Korean society is in the midst of a conflict between modern and postmodern condition. The concept of modernity is rooted in the Enlightenment, which valued reason and proposed the rational and progressive construction and transformation of society and reality. As a result of a rational differentiation between culture and society, modern phenomena such as fragmentation, discontinuity, and loss of meaning have emerged. The consequences of modernization have been identified in Marx's analysis of alienation, Weber's analysis of bureaucratization and instrumental rationality, and Durkheim's analysis of anomie and social integration. Representative postmodern thinkers are Foucault and Lyotard, who attempt to deconstruct the basis of modernity, eradicate the roots of reason, and foster a criterialess society. Habermas develops his concept and analyses of reason and human action through the concept of "colonization of the lifeworld." In the Korean context, disturbances in the lifeworld mean problems in cultural production and reproduction, social integration, and personality development. Adult education should play a part in revitalizing lifeworld functions in society through promoting communicative rationality. An adult education oriented toward a lifeworld perspective can assist in creating the environment for co-learning and co-teaching. (Contains 25 references.) (YLB)
MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY RELATED ISSUES IN DEVELOPING IDEAS AND TASKS OF ADULT EDUCATION IN KOREAN CONTEXT

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We all know that the world is changing. However, we do not clearly understand the nature of the changes we have been experiencing. Our perception that the world is changing is very much related to the perception that we ought to learn in order to cope with the changes. But when we cannot make clear what the changes are, why they are happening, and the characters of the changes, it won't be that easy to figure out what to learn in our attempts to confront the challenges. This mixed consciousness that something should be done but not knowing what to do are commonly felt.

Korean society is in the midst of modern and postmodern condition. We talk about and hear about changes in attitudes, values, social systems, the form of organization, and preferences everyday. However, we are not clear about new learning tasks which come up to us with the changes. We easily say that adult education can play an important role in meeting the challenges of our time. However, we haven't yet developed concrete ideas and tasks of adult education of our time. This paper is an attempt to resolve this uncomfortable perplex.

A number of scholars have attempted to analyze the nature of historical changes that we have gone through. In talking about modernity and postmodernity related issues in this paper, the analyses of Marx, Weber, Durkheim, Foucault, Lyotard, and Habermas will be included. Then I will try to connect these analyses to Korean context. I will attempt to analyze some phenomena related to modernity and postmodernity within Korean context. Finally, I will attempt to explicate some ideas and tasks of Korean adult education in our time.

I. Groundworks Related to Modernity and Postmodernity

Even though we often talk about modernity and postmodernity, these two concepts are not clearly defined, so, tend to be differently understood. Therefore, it is important that we are explicit about the concepts first. I begin with the concepts and impacts of modernity.

1. Modernity and Enlightenment

The concept of modernity is rooted in the project of Enlightenment. And the project of Enlightenment has its origin in the age of Enlightenment. Since the age of Enlightenment, the power and potentiality of reason has been vitalized. This vitalization of reason is the basis of the
The Enlightenment's belief in progress rested on an idea of reason modeled after Newtonian physics, which, with its reliable method and secure growth, was thought to provide a paradigm for knowledge in general. The impact of the advance of science on society as a whole was not envisioned in the first instance as an expansion of productive forces and a refinement of administrative techniques but in terms of its effect on the cultural context of life. In particular, the belief—for us, today, rather implausible—in morality, was based not only on an assimilation of the logics of theoretical and practical questions but also on the historical experience of the powerful reverberations of early modern science in the spheres of religion, morals, and politics. The cultural rationalization emanating effect on traditional habits of thought—the progressive eradication of inherited "superstitions, prejudices, errors"—formed the center of an encompassing rationalization of social life, which included a transformation of political and economic structures as well. The embodiment of reason in the political realm meant the establishment of a republican form of government with guarantees of civil liberties and an institutionally secured public sphere, so that political power could be rationalized through the medium of public discussion to reflect the general will and common interest. On the other hand, the embodiment of reason in the economic sphere meant the establishment of a social space for the free pursuit of one's own self-interest, so far as it was compatible with a like pursuit by all other individuals. The global result of this would be a continuous increase in the general wealth of society and a growing equality of the shares of falling to its individual member.¹

However, the promise of progress and transformation in the project of modernity are heavily hinged on a paradigm of a subject/object dichotomy. This paradigm makes it hard to resolve issues of dehumanization such as objectification, hierarchy, and injustice. We are still questioning: Progressive compared to what and form whom? And rational in what sense and in whose standpoint? As long as the project of modernity remains in the paradigm of the subject/object dichotomy, it is impossible to settle the question of who or what are the subjects are and who or what are the objects are.

This paradigm of subject/object dichotomy, known as the Cartesian paradigm, is referred to the philosophy of the subject by Habermas.

The Cartesian paradigm of the solitary thinker—solus ipse—as the proper, even unavoidable, framework for radical reflection on knowledge and morality

dominated philosophical thought in the early modern period. . . . This monological approach preordained certain ways of posing the basic problems of thought and action: subject versus object, reason versus sense, reason versus desire, mind versus body, self versus other, and so on.  

Habermas attempts to explain the paradigm of subject/object by drawing on the concept of subjective reason and the philosophy of the subject.

Subjective reason regulates exactly two fundamental relations that a subject can take up to possible objects. Under "object" the philosophy of the subject understands everything that can be represented as existing; under "subject" it understands first of all the capacities to relate oneself to such entities in the world in an objectivating attitude and to gain control of objects, be it theoretically or practically. The two attitudes of mind are representation and action. The subject relates to objects either to represent them as they are or to produce them as they should be. These two functions of mind are intertwined: knowledge of states of affairs is structurally related to the possibility of intervention in the world as the totality of states of affairs; and successful action requires in turn knowledge of the causal nexus in which it intervenes. The epistemological connection between knowing and acting became all the clearer along the way from Kant through Marx to Peirce, the more a naturalistic concept of the subject gained ground. The concept of the subject developed in empiricism and rationalism and restricted to contemplative behavior, that is, to theoretically grasping objects, was transformed in such a way as to absorb the concept of self-preservation developed in the modern period.

