This paper explores Max Weber's study of the origins of the secularization of the Puritan work ethic and examines the hybridized category of secular science expert. The hybrid construct provides an opening for the critical analysis of the concrete activity of development from two perspectives, the structural and the individual. The individual perspective is the subject of the paper. Sections of the paper include: (1) "The Idea of Expert and the Context of Development: The Global Tour of Ascetic Rationality"; (2) "The Expert and the Assignment Context: The Voyage from Secular Mechanics to Cargo of Values"; (3) "The Possibility of Transformative Development: Ethics Regained"; (4) "From 'Accidental Expert' to Reflective Ethics"; (5) "The Ethical Education of the Expert: From Consultant to What?" and (6) "Ascetic Rationality Revisited: The Expert Re-educated." Contains a chart on the self-reflection model and 49 references. (EH)
ON TOUR WITH THE "ACCIDENTAL" EXPERT:  
ETHICAL DILEMMAS OF THE DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANT  

By  
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He covered only the cities in these guides, for people taking business trips flew into cities and out again and didn't see the countryside at all. They didn't see the cities, for that matter. Their concern was how to pretend they had never left home. What hotels in Madrid boasted king-sized Beauty-rest mattresses? What restaurants in Tokyo offered Sweet-'n-Low? Did Amsterdam have a McDonald's? Did Mexico City have a Taco Bell? Did any place in Rome serve Chef Boyardee ravioli? Other travelers hoped to discover distinctive local wines; Macon's readers searched for pasteurized and homogenized milk.

Anne Tyler, The Accidental Tourist

The Idea of Expert and the Context of Development: The Global Tour of Ascetic Rationality

In an extensive footnote in his study of the origins of the secularization of the Puritan work ethic, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber presciently opens a space with which to dissect the construct of the international development expert. This opus of Weber's is an apt place to begin because its central theme is the rationalization of the ascetic work ethic into all social life, not just productive activity. Weber reasons that this rationalization process totalizes all human potentiality into a specific calling, thereby expunging the human personality of the distractions of self-centered pleasure and idle leisure. According to this logic, man's sole purpose on earth is one of duty to work for the greater glory of God. My analysis starts with the proposition that the rationalization of the work ethic is reincarnated in the forms of development expertise that have been introduced into the Third World over the last four decades. In this particular footnote, Weber is commenting on the precept of "the Puritan
call to work as the end of life" (Weber, 1958, pp. 158-159), in stark contrast with the egoistic distractions of sex for its own sake:

The transition to a pure, hygienically oriented utilitarianism had already taken place in [Benjamin] Franklin, who took approximately the ethical standpoint of modern physicians, who understand by chastity the restriction of sexual intercourse to the amount desirable for health, and who have, as is well known, even given theoretical advice as to how that should be accomplished. As soon as these matters have become the object of purely rational consideration the same development has everywhere taken place. The Puritan and the hygienic sex-rationalist generally tread very different paths, but here they understand each other perfectly—...Similar, for instance, is the typical specialist's view, occasionally put forward by very distinguished physicians, that a question which extends so far into the subtlest problems of personality and of culture as that of sexual abstinence should be dealt with exclusively in the forum of the physician (as an expert). For the Puritan the expert was the moral theorist, now he is the medical man; but the claim of competence to dispose of the questions which seem to us somewhat narrow-minded is, with opposite signs of course, the same in both cases. (Weber, 1958, pp. 263-264)

Weber's term "expert" comprises a fruitful investigative category for the introduction of a particular kind of secularized rationality into the personal and cultural intimacies that make up the contexts of lived experience in the diverse localities of the Third World. By virtue of being equipped with the discipline-informed and expertise-derived rationality of a scientific specialty, the development consultant is conferred with the legitimacy to cross cultural space and "better" the local context to which she has been called.
Yet, the target contexts of the Third World are local, immediate, tangible, and diverse. They consist of the multiplicities of space and moment in which all personal, community, productive, and cultural life is lived in accordance with the inestimable weight of indigenous histories. At the same time, when clustered as a lot for analytical purposes, as they usually are in development rationality, those very contexts, along with their inhabitants, are deemed to be a priori problematic. As problematized space and moment, they become subject to the intervention and engineering of those initiated and trained according to the rational standards of development science.¹

Weber's construct of expert thus makes a new investigative combination possible: the ethic of the call to specific occupation, actualized as personal vocational commitment, is merged into the developmental version of the spirit of capitalism. In its hybridized form, however, the combina-

