The very existence of pluralism and democratic societies is based on a commitment to certain values, since they do not keep their members in line by sheer force. Theoretically this means that antidemocratic values choices of large numbers of people would lead to the end of such societies. Thus a problem encountered by these societies is how to educate commitment to democratic and pluralistic values without violating them. A philosophical framework for a solution to this problem is suggested. The solution is based on a form of moderate value realism which implies that values are part of the objective structure of human reality of which all persons are capable of acquiring knowledge through their experiential structures. For cognitive value education this means that certain values can be objectively preferred on the basis of valid reasons which can be the content of rational discussion and to which the students can take an independent stance on the basis of their value cognitions. Value education in its affective aspect is concerned primarily with motivating for value behavior by confronting the students with the inherently motivating force of values. For the development of value-directed emotions certain attitudinal skills are needed that consist of attitudes marked by benevolence and respect for persons who treat the student as a subject with the freedom for value choices in the face of rich value possibilities. It is suggested that without this kind of "dangerous" freedom persons will not develop a sensitive value consciousness and cannot become autonomous individuals.

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PLURALISM AND EDUCATION IN VALUES
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Key words: value-education, pluralism, value realism
Preface

This research was carried out as part of a project which focussed on many-sided personality development as an educational aim, led by Professor Erkki A. Niskanen. While starting to work on this paper I was employed as a researcher at the University of Helsinki. I was enabled to bring the work into completion because of a grant provided by Ella and Georg Ehrnrooth Foundation. Professor Niskanen guided my research and gave me constructive criticism and valuable comments based on his expertise on educational theory. Professor Timo Airaksinen read through several versions of this paper and discussed it with me on various occasions. Ms. Maija-Riitta Ollila read the article in its initial stages and gave me several constructive suggestions. I was also helped by discussions with another researcher in the project, Ms. Katarina von Renteln.

Helsinki, October 1990

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INTRODUCTION

This article is part of a larger project aimed at giving a more specific sense to the general educational aim of many-sided personality development. My focus is on values and on the proper methods of teaching them. I want to discuss two interrelated questions: (1) Can education in a pluralistic society be aimed at teaching children commitment to certain values? (2) What are the proper methods in such value education?

I define pluralism as a view according to which it is a value that various life-styles co-exist in society. Democracy I understand as a value-constellation which lays special value on the individual's own contribution on things affecting him. I use the term value education so broadly that it also includes the education of norms and precepts as I reject the strict separation between value and obligation: I assume that it is in the nature of obligation, the 'ought', to lead to the preservation and actualization of value, as 'values are condensed into commandments exactly where reality, that is, the actual conduct of man, does not correspond to them' (Hartmann 1932 I: 68).

For purposes of analysis I initially divide value behaviour into cognitive, affective and conative components. In reality these sectors always function in close coherence with each other. I shall analyse various aspects of value behaviour and study in what ways they can and should be influenced by education. I want, in
particular, to analyse what it means to be committed to certain values and how this kind of commitment can be taught in a way that is consonant with the liberal and individualizing emphases of democratic and pluralistic societies.

The logical structure of my argument can be set forth in a few propositions. I will not defend all of these propositions effectively here, but it is useful to consider the overall structure of the argument. (1) Pluralistic and democratic societies are ideally constituted by certain value structures (although our present 'democratic' societies often do not exhibit these but contrary values). (2) It is consonant with pluralistic and democratic values that these values be taught. (3) Such education is 'deep' enough only when persons are taught to be committed to these values. (4) The most effective methods in such deep education are also the ones that do not violate but rather enhance and develop the personality and individual creativity of the persons concerned.

The basic problem of moral education in democratic societies has been ingeniously analysed by Timo Airaksinen (1982). This analysis can be extended to value education in general. Airaksinen suggests that there is a basic discrepancy between the individualistic nature of genuine morality and the socializing nature of education. If children are simply socialized into the existing values of democratic societies, they are educated to an attitude intrinsically opposed to genuine morality which
is based on personal responsibility even beyond democratic consensus.

