This book discusses foreign policy issues and provides background information on current topics. This edition examines the following major issues: (1) "Conflict in Former Yugoslavia: Quest for Solutions" (Susan L. Woodward); (2) "South Africa: Forging a Democratic Union" (Jean Herskovits); (3) "Environmental Crisis in Former Soviet Bloc: Whose Problem? Who Pays?" (William Sweet); (4) "Trade with the Pacific Rim: Pressure or Cooperation?" (Jinny St. Goar); (5) "Defense: Redefining U.S. Needs and Priorities" (David C. Morrison); (6) "Argentina, Brazil, Chile: Democracy and Market Economics" (Jacqueline Mazza); (7) "Islam and Politics: Egypt, Algeria, and Tunisia" (Lawrence G. Potter); and (8) "New World Disorder? U.S. in Search of a Role" (James Chace). The activity book contains activities on each subject and six handout master sheets pertaining to the world area under study. (EH)
Conflict in Yugoslavia
Democratic South Africa
Ecocide, a Soviet legacy
U.S.-Pacific trade
Defense priorities
Argentina, Brazil, Chile
North Africa’s Islamists
New world disorder
An Invitation

The Foreign Policy Association, which publishes the Great Decisions briefing book and sponsors the nationwide Great Decisions discussion program, invites you to become a National Associate of the Foreign Policy Association. Your participation will enable FPA, an independent, nonpartisan educational organization, to carry out its mission, namely, to help Americans gain a better understanding of U.S. foreign policy and to stimulate constructive and informed citizen participation in world affairs.

To become a National Associate, please use the envelope that is bound into this book. Associates will receive a membership card, FPA’s most recent Headline Series (“Environmental Scarcity and Global Security”) and the catalogue of publications. Members’ names will be listed in next year’s briefing book.

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To start your own group:

1. **Assemble a group of 8–12 people.** Recruit your friends or find members in neighborhood or civic groups, the library, church or synagogue. Put a notice in the local newspaper.

2. **Purchase a copy of Great Decisions for each participant.** Inquire about the special program in Georgia.

3. **Determine a meeting schedule.** Many groups meet weekly or biweekly after the book’s publication in January. Other groups prefer a fall meeting schedule or a monthly schedule throughout the year.

4. **Select the leadership for the group.** Some groups prefer to have the same person lead all eight sessions, while others share responsibilities among group members.

5. **Designate one group member to collect opinion ballots and forward them to the Foreign Policy Association.** Your opinions will be known by the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense and Members of Congress.

Do you have questions about starting, joining, leading or participating in a Great Decisions group? Write or call the Community and College Programs Department at (800) 628-5754.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1993, the Foreign Policy Association celebrated its 75th birthday. Its founders were internationalists. They understood the challenge and the opportunity presented to Americans by our victory in World War I. Unfortunately in the 1920s the country failed to rise to that challenge. We refused to join the League of Nations, which President Woodrow Wilson had designed and, by turning inward, defaulted on the leadership role that had been thrust upon us. Barely a decade later, we paid an awful price for our neglect.

Seventy years later, having won the cold war, Americans face a similar challenge. Once again, domestic concerns, some of them long neglected, cry for attention, and many believe they should be given primacy. Yet the world of the 1990s is very different from that of the 1920s. To illustrate, only 3% of our jobs then were export-driven. Now, that figure has increased almost sixfold to 17%. Television, unknown in the 1920s, has become ubiquitous. Arguably, television got us into Somalia and will get us out, obscuring what should have been the true policy debate about our goals there and what might have been done to achieve them.

The real question, now as in the 1920s, is whether we can turn inward without imperiling America’s long-term interests in the world. Educated Americans can help our leaders answer that question. The national debate in the fall of 1993 over the North American Free Trade Agreement demonstrated once again the role of informed opinion.

Among the lessons to be learned from President Clinton’s Nafta victory are the importance of Presidential leadership, particularly in areas in which domestic interests clash with international interests, and the importance of informed citizens who understand the issues and are willing to express their views to their elected representatives.

For 40 years, participants in the Foreign Policy Association’s Great Decisions program have been studying and discussing American foreign policy and expressing their opinions. This year you have the opportunity to make your voice heard on eight major issues that will be facing the country during 1994. Bound into this book you will find a set of opinion ballots, with a duplicate set for couples who may be sharing the book. All you need do is fill out the ballots and mail them to us before June 30, 1994, in order to be sure that your views can be tabulated in time for presentation to the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the national security adviser, congressional leaders and the media.

In October 1993, I had the honor to present the National Opinion Ballot Report to Deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton. In his acknowledging letter, he wrote: “Special thanks for the survey results. They will be very useful to me. The Great Decisions program is such vital work. I only wish it could be replicated a hundredfold....” A summary of the results of the 1993 National Opinion Ballot Report appears on pages 93 and 94. Copies of the report are available free from FPA.

The 1994 Great Decisions program offers you the opportunity to take part in the national foreign policy debate and to take a stand on the issues of importance to us all. I hope you will seize the opportunity.

John Temple Swing
President
Foreign Policy Association
Conflict in former Yugoslavia: quest for solutions

The conflict in Yugoslavia has increased global insecurity and raises questions about the leadership role of the U.S. in the post-cold-war world.

by Susan L. Woodward

ONLY WEEKS AFTER assuming office as President of the U.S., William Jefferson Clinton declared the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Western attempts to bring peace to the former Yugoslavia "the most frustrating and complex foreign policy issue in the world today." Many observers share that sentiment. Some try to reduce the complexity to a black-and-white struggle of good and evil, democrats against Communists, Croats or Muslims against Serbs, victims and aggressors. Others choose distance to avoid the wars' atrocities by distinguishing themselves from those Balkan people with "ancient ethnic hatreds": they will fight no matter what we do, so leave them alone until they exhaust themselves from hatred and fighting and are ready again for peace.

American foreign policy debate on Bosnia-Herzegovina has swung between these two views. One camp argues that the U.S. has a moral obligation to stop the killing of innocent civilians, the use of force to change state borders, and the violation of fundamental human rights. They watch with horror the daily television pictures or newspaper reports of the blatant violation of the Geneva conventions on war, mass rapes of women, inhumane detention camps, bombardment of cities, mortars lobbed into children's playgrounds and breadlines of old people, whole villages burned to the ground, and the expulsion of people from their homes on the basis of ethnicity. If we have knowledge of such behavior and do nothing, are we not also complicit? Is our own world safe if we allow defiance of its basic values? The other camp protests that this requires the U.S. to be a world policeman, sending soldiers to die in other peoples' battles. The U.S. cannot do everything. It must choose to intervene only in cases that directly affect its vital national interests.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher's statements have reflected both positions. Announcing a new Administration policy in February 1993, he sought to make Bosnia "the intractable 'problem from hell' that no one can be expected to solve...less...a moral tragedy...and more...a tribal feud that no outsider could hope to settle."

The quest for solutions to the Yugoslav conflict has been trapped between these positions since late 1990 when warnings of violent disintegration became urgent. Humanitarian assistance has not achieved its goal of delivering relief to civilians, and it has not prevented massive refugee flows. The wars and cleansing of towns and villages to create pure ethnic areas continue in the former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. War threatens to spread to other republics and to destabilize an entire region of Europe for decades.

The post-cold-war world

The failure of European powers and the U.S. to formulate a policy toward the conflict, let alone prevent or end the wars, has demonstrated serious deficiencies in the European security regime and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and led to quarrels and strains among Western powers. Even the United Nations is facing a major crisis because the U.S. and Europe are attempting to avoid the security issues by deploying humanitarian missions and peacekeeping troops instead, and then balking at the financial costs.

American foreign policy debate on Bosnia-Herzegovina has swung between these two views. One camp argues that the U.S. has a moral obligation to stop the killing of innocent civilians, the use of force to change state borders, and the violation of fundamental human rights.

TWO WOMEN AND A BABY, who fled Sarajevo, found refuge in Split, Croatia. Croatia and Slovenia subsequently closed their borders to refugees.

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the basis of national self-determination for Slovenia and Croatia. Yugoslavia is located at a crossroads of civilizations, cultures, and spheres of economic and geopolitical interest, punctuated by disputes over territory. Its population is composed of multiple ethnic and religious groups and social statuses. Finding a solution has also been complicated by the transition in the international order. Since the end of the contest between a "free world" and Communist states, Western powers are unsure about which countries and what values lie within their national interest and what constitutes a threat to their security. The U.S. has yet to find its role in the transition.

During the cold war, the independence of socialist Yugoslavia from Moscow and its neutrality in the Balkans were thought to be critical to U.S. national security and to NATO strategy. Military aid and financial guarantees of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity followed its break with the Soviet Union in 1948 and continued until 1989, when East-West reconciliation left it without a strategic role.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1991 momentarily raised the specter of a conflict in the Balkans that might once again ignite a world war by drawing in neighbors and then major powers. Europeans, who had recognized Slovene and Croatian independence, placed the highest priority on containing the war to prevent it from spreading beyond Yugoslav borders.

The Bush Administration intermittently intervened in the Yugoslav conflict when it seemed necessary to preserve NATO or U.S. leadership in Europe, but it maintained the position, first taken in 1989, that the U.S. had no national security interest in Yugoslavia. Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney recently reiterated the views of President George Bush and his chief military officer, General Colin Powell: "No one could ever tell us what the mission should be."

In 1992 presidential candidate Clinton reacted with moral outrage at the Bush Administration's unwillingness to defend Muslim victims against Bosnian Serb aggression, and promised support for Muslims and the Bosnian government. But in 1993 the Clinton Administration waivered when Europeans challenged it to use ground troops, for this required it to address the question of U.S. national interests.

Great-Power quarrels

Despite plenty of warning, Europe and the U.S. failed to forestall war. Quarrels among the NATO allies prevented them from taking early military action to stop the war in Croatia or to give peace negotiators any credible threat with warring parties. The quarrels continued over the aims of a possible military intervention, the risks of sending troops where soldiers might be killed, who would pay, and who would have command and control. A UN Security Council resolution creating six safe havens in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not implemented. Proposals for extensive diplomatic but nonmilitary intervention seemed to require too much rethinking. Whereas the crisis of NATO came from inaction, the crisis of the UN comes from the operational inadequacies of some 26,000 troops actually sent on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions in entirely different circumstances than those for which peacekeeping was designed.

The failure to act in the Yugoslav case, many now argue, has increased global insecurity, raising questions about what values and rules will be enforced and who will take a leadership role in initiating new forms of cooperation or intervention to prevent war in a post-cold-war order.

Creation to breakup

The creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 after World War I was the result of nationalist struggles against the empires of Austria, Hungary and Turkey during the 19th century. The Great Powers sitting at Versailles determined its composition and constitution. Although they used President Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination to justify the end of empires, they formed Yugoslavia as a multinational state. The country's liberal democracy gave way to dictatorship in the face of world depression and constitutional quarrels, and the return to democracy in 1935 came in the shadow of German economic penetration. In 1941 a German-led invasion splintered Yugoslavia among occupying armies from Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, and multiple armies of national resistance.

Yugoslavia was not a nation-state but a country composed of six "constituent nations"—Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Mon-
tenegrians, Macedonians, and Muslims (in the political, not religious, sense). People belonging to nations which had states elsewhere, called nationalities, had cultural rights as minorities (the largest such groups were ethnic Albanians and Hungarians, but there were many others such as Jews, Bulgarians, Turks, Romanians and Italians). Individuals who belonged to ethnic minorities without a national status (such as the seminomadic Romany and Vlachs) did not have such rights. Many people lived in compact ethnic or national communities and identified with a territory, but centuries of war, forced or invited resettlements, economic migration and rapid urbanization after 1945 meant that cities, most towns, the plains and former imperial borderlands were ethnically mixed. Intermarriage was common, and people had relatives or second homes in other republics. There was an unusual richness of cultures: Habsburg, Venetian and Ottoman legacies; Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, Muslim, Jewish and Protestant religions; overall Slavic dominance mixed with indigenious and non-Slav traditions. Some areas of the country, such as the republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, took pride in their multicultural pluralism and tolerance in living together in mixed communities for centuries.

**Federal vs. states’ rights**

To accommodate the rights of its six nations to self-determination, Yugoslavia’s constitution after 1945 was federal. Politics revolved around the tug and pull between states’ rights and the powers of the federal government. The country was committed to rights of national equality and individual economic security. But when hard times strained government budgets, richer areas objected to the federally mandated equal standard for wages, welfare programs, minority cultural rights, and quotas in public employment, and to federal taxes for assistance to poorer communities, the defense budget and military industries. Their demand for less government regulation, local self-rule and homogeneous communities was simultaneously antifederal. The government was far more decentralized than in the U.S., but it shared the same commitment to extensive local control over schools, police and welfare. Because the country was composed of minorities (no national, regional or occupational group formed a numerical majority), the system emphasized voting rights to protect minorities instead of majoritarian, competitive democracy.

In terms of how people saw themselves, ethnicity was less important than occupation and urban or rural residence and culture. Residents of cosmopolitan cities had different prospects than those of heartland farming communities or poorer mining and timbering towns in the interior. Villagers had deep cultural and psychological attachments to the land, and households survived periods of severe inflation and unemployment by relying on their own production of food, on neighbors or on rural relatives. There was great economic variety and inequality among the regions. For defense against external invasion, national policy called for substantial military industries and local stockpiling of arms. A tradition of local militia and frontier defense created a gun-owning culture in the interior. This was reinforced after World War II by a military doctrine that called for the entire population to be prepared to take arms against invaders.

**Collapse of Yugoslavia**

The collapse of Yugoslavia did not happen overnight, although its accelerating speed made actions to stop it ever more difficult. It was a long process of economic and political disintegration as a result of efforts to democratize a socialist economy under extremely difficult international conditions. Yugoslavia had experienced a decade of austerity and reforms aimed at paying its foreign debt by reorienting the economy to exports and Western markets, and reversing the progressive weakening of the government’s capacity to manage the economy due to decentralization. Liberalization and anti-inflationary policy prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) demanded cuts in federal expenditures and higher taxes.

As early as 1985, 1 million people, including 70% of youths under age 27, out of a work force of 7 million, were officially unemployed. Economic austerity combined with hyperinflation resulted in declining living standards for 80% of the population. Growing insecurity led to protest actions, religious revival, scapegoating of ethnic groups or women, and a decline in civility.

Politicians quarreled with ever more intransigence over taxes, public expenditures, access to foreign exchange, the powers of legislatures and executives, and whether or how to reform the federal government. Particularly contentious was the IMF demand for an independent central bank that would recentralize monetary policy and replace consensual voting with majority decision. These

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**Map of Former Yugoslavia**

- **Austria**
- **Hungary**
- **Slovenia**
- **Croatia**
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**
- **Montenegro**
- **Kosovo**
- **Albania**
- **Greece**

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**Notes**: 
- **Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**: *Skopje*
- **Former Yugoslav Republic of Serbia**: *Belgrade*
- **Former Yugoslav Republic of Croatia**: *Zagreb*
- **Former Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia**: *Ljubljana*

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**Great Decisions 1994**

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lized in a debate between antifederalists, who wanted to keep primary economic power in the republics and even extend the latter's legislative and judicial powers to near-full sovereignty, and liberals, who believed that a market economy had not only to strengthen federal economic capacity but also to break down the political barriers to capital and labor mobility within the country imposed by the republics.

The declared goal of the Yugoslav federal government by 1988-89 was full Westernization and an end to the socialist system.

**Democracy and war**

War began with democratization. By 1987-88, politicians in the republics of Slovenia and Serbia began openly to seek popular support on the basis of nationalism. They asserted their republics' right to national self-determination, to economic resources and to political control. Whereas the Slovene goal was antifederalist, claiming states' rights against federal powers, the Serbian goal was antiprovincial: it reclaimed states' rights against the powers granted by the 1974 constitution to its provinces of Vojvodina and the rebellious Kosovo. The latter had demanded independence on the basis of nationality: 87% of the population were Albanians. Both leaders also used nationalism to undercut or co-opt anti-Communist intellectuals and youths who were using nationalism to attack Communist rule as a whole, especially from the right.

At the same time, the international order defining Yugoslav security was changing. Between 1985 and 1989, new forms of East-West cooperation and further economic integration began to break down the hostile military and trade blocs. The two most western, antifederalist republics, Slovenia and Croatia, used the opening to increase ties with Central Europe, with which they shared cultural identity as Roman Catholics and part of the former Habsburg civilization. The rapprochement with Europe threatened to isolate areas in Yugoslavia which were labeled Balkan, home of Eastern Orthodox and Muslim populations of the former Ottoman sphere. These areas, such as Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, were geographically farther from Europe and were facing more severe economic decline. The army meanwhile was increasingly concerned about defense preparedness, rising social discontent, cuts in the defense budget, and deadlocks in federal decisionmaking.

**Slovenia ‘dissociates’**

In September 1989, the Slovene government declared its intention to "dissociate" from Yugoslavia. The following January its Communist party withdrew from the Yugoslav Communist party, the only legal political party, which removed the last obstacle to multiparty elections. Elections were held in the republics in spring 1990, and they became vehicles for nationalists in each republic to push through programs that replaced the constitutional protections for national equality with majority exclusivism. Consensus was replaced by confrontation. Freedom of speech permitted intolerance. Small incidents and rumor fed paranoia among people now placed in a minority position by the new constitutions. The Communist system of public security collapsed; many police formed paramilitary gangs affiliated with political parties or joined criminal networks. Ethnic minorities were treated as untrustworthy or disloyal, and some began to demand a restoration of rights or territorial autonomy in reaction to government police action.

**Economic ‘shock therapy’**

As the country was disintegrating politically, Western diplomats and bankers focused on the federal government's economic reform. They were enthusiastic over its recognition that foreign investment and foreign-debt repayment required abandoning socialist property rights and welfare guarantees. They viewed the "shock therapy" program of 1989 as the only way to end hyperinflation and the goal of rapid currency convertibility as the best solution to the persistent trade deficit. Yugoslav prime minister Ante Markovic had inspired hope among liberals throughout the country together by force. Yet in February 1991 the new federal presidency began to mediate the constitutional deadlock among republican leaders and an end to the civil violence in Croatia between the Croatian government and Serbian militants in the krajina region of Croatia. In this area, Serbs, representing less than one third their total number in Croatia but territorially concentrated, had reacted with force against growing discrimination. President Franjo Tudjman had decided to replace all non-Croats in the police and security forces because he considered them unreliable. Members of the same political party as Bosnian Serbs, the Serbs in krajina began to oppose Croatian plans for independence, announced July 1990, and held a referendum demanding territorial autonomy.

The federal presidency moved to disarm all new security and paramilitary forces, ensure civilian authority over the federal army, and end the creation of independent armies in Slovenia and Croatia. When the army began troop movements in January, the U.S. warned that it opposed any attempt to hold the country together by force. Yet in February, Slovenia and Croatia declared all federal laws invalid on their territory. One faction of the army, after failing in March to win a vote in the federal presidency for emergency rule, allied itself with Milosevic.

Only two months before Slovenia and Croatia finally declared full independence, June 25, 1991, the European Community (EC) began a series of “fact-finding” and “good offices” missions. Its policy was to offer economic aid to the
Yugoslavian Civil War Time Line

1989

Sept. 27 Slovenia declares intent to "dissociate" from Yugoslavia.

1990

Jan. 22 Congress rescinds Communist party's monopoly on political power, setting stage for multiparty elections, held April-December.

Dec. 23 Slovenes vote to secede from Yugoslavia should plans for a confederation fail.

1991

June 25 Slovenia and Croatia declare independence from Yugoslavia; federal parliament sends in troops to prevent secessions.

July 7 Brioni Accord, which establishes cease-fire in Slovenia, finalized by EC.

Sept. EC establishes Conference on Yugoslavia, a peace conference to negotiate a political settlement. UN imposes arms embargo on entire country on 25th.

1992

Feb. 21 UN passes resolution to send 14,400 peacekeepers to Croatia.

March 1 Bosnians vote for independence; Bosnian Serbs threaten to secede if referendum passed.

April 4 1,200 UN peacekeepers arrive in Croatia; the next day Serbs begin shelling Sanjevo.

April 7 U.S. and EC recognize Bosnian independence; the U.S. recognizes Croatia and Slovenia. (EC did so April 6.)

April 27 Serbia and Montenegro announce that they alone constitute a new Yugoslavia.

1992 (continued)

May 30 UN imposes economic and political sanctions on Yugoslavia in order to end fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

July 2 Croats living in Bosnia declare an independent state comprising nearly a third of Bosnian territory.

Aug. 26-27 London Conference on the Former Yugoslavia held, establishes the standing International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which creates the Statute of Principles, a set of provisions on which a peace plan can be based.

Sept. 22 UN withdraws Yugoslav seat, occupied by the Belgrade government.

Oct. 9 UN imposes a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia, prohibits all military aircraft flights.

1993

Jan. 30 All parties agree to principles in Vance-Owen plan, which calls for UN-monitored cease-fire; the establishment of a central government with 3 Muslims, 3 Croats and 3 Serbs; and the creation of 10 cantons with proportionate ethnic representation in the government.

Feb. 22 UN mandates an International War Crimes Tribunal.

April 7 "The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" admitted to UN.

May 2 Karadzic is last to sign Vance-Owen peace plan. He later insists that it is subject to ratification by a Serbian assembly, which ultimately rejects it.

Aug. 28 Muslim-led Bosnian parliament rejects the Owen-Stoltenberg plan; the Clinton Administration assures the UN that it would provide half of the 50,000 new troops needed to enforce any peace plan.

federal government on the condition the country remained together and stayed the course on radical economic reform.

EC Europeanists had seized on the opportunity to create a common foreign and security policy as they moved toward financial integration at Maastricht, Netherlands, in December 1991. Together with the brand new crisis-management institutions of the 51-member Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), as Dutch foreign minister Hans van den Broek proclaimed in June, this was to be "Europe's hour." Instead, national disputes arose immediately among the 12 EC members over whether to interpose troops to stop the fighting in Croatia or to internationalize the conflict by recognizing Croatia and defining Serb opposition as aggression against the state. Prevented from military action by U.S. opposition to NATO involvement and alternatives proposed by France, the EC never achieved a common policy, except momentarily to concede to Germany on recognition—and not before Britain and France had sought a substitute for EC action in the UN.

Continuing conflict within the Euro-Atlantic alliance and a priority of national interests over multilateral goals among the 12 led EC governments to retreat, demoralized at their diplomatic failure but also defensive that there was no security threat in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and therefore they should only devote humanitarian aid to what they claimed was, after all, a "civil war." To avoid the real questions of Yugoslavia's place in the new Europe, the security vacuum left in the East and the Balkans, and the values which Europe was willing to defend, they were redefining the border of Europe in cultural terms, between economically compatible, "civilized" states and politically unstable "barbarians" inclined to use military force.

EC mediation

Only when the Yugoslav army moved to defend the state against Slovene takeover of its international borders and customs posts did the EC offer to "facilitate political dialogue." Until that time Western policy had focused on federal economic reform to repay debt and on the protection of human rights when whole republics were demanding full sovereignty or regions, self-rule. The effect of the EC mediation was to accelerate the pace of disintegration. EC negotiations, which began June 29, 1991, effectively ended the Yugoslav state.

With the Brioni Accord of July 7 establishing a cease-fire in Slovenia, the EC shifted its attention to borders. It marginalized the federal government and disregarded internal forces working against disintegration and in favor of cross-border relations, a constitutional compromise and further democratization.

The EC pronounced the army's actions illegitimate and aggressive, and declared the borders of the republics legitimate international borders that could not be changed by force. It recognized the right of Slovenia and Croatia to national self-determination, and ignored the violent consequences of this principle as a basis for sovereignty in a multinational state and ethnically mixed society. It made no arrangements to defend its decision on borders against those who disagreed.

This precipitous end to internal efforts at negotiating the conflict deprived Yugoslavia's citizens of the time needed to develop alternatives or to hold new elections. The dismemberment of the Yugoslav state provided the opening that Serbia and others who were ready to fight for different borders needed, and it forced all those in the middle to alter their positions overnight and to take sides between republican independence and a truncated Yugoslavia.

The EC demand for a three-month moratorium on Slovene and Croatian independence in exchange for the army's retreat to barracks and then from Slovenia (and the Austrian border) into Croatia only encouraged armed mobilization. By August-September, local con-
Yugoslavs’ three camps

THE EC DECISION on borders divided former Yugoslavs into three camps. The first was composed of all those people who were irrelevant to negotiations because they did not control armies or represent states officially. These were ordinary citizens, civic groups, antiwar movements and political groups opposing ethnic apartheid. In the second camp were political leaders who claimed national authority within the republican borders that were declared legitimate. Their primary strategy was therefore to look to foreign support and to expect the international community to defend the sanctity of republican borders. In the third camp were politicians who disputed those borders because their territorial claims to national self-determination crossed those borders or were internal to them. Their strategy was to gain eventual recognition of their state by military control, exclusionary nationalism and physical expulsion to create ethnically dominant territories that would affirm that nation’s right to the land in an eventual referendum.

Slovenia and Croatia

The second camp’s strategy worked for Slovenia. Influential foreign patrons, such as Austria and Germany, together with successful propaganda to persuade world opinion that they were acting in self-defense to protect their endangered democracy, produced Brioni. But theirs was the easy case because, like the Czechs and Slovaks, Slovenia’s many conflicts with its neighbor Croatia did not include the border. The Italian community in Istria, split in two by the independence, had not yet begun to organize. The Croatian case was more difficult. Although the EC recognized its borders and considered Croatia’s relations with Serbs an internal matter of minority rights, many countries such as Britain, France and the U.S. wanted to avoid a precedent that could break up the Soviet Union or legitimize autonomy movements in West European countries.

As fighting in Croatia intensified, the U.S. and Britain rejected proposals by France and by a meeting of the Group of Seven leading economic powers to send in forces. In September 1991, the EC set up a peace conference—the Hague Conference on Yugoslavia—to negotiate a comprehensive political settlement for a confederation of independent states. The UN Security Council voted an arms embargo and in October sent an envoy, former U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, to explore conditions for setting up a peacekeeping operation. Germany, however, favored unilateral recognition of Croatian sovereignty to internationalize the conflict and thus declare the Serb rebellion as external aggression. After a five-month campaign, Germany got its way on December 16, 1991. The recognition of Slovene and Croatian sovereignty nullified the EC’s Hague Conference on Yugoslavia. Vance had negotiated a cessation of hostilities in Croatia in December which depended on an eventual political settlement. As a result, the Vance Plan for a UN peacekeeping operation, adopted by the Security Council in February 1992, only froze the status quo. Placed in an “inkblot” pattern at sites of armed confrontation, 14,000 UN soldiers were to oversee the disarming of Serb militia and the restoration of control over police and government to local majorities in four UN protected areas (UNPAs). Instead, both sides view the UN as legitimating their claims to the territory—the Croatian government to sovereignty within its republican borders, and the Serbs to their right of self-determination to choose their state. Croatia lacks control of almost one third of its territory recognized internationally, and Serbs refuse to disarm because of constant threats from Croatian leaders. Croatian President Tudjman has built an impressive army to confront the Serbs, occasionally orders offensives to retake villages and land, and dares the UN to leave; Serb radicals hope to join a common state with Bosnian Serbs after the partition of Bosnia.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Of all those in the second camp, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina was most in need of international support for its territorial integrity. EC negotiator Lord Carrington, the UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and his envoy, Cyrus Vance, and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic had all warned that German-led EC recognition of Croatia prior to a political settlement for the whole country would lead to further war, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina was officially composed of three political communities (nations)—Serbs (32%), Croats (17%) and Muslims (43%)—within a Bosnian identity. Yugoslavia had acted as the collective security guarantor for its territorial integrity, the equal rights of its nations, its multiethnic cities, the quarter of its population which had intermarried, and more than half its population of 4.4 million living in mixed communities, who have been made refugees by campaigns to create ethnically pure areas. The security of Bosnia-Herzegovina was unlikely without regional or international guarantees. As early as January 1991, the presidents of Croatia (Tudjman) and Serbia (Milosevic) had agreed to partition Bosnia. Croatia claims Bosnian territories historically (and the Croats in western Herzegovina are Tudjman’s most loyal political base); Serbs claim land on the basis of old settlements and private ownership of 63% of Bosnian land, and are allied with autonomist Serbs in Croatia. Both Croatia and Serbia consider Bosnian territory strategically essential to their independent states. At the same time, all three nations within Bosnia have separate political projects for self-determination. Although the Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat parties allied for independence in October
1991, and the army in April 1992 joined the Serbs who had withdrawn to form a separate republic within Bosnia, Muslims and Croats now fight each other in territories contested in central Bosnia, while Croats and Serbs occasionally ally against Muslims.

Three plans

Following the EC-required referendum on March 1, 1992, in which 63% of Bosnians opted for independence (most Serbs boycotted), the EC began negotiations among the three national parties. Assuming that ethnic partition was most likely, it took as a talking point the proposal from Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic for ethnic cantonization. Before the three parties could move from agreement on basic principles, on March 18, 1992, to their disagreements over the maps, the negotiations on the Lisbon Plan were interrupted by recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This time the U.S. preempted in favor of immediate recognition, granted April 6 by the EC and April 7 by the U.S., so that the U.S. could also recognize Croatia and Slovenia and end its quarrel with the EC.

Vance-Owen peace plan

The horrors of the Bosnian wars led the EC and UN to join forces in London in August 1992. They created a standing International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to negotiate an overall peace settlement, to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to create conditions for international enforcement. In contrast to the EC's cantonization plan of March 1992, the Vance-Owen peace plan of January 1993 attempted to protect Bosnian sovereignty and territorial integrity with a decentralized government composed of 10 provinces. Although the EC and the UN Security Council supported the Vance-Owen peace plan, much of the American press and the Clinton Administration (and the Bosnian Serbs) did not. They viewed it as unenforceable and as rewarding Bosnian Serbs for aggression, ethnic cleansing and bombardment of cities to take territory.

The Bosnian government had succeeded in its efforts to influence public opinion and get support for a better settlement for the Muslim victims of the war, but this sympathy did not bring military aid to reverse the Muslims' losses to Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats. The plan with its commitment to a Bosnian identity was abandoned in May of 1993.

Owen-Stoltenberg plan

A third peace plan—drafted by Lord Owen and Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in August 1993—accepted the military fait accompli of three nationally exclusive ministates in a confederation with each one's right to secede. The Bosnian government was unable to accept ethnic partition in which Muslim areas make no viable state and Bosnia-Herzegovina exists in name only. Refusing to sign this plan as it had previous ones, it now faces its own autonomists as well as exclusivist Muslim radicalization.

Economic sanctions

Western efforts to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina included economic and moral pressure. Economic sanctions against the rump Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) for aiding Bosnian Serbs were imposed in May 1992. They were stiffened in April 1993 and enforcement was tightened in August. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was suspended from the CSCE, diplomatically isolated, and barred from some activities of the UN. A War Crimes Tribunal has been established and is taking evidence under a UN Security Council mandate voted February 22, 1993. But the sanctions have thus far strengthened Milosevic's power within Serbia and worsened the economic conditions that are tinder for war, leading many to fear civil war in Serbia and the Europeans to propose their gradual lifting in exchange for territory in Bosnia.

The fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not yet fully dispirited ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, who also appear to expect international support for their opposition to Serbian rule and for eventual independence.

The third camp

The other sizeable group made vulnerable by the breakup of multinational Yugoslavia were the Serbs living outside of Serbia. The state created at Versailles in 1919 granted Serbia its war objective to incorporate Serbs in one state only if it combined with Slovenes and Croats; in federal Yugoslavia, 40% lived in other republics. The fact that Croatia had adopted some of the state symbols and territorial claims of its Nazi-created fascist state of 1941–45, and that some Muslim groups had supported that project, created fears that World War II was still being fought. Thus, Germany's role in early recognition of Croatia was a boon to Milosevic's brand of nationalism: nurturing Serbian paranoia of victimization, he claimed he was defending Serbs against a repeat of the genocide in Croatia and Bosnia during World War II. Since Germany could not constitutionally employ military force and the U.S. had repeated frequently that it would be unwilling to use ground troops or to agree to NATO action in Yugoslavia, this third camp assessed correctly that it could act without fear of retaliation. Only much later did NATO, under U.S. pressure, de-
deploy a few ships in the Adriatic to enforce trade sanctions, create a “no-fly zone” in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and threaten air strikes against Bosnian Serb artillery and supply routes.

The army

The final actor in the third camp was the army. When a state dissolves without prior agreement on borders or disposition of state assets, the organization responsible for defending the borders must find a new role or new loyalties. The Brioni agreement held the army responsible for using force to change borders, and each successive negotiation required it to retreat further into what remained of the former country. Efforts by army units to play a neutralizing role or to fight paramilitary gangs were discounted, and talks between the Bosnian government and army leadership over demobilization, retirements and housing in the fall of 1991 were interrupted by the EC decisions on recognition. Although the army had also begun to disintegrate among national groups, the remaining core and the bulk of its heavy artillery, tanks, airpower and logistical support went to aid local armies of Serbs in Croatia and to form two new armies, one of Bosnian Serbs and a new Yugoslav Army.

The situation in late fall 1993 continued to deteriorate. Political negotiations over the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had stalled with the Bosnian government’s rejection of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan. With the UN’s humanitarian relief con-

voys often unable to reach villages under siege or caught in the cross fire of rival armies, the prospect of mass starvation, disease and death from exposure in winter was all too real.

Serbs in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina had claimed a Serbian Republic. Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina had created their own state of Herzeg-Bosnia, which would eventually join Croatia. Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina had lost their hopes of a unitary sovereign Bosnia and were subdividing into autonomous regions and isolated cities only nominally protected by the UN. Quarrels between Montenegro and Serbia, which had joined in a new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in April 1992, threatened a split. Albanian political aspirations in Kosovo and western Macedonia were growing, and Macedonia remained unrecognized by the U.S. and other countries because of Greek objections to its name. Numerous autonomist movements had emerged within Serbia and within Croatia.

The partition of Bosnia creates problems in the rest of the country. If Tudjman can incorporate Bosnian territories, what claim does he have on Serb-held areas in Croatia? If the republican borders do not hold, what legitimacy is there for Serbian rule over Kosovo and Vojvodina, or what principle will prevent radicals on both sides from war? Even if the Solomonic choice in Bosnia is applied to Kosovo, as many have argued for some time, its partition would be at least as bloody and contested. Some experts doubt war can be contained within Bosnia-Herzegovina. If borders continue to be subject to contest and territories to partition, what is to stand in the way of not only greater Croatia and greater Serbia, but also greater Albania and greater Hungary?

Refugees

The continuing flow of refugees also favors continuation of war and lawlessness. This mechanism is less politically motivated, but also less controllable. In central Bosnia-Herzegovina, people expelled from their villages elsewhere (especially eastern Bosnia by Serbs, but also from neighboring villages by Croats) and who have nowhere else to go are providing cannon fodder for government forces. Slovenia and Croatia closed their borders to refugees in August–September 1992 (and therefore passage to other countries as well). A partition of Bosnia could require the forced resettlement of a million or more persons. Population exchanges are taking place (mostly involuntarily) within the UNPAs in Croatia. Most of the 600,000 refugees in Serbia are housed in family homes, and have become the source of increasingly open tensions. In April–June 1993, Serbia began to disqualify anyone from Serbian areas in Bosnia (56 communes) or the Croatian krajina (20 communes) as refugees, unless eligible for Red Cross aid, so as to force them to return home.

Albania and Greece have been in continuous conflict over Albanian refugees in Greece (and lately Greeks from Albania wishing to enter Greece) for more than two years.

Should fighting erupt in Macedonia, this will bottle up refugees there or send them into Bulgaria or Serbia. Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou has said he will close the border with Macedonia if it does not give up the name because to Greeks this implies it has territorial aspirations to the northern province of Macedonia in Greece.

Another consequence of war has been astounding unemployment, from Slovenia to Macedonia. In the early stages, the unemployed provided ready fighters because they were promised pay and benefits. Outside immediate war zones, they vote for xenophobic, right-wing radicals and exacerbate ethnic tensions with gang fights, crime and terrorizing minorities. Armies no longer have the
FOREIGN POLICY

The international community is currently tolerating extensive police repression in the region to keep order, but such repression actually encourages the likelihood that small incidents can escalate. Government budgets go to the war effort and building new arms industries. The calculation is that Western recession and political barriers against Yugoslav trade will continue and that the surest export market lies in rearmament and local wars predicted throughout the region. The transition to market economics and democratic governments is at a standstill, and has been harshly damaged in neighboring countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. No international compensation exists for the economic and social burden of refugees, the interruption of the only overland transportation between Europe and the Middle East, the cost of building new routes around Yugoslavia, and the billions lost in regional trade, in enforcing sanctions and in economic decline.

International complicity

The Yugoslav conflict demonstrates the tendency of nationalist conflict to escalate out of control when there is no counterbalance. International intervention helped marginalize domestic counterweights. By taking sides of particular national groups, specifying victims and aggressors, it accepted the nationalist arguments.

The international community has not yet confronted the clash of norms that its actions have encouraged. Which takes precedence when they are in conflict, self-determination or the sanctity of borders? noninterference or human rights? Resolution of the conflict between the right to national self-determination and a multinational environment has been relegated to the category of internal affairs. The world denounces the genocidal actions of ethnic cleansing with one hand, and accepts the inevitability of ethnic conflict and nationally exclusive states with the other. Political negotiations and humanitarian aid have focused, moreover, on single contests, forgetting that the dissolution of a state and wars over its successor-states mean they are interrelated.

A global conference?

The Geneva negotiators now propose a global conference, recognizing yet again that no settlement can be reached in one region independently of the others, but the difficulty is how to incorporate new representatives who can propose compromises, save face and begin the restoration of civil order. The importance of this cannot be underestimated because national groups spill over international, as well as internal, borders throughout the region. Any aggrieved minority can appeal for assistance to members of its “nation” in a neighboring province or state, and they feel obliged to respond. Russian nationalists, for whom the plight of Serbs evokes that of Russians outside Russia and tensions with the autonomous republics, have sent mercenaries; northern European countries have aided Slovenia and Croatia; and many Islamic countries have helped Bosnia-Herzegovina. The more the Bosnian conflict is portrayed as a religious war, the more it can destabilize moderate, secular governments in the Middle East under pressure from Islamic fundamentalists. As long as borders are not settled, the process of reversal cannot begin. Only open borders can reassure minorities that they are not trapped in national states and provide the economic cooperation necessary to viable states.

When the EC internationalized the internal republican borders of former Yugoslavia without recognizing inevitable disputes or guaranteeing those borders militarily, it gave advantage to those with arms. The massive production and purchase of weapons for cold-war defense became available for internal war in a nonaligned country patronized by both superpowers. The elaborate civil defense provided stocks of weapons and training for local militia, rival political parties and citizens’ self-protection. Weapons discarded by NATO and the former Soviet bloc’s military alliance, the Warsaw Pact, flowed in. Western powers sought to avoid military involvement by arming combatants within the country. Throughout the region there are surplus arms and mercenaries left over from superpower competition. Demobilized soldiers and officers whose pay and amenities are falling rapidly are selling off stocks of weap-

SARAJEVO: ONCE A HOME, now a base for firing mortar rounds into the surrounding neighborhood.
U.S. foreign policy

U.S. foreign policy toward the conflict in Yugoslavia began in 1989. Between 1989 and 1991 the Bush Administration crossed the country off its strategic agenda. It welcomed European initiatives in 1991, and began to define a post-cold-war policy in which regional organizations would be responsible for managing regional conflicts. By mid-1992, the Group of Seven and the UN had declared this doctrine. In its campaign to recognize Bosnian sovereignty the U.S. made no commitments, for its purpose was to restore unity with its European allies over Croatia and Slovenia. Throughout shifts in policy, the Bush Administration remained consistent that the U.S. would not commit military force to a place where it saw no vital interests. Taking the lead back from Europe after the April 1992 recognition, the U.S. pressed through the UN for sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and for their diplomatic isolation. But it retained its distance, insisting on humanitarian aid to relieve suffering and the CSCE human-rights mechanisms as twin pillars of any intervention.

Presidential candidate Clinton took up the cause of Muslim victims in the Bosnian war during the 1992 election campaign, accusing the Bush Administration of moral defeatism. Upon taking office, however, he discovered that few options remained for effective intervention as long as his Administration, too, was unwilling to commit ground troops to help bring peace. In February 1993, he proposed lifting the arms embargo—so that the Bosnian government could arm to defend itself on a more "level playing field" against heavy artillery held by Bosnian Serbs—and to aid that fight with selective bombing by U.S. planes. The Europeans oppose both "lift and strike" options, however, because they have soldiers on the ground in UN forces protecting humanitarian convoys and relief workers and because lifting the embargo would be merely symbolic unless arms were actually delivered to landlocked Bosnia. They would in any case prolong the war.

In defending Muslims against Serb aggressors, moreover, the Clinton Administration played into the nationalist framework instead of protecting the neutral, international norms necessary to Bosnian sovereignty and all the victims (Muslim and non-Muslim) who support that cause. Insisting on a better Muslim deal in the Vance-Owen peace plan weakened the plan's authority and gave Bosnian Serbs an excuse to defeat it. Encouraging patron-client relations in the bargaining over Bosnia—delegating the Bosnian Croats to Germany, introducing a Russian interlocutor into the negotiations for Bosnian Serbs, and becoming patron to the Bosnian Muslims—had the effect of introducing major-power interests and conflict into the quest for solutions, including a Russian threat of veto in the UN Security Council. Like the previous Administration, it chose to ration its resources and attention with a policy of national interest, defining economic reform and democratization in Russia within that category and Bosnia-Herzegovina of no strategic importance. In April it countered Russian proposals to reinvigorate peace negotiations through the UN by organizing a joint-action program of humanitarian aid and indicating willingness to commit troops to enforce whatever peace agreement was reached by Bosnian parties. Its efforts then turned to improving relief to Muslims trapped by Serbian siege in eastern Bosnian towns, such as Srebrenica, with an airlift that has lasted longer and is more extensive than the Berlin airlift of 1948. In August it persuaded NATO to threaten air strikes on Bosnian Serb forces and supply routes if they did not end the strangulation of Sarajevo.

U.S. airplanes based in Germany currently drop parcels of food and medicines to towns trapped by fighting throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. Presidents Bush and Clinton have both warned Serbian President Milosevic officially that the U.S. will act should fighting begin in its province of Kosovo and endanger the Albanian population. UN troops in Macedonia include 325 U.S. soldiers who monitor activities in hopes of preventing war by early warning. President Clinton continues to support his February 1993 policy to use air strikes against Bosnian Serbs and to lift the arms embargo. (A U.S.-sponsored resolution to lift the arms embargo in favor of the Bosnian Muslims was defeated in June 1993 in the UN Security Council.) Reflecting concern about domestic political opposition, the President conditionally committed the U.S. to providing half of...
the 50,000 or more peacekeeping troops needed according to UN and U.S. military assessments to enforce a peace settlement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, but congressional opposition is strong and mounting in light of U.S. casualties in Somalia.

Few believe that the package of current U.S. actions constitutes a policy. As a stopgap between forces for and against intervention, responding with humanitarian relief, moral condemnation of Serbs and sanctions on Serbia, it appears to address domestic vacillation between moral outrage and disinterest. It proposes no solution to the problem of national self-determination in multiethnic communities while it exacerbates the economic austerity and political instability that contributed to the war and its spread. Four State Department officials have resigned in protest of the Bush Administration for doing little to defend Bosnian sovereignty and of the Clinton Administration for abandoning the Muslims it championed. But Secretary Christopher insists that television pictures should not be the “North Star” of U.S. foreign policy. There is little discussion of ways to prevent such conflicts before it is too late elsewhere or to enforce international law and security for citizens fated to live in countries of no national interest to the major powers. Current options suggest the harsh lesson of early mistakes and the difficult reconceptualization that will have to occur.

U.S. policy options

1. Continue present policy, including support for UN humanitarian aid, verbal backing for the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, plans to prosecute war criminals and genocide, and economic sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro, but otherwise stay out of the conflict.

Pro: The Yugoslav war is a European problem of no vital interest to the U.S. America should do what it can through the UN to support the victims and protect civilians, but it should not risk soldiers’ lives and the possibility of a long-term quagmire except where its global power is at stake.

Con: These measures have failed to stop the war or produce a political agreement. The fighting will likely continue, with unknown but ominous threats to Western security. European security is an American vital interest, and the continuing interruption of regional economies and the negative example of global leadership have broad and direct implications for this country’s global power. The demands on humanitarian missions will increase; already the UN considers withdrawing because of the danger and lack of cooperation from warring groups. More likely than an alternative European response is worsening conflict among Western powers. Segregating moral concerns into humanitarian relief without attention to the political causes is not a productive policy.

2. Mobilize an international ground operation to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and provide a transitional authority.

Pro: Parties on the ground are unable to stop the war alone. Without some outside force, escalation is likely. Although diplomatic activity with a credible threat in 1990-91 might have sufficed, the fighting has created such distrust, as well as political and economic collapse, that an outside force is necessary. The population wants an end to the war and will welcome an international force that is neutral and helps local groups restore basic security so that civil order can be re-established. Instead of mass tragedy still to come, Western moral conscience and U.S. credibility can still be restored and also give pause to those who believe the international community will not intervene to defend international norms without the threat of Soviet response or the loss of a strategic resource (such as oil). In light of Somalia and the prospect of many more impending conflicts like the former Yugoslavia, there is also an incentive for the military to use this opportunity to mount such an operation. The latter should include substantial civil and police components.

Con: An ill-conceived intervention could pose great dangers. It could exacerbate the conflict or give warring parties a new enemy and cause. International operations are poor at disarming and demobilizing parties who have not given up their war aims. Countries are not in the position to provide either the necessary troops or finance the costs because of current commitments and impending ones of greater importance.

3. Support a new global peace conference on the former Yugoslavia and see the talks through to conclusion.

Pro: Since few countries want to become involved militarily and the humanitarian disaster will worsen, a new approach at diplomatic negotiations is unavoidable. Nationally exclusive states and partition are unstable outcomes. U.S. policy scuttled previous negotiations on Bosnia, and it can veto any effort to alter UN sanctions. U.S. leadership will be broadly welcomed by most countries in the world.

Con: Leaders in Yugoslavia who have gained what they want warn of opening a “Pandora’s box.” More talks without willingness to stop fighting on the ground may only lose more time without saving lives. If citizens within the former country are not given a hearing and if the warriors are not given ways to save face, a peace conference may not produce anything new. Western powers would have to take far more initiative on political questions than they have been willing to take so far.

4. Initiate a far-ranging policy review of the role of Western policy and international organizations in the causes of such wars and lead its allies in institutional and policy reforms aimed at effective prevention.

Pro: The Yugoslav conflict is a paradigm for many other conflicts which can still be prevented. The international community exacerbated the domestic conflict because it did not understand the situation and because it is not prepared for post-cold-war conflict. Unless there is a reconceptualization of peacekeeping and peacemaking, of procedures for recognizing new states and negotiating the breakup of old states, and of means to limit arms flows and refugees, then the moral, political and financial costs of future conflicts will rise. Because the U.S. does care about the free-market and democratic transformation of former Communist states such as Russia, it does not want to repeat the mistakes of the Yugoslav transition. U.S. leadership in the world is at stake in the former Yugoslavia, even if Washington chooses not to act militarily.

Con: The Administration was elected to solve domestic problems. Such an effort would require major political resources which could divert it from that task. Moreover, a multilateral review will not succeed; it must be part of an international effort to reshape multilateral institutions and concepts of security. A better route to a post-cold-war world is through national interest and unstructured evolution.
1. What does global leadership mean in this new period? What are the obligations of the U.S. to create a new order as it did in 1944-49? What are the costs and risks if it does not take on a leadership role in cooperation with other countries?

2. What will be the consequences for international peace and security if no one takes on the responsibility to write and enforce the rules of an international community and to initiate new forms of cooperation?

3. Do Western governments have an obligation to help former socialist countries integrate into the West and to cooperate with them on economic and security relations? Do they have an interest in doing so?

4. Americans live in a pluralistic, multi-ethnic, multicultural society. What can they do to ease the difficulties of multi-ethnic states so that human rights, regardless of ethnic background, are protected? so that ethnic groups can preserve their identities without requiring political autonomy? so that peoples can enjoy rights to self-determination without destroying nation-states or the rights of others?

5. The international community accepts the right of intervention to protect universal human rights. How can it do so without violating the right of peoples to noninterference in their internal affairs?

6. What are the implications for U.S. global leadership if NATO fails? if the UN goes into crisis? Are there better ways to organize European and international security?

7. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in a 1992 report entitled An Agenda for Peace, urged UN member states to think more about preventive diplomacy. What actions can the U.S. take to institutionalize preventive diplomacy? Should current thinking about intervention, nonmilitary influence and the role of military force change? Are there obstacles to discussing prevention in American politics?