¹ Preston's (1985) analysis of development theorizing traces various instantiations of positivist sociological and economic science into development. His thesis is based on the problematic claims to the authority of science implicitly made by the major exponents of specific variations of development theories. He focuses most directly on Dudley Seers, Paul Streeten, Gunnar Myrdal, and other major figures who pioneered the new field of development science. I paraphrase Preston's conclusions about the major themes that compose what he critiques as developmental ideology: "Protectionistic Interventionism" (to justify military assistance); "Obligatory Intervention by Economic Stewardship" (to provide a viable economic alternative to counter communist expansion); "The Laboratory Approach to Political Stabilization" (the political institution-building task to lay the ground to manage the development enterprise); and "Expertise-guided Social Engineering" (the technicization of development as an apolitical, administrative process). See also my doctoral dissertation (1989) titled, The Deployment of Educational Innovation through Foreign Aid: An Inquiry into America's Developmental Ideology.
tion is totally secular in that the construct of vocation has been detached entirely from its religious roots. It is this hybrid that yields the investigative category of secular science expert, who embodies the ethic of calling and the developmental mission of modernization. The hybrid construct provides an opening for the critical analysis of the concrete activity of development from two perspectives, the structural and the individual, the latter being the subject of this paper. Though Weber's stress on the formative power of rationality has been criticized severely for its disregard of the historical and material forces that undergird capital formation, his insights into the need to rationalize the instantiation of these forces in civil society nevertheless remain fertile ground for the study of ethics and development and human agency.

The Expert and the Assignment Context: The Voyage From Secular Mechanics to Cargo of Values

2. It is important to note here, however, that the structural relations that converge to set the macro-agendas of global development policies form the institutional basis for the lion's share of the development work done today. One need only consult the budgets of multi- and bi-lateral agencies and compare them with those of NGOs to appreciate the hegemonic scale of difference. Though Berman (1992, pp. 54-57) notes that the scale of policymaking in education over the last three decades is difficult to quantify precisely, he nonetheless concludes that the discretionary allocations for reform and development of education in the Third World were, for the most part, determined by external funding source priorities and agendas. Historical reviews of specific country cases reveal inconsistent and even contradictory policy objectives and implementation, depending on donor agency, source country, political objectives, and the developmental zeitgeist, which varied from decade to decade and agency to agency.
As a depository of secular rationality, Weber's expert category blends conveniently into the idealized persona of the international development consultant. For decades, national and international development policymakers have appropriated the meanings conveyed by "expertise" as suasive ammunition to push their favored development policies. For historically speaking, the journey to global economic development has not, as might have been expected from early optimistic and doctrinaire readings of neo-classical economics, proceeded on automatic pilot according to "natural economic laws." The journey has instead run into two kinds of stumbling blocks—those derived from conflicting rationales put forward on the one hand to justify the merits of a preferred version of development policy over another, and the confounding complexities of politics, culture, and history on the other. Development and its stimulation were thus recognized early on to require deliberate attention.

3. The origins of early rationales for state intervention into the otherwise "natural" processes of economic growth and capital accumulation can be traced from as far back as Hobbes (1949 [1651], esp. pp. 184-192) through Schumpeter (1962, pp. 131-142, & 1954) and Keynes (1964 [1935]). Haney's (1949) recapitulation of economic thought examines the three-century-old debate on the role of the state vis-a-vis the "natural" processes of laissez-faire economics. The split of economic science from the ethical and moral determinants of human behavior to explain the "natural" processes that control and distribute the social product is highly relevant to the study of the origins of development science, the major exponents being the classical economists, Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, through Friedman. See also Meek (1967, pp. 166-172) and Heilbroner (1985 & 1980).

4. From the late 1950s through the 1980s, development planning went through several iterations based roughly on the theoretical emphasis put on economic, political, and social factors that were deemed essential requisites to rational development policy and practice. Rostow (1963), Kaplan (1967), Pye (1963), Chenery (1962), Banfield (1962), Millikan (1962), and Morss and Morss
As a practical concept the case for development has been advanced deliberately as development science, first taking form as strategies to deploy rationality itself, full of state-of-the-art technology derived from economics and sociology. Second, because the "natural laws" of laissez faire economics failed to address, predict, and control the intractability of global poverty on their own momentum, the question of values, and therefore ethics, was raised compellingly by Gunnar Myrdal over three decades ago. The Myrdalian development ethic sought its rightful place on the development planning agenda to compensate for the empirical "mindlessness" of the neo-classical economic models that underlay early development policy. It was therefore within a new spirit of deliberative purpose that Myrdal's conscience-based ethic was born.

Yet, the problem of translating the value-laden and pliant concept "deliberateness of purpose" into action required the explicit commitment of what amounted to an "elect" of those duly equipped to apply it to the diversity of Third World contexts. On its own as a constellation of values, the new development ethic was deemed too feeble and controversial to be integrated into development policy by (1982), among others, trace the rationales to a hodge-podge of various theoretical and political constructs which served to justify the utility of foreign assistance and its relationship to development. See also my review of rationales for foreign assistance (Basile, 1989, pp. 17-51).
the force of collective guilt. Insofar as the new development ethic was dependent on matters of conscience alone, its deployment would remain ever subject to the uncertainties of politics, culture, religion, and local history. Its origins in the conscience-based, culturally-relative concepts of justice, decency, and concern for the general welfare were thought to cripple, not strengthen arguments for its rational extension into the Third World.

