The study examines one component of the system of complementation in Palestinian Arabic. It is argued that the complementizer in question has an inherent semantics capable of influencing the meaning of sentences in which it is embedded. Specifically, its presence in a complex sentence communicates modal meanings distinct from those communicated by analogous sentences lacking it. This analysis challenges traditional assumptions about the functional importance of complementizers. It is hypothesized that the function of this complementizer is to lessen the degree of the matrix subject's commitment to the proposition embodied in the complement clause and to weaken the semantic and syntactic dependence of the clause. Examples are drawn from a number of complement clause types: with subjunctive and indicative complements, after perception verbs, and before direct quotations. Contains 10 references. (MSE)
Commitment and Evidence in Arabic Complementation*

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1. INTRODUCTION. In this paper I investigate one component of the system of complementation in Palestinian Arabic—the complementizer ?inna. I argue that this complementizer has an inherent semantics capable of influencing the meaning of sentences in which it is embedded. Specifically, I show that the presence of the complementizer ?inna in a complex sentence communicates modal meanings distinct from those communicated by analogous sentences lacking the complementizer. By way of illustration, compare the following minimal pair (treated in more detail in §5). These sentences differ only in the presence versus absence of the complementizer.

1. smi?na l-wlaad bil?labu maS il-xurfaan
   we.heard the-children they.play with the-sheep
   ‘We heard the children playing with the sheep.’

2. smi?na ?inna l-wlaad bil?labu maS il-xurfaan
   we.heard that the-children they.play with the-sheep
   ‘We heard that the children are playing with the sheep.’

Both sentences contain the embedded assertion l-wlaad bil?labu maS il-xurfaan ‘the children play with the sheep’. Ex. 1 indicates that the speaker’s source of evidence for this assertion is direct auditory perception, as suggested by the English translation. Ex. 2 indicates that the source of evidence is indirect. The source of evidence in 2 is hearsay. Ex. 2 shows that the complementizer ?inna codes the evidential basis on which the speaker asserts the proposition l-wlaad bil?labu maS il-xurfaan. The data presented in 1–2 indicate that an appropriate analysis of the complementizer must make reference to the meanings that it contributes to assertions in which it is embedded.

The present analysis challenges traditional assumptions regarding the functional import of complementizers. Some linguistic approaches have regarded complementizers as grammatical morphemes (functors) devoid of semantic content, whose main function is to signal the subordinate status of the following embedded clause. This assumption is succinctly captured by Noonan 1985:44–5: ‘Complement types often have associated with them a word, particle, clitic, or affix whose function it is to identify the entity as a complement. Such forms are known as COMPLEMENTIZERS.’ It is clear from 1–2 that the complementizer signals more than simply the subordinate status of the complement clause. But supposing that it is true that the complementizer in 2 serves to ‘identify the entity as a complement’, why is there not a complementizer in 1 to perform such a function?

Exx. 1–2 raise another theoretical issue. A substantial number of studies on complementation have claimed that the type of complement clause or the choice of a complementizer is largely predictable from and triggered by the matrix verb. Thus Noonan writes: ‘Complementation is basically a matter of matching a particular complement type to a particular complement-taking predicate. The basis of this matching is the semantic relation between predicate and complement that is inherent
in the meaning of the CTP' (90–91). Thus in this approach, complement and complementizer choice is dictated by the requirements of the main verb.

An early counterproposal to this approach is found in Bolinger 1968, who states that complementizers have semantics of their own: ‘the complementizers are chosen for their own sake, not as a mechanical result of choosing something else.’ Exx. 1–2 above illustrate Bolinger’s point. In both sentences, the main-clause verb smifna ‘heard’ is the same, yet the complements are different in form (and of course in meaning); in one we have a complementizer, and in the other we do not. To varying extents, Bolinger 1972, Bresnan 1979, Kirsner & Thompson 1976, Givón 1980, Ransom 1986, Frajzyngier & Jasperson 1991, and Frajzyngier 1995 are elaborations on Bolinger’s proposal. The aim of the present study is to explore the semantics of the complementizer ?inna in the spirit of these studies.

The meanings that ?inna contributes largely fall under the rubric of epistemic modality as defined in Palmer 1986:51: ‘the term “epistemic” should apply not simply to modal systems that basically involve the notions of possibility and necessity, but to any modal system that indicates the degree of commitment by the speaker to what he says. In particular, it should include evidentials such as “hearsay” or “report” (the Quotative) or the evidence of the senses.’ Palmer’s definition makes clear that evidential functions such as the ones indicated in 1–2 fall within the realm of epistemic modality, and so do the notions of ‘hearsay’, ‘report’, and ‘commitment’, notions which are taken up later in this paper.