8. The Clinton Administration aims to “enlarge” the sphere of market-oriented democracies, and it emphasizes this policy toward Russia. What help can the U.S. and Western countries give? Will the policy work if only a few countries at a time are selected? Can such an approach harm the process of democratization?

9. Should the U.S. be concerned by the emergence of national states, ethnic apartheid and racist or nationalist violence in Europe and elsewhere? How does it affect this country? What can and should be done?


“Europe and the Balkans.” Current History, November 1993. The entire issue is devoted to the region.


**TOPIC 1**

**Conflict in Former Yugoslavia**

**ISSUE A. In its policy toward the former Yugoslavia, the U.S. should:**

1. Avoid future involvement in what is essentially a European problem.  
2. Support UN humanitarian aid, prosecution of war criminals and economic sanctions.  
3. Arm the Muslims and use air power to protect them from attack.  
4. Mobilize an international ground operation to stop the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
5. Support a new global peace conference on the former Yugoslavia.  
6. Lead allies in institutional and policy reforms to prevent future "Yugoslavias."  
7. Other, or comment

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**TOPIC 2**

**South Africa**

**ISSUE A. In its economic relations with South Africa, the U.S. should:**

1. Provide grants and loans to jump-start the economy.  
2. Encourage international financial institutions to provide funds.  
3. Encourage the U.S. private sector to trade with and invest in South Africa.  
4. Treat South Africa no differently than any other country.  
5. Other, or comment

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In planning future GREAT DECISIONS programs, we would find it helpful to know more about participants and would appreciate your answers to the questions below.

A. How many years have you participated in the GREAT DECISIONS program (that is, attended one or more discussion sessions)?
   - 1. This is the first year I have participated.
   - 2. I participated in one previous year.
   - 3. I participated in more than one previous year.

B. What is your age?
   - 1. 17 or under
   - 2. 18 to 30
   - 3. 31 to 45
   - 4. 46 to 60
   - 5. 61 or over

C. Your sex?
   - 1. Female
   - 2. Male

D. Have you been abroad during the last four years?
   - 1. Yes
   - 2. No

E. What is the highest level of formal education you have completed?
   - 1. Some high school
   - 2. High school degree
   - 3. Some college
   - 4. College graduate
   - 5. Advanced degree

F. How often are you asked for your opinion on foreign policy matters?
   - 1. Often
   - 2. Sometimes
   - 3. Hardly ever

G. One final question. Would you say you have or have not changed your opinion in a fairly significant way as a result of taking part in the GREAT DECISIONS program?
   - 1. Have
   - 2. Have not
   - 3. Uncertain

First three digits of your zip code:  

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**ISSUE B.** With respect to South Africa's democratic transition, the U.S. should (choose one):

- 1. Provide technical assistance, for example poll watchers.
- 2. Play no role, direct or indirect.
South Africa: forging a democratic union

As all South Africans prepare to go to the polls for the first time, economic uncertainty and violence cloud a time of hope. Why should Americans help? What can they do?

by Jean Herskovits

SOUTH AFRICA's appointment with destiny is on track," Nelson Mandela, president of the African National Congress (ANC), declared in September 1993. His country had just passed a point of no return: some two dozen parties had agreed to give blacks their first say in South Africa's governance.

On November 17 the negotiators made another stunning breakthrough: they agreed on the basic principles of a post-apartheid constitution. Truly revolutionary for South Africa were a Bill of Rights, a structure of nine regions with separate, if limited, powers from those of the central government, and a new constitutional court independent of government control.

But the defining moment for South Africa's nonracial democracy still lies ahead. On April 27, 1994, for the first time all voting-age South Africans—black as well as white—will be eligible to cast ballots. The government they produce will be a transitional one with a formidable challenge: to write a final constitution and to run the country at the same time. It will be a government of national unity, with representatives in the cabinet from every party that receives at least 5% of the vote.

Excitement and apprehension surround the event. Can there be "free and fair" elections in a country so long engulfed in violence, where the majority has been disenfranchised? Mandela told a press conference in New York, "I am 75 years of age. I have not voted in my country. I am not allowed to vote. I do not know what happens inside the voting booth. If I do not know how to vote...you can imagine the position of millions in my country." These were the words of the man widely expected to take over as South Africa's first democratically chosen president. Because they have been systematically excluded from learning about, let alone participating in, democratic processes, blacks approach April at an overwhelming disadvantage.

Dangers also loom. Unemployment for blacks in a stagnant economy has reached almost 50%. Years of protest and police violence have left young blacks in cities without schooling, vocational training or jobs—but with weapons. Extremists, white and black, threaten to derail a peaceful transition.

This is not just another election—not for South Africa, Africa or the world. For Americans its success is a matter of deep concern. Despite major differences between the racial problems of South Africa and the U.S., there are enough parallels between the two to make events there resonate here. African Americans feel a special tie, and they are not alone. Living in the most multiracial country in the world, Americans have a stake in South Africa's achieving justice across racial and ethnic lines.

Americans know from experience that changing laws and securing the vote for all do not eradicate racial injustice. But they are a vital beginning. South Africans ask three things from Americans: first, to help provide voter education and training for political parties denied earlier chances to contest elections; second, to trade with and invest in South Africa's economy now that all have joined in the call to lift sanctions; and third, to assist in reconstruction, breaking down walls to bring about a fully integrated society and economy.

Challenges to apartheid

Although it had been on the United Nations' agenda since 1952, apartheid seized the day after white South Africans narrowly voted to retain their pariah status. Talks between the black ANC and the government of President P. W. Botha were aborted in December 1993 after negotiations failed to reach agreement on how to transfer power to the black majority.

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A brief history

South Africa’s history did not begin with the arrival in 1652 of the Dutch East India Company’s agents, sent to provide fresh food for ships en route to the Orient in search of riches. Since time immemorial hunters and gatherers had lived near the Cape, and by A.D.300 the ancestors of today’s Bantu-speaking majority had already begun to farm south of the Limpopo River. From there they moved south. Ancestors of such groups as the Xhosa and Zulu settled along the fertile east coast; the forebears of the modern-day Sotho and Tswana went to the dry plateau to the north and west.

The Dutch settlers, who were predominantly male, started another significant population group, the Cape Coloured, through racial mixing. Over time, French and German Protestants fleeing religious persecution at home joined the Dutch population. Their language evolved into a variant of Dutch they called Afrikaans, and they began calling themselves Afrikaners.

Until the end of the 18th century these groups lived in a kind of equilibrium, not without racial discrimination but with only scattered conflict. Never pleased to obey the authorities in Cape Town, the growing settler population began to move east and north. Each family of trekboers (Dutch for migrant farmers) took along a few slaves. To sustain life on the frontier, each adult male claimed 6,000 acres for himself and his family.

The trekboers were not the only growing population in the area. The Bantu-speakers increased and gradually moved south and west. Under the authority of their chiefs, numerous groups settled unoccupied land, farming and raising cattle. But land was not limitless, and clashes with the trekboers over land and cattle raged for decades.

And then the British

The next wave of colonizers were the British, fresh from their victories in the Napoleonic wars. By 1806 they were in the Cape to stay. The laws they imposed and their modern views, including opposition to the slave trade and later slavery itself, drove fresh bands of Boer, or Afrikaner, families, their Bibles in hand, trekking across formidable mountains in covered wagons. In the 1830s they reached present-day Natal, where they found seemingly empty land laid waste by the great Zulu warrior Shaka and his successors.

The British wanted above all to establish an orderly frontier that was inexpensive to maintain. But nothing the British did, including annexing territory or abandoning it, which infuriated Africans and Afrikaners alike, brought peace to the frontier.

The discovery of South Africa’s mineral wealth opened a new chapter in that nation’s history, equal in significance to the Zulu-driven disarray among Africans and the expanding European presence. Diamonds, found in 1867, drove the demand for migrant labor. The men, who were forced to leave their families behind, could be strictly controlled. This pernicious practice, followed later in the gold mines, drained able-bodied males from the entire region. Not only was South African society divided, but deprivation of the black majority became institutionalized.

Gold was discovered in 1886 along the Transvaal’s Witwatersrand, and it heightened British interest in South Africa. In the “Scramble for Africa,” the rivals included a recently unified and muscle-flexing Germany, whose sympathies were with the Boers.

Anglo-Boer war

Having defeated the Zulu in 1879 (but not without first suffering a humiliating defeat at their hands) and having split them up into 13 “kingdoms,” the British turned to the Boers. By geographical accident the latter controlled both diamond fields and gold reefs. The British triumphed in the Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, in which the African majority were virtual bystanders, though often victims.

The British compensated the defeated Boers by forming an independent Union of South Africa, which they freed in 1910. Every subsequent prime minister was an Afrikaner, even though English-speaking South Africans retained economic power for a long time. The irony, which only a few noted at the time, was that the Africans, whose war it had not been, were the losers.

As early as 1913 legislation was passed that, with later amendments, consigned nearly 90% of South Africa’s people to a mere 13% of the land. Africans were generally prohibited from owning land outside the “tribal reserves.” The twin concepts of a divided society and institutionalized deprivation of the majority were thus imprinted on the economy.

What limited political rights blacks had were whittled away. Africans protested, and in 1912 the ANC was founded and began its decades-long campaign of peaceful opposition to discriminatory treatment. It made a point of drawing leaders and followers from the entire country, regardless of the legacy of 19th-century warfare, in an effort to unite the opposition.

Afrikaners, still defensive toward English-speaking whites who dominated the cities and the economy, organized to protect their language and culture. In the 1930s, working through a secret society called the Broederbond, they fashioned plans to seize control of government.

Apartheid comes and stays

Afrikaner nationalist leaders unexpectedly attained their goal by a slim margin in the 1948 (whites-only) election, which was won by their National party. For the next 45 years the National party charted South Africa’s course. It called its ideology apartheid (separateness).

Apartheid, which carried the earlier concepts of dividing society and institutionalizing deprivation to their extreme, differed from earlier discrimination in two ways. First, it charted a course to deny permanently political and economic equality to blacks. The second difference was one of degree: apartheid theory required color-coded control of all aspects of life. Laws dictated how and where people could—or, if black, could not—move and under what regulations. They prohibited protest and prescribed ever-more stringent punishments for violations: long prison sentences and the innovative “banning” of people and publications to remove them from public sight and influence. Attempts to organize resistance were very broadly defined as “Communist” and later “terrorist,” and those found guilty were severely punished, at times tortured or killed.

In their homelands policy the Afrikaners carved up the 13% of “African” land, gerrymandered to exclude fertile areas, subsoil resources and cities, to isolate blacks even further. They perfected divide-and-rule tactics, applying them systematically and mercilessly to all aspects of blacks’ lives.
the world’s attention on March 21, 1960, when police in Sharpeville shot into a crowd of peaceful African demonstrators, killing 69. In the severe clampdown that followed, the government closed off to blacks all nonviolent avenues of resistance. The ANC, now banned from operating inside South Africa after almost 50 years of peaceful protest, turned to armed struggle. A young, charismatic leader formed the ANC’s “armed wing,” Umkhonto we Sizwe, meaning Spear of the Nation. His name was Nelson Mandela, and his daring efforts to build an underground organization made him a special target of the government. He and his colleagues were swept up in police raids that led to a trial and imprisonment for sabotage and treason in 1964.

The government also banned the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), a breakaway movement from the ANC, formed in the late 1950s over differences in strategy and ideology, and it, too, turned to violent resistance. Whereas the ANC had been open to all races, including members of the largely white South African Communist party, those who formed the PAC believed that the struggle in South Africa should be African-led. These differences between the ANC and PAC persisted in exile and after their return to South Africa in 1990.

For more than a decade after Sharpeville, black resistance appeared shattered. The protest movement was re-vitalized by a dynamic young leader named Steve Biko, who picked up strands of PAC thinking and merged them with ideas of black pride coming from the American civil-rights movement to form the Black Consciousness movement. Despite legal obstacles, the movement gained momentum among students and in the black townships, which provided the urban labor essential to the white community.

Meanwhile, the government went ahead with its apartheid plans and laws. It formalized the ethnically defined homelands into so-called nations. Even though no one but South Africa would recognize them, four, starting with the Xhosas’s Transkei, accepted independence, buttressing the government’s argument that apartheid was working.

However, KwaZulu, carved out of Natal province as a homeland for the Zulu who played such a significant role in the country’s history, would not cooperate. Its leader, Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, had in his student days been a member of the ANC. He decided in the early 1970s (with ANC concurrence) on a course that would allow him to fight apartheid from within. By refusing full independence for KwaZulu, he prevented the Zulu from being denationalized by the South African government.

Having created the homeland, South Africa’s apartheid leaders could hardly forbid political activity there. Working initially through a cultural organization called Inkatha (much as the Afrikaners had done decades earlier with the Broederbond), Buthelezi and others could organize for political purposes, an option barred to others. He was even able to hold political rallies in Soweto. He did not break with the ANC until 1979.

Soweto

When the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola suddenly gained independence in 1975 following a military coup in Portugal, young black South Africans saw that resistance could in fact bring results. The government’s attempt to force Afrikaans on blacks in secondary school (ignoring how Afrikaners themselves had resented having the English language imposed on them decades earlier) lit the fuse that led to protests in the black township of Soweto. The Soweto explosion was heard around the world. Biko was beaten to death in 1977 by the South African police and became a martyr of the antiapartheid movement.

For the children, as the young of the townships came to be called, the events of 1976 in Soweto set an example. They would refuse to cooperate, no matter how many were jailed, maimed or killed by the police or the military. Following ANC policy, they would make the townships “ungovernable,” and insist on “liberation before education.” Over a decade later the urban youth, now called young lions and largely jobless, are among the most impatient and radical ANC supporters, demanding concrete material and political rewards for their years of sacrifice.

Apartheid falters

By the late 1970s South Africa’s Afrikaner rulers faced threats on many fronts, all largely because of apartheid. Internal resistance could not be permanently quelled. The economy was in trouble because of the expense of administering apartheid laws, a 10% inflation rate, a burgeoning black population, a shortage of skilled labor and, for the first time, net white emigration, mainly of professionals and skilled managers. And there were signs of a split in Afrikaner-dom. Whereas the government was considering reforming apartheid to keep itself in power, a growing number of Afrikaners insisted that any change was unacceptable.

The international climate was increasingly hostile. South Africa’s government warned of a “total onslaught” at the hands of communism. The claim was unfounded but it provided the excuse for P.W. Botha, defense minister from 1966 until becoming prime minister in 1978, to increase greatly the role of the military in government.

Botha told his constituents it was time to “adapt or die,” meaning that while preserving Afrikaner power remained his goal, the means would be more flexible. This meant abandoning “petty” apartheid symbols and practices not essential to preserving white power; bringing English-speaking South Africans into the National

KEY TO ACRONYMS

ANC African National Congress
CODESA Convention for a Democratic South Africa
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions
IFP Inkatha Freedom party
PAC Pan-Africanist Congress
UDF United Democratic Front

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party; and wooing big business. Meanwhile, government policy encouraged ethnic and class divisions among blacks and ruthlessly suppressed dissidents.

During the 1970s the black trade union movement got back on its feet, and in 1973 a series of uncoordinated strikes had made headlines. The unions continued organizing against heavy odds, and by 1979 the government concluded that the only way it could control black labor was to legalize the unions.

This reform did not produce a docile black labor force. Instead, by 1986 over a million blacks had gained experience in democracy through membership in their unions. New popularly chosen leaders produced victories at the bargaining table that improved wages and working conditions. They also introduced a new—and legal—militancy with a political edge.

When in 1983 the government proposed constitutional and political reforms, it only fueled black rage. Shifting from a white prime minister to a white state president with increased powers mattered little to those who were still unrepresented; moreover, creating a three-chamber legislature—a dominant white one and two others for Asians and Coloureds—was an insult to Africans.

The so-called reforms invigorated black resistance in the townships. This time there was new coordination: some 575 groups of many kinds, sizes and races sent a thousand delegates to form the United Democratic Front (UDF), which would coordinate opposition to apartheid inside the country. Its goal was a unified, democratic, nonracial South Africa, based on the Freedom Charter which the ANC had adopted in 1955.

Despite mounting arrests, detentions and bannings, the government could not destroy the UDF, nor could it destroy all its leaders because they were so numerous: churchmen like then-Bishop Desmond Tutu, the Reverend Frank Chikane and the Reverend Allan Boesak; women’s leaders like Albertina Sisulu (whose husband was imprisoned with Nelson Mandela); labor leaders like Cyril Ramaphosa; and many others.

The UDF included almost all those militantly opposing the regime with the exception of two groups. One contained believers in Black Consciousness, who were against including whites. The other group was Inkatha, which had severed communication with ANC’s exile leadership in 1979.

Inkatha claimed national support but was overwhelmingly Zulu, even drawing on Zulu military tradition to bolster pride, though evoking that history made others uneasy. Confrontations between UDF and Inkatha supporters in Natal, however, were not ethnic; those fighting were all Zulu, and the clashes began—and continue—over future political power.

Protest, repression, repeal
Protest escalated in the townships. Strikes complemented bus and school boycotts. Policemen beat, tear-gassed and shot stone-hurling young blacks who came in wave after wave, while Western television cameras recorded it all for their nightly newscasts.

The government imposed a state of emergency in much of the country from July 1985 to March 1986. It imposed another in June which applied everywhere and indefinitely. Historian Leonard Thompson called it “legalized tyranny.” The police—supported by thousands of soldiers with armored vehicles—arrested and tortured at will; hit squads assassinated antiapartheid activists. The government banned, detained and tortured some; it tried others for sweepingly defined treason, to be executed or die in jail under mysterious circumstances. Children as young as eight were imprisoned, but the youth especially would not give up.

As a conciliatory gesture, the government by mid-1986 had repealed some segregationist laws, but its move was too little and certainly too late. Multiracial political parties could now exist; interracial sex and marriage were allowed; certain jobs were no longer for whites only; some public facilities were desegregated; blacks were starting to move unchallenged into some previously white urban areas. But there were no improvements in education or health services, and blacks continued to be uprooted and moved about at the government’s whim. Opening up political rights to all was out of the question.

Sanctions
When the government clamped down on the international media in 1985, the viewing public in Europe, and especially the U.S., had already become incensed by what they had seen on nightly newscasts, and were forcing governments to act. In the winter and spring of 1986 the Commonwealth sent a seven-member Eminent Persons Group, drawn from its member countries, to assess the situation in South Africa. After months of interviewing South Africans inside the country and in exile, they produced a “negotiating concept,” only to have their effort torpedoed by South Africa’s invasion of three neighboring countries.

The Eminent Persons Group recommended economic sanctions; at the same time, demonstrators, organized by the black lobbying organization TransAfrica, in Washington, DC, and on American college campuses demanded the same thing. In 1986, the Congress, under pressure from black and white constituents, overrode President Ronald Reagan’s veto and passed the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The law made the U.S. the pace setter in imposing sanctions and exerting other pressures on apartheid.

Violence in the townships continued, and protesters began attacking people in the townships they suspected of collaborating with the regime. Rent strikes, bus strikes and school strikes increased as protest expanded. The government responded with further repression.

Then, in 1989, P.W. Botha resigned the presidency two weeks after suffering a stroke, and the National party caucus replaced him with F.W. de Klerk, an Afrikaner of impeccable credentials. Described by his more liberal brother Willem as “a veritable Mr. National party,” no one expected him to bring revolutionary change. As longtime observer of Africa, Marina Ottaway, puts it, like all the party’s reformers, he tried “to change the system enough to make it acceptable but not so much that essential principles were violated.” But this was a different time, and the “line separating the abandonment of old goals from the use of new means to attain old goals was getting thinner and thinner.” In retrospect it seems that the Afrikaners had exhausted their options, but at the time no one believed they could not continue adapting as they had before.

Apartheid crumbles
As suddenly as the Berlin Wall came down, South Africa faced a new future. On February 2, de Klerk announced that he would unbann the ANC, the PAC and other antiapartheid organizations. The following week came the long-demanded release of Mandela. In the months that followed, exuberant crowds and political leaders alike hailed the ANC leader as he traveled his country and the world to
thank those who had long supported him and his cause.

While the blacks were euphoric, most whites accepted the fact that the unthinkable had happened. A few greeted the change with enthusiasm, some with relief, many with apprehension. Only those on the Afrikaner far right denounced what de Klerk had done, calling him a traitor, and vowed to oppose all change, by violence if necessary.

**Transition challenges**

Hopes for a smooth, rapid transition to an all-inclusive democracy based on justice and equity were unrealistic. The political and economic landscape was too deeply scarred by the long history of racial oppression. Trust, essential to solving problems, was rare and even suspect. Repeal of apartheid laws, unimaginable a short time before, was only a starting point.

Blacks and whites had huge adjustments to make. Both the ANC and the PAC would have to shift from having been a liberation movement in exile, with an armed wing, to being a political party. Their leaders were not prepared. First, no one expected the opportunity to come when it did, and second, the change could only be made inside South Africa, where the exiled movements had limited access. Who would lead in this new phase—apart from Mandela whom all accepted? The ANC had substantial international recognition, but the struggle, most agreed, had been won not by the exiles but inside the country, where the UDF and all the local organizations it embraced had claims of their own. So did another organization which was also sympathetic to the ANC: the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), the labor federation that in December 1985 had brought together some three dozen labor movements, largely but not exclusively black, and pulled considerable economic and political weight.

Challenging the ANC and its allies were Chief Buthelezi and the (renamed) Inkatha Freedom party (IFP) on one side, and on the other, the smaller black consciousness groups, principally the Azanian People’s Organization and the PAC. At stake was more than a role in negotiations; it was future political strength.

The National party also faced challenges—on its right, from the Conservative party, which consolidated the parliamentary opposition, and from extra-parliamentary, paramilitary groups, notably the Afrikaner Resistance Movement. The National party had enormous advantages over the ANC: experience in organizing a party, holding elections and running a government. It also had institutional strength: a bureaucracy and security forces, though those posed challenges to de Klerk as well. The Afrikaner-dominated civil service feared for its secure jobs; the security forces, whose role in policymaking P.W. Botha had inflated, had long fought the ANC and other enemies, at times extralegally, and did not relish change.

The ANC had financial and generational problems to contend with. No predominantly black political organization could hope to match the resources of any white one, especially the National party. The ANC did not rush to change into a political party for precisely that reason: much of its support came from overseas, as it had through the years of exile, and South African law did not allow foreign funding of political parties.

The generational problem was especially difficult. Leaders from the 1950s and 1960s with decades of jail or exile for the cause; so had the younger ones of the 1980s who opposed apartheid from inside the country; and so had the children, whose education was not in the classroom but facing down armed men and vehicles in the townships. Out of such different experiences and eras came different strategies—and different expectations.

**Mandela, de Klerk negotiate**

With Mandela’s release and public knowledge that de Klerk had taken the extraordinary step of conducting discussions with Mandela before he was freed, it was clear that the ANC and the National party—and those two men—would be central to working out South Africa’s constitutional future.

Formal negotiations were slow in coming, however. It was not until December 1991 that the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (Codesa) opened with an angry attack by Mandela on de Klerk’s integrity and actions, which stunned the delegations of the 19 participating political organizations.

The ANC and National party had different agendas. De Klerk, all agreed, was no revolutionary; he hoped to continue by other means what his party had done so successfully for so long: maintain Afrikaner dominance regardless of institutional changes. Mandela and the ANC had a conflicting goal: a genuinely democratic South Africa and an end to white political and economic control under power-sharing or any other guise.

**Nobel Peace Prize**

Winners ANC President Nelson Mandela and South African President F.W. de Klerk conferred in Washington, D.C., in September. They were joined by Foreign Minister Pik Botha.
The Economy

SOUTH AFRICA faces two hard truths as 1994 begins: (1) it is almost impossible to make serious economic policy during an election campaign, and (2) "no country has made a successful transition to democracy while its citizens' incomes were going down," as Bruce Scott, professor of business administration at the Harvard Business School, has noted. No one seriously doubts that a major overhaul of economic practice and policy are essential. A successful transition, according to a range of South Africans assessing the challenge, has to produce "a stable democracy, based on a stable fabric with rising incomes which are reasonably distributed." This is the challenge facing the Transitional Executive Council and the government of national unity that will be chosen in April.

Despite its human resources and mineral reserves, and its infrastructural and financial advantages, South Africa's economy has stalled, with real wages declining for over a decade. International financial pressures and sanctions have aggravated this situation, but lifting them will not remedy it because the principal cause has been apartheid. It distorted the economy, devouring public funds to run its multiple bureaucracies and the security apparatus that supported it.

Apartheid's legacy

Apartheid barred blacks (meaning all who were not white) from owning homes or other property in "white South Africa" until 1980. It largely restricted Africans to the least skilled occupations through "job reservation" until the late 1970s, effectively blocking managerial or entrepreneurial opportunities. Blacks were barred from trading or manufacturing in white areas, and were restricted even in black ones. Influx control kept most Africans living outside urban areas, often commuting long distances to do whatever jobs were allowed them. The result was not only injustice but structural distortions in the economy.

The inequalities between the different groups are vast: per capita income of South Africa's 5 million whites is almost 10 times that of the 28.3 million Africans, 4.5 times that of the 3.3 million Coloureds and 3 times that of the 1 million Asians. Nearly 50% of the employable work force in the formal economy are without jobs, and they are overwhelmingly black (by comparison, 8% of the white work force is unemployed). Half the blacks who can work are not in the formal economy. And only 3% of those who finish school are now finding jobs.

South Africa's per capita gross domestic product, stagnant in the second half of the 1970s, declined in the 1980s, with population growth outstripping economic growth. At this critical time, real income continues declining for blacks, but it is also falling for whites, who enjoyed full employment until 1985.

Blacks are experiencing what Bob Tucker, a South African economic activist, calls "aggravated relative deprivation." Colliding with rising expectations, this reality poses dangers to black political leadership and the transition itself. And it aggravates whites' apprehension that if violence increases, their standard of living will decline further.

Mandela joined de Klerk in asking for foreign investment, but investment—domestic or foreign—will not be forthcoming unless there is confidence in the country's stability. Given the decades of institutionalized deprivation, redressing the imbalances is essential. As Harry Oppenheimer, a leader in the South African business community, put it in a June interview with the London Financial Times, "It's extremely dangerous to be ruled by people who have no material stake in the country. We've got to see that people in the majority have as large a share in the material assets of the country as we can." The challenge is how to do that in a short time, and in the face of the educational and other deprivations apartheid has inflicted.

Clear priorities

Among the most urgent economic and social needs are labor-intensive projects and housing for blacks, especially in urban areas. These are among the priorities in restructuring the economy proposed by South Africans and by such outsiders as the World Bank. They will require both public and private resources.

Unlike many other countries, South Africa has great unused capacity. For example, it could generate 30% more electricity without building a single new power plant or transmission line. It would simply need to reopen nine plants.

Reducing expenditures on multiple bureaucracies created by apartheid and the inefficient state-owned industries designed to keep whites fully employed would free funds for a public works program to extend infrastructure—power lines, roads, pipe-borne water—to long-neglected black areas and to maintain existing services where whites and other blacks live. Rural areas, in particular, need help to promote more labor-intensive agriculture open to blacks on land of their own. Such assistance would provide work, lessen the rush to the cities and improve food-production efficiency.

Education and health

Education and health care for blacks are also high priorities, including building clinics and schools as well as adding classrooms. Because of the 15-year disruption in black-urban education, this need is one of the most pressing. Other problems will take longer to solve: training teachers, offering blacks an education equal to what whites have had, and establishing vocational schools. In the short term, the private sector especially can undertake training programs in cooperation with labor unions, upgrading the work force in its own and its employees' interest. Reorienting South Africa's economy from dependence on mineral exports and increasingly toward the export of manufactured goods is also critical to future growth. Policies to implement this goal can complement those that redress social and economic inequities. A revived and expanding economy is critical to promoting political stability, curbing violence and labor unrest, and ending capital flight in a new South Africa.

Interviewed in June 1993, the finance minister, Derek Keys, said, "We need to reinvent society in the same way as it was reinvented with the empowerment of the Afrikaner in the 1930s." But this time it cannot be at the expense of any segment of the population, and the nation's land, wealth and opportunities will have to be redistributed far more equitably than when blacks were excluded 60 years ago. South Africa will need all its people's creativity and goodwill to succeed with justice and to benefit the country as a whole. Never has it been clearer that South Africans share a single destiny: there can be no prosperity for any group without the prosperity of all.
What bedeviled successful negotiations, according to Ottaway, was that "behind the barrage of confusing verbiage that gave the illusion of progress, the parties remained rooted in their initial positions, convinced that in the end they could obtain what they wanted and avoid a compromise." They also disagreed fundamentally on what was to be negotiated, on the timetable for transition and on the institutions that would function during it.

Furthermore, the presumption on the part of both the ANC and the National party that only they mattered to the outcome did not encourage other parties in the negotiations—let alone those opting to remain outside—to support either side. Thus the two were alternately lone antagonists or lone partners instead of coalition-builders for the future.

Boipatong massacre

The ANC broke off the talks in June 1992 following a massacre in Boipatong, a township south of Johannesburg where many ANC supporters lived and where more than 40 died at the hands of neighboring Inkatha migrant laborers, who lived in single-sex hostels. The ANC charged police complicity and held the government responsible. A scandal a year before, dubbed Inkathagate, had exposed government and police support of Inkatha, confirming what the ANC had long maintained. It saw the Boipatong events as further proof of that collaboration.

The collapse of the negotiations surprised no one. De Klerk had secured through a referendum in March an overwhelming white mandate for his negotiating position, which bolstered his party's confidence that it could impose the outcome it wished. This in turn compounded the suspicions and tensions generated in the talks. Meanwhile blacks in the townships were directing their mounting rage not only at government and police targets but even the ANC leadership for its willingness to negotiate.

South Africa's hopes were being dashed by the stagnant economy and mounting violence. Like the earlier KwaZulu-Natal-based attacks and counterattacks between members of Inkatha and the UDF, it was a struggle for power. Observers called it tribal warfare—Zulu vs. Xhosa. Some claimed that it demonstrated enduring ethnic divisions, with all Zulu favoring the Inkatha Freedom party and all Xhosa, the ANC. This ignored not only present ANC membership but its founding principle. ANC leaders in the past had included Zulu as well as Xhosa (and Sotho and others), notably 1960 Nobel Peace Prize winner Chief Albert Lutuli.

In the wake of Inkathagate, in September 1991, the government, the ANC and others held a National Peace Conference to devise a code of conduct to prevent violence and machinery for investigating and diminishing it. Violence continued, and given the mounting anger, frustration and bitterness in the months that followed the events at Boipatong, it was something of a miracle that the constitutional negotiations resumed.

The negotiators in the renewed talks—no longer called Codesa—tackled their task with fresh realism and seriousness. All recognized that neither the deteriorating economy nor the endemic violence could be reversed without progress toward a political settlement.

Despite an armed attack by the Afrikaner Resistance Movement on the site of the talks in June 1993, the delegations worked on transitional arrangements and, in July, set April 27, 1994, as the date for South Africa's first universal suffrage elections. The Inkatha Freedom party and the Conservative party walked out of the talks in protest.

In drafting the principles to be incorporated in a new South African constitution, the negotiators had to resolve disagreements about fundamentals. How to protect the rights of minorities was one; another was whether and to what extent the government should be centralized. Positions taken grew out of the history of apartheid: the ANC saw the issue of minority rights as a National-party- Inkatha effort to curtail again the power of the long-oppressed majority and to preserve some "homelands." As long as minorities were defined in "group" terms, the ANC saw unacceptable continuity with apartheid: the ANC saw the issue of minorities as a National-partisan one; Inkatha saw the issue of homelands. As long as minorities were defined in "group" terms, the ANC saw unacceptable continuity with apartheid doctrine. Yet ANC and other democrats have long recognized the need to protect against tyranny of the majority. Negotiations produced basic agreement on an ANC-proposed bill of rights to ensure such protection for all, but as individuals, not groups. Agreement also followed on proportional representation in
the legislature so that all voices would be heard.

The form of the future government proved even more challenging. South Africa appears to be an excellent candidate for federal arrangements, given its size and diversity. Here again, however, the legacy of apartheid skewed the issue. “One man, one vote in a unitary state” had long been an opposition cry. It meant that South Africa must be one indivisible country reincorporating the homelands. For that reason, compromise on the issue of federalism was more difficult than it might otherwise have been.

Those favoring federal arrangements included people who believed that in South Africa there should be checks on the central government. They also recognized a worldwide trend away from centralized power. But advocates of federalism also included whites who wanted continued dominance in “their” areas and Africans who wanted to maintain some semblance of “homeland” existence and power. Among those favoring federal arrangements were the National party and Inkatha; on this issue the ANC was the one making concessions. What it will not accept are ethnically or racially defined geographic units. The negotiators eventually agreed to reincorporate the homelands and approved a nine-region map for South Africa consisting of Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging, Northern Transvaal, Eastern Transvaal, KwaZulu/Natal, Orange Free State, Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Northern Cape and North West.

Point of no return
In September came the long-hoped-for breakthrough: agreement on a Transitional Executive Council, in which all negotiating parties will have a representative and in which blacks for the first time will have an active role in making—or blocking—policy. The council has oversight of the civil service, the budget, the police and the army and responsibility for creating the all-important independent electoral commission to run the election and the independent media commission to assure equal media access for all parties. The ease with which implementing legislation cleared the Parliament (despite a Conservative party walkout) made it clear to all that South Africa had, at last, reached the point of no return on its way to democracy.

On September 24, 1993, the day after Parliament passed the Transitional Executive Council enabling legislation, Mandela asked the world, in a historic address at the UN, to lift economic sanctions. F.W. de Klerk, the first South African head of state to enter the UN, came to plead the same cause.

The 1993 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to them jointly in recognition of their courage in seizing the historic moment despite mutual distrust.

Election challenges
The November 17 watershed agreement on a postelection interim constitution does not eliminate dangers in the months leading to the election. The most serious is violence; it has claimed almost 10,000 victims in the last three years. The graph of political violence, observers note, has spiked whenever there was progress toward democracy. Announcement of the election date brought one surge, and agreement on the Transitional Executive Council, another. The optimistic view holds that, though violence is bound to rise as elections approach, as soon as the national unity government has been elected, it will be able to reverse the trend.

Other dangers could also lead to violence and disruption. Organizations that refuse to participate in the process and have their own political agendas may try to delay or derail the transition. Particularly threatening was the refusal to participate in the multiparty negotiations by the IFP and the white right, which—along with some of the homeland parties—had formed the Freedom Alliance in October 1993. Whether they would come to realize that staying out of the process will marginalize and diminish, not enhance, their hopes of having a role in the new government was not certain.

Among the steps being considered to lessen violence is the creation of a national peacekeeping force. Its duties, not yet precisely defined, would be, first, to ensure as peaceful an election as possible. Because blacks have no confidence in the South African police or the armed forces, there is urgent need to create a reliable and credible force, responsible to civilian authority and composed of experienced personnel and trainees proposed by the various parties. Accomplishing that in a very short time is a daunting task. The immediate challenge will be to identify and integrate successfully those who come from suspect government services and homeland police forces with those from liberation armies.

The reintegration of several “independent” homelands and their participation in the transition may pose another problem. Bophuthatswana and Ciskei continue to offer resistance. The reason appears to be power and, as is also the case with KwaZulu, they have appealed to ethnic identity to rally support.

The U.S. and South Africa

A mericans have entered this decade with a renewed commitment to a foreign policy that fosters democracy around the world. Achieving this has proved in many countries to be more complex than expected. The process in Africa has been accompanied as frequently by conflict as by harmonious problem-solving. In some cases, superpower control for decades restrained impulses to both freedom and violence. But in others, superpower competition bolstered repressive regimes and aggravated polarizing rivalries.

In South Africa, Eastern-bloc support for the ANC and PAC (when recognition, let alone support, was denied them by the U.S. and its allies) for a time made the U.S. relationship with the apartheid government ambiguous. But under popular pressure the Congress forced the U.S. to impose economic sanctions in 1986. Whether one argues that sanctions had a good or bad effect (few argue now that they had no effect), all agree that they contributed in some measure to apartheid’s demise.

Under pressure from stockholders and subsequently trade sanctions, the majority of American companies pulled out of South Africa, often amid heated arguments about whether withdrawing—and abandoning efforts to integrate the workplace and provide social and educational
benefits to their workers—would do more good than harm.

Following the establishment of the Transitional Executive Council and the call to lift sanctions by both Mandela and de Klerk, South Africans look to the U.S. to assist in their transition to nonracial democracy.

American policy is to help, however possible. The Clinton Administration and the Congress acknowledge that help is also in the U.S. interest. On the very day that Mandela spoke at the UN, the U.S. Senate approved unanimously legislation to support the democratic transition. It repeals most sanctions and provides for lifting the rest once the new government is installed after the April elections. President Clinton signed the bill on November 23.

Further provisions of the bill call for the U.S. to support the strengthening of South African party and electoral machinery and voter education, and to encourage banks and international financial institutions, especially the World Bank, to make available to South Africa substantial funds to help revitalize the economy. The Congress and the President also urged states, localities and private institutions to rescind expeditiously their own sanctions on South Africa.

The U.S. Agency for International Development conducts an $80 million bilateral assistance program for educational and other projects and to help with election preparations. U.S. assistance is restricted to nongovernmental activities and, in the case of political party training and other education, excludes support of political parties that have previously participated in elections or that refuse to reconcile violence.

Of importance in utilizing U.S. aid have been nonprofit organizations, including the Washington, D.C.-based National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and the International Republican Institute. Both have considerable experience internationally in voter and political-party education and in election observation, and they are running joint, nonpartisan programs in South Africa.

With help from American and other foreign donors, the number of domestic nongovernmental organizations active in South Africa is large, their outreach is varied and their efforts are central. This provides Americans in the private sector with many opportunities (apart from business ventures) to work with South Africans counterparts. One important example is the South Africa Free Elections Fund (SAFE), an organization calling on the business community, foundations and individuals to raise $10 million to be used to educate the majority electorate. It is working through people and organizations in South Africa “with proven track records of using and accounting for foreign contributions at the grass-roots level.”

**U.S. policy options**

Although there is broad U.S. support for South African democracy, there are differences over the nature of that help. Among the options being debated:

- The U.S. government should provide grants and loans to South Africa to jump-start the ailing economy and assist with socioeconomic reconstruction.

**Pro:** A strong infusion of outside aid from the U.S. and the rest of the international community is necessary to help South Africa mobilize its vast human and physical resources and create a stable climate that will attract investors.

- The U.S. government can afford to provide economic aid at a time of pressing domestic needs. What help is forthcoming must come from the U.S. private sector and from abroad.

- The U.S. government should encourage trade and investment, but its role should be limited to that of a facilitator.

**Con:** The U.S. government can ill-afford to provide economic aid at a time of pressing domestic needs. What help is forthcoming must come from the U.S. private sector and from abroad.

- The U.S. government should provide grants and loans to South Africa to jump-start the ailing economy and assist with socioeconomic reconstruction.

**Pro:** Trade and investment will do more than outside aid to revive the South African economy. A 5% growth rate in South Africa’s trade would yield $3 billion a year, far more than any possible foreign assistance.

**Con:** South Africa’s social needs are at least as pressing as its economic needs. The U.S. must take an active role to help South Africans achieve enough progress to ensure that the democratic experiment does not fail.

- The U.S. is not responsible for South Africa’s democratic transition. If it fails and civil war breaks out, the U.S. should do nothing.

**Pro:** In such a crisis, the U.S. should make no move, overt or covert: this would be an internal matter for South Africans to resolve.

- The U.S. should do all in its power to avert such an outcome. The Clinton Administration, the Congress, business interests and nongovernmental organizations should do whatever they can to assist South Africa’s democratic transition. They should all, quietly if not openly, make clear to South Africans that participating in the election, accepting the results and building a South Africa free of political violence are of the greatest importance at home and abroad. And any who threaten this outcome must know that, should they persist, they will be denied international support.
2. What role can the U.S. play to assist a successful transition to democracy in South Africa? In what ways would a stable democracy there affect the U.S.?

3. If some political parties or groups in South Africa refuse to accept the outcome of the April election, what steps could or should the U.S. take? Would the most effective and appropriate response be bilateral or multilateral, or no response at all?

4. How can a more equitable distribution of wealth from the white minority to the whole community be achieved without precipitating large-scale emigration of skilled whites who are needed to implement economic development?

5. Will the Bill of Rights and the constitutional court be enough to ensure the white minority protection against a backlash by the black majority for their past deprivation of human rights?

6. Is educational reform an area where the U.S. can make a contribution in South Africa? Could there be a role for the Peace Corps in supplying teachers or filling other needs?

### Readings and Resources


Moose, George E., A copy of the September 30, 1993, testimony by the assistant secretary for African affairs before the subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee is available from the Office of South African Affairs.
Environmental crisis in former Soviet bloc: whose problem? who pays?

What are the prospects for overcoming environmental problems at least as serious as those the U.S. and Europe experienced 30 years ago?

by William Sweet

During Soviet rule, the environment stirred an odd mix of passions—arrogance, reverence and scientific curiosity. A brutally domineering attitude toward the physical and biological environment coexisted uneasily with a reverence for Mother Nature, rooted in Slavic traditions, and a scientific interest in understanding ecological systems. The utopian mission of creating a new and more just society on the basis of subjugating nature resulted finally in widespread damage to the environment. Yet, paradoxically, the Soviets were also among the first to propose setting aside natural preserves for conservation and research, as Murray Feshbach and Alfred Friendly Jr. note in Ecocide in the U.S.S.R.: Health and Nature Under Siege. Communist leader Vladimir Lenin endorsed the idea of preserves, and by 1920 the new Soviet nation had passed laws regulating land, timber, wildlife, fish and water. Yet these remained for the most part dead letters, and by the early 1930s the environment was falling prey to collectivization and breakneck industrialization. A chronic and well-founded sense of emergency—world war, civil war, foreign intervention, Hitler-style fascism, more world war, the atomic bomb, cold war—all kept the lieutenants of Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin firmly convinced that one couldn’t make an omelette without breaking some eggs, to quote former Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev.

Stalin’s system of production quotas, to be achieved regardless of human or environmental costs, far outlived the tyrant. And so, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the Soviet government started passing legislation supposedly guaranteeing comprehensive environmental protection, the effect was minimal. The powerful and autonomous production ministries thwarted efforts at coordination, and when fines were imposed for violations of environmental regulations, the ministries simply passed the costs back to the government. In effect, the state gave back with one hand what it took away with the other. “Instead of serving as a referee between polluters and conservationists,” Soviet expert Marshall Goldman of Wellesley College observed, “the state [was] the manufacturer.”

Monitoring of the environment was also very weak, and even when significant data were available, they often were not released. Ze’ev Wolfson, a former Soviet environmental dissident who published a pioneering exposé of the situation in the U.S.S.R., compared “Socialist nature” to a “lady of the very highest principles.” In both cases, “she never exposes herself to strangers.”

Environmental activism

Wolfson wrote The Destruction of Nature in the Soviet Union under the pen name of Boris Komarov, and it was published in the samizdat (underground) press in 1978. At that time he was a voice in the wilderness. A campaign to protect Lake Baykal, a huge freshwater body of pristine purity in remote Siberia, was launched in the 1960s (and continues today), but this was an apple-pie issue, at fairly safe remove from the U.S.S.R.’s industrial and agricultural jugulars. Much closer to the capital was the campaign launched in the early 1980s to prevent erection of a 28-kilometer-long dike system in the harbor of Leningrad (now again St. Petersburg) to prevent periodic flooding. After the first barriers went up in 1984, they caused a 60% reduction in the flow of saltwater into the harbor, a blossoming of blue-green algae to six times the normal level, and a buildup of nitrates, phosphorus, heavy metals and biological contaminants. Much of this pollution was deposited in the harbor by the river Neva, which passes through St. Petersburg picking up waste from the city and some 500 factories.

The campaign to save St. Petersburg’s harbor was coordinated by an organize—

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ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS

Defining the crisis

THE U.S.S.R. finally established an environmental ministry, Goskompriroda, in 1988. Grossly underfunded, understaffed and faced with daunting problems, its first chief, Fyodor Morgun, lasted only 15 months. The second, Nikolai Vorontsov, a highly regarded biologist and the first non-Communist to hold a ministerial position, lasted somewhat longer. The current minister is Viktor Danilov-Danilyan. Russia’s President Boris N. Yeltsin also has an environmental and health counselor, Alexei Yablokov, a respected specialist with an independent reputation. Yablokov and Danilov-Danilyan, as well as their European counterparts, face a formidable task.

Glossary

■ EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC): Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain.
■ GROUP OF SEVEN: Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and U.S.
■ SOVIET BLOC (1949–91): Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has been replaced by 15 independent republics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.

Despite meager resources, the Soviet government produced some studies in its final years that began to come to terms with the environmental crisis facing the country, though they may in some cases have been based on questionable scientific methods. A study by the Ministry of Public Health, for example, found correlations between fertilizer production and certain cancers and blood and cardiovascular diseases; between nonferrous-metal production and skin diseases and childhood cancers; between pesticides and death and disease rates for children.

In Eastern Europe, visitors to the former German Democratic Republic often were struck most by the noxious contamination called Delta. Initially it met with sharp repression, but it since has forced the city government to halt construction, pending further analyses of the dam’s impact on local water quality. Meanwhile, the city’s drinking water has gone from bad to worse and recently was described by a correspondent for Toronto’s Globe and Mail as “always smelly and sometimes brown.” The correspondent reported that most children in St. Petersburg are believed to suffer from skin allergies as a result of the contamination and that most foreigners who drink the water get sick.

A more successful environmental initiative was a massive letter and petition drive organized in 1986 by scientists. It persuaded the government to shelve plans to divert several northward-flowing Siberian rivers to provide irrigation for the cotton fields of the Central Asian republics. And in 1987 a grass-roots movement killed a big dam project in Latvia.

By that time Soviet Premier Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s campaigns for glasnost (openness) and perestroika (economic restructuring) were in full swing, and militant environmental protests were becoming almost matter of course all over the country. In Volograd (then Stalingrad), plans for a pesticide plant in the Red Army district prompted an organizing effort in 1987 that soon turned broadly political. Protests in Krasnoyarsk in far-off southern Siberia in 1989 won postponement of a plan to reprocess spent reactor fuels. In May 1990, 10,000 miners in the Donbas region struck when toxic gases seeping into a coal mine caused casualties among workers. And at Semipalatinsk, protest against radioactive pollution from nuclear-weapons testing prompted the Kazakh government to ban further underground testing there in 1991.

Political environmentalism

By 1990 the movement to clean up the environment had turned overtly political in much of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and it was feeding the processes that would lead to the dissolution first of the Soviet bloc* (see glossary) and then of the Soviet state itself. Although governments initially viewed environmental activism as relatively nonsubversive, activists increasingly considered the political system itself the ultimate source of ecological damage. Thus, when the first freely contested elections in Soviet history were held in 1989–90, environmentalists won in 17 of the 37 races they entered in Odessa; 16 Ecology Club members won all their races in Volograd.

In the former Czechoslovakia, Charter 77, which spearheaded the independence and human-rights movements, published a number of important samizdat reports on the environment in the 1980s, including a major study done by the country’s academy of sciences. In Hungary, the “environmental movement was the vanguard of the organized opposition that toppled the country’s Communist regime,” in the estimation of one scholar. “Mass protest against [Hungary’s] Nagymaros Dam was instrumental in the development of an effective political opposition,” another says.

Throughout the Soviet bloc, environmental issues and disasters came to light as a result of the opening that was taking place but they also served as occasions for further opening, mass mobilization and democratization. The most dramatic case in point was the explosion at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine in 1986, which forced the evacuation of tens of thousands of people and contaminated hundreds of square miles. The world’s worst civilian nuclear accident, its consequences were felt far beyond Soviet borders. And because of Gorbachev’s glasnost policy, the government could not keep the accident secret. The repercussions soon went further than any Soviet leader would have liked, feeding separatist and nationalist longings in Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania and Kazakhstan.

As revolution swept the whole Soviet bloc, economic crises and political issues loomed so large that they eclipsed the environment, and it was unclear whether environmentalism was destined to have a major impact in the newly emerged societies or whether its role was merely catalytic. By mid-1991, it appeared that environmental politics had become submerged in the general political opposition, and “reforms in health and ecology administration became a sideshow to the main event,” according to Feshbach and Friendly. One reason the future of environmentalism was so uncertain was that the complexity of the situation far surpassed that in the advanced industrial countries and in the Third World.
containment that allows small increments of excess pressure to lift the reactor’s lid.

The second type of reactor manufactured in the U.S.S.R., the VVER, more closely resembles the pressurized water reactors standard in the U.S., France and Germany. The VVERs also have been found to suffer from many design and construction inadequacies, and the older versions have been determined to be grossly defective.

In addition to the RBMKs still operating at Chernobyl, RBMK reactors are also in use near St. Petersburg in Russia, and in Lithuania. VVER 230s, an older model considered almost as defective as the RBMK, operate in Slovakia, in Bulgaria, and in Russia.

