This case study of a higher education policy-making process tested a conceptual model based on a combination of political systems, behavioral power, and influence theories. The study, which followed the course and outcomes of a branch campus policy formulated in Washington state over a four-year period (1985-89), sought to show that the ability of policy actors to influence decision making could be inferred by analyzing the various strategic efforts mounted during the stages of policy formation. Data analyzed included official state documents and tapes of hearings and floor activities, plus minutes of community group meetings, university memos, and newspaper articles. Major policy actors included the Higher Education Coordinating Board, community boards in various locations throughout the state, the University of Washington, and Washington State University. The study details positions and debate arguments, and the "inducing" coalition-building strategies that each of these groups employed to attain desired policy goals, with a table summarizing legislative actions taken. The report concludes that the data support the conceptual thesis evaluated: namely, it is possible to infer how a complex web of political exchanges and assurances woven by powerful policy actors can accomplish a strategic objective—in this case, establishment of a branch campus system. (Contains approximately 75 references.) (CH)
The Making of a Branch Campus System: A Statewide Strategy of Coalition Building

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This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for the Study of Higher Education held in Memphis, Tennessee, October 31 - November 3, 1996. This paper was reviewed by ASHE and was judged to be of high quality and of interest to others concerned with higher education. It has therefore been selected to be included in the ERIC collection of ASHE conference papers.
The Making of a Branch Campus System: A Statewide Strategy of Coalition Building

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A case study of the branch campus policy-making process in Washington state was utilized to test a conceptual model for policy process analysis derived from a combination of political systems and behavioral power and influence theories. The premise of the model was that influence could be inferred from an assessment of policy actors and their potential to influence the course of decision making along with an analysis of the strategic efforts that were mounted during and across stages of policy formation. Rather than a grass roots effort by state residents seeking greater access opportunities to higher education, community booster groups made up of economic and civic elites organized a systematic approach to generating support for the creation of five branch campuses of the state’s two research universities. A coalition building strategy on local, regional, and state levels fueled by the active engagement of these economic and business interests in the policy-making process shaped policy outcomes both within and across stages of policy making.

The role of special interests in influencing the course and outcome of decision making in state political arenas remains relatively uncharted (Abrams, 1987, 1991; Godall, 1987; Hicks, 1976; Hines, 1988; Hines & Hartmark, 1980; Layzell & Lyddon, 1988; Mazzoni, Sullivan & Sullivan, 1983; McMahon, 1981; Prestine, 1989; Whittaker, 1989; Zumeta & Green, 1987; Zumeta & Mock, 1985). Difficulties in designating cadres of policy participants, in denoting their potential to alter the course of policy making, and in documenting the strategic efforts they have exerted have made the study of the policy-making process less prominent than analyses of policy outcomes and their implementation (Benveniste, 1985; Crosson, 1982; Fisher, 1988; Garms, 1986; Ludington, 1982; Wilson & Miller, 1980; Zumeta, 1992).

Higher education policy research at the state level has most frequently explored policy content and its consequences for higher education interests and the constituencies they serve (Hines, 1988; Jones, 1984); in contrast, predecision processes have “remained relatively uncharted territory” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 70). How issues became part of the public policy agenda and how forces interacted to arrive at alternatives for meeting policy demands generally have not been the focus of research into higher education policy making at the state level. This study mapped the political
landscape throughout which the articulation of interests, the garnering of resources, and the deployment of strategies to affect policy outcomes in a specific case occurred.

**Conceptualization of the Research Problem**

A conceptual model for policy process analysis was constructed from a synthesis of organizational behavior, political science, and educational policy literature. The theoretical basis for the model was derived from the union of two perspectives. Easton’s (1979) political systems model and Camson’s (1968) and Mazzoni’s (1982) actor-influence models were combined to provide both a systems and an arena view of state policy making. A political systems orientation was considered necessary because to study political decision making requires implicitly the acknowledgment of the impact of environmental constraints and supports on policy outcomes (Wirt & Kirst, 1972). However, to explicate the intricacies of the policy-making process in a state level arena also demands a way of mapping the concept of influence as it plays out in the interactions of diverse interests competing in the allocative process that marks policy decisions (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1. Conceptual Model for Policy Process Analysis.](image-url)
From political systems theory, the interweaving of competing social, economic, demographic, and political environmental demands with a policy culture was premised to form the context for state policy making. A political or policy culture was defined as the compilation of beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and expectations by political system actors regarding the nature of policy demands to be considered and the means by which such demands would be converted into policy decisions (Marshall, Mitchell & Wirt, 1985). Actions of participants embedded in this context occurred across three functional stages by which policy inputs or demands were converted into policy outputs or decisions. At the agenda-setting stage, policy wants were transformed into demands through the articulation of interests and the placing of issues or bundles of demands (Easton, 1979) on the public policy agenda. During alternative formation, the conversion process within the political system was activated; policy proposals gained support through the dissemination of diverse solutions by competing actors. Decision enactment, the final stage in the policy conversion process, denoted the selection of a policy choice through formalized legislative action.

In accordance with power and influence theory, the mediation of the conflict generated by actors with differing goals and stands on a policy problem (Allison, 1971; Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Mazzoni, 1982) required the use of power. Sources of power or resources, distributed differentially among actors (Campbell & Mazzoni, 1976; Gamson, 1968), were engaged in attempts to influence the policy-making process based upon their number, availability, and liquidity, the scope and saliency of the policy issue, and the costs to the actor in addressing the issue at hand. The basis of influence was considered the degree of shift in the probability of certain policy decisions over others as a result of the engagement of the influencer in the policy-making process (Gamson, 1968). An actor's potential for influence was based upon the nature and distribution of resources; actor actual influence upon policy outcomes was assessed from the actor's ability to mobilize available assets in influence attempts to impact the process by which policy was considered and effected (Gamson, 1968).

The means by which actors mounted influence attempts were political strategies that added new advantage or inducements to the policy process, new disadvantage or constraints to the policy situation, or that persuaded those with authority in the policy arena to alter their perceptions of and attitudes toward the policy issue or alternatives being considered (Gamson, 1968). Tactics translated political strategies into action. Adding advantage to a policy situation required the exchange of
political goods as inducements through bargaining or log-rolling coalition formation. Tactics that added disadvantage to the policy setting included threats of withholding legislative support for policy proposals, coopting policy opponents, or expanding the scope of conflict. Cultural manipulation of constituency or player perceptions and beliefs about political issues or policy outcomes through the use of symbolic language was a persuasive effort to alter the way the policy issue was framed and acknowledged. An actor was assumed to have exerted influence on the policy decision when, as a result of participation in the policy-making process, policy outcomes emerged which reflected actor goals and stands on the policy issue and which maximized the benefits to the actor of the political settlement reached.

Selection and Framing of a Case of Higher Education Policy Making

Because the unit of analysis was the decision-making process that led to the policy outcome, a policy case was selected that involved multiple political actors engaged in conflict around a salient and significant policy issue in a state policy-making arena. The branch campus policy process took place during a time period in Washington when enormous economic growth, large projected demographic shifts to urban areas within the state, and increasing cultural diversity made the state’s acknowledgment of the importance of the higher education access issue and planned political action to address it inevitable. The timing of the branch campus policy-making process in light of these economic, demographic, social, cultural, and political factors made its choice as a research topic particularly appropriate; it was a clear example of a state higher education policy issue where a variety of competing environmental factors converged to enhance the significance of the issue and the conflict it precipitated.

Branch campus policy making was carried out over a four year period. The agenda setting stage, initiated in 1985 with the formation of the Higher Education Coordinating Board [HEC Board] by the state legislature, ended with the publication of the HEC Board's master plan for Washington state higher education (HEC Board, 1987). Recommending the formation of branch campuses in urban areas, the master plan was approved by the state legislature in February of 1988. Completion of feasibility studies by the state’s two research universities, the University of Washington and Washington State University, marked the end of the alternative formation stage. Amidst contentious
debate, the branch campus policy was approved by both legislative chambers and signed into law by the Governor in May of 1989, thus concluding the policy-making process.

There were three primary research questions related to the branch campus policy case and derived from the conceptual model: 1) Who were the major actors involved in the branch campus policy-making process and what were their resources or potential sources of influence?, 2) What strategies did primary actors deploy to impact the branch campus decision outcome?, and 3) What effect did actor influence efforts have on the process of decision making, i.e. how did the policy decision reflect both the distribution of actor resources and the effectiveness of resource mobilization in influence attempts?

Methodology


Over sixty semi-structured interviews with key informants from five urban communities, governmental agencies, higher education institutions, and the state legislature were completed. The salience of the branch campus issue to potential informants, the extent of participant involvement in the policy process, and the reputation for candor and accessibility of the subject were criteria upon which selection of key informants was based. Study methodology included the development and testing of an interview tool and the articulation of procedures by which documents would be reviewed, key informants accessed, and the analysis of data would be completed.

Data Analysis

The steps of the data analysis process included the reduction of data, the creation of data displays, and the drawing and verification of conclusions (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Tape-
recorded key informant interviews were summarized with pertinent direct quotes included. In order to reduce the mass of newspaper accounts and official and unofficial documents and to provide corroboration of policy events across these data sources, document summary cards were integrated into a detailed sequence of policy activities organized by date and stage of the policy-making process. Impressions from field notes and the researcher’s data collection journal were distilled in beginning conceptual memos about the nature and extent of influence exerted by policy actors.