It is in this sense that Myrdal's (1958) project can be understood as an effort to reintroduce the concept of values into the framework of planning, not as values per se, but as a rationality-based means to broaden the narrow information core provided by social and economic science alone. Myrdal's (1973) later work titled, *Against the stream, critical essays on economics*, sought to press the following values as part of the development ethic onto the planning agenda:

- national consolidation
- redistribution of income
- social welfare
- industrialization
- increases in agricultural productivity
- land reform
- population controls
- education
- public health
- social discipline to counteract corruption (Myrdal, 1973, pp. 101-118)

In my view, the problem with this mix of universal values and modernization goals was that it could be realized
only within a framework that was ideological—namely, development framed and managed as a product of scientific activity—which denied the utility of valuational ethics as such entirely. In recognition of this problem, Myrdal justifies the creation of an elect establishment of international expertise whose function would be to usher in the modern age through the application of rational planning models in all needy societies. The models are echoes of the scientization ethos that Weber envisaged with dread decades earlier in the form of bureaucratic modes of productive organization, or "corporate groups" as he called them (1947, pp. 171-173), whose central task would be appended to the rational spread of capital and the right conduct of homo economicus. It was Parsons who later (1951) incorporated Weber's ideal bureaucratic form of social regulation into a system of social action, with his delineation of institutional roles, the function of which was to provide the norms for socializing all human behavior:

...Such as system of patterned legitimate expectations is called by sociologists a system of roles. In so far as a cluster of such roles is of strategic significance to the social system, the complex of patterns which define expected behavior in them may be referred to as an institution...It is fundamentally the patterns institutionalized in role structure which constitute the moral standards which are introjected in the process of socialization and become an important part of the personality structure of the individual himself... (Parsons, 1985 [1951] in Hamilton, Ed., pp. 126-127 [Emphasis added])
This paper takes issue with the presumed moral/ethical basis on which Myrdal structured his scientifically-reasoned development process. I contend that it is not ethics or morality being advanced by this process at all. Rather, the process has an entirely different function. In this logic, development science is used to justify the appropriation of human behavior into preconceived visions of modernity, such as those outlined in agonizing detail decades ago in the works of David Lerner (1958) and Inkeles and Smith (1974). The result of this process is to either sweep the problem of ethics off the stage of rational action once and for all, or, failing that, to appropriate it into matters of administrative regulation.

The values-conscious Myrdalian version of the development project then remains conceptually undergirded by sociology and economics, the former still known as the science of society and the latter as the science of scarcity. While Weber laid the conceptual groundwork for combining both into their positivistic social science hybrid, its self-denied political function has been vigorously attacked by Fay (1975), who recognized it for its insinuation into and domination of the public sphere as policy science, the development rage of today. Policy science's application to the development project has had the legitimating function of rationalizing the imposition of one culture's common-sense
solutions to noncompliant problems posed by the purported backwardness of another. The alternative-stimulating role that a deliberate, society-wide process of ethical dialogue could play in policy formulation and implementation is only one of its many casualties. The vital and central process of managing social change is instead reduced to what Habermas (1970) referred to as "technocratic consciousness," whose function is:

...the repression of 'ethics' as such as a category of life. The common, positivist way of thinking renders inert the frame of reference of interaction in ordinary language, in which domination and ideology both arise under conditions of distorted communication and can be reflectively detected and broken down. The depoliticization of the mass of the population, which is legitimated through technocratic consciousness, is at the same time men's self-objectification in categories equally of both purposive-rational action and adaptive behavior. The reified models of the sciences migrate into the sociocultural life world and gain objective power over the latter's self-understanding. The ideological nucleus of this consciousness is the elimination of the distinction between the practical and the technical. It reflects, but does not objectively account for, the new constellation of a disempowered institutional framework and systems of purposive-rational action have taken on a life of their own. (Habermas, 1970, pp. 112-113 [emphasis in original])
Conceived as "point of the lance," the development expert can therefore be dissected as a construct of positivist science, whose role has been set like steel reinforcement rods to concretize the international complex of private and public institutional relations in force. Viewed in this light, the development expert functions against the backdrop of an array of contextual deterrents to the application of an independently-derived set of ethical principles with which to judge and recontextualize her work. Nonetheless, whether that work is done in the variant specialties of economics, sociology, or some other social science, the irritant pest of ethics somehow continues to gnaw termite-like at the rational foundations of the scientific instruments and tools at hand to manage development. Recent analyses done by feminist and postmodernist scholars, for example, focus critical attention on the so-called nasty, tena-

5. The term "point of the lance" is taken from R. Sargent Shriver's 1964 work on the Peace Corps of the same title. The Peace Corps philosophy of the early years symbolized what was argued to be an alternative approach to the standard development-expert model pushed by development professionals and economists. The Peace Corps' amateurish spirit of self-help embodied in its promotion at home and abroad could be argued, however, to be less qualitatively than quantitatively different from macro-economic development strategies, in that the practical, down-home American ideology, spread in culturally-sensitive doses, could have transformative power one-on-one and face-to-face.

