s 1987-88 budget would force reductions in district expenditures by more than $10 million. Conner commented, “After years of mandated cuts that have affected students and employees alike, we are faced once again with a huge gap in our state-funded budget and will have to eliminate the deficit before it eliminates us.” Preparing for the possibility of layoffs was only one of many actions the District was taking or considering. Koltai explained that the District hoped to “obtain the support of the faculty collective bargaining representative to assist us in this budgetary dilemma. We initiated discussions aimed at avoiding layoffs by bringing our salaries in line with other districts in Southern California,” most of whom paid hourly rate for summer session instruction (Courier, March, 1987; 1).

The AFT was particularly incensed at this suggestion. Just days prior to the layoff action the District had proposed to the union that March 15 letters could be avoided if hourly rate pay for the summer session were accepted. What Koltai considered an opportunity to
mitigate the fiscal dilemma was regarded by the AFT as simple disregard for the law, since it said layoffs could not be negotiated. It characterized the “offer” as “a threat to lay off faculty if we don’t agree to pay off, a ransom for [the affected faculty], who, as far as AFT really knows may not be laid off, and who, as far as anyone knows, may not need to be laid off” (Read On, March 12, 1987; 1).

Six weeks later, on April 22, the Board voted to rescind the layoffs. Koltai had just returned from a visit to Sacramento, where he had met with Peter G. Mehas, Deukmajian’s chief education advisor, and with Republican and Democratic leaders. He said the legislative analyst’s office had released a new report showing the State’s revenue collections were running $450 million greater than expected. Koltai now anticipated the District’s shortfall would be less than the $12 million projected for the coming fiscal year, and he felt sure the District would receive at least enough additional funds to make up the $1.5 million to be saved by teacher layoffs. Union leaders said Koltai had not produced any evidence that the District’s financial situation had improved. They described the layoff rescission as politics at play and said that the union candidates’ strong showing in the trustee primary election the previous week was the real reason the layoffs had been canceled (Roark, April 23, 1987 and Washington, April 23, 1987).

Regardless of the union’s suspicions, Koltai had received an accurate reading on the improved financial atmosphere in Sacramento. This was apparent in Fallo’s May 20 presentation of the “1986-87 Third Quarter Budget Report.” Revised State estimates pegged revenues at $1.5 billion greater than originally projected. The previous week the Governor had announced that he was requesting an additional $97 million for the community colleges in 1987-88.4 Fallo said the additional $3 to $4 million the District expected to receive would not solve all of the District’s problems, but the projected deficit for 1987-88 would be reduced from $8 million or $9 million down to $4 million to $6 million. The much higher deficit figure used in the Second Quarter Report for had been reduced by selling a portion of the Pierce College campus and through a variety of budget cuts. Koltai was particularly pleased with the news from Sacramento. He said, “I think it means that the relationship between community colleges and the governor has at least found its way onto a firmer footing.”

The District’s 1986-87 fiscal year ending balance was now expected to be $4.56 million. This was about $5 million less than the year’s beginning balance, meaning that “for the fifth time in six years District expenditures have exceeded District income.” Even so, the ending balance was expected to be larger than previously reported to the Board. This was the result of limited purchasing, restricted hiring in classified positions, and two rounds of budget reductions. Fallo said that, as with the previous year, “credit must also be given to the college administration[s] for continued improvements in the management of class schedules that produced reductions in the numbers of hourly rate assignments.” He reported profits in both the community services and the bookstore funds, and an improvement in the cafeteria fund, because of reduced staffing and better management. The District was entitled to $10.47 million in stabilization funds, though only $2.65 million of that amount had thus far been appropriated. Fallo said the improved revenue picture in Sacramento meant that some of the nearly $8 million still due the District might yet be released (Business Services Division, 1987b; 3-6 and 9; and Washington, May 21, 1987).

The financial picture for the State and ultimately for the District changed rapidly at the end of 1986-87. The bulge in revenue collections, which fiscal conservatives, including the Governor, refused to believe would continue, turned out to be larger than anyone expected.

4 Other sources give this figure as $140 million, and no explanation has been found for this discrepancy.
As we have seen, the Governor instructed the Department of Finance to increase his budget for community colleges by $140 million for 1987-88 and even signed the Hughes bill that released some $7.6 million in stabilization funds for the Los Angeles District. When Fallo presented the Tentative Budget for 1987-88 to the Board of Trustees on June 17, he was able to report an extremely positive situation for both the current and the coming fiscal years. After the books were closed and the annual audit completed for 1986-87, the District had a positive balance in the general fund far exceeding any estimates. The auditors were characteristically matter-of-fact in their comments. They observed that they had urged the District in prior years to establish and maintain general fund balances of 5 percent of annual expenditures. "As a result of effective budgeting controls and also state stabilization aid approximating $7.6 million which was released late in the 1986/87 fiscal year, the District's ending general fund balance of $17,940,271 is 9.12% of the 1986/87 operating budget" (Peat Marwick, 1987; 48).

* * * * *

This is a good point at which to look back over the previous two years of climax and denouement in the crisis of the Los Angeles District. At the beginning of 1985-86, nearly a third of enrollment had been lost. The District was saddled with repayment of a $5 million loan, due to the deficit of the previous year. The Governor vetoed bail-out legislation that would have allowed repayment over three fiscal years. For much of 1985-86, the District was under scrutiny by the Little Hoover Commission, the County Grand Jury, and its own auditors. The Chancellor and the Board of Trustees did much of what they were advised to do. They reduced expenditures, laid off classified personnel, transferred faculty to disciplines they thought more productive, prepared to layoff other faculty, and balanced the budget.

After four years of dealing with catastrophe, almost in a state of disbelief and always hoping that conditions would soon improve, the Chancellor and Board dug in their heels in 1985-86 and decided they must initiate actions they would hardly have contemplated in previous years. The irony of their get-tough policy was that they instituted it precisely when the crisis was on the brink of being resolved. The unexpectedly large revenues during the lottery's first year of operation helped the District to balance the budget for 1985-86. Almost as soon as the necessary steps to lay off faculty were taken, enrollment unexpectedly improved, and the District called back almost every teacher who had been laid off and could not transfer to another discipline.

The problems with Sacramento continued during 1986-87 and the District was deprived of most of its stabilization funds. Harsh cost-cutting measures, including preparing for another wave of faculty layoffs, were instituted throughout the year. Projections indicated that once more spending would exceed revenues and the District could remain solvent only because of carry-over funds from the previous year. State revenues then began to surge, which many at first could not believe. Eventually, the estimated surplus became so superfluous that even the Governor could no longer hold hostage the school and college funds he had used in his fight with the Legislature. This last minute infusion of funds, combined with year-long frugality and no pay increases, gave the District an ending balance of a magnitude it had not experienced since before the crisis began.

II. Planning

When Koltai presented his 1986-87 State of the District Address, only seven months after delivering the 1985-86 version, he continued his theme from the previous speech. He said that "1986-87 is the year of turnaround for the Los Angeles Community College District"
and he presented five objectives for the future. The first was “an expansion of our relations with business and industry.” This included “the development of a metropolitan-wide program of community education and college extension offerings,” the project President Feuers had been transferred to the District Office to lead. The second objective was “to focus attention on the statewide scene and once again place this District in the position of leadership it deserves...” He reminded his audience that the current funding mechanism would expire this year. “We will work with legislators to develop a form of funding which is stable, predictable and planable. We will continue to represent the concerns and the unique perspectives of large urban colleges and districts.” The third objective was “the successful completion of the redirection, re-orientation, and retraining of the faculty and staff.” He wanted “a complete reevaluation, reorganization and restructuring of the classified service this year to include job classifications, job qualifications and salaries.” He also would emphasize “continued retraining, upgrading and redirection of our faculty...”

Koltai’s fourth objective related more to administrative reorganization than planning and was covered earlier in this chapter. His final objective, however, was a return to a broad planning scheme. It was what he called “Vision ‘90,” the development of “a long range planning process that will allow us to anticipate, rather than merely react to, the full range of external influences.” An initial project in “Vision ‘90” was to pilot test an enrollment simulation system at Southwest and Valley Colleges, which Koltai hoped would “allow us to target curriculum and develop programs to more effectively serve students... throughout the rest of this century and beyond.” Other elements in “Vision ‘90” were to set goals based on extensive institutional research, motivate employees to pursue significant institutional goals, conceptualize and implement the course of action necessary to reach the goals, and “finally, we must continue to be creative, forward-looking, and innovative...” (Koltai, 1986b; 5-13).

The review and revision of the District’s mission statement had been recommended in the 1985 report of the Commission for the Advancement of Teaching. A plan for this revision had been presented to the Board on October 1, 1986, at the same meeting where Koltai gave his State of the District Address. Just six weeks later, on December 17, 1986, the Board of Trustees authorized a revision in the educational philosophy statement of the District and adopted a revised mission statement. Eight years had elapsed since the Mission and Functions Committee had developed their revised statement after Proposition 13, and five years had passed since the Board had voted not to approve it.

The main reason the District was finally revising its mission statement was the action taken by the State urging greater specificity concerning community colleges’ primary purposes. The Board of Governors had revised its mission statement and the Commission for the Review of the Master Plan for Higher Education was recommending even further changes in the basic goals of the community colleges. The revisions in the District’s mission statement brought it more into line with the state recommendations. Transitional education was added as an important function; a statement about the District’s desire to enter into joint programs with business, labor, education, government and other institutions was included; and community services became optional and self-supporting, rather than a basic function.

The revised mission statement was proposed to the Board by Cedric Sampson, vice chancellor for educational research and development. Sampson had dealt with mission statement revisions in various capacities throughout the long history of this project. He had been the president of the AFT in 1981, when union opposition to placing functions into priority categories was the main factor that spelled defeat for the revised statement. He was also the chairman of the Commission on the Advancement of Teaching that had observed in 1985 that cuts made in budgets and programs had generally conformed to the priorities
recommended by the Mission and Functions Committee. Now, in his role as the top educational administrator of the District, he continued his opposition to setting priorities among functions. "We did not . . . prioritize our functions like the state's master plan," Sampson said. "We believe all functions are important and that each college can achieve emphasis or deemphasis according to its own mission, philosophy and vision" (Courier, February, 1987).

Events had largely overtaken planning during recent years. The Board and the Chancellor's irresistible impulse to react quickly and decisively to the deficit and the probing investigations by outside groups during 1985-86 meant that time to plan was not available. The 1986 Committee could not work effectively to bring together the faculty and other leadership of the District under the constant din of demonstrations and protests over faculty layoffs. But, now that the enrollment and financial situation were improving, Koltai attempted to draw the District's attention once again to planning for the long-term perspective, this time focused on the remainder of the century with "Vision '90." Unfortunately for Koltai's vision, a showdown between the AFT, the Board, and the Chancellor was already looming, and would soon come to its fateful conclusion.