A start list of coding categories and was developed from the constructs of the conceptual framework. Construction, testing, elimination, and refinement of codes was an iterative process throughout the study. Interview summaries, field notes, and document reviews were coded and organized according to coding categories. To improve coding reliability, the researcher trained colleagues in the coding scheme; intercoder reliability reached 90 per cent.

To create data displays, coded data was organized into clusters by coding category and by stage of the policy-making process. The researcher looked both within each coding category across policy-making stages and across coding categories within the same stage to assess overarching themes about the context for policy making or about the decision process, to identify major players at each stage, and to delineate patterns of resource mobilization across policy actors. Once several recurrent patterns in the data had been isolated, analytic questions organized by policy stages were used to construct data displays in order to refine emerging impressions.

After relationships between variables had been predicated, triangulation across several informants with different roles and positions was utilized to indicate the causal links, either directly or indirectly, to verify researcher conclusions, and to account for countervailing evidence. Triangulation with secondary data sources such as documents and newspaper accounts was also a primary confirmatory tactic. Adding interviews and expanding the range of documents became necessary, thereby integrating more data collection with the recursive process of data analysis. Weighting the evidence by informant, some of whom were less adept at recall or in actuality had been positioned less close to certain aspects of the policy process itself, was another analysis strategy utilized to enhance data quality.

Several methods for auditing the data analysis process were employed. A policy expert in higher education was accessed to provide clarification on initial impressions. In addition, a cross-section of key informants was given the opportunity to provide feedback by commenting on a summary of
study findings as data analysis was completed. To track analysis activities, logs for each research question were maintained. These data analysis logs outlined steps followed in gathering data about each research question, the analysis operations utilized, as well as the decision rules devised for omitting or including data.

Findings

The intertwining of environmental demands with cultural constraints formed the backdrop for branch campus policy making. This context was not so much a causative element in the branch campus policy outcome as a receptive one for the influence attempts that occurred. The cast of policy actors, their potential to exert influence, and the actualization of that potential in inducing strategic attempts to create local, regional, and ultimately, state wide coalitions in support of the branch campus notion form the basis for the stage by stage analysis of branch campus policy making.

The Context for Higher Education Policy Making in Washington State

A disparity in population growth, economic resiliency, and employment opportunity was a prominent feature of what was commonly referred to in the 1980's as the "two" Washington's. The eastern more rural part of the state was relatively dependent upon agriculture and other resource-extractive industries. Only the Tri-Cities, where federal funding to support the Hanford nuclear industry predominated, and Spokane, "the inland empire", where industrial efforts were more diversified exhibited some economic vitality. The booming population growth and more diverse economy of the Puget Sound area in western Washington overshadowed even these more urban areas east of the Cascade Mountains. Inconsistencies in economic growth throughout the state, competition between urban and rural areas of the state for manufacturing and other potential employment opportunities, a lack of a well-developed plan for coping with the threatened shutdown of Hanford's nuclear reactor, and a concern over the need for training of workers in the growing electronics, plastics, and other high tech industries that could potentially add to the state's fiscal coffers, were all anticipated problems.

Joined inextricably to the economic climate in the state was the increasingly startling picture of the projected population growth for the state as a whole and, in particular, for the Puget Sound
region. If there was a need for more workers and those individuals had to be better trained, then how would the present system of higher education in the state be able to respond to the overwhelming demands that were projected to occur by the year 2000? Population growth was averaging 1.5 percent a year for the state as a whole. By 2010 it was projected that the total population in Puget Sound would increase by about 50 percent, rising to 3.3 million from the 1980 figure of 2.2 million, a rate that was almost twice the national average (Kerr, 1988). The state’s three largest metropolitan areas would then be “Puget Sound south, north and mid-Sound, followed by Seattle, Spokane and Vancouver” (Kerr, 1988, p. 27).

Accompanying the projected expansion of population throughout urban areas in the state were several significant social changes. First was the rapid growth of single parent families and their increasing economic distress. By 1980, there were 88,868 female-headed households in the state of Washington which comprised more than 16% of all families with children, an increase of 79.4 percent from the previous decade (Narver, 1990). The rate of poverty for single-mother families was double the rate for all families with children; 35 percent of all female-headed families in Washington were at the poverty level, an economic distinction true for all racial and ethnic groups (Narver, 1990). Coupled with the increase in single parent families was the rapid growth of women entering the workforce. Mothers in Washington became employed at slightly lower rates than in the national population, but by 1980, an estimated 43 percent of all Washington state women with children less than six years old were working (Narver, 1990). Many of these families were considered “placebound”, constrained by limited financial and other resources from moving to where educational or employment opportunities might be available and reluctant to leave behind carefully constructed social support systems in the urban communities where they lived.

Yet another social factor was the increasing number of elderly that would require ancillary support services to fulfill health and social needs as they aged. This population created an escalating demand on service industries, simultaneously enhancing potential growth in those industries while exerting a greater drain on state fiscal support of such services. Juxtaposed to the rapid growth of the elderly was the emerging picture of a Washington with marked increases in Asian, Black, and Hispanic populations in urban areas (HEC Board, 1987). These ethnic groups continued to have lower participation rates in higher education programs, less adaptable employment skills, and lower per capita incomes than other state residents.
Also shaping the policy-making context were political factors. During the 1988-1989 legislative sessions, the strong Democratic majority in the House was composed of 63 members out of a total of 98. The Speaker of the House was from the county in southwest Washington where the city of Vancouver was located; the House Majority Leader was a city of Tacoma representative. Chairs of two other prominent committees in the House were from the Seattle delegation which had strong ties to the University of Washington. Most critical was that the distribution of population throughout the state had created large delegations from more heavily populated areas of Washington. Urban centers such as Vancouver, Tacoma, Seattle and its surrounds, the Tri-Cities, and Spokane thus yielded regionalized centers of influence.

The Washington state Senate had forty-nine members, with Republicans having a one vote majority. Dominated by conservative senators from the Eastern part of the state, the tenor of the state Senate reflected its reluctance to support any new policy initiatives that might drain state revenues. The Senate majority leader was from the Tri-Cities area where the Hanford Nuclear Plant was located; the Republican chair of the Senate Ways and Means committee was from a heavily populated Seattle suburb; a Tacoma Democrat was the ranking minority member of the Senate Ways and Means Committee. The head of the Senate Committee on Higher Education was a Spokane senator. Interlocking relationships of long term Republican and Democratic senators were reflected in the powerful committee assignments and positions of caucus authority allocated to senators from both sides of the aisle—senators, who like their counterparts in the House, represented the major urban population areas in the state.

The Governor of the state during branch campus policy making was a popular Democrat. His policy agenda was couched in his strong support for economic development throughout the state. Whatever could provide enhanced productivity and improved revenues for Washington would receive, if not his overt support, at least an opportunity to be aired publicly without his active opposition.

Cultural assumptions regarding access to higher education shaped and were shaped by the contextual interplay of these economic, demographic, social, and political forces. On the one hand, access was the populist notion of availability and opportunity for all those state residents who sought higher education benefits. Access was also construed as job opportunity, reflecting the linkage promoted by the state’s business community. The relationship of access to economic vitality was
premised upon political contentions that improved educational opportunity would lead to a more vibrant economy, assure increased employment options for state residents, and attract new industry to the state while retaining and nurturing established high technology and manufacturing firms. Participants in the policy-making arena in the state increasingly identified higher education as "...linked inexorably to economic development..." (Senator, interview, April 7, 1994) and to the "...trained work force part of access" (Office of Financial Management, interview, March 17, 1994). This connection between higher education and economic growth was proselytized as the answer to not only providing open opportunity to all state residents for higher education services, but also as the appropriate and timely response to a state entering a new phase of economic and business potential.

Cast of Policy Actors
Throughout the branch campus policy-making process, major policy actors included the HEC Board, community groups that were created in Vancouver, North Puget Sound, the Tri-Cities, Spokane, and Tacoma, the University of Washington [UW], and Washington State University [WSU]. During final enactment of branch campus policy in the state legislature, lobbyists of these players and legislative champions of branch campuses became prominent. Massed on the sidelines were regional, community, and private colleges and their legislative liaisons.

HEC Board
As events converged during the mid-1980's, access became the policy driver for linking public universities with state economic development forces organizing around the need for expansion of the state's industrial base. The formation of the Higher Education Coordinating Board [HEC Board] by the 1985 legislature moved the coordination of higher education out of the legislature and into a governing agency with more credibility among institutions of higher education than its predecessors. The primary goal of the HEC Board was to serve "the interests of the population, not the interests of the institutions" (Representative, interview, April 20, 1994). The newly formed HEC Board had been awarded enhanced power over university planning and decision making and was intent on exerting that influence when necessary. The Board was expected to produce a state master plan for higher education that would provide for the coherent expansion of a system fraught with fragmentation.
Recognizing its legislative mandate to address the access demand and acutely cognizant of the pull of business interests on the outcomes of its deliberations, the HEC Board and its prominent businessman chair realized that unless their efforts yielded a viable plan with broad acceptance among special interests in higher education, the HEC Board's long-term existence was in jeopardy. Should the Board be unable to create some sort of branch campus program, "...the politics were so heavy in this...they wouldn't have survived" (Senate staff, interview, March 23, 1994). From a political standpoint, the HEC Board was well aware that the legislature had fashioned the Board as the vehicle to "make those recommendations in order to be able to get the branch campuses through legislatively. It would have been very difficult (otherwise)... to get the support of people who thought we might be just helping one part of the state over another" (Senator, interview, March 24, 1994). With its own continued credibility at stake, the HEC Board early on took a stand on the branch campus issue that planning had to move forward despite overt opposition from many sectors of higher education regarding the need for expansion of the state system of colleges and universities. To fulfill its role would require the HEC Board to pursue a statewide approach to resolving the competition among public and private institutions and to assuring the necessary political support to achieve its mandated objectives.

