In 1994, California voters approved Proposition 187, which prohibits provision of publicly funded education and social services to undocumented immigrants, and which requires public schools to verify the legal status of students and their parents. This paper examines socioeconomic and immigration trends leading to the emergence of Proposition 187, and challenges assumptions about its ability to deter undocumented immigration. Analysis of two cost-benefit studies in San Diego and Los Angeles Counties finds that they invariably overstate the negative fiscal impacts of immigrants on local and state governments and omit parallel computations showing that native-born residents have a larger tax use "deficit" than immigrants. Effectiveness of the proposition depends upon assumptions that illegal immigrants are not well integrated into society and could be easily deported, that education and social services serve as a magnet for immigrants, and that "illegal families" could be easily detected when they apply for services. A social science literature review shows that labor migration is a social process. Permanent settlement has been encouraged by social networks, changes in California labor markets, and worsening Mexican economic conditions. Undocumented workers residing in California have deepened their roots in their communities and are unlikely to go back to their countries of origin even if education were denied. Also, many families have a complex legal status and contain a mixture of U.S. citizens, legal residents, and undocumented persons. Finally, the "unstoppable flow" of undocumented immigration is largely the result of policies implemented by the U.S. and Mexican governments. Contains 63 references. (SV)
Proposition 187: An Effective Measure to Deter Undocumented Migration to California?

Rafael Alarcón
Department of City and Regional Planning
University of California, Berkeley

A REPORT PREPARED FOR META, INC. MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION, TRAINING AND ADVOCACY

San Francisco, California
October 1994

BEST COPY AVAILABLE
INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has estimated that as of October 1992, there were 3.379 million undocumented persons in the United States (Warren, 1994). According to this study, California was the place of residence of the largest portion of the undocumented population: 1.441 million persons or 43 percent of the total. Mexico, the largest contributor, provided 786,000 undocumented persons to California, followed by El Salvador with 205,000, Guatemala with 88,000 and the Philippines with 60,000.

The arrival to California of a large number of unauthorized migrants from Mexico, Central America and Asia has angered a large sector of the state's population which fears that illegal immigrants are taking jobs away from citizens and lawful residents. Similarly, the increased demand for public services has become the main concern for those who argue that California's fiscal deficit is caused by the arrival of a great number of undocumented immigrants, whom they perceive as public service consumers.

Indeed, Governor Wilson on the basis of a report issued by the California Department of Finance in 1991, blamed the state's financial problems on the combination of the emigration of working taxpayers and the increasing demand for expensive government services by poor people and immigrants. This report stated that the imbalance between the number of tax payers and "tax receivers" was jeopardizing the state's ability to maintain funding levels for state programs. According to the report, much of the growth of the tax receiver group reflected increases in the number of school age children resulting from immigration and a recent surge in the birth rate. The report also noted the slowdown in the growth of the working population, reflecting low birth rates during the 1960s and 1970s and a net domestic out-migration in the high-earning 45 to 64 age group (California Department of Finance, 1991).

Using the U.S. Census Bureau unofficial estimates, Governor Wilson stated in his 1994-95 budget, that the number of illegal immigrants between the ages of 5 and 17 will be approximately 456,000 in January 1995, with 392,000 of those estimated to attend public schools in California. According to the Governor, these children will be educated daily in the public schools at a cost of $1.7 billion.

1 The unofficial estimate of the U.S. Census Bureau indicates that by April 1993 the total undocumented immigrant population was 2.083 million in California. Interestingly enough, the Immigration and Naturalization Service's estimate of California's unauthorized population is lower: 1.441 million for October 1992. Thus, if one uses this figure and follows the methodology of the Department of Finance to estimate the number of undocumented children attending public schools in California, one finds that there is an excess of 111,528 undocumented children in the DOF's estimate.
Proposition 187, the “Save our State” initiative originated in this political context in which political actors with a commitment to make undocumented immigration a priority electoral issue were successful in taking advantage of a negative public opinion concerning this problem. Supporters of Proposition 187 seek to challenge the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Plyler vs. Doe. In a 5 to 4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that states could not deny public education to children who were not legally admitted to this country.

Proposition 187 prohibits the provision of publicly funded social services to undocumented persons residing in California. In order to achieve this purpose, it contains five important measures regarding the provision of education, health care and other social services, law enforcement and the use of false immigration or citizenship documents.

Public Elementary and Secondary Schools

Proposition 187 includes provisions that prohibit public schools from admitting and allowing the attendance of children who are not: (1) citizens of the United States, (2) aliens lawfully admitted as permanent residents, and, (3) aliens admitted lawfully for a temporary period of time. Starting in January 1, 1995, each school district must verify the legal status of each child enrolling in the district for the first time. By January 1, 1996, each school district must also verify the legal status of every child already enrolled in the district as well as that of the parents or guardians of those students. If the district determines or “reasonably suspects” that a student, parent or guardian is not legally in the United States, then the district must take the following steps: (1) Within 45 days, it must report the apparent undocumented status of the person to the Superintendent of Public Instruction, the Attorney General, the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the affected parent or guardian. (2) Provide 90 days of additional instruction to undocumented students in order to accomplish an orderly transition to a school in the student’s country of origin.

Public Postsecondary Education

The measure also prohibits public postsecondary educational institutions from enrolling or permitting the attendance of students who are not in the United States legally. Under the measure, each institution would be required to verify the legal status of every student at the beginning of every term after January 1, 1995.
Health Care and Social Services

The measure limits the provision of public social services and of publicly funded health care (except emergency care required by federal law) only to those persons who are citizens of the United States or lawfully admitted aliens. Agencies must notify the state Department of Social Services or the Department of Health Services as well as the state Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the applicant’s undocumented status and provide any additional requested information.

Law Enforcement Agencies

The measure requires every law enforcement agency in the state to attempt to verify the legal status of every arrestee who is suspected of being in the United States illegally, to notify the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the apparent illegal status of arrestees.

New Crimes

Proposition 187 creates two new state crimes. Specifically, it makes the manufacture of false immigration or citizenship documents a felony punishable by a fine of $75,000 or imprisonment for five years. It also makes the use of false immigration or citizenship documents a felony punishable by a fine of $25,000 or a five-year prison term.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to describe the socioeconomic causes that led to the emergence of proposition 187; (2) to examine the assumptions behind the proposition and its alleged effectiveness as a deterrent to undocumented immigration; and (3) to review the current social science literature that challenges the assumptions of the proposition in the current socioeconomic context of California.
In addition to the role played by restrictionist individuals and organizations with record of presenting proposals to legislature, the emergence of Proposition 187 has been also partly the result of the following trends:

1) The changing geographic patterns of immigration to the United States that took place in the last two decades.

2) Failure of immigration law to deter illegal immigration, especially the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).

3) The publication of advocacy reports to support the alleged negative economic impact of illegal immigration on the U.S. economy.


International immigration to the United States has experienced a dramatic change in the last twenty years. Unlike in the past when most immigrants arrived from Europe, the vast majority now comes from developing countries in Asia and Latin America. Table 1 shows that legal immigration from Europe has declined substantially while legal immigration from Central America, Mexico, Africa, and Asia has grown rapidly in the period 1971-1990.
Table 1
Legal Immigration to the US by Region of Last Residence, 1971-80 and 1981-90.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1971-80</th>
<th>1981-90</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>800,368</td>
<td>761,550</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>1,588,178</td>
<td>2,738,157</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>640,294</td>
<td>1,655,843</td>
<td>158.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>169,939</td>
<td>156,938</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>741,126</td>
<td>872,051</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>134,640</td>
<td>468,088</td>
<td>247.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>295,741</td>
<td>461,847</td>
<td>56.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other in America</td>
<td>995</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>-54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>80,779</td>
<td>176,893</td>
<td>119.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>41,242</td>
<td>45,205</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1,032</td>
<td>8500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,493,314</td>
<td>7,338,062</td>
<td>63.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(INS, 1992).