The consensus among reactor experts outside the former Soviet bloc is that all the Chernobyl-type reactors should be permanently closed as soon as possible and that the VVERs should be shut down or substantially upgraded. The optimal and cheaper course of action, according to the latest outside assessment, would be to turn off as many reactors as possible rather than fix them, and undertake energy conservation or install new, highly efficient gas turbines to produce needed energy. However, government officials do not believe they can do without nuclear-generated electricity, and upgrading the nuclear reactors would cost tens of billions of dollars. Foreign aid on that scale has so far not been forthcoming. Therefore, it is likely that the former Soviet and East European governments will adopt none of the recommended strategies and instead settle for makeshift remedies that keep millions of people seriously at risk. In October 1993, the Ukrainian government announced it would continue to operate the undamaged Chernobyl units, despite earlier promises to close them.

Much less is known about the radioactive hazards associated with the former U.S.S.R.’s nuclear weapon-making complex, but what little is known suggests that the dangers are even worse than those connected with power reactors. There have been numerous disclosures during the past two years, for example, that the U.S.S.R. disposed of radioactive wastes and reactors from submarines at sea—a situation that outside experts are just beginning to evaluate.

Two major accidents have occurred at a facility producing material for nuclear warheads near Chelyabinsk, in Russia. In 1957, an enormous chemical explosion spread intensely radioactive materials over a large area but it remained a deep secret until it was discovered by the dissident scientist Zhores Medvedev and described in his book, The Nuclear Disaster in the Urals (New York, Norton, 1979), 20 years later. A second took place in 1967 at Lake Karachay, where materials with roughly 25 times the total radioactive content of the Chernobyl debris had been dumped over a period of decades. Evaporation caused by a drought that year left highly reactive dusts exposed, which winds suddenly blew into the surrounding area, subjecting people as far as 50 miles away to serious levels of radiation. U.S. visitors to the site in 1990 found radiation levels at the edge of the lake high enough to supply a lethal dose to a human in an hour.

Given the large size of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, the desperation and even recklessness with which it was assembled, and the carelessness of general environmental practices in the U.S.S.R., it seems safe to conclude that the cost of satisfactorily dismantling the Soviet bomb complex will be even greater than what the U.S. expects to spend on its complex. That job, which is still afflicted with intractable technical and political problems, is expected to cost upward of $200 billion.
Aral Sea: the ultimate horror

Other inland waters such as the Caspian Sea and the Sea of Azov have suffered similar abuse, but it is the Aral Sea that stands out as the former Soviet Union’s worst water-mismanagement debacle. Diversion of water to Central Asia for intense irrigation of cotton fields depleted the rivers that fed the sea. Over a number of decades the sea—originally larger than Lake Huron—shrank by two thirds. In 1989 it actually separated into two lakes. Because of the chronic overuse of pesticides, defoliants and fertilizers, toxic runoff has contaminated rivers running into the sea, including important sources of drinking water. Winds have carried mineral salts from the exposed seabed to fertile fields up to a thousand miles away. High rates of typhoid, cholera, hepatitis and cancer of the digestive system as well as high infant mortality, have been registered among inhabitants along its shores.

Water quality

One of the intrinsically unfortunate aspects of nuclear energy, from an environmental point of view, is that reactor plants require copious amounts of cooling water and therefore almost all are situated on major water arteries. In the event of a meltdown, the imminent danger is that huge amounts of radiation will immediately enter water systems, rendering them unusable for possibly thousands of years. The violent explosion at Chernobyl dispersed 80 million curies of radiation over the entire globe, but ironically a less “catastrophic” meltdown might have sent the whole radioactive load downriver to the Black Sea.

The condition of waterways in the former Soviet bloc is bad enough, without conjuring up such nightmare scenarios. Yablokov recently told a leading French science magazine, La Recherche, that 75% of Russia’s surface water is dangerous to drink and that 50% of the country’s drinking water is substandard. The Volga river in Russia, slowed by some 10 major dams and reservoirs, is reported to be “a turgid stream.” The Dniester, the chief source of drinking water for Odessa, is said to be contaminated with agricultural chemicals—six times above prescribed limits—from farms in Ukraine and Moldova.

Yablokov has been especially critical of the overuse of pesticides and the building of big dams, although he does foresee a role for small ones. He is quoted in La Recherche as saying, “Calculations show that the value of all the electric energy produced by one of the oldest electric stations on the Volga—that of Rybinsk—is many times smaller than the benefit one would have obtained from the sale of agricultural products grown on the lands of the plain flooded.”

The quality of Russia’s huge inland lakes appears to be even worse than the situation which the U.S. Great Lakes were in a generation ago. The Black Sea, fed by the Danube, Dniester, Dnieper, Don and Kuban, has been deemed by World Bank officials to be one of the world’s most polluted bodies of water. A local joke has it that the famous sanatoriums in the Crimea should be renamed “crimatoria.” The Black Sea has been contaminated by untreated wastes from cities on the Turkish coast; poorly treated wastes from cities like Odessa, Rostov, Constanta and Miropol; by fertilizers and pesticides from all the littoral countries; all kinds of industrial pollutants from oil refining, chemical and metallurgical plants, pulp and paper mills and coal; and discharges from boats. Upstream dams have reduced flushing action, which has led to increased salinization and eutrophication from fertilizers and domestic sewage, including detergents. Between 1986 and 1992, the fish catch from the Black Sea decreased from 900,000 tons to 100,000 tons.

Serious water problems are to be found throughout the former Soviet sphere. Yet the situation is not entirely grim. Some natural habitats in parts of Eastern Europe are better preserved than in Western Europe, La Recherche reported, because of somewhat less intense utilization of waterways. And, it noted, especially in Hungary and Russia, there is a large community of hydrology experts. The first hydrological atlas for Europe was published, in fact, in the U.S.S.R.

“The Danube and the Tisza in Hungary are significantly cleaner [as of the mid-1980s] of faecal bacteria than the Rhine in the Netherlands or the Tejo in Portugal,” according to an article published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Hungary’s Lake Balaton, the largest freshwater lake in Eastern Europe, has recently become swimmable again. Fish began to reappear in the Moscow River in the late 1970s.

Soil and forests

With some exceptions, the degradation of land and losses of biological resources probably are not worse in Eastern Europe than in the OECD countries, according to their magazine. The situation may be worse in the former Soviet states where, “by unhappy coincidence, the major pollution sources...are located in agricultural areas,” as a writer for the Worldwatch Institute in Washington, D.C., noted. “The worst culprits are the metallurgical centers.”

One happy side effect of economic stagnation and underconsumption in the former Soviet bloc has been the relatively low use of packaging and containers, according to Soviet analyst D.J. Peterson of the RAND/UCLA Center for Soviet Studies in Santa Monica. It is safe to say that household wastes have taken a much smaller toll on the environment there than in any of the advanced industrial countries. The flip side of that coin, however, is that as economic growth resumes and a much larger consumer culture develops, the burden will become greater.

There probably is no satisfactory inventory at the present time of hazardous toxic waste dumps in the former Soviet republics. But judging from the situation in what was East Germany, where German authorities have identified 15,000 such sites requiring evaluation, the number is sure to be very large.

Historically, the greatest damage to soils and forests has been the result of overly ambitious development policies. In the 1950s, Khrushchev’s virgin-lands program to put into cultivation 100 million acres of marginal land in Kazakhstan led to a tripling of harvests, but reckless development caused wanton erosion. By the early 1960s, according to a recent article in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, half the virgin lands had been ruined or severely damaged. “Millions of hectares of the Kazakhstan steppe, the grand Central Asian prairie, were plowed for wheat fields. Irreplaceable natural pastures were destroyed.” Though Kazakhstan became one of the U.S.S.R.’s principal domestic sources of wheat, its fields produced a worthwhile harvest only about a third of the time. This was only partly due to frequent droughts.

The decision to turn most of the land
over to growing cotton in Uzbekistan led to similar results there as well as in the neighboring regions of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. "While a corrupt party elite waxed rich off mythical cotton [or, as we say in the U.S., 'king cotton']," Feshbach and Friendly report, "the real crop was ravaging the land."

Among other things, the growth of wheat and cotton impoverished rural diets, while the wide use of defoliants to ease harvesting and of pesticides—including the illegal but widespread use of DDT—directly threatened human health and endangered other species. Between 1976 and 1983, use of pesticides grew 70% in the U.S.S.R., while it dropped 60% in the U.S.

Other common abusive agricultural practices have included heavy use of fertilizers such as phosphates, ammonia, nitrates and chlorinated hydrocarbons, and careless use of heavy equipment, leading to compacting of soil and loss of porosity, according to Peterson.

In forestry, as a result of continuous and unrestrained harvesting, hundreds of thousands of acres in Siberia have turned into barren landscapes and a significant proportion of the evergreens may be permanently lost. Cedar forests in the Primorskiy and Khabarovsk regions of Russia have been reduced more than 20% by clearing in the last 20 years.

**Air pollution**

Air quality in the former Soviet bloc, like water quality, presents a complicated picture that looks different depending on points of reference. In the estimation of authors for the OECD Observer, quality is very poor if judged by local standards, but those often are stricter than the ones prevailing in OECD countries. If compared with worst situations in OECD countries, air quality seems a lot less dire. Thus, for smoke, ash and dust, Prague and Bucharest are worse than Brussels or Frankfurt but better than Athens; for smoke, Budapest is one of the least polluted cities in Europe, and Warsaw is better than Madrid or Athens.

Largely because of automobiles, emissions of sulfur dioxide were about two and half times those in the U.S. But the U.S.S.R., with one tenth as many cars as the U.S., and half the gross national product, still produced about the same total quantity of air pollutants. (Soviet measurement practices probably led to undercounts of the amount of pollution—perhaps by 30% to 50%.)

In the Czech and Slovak republics, where about 60% of all energy comes from some 30 plants fired by dirty brown coal with little or no emission-control technology, sulfur dioxide and nitrous oxide combine in the air to create acid rain “of a virulence unknown in the U.S. and rivaled on the European continent only in Poland,” as a writer put it in *The Amicus Journal*, a magazine published by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in New York.

In Poland’s Katowice region, with some 40 coal mines, use of hard coal for domestic heating and industry puts large amounts of sulfur dioxide and dust into the air. In northern Bohemia, where sulfur-dioxide emissions have exceeded standards one third of the time and some-
**ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS**

Times by several factors of ten, local residents receive compensation known as "burial money."

Energy-inefficient open-hearth furnaces account for over half of the steel production in the former East-bloc countries, which largely explains why sulfur-dioxide emissions there continued to rise in the 1980s, even as they declined nearly 25% in Western Europe. "Poland's Upper Silesia, Czechoslovakia's Northern Bohemia, the southern provinces of eastern Germany and the Ukraine's Donets Basin are today's equivalents of industrial areas such as the Ruhr or Pittsburgh half a century ago," in the estimation of Stanley J. Cabala, a scholar at the University of Pittsburgh and author of the World Bank's first major study of environmental problems in Poland.

### Resources and solutions

**The environmental problems confronting the new regimes in the former Soviet and East European nations and the costs of the environmental cleanup are staggering. What special resources do they have at their disposal as they attempt to find solutions?**

**Energy reserves**

Russia and a few of the other former Soviet states have inherited enormous energy reserves, most importantly oil and natural gas, and so energy policy will continue to be critical to the economic and environmental future of the successor-states. In the U.S.S.R., the energy sector absorbed 40% of industrial investment, and fuels accounted for half of its exports to its satellites, which were almost totally dependent on it for oil and gas.

By the mid-1980s, Russia's most accessible oil reserves had been exploited, and just when Gorbachev took office, oil production had begun to drop, giving rise to an acute sense of crisis. "How the state kept alive, how it got from day to day, was a mystery," says former Washington Post correspondent David Remnick (with benefit of hindsight) in his acclaimed Lenin's Tomb (New York, Random House, 1993). "If not for the plundering of Soviet oil fields and the worldwide energy crisis, the economy might have collapsed even before it did; and by the early 1980s, KGB [Soviet secret police] reports declared that the cushion of oil profits was all but gone....The economy was doomed." Coincidentally, the coal of the Don river basin also was nearly exhausted, and the plentiful Siberian reserves were difficult to access.

With the collapse of the U.S.S.R. and the liberalization of Russia and some of the other successor-states, the way is clear for an infusion of capitalist technology, which undoubtedly will greatly hasten and facilitate the exploitation of the more inaccessible reserves. At the same time, giant new fields have been discovered in the vicinity of the Caspian Sea and in Kazakhstan. These are being explored and developed by Chevron and Elf Aquitaine, among others, as well as by Russian companies that officials hope will reduce dependence on outsiders.

The Kazakh government purports to be especially interested in the ecological, technological and social aspects of agreements with the multinational oil companies, but as The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists recently put it, there is a "big difference between the government's claim to be keeping an 'all-watchful eye' over foreign trade and the real state of Kazakhstan's economic climate." When Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev with great fanfare called for heightened surveillance of foreign companies in June 1993, the writer noted that "sadly, the same initiative was announced [the year before] as well."

Conversion to natural gas and the exporting of natural gas present major opportunities for Russia, which owns roughly two fifths of known global reserves. Almost all of Russia's gas is in remote Siberia, however, and so large amounts of capital are needed for construction of ecologically sound pipelines and storage facilities. Capital also is needed for conversion of domestic power plants, production facilities and home furnaces.

**Conservation and stabilization**

Conservation offers even greater economic benefits. Proceeding from the famous principle that "Communism is Soviet power plus electrification of the whole country," the former Soviet bloc was profligate with energy. The amount of energy the bloc countries used per unit of production was more than twice that of the average OECD country. And this could not be attributed just to climate: the Soviet bloc's usage was two-and-a-half times that of Sweden or Finland per unit of output. Poland's—to take an extreme case—was five times that of the U.S., which is considered a wasteful country by many standards.

And so, even without greater reliance on nuclear energy, there ought in principle to be ample room for energy conservation in the Soviet-bloc countries. As a general rule more energy-efficient technology should also be cleaner technology and at the same time provide large economic payoffs as well as environmental benefits. But here again large amounts of capital are needed, and at present it is unclear where that capital might come from.

Generation of domestic savings will of course depend on stabilization of the economy (above all defeating "hyper-inflation"), the creation of a solid banking system and money markets, the enactment of laws that protect private property and especially productive investment, and legislation that specifies liability for past environmental damage and environmental cleanups that new private-sector owners of companies would incur.

In an analysis of the liability problem published by the Washington, D.C.-based Resources for the Future, in January 1993, James Boyd recommended the creation of "liability pools" (somewhat like the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund for cleanup of toxic-waste sites) rather than trying to assign liability via litigation on the basis of newly awarded property rights. The former East bloc economies "are not currently robust enough to support large resource expenditures aimed at the resolution of legal disputes," Boyd concluded.

The dire economic situation in the former Soviet nations seems to be comparable to the Great Depression in the U.S. in the 1930s and is, as Boyd takes into account, the major constraint on remediation proposals. John Edwin Mroz, president of the Institute for East-West Studies, reported in Foreign Affairs (America and the World 1992–93) that Russia's gross domestic product (GDP) in 1992 was 65% of its 1989 level and that inflation was running at 1,300% per year. Industrial output was down nearly...
In ecologically sound agricultural techniques and new care for the land and greater interest in private ownership should also lead to a stimulus to production. At least in theory, this ought to provide a very considerable end to artificially low prices for food, and increase the scope for private ownership.

Asset stripping

There is an unsettling sense that Russia and the other successor-states are keeping themselves alive mainly by stripping their assets and redistributing them. That is the impression whether it is a question of mineral resources, Russia’s space program and the nuclear establishment, or art treasures and antiques from the czarist era.

The situation is worst of course in the countries where civil wars are taking place. Take Armenia. A visitor reported in the NRC Handelsblad of Rotterdam in early 1993 that one family, the Grigoryans, had spent last winter around a homemade furnace and with 1,100 pounds of potatoes in the basement. They fed the furnace with diesel oil that they had buried in big cans under the house years back, “just in case.”

From all reports, the local impression is that in stripping and selling resources, whatever the asset, some “mafia” or another inevitably is the winner. It therefore needs to be emphasized that there also is something inevitable and necessary about the process, despite its excesses. The industrial sector as a whole, like the energy subsector, was overdeveloped in the former Soviet-bloc countries. As a proportion of GDP, the industrial sector was about twice as large as the service sector, whereas in the OECD countries the ratio is the opposite. And so, when one reads of how everybody in Russia is making a ruble selling something, and nobody is putting any money into producing anything new, it is useful to remember that selling is the part of the economy that most needs developing.

Agricultural reform

In the agricultural sector, the obvious need is to reduce the collectivized share and increase the scope for private ownership and production. This, together with the end of artificially low prices for food, ought to provide a very considerable stimulus to production. At least in theory, private ownership should also lead to more care for the land and greater interest in ecologically sound agricultural techniques and technologies. Moreover, to the extent that public health is considered an aspect of the overall environmental situation, it should be noted that improved agricultural production will also lead to much better general nutrition as people get the vegetables that are often in short supply.

Still, in agriculture as in industry, the transition to private production is not without its pitfalls for the environment. Not every agricultural problem in the former Soviet bloc could be attributed to the overuse of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and defoliants or to the remote and impersonal government production agencies. A lot of damage also was caused by traditional practices such as the use of huge quantities of liquid manure from pig and chicken farms, and old-fashioned overgrazing.

Presented with the opportunity to make a ruble for a change, it is not a foregone conclusion that the Russian or Romanian farmer will always select the option that is ecologically most farsighted.

A global concern

The environmental problems of the former Soviet and East European nations are of course not merely their problems. Together those countries account for about a quarter of global carbon-dioxide emissions and contribute mightily to the global warming threat. The European countries “export” roughly three quarters of their sulfur-dioxide emissions (though they also import a large share of the sulfur dioxide that ends up in their air). Thanks to Chernobyl, everybody appreciates the dangers another accident would pose for Western Europe. And national ecological treasures like Lake Baikal are no more mere “national” possessions than Niagara Falls or the Great Barrier Reef.

The very large, monopolistic industries that were characteristic of the former Soviet bloc represent an especially difficult aspect of environmental improvement. The company Spolchemie in the Czech Republic’s Usti nad Labem, for example, pollutes air and water with mercury, chlorine and other highly toxic chemicals. Even with planned improvements over a five-year period, half its production still will not meet European Community (EC)* standards. But it is the only plant of its kind in the country.

Yablokov told La Recherche that “the egoism of the big ministries has disappeared to a great extent but it has given way to a local egoism. The centralization of the economy and the instability of relations between the federal and regional organs have had the effect that today local authorities often make decisions that are advantageous for their region but dangerous for the rest of the country.” On the other hand, Kabala, an expert on the East European countries, thinks “now that they have regained full national sovereignty, the countries of the region are more inclined to cooperate with each other than they were as ‘fraternal allies’ in the Soviet sphere.”

Capital needs

In a meeting this writer held in early October 1993 with a group of Russian environmental leaders visiting the U.S., the striking thing was that they were unanimous in calling, above all, for more private investment in ecologically sound...
projects in Russia. This was not a group that opposed growth. Anatoly V. Lebedev, an independent writer from Vladivostok and a member of the Primorskiy Regional Soviet, complained that a forestry grant provided by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) only supported research—which, he said, they already had in abundance—rather than environmentally sound forest industries, which is what they had sought. Mark L. Borozin, editor of the weekly Green World in Moscow and an adviser to Russia’s Ministry of Environmental Protection, complained that the advanced industrial countries were conspiring to prevent Russia from getting the best available technology, including environmental know-how. His view appeared to be shared by the whole group.

Obviously, the need for capital and technology is great. Yablokov has quoted estimates that $100 billion would be needed to clean Russia’s water; $50 billion to $70 billion to clean up nuclear pollutants; and restoring the Volga basin alone could cost $300 billion, he said. Poland’s Ministry of Environmental Protection estimated in 1990 that bringing the country into compliance with EC standards by the year 2000 and achieving “sustainable economic development” by 2020 would cost $260 billion.

Seen in the light of these estimates, the international aid provided or promised so far has been small. The World Bank has lent Poland $150 million for a conservation project and $100 million to upgrade highly polluting chemical plants and power stations; it has lent Hungary $300 million for energy efficiency and clean-fuels projects. Together with the United Nations Environment Program and the UN Development Program, the World Bank is supporting a Black Sea project in which the six littoral countries will spend $30 million over three years in a collaborative cleanup program. The Group of Seven major industrial countries has pledged $75 million toward a reactor upgrade program, supported by technical assistance from France, Germany and the U.S. Franco-German nuclear offices are being established in Moscow and Kiev, and similar centers are planned as a result of congressional appropriations promoted by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), which earmarked $400 million in fiscal year 1992 and again in fiscal year 1993 to assist with the dismantling of nuclear weapons. But most of that money has so far been spent on equipment in the U.S., and establishment of the centers at the end of 1993 still was hostage to the political crisis in Russia and to Ukraine’s refusal to make a clear commitment to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968.

Meeting in Lucerne, Switzerland, in April 1993, 50 environmental ministers from Europe, Japan, Canada and the U.S. endorsed a World Bank/OECD environmental action plan for Eastern Europe. The plan designates clean air as the first priority, pure drinking water the second— contrary to what was advocated by the Russian visitors, who claimed that declining industrial production already was taking care of the air—and prevention of further irreversible damage, the third. The emphasis was on small-scale approaches; the Western governments pledged $30 million toward preparation of loans and projects.

**Legal & contractual remedies**

Monies provided former Soviet nations under the U.S. Freedom Support Act for democratic institutions may also contribute to the solution of environmental problems. But in light of the huge capital needs of the former Soviet-bloc nations and the obvious reluctance of the Group of Seven countries to provide aid on the scale desired, it may be well to think also in terms of nonmonetary approaches.

One possibility is to formulate legislation in advanced industrial countries regulating the behavior of their companies operating in the former Soviet-bloc countries. The EC reportedly has been preparing a code of conduct for West European investors.

Another approach is to negotiate debt-for-environmental-improvement deals, in which individual countries are promised debt relief in exchange for firm commitments to make specific environmental upgrades. One objection is that such deals are very difficult to negotiate and inevitably give rise to acrimony that can turn out to be counterproductive.

A similar but still broader approach

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**Magnitogorsk—Russia’s Gary**

The Russian city of Magnitogorsk is a steel town built in the heyday of Stalin’s heavy industrialization drive. Magnitogorsk was producing 10% of the U.S.S.R.’s steel in 1939, it produced 50% of the steel used in Russian tanks during the Great Patriotic War (World War II), and even at the end of the 1980s was making about as much steel as all of Britain.

First described in 1943 by a disillusioned American expatriate, John Scott, Magnitogorsk more recently was the subject of a study by a young Princeton historian, Stephen Kotkin. “Magnitogorsk is part of a Soviet rust belt yet to undergo the wrenching adjustments already inflicted upon cities of the American rust belt,” such as Gary, Indiana, Kotkin observes. It is representative of 1,000 similar cities with a total population of about 100 million— complete with “obsolete industry, ecological devastation, dilapidated or nonexistent infrastructure, declining living standards and deteriorating health.”

Yet it also “is a city without restaurants and cafes, without take-out eateries, all-night convenience stores or supermarkets. It is a city in which disposable diapers or food processors, not to mention personal computers, seem like artifacts of a science-fictional world....

“At the same time, Magnitogorsk is a working-class city without unemployment or even the fear of being laid off, without a sizable and visible underclass, without a conspicuous elite or wealthy class, or for that matter without any manifest personal wealth at all. It is a city without traffic jams and parking nightmares—indeed there are few cars. It is a city without guns and other lethal weapons, where murder and other violent crimes are uncommon and, even more strikingly, uncelebrated events. It is a city where people do not fear walking alone at night, where children can be left to play outside without the threat of being kidnapped....”

But Magnitogorsk also is a city, Kotkin goes on to say, in which the average life expectancy of a man upon retirement is three years, in which one third of the adult population and two thirds of the children suffer respiratory diseases, and in which four out of ten babies are born with abnormalities.

would be to attach environmental conditions to virtually every kind of aid to the former Soviet bloc. The inseparability of the economic and environmental crises in the former Soviet and East European countries is a powerful argument in favor of that approach.

Role of NGOs

During the last 10 years of the Soviet era, scientists associated with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council developed contacts with sympathetic figures in the U.S.S.R. and started some pioneering pilot projects. NRDC, for example, managed to open several jointly operated stations for monitoring nuclear tests in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and it even got the Soviet military to cooperate in pilot detection of nuclear warheads on cruise missiles aboard U.S.S.R. ships. Such projects showed that even under an authoritarian regime and during what Russians now call “the years of stagnation,” skilled and dedicated people could be found who were capable of making worthwhile things happen.

Since 1991 the Institute for Soviet-American Relations (ISAR), based near Washington, D.C., has organized exchanges of environmentalists between the U.S. and the former Soviet countries. It has helped found an international clearinghouse on the former Soviet Union’s environment with the Social Ecological Union, an umbrella organization for 300 groups from the former Soviet Union coordinated by Maria Cherkasova. With support from the National Endowment for Democracy, based in Washington, D.C. and World Learning (formerly the Experiment in International Living), ISAR has got 135 former Soviet Union groups linked up to electronic mail. ISAR has also started a grants program with support from AID, with $2 million to spend over two years. AID has given ISAR another $1 million to organize a one-year NGO cooperation program.

The National Audubon Society also has initiated some joint projects. One, in which Audubon’s Alaska office is taking the lead, aims to establish an international park on Russia’s side of the land bridge that once linked Asia and North America. Native peoples on both sides of the divide are participating in the design of the project, which is geared to the preservation of natural habitats. Another Audubon initiative, the Amur river basin project—a sister of its Platte River Project in the U.S.—protects habitats of migrating storks and cranes.

Cooperation by nongovernmental and private-sector organizations need not always be a one-way street. Mechanical Technology Inc., a company based in Columbus, Ohio, has ordered a line of nuclear waste processing equipment from the Central Scientific Research Laboratory in Russia. The Russian technology involves growing alfalfa on radioactive contaminated soil so that the alfalfa can act as a biological pump, drawing heavy metals out of the earth. Then the plant material is passed through an electromagnetic membrane to remove the contaminants. According to the Ohio company, the processing equipment can be obtained at a fraction of what it would cost in the U.S. and may be an economical method of cleaning low-level radiation from large contaminated areas.

U.S. policy options

1. The U.S. should provide large-scale financial assistance to the former Soviet-bloc countries to clean up the environment.

Pro: The former Soviet republics and their East European neighbors urgently need environment-friendly technology for upgrading their nuclear reactors or converting to gas to supply their energy needs; for emission-control devices for factories and vehicles; for cleaner industrial processes and water and air filtration systems. Unless large amounts of outside capital are forthcoming, there is no way the former Soviet-bloc countries can afford the technology.

Con: It is questionable whether political support can be found in the U.S. for such a strategy. Moreover, large grants and loans inevitably would require the U.S. as donor to make strategic decisions about which environmental problems most urgently need to be addressed, a kind of interventionism that could arouse nationalist resentments in some of the former Soviet-bloc nations.

2. The U.S. should support the efforts of NGOs to assist in cleaning up the environment in the former Soviet-bloc countries.

Pro: Outside countries will never donate enough money to make a serious dent in the former Soviet bloc’s environmental crisis. Providing relatively open-ended support for nongovernmental organizations and private enterprises has the advantage of involving grass-roots organizations in the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe in decisions about which problems to attack and how.

Con: NGO assistance can never be commensurate with the scale of the problems afflicting the former Soviet-bloc countries.

The ex-Soviet-bloc countries have an opportunity to learn from the mistakes made in the West during the last few decades and to make more rapid progress than Europe and the U.S. achieved in the 1970s and 1980s, according to much of the recent literature published in the West about the crisis. But the U.S. and Europe were able to attack their environmental problems with relatively stable institutions, not having to build new social and political organizations from the ground up. Furthermore, the idea of “leapfrogging history” has played a not-altogether-benign role in Russian thought, from Peter the Great to Lenin to Stalin. Perhaps then it would be better for environmentalists in the U.S. to use what influence they have to stress the virtues of the “small is beautiful” approach—to encourage their counterparts in the former Soviet bloc to think realistically about what positive advances can be achieved carefully, in small steps.
1. To what extent should aid-donor countries have a say in determining environmental standards and priorities for the former Soviet-bloc countries?

2. Do you favor making environmental improvements a condition for debt relief to former Soviet-bloc countries?

3. What level of capital assistance would it be appropriate and feasible to offer the former Soviet-bloc states? For example, would you favor earmarking 1% of current defense spending in the seven most-advanced industrial countries for environmental aid, primarily in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

4. Are nuclear weapons an environmental problem? Should Ukraine, which has nuclear weapons, be required to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968 as a condition for receiving help with other environmental problems?

5. Should investors in the former Soviet bloc be required to adhere to codes of conduct, including an obligation to observe environmentally sound practices?

6. Is there any way of making the best environmental technology more available to the former Communist countries given the fact that technology in the capitalist countries is privately owned? For example, should the U.S. government force Chevron to give Kazakhstan the most advanced oil-drilling technology?

7. To what extent might the former Soviet-bloc states be able to "leapfrog" history and achieve very rapid improvement in the environment, adopting the latest technology and avoiding some of the mistakes the advanced industrial countries made? Given Russia's past experience with leapfrogging, most recently the Leninist attempt to skip the capitalist phase of historical development, should the Russians be encouraged to attempt such跳跃 again?

Readings and Resources

"Bitter Conflicts: Wars Engulf Moscow's Dying Empire." World Press Review, October 1993, pp. 8–14. A survey of the most severe conflicts that shed light on the impact of extreme deprivation; situations could be portents of worse to come.


Kopkind, Andrew, "From Russia With Love and Squalor." The Nation, January 18, 1993, pp. 44–62. A journalist's portrait of life in Russia a year after democratization.


Zagalsky, Leonid, ed., "Kazakhstan." The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1993, pp. 14–47. With contributions by former Soviet authors, provides much insight into agricultural and oil development, as well as the political context.
OPINION BALLOTS

How to use the Opinion Ballots: For your convenience, there are two copies of each opinion ballot. Please cut out and mail one ballot only. To have your vote counted, please mail ballots by June 30, 1994. Send ballots to:
FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, 729 SEVENTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019

TOPIC 3 Ex-Soviet Bloc's Environmental Crisis

ISSUE A. In order to help the former Soviet-bloc countries improve their environmental conditions, the U.S. should provide:

1. Unrestricted grants. YES NO
2. Unrestricted loans. YES NO
3. Grants earmarked for specific programs such as environment-friendly technology. YES NO
4. Loans earmarked for specific purposes such as environment-friendly technology. YES NO
5. Other, or comment

First three digits of your zip code: ______ ______

Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...

TOPIC 4 Trade with Pacific Rim

ISSUE A. In its trade negotiations with the Pacific Rim, the U.S. should:

1. Pursue freer trade with all economies of the region. YES NO
2. Correct trade imbalances by the use of quotas, voluntary export restraints and other barriers. YES NO
3. Tie trade agreements with China and Indonesia to respect for human rights. YES NO
4. Tie trade with Taiwan to guarantees for intellectual property rights. YES NO
5. Lift the trade embargo on Vietnam. YES NO
6. Other, or comment

First three digits of your zip code: ______ ______

Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...
OPINION BALLOTS

ISSUE B. Would it be appropriate for the U.S. to channel aid for environmental cleanup through citizen groups?
☐ 1. Yes.
☐ 2. No.

ISSUE C. To combat the environmental damage caused by the policies of the former Soviet-bloc countries, the U.S. should urge those countries to give the highest priority to (check one only):

☐ 1. Reducing air pollution.
☐ 2. Upgrading nuclear reactors to meet international standards.
☐ 4. Eliminating or reducing nuclear weapons and providing for their safe disposal.
☐ 5. Cleaning up and restoring the quality of international bodies of water in and around the former Soviet bloc.
6. Other, or comment __________________________

ISSUE B. In its trade negotiations with Japan, the U.S. should:

YES NO

1. Press for a share of the Japanese market for U.S. exports, industry by industry.
☐ ☐

2. Press for structural changes in the Japanese economy.
☐ ☐

3. Offer to make structural changes in the U.S. economy (e.g., increase savings and investment) in exchange for structural changes in the Japanese economy.
☐ ☐

4. Not worry about a trade imbalance with Japan since the U.S. has trade surpluses with other countries.
☐ ☐

5. Other, or comment __________________________

ISSUE B. In its trade negotiations with Japan, the U.S. should:

YES NO

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☐ ☐

2. Press for structural changes in the Japanese economy.
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☐ ☐

4. Not worry about a trade imbalance with Japan since the U.S. has trade surpluses with other countries.
☐ ☐

5. Other, or comment __________________________
Trade with the Pacific Rim: pressure or cooperation?

As a trading partner, Asia is one and one-half times as large as Europe and growing rapidly. So is the U.S. trade deficit with the region.

by Jinny St. Goar

“As Asia advances, so must we. For today, no region in the world is more important to the U.S. than Asia...That is why President Clinton has called for a New Pacific Community, built on three core elements: shared prosperity, shared strength, and a shared commitment to democratic values.”

Secretary of State Warren Christopher
Address at University of Washington, Seattle, November 17, 1993

If the 20th century was the “American century,” as the founder of Time, Life and Fortune Henry R. Luce so modestly dubbed it, then the 21st century will belong to the countries of the Pacific Rim, at least in the world view of the U.S. “Fast-forward” describes the growth of the region’s economies. Consider the needs of typical consumers in China, for example. In the late 1970s, they were looking for a sewing machine, a bicycle and an electric fan. By the 1980s, according to a Hong Kong-based market research firm, Chinese consumers might have aspired to a TV, a refrigerator and a washing machine. In the 1990s, the Chinese have a new trio of desires: a VCR, a motorcycle and a telephone.

For the 1.2 billion people in China, these changes in buying patterns indicate a quickly rising standard of living and an economy that is scrambling to meet these demands. As a whole, the economies of the Pacific region are growing more than six times as fast as the 24 leading industrial economies did last year. Most of East Asia has been growing at a rate of more than 6% a year for a generation. Imagine the changes in the U.S. from the start of the 20th century through the present being compressed into one or two decades for a picture of economic development in Asia.

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The Pacific Rim economies (Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam) offer vital markets for U.S. goods—markets that account for more than 2.4 million American jobs. In 1960, U.S. trade with Asia was less than half the volume of U.S. trade with Europe. Three decades later, the total of American exports to and imports from Asia, now up to $344 billion, dwarfed those crossing the Atlantic—by 50%. Although Canada is the U.S.'s largest trading partner, the combined U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico in 1992 was only $265 billion, also greatly overshadowed by U.S. trade with Asia.

Because several of the Asian-Pacific economies are growing at more than twice the rate of the U.S. and its industrialized trading partners in Europe, Washington can anticipate an even greater proportion of its trade flowing across the Pacific Ocean in the coming years. For the Pacific Rim, international trade has been critical to its vitality.

AT THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, President Clinton, with President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines on his right and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien of Canada on his left, led the other Pacific Rim leaders on a walk before sitting down to six hours of meetings.
The Pacific Rim: an overview

When he stressed the need to increase employment in the industrialized economies, President Bill Clinton defined a top priority in his foreign policy. Clearly this Administration sees exports to growing economies as a vehicle for job creation. At the same time the U.S. has a history of close diplomatic relations with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Taiwan and Thailand—relations that cannot be entirely given over to banging on entry-port doors for trade access. The region also includes two of the world’s most worrisome nuclear powers—China, which tested nuclear weapons as recently as October 1993, and North Korea, which refuses international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

The end of the cold war threw into question the terms of all U.S. alliances, and those relationships have not all been clearly redefined. As recently as 1987, when the U.S. trade deficit with Japan peaked at $56 billion, the Soviet strategic buildup in the Pacific was viewed as a threat. For four decades, a rough trade-off was premised on Pacific Rim countries resisting the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China and the U.S. playing a strategic balancing role, offering its nuclear umbrella to Japan and South Korea. The U.S. also contributed to the region’s conventional defense, provided economic and military assistance and allowed relatively unhindered access to American markets. But U.S. economic interests no longer take a back seat. And without those trade-offs, the pressure to rectify imbalances increases.

Asians are selling far more to Americans than they are buying. The U.S. had a trade deficit of $87 billion with the region in 1992, representing the difference between exports to and imports from Asia. Since the U.S. buys more from Asia than it sells to Asia, the imbalance is widely understood as a deficiency of domestic U.S. producers to meet the demands of American consumers. Viewed in a different light, the deficit also represents the transfer of U.S. buying power overseas and an attendant loss of jobs at home.

This shortfall in 1992 was all the more frustrating because the U.S. had a global deficit for that year of only $84.3 billion, indicating that the rest of the world was buying more from the U.S. than it was selling to Americans by a margin of $2.7 billion. The persistence of the recession in Europe, however, changed that global surplus in the first seven months of 1993 to a deficit of $6.2 billion.

Japan accounts for about 40% of the total U.S. trade deficit—or around $50 billion—which has gradually increased over the past three years. But in 1992, China’s trade surplus with the U.S. ballooned by 50% to $18 billion, and it continued at about that level in 1993. A large element of the growth of China’s exports to the U.S. can be attributed to Taiwan and Hong Kong having shifted production to the People’s Republic of China. In 1987, the combined surplus of the “three Chinas” with the U.S. was $28 billion, the same level as in 1992.

Within the region, four newly industrialized economies, often described as the “Four Tigers” (Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore) account for another $11 billion of the U.S. shortfall. Hong Kong and Singapore are notable for their lack of trade barriers. Hong Kong is the only Asian trading partner with which the U.S. has turned its traditional trade deficit into a positive balance in 1993.

Six countries form the loose entity known as Asean, the Association of South East Asian Nations: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and the small Sultanate of Brunei. Founded in 1967, Asean is the U.S.’s fourth largest trading partner, with 320 million people. Its trade surplus with the U.S. was $12 billion in 1992.

Australia, whose economy has grown at much the same pace as the U.S. economy, is the only Pacific Rim country with which the U.S. has always had a trade surplus. In 1992 that amounted to $5.2 billion, roughly the same as in the first half of 1993. Recently New Zealand, which traditionally has had a trade deficit with the U.S., also had a small surplus.

The U.S. has had an embargo on trade with Vietnam since 1975; no U.S. enterprises have been allowed to trade directly with Vietnam or manufacture there. During his first year President Clinton lifted the embargo slightly by agreeing to let the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank lend to Vietnam. U.S. companies
can now bid on internationally funded development projects, but they are still prohibited from selling their goods directly or manufacturing in Vietnam.

Since 1986, echoing the Soviet Union’s economic reforms, Vietnam has moved gradually toward a market-oriented economy. As in China, political reform has not kept pace with the changing Vietnamese economy. The 72 million people (twice the population of South Korea) are hard-working and literate. The country’s natural resources are also enviable, among them: anthracite coal, the potential for hydroelectric power, timber, agriculture, fisheries, and offshore oil.

Sources of trade tensions
Fundamental differences between East and West have made trade conflicts particularly intractable. This became apparent in the 1980s between the U.S. and Japan, but similar problems have arisen in the 1990s with South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. The primary U.S. complaint with respect to Japan has been the concentration of ownership and additional cross-ownership in conglomerates, or *keiretsu*, that make the Japanese economy a restricted club. Add to that Japan’s emphasis on production rather than consumption, and the result is an economy that sells vigorously to the U.S. (and to Europe, as well) and buys considerably less from the U.S.

Tensions with the Japanese over trade issues have intensified. The term “Japan-bashing” has become shorthand for U.S. politicians’ diatribes about the trade deficit and the declining fortunes of U.S. industries that compete directly with Japan. The Japanese, for their part, claim that their markets are open to U.S. goods, but that the quality of those goods is not appealing to the Japanese consumer.

Some observers have suggested that these acrimonious words will soon be echoed in exchanges between the U.S. and other Asian nations. Until now, U.S. trade negotiators have focused mainly on Japan, but U.S. policymakers are starting to grapple with the rest of the region’s contribution to the U.S. trade deficit.

Trade issues worry U.S. policymakers for another reason. The trade surpluses for several Pacific Rim economies have coincided with significant increases in defense spending—in China, the Philippines, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. And those funds are going to air and naval resources, which seem to be geared to the projection of power rather than the protection of borders. The settlement of trade disputes and general easing of tensions in the Pacific Rim area have become all the more pressing.

Population and geography
The Asian-Pacific region has a history of relying on trade for its growth. Two forces have shaped this orientation, each with complications for the region. First, population pressures in China have encouraged 30 million Chinese to emigrate during the last two centuries. But the overseas Chinese have retained strong cultural ties and have created a vast network of business relationships, particularly in Southeast Asia. In Thailand, roughly 50% of the capital city’s 8 million residents are of Chinese descent. The Chinese of Malaysia constitute the lion’s share of the country’s merchant class.

Indonesia, like Malaysia, a predominantly Muslim country, shares Malaysia’s unease about the potentially divided loyalties of their ethnic Chinese merchant class. In these two Islamic countries, certain social and economic privileges are still reserved for the *bumiputra* (sons of the soil), the ethnic Malay and Indonesians—an explicit slight to these countries’ ethnic Chinese citizens. Nonetheless, the entrepreneurial spirit of the overseas Chinese has been a major contributor to the dynamism of Asia.

Another force that promotes trading is a quirk of nature’s endowment. Many of the countries are island-nations driven to international commerce by necessity. Japan is the outstanding example—an archipelago poor in certain natural resources and rich in culture and human energy. Indonesia, the region’s second-most-populous country (after China) with 188 million people, is another island-nation as are the Philippines, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong.

U.S. trade partners
The island of Taiwan became the refuge for the Nationalist Chinese, or the Kuomintang, who lost their civil war on the mainland to Mao Zedung and the Communists in 1949. For three decades the U.S. recognized Taiwan, or the Republic of China, as the only legitimate Chinese government. Since the opening of U.S. diplomatic relations with Beijing in late 1978, Taiwan has been in an awkward position: a loyal U.S. ally who has been slighted. The second-largest source of investment capital for the Pacific Rim, Taiwan remains a diplomatic outsider as its trading partners prefer not to alienate the region’s behemoth, China.

Traditionally, Taiwan exported footwear, clothing, plastics, umbrellas and travel accessories to the U.S. However, Taiwanese traders moved such light manufacturing concerns first to Southeast Asian lower-wage countries, and more
recently to mainland China, concentrating on developing high-technology industries, such as electronics, on Taiwan. Recently, Taiwan has started to shift its investments in China toward more technology-intensive industries, including chemicals, building materials, automobiles and electronic products and components.

The economic liberalization policies of the 1980s in the People's Republic of China spawned rapid growth, fulfilling for many Chairman Deng Xiao-ping’s slogan “To get rich is glorious.” But the difficult transition from a planned economy to a market economy also fostered the uncontrolled inflation in the late 1980s that culminated in the democracy protests in Tiananmen Square. Similar inflationary conditions developed in 1993. The situation is further complicated by 89-year-old Chairman Deng’s declining health and the eventual transition of power.

Under a 1992 agreement aimed at opening Chinese markets, the U.S. was given assurances that all trade-related laws and regulations in China would be published, and that the Chinese central government would try to standardize the treatment of imports, no matter where goods arrive. Furthermore, the Chinese pledged to end the export of goods manufactured by prison labor.

South Korea recently elected its first civilian president, Kim Young Sam, reflecting South Koreans’ greater confidence in their still precarious position of abutting Communist North Korea. Since the inconclusive war on the Korean peninsula in the early 1950s, the U.S. has maintained troops in South Korea—recently at the level of 37,000 strong. The host country has agreed to pay more of the U.S. defense costs there. In 1991 both North and South Korea became members of the United Nations. The South Koreans established diplomatic relations with China in August 1992.

The South Korean economy has been marked by a state-directed policy of industrialization and the presence of the chaebols, the Korean counterpart to the Japanese keiretsu. These conglomerates tend to be vertically integrated, meaning the corporate entity embraces units that contribute all parts of a production process, cutting off opportunities for outside suppliers. Certain barriers to trade have been lifted within the last two years. President Kim has proposed reforms that would move South Korea toward a more liberal, market-based economic system, a transition that is not yet complete.

As a frontier land settled by mainly British immigrants, Australia traditionally oriented its diplomacy and trade toward Europe and the U.S. But in the mid-1980s began shifting gears to carve out a more Asian identity. Australia’s Labor party has controlled national politics for the last decade, putting the country out of sync with the Republican White House in the 1980s. Labor held on to the prime minister’s portfolio in March 1993, giving the Australians the hope of working closely with the Clinton Administration.

Thailand, a constitutional monarchy and the only country in Southeast Asia that has never been colonized, was largely controlled by the military until the late 1980s. Failed coup attempts by the military in 1985 and 1992 have signaled the maturing of Thai democracy, evidence of a burgeoning middle class. A strong ally to the U.S. throughout the Vietnam War, Thailand has had notably close diplomatic relations with China since the late 1970s, largely because of the two countries’ common fear of Vietnam. The Thais have also been eager for the U.S. to serve as a counterweight to the Japanese in trade relations.

The U.S. trade deficit with Thailand increased by almost 40% in the first seven months of 1993, indicating that Thailand could join China in a special category of newly emerging problem partners.

Indonesia is the only Asian member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and is the world’s biggest exporter of liquid natural gas. In 1993 at age 72, President Suharto started his sixth term in office and chose a cabinet of younger officials to groom the next generation of leaders. The U.S. has raised concerns about the treatment of trade unions and the Indonesian government’s handling of the East Timorese separatist movement.

With about 125 million people, roughly half the population of the U.S., Japan has a gross national product (GNP) of about 60% that of the U.S. Since 1955, the end of the post-World War II occupation by the U.S., Japan has had a parliamentary democracy, dominated by the Liberal Democratic party (LDP). Reflecting the country’s roots as a nation of rice farmers, votes from agricultural regions have carried more weight than urban votes, and a system of land subsidies protects the rice paddies, artificially inflating the value of urban land as well. The voters’ rejection of the LDP last year is expected to introduce political reforms that could change the traditional balance of power in favor of the cities.

Japan’s rate of economic growth had consistently exceeded that of the U.S. until the country moved into a full-blown recession in 1993. Corporate profits declined to such an extent that Japanese companies laid off workers in 1993. This further dampens the prospects for a

### SELECTED STATISTICS

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*1991 figures

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PACIFIC RIM

GREAT DECISIONS 1994
Regional trade cooperation

In referring to the Pacific Rim, policymakers occasionally include all countries that border the world’s largest ocean, not just the U.S. and Asia. Canada is already part of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and APEC’s 15 member economies recently agreed to admit three more countries, Mexico, Chile and Papua New Guinea.

Within this diverse region, the relatively young APEC forum is the most all-encompassing organization. When APEC was launched in late 1989, largely at the initiative of the Australians, it provided a forum for regional leaders to exchange ideas about trade, investment and development. Several Asian economies had already moved into their recent phase of double-digit growth rates. At the same time, regional tensions over the one place of armed conflict, Cambodia, eased as the Vietnamese growth rates. At the same time, regional tensions over the one place of armed conflict, Cambodia, eased as the Vietnamese

APEC has been vocal in its support for the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the multilateral organization set up in 1947 to reduce tariffs and promote trade globally. To develop a comparable set of rules and a governing body that commands limits, if only obliquely. For example, APEC could help contain U.S.-Japanese trade frictions, suggests Garry Woodard, a former Australian diplomat who now heads the Australian Institute of International Affairs.

To a large extent, a more open enrollment for APEC members hinges on whether Asians feel left out of other trade relationships. Free-trade agreements, by definition, discriminate against those who are not included. As for the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) between the U.S., Canada and Mexico, some of the smaller Asian nations are concerned that Nafta will draw investment capital away.

Some APEC members, the Australians for example, have raised concerns about Nafta diminishing the market for their exports. But Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating has emphasized that the reduction could amount to only about 4%. Some large Australian or Japanese companies would be more likely to take advantage of Nafta by manufacturing goods in Mexico for sale in the U.S. The Singaporeans are more concerned that the strong opposition to Nafta in the U.S. signaled a rising tide of protectionism. By the same token, a failure by the parties to GATT to conclude the long-overdue Uruguay Round of negotiations could also trigger protectionism, prompting Asians to react defensively.

Next to APEC, the most inclusive organization is the East Asian Economic Group, more a forum for discussion than a long-established entity with accepted rules. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad started this group in 1991, explicitly excluding the U.S. because of his irritation with Americans’ attention to human rights abuses in other countries.