Anne Tyler's Accidental Tourist anti-heroic figure Macon Leary of course violates the cultural immersion ideals of the Peace Corps' liberal tradition. Although Macon's persona appears to do so when contrasting it with the volunteer's physical isolation from the cherished amenities that constitute the American way of life, Macon's hermetic seal could be argued to be more intact in the volunteer's persona than visibly apparent, at least in a symbolic sense. The volunteer is inescapably no more or less than her cultural background and availability make her—typically of well-to-do socio-economic circumstance who volunteers to help with the unfortunate's transition to modernity. On this basis I stick with my argument that the analogy with Tyler's Macon is a matter of the degree to which the American way of life is looked upon as the "leading edge" of modern life. We are inexorably what we are, even the best and brightest of us.
cious "externalities" of development activity: such as, the obliteration of cultural and intellectual diversity, the fixed investment of positivist social science in patriarchal forms, and the dualisms, alienations, and fragmentations that have been packed into a profusion of modernization prescriptions.⁶

In their work, *Ethics, Politics, and International Social Science Research*, Hamnett et al. (1984) argue that active debate on ethics is an unavoidable requisite for conducting international research on development, even considering the long-standing practice of ethically cleansing development science and politics. They put the matter this way:

Of relevance here is the realization that scientific knowledge, far from being of universal and thus a valid basis for ethical legitimacy, is the product of particular points of view, of particular ideological presup-

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⁶ The problem of the grounds of critique of the modernization project and its projection into the Third World as development has begun to receive more direct attention in the past ten years. Feminist and postmodernist scholars, for example, have at last begun to explore a diversity of issues that probe the tendentious scientization ethos packed into the development project: penetrating the core of rationality embodied in the professional mystique (Addelson, 1991, pp. 16-34); the discounting of women's work by the development donor community (Dixon-Mueller, 1991, pp. 226-247); critiquing regimes of truth in educational inquiry (Lather, 1991, Spring, pp. 153-173); deconstructing discourses on gender equity in education (Bryson, 1993, Summer, pp. 341-355); "the totalitarian nature of metanarratives" (Rust, 1991, November, pp. 610-626); metaphors and the language of educational reform (Zachariah, 1985, February, pp. 1-21); compensatory legitimation in educational administration and policymaking (Weiler, 1983, June, pp. 259-277); education and the construction of consciousness (Torres, 1994, Fall, pp. 429-445); and postmodernism and feminism for political mobilization (Nicholson, 1989, Summer, pp. 197-205).

A particularly relevant and promising article titled, "Who is the 'Other'? A Postmodern Feminist Critique of Women and Development Theory and Practice," by Jane Parpart (1993, pp. 439-464) focuses sharply on portrayals of Third World Women as embodiments of problems and needs, rather than as subjects of development and change. I say promising because such direct attention to the critique of development and women has been overdue.
positions and value commitments...Therefore, in professional conduct and the acceptance of ethical principles—such as the selection of problems, techniques, and styles of research—the social scientist is expressing and affirming particular assumptions and a taken-for-granted understanding of the world. (Hamnett, et al., 1984, p. 7)

They suggest focus on two issues central to development research ethics: "(1) the degree to which researchers from industrialized countries have an obligation to collaborate with scholars from the Third World countries they study and (2) the degree to which researchers are obliged to insure that their subjects benefit from the research" (Hamnett, et al., 1984, p. 8).

Recognition of the need to collaborate and to insure that benefits accrue to their subjects may be a step in the right direction. Nevertheless, the assignment context of the development expert remains hostile to the explicit introduction of dialogical activity on ethical principles. The collaborative spirit on the one hand may connote a postmodernist attitude, a readiness to listen and respond to the multiple relativities of context. On the other hand, the corrective intent to apply a specific code of discipline-determined universal ethics to all local situations should not be the only option. To apply a set of externally-produced and universal ethics would be no different than to recommit the sins of the past by (re)circumscribing the space in which collaboration could develop, this time in yet
other metanarratives. It is time to take stock of the controversies that inhere in the scientized metanarratives that are used to support development practice. The disciplines that inform practice have been so shaken by postmodernist critiques that their outputs are now being produced in a climate of intra- and inter-disciplinary disputation and confusion.⁷

Insofar as development science remains discipline-based and methodological, can there be a way out of the instrumental rationality box?⁸ Can the ethics-minded expert be ob-

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⁷ Hamnett et al. (1984) trace this troubled history from the psychological experimentation of the 1950s to later cross-cultural applications in sociology and anthropology, and arrive at a unique set of problems, a major one being that of relativism. The question of who should have the power to define standards of conduct, viz. local researchers, officials, or internationally-commissioned watchdog bodies, remains largely unresolved. The second problem, derived from the question of who benefits, is also unresolved. Of late, while some action and participatory research strategies and techniques have been applied in the Third World, the dominant mode of inquiry remains primarily extractive, centralized, and responsive to the needs, networks, logics, and capacities of industrialized societies and their institutions. In addition, Hayhoe's (1989, pp. 155-175) analysis raises several problems in the presumption of transferability of research process and findings to the Chinese setting, which is a third problem. Lastly, implementation of collaboration remains highly problematic, with institutional disincentives outweighing individual motivation to buck trend and tradition, e.g., the need for one's published works to be judged by panels of one's peers, not by one's research subjects, still remains paramount (Hamnett et al., [1984] pp. 30-33).