A more liberal immigration legislation that began in the mid-1960s has given rise to a more diversified pool of legal immigrants as shown in Table 1. In 1965, the Immigration and Nationality Act abolished the national origins quota system established in 1924, thus eliminating national origin, race or ancestry as a basis for immigration to the United States. However, this legislation maintained the principle of numerical restriction, limiting Eastern Hemisphere immigration to 170,000 persons per year and for the first time placing a ceiling on Western Hemisphere immigration of 120,000 persons. In addition, the act provided a 20,000 persons per country limit and also established seven categories for relatives of US. citizens and permanent residents (for the reunification of families) and for persons with special occupational skills needed in the US. Immediate relatives of US. citizens and special immigrants (certain ministers of religion, certain former employees of the US., etc.) were not subject to numerical restrictions. However, at the end, neither the preference system nor the per-country limit were applied to the Western Hemisphere (U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1992: A.1.14-15).

During the 1980s, legal immigration from Central America reached the highest rate of growth of all regions primarily because of the civil wars in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala. In addition to this, during this period of time a large number of immigrants from Mexico and other countries became legal residents thanks to the enactment of the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) that included a liberal legalization program that benefited a substantial portion of the undocumented population already living in the United States.

2) Failure of immigration law to deter illegal immigration especially IRCA

The image of the unstoppable flow of undocumented immigrants has intensified with the realization that IRCA failed to reduce illegal immigration. In 1986, US Congress enacted IRCA that contained three principal measures: (1) an amnesty for undocumented workers already residing in the United States, (2) sanctions against employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers, and (3) increased enforcement at US. borders. The amnesty was administered under two programs: The Section 245A program commonly known as the "general amnesty" program that was intended for persons who had lived continuously in the United States since January 1, 1982, and, the Special Agricultural Workers (SAW) program was designed for people who worked 90 days in perishable agriculture between May 1985 and May 1986.

Congress passed IRCA to stem the flow of illegal immigration. Its supporters argued that this legislation would solve the illegal immigration problem since it contained measures that would affect both the supply and the demand side of the process, besides providing a generous amnesty program that would benefit a large number of undocumented people who were already in this country. However, there is a growing consensus that IRCA has not brought about the sought-after reduction of undocumented immigration from Mexico. Apprehensions at the border --an imprecise measure of actual flows but a good indicator of trends-- rose sharply in 1990, showing that the reduction in the number of apprehensions observed between 1987 and 1989 was only a fleeting result of legalization.

In addition, several academic studies have found little evidence that the new law has deterred illegal immigration. In a study conducted in three traditional sending communities in Western Mexico in 1988, Cornelius (1990) found no evidence that IRCA had reduced the traditionally heavy flow of workers to the United States; on the contrary, he found that IRCA seemed to have augmented that flow, at least in the short term, through the legalization programs. Bean, Edmonston and Passel (1990) concluded that the studies they collected generally suggested a decrease in the flow of illegal migrants as a result of IRCA. However, they indicated that a large proportion of this decrease was due to the legalization programs and that some recent data suggested that undocumented migration flows continued to grow in the post-IRCA period. Donato and her associates (1992) more emphatically stressed the failure of IRCA. Their study

---

2 This section is taken from Alarcon (1994a).
based in seven Mexican communities showed little evidence that IRCA had significantly deterred undocumented Mexican migration. In their view, the few small effects that they uncovered were little to show for the millions of dollars and thousands of hours that IRCA invested in an effort to stem the tide of Mexican migrants to the United States.

In this context, President Carlos Salinas de Gortari in 1991 proposed the establishment of a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that, among other things, would bring about a reduction of immigration from Mexico because "Mexico prefers to export its products rather than its people." President Salinas considered NAFTA essential for the creation of jobs in Mexico that would reduce the pressures for emigration to the United States.

The debate over the ratification of NAFTA, which Congress narrowly approved in November of 1993, generated a number of studies that examine the agreement's effects on migration patterns from Mexico. Calva (1991), for instance, foresees a chaotic situation for Mexico as a result of NAFTA. In his opinion, free trade in agricultural and livestock products will cause the virtual demise of Mexico's domestic production of its most important grains (corn and beans) since their production costs in Mexico are higher than those in the United States and Canada. Calva predicts that this liberalization of agricultural trade will eliminate 10 million cultivated hectares in Mexico, which in turn will lead to the emigration of three million campesino families who depend on the production of these grains. In Calva's view, if NAFTA permitted the free mobility of those expelled from the rural areas, nearly 15 million people would go to the United States and Canada. But since these governments are not willing to receive these displaced workers, they will emigrate clandestinely or go to Mexican cities where there are already 9 million people unemployed.

On the other hand, Cornelius and Martin (1993) argue that, even with the anticipated dislocations in small-scale agriculture, future levels of total Mexican migration to the United States (both legal and illegal) will increase in the absence of trade liberalization. The authors provide four reasons to explain why Mexican emigration may not increase significantly despite restructuring and displacement from traditional agriculture. First, many rural dwellers already have diversified their sources of income, making them less dependent on income earned from producing agricultural commodities. Second, a free trade zone will induce more U.S. agricultural producers to expand in Mexico in the 1990s, creating additional jobs there, instead of in the United States as they did in the 1980s. Third, the links between internal and international migration are not as direct as is often assumed, so that, even if economic restructuring increases internal migration, this shift may not translate into a great deal of international migration. Finally, following the European experience, free trade and economic integration can be structured so as not to cause significant emigration.
Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson (1992), analyzing economic models that address the potential effects of NAFTA on wages and employment in Mexico and the United States, conclude that while complete liberalization will increase U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico, this will also speed up out-migration from rural areas of people who will show up in Mexican urban and U.S. labor markets. For this reason they propose a long transition period for Mexican agriculture to allow time for needed infrastructure investments in rural areas and to smooth the process of labor absorption in the Mexican industrial sector.

3) The publication of advocacy reports to support the alleged negative economic impact of illegal immigration on the U.S. economy

Unlike several studies in the past that argued that immigrants in general have a positive effect in the U.S. economy, several economists have begun to change this image. In particular, George Borjas, an economist from UC San Diego, has been very influential in changing the perception of the impact of legal and illegal immigrants on the U.S. economy. He argues that the United States has become an importer of relatively unskilled labor and that immigrants in recent waves, have relatively less schooling, weaker labor market attachment, higher unemployment rates, lower wage rates, higher poverty rates, and higher rates of welfare participation than immigrants in the waves that arrived in the 1950s and 1960s. In sum, according to Borjas (1990: 219) immigrants do not perform as well in the U.S. labor market as do natives, or as did earlier immigrants.

Borjas (1990: 97-114) contends that the pioneering study contrasting the earnings of immigrants to those of their native counterparts, conducted by Chiswick (1978) gave a wrong impression of the assimilation process of immigrants. According to Borjas, the Chiswick's study and other similar works were extremely influential in forming the current conventional wisdom that legal immigrants perform quite well in the U.S. economy and therefore assimilate "too well."

The results of Chiswick's study indicate that at the time of entry into the United States, the annual earnings of men are 15 percent lower than the earnings of natives with the same demographic characteristics. However, the earnings of immigrants grow at a much faster rate than earnings parity between the two groups is reached about fourteen years after arrival. After thirty years, the typical immigrant actually earns 10 percent more than a demographically comparable native. Borjas argues that the results of this study came from a comparison of the 1969 earnings of newly arrived immigrants with the 1969 earnings of immigrants who arrived ten or twenty years earlier. He questions whether the cross section observation reflects immigrant
assimilation or the possibility that recent immigrant waves are substantially different from earlier waves. A statistical analysis that tracks specific immigrant cohorts across various censuses shows that at the time of entry into the United States (at age twenty) men who migrated between 1975 and 1979 earned 21 percent less than comparable natives. After twenty years the wage gap will narrow to 13 percent, but even after forty years in the United States the predicted wage differential will be 12 percent. By contrast, immigrants who arrived in the United states between 1960 and 1964 entered the labor market with a wage disadvantage of 10 percent, and the wage gap disappeared after about two decades. Wage parity remains until retirement age.