Community Groups

As the HEC Board began its deliberations in January of 1986, communities located in urban settings initiated work groups of interested business and economic elites. Threatened with economic disaster if the Nuclear Reactor were to shut down, the Tri-Cities community group began to discuss how that region's present educational services could be linked to the promise of further industrial development. The TUC [Tri-Cities University Center] had served the area for years with an array of fragmented coursework from WSU, the UW, Eastern Washington University, and Oregon State. Thinking their community was "down for the count...this was a city that was dying..." (HEC Board, interview, March 31, 1994), the Tri-Cities' work group established its objectives. The first policy goal was to find a university willing to accept the challenge of initiating a full-fledged branch campus in the Tri-Cities; the next was to organize a concerted move to garner political and statewide support for the branch campus concept; a final objective was to develop a strategic effort that would convince the HEC Board, other special interests in higher education, the local
community, and the legislature that the Tri-Cities’ stake in the branch campus issue was the continued vitality of that region’s economic functioning.

The history of interest in the branch campus issue extended even further back in the Vancouver area. Located in a rapidly growing part of southwest Washington, just across the river from Portland, Oregon, Vancouver business interests had exerted successful efforts during the late 70’s and early 80’s to attract a variety of high technology industries to the area. Serving the higher education needs of the region was a consortium of The Evergreen State College and WSU, which had been combined into the Southwest Joint Center for Higher Education in 1973. By the early 80’s, community members had documented the increased demand for higher education in southwest Washington as part of an economic development strategy. Even before the HEC Board had completed its analyses of demographic and social data, the Vancouver advisory committee recommended in June of 1986 that “…WSU should establish a branch campus in Vancouver on or before July 1, 1987...”(Advisory Committee of the SW Washington Joint Center for Education, 1986, p. 1).

By the fall of 1987, the president of WSU had reorganized this advisory committee into the WSU-Vancouver Advisory Council which included educational and political leaders from Clark county, the director of the local Columbia River Economic Development Council, and representatives from all major high technology, banking, and health care industries in the area. The goals of this group were two fold: “To give information to WSU to help them develop a university branch and secondly, to act as a lobbying and network group...for the whole WSU-Vancouver concept” (Vancouver community group, interview, March 28, 1994). How and to what extent expansion of higher education services could serve the economic interests of the region formed the foundation for the Vancouver council’s goals on the branch campus issue.

The third potential WSU community was Spokane, suffering from a long term economic recession and the inability to attract new industry. Projected growth figures for Spokane, although paling in comparison to the Puget Sound region, still indicated that population increases would occur in that part of the state. With these increases emerged the need to enhance training for Spokane’s local workforce, not through the expansion, but through the consolidation of educational services. Two private institutions, two community colleges, Eastern Washington University, and WSU already offered coursework to Spokane residents. However, industries that had considered
Spokane had expressed concern over the obvious lack of organization of course options, the high cost of attending private institutions which had necessary graduate level engineering and technology courses that would fulfill industrial training needs, and the lack of commitment to programming that WSU had evinced over the previous decades.

Moving from undergraduate to graduate educational opportunities as a goal because of these high tech industrial demands, citizens in Spokane organized into two community groups with similar stands on the formation of a WSU branch campus in that region. One group, comprised of diverse educational, political, and business leaders, was formed by the president of WSU in August of 1987 and included nine industrial and banking executives out of a total of fifteen members (WSU, 1988). Earlier in February of 1987, another group had been formed by business leaders from an economic coalition of major Spokane industries; this conglomerate became known as Momentum '87, dedicated to "...educating business leaders and politicians around the state" (Sperry, 1988) about the potential for economic development in Spokane. As in Vancouver and the Tri-Cities, the stakes for Spokane in the creation of a branch campus were inextricably intertwined with the enhancement of the local economy of the region.

The northern part of Puget Sound had been identified early in the HEC Board process as an area of phenomenal projected growth—the area was predicted to increase its population base by 51 percent between 1980 and 2000, while eastside Seattle suburbs were to grow by 66 percent during that same period (Puget Sound Council of Governments, 1984). Urgent needs for increased higher education services to accommodate projections of population growth and to support the rapidly expanding high technology base of the region led to the organization of a Committee on Higher Education by the Bellevue Chamber of Commerce early in 1986. Enrollment demand projections were compelling enough evidence for the Chamber to resolve that a primary goal should be to garner support from other local chambers of commerce. The chamber ultimately created a coalition of interests from areas both north and east of Seattle called the Eastside Higher Education Coalition to assure a place at the bargaining table.

The primary policy actor in Central Puget Sound was the Tacoma-Pierce County Economic Development Board [EDB]. This group initiated a series of surveys of employers in the area early in 1986 to ascertain educational needs. Results of this survey indicated that to assure the industrial growth of the city of Tacoma, a research university would be required—one that would be willing
and able to provide the graduate level programming necessary for local economic expansion. Beset with decaying buildings, a growing reputation for crime, and an exodus of small businesses to the suburbs, the downtown Tacoma area was viewed as an unappealing place for economic development and as an unlikely candidate for renovation funding from the state. Although Tacoma had two private four-year institutions and a community college, educational resources of the type that the EDB and its members sought were lacking; there were no accessible, low cost technical programs that were available to local residents to either enhance the level of training of the workforce or to maintain the skill of those already employed in the limited industrial base.

Anxious to get the community involved in its emerging efforts, the EDB formed a Commission on Education and Research in March of 1987. Appointed to this group, which ultimately expanded to become the South Puget Sound Higher Education Council in 1988, were educational, political, and business elites. Their policy goal became to pave the way for a branch campus in the city of Tacoma through generating support within the community and the HEC Board (Tacoma-Pierce County EDB, personal communication, March, 1987). The stakes for the Tacoma players were as high as for those in the other communities massing around the concept of a branch campus as an economic development tool and as an educational resource for their local areas.

**Washington State University**

The stakes for WSU in the branch campus issue were political in nature. If the university could extend its influence outside of its rural Eastern Washington location to other urban areas of the state, then the likelihood of enhanced legislative support for the university and greater political potential to influence the system of higher education on a statewide basis could be assured. WSU administrators defined their policy goals as working behind the scenes to attain broad-based community support in the areas where branch campuses might be located, to shape public opinion in those communities so legislative pressure for the desired expansion would occur, and to work toward an alliance with their sister university, the University of Washington.

**University of Washington**

The University of Washington in contrast valiantly sought to be excluded from having to participate in the branch campus policy-making process until the very end of the summer of 1987. Throughout the HEC Board study process from 1986-1987, the University of Washington continued to assert that branch campuses “would be a distraction and a pulling away from the...
mission of the main campus” (Eastside community group, interview, April 26, 1994). The stakes in the branch campus issue for the University of Washington were derived from two primary sources. First, there was the concern that the branch campuses would impede the UW’s ability to obtain the increased operational and especially, capital renovation funding, it desperately needed in the next biennium (Lobbyist, interview, March 25, 1994). But, with the recognition of the vested interest that Puget Sound communities had in branch campus development came a concomitant acknowledgment by the UW regarding its “...need to expand its sphere of influence” (Senator, interview, April 11, 1994) outside of its Seattle campus. The university realized that “it was capped and that there would be no growth on the main campus...and the administration knew they needed growth to achieve other goals” (Eastside community group, interview, April 25, 1994)– goals that included increased legislative fiscal support and enhanced political clout. Ultimately, UW’s President and Board of Regents had no alternative but to join forces with the HEC Board, WSU, and Puget Sound booster groups in favor of higher education expansion.

Peripheral Players from the State Higher Education System

Other policy actors did not attempt to impact the branch campus policy-making process directly. Nonetheless, their ability to mount resistance to branch campus momentum building at various points of leverage in the policy-making process was noteworthy. Located in the Yakima valley and drawing more than 30 percent of its enrollment from the Puget Sound region, Central Washington University had been involved in developing off-campus programs throughout the state since the mid 1970’s. Central’s stake in the enrollment base of the Puget Sound region was enormous, as its basis for existence was dependent upon its ability to draw students from more populous urban areas. In addition, the enrollment lids that had been placed on state universities during the early 1980’s recession had proved beneficial to Central and other state regional universities which had assumed the overflow of students unable to access the University of Washington. Central’s goal became to deny the need for expansion of higher education services and to denigrate the efforts of those who sought to make it a political reality.

Regional universities aside from Central Washington, watching the momentum building behind expansion of higher education through the creation of branch campuses, chose to retreat to the sidelines. The Evergreen State College, located south of Tacoma, never entered the branch campus policy-making process because, “our belief (was)...we were so politically powerless that
anyone (could) . . . roll over us . . . " (Lobbyist, interview, March 31, 1994). With a stake in the budgetary process and in retaining political support, both Evergreen and Western Washington University broached no public opposition to the branch campuses. Wanting to alienate neither the HEC Board nor the research universities, they chose to work quietly instead for added student enrollments on their campuses. Eastern Washington University took a public stand in favor of WSU branch campus formation, and aside from asserting its stake in the continuance of its Spokane program, also made no attempt to influence the course of policy making.