⁸ Critical theorists of the Frankfurt School in particular have targeted, quite productively, the ideological assumptions embedded in empiricist and positivist social science. Schroyer’s (1973, pp. 147-149) critique of positivism emphasizes..."the technical interest of strict science [being] that such inquiry presupposes a concern for certainty which is related to actions that can control objectified processes." His reading of Habermas:

...argues that the technocratic consciousness now functions as a societal pricri which uncritically contributes to the generation of decision-making whose "rationality" is instrumental effectiveness and efficiency. Such mechanisms work against a broader mode of rationalization which would maximize the participation and individuation of persons affected by societal decisions... (Schroyer, 1973, pp. 219-220)

The concern with efficiency dominated the education donor policy of the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) throughout the 1980s. For a review of the instrumental and technical logic incorporated in AID's largest project in educational reform, see Windham, 1988.
liged to leap—mind, body, and spirit—into the river of discontent that flows over and through the clay of lived, subjective experience? As a creature molded by the metanarratives of development theory, the ethics-conscious consulting expert cannot be left content to consider herself an historical accident. For the question of ethics turns on the power of her agency to identify in solidarity with those committed to transform their own circumstance, not reproduce it.

The Possibility of Transformative Development: Ethics Regained

The philosophical dimensions of the modernity problem—namely, the split of valuational ethics from scientific discourse—was addressed at length by Dewey:

...Philosophy is called upon to be the theory of the practice, through ideas sufficiently definite to be operative in experimental endeavor, by which the integration [of knowing and doing] may be made secure in actual experience. Its central problem is the relation that exists between the beliefs about the nature of things due to natural science to beliefs about values—using that word to designate whatever is taken to have rightful authority in the direction of conduct. A philosophy which should take up this problem is struck first of all by the fact that beliefs about values are pretty much in the position in which beliefs about nature were before the scientific revolution. There is either a basic distrust of the capacity of experience to develop its own regulative standards, and an appeal to what philosophers call eternal values, in order to insure regulation of belief and action; or there is acceptance of enjoyments actually experienced irrespective of the method or operation by which they are
brought into existence. Complete bifurcation between rationalistic method and an empirical method has its final and most deeply human significance in the ways in which good and bad are thought of and acted for and upon. (Dewey, 1977 [1929], pp. 154-155)

Further on Dewey argues the case for the exercise of empirically-informed judgment over social conduct. Rather than be satisfied with the split between the domains of experimental science and the practical activity of valuation, he, as Myrdal himself did later, believed in the rational power of empirical study to inform the relationship between judgment, action, and consequence. His view of science was thus practical: in the context of creating democracy, people were empowered by right and education to exercise informed judgment over all matters economic, social, and political. Such a belief, far from "scientificizing" politics, could be argued to be consonant with Habermas's later project in support of rational communicative action. What institutional forms Dewey's beliefs would have taken in the radically diverse contexts of other societies, however, can only be argued. His unswerving belief in "intelligent method" undergirded his entire philosophy of education, citizenry, and governance:

Refusal to accept responsibility for looking ahead and for planning in matters national and international is based upon refusal to employ in social affairs, in the field of human relations, the methods of observation, interpretation, and test that are matters of course in dealing with physical things, and to which we owe the conquest of physical nature. The net result is
a state of imbalance, of profoundly disturbed equilib-
rium between our physical knowledge and our social-
moral knowledge...For physical knowledge and physical
technology have far outstripped social or humane knowl-
edge and human engineering. Our failure to use in
matters of direct human concern the scientific methods
which have revolutionized physical knowledge has per-
mitted the latter to dominate the social scene. (Dewey,
1977 [1929], p. 229)

We should be cautious, however, not to reduce Dewey's ratio-
nal social ethics to a non-reflexive importation of the
predominant "received model" of inquiry applied in the do-
main of the natural sciences into the domain of the social.9

The social context of interactive participation underlay all
his theories of experience and education. I accept the idea
of contextual dialogue he suggests to open space for intro-
ducing a participatory ethic into development practice.