III. Programs

In Koltai's October 1, 1986 State of the District speech, he emphasized that in planning and program development the District was reaching out for more involvement in business and industry. He mentioned that the District was in the early stages of participating in a statewide training program for California's welfare recipients, called Greater Avenues for Independence, or GAIN. The objective of this program was to develop community education and college extension offerings throughout the metropolitan area. Again, he discussed serving the downtown area, "with a primary focus on non-credit or contractual arrangements to meet staff development needs of local business and industry." He was no more precise, however, in describing the idea this time than when he had talked about a "Downtown Center" in his previous State of the District Address. In fact, most of the programs he discussed in his October, 1986, speech were unusually vague. He spoke of International Education expanding "cooperative linkages with our selected sister institutions around the world." He was "calling for a complete reevaluation, reorganization and restructuring of the classified service to include job classifications, job qualifications and salaries." The Office of Staff Development Programs would expand its activities to emphasize "continued retraining, upgrading and redirection of our faculty, as well as the ongoing revitalization of our classified staff." In none of these descriptions did Koltai include specifics as to what was to be done or how it was to be accomplished. He seemed to rely on his reorganization of the District Office divisions and his long range planning project, Vision '90, to fill in the details (Koltai, 1986b; 5-9).

Koltai was more specific when he had described how the Core Curriculum Development Laboratory (CCDL) would work, and he provided funding to the Educational Research and Development Division to implement it. In its publication "The Agenda, An Initial Study of Critical Curricular Issues in the Los Angeles Community Colleges," the CCDL said that Vice Chancellor Sampson subsequently had clarified the laboratory's purpose and structure:

He described CCDL as a task force that would develop "vertical" or sequential programs of study leading to completion of the desired degree objective within the established two years, instead of the current situation of a "horizontal" educational structure where students flounder from course to course without achieving their final objective.
The report said that encouraging pronouncements from a Carnegie Foundation study and policies from the Board of Governors suggested that establishing the CCDL was “an excellent beginning for curricular exploration, experimentation, revision and reform.” While Koltai had said that no more than five full time faculty would comprise the laboratory, nine faculty members were selected in October, 1986, and assigned to the CCDL. The disciplines represented were mathematics, with two faculty members; life sciences, with two; and English, history, humanities/languages, business/aircraft, and fashion design, each with a single instructor. The group was supported by a curriculum specialist from UCLA and a resource staff drawn from the Educational Research and Development Division.

The laboratory faculty sought out the ideas of outstanding educators and conducted their own investigative studies. The publication said they had arrived at a tentative working definition of “core curriculum”: “a collection of integrated courses and services offered to all students in pursuit of a specific objective (e.g., transfer, occupational certificate, associate degree).” They had also, as the title of the publication declared, developed “The Agenda” for further research (Core Curriculum Development Laboratory, February, 1987; 1-5).

The least charitable critics of the CCDL accused it of being Koltai’s equivalent of a Works Project Administration, although that was unlikely considering some of the highly productive disciplines represented by its faculty. Others, however, wondered whether the District could yet afford such an expensive experiment in curriculum development, so divorced from the campuses where instruction, and usually curriculum development, took place. As with many of Koltai’s risky projects, if it succeeded, it would be considered a brilliant gamble; but if it failed, it would be dubbed another of Koltai’s follies.

At about the same time as the CCDL was publishing “The Agenda,” the second unit Koltai had planned for his core concept was beginning its work. The ESL Institute undertook a study “to obtain a comprehensive picture of the ESL language needs in the LACCD service area as well as those of current students whose native language is not English.” The unit published a report entitled ESL, Responding to the Challenge of Demographic Change, in June. The Institute’s investigation found that approximately 13 percent of the District’s population spoke only a foreign language at home, while another 20 percent used both English and a foreign language. In 1985, Latino students made up 55.2 percent of those enrolled in the Los Angeles Unified School District. These half-million pupils, along with the 2.3 million adult Latinos, constituted “a large pool of potential students for the LACCD.”

The study reported that about 7,600 students were enrolled in ESL classes throughout the Los Angeles Community College District, though 26,611 students “identify themselves as foreign language native speakers who need help in English.” Nearly three quarters of the ESL students in the District attended City, East, and Valley Colleges. Throughout the District, three-fifths of the ESL classes were taught in English departments, while speech and developmental communications departments each taught about one-fifth of the ESL classes. The credit ESL program had grown from two courses to 29 in the previous ten years. Course sequences varied from college to college and courses with the same name and number were not necessarily equivalent. “To meet the English language needs of both current and future students in the LACCD,” the ESL Institute recommended “a consolidated ESL discipline and an expanded ESL program districtwide.” While the proposal to expand ESL offerings was only somewhat controversial, the recommendation to consolidate the ESL discipline would unleash a turf war that had not subsided many years after the report was issued (English As A Second Language Institute, 1987; 1-8).
IV. The AFT, the Board and the Chancellor

At the end of 1985-86 and the beginning of 1986-87, the Board of Trustees themselves became the center of controversy. The same week in June the Grand Jury report was issued and Legislators attempted to withhold stabilization funds because of teacher layoffs, a motion was introduced to double the trustees' salaries to $24,000 per year. Garvin, the retired political science instructor whose income was based on an early retirement and a salary well below what the teachers now were receiving after hefty pay hikes in the early 1980's, was generally acknowledged as the author of the action. The measure received little support and considerable criticism from most of the other trustees, not so much because they believed the increase unjustified, but because the timing was so abominable. Soon after, a resolution was introduced to pay expenses for Trustee Bronson to take a District-sponsored course in Mexico, to improve his Spanish and check out the program "at first hand." When the resolution was discussed by the Board, Bronson said he did not intend that his expenses would be covered, and the wording was changed to authorize an excused absence from board meetings, which would enable him to receive his usual compensation. A motion to double trustee salaries and another that provided for a trustee's salary to be paid during his absence, while not in themselves of great importance, were seen by already embittered employees as further evidence of Board insensitivity (Washington, June 6, 1986 and June 13, 1986, and Woo, June 26, 1986).

Turmoil within the board itself became evident in the election for trustee officers on July 23. With Bronson away, the evenly divided Board made five attempts to break a deadlock between Quezada and Albertson for the presidency. The trustees finally decided to delay the vote until the August 6 meeting, when Bronson would be back. At that time, Bronson's support provided the necessary fourth vote to elect Albertson. The significance of the election was that the most senior trustees, Albertson, Bronson, and Richman, joined by Conner, were supporting Albertson's experience on the Board. On the other hand, Garvin and Archie-Hudson were supporting the Board's newest member, Quezada, perhaps in hope that leadership by a relative newcomer during the coming difficult year would put a new face on the situation. Quezada and her two supporters, plus Richman, were all up for reelection the following spring (Washington, July 24, 1986 and Board of Trustees, Minutes, August 6, 1986).

In a publication issued after the 1987 Board elections, the AFT said the union's campaign to oust the Board members who had supported teacher layoffs were initiated well before Fall, 1986. Even so, the union's efforts were not begun in earnest until the date passed for renewing the certificated employees contract on October 12, 1986, "without the District moving for a settlement." President Fox convened the AFT's Committee for Political Education (COPE) and began interviewing potential candidates. This was an unusual approach, since in the past the union had interviewed Trustee hopefuls only after they had filed to run for a Board office. This time, however, the union was actively seeking out candidates to run against the offending incumbents. Those very incumbents were also invited to be interviewed, because, the AFT publication states, "Not to have done so would have given the game away."

By this time, Fox and other union leaders were convinced that the Board's attempt to lay off teachers and stall contract negotiations were part of a concerted effort at "union busting." Board members might deny this and continue to hope for union endorsement in the coming election, but Fox's strategy was to hide his real intent by delaying an announcement of union opposition to any of the incumbents. This he did, the publication

---

5 Bronson and Richman had just been honored for their fifteen years as Trustees, at the time the record for length of service on the Board (Daily News, July 9, 1986).
said, because the union “wanted to prevent the incumbents from fielding a strong candidate against Hal Garvin,” the one trustee who opposed the layoffs. On December 3, 1986, Fox wrote a letter to legislators and other political leaders whose political support could be important in the trustee election. He requested that they not endorse any of the incumbents, “due to mismanagement and unprecedented anti-union actions, including ‘unfairs,’ illegal union-busting layoffs, and attempts to terminate union representation of District employees” (AFT College Guild, 1987a; 3-8).

As 1987 opened, contract negotiations were still stalled and Mulrooney’s periodical, PS, and Fox’s Read-On were blasting away at each other, blaming the opposing side for lack of progress. By the filing deadline for the trustee election, January 17, three of the incumbents had thrown their hats in the ring, but Quezada had filed as a candidate for the Board of Education rather than pursue her first electoral campaign for the community college board. This meant the election would have one post with no incumbent, another with an incumbent who had voted against the layoffs, and two with incumbents who had supported the dismissals (PS, January, 1987, and Read-On, January 7 and January 23, 1987).

On February 9, an “AFT Briefing Paper” presented a number of the union’s positions. Concerning “Top Level Administration,” the paper said the chancellor and vice chancellors had “lost their abilities to lead. . . . Faculty, staff, and local administrators believe that Chancellor Koltai should be removed as Chancellor.” This was because of Koltai’s continued support for strong central control with little input from the campuses, his continued public pride in the layoffs and their staffing results, his inability to significantly trim administrative staffing levels, his inability to direct Dr. Mulrooney toward reasonable dealings with district employees, his lack of understanding of fiscal matters, and his inability to keep in touch with local campus concerns and issues. . .

The “Briefing” also said that Mulrooney had

proved to be the most warring and hostile Vice Chancellor the district has ever known. She has tried, unsuccessfully, to bypass the conditions of the Collective Bargaining Agreement. Each change proposed by the district in the current negotiations is a result of some personal battle that she has lost with the AFT. This includes such areas as coaching, transfers, reassignments, grievance procedure, summer school, calendar, and holidays. She has been unable to work in any kind of a collegial manner with the AFT or the faculty in general. Even her former associates and friends in the AFT have found her impossible to work with and call for her removal.

While the briefing paper dealt with several other issues, the union’s most pointed language was reserved for its abject lack of confidence in the District’s top administration (AFT College Guild, 1987a; 2-3).

The AFT said it would announce its slate of candidates in January, but held off until late February. Then, it supported only Garvin among the incumbents, Wallace B. Knox for Richman’s position, and David Lopez-Lee for the seat to be vacated by Quezada. Whom to support for Archie-Hudson’s spot on the ticket was a problem for the union. The AFT had close ties to the Democratic Party and had traditionally endorsed Democratic candidates. Julia Wu, a librarian, was attracting considerable support among elected officials and the Asian community, but she was an active and involved Republican. Also running for
Archie-Hudson's position was one of the union's own, Bernie Friedman, a retired Valley College instructor. Finally, the AFT announced it would take the unusual action of endorsing both Wu and Friedman for the post.

Nineteen candidates were competing for the four seats on the Board. The union said all of its candidates were "committed to reversing the long drift into insensitivity, bad management, indifference to quality education, exertion of willful power, and incredible complacency and arrogance on the part of several members of the Board and its administrative management." Opponents to the trustees, whether sponsored by the AFT or not, concentrated on the union's issues of waste and mismanagement, with a variety of themes. Candidates pointed to the "extravagant" District Offices in a downtown building, decried the "top-heavy administration," and called for the ouster of Chancellor Koltai.