Asian trade pact

Under the terms of the Asean free-trade agreement (AFTA) launched in January 1993, the six members agreed to start lowering tariffs to a range from 5% to 0 by 2008. But since the agreement was signed in early 1992, a new prime minister has taken the helm in Thailand and a new cabinet was appointed in Indonesia. The agreement is not legally binding, nor is it so firm that reluctant participants cannot wriggle out. The signers agreed to differing paces of tariff reductions. But AFTA’s most fundamental limitation is the fact that most Asean exports go to Japan, Europe and the U.S., whereas intra-Asean trade has remained at about 20% of the six countries’ total since 1980.

recovery as Japanese consumers become more reluctant to spend. But Japan remains a powerful exporter. The Japanese recession has exacerbated the U.S. trade imbalance by shrinking the market there for U.S. goods.

The industrial composition of the U.S. and Japanese economies is so similar (even though Japan now manufactures a number of products the U.S. no longer makes) that competition in trade is almost inevitable. But in part because Japan has a narrower base of natural resources than the U.S., the Japanese have specialized intensively in certain engineering-based sectors of the economy with good results in export markets: electrical machinery, transportation equipment, precision machinery, computers, subway cars and machine tools. The Japanese have taken advantage of a slightly longer workweek than the Americans—about four hours longer, which adds up to 200 hours a year. The Japanese import most raw materials for manufacturing and are almost entirely dependent on foreign sources for oil and other energy supplies. Food, fuel and raw materials constituted 35% of U.S. exports to Japan in 1992, while the U.S. imported a negligible volume in these categories from Japan.

As the Japanese standard of living rose rapidly after World War II, manufacturing moved abroad in several waves in search of lower wages. Most recently, between 1983 and 1990, when the yen appreciated sharply due to American efforts to curb the growing U.S. trade deficit, the Japanese placed almost $600 billion in direct investments throughout East Asia and the U.S.

By several measures, Japan buys less abroad than other industrialized nations. The Japanese import about one third as many manufactured goods as either Americans or Germans. Moreover, foreign firms of any origin have accounted for a tiny fraction of sales in Japan—about 1%, as compared with 10% in the U.S. or 18% in Germany—indicating not only a low level of imports but also the control of those imports by Japanese firms.

Japan’s average tariff for industrial products is comparable to that of the U.S. and the European Community, the 12-nation common market—about 5.3%. But obstacles to trade evidently exist, given the low level of imports. The Japanese occasionally acknowledge these limits, if only obliquely. For example, last year, Japan continued a 22-year ban...
on the import of U.S. apples, citing inadequate U.S. technology to control insects. Since American-grown apples cost about half what Japanese apples do, the real reason for the ban seemed transparent.

Much like Americans, the Japanese recently chose a member of a new generation as their leader, 55-year-old Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa, the first non-LDP prime minister since World War II. But Hosokawa’s election in midsummer probably will not change a few fundamentals of U.S.-Japanese trade relations.

In late September Hosokawa’s agriculture minister was forced by an unusually poor rice harvest to announce Japan’s first imports of this staple, leading to momentary optimism about the prospects for trade reform in Japan. But shortly thereafter, the agriculture ministry said that any rice imports would only be temporary—a harsh message for Japanese consumers who pay $45 to $50 for the 20-pound bag of rice that sells for $6 to $7 in the U.S.

The overwhelming impression of the Japanese trade negotiating posture in 1993 has been generated by a few testy encounters. In its first months, the Clinton Administration was perceived as more protectionist than its predecessor. By May, Japan was pressuring its industrialized trading partners in Europe to endorse the principles of free trade and condemn numerical targets. The Japanese made no excuses for this effort to embarrass the Clinton Administration into backing off from its tough threats. And even after the change in government with Hosokawa’s accession to power, at a round of trade talks in September, The Wall Street Journal reported that “the Japanese side reverted to standard bromides about Japan already being ‘the most open economy in the world.’”

There is a peculiar wrinkle to some of Japan’s posturing in trade talks. The government uses foreign pressure to press legislators to accept politically unpalatable but ultimately desirable change. Invoking this force in April, the former Japanese Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa did not mince words, leading The Washington Post to announce in its headline: “Japanese Invite Trade Hard-Line: Tough U.S. Stance Could Spur Change, Prime Minister Says.”

Japan’s trade relations with the U.S. have been colored by dependence on the U.S. for its security needs. But several landmarks indicate the Japanese are taking on greater responsibility in the international arena. They helped to negotiate peace in Cambodia and to finance the war in the Persian Gulf, and they are making a strong bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council at the United Nations.

Trade imbalances: is there a cure?

What does the continuing U.S. trade deficit with the Pacific Rim signify for the economy? There are several ways to look at trade deficits. At one end of the spectrum, free-market economists in the U.S. argue that the American trade problem has little to do with individual partners’ laws and practices. Rather the imbalance has more to do with a shortcoming in U.S. savings and an excess of U.S. consumption. In simple terms, this means that the U.S. has greater purchasing power than producing power, as the U.S. rate of savings has been too low to fund the production of all the goods that Americans demand. What counts is not the trade deficit, which usually refers to so-called merchandise trade in raw materials, agricultural products and manufactured goods. Instead, the critical component is the current-account deficit, which is the excess of all U.S. payments for imports of goods and services over American export earnings from goods and services. From the trade in services, the U.S. enjoyed a $60 billion global surplus in 1992 compared with its $110 billion merchandise deficit. The services include insurance, tourism, interest and dividends on investment, educating foreign students at U.S. universities and other intangibles.

According to economists of this school, a straightforward solution to reducing the current-account deficit is
within reach of Americans: boost domestic savings to meet the investment needs of the U.S. By curbing the acquisitive instincts of Americans, and in particular doing without some imported goods, the savings could be put to productive use that would create long-term jobs at home. But those goals would only be reached by the broadest strokes of economic reform, according to this school of thought, such as decreasing the budget deficit, increasing incentives for investment and eliminating the double taxation of corporate dividends to increase savings. Japan has urged the U.S. to take such steps.

At the other end of the spectrum are economists more closely identified with the Clinton Administration. They, too, accept the current-account deficit as a more accurate reflection of reality than the merchandise trade deficit. But they tend to focus on the current-account deficit’s drain on jobs in the U.S.

This perspective favors various degrees of government intervention in the free flow of international trade. In this view, the range of levers to steer the current-account deficit closer to balance include the management of currency-exchange rates, industry-specific trade targets that are also known as sectoral targets, or broader macroeconomic goals such as working to stimulate foreign consumption or to curb the U.S. federal government deficit to free up investment capital.

Public debate

A key issue in the public debate on U.S. relations with the Pacific Rim is how to strike a balance between U.S. economic interests and U.S. concern for the promotion of human rights, democracy and regional stability and security. The debate is colored by the public’s perception of the issues.

Just before President Clinton arrived in Tokyo to meet with six leaders of the industrialized world in July 1993, a startling 64% of Japanese polled described relations with the U.S. as “unfriendly”—startling, in part, because at the same time, 70% of Americans described relations between the two countries as “friendly.” This annual survey also found that 45% of Americans believe that Japanese companies are competing “unfairly,” the highest percentage since the poll was first conducted in 1985. And 85% of the Japanese believe the U.S. is blaming Japan for its own economic problems.

The tensions in public debate are not restricted to U.S.-Japanese relations. The U.S. and China have argued over Chinese weapons sales abroad so vigorously that in August 1993 the U.S. placed a two-year ban on the sale of certain high-technology goods to 10 Chinese aerospace companies, despite the ban’s reducing the volume of U.S. exports. In November, in a goodwill gesture, the Administration agreed to sell China an $8 million supercomputer. And when Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir boycotted the November meeting of APEC, it was because of Washington’s cool response to the Asians-only economic grouping he has promoted and a desire to draw attention to his small nation.

Easing access for U.S. exports

Recognizing that trade imbalances are a two-way street, the U.S. has occasionally sought a two-track approach—seeking to improve access for U.S. goods to the Asian markets while restraining Asian exports. When the U.S. trade deficit with Japan grew sharply in the early 1980s, from $12 billion in 1980 to $33 billion in 1984, the U.S. sought several unilateral concessions by the Japanese—a pattern that is beginning to emerge in U.S. trade relations with other Asian nations. Sales of U.S. products covered by certain of these agreements increased by about 25% annually thereafter until the recession of 1990, slowing to about 9% through 1991. In total, U.S. sales to Japan of forest products, medical equipment and pharmaceuticals, electronics and telecommunications systems increased from $1.2 billion in 1985 to about $3.6 billion in 1991.

In search of redress for persistent trade deficits in the late 1980s, the U.S. Congress created what is known as Super 301. This set up an ongoing review of other countries’ trade practices that culminates in a yearly list identifying “priority practices” of “priority countries.” The first list came out in May 1989. The Japanese were cited for their exclusionary practices in buying satellites and supercomputers for public use, as well as some technical barriers to trade in forest products. It was widely expected that South Korea and Taiwan would also be on the dreaded list. But not long before May 1989 both countries had lowered certain trade barriers. A year later, the U.S. and Japan signed agreements on supercomputers, satellites and wood products.

The unwelcome designation as a priority offender on the Super 301 is a trade weapon that the Clinton Administration has revived, after the Bush Administration intentionally let it lapse. In March 1993, U.S.-Taiwanese trade talks broke down over the question of intellectual property rights, an evolving body of law regulating the commerce of ideas—in this case, primarily the “stealing” of software. The Taiwanese legislature was advised to pass legislation “acceptable to
the U.S. or else.” The threat was to list Taiwan as a “Super 301” priority opponent, with the prospect of 100% tariffs on electronic goods. By April, the U.S. was mollified, and Taiwan was listed only as a second-class offender.

In 1989, President Bush had proposed a series of talks about structural barriers in the Japanese economy that hinder imports, including business practices, government spending priorities and laws. The Japanese stipulated that they, too, would identify shortcomings in U.S. business practices, government activities, U.S. savings habits and the educational system that contribute to the trade imbalance. These trade negotiations broke new ground in covering issues that had never before been considered the concerns of foreign governments.

In another case of searching for a remedy for allegedly unfair trade practices, the U.S. manufacturers of semiconductors, the silicon chips that are the basic building-blocks of computers, complained formally about their Japanese counterparts. Prior to the chip talks and the imposition of retaliatory tariffs on Japanese electronic goods, U.S. semiconductors claimed only 8.6% of the Japanese market, while claiming 56% of the worldwide market outside Japan. By late 1992, U.S. chipmakers had reached their 20% market share in Japan. This increase probably created about 114,000 new jobs in the U.S. during the past six years.

While job-creation has been the primary goal of the Clinton Administration's trade policy, the President has also explicitly tied the U.S. emphasis on human rights to trade issues. In renewing standard trade privileges (dubbed misleadingly most-favored nation or MFN status) for China in June 1993, Clinton declared that 1994’s renewal will be contingent on progress on human rights. The U.S. also threatened the Indonesians with punitive trade tariffs for their handling of a separatist movement in East Timor.

The clout the U.S. yields in both cases comes from serving as a ready market for Chinese and Indonesian goods. In other words, the U.S. trade deficit provides an incentive to the Chinese and the Indonesians to be cautious. Last year, in fact, the Chinese went out of their way to steer contracts to U.S. business enterprises and permitted 100% foreign ownership ventures. The impact on Indonesia is not yet clear, but, the U.S. pressure has achieved some results in China.

Just before the Clinton Administration reached its decision on MFN status for China in late May, the Chinese released a long-imprisoned dissident. There are still some 3,000 political prisoners languishing in jails.

Restraining Asian exports

Efforts to restrain Asian exports to the U.S. seem to have proven the squeezed-balloon maxim of economics: when a market is artificially curbed, it reveals itself elsewhere. Since 1981, Japan has had voluntary export restraints on cars shipped to the U.S. During these past 12 years, the annual production of automobiles in the U.S. by Japanese manufacturers alone or in partnership with an American enterprise grew from none to 1.4 million units in 1992.

In 1985, President Ronald Reagan called for the removal of the voluntary export limits on Japanese cars. The Japanese government nevertheless decided to extend these rules and to raise the limit to 2.3 million cars, a ceiling that has stuck since then. The value of Japanese exports to the U.S. has risen slightly, even though the ceiling has not been reached.

Parties to trade negotiations

Presidential candidate Clinton promised a new understanding of trade as an integral part of creating jobs and as the center of his foreign policy. Early in his Administration, Clinton identified four factors bearing on the U.S. international position: the federal budget deficit; worker productivity; technology policy; and the emergence of trade issues from under the blanket of security concerns. The extent to which the Clinton Administration can secure its trading partners’ cooperation depends in part on which domestic interest group is pushing or pulling, and how hard.

While the Clinton Administration has revived the Super 301 designations, the U.S. trade team has backed away from automatic retaliatory measures in the event that industry market-share targets are not met. The U.S. is pressing the Japanese to increase imports from all countries to soften the image of selfishness. As a senior U.S. trade official remarked in describing the Administration’s policy, “Nothing is sacrosanct; anything is possible. We’re not constrained by particular ideologies.”

Ideology, maybe not, but interest groups, certainly. With respect to trade policy, the concerned parties include the management and employees of export-generating enterprises—who do not always speak with one voice; the various agencies of the federal bureaucracy with an interest in or hand on trade policy; the U.S. Congress; the press; and public opinion.

Industry associations, such as the U.S. chipmakers’ group, have been important catalysts in calling attention to trade practices that work to their collective disadvantage. Organized labor has frequently worked in concert with industry on trade issues. Although labor unions only represent about 20% of the U.S. workforce, they still speak for the lion’s share of employees in industries that are struggling to compete globally—the automakers and the steelmakers, for example. Within the federal bureaucracy, export-oriented industries have traditionally had the ear of the Commerce Department. Recently three Commerce rulings on trade matters that favored U.S. companies at the expense of foreign competitors were overturned by either a U.S.-based or an international court. In one case, the court went so far as to order the return of penalties to a Japanese ball-bearing company.

The U.S. Trade Representative, the country’s chief negotiator, also tends to listen to an industry’s perspective. In fact, because of the success of semiconductor manufacturers in gaining access to Japan, speculation now centers on which industry will push next for a similar market-opening agreement in Japan or elsewhere.

The U.S. Congress also gives voice to exporters’ concerns and to the concerns of those companies’ employees. As an institution, Congress has typically been a vehicle for protectionist sentiment. The Members of Congress from large auto-producing states, such as Michigan and Missouri, have been particularly outspoken in favor of restraining Japanese exports and promoting U.S. exports. This congressional posture has proved useful at times to the interests of free trade. When talks have come to an impasse, U.S. negotiators have been able to remind a reluctant party of a more severe alternative pending in the halls of Congress.

Popular opinion in the U.S. is reflected in the congressional inclination toward protectionism. People who believe they have lost their jobs because of foreign competition are much easier to
identify than those who benefit from international trade. But perhaps even more to the point, protectionist sentiment ebbs and flows with the unemployment rate. The slow-paced recovery over the last two years after a recession marked by massive lay-offs by some of the country's largest employers—among them General Motors and IBM—engendered a collective sense of the fragility of the American economy.

**U.S. trade policy options**

What should be the balance between pressure and cooperation in formulating U.S. trade policy with respect to the Pacific Rim?

1. **Should the U.S. try to pressure those Pacific Rim countries with which it runs a trade deficit to open their markets to U.S. goods by threatening to impose quotas or other trade barriers?**

   **Yes:** Trade barriers maintained by Japan and other Pacific Rim economies are depriving American exporters of a level playing field and workers of viable employment. Making some structural changes in the U.S. economy may be in order, but the benefits will take time to show up. In the meantime, the U.S. should use persuasion and, if necessary, threats to open markets for its exports.

   **No:** Focusing on barriers, rather than looking for avenues of cooperation, only alienates partners whose markets are important to us. Trade barriers, moreover, don't work: obstacles can spur the targeted country to export higher value goods to the U.S., or the exporters simply move their enterprises to another country, entirely circumventing the barrier. The U.S. should instead focus on the structural problems in the U.S. economy that contribute to trade deficits, target more directly the ways that government can effectively help foster job creation and, in its relations with trade partners, follow a policy of inclusion and engagement rather than exclusion.

2. **What domestic policies would be most beneficial in restoring balance to U.S. trade relations with Asia? Cutting the federal budget deficit? Encouraging savings and discouraging consumption? Promoting export-oriented "industries of the future"? Or should all three areas be emphasized equally?**

   Proponents of cutting the federal budget would argue that its ballooning has gobbled up investment capital that should be working to make U.S. industry more competitive. Those who would prefer to emphasize savings and discourage consumption would contend that the low rate of savings in this country compared with others contributes to the trade deficit. People who doubt the centrality of savings and consumption would point to the specific trade barriers—the raising or lowering thereof—and their impact on the balance. And those who raise an eyebrow at industrial policy would contend that government has rarely succeeded in picking winners in a free-market economy.

3. **Should the U.S. use trade to pressure countries, in particular China and Indonesia, on human rights and arms control issues?**

   **Yes:** The record shows that the Chinese respond to threats to their trade status with the U.S. by easing the repression of antigovernment activism. Similar pressure should be effective in the case of Indonesia: because its exports to the U.S. (and the U.S. trade deficit) are growing, Indonesia will want to protect its exporters by complying with U.S. demands to respect human rights.

   **No:** Pressure on either human-rights or arms-control issues may work to a limited extent but at the expense of more important goals. A preferable policy is to expand trade, investment and economic cooperation with the rest of the Pacific Rim. Economic growth has been more effective in spawning political reform and democratization, notably in countries such as South Korea, Thailand and, up to a point, China, than U.S. pressure and threats of retaliation. Only one Chinese dissident was released prior to the renewal of the country's MFN status, a token gesture. The cause of human rights in China would be better advanced by actively promoting U.S. service industries there. This would have the added benefit of reducing the U.S. current-account deficit.

   Similarly arms control issues are not vulnerable to trade pressures. Any country looking to buy weapons will succeed on the open market. Unilateral U.S. attempts to curb those purchases only hurts the U.S. defense industry.

4. **Should the U.S. end the trade embargo on Vietnam?**

   **Yes:** The U.S. is the only country that maintains a trade embargo and its leverage is limited. The boycott hurts U.S. businesses, which are rapidly losing opportunities to invest and trade with this market of 72 million, more than it does Vietnam. More contacts could help open Vietnamese society and increase the pressure on the Vietnamese government to improve its human rights practices.

   **No:** The Vietnamese government is a dictatorship with which the U.S. has a number of unresolved issues, including accounting for American servicemen who were missing in action in the Vietnam War. Lifting the embargo would deprive U.S. negotiators of their most effective leverage.
**GREAT DECISIONS 1994**

**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**

1. What are some of the differences between Asia and the U.S. that cause difficulties in business relationships? What contributes to an understanding of those differences?

2. Which are more important in creating trade imbalances: the large economic forces, such as how much we save or spend; or the more detailed transactions between individual businesses?

3. Is there a relationship between increased arms purchases and trade surpluses in the Pacific Basin?

4. Who wins most from freer trade? Who loses most? In the U.S.? In Asia?

5. The U.S. has tried various measures to increase its exports to Japan. What has worked most effectively: punitive tariffs? Promoting export-oriented industries? Demanding market-share targets for individual industries? Which measure seems the most fair?

6. Which remedies would be most effective in setting the imbalanced trade relationship between the U.S. and Japan on an even keel: currency revaluation or structural changes to the U.S. and/or the Japanese economies?

7. Should trade negotiations with the People’s Republic of China be tied to the country’s record on human rights? Should pressure or cooperation be the guiding principles in negotiations with Taiwan over intellectual property rights? Should the U.S. try to restrain the arms race in Asia through trade talks? Should the trade embargo with Vietnam be lifted?

**READINGS AND RESOURCES**


Drucker, Peter F., “The End of Japan, Inc.?” *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1993, pp. 10–15. Professor Drucker argues that the breakdown of government-guided economic policy in Japan will result in tougher competition.


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Klare, Michael T., “The Next Great Arms Race.” *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 136–152. Hampshire College Professor Klare sees economic growth as possibly propelling regional powers into conflicting claims over resources and waterways.


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Defense: redefining U.S. needs and priorities

With the evaporation of the Soviet threat, U.S. military policymakers are struggling to revamp forces and doctrines suitable to an ambiguous post-cold-war era.

by David C. Morrison

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE LES ASPIN (left) and General Colin L. Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April 1993 on the subject of the fiscal 1994 defense posture.

During a recent off-the-record conversation with a reporter in his Pentagon office, a Defense Department official remarked, only half-facetiously, that the U.S. military establishment confronted an institutionally disastrous "threat meltdown."

For four decades, American armed forces had based their budgets, weapons projects and war plans on the most challenging and apocalyptic of scenarios: global conventional and nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This "Soviet threat" seemed as immutable as a law of physics. For Americans born after the onset of the cold war it was almost impossible to conceive of a global political system not dominated by the bipolar ideological and military confrontation between Washington and Moscow.

In a succession of head-spinning events, however, beginning with the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and culminating in the formal dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and then the Soviet Union itself in 1991, this central rationale for the huge standing force that the U.S. had rebuilt for the Korean War and had maintained ever after simply melted away.

Not long ago, the Soviet Union fielded some 3.5 million active-duty troops. But Russia's armed forces have today shrunk to 1.2 million. The road to reform in Russia is rocky and rife with uncertainty, of course, but even the rise of a hostile and aggressive regime in Moscow would not affect this new equation, at least for the foreseeable future.

Says retired Army Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, former director of the National Security Agency: "The decay in the former Soviet military is so great that...they're not going to be a problem for anyone except themselves and their immediate neighbors."

Demilitarization

This unexpected geopolitical tectonic shift has major consequences for all. Most notably, the relentless superpower nuclear arms race has ground to a halt. For decades, the Soviet Union and the U.S. aimed tens of thousands of nuclear warheads at each other, poised to unleash global Armageddon at a moment's notice.

Washington and Moscow have now retired the vast bulk of their tactical, or short-range, nuclear weaponry. Under the strategic arms reduction treaty (Start II), both powers are committed to reducing their arsenals of long-range weapons to 3,500 warheads apiece by 2003 or sooner.

That still represents an annihilating military potential; some observers argue that much deeper nuclear arms reductions are in order. And there is reason to worry about what might happen to the many undismantled nuclear weapons crowding depots in a former Soviet Union roiled by political turmoil. But the dire nuclear hair-trigger, at least, has been uncocked for now.

The so-called new world order has not necessarily benefited everyone, however. Much has been written about the dislocations afflicting the former Soviet Union in the cold war's wake. An estimated 25% of Soviet gross domestic product (GDP), after all, was dedicated to defense. Rather less well-recognized is how profoundly the U.S., too, was militarized by the superpower stand-off.

Until the Korean War of 1950-53, the U.S. had never supported a large standing military. And yet, in 1987, a post-Vietnam peak year, almost 8 million Americans drew a paycheck from the Defense Department in one fashion or another—as full-time soldiers, Pentagon bureaucrats, defense industry workers or regularly drilling military reservists.

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These cold warriors accounted for an astonishing 6.5% of the U.S. workforce. That’s a lot of “rice bowls.” And many of those national security rice bowls are now being shattered. U.S. military spending is sliding from roughly $300 billion a year in fiscal year 1990 to about $250 billion by 1998. Of that, approximately $45 billion is budgeted for weapons purchases in fiscal 1994. No question, that is a lot of money compared to what most nations spend on arms. All the same, it is only half the sum that the U.S. devoted to buying military hardware in the mid-1980s.

As a result, the arms industry is undergoing an unprecedented shake-out. As many as 2.5 million defense workers may have to find new work by the decade’s close. The same goes for tens of thousands of troops as the armed forces decline from the 2.2 million personnel kept on active duty in the 1980s to 1.4 million by the end of the decade (see box on p. 57).

Congress and the executive branch are thus floating a plethora of programs designed to ease the conversion of industries and to retrain workers for civilian production.

The personnel drawdown is but one of a dizzying range of readjustments with which the Pentagon must now grapple. Gone, for instance, are the days when anticommunism served as the primary or even sole rationale for U.S. military intervention overseas.

The December 1989 invasion of Panama to depose strongman Manuel A. Noriega, strikingly, was the first large-scale military incursion since World War II that the U.S. did not justify in terms of countering Soviet penetration. Even the U.S. naval patrols launched in the Persian Gulf in 1987 to fend off Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers were sold to Congress largely as driven by a need to offset the Soviet presence in the Gulf.

The national interest propelling the 1991 Persian Gulf war that pushed Iraq out of Kuwait could not have been more straightforward—protecting the petroleum that nourishes industrial society. But few analysts expect a reprise of the unique circumstances that fostered the unprecedentedly broad allied coalition that triumphed so handily over Iraq.

New roles and missions

While trimming back to force levels not seen since before the Korean War, the U.S. military is thus also now compelled to reinvent itself, to identify a new set of justifying roles and missions for a world suddenly transformed.

Reporting the results of a protracted Pentagon study, the so-called Bottom-Up Review, Defense Secretary Les Aspin last September listed what he termed the four primary “dangers that face the U.S. in the post-cold-war, post-Soviet world.”

First, is the “unpredictable challenge” of stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Second, is the “regional dangers” posed by a “handful of bad guys” in developing nations that “can threaten American interests or American allies.” Third, is “dangers to democracy,” or ensuring that the former Soviet republics and other emerging states follow a peaceful path to reform. And, fourth, Aspin said, is “something that we’ve never really explicitly addressed before...the dangers of a weak economy.”

This hodge-podge of priorities seems a far cry from the simpler era when the challenges confronting the Pentagon could be neatly summed up in its annual threat booklet, Soviet Military Power. No wonder President Bill Clinton was recently moved to remark, with mock nostalgia, “Gosh, I miss the cold war.”

The question is, does an increasingly introspective American public have the stomach to play the role of the world’s sole surviving superpower? In off-the-record comments tendered last May, Peter Tarnoff, the undersecretary of state for political affairs, spoke of “setting limits on the amount of American engagement...around the world.”

Those remarks were promptly repudiated by the White House. In fact, the Clinton Administration has set for itself a potentially expansive foreign policy goal—the “enlargement” of the democratic sphere around the globe. But, national security adviser Anthony Lake cautioned in explaining this policy, “there will be relatively few [instances] that justify our military intervention.”

If anything, though, even as the total force shrinks, U.S. troops are more active players on the global stage now than they generally were while “containing” the Soviet Union. This frenzy of activity has been prompted largely by a shift in focus to new, nontraditional military missions, most prominently international peacekeeping and humanitarian relief.

Peacekeeping and humanitarian relief are nothing new. But the scale and prominence of such endeavors today are novelties, as witnessed by the injection of U.S. troops into famine- and civil war-wrecked Somalia in December 1992. The fielding of a handful of U.S. “tripwire” troops to Macedonia in war-torn former Yugoslavia in 1992 might also foretell the deployment of a far larger force to keep the peace in Bosnia, should a peace ever be agreed upon there.

When U.S. forces ended up in actual combat in Somalia, seeking to hunt down clan leader Mohammed Farah Aaidid, this peacekeeping task became a “peacekeeping task became a “peacekeeping task.”” or “peace enforcement” mission. After all, when there is no peace to keep, outside forces, should they choose to involve themselves, will have to make peace. The Pentagon subsumes all such missions under the rubric simply of “peace operations.”

Although engulfed in controversy, this high-profile peacekeeping role seems to be here to stay. This year, for the first time, the Pentagon inserted a line item in
its annual budget to cover peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And the U.S. Atlantic Command, one of the five U.S. regional commands that cover the planet, is being rejiggered to act as the lead agency to plan and carry out such missions.

If some elements in the Pentagon have their way—most notably the Army Corps of Engineers and the Special Operations forces, meaning the Green Berets and other commando units—the military could wind up adopting an even more-expansive version of the humanitarian mission.

Called "peace engagement," the idea, as the Army put it in a recent report, is to use the "coordinated application of political, economic, informational and military means to promote stability and to counteract violence worldwide."

In other words, the U.S. military would act in troubled nations as a development agency—erecting bridges, dams and other elements of economic infrastructure—and as a tutor in American democratic values—instilling overseas militaries with the virtues of civilian control, for example.

That's a tall order—to play not only global policeman but also global handyman and global schoolmarm. While the Pentagon leadership has not formally rejected "peace engagement" in its most broadly defined form, neither has it formally embraced it. Meanwhile, the concept continues to crop up in Army doctrine manuals.

In any event, this is precisely the sort of policy question now being debated and decided in Washington. How much can the nation afford to spend on the military in an era of general belt-tightening? And precisely what sort of tasks can and should be assigned to this post-cold-war force?

How much is enough?

The waning days of previous American wars—World War II, Korea, Vietnam—have typically been marked by mounting anticipation of a "peace dividend" as the fiscal resources directed against a military foe are refocused on domestic needs.

Similarly, many Americans want their peace dividend now that the long, costly cold war is finally over and won. In 1990, the U.S. budgeted $301.3 billion for national defense. In 1993, the figure was $273 billion. And, by 1997, new spending on national security is slated to bottom out at $246 billion, before starting to edge upward again.

While not as deep a cut as some would like to see, at better than $50 billion the defense reduction between 1990 and 1997 is no small potatoes—especially when the defense budget's trajectory is viewed in terms of inflation-adjusted dollars. In "constant" dollar terms, the Pentagon stands to lose more than $100 billion, or better than 30% of its actual spending power from 1990–97. But, still, why hasn't the U.S. realized a richer peace dividend? The reasons, largely, have to do with the peculiar exigencies of federal budgeting.

For one thing, the federal budget deficit in 1992 climbed to a whopping $290 billion, an all-time high. This year, fiscal 1994, the deficit will still run about $253 billion. This seemingly unstemmable tide of red ink means that you would have to wipe out the entire Defense Department, totally abolishing the military, to eliminate the budget deficit. In this light, one might say that our peace dividend has al-
ready long been used up, thanks to deficit spending.

For another thing, Pentagon planners have tended to build unrealistic expectations of future spending growth into their budget projections for future years. As a result, much Pentagon budget cutting consists of whittling these inflated expectations about spending down to something approaching fiscal reality.

In his last budget, submitted in January 1992, for example, President George Bush forecast a 1997 defense budget of $290.6 billion. President Clinton’s first budget, submitted in March 1993, foresees spending at least $40 billion less on defense in 1997. As the oft-quoted cliché has it, it’s hard to cram 10 pounds of defense program into a 5-pound budget bag.

After conducting his exhaustive Bottom-Up Review of the future defense program, for instance, Aspin discovered that his new, ostensibly leaner-and-meaner plan would exceed the $1.2 trillion that the Clinton Administration planned to spend from fiscal 1995-99 by $13 billion. Military forces are expensive to maintain, and they always seem to cost more than planners expect.

Finally, as witnessed by the fierce resistance with which communities and their representatives on Capitol Hill greet Pentagon efforts to shutter costly military bases that no longer serve any purpose, military spending is resistant to sharp cuts because it represents jobs and votes.

The wheels of the electoral system tend to be greased with the fat of government largesse, the bulk of which is rendered at the Pentagon in the form of military installations, weapons contracts and National Guard armories. Members of Congress may demand a “peace dividend,” but when shrinking military budgets tighten belts in their home districts, they leap into the legislative trenches to defend their piece of the pork barrel.

It may thus turn out, as former Defense Secretary Dick Cheney was fond of saying, that the “dividend of peace is peace,” and little more. If nothing else, though, the relative burden of defense is undeniably on the wane. During the Korean War, 11.9% of U.S. GDP was consumed by the military. At the apex of the buildup under President Ronald Reagan, Pentagon spending accounted for 6.3% of GDP. By 1998, however, only 3% of American GDP will go for defense.

Hollow forces?

Defense in America is more than a bulwark of national interests and security. It is also a jobs program. Over and above any objective assessment of the future geopolitical lay of the land, this fact of domestic political life will likely determine the floor below which defense budgets and force levels will not be allowed to fall.

Besides which, as always, there is considerable disagreement over how much is enough for defense. “The Clinton defense budget plan for fiscal year 1994 and beyond is adequate to meet the defense needs of the era and support forces planned for that period,” according to Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.), the liberal chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. “Providing larger forces and budgets than those planned would not materially improve our national security, and could in fact impair it by impeding economic growth,” he says.

On the other hand, Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-Ariz.), blasted the 1994 defense bill because it “will leave our proud fighting forces naked, without adequate resources or manpower. I oppose this legislation because of the size and timing of the cuts to the military,” he added, “cuts leading to the ‘hollow forces’ reminiscent of the Carter Administration.”

As with the question of overall military spending, opinions differ on how immediately the hollowness threat really looms. But few experts argue seriously that preserving readiness will not pose a major challenge in the years ahead.

After all, preserving readiness—or the military’s ability to pull up its socks and rush off to war at a moment’s notice—is the most venerated of sacred military cows in Washington. “The worst thing that can happen to a man with a green eyeshade is to fall off his stool,” Senate Armed Services Committee stalwart John McCain (R-Ariz.) says of the defense budget cutters. “The price of going hollow is body bags.”

“Right now, we’ve got the best, most ready force in the world,” Defense Secretary Aspin asserted in May 1993. But “to keep it that way,” he said, “we’re going to have to do something that has proved very, very difficult in the past, and that is, we’re going to have to maintain readiness during a major drawdown of our forces.”

As Aspin and others have pointedly observed, this cannot be done without shedding now-unneeded cold-war infrastructure—most notoriously, excess military bases. That’s no mean feat. Shutting down these facilities is a traumatic prospect for the communities in which they are located, necessitating the establishment of an elaborate base closure commission process and strict rules of the road to keep affected Members of Congress from keeping unnecessary bases in operation indefinitely.

The danger is that disproportionate cuts in the Pentagon’s operations and maintenance (O&M) budget, the easiest wedge of the defense budget to cut, will slice into readiness. If so, training hours would be reduced, and so, also, combat readiness. Stocks of ammunition and spare parts would dwindle, and the maintenance of military real estate and hardware would be deferred. Sagging morale, sapped by lagging enlistment rates and the recruitment of top-quality enlistees—vital factors for an all-volunteer military.

The good news is that though the O&M account grew more slowly during
the Reagan buildup than spending on weapons procurement did, it also lost comparatively less ground in the budget fall-off initiated in the mid-1980s. Divided by the number of active-duty troops, in fact, O&M spending has grown by 28% in real, after-inflation terms from fiscal 1980 to 1993. Bear in mind that the active-duty force is also some 10% smaller today than in 1980.

And that means that “we can make additional cuts in O&M in the future, as the size of the military is brought down,” Steven M. Kosiak, a senior analyst with the private Defense Budget Project, judges. But, he cautioned, “these cuts will have to be handled very, very carefully.”

No more nukes
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the new geopolitical era upon which the U.S. is embarked is the way in which nuclear weaponry, so long the very centerpiece of the cold war, has receded into the woodwork.

In 1991, the Strategic Air Command commissioned 21 “defense intellectuals,” most of them boasting prior service in the nuclear weapons complex, to ponder the role of “nuclear weapons in the new world order.” This panel seemed determined to pursue an atomic business as usual. It proposed letting Russia, whose nuclear testing grounds have been shut down by nationalist pressures in the neighboring republic of Kazakhstan, test its warheads in Nevada. It also suggested having Washington, which has no operating tritium reactor, buy that perishable fuel from Moscow.

Even if Russia reduced its atomic arsenal to only a few hundred warheads, the panel urged, the U.S. should retain some 10% smaller today than in 1980. And that means that “we can make additional cuts in O&M in the future, as the size of the military is brought down,” Steven M. Kosiak, a senior analyst with the private Defense Budget Project, judges. But, he cautioned, “these cuts will have to be handled very, very carefully.”

In the end, however, this report was a dead letter. While concern remains about the atomic ambitions of nations such as Iran and North Korea, the superpower nuclear arms race is indisputably a relic of history. Besides Russia, three other former Soviet republics still have nuclear weapons on their soil. Belarus has already begun dismantling these arms, with U.S. aid. The situation is more complicated with Kazakhstan and Ukraine, both of which hope to parlay their current nuclear status into enhanced recognition and aid from the outside world.

Pursuant to a 1991 directive from President George Bush, all but some 1,600 tactical nuclear weapons are being retired. For the first time since the 1950s, therefore, the Army and the Marine Corps deploy no nuclear weapons and Navy ships now routinely patrol with no nukes aboard. Meanwhile, the arsenal of long-range, strategic weapons is slated to fall from more than 12,000 to no more than 3,500 by the turn of the century.

The nuclear weapons production complex, managed by the Energy Department, has not generated any tritium gas for nuclear warheads since 1988, nor any plutonium “pits,” the explosive core of atomic weaponry, since 1989. Indeed, its major activities today are cleaning up the toxic legacy of a half-century of bomb building and dismantling thousands of retired atomic warheads. In 1994, the Energy Department will spend $5.5 billion on environmental compliance and waste management, and only $3.8 billion on weapons activities.

But even if the Administration wanted to follow suit with a test of its own—and the 1994 budget contains $320 million to support just that option—stiff congressional opposition is likely to stay its hand.

The U.S. nuclear test moratorium and the prospect of enactment of a comprehensive test ban, proponents argue, set an example for potential proliferators. Moreover, there is no compelling need to test now that the U.S. is out of the business of producing new nuclear warheads, testing foes contend. Warhead reliability and safety modifications can be modeled on computers, obviating the need for explosive testing.

Others are not persuaded by this logic. The Center for Security Policy, a hard-line Washington think tank, for instance, urges Clinton “to reestablish a modest but necessary underground test program. Doing otherwise,” it says, “will not measurably affect proliferation; it will, however, cause possibly catastrophic damage to the long-run safety, reliability and effectiveness of the U.S. arsenal.”

The fate of another centerpiece of the cold-war nuclear arms race—the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or “Star Wars”—is more ambiguous. In May 1993, after ten years of research costing some $30 billion, Aspin announced the demise of the Pentagon’s SDI Organization, which is to be replaced by a Ballistic Missile Defense Organization. Congress cut the funding level by $1 billion to $3 billion and the main focus will shift from striving to defend the continental...
U.S. against long-range missile attack to shielding U.S. troops and overseas combat operations against shorter-range missiles. Research on means to defend the U.S. itself will continue, but at lower levels of effort than in the past.

"Assuming some deployment of theater defenses for crises abroad, the U.S. will be in the curious position of being ready to defend its allies against missile attack, but incapable of doing so for its own citizens," the conservative Heritage Foundation charges.

Not so, retorts Dave McCurdy, a House Armed Services Committee Democrat from Oklahoma. Clinton’s “plan is the right answer to the missile threats we face,” McCurdy says. “And the political and strategic context will not support anything more ambitious.”

One thing we can probably count on, whatever name it goes by, the ever-controversial Star Wars program is sure to continue to provide an element of contentious continuity to the defense debate of the 1990s.

In retrospect, one of the most striking aspects of the cold war was the sheer size of the overseas troop presence that helped underwrite the 40-year policy of containing the Soviet Union.

Until quite recently, almost 1 million Americans served overseas on Pentagon-related missions. With 100 major U.S. bases—i.e., those boasting more than 500 troops—located in some 50 countries, and hundreds of more minor sites scattered around the globe, that figure includes 450,000 troops, 391,000 military family members and 152,000 civilian Pentagon employees.

Those numbers, needless to say, are headed downward. The most dramatic drawdown is in Europe where U.S. servicemen and women are streaming home from garrisons that have been maintained since World War II. In 1988, a year before the Berlin Wall tumbled down, the Pentagon supported more than 300,000 active-duty personnel on the ground in Europe. That contingent is rapidly heading toward a force 100,000 strong.

Sink much below that level, some analysts contend, and the U.S. contribution to the 16-nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will approximate that of tiny Belgium or Denmark. In that case, they warn, the U.S. would become a marginal player in a military machine dominated by German forces.

So what? responds another school of thought, which holds that NATO has outlived its usefulness. Many Americans “believe that NATO is a cold-war institution whose relevance has now passed and that our military presence in Europe is nothing more than a cold-war hangover,” Senator William V. Roth Jr. (R-Del.) recently observed. “If nothing is done to change this perception and to place the Alliance on a new course, I have no doubt that U.S. support for our military presence in Europe will wither, prompting congressional action to reduce troop levels and ultimately the alliance will exist in name only.”

Proponents of a powerful U.S. role in NATO argue that the alliance provides a crucial forum for American involvement in European affairs, while affording leverage in other arenas of dispute, such as trade. And, these NATO boosters add, the alliance is a source of stability in an era of geopolitical upheaval on a continent that has already sucked the U.S. into two major wars this century.

“The U.S. will not be able to pursue domestic renewal successfully without peace and stability in Europe,” Manfred Wörner, NATO’s secretary general, cautions.

At the same time, the savage outbreak of communal butchery in the former Yugoslavia, and Western Europe’s dithering as to what to do to stop it, has raised some serious questions about the nature of “peace and stability” in Europe and what role NATO might realistically play in the future. These concerns dovetail with the long-running “burden-sharing” issue, or the suspicion on this side of the Atlantic that the U.S. shoulders more than its fair share of global military duties.

“Our European friends need to, I think, be ready to assume more of the burden than they’ve indicated thus far that they would,” Senator Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.) argued during a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing. “We have to keep in mind that we can’t furnish the manpower and the armies to police difficult and bloody conflicts throughout the world.”

The larger West European powers surely could pay more for the common defense—France, in fact, is increasing spending, while Britain is cutting back—but their leaders face the same domestic political constraints on post-cold-war military spending as do their American counterparts. If burdensharing resentment among the American people eventually prompts Washington to reduce its involvement in NATO, it is unlikely that the alliance would survive.

Meanwhile, ironically, the former Warsaw Pact states of Eastern Europe are clamoring to join NATO but are being put off for now with promises of increased defense cooperation. There is good reason for caution. Could a much-expanded NATO survive as an effective military organization, or would it just turn into an ineffectual European “talking shop”? Similarly, can NATO effectively involve itself in “out of area” conflicts, not involving the strict territorial defense of its member-nations, as some have said it should? Or would such involvement generate controversies that would simply tear the alliance apart?

The evolution of NATO will be one of the most closely watched defense policy dramas of the 1990s.

As in Europe, the nations of Asia are given to worries that the U.S., a powerful Pacific presence since World War II, is now poised to withdraw into some sort of Fortress America. In fact, total U.S. forces in the vast Pacific region are slated to fall from 390,000 today to 350,000 by the turn of the century. That’s only a 10% reduction, a fraction of the dramatic U.S. drawdown in Europe.

But U.S. forces “forward-based” on foreign soil in Asia have already fallen by 28% from the cold-war peak, down to about 98,000 personnel, the vast bulk of them stationed in Japan and South Korea.

Russia may have exited the Pacific stage, for the time being. But, from the vantage of various Asian capitals, new threats are springing up to take Moscow’s place. China is the power wary Asian nations are watching most closely. Fueled by an economy that is ballooning by better than 12% annually, China’s military budget in 1991 marked a 50% increase over its defense spending in 1989.
Mightily impressed by the U.S.'s high-technology trouncing of Iraq in 1991, China's generals are investing their new-found wealth in upgrading their 3 million-strong forces with modern equipment, much of it purchased from Russia at bargain-basement prices.

"Now that the Soviet menace is gone, China is a menace," Kigoaki Kikuchi, formerly Japan's ambassador to the United Nations (UN) and now an adviser to the Foreign Ministry, asserts. "And North Korea is a menace. And some people believe South Korea is, too."

This vague sense of unease is mutual. "Even after unification [with North Korea], South Korea should maintain some kind of military alliance with the U.S.," Ahn Byung-joon, a political science professor at Yonsei University in Seoul, said. "Korea is a place where the military interests of the great powers intersect. To be blunt, we need U.S. forces as a constraint on Japanese military capabilities, as well as on China's."

Washington has the perfect resume to act as honest broker, Ahn added, because "it so happens that the U.S. is the least hated of the Pacific powers. The U.S. is less interested in territorial ambitions and only in maintaining a balance of power."

Indeed, U.S. officials have repeatedly stressed their willingness to play this balancing role in a region that annually consumes $140 billion in U.S. exports, or one third of the total.

Elsewhere, Washington is also lowering its military profile. As mandated by the 1979 Panama Canal Treaty, the headquarters of the U.S. Southern Command, with its 10,000 American troops, must be relocated by 1999. Under the glide path planned by the Pentagon, only 5,000 U.S. soldiers will remain by the end of 1995. But no final decision has yet been made about the future location of the Southern Command. Most likely, it will end up shifting to southern Florida.

In contrast with other parts of the world, the U.S. military presence is actually increasing in the Persian Gulf—to just over 20,000. Besides the massive infrastructure it already boasts in Saudi Arabia, Washington has recently signed defense pacts with Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, while renewing an existing agreement with Oman.

The details remain secret, but these post-Gulf war accords are said to provide for the "pre-positioning" of military gear, naval and air access and joint training exercises. Thanks to Arab sensitivities about hosting a conspicuous American presence, much of the gear for a future U.S. intervention in the region is deployed on special cargo ships afloat in the Indian Ocean.

Pax Americana

In the immediate wake of the Gulf war, with its promise of a multilateral new world order coordinated through a newly aggressive UN, enthusiasm ran high for peacekeeping as a major mission for the U.S. military. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1992 bid to create a permanent, standing UN peacekeeping force was even accorded a respectful hearing in Washington.

More recently, however, this enthusiasm has begun to dim, snuffed out, as much as anything else, by an October 3 debacle in Mogadishu, Somalia, in which 18 U.S. servicemen died trying to track down clan leader Mohammed Farah Aidid.

Following the smashing victory in the Persian Gulf, U.S. commentators were fond of proclaiming that the U.S. had finally overcome the "Vietnam syndrome." In fact, the conduct of that conflict, marked as it was by a clearly stated set of military goals and a steadfast emphasis on keeping U.S. casualties to an absolute minimum, showed that the Vietnam syndrome is alive and well.

Among other things, this means a hypersensitivity to the prospect of American deaths in overseas interventions. It seems unlikely that a President will ever again be able to secure reelection after presiding over 15,000 combat deaths during his first term, as did President Richard M. Nixon in 1972.

"This is not an abstract intellectual exercise," Gen. Colin L. Powell, the outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said of peacekeeping missions in his valedictory address last September. "It is nothing less than sending young American sons and daughters off to a foreign land to fight other sons and daughters, perhaps to kill them and to be killed.... We are not committing mercenaries. We are committing sons and daughters."

Drawing on the lessons of Vietnam, just like his predecessor, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. John Shalikashvili also has no use for the incrementalism that marked the American style of warfare in Vietnam.

"I believe," he said in his confirmation testimony, "that whether we are fighting Desert Storm to defend vital interests of ours or whether we are committing forces to lesser interests, might...they be humanitarian operations or whatnot, that we use decisive force. And by decisive I
meant that we bring to the table enough force to decide the outcome in our favor.”

This mindset, in turn, means an exceedingly high threshold for U.S. military involvement in overseas adventures, however ostensibly noble the cause. Last September, therefore, troubled by the eruption into urban warfare of what was meant to be a food relief operation in Somalia and anxious about potential involvement in securing peace in Bosnia, the Clinton Administration narrowed the terms for participation in future UN missions. U.S. intervention would have to be justified by clear U.S. national interests, the new policy states, and only in carefully delineated circumstances would the Pentagon outright cede command of its troops to UN control.

Unconventional missions

In 1988, Congress tapped the Pentagon to serve as the “lead agency” in the campaign to interdict illegal narcotics at the nation’s borders. Even so, in 1989, the Defense Department requested no funding to carry out this mission. The next year, however, shortly after the Berlin Wall had so abruptly tumbled down, the military asked for $1.2 billion with which to wage its “war on drugs.”

A sixth of that sum, interestingly, was to fund the Midwestern portion of the Air Force’s Over-the-Horizon Backscatter radar network. Originally conceived as a device designed to detect nuclear cruise missiles fired from Soviet submarines, the Backscatter was now being sold as a means to spot drug couriers winging across the Gulf of Mexico.

Congress has since cancelled the Backscatter radar. And the cocaine interdiction campaign has never proven all that effective. The Administration thus appears inclined to tilt the drug war’s focus more toward treatment and other homefront efforts.

Meanwhile, a host of other non-traditional missions are being urged upon the Pentagon. “An unprecedented opportunity exists to use Defense Department resources—particularly the talent and skills of men and women in uniform—to meet some of our pressing domestic needs,” Senate Armed Services Committee chairman Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), one of Washington’s most vociferous boosters of unconventional roles for the military, has written.

Among other missions, Nunn has said, military medical teams could conduct childhood immunization drives in our cities, combat engineers could respond to national and civil emergencies and the 400,000 African-American and 90,000 Hispanic men and women in uniform could serve as “role models” for minority youth. “I would like to see our military people out in the schools visiting people for an hour or two every week,” Nunn asserts.

Casting about for post-cold-war roles and missions, the armed services do not need all that much prompting from Capitol Hill to put themselves forward as social service agencies. In its annual report to Congress two years ago, the Air Force touted the 120 overseas relief and rescue missions it had conducted since 1947. “A response does not necessarily have to be lethal,” that service said. “A helping hand or a clenched fist—airpower can, and has, delivered both.”