My aim in this article is to show how this problem can be solved. My solution assumes a moderate form of value realism. To be a value realist in such a moderate sense means to assume that the necessary preconditions of interpersonal functioning include irreducible value components. Only commitment to certain objectively preferable values satisfies the requirements both of the individual and the community and reconciles them with each other. In so far as the functioning of human interaction on such a humane level has certain (practically) necessary preconditions, we can also say that the real (as opposed to projected or imaginary) structure of these relationships sets certain requirements for human behaviour. And in so far as we can distinguish in those structural preconditions irreducible value components, we can say that values are part of the practically necessary structure of human relationships.

I cannot, in this context, develop a comprehensive argument for the value realist view - I can only make certain relevant observations (see further Puolimatka 1989). My first point is that the very existence of specific value language points to the objective existence of value reality, because it assumes the existence of what Broad calls 'value cognitions'. The fact that civilized languages have words like 'right' and 'wrong', 'good' and 'evil', or their equivalents shows, according to Broad (1971:137), that 'human beings from the earliest
times have had certain experiences which they took to be cognitions of acts, intentions, motives etc. as having certain characteristics, viz. moral ones, which take opposed forms.' Even most noncognitivists today would admit that 'there is something special about ethical language — if there weren't something special, language would never have developed specifically ethical terminology' (Brandt 1961: 254). These considerations, I assume, can be expanded to value language and value concepts in general. Since we can assume that language is largely moulded by reality, we can assume that the universal development of specifically value language reflects the existence of an inescapable value reality.

The view that we as humans have access to value reality through our cognitions receives some backing from the fact that we are able to discuss values and to argue about them in many complex applications while assuming certain common background values. Common man seems generally more capable of drawing value implications for practical decisions than he is of conceptualizing his value system. The fact that common people universally are conscious of values would seem to indicate that they have an experiential access to an independent value reality.

Brentano (1969: 38-9) discusses the question of how it is possible that common people are in many respects correct in their views about moral issues even though the best of philosophers are having a hard time in explaining the source of our moral knowledge. He points out that we have a similar situation with respect to logic. People
have been able to reason correctly for thousands of years without being able to give a theoretical account of the principles of valid reasoning. Even if a person is unable to define the source of his knowledge of the syllogism, he is usually able to reason according to valid principles. Similar considerations apply to morality. Our store of moral knowledge is much wider than our ability to give a theoretical account of it so that 'much of what is present in our store of knowledge contributes toward the attainment of new knowledge without our being clearly conscious of the process'.

The value realist aspect of my solution implies that values are part of objective reality which means that they are something to be discovered, not simply to be agreed upon or invented. Consequently, the emphasis in value education should be in directing students to discover for themselves what is valuable and right and not in imposing on them a ready-made system from outside. We do not need to fear that this will lead to anarchy simply because we can confidently assume that all normal human beings have independent access to objective value reality. In any case any genuine value behaviour would have to be motivated by this personal encounter with objective values.
1. THE COGNITIVE EDUCATION OF VALUES

The essence of my argument in this chapter is as follows: Human beings universally have cognitions of values to which they refer with a special value terminology. These cognitions give them an experiential access to value reality. This means that children can learn to recognize the meaning of value concepts by relating them to their own experience. As children develop morally, their value cognitions become better focussed, gradually directed to higher values and more adequately expressed in conceptual and systematic form. The relevant educational aim is to make them capable of personally evaluating what is good and right, of developing an individual value system and learning to apply it in many complex applications.

The value realist element in my scheme, therefore, implies the assumption that all normal human beings have cognitions of values that provide them with knowledge about objective value structures. It is hardly reasonable to speak about the reality of value structures without the assumption that we can have some kind of experiential access to them. It can be taken as almost uncontested data in the philosophical debate between value realism and antirealism that in common experience we take the existence of such cognitions for granted (although some notable antirealists would deny this). In common experience we also assume that there really are objective
values in the structure of human relationships. The philosophical problem concerns the status of this common sense assumption.