The subjective reason utilized in modern period are vehemently criticized by Horkheimer and Adorno in their book, Eclipse of Reason. Their critique succinctly says, "the societal subject behaves in relation to nature just as the individual subject does in relation to objects: Nature is objectivated and dominated for the sake of reproducing the life of society." That is to say, as Habermas points out, the structure of exploiting an objectivated nature that is placed at subject's disposal repeats itself within society, both in interpersonal relations marked by the suppression of social classes and in intrapsychic relations marked by the repression of our instinctual nature.

Evidently, the paradigm of subject/object cannot transcend the notion of exploitation, domination, and inequality, which make it hard to understand the meaning of progress and development.

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2 Ibid., ix

3 Ibid., 387.

4 Ibid., 389.
2. Some Issues Related to Modernity

Since the age of Enlightenment and the project of modernity, the power and potentiality of reason has been vitalized. The vitality of reason symbolizes its power and potentiality for constructing a more rational and better life and society. This emphasis on the transformative power of reason, furthermore, leads us to transcend the premodern perception of reality as already pregiven. This vitalized reason in its constructive and transformative power contributes to forming the perception that reality is socially constructed rather than pregiven.

The potential for the realization and the fulfillment of the constructive and transforming power of reason is the foundational claim of the project of modernity. The project of Enlightenment or modernity proposes and promises progress by institutionalizing reason in the modern sociocultural, economical, and political forms of life.

However, as a result of this enlightened rationalization or rational differentiation between culture and society which was closely interconnected in premodern times, modern phenomena such as "fragmentation," "discontinuity," and "loss of meaning" have emerged. These modern phenomena are directly and indirectly related to the problems of "anomie," "alienation," "unstable identities," and "existential insecurities." Therefore, the implicit promise that progress would be made in modern culture and society as a result of the project of modernity, becomes very problematic, especially in relation to the advancement of freedom, justice, happiness, and self-realization.

The occurrence of these modern phenomena and problems lead some social theorists to raise the questions of: What have we gained or lost as a consequence of modernization? To whose standpoint and to what sense has modernization brought about progress?

1) Marx's Analysis on Alienation

I will begin my discussion of some issues related to modernity with Karl Marx' analysis on alienation. Marx recognizes the emancipatory potential within the modernization process. He writes that modernization brings about the advanced forces of production, which could lead to the creation of more productive and better lives for human beings. But these forces of production have been fettered by capitalistic relations of production. Habermas explains:

According to Marx, the rationalization of society takes place directly in the development of productive forces, that is, in the expansion of empirical knowledge, the improvement of production, and organization of socially useful labor power. On the other hand, relations of production, the institutionalization that express the distribution of social power and regulate a differential access to the means of production, are revolutionized only under the pressure of rationalization of productive forces.⁵

⁵ Ibid., 144.
By contrasting the forces of production with the relations of production, and also through associating the former with the emancipatory potential of society, and the latter with the emergence of the capitalist economy and the modern state, Marx illuminates how the two--forces and relations of production--ought to be related. His critique is directed toward uncovering opposites to these oppressive social conditions and pointing to the confinement of the revolutionary and emancipatory potentials of the modernization process. In order to redeem the emancipatory potential from the rationalization process, Marx centered his analysis on the questions of what fettered the forces of production and on how and why this fettered forces of production blocked the revolutionary emancipation.

Marx's analysis on commodity elucidates how and why the institutional framework of the capitalist mode of production induced the constraints of the forces of production and thereby engendered alienated social conditions and structures.

Marx exposes the close connection between commodity and the way in which people's historical and creative productive work is institutionally neutralized and abstracted from life. Marx developed his concept of alienation coming from the "alienation of the worker in his object."1

1) Alienation of labor from its product (which is the alienation of the laborer from the object of his production), alienation from the object:
   a) Labor is independent of, alien to its product, which is in other hands; labor remains a thing outside the laborer, it is only his exterior state: 'appropriation is alienation,' 'realization of labor is its derealization' (even so far as starvation).
   b) The life that labor has given the object of its labor confronts it as a hostile force.
   c) Labor becomes the slave of its object, since only through it can the laborer continue to exist, not only as a worker, but as a human being.

2) Alienation of labor from the act of production, self-alienation:
   a) Since labor is exterior to the laborer, labor is forced labor, a means to satisfy needs, not a need itself: 'what is animal in man becomes human, what is human becomes animal.'

3) Alienation of man from nature, hence from his species, mankind:
   a) Since mankind's deepest need is to produce, to create, and alienation makes productive life only a means to satisfy needs, individual man is alienated from mankind: 'man makes his essence only a means of his existence.'
   b) Since alienated labor takes species-life away from man, it takes his advantage over the animal away from him. A worker may as well be a horse the way society treats him: he gets just enough to keep going.
   c) The life of mankind is alienated as a whole; man is not what he should be as a human being, but finds himself treated as a means, as a tool.

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d) Hence, man is alienated from his fellow man, since he treats him also as a means, a tool.\textsuperscript{7}

For Marx, the capitalist mode of production institutionalizes the commodification of labor through objectifying concrete work, and valorization of capital. Capitalistic relations of production fetter the forces of production by systematically blocking the emancipatory potential of the modernization process in the form of neutralized, objectified, and alienated labor conditions. According to Marx, alienated consciousness is deeply connected to social conditions. Marx explicates how the unfreedom generated by exploitive social conditions causes alienation, and moreover stifles the inherently creative human capacity to work by combining mental and manual labor.

2) Weber's Analysis on Bureaucratization and Instrumental Rationality

Second issue related to modernity can be Weber's analysis on bureaucratization and the dominance of instrumental rationality in modern culture and society. Weber problematizes and characterizes the institutional framework of the capital economy and modern state differently form Marx. Whereas Marx characterized it as a capitalistic mode of production that fetters the forces of production, and which blocks the emancipatory potential of rationalization, Weber conceptualized it as "subsystems of purposive-rational action in which Occidental rationalization develops at a societal level."\textsuperscript{8} In explaining Occidental rationalism with the help of a theory of cultural and societal rationalization, Weber emphasized two major characters within Western society's unique rationalization process—the rationalization of worldviews and the transposition of cultural rationalization into societal rationalization.