Based on his own research, Borjas argues that the socioeconomic characteristics of immigrants (mainly education, English-language proficiency, etc.) have deteriorated significantly in the last two or three decades and for this reason the actual wage of recent immigrants will remain far below that of natives throughout their entire working lives.

Borjas (1990:151) also argues that a relatively generous welfare system increases the attractiveness of America's offer in the immigration market particularly for those potential migrants most likely to qualify for public assistance. "America of the 1980s is vastly different from America of the 1880s. Now we have social service and welfare programs that are easy to deceive and exploit. We have a cash-wage economy with high unemployment, vastly different from the empty frontier that greeted previous immigrants. And we have a new social phenomenon wherein all groups can "demand" almost instant entry into the American middle class, not as a result of hard work but as a matter of entitlement (Borjas, 1990:151).

In this vein, Huddle (1993b) argues that the 7.4 million immigrants settling legally and illegally in California since 1970 caused total net public assistance costs to California taxpayers in 1992 of $18.1 billion in excess of the $8.9 billion immigrants paid in taxes. Included in the $18.1 billion is $4.2 billion for costs of assistance to 914,000 California residents unemployed in 1992 because of immigration. Passel (1994) provides a very intelligent critique of the studies conducted by Huddle (1993a and 1993b).

The fiscal impact of undocumented persons on local and state governments has been examined in two cost-benefit studies conducted in San Diego and Los Angeles Counties.

The San Diego County Study (Rea and Parker, 1992)

This study found that the cost to State and local governments associated with processing undocumented immigrants through the criminal justice system and with providing health services, education and social services for this population is $206,411,969. The state and local governments' revenues associated with tax receipts derived from the employment and consumer
spending of undocumented immigrants is $60,490,124. Thus, the excess of costs over revenues is equal to $145,921,845.

According to this study, an average of 11,954 undocumented immigrant children are being educated in public elementary and secondary schools in San Diego County annually. These students represent 3.1% of the total San Diego County student population and 19.0% of all students categorized as Limited English Proficient (LEP). The annual average costs of providing basic education to these undocumented immigrant students is $49,214,618.

The Los Angeles County Study (ISD, 1992)

Based on demographic estimates, this study found that recent immigrants, legal immigrants, amnesty persons, undocumented persons and the citizen children of undocumented persons accounted for about 25 percent of total population in Los Angeles County as of January 1992, as shown in the next table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent Legal Immigrants</td>
<td>630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty Persons</td>
<td>720,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Persons</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Children of Undocumented</td>
<td>250,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
<td>2,300,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Population</td>
<td>6,890,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9,190,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study found that estimated net county costs for services provided to recent legal immigrants, amnesty persons, undocumented persons and their citizen children exceeded estimated county revenues generated from them in fiscal year 1991-92, as shown below. When comparing net County costs with revenues, it should be noted that revenues paid by businesses were not counted:

- Net County costs experienced: $946,706,000
- County revenues generated: $139,100,000
- Difference: $807,606,000
Educational costs for the three immigrant groups accounted for $1.5 billion, (23%) of total school districts cost in Los Angeles County. The estimated costs for the studied populations compared to the rest of the population in 1991-1992 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recent Legal Immigrant Children</td>
<td>$331,100,000</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amnesty Children</td>
<td>$123,500,000</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Children</td>
<td>$367,900,000</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Children of Undocumented Persons</td>
<td>$662,300,000</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBTOTAL</strong></td>
<td>$1,484,800,000</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Other Children</td>
<td>$4,972,700,000</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>$6,457,500,004</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the study, the three immigrant groups and the citizen children of undocumented persons' share of total net county costs was 31 percent which exceeds both their 25 percent share of County's population and 10 percent share of total County revenues.

Fix and Passel (1993: 5) state that these studies have been produced by government agencies interested in "recovering" the costs of immigrants and non-profit groups committed to reducing levels of immigration. The results of these studies uniformly find that immigrants impose fiscal burdens on governments and native-born taxpayers. Their own review has found that the studies vary in quality, but the results invariably overstate the negative impacts of immigrants for the following reasons:

- They systematically understate tax collections from immigrants
- They systematically overstate service costs for immigrants
- None credit immigrants for the impact of immigrants-owned businesses or the full economic benefits generated by consumer spending from immigrants
- Job displacement impacts and costs are overstated
- They omit parallel computations for natives that, when done, show natives are net tax users, too
- The size of the immigrant population - particularly the undocumented immigrant population - is overstated.

---

3 Overall, an estimated 61 percent of school district's funding come from state funds, 2 percent from lottery funds, 21 percent from local property tax levies, 8 percent from federal funds and 9 percent from other local sources.
Of the studies reviewed, the Los Angeles County study (ISD, 1992) seems to be the most careful and uses the best demographic assumptions regarding, for example, the number of illegal immigrants. Still, when evaluated, the study:

- Understated revenues from immigrants by much as 30 percent because the study underestimated the income of recent legal immigrants;
- Omitted the contribution of long-term legal immigrants, who represent 15 percent of the population and pay 18 percent of the taxes;
- Overstated costs for recent legal immigrants by 60 percent or about $140 million
- Failed to clarify the county-level "deficit" for natives is larger than for immigrants.

In the same vein, Fix and Passel (1993) argue that the two studies of San Diego County by Rea and Parker (1992,1993) employ methods and assumptions that overstate costs and underestimate revenues. In this sense, the authors of the San Diego study assume that there are far more undocumented aliens in San Diego County - over 200,000 - than is plausible or can be supported by data. This figure would imply, by the authors' own reasoning, over 4 million undocumented in California and 8-12 million in the United States, numbers which exceed by far any creditable estimates.

II A CRITIQUE OF THE GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND PROPOSITION 187

The effectiveness of Proposition 187 to deter undocumented immigration to California lies on three main assumptions about the immigration process to California:

1) Illegal immigrants are not well integrated into society in California, therefore they can easily be deported to their countries of origin.

2) Since education and social services in general function as a magnet for large numbers of undocumented immigrants, limiting the access of undocumented persons to these services will discourage further undocumented immigration.

3) There are "illegal families" in California which can be detected and easily deported when they apply for public education or any other social service.
These assumptions contradict some of the most important features of current immigration patterns to California. Research in the social sciences has revealed that: (1) Labor migration is fundamentally a social process based on social networks. As a result of the formation of personal, social, and economic ties with the receiving society, increasingly legal and undocumented migrants are becoming “settlers” rather than sojourners” in California. This change also reflects transformations in labor markets in sending and receiving regions. (2) The denial of education will not force the return of many undocumented persons because undocumented migrants primarily come to work to California. In addition, the disparity in economic conditions between the United States and sending countries not only encourages further migration but also prevents the return of already settled immigrants in the United States. (3) Many immigrant families in California are mixed-status families in which there are citizens, legal residents and undocumented persons. This process has been accelerated by the legalization brought about by IRCA.

As a result of all these trends, a large segment of the undocumented workers residing in California are people who are here for a more permanent stay because they have deep roots in their communities. Consequently, it is unlikely that these people would go back to their countries of origin even if education were denied in California. In light of the assumptions implied in proposition 187, these three arguments are developed in depth in the following section.