It is often suggested that, for educational purposes, we can leave this difficult question about value realism unresolved. It is supposed to be sufficient that values can be rationally discussed - and this should be possible even if their ontological status is understood only as that of human preferences or inventions. Values can be discussed - whether they have only the status of conventions, inventions etc. or whether they are something in the structure of reality.

But value education in this kind of context would have to assume that there was no objectively structured value reality - the only structure that could serve as educational basis was the one agreed upon by society. For value education this would leave only two basic alternatives with many possible compromises between the two: (1) Taking value education as a socialization process in which students are conditioned to the values of their society. (2) Accepting ultimate value relativity and encouraging students to adopt values on the basis of unstructured 'existentialistic' choice.

These alternatives are inadequate if we suppose that part of value education is teaching children commitment to certain values without violating their individuality. Here we would generally assume that valid and good reasons should be given for those values for which we want our students to commit themselves. And it is hardly a
valid and good reason for such a commitment that their teacher happens to prefer certain values or that these values are backed by democratic consensus. These reasons would somehow have to be related to the nature of things, to the preconditions of social structures and human interaction. We would have to be able to argue for basic egalitarian and democratic values in a way that is consonant with the free exchange of ideas implied by these values. These arguments should stand the tests of competing value systems, which means that the reasons should be founded somehow on the nature of things as opposed to arbitrary preferences.

An implication of moderate value realism is that human beings cannot avoid taking sides on central values which means that we cannot avoid being committed to certain value positions. A position beyond values, beyond good and bad, is not an option for man. Value choices become realized in structurations of our individual and communal life. This necessity of being committed to certain values applies also to educators. They do not have a neutral position beyond values. Consequently, it is not honest for them to adopt a would-be-neutral attitude. Rather, it is preferable that they honestly express their own valuations. But the point is, to do this without assuming any inherent authority for their views. Their task as teachers is to develop the value consciousness of their students on the basis of the students' value cognitions. The real authority is in value reality itself, to which both students and teachers have indepen-
dent access. Thus the essential assumption is that value cognitions are in principle capable of giving us reliable information about an independently existing value aspect of reality.

Without such a universal human capability of value knowledge we could only teach values in a rather mechanical sense, for example, by conditioning people to think, feel and act according to certain socially beneficial principles. Since we would have to assume that children's own consciousness were totally unstructured as to values, as they supposedly had no access to them through their experiential structures, education would have to provide them with these structures and impose them upon their minds. In some respects we would be in a similar situation as trying to teach colour words to colour-blind children.

Lean (1970:375-7) discusses this problem of teaching colour-words or even the word 'colour' itself to a totally colour-blind child. The colour-blind child could never be expected to be able to differentiate colours for himself. Lean (1975:375) applies this to moral education. 'So imagine trying to teach a child the use of the moral terms if there were nothing that one could expect him to discern in common among the diverse moral precepts, or among the varied examples in terms of which a given one is taught. How would this be possible, and especially how would it be possible that he could by himself discern the moral features in new and increasingly more complex types of circumstances, and initiate new and subtle judgments
of his own?' In value education we have to assume at least the capacity for making value distinctions, and the development of this ability has to be considered educationally possible.

The aim of value education is, in general, that of 'raising the cognitive status' of a person's value cognitions onto a stage of greater explicitness. The most elementary stage of the cognitive education of values could be defined simply as providing the child with opportunities for value cognitions. An effective method for this is to confront the child with stark value contrasts. The traditional way of doing this has been through fairy tales, where we meet with monstrous evil and angelical goodness. Many of our 'tame' modern fairy tales simply lack this ability to arouse value consciousness because they lack such stark contrasts. We cannot expect the child to catch up immediately with some nuanced value implication when his value cognitions have not received the full colour provided by imaginative possibilities. Another traditional method of arousing value consciousness has been religion. Think of the value contrasts involved, for example, in the story of the crucifixion. Once a child's value consciousness has received some colour and depth, we can expect him to begin to develop finer nuances and applications.