For Weber, the rationalization of worldviews could happen only when the worldviews are decentered and disenchanted from traditional religious-metaphysical worldviews. In premodern society, when the enchantment by religious-metaphysical worldviews was dominant, the cognitive, evaluative, and expressive elements of culture were very closely integrated together. This undifferentiated unity of worldviews and culture leads people not to differentiate, or to mix the different validity claims of value spheres such as truth, normative rightness, and authentic statements or beauty.

The disenchantment of the world which characterizes modernity is a rationalization process which dissolves the traditional superstitions and prejudices. Through differentiating the three value spheres-cognitive, normative, and expressive-and developing a different logic of its own, modern cultural rationalization has evolved. However, modern cultural rationalization has paid the price for this differentiation values and logic. This modern differentiation process is unable to replace the framework for unity and meaning that premodern metaphysical-religious worldviews used to fulfill. In place of a unitary ground, cultural rationalization creates irreducible

\textsuperscript{7} Ibid., 46-47.

\textsuperscript{8} Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society, 144.
plurality of competing values and irreconcilable interests of culture which has affected to generate the modern problem of "loss of meaning."

Moreover, this cultural rationalization, with the help of Protestant ethic, is transposed into societal rationalization which includes the differentiation between the capitalist economy and the modern state. According to Weber, the capitalist economy and modern state produce and increase the level of societal rationalization by systematically structuring economic actions and administration.

What Weber wants to do, in explaining Occidental rationalism, is to elucidate the institutionalization of purposive-rational action in terms of a process of rationalization. The totalizing dominance of purposive rationality in the post-traditional rationalization process can be clearly represented by the modern creation of bureaucratic society.

For Weber, bureaucratization is a key to understanding modern societies. They are marked by the appearance of a new type of organization: economic production is organized in a capitalist manner, with rationally calculating entrepreneurs; public administration is organized in a bureaucratic manner, with juristically trained, specialized officials—that is, they are organized in the form of private enterprises and public bureaucracies. The relevant means for carrying out their tasks are concentrated in the hands of owners and leaders; membership in these organizations is made independent of ascriptive properties. By these means, organization gain a high degree of internal flexibility and external autonomy. In virtue of their efficiency, the organizational forms of the capitalist economy and the modern state administration establish themselves in other actions systems to such an extent that modern societies fit the picture of 'society of organizations,' even from the standpoint of lay members.

According to Weber, bureaucratization in society establishes two things at once: the highest form of societal rationality and the effective subsumption of acting subjects under the objective force which subsequently foments the subjects' "loss of freedom." Bureaucracy increases organizational and systemic rationality, stripping the value-rational and ethical meaning of human actions (loss of meaning) through objectifying and depersonalizing the social relations within an organization (loss of freedom).

Occidental rationalism has embodied a partial rationalization process which brought about cultural rationalization and societal rationalization. Weber is very critical of the issue of whether this modernization process, and the project of enlightenment have fulfilled their promise of progress in human life within society. Actually, Weber negatively argues this promise of progress in the project of modernity and expresses deeply pessimistic views concerning enlightenment or modernity's faith in reason and progress. Bernstein offers an excellent explication of Weber's argument:

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Weber argued that the hope and expectation of the Enlightenment thinkers was a bitter and ironic illusion. They maintained a strong necessary linkage between the growth of science, rationality, and universal human freedom. But when unmasked and understood, the legacy of the Enlightenment was the triumph of purposive-instrumental rationality. This form of rationality affects and infects the entire range of social and cultural life encompassing economic structures, law, bureaucratic administration, and even the arts. The growth of purposive-instrumental rationality does not lead to the concrete realization of universal freedom but to the creation of an 'iron cage' of bureaucratic rationality from there is no escape.

Weber defines modern rationality as purposive rationality, the embodiment of instrumental rationality and rationality of choice. It is "means/ends rationality." In relation to an instrumental rationality-oriented bureaucratic system, Weber made a pessimistic prognosis of late capitalism, claiming that there exists in modern society an "inexorable process that produces only 'sensualists without spirit, specialists without heart,' and locks us all into the 'iron cage.'" Weber points out that bureaucratization not only leads to a reification of social relationships, but that it also stifles motivational incentives for a rational conduct of life.

3) Durkheim's Analysis on Anomie and Social Integration

The third issue tied to modernity can be Durkheim's analysis on social phenomena of anomie and the issue of social integration. Durkheim is concerned with the relationship between the dissolution of archaic moral cores and the modern problem of social integration. In the context of highly differentiated modern societies, Durkheim asks how social order and social integration are possible, and what provides the ground for moral authority and political legitimation in different societies. The break off from the premodern societies and the disintegration of archaic moral cores has led to modern socio-cultural issue of, "anomie."

In the evolution of modern society, according to Durkheim, structural differentiation of the system with the division of labor cuts off the roots of normativity and creates a norm-free sociality. This norm-free sociality has been engendered out of replacement of collective consciousness by a mechanism which leads to a division of labor constitutive of modern forms of societal integration—namely, through the market. However, this market mechanism generates a systemic integration of society which is uncoupled from the value orientation of individual actors. It performs the norm-free regulating function, where actions are oriented by the aggregate effects of individual interests. And where interest is the only ruling force each individual finds oneself "in a state of war with every other, since nothing comes to mollify the egos, and any truce in this

10 Richard Bernstein, Habermas and Modernity, 5.
12 Bernstein, Habermas and Modernity, 10.
antagonism would not be of long duration. There is nothing else constant than interest" which makes it hard to be grounded in social and moral norms or values.\textsuperscript{13}

The phenomena of "anomie" has been rested on crisis of values and moral ground, the ground for binding power. And the crisis of moral ground make it hard to form social integration and social order. Durkheim attempts to reestablish the normative validity of modern institutions and values by "unearthing the sacred roots of the moral authority of social norms."\textsuperscript{14}

In his attempt to restore the ground for social integration, Durkheim investigates the character of moral rule or social norms. In his presentation of "the determination of Moral Facts," Durkheim attempts to elucidate that "moral rules are invested with a special authority by virtue of which they are obeyed simply because they command."\textsuperscript{15} Thus, obligation, for Durkheim, is one of the primary character of moral rules.