The Army is no-less eager to proffer the helping hand as a raison d’être. “While fighting our nation’s wars remains the Army’s principal mission,” Lt. Col. Cole C. Kingsseed wrote in the autumn 1992 issue of Parameters, the quarterly journal of the U.S. Army War College, …activities that contribute to the general domestic welfare of assisted nations should become commonplace for the Army in the post-cold-war environment.”

Critics fear that this diffusion of focus could hamper combat readiness. “As you pull the military away from its primary mission, preparation for war, and turn it toward humanitarian missions and civil law enforcement missions and so on, you weaken its combat capabilities, which is dangerous,” Harry G. Summers Jr., a retired Army colonel and military affairs columnist, argues.

Summers frets about another, longer-range peril posed by turning to the armed forces to tackle educational decline, environmental devastation, world hunger and the world’s many other woes. “You may also weaken its traditional subservience to civilian control,” he says. “If you keep saying [to the military], ‘You can do it better than the civilians,’ someone may eventually pay attention.”

Precisely that menace was raised in a now-notorious essay printed in the Winter 1992–93 issue of Parameters. Penned by Air Force Lt. Col. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., the article posits a military coup in Washington in the year 2012, a putsch prompted by too much responsibility for too many nonmilitary chores having been loaded onto epauleted shoulders. If the people want us to run the country, the coup leaders reason, why not go all the way?

“In truth, militaries ought to ‘prepare for war’ and leave the ‘peace waging’ to those agencies of government whose mission is just that,” Dunlap insists. But, then, who is to say precisely what missions are appropriate for the military in this uncertain new era?
U.S. policy options

After 40-some years of relative predictability in waging the cold war with the Soviet Union, the American armed forces suddenly find themselves at a unique juncture where almost every element of military policy—budgets, overseas deployments, roles and missions—is up for grabs. Here are only a few of the policy options facing Washington as it charts a post-cold-war course for the Pentagon.

1. The U.S. must maintain forces and bases overseas, even as it reduces their numbers.
   **Pro:** The Soviet Union may have collapsed, but it is still a dangerous world out there. Twice this century, the U.S. has had to land troops in Europe to wage major wars. Three times this century, it has fought conflicts in Asia. Overseas garrisons are an insurance policy, deterring potential conflicts. For that reason, its allies want the U.S. to maintain a military presence. And there is good reason to comply, considering the large volume of U.S. trade with Asia and Europe and the U.S. interest in maintaining global stability.

   **Con:** Now that the Soviet Union has collapsed, it is time for the U.S. to stop playing global policeman. We have plenty of problems here at home that urgently demand our attention and dollars. There is no reason why the U.S. should have “a dog in every fight.” U.S. interests are not directly served by maintaining troops overseas, even as it reduces its allies want the U.S. to maintain a military presence. And there is good reason to comply, considering the large volume of U.S. trade with Asia and Europe and the U.S. interest in maintaining global stability.

2. The U.S. national defense budget should be stabilized in the neighborhood of $250 billion a year.
   **Pro:** The world remains a dangerous place rife with powers that, though far smaller than the Soviet Union, still pose potential threats to U.S. interests. To deter aggression and promote stability, $250 billion is a comparatively small price to pay. By the turn of the century, this country will be devoting only 3% of total economic output to national defense.

   **Con:** Currently planned reductions in defense spending do not begin to reflect the geopolitical revolution of the past half decade. Under the Administration’s proposal, the U.S. will still spend roughly 70% as much on its armed forces as at the peak of the cold war.

3. The U.S. military should tackle a wide range of unconventional challenges, from disaster relief to stemming the flow of narcotics across U.S. borders.
   **Pro:** The country cannot afford to allow 1.4 million taxpayer-supported professionals to bunker down in garrisons and train for potential conflicts that may never happen when society has real needs now. Many nontraditional missions also serve double-duty as training for more traditional combat operations.

   **Con:** The armed forces’ primary mission is defending the U.S. and its interests against armed attack. It is a long-held tradition in the U.S. that the armed forces should be wielded solely as a bulwark against external threats. Overburdening the armed forces with nontraditional missions will only ensure that they will come to woe when it comes time to go to war.

4. The U.S. should maintain its current nuclear test moratorium and work toward implementing a global comprehensive test ban.
   **Pro:** The arms race is over. The U.S. has plenty of tried-and-true nuclear warheads with which to sustain deterrence in a post-cold-war world. Older warheads can be rebuilt according to existing, tested designs. By rejecting nuclear testing, as well as the production of new nuclear warheads, Washington can set a positive example for potential nuclear proliferators elsewhere in the world.

   **Con:** The superpower nuclear arms race may have ended for now, but a capable nuclear deterrent is still needed in a world in which potentially hostile nations are seeking to acquire nuclear weaponry. There is no substitute for actual underground explosive tests to ensure the safety, reliability and effectiveness of the nuclear arsenal. And there is no assurance that potential proliferators such as Iran and North Korea will be dissuaded by an American refusal to continue testing.
**DISCUSSION QUESTIONS**

1. Annual military spending is scheduled to fall by some $50 billion, to about $250 billion a year. Does this provide a large enough “peace dividend,” or is the Clinton Administration cutting too deeply?

2. Asian leaders want American troops to stay on in the region as an “honest broker” to keep regional rivalries from spinning out of control. Would this serve American national interests, as you conceive them, or not?

3. Even with the end of the cold war, the Pentagon still plans to garrison 100,000 troops in Western Europe and almost as many at overseas bases in Asia. Some observers say that we can safely bring all of our troops home now. What do you think?

4. By testing a nuclear device last October, China created a legal pretext for the U.S. to follow suit. Would U.S. national security be best served by resuming nuclear testing or by sticking with the moratorium and eventually signing onto a comprehensive test ban? Why?

5. The Clinton Administration has redirected the Strategic Defense Initiative away from providing anti-missile defenses for the continental U.S. and toward anti-tactical missile defenses in overseas theaters of war. Was this a wise policy choice? Does America need defending against missile attack?

6. Some policy analysts argue that the U.S., as the sole surviving superpower, has a humanitarian duty to intervene militarily in Bosnia, Haiti and other killing fields around the world to stop the bloodshed. How aggressively should the U.S. pursue this peacekeeping and “peacemaking” mission?

7. Sen. Sam Nunn and others also want the military to tackle such domestic woes as drug trafficking, urban crime and childhood immunization. Considering the large sums that taxpayers invest every year in these forces, why shouldn’t the military help cope with problems here at home? Or do you think this is an inappropriate use of the armed forces?

**READINGS AND RESOURCES**


Ravenal, Earl C., **Designing Defense for a New World Order.** Washington, D.C., Cato Institute, 1991. 82 pp. $9.95. Abandoning the current policy of “collective security” for “strategic disengagement,” this former Pentagon official argues in this provocative monograph, could yield a substantial peace dividend.

OPINION BALLOTS

How to use the Opinion Ballots: For your convenience, there are two copies of each opinion ballot. Please cut out and mail one ballot only. To have your vote counted, please mail ballots by June 30, 1994. Send ballots to:

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, 729 SEVENTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10019

TOPIC 5 Defense Priorities

ISSUE A. From roughly $300 billion in 1990, the U.S. national defense budget is slated to decline to just over $250 billion (in current dollars, not adjusted for inflation) in 1998. This proposed level of defense spending is (choose one):

1. Too much.
2. Too little.
3. Just about right.

First three digits of your zip code: ___ ___ ___

Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...

TOPIC 6 Argentina, Brazil, Chile

ISSUE A. In its relations with Argentina, Brazil and Chile, the U.S. should:

YES NO

1. Strengthen economic and trade ties, particularly to increase U.S. exports to the region.
2. Support the democratization process to ensure that military dictatorship does not recur.
3. Provide economic and technical assistance to address the growing problem of poverty and social needs.
4. Not intervene in the domestic affairs of the three countries.
5. Other, or comment ____________________________

First three digits of your zip code: ___ ___ ___

Date: / /1994 Ballot continues on reverse side...
ISSUE B. Concerning peacekeeping missions overseas, the U.S. should (choose one):

1. Participate only in concert with the UN or other nations.
2. Take unilateral action if others refuse to act.

Regarding other aspects of peacekeeping missions, the U.S. should:

YES  NO

1. Engage in such missions only when U.S. national interests are at stake.
2. Commit troops only when peace can be established quickly and with little risk to American lives.

ISSUE C. With regard to the size of the post-cold-war military, the U.S. should (choose one):

1. Retain the 1.6 million-strong “base force” advocated by the Bush Administration.
2. Further reduce to 1.4 million active-duty troops, as recommended by the Clinton Administration.
3. Cut back even further in recognition of the fact that our primary military competitor has collapsed.
4. Other, or comment

ISSUE B. Should the U.S. seek to expand the North American Free Trade Agreement to include Chile and other Latin American countries?

1. Yes.
2. No.

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1. Yes.
2. No.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile: democracy and market economics

A democratic revolution has transformed the Southern Cone countries. Argentina and Chile are enjoying an economic boom. But social and economic problems persist.

by Jacqueline Mazza

Just over 10 years ago, the military ruled the countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Today, civilian governments are installed in each of the three countries; opposition groups openly campaign and thrive. The press operates freely; open elections have been held. The dramatic "revolutions" in these three Southern Cone countries join Latin America to a string of democratic revolutions around the world—in Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. There were few TV cameras present to mark events in Latin America. No Berlin Wall came tumbling down to symbolize the end of the old era and the beginning of the new. But an era nearly as dramatic as that in Eastern Europe has begun.

The new democratic age in the so-called ABC countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile could not be more different from the preceding period. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have had some of the most repressive military regimes in the Western Hemisphere. The region has been torn by polarized, antidemocratic politics on the left and right, consisting of Marxism, populism and military dictatorship. The most recent military regimes dominated a wide spectrum of daily life—economic policy, industrial development, social services, education and police forces.

How did such all-encompassing authoritarian rule give way to democracy? Each case represents a distinctive transition to democracy, reflecting the country's history and the different nature of each government. Each case demonstrates that democracy rarely comes quietly but is born from crisis that calls into question the viability of the regime.

Transition by ballot box

Of the three countries, Chile surprised Latin observers most by succumbing to one of the longest-running and strongest military dictatorships in the region. Chile had had a long tradition of democracy—with a liberal constitution for over 150 years—before a coup against President Salvador Allende in 1973 robbed the country of its democracy. Allende had been elected by a small margin on a Marxist and populist platform. His radical economic and social policies deeply divided the country. Industries were taken over by the government, and private property was expropriated. Long food lines and rationing became commonplace. The government went heavily into debt. It increased wages rapidly, which led to dramatically higher prices and business bankruptcies. Chile, which had thrived as a result of political accommodation, was engulfed in a spiraling political crisis. As Arturo Valenzuela and Pamela Constable explain in A Nation of Enemies: Chile under Pinochet, "Conservatives openly plotted to overthrow the government, while leftist groups demanded that Allende surge ahead with the revolution and arm workers for its defense." With tensions mounting, the military overthrew the government by force on September 11, 1973.

General Augusto Pinochet led the coup and soon installed himself as the head of a military government. The military and security forces launched a brutal campaign against Allende's supporters. Pinochet dissolved the Congress, banned independent political parties and closed down the free press. He brought in a new economic team, the "Chicago boys," who had studied at the University of Chicago, which is known for conservative, classical capitalist economics. They introduced strict free-market economic policies. The economy experienced a boom based heavily on foreign loans. A variety of factors, including overextended loans, subsequently led to economic difficulties. Chile's financial system went on the skids, and unemployment rose sharply, as did poverty. Beginning in 1981, according to Chilean specialist Manuel Garretón, the Pinochet regime faced a...
The military launched a violent campaign, known as the Dirty War, against Communist guerrillas, union leaders, teachers, doctors and others suspected of opposing the regime. Political opposition and a free press were silenced. Books were burned, and sociology and philosophy could no longer be taught in the universities.

The military proved inept at handling the economy, and corruption was endemic. They received huge loans, then squandered them and racked up increasing debt they could not repay. Inflation skyrocketed. A financial crisis ensued in 1982, and banks collapsed. Civilian opposition to the military regime grew. Mothers of the thousands who “disappeared” under the regime began marching in protest. (See box, p. 63.)

In an effort to shore up faltering support, the military tried to recapture the British-held Falkland (or Malvinas) Islands in 1982. By all accounts, the Argentine military fumbled the campaign in which thousands of young soldiers died. Military leaders misled the Argentine people by claiming successes, and then shocked the nation by surrendering. Soon thereafter, the military voluntarily handed over the government to civilians and permitted elections for a new president.
People power: average citizens and the fight for democracy

“It was crucial that the whole world hear our anguish and help us. Alone we are nothing...”

Mother of a disappeared youth, quoted in Jean-Pierre Bousquet, Las Locas de la Plaza del Mayo (The Madwomen of the Plaza del Mayo)

F OR YEARS under the military regime, mothers everywhere in Argentina found that their children had mysteriously “disappeared,” taken by government security forces or masked men without a trace. Alone, they made the rounds of government ministries, police stations and courts to seek an answer to where their children were. The dangers were great; they were warned if they tried to find their children, the children would be killed. They also ran the risk that they themselves would “disappear.”

Despite the mothers’ pleas, the military regime refused to provide answers. On April 30, 1977, 14 mothers of the “disappeared” banded together in the main square of Buenos Aires, the Plaza del Mayo, to protest in public. Maybe this time government officials would listen. The next week there were 20, the week after that 30; by June, 100 showed up. They decided to march in protest every week on Thursday afternoons. The police harassed them at gunpoint and kicked them. At first the military regime ignored them, calling them “the crazy women of the Plaza del Mayo.” But the movement grew. Over 2,000 gathered in the square in December 1977. International attention now focused on a movement with one simple and compelling question: What have you done to our children? As the movement grew, more mothers were beaten and harassed; some were killed. But their courage inspired other Argentines to begin protesting against the regime. By mid-1981, a general strike was supported by 1 million Argentines. They helped undermine civil support for the regime, which collapsed by 1983. One mother explained the initial motivation: “Our desire to find our sons was stronger than our fright.”

In Brazil and Chile, as well, civilian organizations played important roles in the transition to democracy. Although clearly citizens’ movements did not bring down the regimes, they did play a role in growing opposition to the military regimes and the building of democracy. In Brazil, where voluntary associations and political parties were generally considered weak, the Catholic Church, believed to be the most progressive in the region, formed the early “single largest opposition force to military rule.”

In 1989, Peronist candidate Carlos Saúl Menem was elected president. The event marked the first time in recent Argentine memory that power was passed peacefully from one civilian elected president to another. Menem is currently leading a dramatic free-market economic program, which has paid off by drastically cutting inflation and spurring growth.

Argentina, like its neighbors, still faces vestiges of authoritarian practices that stand in the way of a full consolidation of democracy. In addition to sporadic actions by military factions, attacks and death threats have occurred against journalists criticizing President Menem. The leader of the journalists’ union in Argentina reports that in the nearly four years of Menem’s rule, 139 writers have received threats and 50 were physically assaulted.

Although Menem has been criticized for ruling by decree to get his economic program moving forward, the economic revolution that he has brought to a country racked by astronomical levels of in-

Raúl Alfonsín, representing the Radical party, beat the Peronist candidate. Under the new civilian government, press controls were lifted and political opposition flourished. Alfonsín faced an enormous task: the economy was in shambles, political institutions were weak, and the cost of military repression had been high. Alfonsín’s poor management of the economy drew criticism: a weak, and the cost of military repression spun out of control. On the other hand, he bucked the military by taking strong actions to reduce defense expenditures and bring to trial the leaders of the Dirty War. Alfonsín weathered three separate rebellions led by a renegade military faction known as the carapintadas, the painted faces. The civilian government, with the support of the military, held; military rule had been clearly discredited.

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ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE

A long and gradual transition

Brazil, Latin America’s largest and most populous country, also had a long history of instability with weak political parties and institutions. Authoritarian military regimes alternated with civilian governments for years. In the early 1960s, as social mobilization increased and the economy faltered, the military ousted President João Goulart with substantial popular backing and installed a military government. After a period of economic stabilization, Brazil began a tremendous spurt of economic growth known as the Brazilian miracle.

In the political sphere, hard-liners in the military were pushing to crack down further on left-wing activity. The regime developed the region’s most sophisticated internal intelligence apparatus, the SNI, for spying on and torturing those it considered opponents. The SNI had the legal right to have an office in every government department, state company and university. The intense methods of policing and the slowdown in the economic “miracle” in later years cost the regime much of its civilian support. A number of military leaders were anxious about their declining public prestige and the toll that running a government was putting on the armed forces’ principal job—military defense. Moderate elements of the military sought civilian allies in order to isolate the hard-liners and restore the armed forces to their principal role as a military institution.

Beginning with the new military regime of Ernesto Geisel in 1974, Brazil underwent a long period of desentão, or decompression. In contrast to Argentina and Chile, elements of the Brazilian military were directly involved in negotiating and guiding the transition to democracy. Geisel helped lead a gradual liberalization of the regime, granting political rights slowly over time. First, congressional elections were permitted and press censorship was eased. Through this decade-long process, civilian groups, in particular the Church through local Christian-Based Communities, pressured the government for further liberalization. The decompression process alternated back and forth, with the opposition pushing for a return of the rule of law and the military insisting on holding on to arbitrary powers to keep control of the process. An amnesty for those accused or convicted of political crimes since 1961, including the military, left and right, was approved by the Congress in 1979. As a result of the new law, exiles flooded back to Brazil. Opponents of liberalization conducted a campaign of violence, bombings and terrorism in 1980 and 1981. In 1982, direct elections for the state governorships were held.

A key turning point came in 1985, when, for the first time in 21 years, the electoral college voted in a civilian president, Tancredo Neves, with José Sarney as his vice-president. Both had good relationships with the military. Neves died suddenly, and Sarney became the first civilian president in 21 years. Civilian groups led a broad-based campaign for direct elections, Directas Ja. In 1989 Brazil saw its first direct presidential election. The winner was Fernando Collor de Mello, a relative unknown who led a coalition of conservative parties. Reflecting on the transition, Brazil expert Thomas Skidmore notes, “No observer of contemporary Latin American politics could fail to be impressed by Brazil’s relatively smooth transition away from a military-dominated regime.” Moderates in the military had collaborated with civilians to bring it about. Democratic elections were put in place, press censorship ended, and civil society opened up.

Brazilian democracy, though, has gone through serious challenges, heightened by economic troubles. One of the greatest challenges was the corruption scandal involving President Collor: he was implicated in a $55 million graft and influence-peddling scheme and refused to resign. The Brazilian Congress successfully impeached and removed him—a feat unparalleled in the hemisphere—without provoking a breakdown of the system. The new president, Itamar Franco, faces formidable constraints in stabilizing the Brazilian economy and addressing one of the most unequal income distributions in the region.

As in Argentina and Chile, the Brazilian transition process is incomplete. Restoring the rule of law is clearly imperative. Human-rights groups report torture and ill-treatment by the police. Human-rights workers, rural leaders and Indian leaders have been repeatedly threatened with death. Another serious target is street children, gunned down to “clean up the streets” or eliminate witnesses. Vigilante “death squads” linked to the police and financed by local merchants have been responsible for the deaths of thousands of street children. Estimates for 1992 are that four children are murdered a day, 1,500 a year. Freedom House reported that the judicial system, reflecting the political system as a whole, is “chronically corrupt,” although Freedom House finds the court displayed remarkable independence in fending off Collor’s attempts to manipulate the judicial process. Brazil, like Argentina and Chile, is now moving to “consolidate” democracy. All three face the challenge of keeping the process going. Nonetheless, the successes during the transition period are undeniable. Press and political freedoms have been restored and free elections held for all levels of government.

Challenges to democracy

There are a number of challenges confronting democracy-building in Argentina, Brazil and Chile: the role of the military; governance and corruption; and economic and social instability.

Role of the Military. Keeping the military forces in the barracks and out of politics is particularly critical in the ABC countries. Latin America specialist...
Alfred Stepan points out that the key concerns of the military in the transition phase are to retain their high level of special advantages and to avoid la revancha, or revenge, for years of human-rights abuses. All three countries have agreed on some form of amnesty for the military for past crimes. Only Argentina, under President Alfonsin, undertook trials of top military officers. But no country has avoided difficult confrontations with the military. They have faced, in various degrees, shows of force by the military, coup rumors or, in Argentina’s case, attacks by military factions.

Scholars differ on how great a threat the militaries in Argentina, Brazil and Chile now pose to civilian governments. With the decay of communism and the worldwide movement toward democracy, the international environment is much less supportive of military rule. Few would disagree, though, that given the record of past military intervention, it is an area that requires special vigilance in all three countries.

**Governance and Corruption.** Throughout Latin America, the twin problems of establishing functioning democratic systems of government at all levels and weeding out corruption have come to the forefront. Corruption is not just a phenomenon of civilian governments; indeed, there was reportedly large-scale corruption under military governments. But in more-open societies with free presses, corruption is being exposed. In Brazil and Argentina, political leaders or their close associates have been tainted by corruption; in Brazil, there is a widening scandal involving congressional leaders. Judicial reform has not kept pace with economic reform, imposing challenges for the period ahead. Privatization, according to a number of analysts, could help wrest corrupting power from state hands.

**Economic and Social Instability.** Improving conditions for the poor and economic performance overall are challenges for all three countries. Current problems stem from a long history of state economic intervention and mismanagement, accentuated by the austerity and reform programs enacted under the new civilian governments. According to the World Bank, Latin America—and Brazil in particular—has among the most unequal distributions of income in the world. While Marxism has been discredited around the world, some fear that populist authoritarianism is a potential temptation in the region. It is the new economic and social challenges, many scholars believe, that are the most pressing and difficult ones faced by democratic governments.

### The economic revolution

**Chile, Argentina and to a lesser extent Brazil are undergoing an economic, free-market "revolution" as sweeping and as challenging as the democratic political revolution.** What exactly is the relationship between the political and economic revolutions in the ABC countries and elsewhere? Should economic and political reform be pursued together or are economic reform and stability prerequisites for political reform? Some point to the former Soviet Union as an example of the error of opening up a closed political system without first setting the economic house in order. They note that Chile pursued economic reform before tackling political reform. In Argentina and Brazil it is the newly elected democratic governments that have undertaken economic reform along with political reforms. While it is difficult to generalize due to each country’s unique economic and social conditions, many Latin Americans countries, the ABC countries included, start from a similar point: a rejection of the old state-led economies and populism, which clearly failed them.

**Old state-led economies**

Beginning in the 1950s, nearly all of Latin America moved to highly protectionist, state-led economies. The state became the “engine” and owner of industries from steel mills, to airlines, to oil companies. The push to have the state, not the private sector, develop these industries was based on a theory of development that argued that Third World countries could only industrialize by a comprehensive strategy to keep foreign investors and competition out and use the economic largess of the state to create national companies. A model called the “import substitution strategy” was developed by Latin American economists. Under that strategy, protectionist walls were kept high to keep out foreign competition, and the state created new indus-
tries to serve domestic markets and export to foreign nations. The state played a major role in industrial development and regulation. In many cases it created artificially high exchange rates.

For a while the strategy seemed to be working. Huge steel and manufacturing complexes were created. Brazil, in particular, had very high rates of growth—an average of 11% per year from 1968 to 1974, and the region as a whole saw improvements in health, education, and literacy. But import substitution compelled governments to borrow heavily to feed state industries, and the result was domestic products that often cost more than foreign ones.

In the 1970s, the region, like the rest of the world, was hit with two sharp oil-price increases. The billions of dollars earned by the oil-rich countries were recycled through Western commercial banks, and Latin America became a main market for the lending of “petrodollars.” Argentina, Brazil, and Chile became regular clients. This new lending, combined with poor economic performance and mismanagement, led to an explosive economic crisis. The new civilian president, Alfonsin, was not able to stabilize the economy. He tried several plans to control hyperinflation to no avail. Inflation peaked at 4,924% in 1989. With inflation out of control, Argentina defaulted on its international debts, and economic production fell. The New York Times reported, “Not surprisingly, the Argentine economy shrank 25% in the 1980s, more than any other in Latin America with the exception of Nicaragua and Guyana.”

Only Chile initiated reforms for developing a private-sector-based economy during this period. The military cut government spending, laid off workers and reduced subsidies to industry. Short-term costs were high, the foundation was laid for economic growth in the future.

Throughout Latin America, the burden of austerity measures fell heaviest on the poor, through higher prices and greater unemployment. In Brazil the number of people who were poor increased by 10 million.
The free-market transformation that is now taking place in Argentina and Chile, in particular, and Brazil to a much lesser extent, is as dramatic as the democratic revolution itself. Contrary to concerns of economists that democratic governments might not be able to undertake such politically difficult and risky reforms, they have made tough choices and borne the pain of economic reform. Of the ABC countries, Chile is distinct in beginning the reform process under a military government.

Chile led the way in the 1980s and is often cited as the region’s success story for “neo-liberal” transformation. Chile’s markets were opened to foreign competition, and many state industries and services were privatized, including the social security system. Chile is trying to be a “Latin American tiger,” modeled after the export-led economies of Southeast Asia. The government dismissed many state employees and diversified exports, particularly wood and pulp products, fresh fruit and other agricultural products, to reach new markets. Certain important industries, such as copper mining, have remained in state hands.

Chile’s hard work has paid off: in 1992, the nation registered an enviable 10.4% growth rate, one of the highest worldwide, with an unemployment level at an equally coveted 4.5%. In early 1993, growth slowed to a still enviable 8.3% rate.

Chile’s transformation, however, has come with social costs. The poor have paid the highest price for the adjustment—higher food costs and reduced wages. About 40% of the population is below the poverty line of $200 a month for a family of four. But the new democratic government has launched strong antipoverty efforts, financed by a tax increase. The new funds are concentrated on affordable housing, health care, education and microenterprise development. Its antipoverty strategy has been called one of the world’s best by the United Nations.

Argentina’s transformation went through stages under current President Menem. A Peronist, Menem surprised the nation by implementing a very non-Peronist program of free-market reform. By nearly all accounts, Argentina is implementing one of the most far-reaching privatization and reform plans in Latin America. Nearly everything has been privatized—the state airlines, the telephone company, the railroads and television stations. Menem abolished 36 regulatory agencies, lifted import restrictions and cut the government work force by 20%.

Menem’s first economic plan was considered bold but a bit haphazard. The turnaround came in the second phase under current Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo, who built a more comprehensive plan of large privatizations, increased tax collections and abolished export taxes. A key move came in early 1991 with the adoption of a “convertibility” scheme, making one Argentine peso equivalent to one U.S. dollar. The major achievement has been the dramatic decrease in inflation. Average annual consumer-price inflation dropped from 2,314% in 1990 to 24.9% in 1992. High growth rates have been achieved, with an average of 8.7% in 1992. Inflation in the single digits was predicted for 1993. Decisions on economic reform were often taken by executive decree, however, because of difficulties getting measures through the Argentine congress, and the speed and lack of control over the process have offered opportunities for corruption.

Of the three nations, Brazil’s economic reforms are the slowest-moving and its economic performance in key areas is poor. Many feel Brazil’s commitment to reform is erratic. In the past seven years, Brazil has had five successive stabilization plans with varying success. Trade liberalization has been much slower and more cautious than in either Argentina or Chile. Brazil has the highest inflation rate in all of Latin America—1,009% in 1992—and one of the highest in the world. The economy did not grow at all in 1992, although healthier economic growth was expected in 1993. Economic management has been hampered by poor political management. President Collor de Mello ran into serious corruption charges, which cost him his job. In what has jokingly been called “economic musical chairs,” President Itamar Franco is on his fourth finance minister in a little over a year since taking office. This lack of continuity has made economic policy difficult. The most recent economic team under Fernando Cardoso is also having its difficulties.

As the tenth largest economy in the world, though, Brazil clearly has a strong base on which to build. Export growth and agriculture are areas of strength; auto production is at record levels. Brazil has been trying to resurrect a standby agreement with the IMF, but the concern in the fall of 1993 was that the country was still not meeting the economic targets.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile

A pressing and serious problem confronting Brazil is deteriorating social conditions. As the largest and most ethnically diverse of the Latin American countries, Brazil has been facing an explosive social situation. Brazil has the highest per capita income in Latin America, but the richest 20% of Brazilians earn 26 times what the poorest 20% earn. Brazil’s 26:1 ratio far exceeds the U.S. at 9:1 or India at 5:1. Crime and poverty are serious problems. In the capital city of Rio de Janeiro, where 5.5 million people live, everyday an average of 10 people are killed and 100 cars are stolen.

Overall, a dramatic economic revolution has occurred in Argentina and Chile, in particular. Some worry that a rise in exchange rates or shakiness in some portfolio investments could weaken economic performance. But so far, high growth rates and containment of hyper-inflation have rendered these countries big winners.

Reconnecting with the world

The twin economic and political revolutions that Argentina, Chile and to a lesser extent Brazil are undergoing have brought forward a new relationship with the outside world. Each one is participating in an increasingly competitive international marketplace as well as participating in a more democratic community of nations.

New international role

The most visible sign of a change in the external relations of the Southern Cone is in the primacy of economic relations. For the free-market reforms enacted in the region to work requires open trading relations and borders open to investment. Foreign trade—both inside and outside the region—is more actively encouraged.

The countries of the Southern Cone—not only Argentina, Brazil and Chile, but also the two smaller countries, Paraguay and Uruguay—have often had difficult relations with each other. Nonetheless, four of these countries have set out to create a free-trade area. The Treaty of Asunción was signed in March 1991, establishing Mercosur, the Spanish acronym for the Southern Cone Common Market, among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. Mercosur’s goal is to establish a free-trade area by January 1, 1995. Some trade barriers have come down and trade has increased. Mercosur also encourages the physical integration of the countries, including the construction of a new superhighway and bridges, establishing hydrofoil service, and promoting the sharing of consulates abroad. In May 1993, the presidents of Argentina and Brazil agreed to uphold the timetable and objectives of Mercosur. The biggest issue facing Mercosur is agreement on a common external tariff for all four countries.

Chile is outside of Mercosur for the moment, although there is hope that it will ultimately join. It has stayed out on the grounds that the other countries’ economic policies still have a long way to go to be compatible with its own. Chile has progressed steadily in creating international links with other countries pursuing free-market policies. In the beginning of 1992, a free-trade agreement between Chile and Mexico came into force, with a common 10% tariff between them that is to fall to zero by 1996. Chile has also been invited to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, one of the richest groups of trading nations in the world. Japanese investors have been particularly interested in the highly competitive Chilean economy. While the U.S. is still the top exporter to Chile, Chile exported slightly more to Japan (16.7%) in 1992 than to the U.S. (16.1%). The most talked about free-trade area for Chile is one with the U.S. The Clinton Administration, like the Bush Administration before it, has argued that Chile has made the right reforms and is a prime candidate for a free-trade agreement with the U.S. after the completion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta).

Relations with the U.S.

Past U.S. relations with the former military dictatorships of the Southern Cone have been rocky. Through most of the cold-war period, the U.S. sent a variety of mixed messages to the Southern Cone dictatorships. A number of Administrations embraced them. The Nixon Administration provided the new Pinochet government with aid. The Carter Administration canceled aid to Argentina over its human-rights violations, and its relations with Brazil were icy due to its nuclear policy. The Reagan Administration decided the human-rights policies of the Carter Administration and largely supported the Southern Cone dictatorships. However, in its later years, the Reagan Administration took a stronger pro-democracy stand and supported aid for the “No”-to-Pinochet campaign.

With the advent of democracy in the region, better relations with all three countries were restored. Under President George Bush, economic policy achieved primacy. In 1990, the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative was announced, setting the long-term goal of creating a free-trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. In addition to trade, the initiative has two other components: debt and investment. Specifically, the debt initiative provided relief from debt owed to the U.S. government, and the investment initiative created a new Multilateral Investment Fund with U.S., Japanese, European and Latin American contributions to promote private-sector development in the region. Chile has already received debt-relief under the Brady plan (named for a former Treasury secretary) and the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, and plans are now being made for MIF aid to Chile and Argentina. On balance, Latin America scholar Abraham Lowenthal argues, “Latin America’s interest in prospective regional partnerships was aroused, but the U.S. under Bush was not able to deliver much.” Lowenthal explains the shortfall as being largely due to domestic difficulties facing the U.S., including recession and opposition among domestic groups to investment south of the border.

President Bill Clinton faces a new opportunity in relations with Argentina, Brazil and Chile. A State Department official announced in a May 1993 speech that “President Clinton is committed to forging a true partnership of the Americas—a Western Hemisphere community of democracies—-to strengthen democratic institutions, to defend human rights, to fight for social justice, to support economic reform and free markets, and to protect the environment.” The Administration has responded to threats against new democracies in Haiti and Guatemala.

The Clinton Administration has indicated that it intends to move forward...
with free-trade agreements with Chile, Argentina and then Venezuela after Nafta's adoption. President Clinton outlined the overall vision in a speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: "The real job gains from Nafta come when we take that agreement (Nafta)...to Chile, to Argentina, to Colombia, to Venezuela, to the other market-oriented democracies in Latin America and create a consumer market of 700 million people, soon to be over 1 billion people in the next century."

There are a number of more-sector-specific subsidies of agricultural products. Intellectual property rights—the protection of U.S. patents and copyrights in foreign markets—have been an important concern, particularly in Brazil. At the same time, environmental differences are likely to increase, particularly with regard to Brazil, which holds the world’s largest remaining reserves of tropical forest, rapidly being destroyed.

After years of acrimony, U.S.-Latin American relations are in a much stronger position. As Secretary of State Warren Christopher explained, "there is an unprecedented convergence of goals and values among all the people of the Americas." Similar sentiments are echoed by Latin American leaders. Argentine President Menem stated in 1993 that "Never before have relations between the U.S. and Argentina been better."

Just how far greater regional ties can go in the short term is debatable. Lowenthal concludes: "There is greater convergence in the Americas, North and South, on political values and economic fundamentals than ever before, but a hemispheric political community is far from achievement."

**U.S. policy options**

- **Should the U.S. move forward with free-trade agreements with the Southern Cone countries?**
  - **Yes:** Argentina, Brazil and Chile are among the most dynamic economies of South America. The Chilean economy presents none of the major concerns associated with Mexico. It is much smaller, the immigration problem is nonexistent, it offers an important export market for U.S. goods and services and a window onto the larger South American market. Argentina, as a larger economy, offers even greater export possibilities. Most important, free-trade arrangements would help consolidate the democratic transitions in these countries and shore up badly bruised relations with Latin America over the difficult fight in the U.S. over Nafta.
  - **No:** The divisiveness of the Nafta debate in Congress and the country demonstrates that Americans are deeply divided over the merits of opening up free trade with the low-wage developing countries to the south. The U.S. should not offer more incentives for companies to invest outside the U.S. when its own workers are in such trouble. The Nafta agreement should not be extended to other countries until the U.S. has strengthened its own economy. There are other ways for the U.S. to offer its support to the democracies of the Southern Cone than by mortgaging its own economic future.

- **Should the U.S. do more to support the democratic transitions in Argentina, Brazil and Chile?**
  - **Yes:** With almost two thirds of the population of South America, these countries are a linchpin for the whole region. The military uprisings, the instability arising from corruption scandals, and the pressing social needs of the ABC countries demonstrate that the democratic process is fragile. The U.S. needs to indicate its support for strengthening civilian rule through targeted economic assistance in key areas, trade and investment promotion, greater contacts with regional militaries and social organizations, and diplomatic support. The U.S. cannot just wait until a crisis arises, for in many cases that is too late.
  - **No:** Democracy-building is an important foreign policy priority, but the U.S. cannot afford to be totally involved in all democracies. The U.S. is currently overwhelmed with international crises around the globe: Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, the former Soviet Union. Should a crisis erupt in any of these countries, the U.S. would surely be there leading the fight to restore democracy, as it has done in Guatemala and Haiti. Actions in the absence of a crisis are unnecessary and stretch diplomatic resources. Given all the other world crises, the Southern Cone cannot be an immediate priority for the U.S.
ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE

Discussion Questions

1. The Southern Cone countries have a history of political instability and military intervention. How firmly is democracy rooted in these three countries? Is there a danger of reversal in any of the countries?

2. If the military overthrew the present government in Argentina, Brazil or Chile, how should the U.S. react? Should the U.S. send in troops? Send warships to enforce an embargo, as it did in the case of Haiti?

3. If your children or parents had been tortured and killed under a military dictatorship, would you have supported granting amnesty to the torturers? Did Argentina, Brazil and Chile take too soft a line on military crimes or did they have little choice?

4. Now that the cold war has ended, does the U.S. have any national interests at stake in Latin America? Should the U.S. maintain a special relationship with Argentina, Brazil and Chile?

5. Do you believe that the same concerns about a free-trade area with Mexico are valid for a free-trade area with Chile, or Argentina or Brazil? Are the implications for U.S. jobs the same?

6. What would be the advantages—or disadvantages—for the U.S. of establishing a free-trade area with Chile, as proposed, and later including Argentina and Brazil?

Readings and Resources


Loveman, Brian, “Misión Cumplida? Civil-Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition.” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, Fall 1991, pp. 35–74. (Available from The North-South Center/The University of Miami, P.O. Box 248205, Coral Gables, Fla. 33124-3027.) The author argues that the transition is incomplete and more needs to be done to assert true civilian rule.


North American Congress on Latin America, 475 Riverside Dr., Suite 454, New York, N.Y 10115; (212) 870-3146. ■ Conducts research on Latin America, including contemporary affairs. Offers reference materials, training, conferences, audiovisuals and a biannual newsletter, Tolas.

Tulane University, Center for Latin American Studies, 319 Griner Hall, Gainesville, Fla. 32611; (904) 392-0375. ■ Promotes teaching and research on Latin America and the Caribbean. Sponsors conferences and offers curriculum material and a newsletter; has staff available to speak.

University of New Mexico, Center for Latin American Studies, 801 Yale, N.E., Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131; (505) 277-6839. ■ Monitors Latin American wire services and print media and produces four on-line publications.

Islam and politics: Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia

Three North African governments are under siege by Islamic militants. Why is this happening? How will it end?

by Lawrence G. Potter

NEW YORK CITY, JULY 2, 1993: Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman (center) surrenders to U.S. immigration officials. Some of his followers were implicated in the World Trade Center bombing.

On February 26, 1993, the World Trade Center in New York City was bombed, leaving six dead and over a thousand injured. The attack appears to have been the work of Islamic radicals inspired by a blind Egyptian cleric, Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. The attack shattered Americans' illusions that distance somehow guaranteed them immunity to the volatile mix of religion and politics that has long plagued the Middle East.

Seven months later, on September 13, the leaders of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) met with President Bill Clinton on the White House lawn and shook hands, opening a new chapter in Middle Eastern history.

The two epic events were directly related to the rising tide of political Islam and its violent fringe groups. A driving force behind the Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation was a concern shared by leaders of both Israel and the PLO that time was running out. If they did not act soon, they feared, growing support for Islamic forces that reject the peace process could permanently block the way. A common sense of vulnerability that they themselves could be overthrown by Islamic militants now has united leaders as different as Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, Syria's President Hafez al-Assad and Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak.

The peace agreement between Israel and the PLO has almost universal support among Middle Eastern governments. And for now, at least, those opposed to rule by religious activists—as in Iran—still prevail in the Middle East. Nevertheless, this may be changing. Those supporting Islamic rule have been growing in numbers. The resurgence has been particularly dramatic in three North African countries, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia. Until recently, governments in those nations had sought accommodation with some Islamic opposition groups, but now they are locked in deadly confrontation.

What accounts for this religious revival throughout the Islamic world, in particular in North Africa? Why has it sometimes taken a violent turn? U.S. policymakers face a dilemma in responding to this phenomenon. They are accustomed to dealing with sovereign states, not transnational movements. The West "is even more apprehensive about Islam than it was about communism, because while it knows how to deal with material challenges, it has no idea how to go about facing a spiritual challenge," according to Hassan al-Turabi, head of Sudan's National Islamic Front.

In the new Middle East, the Clinton Administration must decide how to help its allies in the region deal with the threat of militant Islam. At the same time it must consider how strongly to press those governments to implement U.S. foreign policy priorities such as democracy and human rights.

Roots of revival

The Islamic resurgence is part of a broader worldwide movement in which people, disaffected from their govern-
ISLAM AND POLITICS

SELECTED INDICATORS

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EGYPT</th>
<th>ALGERIA</th>
<th>TUNISIA</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita GNP ($U.S.)</td>
<td>$620</td>
<td>$2,020</td>
<td>$1,510</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy (years)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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</tbody>
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ments and feeling threatened by the erosion of traditional values, turn to religion as a source of identity. This has occurred among Hindus in India, Jews in Israel and Eastern Orthodox Christians in Russia. The process of modernization, which took centuries in the West, has been compressed in much of the rest of the world, including the Middle East and North Africa. “The contemporary Islamic revival is a special response to the particular conditions of the late 20th century and must be seen in the context of the conflicts and challenges of the modern world,” according to Professor John O. Voll of the University of New Hampshire.

Historically, there have been periodic calls by Muslims for renewal and reform of the faith. The present revival had its roots in the late 18th century, when the Wahhabis, a militant group in the Arabian peninsula, sought to purify Islam by going back to its origins, interpreting the Koran (Quran), considered the Word of God, literally and abandoning devotional practices not sanctioned by the Prophet Muhammad. In the 19th century, Europeans conquered much of the Islamic world, and this stimulated a profound debate among Muslims as to the reasons for their powerlessness. Many concluded that their political decline was rooted in a lack of faith. They regarded the time when Muhammad established a state in 7th-century Arabia and united religious and political leadership as a “Golden Age,” and they sought to recapture it.

In the late 1800s a number of other reform movements sprang up, led by so-called Islamic modernists. These were lay political thinkers, not religious scholars, or ulema, who tried to strengthen the Islamic community by emphasizing the compatibility of Islam with reason and science. Also at this time the idea of pan-Islam, or a political union of Islamic coun-

tries, gained favor. Islamic modernism’s primary appeal was to the educated elite, however, and by World War I they were turning to new definitions of political identity. Islamic modernism had failed as a political force, but it exerted an intellectual influence on later reformers.

The modern Middle East

The post-World War I breakup of the Ottoman Empire, which had ruled large parts of the Middle East and North Africa for five centuries, gave rise to a number of new states. Creations of European powers, some of these countries, like Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, had no historical basis and found it difficult to forge a sense of national identity. People found themselves arbitrarily joined with members of different religious, tribal and linguistic groups. Their only common denominators were Islam or “Arabness.”

European influence peaked in the period between World Wars I and II. The British in Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan and Iraq, and the French in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia), Syria and Lebanon, exercised hegemony over much of the region. Of the major countries in the Middle East, only two—Persia (renamed Iran in 1935) and Turkey—retained their independence.

The most powerful ideological current at that time was secular nationalism, as exemplified by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (president of Turkey, 1923–38) and Reza Pahlavi (shah of Iran, 1925–41). Both men did much to modernize their countries’ economies and military establishments. In the process they created a wide gap between the ruling elite and the people, between leaders and the more religious masses. Although the shah forbade the veiling of women and pressed the ulema, the clergy retained the popular allegiance of most Iranians, as demonstrated at the time of the revolution in 1978–79.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, was the first modern Islamic movement to attract mass support. This movement emphasized that Islam was more than a religion: it was a comprehensive system for conducting one’s life. By combining social activism with a rejection of the materialism of the West and opposition to British imperialism, it had broad appeal among the poor as well as the urban middle class. (It established schools, factories and mosques.)

After World War II, Arab socialism was the prevailing political ideology in Egypt, Algeria and other Arab countries. This did not prevent the new elite from invoking Islam to justify secular goals, which showed the strong continuing influence of Islamic modernism. President Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956–70), for example, regularly obtained legal decrees (fatwas) from the ulema to give his policies the tincture of religious legitimacy. The Muslim Brotherhood was suppressed in 1954 after being accused of trying to assassinate Nasser but has continued to be an important force in Egyptian politics down to the present day.

The end of ideology

Israel’s defeat of the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria in the Six-Day War of 1967 was a bitter blow to Arab self-esteem. It resulted in the loss of the West Bank of the Jordan river and the eastern part of the city of Jerusalem, which had been under Jordanian administration for two decades. It also set off a period of soul-searching as to what had gone wrong. The ineptitude of Arab armies was revealed, and many Arabs felt their governments had failed them. The Palestinians, seeking their own state, concluded that it was time to take matters into their own hands, and some turned to terrorism to gain the world’s attention.

Many others in the region concluded that Israel had won because Jews were more faithful than they were to their religious tradition. Islam, Muslims believed, had led them to a glorious civilization in the past, and, if properly followed, could do so again. Muslims’ disillusionment with their leaders went hand in hand with a general disenchantment with the West and all of its “isms,” including liberalism, capitalism, socialism and communism. In their search for a guiding ideology, many rediscovered Islam: it provided a comprehensive, culturally authentic worldview that was not tainted by association with the West.

Some Muslim successes, such as the

KEY TO ACRONYMS

FIS: Islamic Salvation Front (Algerian)
FLN: National Liberation Front (Algerian)
MTI: Islamic Tendency Movement (Tunisian)
PLO: Palestine Liberation Organization
creditable performance by Arab armies in their war with Israel in 1973 and the associated Arab oil embargo (which caused turmoil in the West), were signs that the fortunes of the Islamic world were on the upswing at last. The Iranian revolution at the end of the decade appeared to demonstrate that Islamic forces could triumph over those of an impious, autocratic ruler closely allied with the U.S.

**Fundamentalists**

Islamic fundamentalism is a term that has been loosely applied to the Islamic religious revival, to Islam as a political force, and to terrorism conducted in the name of Islam. The word fundamentalist has also been used to describe such widely dissimilar governments as those of Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Libya, whose people practice the predominant Sunni form of the Islamic religion. Iran, whose people belong to the minority Shiite branch of the faith, has also been called fundamentalist.

The word fundamentalism (which has no equivalent in Arabic) originated as a term to describe a small group of American Protestant evangelicals in the early 20th century who rejected liberalism and modernity. Indeed, "fundamentalism...is one of the responses of organized religion to the unique challenges posed to traditional societies and belief systems by modernity," according to R. Scott Appleby, associate director of The Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. “[Fundamentalists] are dedicated, sometimes fierce, opponents of the modern world’s elevation of human reason, material goods and historical processes to the level of ultimate meaning and value.” A term currently in favor among Muslim groups themselves and used by outside experts is Islamist.

Many Islamists would like to see the Sharia, or Islamic law, replace Western legal codes. This medieval law code, whose main sources are the Koran and the practices (Sunna) and traditions (Hadith) of the Prophet, however, fails to address explicitly a multitude of contemporary issues. Nevertheless it has been interpreted, for example, to forbid the payment of interest on bank accounts and, in Saudi Arabia, to ban women from driving. Although the Koran prohibits usury, it does not call for veiling and seclusion of women. These are practices that arose in the early Islamic community.

The Islamic revival is manifested in a genuine increase in personal religiosity among many Muslims. This is evident in the increased adoption of “Islamic” garb, including beards for men and veiling for women, the banning of alcohol and rising mosque attendance. At the same time, there have been mounting protests against Western cultural influence, including sexually suggestive clothing, magazines and movies. A tendency to reject the West and to blame their troubles on Westerners is common among Islamists. In the Middle East today, Islam has moved from what had for decades appeared to be a peripheral position to an undeniably central one.

**Radical Islam**

A majority of Islamists seek to change their societies peacefully; those who advocate violence are in the minority. Some employ violence in response to government repression; when denied electoral victories, as in Algeria, they may take up arms. Islamic radicals believe that leaders and governments who do not share their interpretation of the Sharia are illegitimate, and they are obliged to wage holy war (jihad) against them. Such sentiments, and objections to the spread of modern ways in Saudi Arabia, lay behind the attempted takeover of the Great Mosque in Mecca in November 1979.

Islamic radicals regard the West as seeking to dominate Muslims and see Israel as an oppressive outpost of colonialism. Activists, such as the Hezbollah, or Party of God, in Lebanon (thought to be behind the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983), believe they have a religious duty to wage war on infidels and have persistently opposed peace with Israel.

Although they attract attention, Islamic radicals are no more typical of most Muslims than Provisional Irish Republican Army terrorists are of most Irish Catholics. "There is indeed an Islamic revolution occurring in many parts of the Muslim world," according to Professor John L. Esposito of Georgetown University. "However, the most significant and pervasive revolution is not that of bombs and hostages, but of clinics and schools. It is dominated by social activists (teachers, doctors, lawyers, dentists) and preachers
rather than warriors. The battle is often one of the pen, tongue and heart rather than the sword. Radicalism and terrorism, though capturing the headlines, are a very small though at times deadly part of a phenomenon characterized more by a broad-based religio-social revolution which has affected most Muslim societies.”