This stage is unproblematic even for democratic education because we can assume practically complete value agreement concerning such stark value contrasts. Commitment to democratic values can then be gradually built on
these contrasts, since prudence, freedom, respect for persons, benevolence and justice are to be objectively valued in opposition to irrationality, tyranny, manipulation, selfish indifference and injustice.

A parallel stage would be the development of the ability to put one's value cognitions into words. The beginning of value education includes teaching a rich vocabulary of values and helping the child to gradually relate his own value cognitions to value terms and in this way making him more conscious of his ability to recognize values and to state them in words.

Gradually emphasis could be directed towards focussing a child's attention on the fact that his own value cognitions provide him with an independent access to value reality. This enables him to realize that some basic values are something objective and universal and lead to principles that apply equally to everyone. This realization helps him to develop a value consciousness that is free from undue dependence on authority and, at the same time, avoids the arbitrariness and anarchy of a moral system based simply on unstructured choice.

A more developed stage is characterized by using value concepts that are defined as parts of an overall value system. That requires the possibility of drawing logical implications from value judgments and constructing conceptual connections between value concepts. This leads to the development of an ability to initiate new value judgments in complex situations. For this a person has to learn an intuitive grasp of basic value possibil-
ities. The problem in teaching him a full-blown conceptual system is, of course, that such a system might have value-commitments that are not uncontroversial. The solution may be in teaching him several conceptual possibilities open to persons within the basic commitment to democratic and egalitarian values.

An important point to notice is that, although in pluralistic societies various value systems are meant to co-exist, the very existence of pluralistic societies assumes a core complex of shared values. A pluralistic society is built on values like liberty, dignity of persons, tolerance, equality, justice, prudence, minimal benevolence etc. A pluralistic and democratic society is an organization of persons around some such values as these. And in order to perpetuate this form of society, we will have to teach a society-wide commitment to these values. If in the general consciousness these values are replaced, for example, by the Fascist value of the right of the stronger etc, our society ceases to be pluralistic and democratic.

The only justified method in teaching democratic values that is consonant with these values themselves is the one that aims at strengthening the individuality and creativity of the persons being educated in values. It is strong and independent individuals, with a developed value consciousness, that are the basis of a democratic and free society. There is no use in speaking of freedom as the basic value in a society unless there are people capable of such freedom.
A person, according to Charles Taylor (1976), is defined primarily by his value system. And Taylor suggests that a person is distinguished by his capacity for making strong evaluations even of his own desires and value system. Strong evaluation of desires means contrastive and qualitative evaluation classifying desires as higher or lower, virtuous or vicious, more or less fulfilling, more or less refined, profound or superficial etc.; or judging them as belonging to qualitatively different modes of life, fragmented or integrated, alienated or free, and so on. (Taylor 1976: 282.)

Self-evaluation, in the strong sense, can be considered the ultimate form of self-education where a person tries to clarify what is essential to his identity and to determine what kind of a person he actually wants to be. The aim of value education is to encourage a person towards this kind of independent moral stance. The moral development of the whole community is best achieved through the independent contributions of autonomous individuals. Any lower view of moral education will actually hinder the development of these higher moral abilities. We cannot expect a child to develop into a person with a strong individual value consciousness if we methodically subject him to educational methods like conditioning which, when applied to value education, constitute a violation of his essential human dignity. On the cognitive level value education is intended to enhance a person's ability for making thorough-going self-evaluations and thus raising his value-consciousness
and consciousness of his own identity as defined by his value system.