Among the candidates, Harold Garvin's situation seemed the most favorable. Not only did he have union support and had not voted with the other trustees for teacher layoffs, but he had successfully distanced himself from a Board majority perceived to be largely responsible for the District's financial mess. He pushed the Board for a thorough evaluation of Koltai and said the chancellor "had to reestablish his credibility . . . or we should get a new chancellor." Opposing Garvin was Frank Mazzi, principal of a private elementary school and a member of a Republican-linked slate, who criticized Garvin for his attempt to double the trustees' salaries. The other candidate was Mark MacCarley, an attorney who was financing most of his own campaign.

Monroe Richman was facing a tough challenge from four opponents, the largest number standing against any of the incumbents. He defended the Board's layoff action, saying it was a legally required first step in order to transfer teachers from low enrollment disciplines to programs that could attract more students. Layoffs could have been avoided had the union agreed to reassignments. His challengers included former Trustee and perennial candidate, William Orozco, who had helped to put together a full slate of Republican hopefuls in the election. Orozco said he wanted to return to the Board because of the "terrible mess they've made of things by not living within their means." Knox, the union-backed candidate for the position, was a labor relations attorney. He favored retirement incentives for faculty and contended that Richman's outspoken behavior had alienated officials in Sacramento. He called for building a constituency that would lobby for the District in the State Capital. Another contender was Patricia Hollingsworth, a Trade-Technical College instructor and author of a doctoral dissertation on alternative funding for community colleges. The final candidate opposing Richman was Deborah LeBlanc, a research consultant, who had also written a doctoral dissertation on community college administration.

The open position on the Board attracted a total of seven candidates. AFT-backed Lopez-Lee, a professor of public administration at the University of Southern California, had long been active in politics and had run for both the city council and the community college board. Lopez-Lee said faculty and curriculum cuts were unnecessary and expressed strong support for nursing and other vocational programs of the District. One of his major rivals for the post was Richard E. Ferraro, who had forced Bronson into a run-off election in 1985 and had served on the County Grand Jury. Ferraro was allied with Orozco and proposed firing Koltai, laying off more faculty and closing Mission College. Another apparently viable candidate for this seat was Carmen E. Luna, a budget analyst for the City of Los Angeles backed by Quezada. Four other candidates for the post lacked organizational support and showed little promise as serious contenders.

Marguerite Archie-Hudson was attempting to demonstrate her independence from the Board majority by demanding, along with Garvin, a tough evaluation of Koltai and by
voting against the second layoff action. She said she had supported the previous layoffs because of the need to restructure class offerings to attract more students, and recent enrollment increases upheld her view. She wanted the colleges' offerings to be more flexible to meet the needs of changing enrollments, and she had been a strong supporter of Southwest and Mission Colleges. One of Archie-Hudson's union-backed opponents, Julia Wu, said the main issue in the campaign was mismanagement. She sought a new funding formula so more funds would be available for instructional programs, favored relocating the District headquarters to a college campus, and wanted to attract more recent immigrants to the low-fee programs of the colleges. Friedman, the other AFT candidate, said "demoralization" was being promoted by the current Board, and he favored faculty retirement incentives and administrative reductions. The final candidate was Marjorie Davis, a USC student and former student body president at Trade-Tech (Anderluh, April 13, 1987; Kim, March 14, 1987; Littlejohn, April 12, 1987; Pollack, April 1, 1987; Ramos, March 29 and April 12, 1987; Read On, April 8, 1987; 1; and Washington, February 22 and April 12, 1987).

The April 12 election results revealed the strength of the union. Garvin was reelected with a comfortable 62.5 percent of the votes, while Richman lost even the opportunity to remain in the run-off election. He was beaten by AFT-backed Knox with 38 percent and Trade-Tech instructor Hollingsworth with 22 percent. Richman was third with 17.5 percent and Orozco fourth with 14.7 percent of the vote. Archie-Hudson's 49.1 percent meant that less than one percent of the voters had forced her into a run-off election with Wu. The two AFT candidates in this race, Wu with 22.5 percent and Friedman with 19.4 percent, had together garnered 41.9 percent of the vote. In the one competition without an incumbent, the union-supported candidate, Lopez-Lee, received 38 percent to Ferraro's 23.3 percent, placing them in a run-off election. Quezada's endorsed candidate, Luna, came in fourth place with slightly more than ten percent of the vote. In each of the races, with the exception of Garvin's, the candidate or candidates supported by the union garnered about 40 percent of the votes cast. The AFT's challenge now in the three races yet to be decided was to attract enough of the votes away from the defeated candidates' supporters to boost its three candidates over the necessary 50 percent in the June 3 election (Courier, April, 1987).

As the run-off election campaign got under way, the union increasingly came to value Julia Wu's associations with the state's Republican leadership. At the beginning of her primary campaign, in January, she had met with Governor Deukmajian to discuss the condition of the community colleges, and she had continued to meet with various area Republican leaders and groups to win their support both for her candidacy and for the community colleges. The May 20 Read On indicated that Wu had met with the Governor's sister to discuss the importance of community colleges and their funding needs just three days before Deukmajian announced a $140 million increase in community college appropriations for the following fiscal year. While the AFT stopped short of attributing the governor's new generosity for the colleges to Wu's visit, it was cited as one among several factors for which the union and its Republican candidate were responsible. The AFT, however, was not the only element within the District that realized that an adversarial role vis-à-vis the Governor had been unwise and was now trying now to mend fences. Koltai had contracted with a prominent Republican lobbyist, Donald Livingstone, to get to know the Los Angeles District and its problems and to provide some liaison for the District with the Governor and his administration (Read On, May 20, 1987 and Washington, April 9, 1987).

As a Los Angeles Times article observed, much of the campaign focused "on a person whose name did not appear on [the] ballot--Chancellor Leslie Koltai." One candidate in each of the three races supported getting rid of Koltai. Among the union candidates, Wu
was the only one to espouse this position and said that the chancellor's contract should not be renewed. Hollingsworth called for the immediate ouster of the chancellor and called for "new leadership" in the District. The most strident candidate on the issue was Ferraro, who devoted much of his campaign to criticizing what he called district mismanagement under Koltai and who favored the immediate removal of the chancellor and other administrators. Candidates Archie-Hudson, Knox, and Lopez-Lee, however, were closer to Garvin's position on the issue, which was that Koltai needed to quickly produce some changes in policy. Knox wanted a comprehensive review of the financial practices of the chancellor and his administration. Lopez-Lee called for an evaluation of "the crucial problem" of the central administration and said he would "work to remove anyone who has lost the confidence and respect of the district" (Littlejohn, June 1, 1987; Los Angeles Times, June 1, 1987; Ramos, June 1 and June 3, 1987; and Warnock, June 1, 1987).

Shortly before the primary election, the trustees had evaluated Koltai. While the evaluation was conducted in a closed session of the Board, its two principal backers, Archie-Hudson and Garvin, spoke candidly about it to the press. Archie-Hudson described the process as the toughest and most formal evaluation made in the 15 years Koltai had served as chancellor. Garvin said that Koltai had not really been evaluated before. What had been used in the past "consisted of an evaluation around the table as the contract was being renewed." An unnamed trustee source said, "the board has for the first time asked Koltai expressly to outline goals and objectives which they will discuss with the chancellor in the not too distant future." Archie-Hudson indicated that most of the trustees thought Koltai had "done pretty well," but that they wanted him "to do a better job of forecasting financial and educational problems and planning to offset those problems." She also said that Koltai was told he needed to be more effective at involving the trustees and college presidents in running the District, and he must improve his relationship with the Legislature.

The evaluation was undertaken to determine whether or not Koltai's four-year contract should be renewed. The contract would not expire until June, 1988, but normally the trustees had extended it by two years at the midpoint of the previous agreement. This meant that Koltai always had the protection of at least two years to run on his contract. The midpoint in his current agreement had fallen in summer of 1986 when the district was in the midst of the turmoil over layoffs, and the renewal was delayed. Koltai had requested a renewal again in October, but it was postponed once more. When he was finally evaluated in early April, 1987, the trustees decided not to extend the contract until enough time had passed to determine whether Koltai had acted on the Board's instructions.

On May 6, about a month before the runoff election, Koltai announced that he would not ask for a contract renewal until after the new trustees took office in July. He said he preferred "to have a contract presented to me by the people I plan to work with for the next two to four years." Board President Albertson said Koltai should not have to wait for a new contract, and that she had favored renewing it last year. She thought it was unfair to him for his contract "to be left to run this late," and that Koltai was "the best chancellor in the nation and we are lucky to have him." AFT President Fox said the new trustees would want "some flexibility," which they would not have if the decision was made before they were in office. AFT Executive Secretary Hittelman stated that the new trustees "will have a mandate to look seriously at the management of the district," but he already thought the Chancellor was "in trouble," because of "serious problems and a lack of confidence" in Koltai's management. Koltai said he thought he could work with the union-backed candidates and win a new contract from them, but he could not allow himself to be controlled by the AFT: "I can't walk every step, doing what the union tells me to do. I manage the district, not the union" (Washington, April 9, 1987 and May 7, 1987).
On June 2, the union-backed candidates made a clean sweep of all three board positions. David Lopez-Lee achieved the largest majority with 57.6 percent to Ferraro's 42.4 percent. Archie-Hudson's eight years on the Board ended with Julia Wu winning 54.4 percent of the votes to her 45.6 percent. Wally Knox won with 53 percent of the votes to Hollingsworth's 47 percent. Along with Hal Garvin, they would comprise a majority of the newly constituted Board of Trustees when it would meet on July 15. AFT members had contributed approximately $100,000 and devoted thousands of hours to the victorious campaign. In "Anatomy of a Victory," AFT's post-election publication, the campaign was described as "well-organized, confident, competent, and enthusiastic."6 (AFT, 1987b; 11; and City Board of Election Commissioners).

The newly elected trustees said their principal focus was on reversing the direction of the troubled District, and they needed to decide what to do about Koltai. Even Wu was now not entirely certain about her stand on the Chancellor. Shortly after her victory, she said, "I'd like to review his record and his performance before I can make any decision." Koltai himself immediately set about winning over the new board members by sending them congratulatory telegrams and holding meetings with the AFT, trying to resolve differences prior to the time the new board members would be seated.

While momentous changes would be set into motion by the events of 1986-87, at least in one way the year ended as it had begun. At the June 17 Board meeting, as Fallo was reporting on the improved financial picture, the proposal to double the Board's salaries was reintroduced, this time by Trustee Bronson. He hoped to get the necessary four votes before the new board took over, assuming the freshmen board members would be unlikely to raise their own salaries shortly after being sworn in. The outgoing Board did not authorize the pay increase. Within four months of taking over, however, the new Board decided that the weekly meetings and the committee system they had just instituted warranted a doubling of their compensation, and the $24,000 pay increase was passed (Read On, November 4, 1987; 2; Warnick, June 4, 1987 and Washington, June 4 and June 8, 1987).