Against the background given above, this paper aims to provide a semantic/functional motivation for ?inna. The hypothesis of this paper is that the function of the complementizer ?inna in Palestinian Arabic (hereafter PA) is at once to lessen the degree of the matrix subject’s commitment to the proposition embodied in the complement clause and to weaken the semantic and syntactic dependence of the complement clause. The support for this hypothesis will consist of showing the following:

- The occurrence of ?inna in subjunctive complements that allow it lessens the degree of commitment of the matrix subject to the proposition contained in the complement (§3).
- In indicative complements, ?inna sets up the embedded clause as one that is semantically and syntactically more self-contained (i.e. less dependent) than one not introduced by ?inna (§4).
- When ?inna introduces complements to main-clause perception verbs (e.g. ‘see’, ‘hear’), it indicates that the propositional event in the embedded clause was a result of indirect evidence (thus entailing less speaker commitment) when compared with the same but without ?inna (where perception is direct, thus entailing more speaker commitment) (§5).
- In natural conversation data, when ?inna introduces direct quotes it indicates low speaker commitment to the quoted utterance (§6).

In §2 the two complement clause types in PA—indicative and subjunctive—are introduced to set the stage for §§3–4.

2. COMPLEMENT CLAUSE TYPES. An examination of the morphosyntactic structure of complement clauses in PA reveals two types of complements: indicative and subjunctive. The difference between the two types can be seen most transparently in the form of the embedded verb: the indicative verb is inflected for both tense and person, whereas the subjunctive is inflected for person only; it is not marked for tense. The following are examples of indicative complements:
3. *kaal-at* (ʔinn) *it-taks* *thassan*
   say.PERF-3FS (COMP) ART-weather improve.PERF
   ‘She said that the weather got better.’
4. *iiktaaf* (ʔin-ha) *zaar-at* *kolorado*
   discover.PERF.3MS (COMP-3FS) visit.PERF-3FS Colorado
   ‘He found out that she visited Colorado.’
5. *fakkarit* (ʔin-na) *zaar* *kolorado*
   think.PERF.1S (COMP-3MS) visit.PERF.3MS Colorado
   ‘I thought that he visited Colorado.’

All of these complements are object complements (PA is SVO). The complement clauses are all optionally introduced by the complementizer ʔinna ‘that’ (variant: ʔin-+ enclitic pronoun if the complement clause lacks a nominal subject NP),¹ and they all imply statements of fact. All the verbs in the embedded clauses—thassan, zaarat, zaar—are inflected for the perfective aspect. Contrast these with the subjunctive complements in 6–7:

6. *ʔamrat-a* *yitaʕ* *min* *is-seyyara*
   order.3FS-3MS exit.SUBJ.3MS PREP ART-car
   ‘She ordered him to get out of the car.’
7. *ʔaqnaʕ-ha* *timfi*
   persuade.3MS-3FS walk.SUBJ.3FS
   ‘He persuaded her to walk.’

In 6–7, the complementizer is disallowed. Furthermore, and crucially, the embedded verb form is in the subjunctive.² To see that the clause in 7, for example, is in fact a subjunctive complement, contrast it with the following two indicative complement examples:

8. *ʔaqnaʕ-ha* (ʔin-ha) *mafata* *fi* *noom-ha*
   persuade.3MS-3FS (COMP-3FS) walk.PERF-3FS PREP sleep-3FS
   ‘He convinced her that she sleepwalked.’
9. *ʔaqnaʕ-ha* (ʔin-ha) *btimfi* *fi* *noom-ha*
   persuade.3MS-3FS (COMP-3FS) walk.IMPERF.3FS PREP sleep-3FS
   ‘He convinced her that she sleepwalks.’

In 7, the complementizer is disallowed; thus the following strings are unacceptable:

10. a. *ʔaqnaʕha* ʔin(-ha) *timfi*
    b. *ʔaqnaʕha* ʔinna *timfi*

The preceding discussion shows that the crucial difference between indicative and subjunctive complement clauses lies in the form of the embedded verb itself.

A survey of a wide range of complement-taking verbs in PA reveals that verbs that can be categorized as manipulative or emotive in nature, such as:

typically (but not always—see §3) occur with subjunctive complements, whereas verbs that may be said to belong to the cognitive or communicative domain, such as:


typically occur with indicative complements. In §§3–4, we examine environments involving these kinds of verbs to see where ʾinna is allowed and disallowed, and what semantic contribution this complementizer makes.