As Taylor points out, it is on the level of self-evaluation that it is hardest for the person to achieve clarity. 'But our evaluations are the more open to challenge precisely in virtue of the very character of depth which we see in the self. For it is precisely the deepest evaluations which are the least clear, least articulated, most easily subject to illusion and distortion. It is those which are closest to what I am as a subject, in the sense that shorn of them I would break down as a person, which are among the hardest for me to be clear about.' (Taylor 1976:296.) The aim of value education is to encourage such individuality which is capable of accomplishing the deepest self-evaluation and taking total responsibility for the results.
2. EDUCATING ATTITUDES AND VALUE-DIRECTED EMOTIONS

In this chapter I shall argue for two claims:

(1) The 'affective component' of value behaviour is more complex than is usually assumed. Value attitudes and motives cannot be explained in purely psychological terms but irreducible value concepts have to be used.

(2) The 'didactic skill' needed for educating value-attitudes, motives and value-directed feelings consists primarily in value-attitudes of which benevolence, the concern for promoting the person-values of those to be educated, holds a central place. Conditioning fails as a method mainly because normative freedom is the presupposition of the development of the affective component of value-behaviour.

2.1. The structure of the affective component

The education of the affective component of values presents its own peculiar problems. The very definition of the affective component is problematic. According to the 'traditional picture' a person's moral behaviour is primarily determined by knowledge (or at least beliefs) about what kinds of actions are morally right or wrong, with motivation and emotion appearing as responses to the knowledge. At the other extreme is the view that moral behaviour consists primarily of a system of intrinsic desires (aversions) directed at types of conduct with
corresponding feelings of guilt and approval. (Brandt 1979:163-73.) Brandt's argument against the 'intellectualistic approach' is that the intellectualistic picture is not psychologically correct. It is not correct to suppose that the conative-emotional complex is a response to moral judgments. It is impossible for moral judgments to produce that kind of response. (Brandt 1979:171-2.)

I think that Brandt is right in rejecting the idea that the psychologically understood motivational-emotional complex is simply a response to the intellectual component of moral codes. The motivational-emotional complex (in the psychological sense) seems to have a relatively autonomous genesis and functional structure that cannot be reduced to a mere response to knowledge. But at the same time Brandt's own view seems an overreaction to the intellectualistic approach. He bypasses the obvious fact that common people have what they regard as moral cognitions and that these cognitions play a crucial role in their moral behaviour. We need to assume some interplay between the cognitive and the affective components to explain the complexity of the value-oriented behaviour, even though sometimes the affective part can be the dominant factor: Once attitudes, motivations and value-directed emotions have developed they are considered valid reasons for actions on their own right.

Even such a moral rationalist as Butler would acknowledge the important function of affections and sentiments in value-directed behaviour: 'And it is so far from being true, that a wise man must entirely suppress
compassion, and all fellow-feeling for others, as a weakness; and trust to reason alone, to teach and enforce upon him the practice of the several charities we owe to our kind; that on the contrary, even the bare exercise of such affections would itself be for the good and happiness of the world; and the imperfection of the higher principles of reason and religion in man, the little influence they have upon our practice, and the strength and prevalency of contrary ones plainly require these affections to be a restraint upon these latter, and a supply to the deficiencies of the former.' (Butler 1792: 72-3.)

Butler's point is that although moral behaviour should ideally be directed by reason, we cannot rely on reason alone due to the weakness of will. That is why we need affections like compassion and fellow-feeling. These beneficial affections should counter the force of immoral impulses and provide the motivational force that is often lacking in rational moral principles, and so help men to behave morally.

Butler points out that affections can mold human behaviour in ways that are desirable even from the value-oriented viewpoint. They can lead to behaviour that preserves human values, even if such behaviour does not originate from value-directed free intention but rather from factors related to temperament and feeling.

To clarify these complex problems I analyze value-consciousness in six components:

(1) value cognitions
(2) value beliefs
(3) value attitudes
(4) motivation
(5) value-directed emotions
(6) value-oriented conative structurations

We discussed the two first components in the previous chapter. In this chapter I shall concentrate on components (3) to (5).

The most essential distinction is between desires (aversions), feelings, motivations etc. as parts of our psychological functioning, and those factors that cannot be reduced to mere psychology but have to be explained by irreducible value concepts.

