This paper interrogates the "voice" in intercultural theory, research, and education. The argument presented in the paper is that existing theory and research fall primarily within recent historical Western conceptions of what constitutes science, and intercultural communication educators' teaching is frequently from a Western perspective, despite the fact that they teach culture and culture-boundedness of other forms of communication. Thus, the paper looks at the "culture" of the intercultural discipline, first explaining some key concepts from critical theory as these regard the social sciences in general. These notions are applied first to theory/research and then to educational styles to see if they can inform the intercultural discipline. The paper discusses the predominant "voice" in the intercultural discipline through 3 frames: historical conceptualization, power structures, and the postmodern notion of decenteredness. In the conclusion, the paper reflects on the author's own voice in his writing and teaching. Contains 74 references and 13 notes. (Author/RS)
Whose 'Voice' Speaks in Intercultural Communication Education?

A Question of Content and Style

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Abstract

This paper interrogates the "voice" in intercultural theory, research, and education. The argument presented is that our theory and research fall primarily within a recent historical Western conception of what constitutes science, and our teaching is frequently from a Western perspective, despite the fact that we teach culture and culture-boundedness of other forms of communication. Thus, this paper looks at the "culture" of the intercultural discipline, first explaining some key concepts from critical theory as these regard the social sciences in general. These notions are applied first to theory/research and then to educational styles to see if they can inform the intercultural discipline. The author discusses the predominant "voice" in the intercultural discipline through three frames: historical contextualization, power structures, and the postmodern notion of decenteredness. In the conclusion, the author pauses to reflect on his own voice in his writing and teaching.

Special thanks to Wen Shu Lee, who developed and planned this panel, to the students of COM 492 (Seminar in Communication Theory: Intercultural and Interethnic Communication), Fall, 1995, at Illinois State University who challenge my ideas and continually give me insights; and to those who have challenged my voice and led me to analyze ("deconstruct") my own teaching, specifically M. Cristina Gonzalez, T.K. Nakayama, and M.L. Hecht. However, the ideas presented here are my own ideas in my own voice . . . or are they?
The Western subject as one who is at the centre of awareness is thereby seen as the work of an ideological practice that represses the fluidity and indeterminacy of the process in the name of a fixed point of origin. Ideology is understood as an aspect of the symbolic universe that accomplishes this fixing in the service of certain cultural and institutional practices and requirements. In this view, the intervention required to produce a new subject, decenred and open to other fixings, demands a depth process akin to psychoanalysis joined with a structural change to support this new subject. (Samson. 1989, p. 14)

Debates into the notion of identity often seem confusing and hard to access, for they step out of the dialogues and ways of speaking with which we are accustomed and move us to a new level of abstraction. For example, in the above quote, Samson (1989) is discussing the Western notion of self. We often think of self in terms of self esteem (high or low), having or not having fear of communication, or other such constructs. Self, for Samson, is not to be understood in the older notions of opposition and contradiction (where we are this instead of that), but in terms of inclusion of various contradictions. "The Western logic of identity is a logic of either/or. By contrast, Derrida's logic ... is a logic of both/and" (p. 15) Selves, Samson suggests, are not singular identities, but are a result of the multiple voices that have made us. It is the inclusion, or consideration of those differences, and not the "resolving" or denial of difference which brings suggests wholeness. Further, the attempt to make us seem a single, unitary self is seen as an attempt to serve "certain cultural and institutional practices" (p. 14). Samson concludes:

In so far as differences between people and between organism and environment have been understood to be non-reciprocal and hierarchical (with certain kinds of people on top), there has evolved a domination of group over group, individual over individual, humanity over humanity's environment ... As long as we persist in this individuated manner of viewing the world and its inhabitants, there will continue to be incursions that destroy in the name of momentary peace (p. 17)
Traditional notions of the self keep in place notions of what is pathological and how the self should be treated (e.g. psychiatry/psychology). They encourage the notion of domination of individual over individual, of ideology over ideology. And they promote a way of looking at the self (that is, a social construction of science) that keeps in place a certain way of "doing science," excluding other perspectives that are not in the dominant "center." However, in the modern world, these other voices are now speaking, are now demanding a place for themselves alongside and within traditional views of the self—and traditional views of social science.

What, the reader may ask, does all of this have to do with intercultural communication research and teaching? I would say much. My overall proposition is that the field of intercultural communication is itself a culture, a self. It has been treated historically as unified, as monolithic. In fact, however, this construction of the discipline has reflected and kept in place (for the most part) a dominant voice of science—a particularly Western voice. This voice pervades both the content of what we teach (theory, research, notions of culture, etc.) and the style in which we teach it. While we promote an "emic," cultural understanding of various cultural ways of forming relationships, of defining and using words, of resolving conflict, and so on, when we write about them and teach them, we suddenly retreat into a Western, culturally bound voice which suppresses, rather than values difference. In this paper, I will look at the voice I hear in our content and teaching. Finally, I will pause to critique my own voice in my teaching and writing, to see if and how I reproduce a voice which excludes other, especially Non-Western perspectives. Before I begin, however, I must (in a very Western fashion) define my terms.

You Mean There's More than One Voice?

When I was a master's student, as even now, as I read much of the literature in the field,
everything is presented as if there is only one voice. Reality is "out there," and we report it. Communicative groups, small or large, have this thing called "culture" which is simply there--and we study it. Once in a while, scholars make disclaimers that as we approach these cultures and look at them, our own biases and ethnocentrism might get in the way of our research and presentation of the material (Samovar & Porter, 1991, make this bold step--but I do not recall it standing out in other texts I have read or used). In order to arrive at a point where I can talk about "voice" I feel I should first present some of the basic notions I see leading up to it, specifically from the field of critical theory.

**Marxism, Neo-Marxism, and Ideology.**

Let me begin by an example I shall later return to. Stepan (1990) has suggested that science is never simply a description of reality, but that it reflects the social practices and politics of the day. She demonstrates through historical analysis how science has constructed "race" and "gender" differently in different parts of Latin America at different times, and how what is considered good "science" is influenced both by political thought and by political interests. Early critical theorists, such as those of the early Frankfurt School--Adorno, Horkheimer, and others--might have seen this construction of science at service to fascist tendencies in Latin America (hence, *The Authoritarian Personality* and the F-scale--for Fascism, Adorno, et al., 1982) and might discuss how those tendencies kept in place the capitalist system (Kellner, 1989).