In further explaining the obligatory character of this type of authority, Durkheim analyzes two features of "moral facts": "a) the mark of the impersonal that attaches to moral authority; and b) the ambivalent feelings that this triggers in the actor."\textsuperscript{16} Habermas comments:

\begin{quote}
a) Durkheim first discusses the Kantian opposition between duty and inclination from the standpoint that the relation of moral precepts and the interests of the individual is one of tension. Imperatives of self-maintenance, interests in the satisfaction of private needs and desires--in short, action orientation that are utilitarian and related to oneself--are not as such in accord with moral requirements, which demand, rather, that the actor raise himself above himself. The selfishness of the morally acting individual corresponds to the universality of morally formed expectations, which are directed to all the members of a community: 'Morality begins with membership in a group, whatever that group may be.'

b) There is also a second standpoint from which Durkheim discusses the Kantian distinction between duty and inclination, namely, that moral commands exert a singular force upon the individual. A subject acting morally has to submit to an authority and do violence to his nature in a certain sense, but he does this in such a way that he takes on the obligation himself and makes the moral requirements his own.... Moral constraint has the character of a self-overcoming. On the other hand, Durkheim relativizes the Kantian dualism by deriving the binding power of obligations from constraint and attractions simultaneously. The morally good is at
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\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 116.

\textsuperscript{14} Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action  Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, 47.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 48.
the same time something worth pursuing; it could not be effective as an ideal and arouse enthusiastic fervor if it did not offer the prospect of satisfying real needs and desires.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus, Durkheim adds a second character, desirability, to the obligatory character of moral acts.

In respect two characters of moral acts and two features of moral facts, Durkheim points out the relationship between the validity of moral rules and the aura of the sacred.

In investigating mythical representations and ritual behavior in primitive societies, we encounter a demarcation of sacred and profane areas of life: "The sacred . . . is that which is set apart, that which is separated . . . What characterizes it, is that it cannot, without losing its nature, be mixed with the profane. . . . Like the attitude toward moral authority, the attitude the sacred is marked by devotion and self-renunciation; in worshipping the sacred, in performing cultic actions, in observing ritual prescriptions, and the like, the believer renounces his profane action orientations, that is, those that are utilitarian and related to the self. Without regard for the imperative of self-maintenance, for personal interest, he enters into communion with all other believers; he merges with the impersonal power of the sacred which reaches beyond all that is merely individual.\textsuperscript{18}

As shown above, one primary mark of moral authority is its impersonal power which originated from its sacred roots.

There is similarities between the moral authority and the authority of the sacred in terms of having an ambivalent attitude. Durkheim points out that "the sacred being is in a sense forbidden; it is a being which may not be violated; it is also good, loved and sought after."\textsuperscript{19} The dual sentiments toward the sacred parallel the individuals' dual feelings toward moral principles—the desire to do whatever one wants to do versus the conscience compelling one to do what one ought to do.

Thus, to Durkheim, the moral authority is rooted in the sacred. That is to say, moral rules get their binding power from the sphere of the sacred. The character of the sacred can be described as "impersonal, commanding respect, overpowering and at the same time uplifting, as triggering enthusiasm, motivating the faithful to selflessness and self-overcoming, permitting them

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 48-49.

\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 49.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
Furthermore, by associating religious experience with the representation of the sacred, Durkheim points out that the individual's experience of the authority of the sacred essentially involves coming to terms with a collective, supraindividual consciousness.

Durkheim, by illustrating the impact of religious symbols on collective consciousness and identity, attempts to resolve the question: "how can we at one and the same time belong wholly to ourselves and just as completely to others? How can we be simultaneously within ourselves and outside of ourselves?" For Durkheim, the consensus character of morality is rooted in the sacred as represented via religious symbols.

Durkheim analyzes this normatively oriented consensus in connection with ritual practices. In Habermas's interpretation of Durkheim, ritual practice and action not only express the collective consciousness but also bring about communion in a communicative fashion. This communion in a communicative way represents its unity and its personality in ritual practice. Furthermore, through participating and performing ritual practice, collective identity can be developed in the form of normative consensus.

However, since the normative consensus can be distinguished from achieved consensus, the concept of identity between these two types of consensus need accordingly to be distinguished. According to Habermas, the identities which the individual develops through the form of normative consensus, "are established equiprimordially with the identity of the group. What makes the individual into a person is that in which he agrees with all the other members of his social group." From the standpoint of this collective identity, it can be inferred that the identity of the person is only a mirror image of collective identity. This normative consensual form of collective consciousness and identity contributes to securing social solidarity in what Durkheim terms a mechanical form.

This mechanical formation of social solidarity, normatively integrated through the archaic forms of ritual practice and action, and thereby disregarding individuation and differentiation, is hard to continue in the differentiated and rationalized modern society, and therefore the question of how the individual and society stand to one another is raised once again. Furthermore, in the process of secularization, as the sacred roots of binding power are dissolved, the question can be posed as to whether secularized morality (when reinterpreted in utilitarian terms) can encompass at all obligatory and integrating character of strong social norms. This means that we need to explain "how the unity-bringing symbolic structure is related to the multiplicity of institutions and socialized individuals." Furthermore, this calls for a reexamination of the normative ground of

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20 Ibid., 51.
21 Ibid., 51-52
22 Ibid., 53.
23 Ibid., 55.
social and political institutions and values owing to a different level of socio-cultural development.

In explaining how social order or social integration is possible in modern society after the dissolution of the sacred roots of moral authority, Durkheim places the modern legal development in the context of changing forms of social integration. Durkheim characterizes modern law as contract law, where "the contract between autonomous legal person is the basic instrument of bourgeois private law." The binding power of this contract law is its coerciveness. Contract law implies that legal claims require the guarantee of obedience to law. However, Durkheim does not consider that the coerciveness of modern contract law is enough for explaining the issue of social integration in modern society. In explaining the reasons for that, Durkheim claims that "even the modern legal subject has to have a moral core. For the legal system is part of a political order, together with which it would break down if that order could not claim legitimacy." For Durkheim, the legitimacy of contract law is grounded in moral and social norms which transcend individual interest. Habermas comments that for Durkheim, the obligatory character of a contract is based on not the coerciveness of law but on the legitimacy of the legal regulations that underlie it. Moreover, the latter, according to Durkheim, count as legitimate only insofar as they express a general interest. This general interest, for Durkheim, is by no means the sum of, or a compromise between, a number of individual interests. Rather, the general interest evokes its morally obligatory force from its impersonal and impartial character.