Private and community colleges had high stakes in the branch campus issue. For both of these sectors of higher education, the creation of additional campuses boded a threat to their continued enrollment and growth. Community colleges feared draining resources from the community college system for “there was a very strong feeling that the pie was not going to get any larger so having branch campuses would take resources away” (Community college administrator, interview, April 29, 1994). For private institutions with little acknowledgment as part of the statewide system of higher education, the proposed branch campus formation was “something we weren’t particularly wild about because we felt it proposed a threat to private institutions in the state and certainly in the Seattle area” (Private university administrator, interview, May 5, 1994).

Despite high stakes in the branch campus policy outcome, neither private colleges nor the community college system actively engaged in overt strategic efforts to influence the course of policy making. Instead, both policy actors sought accommodation through tradeoffs from branch campus policy advocates for their non-opposition to the HEC Board proposal for extensions of university campuses. Private institutions utilized the branch campus notion as an opportunity to assert their place in providing access to higher education. In turn, community colleges, once assured that branch programming would be upper-division only, worked on the assumption that “branch campuses were a public good that would serve the needs of the state . . . and that it was in the interests . . . of people we were trying to serve to do that” (Community college board, interview, April 13, 1994).

House of Representatives

Occupying positions of power in the House of Representatives were branch campus advocates who were from urban areas where campuses might be sited: the Speaker of the House, the House Majority Leader, the Chair of the House Higher Education Committee, and a ranking member of
the Higher Education Committee. This ensured that the “legislators in the House (who) thought that money would be better spent in increasing capacity at existing institutions rather than in building branch campuses” (Representative, interview, April 20, 1994) would be neutralized in their efforts to oppose branch campus enactment.

With a political goal of framing the branch campus issue within the larger context of enhancement for all of higher education “instead of viewing budgets as a zero sum game” (Lobbyist, interview, April 6, 1994), the Higher Education Committee chair (D-Seattle) sought to move the university system further up the ladder of legislative funding priorities and to establish a broader base of legislative support for the system as a whole. In turn, the House Majority Leader (D-Tacoma), seeking the revitalization of Tacoma’s manufacturing and industrial base, established a policy goal of “gaining well-paid faculty, staff...a better-trained work force, stimulating business...(and)...bringing in suppliers and equipment” (Wilson, 1989, p. A1) through the placement of a branch campus of the UW in his area. House branch campus policy proponents shared policy aspirations of economic gain for the communities they represented through the attainment of educational services that would enhance local workforce training opportunities and thus attract or retain existing industry. House leaders, even before the 1989 session had begun, had established themselves as a formidable force broaching little opposition in their drive to push branch campus legislation through the session.

Legislative opponents to the branch campus plan were lawmakers from coastal, northern, and central Washington delegations, who recognized that their constituents would gain little advantage from branch campus enactment. Fearful of losing enrollment enhancements in already existing community colleges and regional universities if branch campuses were funded, these legislators took a stand in opposition to powerful branch campus advocates in the House. These lawmakers asserted that “areas could deliver upper-division higher education to students, not by the construction of branch campuses but by extending upper-level courses through community colleges” (“Educators make”, p. 3A). Calling lawmaker support on the branch campus issue “a lot of high-level pork for a lot of people” (Partlow, 1989, p. 1A), House foes from Bellingham and Yakima, areas that had regional universities within their environs, were determined to resist publicly the momentum building for passage of some form of branch campus legislation.
The Senate

In contrast to House counterparts, Senate leaders who represented urban areas designated as potential branch campus sites were constrained in their support of branch campuses by their fiscal conservatism and competing allegiances to community colleges and private universities. Prominent policy actors in the Senate Republican caucus with often unclear stands on the branch campus issue included the chair (R-Spokane) of the Senate Committee on Higher Education, also a member of Senate Ways and Means, the Majority leader of the Republican Caucus (R-Walla Walla), and the chair (R-Bellevue) of the Senate Ways and Means Committee. A staunch advocate for the branch campus concept was the ranking minority member on Senate Ways and Means, a Democrat from the Tacoma area.

Senate branch campus opponents cited similar arguments to their House counterparts. Asserting that “existing universities could accommodate 15,400 more students if the instructional money was provided” (Wolf, 1989, p. A3), Senators from the Seattle delegation, Bellingham, the Yakima valley, and coastal regions assumed a stand toward branch campuses that emphasized that “The real issue (was)...access, not bricks and mortar” (Prager, 1989, p. B1). With constituencies which had been excluded from consideration during the selection of the branch campus alternative, Senators from areas with struggling regional universities, overextended community colleges, no promise of a satellite campus, or where the main campus funding could be threatened if branch campuses were to materialize, exhibited a cohesive front in posing resistance.

Most visible was the Senate chair (R-Spokane) of the Higher Education Committee. Representing Spokane, which had the dual booster groups from industry and WSU backing the expansion of higher education, the senate Chair endorsed WSU branch campuses and dedicated himself to the creation of Spokane’s Intercollegiate Research and Technology Institute (SIRTI), a consortium of public and private institutions intended to fulfill Spokane business interests’ economic development agenda. Demonstrating a consistently reluctant approach to the creation and subsequent funding of any satellite campuses, the newly appointed chair (R-Bellevue) of the Senate Ways and Means Committee in contrast asserted that “the need for additional enrollments won’t become compelling until 1997—and that gives the state time to plan” (Smith, 1989, p. A1) The Senate Majority Leader (R-Walla Walla) wavered between agreement with her Tri-Cities constituents’ political priority for a WSU branch campus that would revitalize the flagging local
economy and a staunch advocacy for private institutions that inevitably conflicted with rising policy
demands for access to public higher education.

Community Group Lobbyists

"Hiring the best lobbyists in Olympia...so it got completely taken away from the universities'
lobbyists..." (Lobbyist, interview, May 5, 1993), the economic development councils and
community groups in each potential branch campus site maximized their ability to alter the course
of policy negotiations and to consolidate support for their policy goal of linking higher education
services to industrial and business growth. Lobbyists from Spokane, the Tri-Cities, and Vancouver
booster groups exhibited conjoined stances on how the branch campus conflict could be resolved to
the benefit of the WSU communities that they represented.

Lobbyists for Spokane interests "viewed branch campuses as a way to develop
(the)...community...to get educated people who (would)...stay right in Spokane..." (Office of
Financial Management, interview, March 17, 1994). The Tri-Cities contingent entered the
legislative arena with economic distress and threatened extinction as motivators and with the
branch campus as the answer to the question of what to do with "a high tech based
economy...(that)...needed higher ed to transition to other high tech kinds of activities" (Senator,
interview, March 21, 1994). With the Speaker of the House (D-Vancouver) "interested in the
Vancouver branch and the business people...very interested..." (Senator, interview, March 31,
1994), the "Tri-Cities' community group being very very strong..." (Senator, interview, March 21,
1994), and the Spokane groups "seeing the connections that could be made between a branch
campus in Spokane of WSU and SIRTI..." (Senator, interview, March 31, 1994), lobbyists
employed by WSU community boosters possessed a rich array of resources with which to mount
efforts to attain their constituents' policy goal of branch campus enactment.

Already distrustful of the University of Washington's commitment to branch campuses, Puget
Sound community groups, in forming the Puget Sound Higher Education Coalition to represent
the needs and wants of both Tacoma and the north Puget Sound area, sought a lobbyist able to
focus legislative attention on the economic and enrollment demands threatening the economic
vitality of the region. In contrast to east King county, where "we had such a large economic base
that was growing and it was critical to the state's economy...we needed more education there or we
were going to lose companies that were going to move out..." (Eastside community group,
interview, April 21, 1994), the Tacoma contingent desired a branch campus "as a way to rebuild downtown Tacoma...as a way to get the state to virtually revitalize all of downtown Tacoma because of...the branch campus" (Office of Financial Management, interview, March 17, 1994). The lobbyist for the Puget Sound Higher Education Coalition capitalized on the concerns of the community group membership regarding the reluctant commitment of the UW to branch campus formation; he was determined to "drag the UW into it...it had to be the 'U' for the stature it could give to those communities" (Senate staff, interview, March 23, 1994). Driven by the need to link economic opportunity to research university presence, the Puget Sound community group lobbyist joined with WSU community organization counterparts in predicating the goals of community boosters to be mobilizing legislative support behind a branch campus mandate, manipulating the issue so that public pressure could be maximized, and molding the policy decision process to ensure that the branch campus system that the communities demanded would be actualized into public policy.

**The Governor**

"Only lukewarm about branch campuses...and (not) knowing if branch campuses were the right decision (because)...they were expensive" (Governor's staff, interview, April 1, 1994), the Governor assumed a stand on the branch campus issue that was inconsistent at most points in the decision enactment process. The Governor came out in late 1988 with a budget proposal that committed $45 million to branch campus construction funding and only $4.7 million to their operation, in contrast to the approximately $33 million for operating costs recommended by the HEC Board at the start of the session. By initiating a series of offensive maneuvers indicating commitment at one point to the notion of branch campuses followed by a set of rapid retreats as he refused to fund branches without linking moneys to other tax initiatives, the state's executive tried to exploit branch campus fervor as a possible tradeoff for attaining desired tax reform from reluctant fiscally conservative Senators.

**Comparative Analysis of Influence Potential**

Among policy actors, certain constraints operated to affect the extent to which the potential to influence the conversion of the branch campus demand into public policy would be actualized. For certain higher education interests, including the regional universities and the private and community colleges, the saliency of the issue was not enough to offset the limitations imposed by
the unavailability of material and physical resources. Although the University of Washington possessed the funding, numbers, presence, and access to decision makers that would smooth the path toward utilization of these resources in influence attempts, its resource base was constrained by the lack of saliency of the branch campus issue to university goals. In contrast, WSU was positioned to exert increasing influence on the course of policy making with a president skillful enough to harness its assets to its primary policy goal of increasing the political base and the enrollment potential of its Eastern Washington campus.