The neo-Marxist looks beyond economic relations to suggest that power relations can exist in various aspects of society. Althusser (1971) proposed that dominant groups maintain their power not only through law systems, courts, and police (*Repressive State Apparatus*), but also through family, religion, education, and, we might add, social science (*Ideological State*...
Apparatus). Neo-Marxists sometimes add to this concept the notion of Gramsci (1983) that power does not lie only in the hands of the dominant group, but that all groups have some sort of power in a given struggle for dominance (hegemony). Further, dominance can exist in several areas: Different groups can struggle for or gain dominance over the media, over religion, over family values, over the economic system of a society, over education, and so forth (what Gramsci calls different terrains or later writers call sites of struggle). From this perspective, culture itself becomes not merely a set of traditions, norms, values, knowledge systems, or behaviors passed down from generation to generation, but rather culture:

begins with the way that such manifest phenomena [religious beliefs, communal rituals or shared traditions] are produced through systems of meaning, through structures of power, and through the institutions through which these are deployed. . . From this point of view, culture is no longer understood as what expresses the identity of a community. Rather, it refers to the processes, categories and knowledges through which communities are defined as such; that is, how they are rendered specific and differentiated. (Donald & Rattansi, 1992, p 4, emphases added).

This definition goes beyond a process view of culture (e.g., Bantz, 1993, p. 25) in that the process view looks at how culture is created and the critical view (at least, this particular critical view, for critical theory is a diverse and hard-to-categorize perspective) looks at both how and why culture is created. Culture is created and re-recreated, produced and re-produced through symbols, including both mediated symbols (bumper stickers, graffiti, music videos, romance novels, TV) and interpersonal symbols (stories, conversational style, interruptions, eye gaze patterns). These, in turn, exist in various relations of power. For example, certain groups get to call their "culture" the "dominant American culture," (thus marginalizing other norms, behaviors, rituals) Within a set of cultural practices, verbal, nonverbal, and mediated messages help
maintain power differences, such as between men and women, between upper and lower socioeconomic classes, and between "racial"/ethnic groups. Between and among these and other groups, a particular cultural value (e.g., individualism, materialism) is fought over through media, through the establishment of artistic and literary canons, and so on. There are struggles to articulate or define certain values. For example, altruism might be a cultural value in America, but should only be expressed toward certain groups (the masses in Ethiopia) and not others (the masses in Iraq). Symbolic battles are fought to determine what rituals and symbols mean (for example, the rebel or the American flag) and what behaviors are normative or accepted in a given behavior. Althusser would suggest that the various spheres of struggle are "relatively autonomous" and do not always function and change together, but that "in the last instance," the economic sphere prevails. However, different neo-Marxists hold different views, seeing varying degrees of separation between the economic and the other areas (Solomos, 1986).

Within this notion of power structures, and from the school of critical theory, comes a group of writers who focus on popular culture as it creates and recreates culture (norms, beliefs, and so on). The interdisciplinary group formed a school commonly called Cultural Studies (e.g. Grossberg, Nelson, & Treichler, 1992). This group of writers has looked at a variety of representations, from James Bond detective novels to London fashions to media representations of riots to news talk shows (see Barker & Beezer, 1992 for a review of several works), analyzing what these have to say about different cultures. One of the notions that occurs frequently in these writings is that of ideology. Ideology, according to Hall (1981), refers to "those images, concepts and premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, interpret, understand and 'make sense' of some aspect of social existence" (p. 31). Language is not the same as
ideology, Hall notes, since a given symbolic term (such as "democracy" or, in the present study, "social science") "can be deployed within different ideological discourses" (p. 31). Language is, however, one of the principal vehicles of ideology. Hall suggests that ideologies do not consist of single concepts or beliefs, "but in the articulation of different elements into a distinctive set or chain of meanings" (p. 31). These meanings are not propagated or created by individuals—they are not "the product of individual consciousness or intention" (p. 31). Rather, we are born into certain symbolic worlds—they precede us, and we speak within them. As such, they are difficult to notice. It is like a fish trying to notice and comment on the water in which it swims.

Ideologies are framed or discussed as "natural" or "traditional" (thus, anything which does not fit within them is "weird," "abnormal" or "deviant"). Since they are so invisible, even when we try to escape them, the trajectory of our ideas often falls short and does not break the atmosphere of their environment.

Postmodernism and "Voice"

Donald and Rattansi's (1992) definition of culture above begins in power structures. However, Donald and Rattansi continue to say that culture "refers to the processes, categories and knowledges through which communities are defined as such; that is, how they are rendered specific and differentiated. (p. 4). That is, by focusing on one culture, we are inherently differentiating it from another culture. By thinking of ourselves, we are creating an "Other"—and we often then create ways of symbolically creating the Other in ways which denigrate, distance, and separate them from us. Further, as we symbolically create Japanese, Middle Eastern, and American culture, we use categories which become solidified, reified. We speak of these cultures as monolithic, unchanging entities, thus essentializing them. That is, we give them "a notion of
ultimate essence that transcends historical boundaries" (Brah, 1992, p. 126)--we fail to highlight the diversity and contradictions within them. The articles in Donald and Rattansi's edited collection let one know they are not speaking of national cultures, but also of gender and racial representations. The very notions of multiple sites of struggle, with multiple forces vying for dominance, suggests that in any given society, there are multiple creators of these images, of these ideologies, who marginalize each other as wrong, un-democratic, unscientific, and so on.

At this point, we can see how some of the basic notions of structuralism could lead to some of the notions of what is sometimes called postmodernism. Best and Kellner (1991) explain: 'Modernism' could be used to describe the art movements of the modern age... while 'postmodernism' can describe those diverse aesthetic forms and practices which come after the break with modernism... Modern theory--ranging from the philosophical project of Descartes through the Enlightenment, to the social theory of Compte, Marx, Weber and others--is criticized for its search for a foundation of knowledge, for its universalizing and totalizing claims... Postmodern theory... rejects modern assumptions of social coherence and notions of causality in favour of multiplicity, plurality, fragmentation, and indeterminacy. (p. 4)

In summary, while most modernists would look for Truth (with a capital T) and would see and represent social realities, including the self and culture, as external, somewhat consistent entities, some postmodernists would discuss cultures in terms of the multiple voices or groups within them (the "micropolitics that challenge a broad array of discourses and institutionalized forms of power," Best & Kellner, p 5), and would describe selves as "contingent, forming and reforming within diverse relationships and circumstances" (Duck & Wood, 1995, p. 8-9).

Much postmodernism focuses on a sense of "decenteredness." Social reality is not necessarily framed in structure and hierarchy (notions emphasized in the Enlightenment, Billig et al., 1988). Reality and meaning, rather, jump from symbol to symbol, from place to place, similar
to the potato-like tuber which has no center, so meaning and reality are "decentered" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Postmodernists would oppose "modern beliefs in unity, hierarchy, identity, foundations, subjectivity, and representation, while celebrating principles of difference and multiplicity in theory, politics, and everyday life" (Best & Kellner, 1991, p. 76). For some, such multiplicity has always existed. For others, it is the result of struggle as those voices which have been traditionally marginalized and silenced have now gained enough power ("been empowered") to make themselves heard. Hughes' (1992) analysis of American culture reflects this notion.