The state, according to Durkheim, is a special organization whose responsibility is to provide certain representations which can hold good for the collectivity. For Durkheim, the legitimacy of the modern state can be best achieved when it is transformed "from the sacred foundation of legitimation to foundation of a common will, communicatively shaped and discursively clarified in the political public sphere." This transformation can be achieved through promoting the medium of political-will formation which is essential for the realization of the principle of democracy.

In modern law, the private contract draws its binding power from its legality; but the law that gives it this legality owes its obligatory character, demanding recognition, to a legal system legitimated in the end by political will-formation. It is the achievement of mutual understanding by a communication community of citizens, their own words, that brings about the binding consensus.

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24 Ibid., 80.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 81.
27 Ibid.
This democratic development is possible only when the transformation from mechanical to organic social solidarity is attained.

2. Emotivism and Postmodernity

After the project of Enlightenment, the traditional metaphysical-religious world views are secularized. According to MacIntyre, the modern secularized rationality has replaced the telos and the common-bond oriented morality and rationality. This affects to increase the dominance of utilitarianism and individualism, and the emergence of "emotivism." Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically, moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling in so far as they are moral or evaluative in character.

The peculiar modern self, the emotive self, in acquiring sovereignty in its own realm lost its traditional boundaries provided by a social identity and a view of human life as ordered to a given end. The emotive self has its own kind of social definition. The bifurcation of the contemporary social world into a realm of the organizational in which ends are taken to be given and are not available for rational scrutiny and a realm of the personal in which judgment and debate about values are central factors, but in which no rational social resolution of issues is available, finds its internalization, its inner representation in the relation of the individual self to the roles and characters of social life. This bifurcation is itself an important clue to the central characteristics of modern societies. On the one side there appear the self-defined protagonists of individual liberty, on the other the self-defined protagonists of planning and regulation, of the goods which are available through bureaucratic organization. Given this deep cultural agreement, it is unsurprising that the politics of modern societies oscillate between a freedom which is nothing but a lack of regulation of individual behavior and forms of collective control designed only to limit the anarchy of self-interest. Thus the society in which we live is one in which bureaucracy and individualism are partners as well as antagonists. And it is in the cultural climate of this bureaucratic individualism that the emotivist self is naturally at home.

Since the emergence of the project of modernity and the enlightenment, the modern and postmodern culture and society celebrate constraint-free, individual liberty at the cost of a common-good oriented rationality and morality, resulting in moral, social, and political confusion.

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29 Ibid., 34-35.
"Emotivism" which claims that moral judgment is a matter of personal preference invalidate interpersonal and social ground of ethics and morality. Rather, this emotivist attitudes contribute to fomenting postmodern condition and trends. Grasping the concept of postmodernity presuppose understanding the concept of modernity for the reason that postmodernity attempts to criticize and deconstruct the underlying assumptions of modernity. The concept of postmodernity is not agreed upon concept. Therefore, we can trace its concept by the ideas of some scholars who are referred to postmodernists. For representative postmodern thinkers, I will include Foucault and Lyotard.

1) Foucault

The concept of modernity is rooted in power of reason. Thanks to reason, the project of modernity proposes the construction of progressive and rational society and culture. Therefore, main underlying assumptions of modernity can be found in rational worldviews and objective knowledge. Rational worldviews elucidate what it means to live rationally. Rational living requires one to repress one's emotion, to perceive nature with clear thinking, and act with good reasoning. Objective knowledge is distinguished from mere opinion. Objective knowledge, attained by rational procedure and reasoning, can be universally applied.

What Foucault assaults is the claim of universalibility of objective knowledge. According to Foucault, attainment of objective knowledge is illusion, therefore, cannot be universally applied. He claims that knowledge is constructed by everyday discursive practice. This means that no knowledge is possible without concrete discursive practice. For Foucault, the discourses which are connected to the construction of knowledge consist of different kinds of groups of speeches and statements whether written or spoken. The basic unit of discourse is groups of speeches and statements. The similar statements can be differently affected and understood. The real meaning and impact of speeches and statements are contexts bounded, that is to say, the same statements are differently used and understood by its way to speak or spoken, the place and the status it is used, its relation to institution and law, and how it is distributed. According to Foucault, the basic unit of discourse--speeches and statements do not have fixed object nor fixed subject. The speeches can be meaningful only when they are related to meaning structures. When the speeches form certain relationship with other speeches, they makes a discourse.

If knowledge is constructed by everyday discursive practice and if discourse is formed by everyday contexts bounded speeches and statements, knowledge can never be objective. Rather knowledge is contexts bounded. In practicing discourse, not all speeches or ideas are chosen but some are included and others excluded. This practice of inclusion and exclusion tells that there is power structure in everyday discursive practice. Power, for Foucault, is formed and exercised in person to person or group to group relationships. Power is more related to social relational and interpersonal practice. For Foucault, knowledge is deeply connected to power. That is to say, knowledge contributes to generating power and power is exercised through the production and

the distribution of knowledge.

Foucault's analysis on knowledge and power actually charges the hypocratic and constraining nature of reason. According to Foucault, modernity which proposes a rational and liberating life, in real nature, confines us more by demarcating between normal and abnormal, between rational and irrational, between right and wrong, and between reasonable and emotional. According to Foucault, the concept and practice of rational life and good life are nothing but the product of power relations of dominant human relationships and social practice. In the name of rational, right and good, anything different from the standard practice is repressed, rejected, and named irrational, wrong, and bad.  

2) Lyotard

Lyotard's book, The Postmodern Condition sparks academic debate and contributes to distributing the term, postmodernism. According to Lyotard, the modernity related intellectual issues have been centered around the notions of progress, liberation, equality, freedom, and democracy which are thought of universal issues to everyone. These notions seem to be ultimate purposes for everyone and presumed to be pursued by all. Moreover, these meta issues of humanity come to be recognized as the main purposes of every disciplines such as political science, economy, history, sociology, biology, physics etc.. Almost all disciplines stress disciplinary structure of logical coherence and unity. Any theory which is outside these grand theories is excluded and recognized as pseudo theories. The representative grand theorists can be Hegel, Marx, and Kant etc..