In the House of Representatives, branch campus proponents joined together in consolidating positional and physical collateral behind the political skill that would lead to their desired legislative mandate for branch campus formation. Occupying places of authority in the legislature including the most powerful positions, branch campus supporters controlled all access points to the decision-making process. However, the Senate forces were constrained by the fragmentation in branch campus advocacy among Republican Senators. Seeking policy gain for their own constituencies but reluctant to support the costly expansion of research universities into five new campuses, these lukewarm Senate branch campus advocates fostered discord in lieu of forming a coalition of support with House and Senate Democrats to ensure branch campus enactment.

For both the HEC Board and the community groups scattered in urban areas throughout the state, the saliency and scope of the issue added impetus to their utilization of available, liquid, and numerous material and physical resources in strategic efforts to propel branch campuses to the top of the public policy agenda. The HEC Board had the advantage of policy activity having been relocated to its arena where it could control and monitor progress toward the attainment of consensus on the branch campus issue. Given credibility and mandate for action by the state legislature and the Governor's office, having the social and economic status of Board members to draw upon, and wielding the political skill of an experienced and prestigious chair, the HEC Board was poised to propel branch campuses through the policy-making process. With the social, economic, and civic elites who formed the membership of local community booster groups came the resource advantages of varied sources of funding, public stature, legislative clout, a knowledge of the political process, and the finely honed skills associated with driving economic demands through political gatekeepers into the policy-making arena. The stakes for both policy actors in bringing expansion of the state higher education system to fruition were high enough and their resource
potential superior enough in comparison to other participants, that both policy proponents entered the policy-making arena with strategic advantage over those actors who might try to restrain branch campuses from becoming a state political priority.

Agenda-Setting Stage

The agenda-setting stage was initiated with the newly created Higher Education Coordinating Board’s work in January of 1986. It extended until the Board’s final approval of a state master plan for higher education (HEC Board, 1987) in November of 1987. The HEC Board and community groups, both possessing the largest resource bases in comparison to other higher education special interests, mounted more efforts to push branch campuses to the top of the public policy agenda.

These players utilized the adding of inducements to the policy situation through coalition building as their most frequent strategic choice for attaining desired policy goals.

HEC Board: Inducing Strategies

The Board spent 1986 gathering demographic and population growth data that would frame HEC Board efforts to market the branch campus idea and to build a coalition of support behind it. Coupled with the analysis of demographic trends, the HEC Board “sent out a letter to everybody around the state and said we are starting this process and we want to identify the critical issues on your mind, so if you are interested, please respond...” (HEC Board, interview, March 31, 1994). By extending the scope of deliberations to include community groups, state government representatives, and all levels of the higher education hierarchy in the state, the HEC Board added inducements to the policy situation. This strategy set the stage for moving the decision process into the macropolitical arena where powerful champions of the branch campus idea could exert maximum influence on coalescing support behind this policy choice.

Having legislatively been mandated to service urban communities, the Board first “figured out where the student and population pockets were...” (HEC Board, interview, April 13, 1994) and named Spokane, the Tri-Cities, Vancouver and the North-Central Puget Sound as areas of “unmet need”. This assured the immediate support of the three WSU community groups. At the same time, the Board’s recommendation increased the efforts of those in Tacoma and north and east of Seattle to join together in actively promoting the benefits of a branch campus to their local communities while linking their activities with those of the HEC Board chair and its members.
To accomplish the transition of the branch campus issue into a policy demand, the HEC Board and its chair sought to build alliances with policy players from research and regional universities as well as from private and community colleges— in essence to develop a “master plan...that...had something that everyone could support so there would be no big constituencies that were losers...” (Community college board, interview, April 13, 1994). Acknowledging the place of the private sector in solving state access problems despite a HEC Board staff that asserted that “public policy should focus on public institutions...” (Lobbyist, interview, May 5, 1993), assuring community colleges that any alternative would be a two plus two system so “they would be part of the long range policy solution” (Lobbyist, interview, March 24, 1994), ferreting out regional university opposition and neutralizing it with promises of enhanced capacity on existing campuses, and nurturing the support of WSU while persistently seeking the acquiescence of the UW, the HEC Board and its chair methodically constructed a statewide view of the problems of higher education. In turn, a statewide solution to providing access for Washington residents resulted, supported by a statewide coalition of special interests with increased stakes in seeing the formation of branches through to completion.

By the time the draft master plan was presented in July of 1987, the chair of the HEC Board had already convinced Board members of the efficacy of the UW-WSU branch campus solution and had promised benefits from this policy solution to higher education institutions and community groups. The draft master plan included a recommendation for decentralization of the state system of higher education by “...fixing responsibility for baccalaureate and graduate programming within each urban area...” (HEC Board, 1987, p. 60). Coalition building had marked the public and clandestine maneuvers of HEC Board members with economic and business elites from all involved groups.

**WSU Community Groups: Inducing Strategies**

Community booster efforts added further advantage to the agenda-setting process. Members of Spokane’s Momentum organization proffered resources in exchange for branch campus support, as they met privately with HEC Board members, accessed the Governor’s office, and joined together locally to garner legislative commitment to SIRTI and the WSU branch campus. Seeking to add inducements to the push for branches as a policy agenda priority, Tri-City community group members worked to build a coalition of Spokane and Vancouver interests behind WSU branch
campuses. Tri-Cities boosters encouraged community groups to unite with their own organization in supporting the draft plan of the HEC Board and in fueling the public clamor for expansion of higher education.

Joining community-based efforts were the President of WSU and members of his administration. WSU administrators recognized that political support for the university could only be expanded by “putting a piece of WSU in every part of the state of Washington” (Representative, interview, April 14, 1994), thus encouraging legislators to “not only...not vote against you but to make sure you were wealthy” (Representative, interview, April 14, 1994). With the participation in its Vancouver Advisory Council of political, educational, and business leaders, WSU could benefit from the resources of powerful local interests. The leader of the Tri-Cities community group [Advisory Council Tri-Cities] utilized his position as the Tri-Cities Herald publisher to provide an onslaught of media attention in the Tri-Cities that enhanced local cohesion around a WSU branch campus alternative. WSU linked its branch campus aspirations to the formation of SIRTI in Spokane, thereby forcing private Spokane colleges to reluctantly unite under a flag of economic opportunity for the inland empire. In this way, the WSU administration moved with diverse interests from three urban regions to create a burgeoning coalition designed to achieve recognition for local community educational need and for the economic growth that would accompany WSU expansion.

Puget Sound Community Groups: Inducing Strategies

Tacoma and north Puget Sound chamber and economic development groups initiated tactical maneuvers to build bases of local support among social, civic, and economic leaders by including all higher education institutions from their areas in their deliberations and by actively organizing independent regional efforts to “present...a united front to the HEC Board” (Tacoma-Pierce County EDB, personal communication, May 1, 1987). Forces massing north of Seattle were less cohesive because of competition among the several city and regional chambers of commerce and economic development councils. In contrast, the Tacoma contingent rapidly moved its strategic efforts out from under the umbrella of the economic development board and into a citizen based group.

Trying to secure the linkage among community needs for economic revitalization, educational needs of local residents, and institutional needs for expansion, Tacoma worked parallel to the HEC Board in exerting efforts to bring the University of Washington, rich in potential resources that
could be applied to strategic efforts, in step with the branch campus policy movement. Along with community booster pressure, the UW was awash in a sea of threats mounted by Seattle area legislators regarding the UW’s ability to sustain political support for its capital needs should it not agree to involvement in branch campus formation. The UW became convinced that if it did not participate in the HEC Board’s branch campus proposal that “not playing in that game would have enormous consequences politically and otherwise” (Lobbyist, interview, April 6, 1994). Ultimately, by the end of agenda setting, the UW agreed to assume responsibility for the development of branch campuses in the Puget Sound region.

Because of the legislative clout of the Tacoma delegation, local community leaders from that city were also included in efforts by WSU community groups to build advocacy on a statewide basis for the notion of branch campus formation. By the end of agenda setting, all five community groups recognized that coalition building among regions of the state could lead to a broad base of political support for branch campuses in the legislature. Constructing local and then regional coalitions of special interests “politically had to be the strategy...” (Tri-Cities community group, interview, April 20, 1994) to add advantage to the policy situation. Enhancing the saliency of the branch campus issue required not only a HEC Board recommendation to build branches, but also community coalition maneuvers to create a public outcry for them that would secure the branch campus idea’s place on the top of the state’s policy-making agenda.