From "Accidental Expert" to Reflective Ethics

The practical matter of introducing ethical reflection
and action into development work is taken up directly by

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9. Preston's (1985) study of the importation of the positivistic model of
empirical investigation of the natural world into the social world as development
theorizing examines how ideology masks itself as science. Dewey's concern was
with expanding the font of knowledge to counter the ritualistic and ideological
absolutism of authoritarian systems of thought and governance. Scientific inves-
tigation was to play its part in the expansion process. There is also ample
backing for the conclusion that Dewey did not conceive "science" narrowly accord-
ing to strictness of method alone, decontextualized as such, with the individual
subject to its results, but very much the other way around:

Science and metaphysics or philosophy, though seeming often to be at
war, with their respective adherents often throwing jibes and slurs at each
other, are really the most intimate allies. The philosophic movement is
simply the coming to consciousness of this claim of the individual to be
able to discover not only to direct his own conduct, but to become an
influential an decisive factor in the organization of life itself...(Dewey,
1977 [1897], p. 61)

Further, Dewey's educational practice is consistent with his interactive
principles of governance (e.g., Dewey, 1938).
Denis Goulet. Goulet (1971, pp. 28-31) begins by suggesting the necessity for a direct experience base of the starkly personal and human realities of poverty and exploitation. The development expert's sensibilities, having repressed such realities from awareness at home, require direct and lived experience to perceive that human misery knows no borders. The Third World has no monopoly on poverty. Goulet argues that this new awareness is necessary to shake the "modern" mind into reconsidering itself as a metaphorical construct, into which divisions of race, class, and gender have been conditioned. In this view, movement toward an ethically-informed practice starts with self-awareness.

To actualize an alternative approach to development research work, Goulet draws heavily on the work of Georges Allo (Goulet, 1971, pp. 342-351), who developed a system to introduce a values focus into the local context, a system whose basis is the full engagement and participation of the individuals who make up community and social life. The system presented by Goulet is outlined in an appendix (1971a, pp. 342-351 and in an article appearing in the *Harvard Education Review*, in the May, 1971, issue, pp. 215-226.). In this system, the development researcher is required to proceed through a set of stages: "preliminary synthesis," (1971a, p. 347) in which the development researcher, over ample time periods, develops relationships of confidence and trust with community-based "natural elites" to solicit information through dialogue to be used in determining what is "valuated and evaluated" in the totality of the lived context. This is followed by "systematic observation" (p. 347) of the community using social science methods, under the condition that all areas of study and hypotheses be chosen on the basis of information obtained in the first stage. In the next stage, "reflective synthesis" (pp. 347-348), the researcher(s) engaged in the previous stages "begin formulating a reflective synthesis of the human group under study. This leads to a representation of the diversity of "interest groups, classes, partisans, and ideologies" that constitute the totality of existential values. Finally, "feedback to the populace" is presented in "prolonged interaction[s]" with the partic-
system implies a blending of social science and philosophy that is necessary for the researcher and the subject to fathom the lived experience of development.

I propose that introduction of such a system into the consciousness of the development worker is an educational task that can proceed on the basis of such experience. As a matter of choice, the activation of such a valuational system in the life-world of the expert signifies at its roots a personal commitment to change of a qualitative order: the development expert learns that ethics denotes interactive process, not a set of codified and imposed articles of faith. It is in this sense that ethics is activated in the interstices between the forces that condition and the agency that resists being conditioned. The development expert's position is right in the center.

How, then, can the expert be educated ethically? I propose that the activation of his individual ethical principles can occur in the context of interaction with all who occupy his sphere of action and life: subjects, peers, family, community, and superiors. The development expert is not simply an abstracted category. He is flesh and blood totality, all mind, body, and spirit of him. The context of participants and informants involved in the first stage. The "system" is argued to be sequential and compulsory for the development researcher's need to understand the values impinging on the totality.
his education is both spatial and temporal. The expert is conscious being not simply away in the bush, but at home in bed. Self-awareness of the dichotomies and contradictions of life lived in atomized, compartmentalized contexts whose only commonality is the location and moment of his corpus can be the starting point for his re-education. The dichotomous life-sphere of the expert, in short, must needs be deemed problematic, too.

The Ethical Education of the Expert: From Consultant to What?

What follows should be taken in the spirit of a modest proposal, a self-reflective exercise on my own part, if you will. When one presumes to educate another, an existential relationship of lived mutuality, reciprocity, and dialogue is premised to be fundamental. This version of the educational process, however, is idealized. It exists only as an exception, in-the-making here and there, now and again. As such, the conjuncture of education and a relationship of equality presents a fundamental dilemma: We educate to transcend and transform dichotomized life so that contexts characterized by mutuality, reciprocity, and dialogue can be created and sustained. The education of the expert, however, must begin in the unidealized realities of social division, in problematized home-space. The proposal offered
here is no exception. At this stage, it is no more than a thought-piece offered for self-reflection. Its integration into the lived contexts of work is left as an incomplete project, subject to the pangs of individual conscience and the options available.

The five-step process to encourage consideration of ethics proposed here is directed to the self-education of the expert. Its function is to provide an interrelated series of reflective indicators around which to raise ethical issues about doing development work. This reflective process is based on an experiential view of education that incorporates the following principles:

- experience in context is the basis for the development of self-awareness, insight, and one's disposition to change;
- experience in context is necessary to engage mind, body, and spirit—the whole person—in reflective activity;
- reflection on experience is informed by critical analysis;
- alliance with the life-world of others can only be achieved in existential relationship with them;
- such relationship is necessary for one to undertake education on behalf of the development of others.