Islam vs. the West

The Islamic revival came as a great surprise to Western analysts, who had believed that as a nation modernizes the role of religion recedes. It also came as a shock to the regional leadership and the elites, schooled in the West, who did not see the storm gathering before their eyes and found themselves prime targets. The overthrow of the shah of Iran in 1979 by a coalition of forces led by the Shiite cleric, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, provided graphic evidence that a religious resurgence was under way. This was followed by the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat (1970–81) by a secret organization that called itself Holy War. Partly out of fear that Iran would export its revolution, most Arab states and the U.S. backed Iraq in the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War. The war ended in a stalemate, much to the relief of countries that feared an Iranian victory, and the Iranian revolution has not been replicated elsewhere.

After the defeat of Iraq by a United Nations coalition in the Persian Gulf war of 1991, the power of Islamic groups (some of which had supported Iraqi President Saddam Hussein) seemed slight next to the victorious armies of the “moderate” Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. However, the rising popular demand for participation in the political process has benefited Islamists. With the revolution in communications technology helping to turn the world into a global village, Middle Easterners are aware of political changes in the next country and the next continent, and they feel they are due for a change themselves. Participation in the political system is the rallying cry of Islamists and anathema to most governments.

Given the opportunity, most Islamists will participate in elections, and they have already joined parliaments in Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait and Lebanon. Islamic groups offer the only alternative to autocracy in many Middle Eastern countries where there are no viable secular opposition parties. In Algeria, the Islamic Salvation Front won almost half the votes cast in parliamentary elections in December 1991 and would probably have won the runoff elections in January 1992, if the military had not canceled them. In Jordan, on the other hand, Islamists were trounced in elections last November.

Some more-secular Middle Easterners believe governments should invite Islamists to share power so that the impracticality of their programs will be revealed and they will be forced to share blame for unpopular policies. This is already happening in Iran. Others are opposed, fearing that, if given power, Islamists would impose an intolerant version of the Sharia. “I believe freedom should not be given to the enemies of freedom,” says Hussein Amin, a former Egyptian ambassador to Algeria. Mubarak: growing discontent

In an attempt to defuse Egyptian anger over poor economic and social conditions, Mubarak, the successor to Sadat and current president, gave Islamists more freedom to operate. He allowed Muslim Brotherhood supporters to run for seats in parliament, and they were very successful in local elections in 1987. While not a legal political party, they now constitute the largest opposition bloc. Muslim Brotherhood activists control key professional syndicates, notably those for lawyers, doctors, engineers and journalists. They are also influential in the media and the educational system, as well as among student groups on campuses. The organization criticizes the government for human-rights abuses, corruption and the lack of democracy. It has also denounced the violence of the militants, although some suspect its sincerity in doing so.

While tolerating the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood, the Egyptian government has cracked down on the militant Islamic Group, which draws its inspiration from Sheik Abdel Rahman (at present imprisoned in New York City).

The Islamic Group, originally a student wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, later broke with it and established a base of support in upper Egypt, particularly in the town of Asyut, and in the slums around the capital city of Cairo. The group propagates its ideas through schools, clinics, mosques and the charities it controls. Apart from its political agenda, the group provides social ser-

Islam in North Africa

The confrontation between Islam and the state is particularly acute in North Africa. In three case studies, strong similarities emerge: deteriorating economic conditions, the increasing politicization of the Islamists, and the fierce state response.

EGYPT

Islam vs. the state

The present confrontation between Islamic forces and the Egyptian government has been building for two decades. After the death of Nasser in 1970, his successor, Sadat, sought to legitimize his own rule by appealing to Islam. He called himself “The Believer President” and employed Islamic rhetoric and slogans. The 1973 war with Israel was portrayed as a jihad; the battle cry of the Egyptian troops was Allahu Akbar (God Is Great). Sadat also allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to function openly. Sadat calculated that the Islamic groups he was cultivating would neutralize the influence of the leftists and Nasserites who opposed his pro-Western policies.

While Sadat’s prestige rose abroad after the signing of the Camp David accords (1978) and peace treaty with Israel (1979), his support within Egypt was rapidly crumbling. His policies, which led to an “open-door” economy and a much greater U.S. presence, were criticized, as was his support for the shah of Iran. In 1979 he moved to assert greater control over Islamic institutions, especially mosques. His suppression of dissent, both religious and secular, led directly to his assassination on October 6, 1981.

The killers belonged to Holy War, an organization whose members came from all parts of Egyptian society, including the military, university students and radio and television workers. As the name implies, they believed they had to wage a Holy War against infidels, among them Sadat. Their action was to be a first step toward imposing Islamic rule in Egypt.
The U.S. and North Africa

The issues confronting the U.S.—how to deal with militant religious groups, how strongly to encourage democracy, free elections and respect for human rights—apply to countries both inside and outside the Islamic world. The countries in these case studies, Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, have each had a different pattern of relations with the U.S.

U.S. ties with North Africa go back to the earliest days of the republic. Harassment of American ships by the corsairs (pirate ships) of the Barbary Coast was the original impetus behind the formation of the U.S. Navy. It also led to a treaty between the U.S. and Algiers in 1795, under which the U.S. agreed to pay an annual tribute to safeguard its shipping. Similar treaties followed with Tripoli (the capital of present-day Libya) in 1796 and Tunis (1799). The annual tribute to Algiers was abolished in 1816, and Barbary piracy was suppressed after joint action by the European powers in 1819.

For the next 120 years, the U.S. had little reason to get involved in North Africa. With Algeria and Tunisia French colonies, and Egypt under British tutelage, the U.S. saw no reason to interfere. Only during World War II, when U.S. troops were sent to help evict Axis forces, did many Americans learn about the area. Not until the French territories reached independence was there a pressing need to formulate policies toward them.

With the notable exception of Egypt, the U.S. did not have important interests in North Africa during the cold war other than to exclude the Soviet Union and secure American lines of communication in the Mediterranean. In the new Middle East, the fact is that Algeria and Tunisia are not particularly important to the U.S. The same cannot be said of the Islamic movements.

In the past, U.S. ties with Algeria were cool—it was regarded as a Soviet client, strongly opposed to Israel and a leading anti-imperialist at the UN and in Third World forums. Economic relations were another matter, however, with the U.S. importing oil and natural gas. Algeria played an important role in negotiating an end to the Iranian hostage crisis in early 1981, for which the U.S. was grateful. But Algerians always chafed at the U.S. preference for closer relations with its neighbor and rival, the pro-West Morocco.

U.S. relations with Tunisia have traditionally been warm. The U.S. has provided about a third of independent Tunisia’s economic and military assistance, although the amount is small (around $1.4 billion in the period 1957–90). Military aid was aimed at fortifying the country against Libya. Tunisia under Bourguiba was pro-West and closely tied to France. In October 1985, an Israeli air raid on PLO headquarters in Tunis, Tunisia’s capital, provoked an anti-American outcry. For years the main U.S. concern was the stability of the government. While the succession to Bourguiba was peaceful, social problems have not been solved, so Tunisia’s future remains in question.

U.S. relations with Egypt, perhaps the most influential Arab country and closest U.S. ally in the Middle East, are another matter entirely. Ties were tense during the presidency of Nasser, a secular nationalist who promoted pan-Arabism and accepted Soviet military support. But they blossomed under President Sadat, who broke with the Soviets and signed a peace treaty with Israel. Sadat’s assassination contributed to the U.S. perception of a serious “Islamic threat” to its interests in the Middle East. Egypt has received $35 billion in U.S. financial assistance since 1975.

The U.S. regards President Mubarak as a key force for moderation. Many Americans have noted, however, that in order to defuse explosive tensions between the Cairo government and Islamists, Egypt will have to make reforms.
vices where the government’s are lacking: for example, it supplied rapid relief after a major earthquake struck Cairo in 1992.

In 1993 the Islamic Group stepped up its struggle with the state. It battled with Coptic Christians, an important minority, in Asyut, and attacked security officials and cabinet ministers throughout the country. Nobel Prize winner Naguib Mahfouz, whose novel, The Children of Our Street, was considered disrespectful of Islam, is reportedly at the top of its death list. The Islamic Group has also warned foreign tourists not to visit Egypt, and several have been killed. As a result, tourism, Egypt’s largest employer and foreign-exchange earner, experienced a 30% to 40% drop-off in business in the first half of 1993.

The crackdown
By October 1993 over 200 people had been killed in politically related violence, and the government responded forcefully, rounding up thousands of suspects. Since October 1992 militants have been tried in military courts, ensuring that their cases will be heard rapidly without possibility of appeal or problems with procedural rights. Last August, a civilian court acquitted all those charged with assassinating the speaker of parliament in 1990, finding that some confessions had been obtained by torture. In June 1993, the first executions of Islamists in a decade—since the trial of Sadat’s murderers—took place.

Many Egyptians disapprove of the violence. After the assassination of a police general in March 1993 in upper Egypt, thousands of mourners attended his funeral in protest. Some charge that Egypt’s Islamist organizations are just as authoritarian as the government. According to sociologist Sami Zubaida, “Far from being popular organizations, the Islamic associations constitute the instrument by which the Islamist current controls and directs the masses. They do not encourage or foster autonomous popular organization or action, but treat the masses as objects of religious reform and control.”

Most observers believe that military measures alone will not eradicate the problem. The support for the Islamists arises from popular frustration with rigged elections, poor job prospects and a low standard of living. The average salary of a government employee is $50 a month, and some 23% of the population live in absolute poverty, according to the United Nations Development Program. The New York Times, reflecting a commonly held view, editorialized: “Mr. Mubarak’s inbred, bureaucratic and unresponsive regime has lost touch with the needs and feelings of large numbers of ordinary Egyptians. The Islamic insurgency, fueled by the fiery rhetoric of Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman and others, has survived repression and grown as much through government incompetence as through fundamentalist fanaticism.”

In January 1993, Mubarak said that he was trying to spare Egypt the fate of Algeria. His strategy is evidently to deny Islamists a role in the political process. But by lumping all Islamists together, he risks alienating voices for moderation. Muslim Brotherhood leaders warn that any crackdown will only swell the ranks of the militants, something the government wants to avoid.

ALGERIA

Democracy aborted
In Algeria, a French colony from 1830 to 1962, Islam provided a focus of identity distinct from that of the colonizer, especially during the bitter war for independence (1954–62). Afterward, the state embarked on a socialist course under the leadership of the military and the dominant political party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), which had led the struggle against the French. Under Houari Boumediene (1965–78), the state had healthy revenues from the sale of oil and natural gas and was able to provide jobs and economic progress while exercising close control over society. It monitored Islamic activities through its Ministry of Religious Affairs, which administered an estimated 5,000 mosques.

As in Iran, the state acquired the trappings of a modernized nation, but the cultural identity of most Algerians lay in Islam. When oil revenues plunged from $13 billion per year in 1985 to $8 billion thereafter, the economy deteriorated and discontent mounted. The lack of jobs, stifling bureaucracy, poor education and government control of the media led to demands for more freedom.

As in other Islamic countries, this malaise has been increasingly expressed in a return to religion. The Iranian revolution provided a strong source of inspiration for the dispossessed and dispirited. Islamists, who had built their own network of private mosques, blamed the secular elite who had governed them for a quarter of a century for depriving them of the fruits of independence.

Riots and reforms
The government of Col. Chadli Benjedid (1979–92) attempted to impose economic reforms and introduce limited democratization. However, the measures employed were not aggressive enough to make a real difference. By 1988, when consumer subsidies were sharply curtailed, more than a quarter of the work force was unemployed. “By the end of the 1980s there was an enormous gap between revolutionary rhetoric and the oppressive nature of Algeria’s domestic political economic order,” according to Professor John P. Entelis of Fordham University.

The result was major rioting in October 1988. Some dubbed this the couscous revolt, a reference to the staple food then in short supply. The government soon regained control, and Benjedid instituted unprecedented changes to permit political pluralism. The monopoly of the FLN on senior government and military posts was ended. A new constitution of February 1989 guaranteed freedom of expression and the right to form political associations. In July 1989, a multiparty political system was approved that gave the first opportunity for the opposition, including the Islamists, to demonstrate their strength. Algeria briefly became the freest country in the Arab world.

Rise of the FIS
These riots and reforms presaged the rise of a politically powerful Islamic movement in Algeria. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), led by Abassi Madani, a university professor, quickly became the dominant political force in the country. The FIS emphasized the necessity of winning political power so it could institute Islamic government. Its style was populist. “The leaders of the FIS...speak a religious language, but this language is not theological—it is political, social and economic,” according to the Algerian sociologist Lahouari Addi. Like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the FIS carried out social-welfare activities. (It obtained significant funding from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, but this dried up due to Algerians’ support for Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf war.)
The FIS won a major victory in the June 1990 municipal and provincial elections, completely overshadowing the FLN. In December 1991 parliamentary elections, it won 188 seats out of 430. One of the losing candidates, Belaid Abdessalam (a well-known former cabinet minister), complained afterward, “I wasn’t beaten by a political party, I was beaten by God.”

The FIS victory represented a massive vote of no confidence in the Benjedid government. It did not necessarily mean a majority of Algerians wanted an Islamic government. Algeria has a long legacy of secularism, yet no strong secular party contested the election. In fact, due to low turnout, less than a quarter of registered voters actually cast ballots for the FIS, and, compared to the 1990 elections, the FIS received over a million fewer votes.

Runoff elections were scheduled for January 1992, with the FIS expected to win a parliamentary majority. However, before they could take place, the military stepped in and pressured the president to resign, annulled the elections and outlawed the FIS. Since then, Algeria has been governed by a military-dominated High State Council.

The ‘dirty war’

What would have happened if the elections had been held and the FIS had won control of parliament? Would it have respected the democratic process that led it to power? No one knows. It is clear that the FIS would have tried to establish the Sharia as the source of law and would have made social equality in employment and housing a priority. It would likely have imposed “Islamic standards” on women to ensure their modesty. Whether it would have respected the rights of secular Algerians is an open question.

Since January 1992, the Algerian government has been locked in an escalating struggle with the FIS, now transformed into a guerrilla army whose strength is estimated at 10,000 to 15,000. (Included are some 1,000 Algerian veterans of the war in Afghanistan.) The FIS has launched attacks against security forces, top government officials and leading intellectuals. The government is routinely resorting to torture in retaliation. In April 1993, in an admission of defeat, the government sent 15,000 troops to occupy Algiers. “This is an increasingly dirty war, one in which both sides have decided that normal rules of decency cannot prevail,” according to Francis Ghiles of the London Financial Times.

The government is no closer to solving the major social and economic problems that led people to vote against it in the first place. Much support for the FIS now seems to come from those disgusted with the government’s inability to stimulate economic growth and restart the political process. Even junior officers in the military have collaborated with the Islamists in some attacks. “Algerians are increasingly weary and cynical. There is widespread despair at the inability and lack of will among the country’s leaders to do anything more than remain in power through force,” commented The Middle East magazine.

Unlike Iran, where revolution was carried out in the streets, Algerian Islamists were on the brink of winning power fairly, only to have it taken away from them. By the fall of 1993, the FIS was torn by internal disputes and accused by the government of assassinating a number of public figures, including, in August, a former prime minister. The FIS has now set up a leadership in exile. So far the government has resisted pressure to negotiate with the FIS, and prospects for an end to the strife, which has resulted in over 2,000 deaths since January 1992, are poor.

TUNISIA

Continuing standoff

Tunisia, like Algeria part of French North Africa, was a protectorate from 1883 until 1956. After independence, under the leadership of President Habib Bourguiba, who had led the national struggle against the French, Tunisia denied Islamists a role in state policy. Bourguiba governed through a mass organization, the Neo-Destour party (later renamed the Destourian Socialist party). After three decades in power and with social unrest growing, Bourguiba was ousted in 1987 by Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, the current president.

Ben Ali took steps to introduce democracy and permitted Islamists more freedom, but he did not allow them to run for office. Like Sadat and Mubarak in Egypt, Ben Ali employed Islamic slogans and symbols to win Islamist support; he observed Ramadan (Islam’s annual month of fasting from dawn to sunset), and posters portrayed him in the white robes of a hajji (one who has made a pilgrimage to Mecca) during the 1989 election.

As in Egypt and Algeria, when social discontent mounted in Tunisia in the 1980s, Islamic groups became the focus of opposition to the government. They accused the French-speaking
elite, whom Bourguiba had promoted, of betraying the country and demanded the imposition of Islamic law. Their leader, Rashid Ghannouchi, founded the most important of the Islamic groups, the Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) in 1981.

Ghannouchi's group started out as a supposedly nonpolitical Koran Preservation Society, but was subsequently transformed into a political movement. Drawing members from a broad spectrum of society, Ghannouchi addressed their concerns—notably jobs, political participation and a rejection of Western cultural imperialism. He took his message to mosques and university campuses, where more and more students adopted "Islamic" garb.

Ben Ali's accession to power and his call for a multiparty system encouraged the Islamists. However, the success of MTI supporters running as independents in the 1989 elections, and the strong showing of the FIS in Algerian elections the following year, frightened the Tunis government. Ben Ali refused to legalize the MTI (in 1989 it changed its name to the Renaissance party), which prevented it from participating in elections. He claimed that doing so could lead to an Islamic state that would not respect the rights of secularly oriented Tunisians. In particular, it might try to undo the Personal Status Code, which guaranteed women's rights. (The pronouncements of the MTI on the subject of democracy were ambiguous; some members clearly opposed it.)

The government's refusal to permit the Renaissance party to participate openly in political life has led to the radicalization of the movement and increasingly violent confrontations with the state. In its crackdown, the government has been accused by Amnesty International of abusing human rights, particularly those of women whose relatives were partisans of the Renaissance party.

As in Algeria, hopes of political liberalization in Tunisia were raised and then dashed. Ben Ali has not introduced the democracy he promised upon taking office, and he rules in a dictatorial manner like his predecessor. He is expected to be a candidate in the March 1994 presidential elections and has hinted that the five legal opposition parties (not including the Islamists, who appear to have popular support) will be allowed to join parliament. As in Egypt and Algeria, the secular opposition in Tunisia so far has failed to offer a viable alternative. As in Egypt, tourism is a key sector of Tunisia's economy, providing some 20% of foreign revenues, and any escalation of the unrest would have serious consequences.

**The U.S., Islam and North Africa**

After the landmark reconciliation between Israel and the PLO last September, Middle East politics, and U.S. foreign policy, will no longer be the same. Although not a party to the secret talks that produced the agreement, the U.S. and President Clinton are to be the main guarantors of the most significant regional peace pact since the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty of 1979. The normalization of relations between Israel and neighboring Arab states–Jordan, Syria and Lebanon—which is expected to follow in the near future, would remove a significant source of tension within the region.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the strategic significance of the Middle East—a long-time rationale for U.S. involvement—has been reduced. Tensions between the U.S. and states that were formerly regarded as Soviet clients, such as Algeria and Syria, have dissipated. The former Soviet threat, however, has now been replaced in the minds of many by “Islamic fundamentalism.” Although the settlement with the Palestinians was reached over the Islamists' objections, it will not necessarily result in any decline in support for Islam. “The Arab-Israeli conflict did not make the Islamic movement,” according to Professor Richard W. Bulliet of Columbia University, “and peace between Arabs and Israelis will not break it.”

How to deal with a transnational phenomenon like Islam is causing consternation among policymakers. The U.S. appears to have little leverage on the Muslim masses. What can, or should, the U.S. do?

**U.S. dilemmas**

President Clinton noted at the UN on September 27 that “the end of the cold war did not bring us to the millennium of peace. Indeed, it simply removed the lid from many caldrons of ethnic, religious and territorial animosity.” He might have added that some of the most threatening caldrons are in the Middle East and North Africa.

So far the Administration has made few policy pronouncements regarding the Islamic world. Anthony Lake, the President's national security adviser, noted last September that “we will extend every expression of friendship to those of the Islamic faith who abide in peace and tolerance. But we will provide every resistance to militants who distort Islamic doctrines and seek to expand their influence by force.”

The Administration has taken a firm stand against what it terms the “backlash states,” such as Iran and Iraq, that it charges are likely to sponsor terrorism and trade in weapons of mass destruction. It seeks to isolate them and, if directly threatened, strike back. The U.S. appears to have endorsed the idea, promoted by Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, that Iran and Sudan are the main instigators of Islamic militancy. The role of foreign support is a complex one to assess, however, since the countries where the Islamists operate have enough internal problems to account for religiously inspired unrest.

President Mubarak has claimed that the World Trade Center bombing could have been avoided had the U.S. listened to his warnings that Islamic extremists were operating here. He has also seemed to suggest that the U.S. created a monster when it encouraged fundamentalist Muslims in Afghanistan to take up arms and fight the Soviets. An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 Arab volunteers poured into Afghanistan, inspired by thoughts of Holy War. Some 6,000 of them were involved in the fighting that eventually forced the Soviets out and contributed to the success of U.S. policy. Now security officials in Algeria, Tunisia and
Egypt complains that these so-called Afghans have returned home to stir up trouble.

**U.S. policy options**

There are three major questions to be addressed by U.S. policymakers as they search for a way to deal with Islam and politics in three North African nations.

1. **Is the Islamic revival a threat to U.S. interests?**

   Judith Miller, a writer for *The New York Times*, believes the rise of militant Islamic governments "would be a catastrophe for democrats and Western-minded Arabs in the region." In her view, the Clinton Administration should reject the assumption that Islamic forces are destined to come to power in the Middle East, and the U.S. should reaffirm its belief in the necessity of keeping temporal and spiritual power separate.

   Professor Esposito believes the Islamic revival should be regarded more as a challenge to the West's complacency than as a threat to be feared. He comments, "movements are more often motivated by objection to specific Western policies than by cultural hostility....U.S. presence and policy, not a genetic hatred for Americans, is often the primary motivating force behind acts against American government, business and military interests." He urges that Americans make a greater effort to differentiate between Islamic movements—those that are moderate and those that are extremist. "U.S. perception of a monolithic 'Islamic threat' often contributes to support for repressive governments in the Muslim world and thus to the creation of a self-fulfilling prophecy."

2. **Should the U.S. continue to support friendly governments if they oppose free elections and violate human rights?**

   Past Administrations have regarded stability and the willingness to work with the West as the main criteria for regional allies. Despite the shortcomings of the Egyptian and Saudi Arabian governments, many Americans believe they are more likely to contribute to stability in the Middle East than Islamists who, if given power, might impose an intolerant, anti-Western order. On the other hand, if the U.S. wants to encourage free elections, it must be prepared to accept the increasing number of Islamists elected to office. By not condemning the overturn of election results in Algeria in 1991, the U.S. appeared to side with the forces of repression. The U.S. also has not criticized the October 1993 referendum (a patently unfair single-candidate contest) which guaranteed President Mubarak another six years in power. "So long as the Islamist movements are given no voice in politics, there can be no surprise that their rhetoric will be shrill and their stance uncompromising," according to Boston University political scientist Augustus Richard Norton. "In contrast, well-designed strategies of political inclusion hold great promise for facilitating essential political change."

   Human rights are a concern of the opposition in all Middle Eastern countries, and what they see as U.S. reticence on this subject leads Islamists to charge that the U.S. is employing a double standard. Secretary of State Warren M. Christopher has noted that respect for human rights generally leads to peaceful and stable countries, and he has served notice that the U.S. would hold countries to a universal standard. Does this mean that the U.S. is prepared to put pressure on Egypt, which has been accused of serious human rights violations by international watchdog groups?

3. **Should the U.S. attach strings on aid to Egypt (currently running at $2 billion per year)?**

   Should the U.S. insist that the Egyptian government eliminate corruption and make greater economic reforms before more money is advanced? Or is Egypt's contribution to the peace process and regional stability so valuable that economic mismanagement and corruption there can be tolerated?

   Observers are unanimous that the appeal of Islamic movements would be blunted if the economic situation in their respective countries improved. This will soon be put to the test in Gaza and the West Bank, where an infusion of cash, along with a recognized political role, may reduce the appeal of Hamas, a radical Palestinian group that has opposed peace with Israel.

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Former President Jimmy Carter, who has been deeply involved with Middle East politics for over a decade, recently complained that Americans' "obsession" with Islam is unfair. He told newsmen, "I think there is too much of an inclination in this country to look on Muslims as inherently terrorist or inherently against the West. I don't see that when I meet these people." With peace in prospect for the Israelis and Palestinians, more energy and resources should be released to address the grievances that have bred malaise throughout the Middle East.

Although a religious revival among mainstream Muslims is likely to continue, the introduction of political and economic reforms would help undercut the rationale for religiously inspired violence against governments throughout the region, many of whom have close ties to the U.S.
ISLAM AND POLITICS

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Should the U.S. press the Mubarak government harder to introduce democratic reforms and respect human rights? Or should it refrain from criticizing a valuable friend who helped bring about the Israeli-Palestinian settlement?

2. According to Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd, “the prevailing democratic system in the world is not suitable for us in this region, for our peoples’ composition and traits are different from the traits of that world.” Do you agree or disagree?

3. Algeria briefly enjoyed a multiparty political system. Was the subdued U.S. response to the cancellation of the Algerian elections consistent with American support of democracy?

4. Some observers see the rise of militant Islamic groups as a danger to the U.S. Others do not consider the various Islamic political movements a threat. They warn, if the U.S. continues to support authoritarian governments, it will end up radicalizing moderates. What are your views?

5. What accounts for the widespread support Islamic groups have attracted in North Africa and elsewhere in the Middle East? In Egypt and Algeria, confrontation between the government and Islamists has recently replaced cooperation. Could this have been avoided? What would reverse the trend?

6. Do you think the reconciliation between Israel and the P.L.O. will dampen or stimulate the Islamic resurgence?

7. Author Salman Rushdie has complained that if “the mullahs get all the headlines while progressive, modernizing voices are treated as minor and marginal…then the fundamentalists are being allowed to set the agenda.” Have the views of the nonviolent majority of Muslims been overlooked? Who is to blame for the stereotype of the Islamic fundamentalist as a bomb-throwing terrorist?

READINGS AND RESOURCES


Lake, Anthony, “From Containment to Enlargement.” U.S. Department of State Dispatch, September 27, 1993, pp. 658–64. Remarks by President Clinton’s national security adviser on September 21, 1993, on the Administration’s approach to foreign policy.


AMERICA-MIDEAST EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING SERVICES, 1100 17th St., N.W., Washington, DC 20036; (202) 785-0022. Amideast seeks to increase understanding between the U.S., the Middle East and North Africa through education, information and development programs. Experts available to speak.

AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL TRUST, P.O. Box 53062, Washington, DC 20009; (202) 939-6050. A research and educational institution dedicated to issues on the Middle East and North Africa. Publishes Washington Report on Middle East Affairs monthly.

MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE, 1761 N. St., N.W., Washington, DC 20036; (202) 785-1141. MEI serves as a resource center providing information on recent developments. Publishes The Middle East Journal quarterly.

MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION OF NORTH AMERICA, 1232 N. Cherry Ave., University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721; (602) 621-5850. MESA is a nonprofit, nonpartisan membership organization comprised of academics, students and others interested in the Middle East and North Africa.

NATIONAL COUNCIL ON U.S.-ARAB RELATIONS, 1735 I St., N.W., Suite 515, Washington, DC 20006; (202) 293-0801. Promotes U.S. understanding of Islam and the Arab world through visits to the region. Offers a wide range of audiovisuals, books, reports, curriculum materials, as well as speakers.
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**TOPIC 7: Islam and Politics**

**ISSUE A.** In its relations with Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, the U.S. should give its highest priority to (check one only):

- 1. Supporting governments that back Arab-Israeli peace process.
- 2. Promoting free elections.
- 4. Encouraging economic and social reforms.
- 5. Supporting repression of Islamic movements.
- 6. Other, or comment ____________________________

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**TOPIC 8: New World Disorder?**

**ISSUE A.** To further the national interest, the U.S. should (choose one):

- 1. Expand NATO to include nations from the former Warsaw Pact.
- 2. Maintain NATO as it is.
- 3. Withdraw from NATO.

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### ISSUE B. With regard to the Islamic revival, do you consider it a threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East?

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### ISSUE B. In East Asia and the Western Pacific, the U.S. should:

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<td>Maintain the present military and naval posture in the region.</td>
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<td>Withdraw troops from South Korea and Japan while maintaining present naval posture in the region.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>Reduce present military and naval posture in the region.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>Negotiate overall arms reductions with the other powers of the region.</td>
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### ISSUE C. With regard to America's democratic mission, the U.S. should:

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<td>1.</td>
<td>Restore democracy in Haiti.</td>
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New world disorder?
U.S. in search of a role

In the post-cold-war world, America’s vital interests are likely to remain the stability of Europe, the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and the economic and military security of North America. These interests must be tied to the larger interest of promoting global growth and equity.

by James Chace

It would be an irony of fate if my Administration had to deal chiefly with foreign affairs—so said Woodrow Wilson in 1913 as he left Princeton, N.J., for his first inauguration in Washington, D.C. President William Jefferson Clinton might well have echoed these words as he boarded the plane from Little Rock, Arkansas, to the White House in January 1993. Bedevilled by an endless war in the former Yugoslavia, a humanitarian mission gone sour in Somalia, seemingly intractable authoritarianism in Haiti and the threatened erosion of the international trading system, the President and his aides spent much of their first year in office struggling to define U.S. goals.

The cold war, after all, had provided two superpowers with the means to control vast areas of the globe. It was a bipolar world that enforced stability within respective spheres of influence. With the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1991, however, the simmering conflicts that had never been resolved after the breakdown of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires boiled over. With the further retreat of Russian power, newly emancipated countries on the periphery of the former Soviet Union came into conflict with one another. In Georgia, in Armenia, in Central Asia, ethnic and religious conflict is likely to be quelled only if Russia asserts a neo-imperial role, and as 1993 drew to a close that was precisely what was happening.

Haiti: setback for democracy

For the U.S., turmoil was also raging within its own sphere of influence. In Haiti, the unwillingness of the military to step down and restore the freely elected, populist president, Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide, posed a dangerous problem for an American government that had always preferred stability in the Caribbean-Central American region. Even if the Clinton Administration had wanted to leave Haiti to the Haitians, that was not advisable because of the likelihood that continued political and economic repression would lead to new boatloads of refugees streaming to Floridian shores. In addition, there was a significant Haitian minority in New York City and Miami, Florida, that would continue to press Washington to reinstate Aristide, by force if necessary.

To this end, the Clinton Administration believed it had an agreement, signed July 3, 1993, with the Haitian military that

TO STIMULATE DISCUSSION and debate, the Foreign Policy Association invited James Chace, Henry Luce Professor in Freedom of Inquiry and Expression at Bard College, and editor of World Policy Journal, to write this essay. The views expressed are those of the author. FPA itself takes no position on issues of foreign policy.
would allow Aristide to return to power; but when an American troopship appeared off Port-au-Prince carrying more than 200 American “combat engineers and technical advisers” who were to train and “professionalize” the Haitian military, it was greeted by scores of civilians shouting anti-Aristide slogans and brandishing automatic weapons. In response, the Administration had the ship turn back and found itself once again hoping that increased economic pressure would bring the military to heel.

Finally, in Somalia, the ostensibly humanitarian mission of feeding a starving population—which the departing President George Bush had willed as a dubious legacy to his successor—had turned into a political and military nightmare. Clinton’s people had initially endorsed the policy of United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who had decided that Somali clan leader, General Mohammed Farah Aidid, should be pursued and punished for killing on June 5, 1993, 24 Pakistani soldiers who were in Mogadishu as part of the UN peacekeeping force. By the fall, Washington was rethinking this policy but had apparently not communicated this to the U.S. commander there, who had final approval over the use of U.S. troops as part of the UN mission. On October 3–4, U.S. Army Rangers found themselves surrounded by about 400 of Aidid’s men. Within hours, television screens were displaying pictures of corpses of American soldiers being dragged through the streets.

Somalia: U.S. to pull out

For the Clinton Administration, enough was enough. On October 7, the President announced that 15,000 reinforcements would be sent to Somalia to protect our soldiers, but also that U.S. military personnel would be withdrawn by March 31, 1994. Our motives, he explained, were pure and our hands were clean. But with no discernible national interest involved, Clinton was finally prepared to seek a political solution to what had always been a political problem. The tragedy of Somalia resulted from warring military and political factions; the suffering of the Somali people did not result from a natural disaster like a famine but rather from a political disaster. Once Somalia had ceased to be even remotely important as a staging ground for cold-war rivalries in East Africa and the U.S. and the Soviet Union had stopped giving aid to its dictator, it disintegrated. But the U.S. had never admitted that what brought us into Somalia probably required nothing less than a neocolonial UN trusteeship.

Nafta victory

While the U.S. may prefer to forsake the use of force in Somalia, Haiti and the remnants of the Communist empire, Washington nonetheless has no intention of withdrawing from the world. Clinton’s successful campaign to gain congressional endorsement for an open-trading system through passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) testified to his internationalist commitment. But at the end of the first year of a new Administration, it was also apparent that the President had signal failed to define America’s mission—unless it be to contain chaos and to make the world safe for democracy, following once again in the footsteps of President Wilson—or, as national security adviser Anthony Lake put it when asked to define what comes to mind when Clinton’s foreign policy is mentioned, “pragmatic neo-Wilsonian.”

Attitudes, not policies

On another occasion, Lake spoke of the Administration’s strategy as the “enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.” Such a policy, however, is likely to prove quixotic: there are market economies, especially in Asia, that are not by America’s definition democratic, just as there are democracies that are committed to a very large measure of centralized control, as in India. Other than Lake’s high-minded neo-Wilsonianism, there was nothing said that would clearly delineate the central contours of American foreign policy. When Secretary of State Warren Christopher testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 4, 1993, he offered familiar nostrums of the “overarching priorities” of American foreign policy: “the security of our nation,” “the prosperity of our people,” and the advancement of “our democratic values.”

But these are attitudes not policies. Without even a rough roadmap to lead us safely into a new internationalism that avoids either a latter-day Pax Americana or an illusionary isolationism, the signal absence of an articulated foreign policy can only contribute to disorder abroad and confusion at home.

National interests

What are America’s national interests? Are they so difficult to define for a broad public? To what extent are they long-standing and to what extent have they changed in a world where the linkages between domestic and foreign policies, as President Clinton himself has pointed out, have become indivisible?

As most Americans now recognize, the U.S. emerged from the cold war geopolitically dominant but economically impaired. With the 12-nation European Community (EC) politically divided and Japan still in the shadow of its wartime atrocities, neither has been able to assume global responsibilities
American claim to be commensurate with its economic strength; yet with the disappearance of the Soviet threat both have been increasingly unwilling to follow Washington’s every command. Without economic strength to match its military might, any American claim to be anything but a military superpower is a hollow one.

American foreign policy in the 1990s will therefore have to choose its goals and targets much more carefully. In newspaper columnist Walter Lippmann’s definition, it will have to bring into balance, with a fair surplus of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s capabilities. The U.S. may be the only truly global power at the end of the 20th century—but neither the American people nor their political leaders are likely to regard this as an unmixed blessing.

In little more than a decade the U.S. has gone from being a creditor nation to a debtor nation that owes the world almost half a trillion dollars. To finance our standard of living we printed money from 1967 to 1979; from 1980 to the present, we borrowed money, both from abroad, and now increasingly from ourselves. This money has not and does not go into investment and savings. It finances consumer buying, our VCRs and our walking shoes. In 1985 we deliberately drove down the value of the dollar in order to get rid of our trade deficit, but we have not succeeded. What we have to learn is that you cannot repair an economy with a weak currency.

So in considering any new foreign policy agenda in defense of our national interests, we have to keep in mind that the U.S. must first and foremost restore its economy to solvency. America’s fiscal deficit—$290.3 billion for fiscal year 1992—has to be reduced not merely in the short term but also over the long haul. This the President understands, although his program to do so is modest enough by any standard. Solvency, however, is not only about a balanced budget. It is about means and ends. It is about strengthening the fabric of American society in order to allow the nation to meet its obligations.

**Three priorities**

Absent the Soviet threat, America’s primary national interests are and are likely to remain (1) the stability of Europe; (2) the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific; and (3) the security—economic and military—of North America.

In the defense of these interests, we can reassure the Europeans, both politically and militarily, that we will not permit any one nation so to dominate the Continent as to endanger the general peace; we can continue to play a central role as a holder of the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific; and we can attempt to extend a free-trading zone throughout the Western Hemisphere.

To the extent that the West depends on Middle Eastern-Persian Gulf oil, we are also concerned that the free flow of oil be available at reasonable prices to the outside world; for that reason we should be prepared to play a role in ensuring the stability of the Persian Gulf. And for both moral and strategic reasons we remain committed to the security of Israel, a functioning democracy that shares our basic values.

Our commitment to democratic values compels us to do what we can to promote democracy abroad, recognizing that our ability to create democratic regimes is highly circumscribed. No American foreign policy can be successful over the long term without such a moral component. But our democratic mission today is not so much a Wilsonian export of democracy as the effort to create the broad conditions under which democracy can take hold.

These interests and these strategies, in turn, are tied to a larger goal of global economic growth and equity. To this end, the U.S. can strive to prevent the world from falling into hostile trading blocs and to ensure that the rules of international trade and investment will help support the existence of social democracy and social peace.

**Germany, dominant power in Europe**

In sketching out the contours of the new Europe, which will now require the integration of the newly emancipated nations of what was once Soviet-controlled Europe, the economic and political weight of Germany inevitably dominates the landscape. As the great British economist John Maynard Keynes wrote of Germany in 1914: “Round Germany as a central support the rest of the European economic system grouped itself, and on the prosperity and enterprise of Germany, the prosperity of the rest of the Continent mainly depended....The whole of Europe east of the Rhine thus fell into the German industrial orbit, and its economic life was adjusted accordingly.” The German question is not who will dominate Central Europe, for surely Germany will do so, but whether the new Europe can accommodate a unified Germany.
The emergence of Germany as the dominant power in Europe, coupled with the disintegration of the Soviet empire—while this is something to be grateful for—will force the U.S. to rethink its view of the direction of Europe. We had expected that the EC would deepen, and that the political unity of Europe would follow hard upon the single market that was to come into being on January 1, 1993. We anticipated a European central bank and a European currency, and eventually a European defense mechanism.

**Nationalism and political fragmentation**

Instead, what we see are two parallel movements—on the one hand, increasing economic integration, not only in such institutions as the European single market, but globally, with Nafta and newly emerging Asian groupings, and, on the other hand, growing fragmentation. But in Europe and the former Soviet Union the forces of fragmentation are now—and are likely to be for some time to come—in the ascendency. The political fragmentation in Europe inhibits further political unity; the shift toward market economies by the East European countries and the former Soviet Union puts a further strain on any movement to deepen the EC and thus to move it forward as the West European leaders had hoped to do in the late 1980s.

Political fragmentation has followed in the wake of ethnic, cultural, religious and nationalist movements. On the one hand, how can the EC accommodate countries that are in danger of splitting apart? On the other hand, how can Europe exclude countries that aim to become like the West, for example Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia? Moreover, if you exclude countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, not to mention the Balkans, is there not a greater danger in having these countries outside a European polity than within one?

**Economic integration stalls**

The shape of things to come is therefore very different from what anyone might have imagined a few years ago. The expectation that “Europe”—the EC—would emerge as a political entity, able to act in concert with the U.S. and Canada on political and economic issues, is increasingly remote. Even though almost all the European states have approved the 1992 Maastricht treaty establishing a single market, the likelihood is that Europe will not make much headway toward creating a common currency, a common central bank, or a common foreign policy. The German Central Bank’s insistence on raising interest rates to attract foreign capital in order to rebuild eastern Germany put pressure on the other members of the European Monetary System (EMS), established in 1979, to shore up their own currencies. Recession and unemployment followed, and speculators forced the weakest of them to expend their foreign reserves to support currencies against the all-powerful deutsche mark. Finally, the EMS cracked: London decided it couldn’t afford to tie the British pound to the German mark, Rome followed suit, and they abandoned the system in the wake of their devalued currencies. A few months later, even France was forced to expend so much of its reserves that the EMS had to be radically modified so that to all intents and purposes it no longer fulfilled the function for which it was designed. German national purpose and power took precedence over the political construction of Europe.

**NATO: expensive fiction?**

As for the Western alliance, its behavior in the light of the Yugoslav war has demonstrated its irrelevance. It seems likely that history will record the failure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to respond to the Bosnian conflict with military force as evidence of the demise of an alliance that lasted for almost half a century. Founded to deter the expansion of the Soviet Union and to shore up the Western economic and political system, the Atlantic alliance was one of the signal achievements of that extraordinarily creative period in American history that brought forth the 1944 Bretton Woods, N.H., conference, which created the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and later the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

With the collapse of communism, the task of containing the
Soviet Union no longer existed. The new mission, many of us believed, would be to transform NATO into a broader organization that might eventually include the former members of the Soviet military alliance, known as the Warsaw Pact. In this respect, a transformed NATO would permit American and Russian troops to remain in Europe, not as occupiers but as guarantors of the European order.

The primary purpose of the new security organization would be to preserve the territorial status quo, except where changes are mutually agreed upon by both parties. Borders are not carved in stone, but the greatest danger that faces post-cold-war Europe is rectification of borders by force rather than by negotiation. Aggression by any country against its neighbor could then be met with a united response from the organization as a whole.

**Crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The expansion of Serbia to include large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina—a state whose sovereignty was recognized by all the members of NATO—would seem to fulfill the requirements of military intervention in the post-cold-war world. It did not happen. On the other hand, if NATO’s mission is not to contain military conflict across borders, then what role does NATO have to play?

The U.S. therefore finds itself in a dilemma. Had it taken unilateral military action in Bosnia, it would have undermined NATO, for it soon became clear that the other members of NATO were unwilling to intervene militarily to enforce a settlement. Even had the Clinton Administration shown more resolve in its policy toward Serbia, rather than merely threatening to bomb Serbian positions and arm the Bosnians, it would not have moved without at least some allied support. But that support would not have had to entail a NATO action. It could have been a traditional coalition, similar to the one President Bush assembled to wage the Persian Gulf war.

Thus, the crisis in Bosnia revealed that NATO is little more than an expensive fiction. By failing to push our allies into taking concerted NATO action and by refusing to act unilaterally outside NATO, Clinton may have “saved” NATO while at the same time demonstrating its irrelevance.

In the light of all this, what is the likely role of the U.S. in Europe?

The most self-defeating posture for the Clinton Administration would be to cling to the status quo. With NATO moribund, security concerns are likely to be met by coalitions that will vary crisis by crisis. Moreover, if the U.S. remains concerned with European stability, as it should, it will have to keep some bases and troops in Europe for an indefinite period.

In addition, Washington will have to seek allies willing to use arms to preserve borders from being changed by force rather than negotiation. This could mean, for example, that the U.S., France and Russia would intervene in a Hungarian-Romanian conflict over the lost Hungarian lands now part of Romanian Transylvania. Even if done under a UN umbrella, it would be a very traditional way of preserving the peace.

In this respect, the end of the 20th century might come to resemble the end of the 19th, and America’s connection to a Europe increasingly threatened by authoritarian nationalism would be frayed and tenuous, endangering European stability and America’s role in the world.

**APEC summit**

The Administration believes the Asia-Pacific region to be the most “lucrative terrain for American exports and jobs,” as Secretary Christopher put it on the eve of Clinton’s meeting in Seattle, Washington, with the leaders of the 15-member Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum. Within APEC are gathered together all of America’s and Japan’s major Asian trading partners, including even China, Hong Kong and Taiwan, representing more than half the world’s total gross national product (GNP). In 1992, even without formal ties, U.S. exports to the Pacific area totaled $120 billion, and accounted for 2.4 million American jobs.

It is an encouraging sign that the U.S. is committed to playing a central role in preserving the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific among the four great powers—China, Japan, Russia and the U.S. In that part of the world, there are no supranational organizations that can help stabilize the region—no NATO, no EC. The countries are too big and remain in a state of dynamic tension.

While APEC may be useful in encouraging the Asia-Pacific region to open its markets, the organization is as yet little more than a forum aimed at fostering market-driven growth and liberalizing trade. But the problems that Asian economies pose for the U.S., and, indeed, for other highly industrialized economies, is the unwillingness of Asians to spend their money. Excessively high savings act as a brake on the growth of the global economy, and it is no accident that America undergoes continuing and rising trade deficits with both China and Japan.
Chinese and human rights

With a phenomenal growth rate, China is trying to manage a transition to a market-driven economy while at the same time keeping the political lid on. This policy is the conclusion the aging Chinese gerontocracy came to after the 1989 massacre in Tiananmen Square. Punishing China for human-rights violations—if it is done unilaterally by the U.S.—is unlikely to have a great effect on the Chinese political scene, especially when other countries, particularly Japan, are seeking access to the Chinese market. On the other hand, China very much needs the American market, as it continues to enjoy a sizable trade surplus with the U.S. At the same time, China is also increasing its defense budget, which causes profound uneasiness in Japan and Russia. By the end of the first decade of the 21st century, China is likely to be the dominant power in Asia.

Relations with Japan

Japan, in its turn, has extended its “yen-bloc” to Southeast Asia and Thailand—which is reminiscent of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan tried to construct during World War II. At the same time, American fears of Japan’s trade surplus of $49 billion a year contribute to anti-Japanese feelings in the U.S. In fact, on a per capita basis, according to political economist Masuru Tamamoto, Japan now imports more from America than the U.S. imports from Japan—about $400 a year as compared with about $370 a year. The U.S. trade deficit with Japan results in part from the fact that the population of the U.S. is twice that of Japan. Moreover, the Japanese consumer saves more than does the American, and Americans buy Japanese manufactured goods that are no longer made in the U.S.—fax machines, camcorders, industrial robots and high-quality luxury cars. In addition, trade imbalances with Japan and other countries are aggravated by U.S. factories moving abroad. What we are now seeing is a relatively new phenomenon: global manufacturing allows high-tech goods to be produced by low-wage countries—Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines. In any case, it is unlikely that such trade balances can be righted by import quotas, local-content requirements or demands for a set percentage of the market. But the Clinton Administration’s obsession with the trade deficit has led it to continue making Japan a scapegoat for America’s economic malaise.

Russia, fearful of losing face in the region, refuses to compose its differences with Japan over the islands it seized at the end of World War II. But there is some reason to believe that President Boris Yeltsin will try to do so, if he can without aggravating nationalist critics. China, in turn, is wary of Russia’s turmoil as Russia tries to convert to a market-driven economy.

Rx for Pax Pacifica

Although North Korea is not a major power, it nonetheless poses the most immediate threat to Asian security by refusing to halt its nuclear program. This threatens not only South Korea and the other nations of the region, but it could also spark Japanese rearmament, which would in itself upset the balance of power dramatically.

For the U.S., the closing of its bases in the Philippines, as well as its need to reduce the defense budget, requires it to rethink its military posture in the Pacific, even if it does not radically scale down its military and naval deployments in the region. In short, Washington cannot impose a Pax Pacifica, even if it wants to.

What probably ought to be done, at the very least, is for the U.S. to propose broad arms reductions—including nuclear weapons—among all the powers of the region. Washington need not encourage Japan to arm, as it has done in the past, but to disarm. America should engage China, Russia and the Koreas in this same effort. This means that the U.S. Navy must also be prepared to reduce the number of aircraft carrier battle groups and that the U.S. Army further cut down on the number of troops in South Korea and the garrisons in Japan. All this, however, must be part of an overall Asian initiative. But the United States cannot—and should not—withdraw from the region or the fragile balance of power will be destroyed.

North American concerns

Who would deny that the region that should stand at the very apex of U.S. interests—at any time—is North America. Relations with Canada, whatever the tensions in the past, have never resulted in open warfare in this century. But the depth of Canadian nationalism is often underestimated or ignored in Washington, and the likelihood that Quebec will achieve independence by the end of the century cannot be discounted.

The U.S. role in the Caribbean/Central American/Mexican region has, of course, had a very different history. This has been a traditional U.S. sphere of influence since the 1820s, and while our behavior toward the nations of this region has been far from exemplary, the alternative is not withdrawal but wiser policies.

In Central America, at least, U.S. involvement is winding down. In the future, Central America’s economic problems can only be resolved by sensible economic and fiscal policies of the government involved, coupled with a willingness on our part to lower our trade barriers to its goods. The recourse to Marxist economics is probably dead—but the return to authoritarianism is likely, should the economies fail to deliver.

Nafta’s impact

As a result of the passage of Nafta, trade barriers between the U.S. and Mexico will fall. U.S. exports are also likely to increase, and more exports will mean more jobs. According to one study, from a base year of 1990, the agreement should, over five years, "create approximately 320,000 new jobs in the U.S. and displace about 150,000 workers, resulting in about 170,000 net new jobs." The long-term goal, to improve the Mexican economy so that its workers begin to earn wages comparable with those of American and Canadian workers, which in turn should slow illegal emigration and offer an even greater market for Canadian and U.S. goods, can only take place over time. It is a long-term goal, however, and perhaps the strongest argument made in favor of Nafta was the fact that a good deal of manufacturing from the north had already moved south, and in a global economy there was
probably no effective way to prevent it. Nafta is also likely to lock in Mexico’s market reforms, its new openness to foreign investment and foreign imports. Finally, insofar as Nafta may lead to a more prosperous, stable, and ultimately more democratic, Mexico, the overall goals of North American security will be fulfilled, and the way will be open to extend the free-trading zone throughout the hemisphere.