The fundamental temper of America tends toward an existential ideal that can probably never be reached but can never be discarded: equal rights to variety, to construct your life as you see fit, to choose your traveling companions. It has always been a heterogeneous country, and its cohesion, whatever cohesion it has, can only be based on mutual respect. There never was a core America in which everyone looked the same, spoke the same language, worshipped the same gods and believed the same things.

America is a construction of the mind, not of race or inherited class or ancestral territory. It is a creed born of immigration, of the jostling of scores of tribes that become American to the extent to which they can negotiate accommodations with one another. These negotiations succeed unevenly and often fail; you need only to glance at the history of racial relations to know that. The melting pot never melted. But American mutuality lives in recognition of difference. The fact remains that America is a collective act of imagining whose making never ends, and once that sense of collectivity and mutual respect is broken, the possibilities of Americanness begin to unravel.

The postmodern view of a culture (for example, America), then, looks not to the unity of the culture, not to a so-called mythical "American culture," but to diversity and fracturation within American culture. American culture no longer had (or never had) a center of White, middle-class, mainstream norms, behaviors, beliefs, and symbols. Rather, American culture (or the self, or relationships, or other social reality) is seen as a collage. But it is not a collage in the modernistic
sense, where one would still seek to have the focal point or center of interest somewhere in the artistic work. It is a collage in which the various elements exist side by side in connected and yet unconnected, consistent and yet inconsistent ways. If I may mix my metaphors (being the inconsistent self that I am), it is a collage of many voices who contradict, support, and challenge one another. What makes America continue to exist in this postmodern world, according to Hughes, is mutual respect. Does that respect exist in intercultural science and teaching?

Dominant and Emerging Voices in Content and Style

What the reader might wonder is if such a discussion in any way applies to social science in general or to the "discipline" of intercultural communication specifically. Wood and Duck (1995) address the first question in a new book on relationships and relational communication which seems to take a postmodern stance. For example, they suggest:

Because scholarship on personal relationships arose during the modernist period, it is infused by the predilections of that epoch. Among the characteristics of modernity as an intellectual mind-set are belief in capital-T Truth (e.g., laws, generalizations, and grand models); emphasis on the autonomous, sovereign, individual; a quest for control, and a view of stability and coherence as natural, and, more important, as inherent in Nature. These features are evident in the conventionally preferred topics and modes of inquiry in research on relationships. (p. 7)

They suggest that "all researchers... have been selective. They have limited the field's scope to a small sample of relationships and have adopted particular conceptual and methodological lenses, which have simultaneously sharpened and occluded vision" (p. 3). The selectivity of science is seen in and creates the character of what science is. "Because science is social, it is responsive to the particular mind-sets, problems, and mysteries ascendant at a given moment in a culture's life" (pp. 3-4). We might suggest that a culture, like a self, "does not have a monolithic, lifelong
identity, but instead assumes identity in response to others and activities in particular contexts" (p. 9). If this is true, the authors suggest, "then the research tradition of focusing on individuals unencumbered by relational and contextual influences ceases to be viable" (p. 9).

I would not, with Wood and Duck (1995), say that traditional social science ceases to be viable, but I would agree with them and with Stepan (1991) that the science we practice is a social construction, come about at a particular juncture in history and time. I would propose that intercultural communication research (and teaching) has been entrenched in a Western, modernist conception of science and pedagogy.

The notion that social science and theory are social constructions and culturally bound should not be a surprise to intercultural researchers. We have long said that "culture is selective" (Samovar & Porter, 1991). We teach that there are different types of thought patterns. One, factual-inductive, seeks to learn truth or "facts" through looking at similarities between multiple examples. Another pattern, axiomatic-inductive, applies general principles to particular instances. A third pattern, intuitive-affective looks first at emotion, then, perhaps at "facts" (Lieberman, 1994; see also Dodd, 1995; Gudykunst & Kim, 1992; Samovar & Porter, 1991). We say that for different cultures, different things constitute "truth"—for one, what is true is what is arrived at through principle, for another, through intuition, and for another, through inductive inference. However, the argument of this section is that intercultural theory, research, and teaching really focus on (privilege) one of these thought patterns, and thus speak in a voice that will not be understood by many of our students and may not be appropriately translated to other cultures.

Voice in Intercultural Communication Research and Theory

The social-scientific method most common in intercultural communication is one of
quantitative science (Chen & Starosta, in press). This is, in fact, a more complicated form of induction. We look, for example, at 235 college sophomores in a basic speech communication class. We see how they behave in a given experimental situation or answer a survey. Based on physical observation of data, we find the similarities in a large number of examples and draw a conclusion—that is, inductively going from the specific to draw general truth.

Our theory construction is much the same way. One reviewer of a "theoretical piece" I submitted stated, "It seems to me that your focus should be on isolating propositions at the various levels. . . . if you take the various levels, you might be able to generate some form of propositions." Even more explicitly, "Define concepts, interrelate concepts in some form. No matter which metatheoretical framework you use, all involve some aspect of interrelated concepts as the basis of theory" (emphasis added). In a Dubinian sense (1969), the reviewer is correct.

A theoretical model starts with things or variables, or (1) units whose interactions constitute the subject matter of attention. The model then specifies the manner in which these units interact with each other or (2) the laws of interaction among the units of the model. . . . Once these . . . basic features of a theoretical model are set forth, the theorist is in a position to derive conclusions that represent logical and true deductions about the model in operation, or the (5) propositions of the model. (pp. 7-8, emphasis in original)

Theories, as traditionally seen, are relationships between variables, either in terms of connections (without focus on cause), or in terms of causal relationships. However, both the scientific premise which supports traditional research and the notions of causality and connection (frequently implied causality) are based strongly on Western Enlightenment ideals of reality and Truth (with a capital T). This, in and of itself, does not suggest a rejection of the Western scientific model, but suggests, at least, that we recognize (and admit) the strange irony of using a
predominantly Western approach (i.e., a culture-bound notion of truth and learning) to refer to and explain the realities of other groups.