Within the psychological functioning we can further distinguish between emotions according to whether they are felt in respect of the value characteristics of an act, intention etc. or its other characteristics. Within the sphere of emotions we can thus differentiate between 'value-directed emotions' and those emotions that are not value-directed (cf. Broad 1971: 137-9). Value-directed emotions can take various directions, for example, morally-directed emotions, esthetically-directed emotions etc. Value-directed emotions could be defined as emotions that have been developed in man by value experiences. They primarily develop as a child has the consistent experience of being valued by the ones rearing him. They also develop as a reflection of a person's value cognitions in general. They often have a dominant position in man's value-oriented behaviour.
I make a distinction between value-attitudes and value-directed emotions. Our feeling function is pre-intellectual in the sense that it is not directly controllable by rational thought. Our value attitudes, on the other hand, are the end-result of a process which is directed by free choices concerning values. We can take as an example the case of a person who has been psycholog-ically conditioned by early experiences to have averse feelings towards his father. Later in life this person comes to subscribe to a moral code which requires him to respect all people and especially his parents. He becomes conscious of the fact that he owes a debt of gratitude towards his parents in spite of their failures. Because of his moral convictions this person now has an independent attitude of respect towards his father in spite of his averse feelings. But he cannot easily change his averse feelings because they function psychologically-causally and are not under his immediate control. While realizing that he might be unable to undo the early conditioning immediately, he now acknowledges a moral duty to respect other people and especially one's parents irrespective of their qualities. This acknowledgment itself constitutes a moral choice that results in a moral attitude functioning parallel to the psychological-causal processes. Eventually the interaction between his moral attitudes and his psychological feelings can also modify the averse feelings. But that change in feelings is in the nature of a causal readjustment of the inner psychological functioning and cannot be identified with the
I also distinguish value-attitudes from value cognitions and value beliefs because I assume that virtue is not simply knowledge. Even when a person has the right knowledge he can still choose to act against value. That is, even if a man had perfect value knowledge, he could still choose a destructive life-style. There is of course a connection between these factors: a person who acts destructively gradually loses some of his sensitivity for values. The most difficult question is whether we can influence these value choices and the resulting value attitudes, as they originate in the deepest level of human personality. I suggest that we can influence these choices indirectly, through motivation.

I suppose that value motivation cannot be reduced to value-directed emotions - these emotions form a part of our psychological-causal functioning, while value motivation is primarily constituted by the 'value-pull' experienced by that free personality-center which is capable of transcending psychological conditioning, and from which human actions originate. In the centre of our being we determine ourselves by choosing the values by which our deepest motivations are structured. In value-education, in its affective component, we are concerned primarily with confronting a person with the inherently motivating force of values.

Since value-experiences can be reflected in emotions without being reducible to mere emotions, we can differentiate value motivation as a value-intention from the moral attitude itself.
value-directed feelings of being value-motivated; the latter are to be further differentiated from the non-value-directed feelings of being motivated by other than value-factors.

We can consider the special case of guilt feelings to clarify the distinction between value-directed emotions and value cognitions. I suggest that we should place guilt feelings into a category different from that of moral guilt. Moral guilt is established on moral criteria that are independent of psychological tendencies to feel guilty. Although guilt feelings often accord with the cognition of moral guilt because of the close coherence between the moral and the psychological functions, the psychological tendency to have guilt feelings seems to be logically distinct from moral guilt. The apprehension or recognition of moral guilt is not necessarily connected with having certain kinds of averse feelings (for example, guilt feelings), so that the fact of moral guilt and the (usually) accompanying averse feelings can be logically distinguished.