According to Lyotard, the grand theory is not appropriate for the future world, postmodern society. In postmodern society, the diverse language games and a varieties of discourses are mixed together. In this diverse societies, the grand theory cannot incorporate all the differences. Law, philosophy, science, literature, economics have their own different language games and logics, therefore, are impossible to be integrated by one grand theory which proffers one standards.

A fact, according to Lyotard, is never given but is made as a result of language game. In other words, a fact is induced by individual discourse rather than is given. Therefore, the meta-theories which do not have factual ground by itself, cannot be integrating ground for all those multiple discourses. The unifying attempt which ignores multiplicity among diverse language games and logics, for Lyotard, is equal to totalitarian terror.

For Lyotard, modernists' pursuit of coherent and unified grand theory destroys the


diverse experiences and multiple ways of living but forces us to have one kind of life—the totalitarian life. According to Lyotard, only different styles and multiple ways of living become adequate and come to be the postmodern condition. In this postmodern societies which emphasize differences in tastes, preferences, styles, values, attitudes, and ways of thinking and living, do not need to struggle to seek the consistencies or coherence among the differences. Promoting the differences in daily life in postmodern societies makes it possible to have creative life, transcending traditional life which have been totalized our life.

According to Lyotard, the adequate discourse in postmodern societies should be local narratives. These local narratives make it possible to have different life styles and multiple ways of living. Local narratives are happened around a person's family, community, job, and personal matters unlike the grand narratives of national development, historical progress, and human liberation. In the postmodern societies where local narratives become focus, local knowledges replace universal and objective knowledge.

Lyotard's attack on grand theories, especially its universal and unifying trends, break off consistency, coherence, and unity. What is left, thus, is differences with no standards nor criteria. However, when there are only differences, how can we make an judgment, develop sharable social norms and rules? Foucault nor Lyotard do not seem to be concerned in these matters.

So far, by introducing Foucault and Lyotard's ideas, I have tried to portray what postmodernity is. Even though the concept of postmodernity is not well defined owing to the different views among postmodern thinkers, we can trace general nature of postmodernity. Postmodernity which has illustrated by postmodern thinkers, such as Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, and Lacan etc., attempts to deconstruct modernity's basis, the ground of reason, subjectivity, and historical continuity. By deconstructing the ground of modernity, postmodernity eradicates the roots of reason and confer us criterialess society. When there is no criteria to tell right from wrong, rational from irrational, good from bad, everything is possible. In this postmodern context, we can no longer say what the goodness is nor what the badness is. No more can we claim democracy is better than dictatorship. Only differences are left to us.

3) Habermas's Analysis on "Colonization of Lifeworld"

Habermas develops his concept and analyses of reason and human action. This offers a framework for examining the relationship between reason and social reality (social condition and structure). Specifically, this helps to reevaluate the project of Enlightenment or modernity by enabling us to analyze how reason has been positively and negatively manifested in modern sociocultural and political life forms.

The project of modernity has contributed to transforming the premodern, deterministic view of reality. Supported and grounded by revitalized reason's power and potentiality, the project of modernity proposes the construction and transformation of social reality toward a more progressive and rational life and society. This construction and transformation involves the processes of differentiation, dissolution, and disenchantment of the religious-metaphysical
worldviews—from its irrational superstitions, and unreasonable and unjust prejudice and determinism.

However, this promise of progress in the project of modernity hinges to a great extent on the paradigm of the dichotomy of subject and object. This paradigm stresses the increased control and efficiency of modern society which in turn engenders dehumanization, as seen in the problems of alienation, objectification, and domination. These issues, for Marx, Weber, and Critical theorists, epitomize the impact of the deformed type of rationalization of modernity.

The subject/object paradigm promotes the division between subject (the being to take control, or charge of) and object (the being to be controlled and dominated). This dichotomy between subject and object is reinforced by the objectifying attitude and by reifying consciousness and culture. Moreover, this paradigm, by contributing to shaping and framing its paradigmatic (subject and object division) oriented socialization and social order or control, escalates the divisions, alienation, and hierarchy within societies. What this subject and object division-oriented socialization and social order fortify is the subject-centered values, attitudes, consciousness, and order. These intensified divisions in human life within societies further the issues of dehumanization and subhumanization by aggravating the oppressive, dominating, reifying, and alienating social conditions and structures.

In an attempt to overcome the deformed rationalization (which might further the unfinished project of modernity), and thereby to construct a more humanizing life and society, Habermas proposes a paradigm shift from the subject versus object paradigm to an intersubjective paradigm. This alternative paradigm, according to Habermas, ought to include the notions for overcoming the subject and object division oriented-socialization, subject-centered purposeful activities, values, consciousness, and social control and order. Therefore, this alternative framework necessarily stresses more interactive, intersubjective, cooperative, and dialogical sociocultural and political developments. For Habermas, the theory of communicative action elucidates well the intersubjective paradigm.

Communicative action employs communicative rationality which requires at least two parties. Habermas explains:

The paradigm for the communicative rationality is not the relation of a solitary subject to something in the objective world that can be represented and manipulated, but the intersubjective relation that speaking and acting subjects take up when they come to an understanding with one another about something.\(^{33}\)

Communicative rationality, therefore, for Habermas, is primarily used to come to an understanding which can be obtained through accomplishing intersubjective validity relations. One crucial condition to coming to an understanding, according to Habermas, is that the participants

\(^{33}\) Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and Rationalization of Society, 392.
be uncoerced and grounded in reason.

The intersubjectively based paradigm ought to offer a relevant framework for a different and transcending understanding and conceptualization of socialization, social integration, and cultural production and reproduction. Examining the nature and character of linguistically-mediated and coordinated interactions and intersubjectively developed socialization, social integration, and cultural production and reproduction leads us to understand better the impacts of communicative action on the construction of a more humanizing life and society.