For some, the question might remain as to whether such a Western bias does exist in intercultural research. At first glance, this does not seem to be the case. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations (IJIR)*, being interdisciplinary in nature, has long encouraged a variety of approaches. Articles in recent issues represent various disciplines, applied versus theory/research orientations, and methodologies (quantitative survey, qualitative interview, open-end response with statistics, linguistic analysis, etc.). The *International and Intercultural Communication Annual* also encourages different theoretical and methodological voices. For example, Gudykunst and Kim (1984) edit the volume entitled *Methods for Intercultural Communication Research*. The purpose of the volume is not to "make the reader a competent methodologist," but to "focus upon some of the special concerns of intercultural and cross-cultural research" (p. 8). The volume lays out a variety of methodological perspectives—survey methods, spatial models, quantitative content analysis, qualitative content analysis, naturalistic field research, rhetorical analysis, and so forth. Successive IIC volumes continue to utilize a variety of methods. For example, Vol. XIII, *Language, Communication, and Culture* (Ting-Toomey & Korzenny, 1989) includes articles utilizing ethnography of communication, conversation analysis, and survey research.

As characteristic of these volumes, Kim (1984) recommends an integration is needed between the "holistic-contextual-qualitative" and the "analytic-reductionist-quantitative" approaches (Kim, 1984, pp. 24-25). She suggests that:

The nomothetic ideal of universal measurement and the fact of individuality may not necessarily be considered
a conflict so long as the ideal does not claim exclusivity in studying human-social phenomena. As far as the reality goes, it presents itself as having universalities (regularities, commonalities, consistencies, similarities) as well as individualities (irregularities, individual uniquenesses, inconsistencies, differences). This means that to the extent that human social phenomena share universality, universal measurement can be appropriate and useful. (p. 27)

I once strongly relied on Burrel and Morgan's (1979) discussion of "objective" and "subjective" paradigms. While some authors (e.g., Gudykunst & Nishida, 1989) critique Burrel and Morgan's framework as a dichotomy, I see it presented as a continuum--social science can range from extremely objective to extremely subjective. Now, I tend to agree more with Kim (1984), that reality has both regularity and difference. I would suggest that, rather than dichotomies or even a continuum, objectivity and subjectivity (including views on causality, the nature of reality, and the nature of science) may best be seen as both existing in human nature (a sort of dialectic). There are many situations in which we respond behavioristically--in a stimulus-response fashion--and many situations in which we make choices. There are individual realities, realities co-created by groups of any size who communicate with one another (intersubjectivity, according to Collier & Thomas, 1988), external realities which are the past result of our communications (such as the social construction of "race"), and environmental, physical, and biological realities which impinge upon the communication process.6

At the same time, there are often subtle references to research that suggest a certain agenda. For example, Kim proposes to undertake a review of "current research in intercultural communication" (Kim, 1984, p. 20). In this review, she considers cultural value comparisons and subjective culture, acculturation and adaptation research. She notes, explicitly, that: "The present
review is limited to empirical studies that involve direct observations or experimentation of intercultural phenomena. Other research endeavors such as historical, critical, rhetorical, or linguistic studies will not be included in this review" (p. 20). There is nothing wrong, as I see it, with an author limiting the focus of an article only to a certain area of research. What, perhaps, is dangerous about the limitation here is its rhetorical framing: "Based on the above conceptualization of intercultural framework, I will now proceed to examine the research activities in the area" (p. 20, emphasis added). The unspoken assumption seems to be that this is the research in the area, and the other areas are less significant—or are not research. At least, however, Kim admits these other areas exist. Others do not even acknowledge them. Gudykunst and Nishida (1989) for example, provide a fine review of several of the theories appearing in Kim and Gudykunst's (1988) theory book. As part of the review of subjective approaches, they note: "While much of the early work in intercultural communication used a rhetorical approach, there has been little recent work in this area" (p. 33, cites omitted). They do suggest that some authors are encouraging a return to this work, but make no reference to Starosta (1984) or Deetz' recommendations (1984) to subsequent rhetorical work. More significantly, there is no reference whatsoever to writings from critical theory and cultural studies which analyzes culture. This critical work provides an analysis of single cultures (in the order of the "emic" approaches Gudykunst and Nishida cite), and hence would partially fulfill Shuter's (1990) suggestion that intercultural communication focus for a time on specific cultures. It would parallel the work of empirical scholars who compare cultures or look at phenomena only in given cultures. But, notably, Gudykunst and Nishida do not even admit the existence of critical or cultural research. This is especially interesting as they take as their framework one of Burrel and Morgan's (1989)
two axes (objective-subjective research), but do not even mention the other (status quo-social change), even though its discussion occupies half of Burrel and Morgan's book.

Indeed, while the *International and Intercultural Communication Annual* has vocally embraced diverse perspectives, Chen and Starosta (in press) suggest that the Annual has been strongly oriented toward quantitative approach. They note that in the mid-1990s, the trend is reversing due to a methodological pluralism and the rise of interest in co-cultures as well as interpretive and rhetorical methodologies (still no mention of critical methodologies). The new IICA theory book (Wiseman, 1995) does include chapters by scholars that have been known as interpretivists or ethnographers. However, in the introduction (Wiseman & Van Horn, 1995), three points suggest a continued privileging of the dominant (Western) scientific paradigm. First, the authors cite that the purposes of theory should be explanation and prediction (that is, a theory must support and be founded in a cause-effect, objective view of the world and cannot merely explain what is there, much less seek to change it). Second, although the authors suggest that "theories are masks of scholarly culture that hide many basic aspects of inquiry from one's own perception"--thus encouraging "dialogue"--they argue that theory refinement "must occur in the context of empirical testing, verification, and replication" (p. 6). Third, and more subtly, the whole language of the introduction suggests there is one way to do science. "Typically, studies are variable analytic in nature... Frequently, researchers investigating the same variables conceptualize them differently, implement them differently, and use diverse measuring techniques" (p. 2, emphases added). Theories should help us "control social behavior." Those (quantitative, causal) theories which meet the "rigorous standard" of control of variables to understand "the causal relationships" (p. 4).
This is not intended to be too hard on the various authors or editors. For example, Wiseman and Van Horn (1995), while highlighting those theories which have created the most (empirical) research, do note that "the remaining theories have the potential of generating research of their own" through their "empirical and testable propositions" (p. 5). They attempt to be fair to all theories. And, in a sense, to go back to Hall's (1981) notion of ideology, they have done a good job at laying out the standard notion of theory. The problem is, our notion of theory, while a social creation, has become "naturalized." Thus, it is not seen as culturally derived; and try though we may to embrace methodological pluralism, it is hard to escape the trajectory of the metatheoretical environment in which we have learned to work and breathe. Only if we can learn to theorize in new ways will we be able to hear voices which are silenced or muffled by our current social constructions of theory. My child had one of those plastic balls with shapes, and every now and then, some triangle or square from another toy would find itself with the other shapes in the ball. But, since there were not holes the right shape for these shapes, they simply would not go in the ball. So also is our notion of intercultural theory: It has predetermined shapes for what can fit in—and other forms and shapes cannot make their way in.