Trading blocs and trade wars

Perhaps the greatest danger the world faces is not small wars and unsolvable conflicts, but rather its division into three great trading blocs: Europe, East Asia and the Western Hemisphere.

Even before the unification of Germany, the EC’s GNP was two-and-one-half times larger than Japan’s. A new European bloc would account for one fourth of the world product. Should Europe close its gates, the risks to the U.S. are huge, for America sells one fourth of its products to Europe and has recently enjoyed a trade surplus with the EC. In a well-intentioned effort to stabilize Eastern Europe, as political analyst Walter Russell Mead has pointed out, “Western Europe, led by Germany, could establish something like Napoleon’s projected continental system. Eastern Europe and North Africa would supply the raw materials, certain agricultural products, and low-wage industrial labor. Western Europe would provide capital and host the high-value-added and high-tech industries.... A Europe of this kind would inevitably put most of its capital into its own backyard, and it would close its markets to competitors from the rest of the world. It would produce VCRs in Poland, not China; it would buy its wheat from Ukraine, rather than the Dakotas.”

As for Japan, by the year 2000, Japan, with less than half the population of the U.S., will likely have a GNP only 15% smaller. In this respect, danger would result from an American determination to shut out—as much as possible—Japanese goods from a North American market.

New challenges, new institutions

To avoid trade wars and ensure global prosperity, new international institutions and arrangements are needed to replace or augment the existing international economic and financial system that was set up after World War II at Bretton Woods under U.S. leadership. For example, we might consider reviving the idea of an international trade organization—suggested originally by Keynes. It would do more than focus on lower tariffs as the U.S. preferred instrument, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), does. GATT never has been able to resolve questions of how to harmonize differences among economic policies or provide rules of the road. A new trade organization would be similar to America’s interstate commerce commission. It would work to set up common rules for antidumping, subsidies, antitrust mechanisms and intellectual property.

Also needed is a more powerful coordination of international monetary policies. The Bretton Woods institutions were set up when the dollar was world currency. But now America no longer sets the pace of the world economy, which is subject to sudden shifts that threaten international economic stability. The IMF alone is clearly inadequate to meet needs of a global economy.

In search of new directions

Despite the EC’s problems in establishing its own central bank, we should nonetheless proceed to investigate the feasibility of a world central bank to help stabilize currency shifts and thus help promote free trade. To deal with a global recession, for example, no international agency is now capable of strategic planning and rapid action, and individual nation-states may not be able to take action on a grand scale. In this respect, the relationship between nation-states and the global economy is comparable to that between firms and the nation-state.

There may be no single blueprint for the future, but the inability of President Clinton and his secretary of state to articulate a comprehensible hierarchy of U.S. interests may well lead to a directionless America, increasingly embittered as U.S. purpose and power erode. There was a time, let us not forget, when the international order had to be rebuilt. Dean Acheson and General George Marshall, John Maynard Keynes, Ernest Bevin, Lester Pearson, Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and later Konrad Adenauer, were determined to remake the system. They were all, in Acheson’s memorable phrase, present at the creation. It would be a tragedy of world proportions if a new generation were found to be present at the destruction.
NEW WORLD DISORDER?

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS

1. Should the U.S. urge NATO to incorporate Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic? How would this affect NATO's mission? What do you think Moscow's reaction would be?

2. Do you think that the emergence of Germany as the dominant power in Europe is likely to be a threat to peace? How will that affect America's role in Europe?

3. If Europe does not make much progress for the rest of the century toward unification, how would this phenomenon affect America's role in Europe?

4. Do you think a unilateral reduction in our naval and military presence in East Asia and the Western Pacific will seriously inhibit our role as the holder of the balance of power in that region?

5. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in 1993 that "Western Europe is no longer the dominant area of the world" and that Washington has to get over its Eurocentric view of diplomacy. Do you agree?

6. Do you believe the Clinton Administration should campaign for human rights in China? How is this likely to affect America's relationship with this great power?

7. If Japan loses confidence in the U.S. as the guarantor of its security, what are likely to be the consequences for Japanese policy?

8. The bipolar world of the cold war, when the U.S. and the Soviet Union were the only two superpowers, was a relatively stable one. Does it seem in retrospect a more desirable world than the one in which we are now living?

SUGGESTED READINGS


Chace, James, The Consequences of the Peace: The New Internationalism and American Foreign Policy. New York, Oxford University Press, 1993. 240 pp. $10.95 (paper). This short book provides a sweeping overview of U.S. national interests after the cold war.

Clinton, Bill, "Confronting the Challenges of a Broader World." U.S. Department of State Dispatch, September 27, 1993, pp. 649–53. President's address to the UN General Assembly.


Rizopoulos, Nicholas X., "A Third Balkan War?" World Policy Journal, Summer 1993, pp. 1–6. The director of studies at the Council on Foreign Relations pulls no punches in criticizing the Clinton Administration zigzags in its policy toward the Yugoslav war.

■ **OPINION BALLOTS**... Vote for the foreign policy of your choice!

You can make your opinions count by filling in a ballot after you read and discuss each topic. If you prefer to wait until you have finished discussing all eight topics, you can use the ballot envelope that is bound into this book to mail your ballots to the Foreign Policy Association.

Either way, please send your ballots no later than the June 30th cutoff date in order to have your opinions included in the final National Opinion Ballot Report. The Ballot Report will be prepared by FPA with the advice of a public opinion analyst and will be presented to the White House, the Departments of State and Defense, and members of Congress, as well as the nation’s media.

■ **1994 ACTIVITY BOOK**... The 1994 edition of the *Great Decisions Activity Book* has been prepared by Amon A. Diggs. Mr. Diggs has been a high school social studies teacher for 30 years. A graduate of the University of Illinois with an MS degree from Queens College (CUNY), he received the University of Chicago’s Outstanding Teacher Award in 1990. Designed to be used with the 1994 edition of the *Great Decisions* briefing book, the *Activity Book* provides learning objectives, teaching strategies, decisionmaking exercises, role-playing activities and handouts that can be reproduced for classroom use. (40 pp., $11.95 plus $3.00 for postage and handling, prepaid.)

■ **LEADERSHIP HANDBOOK**... This FPA guide discusses the need for citizen involvement in foreign policy and includes strategies for establishing a Great Decisions discussion group in your community and tips for leading a discussion. (Single copy free.)

■ **TELEVISION**... A series of eight half-hour television programs on the 1994 *Great Decisions* topics is being coproduced with the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. The series will present different points of view on each of the topics by recognized experts. Peter F. Krogh, dean of the School of Foreign Service, will anchor the series.

The first program will be made available to public television stations, via satellite, in the beginning of February. Check your local PBS affiliate or the newspaper for the exact dates and times when the eight programs will be aired. Videotapes of the series will be available from FPA in March 1994. (Set of 8 programs—2 VHS cassettes—$70.00 plus $5.00 postage and handling, prepaid. Also available, Tape 1, with programs 1–4, and Tape 2, with programs 5–8, for $37.00 each plus $3.00 postage and handling, prepaid.) Single programs not available.

■ **WORLD MAP**... Thanks to a generous grant from The New York Times Company Foundation, an up-to-date World Map is included in your copy of *Great Decisions*. Additional copies of the map are available for $3.00 each.

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Credit cardholders: You can fax your order to 607-277-6292.
### General Resources

Additional resource lists can be found at the end of each topic, with questions for discussion and suggested readings.

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<td>Amnesty International U.S.A.</td>
<td>322 Eighth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10001; (212) 807-8400.</td>
<td>- Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, AI works for the release of prisoners of conscience, fair and prompt trials for political prisoners and the end of torture and executions.</td>
<td>Publications include reports on the status of human rights around the globe. For classroom materials, call National Student Campaign (202) 775-5161.</td>
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<td>The Brookings Institution</td>
<td>1775 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036-2188; (202) 797-6000.</td>
<td>- Nonprofit research organization publishes books, papers and the quarterly <em>Brookings Review</em> to educate the public on policy issues.</td>
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<td>Center for Teaching International Relations</td>
<td>University of Denver, 2201 S. Gaylord St., Denver, Colo. 80208-0268; (303) 871-3106.</td>
<td>- CTIR offers graduate courses, conducts teacher inservice workshops, publishes curriculum materials, and offers consultation services.</td>
<td>For catalogue of publications, call: (303) 871-2164.</td>
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<td>Choices for the 21st Century Education Project</td>
<td>Center for Foreign Policy Development, Brown University, Box 1948, Providence, R.I. 02912; (401) 863-3155.</td>
<td>- The project provides curricula, including reproducible mini-units, for high school and college teachers on foreign policy issues; the center offers workshops, institutes and in-service programs for high school teachers.</td>
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<td>Educators for Social Responsibility</td>
<td>23 Garden St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138; (617) 492-1764.</td>
<td>- A national educational organization offering programs and curricula to help young people become involved in the global society.</td>
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<td>120 Wall St., New York, N.Y. 10005; (212) 514-8040.</td>
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<td>485 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017-6104; (212) 972-8400.</td>
<td>- The leading U.S.-based international human-rights organization has five regional divisions: Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch and Middle East Watch—plus the Fund for Free Expression.</td>
<td>Publishes reports by the various divisions, a catalog and newsletters.</td>
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<td>1101 15th St., N.W., Suite 700, Washington, D.C. 20005; (202) 293-9072.</td>
<td>- Nonprofit organization created to strengthen democratic institutions around the world through nongovernmental efforts. Quarterly <em>Journal of Democracy</em> covers democratic movements and newly established democracies around the world.</td>
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<td>Overseas Development Council (ODC)</td>
<td>1875 Connecticut Ave., NW, Suite 1012, Washington, D.C. 20009; (202) 234-8701.</td>
<td>- Seeks to increase understanding of development issues and problems of developing countries.</td>
<td>Publications include <em>Policy Focus</em> series.</td>
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<td>Spice, Stanford University Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education</td>
<td>Littlefield Center, Room 14, 300 Lasuen St., Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. 94305-5013; (415) 723-1114.</td>
<td>- SPICE seeks to improve international and cross-cultural education, K-12.</td>
<td>Offers curriculum, staff development programs and materials.</td>
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<td>United States Institute of Peace</td>
<td>1550 M St., NW, 7th Floor, Washington, D.C. 20005-1708; (202) 429-3834.</td>
<td>- An independent government organization created by Congress to promote research, education and training on international peace and conflict management, the institute has a variety of educational materials available free of charge, including a bimonthly newsletter.</td>
<td>For list, contact Office of Public Affairs and Information.</td>
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<td>World Bank Development Education Program</td>
<td>1818 H St., NW, Room T-8082, Washington, D.C. 20433; (202) 473-1945.</td>
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### TOPIC 1: U.S. IN A NEW WORLD

**Issue A.** The principal international role of the U.S. should be to:
- Take the lead in solving international problems. 7%
- Work through organizations such as the UN to solve global problems. 79%
- Participate in solving international problems only when they affect Americans directly. 7%

**Issue B.** The domestic policy priority of the U.S. should be to:
(readers were asked to rank the following in order of importance)
- Hone its competitive edge in the global economy. 12%
- Address social problems (education, health, crime). 31%
- Stimulate the economy. 25%
- Reduce the budget deficit. 29%
- Maintain its military strength. 3%

### TOPIC 2: UNITED NATIONS

**Issue A.** Do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Agree with Reservations</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Disagree with Reservations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The UN should be given power by the U.S. and other member states to be the world policeman.</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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<td>The UN should have intervened more strongly, and sooner, in the former Yugoslavia.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The UN should have intervened more strongly, and sooner, in Somalia.</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. should hold troops in readiness for use by the UN as peacekeepers.</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. should keep troops trained and in readiness for use by the UN in peace-enforcement.</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The U.S. should immediately pay what it owes the UN for peacekeeping and the regular budget.</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If a government is suspected of building nuclear, chemical or germ-warfare weapons, and refuses to permit surprise inspection of the factories, the UN should impose sanctions and, if necessary, take military action. 46% 35% 8% 4%

If human rights are being seriously violated anywhere, resulting in injury or death to large numbers of people, the UN should intervene whether or not the government asks for help. 33% 38% 12% 6%

### TOPIC 3: GERMANY’S ROLE

**Issue A.** Concerning the U.S. military commitment to NATO, the U.S. should:
- Maintain its commitment to NATO and its present force level in Europe. 6%
- Maintain its commitment to NATO but reduce its force level in Europe. 68%
- Maintain its commitment to NATO but remove U.S. forces stationed in Europe. 17%
- Withdraw from NATO and remove U.S. forces stationed in Europe. 3%

**Issue B.** Concerning economic assistance to Eastern Europe, Russia and the other former Soviet states, the U.S. should:
- Increase its share of the burden because otherwise Germany and others will gain access to their resources and potentially lucrative markets and the U.S. will lose out. 20%
- Maintain present levels of assistance and let Germany and others with more direct geographic and cultural ties assume most of the burden. 53%
- Decrease the current level of economic assistance. 9%

**Issue C.** Concerning European integration, to the extent that the U.S. has any influence in the matter it should:
- Support European integration. 53%
- Discourage European integration. 2%
- Neither support nor discourage European integration. 33%

### TOPIC 4: CHINA

**Issue A.** With regard to overall policy toward China, the U.S. should:
- Condition future relations on China’s ending human-rights abuses, eliminating trade barriers and halting sales of nuclear technology. 16%
- Follow a course of “constructive engagement”: continue negotiating with the government while keeping lines open to the dissidents. 47%
- Maintain correct relations with the government to secure U.S. interests: leave China’s future (including the question of economic and political liberalization) to the Chinese. 29%

**Issue B.** Concerning trade with China, the U.S. should:
- Renew China’s most-favored-nation status unconditionally. 19%
- Renew China’s most-favored-nation status but restrict it to exports produced by private enterprise, not exports of state-owned industries. 27%
- Make renewal of China’s most-favored-nation status conditional on Chinese concessions in nontrade areas, for example human rights. 33%
- Refuse China most-favored-nation status. 3%

**Issue C.** How serious are the following obstacles to improved U.S. relations with China? (Percent answering “very serious”)
- China’s sale of nuclear and missile technology and conventional weapons. 63%
- Trade issues, including Chinese “dumping” and theft of technology. 30%
- Ideological differences. 9%
- Human-rights abuses by China. 28%
- U.S. military sales to Taiwan. 13%
- Differences over Hong Kong’s future. 12%

*Results of 35,800 ballots received as of June 30, 1993, and tabulated by Calculogic Corporation of New York City.*
TOPIC 5: TRADE

Issue A. With regard to the North American free-trade agreement with Mexico, the U.S. should:

- Support the agreement unconditionally: YES 17%, NO 64%
- Condition support on Mexico’s enforcement of environmental laws: YES 77%, NO 10%
- Condition support on Mexico’s protection of human rights: YES 59%, NO 20%
- Condition support on Mexico’s holding of free, fair elections: YES 40%, NO 35%
- Break off negotiations: YES 5%, NO 64%

Issue B. What trade policy is in the best interest of the U.S.?

AGREE DISAGREE
Redouble efforts to bring multilateral negotiations to a successful conclusion and proceed cautiously on regional trade agreements: YES 67%, NO 8%
Give priority to developing a Western Hemisphere free-trade association: YES 47%, NO 21%
Insist that trading partners “play by the rules,” penalizing those that do not, and negotiate bilateral agreements if necessary to open foreign markets: YES 64%, NO 11%
Adopt a policy of managed trade, promoting important high-technology industries to make the U.S. more competitive: YES 55%, NO 16%

TOPIC 6: RUSSIA & CENTRAL ASIAN REPUBLICS

Issue A. In its policy toward Russia, the U.S. should:

- Support Russia as the “first among equals” of the successor-states of the former Soviet Union: AGREE 31%, AGREE with reservations 47%, DISAGREE 11%, DISAGREE with reservations 4%
- Avoid placing primary emphasis on relations with Russia at the expense of the other successor-states: AGREE 29%, AGREE with reservations 38%, DISAGREE 19%, DISAGREE with reservations 5%
- Pay attention to other U.S. concerns now that the cold war is over and let Russia take care of itself: AGREE 8%, AGREE with reservations 17%, DISAGREE 24%, DISAGREE with reservations 37%

Issue B. In its policy toward the Central Asian republics, the U.S. should:

- Cultivate relations by extending economic aid and technical assistance to alleviate poverty: AGREE 37%, AGREE with reservations 38%, DISAGREE 10%, DISAGREE with reservations 3%
- Recognize that its own influence is limited and continue to provide primarily technology, training and skills in agriculture and irrigation: AGREE 52%, AGREE with reservations 29%, DISAGREE 6%, DISAGREE with reservations 2%
- Rely on friends, such as Turkey, that have cultural and geographic ties to the region, to promote U.S. interests: AGREE 27%, AGREE with reservations 36%, DISAGREE 15%, DISAGREE with reservations 9%
- Make a long-term commitment to assisting Central Asia’s development through dialogue with its governments and assistance and exchange programs: AGREE 42%, AGREE with reservations 33%, DISAGREE 9%, DISAGREE with reservations 3%

TOPIC 7: INDIA AND PAKISTAN

Issue A. With regard to the development and spread of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, the U.S. should:

- Increase economic pressure on India and Pakistan and encourage other aid donors to withhold aid: YES 10%
- Instead of relying on economic leverage, which has not been effective, promote a regional nuclear-free zone, which would include India and Pakistan: YES 38%
- Acknowledge that it is too late to achieve a nuclear freeze and work to rebuild U.S. influence in Pakistan and improve relations with India: YES 45%

Issue B. How would you rank U.S. policy interests in South Asia?

- Restrain nuclear proliferation: YES 42%
- Promote self-determination for Kashmir: YES 3%
- Protect human rights: YES 10%
- Support democratic leaders and policies: YES 23%
- Encourage privatization, trade and investment: YES 15%

Issue C. If forced to choose between them, which country should the U.S. favor?

- India: YES 50%
- Pakistan: YES 9%

TOPIC 8: CHILDREN AT RISK

Issue A. To improve the lives of children throughout the world, the U.S. should:

- Ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: AGREE 66%, AGREE with reservations 22%, DISAGREE 4%, DISAGREE with reservations 4%
- Shift international aid priorities to increase funding for child survival and basic needs: AGREE 53%, AGREE with reservations 32%, DISAGREE 7%, DISAGREE with reservations 3%
- Shift bilateral aid priorities in order to direct more aid to the neediest countries: AGREE 33%, AGREE with reservations 41%, DISAGREE 12%, DISAGREE with reservations 4%
- Resume funding for the UN Population Fund: AGREE 61%, AGREE with reservations 21%, DISAGREE 7%, DISAGREE with reservations 4%
- Restructure the U.S. Agency for International Development so that its focus is on sustainable development and transfer security assistance programs to the State Department: AGREE 44%, AGREE with reservations 29%, DISAGREE 7%, DISAGREE with reservations 5%

Issue B. To improve the lives of children in this country, the U.S. should:

- Apply the lessons learned from the international child survival program, which emphasized preventive health care and mass health education campaigns: YES 86%, NO 2%
- Increase investments in children’s health and education programs, including Head Start and WIC: YES 82%, NO 6%
- Encourage a partnership between government and the private sector to improve children’s lives: YES 79%, NO 6%
- Emphasize the role of the family and reduce the role of government: YES 57%, NO 21%

Note: Percentages reported above may not add up to 100 because some participants did not mark particular ballots or volunteered other responses not tabulated here.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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As the Clinton Administration reaches the end of its first year in office, political observers and citizens across the U.S. are evaluating its performance. The record of the new President, like that of his predecessors, has been examined using a wide range of standards that reflects each reviewer's particular interests, biases or political agenda.

Political pundits and others are also examining the record of the U.S. performance in the "new world order." It has been two years since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold-war bipolar world. Unlike reviews of the presidency, evaluations of the U.S. role in the world tend to be dispassionate. Discrediting or undermining a president for partisan purposes because of his conduct of foreign affairs is considered unpatriotic. Politics, it is said, ends at the water's edge. Since World War II, with some notable exceptions such as opposition to the Vietnam War or U.S. policy toward China, support for the conduct of U.S. foreign affairs has cut across party lines. Almost all Americans want the U.S. to survive and to do well in the world. They recognize that the U.S. is a military superpower, that it has serious economic problems, that U.S. culture is popular worldwide and that U.S. values and ideals concerning democracy and human rights are appealing and have evoked positive responses among many peoples.

Creating grist for the current debate about U.S. foreign policy are the disagreement and uncertainties about what role, responsibilities or commitments the U.S. should assume in the post-cold-war world. The bewildering and unsettling changes since the collapse of the "evil empire" are evident to everyone in the global village. What is not clear is where the vital interests of the U.S. may lie.

Only when U.S. interests have been defined and made clear to all can resources be allocated and policies formulated to ensure long-term survival and short-term security in the world.

We believe that the 1994 edition of the Great Decisions briefing book will help Americans define and clarify vital U.S. interests in the world. The turmoil in Yugoslavia and the environmental crisis in the former Soviet bloc raise important questions about humanitarian aid and military intervention. The problematical economic and political developments—along with rising hopes and expectations—in nations such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile and South Africa, along with the sizeable economic challenges from the Pacific Rim, present difficult questions for the U.S. with respect to trade, industrial development, economic assistance, diplomacy and a host of other issues. The dynamics of a worldwide, often misunderstood Islamic revival offer opportunity for new insight and understanding of this important global phenomenon. In addition, exploring the needs, priorities and role of the U.S. in the face of these and other foreign and domestic issues in an organized, systematic way can provide invaluable assistance in achieving an understanding and an appreciation of the decisions that must be made in the coming years.

There is nothing more important for the U.S. than to seek to understand where our vital interests lie and to ensure that they are protected.

Amon A. Diggs
January 1994
Conflict in former Yugoslavia: quest for solutions

- What common bonds united the Yugoslav federation? What ethnic, economic and political differences divided the country?
- What led to Yugoslavia’s breakup? Could similar circumstances occur elsewhere?
- Should the U.S. intervene and try to end the conflict?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

The complexity of the Yugoslav conflict has produced confusion in U.S. foreign policy. American response has swung between moral outrage at the “humanitarian nightmare” of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a reluctance to become involved militarily because U.S. national interests were not at stake. This ambivalence has inhibited the formulation of policy and led to the failure of even humanitarian actions.

The causes of the conflict, the author writes, have more to do with the attempts to transform a socialist country into a market-oriented democracy and to incorporate it into Europe than with the ethnic and cultural makeup of former Yugoslavia. The war therefore has forced the U.S. and Europe to confront their own disagreements and national competition over economic and security relations in a post-cold-war world. Western attempts to mediate, based on old thinking and instruments inappropriate to the conflict, have escalated the process of disintegration. Lacking are procedures and instruments to address conflicts over the principle of self-determination and over borders within Europe, and national interests have predominated over multilateral cooperation in Western policies. In Yugoslavia, the forces for further disintegration and war are stronger than those for an end to the fighting or for its containment.

ACTIVITY ONE

Overview

If today the world faces problems that are not somehow displayed in the tragedy unfolding in Yugoslavia, it would be difficult to imagine what they would be. Yugoslavia is a sobering example of the fragility of the post-cold-war world and the relationships between political, military and economic development; ethnic, social and occupational groups; and religious and national communities. Yugoslavia was created by the Great Powers after World War I. It was buffeted by worldwide depression, a multinational military occupation during World War II and a struggle to maintain neutrality during the cold war that followed.

Now the Yugoslav federation has disintegrated. Issues such as democratization, federalism, economic reform and the role of government in society have been superseded by arms sales, bombardments, “ethnic cleansing,” lawlessness and brigandry, military campaigns and political chicanery. The Western powers, including the U.S., have vacillated between concern and indifference, lacking the will, the means and the experience to halt the disintegration.

The situation in Yugoslavia is complex. Federalists in the former Yugoslavia had sought unsuccessfully to strengthen democracy and liberalize the economy through the national government in Belgrade. How-
However, Yugoslavia was in reality six nations in one federal state, and opposition to federalism arose, based on social class, ethnicity, personal wealth and economic or occupational status. Internally, the former Yugoslav republics are beset with overwhelming political, military, economic and social problems. Movements espousing nationalism, political or military adventurism or the redress of old or new grievances have proliferated. Clashes between factions that champion various public and private interests have brought war, destruction and death. Various external groups, including northern Europeans, Germans, Austrians, Russians, Hungarians, Albanians, Islamists, Italians, Greeks and others, are involved in promoting their own agendas, and for the most part they have worsened the situation.

What are the basic causes of violence and division in this land? How have ethnic, religious, social and economic differences contributed to the breakup of this country? What consequences will the continued strife have? How do these events mirror issues and problems in other parts of the world?

Objectives
Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Describe the forces that divide and create destruction in the former country of Yugoslavia.
2. Explain what will be required to bring peace and stability to the region.
3. Compare problems and issues that have affected Yugoslavia with similar problems and issues elsewhere.

Materials
"Handout on Yugoslavia" (page 35), chalk, chalkboard

Time
Approximately 45 minutes

Procedure
Begin the discussion by asking the participants to describe the difficult problems the U.S. has faced recently as a result of the Rodney King and Reginald Denny incidents in Los Angeles. Ask for the participants' reactions to Rodney King's widely quoted query: "Can't we get along?" Ask whether or not they believe that Americans are divided because of racial or ethnic tensions or other similar matters. Ask them to describe aspects of American society that they believe cause people to be united and to compare them with those aspects of American society that cause them to be divided. List the main points in two separate columns on the chalkboard labeled "U.S. Unity" and "U.S. Division." Ask participants to predict, on the basis of what they have presented, if they believe that the U.S. could break up sometime in the near future.

Turn the discussion to the new Balkan states (formerly Yugoslavia). Briefly describe the background and history of the former Yugoslavia, including a general description of its cultural legacies and traditions. Point out the highlights of its 20th century history. Then divide the participants into four groups, explaining to them that they are going to concentrate on four states, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Yugoslavia. Assign each group a state, distribute the "Handout on Yugoslavia," and ask them to work together within their respective group to produce an up-to-date assessment of the situation in the state they represent. Ask them to note the most serious conditions and problems at the present time, and ask them to recommend short-term measures that would provide stability and alleviate the problems. Give them approximately 10 minutes to complete this work.

Call them back together and ask each of them to summarize the situation in their designated state. Outline their findings on the chalkboard. After all four states have been described, ask them to compare conditions and to assess which situations are the most difficult. Ask them to specify the problems in their state that are connected with problems or issues in the other states. Get them to work together toward solving what they consider the major problems within each state by suggesting comprehensive, cooperative efforts and solutions. Ask them to suggest what resources would have to be deployed to ensure a successful outcome.

End the discussion by asking if they believe that what happened in Yugoslavia could happen elsewhere in the world. Turn their attention to the notes on the chalkboard about unity and division in the U.S. Ask them to compare Yugoslavia and the U.S., and ask them if they believe the situations are similar. Ask them if what happened to Yugoslavia could happen to the U.S. in their lifetimes. Ask them to state briefly the reasons they believe this could or could not happen.
ACTIVITY TWO

Overview

Anyone seeking evidence that the U.S. and its NATO allies have not developed a cogent plan to deal with difficult international issues in the post-cold-war era need look no further than the continuing tragedy in what was formerly Yugoslavia. Successor states to that country have been ensnared in recurrent waves of hatred, violence and nihilism as the U.S. and its friends have displayed timidity and inconsistency in their approach to the problem. Neutral during the cold war, Yugoslavia was neither part of the Soviet bloc nor the free world but was courted by both. Today, few Europeans or Americans seem to be sure of how to grapple with the situation there.

Furthermore, the violence and ethnic strife in former Yugoslavia threaten to spill over its borders. There have been serious delays and setbacks in democratic development and economic reforms in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania. The increasing pressures generated by floods of refugees have heightened tension and conflict both within and among neighboring countries. Economic damage has also been substantial. Added to the burdens of the refugee problem are billions of dollars lost in regional trade, staggering unemployment and the disruption of overland transportation between Europe and the Middle East. The cost of building new routes around Yugoslavia will be considerable. Meanwhile, arms sales have helped rejuvenate military industries and slowed the post-cold-war conversion to other economic pursuits.

The U.S. finds itself in a particular dilemma. Uncertain of its role, the world's only military superpower and the "winner" of the cold war promotes democracy, self-determination and human rights around the world. It is weighing the future of the NATO alliance and the economic and political development of Europe. The Clinton Administration has sought to cut back military spending in order to concentrate on domestic issues such as economic revitalization, health and educational reform, racial divisiveness, urban decay, etc.

What role should the U.S. play in the continuing crisis in Yugoslavia? What ideas or strategies should the U.S. pursue for the area? How will U.S. action or inaction affect its relationship with Europe and the promotion of its foreign policy goals in the world? How will the crisis in Yugoslavia affect U.S. domestic priorities?

Objectives

Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Discuss and compare the advantages and disadvantages of U.S. efforts to intervene in the crisis in Yugoslavia.
2. Assess and determine the role other nations and international organizations play in the conflict.
3. Describe the possible effect U.S. action in Yugoslavia would have on American leadership in Europe.
4. Discuss the impact U.S. policy in Yugoslavia will have on American domestic concerns and priorities.

Materials

Chalk, chalkboard

Time

Approximately 45 minutes

Procedure

Begin the discussion by briefly outlining the serious problems that exist in the former Yugoslavia. Ask participants what specific actions should be taken to bring immediate pressure to bear in order to resolve these problems. List these actions on the blackboard.

Write the following on the chalkboard: "Europe (NATO)," "U.S.," "United Nations." Ask participants to develop a possible scenario in which one or more of these—or any other national or international public or private entity, alone or in combination—could successfully carry out the actions suggested by the group to end the crisis in Yugoslavia. Ask them why this has not taken place before and what the U.S. could or should do in order for this to occur. Describe the basic principles that the U.S. stands for in the world—democracy, self-determination and human rights—and ask them why they believe these principles would or would not make it possible for the U.S. to play a significant role in trying to resolve the conflicts in Yugoslavia. Ask them to agree on which principles or concepts they believe apply to U.S. involvement or noninvolvement in the struggle.

End the discussion by asking them what they believe will happen if something is not done about the situation in Yugoslavia and how they think this will
affect the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in Europe and throughout the world.

Ask the participants what dangers the U.S. may face if it decides to play a role in the tragedy and how U.S. actions would affect its relations with Europe and the United Nations. Ask them what they believe will be the economic, political and military price the U.S. may have to pay in order to play a significant role. Ask them if such expenditures are worthwhile given the domestic needs and other U.S. international commitments and priorities.

**GLOSSARY**

- **Balkans.** The Balkan Peninsula is a large, ethnically diverse region in southeastern Europe consisting of all or parts of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Turkey and the former Yugoslavia. This volatile mix of peoples and cultures in the region has produced numerous intrastate and border conflicts, which continue up to the present time.

- **federalism.** A system of government in which sovereignty is divided between a central authority and component state authorities. The central government most often handles the concerns of the people as a whole, including foreign affairs, defense and commerce; the local entities retain other powers.

- **Geneva Conventions.** Series of treaties signed (1864–1949) in Geneva, Switzerland, that provide for the humane treatment of combatants and civilians in wartime.

- **Great Powers.** The victorious allies of World War I—Britain, France, Italy and the U.S.

- **Habsburg dynasty.** The ruling house of Austria from 1282 to 1918. It controlled large parts of Europe during its reign. In 1867 the Habsburg empire was reorganized into the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which was dissolved at the end of World War I. Part of the former empire became Yugoslavia.

- **market economy.** An economic system that relies on free competition, profit incentives and the principle of supply and demand to determine which goods to produce, how to produce them, and who will receive them once they have been produced.

- **nation-state.** A country that consists of people who are conscious of their common historical and cultural background and who wish to perpetuate it within the framework of a state.

- **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).** Military alliance created in 1949 linking the U.S., Canada, Belgium, Britain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal. Greece, Spain, Turkey and Germany were subsequently admitted to the alliance. It was created to defend the North Atlantic allies against potential Communist aggression.

- **Ottoman dynasty.** An Islamic empire based in Istanbul that was ruled by the Ottoman Turks from 1300 to 1922. At their height in the 16th and 17th centuries, the Ottomans ruled over an area stretching from Algeria to the Persian Gulf and from Hungary to Yemen.

- **Venetian dynasty.** Rulers of this island-city came to dominate the Adriatic region in the 9th century as a leading sea power. The zenith of the empire was reached in the 15th century when it served as a link between Europe and Asia. It fell in 1797 to Napoleon I who delivered Venice to Austrian rule.

- **Versailles.** The site in France where the most important of the five peace treaties ending World War I—the Treaty of Versailles—was signed. The victorious Great Powers forced defeated Germany to admit war guilt and to accept limitations on its rearmament. Germany also had to pay war reparations and give up certain territories. The League of Nations, the forerunner of the United Nations, was also established under this treaty.
South Africa: forging a democratic union

- What are the aftereffects of apartheid and what problems do they create for South Africa’s leaders?
- Can a new multiracial government heal old wounds?
- What stakes does the U.S. have in South Africa’s democratic transition?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

South Africa has passed a point of no return. The old system of apartheid is gone and the first all-inclusive elections will be held on April 27, 1994. From its inception in 1948, advocates of apartheid strove systematically to separate the majority black population from the minority white population. Internal opposition to this system followed. The government banned the African National Congress and jailed its leaders, including Nelson Mandela, but the opposition to apartheid continued to grow and led to violent confrontations in the black townships. The outraged international community imposed economic sanctions, and foreign businesses divested themselves of their holdings in South Africa. In 1989 the situation came to a head. A new president, F.W. de Klerk, announced plans to dismantle gradually the apartheid system. Mandela and de Klerk are currently members of a transitional government charged with finalizing a new constitution with a bill of rights and addressing apartheid’s legacy—a divided country, a stagnant economy and a largely unemployed majority. The U.S. has declared its commitment to helping South Africa make this transition. But what form should that help take? What are the best policies? The decisions made now may have profound effects on South Africa’s future.

ACTIVITY ONE

Overview

A nation long regarded as a pariah state by the international community, South Africa is no longer shunned but is being observed with amazement, excitement and apprehension as it moves through the last decade of the 20th century. For many years the government of this multiracial society used tyranny to uphold race as the defining criterion for political, economic and social well-being. It has now embarked upon a course that not only has put an end to legal apartheid and invited full political participation by the nonwhite majority, but also seeks to eliminate the results of powerful traditions of racism, violence, tyranny and economic exploitation that were inspired and sanctioned by the whites-only South African government and that still have a crippling effect on many aspects of South African life today.

The history of South Africa is replete with racial and ethnic unrest. In addition to struggles and conflict over language and culture, there have been violent rivalries concerning land, cattle and mineral rights as well as political and economic power. The victory of the Nationalist party in 1948 enabled the Afrikaners to codify and expand previous forms of discrimination to all aspects of life in order to deny political and economic equality to blacks. Separated from the land,
restricted in movement, denied the right to protest or
organize and subjected to divide-and-rule tactics en-
forced by state tyranny, blacks organized and fought
back through political activism and armed struggle.

International condemnation, economic sanctions
and U.S.-led divestment, coupled with increasing state
and individual violence and opposition from South
African whites and blacks, eventually brought an end
to apartheid. South Africa is now attempting to rebuild
and restructure its economy and society. Can South
Africa overcome its tumultuous past and become an
open, democratic, multiracial nation? What immediate
steps can be taken to ensure a successful transition?
How can needs such as housing, education, job train-
ing and health be managed in an uncertain period of
transition for the black majority? What role, if any,
should the U.S. and the world play in these efforts?

Objectives
Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Identify social, economic and political prob-
lems that have developed as a result of the
policy of apartheid in South Africa.

2. Explain the challenges South Africa faces as it
attempts to reform and restructure the govern-
ment.

3. Discuss and assess the role the international
community should play in order to assist the
reform process.

Materials
Chalkboard, chalk

Time
Approximately 45 minutes

Procedures
After briefly describing apartheid, ask the participants
to speculate on how successful they believe South
Africans will be in reforming, restructuring and de-
mocratizing their society. Ask them to list the most
difficult problems they believe the country must over-
come in order to be successful. Make sure they explain
why they choose the problems they do. List all prob-
lems on the chalkboard and, after the list is completed,
ask them to rank these problems from the most to the
least difficult to solve.

Divide the participants into the following groups:
National party, Afrikaner Resistance Movement, Af-
rican National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom
party. Ask them to develop specific positions and
specific proposals or demands concerning how the
group would like to deal with the problems listed on
the chalkboard. Bring the groups together and, under
columns on the chalkboard labeled “National Party,”
“Afrikaner Resistance Movement,” “African National
Congress” and “Inkatha Freedom Party,” have each
present its ideas and demands. After the suggestions
have been summarized on the chalkboard, get them to
compare and contrast the ideas and approaches to each
problem. Ask them to try to work out a consensus or
compromise on their goals. Ask them to determine
whether or not the issues, ideas and difficulties sug-
gested are primarily political, social or economic in
nature. Ask them what help, if any, they might seek
from outsiders, such as the U.S., multilateral organiza-
tions or any other groups or individuals in order to help
resolve these issues. Get them to speculate as to
whether or not outside help might be forthcoming and
the reasons why.

Review their progress in attempting to resolve
differences over these issues. Ask participants what, if
any, patterns or principles could be used as a general
statement of the difficulties connected with this pro-
cess. Then turn back to their original ranking of the
problems. Ask them whether they still hold to the same
order of difficulties and to explain the reasons why
they may or may not have changed their minds.

End the discussion by comparing what they have
done with what must be done in South Africa. Ask
them if they understand why so many people in and out
of South Africa are deeply concerned about the chances
for success and the reasons why they believe there will
or will not be progress toward the creation of a demo-
cratic, multiracial society in that country.

ACTIVITY TWO
Overview
The recent announcement that the 1993 Nobel Prize
for Peace has been jointly awarded to Prime Minister
F.W. de Klerk and Nelson Mandela of South Africa
stands out as another remarkable moment for a world that has recently witnessed one incredible change after another. South Africa is swiftly moving away from being a rigid, brutally segregated, whites-only society toward becoming an open, integrated, multiracial democratic society, and no one inside or outside this country is quite certain, despite ambitious goals and objectives, what will happen. Violence, division, distrust, economic stagnation, extremism, ignorance and historical traditions cast a pall over hopes and dreams for South Africa’s future.

The future of South Africa is important to the U.S. for several reasons. In the first place, the U.S. has recently shown a renewed commitment to democracy and self-determination in the world. South Africa offers a dramatic opportunity to determine if people of different racial or ethnic backgrounds can live in peace, harmony and equality in spite of a deeply troubled past and profound social and economic problems in the present. Many feel that the U.S., as the foreign country that contributed most to ending apartheid, has a special obligation to assist in South Africa’s transition to democracy and economic stability. South Africa’s uncertain future may have a serious effect on racial politics in the U.S., especially in foreign affairs. African-Americans feel a special tie to events there and were influential in pressuring the U.S. government to sanction South Africa. Future U.S. efforts, whether they succeed or fail, will be felt across the racial divide. In addition, the U.S., having emerged from a long period of severe legal and social segregation only about 30 years ago, finds itself facing challenges at home that are similar to those of South Africa. While not as pronounced as conditions in South Africa, division, distrust, extremism, violence, ignorance and some historical traditions have contributed to impediments to multiracial and multiethnic integration and democratic progress here. As in South Africa, economic stagnation has exacerbated these problems and has prompted warnings that the U.S. is headed for serious social disintegration and unrest. Should we compare South Africa and its problems to similar problems in the U.S.? What differences exist between the two? What can the U.S. do to help South Africa move toward multiracial democracy? What role—if any—should the U.S. play in such a transition? How will U.S. actions in South Africa affect the U.S. position in the world? at home?

**Objectives**

Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Describe and compare the problems and challenges South Africa, the U.S. and other multiracial, multiethnic societies face in attempting to manage democratic reform.
2. Explain why the U.S. has a special stake in events unfolding in South Africa.
3. Discuss which important principles and values will ensure that U.S. interests in democracy and self-determination can be sustained in the world and at home.

**Materials**

"Handout on South Africa" (page 36), chalkboard, chalk

**Time**

Approximately 45 minutes

**Procedures**

Begin the discussion by quoting from a famous speech by Dr. Martin Luther King: "I have a dream...a dream deeply rooted in the American dream.” Ask the participants why this speech is famous and when it was delivered. Ask them what they believe constitutes the American dream and why they believe African-Americans were willing to march on Washington, D.C., to protest their treatment and denial of access to the American dream in American society.

Ask the group to compare conditions in the U.S. in 1963 to conditions in South Africa today.

Distribute the “Handout on South Africa” to the participants and give them about 10 minutes to complete it. When they have finished, open the discussion by asking them to compare the definition of U.S. segregation with that of apartheid in South Africa. Ask them to describe major differences between the two in terms of demographics, social conditions, government policies and actions, and recent history. Ask them to compare the steps being taken to bring about reforms in the two societies. Get them to determine whether or not the U.S. has or should have a special role in influencing an end to apartheid in South Africa because of its democratic principles, its prominence in
the world and its racial problems. Ask them what effect, if any, developments in South Africa will have on U.S. racial problems and what influence, if any, U.S. racial problems will have on developments in South Africa.

Turn the discussion to recently published literature and commentary that have stated that the U.S., despite the elimination of legal and many social barriers to racial integration, is a society that is dividing more and more along racial and ethnic lines. Ask them if they believe this to be true and, if so, what conditions have contributed to this development. Ask them what needs to be done to arrest this trend in order to avoid racial and ethnic conflicts and social disintegration. Ask them what they think this may or may not mean for the chances for far-reaching and difficult reforms and changes that are planned for South Africa.

Glossary


- Agency for International Development (AID). Established in 1961 under the U.S. State Department to coordinate nonmilitary assistance to developing nations. The Agency for International Development gives priority to programs in agriculture, health, population planning, education and the environment.

- British Commonwealth. A voluntary coalition of Britain, associated states and certain sovereign states that were former dependencies. Founded in 1931, its purpose is consultation and cooperation. No collective decisions are binding on members and they may withdraw at any time. The British monarch is recognized as the symbolic head and, while the commonwealth states are linked economically, preferential tariffs were abandoned when Britain joined the Common Market in 1973.

- Dutch East India Company. This company was chartered by the States-General of the Netherlands in 1602 and granted a monopoly on Dutch trade east of the Cape of Good Hope and west of the Strait of Magellan. It subdued local rulers and drove out competition to dominate trade. Its possessions became part of the Dutch empire in the Far East in 1798.

- Economic sanctions. Economic restraints imposed by outside powers seeking to pressure a country, without using force, to change its policies. Sanctions include embargoes, tariffs, quotas and denial of credit.

- far right. A political position favoring authoritarian rule. For example, far-right governments often demand popular allegiance to one leader who derives his or her power from the military.

- Freedom Charter. This 1955 political platform of the African National Congress (ANC) announced the goal of a democratic state based on the will of the people, with no distinctions based on color, race, sex or belief. It demanded that members of all races be given the right to vote and to run for office.

- gerrymandering. The practice of drawing the boundaries of districts in such a way that a particular political party has an advantage in elections.

- infrastructure. The foundation on which a nation’s economy, including agriculture, trade and industry, depends—for example, roads, railroads, ports and power facilities.

- labor-intensive agriculture. Farming that relies primarily on human labor rather than mechanical, technological or scientific methods to produce crops.

- miscegenation. A mixture of races by inbreeding; or marriage or cohabitation between members of different races.

- Napoleon I. Emperor of France and commander of French armies (1804–14). He is widely regarded as one of the greatest conquerors of all times.

Nobel Peace Prize. International prize awarded annually by the Nobel Foundation in Stockholm for the promotion of peace.

Per capita gross domestic product. The total value of goods and services produced within a country in a given year (does not include income earned abroad) divided by the population.

Per capita income. National income per person, or the total value of a country's goods and services divided by the total population.

Real wages. Real wages indicate the earnings of workers adjusted for changes in consumer prices. They are an index of workers' standard of living. They also are an indication of real output per unit of labor input (productivity).

Sharpeville. A town near Johannesburg. South African police opened fire on blacks demonstrating against apartheid pass laws in March 1960 and killed 69. The massacre brought South Africa close to civil war and precipitated international condemnation of the government.

Soweto. A black township near Johannesburg. A student demonstration against a government attempt to impose the Afrikaans language in education led to three days of riots in Soweto; 236 non-whites were killed by police and 2 whites were killed by rioters. The government withdrew the proposal.

Torture. The infliction of severe pain as a means of punishment or coercion.

Tricameral parliament. A parliament that consists of three bodies or chambers.

Tyranny. Coercive, arbitrary government that recognizes no law or limitations.

World Bank. An international agency closely associated with the International Monetary Fund. The World Bank was established in 1944 to help countries devastated by World War II to rebuild. Today it makes low-interest loans to developing nations for economic development projects such as highways and dams. Officially known as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), it is the largest international lending agency of its kind and disburses about $15 billion annually.
Environmental crisis in former Soviet bloc: whose problem? who pays?

- How did Communist government policies affect the environment?
- What priority should new governments in the former Soviet bloc give to environmental cleanup efforts?
- How can the international community address global environmental problems? Why have past efforts failed?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

The former Soviet republics and East European nations face wide-scale environmental problems at least as serious as those the U.S. and Europe experienced 30 years ago. The damage in the former Soviet Union is the result of 60 years of abuse and neglect. Early government measures to protect the environment from the effects of collectivization and rapid industrialization were never enforced, and warnings by environmentalists were suppressed or largely ignored. When Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in the mid-1980s called for glasnost, or a more open society, environmental activists stepped up their protests against government policies, contributing to the political ferment that eventually toppled the Soviet Union. Currently the former Soviet bloc’s most serious and urgent environmental problem is dealing with defective nuclear reactors, similar to the one at Chernobyl that caused the worst nuclear catastrophe in history. Other environmental problems include serious water pollution, degradation of land, losses of biological resources and air pollution. The economic and environmental recovery of the region will depend on new energy policies and on exploiting and conserving energy reserves, namely oil and natural gas. New policies will require technology and large amounts of capital, which is in short supply. Russia especially is in need of loans, grants and private investment to advance ecologically sound projects. The U.S. government, business and nongovernmental organizations may all play a role, but the problems will not soon go away.

ACTIVITY

Overview

Since the first international conference on the human environment in Stockholm, Sweden, in 1972, pollution of the environment and the destruction of the earth’s ecosystem have been high on the world’s agenda. The recent Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, underscored the continuing universal concern.

While few people can agree on what, precisely, should be done—and by whom—most feel that the pollution of the environment and the destruction of the ecosystem of the earth must be stopped. Nearly all recognize that the solution to many of these problems will cost a great deal of money and effort.

One region where environmental degradation has taken its greatest toll is the former Soviet bloc. While the political, economic and social problems that haunt this former empire are massive, the environmental crisis that it faces may be even greater, threatening the very existence of the land and its people. By extension, it menaces the ecology of the entire globe.

With reckless disregard for health, human life and the environment, the ambitious Stalinist programs for
rapid heavy industrialization and collectivization of agriculture depleted natural resources, destroyed forests and agricultural areas and polluted waters and streams. In many respects, present environmental conditions in the former empire are comparable with the situation that existed in other industrial nations 30 years ago.

One of the most hazardous problems in the former Soviet states involves civilian and military nuclear establishments. Civilian nuclear reactors, substandard in design and poorly constructed, threaten the lives and safety of people throughout the world. Some experts are afraid that an accident even worse than the Chernobyl disaster may occur in the near future unless nuclear reactors are shut down or upgraded immediately. In addition, while the complete story has not been forthcoming, there are indications that the industrial complex responsible for the manufacture of nuclear weapons may present even greater dangers to the world. At least three serious nuclear accidents have occurred since the late 1950s, causing tremendous damage in and around the former Soviet states.

The massive cleanups and the reallocation and restructuring of resources and priorities will require a great deal of money. Where will funds be found? Given the difficulties faced by the former Soviet empire in converting to market economies, curbing hyperinflation and developing trade and investment—as well as dealing with other economic and social problems—money for environmental concerns is simply not available in anywhere near the amount needed. Some assistance has been forthcoming from outside the former states. Nations, international organizations, NGOs and others have pledged or sent funds, often with strings attached, to tackle the problems. How can the former Soviet bloc countries afford to manage their affairs, develop political, economic and social harmony and solve the environmental crisis, as well? What steps can be taken to ensure that the movement to a market economy will feature a more environmentally sound approach? What role should nations, international organizations, NGOs and others play in working for solutions to these problems?

Objectives
Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Discuss the severe environmental problems that exist in the former Soviet empire and explain how these problems were created.