1. Labor Migration: A Social Process based on Social Networks

According to Massey et al (1987: 5) the idea that social networks are central to migration is not new. Research in the 1920s, demonstrated a tendency for migrants from particular sending areas to be channeled to specific districts in American cities (Zorbaugh, 1929; Gamio, 1930). Similarly, Tilly and Brown (1967) refer to the “auspices” of migration by which they mean “social structures which establish relationships between the migrant and the receiving community before he moves.” Others have called these relationships “migration chains.” (McDonald and McDonald, 1974; Graves and Graves, 1974; Tilly, 1978). Anthropological studies have long emphasized the importance of assistance provided to migrants by relatives and friends (Magnin 1959, 1970; Jongkind, 1971; Lomnitz, 1975; Arizpe, 1978; Roberts, 1973, 1974, 1978). Economists have also demonstrated the importance of network connections in household migration decisions (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Taylor, 1984).

---

4 This analysis of migration as a social process is a summary of Massey et al. (1987).
Social Networks and the Formation of Linkages with the Host Society

From this perspective, it has been observed that once international migration begins, social networks develop to make foreign employment increasingly accessible to all classes of the sending society. Similarly, the maturation of migrant networks is facilitated by an ongoing process of settlement, whereby migrants build personal, social, and economic ties to the receiving society as they accumulate time abroad.

Migrant networks consist of social ties that link sending communities to specific points of destination in receiving societies. These ties bind migrants and nonmigrants within a complex web of complementary social roles and interpersonal relationships that are maintained by an informal set of mutual expectations and prescribed behaviors. The social relationships that constitute migrant networks are not unique to migrants but develop as a result of universal human bonds that are molded to the special circumstances of international migration. These social ties are not created by the migratory process but are adapted to it and over time are reinforced by the common experience of migration itself.

The most important network relationships are based on kinship, friendship, and paisanaje (common origin) which are reinforced though regular interaction in voluntary associations. In moving to a strange and often hostile land, migrants naturally draw upon these familiar bonds to share the hazards and hardships of life in exile, and those left behind rely on the same ties to mitigate the loneliness and anxiety of having a loved one far away. As migration continues, however, these well-known social connections acquire new meanings and functions. They are transformed into a set of social relationships whose content and meaning are defined about what it means to be a friend, relative or paisano within a community of migrants. Eventually these understandings crystallize into a set of interrelationships that define the migrants network.

Kinship forms one of the most important bases of migrant social organization and family connections are the most secure bonds within the networks. The strongest relationship are between male migrants interacting as fathers and sons. Faced with a hostile and alien environment, father and sons develop well-established conventions of mutual aid and cooperation in the United States, practices that transcend the stream household itself. Long after sons have grown up to form their own families, fathers travel with them to El Norte, sharing the hardships and risks of undocumented life. From this common experience, the paternal bond is strengthened, and a new relationship between migrant fathers and sons develops, one that carries over into the home community. Throughout their lives, migrant fathers and sons are more likely to offer assistance, information, and services to one another.
Migrants brothers also establish a mutual collaboration that builds on and strengthens the fraternal tie. Facing many demands for assistance, from various friends and relatives while abroad, migrants naturally display a preference for the tie of brotherhood. Between brothers there is continual exchange of favors and help, one that cannot be measured in money alone. To a brother arriving in the United States without money, job, or documents, a series of obligations is owed. A place to stay, help in getting a job, the loan of money, or payment for the trip are just a few examples of how the ties of brotherhood are extended and tested in the migrant context. The next most important family tie within migrants networks is that between a man and his brother's sons. The strong relationships that brothers expect and maintain with respect to each other also extends to their sons. Nephews are thus given preference over other relations in the offering of assistance. Arriving in the United States for the first time a young man can generally count on the aid of his uncle; or an uncle may take it upon himself to accompany a young man on his first trip to *el Norte*. These ties also carry over to relationships between cousins. Among cousins linked though a common male relative there is a strong family identification, one reinforced by traditional practices of coresidence and mutual assistance between brothers.

These kinship connections are reinforced though frequent interactions on important ceremonial occasions. Ritual associated with life milestones are specially important in linking settled migrants in the United States with their relatives back home. A wedding, a baptism, or the quince años (fifteenth birthday) of a daughter provide opportunities for reuniting family members separated by migration. Relatives from Mexico are invited to share in the festivities, and friends and acquaintances from the home community who happen to be in the United States are also asked to join in, expanding the possibilities for communication and interchange. In this way, settled U.S migrants lend greater permanence and coherence to the networks.

Kin assistance is generally extended freely and openly up through parallel cousins. Among relatives more distant than these, the strength of ties falls off rapidly, however, and their roles in the migratory process are correspondingly smaller. The most important kin relationship in migrant networks are those between fathers and sons, uncles and nephews, brothers and male cousins. Beyond these relationships, expectations more appropriate to friendship are relevant in governing behavior between two migrants.

Friendship. Because of its explosive growth, migration has outgrown a social organization based solely on the limited confines of kinship, and networks have increasingly incorporated other close social relationships. The closest bonds outside the family are those formed between people as they grow up together. These are typically friendships between people of roughly the same age who lived near one another and joined together in play and shared formative experiences in church, school, or organized sports. If migration becomes frequent
among a group of friends from the same community, their relationship will eventually overlap with other circles of friends with whom they are brought into frequent contact.

**Paisanaje.** The feeling of belonging to a common community of origin or *paisanaje* is different from the other social relationships we have discussed in that it is dimension of association in the home community. Origin from the same place is not a meaningful basis of social organization for people while they are at home. In general, within the community itself, the concept of paisanaje does not imply any additional rights and responsibilities to other paisano that are not already included in the relationships of friend, family member or neighbor. It is not meaningful concept until two paisanos encounter each other outside their home community. Then the strength of the paisanaje tie depends on the strangeness of the environment and the nature of their prior relationship in the community.

Given the cultural distance between Mexico and the United States and the large number of Mexican migrants living and working abroad, it is not surprising that paisanaje has become an important social relationship in recent years. Common origin creates a strong communal identity among migrants in the United States. In an unknown, alien, and often threatening milieu, migrants share a variety of life experiences that draw them together in the pursuit of common goals. Although this sense of paisanaje naturally depends on the nature of migrants' past interactions, they often produce new forms of association that not only promote the cohesion of migrants in the United States but also facilitate their reintegration into the community.

The best example of how the paisanaje operates as integrative force is the annual fiesta held in honor of each town's patron saint. The patron saint, of course, is the personification of paisanaje, the symbolic representation of the town for all its citizens. The celebration held each year to commemorate the patron saint is thus more than a religious holiday. It is a reaffirmation of the community and its people. As such, fiestas have always represented an important integrative mechanism in rural Mexican society. With the advent of U.S. migration, however, the symbolic value of the patron saint has been shaped to the new reality of a migrant community, and the traditional importance of the fiesta has been greatly enhanced.

**Voluntary organizations**

Thus far we have considered various social relationships that make up the migrant networks, but not less important are certain institutional mechanisms that facilitate the formation and maintenance of social ties. A variety of voluntary associations established by migrants in the United States promote regular interpersonal contact, greatly facilitating the process of adaptation and mutual assistance. Although migrants belong to many organizations, probably the most
important is the soccer club that has risen to support international migration in many communities of Western Mexico, the traditional sending region.

Soccer games break up the routine of work and isolation and provide a forum for communication and interchange. Migrants share experience of the past week, discuss events of general interest in the town or in other places where paisanos go in the United States, and exchange information about job opportunities. Everyone enjoys the conviviality, and they all share expenses for refreshments and foods.

Formation of Daughter Communities

The emergence of established communities in the United States is a crucial step in the maturation of the migrant networks. The settlement of a few families from the same place in Mexico transforms the migration process by directing the streams to work sites in particular U.S. towns and cities. Around these families a socioeconomic organization grows, drawing subsequent migrants in ever increasing numbers to the specific points of destination.