This is not to say that other types of theory have not been attempted. Kincaid (1987) offered a collection of "Eastern and Western perspectives" of communication theory. Some of these offer Western looks at other cultures. For example, Okabe (1987) analyzes Japanese communication using Speech Acts Theory, and Tsujimura (1987) analyzes Japanese taciturnity in terms of social causes. Others seem to have less connection to any Western theory (e.g. Dissanayake, 1987) Asante (1987) takes a strong stance that Western perspectives, including Marxist approaches, cannot be used to adequately explain African or Afr"ean-American reality.
Western science, he suggests, creates a false dichotomy between mind and body, and obscures reality by fracturing it to analyze it:

Without severe criticism, the preponderant Eurocentric myths of universalism, objectivity, and classical traditions retain a provincial European cast. Scholarship rooted in such a tradition obviously lacks either historical or conceptual authenticity. The aggressive seizure of intellectual space, like the seizure of land, amounts to the aggressor occupying someone else's territory while claiming it as his own. The problem with this is that cultural analysis takes a back seat to galloping ethnocentric interpretations of a phenomenon. (p. 9)

Trinh (1989) suggests the same thing: "Remember, the minor-ity's voice is always personal; that of the major-ity is always impersonal. Man thinks, woman feels. The white man understands through reason and logic--the intelligible. The black man understands through intuition and sympathy--the sensible" (p. 28, emphasis in the original). A review of several (but not all) intercultural textbooks available for undergraduate education reveals little or no mention of Asante, of Trinh, or even of many non-objective approaches. There is a fairly consistent voice of what theory is and what constitutes research--a model we teach to our students indirectly unless we challenge the hidden assumptions of the textbooks.

**Voice in Intercultural Instruction**

If our theory and research is culture-bound and tends to admit only Western variations, could the same be said of our pedagogy? Much has been done to improve pedagogy. Various intercultural textbooks offer instruction manuals Some of these offer primarily test questions (based on inductive learning and decontextualized facts--not something easily learned by traditionally oral cultures, Shuter, 1994) and survey questionnaires, which may promote a Western view of self (analytical, broken down into various "variables" rather than holistic) and
learning (little focus on the intuitive, but rather on the factual and inductive). Others (e.g. Skow, 1991) contain the test questions, but also several exercises focused on deductive and especially intuitive, experiential learning. Other approaches, such as Brislin et al.'s (1986) Cultural Assimilator model and host of helpful critical incidents and explanatory essays, offer a chance for discussion and learning through making mistakes (probably, in actual usage, focusing on an "impulsive" style, but disadvantaging those who learn reflectively and want to know about the culture first before attempting to answer).

While authors in education have long been addressing issues of multiculturalism, communication writers have recently been adding to communication courses the notion that students learn and speak in different ways (e.g. Lieberman, 1994b, Kearney & Plax, 1995). In most instances, our approaches, even some of those above, probably still strike of linearity, of impulsivity, of the isolation of decontextualized facts (field independence), of "left-brain" analytical and quantitative thinking and learning, and of mostly factual-inductive learning rather than including more holistic, experiential learning. Student evaluation is frequently done through standardized testing (a style which may benefit the learning styles only of some students) and classroom participation (benefitting those who are more impulsive, confident, and individualistic).

Why would these methods prevail, even in classrooms which promote the appreciation and adaptation of diversity? One argument is that it is necessary to teach in this style, for the students who we teach (assuming they will work for American companies) will have to know these styles in the workplace: "They are in America, so they should know the American learning system."
Another possible reason is that we know no other way. Like our theorizing, our (socially, culturally created) teaching methodologies become ideologies, the trajectories of which we cannot
escape. Often we cannot escape them because the inertia of our systems of teaching and
evaluation are too great. Other times, we simply are not aware of the cultural boundedness of the
ways in which we teach culture (and culture-boundedness).

Not only are various methodologies, perspectives, and non-Western approaches to the
world frequently marginalized in our courses and textbooks, so also are various voices within
given cultures. There is a tendency to treat as cultures only those shared by relatively large
groups of people. Such an approach may serve primarily scholarly interests, as it allows
researchers to compare "national subjective cultures" such as Japanese and Americans. That is,
this notion of culture may serve more to promote scholarly agendas than it does to reveal the
nature of given cultures. This is not to deny that there may be realities shared by most of the
people in a given culture. For example, most Japanese may be collectivistic, but such a focus on
culture ignores (and marginalizes) difference within Japanese culture. So also, the discussion of
"American" culture (or "black" culture, or "Latino" culture) is often spoken of as if it were
monolithic, as opposed to being characterized by diversity. These discussions naturalize a certain
set of values, norms, and behaviors as "American," obscuring the voices of those who may not
hold the same assumptions. Perhaps the best "evidence" of this (there I go again, proving by
induction) is that some scholars have opted to present a different view: Our Voices (Gonzalez,
Houston, & Chen, 1994) gives people from various perspectives (besides white, "mainstream"
Americans) a chance to speak about culture, race, and ethnicity.

Deconstructing Theory, Research, and Teaching

Is this centering of certain perspectives and cultural voices in our theory and teaching
intentional and malicious? I would argue that it is not (at least, not entirely--certain editors and
authors will need to speak for themselves in this regard. Collins (1989) suggests that many have abandoned the notion of the "grand hotel," in which certain power people pulled the strings for all that went on in an effort to maintain control. Collins suggests that "all cultural production must be seen as a set of power relations that produce particular forms of subjectivity, but that the nature, function, and uses of mass culture can no longer be seen in a monolithic manner" (p. 16).

In the same sense, cultural ways of doing research, writing theory, and teaching intercultural communication are *cultural productions*. They create forms of subjectivity (ways of seeing ourselves, experiencing reality). And there are power relations at work in their production. However, contrary to the Marxism that characterized early Critical Theory (Kellner, 1989), there may be various forces in the intercultural communication discipline, each with power, vying to establish definitions of theory, norms of research, and behaviors that constitute teaching practices. That is, the *culture of intercultural research and education is a site of struggle*, and should no longer be seen as a naturalized "given" (e.g., "This is the way we've always done it."). Three views from critical theory may give us insight as to where we have come from and where we are going: a historical-cultural view, a view of power relations, and a post-modern view.