* * * * *

The Board election of 1987 was one of the most important in the history of the District. It was even of greater significance than the election of 1975, when the defeat of two conservative trustees by two liberals changed the political complexion of the Board. Only the initial Board election in 1969, which established the governing body of the District and led to so much chaos and conflict in the early years, can be said to have matched or exceeded the consequences of the election of 1987. Never had so many new Trustees come onto the Board at one time since the founding Board had taken office; and never had the election of Trustees been the result of such profound dissatisfaction with actions of the Board and the District administration. The impact of the new majority's takeover would resound throughout the District for years to come.

---

6 This curious publication resonated with both pride and paranoia. One trustee characterized it as saying, "We lied, we cheated, we deceived, but we had to. When working with the Mandarin Court, you must be like the Mandarin Court."
V. Enrollment

A. 1986-87

For Fall, 1986 community college enrollments at national, State and District levels began to recover and to climb. The growth at these three levels was inversely related to the decline of the last several years. At the national level, where enrollment losses had been the least, the growth for Fall 1986 was 3.4 percent; for the California Community Colleges, which suffered a proportionally larger decline, the increase was now 7.7 percent; but for the Los Angeles District, whose decrease had been a catastrophe, enrollment bounced back by over 11 percent.

In Fall, 1986 the District enrolled 10,310 more students than in Fall 1985, for a total of 103,336. The increase was led by Mission College, which built on the previous year's growth and achieved a 44.1 percent gain. In one year, Mission had moved from an enrollment roughly equivalent to what it had in 1980 to the largest enrollment in its history. Southwest and West, the two colleges with the greatest percentage losses but now with new leadership, scored the next largest increases, with 38.8 percent and 32.4 percent, respectively. These three small colleges not only posted the largest percentage increases, but led in absolute growth, with the single exception that Valley College's increase of 1906 students put it squarely in the competition. West topped even that figure with 2,117 more students, Mission grew by 1507, and Southwest by 1,188 students. The remaining colleges all had enrollment increases, the smallest percentage growth being at Trade-Tech with 3.7. Evening enrollments grew more (16.8 percent) than the day (7.4 percent), and Mission and West had more students enrolled in their evening programs than during the day.

The WSCH increase (7.3 percent) was not in most cases as great as that in students, except at Mission, which was now teaching nearly two-thirds more contact hours (63.3 percent) than in Fall, 1985. Southwest and West had about a quarter more, 25.4 percent and 24.6 percent, respectively. All the other colleges showed WSCH growth, except for Trade-Tech, which lost 0.7 percent. The difference between day and evening WSCH was even more pronounced than were enrollments, with a 19.6 percent increase in the evening and only 1.9 percent in the day. All of this indicated that the colleges were regaining the part-time evening students, who had deserted the colleges more than any other group (Board of Trustees, “Reports,” Communication No. A., “Fall 1986 Final First Census,” November 12, 1986; 1-4).

The growth in enrollment for Spring, 1987 compared to Spring, 1986 was nearly as great as it had been in the fall. Enrollment reached 96,492, an increase of 9003 students or 10.3 percent. This time West led in enrollment growth with a 41.3 percent increase, Southwest was second with 30.6 percent, and Mission was third with 19.9 percent. All of the colleges were doing better than they had the year before, but the normal spring semester slump meant that enrollments were not as large as in the fall. The WSCH growth compared to 1986 was slightly less than the enrollment, at 6.7 percent. The difference between day and evening increases for both enrollment and WSCH were less pronounced than they had been in the fall. Every college enjoyed some growth in both the day and the evening and in both enrollment and WSCH, with the single exception of Trade-Tech's day WSCH, which dropped by 2.5 percent. The experience of the two semesters showed that a solid and lasting improvement in enrollment had taken place throughout all colleges, in both day and evening programs and in WSCH as well as in enrollment (Board of Trustees, “Reports,” Communication No. A, “First Census Enrollment and Weekly Student Contact Hours (WSCH) Comparison of Spring 1986 and 1987”, April 15, 1987; 1-4).
B. Enrollment Decline and Reversal, 1981-87

During four years of declining enrollments, between Fall 1981 and Fall 1985, the District lost over 40,000 students,\(^7\) which by the latter date made it smaller than it had been in 1969, when the separate district was founded. City and Trade-Technical Colleges were at enrollment levels lower than those of the early 1960's. East had not been so small since 1964, Valley since 1967, and Harbor since 1968. Among the older and larger colleges, only Pierce had an enrollment comparable to that of the early 1970's. The smaller and newer colleges had enrollments similar to those in their early years, with Southwest nearly down to its 1970 level, only four years after it was founded, and West below its enrollment for 1974, when it was five years old. While Mission had begun to grow in Fall, 1985, it was still at about the same size as 1980, when it had been operating for just five years (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1987b; 17).

Why did enrollment drop so drastically in the Los Angeles Community College District? Numerous explanations were suggested for the enrollment losses during this period, some national in scope, some statewide, and some strictly local:

- The pool of high school graduates was diminishing.
- The improved economy attracted students and potential students away from community colleges and into the work force.
- Reduced funding cut course offerings.
- News reports made the colleges' plight and the reductions in courses and student services seem worse than they actually were.
- Mandatory student fees, regardless of the amount, now charged students for something that was formerly free.
- Some students were confused about what “units” were, which led them to believe the new fees were much higher than they actually were.
- Drop fees continued to be collected in addition to enrollment fees.
- The state imposed various reforms, such as academic and progress probation and disqualification.
- The District tightened and expanded its admissions and placement processes.

A Trustee described the situation as one where, in certain ways, the District had “shot itself in the foot.” The early start of the semester in Fall 1984 altered the registration period so that it was in competition with the Olympics, summer jobs, and whatever else students normally did until after Labor Day. The semester was no longer in sync with the public schools’ calendar, and mothers were confronted with the problem of starting their college classes without anywhere to send their children for three weeks. The unwieldy situation that grew out of financial aid centralization caused confusion and delay at a time when even more students needed this assistance. And, finally, as explained in the previous section,

\(^7\) Because the District provides data for such long-term comparisons using fall statistics only, they are used in this analysis. However, since Spring 1986 enrollment was even smaller than Fall 1985, the actual situation for the District was slightly worse than what is presented here.
the exodus of District students to neighboring community colleges was encouraged by
dropping interdistrict permits, after which the flood of student outmigration could not be
stopped (Office of Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1986a; 1; and Office

Examining the dramatic decline in enrollment between 1981 and 1985 from a longer
perspective demonstrates that the large colleges experienced dissimilar enrollment patterns
from those of the small colleges. The five large colleges (City, East, Pierce, Valley, and
Trade-Tech) never regained their enrollment peak, reached in 1975, even though total
District enrollment finally exceeded that figure in 1981. One District analysis credited much
of the enrollment growth during the late 1970s early 1980s to the small colleges (Harbor,
Mission, Southwest, and West). Actually, during the growth years following Proposition
13 (Fall 1979 through 1981), the five large colleges grew by 9254 students, while the four
small ones added 5552 enrollments to the District total. The small colleges grew
appreciably in terms of percentages, but not as much as the large colleges in absolute
numbers. The main period during which the small colleges changed in size relative to the
large ones was from Fall 1975 to 1978, when the larger colleges declined by 15,696
students and the smaller colleges grew by 3913. The small colleges, unlike the large ones,
were able to grow, even when faced with the growth cap imposed for 1976. (Office of
Educational Planning and Resource Development, 1986b; 36-37).

Enrollments at the three smallest colleges were the most erratic during the crisis period.
They reached their peak enrollments in different years: West in 1980, Southwest in 1981,
and Mission not until 1982. In Fall 1981, when the whole District grew only by three
percent, Mission gained 24 percent and Southwest 15 percent, while West lost five percent
of its students. Mission continued it rapid growth, with 14 percent, into Fall 1982, while
Southwest began its downward trend with an 11 percent loss, and the District as a whole
declined only a moderate three percent. Mission experienced a considerable enrollment loss
of 16 percent in Fall 1983, while West went down by 18 percent and Southwest by 13
percent, all three exceeding the District decrease of 12 percent. Southwest set records for
student losses with a large 29 percent drop in Fall 1984 and then with an even larger 31
percent loss in Fall 1985. These represented multiples of the District average decreases of
14 percent and nine percent for those two years.

By 1985, Mission College, with a small increase of two percent, was the first college in the
District to begin regaining enrollment. The next fall, all three of the smallest colleges set
growth records with Mission at 44 percent, Southwest at 39 percent, and West at 32
percent, while the whole District grew a healthy 11 percent. Not only did the three smallest
colleges outpace the other colleges in proportional increases, but they also led in absolute
growth, with the single exception that Valley College had the second largest numerical
increase with 1906 students. West topped even that figure with 2,117 more students,
Mission grew by 1507, and Southwest by 1,188 students. Just why Mission continued its
growth longer and began to regain it earlier cannot be determined. Nor can the reasons for
Southwest and West losing such hefty proportions of their students. Their rebounds in
enrollment took place after new administrations were installed, and the resulting
revitalizations of the colleges must be considered as a major factor in the reversed fortunes
of the two institutions.

The reasons for the positive turnaround in enrollments during 1986-87 were as complicated
and elusive as were the causes of the enrollment decline in the first place. A UCLA
researcher, Wellford W. Wilms, in Marketing Strategies for Changing Times, gives a
wonderfully simplistic explanation: "When Leslie Koltai . . . was suddenly faced with a 30

8 Percentages have been rounded to the nearest whole percentage point.
percent enrollment decline, he began cutting underenrolled programs and expanding those in demand. The district invested in mass advertising and direct mail, thus reversing the tide and registering an 11 percent enrollment gain in the fall [semester] of 1986" (Wilms and Moore, 1987; 13). Wilms' explanation is not so much wrong as it is incomplete.

The "Overview" in the 1986-87 College Annual Reports, said that "Enrollment growth can be credited in large measure to changes in policy and procedures at both college and district levels; most of these initiatives were enacted during the previous year in response to the enrollment decline." Colleges "made vigorous efforts to increase their visibility in the community" through a great many techniques. "Greater resources were allocated to disciplines that showed stronger enrollment during the previous year, while weaker programs were reduced or phased out, and their faculty reassigned." The early start of the semester was discontinued. "Finally, and most significantly, new programs were developed and expanded in response to changing student needs." The "Overview" pointed to PACE as the "most conspicuously successful of these new programs," which was expanded at Harbor and Mission and initiated at four other colleges. Besides PACE, most success was realized by basic transfer and general education disciplines like English, math, and Spanish, and basic skills offerings, especially English as a second language (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1988a: 1-2). The "Overview" does not mention the action taken to return most of the processing of financial aid applications to the campuses nor the factor that the net loss of District students to neighboring colleges had stabilized for a second year.