When sacredly integrated culture, society, and personality are rationalized and transformed through the medium of linguistification or through the practice of communicative action, Habermas claims that this rationalization accomplished by linguistification of the sacred preserves the "continuation of traditions, the maintenance of legitimate orders, and the continuity of life histories of individual persons." However, the prevalent pathological manifestations of anomie, fragmentation, discontinuity, and insecure identity suggest that rational potential linguistification has not been fully released in the modernization processes thereby engenders the broken reality between linguistification and rationalization. This inhibited linguistification, for Habermas, leads to deformed or repressed rationalization.

In analyzing what blocks the linguistically mediated and intersubjectively based rationalization process, Habermas points to the dominance of functionalist reason. According to Habermas, functionalist reason becomes a repressive mechanism in linguistification process. The dominance of the de-linguistified mechanism, such as money and power, over linguistically mediated interaction, supported and promoted for the sake of system functioning and maintenance as the simplifying tool for reducing the cost of disagreements and conflictive views, leads to what Habermas terms the uncoupling of system and lifeworld or colonization of lifeworld.

According to Habermas, the lifeworld concept of society is based on the acting subjects' creative roles of constructing, negotiating, and reconstructing the social meanings of their society. The system concept of society focuses more on self-regulating systems, which fulfill functions with respect to the maintenance of the societal systems. Functionalist reason becomes dominant here.

Habermas strongly stresses that an adequate and proper concept of society ought to synthesize these two competing concepts of society.

We cannot understand the character of the lifeworld unless we understand the social systems that shape it, and we cannot understand the social systems unless we see how they arise out of activities of social agents. The synthesis of system and lifeworld orientations is integrated with Habermas's delineation of different forms of rationality and rationalization; systems rationality is a type of purposive-rational rationality, lifeworld rationality is communicative

rationality.\textsuperscript{35}

The dominance of functionalist reason (the mechanism of money and power from the system of economy and the state) and the inhibition of communicative action means that structural components of lifeworld—culture (as the ground for standards of the rationality of knowledge), society (the solidarity of members), and personality (the responsibility of the adult personality) are colonized by systemic integration mechanism.

The colonization of lifeworld disrupts lifeworld reproduction process—cultural production and reproduction, social integration, socialization and identity development. And this hurts greatly the quality of our everyday life. The mutilation of the lifeworld by systemic integrational mechanism can also be understood in relation to Weber's notion of "loss of freedom" and "loss of meaning," which permeates both the private and public spheres. The private way of life was reformulate in order to be adjusted to capitalist labor relations. Persons become dependent on their organizational membership of employees or on their organizational dependence as clients. This is a threat to individual freedom. Moreover, when functionalist reason is perceived as the dominant rationality, individuals' lives in society become increasingly reified and abstracted. With this reifying form of life, persons lose their ability to give their life histories a certain degree of consistent direction.

In the light of this concept of the colonization of the lifeworld, Habermas writes that within the welfare-state, there developed four existing relations between "system (economy and state) and lifeworld (private and public spheres), around which the roles of the employee and the consumer, the client of public bureaucracies and the citizen of the state, crystallize."\textsuperscript{36} Social welfare policy purports to maintain the system by reducing extreme disadvantages, insecurities, or class conflicts without affecting the structurally unequal access to property, income, and power relations.

The inhibition of communicative action and the colonization of lifeworld has brought about amoral, asocial, and apolitical effects. These effects lead to further fragmentation of persons within society, and generate the psychopathological and sociopathological problems relating to the problem of anomie and identity, and to the issues of such as motivation, and legitimation crises. The new task for humanization is very closely related to how to recouple the system and lifeworld and thereby overcome fragmentation through educative processes.

\textbf{II. Modernity- and Postmodernity-Related Phenomena in the Korean Context}

Korea is well known for its rapid economic development. A number of social scientists and foreign countries have wondered how Korea has achieved economic development in such a short time. Several attempts have been made to analyze what brings to Korea such an

\textsuperscript{35} Bernstein, Habermas and Modernity, 22.

development. I am not here to discuss such analyses. What interests me is the impact of economic, socio-cultural, and political developments of Korea upon our daily life, our ways of living, our belief system, and our attitudes toward other persons and society at large. Korea society is considered to be in the midst of modern and postmodern conditions. This means that we are going through a great deal of changes. How do we perceive and assess such changes?

The expression, "What a convenient world we are living!" becomes a common talk we hear and say in our daily life. The transformation of Korea into an industrial and postindustrial society has brought to Koreans, for sure, extensive convenience in our daily life. Convenience comes to be the major focus of life. We are buying products for convenience's sake not because we need the product. We are even educating ourselves to increase access to convenience rather than to fulfill dream about life. The concept of good life means, now, to Koreans to have a convenient life, geared to personal wants rather than human needs.

Traditionally for Koreans, the principal purpose of education is to develop the ground for their position in society, in the world, and in the universe. This includes understanding who s/he is and what s/he ought to do for society as well as cultivating her/his mind and capability sufficiently to be ready for life-long commitment. That is to say, the crucial educational endeavors of Koreans are value-oriented. The pursuit of conveniences in life, for aged Koreans, is perceived to be a Western thing.

It is evident that the concept of good life has been changed. When the concept is value-oriented, it requires constant search and endeavor; therefore, it can give directions and hopes of life. When the concept is wants-oriented, it requires immediate fulfillment and transient quest; therefore, it cannot offer any continuity and direction. In this concept of life, we are living moment to moment, hence, no need of having hopes or dreams. We may live by temporary wants.

I will try to contextualize this change in life focus in order to illustrate the impacts of this change on daily life in Korea. The different attitudes toward life between young and old generations have much to do with the disturbances of the Korean lifeworld. As mentioned before, the structural components of the lifeworld—culture, society, and personality—are responsible for the cultural production and reproduction which is connected to transmission and reproduction of tradition, social integration based on communicative rationality, and socialization in relation to identity and personality development. The disturbances in the lifeworld mean problems in cultural production and reproduction, social integration, and personality development.