Alternative Formation Stage

The alternative formation stage extended from the delivery of the HEC Board’s final master plan to the Governor and legislature on December 1, 1987 through the 1988 legislative session when the plan was formally approved, to the prelegislative activity around the plan’s branch campus proposal which ended in December of 1988. During the alternative formation stage, once the 1988 session had passed the concurrent resolution approving the master plan (State of Washington Senate, 1988), the two research universities assumed more visible participation in the decision process. With the concurrent branch campus study processes of the two research universities came increased engagement of community groups in activities that would lead to the selection of policy options which would maximize benefits for their constituencies.
Washington State University: Inducing Strategies

With a lengthy study period preceding the onset of alternative formation, WSU had the policy advantage of long term involvement in urban communities with community elites who formed the basis for WSU advisory councils. WSU fostered coalition-building attempts even further by bringing all three community advisory groups to its main campus in Pullman for "work sessions to develop legislative strategies and to talk about how we had to keep working together" (WSU administration, interview, April 13, 1994). These efforts helped the university to end up with "42 legislators with an interest in having the branch campuses succeed...instead of only four from Pullman" (WSU administration, interview, May 24, 1994). In addition, WSU attempted to appease "the faculty and deans (on the main campus)...who were very threatened that somehow these mini-campuses would take resources out of Pullman" (Tri-Cities community group, interview, April 20, 1994). Mounting efforts to entice private universities in Spokane into a collaborative approach to the formation of SIRTI, WSU's president and vice provost exerted continuous labor to convince policy opponents that "if Pullman (were)...to have a future, it needed stronger state wide politics" (Tri-Cities community group, interview, April 20, 1994). WSU drew upon loyal alumni who had access to local business and economic elites, and exploited its position near the top of the state higher education ladder in strategic attempts to contain community boosters, main campus faculty, and other higher education institutions in Spokane within a coalition—a coalition that would stand united behind WSU branch campuses as a policy alternative.

University of Washington: Inducing Strategies

In contrast to WSU which had already aligned itself with local community elites, the UW allowed community boosters and other educational institutions to participate in the UW study process, without promising in exchange that special interests would dictate what the university ultimately would decide to do. The vice provost in charge of the study worked to minimize opposition to university goals by fashioning policy options that might allay the threat of university branch campuses and smooth the path for such a proposal to garner necessary legislative support. Suggesting that community colleges might be "the place to go for the first two years of education" (Smith, 1988, p. A3), that private universities might be "the most cost effective way for the state to buy slots for economically and socially placebound students" (Council on Postsecondary Education staff, interview, April 8, 1994), and that regional institutions might be utilized more efficiently if
enrollment lids were lifted, the vice provost provided a means for assuring an exchange of tradeoffs to neutralize opposition to the study's conclusions.

In final recommendations made in UW's report to the HEC Board in August of 1988, the need for university branch campuses to be placed in the Bothell-Woodinville area in North Puget Sound and in Tacoma were highlighted. In addition, the university assured competing parties that their stakes in the branch campus issue had been recognized by recommending that "the enrollment lids at the upper-division at Western... Central...and Evergreen" (Kerr, 1988, p. 7) be raised, an upper-division UW evening degree program be added, regional universities be allowed to maintain existing off-campus programs in Tacoma and north of Seattle, and "a tuition voucher program for students who have completed the associate of arts degree or its equivalent..." (Kerr, p. 10) be established to allow for study at private institutions. The accommodation of higher education interests drove the UW study process as much as the research into the "...demography, economy, and occupational structure of the region to the year 2010" (Kerr, p. 1). By framing the basis for study recommendations on unmet need and service to placebound students, the UW constructed study conclusions to reflect diverse interests' demands in exchange for their support.

Community Groups: Inducing Strategies

Community booster organizations participated in institutional study processes, worked to mobilize local constituencies in support of a branch campus proposal, and restructured to broaden regional representation. Vancouver, Spokane, and Tri-Cities Advisory Councils "...did articles and editorials to generate more grass roots support..."(Vancouver community group, interview, March 28, 1994) among local residents for the branch campus idea and urged members of local chambers of commerce and other organized professional groups to market branch campuses to their legislators in order to assure that "...economic advantages would accrue...in the form of more jobs..." (Woehler, 1988, p. B1). The Spokane business organization, Momentum '88, carved out a role for SIRTI as an integral part of WSU's branch campus proposal to the HEC Board. Drawing together a coalition of interests that included the two private universities in Spokane, WSU, and Eastern Washington University, representatives from Momentum '88 fostered a compromise between business interests and those associated with the state system of higher education. Because of their material, physical, and positional superiority in the Spokane community, the group was able to trade business advocacy for a WSU branch campus in exchange for technical workforce training
through the formation of an intercollegiate research center. Once forces merged behind SIRTI, the inducement for the Spokane community and for the legislators who represented its interests to bring a WSU branch campus to Spokane had been accomplished.

In the Puget Sound, two primary community groups also mounted inducing strategic efforts. Distrustful of UW's commitment to establishing branch campuses, the Eastside Higher Education Coalition [EHEC] exerted pressure on the UW vice provost to remedy the lack of recognition of the Eastside's burgeoning population growth and consequent educational need. By framing EHEC arguments for inclusion in the UW study plan as a regional problem, the several local chambers were able to consolidate their resources. This regional approach also enhanced the appeal of EHEC efforts to "hundreds...of people in the community...who would attend our public meetings to get some update on where we were going with the branch campus" (Eastside community group, interview, April 21, 1994). Though EHEC was often stymied by its lack of legislative leverage in comparison to Tacoma, EHEC members continued their local crusade of constituency mobilization around the branch campus alternative.

The South Puget Sound Higher Education Council [SPSHEC] was created in May of 1988. Trying to create "an opportunity that would be a win-win for everybody...the two privates (in Tacoma), the community colleges, the UW and WSU" (Tacoma-Pierce County EDB, interview, May 3, 1994), the Tacoma council hired an educational consultant to complete a needs assessment study of the area and to recommend a policy alternative that could be considered along with the UW's study conclusions by the end of the summer.

Although the SPSHEC had initiated this independent effort to document and address local needs, it ultimately realized that the UW "was the only show in town" (Tacoma community group, interview, April 14, 1994). Recognizing that to convince lawmakers that higher education for the area was a critical priority would "require that the strongest, most unified statements be made to the legislature and the people of the state" (Tacoma-Pierce County EDB, personal communication, August 17, 1988), the Tacoma council brokered an exchange of benefits with the UW. By agreeing to the university's upper-division branch campus proposal and publicly rejecting their consultant's recommendation for a four year university, the Tacoma council allied itself with the most powerful higher education institution in the policy fray. This action assured that Tacoma "was not going to be a step child and could plan some of its...program here..." (Tacoma community group, interview,
April 26, 1994), in essence garnering the tradeoff of future participation in university branch campus plans.

By the end of the UW study process in August of 1988, both EHEC and the Tacoma council had formed a coalition of interests whose purpose was to provide "united regional leadership and support which (would)...assure that adequate higher education services (were)...available to meet the needs of business communities as well as Pierce, East King, and Snohomish county residents" (Tacoma-Pierce County EDB, personal communication, August 17, 1988). The Puget Sound Higher Education Coalition, as this alliance was called, coalesced the resources of civic, business, and social elites from the North-Central Puget Sound region behind community efforts to exert influence on the outcomes of the alternative formation stage. Led by members of EHEC, the SPSHEC, and the Tacoma-Pierce County and Snohomish Economic Development Councils, the Puget Sound Higher Education Coalition generated broad based legislative support previously lacking in the north and consolidated the high tech industrial support behind branch campuses that had been missing in the South. Vowing that "we would not be brought in and pitted against each other" (Tacoma community group, interview, April 14, 1994), the coalition strategized with the three groups from WSU communities before the legislative session. The coalition also hired a lobbyist to represent its interests to the legislature and mounted a systematic effort before the 1989 session to access relevant legislative groups (Puget Sound Higher Education Coalition lobbyist, personal communication, December 13, 1988). In constructing ever broadening coalitions of regional and state wide community interests, Puget Sound community boosters garnered extensive legislative backing for the branch campus policy option.

**Decision Enactment Stage**

The decision enactment stage was framed by the legislative action that occurred around the branch campus policy alternative as it moved through the legislative process during the 1989 session. Between January and the middle of May when a branch campus measure was passed, the legislative session was dominated by branch campus activity that culminated in a display of strategic efforts by state lawmakers, community groups and their lobbyists, and the HEC Board chair in a drive to attain maximum policy benefits for their respective interests. Table I summarizes legislative action on branch campus formation.
### Table I

**Synopsis of Legislative Activity, 1989 Session**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bill #</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Provisions</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SB 5230 (1/18/89)</td>
<td>Branch Campuses</td>
<td>Created extension programs of UW, WSU; $35 million appropriation.</td>
<td>Died Senate Ways and Means, 3/6/89.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB 5975 (2/20/89)</td>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Only extension programs UW/WSU; increased FTE's to regional universities, community colleges; UW to begin extension programs in fall of 1989. $17.2 million total appropriation.</td>
<td>Left in limbo on Senate floor, 3/15/89. Increase in FTE's ultimately addressed in 1989-91 biennial budget.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB 6095 (2/29/89)</td>
<td>Branch Campus</td>
<td>Same as SB 5230. No Appropriation.</td>
<td>Passed Senate, 29:17; amended on House floor with SIRTI and tuition vouchers, passed 68:29, 4/14/89. Reintroduced after conference committee in Senate, 4/24/89; passed Senate 33:12, 5/10/89; passed House 67:27, 5/10/89; Governor signed 5/31/89.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The adding of inducements by branch campus advocates pervaded the decision enactment stage of branch campus policy making. Employing a strategic approach that involved the formation of log-rolling coalitions in formulating and passing the House branch campus bill (HB 1822), House branch campus leaders capitalized upon positions of authority and political skill in manipulating the policy system to serve their own ends. Community boosters and lobbyists added advantage to strategic efforts of key House legislators by building coalitions among recalcitrant representatives and by negotiating with home delegations to maximize policy outcomes for their constituencies. Community group lobbyists also sought to induce Senate leaders to join the branch campus crusade through efforts to engage lukewarm branch campus supporters in a collaborative push for Senate approval of a branch campus measure. Collaboration and coalition building were inducing strategies that the HEC Board chair engaged in as well.