2. Discuss why the ex-Soviet bloc and many other nations find it difficult to deal effectively with managing and correcting environmental problems.

3. Discuss possible ideas or programs that could be developed by the world community to assist in the management of the environmental crisis in the former Soviet empire or in other nations around the world.

Materials
“Handout on the Environment” (page 37), chalk, chalkboard

Time
Approximately 45 minutes

Procedure
Begin the discussion by describing some current environmental problems, such as the depletion of the ozone layer, the greenhouse effect, acid rain, etc. Ask participants their views on these questions and get them to express whether or not they believe that the earth and its environment are endangered. Ask them what they believe are the most serious environmental challenges facing the U.S. and what difficulties stand in the way of correcting these problems. Ask them what they believe they should do to help solve environmental problems in the U.S.

Turn the discussion to the former Soviet empire. Ask them to summarize environmental problems that exist there. Ask them to compare these problems with environmental difficulties in the U.S. Describe some of the social, political and economic changes that are occurring in the former bloc and ask them what effect they believe these changes will have on efforts to do something about the environmental crisis there. Inform the participants that, because of the gravity of the situation, the precariousness of the transition to democracy and market economics and the lack of available resources, it may be necessary for other countries to help solve this problem in order to prevent further environmental damage.

Write the names of four groups on the chalkboard: “Europe,” “The United Nations,” “The U.S.” and “Nongovernmental organizations.” Explain to the participants that they are to divide evenly into these
groups—and any other group that they might suggest—in order to produce ideas and programs on how to deal with this environmental crisis. Distribute the "Handout on the Environment." Ask them to work together within their group to prepare an action plan for what they believe needs to be done. Give them about 10 minutes to complete this task.

Call them back together and ask each group to present its views on what it believes to be the worst environmental situations in the former Soviet bloc. Be sure that the groups provide reasons for their choices. Ask them whether or not they believe that the effects of these problems are confined to the former Soviet bloc or if they pose a threat to the world at large. Ask them to offer suggestions on how to eliminate these problems and how they would arrange to provide the necessary funds. Outline the views of each group on the chalkboard and, when all the groups have finished, ask them to rank and evaluate the different viewpoints and solutions. Ask them which program they think is the best and whether or not they would use its solutions or combine them with others in order to address the problem. Ask them to rank and evaluate their funding ideas and whether or not they should also be combined.

After they have finished their evaluation, ask them what they believe will happen to the world's environment if their ideas or similar ones are not adopted. Have them explain and evaluate what role the U.S. should play in this matter. Ask them what, if anything, they should personally do with regard to this problem as citizens of the U.S. or as concerned individuals.
**GLOSSARY**

- **DDT.** A toxic insecticide developed during World War II to improve agricultural production. It was banned from further use during the 1970s by the U.S. government because of dangers of residual effects on the ecosystem. Its use is continued in other parts of the world.

- **European Community (EC).** A European economic union created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 that eliminated internal barriers to trade. The six original members were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. Since then, Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal have joined. At the end of 1993 the EC became the European Union.

- **Great Depression.** A period of worldwide economic stagnation and unemployment in the 1930s that was marked by severe cutbacks in international trade and widespread default on loans by sovereign borrowers. In the U.S., the Depression dated from the stock market crash of 1929.

- **gross national product (GNP).** The total value of a nation's goods and services, including government expenditures and investments abroad, during a given period of time, usually one year. Different methods of calculating national economic factors, such as currency-value changes, can lead to varying figures.

- **Group of Seven (G-7).** The seven most economically developed countries of the world: Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.S. The heads of state of these countries meet at yearly summits to discuss international economic and monetary developments as well as a wider range of issues, such as terrorism and arms control. These summits are also attended by the president of the European Community's Council of Ministers.

- **Lenin, Vladimir Ilich Ulyanov.** Founder and leader of the Russian Bolshevik party, he devised the strategy for the seizure of power in the October 1917 revolution. He became the founder and leader of the Soviet Union.

- **nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).** These private foundations and voluntary associations, usually designed to deal with specific issues or areas of concern, devote their efforts and resources to addressing or influencing national or international matters.

- **Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).** In addition to trying to curb the spread of nuclear weapons, the treaty commits all signatories to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and, ultimately, to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

- **Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).** Organization launched in December 1960 to promote economic growth, employment and improved standards of living among member countries by encouraging coordinated policies. It seeks "to promote the sound and harmonious development of the world economy and improve the lot of the developing countries..." Its members include the U.S., the West European countries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada.

- **Stalin, Joseph.** The sole and undisputed head of the Communist party and leader of the Soviet Union from 1927 to 1953. He ruled with rigid authoritarianism and through widespread use of terror.

- **Third World.** Economically less-developed nations of the world, most of which gained independence after World War II. During the cold war, the First World referred to the U.S. and other countries with free-market economies and the Second World to the Soviet Union and other Communist-bloc countries.

- **United Nations Development Program.** An international agency that coordinates and administers technical assistance provided through the UN system to speed social and economic development in less-developed countries.

- **United Nations Environment Program.** Established in 1972 to facilitate international cooperation in all matters affecting the human environment, to ensure that environmental problems of wide international significance receive appropriate governmental consideration and to promote the acquisition and exchange of environmental knowledge.

- **U.S. Superfund.** A program of the U.S. government that began in 1986 and established deadlines and standards for the cleanup of hazardous toxic waste sites in the U.S. It designates which sites are considered the most serious toxic hazards in the nation and provides the means to clean them up.

- **World Bank.** See Glossary, Topic 2.
**Trade with the Pacific Rim: pressure or cooperation?**

- What is the relationship between U.S. jobs and the rapidly expanding Pacific Rim economies?
- What accounts for the U.S. trade deficit with the Pacific Rim?
- How can the U.S. improve relations with the Pacific Rim?

### ARTICLE SUMMARY

The Clinton Administration has declared that “no region in the world is more important to the U.S. than Asia.” It dramatized that point at the November meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Seattle. U.S. trade with Asia is already one and one-half times as large as U.S. trade with Europe. As the economies of the Pacific Rim countries grow and their markets continue to expand, trade with that region will be even more important to Americans. Increasing the access of U.S. exports to overseas markets can lead to job growth and a reduction in the trade deficit.

The article explores the prospects for trade with the major Pacific Rim countries. It presents conflicting views on the U.S. trade deficit and ways to reduce it, such as asking trade partners voluntarily to restrain exports, establishing lists of unfair trading practices and imposing retaliatory tariffs. The article also raises the question of how much weight the architects of trade policy should give to such traditional U.S. concerns as promoting human rights, democracy and regional stability and security. To what extent, for example, should the U.S. apply pressure to its trade partners? Should it tie improved trade relations to observance of human rights? to respect for intellectual property rights? Has the time come to end the trade embargo on Vietnam?

### ACTIVITY ONE

**Overview**

When we think of popular ideas about the growth and development of the U.S., we invariably think of the dynamics of a westward movement of people and events. The U.S., settled primarily by Europeans, was formed by the westward movement of people from the original 13 colonies on the Atlantic seaboard to Pacific outposts in Oregon, California, Alaska and Hawaii. What is often ignored by Americans is the eastward movement of people and ideas from the Pacific Rim to the U.S. Most Asian-Americans came to the New World across the Pacific. In recent years the pace of Asian immigration has picked up.

The U.S. has been heavily involved in the Pacific region for well over a century. It acquired the Philippines during the Spanish-American War and promulgated the “Open Door” policy for China as the 20th century began. It had already annexed Hawaii, purchased Alaska and “opened up” Japan for U.S. trade. Other milestones of U.S. involvement in the Asian-Pacific area include the Pacific theater of World War II, the Korean War and the long Indochina struggle. The flow of U.S. history appears to be away from its European past in the direction of a Pacific future. It is no mere coincidence that the Pacific state of California is presently the most populous in the nation and one of the major cultural and industrial centers of the U.S.
The Pacific Rim—Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam—presents new challenges and opportunities for the U.S. to address in the post-cold-war world. U.S. trade with the Pacific Rim, which is undergoing rapid, far-reaching economic growth and political development, is already larger than trade with Europe. The U.S., beset by budget and trade deficits, persistent unemployment and social unrest, is anxious to expand its trade with the region. In addition to increasing exports, the U.S. is concerned about working with the Pacific Rim countries to curb nuclear proliferation, to promulgate human rights and to promote democratic development.

As the Pacific Rim nations continue their remarkable growth and development, the U.S. may be hard-pressed to maintain a high level of influence in the region. The U.S. needs to identify its principal goals and the means to achieve them. What can it do in order to have a role in shaping desired outcomes? Why have Pacific Rim economies experienced rapid, dynamic changes in recent years? What policies or events have accelerated this growth? How have these changes affected relations with the U.S. and the world? What future problems and challenges can be anticipated in the region?

Objectives
Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Describe how and why Pacific Rim economies are experiencing rapid and far-reaching growth and development at the present time.

2. Compare recent economic developments in the Pacific Rim with those in other areas of the world.

3. Discuss and evaluate what issues or problems must be taken into account to ensure that positive economic and political growth continues in the area.

Materials
“Handout on the Pacific Rim” (page 38), The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1994, chalk, chalkboard

Time
Approximately 45 minutes

Procedure
Begin the discussion by asking the participants what is meant by “advanced industrial nation.” Ask them to give reasons why some nations are advanced. Ask them what the advanced industrial nations have in common and get them to determine which of these traits are most important. List their responses on the chalkboard.

Turn the discussion to “developing nations.” Ask them how they would describe the major differences between developing nations and advanced industrial nations. Ask them to explain what nations must do to become industrially advanced. List the responses on the chalkboard as well. Take about 10 minutes for this part of the activity.

Divide the participants into five equal groups representing the Asean countries, China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Distribute the “Handout on the Pacific Rim” and give them about 10 minutes to create a profile of their group.

After 10 minutes ask the participants to come together to report on their group. Ask them to give an economic and political profile of their nation or group of nations and to explain why they believe it is either industrially advanced, developing or stagnant. Get them to state the reasons for their choice. Then ask them to predict what their group will be able to achieve over the next 25 years and to state how and why they believe this will happen. Summarize their reports on the chalkboard and, when they have finished, ask all participants whether or not they agree with each analysis. Ask them to find similarities and differences among the nations. Ask them to determine whether or not their relationship with the U.S. is important to these nations and how they might use this relationship as a measuring stick to compare the nations’ futures. Ask them what other factors should be considered in order to determine the successes or failures each group can anticipate in the future. End the discussion by comparing their profiles with the characteristics of advanced or developing nations that they listed on the chalkboard at the beginning of the discussion. Ask them if they still like the earlier ideas they expressed or if they would like to change or modify what they previously stated. End the discussion by asking them if they can make a general statement about what causes nations to develop and to become advanced. Ask them what nations can or should do in order to prevent their decline and fall.
ACTIVITY TWO

Overview
Many people in and out of public life have begun to accept the idea that possibly the most important adjustment the U.S. must make to succeed in the post-cold-war world will be a willingness on the part of Americans to reexamine old assumptions and to accept new ways of thinking. This is particularly true in the case of the U.S. economy. Americans are worried about jobs, budget and trade deficits, productivity, insufficient savings and investment and the lack of a robust confidence in business enterprise. A general uneasiness over the loss of jobs in the U.S. to overseas industries and the failure to make the necessary adjustments to reverse course is growing. Rather than face these issues head on, various Americans have blamed each other, foreigners or any other convenient target for their problems. A good example of this is the "Japan bashing" that has occurred as the result of trade difficulties between the U.S. and Japan.

In a very short time, the U.S. has gone from being a creditor nation with a strong industrial base and a trade surplus to being a debtor nation that has experienced a remarkable decline in its industrial output and a trade deficit. Various segments of U.S. society, whether they are part of the government and its bureaucracy, export-generating enterprises, organized labor or members of the general public, have differing opinions as to what should or should not be done in order to reverse current trends and to improve American performance in trade and production. Some believe the U.S. should use various forms of pressure; others favor greater cooperation. According to others, the U.S. should concentrate on making serious domestic adjustments, such as cutting the federal budget deficit, encouraging savings and discouraging consumption, and promoting export-oriented industries in order to make the U.S. more competitive in this vital region.

How do U.S. trade relations with Pacific Rim nations affect the U.S. economy? What approaches will best help the U.S. improve trade relations with Pacific Rim nations and address its domestic concerns? How do differences of politics or perceptions influence the difficulties the U.S. has in this area? To which particular Pacific Rim economies, issues or practices should the U.S. give priority? Which interests—economic, political or military—are more important in the short term? the long term?

Objectives
Upon completion, participants will be able to:
1. Explain the effects of U.S. trade relations with the Pacific Rim on the U.S. economy.
2. Identify, describe and compare key Pacific Rim nations and situations that the U.S. must address in order to develop successful trade policies for the area.
3. Describe and compare various approaches that the U.S. may try in order to improve its trade relations in the area.

Materials
Chalk, chalkboard

Time
Approximately 45 minutes

Procedure
Begin the discussion by asking the participants to list the major appliances (cameras, autos, televisions, etc.) their families possess. Ask them how many of these items were made by foreign or foreign-owned companies and how many were American-made. Ask them to list the countries that manufactured these products, if they can. Take a random sample from the group and write the results on the chalkboard. Ask them why they believe this situation is typical for most American families. Explain to them that as late as the early 1960s Americans bought fewer foreign goods and that U.S. industries manufactured many of these products. Ask them why they believe that U.S. industries no longer produce many of the manufactured goods that Americans purchase today. Ask them to explain what economic effect this has had on the nation.

Write the following statistics on the chalkboard:
1992 U.S. global trade deficit $84.3 billion
1992 U.S. trade deficit with Asia $87 billion.

Ask them what these statistics say about U.S. trade relations with the Pacific Rim. Then turn their attention to the “Selected Statistics” chart on page 42 of the 1994 Great Decisions. Ask them to explain the general information the chart gives them about Pacific Rim trade. Ask them to target four economies or groups of nations, based on their interpretation of the chart and on their understanding of the readings, and to develop
a U.S. strategy on trade and other matters for each. Ask them to keep in mind that the purpose of their actions is to improve economic conditions in the U.S.

Divide them into four groups and give them 10 minutes to devise a strategy and plan of action to improve trade relations with their targeted economy. Then call them back together and ask each group to report on its strategy and plan of action. Summarize the findings on the chalkboard. When all have reported, invite the entire group to comment on the ideas and strategies presented. Ask them to compare the strategies and to determine whether or not the U.S. can or should adopt a comprehensive plan or set of principles when approaching these matters. Ask them to speculate on how difficult it would or would not be to get the following groups to agree to these approaches: American consumers, the American government, American investors, American businessmen, the general public. Ask them what laws or policies must be enacted in order get the American people to embrace the measures they have suggested.

End the discussion by asking what they believe would happen to the U.S. and its relations with the Pacific Rim economies if their ideas were carried out. Close by asking them what will eventually happen to the U.S. if it fails to take action regarding trade matters with the Pacific Rim.

GLOSSARY

- Asian Development Bank. A financial institution established to promote investment and provide technical assistance for economic development in the Asian countries. Its members include both the Asian countries and several nonregional members such as the U.S. and the countries of Western Europe.
- free-market economists. They believe in economic policies that stress free competition, profits and the elimination of trade barriers such as tariffs, quotas and duties.
- International Monetary Fund (IMF). Founded in 1944, the IMF is an international agency based in Washington, D.C. It helps maintain stable exchange rates and acts as a lender of last resort to countries with serious debt problems. In return for IMF loans, countries are usually required to make economic reforms and undertake austerity programs. The IMF is controlled by the U.S. and other major Western powers and is closely associated with the World Bank.
- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). A cartel of oil-producing countries established in 1960 to unify and coordinate their petroleum supply and pricing policies. OPEC members drastically raised oil prices in 1973 and 1979.
- Tiananmen Square. A square in the heart of Beijing, the capital of China, which was the site of pro-democracy protests in spring 1989.
Defense: redefining U.S. needs and priorities

- Are the planned cuts in the defense budget too little or too much?
- How much military force is enough in the post-cold-war world?
- Should the U.S. military be assigned nontraditional roles, for example, fighting the war on drugs?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

For more than 40 years, the American military based its budgets, weapons projects, war plans—indeed, its very reason for existence—on the challenging and frightening possibility of global conventional and nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The uncertain new post-cold-war era now poses a novel range of unexpected challenges for U.S. defense policymakers. What unconventional roles can the military appropriately be asked to shoulder to help the nation solve its many domestic problems? In the absence of the superpower nuclear arms race, what role do nuclear weapons play in this “new world order”? And, can the U.S. reduce its all-pervasive presence around the world without leading other nations to believe that it is withdrawing from its global responsibilities and thus, perhaps, sparking unwanted regional arms races? These and other pressing questions all call for answers as the U.S. national security establishment steers its way through the uncharted waters of a fractious, post-Soviet world.

ACTIVITY

Overview

One of the important legacies that the U.S. must address in the aftermath of the cold war is the question of what are or should be the proper status and role for its military today. Since the Korean War ended in 1953 the U.S. has maintained large defense forces in order to contain the military threat from the Soviet Union. The U.S. had never before in peacetime maintained a large standing army. In order to be prepared for conventional or nuclear war on a global scale, American military leaders asked for and received a great deal of support and resources from the nation.

The almost unbelievable series of events, beginning with the removal of the Berlin Wall, which had symbolized the division of Europe into Communist East and free world West, and culminating with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, not only ended the cold war but raised the possibility of a “threat meltdown” for the U.S. military. Without the almost daily apprehension about nuclear or conventional warfare with the Communist bloc, the U.S., the world’s only military superpower, is now obliged to define new roles and missions for itself in a world that has yet to be clearly understood or defined.

The U.S. Defense Department has identified nuclear proliferation, dangers to democracy, crises or threats from a “handful of bad guys,” such as Iraq and Libya, and problems stemming from a weak economy as priorities that must be addressed. These priorities require new thinking about the world and new strategies.
How will the U.S. military be used to carry out these objectives? The unilateral U.S. invasion of Panama to remove “bad guy” Manuel Noriega in 1989 was the first large-scale U.S. military action since World War II that was not directed at a Communist threat. A second was the Persian Gulf War, a multilateral operation planned and executed to deal with another “bad guy.” The more recent humanitarian and military action in Somalia, which featured close military cooperation with the United Nations, has left the U.S. wary about similar missions in the future.

Peacetime engagement of U.S. forces to promote political and economic stability could require the U.S. military to act as a development agency, political tutor and global policeman in troubled nations and even at home. Some consideration has been given to using the armed forces in the war on drugs. There have also been calls for use of the military to battle violent crime and for a larger “civilian” role for the military in American domestic life.

All of this would require profound changes in approach and objectives for the U.S. military and affect it as a fighting force. In addition, the American public is clamoring for the downsizing of government, deficit reduction and domestic reform, to be paid for with a “peace dividend.” This could require the downsizing of the military to the point where it affected military capability, morale, operations and maintenance. Drastic changes in U.S. military missions not only raise the possibility of diminishing U.S. security but also of doing harm to the military establishment and its position in American society.

Redefining the objectives, role and requirements for the U.S. military will require political, diplomatic and economic skills. What role or roles should the U.S. military play in the new world order? How can the U.S. protect and project its interests as the world’s only superpower? What new, unconventional missions—if any—should the U.S. military undertake abroad and at home? How far should the U.S. cut its military expenditures? How will this affect American society?

**Objectives**

Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Discuss how the end of the cold war has affected the planning and use of U.S. military forces at home and abroad.

2. Describe how the role and status of the U.S. military may be seriously revised to deal with changing world events and pressing domestic requirements.

3. Explain the political and economic factors that must be considered in determining the future role and position of the military in American society.

**Materials**

“Handout on U.S. Defense” (page 39), chalk, chalkboard

**Time**

Approximately 45 minutes

**Procedure**

Begin the discussion by asking the participants what they believe are the greatest threats to world peace since the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Write their responses on the chalkboard and ask them to compare these problems with the real or imagined problems that existed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Point out that the U.S. is now the world’s only military superpower and that many Americans are uncertain whether we should maintain the same levels of spending and preparedness on military matters that we did during the cold war. Ask them their beliefs on this subject and the reasons why they hold them.

Divide the participants into two groups according to their beliefs: one group representing Americans who favor reducing the role and status of the U.S. military and the other representing those who favor maintaining or strengthening it. If they are lopsided or unanimous in their position, simply “volunteer” enough participants to the opposing side to ensure that the two groups are equal in number.

Ask them to work together to prepare their positions. Distribute the “Handout on U.S. Defense” and give the participants about 15 minutes to complete it. When they have finished, ask both groups for their views on the importance of the strategic global areas and the reasoning behind their military policy for each area. Summarize their arguments on the chalkboard. Ask them what actions they would take with regard to spending, size of forces, etc., in order to implement their policies.
After both sides have presented their arguments, ask them to point out the areas where they agree or disagree. Get them to summarize the ideas that underlie the differences between the two positions and ask them what could happen to U.S. security and other interests if these ideas or assumptions are in error.

Ask them if they believe that “unconventional missions”—for instance, the use of U.S. military personnel to provide humanitarian or developmental services—would be a good compromise between the two positions. Ask them how this might affect the concept of civilian control over the military in the U.S. system of government. Would it lead to the kind of concentration of power and influence that President Dwight D. Eisenhower had in mind when he warned Americans in his farewell address to beware the “military-industrial complex”?

GLOSSARY

- gross domestic product (GDP). The total value of goods and services produced within a country in a given year (does not include income earned abroad).
- Korean War. This conflict between Communist and non-Communist forces in Korea began in June 1950 and centered around the 38th parallel. The United Nations authorized member nations to aid South Korea under the command of U.S. General Douglas MacArthur. Chinese forces joined the North Korean army. Negotiations for a cease-fire to end the stalemate were begun at Panmunjom in 1951 but were not successful until July 1953. This was the first limited war fought by the U.S. during the cold-war era.
- military coup (coup d'état). The violent overthrow or change of an existing government by military force.
- National Guard. The volunteer military forces retained by each state in the U.S. to maintain internal order. The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees each state the right to keep its own militia. Financed largely by federal funds, the Guard may be called into federal service during wartime.
- National Security Agency. Established in 1952, this secret communications, cryptographical and intelligence agency protects worldwide American government secret communications and produces intelligence information derived from its surveillance of secret communications of all foreign nations. It serves as the principal secret code-maker and code-breaker of the U.S. government.
- Panama Canal Treaty. The 1977 treaty provided for the return of the Canal Zone to Panama in 1999. The U.S. exercised its right to protect the canal when U.S. forces invaded Panama in December 1989.
- Pentagon. This five-sided structure on the Virginia side of the Potomac River adjacent to Washington, D.C., houses the principal executive offices of the U.S. Department of Defense. Completed in 1943, it contains 17 miles of corridors and provides office space for more than 30,000 persons.
- Strategic Air Command. This specialized command of the U.S. Air Force, answerable directly to the President through the Secretary of Defense, is designed to attack and destroy the vital elements of an aggressor’s war-making capabilities. It therefore acts as a deterrent to all-out war.
- Vietnam syndrome. U.S. participation in the Indochinese wars of 1964–73 damaged civilian and military morale and made the country reluctant ever again to dispatch U.S. forces to faraway countries. The commitment and deployment of U.S. military forces in the post-Vietnam era are seen in some quarters as efforts to strengthen U.S. resolve.
Argentina, Brazil, Chile: democracy and market economics

- Why did Argentina, Brazil and Chile send the military back to the barracks?
- Are democracy and free-market economics firmly rooted in the Southern Cone?
- What is the outlook for increased U.S. trade with the Western Hemisphere?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

Argentina, Brazil and Chile are currently undergoing dramatic political and economic change. Each country is, in its own distinctive way, shedding the vestiges of authoritarianism and adopting free-market economic policies. The article traces these developments in the so-called ABC countries—from Pinochet’s military dictatorship in Chile to the 1988 plebiscite that ousted him; from Peronism and militarism in Argentina to the ouster of the military after the country’s defeat in the Falklands (Malvinas) War; and Brazil’s long and gradual movement away from unstable military regimes. These young democracies face some common internal challenges, such as defining the role of the military, weeding out corruption, and improving economic and social conditions. Politics aside, they are also now undertaking major steps to alter their economies. They began in the late 1980s to replace their highly protectionist, state-led economies, which had brought them hyperinflation, debt and poverty, with more-competitive free-market systems. Chile is the region’s success story and is achieving an economic growth rate comparable with that of Southeast Asia. Argentina has also successfully implemented some of the most profound privatization and reform plans in Latin America. Brazil has made the slowest progress in instituting reforms and still suffers from low economic performance in some key areas. These economic and political changes have created new relationships both within the region and with the outside world. A Southern Cone Common Market, Mercosur, has been formed, and the U.S. has indicated it favors closer economic cooperation with its southern neighbors. The U.S. must decide whether it also wishes to become involved in the ABC countries’ democratic transition.

ACTIVITY ONE

Overview

Throughout their history U.S. citizens have often been unaware of or simply uninterested in South America. How many people, for example, are familiar with the democratic revolutions that have taken place in Argentina, Brazil and Chile over the past few years? The answer is probably fewer than those who have heard of the startling changes in Eastern Europe, South Africa and China. In spite of the outbreak of democracy and the restructuring of the economic life of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, there have been few video images to capture the popular imagination. Since these events do not bear directly on the dissolution of the Soviet empire or on the position of the U.S. as the world’s only military superpower, they have not received attention commensurate with their importance.

In recent years the Southern Cone nations have been successfully tackling problems created by years of extensive mismanagement and corruption. Enor-
mous foreign debts, cycles of hyperinflation, stagnant economic growth, recession and doubt undermined society and exacerbated existing economic and social problems. Argentina, Brazil and Chile have instituted dramatic changes in their economies and governments. The adoption of strict free-market policies has helped to bring about an economic boom and the prospect of continued growth and expansion. In addition, these nations are poised to play a wider, more prominent role in Western Hemispheric affairs and in relations with the U.S. How were polarized, antidemocratic politics of the left and right, repressive militarism and authoritarian rule swept aside in these three countries and replaced by open, democratic politics and debate? What remaining problems and conditions may threaten these changes? What role will these new societies play in the Western Hemisphere and in the world at large?

Objectives
Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Describe the forces and events that have helped Argentina, Brazil and Chile move from authoritarian governments to evolving prosperous democracies.

2. Describe problems in the three countries that could sidetrack continued economic and political reform.

3. Explore what could help Argentina, Brazil and Chile improve their chances of successfully reforming their societies.

Materials
“Handout on Argentina, Brazil and Chile” (page 40), chalk, chalkboard

Time
Approximately 45 minutes

Procedure
Begin the discussion with a brief description of the dispute between President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur during the Korean War, which led the President to dismiss MacArthur. Ask them what the dismissal illustrates about the role of the military in the U.S. system of government. Ask them if they believe that a military coup is a serious threat to U.S. society and to state what conditions would have to obtain in order for the military to seize control of the government.

Distribute the “Handout on Argentina, Brazil and Chile.” Divide participants into three groups, each representing a country. Give them about 10 minutes to gather the information asked for in the handout. Then bring them back together and ask them to contrast the role and influence of the military in these countries with the situation in the U.S. Ask each group to provide an analysis of the prospects for a regression to military rule in each country. Ask them to cite examples from the past or present that tend to support their ideas. Ask them what needs to be done to ensure that democratic reform will continue to succeed and, also, how they believe this could be brought about. Ask them what role economic and social conditions may play in the continued growth of democracy. Record their responses to these questions on the chalkboard under the general heading of “Conditions” and the subheadings of “Economic,” “Social” and “Political.”

End the discussion by asking them what the three countries could do to gain greater understanding and appreciation in the U.S. and elsewhere of the changes that are taking place in the Southern Cone countries and the challenges these countries face for continued success in the near future.

ACTIVITY TWO
Overview
The recent U.S. national debate about the North American Free Trade Agreement (Nafta) was marked by disagreement about how free trade between Mexico, Canada and the U.S. would affect U.S. jobs, production and the environment. Many Americans are still apprehensive. At the same time, they are concerned about the serious economic competition that the U.S. faces from Europe and Asia, and the increasing federal indebtedness. In private and public discourse, people from government, business, industry and labor have called for various measures to “get tough” with U.S. trading partners. If there is general agreement on any aspect of this issue, it is that the U.S. is in a difficult position and must persuade or coerce its major trading partners.
partners to give U.S. goods and services greater access to their markets. Faced with the rapid economic growth and trading power of Pacific Rim nations and competition from the European Community, the U.S. needs to reconsider its trade priorities and policies.

The Western Hemisphere offers the possibility for expanding U.S. initiatives. While socioeconomic and political problems still exist, the nations of Argentina, Brazil and Chile are open to new relationships with the outside world. Measures such as the Southern Cone Common Market (Mercosur) among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay offer new opportunities for the U.S. to explore, as does Nafta. The addition of Chile to Nafta could advance the long-term goal of creating the free-trade area from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego proposed by President George Bush in his Enterprise for the Americas Initiative.

What vital interests does the U.S. have in South America? How should it respond to the recent trend toward free-market economies in the Southern Cone countries? How should it react to obstacles to further progress in the area? Should the U.S. support the expansion of Nafta to include Chile, Argentina and Brazil?

**Objectives**

Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Describe and evaluate the economic potential of the emerging Southern Cone nations.

2. Discuss the significance of the Southern Cone nations in U.S. trade policy.

3. Evaluate the effects the extension of Nafta to the rest of the Western Hemisphere would have on U.S. trade, jobs and industry.

**Materials**

Chalk, chalkboard

**Time**

Approximately 45 minutes

**Procedure**

Begin the discussion by asking the participants to give reasons why they would or would not agree with the remark that Americans will do anything about Latin America except read about it. Ask why many Americans have such little knowledge of or interest in many of the countries and peoples of this region. Ask them to describe how this affects the U.S. and its people. Point out some of the ways the U.S. has been actively involved in the area by briefly describing U.S. interests and actions in Cuba, Central America, Haiti and the war on drugs.

Turn the discussion to U.S. economic concerns. Briefly describe U.S. trade problems with Asia and Europe and the difficulties that must be faced in order to improve U.S. performance in these regions. Then ask them to respond to the proposition that the U.S. can solve some of its problems by entering into a free-trade union in the Western Hemisphere. Point out that Nafta is a step in that direction.

Ask the participants to consider the future role of Argentina, Brazil and Chile in economic matters. Ask them to describe the strengths and weaknesses of each country and whether or not they believe each country will continue its positive economic development. After they have finished this evaluation, ask them if the U.S. should take on any special responsibilities or policies to guarantee or assist any of the three countries to continue sound economic development.

End the discussion by asking them to summarize economic and political reasons why they believe the U.S. should or should not forge partnerships with Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Ask them why the U.S. should or should not actively pursue the extension of Nafta to all countries in the Western Hemisphere.
authoritarian military regimes. Concentrated power in the hands of a military leader or group of military leaders who are not responsible to the people.

Berlin Wall. This wall dividing Communist East and non-Communist West Berlin was built in 1961 in order to slow the escape of East Germans to freedom.

Christian Democrats. A Chilean Catholic party that contained a left wing. It was supported by radicals in Chile from 1952 until it lost power to Salvador Allende in 1970. It was tolerated by military leaders until 1977.

Communist guerrillas. Members of highly mobile, independent Communist bands whose war tactics are based on harassment, sabotage and surprise attacks.

Freedom House. Has served as a clearinghouse and research and document center devoted to the cause of freedom and democratic institutions since 1941. It conducts a worldwide Survey of Freedom, and it maintains a speaker’s bureau of dissenters-in-exile.

Hyperinflation. An increase in the volume of money and credit relative to available goods resulting in a major and continuing rise in the general price level.


Marxism. Based on the theories of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, this economic philosophy calls for the rejection of free competition and the profit motive and the creation of a centrally controlled economy.

petrodollars. A term used to describe the huge amounts of money earned by OPEC (see Glossary, Topic 4) after it raised oil prices in the 1970s. Since OPEC would only take dollars in payment for its oil, its members racked up billions of dollars—many more than they could spend within their countries.

plebiscite. A vote by people of a country or district expressing an opinion for or against a proposal, such as a government or constitution.

Socialists. A group that favors redistributing wealth, income and power to the less well-off, particularly industrial workers, through common ownership of factories, banks and the land, that is, the “means of production.”

Third World. See Glossary, Topic 3.

wage and price controls. The use of government-mandated guidelines or caps on wages and prices to control inflation.

Islam and politics: Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia

What conditions have contributed to the recent resurgence in Islamic fundamentalism?

What role will the Islamic revival play in the future of the Middle East?

How does the religious revival affect U.S. interests and policies in the Middle East? at home?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

The article explores the reasons for the increasing involvement of Islamic groups in politics throughout the Middle East and North Africa, using as case studies Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia. It traces the roots of religious revival in the region over the past century, the post-World War II Muslim disillusionment with socialism, liberalism and modernity, and the widespread return to Islam since the 1970s. The movement toward Islam has for the most part been peaceful, with such major exceptions as the Iranian revolution and the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. The increased participation of Islamic groups in elections is noted. Among the major reasons for their popularity are repressive governments, poverty and lack of jobs, and an absence of secular alternatives. The author weighs whether the Islamic revival represents a threat to U.S. interests and also considers alternative policies for combating militant, anti-Western groups, including encouraging U.S. friends in the region to undertake economic and social reforms.

ACTIVITY

Overview

More and more people in the Middle East and other developing regions believe that preparing for the future means looking to the past. This sentiment is surfacing with ever more frequency as a result of the often unsettling changes that have occurred in the late 20th century. Gradual modernization in the West brought prosperity and a sense of well-being to millions. For Muslims of the Middle East things have been different. Modernization, in countries for the most part created and controlled by Europeans or their surrogates after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire, occurred in a short period of time and created wide gaps between governments, leaders and the people they ruled. Beset by a loss of self-esteem resulting from military defeats at the hands of the Israelis and angered by intrusions and threats to traditional Islamic values by an invading Western culture, more and more Islamic intellectuals, clergy and laity turned to religion as a source of inspiration and identity. This Islamic resurgence is part of a broader movement that includes Hindu, Eastern Orthodox, Jewish and Protestant constituencies around the world.

The internal strife and debate within Middle Eastern nations experiencing Islamic revival have helped fuel profound political and moral concerns throughout the region and beyond. The end of the cold war and the progress in the negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis have created considerable opportunities for peace in the area. However, there are also portents of instability. The U.S. and the West are apprehensive about the Islamist call for a return to the ways of the
past and about recent incidents of terrorism and violence associated with religious extremists.

The U.S. is committed to promoting democracy and human rights, but when it comes to North Africa's Islamist movements, it has supported their repression by authoritarian, pro-American governments. As the Islamic resurgence advances and recedes in nations such as Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, the U.S. must weigh the cost of defending religious freedom vs. the cost of defending authoritarian governments. How will the Islamic revival affect the future of the people of the Middle East? How will political, social and economic development affect this revival? What impact, if any, will the rapprochement between Arabs and Israelis have on this process? What role will U.S. policies—and culture—play in these events?

Objectives
Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Explain why many communities in the Middle East are turning to Islam as a social, economic and political force.
2. Discuss the conditions that contributed to the development of Islam as a sociopolitical force in the Middle East.
3. Discuss how current developments in the Middle East can or will affect U.S. policy and U.S. security.

Materials
Chalkboard, chalk

Time
Approximately 45 minutes

Procedure
Begin the discussion by asking the participants how they would define “religion.” List the world’s major religions on the chalkboard and ask the class what role these movements play in the lives of most of their followers throughout the world. Ask them to describe the influence of religion on the lives of most Americans. Cite the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and ask them to describe its purpose. Ask them what they believe would be the effect if it were repealed.

Then turn the discussion to Islam. Ask them why there has been a renewed interest in and revival of traditional Islam, particularly in the Middle East. Be sure to have them suggest conditions, problems or issues in the modern world that have contributed to this revival. List the responses on the chalkboard and ask participants to explain how or why Islamists believe that Islam will solve or ameliorate these problems.

Divide the participants into three groups representing Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia. Tell them they have 10 minutes to prepare brief descriptions of social, economic and political conditions in their nation and the approaches Islamists have taken in dealing with these issues. Ask them to explain how the Islamic movement began in their nation and to list the principles of and the methods used by the Islamists to win support. After about 10 minutes, call them back together and ask each group to describe the situation in its nation, making sure that they include descriptions of government policies and government reactions to the Islamists as well as significant events that have occurred. Write their descriptions on the chalkboard and, when they have finished, ask them to compare the three countries. Get them to agree on the similarities and differences between conditions in the three countries. Then ask them to compare these specific situations with the general principles and ideas they discussed about the rise of Islam at the beginning of the activity. Ask them, on the basis of what they have done, to predict and describe what they believe will be the principal role of Islam in future conflicts and whether or not they believe other predominantly Islamic nations will follow similar patterns of religious revival and struggle. Ask them if they believe this will foster extremism and violence throughout the area or if they believe that differences can be reconciled through peaceful means. Point out some of the recent developments in the peace process between Arabs and Israelis and ask them to speculate on how this will affect Islamic fundamentalism in the region.

End the discussion by asking them what effects, if any, the Islamic revival will have on future U.S. policies regarding the spread of democracy and human rights, support for friendly governments or access to the petroleum in the area. Ask them what, if anything, the U.S. can or should do to influence Islamic movements and to avoid becoming a target of hostility, violence or terrorism.
Amnesty International (AI). Winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, AI works for the release of prisoners of conscience, fair and prompt trial for political prisoners, and the end of torture and executions.

Axis forces. This coalition of armies in World War II (1939–45) was headed by Germany, Italy and Japan. It was opposed and defeated by the Allied powers, headed by the U.S., Britain, China and the Soviet Union.

Camp David Accords. This popular name for the 1979 peace treaty between Israel and Egypt was named for the U.S. presidential retreat in Maryland where agreement was reached. Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt and agreed to negotiate Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Egypt recognized the state of Israel.

capitalism. An economic system, based on open competition in a free market, in which the means of production and distribution are privately owned and growth results from the accumulation and reinvestment of profits.

communism. See Marxism, Topic 6.

cultural imperialism. When artifacts of one society, such as music, cinema, fashion, etc., along with values and mores, are transported to another society as a result of political or economic exchanges or commerce and threaten to overwhelm the local culture, members of the latter may complain of cultural imperialism.

Gaza. A densely populated, poverty-stricken strip of land on the southeastern Mediterranean Sea that has been occupied by Israel since 1967. Three quarters of the population are Palestinian refugees.

global village. A term coined by a world-renowned communication theorist, Herbert Marshall McLuhan. He contended that the electronic media, especially television, were transforming the world technologically into a global village in which books would become obsolete.

guerrilla army. Members of highly mobile, independent bands whose war tactics are based on harassment, sabotage and surprise attacks.

human rights. Usually defined in the West as the protection of an individual’s political and civil liberties (as in the U.S. Bill of Rights). Sometimes this definition is broadened to include economic and social rights, such as the right to adequate food and shelter.

Iranian hostage crisis. In 1979, tensions between the U.S. and the Islamic fundamentalist rulers in Iran rose when the exiled shah was admitted into the U.S. for medical treatment. In November 1979, Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Teheran and held 63 members of the embassy staff hostage. They demanded the return of the shah to Iran. The hostage crisis received almost continual television and press coverage and contributed heavily to President Jimmy Carter’s defeat in the 1980 election. The hostages were released at the time of the inauguration of his successor, Ronald Reagan.

Koran. The sacred book of Islam, it was revealed by Allah to the Prophet Muhammad in separate revelations at Mecca and Medina during the Prophet’s life.

Mecca. The birthplace and perpetual shrine of Islam. Devotees everywhere turn to face this holy city to perform the ritual prayer as established in the days of Muhammad.

Ottoman Empire. See Glossary, Topic 1: “Ottoman dynasty.”

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Created by the Arab League in 1964 as an umbrella organization for various Palestinian groups, the PLO is the leading spokesman for the Palestinian cause. Its longtime leader is Yasir Arafat. It recently agreed to renounce terrorism and to recognize the right of Israel to exist, and it is negotiating for Israeli withdrawal from Jericho and the Gaza Strip.

protectorate. A relationship by which a weaker state or political entity places itself under the protection of a more powerful state and accepts the direction of its foreign affairs by the latter, while retaining some powers of self-government. This relationship developed as a result of expansionist policies under European colonial rule in Africa and Asia.

secularism. The indifference to or the rejection of religion and religious consideration in personal and public affairs.

socialism. See Glossary, Topic 6: “Socialists.”

Third World. See Glossary, Topic 3.


West Bank. The territory west of the River Jordan, inhabited by Palestinians, which was administered by Jordan from 1948 to 1967 and thereafter by Israel.
New world disorder?
U.S. in search of a role

- What is the role of the U.S. in the world after the cold war?
- What are the vital interests of the U.S. and where do they lie?
- What are the goals of the U.S. and how can it achieve them?

ARTICLE SUMMARY

The final chapter is an essay by James Chace, editor of World Policy Journal and Henry Luce Professor in Freedom of Inquiry and Expression at Bard College. After taking the reader on a tour of the new world disorder, including the trouble spots documented in the first seven articles, Chace conducts a search for the U.S. role in the post-cold-war world. He calls on the Clinton Administration to define U.S. national interests and provides some guidelines of his own. According to Chace, America's vital interests are likely to remain the stability of Europe, the balance of power in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and the economic and military security of North America. These goals and the strategies devised to implement them, Chace concludes, must be tied to the larger interest of promoting global growth and equity.

ACTIVITY

Overview

The proper role for the U.S. after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 continues to be the subject of intense debate. With the demise of the international order created at the end of World War II, new tensions and conflicts have emerged that require a rearrangement and redefinition of priorities and policies.

Recent U.S. difficulties with Haiti and Somalia have caused U.S. leaders and the general public to question American interests and goals and how to achieve them. Should the U.S. promote democracy and provide humanitarian aid to the world? Should it do so at the expense of American lives?

In the Balkans, NATO failed to respond to the forces of fragmentation. The political unity of Yugoslavia has been undone by ethnic, cultural and nationalist movements that produce increasing levels of division and discord. Some countries have split apart; others seek inclusion in Europe. Germany, Europe's dominant power, has pursued monetary policies that have caused division on the continent.

The Asian-Pacific region also poses problems and challenges that must be considered when defining U.S. interests: U.S. trade imbalances with Japan and other area economies; concern over human rights in China and nuclear programs in North Korea; questions about the proper level of U.S. military forces; Japanese rearmament; the future projection of power by the People's Republic of China; and Russia's role in the region.

The world appears to be moving toward the creation of three great trading blocs, Europe, East Asia and the Western Hemisphere. This could bring about an expansion of global trade or lead to acrimonious trade wars that threaten global prosperity. The recently
concluded North American Free Trade Agreement between the U.S., Canada and Mexico could encourage trade and lead to a hemisphere-wide free-trade area.

How important is European stability to the U.S.? What are U.S. priorities in East Asia and the Western Pacific? What is required for the U.S. to promote and maintain the economic and military security of North America? How should the U.S. define its vital interests?

Objectives
Upon completion, participants will be able to:

1. Describe present conditions and trends in Europe, East Asia and North America.
2. Discuss how vital interests are defined and addressed in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy.
3. Explain why they do or do not believe that European stability, the power balance in East Asia and the Western Pacific, and North American economic and military security are vital interests.

Materials
Chalk, chalkboard

Time
Approximately 45 minutes

Procedure
Begin the discussion by asking the participants if they agree with some Americans that the U.S. has a special role and mission in the world. Ask them what that role and mission are and whether or not they believe the U.S. is carrying them out properly.

Write the following on the chalkboard: “Panama (General Noriega),” “Gulf War (Saddam Hussein),” “Haiti (Jean-Bertrand Aristide),” and “Somalia (Mohammed Aidid),” and ask them what actions the U.S. took in these matters and what the purpose of the action was. Write a very brief description of U.S. actions under each heading. Point out that these actions are post-cold-war initiatives on the part of the U.S. Ask them to use only these initiatives to create a general description of what the basic policy and interests of the U.S. appear to be in the post-cold-war world. After they have done this, ask them if they believe that this represents the true vital interests of the U.S. and, if not, why the U.S. took the action that it did.

Turn the discussion to Europe, East Asia and the Western Pacific, and the Western Hemisphere. Ask them to describe problems in each of these areas in turn and why they believe that they do or do not involve the vital interests of the U.S. Ask them to discuss what the U.S. should do in order to address these concerns. Ask them to compare these suggestions with the type of actions described previously. Ask them whether they now have a different view about why the U.S. took these actions. Ask them whether or not they believe the actions have helped or harmed our ability to define and formulate a foreign policy that centers around our vital interests. Ask them whether or not the U.S. should involve itself in similar activities in the future and under what circumstances.

Turn the discussion to how foreign policy is formulated. Ask them what they believe can and must be done to improve the level of debate and discussion about foreign affairs and a consensus on U.S. vital interests. End the discussion by asking them what they can do as individuals to help promote this process in their community.
**Austro-Hungarian Empire.** See Glossary, Topic 1: “Habsburg dynasty.”

**Authoritarianism.** The concentration of power in the hands of a leader or group of leaders who is not responsible to the people.

**European Community (EC).** See Glossary, Topic 3.

**European Monetary System (EMS).** Adopted by the EC in 1979, the EMS established a European currency association and a mechanism to prevent wide fluctuations among members’ currencies.

**General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).** An organization established in Geneva in 1947 to promote world trade through the reduction of trade barriers. The 107 countries participating in the talks represent over 80% of world trade.

**International Monetary Fund (IMF).** See Glossary, Topic 4.

**Maastricht Treaty.** A treaty signed in December 1991 in the Dutch city of Maastricht to complete the European Community’s economic integration by establishing a single currency and a central bank. The treaty also calls for closer political integration, through common foreign and security policies. Ratification of the treaty by the 12 member states led to the creation of the European Union in 1993.

**Market economy.** See Glossary, Topic 1.

**Ottoman Empire.** See Glossary, Topic 1: “Ottoman dynasty.”

**Pax Americana.** Peace guaranteed by the U.S. as a military superpower. America’s overwhelming superiority makes it less likely that any nation will challenge it or launch a major war.

**Tiananmen Square.** See Glossary, Topic 4.

**World Bank.** See Glossary, Topic 2.
Handout on Yugoslavia

Slovenia  Croatia  Bosnia-Herzegovina  Yugoslavia

1. List foreign patrons, if any.

2. Are there major internal conflicts in this state?

3. State briefly the status of military activity.

4. Give name and terms of international accords applied to this situation.
Handout on South Africa

SEGREGATION: separation of a race, class or ethnic group by enforced residence in a restricted area, by barriers to social interaction, by separate educational facilities or other means

APARTHEID: a policy of segregation and political and economic discrimination against non-European groups in the Republic of South Africa

1. How was this policy enforced in the past?

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2. What specific reforms were instituted to help bring about changes in this policy?

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Handout on the Environment

NAME OF YOUR GROUP (Check one)
☐ Europe ☐ United Nations ☐ U.S. ☐ NGOs ☐ Other

1. List the environmental problems of the former Soviet bloc that you believe are the gravest threats to the earth, beginning with the most serious.
Most serious

Least serious

2. What measures or actions would your group like to see taken in order to eliminate these problems in the former Soviet bloc?

3. Explain what role, if any, you would like to see your group play in dealing with this problem.

4. Explain who you believe should pay the costs of carrying out this program. Be sure to include why you believe they should pay.
# Handout on the Pacific Rim

Your nation or group

Size of population

Type of government

Describe the economic system

Give the special features, if any, of your economic system

How does your average GNP growth compare with other world areas?

What are the major reasons for this growth?

Describe the present trade policy of your nation or group

What is the status of your nation? (Check one.)  □ Industrial nation  □ Developing nation

Give reasons for your choice.
Handout on U.S. Defense

1. Describe what you believe should be the proper U.S. military presence and role in the following areas between now and the year 2000. Be sure to state the reason for your answer.

   Europe (NATO):
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

   The Pacific Rim:
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

   The Persian Gulf:
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

   Central and South America:
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

   Africa:
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

2. In support of your answers above, describe why you would or would not increase or decrease your support for the following items:

   Total amount of military spending
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

   Number of military personnel on active duty
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

   Money spent for retraining of defense workers and conversion of defense industries
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________

   Number of long-range nuclear missiles
   ________________________________________________________________
   ________________________________________________________________
Handout on Argentina, Brazil, Chile

CHECK YOUR COUNTRY  □ Argentina  □ Brazil  □ Chile

1. Describe the political traditions.

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

2. What conditions caused the military to seize control of the state?

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

3. What aspects of military rule contributed to removing the military from power?

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

4. What problems exist that might lead to a military seizure of power in the future?

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________

5. What do you predict to be the chances for a return to military rule in the near future? (Choose one and give the reasons for your choice.)

□ Very possible (likely to occur)  □ Possible (could occur)  □ Not very possible (unlikely to occur)

__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
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