Lifeworld is the background for mutual understanding and the development of interpersonal and social relations. The postmodern phenomenon of "communication break," found between old and young generations in Korea, is a good example. The younger Korean generation, referred to "X Generation" or "New Generation," is considered to be a postmodern generation. They are well known by their outspokenness of their intention and preferences. However, they do not seem to care to get understood nor to understand others. When asked to explain reasons for their action, their attitude is more like saying, "It's none of your business." I have had this kind of communication break experience with my freshman and sophomore students.
The phenomenon of communication break is more serious in the junior high or high school life contexts. Students do not care to listen what teachers say. Most students seem to pass their judgments based on their preference—what they like or dislike to do. Therefore, teachers who still maintain their grounds of reasoning, are having a lot of difficulty in developing sharable culture with students. When scolded by their teacher, students simply respond by saying, "Just because I don't like."

Another modern and postmodern phenomenon is related to "human relations break." When society gets highly differentiated and developed, our life become complex and busy, structuring works and leisure sufficiently convenient for a person's work. This tendency toward individualistic behavior has changed the group-oriented daily activities. Koreans, in daily activities—such as going out to eat at a restaurant, going hiking, playing sports, or even going to the rest room—tend to act in a group. But now, we tend to like to do things individually. And the busily structured and individualism-oriented life has led to form the attitude of minding own business and not caring about others'.

This attitude is very much for Western and against the dominant Korean feelings of jung, which contains the mixed feelings of liking, love, affection, as well as dislike and hate, having developed through long and gradually evolving human relationships. The basis of "jung" is care and interest among persons. We, Koreans tend to believe the emotion of "jung" is uniquely Korean. In many cases, in Korean society, our doing or not doing certain things are more related to "jung" rather than rationality. jung represent how strongly Koreans put emphasis on human relations. Therefore, the Western kind of attitude toward human relations, such as "Mind your own business" shatters Koreans' traditional way of making human relations.

It used to be common for Koreans to ask and to be asked "Are you married?" "How many children do you have?" "What does your husband do?" or "How old are you?" However, people no longer do not like to be asked those questions. Moreover, people do not care to know what others are doing even in the same office. This kind of attitude can be easily found in middle or high school. Students form their own group and show no interest at all to other groups of classmates including teachers. Often, they pass a year without knowing names of other classmates—a phenomena which was unthinkable in the past.

It seems to me that Korean society is functioned by what Habermas terms "civil privatism."

Civil privatism means strong interests in the administrative system's output and minor participation in the process of will-formation (high output orientation vs. low-input orientation). Civil privatism thus corresponds to the structures of a depoliticized public. Family and vocational privatism complements civil privatism. It consists of a family orientation with consumer and leisure interests, and of a career orientation consistent with status competition. This privatism thus corresponds to the structures of educational and occupational
systems regulated by competitive performance.\textsuperscript{37}

The prevalent practice of "civil privatism" in Korea society means breaking off the traditional group-oriented ways of living.

\section*{III. Ideas and Tasks of Adult Education in the Korean Context}

If I make a summary of modernity and postmodernity related issues and phenomena, it might be related to the issues of productions and reproductions of lifeworld. The issues of alienation, dominance of instrumental and technical rationality, anomie, and colonization of lifeworld reveal that the condition of our daily life becomes problematic due to the disturbances of lifeworld. The disturbances of lifeworld in the Korean context are related to breaking off the ground for mutual understanding and human relations. When we do not even try to communicate in order to reach understanding and when we do not care about others, how can we work and live together? This break is constitutive to augmenting fragmentation in consciousness, attitude, and values.

Among many things that adult education can do in our time, I believe, adult education ought to play a part in vitalizing lifeworld functions in society through promoting communicative rationality. That is to say, ideas and tasks of adult education ought to be related to upholding cultural production and reproduction, social integration, and personality development.

In securing cultural production and reproduction involving values, ethics, and rationality, continuity of tradition and coherence of knowledge are extremely important. Continuity and coherence are the basis for meaning-making. In relation to continuity and coherence, our learning task is how to combine our Korean tradition and modernity or the two ways of living, namely, living by "jung" (which is old Korean style of living) and living by rationality (which is modern and Western style of living). Some conflicts between these two styles of living might bring about a meaning crisis in Korea. Furthermore, this meaning crisis might also be related to motivation and orientation crises. "Hopelessness," a sentiment which is found among younger Korean generations illustrate this problem.

Social integration "takes care of coordinating actions by way of legitimately regulated interpersonal relations and stabilizes the identity of groups to an extent sufficient for everyday practice."\textsuperscript{38} The phenomena of "communication break" and "human relations break" have much to do with the issue of social integration. To resolve this matter, our learning task is to learn how to practice communicative rationality in our every day life contexts. Learning to reach understanding each other through validity claims is one important task. Having problems of social integration is connected to the issue

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{37} Jurgen Habermas, Jurgen Habermas on Society and Politics: A Reader ed. Steven Seidman, (Boston, Beacon Press, 1989), 278.
\item \textsuperscript{38} Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, 140.
\end{itemize}
Socialization is related to personality development. Having a good socialization makes possible for "individual life histories are in harmony with collective forms of life." The problem in socialization and personality development is connected to the issue of "alienation" and psychopathology. Our learning task in this matter is how to make a responsible adult. Seeing or experiencing extensive violations in our daily life has led a person to feel, "I am not the only victimizer, the only one who violates. Everybody does it. Why should I be punished? I myself was once victimized." All of us living in Korean society need to learn together what it means to be responsible citizens.

Considering ideas and tasks of adult education from the lifeworld perspective requires different outlook about purposes of adult education programs and the ways of structuring learning experiences and activities. Lifeworld perspective-oriented adult education, in reconstructing the field, enable to overcome consumerism and civil privatism-oriented practice by presenting the ground for mutual understanding and social learning.

Lifeworld perspective-oriented adult education assist creating the environment for co-learning and co-teaching. Through co-learning activities we are learning how to share views together and how to negotiate situations, how to compromise the differences, and how to work together. These learnings involve experiences of opening oneself, making relations, restructuring and reorganizing work, creating and recreating life spaces etc. Quality of life is fundamentally connected to lifeworld production processes. The development of the quality of life, which tend to be perceived to be major purpose of adult and continuing education, means more than increasing convenience in life. When we have a lifeworld which secures dialogical practice, relational interaction, and responsible action, we can expect to create and recreate meaningful, healthy, and joyful lives. I believe that is what quality of life is about.

\[39\] Ibid., 141.


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