House of Representatives: Inducing Strategies

House leaders recognized from the start of the session that to survive the legislative process any branch campus measure would have to be pieced together strategically to insure that every potentially powerful opponent had a piece of the action. The House leaders melded strategic efforts to assure that a branch campus bill would emerge that would “keep everyone together...that what each player wanted would all be part of one piece of legislation...” (House staff, interview, April 5, 1993). House branch campus advocates defined their strategic goals as building a regional coalition of delegates from urban areas designated as potential branch campus sites and as providing the tradeoffs necessary for the desired log-rolling coalition to occur.

The House Majority Leader (D-Tacoma) deployed tactical maneuvers to garner needed advocacy for branch campuses not only from the dominant delegations to receive branches but also from other members of the Democratic caucus from Seattle and coastal areas resistant to the branch campus concept. These opponents continued to assert that “the cheapest way to get more people involved in higher education was just to fund the FTE’s” (Representative, interview, April 12, 1994) on existing campuses. With the promise that such funding could be added to the branch campus push, the House Speaker combined proponents of enhanced higher education access together so “it would be all of us...in a big enough political coalition in order to fund the FTE’s and the branches...and make sure the funding would move forward” (Representative, interview, April 12, 1994). Although the size of the delegations from the five largest cities in the state where branch
campuses would be located would have assured "that if you added up the legislators in those...the bill (was)...gonna pass unless you really screwed up..." (Lobbyist, interview, April 6, 1994), the formation of a broader coalition with members who would sign onto the bill because of promises of enhanced enrollments at regional universities and community colleges and involvement of private institutions through educational opportunity grants in assuring smaller sized branches at least initially, created the needed momentum in the House.

House branch campus champions mounted influence attempts to provide inducements for support of the branch campus bill (HB 1822) at three separate stages of the bill process. When it was first introduced on February 6th, after the appearance of several Senate measures creating branches and SIRTI three weeks earlier (see Table I), the delay was predicated on the efforts of House branch campus advocates to "get a whole lot of signatures...because we knew that if they would sign on the bill, that they would vote for the bill..." (Representative, interview, April 12, 1994). Once the more than fifty co-sponsors of the bill had been attained, the momentum building in the House for a branch campus measure propelled the bill through two days of public hearings. These hearings drew scores of supporters who drove the fervor for branch campuses to a feverish pitch among public constituencies and within the delegations which represented their interests.

A second set of strategic attempts by the same House contingent was evoked to ensure that the bill would move out of Rules with enough votes to pass it through the House. House branch campus advocates initiated additional tactics of member checking, vote counting, pressuring hesitant supporters, and arguing with branch campus opponents from Seattle, Central Washington, and Coastal delegations. Keeping higher education interests together through regular strategic sessions with private sector and public university lobbyists as well as with legislative liaisons from branch campus community groups, the leadership combed House ranks for additional sources of support. Ultimately, these efforts resulted in "...picking up another 18 or so who were absolutely rock solid so we were at 60...and once we got to 60, we were comfortable enough and made sure the bill got out of Rules" (Representative, interview, April 12, 1994).

House branch campus leaders then moved into a third and final phase where bipartisan endorsement on the House floor could be assured. Ferreting out the members who remained opposed to the bill because of political reasons, the branch campus contingent worked the issue so that members opposed to branch campus enactment because of cost or what would happen to other
portions of the higher education system could be assured that those concerns would be addressed in the final legislation. There was mounting realization on the part of lawmakers that "a legislator was gonna commit suicide if they lived in Tacoma or Vancouver and voted against this thing." (Lobbyist, interview, April 6, 1994). The introduction of a separate bill (HB 1417) advocating for the tuition voucher program was a means of assuring that additional controversy regarding issues of public versus private sector funding would not jeopardize branch campus approval. With the passage of HB 1822 by an overwhelming majority of 74:24 on March 6th, House leadership was able to position the House as the chamber most cohesive in its support for expansion of higher education through the formation of a branch campus system.

Community Groups: Inducing Strategies

Coalition building in the Senate was not the outcome of Senate leadership intervention to effect caucus or chamber cohesion around the branch campus issue. Instead, the construction of a branch campus coalition was the result of strategic attempts mounted by community boosters and their expert lobbyists to consolidate support from the fractious Republican caucus around a branch campus push. Drawing upon arguments that suggested that making branch campuses a Democratic mandate from the House could threaten Senate reelection efforts, community group lobbyists held one-on-one meetings with Senate representatives, organized community booster meetings with key Senate leaders, and formed a coalition that met weekly or even more often to "discuss lobbying tactics...and think through our strategy" (Lobbyist, interview, April 7, 1994). As the Senate Higher Education chair's (R-Spokane) commitment to Spokane's interests and the formation of SIRTI threatened to take over Senate Democratic leaders' efforts to garner approval for a branch campus measure, community groups joined together in organizing additional efforts to convince Republican senators of the efficacy of branch campus formation for economic gain in urban communities. Their goal was to assure that all five branch campus communities would present a united front in averting "attempts to divide the group..." (Eastside community group, interview, April 21, 1994). As Senate negotiations continued, community groups and their lobbyists redirected attempts to influence the course of branch campus policy formation by fostering support for a measure that could lay the groundwork for a settlement of interhouse differences.

Knowing that the timing was right to tie the bargaining chip of SIRTI provided by the Senate to House advocacy for branch campuses, community group members and lobbyists intensified efforts
to convince the House bipartisan alliance to endorse the addition of SIRTI to a final branch campus bill. By linking advocacy for SIRTI to the branch campus endeavor, community lobbyists ensured that support from “strong legislators from Spokane...and from everybody...from the mountains eastward” (HEC Board staff, interview, March 23, 1994) would be forthcoming.

Combining the branch campus with SIRTI, because “we needed the presence of WSU to provide the advanced degrees and advanced courses in Spokane so it had to be a package deal” (Spokane community group, interview, April 4, 1994), community boosters continued to generate local ardor for branch campuses through information forums, educational presentations, and ever increasing visibility of community group members in regional media and activities.

With a “oneness of purpose that insured that all the cities would work together with less territoriality and turf guarding” (Tri-Cities community group, interview, March 28, 1994), the cohesive band of community policy actors that had been created through local, regional, and statewide coalition formation efforts in earlier stages of the branch campus policy process permeated the workings of the legislative session. “Very smart in the way (they)...prepared for that assault on the hill...and all five areas working very well together...” (Lobbyist, interview, April 20, 1994), community groups increased their visibility within the formal policy-making arena, worked to formulate compromises that would be acceptable to legislative branch campus champions, and prodded members from both chambers into a willingness to negotiate by “selling this economic development stuff...although all those arguments about economic development (weren’t)...as visible as the good argument...about serving the future of our state, educating the masses” (Lobbyist, interview, April 20, 1994). Exchanging favors from a rich cache of resources, community groups and their lobbyists sustained the momentum behind the House’s approval of branch campuses by pushing the Senate Republican caucus into an alliance with branch campus proponents in the House.

Knowing that “(the Senate Higher Education chair) did not care if branch campuses came out of it as long as SIRTI did too and that the (other)...community groups didn’t care if SIRTI came out of it as long as branch campuses did too” (Eastside community group, interview, April 21, 1994), community group lobbyists continued attempts to encourage legislation for branches in the Senate. With the announcement by the House Majority Leader on March 22nd that “when we adjourn all five branch campuses and the Intercollegiate Research and Technological Institute in Spokane will
have happened with some enhancements" (Rexus, 1989, p. A4), public acknowledgment of House support for a SIRTI tradeoff in exchange for Senate endorsement of branch campus formation emerged. With this tradeoff secured, strategic efforts to foster a consensus among Senate and House branch campus proponents by community booster lobbyists culminated finally in agreement by the Senate Majority Leader to bring forth a final Senate legislative measure for mandating branch campuses.

With growing consensus among Republican caucus members in the Senate to formally link SIRTI to branch campus legislation, to incorporate a tuition voucher program for private institutions that would assist in cost containment for the proposed branch campuses, and to include a means for enhancing enrollments at existing community colleges and regional universities, arguments of Senate opponents to a branch campus measure were diminished. Realizing that there was no alternative to joining in the growing commitment to create a university branch campus system, the Senate Majority Leader awarded sponsorship of a resurrected branch campus measure to the Tri-Cities Republican Senator up for reelection that fall. Community group lobbying efforts had provided a means by which a bipartisan majority from both chambers could negotiate a final branch campus measure.

HEC Board: Inducing Strategies

Assuming lesser prominence in the formal policy-making process because of his position removed from the inner policy circle, the HEC Board chair sought to cement the coalition among higher education institutions that had been tenuously constructed outside of the formal policy arena and to build broad legislative advocacy for the branch campus proposal. Knowing that if “you had five branches you had a lot of legislators sucked into the branch campus politics...if you only tried for one in Tacoma and one in Vancouver...(that) would have reduced the political mass substantially...” (Community college board, interview, March 30, 1994), the Board’s chair employed tactical maneuvers to enhance the cohesiveness of the log-rolling coalition among higher education institutions that the Board had molded in earlier policy stages through the promise of relevant tradeoffs acceptable to each diverse interest. Having “spent a lot of time figuring out what it took to get a political coalition together to support that package” (Community college board, interview, April 13, 1994), the HEC Board chair was determined that the needed coalition would hold together through the heated legislative debate that erupted around the branch campus issue.
The HEC Board chair pushed forward a bill through the House (HB 1417) to assure a tuition voucher program for the private sector as had been promised before the session began. Shaping a legislative package that would give community colleges and regional universities additional enrollments “to the extent that doing so (would)...increase participation rates in underserved areas of the state” (State of Washington House Higher Education Committee Staff, 1989a), the HEC Board chair helped guarantee that the regional university and community college sectors would derive some benefit from legislation passed to enact branch campuses. He urged representative support for amendments that would not only recognize community colleges as “...cooperative partners...(in) the state’s system of higher education” (State of Washington, 1989g, p. 599), but that would also assure that “...branch campuses were...(to be) operated as models of a two plus two educational system” (State of Washington, 1989g, p. 599). These inducing activities made manifest the HEC Board’s commitment to the exchanges that formed the basis for its carefully constructed coalition.