The channeling of migrants occurs as social networks focus increasingly on specific communities. As “daughter” settlements of Mexican out-migrants develop, the social infrastructure linking them to the parent communities becomes more directed and reified and the network becomes self-perpetuating. More migrants move to a particular place because that is where the networks lead, and because that is where the social structure affords them the greatest opportunities for success. As more migrants arrive, the range of social connections is further extended, making subsequent migration to that place even more likely.

Social networks are essential elements in the integration to a new host society. However, Menjivar (1994: 22) has found that the particular characteristics of immigration from El Salvador prevented the formation of social networks that ultimately explain why Salvadorians have had many problems adjusting to life in San Francisco, in addition to exacerbated impoverished conditions. According to the author, recent immigrants from El Salvador have come to face a recessionary economy that offers bleak opportunities for employment for themselves as well as for their relatives already in the U.S. who otherwise might have supported them. In addition, the community is highly divided politically. This explains why compatriots and others with whom migrants could establish community networks are also struggling to cope with difficult aspects of life in the United States. Consequently, those upon whom they expected to rely for aid, are not always in a position to support them financially or emotionally. In many cases, once Salvadorian migrants join family members in the United States, the assistance they had received in the early stages of migration process disappear and instead, a series of hostile relations develop.
This section has shown that networks, a form of social capital, is an essential part of the migration process and that the maturation of social networks leads to the creation of daughter communities in the United States that in turn facilitate the process of settlement, whereby migrants build personal, social and economic ties to the receiving community as they accumulate time abroad. In the next section I will argue that the settlement process is a natural consequence of the development of labor migration, as migrants over time, establish strong socioeconomic linkages in the United States. These ties prevent migrants from returning to their countries of origin.

The Settlement Process

Mexico provides the largest number of undocumented people to the United States. The proximity between the two countries has allowed the development of a temporary pattern of migration in which males, usually young, have worked for a certain period of time or seasonally for a few years and then they usually return to Mexico. However, several studies have suggested that since the 1980s, migration from Mexico has become more permanent and heterogeneous in terms of settlement patterns, gender, legal status and employment experience (Cornelius, 1992; Chavez, 1988, Alarcon, 1992).

Between the mid 1960s, after the termination of the Bracero Program, and up to the mid 1980s, Mexican migrants followed a pattern of migration that resembled that of the Braceros. Cornelius (1992: 156-157), describes this pattern as a circular flow of mostly undocumented young adult males who left their families behind in a rural community to work in seasonal U.S. agriculture for six months or less and then returned to their community of origin. Most came from a small subset of communities, located in seven or eight Mexican states that for many years had sent the bulk of Mexican migrants to the United States. Cornelius (1992:157) argues that the erosion of the stereotypic illegal alien population, which probably began in the late 1960s or early 1970s has been intensified during the last ten years by four principal factors: (1) changes in the U.S. economy that have affected the nature and magnitude of the demand for Mexican immigrant labor, (2) the long-running economic crisis in Mexico, (3) the 1986 U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and, (4) the maturation of transnational migrant networks, whose formation was initiated by earlier waves of migrants to the United States.

How can we understand the settlement process of migrants?

In his seminal work *Birds of Passage*, Piore (1979) defines settlement as the development of a permanent commitment to the industrial society on the part of the migrants. The migration stream that starts out as temporary seems to develop over time into settlement of more or less
permanent residents. For this reason, although migration has a temporary character a nucleus of more or less permanent migrants seems inevitably to occur. In a superficial perspective, settlement can be understood in terms of the success or failure of the migrants in the industrial society. The conventional view tends to see settlement as success: people who do well stay. However settlement can also be the product of failure since migrants stay when they can not accumulate enough funds for whatever project at home.

In this process, the individual migrant evolves from being *homo economicus* to a stage in which a permanent community of immigrant families establishes stable linkages with the labor market in their demand for permanent jobs. In the first stage, immigrants view work as purely instrumental; a means to gather income that can be taken to the home community, however as time passes the need for community grows among immigrants and begin to anticipate their inability to maintain the ascetic existence they had originally planned and they begin to bring their wives and children from home.

Massey (1986: 671-683) believes that data collected from migrants in four Mexican communities confirms the model postulated by Piore. Mexican immigrants become progressively enmeshed in a web of social connections in the United States as they build up time in this country and, in this process, they eventually settle in the United States. While migrants form friendship outside the group and family members begin traveling with them, they become more involved with public institutions and informal organizations. At the same time, migrants acquire more stable urban jobs and the share of earnings sent home falls as they shift their focus from Mexico to the United States.

In addition to this, Chavez (1988) argues that even for undocumented workers, the formation of a family begins a process that leads to eventual settlement. These families become binational with the arrival of children who are American citizens and therefore have the right to obtain social services and education that reinforce the links to the United States. Taking this further, Hondagneu (1990) has found that within the household, men and women express different preferences with respect to settlement. Men generally indicate a desire to return to Mexico while women express their intention of staying in the United States. This author believes that men dream of the ultimate return to Mexico because through the process of migration and resettlement, they lose control over family resources, decisions, and privileges.

Massey and his associates (Massey et al. 1987) found that ethnographic data and regression analysis show that time spent in the United States is the single most important variable that explains settlement and that this process is strongly affected by urban origin, non-farm employment in the United States and legal status. In this study, a "settler" is defined as a migrant who has been in the United States for three continuous years.
As migrants make additional trips and stay longer in the United States, they accumulate experience in the United States which increase the likelihood of permanent settlement. As migration continues, a growing number of families settle down forming "daughter communities". These communities in turn greatly facilitate migration by providing a stable anchor in the receiving community. After ten years of migrant experience, 42 percent of rural migrants and 53 percent of urban migrants from the sample of four Mexican communities have settled, with the figures rising to 79 percent and 76 percent after twenty years.

Determinants of the settlement process were studied by a logistic regression analysis of men's migrant experience. The results show that factors related to the household economic position are not very important. Among personal characteristics, settlement is considerably enhanced by a lack of children as well as age. Settlement is then most likely to occur at early stages of the life cycle, just before or just after marriage. The most striking finding was that migrant experience ultimately overcomes the effect of other variables to render settlement virtually inevitable in the long run. As indicated before, possession of legal documents but no children and the status of being a nonfarmworker from an urban background all substantially increase the probability of settlement early in the migrant career, as experience progresses, however, these variables matter less and less. In sum, the people most likely to settle are young childless men from urban areas who possess legal documents and have accumulated extensive experience in the United States.

This overview of some of the studies that have focused on the settlement process shows very interesting and useful insights as well as limitations. First, as observed in the work of Piore (1979) and Massey (1986) and Massey et al. (1987), time spent in the United States seems to be the key factor that determines settlement: the more time a migrant spends in the United States the more likely she will become a "settler". However, it is very limiting to define a "settler" as someone who has been in the United States for three continuous years (Massey et al. 1987). Although this definition is useful for a statistical analysis it lacks sociological meaning, for this reason it seems strange that, according to the authors of Return to Aztlan, the people most likely to settle are young urban men without children who possess legal documents and have accumulated extensive experience in the United States. This image contradicts the prevalent assumption in the literature that states that family formation leads to settlement. In this sense, it is useful to incorporate in the analysis the sociological/anthropological approach (Chavez, 1988; Hondagneu, 1990; Massey et al. 1987; and, Rouse, 1992) that states that family formation, the participation of women, and the maturation of social networks play fundamental roles in encouraging settlement in the United States. However, most of these studies, based only on ethnographic data, focus on the demographic characteristics, attitudes, opinions and practices of migrants; assuming ultimately that settlement is only the result of the decision of migrants. This
view seems to suggest that settlement takes place in a vacuum. It is crucial to analyze the political and economic context of reception of immigration as suggested by Portes and Borocz (1989).