**Historical contextualization.** The first insight to intercultural communication concerns a *historical-contextual view* of the discipline. Leeds-Hurwitz (1990) gives a good beginning to this view. She traces the beginnings of what we now call intercultural communication to the work of E T. Hall, George L. Trager, Clyde Kluckhohn, and others for the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). "Because intercultural communication grew out of the need to apply abstract anthropological concepts to the world of foreign service diplomats, its early focus on training American diplomats led to the later, now standard use of intercultural communication training" (p. 262).
She lists eight developments in the field that came as a result of the work of Hall and the others, including the introduction of the study of communication to a primarily anthropological field and the focus on what happens when people from two cultures communicate, the focus on culture as "patterned, learned, and analyzable" (p. 263); the shift from culture as a general concept (macroanalysis) to viewing culture in terms of smaller units (microanalysis); and a set of training methods still being used today. Notable among Hall's contributions were the expansion of intercultural communication beyond diplomats to teachers, students, and immigrants and the use of a linguistic model in the study of intercultural communication, especially as it applied to nonverbal communication (the first focus in our field).

From the work of the Foreign Service institute, I see two main influences on the field and education of today. The first is a methodological and substantive focus. The FSI wanted its anthropology of culture "to be equally [as] scientific" as linguistics, "the most 'scientific' of the social and behavioral sciences" (p. 272) was then seen. Thus, it modeled the study of paralanguage, gesture and posture, and use of space after linguistic studies. This entailed a "microcultural investigation"--the analysis of the small parts that make up a culture, often in separation from the context of the cultures as a whole (for reasons we shall arrive at shortly). Leeds-Hurwitz' point, I believe, is that the roots of intercultural communication strongly influenced what we then saw as scientific and how we studied it (that is, analytically, field-independently, inductively), as well as infusing us with a goal of even wanting to see ourselves as truly scientific. Some of the influences of this era still characterize our discipline today--the focus on parts of culture to understand the whole and the desire to be scientific in a standard, quantifiable sense.
These influences are both reflected and modified in the intercultural communication discipline as the baton of intercultural communication is passed from anthropology to communication in the 1960s and 1970s. I would continue Leeds-Hurwitz' historical contextualization of the discipline by suggesting that the scholarship that characterized mainline communication studies (then and now) shapes what are considered to be the appropriate definitions of culture, foci of intercultural communication studies, and methods and ways of doing intercultural research. For example, in the early days in the communication family, intercultural communication had more of a rhetorical focus, with books by Prosser (1978) and so on. Dodd's book (1995), especially in earlier additions, contains a focus on diffusion of innovations (reflecting the area of his doctoral work). Gudykunst and Kim's (1992) book reflects a cognitive social-psychological approach (based on Gudykunst's background in psychological studies). That is, a scholar's background, interest areas, and reading lists lead that scholar to define in certain ways what is culture and what is science. In the 1970s and 1980s, much intercultural communication research was being done by interpersonal researchers. This would lead logically to a strong interpersonal focus, as well as a cognitive research focus--intercultural communication maintains parts of the culture it was born with and lived through its early years, but also has learned much of its culture (and voice) from its new family.

The FSI researchers believed that just as a verbal language could be studied and learned, so the nonverbal and cultural language could be studied and learned. Thus, the second main influence I see from the FSI is a practical focus. Hall, in his training of foreign service workers, quickly found that they were not interested in knowing everything about a culture, but rather, only what was necessary to get the job done. "Hall gradually concluded that the majority of
information potentially available about a culture was not really essential in face-to-face interaction with members of that culture: only a small percentage of the total need be known, although that portion was critical" (p. 269). This conclusion seems to reflect what others have found about "American culture" in general, that American language and culture are highly pragmatic. Friday (1994) cites anthropologist Mead, who discusses the development of American English as a highly practical language, shaped by immigrants who used it as a trade or public language to get their work and trading done. Friday continues.

Americans tend to focus on the present as the beginning of the future. . . While some pockets of sophisticated thinking exist, it is not by no means the standard. Indeed, many American college students are unable to place significant (noteworthy) events within an overall political/philosophical framework two months after the occurrence. (p. 281)

One potential result of this pragmatism in the current study of intercultural communication is a limited focus on the intercultural communication event, only (sometimes) considering the most proximate influences—those which are psychological—but with a neglect of the influence of larger social, philosophical, and political issues on the communication event. A second result, possibly stemming from our silence on social-philosophical issues, is a void of solid ethical considerations in our textbooks, our publication outlets, and perhaps our teaching (Baldwin, 1994a).

Power structures. Some might argue that both the birth of intercultural communication (in supporting United States power relations) and our silence on ethical issues reflects a greater concern. For example, there is about three pages of ethical discussion in Gudykunst and Kim (1992) and in Samovar & Porter (1991). I did not find ethics of intercultural communication are in the indexes or tables of contents of Dodd (1994), Koole & ten Thije (1994), Ricard (1993),
Scollon and Scollon (1995), Sarbaugh (1979), or Smith (1973). Condon and Saito (1974) include chapters that discuss conflict between "Japanese" and "American" cultures, but seem to refer to conflict that might arise from language differences and communication styles. Tyler (1987) includes a section on not abusing translators. Singer (1987) is one of the few authors to discuss power implications in relationships, focusing mostly on "how perceptions of power can affect the behavior of people" (p. 122). His discussions of international power focus on power struggles that lead to warfare between nations and he considers economic power of nations as it leads to struggles over resources. This is not specifically applied to intercultural training. Koole and ten Thije (1994), like Byrd (1993) discuss notions of power between racial groups in the Netherlands and the United States respectively. And Prosser (1978) considers the notion that "most cultures seek to extend their culture both geographically and temporally, by forcing others to accept their cultural controls" (p. 38). Intercultural communication, especially mediated, can lead to either cultural dominance and imperialism or to cultural dependency.

In the same vein, some texts on cultural change (diffusion of innovation) include clear discussions or chapters on the possible negative influences of those communications and innovations which change cultures, including threats to cultural autonomy (Hamelink, 1983, Lerner & Schramm, 1967). Others remain strangely silent on the entire issue of ethics (Rogers, 1983). Books on "managing cultural diversity" (e.g., Harris & Moran, 1987) might have a few pages on whether or not one should give a bribe in a foreign culture, but little other discussion of ethics. Overall, intercultural textbooks do not deal directly with personal ethics of intercultural communication or on the ethics of what we do with our science (Baldwin, 1994b).

Some might argue that intercultural education and research is geared to the benefit of
power structures. Volosinov (1973) suggests:

The forms of signs are conditioned by the social organization of the participants involved and also by the immediate conditions of their interaction. . . . Ideology may not be divorced from the material reality of signs.

Every ideological sign—the verbal sign included—is coming about through the process of social intercourse. is defined by the social purview of the given time period and the given social group. (p. 21)

Sign usage—including language, supports ideologies. And ideologies, as we have reviewed, have to do with power structures. One such power structure would be economical (from a Marxist perspective). From this perspective, it would make sense for Gulf Publishers (Harris & Moran, 1987) to not want a clear discussion of ethics, especially as it pertains to the effects of multinational corporations and their effect on the economies and cultures of developing nations.