The HEC Board chair seized SIRTI as a bargaining chip in negotiations on a final branch campus measure. Acknowledging that “SIRTI...was a legitimate price to pay for getting a downtown university facility in Spokane” (HEC Board, interview, April 2, 1993), the HEC Board chair initiated strategic intervention directly with the Senate Republican caucus. The Chair’s goal was to convince members, several of whom had asserted “that they would...drop SIRTI last as the wish lists met budget reality...” (“Cost could derail”, 1989, p. A8), that not only Western Washington, but Spokane interests would be represented in the final piece of legislation that would create a branch campus system.

Conference Committee: Inducing Strategies

The interchamber conference committee that was formed to negotiate a final branch campus measure ensured the necessary geographic distribution of legislators required for representation of each of the proposed branch campus communities’ interests. Members included representatives and senators from each of the branch campus locales. Meeting between April 15th, once SB 6095 had passed the House amended with SIRTI and tuition vouchers, and April 24th when the bill was reintroduced into the Senate, the conference committee on SB 6095 brokered numerous tradeoffs to create a settlement among competing interests.
Branch campus conference committee members knew that to "get enough votes to pass the branch campuses, we had to roll all of it...(SIRTI, tuition vouchers)... into one package" (Senator, interview, April 11, 1994). To mediate a compromise solution to the branch campus bill that would satisfy all the "legislators and community groups from Spokane, Tacoma, and other areas to get branch campuses...(who) all...wanted a piece of the pie" (Senator, interview, April 11, 1994) would require consensus among powerful legislators regarding what was to be exchanged for what, how that was to be accomplished, and who would assume responsibility for the bartering that was to occur. The two majority leaders mounted threats of retaliation for non-compliance with the branch campus measure in the budgetary deliberations that were occurring simultaneously and negotiated exchanges of favors to increase the ownership of the branch campus notion by opponents in both Houses.

Agreeing to enhance enrollment funding in the state operating budget, thereby providing for greater access at regional and community colleges, convincing the Senate Higher Education chair (R-Spokane) of the benefits of acquiescing to the educational opportunity grant program for private institutions in exchange for the attachment of SIRTI to the final conference bill, and acquiring "an agreement with the Governor...that SIRTI would not be vetoed out of the bill..." (Senator, interview, March 31, 1994), the majority leaders negotiated a final branch campus settlement. The two chamber leaders assured that earlier tradeoffs made to special higher education interests would all be included in the language of the compromise bill. By guaranteeing the five urban communities represented by conference committee delegates the necessary funding to infuse dollars through branch campus construction into those local economies, the House and Senate Majority Leaders capitalized on bargains that had been wrought before the session began. In legitimating the HEC Board's drive for branch campus creation, the opportunity seized by the research universities to broaden their political support, and the rallying of community elites around potential economic gain, House and Senate leaders, through their construction of the final branch campus bill, effected the critical mass necessary to actualize branch campus aspirations into a mandate for public policy.

House and Senate leadership also accomplished a budgetary compromise on funding both capital and operating demands for a branch campus system as negotiations around a final branch campus legislative vehicle continued during the latter part of April. With the House and Senate
Majority Leaders as the two key legislators on the budget conference committee along with the chairs of the respective appropriations committees under their partisan direction, the outcome of the budgetary deliberations in “protecting the funding for the branches with (the Majority Leaders)...at the table was never a problem” (Representative, interview, April 14, 1994). In the end, the state budget was written by the conference committee whose “report always passed” (Representative, interview, April 14, 1994). It contained $9 million for operating all five branches and SIRTI as well as the already agreed upon $45 million for capital construction costs.

Discussion

Key policy actors during branch campus policy making were community groups with an impressive arsenal of resources strategically deployed across all policy stages and resulting in the formation of broad based coalitions of support. The HEC Board chair was the other critical player during the first and final policy stages. However, the Chair’s resources and the Board’s consistency in garnering strategic advantage were only effective within the context created and perpetuated by community group involvement. While other resource-rich policy actors assumed more visibility at one policy phase or another— the research universities during the selection of alternative policy options and key legislators during the enactment of the branch campus policy decision— the groups of community elites remained dominant across all three stages of the policy-making process.

Community boosters were able to avail themselves of material benefits, positional superiority, access to decision makers, distribution of representatives in economically and socially elite circles of influence, and organizational skill throughout the policy-making process. Community groups chose to deploy these assets across all stages. At agenda setting, these actors linked economic aspirations with higher education opportunity through active engagement in HEC Board study deliberations. In the alternative formation stage, the community groups’ choice of branch campuses dominated other solutions to the access issue, because of their involvement with university study processes and with legislative approval of the HEC Board master plan. By the 1989 legislative session, the nature and number of strategic efforts consummated by community boosters surpassed all other policy participants as they sought to link a means for expanding higher education access to a way of enhancing their local communities’ economic vitality.
The primary strategic effort deployed by community groups was the fostering of tradeoffs to build the necessary coalitions needed to support the branch campus drive. Community booster groups expanded their memberships to include large numbers of social, civic, business, and legislative elites. These larger coalitions of branch campus believers formed the basis for the pervasive effects of ever expanding community booster organizations on the macro and micropolitical policy arenas. The HEC Board chair and WSU’s president became linked to community boosters through their respective policy goals of state economic growth and broader political influence. Both of these actors worked with community groups to connect desired tradeoffs to advocacy for the branch campus notion. By pressuring legislators to create a statewide coalition that would encompass the policy arena, the Governor’s office, and the delegations from areas to receive branch campuses, community groups added to local and regional consolidation of branch campus forces. Coalitions of special interests and their audiences were ultimately combined with legislative champions and branch campus delegations to propel the branch campus notion through the legislative process and into political mandate.

Community group actors and their allies, initiating and sustaining coalition-building strategies, shaped the outcomes of each policy-making stage within a context that provided the social, demographic, economic, and political medium that would allow for the emergence of possible incentives that could be manipulated to buttress branch campus support. Coalition-building transcended policy-making stages. Horizontal efforts within local communities and among higher education sectors were joined by vertical attempts to connect the streams of policy participants into a confluence of forces. This coalition of actors, assets, and attitudes converged on the formal legislative arena, expanded on opportunities that had been opened by inside branch campus advocates, and flooded the policy-making forum with enough pressure to propel branch campuses through the legislative structure. In the end, the cementing of higher education special interests into a cohesive conglomerate across policy stages was predicated not upon common interests, but upon the transfer of desired goods, the premise of demanded promises, and the exchange of preferred favors.

By the time the final branch campus bill had made its appearance at the end of the session, the strategy of coalition building had reached its pinnacle. The base of the tactical pyramid was composed of small discrete alliances between and among policy players. Clustered at the top was
the collective force of special interests bonded to each other and to the branch campus concept through a complex web of exchanges and assurances woven by the efforts of powerful policy actors with the arsenal of favors to accomplish this strategic objective. Realizing from the start of the branch campus policy-making process that a state level coalition would be required to accomplish the branch campus policy goal, community elites with entrepreneur-like skills linked the branch campus solution to the defining of the policy problem, the delineation of policy options, and the deciding of the final instrument by which it would become a reality.

Conclusion

The synthesis of components from both political systems and power and influence theories that formed the basis for data analysis support the conclusions drawn from the case study. Within a political system buffeted by statewide demands of urban growth, increasing cultural diversity, economic uncertainty, and inadequate opportunity for placebound students, the creation of a branch campus system became inevitable. Crafted as the solution to environmental demands and as the fulfillment of cultural values related to access to educational and employment opportunity, branch campuses were not only the symbolic, but the substantive alternative proposed and propelled by statewide economic interests.

With sources of power that were broad enough to address the scope and the saliency of the access issue for Washington residents, community boosters and their legislative counterparts were able to mobilize needed assets to impact each stage of the policy-making process. Influence attempts by these players cemented the issue of access to the forefront of the public policy agenda, highlighted the branch campus alternative as the primary way to address it, and shaped the legislative bartering that would secure necessary tradeoffs for branch campus enactment. Through the adding of advantage to the policy process through a coalition building effort that was strategically planned to ensure relevant exchanges of resources, community-based interests transformed the possibility of branch campuses into the most probable and most promising outcome of state deliberations over increasing access to higher education.

The creation of a branch campus system emerged from the participation by these potentially powerful special interests in a decision process which not only fulfilled their goals for economic gain and educational opportunity, but which also maximized the short and long term benefits that
would accrue to them and their urban locales as a result of the political settlement that was reached. The branch campus policy outcome reflected both the overwhelming dominance of these actors' potential power, the effectiveness of their mobilization of these resources in influence attempts to garner political advantage, and ultimately, their consummate skill in assuring policy gain both for themselves and the constituencies they represented.
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