Transformation of Labor Markets in California: A New Demand for Immigrant Labor

Settlement has been encouraged by the transformation of labor markets in the United States. Global restructuring has led to the consolidation of two-tier labor markets. Sassen (1991) argues that in "global cities" like New York and London, immigrants provide low-wage labor to declining backward sectors of capital but also to jobs that support the highly specialized service sector and the high-income lifestyles of those employed in this sector. From a similar perspective, Castells (1989) has found that economic restructuring has caused the differentiation of labor in two equally dynamic sectors: the information-based formal economy and the downgraded labor-based informal economy that employs ethnic minority workers and immigrants.

As a result of this, recent immigrants to the United States are mostly locating in only a few metropolitan cities, especially New York and Los Angeles. For this reason these metropolises are becoming fractured cities that are inhabited by a two-tier society. New York has been referred to as a "dual city" (Mollenkopf and Castells, 1991) and Los Angeles has been named the primary homeland of a largely Third World labor force (Soja, 1991).

According to Cornelius (1991:167-168) California's attractiveness to the most recent wave of Mexican migrants reflects a more robust, more diversified employment growth in that state, relative to other potential destinations. Following the 1980-82 recession, a boom occurred in most sectors of the highly diversified California economy. Since 1986, this boom has coincided with a sharp contraction in employment opportunities in "oil bust" Texas, whose economy only recently has begun to revive. In the last two decades, employment growth in California has been far more robust than in the United States as a whole. During the 1970s, for example, blue collar jobs increased in California at twice the national rate, and manufacturing employment expanded at nearly four times the national rate. In addition to its overall dynamism and diversity, there are certain structural features of the contemporary California economy that increase the demand for immigrant labor. For example, the system of contracting out labor-intensive tasks to small, largely nonunion, immigrant dominated firms in such industries as apparel, electronics, and construction appears to be advancing more rapidly in California than in other parts of the nation. And while the demand for entry-level workers is likely to remain strong, the largest numbers of new jobs to be created in California during the next twenty years will be relatively low-paying, low skill, low status jobs in restaurants, hotels, and other parts of the urban service sectors -
precisely the kinds of jobs that are increasingly shunned by young, better educated, native-born Californians. The need for personal services among the rapidly expanding business-financial-professional elite has been a significant source of jobs for female immigrants in Los Angeles in recent years. Similarly, Roger Rouse has described the most recent emigrants from Aguililla, Michoacan to Redwood City, California (a bedroom suburb of northern California’s high-tech "Silicon Valley" as that community’s janitors, dishwashers, gardeners, hotel workers, and house cleaners- "proletarian servants in the paragon of post-industrial society”).

On the debate over the effects of immigration on the U.S. labor markets, there are three theories that seek to explain this process: displacement, segmentation, and "queuing" theories (Valenzuela, 1993). The neoclassical displacement theory argues that immigrants arrive to the U.S. in the face of declining wages. As a result, an increased supply of foreign workers further pushes domestic wages down by expanding the aggregate labor supply despite a stable demand for labor. Immigrants displace native-born workers because the former are assumed to be perfect substitutes for the latter and skill-differences are ignored. According to segmentation theory, the U.S. labor market is sufficiently divided between immigrant and non-immigrant jobs so that domestic workers are insulated from direct displacement effects of employing migrants. Although native workers may be employed in unskilled jobs, they are nevertheless protected from competition because their jobs may be covered by union contracts. The queuing theory, that is related to the segmentation theory, argues that immigrants take jobs that native workers no longer want; that is, a job ladder, or queue, for immigrant workers exists. Over time, U.S.-born labor moves onto better occupations, vacating "lower-rung" and less desirable jobs that various groups of newcomers then take. To the extent that such a queue is developing in secondary occupations or peripheral industries where immigrants and other disadvantaged groups are concentrated, immigrant labor may work at the expense of Black and other U.S.-born labor.

In relation with the "queue" theory of labor markets, Scott (1988: 226) argues that labor markets in American metropolises require the continual recreation of pools of cheap and malleable labor suitable for employment in the disintegrated complexes of labor-intensive manufacturing and service industries. Similarly, Zabin et al. (1993) argue that California’s agricultural industry has historically experienced an ethnic replacement process. This concept is used to describe how agricultural employers in California have relied on the sequential entry of groups of foreign workers for most of the last hundred years. In general, a more settled group of farm workers is replaced by a new group who is willing to accept worse working conditions. California farmworkers have been successively Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, and mestizo Mexicans. Only during the Great Depression, white workers "Okies" and "Arkies" formed the major part of the harvest labor force. Interestingly enough, beginning in the 1980s, this replacement process is
occurring within the Mexican migrant group since Mixtecos, indigenous people from Oaxaca, are replacing mestizo farmworkers in many rural areas of California.

2. Labor Migration and Economic Crisis in Mexico

This section focuses on Mexico and seeks to relate migration patterns that developed in the 1980s with the emergence of the economic crisis. The main contention is that the denial of social services will not force the return of many undocumented persons because the hard economic conditions in Mexico prevent the return of already settled immigrants in California.

Impact of the Economic Crisis on Employment and Wages

Cordera (1991) has found that between 1982 and 1988, domestic production was practically stagnant in Mexico and that the concomitant per capita decline in production caused that Mexican's standard of living was 15 percent lower in 1989 than at the beginning of the decade. The impact of the economic crisis within the labor market had three distinct aspects: the loss of employment-generation dynamism, particularly in the more modern industrial sectors (the manufacturing sector traditionally accounting for almost 20 percent of total employment, was stagnant through the decade), the lower quality of the jobs that were created; and the decline in real wages. According to Lustig (1990) between 1982 and 1984 employment contracted sharply in manufacturing and construction, which together comprise about 20 percent of total employment and 27 percent of nonagricultural employment. The largest drop occurred in construction. In 1984 the wage bill was 45 percent below its 1981 level. However, between 1982 and 1985, in the midst of overall economic decline, the agricultural sector fared relatively well in terms of output performance. The average growth rate of total GDP in the period from 1982 to 1985 was close to zero, while for agriculture was over 2 percent. In this sector, while large-scale producers using hired labor probably benefited from the combination of rising crop prices and decreasing real wages, smallholder peasants who produce an agricultural surplus may have been able to protect their real income and food consumption. However, rural families who depend on wage income must have experienced significant deterioration in their purchasing power.

Cordera (1991) argues that individual responses to the practical impossibility of obtaining formal employment led to an increase in legal and illegal migration to the United States, a
considerable increase in criminal activity, the entrance of more family members into the labor market; and an increase in marginal employment, particularly self-employment—in part motivated by government's "empleate a ti mismo" (be your own employer) ad campaign. In this sense, the informal sector to some extent offset the negative job-creation and employment-rate tendencies of the Mexican economy in the 1980s. According to the National Urban Employment Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, ENEU), between 1982 and 1987 the proportion of self-employed workers and family members working without remuneration increased from 16 to 21 percent of the entire economically active population; the proportion of workers earning a wage, salary, or commissions dropped from 81 to 74 percent over the same period.

Cornelius (1991) found that in the 1980s, migration to the United States from Mexican cities grew substantially. This phenomenon is consistent with the widely held notion that, in relative terms, the economic crisis has affected urban dwellers (especially residents of the largest cities) even more severely than the rural population. Prior to the economic crisis and the government austerity measures that it provoked, Mexico City and other large urban centers were heavily subsidized as places to live and work. Moreover, they were major centers of government employment, and the wages of government workers filtered back into the general urban economy. Therefore, crisis-induced austerity has disproportionately impacted Mexico's large cities.