It might further be argued that the economic structures of capitalism also support much intercultural research. Some social scientists argue that our function as scholars is to produce knowledge, and what people do with it is up to them. They suggest that we, as researchers, have no responsibility for what is done with our data once we put it in the journals.11 In part, the desire to be "value free" could represent the voice of objectivity in science which I have already addressed—the desire to be scientific excludes the notion that we might have values in our research. On the other hand, if, as Volosinov (1973) suggests, our communications occur within and influenced by "the material basis" of social life, then both value-freedom and American pragmatism could be seen as inherently supporting the spread of capitalism. We produce value-free research, read mostly by the "elite," who then use information, for example, on Mexican values, to better motivate Mexicans to work for international companies.

As noted above, many feel the Marxist approach is too limited. Sometimes what may be
at stake in power struggles is not maintaining (only) an economic advantage, but also maintaining the ability to keep my group in political or cultural control. Thus, as one scholar asks, when we discuss "management of diversity," who is doing the managing, and whom is being managed—and to what ends? Research and texts which speak only of dominant cultures within a society give those cultural groups cultural power (or cultural capital) by legitimizing that group's notions of behavior, values, and so on. Even more, within the intercultural communication discipline itself, it could be said that groups struggle for power. Ideological power centers exist, in which certain groups of people define what is research, what should be looked at, and how research should be done. Again, it is hard to suggest that there is some invisible force at the top of the structure, pulling the puppet strings for all the researchers. More likely, notions of science and education are "reproduced" through our practices, through the books we write, through the way we teach our courses--through only discussing certain perspectives, only citing certain authors (often including few from the actual cultures we study), and through monolithic conceptions of culture.

This is not to suggest that there is malicious intent in such representations and such exclusions. There is a possibility that some authors or educators deliberately refuse to cite other authors or research because of personality or power struggles—however, I am taking a more benevolent approach to suggest that such exclusions are a form of conformity, that they exist within an invisible ideology of what is science and what is intercultural communication. Also, it is not to suggest that only one group has power or makes such representations. Following Gramsci (1983), I would suggest that there are various centers of power, and that someone who favors, say, Critical Theory or linguistic analysis is just as likely to exclude quantitative scholars and look down upon them as the other way around. Both forms seem a sort of power play, in effort to
describe appropriate science in a way which legitimizes (only) one's own frame of thinking and line of research.

Decentered power and the postmodern approach. It is in the framework of this last discussion that we can understand how postmodernism might help us to understand where intercultural communication education and research has been and is going. For a long time, I would suggest, the Western, quantitative power center was largely invisible. Other perspectives, other voices, including Afrocentrism, ethnography of communication, linguistic analysis, and cultural studies, have long been speaking in the margins, but in the last decade have gained power. This can be seen in our discussion of the field at large. Several authors have debated what intercultural communication is and should be. Smith (1982) for example, sees the focus in the 1970s to be on cosmopolitanism, job skills, and interpersonal adjustment. He suggests, instead, that intercultural communication address more pressing world concerns. Rohrlich (1987) answers that we must first understand intercultural interaction, which will then help us either on the job or in resolving international issues. Shuter (1990) recommends a focus on culture for a time, for only when we understand individual cultures will we be able to understand what happens between people of different cultures. Others recommend a focus on ethics and a consideration of the practical value of intercultural communication (Casmir & Asuncion-Lande, 1990, Starosta, 1990).

What is common among some (but not all) of these writers is a search for a specific focus, a clear delineation of the "discipline" of intercultural communication. If the focus suggested is rigid, it could represent what Starosta (1990) sees as representative of some theory building in the discipline. That is, that some scholars have "a myopic view that sees only its own favored framework" (p. 313). He asks, "Can these disparate approaches to the study of intercultural
This question suggests that what is desired is a merger, a unified body of what is researched and how it is researched, a grand theory which, centered, can explain all intercultural communication. This is a way I think we have traditionally viewed intercultural communication—with a search for what makes us "distinctive as a discipline." Smith (1982) exemplifies this: "The birth of this new division can be a timely moment for making collective decisions. This turning point is the time to delineate the scope and content of the field" (p. 262). Rohrlich (1987) suggests, regarding intercultural communication, that "as a discipline, it is ill-defined, and seems permeated by other fields... The ultimate utility of intercultural communication may extend significantly beyond its discipline as its theory accumulates and solidifies" (p. 128). These authors suggest a solid notion of disciplinary boundaries, with a specific content to what is intercultural communication.

Such a notion is very valuable, especially in the practical sense of departmental funding and so on. After all, our "disciplines" do exist within an always, already constructed notion of what disciplines are. But a postmodern approach would suggest that what disciplines are is, in fact, also socially and culturally constructed. Certain discourses (i.e., what intercultural communication is and how it should be researched) become centered or dominant. However, other discourses challenge that notion. There come to be different readings (polysemy, Turner, 1990) of what culture, theory, and research mean. We realize that each of these are contested terms, not terms that are natural or give. And just as new readings or interpretations of the terms challenge the centered notion, so those two will be challenged as new approaches emerge.

What the postmodern approach might suggest to us is that there need not be a solid core of intercultural communication. There might be cores, multiplicity, diversity of voices within the
"discipline." Further, walls between disciplines should be permeable. They are, after all, constructed only through communication. If we see the benefit that different disciplines have to offer the study of communication, we should encourage their voices to be heard in our classes and textbooks—we, as scholars, can have an effect in the reconstruction of the boundaries through our continued communication. The challenge in all this is to continue to allow for the emergence of new voices, without marginalizing others. This also suggests that those whose voices are challenging should not try to marginalize those who have been centered, or these voices will be guilty of the same exclusion they decry.

Conclusion: Do you Recognize My Voice?

A student recently presented me a position paper in which she was taking a stand for a particular intercultural theory. Up front, she stated the assumptions for what reality was, what constitutes knowledge, and so on. As she discussed the paper, she said with a hint of sarcasm, "Oh, I knew you were going to like this part!" I responded, "Are my theoretical biases so obvious?" She responded they were, at least for those who pay attention. I was trying to present all theories and theoretical approaches with a hint of aloofness, without giving hint to what my own predilections were. But, through my nonverbal communication, through those little things I say, through the amount and type of critique I levy against one theory or approach as opposed to another, I seem to be much more transparent than I thought. "This is bad," I thought. I want to be the neutral, objective, value-free critic of theories—even those in which I critique the whole notion that any approach or theory can be value free (Bernstein, 1976, Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

My teaching is full of ironies. Even in my attempt to present alternate voices, my talk may present them from a Western voice, a Western framework. As I move to present various voices
in a value-free perspective, I am privileging one axiological (value-oriented) perspective in my approach. As I seek to present a non-linear approach to research or theory, I find myself, either for my own comfort or (supposedly) for that of my students, trying to distill (in a linear fashion) the main points or assumptions of the theory. As I promote the necessity for students to make their own theoretical (and metatheoretical) decisions, it is hard to divorce myself from my own preferences, and I find myself wondering if such a divorce is even warranted or healthy. My whole teaching on cultural variability, including cultural learning styles, strikes of a value-preference on induction, on spontaneous "discovery-learning" and on impulsivity, and the content of my lectures and handouts, while deliberate "low-context" and "elaborated" (to make my expectations clear) is clearly aimed strictly at those students who are more "verbal" than "oral."