All these actions taken by the District and the colleges no doubt had a major impact on reversing the enrollment situation. On the other hand, just as the actions by the District and the colleges cannot account for the extreme enrollment losses from 1981 to 1985, neither can they explain the dramatic reversal during 1986-87. Trustees and District researchers will seek in vain for direct cause-and-effect relationships between District and college actions and enrollment results. Enrollment figures for the District partially mirrored those of the State and the nation; however, both in losses and in gains, the State percentages magnified those of the nation, and the District's figures were exaggerations of both. The factors that might explain why students enroll and in which courses are too subtle and complex to conform to easy explanations. Would that college decision makers actually lived in Wilms' wonderfully simplistic world.
CHAPTER SIX

The Colleges in Crisis, 1985-87

The year 1985-86 was the last of five consecutive years of decline in college enrollments. It was also a year of extreme limitations on budget and staffing, because the District was reeling from the 1984-85 deficit and the unwillingness of the State to provide a loan. In September, colleges were required to return large portions of already inadequate budgets to enable the District to help balance the total budget. One college administrator expressed a common though not necessarily accurate observation: "It seems as though the District decides what it needs for the District Office and other purposes and then divides whatever is left over for the colleges to use in trying to educate students."

The next year, 1986-87, brought a dramatic turnaround in enrollment, but it also confronted the colleges with a new and some would say even a worse set of problems, as described in the Harbor College Annual Report: "During 1986-87 Harbor College was caught between two opposing forces. Budget restrictions required that course offerings be reduced, while simultaneously more students were enrolling in the college." Or, as one college administrator put it, "The only thing worse than enrollment losses during a time of severe budget limitations is enrollment gains" (Office of Research, Planning, and Analysis, 1988a; 59).

I. Staffing

During the earlier periods, colleges were forced to adjust to reduced staffs because employees who retired or resigned were often not replaced. However, in the 1985-87 period, colleges suffered a greater dislocation of staff than ever before. This was caused by layoffs of classified personnel; layoffs, transfers to new locations, reassignments to new disciplines, and then recalling most faculty; plus almost total changes in certificated administrative staffs at Southwest and West, which had repercussions throughout the District. Koltai claimed that the administrators who were reassigned to those two colleges in March, 1986, were hand picked by the new presidents, Lakin and Thor. However, the two presidents later described the process as one of compromise with Koltai over who would be the new administrators, to help lead the colleges back from near collapse. These administrators for Southwest and West had to be taken from other colleges; the ones who were being transfer away from the two colleges had to be placed elsewhere; and other adjustments in locations and assignments had to be made throughout the District in order that the transfers to and from West and Southwest could take place.

The effects of these administrative changes on the various colleges differed. Mission College, with only six certificated administrators, had both of its academic affairs administrators sent to other colleges. One administrator each from West and Southwest were transferred to Mission. All but one of the administrators who remained at the college were either in acting positions or reassigned to new duties, so that only the assistant dean of student services was permanent in his position and still doing what he had been prior to the administrative reshuffling. At Pierce, where Wolf had replaced Ravetch on July 1, 1985, the college received three transferred administrators, which required a complete reorganization of the administrative staff.
Other administrative changes, which took place in 1986-87 and did not relate to Southwest and West, included one we have already noted, the transfer to the District Office of City College President Feuers, as well as two others: The sudden death of City’s vice president of administration, Dorothy Hata, whose position was filled by a District Office administrator; and the resignation of Harbor’s Dean Dell Anderson, a leader in student services at the college, District, and State levels, who left to assume a vice presidency outside the District (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 84; and 1988a; 8 and 59).

Even more disturbing to the colleges than the administrative changes were dislocations of faculty which resulted from the layoff attempts. Scores of instructors were either reassigned to teach in a different discipline at the same college, were transferred to teach in the same discipline at another college, or were both transferred in location and reassigned to teach a new subject. Many other faculty passed the summer assuming they were laid off, only to be recalled just as the fall semester began, because of the surge in enrollment. Instructors were also affected by programs discontinued by the Board, or which were being phased out, so that students already in them would not be affected.

The nursing programs at City and West were phased out in 1986-87, and the allied health programs of dental assisting, nuclear medical technology, occupational therapy, and ophthalmic optics were closed down. The nursing faculty at City were transferred to other District nursing programs, except for two who retired, and the allied health instructors were reassigned to other disciplines, either at City or at other colleges. West added a special summer session in 1986 to permit the graduation of all enrollees by June, 1987. The effects of the nursing instructor layoffs can be demonstrated by the situation at Harbor College, which even though its program was not being closed, its faculty was affected because of seniority considerations: “Of the seven faculty members originally slated for layoffs, three members received final termination notices but were rehired as long term substitutes; two were reassigned to the Counseling Department; one was transferred to L. A. Pierce College; and one was rehired into nursing.” Such mixed fortunes befell the members of many instructional departments throughout the District (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1988a; 9, 62, and 208).

II. Funding

Besides the many personnel changes during this period, the colleges had to confront the problems and challenges of ever-limited resources. Libraries still suffered the consequences of declining staffs and increasing costs for books, periodicals and other materials. During 1985-86, West lost three classified employees in the library and learning center, none of whom were replaced, and had an acquisitions budget that was only a half what it had been three years before. The number of volumes in the City College library declined during 1985-86, because of an active weeding program and book thefts, but library use increased, largely because classes participated in a new library skills examination. The next year, City’s no-growth situation was alleviated somewhat by a slight increase in budget, gifts, and proceeds from a book sale. That same year, East used a larger budget allocation to significantly increase the reference collection. Trade-Tech’s library was able to purchase 58 percent more books in 1985-86 than the year before, though use of the library was down by 25 percent. The next year its acquisitions had to be cut back by 30 percent.

Several libraries reported in their Annual Reports that the use of computers increased. Harbor’s library was engaged in the computer automation of its resources, with 20,000 titles or about 25 percent of the collection being converted to machine readable form. The
college was moving toward automated circulation and an on-line catalog. Valley used an award from the Chancellor's Library Development Fund to purchase a microcomputer and three-year subscription to a CD-ROM database, which was used to catalog new materials and convert the existing card catalog to machine readable form for possible future automation (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 11, 51, 122, 139-40, and 157; and 1988a; 12, 38, 64, 161, and 183-84).

Admissions and records continued to lose staff, and Pierce College helped to counter the problem by beginning a volunteer program, in which over 100 students worked 12 hours or more during registration for being allowed to register early. Admissions and records services once again benefited from computerized improvements. An on-line transcript system was instituted, which allowed City College to transfer staff, which had been updating student records with labels, to the transcript activity. This, plus the automated system, "reduced the turnaround time for transcript processing from six weeks to one week" (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 88; and 1988a; 14 and 114).

Vocational and technical programs were once again particularly effective in attracting large amounts of special funding, while other areas of the colleges remained impoverished. Valley College's engineering and office administration continued to attract major grants from the Employment Training Panel (ETP). For 1985-86 nearly a million dollars was awarded to update the CAD/CAM laboratories and to operate a mobile laboratory with 25 personal computers for office automation training at major employment sites. The next year the two programs received nearly a half million dollars. Trade-Tech raised over $1.2 million in 1985-86, of which over $650,000 was awarded from the Vocational Education Act (VEA) for new equipment and for re-entry, tutoring, and handicapped services. Another $650,000 came from the ETP for computer-assisted apparel grading equipment, instructor salaries, and an electronic telecommunications technology program. In 1986-87, the college received $600,000 in VEA funds and an ETP grant for apparel grading, marketing, and pattern development (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 127 and 136-37; and 1988a; 167).

Ironically, in a year when Southwest's administration was ousted because enrollments were so devastated, the college was setting records in having grant proposals funded. One of these was $3.5 million from the U. S. Department of Education (Title III), which was "the largest grant received by a single college in the LACCD in over ten years." Southwest was the only college in California to be funded under this special needs program, and one of only 14 in the entire country. The project would provide a management information system for administration, a computerized "attrition control" system for student services, and faculty and curriculum development for drafting, allied health, electronics, word processing, mathematics, languages, and the sciences. Another major grant was $1 million from the State Employment Development Department, the largest the agency funded that year. The Southwest Employment Referral and Vocational Education (SERVE) Center was a one-step community service, in which the local inner-city population was provided assessments, job placements, and referrals for basic skills and vocational education to Southwest and other educational institutions. A mobile assessment and training unit brought the services of the Center to outreach locations on a regular basis (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 99 and 108).

The colleges also continued to go after other sources of revenues, such as foreign student tuition, associated student organizations, and foundations. In 1986-87, City College established the International Student Center to facilitate the use of college services by foreign students and to retain these students in college programs. City enrolled more foreign students than any college in the District, and the contingent had grown from 140 students in 1981 to 546 in 1986. Non-residents of California could be charged the full cost
of instruction and other services and this now amounted to $1214 per semester. The associated student organizations at the colleges continued to underwrite those services the organizations wished to assure for their members and the colleges continued to work with the foundations to secure gifts and other forms of support. When Wolf reorganized the Pierce administration in 1985-86, he felt that working with the foundation, grant writing, and fund raising were responsibilities significant enough to warrant establishing a position of dean of development. This had been a common post at the colleges during the 1970's, but what remained of them had been discontinued with the administrative reorganization of 1982 (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 17 and 126; and 1988a; 17, 106, and 119).

III. Programs

Colleges emphasized transfer education through the Project for Adult College Education (PACE) Program, honors programs, the Transfer Alliance Program (TAP), and Transfer Centers. PACE was first offered in the District by Harbor College in 1981, was adopted by Mission College in 1985, and expanded to East, Pierce, Southwest, and West in 1986. The program offered working adults the opportunity to complete an associate’s degree in five semesters by taking course work one evening each week and on every other Saturday, and by viewing televised and videotaped materials. The classes were team taught, interdisciplinary, and organized around a theme each semester. The program had a strong humanities and transfer emphasis. Harbor had built up its PACE enrollment to 550 students by 1985 and Mission initiated its program with nearly 200 students that first semester. By the time the other four colleges began their PACE programs, Harbor’s had grown to 750 students and in one year Mission’s program was even larger.

Faculty at some of the offering institutions were critical of a transfer program that did not require any more time in class than the PACE program did. An evaluation of PACE programs, conducted by the District in 1989, found that students tended to be older, more often female, and more often black than non-PACE students. PACE faculty indicated that the students were “more mature, more committed to educational goals, better class participants and better at completing class assignments.” An analysis of the rigor in the PACE courses found that a significant number of assignments were required and these included substantial writing requirements. Long-term retention in the program far exceeded that for other students and black PACE students had “a much greater retention rate than their counterparts in the regular program.” Perhaps most important for the colleges was that the PACE program added a sizable contingent of serious transfer students, who persevered in their college programs and then tended to actually transfer to four-year institutions (Hudson, 1989; 1-2; Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 49 and 74; and 1988a; 32, 60, 100, 108, and 206).

In Fall, 1985 UCLA, in cooperation with eight of the LACCD colleges (excluding only Mission), initiated the Transfer Alliance Program (TAP). This program grew out of UCLA’ concern about the small number of community college students who were transferring to the University and the large number of fully qualified students UCLA was having to turn away from admission as freshmen. President Mary Lee at Valley had been investigating the problem of full time transfer students who were unable to complete their programs in two years, not only because of the limited number of second-year courses offered but because too often these courses were scheduled during the same time periods. The TAP curricula, established at each of the participating colleges, sought to rectify both of these problems and to insure that students would receive courses similar in rigor and content to what was being offered at UCLA. Each college established a “core curriculum” which was guaranteed to be scheduled so that students could complete their programs in
two years and the second year classes would be offered regardless of how many students were enrolled or of fiscal considerations. Students could enter the programs either by being "redirected" to them, after having applied to UCLA, or applying to them while enrolled in the community colleges. Rigorous standards of achievement were maintained in the programs and students who completed them were guaranteed priority admission at the junior level in the College of Letters and Sciences at UCLA. Several of the colleges either transformed existing honors programs or began new ones that served as their version of the TAP curriculum. Programs were small at the beginning, enrolling between 30 and 100 students. The colleges saw TAP as another source of committed and successful transfer students and began to develop similar arrangements with California State University campuses (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 8-9, 49, 85, and 155; and 1988a; 15, 31, 59, 108, 177, and 207; Wheeler, 1985; ).