Economic Crisis and the Standard of Living of Mexicans

According to Tello (1991: 58) the crisis initiated in the early 1980s has not only affected negatively the living standards of people but has also widened inequality. In his view, although Mexico in the early 1980s was a primary example of sustained economic growth in Latin America, the country's low marks in social well-being and pervasive economic inequality fell far short of what this "economic miracle" would suggest.

While the poorest 10 percent of Mexican families earned 2.4 percent of national income in 1958 they only earned 1.1 percent in 1977. At the other extreme, the richest 20 percent of families received 50 percent of the country's available income in 1977, just as they had thirty years earlier. In 1985, the poorest 40 percent of the Mexican population received 9.9 percent of GDP. Economic inequality continues to be more marked in Mexico than in countries with comparable, or even lower, levels of per capita income.

Mexico's crisis years (1982-89) further impoverished the population. During this period of time, the country's poor grew in both absolute and relative terms. Per capita GDP fell 14 percent, and the decline in earnings was very unevenly distributed. While the country's population expanded from 71.4 million in 1981 to 81.2 million in 1987, the country's poor grew from 32.1 to
41.3 million. In this six year period, nine of every ten Mexicans added to the national population were to be found in the ranks of the poor. Today forty-one million Mexicans are unable to satisfy their basic needs, and seventeen million live in extreme poverty.

The portion of GDP which corresponds to wage earnings, which had always been low in Mexico compared to more advanced countries, dropped from 36 percent in 1980 to 28.6 percent in 1986. This decline reflects the behavior of real minimum wage: from an index of 100 in 1970, the real minimum wage rose to 109 in 1980 and then dropped precipitously to 56.6 percent in 1988. Over the same period, unemployment rose from 6 to 12.1 percent of the economically active population.

In the same vein, Cordera (1991: 30) has found that while in 1980 wages and salaries accounted for 36 percent of national income by 1986 that figure had dropped to 28 percent. Several factors interacted to place the brunt of the economic adjustment on wage earners: a stagnant job market; uncontrolled inflation that outpaced all attempts at wage and salary adjustment, so that by 1988 the legal minimum wage was worth only half its 1981 value; and the combined effect of flexible exchange rates and repressive wage policies, designed to transfer much of the burden of inflation control and international price competitiveness to wage earners.

The economic crisis and the adjustment policies to control it have affected the quality of education, nutrition and health among the Mexican population. As a result of reduced government spending on education there were fewer jobs and lower wages for educators, leading to stagnation and deterioration in both the quality and availability of public education. Spending on education declined in real terms from 1981 to 1987 and, as a percentage of GDP, was lower in 1987 than it had been in eleven years. A corollary effect of the crisis, with serious implications for education, is that household strategies for confronting economic hardship included the integration of children and adolescents into the labor market.

The declining investment in education halted construction of educational infrastructure. Budget constraints also reduced the availability of free textbooks and increased the student-teacher ratio, even as overall enrollment levels fell. This last consideration is reflected in the graduation rates at the different educational levels. For example, only ten of every hundred students entering university receive degrees. Moreover, there have been sharp declines in high school and junior college graduation rates. In 1987, fully 10 percent of the population over age 15 (approximately five million people) was illiterate, and the remaining 90 percent had, on average, only six grade education.

The decline in nutritional levels has multiple roots: a contracting job market and reduced household incomes; regressive tendencies in social spending; a fiscal policy, characterized since 1982 by shrinking subsidies and increased prices for public goods and services; and lagging minimum-wage rates relative to prices for basic goods. For example, the average cost of a basket
of basic goods was almost 50 percent of the legal minimum wage in 1987, compared to about 30 percent in 1981. Similarly, according to Cordera, government spending on health and social security in 1987 was lower than in 1970, whether measured as per capita expenditures, percent of GDP, or percent of total public expenditures.

Economic Crisis and Migration to the United States

Cornelius (1991) in his article Los Migrantes de la Crisis argues that the economic crisis in Mexico of the 1980's propelled into the migratory flow people from families, communities, and states without a long history of U.S. bound migration. Similarly, the extensive publicity surrounding IRCA's legalization and Replenishment Agricultural Worker (RAW) programs seems to have attracted into the migratory flow persons from communities and states that had not participated significantly. In general, the 1980s saw the rapid growth in the migration of people from new regions, including urban areas, and more women.

Mexican migrants to the United States in the 1980's included skilled, urban-born Mexican workers from Mexico's principal cities as well as destitute campesinos from some of Mexico's most underdeveloped states, such as Guerrero, Oaxaca, Hidalgo, and Puebla. These states all have large indigenous populations. It is significant that several of the nontraditional areas now sending migrants to the United States are among the Mexican states most adversely impacted by the economic crisis of the 1980's (The Federal District, Morelos, and Hidalgo, all of whose economies contracted by more than 2 percent during the 1980-85 period; and Guerrero and Puebla, whose economies contracted by 0.1-2.0 percent in the same years).

The shift from a migrant population consisting mainly of highly mobile, seasonally employed "lone males" (unmarried or unaccompanied by dependents) toward a more socially heterogeneous, year-round, de facto permanent Mexican immigrant population in the United States accelerated in the 1980s. To be sure, the absolute number of young, temporary Mexican male farmworkers in the United State did not decline during the 1970s and 1980s, but it grew slowly in absolute terms and, in relative terms, this fraction of the Mexican immigrants population was overtaken and overwhelmed by migrants who remained in the United States for long periods, accompanied by their dependents. Ethnographic and survey studies of both sending and receiving communities, interviews with would-be illegal migrants at the border, and INS apprehension statistics all show that there is now considerably more migration by whole family units (moving together), more family-reunification migration (women and children joining heads already established in the United States), and more migration by single women than there was a decade ago.

Increased female migration to the United States reflects, in part, generational changes in the attitudes and expectations of Mexican women. Gonzalez de la Rocha (1989) has summarized
her findings from a high-migration town in Jalisco as follows: "During the last three years more women have left the town to be reunited with their husbands in the United States... Upon getting married, the woman no longer stays in the town.... The young women do not want to repeat the loneliness that their mothers experienced nor the hardships that they had to endure (while their husband worked in the United States". (Cornelius, 1991:171).

The higher propensity of females to migrate to the United States in recent years is also a consequence of Mexico's economic crisis, which has driven more wives, single women, and children into the work force. Especially among Mexico's urban poor, the male family head's income is not nearly sufficient now to meet the family's needs.

Female emigration to the United States has also been increasing because of the abundance of new employment opportunities for which women are the preferred labor source. For example, there is a booming market in California's largest urban areas for undocumented female Mexican labor to provide child care, clean houses and offices, and iron clothes. In the San Diego area, recently arrived female Mexican migrants now find housecleaning work by going door to door, as males have done (for gardening work) for many years.

3. **Mixed-Status Families vs. “Undocumented Families”**

Supporters of Proposition 187 assume that the undocumented population of California is composed of families in which all of their members lack legal documents. In their view they can be found when they apply for public education or any other social service. Research has found that this is not true because there is a large number of mixed-status families which include US citizens, legal residents and undocumented people. This trend has been expanded by the ample legalization brought about by IRCA.

More than 3 million people applied for the two legalization programs (1.8 million for the "general amnesty" and 1.3 million for the SAW program) contained in IRCA. The approval rate for decided cases was 94 percent and 93 percent respectively. As a result of the implementation of the "general amnesty" more than 1.6 million people (the majority from Mexico) were granted legalization. This legalized population included immigrants from 179 countries. Table 2 shows that as of February 1991, the vast majority came from Mexico (nearly 70 percent) and Central America (13 percent). The four nations that provided the most applicants were Mexico (1,162, 461), El Salvador (136,073), Guatemala (49,942) and Colombia (24,596) (INS, 1992: 8).
Table 2.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>33,359</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>75,529</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1,162,461</td>
<td>69.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>10,422</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>55,279</td>
<td>3.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>224,089</td>
<td>13.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>69,447</td>
<td>4.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>28,880</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,663,595</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Table Adapted from Table 3 (INS, 1992: 8)

The legalized population was highly concentrated in several regions and major urban centers. Overall, 86 percent resided in four states: California, Texas, Illinois and New York. California was the place of origin of the majority of applicants since more than half of the legalized immigrants (54.7 percent) filed their application in this state. While one US resident in 81 applied for legalization, one Californian in 17 did so. Similarly, while 910,235 people applied for legalization in California - the largest number - only 14 did so in North Dakota. (INS, 1992: 18).