We are also able to recognize causal psychological law-structures that can explain our tendency to feel guilt or shame for actions that we consider morally right, and the propensity to be devoid of any tendency to feel psychological guilt-feelings for actions that we consider morally wrong. Since guilt feelings are part of our psychological constitution that functions causally, they are not under our immediate control. Thus, it is part of our ordinary moral experience to recognize that
certain tendencies to experience guilt feelings have no moral basis (cf. Foot 1983:382; Taylor 1985:42). This is an indication that we can differentiate between the cognition of moral guilt and the 'morally directed emotion' that we signify with the name guilt-feeling (cf. Broad 1971:137-9). A person, for example, might have a psychological tendency to feel guilty when telling a lie to protect someone's reputation, although he might think that he is morally justified in doing so or even morally required to do so. On the other hand, a person might regret a deed or an attitude on moral considerations although he does not have a psychological tendency to feel guilty for such a deed or attitude.

2.2. The method in educating value-directed emotions and attitudes

The reason for the discrepancies between our guilt feelings and moral guilt seems to be that the tendency to have guilt feelings is dependent on a person's psychological history, while moral guilt is a normative conception that is independent of such psychological-causal relationships. The methods used to produce psychological guilt-feelings are 'rough', as Brandt points out. And 'the fact of stimulus generalization has the effect that the motivation and tendency to guilt-feelings that we build in are liable to spill over into areas where we do not want them' (Brandt 1979:198). We might like to control the behaviour of children by conditioning strong
feelings of guilt in them, but the problem is that there is always a price to be paid for such negative value-directed emotions. Strong guilt feelings established by conditioning actually hinder cognitions of moral guilt, because these feelings form a counter motivation against recognizing instances of such moral guilt that would implicate the person himself. In this way conditioning moral guilt actually hinders moral growth.

Another reason why I have doubts about the view, according to which morality should be taught mainly by conditioning, is that I assume the distinctness of the value function from the psychological function. As Brandt sees moral systems essentially as systems of intrinsic valences - and thinks that valences are most economically interpreted as results of classical conditioning - he argues that one of the criteria according to which a moral system must be evaluated is whether it could be taught by means of classical conditioning (which, he believes, must be used to interiorize moral principles) (Brandt 1979:180-1). But if my account of the independence of moral motivation and attitudes from a merely psychological-causal system of desires and aversions is correct, it would be unnecessary and even undesirable to use classical conditioning in moral education: It should not be used to influence a person's value choices, these being more directly based on value cognitions than on psychological valences. In any case, classical conditioning is not able to create a functional apparatus that would be sufficiently sophisticated to cope with the
complexities of moral practice.

An additional problem is that the education of value-directed emotions through conditioning seems to lead to a superficial conception of person-values. By person-values I mean that structuration of values which constitutes the person. Brandt suggests that to educate someone morally means 'some showing, free from factual error and conceptual confusion and fallacious argument, which serves to recommend something to a person, remove his ambivalence about it and arouse his enthusiasm for it, and in general to make him content with it' (Brandt 1979:188). According to Brandt, the task here is to identify what is to be a morally desirable system of intrinsic desires and aversions, and to motivate a person to feel and react according to it by conditioning him through information that is valid and free from factual error.

Brandt's suggestion is that the information that is presented should itself be value-free (Brandt 1979:113). For educational purposes in a pluralistic society it would, of course, be ideal if such value-free information were as effective as Brandt himself supposes in molding a person's value system. That would imply that a person's attitudes and value-directed emotions, to a considerable degree, could be affected by the presentation of information that does not contain explicit value components (even if, pace Brandt, the production of such information would implicitly assume some value commitments.)

What is disappointing, however, in Brandt's account
is the shallow type of value-consciousness that his method is set to produce. He simply aims at making a person content with a certain value system and conditioning him to react according to it. Brandt's account misses the free and personal nature of value-directed emotions. He seems to have no place for genuine individuality which involves that a person has radical freedom of choice and consequently is responsible even for the value system that he adopts. Conditioning methodically educates a person to react as a response to stimuli, while our aim should rather be a creative personality with a capacity for originality in his value behaviour.