Transfer Centers had been opened at six of the colleges: City, East, Harbor, Pierce, Valley, and West. These were among 17 in the state receiving supplemental funding. The centers provided counseling and other services to students who wanted to transfer to senior institutions, and made students "aware of the transfer opportunities available to them." Related programs had been funded by grants totaling $175,000 from the Ford Foundation. Harbor received $80,000 to develop a directory of outstanding students from underrepresented groups attending Harbor and 13 other colleges in greater Los Angeles. The directory was distributed to four-year institutions to assist with their recruitment efforts. An $80,000 grant went to City College for a two-year program to develop an honors transfer program and West was awarded $15,000 for a two-year study of declared transfer students (Koltai, 1986; 9-11).

Developments in vocational education concentrated on new equipment and improved facilities, especially for the computerization of programs; revised curriculum; and special centers to better serve business and labor. Technical programs at Southwest obtained new equipment and improved and expanded facilities. Title III funds were used by the college to initiate a new computer-aided drafting program through the purchase of "a turn key system which consisted of a mainframe, ten terminals, and peripherals," as well as faculty training. Software was contributed by a subsidiary of Lockheed. East Los Angeles College's campus newspaper, which served as the laboratory publication for the journalism program, had to contend with a production budget in 1985-86 that was only 30 percent of 1978, discounting for inflation. The program reduced production costs by purchasing computerized typesetting equipment and became one of only two colleges in the state to move to desktop publishing. West Los Angeles College used Vocational Education Act funds to purchase computers and other equipment and to combine the word processing laboratory with the computer center for a larger and better equipped facility. Trade-Tech's Annual Report indicated that "...microcomputers became integral learning tools in several areas," including sciences and mathematics, as well as vocational programs. Computer literacy courses were developed in the Industrial Resources Laboratory and computer graphics courses were added to the commercial arts program. Valley College used special funding to develop and support the Center for Computer Assisted Instruction in Vocational Instruction (CCAIVE). This included a tutorial program which combined the use of computers and tutors to better prepare occupational students for success in their classes.

For some programs, the availability of special funds to buy more and newer equipment determined whether or not those programs could remain competitive. East determined that much of the 50 percent enrollment loss in business data processing over a two-year period was due to the lack of up-to-date equipment and training for the technical staff. The college's office administration program attempted to counter declining enrollments by opening a word processing laboratory, which worked only temporarily because of the limitations of a 16-student-station facility. Harbor College purchased new computers from
State equipment funds for the architectural drafting, nursing, and business programs, but limited staffing restricted the hours the computer laboratories could be open. East's Nursing Laboratory, which had added computers, was able to stay open five days per week, only because of volunteer staffing (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 29-31, 101-02, and 156; and 1988a; 34, 61-2, and 155).

Vocational programs were both initiated and revised. Mission College received State approval for its new legal assisting program. City College's office administration programs "developed short term, concentrated courses to speed skill development, using electric typewriters, a variety of word processors, and IBM personal computers." Based on advisory committee recommendations, Trade-Technical College incorporated a pre-engineering transfer program into its electrical construction engineering program, began a pre-technology program for high school students, completed major revisions in the nursing curriculum, and integrated a variety of courses into a single culinary arts program. Pierce, which was begun as an agricultural college, came to realize that increasing costs and changing student interests could turn a legacy into a liability. Any hint of selling a portion of the college's 400-plus acres, which were being eyed greedily by developers, evoked a fervent public protest. The new president began working directly with the agricultural faculty to review curriculum and determine how best to use the farm lands. The purpose of the resulting revitalization study was "to bring the farm expenses within the greatly reduced budget and to move agricultural education into new directions appropriate for the last years of the 20th century." Four years later, the college was still struggling with these difficult issues (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 9, 86, and 119; and 1988a; 80 and 111).

The colleges continued to find ways to work more closely and effectively with business and labor. In conjunction with Pacific Bell, City College began a state-wide associate's degree program, taught at the company's work sites. West developed a College for Small Businesses, "to offer a course of study specially designed to provide for successful management of today's small businesses." Special funding enabled Valley to open a Center for Advancement of Business, Labor and Education (CABLE), which provided enrollment and revenues for the college "through creative partnerships with business and labor" (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 21, 136-37, and 165; and 1988a; 179).

IV. Recruitment

The extent to which the former presidents contributed to the catastrophic declines at Southwest and West, or failed to head them off, cannot be determined. However, regardless of that, what was apparent was that the new presidents and their administrations quickly imbued the two colleges with enthusiasm and optimism. The Board had been quite candid with Lakin and Thor that their permanent presidencies depended on them bringing about the necessary changes so that the two colleges would begin immediately to regain lost enrollments. Both of the new presidents had attractive personalities and assertive management styles and they promptly undertook marketing strategies to recruit and retain students.

At Southwest Lakin established the Recruitment and Marketing Task Force, a committee of faculty, students, and administrators. The task force conducted demographic analyses as a basis for developing special programs aimed at the increasing Hispanic population of the area; hosted a news conference-reception for the new president; mailed recruitment materials to a newly constituted list of potential students; and produced a videotape and booklet for fall orientation. Lakin began to make regular visits to the local high schools.
At least as important as the recruitment activities were the new and rejuvenated programs and services instituted at the college. Many of these have already been described in this section. For example, Southwest was among the four colleges that began PACE programs in Fall, 1987. A new English as a Second Language Program was offered to better serve the needs of Latino students, and a bilingual/bicultural teacher aide program was revived to appeal to that population. Lakin made full use of the large grants which the college had received for the SERVE Center and from Title III. Other changes he undertook included special sections of college classes for high school students, a Learning Skills Institute to administer developmental programs and the Learning Center, and curriculum review to determine the appropriateness of courses and to improve their content.

At West Thor drew on her public relations background and arranged for an opinion research firm to conduct an extensive community survey, to determine how the college was perceived and what steps needed to be taken to improve the college's image. The survey discovered that the college did not have a bad image, but rather, for many area residents the institution had no image at all. The main negative factor was the mistaken impression that the campus was unsafe. Extensive public information and recruitment efforts were undertaken and "were directed at building upon positive factors while raising the visibility of the College in the community and among local businesses." A modified class schedule was mailed to 225,000 homes in the college's service area, a lighted marquee was erected at the entrance to the campus, and a series of College Success Seminars were conducted for graduating high school seniors and their parents. At West, as well as at Southwest, new and modified programs, such as PACE, were important in attracting and holding students (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 109; and 1988a; 130 and 219-20).

The other seven colleges were also active in public information and student recruitment activities. In 1984-85 the remaining public information officers had been centralized at the District Office, which meant that each campus had only part-time public information assistance with its projects. Even with these reduced services, according to several of the 1985-86 Annual Reports, the colleges continued to provide numerous news releases and public service announcements to the media and to publish a variety of recruitment and other promotional materials. For example, City College reported that more that 150 news releases were sent to about 100 media outlets and Trade-Tech estimated that its public service announcements resulted in over $45,000 of contributed time on radio stations. Valley College was designated as the District-wide service center for printing and distributing schedules, catalogs, and off-campus mailings. Post cards were sent to previous students who had not enrolled and to applicants who had not completed the registration process. A million and a half brochures with information about each of the college's instructional and student programs was printed and 1.2 million of these were distributed through the Los Angeles Times.

Colleges increased their efforts at attracting students directly from high school. This was accomplished by faculty and counselors making regular visits to the high schools, by providing services to students at their high schools, and by inviting high school seniors to come to the college campuses. In 1985-86, Trade-Tech faculty visited 75 high schools and 30 of these schools participated in the college's high school day, with tours, workshops and classes conducted on the college campus. In 1986-87, Valley began testing, counseling, and orienting students at about 15 high school campuses and received more than 1400 applications for Fall, 1987. Valley also hosted the faculty and administrators of six high schools for lunch and an orientation program. Pierce College had instituted its Early Admissions Program in 1984-85 and continued and expanded it during the 1985-87 period. High school seniors were contacted to encourage them to apply to the college in November, the same time that they would be applying to a UC or CSU campus. Students were given the opportunity to visit Pierce, with lunch and transportation provided by the
college. They could complete their assessment testing, have an advisement session with a counselor, and enroll in classes for fall. In 1985-86, 765 seniors enrolled through this program and the next year 1550 applied. Harbor College had a similar project called Early Admissions Project, and had about 200 students apply. Harbor also participated in the California Academic Partnership Program, funded through UCLA, which included junior high schools and high schools and encouraged students to enter a college track at an early educational level.

The colleges began to formalize the organizations responsible for student recruitment. During 1985-86, college recruitment or marketing committees were organized at East, Mission, Trade-Tech, and Valley, to develop strategies and activities for attracting students to the colleges. Trade-Tech established the College Information Center in 1986-87 as part of the student recruitment process, as well as to provide information to all students, staff, and visitors to the campus. It coordinated high school visits and tours for over 1000 prospective students from 30 high schools and furnished the literature used in recruitment. Graduate students in the USC Master's of Business Administration program developed a marketing plan, which was incorporated into the college's strategic plan. At Pierce, marketing activities and budgets were consolidated under the dean of student services. The design of all publications and other printed materials were coordinated and used a common logo, a portable display unit was purchased, and mailing lists were computerized. Recruitment activities were focused on "specific marketing segments," after a follow up survey indicated a low return on mass communications efforts (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 20, 40, 56, 75, 92, 128, and 145-46; and 1988a; 65, 120-21, 168, and 194).

V. Planning

We have already described District Office efforts to encourage and provide services for college planning activities. "A Proposal for Strategic Long-Range Planning at the College Level," and a volume of data and analysis, "Coping with Change: Strategic Planning Issues for Educational Programs and Services in the Los Angeles Community College District, 1985-87" were distributed and a series of Strategic Planning Workshops was held for college planning coordinators. With the single exception of Harbor, all of the colleges engaged in strategic planning activities during 1985-87 to one extent or another. A college-wide strategic planning committee was established at City and it embarked on a three-phase approach to developing a long-range master plan, with one phase completed each year. Valley College used planned institutional goals as a basis for strengthening "the delivery systems that give students the opportunity to complete their educational goals." A Long-Range Planning Analysis Committee identified and discussed what should be addressed in coming years, including demographic changes, curricular offerings for day and evening students, support services for students, library staffing and facilities, and students with special needs.