1. The first activity of the reflective process revolves around the conscious self as development expert. It includes analysis of a set of questions about the contextual forces that impinge on the self-as-expert:
What are mission and the purposes of the agency for whom one works?
What are the objectives of the specific assignment?
What are one's own motivations, needs, and beliefs in undertaking the assignment? What are one's own values about human development?
What does a comparative analysis of the consistencies and inconsistencies revealed by reflection on the above mean about choice of the assignment and the latitude one has to abide by one's own ethical standards in performing it?

The result of this reflection would be a self-generated knowledge base of possible utility in making an assignment choice, clarifying the latitude within which one can address ethical and valuational issues, and awareness of the potential contradictions and problems that inhere in the context of the assignment.

2. The next step in the reflective process involves the extent to which self-disclosure of the results gained in Step 1 are deemed possible in the assignment context. Questions designed to indicate the extent of self-disclosure to local colleagues and members of the community one is assigned to would be:

- Does the duration of the assignment provide the opportunity to develop work and living relationships with the people to be served?
- What are the impediments that could interfere with developing such relationships?
- What opportunities are there to disclose to colleagues, local leaders, and informants the information gained in Step 1? What impediments would inhibit such disclosure?
- What opportunities in the assignment are there for encouraging self-disclosure on values by local people?
• What is the latitude in the assignment that allows the expert to act on the results of the information gained above? What difference would it make?

Reflection on these questions implies an active effort on the part of the expert to dialogue with the superiors and managers who field her. The constraints that actually arise in asking, reflecting, and acting on the answers to the questions would be an empirical indicator of the extent to which ethical issues can be raised at all in the assignment context.

3. Studies done on the dynamics of the helping relationship done in industrial psychology over the past three decades have found that the terms on which assistance is exchanged should be set by the individuals, community, or target group to be helped, not the other way round. Preparatory questions included in the expert's reflective process could take the following form:

• How were the terms of reference for the assignment developed? Who participated in the process? To what extent were local people consulted and what forms did the consulting process take? What were its results?
• What latitude would there be to renegotiate the objectives and outputs of the assignment with local people as experience with them unfolds?
• What powers do local colleagues, leaders, and informants have to redirect and/or influence the performance of the expert? the project?

The result of this step would be to provide the expert with a sense of who works for whom, at least in the eyes of pro-
ject managers. Discussion on the context in which the dynamics of the helping relationship that could be developed to maximize local control would provide the expert with a feel for the locus of control over the conduct of the assignment on site.

4. This step incorporates the work of Denis Goulet (See esp. 1971, pp. 220-222), whose concern is with introducing a context-based dialogue on values into development. A summary of the main features of the process is covered in footnote 10. Prior to assignment, the expert is invited to pose the following questions:

- What are the possibilities and supports provided for engaging in a localized process of values study and discussion?
- To what extent can the participation of local leaders, informants, and members of communities impacted by the development initiative be secured in this process?
- What is the latitude the expert would have in incorporating the valuational process into the making of choices about development programs and their implementation.
- The converse should also be asked: what are the possibilities for restructuring the development process according to the issues raised in the valuational process?

The implications of this step are clear for the potential to (re)direct the development process. It is one thing to frame the questions on the basis of their incorporation into the larger strategic development picture and quite another to frame the questions on the basis of the possibilities
raised by restructuring the strategic development process according to the system of values impinging on the local context. Whose values are paramount is the issue at stake here. Is the expert developer, in other words, able to develop himself and the agency that fields him?

5. The implications of this reflective process for the expert's capacity to identify in solidarity with the interests, needs, and aspirations of local peoples is at issue in this step. Goulet (1974, pp. 127-140) calls this a level of engagement in which the expert and the people are called to "make history" together. It is a higher calling than that implied by development as an end. It challenges the expert and people:

"...to find in their faith and religiosity a high coefficient of involvement in the tasks of history: to build up science, to abolish want and war, to explore nature more fully, to bring human potentialities to fruition. They must, accordingly, interpret their God, their ethics, and their hopes—especially their aspirations after immortality and eternity—in such as way as to allow them to plunge fully into history..." (Goulet, 1974, p. 128)

Questions that the expert could pose at this stage of reflection would be:

- Is the development ethic being promoted fully encompassed by non-spiritual and material interests alone?
- As an extension of development agency interests, what can the expert do to address the non-material needs of both the people served and himself?
- In the context of the assignment, what are the possibilities for addressing the totality of relations
that comprise physical, mental, and spiritual identity at the local level?

- What can critical analysis of those relations mean for controlling the development process at the local level?

The Freirean tone of the process at this final stage is evident. The life-worlds of the expert and the client converge at the intersection of institutional relations and local circumstance. Freire's (1973) method for the development of critical consciousness is, I argue here, a two-way street, where the consultant has problematized her own sphere of action, not just her clients'. She is then predisposed to respond to the issues that arise in the course of experience.