Brandt thinks that the motivational-emotional complex can be influenced by information that is repeatedly and vividly presented to the mind. He assumes that an essential part of moral education is in producing what he calls 'rational desires' by which he means desires that are maximally exposed to facts and logic. The method used in the production of such desires is what Brandt calls cognitive psychotherapy. Cognitive psychotherapy is a method of (psychologically-causally) producing or extinguishing desires/aversions through a process of 'confronting desires with relevant information by repeatedly representing it, in an ideally vivid way and at an appropriate time' (Brandt 1979:113.). Brandt's theory of cognitive psychotherapy implies that the representation of relevant information in an ideally vivid way would in the long run cause changes in those emotional and motivational structures that for Brandt are definitive of a per-
son's moral system.

But since moderate moral realism implies that we are capable of value knowledge, Brandt's account has to be widened. When value knowledge is repeatedly presented to the mind in a vivid way, it could be considered effective in developing and activating value-directed emotions. But this effect would not be produced through the principles of conditioning, since the point is not in the conditioning effect of a pleasant or unpleasant fact related to the person's desires. Rather, we are here concerned with the inherently motivating force of values. Since it is assumed that we are all capable of value cognitions about objective value structures, the aim is to direct persons to their source of value knowledge.

Value directed emotions cannot develop without the positive contribution of educators, especially parents. A plausible empirical assumption with regard to the affective component in the education of values is that without the experience of minimal benevolence children will never be able to develop the basic sensitivity necessary for the experience of value. The basic precondition of moral development seems to be love and affection experienced by a child. Without such loving care (even if he has experienced constant punishment) a child can develop into a psychopath who seems to be without any moral consciousness. (Cf. Goldfarb 1945; McCord 1956.)

I suggest that the essence of the 'skill' required in education of motives and value-directed emotions is in certain value attitudes. Of course it is more problematic
to ensure that teachers will apply certain values in education than that they would simply employ certain didactic-technical skills. But at the same time, it is not reasonable to suppose that values could be taught properly by someone who has not developed his own value consciousness. Any methods of conditioning, manipulation or indoctrination would obviously subvert the educational aim here even if the 'contents' of the teaching would be 'correct', since the teacher's example would constitute an encouragement for violating the dignity of other persons in the name of democratic values. Even though conditioning can be successfully applied in other realms of education, it is unsuitable for value education simply because value behaviour resulting from conditioned reflexes hardly deserves its name.

The basic method of value education in its affective component is the creation of an atmosphere structured by a value attitude characterized by the commitment to the dignity of persons and their intrinsic value. A person has to experience being the object of such a valuing attitude to open up for the possibilities of value. Human personality has the capacity for arriving at value commitments on a level transcending psychological conditioning. In such a personal depth the person chooses his very identity. The task of education is in guiding and orientating a person to a systematic encounter with the realm of value.

The attitudinal skill consists in the practice of a many sided value-attitude which regards the other person
as intrinsically valuable. An essential factor in it is benevolence, which in the educational context implies concern for promoting the person-values of those to be educated. The principle of benevolence requires the educator to promote the person-values of his students from the intention of doing so.

Benevolence would have to include both a feeling aspect and a value aspect. The value aspect is needed for guaranteeing the consistency of the attitude, and the feeling aspect for its effective communication. Benevolent affection in the sense of a psychological feeling complements the value-attitude. However, I reject a psychologized conception of value-attitudes as something merely emotional. Benevolent affections and will-inclinations are the psychological substrata of the value-attitude, which is the resolution and settled endeavour to benefit; the accompaniment of emotions contributes to educational effectiveness. From the educational point of view these benevolent affections are most important for education at home, where their lack would tend to cause psychological abnormality in the child.
CONCLUSION

A basic educational problem in democratic and pluralistic societies is the discrepancy between value-education understood as socialization and the individualistic nature of genuine value behaviour. Value realist presuppositions allow us to subject all values to rational scrutiny in educational contexts without jeopardizing the aims of democratic value-education. This approach does not offend the rational autonomy of individuals: They become rationally convinced of those values that stand critical discussion. It is these values that are as close to truth as it is possible to arrive in the circumstances. And it is the democratic conviction that they include the essence of what we call democratic and pluralistic values.
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