Southwest College, in its 1985-86 Annual Report, proudly announced that it was "... the first college to develop a long-range, five-year strategic plan to open channels to development funds." Development activities were coordinated by the President's Academic Task Force and a plan was produced that included college goals, behavioral objectives, and a narrative detailing the problems and proposed solutions. Pierce had already developed a new statement of goals and it "laid the groundwork for a strategic planning and management process" in 1985-86. The next year a strategic plan was developed and widely discussed and the first steps of the new process were to be initiated in 1987-88. West already had a planning process under development, but the new president established The Futures Committee, chaired by her and charged with the strategic planning
responsibility for the college. It worked to revise the facilities master plan and the college mission statement and then concentrated its efforts on the capital development of the campus, which had been so long delayed. A property development counselor was hired "to make recommendations for the best use of the Airport Center property and eventual use of property on the WLAC campus." Requests to fund two new buildings were submitted to the State and plans were developed for Phases II and III of campus construction (Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1987a; 18, 91, 108, 126-27, 144, and 163; and 1988a; 21, 119, 217, and 221).

Some college planning efforts were motivated by pressures from accreditation committees, which continued to emphasize the need for planning, regardless of financial pressures on the institutions. The master planning activities at East were conducted in preparation for a Spring, 1986 accreditation visit and the strategic plan at Mission College was developed in response to problems with an earlier accreditation. Mission's 1984 accreditation report required that the institution develop specific goals and objectives, but when a committee revisited the college in April, 1986, it determined that the requirements of the Accreditation Commission had not yet been met. The college president appointed a College Planning Committee, assumed the chair himself, and the committee met weekly until a strategic plan was developed. When the college was once again reviewed by the Accreditation Commission in December, 1986, its Preparing for the 1990's and the Twenty-First Century: A Strategic Plan for Los Angeles Mission College, 1986-91, was considered to have satisfied the Commission's goals and objectives requirements (Los Angeles Mission College, 1986; and Office of Research, Planning and Analysis, 1988a; 92-93).

VI. Mission's Permanent Campus

Mission College, in its quest to finance permanent facilities, had a roller coaster ride of highs and lows during this period. Early in the Fall, 1985, semester, the positive effects of the college initiating the District's second PACE program became apparent. While total District enrollment fell by another 9.1 percent, Mission was the only college to grow, with a two percent increase in enrollment and a larger boost of nine percent in WSCH. However, the State Department of Finance, which conducted enrollment projections to determine the need for State funding, recommended against building the permanent campus. The agency's analysts felt that any growth in the area could be served by the other two San Fernando Valley colleges, Valley and Pierce. Based on this recommendation, the staff and executive director of the California Postsecondary Education Commission also turned down the college's request for approval to receive State funds. Koltai wrote to the Commission, disputing the State's enrollment projections. The college made an end run around CPEC, appealing directly to the State Board of Governors, which normally only considered State funding after colleges had received CPEC approval. In the meantime, at its November 26 meeting, the Board of Trustees approved the sale of the Northwest Valley site to a private development firm for $12,515,000. This was the Board meeting at which Fallo warned the trustees that the District was facing a deficit for 1985-86 as great as that of the previous year unless stringent actions were taken. However, the proceeds from the sale had been restricted for Mission's exclusive use on campus development by State legislation and the Board of Trustee's own resolution (Bates, November 27, 1985; and Moreland and Igler, November 13, 1985).

A delegation of Mission College supporters, led by Acting President Daniel Means, traveled to San Francisco to put the college's case before the Board of Governors' December 5-6 meeting. Guadalupe Ramirez, a 70-year-old great grandmother, said she

---

1 Permanent President Erickson was on a sabbatical leave.
had been fighting for a college in the Northeast San Fernando Valley for 17 years. She warned that many of the students were women taking night classes, and, if required to ride public transportation to one of the other colleges, they would not be back in their homes until nearly midnight. The Board of Governors was still not convinced of the need for another college and expressed some concern about the District's reliability in preserving the funds from the Northwest campus sale exclusively for Mission's use.

The college and its supporters were finally able to gain the approval of the Board of Governors when it reconsidered its action at the January, 1986, meeting; and CPEC also approved the college for State funds in April. This success was achieved by a variety of unusual strategies. These included Assemblyman Richard Katz taking State Chancellor Smith on a ride that traced the long bus routes students would need to take to the other colleges and a written appeal by Chuck Dirks, Mission's AFT chair, which was so convincing the CPEC staff included it in their report to the Commission (CPEC, Agenda, April, 1986, and Moreland, December 6 and December 7, 1985).

CPEC and the Board of Governors had not approved Mission for funding in time for construction funds to be included in the Governor's 1986-87 budget, submitted to the Legislature in January, 1986. Katz was able to amend the $8.9 million for the project into the budget, but the Department of Finance was opposed because the funding had not gone through the normal recommendation process. On June 25, the Governor vetoed the funds for the campus, citing the District's declining enrollment as his reason, and indirectly referring to the recent Grand Jury recommendation that the college should be closed. Two days later, Katz and the college turned out 200 supporters at a rally to protest the Governor's veto. Katz called the veto "a gratuitous cheap shot at the Valley," and continued his efforts throughout the summer to have the Mission project included in a $400 million higher education bond issue to be voted on in November. He was unsuccessful at achieving this, but the project went through the regular approval process and was included in the 1987-88 budget. Both the Department of Finance and the Legislative Analyst's Office reviewed the new campus project meticulously and suspiciously, but it was passed by the Legislature and this time was approved by the Governor. Finally, at the end of the end of the 1985-87 period, after waiting 12 years, Mission College was successful at securing funding for the Phase I construction of its permanent campus (Gladstone and O'Shaughnessy, June 13, 1986; Igler, June 28, 1986; and O'Shaughnessy, June 26, and August 29, 1986).
CHAPTER SEVEN

The Continuing Crisis, 1987-1996

I. Immediate Impact of the Crisis, 1987-89

As the new Board majority prepared to assume office in July, 1987, the AFT, through its publication, Read On, and undoubtedly in other ways as well, let the Board members know what was expected of them. Two main issues were to respond "to the electorate’s expectations regarding the District Administration’s poor management during the past several years" and to "work to settle Contract negotiations with the Faculty Guild," which had dragged on for nearly a year. Negotiations on the certificated agreement progressed steadily during the following weeks and by September the Board and the union had come to an agreement on a new contract that provided a seven percent pay increase, retroactive to July 1.

The Chancellor and the new Board majority gave every appearance of attempting to work out their differences during this period. On September 30, however, the same day the Board approved the certificated contract, the trustees held an extra executive session prior to the public meeting. After five hours of discussion and a vote that pitted the new majority’s four votes in favor against the other trustees’ three votes in opposition, Chancellor Leslie Koltai announced that he was resigning. Over the next several days, the settlement arrived at between the Board and Koltai’s attorney became known to the press. Koltai was to receive his annual salary of $103,000 until his contract expired June 30. He was also to receive a payment of $52,619 to cover vacation pay, a car allowance, and an entertainment expense account. The District would purchase an insurance annuity for $239,000 that would provide a lifelong annual payment of $23,000 to Koltai (and to his wife if he died before she did). Koltai’s attorney fees of $8000 were to be paid by the District. As of his official retirement date, June 30, 1988, he would be designated Chancellor Emeritus. On October 7, the Board appointed Vice Chancellor Tom Fallo as acting chancellor until a permanent chancellor could be appointed, and Koltai was placed on a leave through the remainder of the fiscal year (Read On, July 13, 1987; 1; and October 6, 1987; 1-2; and Woo, October 8, 1987).

Koltai said his decision to retire came “at a time when I believe the district has been set on a sound financial footing and educational footing, due to strong, though often difficult decisions made over the past two years.” Garvin, who had been elected president of the Board in July, said, “The Board wishes Dr. Koltai well in his future professional endeavors and recognizes his outstanding service to the district during some very difficult times as well as through many years of growth.” Koltai’s future professional endeavors centered around the presidency of the National Center for the Development of Education, an organization he had founded. He was also appointed professor in the UCLA Graduate School of Education, where he had been teaching part time for many years, and director of a graduate program at the University of Judaism. Even while fighting to save his career with the Los Angeles District, Koltai had been laying the groundwork for an active and productive retirement when his years with the District were over (Courier, November, 1987; 1).

Koltai’s retirement was one of many changes that took place after the election of the new Board majority. Within about two years, practically the entire District power structure had been replaced. Besides the three trustees who left the Board in 1987, two others,
Albertson and Bronson, decided not to run for reelection in 1989, so that only two of the Board members who had governed the District during the critical period from 1981 to 1987 remained after that election. Two senior staff members, Vice Chancellor of Educational Services Cedric Sampson and General Counsel Mary Dowell, resigned to accept positions elsewhere, and a third, Vice Chancellor of Human Resources Virginia Mulrooney, was induced to return to full-time teaching through the payment of a settlement. The final member of Koltai’s senior staff, Acting Chancellor Fallo, resigned in Fall, 1988, to accept a position elsewhere, shortly after the arrival of the new permanent Chancellor, Donald G. Phelps.

Three of the nine college presidents had also left their posts, within a little more than two years after the new board was elected. Arthur Avila retired with a settlement; Stelle Feuers, who had returned to City College in 1987, was once more transferred to the District Office, this time permanently; and David Wolf accepted a vice presidency outside the District. Even Hal Fox, who had led the AFT to victory in the 1987 Trustee election, was defeated in the next election of union officers in 1988. As one college union leader put it, Fox was “locked into confrontational politics” and the AFT needed new leadership that would effect a different style for the new era.

II. The Crisis Renewed, 1988-96

During 1987-88 the Los Angeles District went through a transition period, with an Interim Chancellor, and attempted to come to grips with decentralization and reorganization by appointing a commission and hiring a firm of consultants. A new permanent Chancellor, Dr. Donald Phelps, assumed office in September, 1988. He had extensive experience in both educational and local government work in the state of Washington. He was retired from the chancellorship of the Seattle Community College District and appeared to be the perfect choice for the job. With a successful career behind him, he could fearlessly confront the problems of the Los Angeles District. Both his reputation and his pension were already secure.

For whatever reason, Phelps disregarded (or at least did not publicly acknowledge any indebtedness to) the reports of the Reorganization Commission and its consultants. He moved quickly to improve the morale of the District, reduce the District Office staff, and transfer both employees and responsibilities to the colleges. With the encouragement of the Board, Phelps organized a districtwide consultation group, something that had been recommended by the Reorganization Commission and a structure he had used before in Seattle. Unfortunately, the District Planning and Budgeting Advisory Committee quickly became little more than a debating society. Its membership represented almost every group at each college and it was immobilized by its own corpulence. It lost the serious consideration of the AFT, the administration, and the Board, and soon faded into insignificance.

Phelps and the Trustees repeated a mistake of the previous administration and Board, by awarding a pay increase to employees in Fall 1989 that was twice what the vice chancellor of business services believed was affordable. This time the District avoided a negative ending balance for Fiscal Year 1989-90, but insiders knew this was accomplished only by temporary transfers from other accounts into the general fund. The enrollment and fiscal environment deteriorated, albeit without the frenetic responses of the previous

---

1 Harold Garvin decided not to run for reelection in 1991, which meant that only Lindsay Conner was still on the Board after four years.
Phelps' relations with the AFT leadership was never very positive, and he now began to lose the support of some Board members. On Phelps' recommendation, the Board purchased a nine-story office building to house the District Offices. The peculiarities of the Los Angeles real estate market soon brought about a change in the situation and made leasing a facility a preferable option, at least for the short run. By this time the short term was all the District could afford to cope with. The Board decided to put the building up for sale, and to move the District Offices to a leased facility instead. This action drew considerable criticism of the Chancellor and the Board.