The five-step self-reflection process proposed here is not to be undertaken in isolation. It depends on the power of the expert as conscious subject to activate within the circumstance of employment. As summarized in the Figure below, it is subject to the initiative of the expert to actualize in the selection of assignment (as well as career) options, its negotiation, and its performance in context. To this end, I have added a separate third column that suggests specific actions that can be taken to facilitate engagement in self-reflective activity.
### The Expert’s Self-Reflection Model

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<tr>
<th>Reflection Step</th>
<th>Outcomes Sought</th>
<th>Possible Actions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Developing Self-awareness of values, impinging agendas, and interests</td>
<td>Knowledge of one's individual value commitments, the latitude of the work space, and awareness of assignment context. Increase of information base to select and modify assignment.</td>
<td>Questions directed to assignment managers, self-awareness exercises, negotiation with employer, choice of assignment.</td>
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<td>2. Disclosure of values and agendas</td>
<td>Increased knowledge about room to engage values focus, impediments, opportunity to develop relationships, and options for mutual disclosure.</td>
<td>Negotiation with employer, local language study, revision of project objectives, values exploration with clients.</td>
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<td>3. Establishing the helping relationship</td>
<td>Knowledge about the source of control over project objectives and extent to which it is possible to localize.</td>
<td>Discussions with local officials, community leaders, and with employer about terms of reference for assignment and their renegotiation.</td>
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<td>4. Engaging in the valuational activity</td>
<td>Knowledge about and commitment to the valuational process. Clarification of the extent to which the project will allow and support it.</td>
<td>Explicit adoption of a valuational process to be implemented in the course of assignment, agreement by all key stakeholders.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Critical reflection and action</td>
<td>Expansion of the valuation process to include nonmaterial referents that impinge on cultural life. Increase of local control over the development process.</td>
<td>Progressively deeper involvement of the expert in the local context: time spent, commonality of causes and goals for development reached and explicitly shared.</td>
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Ascetic Rationality Revisited: The Expert Re-educated

The progression of development ethics from its enfeebled state at the dawn of the Myrdalian project up to now has been spurred by recognition of the crisis of development science to improve the human condition on its own. The reintroduction of ethics into the process of change is not simply compelled by its failure. The project implied by ethics is a human artifact to be constructed out of the ashes left by the critique of domination. The education of the development expert can occur dialectically, in the purposeful activity of negating the metanarratives that define the context of his work. The social construct "expert" embodied in development practice today addresses only the disparate and partial dimensions of human potential. Alternatively, engaging in critical self-reflection that is informed by lived confrontations with the contradictions of development predisposes the expert to join with her people in a reciprocal endeavor to create new and different possibilities.11

11. Torres's (1994, Fall, pp. 429-445) comparative analysis of Freire's pedagogy and Hegel's dialectics traces the interplays of structure and agency that offers possibility for deconstructing the classification "expert" as knowledge source in the effort to counter domination: Freire's theory of consciousness is based on a theory of domination. His project is a reconstructive integration of the pedagogy of the oppressed as a pedagogy for decolonization of the lifeworld. At the same time, following the tradition of Mannheim, John Dewey, and Jurgen Habermas, he discusses some of the perils of democracy (for instance massification, the manipulation of the masses) in the context of populist societies. In his later work, the crucial elements of domination by virtue of class or
In sum, I propose that the expert can be educated to transform the constricted ascetic ethic that supports development rationality. The spirit in which that could happen is captured by Gandhi when he was once asked by a friend about the "purely humanitarian" aim he had in "settling in the village and serving the villagers":

..I am here to serve no one else but myself, to find my own self-realization through the service of these village folk. (Quoted in Aitken, 1984, p. 168)

The transformed ethic is not dead code. It emerges instead as:

The practice of "being with them" converts the third person, they, it, she, he, into the first person, I and we. For Dogen Zenji, the others who are "none other than myself" include mountains, rivers, and the great earth. When one thinks like a mountain, one thinks also like the black bear, and this is a step beyond Gandhi's usual concerns to deep ecology, which requires openness to the black bear, becoming intimate with him. This is compassion, suffering with others. Look again at the Diamond Sutra: "Dwell nowhere, and bring forth that mind." "Nowhere" is the zero of purest experience, known inwardly as peace and rest. To "come forth" is to stand firmly and contain the myriad things. For peace or ecology worker, the message of the Diamond Sutra would be: "From that place of funda-

race are complemented with clear anti-sexist positions, linking class, race and gender in a complex synthesis. His intellectual roots have explored different directions and seem to be continually evolving. Not by chance, many proponents of theories of agency will find reverberations in Freire of the works of Max Weber or Karl Mannheim. Similarly, proponents of theories of action will find, at times, some of his analysis and themes closer to phenomenology or symbolic interactionism. Finally, others will find in Freire's heuristic framework echoes of the works of Karl Marx and particularly Antonio Gramsci.

Freire has been able to put together a synthetic yet dialectical approach to structures and social agency in education, and has done so at the level of meta-theory, that is to say, discussing basic ontological commitments about the nature of social reality, human individuals, history, and society, and how they affect the relationships between knowledge, power and education. (Torres, 1994, p. 445)
mental peace, come forth as a man or woman of peace, presenting peace in the inmost community of those who would destroy it." (Aitkin, 1984, p. 173)
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