As a result of the legalization of more than 3 million people, a large number of families in California have US citizens, legal residents and undocumented persons among their members. This has been revealed in three studies conducted in Los Angeles, San Diego and Madera County:

The Los Angeles County Study (ISD, 1992)

The Los Angeles County Study provides valuable data to estimate the importance of the mixed-status families in California’s population. The study found that recent immigrants, legal immigrants, amnesty persons, undocumented persons and the citizen children of undocumented
persons accounted for about 25 percent of total population in Los Angeles County as of January 1992. In this estimate, the U.S. citizen children born to undocumented persons accounted for 250,000 or 2.7 percent of total population in the county.

Since the study defines the **citizen children of the undocumented** as “children under the age of 18 born in the United States whose mothers are undocumented persons” (ISD, 15.2:15), this implies that a large number of the 700,000 estimated undocumented persons living in the Los Angeles County are the parents or sibling of these U.S. citizens. Therefore, there is a large number of mixed-status families in Los Angeles County that will be difficult to deport. It is also unlikely that these families will leave the United States voluntarily as a result of the denial of education and other social services because some of their members are U.S. citizens.

The authors of this study state that based on the Westat survey they derived that the average number of children born in the United States per female amnesty person who had entered after 1978 was .90. Then, this ratio was used with their estimate of undocumented females to estimate the number of citizen children of the undocumented. The authors caution “that in evaluating this estimate, it needs to be remembered that the proportion of undocumented immigrants who are married or cohabiting is lower than average and that at this time most of them have been in the United States less than 10 years. The ratio would be expected to go up over time as the proportion in family unions increases and the average number of years in the United States increases. The women in this subsample of the Westat survey had been in the United States 8 to 10 years at the time of the survey. Ten years had also elapsed from the pre-1982 entry cut-off date of our January 1, 1992 estimate. Some of the undocumented women, however, have been in the United States much less than 10 years, while others entered prior to 1982 and did not apply for amnesty. Nationwide, the number of pre-1982 amnesty applicants was 15% lower than the number of undocumented persons estimated to have been counted in the 1980 Census. We do not know the degree of bias caused by differences between the Westat subsample and the current population of undocumented women.” (ISD, 1992.22)

**San Diego: Settlers and Sojourners**

Leo Chavez (1988) in his article *Settlers and Sojourners: The Case of Mexicans in the United States* based on his study in San Diego, argues that migrants with families were much more likely to reside more permanently in the United States than those who migrated alone

---

5 The Westat survey was a sample survey of the amnesty population commissioned by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and conducted by Westat, Inc. in 1989. The number of cases for Los Angeles County was 2,129.)
(63.8% to 39.5% respectively) because migrating with a family appears to influence continued residence rather than returning to Mexico.

In this context, Chavez contends that popular terms such as "undocumented family" and "illegal family" are generalities which disregard the fact that many of these families have at least one child born in the U.S. and is therefore a citizen. Out of 603 households headed by undocumented immigrants in the San Diego sample, 42.1% contained at least one member who was a citizen by birth in the United States. This proportion compares favorably with similar data collected in Texas.

An analysis of the ages of undocumented interviewees provides further evidence that undocumented settlers are in the early childbearing years: 46% of the children were five years old or younger. Consequently, the chances that a family headed by an undocumented immigrant will have a child born in the U.S. increase the longer that family resides in the United States.

The evidence also indicates another pattern that is important for considering the future of long-term undocumented residents: many eventually become legal residents. Of the 151 legal interviewees who had a previous history of migration to the U.S., 59.4% were at one time undocumented migrants.

In sum, many of the undocumented who are long-term residents of the U.S. must be considered "immigrants" rather than "migrants". This is especially true for those who have taken the crucial step of forming a family in the U.S., either by marrying here or by bringing their family from Mexico. Such families will not necessarily follow previous migration patterns based upon the mobility of a single individual. There is scant evidence that most of such families would willingly return to Mexico after a brief "season" in the United States. Many will remain in the U.S. unless they are apprehended and returned to Mexico by INS authorities. Even then, these families will have incentives to return to the home community and equity (both economic and social) they have built up, sometimes over several years, in the United States.

Madera County: Transnational or Immigrant Workers?

Similarly, in my study in California's San Joaquin Valley (Alarcón, 1994b), I found that as a result of the ample legalization brought about by IRCA the legal status of migrant families became very complicated with the predominance of mixed-status families. This study that examined the integration of Mexican immigrants into rural California focused on the migration experience of a group of families who are originally from a town in Michoacan (Mexico) and live in Madera County. As part of the research project, I conducted a survey of a random sample of
this immigrant population living in Madera County. For this reason I selected 30 families which constitutes nearly 20 percent of the total number of families.

In 80 percent of the families there were not any undocumented persons. In all of these families there were different combinations of US citizens, “green-card” holders, and the so-called “Rodinos”, that is, people who became legal residents as a result of IRCA. In 17 percent of the rest of families there were also combinations of US citizens, “green-card” holders, and “Rodinos” living with undocumented persons. Finally, only 3 percent were “undocumented families” where all of the members were undocumented.

CONCLUSIONS

This study has shown that the assumptions that support Proposition 187 contradict some of the most important characteristics of current immigration patterns to California. These trends have been uncovered by research in the different disciplines of the social sciences. Research has shown that labor migration is a social process and that social networks over time lead to permanent settlement in the receiving country. Similarly, changes in labor markets in California have encouraged the permanent stay of immigrants. Settlement has also been reinforced by the worsening economic conditions in countries like Mexico. Finally, unlike supporters of Proposition 187 who assume the existence of immigrant families in California, research has shown that the legal status of families is a complicated issue with the presence of a large number of mixed-status families in which there are U.S citizens, legal residents and undocumented persons.

As a result of all these trends, it seems that Proposition 187 instead of solving the problem of undocumented immigration, it will create social conflicts and economic disruption in California. It is evident that many undocumented workers residing in California are people who are here for a more permanent stay because they have deepened their roots in their communities. Consequently, it is unlikely that these people would go back to their countries of origin even if education were denied in California.

Lastly, it is crucial to emphasize that current undocumented migration to the United States that seems to be an unstoppable flow, is largely the result of polices implemented by the United States and Mexico governments. The historical review of the policies implemented by the two governments on labor migration reveals that the United States has always taken the initiative in the policy making process through a well-defined immigration legislation that is often used to favor particular interests. Mexico’s policies have largely emerged as a response to U.S.
immigration policies. In the case of Mexico, a short period of a nationalist stand that opposed emigration to the United States ended in the 1940s and gave way to a policy that tacitly has sought to maintain the migration process. Despite this long-standing laissez-faire stance that keeps the "back door" open to emigration, Mexican officials have recently proclaimed that Mexico prefers to create jobs rather than export people. This argument was used as one of the principal justifications for the establishment of NAFTA.

From the turn of the century to the mid-1960s, U.S. immigration policy encouraged temporary Mexican labor migration. This was the overall intention despite the deportations that took place in the 1930s and 1950s. The restrictionist push to limit immigration crystallized in IRCA, but this legislation still contains many concessions for employers in their search for cheap labor (Alarcón, 1994a).
BIBLIOGRAPHY