The Board had learned that it needed to evaluate the Chancellor regularly, but Phelps' 1993-94 evaluation was delayed for a variety of reasons. Informed opinion within the District held that Phelps was now in the same situation as confronted Koltai in 1987, depending on that fourth vote to preserve his position. After only five years--the minimum time required to become vested in the retirement system--Phelps resigned the Chancellorship to assume an enviable third career as a professor of higher education at the University of Texas, Austin. He left the District, resenting the union's power that made his work so frustrating and embittered by the treatment he had received from some Trustees.

When Phelps left in late 1993, the Board replaced him, on an interim basis, with the vice chancellor of business services, Neil Yoneji. Yoneji had originally served as a budget analyst with the District, moved on to direct the business operations of two nearby community college districts, and then returned to the Los Angeles District in 1991 as vice chancellor. The AFT pushed for the Board to select the permanent chancellor from within the District and to save the considerable expense of contracting with outside consultants to assist in the selection process. The Board, however, decided to conduct a nation-wide search. This elaborate and expensive process resulted in the Board choosing from among three finalists: the Chancellor of the San Diego Community College District, whose major interest seemed to be to use his candidacy as leverage with his current employers to improve his contract; the former Los Angeles union president and District vice chancellor, Cedric Sampson, who was now president of the College of the Redwoods; and Interim Chancellor Yoneji.

The Trustees could not have had a better opportunity to evaluate and get to know a chancellor candidate than they did Yoneji. Nevertheless, when the Board appointed him as permanent chancellor in October, 1994, it did so with reservations. It gave him a two-year contract instead of the usual four-year agreement his predecessors had received. The Board also informed him that to receive an extension of his contract he would have to demonstrate definite progress in solving the District's fiscal and enrollment problems. Having served as the District's chief business administrator and then as interim chancellor, Yoneji understood the District's financial difficulties as well as anyone. Among other actions, he proposed to reduce the cost of classified employees by reorganizing many of these services along regional lines. At about the same time as his reorganization plan was made public, Yoneji requested that the Board renew his contract. The agreement by then had only one more year to run, so this was the normal time for extending a multi-year contract. And yet in October, 1995, the Board voted not to renew his contract. Once again the Trustees were engaged in a search for a new top administrator. In August, 1996, William Segura left his post as chancellor in Austin, Texas, to take over the leadership position for the Los Angeles Community College District.

What had happened? During the previous nine years, beginning with the election of a new Board majority and the firing of Koltai in 1987, the District had almost constant changes in leadership. The Board of Trustees experienced a complete turnover in membership, with one exception, and then other changes among its new members. The District administration was led first by an interim chancellor, then by a permanent
chancellor for five years, followed by another interim chancellor who was given a two-year contract as permanent chancellor, and now by a third permanent chancellor. That same period of time saw the AFT reject three of its presidents, and it was now on its fourth. A new and changing Board of Trustees, new Chancellors, and new union presidents--none of the several combinations was able to truly reestablish stable leadership. If other leaders had been selected as Trustees, Chancellors, and union presidents, could an effective coalition have been reconstituted? Perhaps, yet the real reason why stable leadership was not achieved was the continuing crisis. The names and the faces had changed, but the community college problems at both the state and local levels had never been resolved.

Once more the State suffered from fiscal problems that by necessity it passed on to the agencies and institutions it funded. Enrollment at first rose, but then receded. Community colleges received less in per capita funding than the public schools. They were expected to educate students who ranged from those for whom English was a second language and high school graduates who were barely literate to students with bachelor's degrees. The State decided it would no longer subsidize these latter students. Tuition for them was raised to $50 per unit, regardless of whether their purpose in attending was cultural enrichment or acquiring an employable skill. Much of the enrollment loss was among these students.

The impact on the Los Angeles District was again particularly devastating. Hampered by restrictive laws and an ineffective governance system, the District could not accomplish the necessary economies. While elsewhere leaders were "reinventing" government and "reengineering" the corporation, the District's ability to act was limited (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993 and Hammer and Champy, 1994). Such actions as contracting out obviously inefficient services, revising instructor workloads, consolidating or eliminating small and unnecessary programs, adjusting clerical assignments for the computer age, fully utilizing technological advantages, and exploiting District real estate resources were difficult and usually impossible for the Los Angeles District. The result was a system resistant to reform and unnecessarily costly to operate.

The community college crisis of 1981-87 had revealed inadequacies and deficiencies that persisted after the crisis seemed to subside. Actions to correct them should have been taken by the leadership of the State and the District. The crisis that recurred in the 1990s indicated more emphatically than before that basic structural changes needed to be made, or the community colleges of Los Angeles would continue to be plagued by serious problems.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


Administrators Association Newsletter. Published by the Los Angeles Community College District Administrators Association, various dates.


"Deukmajian Eases Stand on Colleges." Los Angeles Times, September 24, 1983.


"Sales Tax Hike for Schools, Junior College Fee Backed." Los Angeles Times, August 17, 1983.


________. "New Coast College Panel Takes Aim at Lame-Duck Actions."  Los Angeles Times, December 8, 1983.


Request for Advance Apportionment and Three Year Repayment Plan. Report to the Board of Trustees, Business Services Division, June 19, 1985.


Student Matriculation: A Plan for Implementation in the California Community Colleges. Sacramento: California Community Colleges, 1984b.


"WLAC President Ousted." Evening Outlook, February 20, 1986.


"Public Hearing on California's Community College System." Transcript of a hearing conducted in the Auditorium, Room 1138 South Broadway, Los Angeles, on October 2, 1985.
"Public Hearing on California's Community College System." Transcript of a
hearing conducted in the Los Angeles City Council Chambers, 200 North Spring
Street, Los Angeles, California, on November 21, 1985.

Committee on Community Colleges: Commitment to Access and Excellence. "Educational
Needs, Goals, and Resources: Planning Issues for the Los Angeles Community
Colleges, 1984-89." Los Angeles: Los Angeles Community College District,
1983a.

"Short Term Task Force Reports." Los Angeles: Los Angeles Community
College District, 1983b.

Committee on Institutional Reassessment. "Report of the Committee on Institutional

Connell, Rich. "Approval to Sell Land Improves Prospect for Permanent Mission
College." Los Angeles Times, August 21, 1983.

"Bronson, Ferraro Face June Runoff After Final Absentee Ballot Count." Los
Angeles Times, April 18, 1985.

"L.A. College District to Cut Transfers to Other Schools." Los Angeles
Times, October 25, 1984.

"L.A. College Teachers to Elect New Union Chief." Los Angeles Times, May
23, 1983.

"L.A. Junior Colleges Budget Slashes Classes, Jobs." Los Angeles Times,
September 1, 1983.

Conrath, Nancy. "The Role of Research and Planning in a Period of Retrenchment."
Presentation at the Annual Research Conference sponsored by the Research
Commission of the California Association of Community Colleges, April 22-24,
1987.


Core Curriculum Development Laboratory. The Agenda, An Initial Study of Critical
Curricular Issues in the Los Angeles Community Colleges. Los Angeles: Los

Courier. Published for the Employees of the Los Angeles Community Colleges. Various
dates.

Education. March/April, 1981.

"Determining Missions and Priorities for the Fifth Generation." In Deegan,
Tillery and Associates, Renewing the American Community College. San


"College Manager Pay Dispute Continues; New Study Ordered." Los Angeles Times, June 20, 1982.


"Ex-Foes Meet Again in College Board Runoff." Los Angeles Times, June 3, 1983.


"Ralph Richardson: Veteran of Education Wars Wearied by All the Battles." Los Angeles Times, September 13, 1981d.

"State Grant of 'Several Million' May Start Technical Institute." Los Angeles Times, January 21, 1982b.


Hersch, Peter M. "Director's Report" #56, September 12, 1985, California Association of Community Colleges, Sacramento.


_______. Letter to University of California President David Saxon, September 14, 1981.


_______. "Community College Need a New Map If They're to Get Out of the Woods." Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1984.


_______. "Remarks by Dr. Leslie Koltai, Chancellor, Los Angeles Community College District, Tentative Budget Presentation," June 11, 1986.


_______. "Status Update on the State of the District." Report to the Los Angeles Community College District Board of Trustees, May 15, 1985b.


Los Angeles Community College District Board of Trustees. Minutes. Various dates.


"District Has Plan To Speed up Student Aid." Daily News, January 24, 1985.


P.S., The Newsletter of the Personnel Services Division, various dates.


Read On. AFT College Guild Newsletter. Various dates.

Richardson, Richard C., Jr. “Governing the Multiunit Community College System.” Educational Record 54 (Spring, 1973), 141-46.


______. "College Trustees Approve Major Faculty Cutback." Los Angeles Times, February 6, 1986.


_______. "Governor Credited With Strong Education Record." Los Angeles Times, October 1, 1986.


_______. "Most Educators Are Happy With Plan, Wary of Its Funding." Los Angeles Times, January 11, 1983.


_______. "Staff Furloughs Ordered to Cut College's Costs." Los Angeles Times, December 12, 1985.

_______. "State Panel Seeks to Define a Role for Local Colleges." Los Angeles Times, October 20, 1985.


______. "Community College Fee Part of Senate's Education Funds Plan." Los Angeles Times, May 28, 1981.


Smith, Joshua L. "Presentation to the Joint Committee to Review the Master Plan for Higher Education." June 24, 1986.


Statutes of California. Various.


183 190


______. "Colleges Could Lose 100,000 Students in Fall." Los Angeles Times, July 22, 1983.


______. "Community Colleges Lose $4-Million Pact." Los Angeles Times, June 22, 1983c.


______. "Enrollment Off 12% at L.A.'s 2-Year Colleges." Los Angeles Times, November 2, 1983.


______. "Loss of Students in Cutbacks Told." Los Angeles Times, April 5, 1983.

184 191


"Seniority May Save 60 Teachers." Daily News, March 6, 1986.


III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (FROM NON-ERIC SOURCE):

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents that cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:

Address:

Price:

IV. REFERRAL OF ERIC TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER:

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

Name:

Address:

V. WHERE TO SEND THIS FORM:

Send this form to the following ERIC Clearinghouse:

**ERIC Clearinghouse for Community Colleges**
3051 Moore Hall
University of California, Los Angeles
P.O. Box 951521
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1521 EE 45

However, if solicited by the ERIC Facility, or if making an unsolicited contribution to ERIC, return this form (and the document being contributed) to:

**ERIC Processing and Reference Facility**
1100 West Street, 2d Floor
Laurel, Maryland 20707-3598

Telephone: 301-497-4080
Toll Free: 800-799-3742
FAX: 301-953-0263
e-mail: ericfac@inet.ed.gov
WWW: http://ericfac.piccard.csc.com