So whose voice do I speak in as I teach or write? Is it really "my own voice" as I suggest my students use? In one sense, my voice is my own—they are my constructions about the theory, my critiques of its weaknesses or plaudits of its strengths. And yet, my voice is far from unified. It is a combination of the voices—the decentered self of the communicative messages I have shared or in which I have partaken. Whose voice is speaking, then, as I stand before the classroom (does "standing before the classroom," itself, say something about my voice and what I perceive the student/professor roles and power relations to be?) or as I write an article (does my writing support or challenge the whole enterprise of intercultural scholarship, as our "discipline" has chosen to construct it?)? As I am talking, whose voice is speaking? Part of the voice could be coming from my own background. As I teach and as I write, I must from time to time step back and listen to the voices that constitute, shape, and reshape who I am.

In one sense, I am the white Christian American male (various identities which influence
me in different ways at different times). As such, I bring to my teaching some of the background and experiences common to people with those identities. For example, as I speak of racial, sexual, and ethnic exclusion, of oppression, and so on, my voice is not one of experience, but of book-learning and second-hand accounts. I am enabled to speak from the "privileged position" (at least historically) of white-maleness. Yet, this in itself presents certain dilemmas. [Not to step on any ideas that might be presented by a co-panelist,] some of these dilemmas include my motivations for being in front of the classroom. I have an advantage over someone of color or over a woman who might teach the same things (e.g., appreciation of diversity), for many students will perceive them as having an axe to grind, while I will be seen as the "benevolent, liberal, white male." At the same time, others could see me teaching or writing on diversity and wonder, "Who is this white person who thinks he can speak on diversity?" I might be expected to read and learn about other cultures, but never to know. I cannot ask visitors to come in and speak on their cultural perspectives, for that is tokenism, but I cannot speak on them myself, because I cannot really understand. I cannot study only the white perspective, for that is ethnocentric and privileges the white center; but I cannot study other groups, for than I exhibit the colonizing gaze. I cannot stand by and leave matters of oppression unaddressed, for then I am only contributing to the problem, but if I assist in the wrong way, I am the "Great White Hope" coming in to "save the day"--I am condescending and arrogant. Such are some of the dilemmas of the white voice (but those with other voices will face a different set of dilemmas in the classroom).

Beyond my voice as a white male, I carry those voices particular to my situation in life--and they are often competing and often collaborating. I carry the voice of my conservative Christian upbringing and value system, the voice of reason and tolerance, and the voice of a
critical perspective based on my experiences and coursework. I want to present all the options, the whole picture in my teaching and writing. This is my voice. But whose voice is it?

What is essential as we teach and write is that we recognize the various voices that constitute who we are and who constitute the culture of the intercultural communication discipline. What we teach about culture(s), what we teach about theory, what we teach about science does not come out of a vacuum of Pure Truth (as we often present it). Our perspectives are not simply "there" and "factual." They are a collage (sometimes with a central dominating them, and sometimes not) of our readings, of Western constructions of science, of our value systems, of our impression management (before students, tenure committees, and editorial boards), and of the place in which we find ourselves situated by our culture, gender, ethnicity, and social status. It is not bad to have these various voices, for it is in the dialogue of the voices that we mature. It is the confluence--but not the convergence, unification, or monolithization--of the voices that we learn and can become a truly intercultural discipline.
References


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1. This is not to say that challenging voices have never spoken or are not at this very moment speaking. There is a diversity in textbooks and in intercultural social science that is both on-going and emergent.

2. As I write this, my goal is for any college student reader or academician not familiar with the terms to be able to hear my voice. Thus, I will try to clearly define the key terms as I go along.

3. Indeed, Baldwin & Hecht, 1995, suggest that one of the critiques of critical theory as a whole is that it tends to focus only on the sets of articulations and symbols created by the dominant culture. Helpful critical analysis might also look at the ideologies of challenging groups.

4. Postmodernism, like critical theory, is diverse. Many critical theorists strongly oppose postmodernism (e.g. Jurgen Habermas). Many postmodernists do not look even at the emerging voices who challenge the dominant voice, but rather focus on the expression of pleasure and other such things. For this essay, I have chosen to borrow and explain only the terms I feel pertinent to my discussion.

5. The editors of the volume note that some scholars may feel that the difference between "qualitative" and "quantitative" research is a false dichotomy. I, like they, will leave this debate to others. The focus of this paper is not on the construction of research, but the voice in which our research speaks.

6. In a sense, however, it seems that Kim (1984) might be simplifying the notion of subjective reality. She speaks of individual differences, but these have long been a subject of psychological studies, and can still be seen objectively, as if the differences are "out there." Some might argue that her discussion quoted here misses the main point of "subjectivity" as not one's individual differences, but one's perception of and response to the world.

7. Indeed, having submitted to this version of the IIC annual, I must commend the editor, Richard Wiseman, for attempting to include variety. He was respectful and helpful as he attempted to balance our view of theory with that of one of the reviewers.

8. I had contemplated a survey of specific textbooks, but I do not want this article to "exclude" the voices of these authors. Rather, I will leave my comments vague, so that instructors and textbook-writers may draw their own applications.

9. I am not assuming that Japanese are or are not collectivistic. Hofstede (1980) places them about at the midpoint of collectivism, rather than as dichotomously collective. However, I argue that most of our cultural notions, especially the dichotomies such as Lo-High context, Individualism-Collectivism, etc., need to be rethought. However, some of this rethinking is currently being done--and this issue is one for another paper.

10. As further evidence, in our conferences, studies on "gay" culture, "black" culture, and so on frequently appear in special-interest caucuses and are only recently (and with irregularity)
appearing in the "mainstream" or "centered" forums.

11. Although I now find myself falling into the same sort of centered generalizations I have just critiqued above.

12. This is by no means meant to be an exhaustive list of intercultural texts. Others are not currently available for my review, such as Lustig & Koester, 1993.

13. At a recent national conference, a writer of an intercultural textbook, presenting research on employees' values in multi-national corporations, was asked if the information might be used to manipulate and control the employees. The writer suggested that what was done with the research was not our concern--"our purpose is to do research."