### 3. ʾINNA WITH SUBJUNCTIVE COMPLEMENTS

As we have seen, some indicative complements can either occur with or without ʾinna (e.g. 3–5). Is this choice also available for subjunctive complements?

Some of the manipulative verbs listed in §2 (e.g. ʿaṭḥar ‘oblige, force’, ḥāmar ‘order’, manaḥṣar ‘prevent’, xalla ‘make, let’) never allow the occurrence of the complementizer in their complements. Thus in the following set of examples, ʾinna cannot appear anywhere:

11. layla ʿaṭṭaḥ-ṭar xaalid yruuh
   Laila force.PERF-3FS Khalid go.SUBJ.3MS
   ‘Laila forced Khalid to go.’
12. ʿaṭṭaḥ-ṭar xaalid yruuh
   force.PERF-1S Khalid go.SUBJ.3MS
   ‘I forced Khalid to go.’
13. layla xaall-at xaalid yruuh
   Laila make.PERF-3FS Khalid go.SUBJ.3MS
   ‘Laila made Khalid go.’
14. xaall-ṭet xaalid yruuh
   make.PERF-1S Khalid go.SUBJ.3MS
   ‘I made Khalid go.’

On the other hand, emotive verbs (e.g. ḥabb ‘like’, xaaf ‘fear’, tʾammal ‘hope’, ʾinna ‘wish’) do allow ʾinna in their complement clauses if the subject of the matrix clause and the subject of the embedded clause are non-coreferential. If the two subjects are coreferential, the complementizer is disallowed. Thus 15–16 are well-formed, but 17–18 are not:

15. ḥabb-ṣet aruuh
    like.PERF-1S go.SUBJ.1S
    ‘I liked to go.’
16. habb-u  yruuh-u
   like.PERF-3PL  go.SUBJ-3PL
   'They liked to go.'

17. * habb-eet  ðin-ni  aruuh
    like.PERF-1S  COMP-1S  go.SUBJ-1S
    for: 'I liked to go.'

18. * habb-u  ðin-him  yruuh-u4
    like.PERF-3PL  COMP-3PL  go.SUBJ-3PL
    for: 'They liked to go.'

The picture that is emerging with respect to subjunctive complements to matrix clause emotive verbs is that these complements typically do not allow ?inna except under the condition that the matrix and complement subjects are non-coreferential. Manipulative verbs (see 11–14) are excluded from this statement by type. These verbs do not allow ?inna under any circumstances, possibly because of a lexically-specified constraint that they must have non-coreferential subjects since one normally makes, forces, prevents etc. others, not oneself. With these verbs, the question of the occurrence of ?inna does not arise; ?inna never occurs with these verbs.

But the picture with respect to emotive verbs is a little more complicated than painted thus far. Whereas it is true that the presence of the complementizer is the norm if the subjects of the main and embedded clauses are non-coreferential, as in 19, the absence of the complementizer MAY be acceptable; hence the marginal acceptability of 20. Ex. 20 is not as well-formed as 19, but it is not outright ungrammatical.

19. habb-eet  ðin-him  yruuh-u
    like.PERF-1S  COMP-3PL  go.SUBJ-3PL
    'I liked them to go.'

20. ? habb-eet  yruuh-u
    like.PERF-1S  go.SUBJ-3PL
    'I liked them to go.'

I would like to suggest that the phenomena represented in 15–20 can be explained in the light of the notion of commitment, in the following sense. The matrix and embedded clauses each have one proposition consisting of a subject and its predicate, and a relation holds between the two propositions such that the second proposition (the embedded proposition) is predicated upon the first (the matrix proposition). If the agent of the second predicate is the same as that of the first predicate, the agent has more control in bringing about the action or event in the complement than if the agents of the matrix and complement were different. Thus in 15–20 one can be committed to and responsible for one’s own actions (i.e. going) but not (necessarily) so for the actions of others. Admittedly, it is not clear what is responsible in 19 for the lack of commitment—whether it is the presence of the complementizer or the non-identity of the subjects in the main and embedded clauses. If it turns out that there is in fact a clear preference for 19 over 20, then we may be more confident in concluding that it is the complementizer—rather than the non-identity of the subjects—that is responsible for the low commitment. We will return to this issue presently.
The complement-taking verb ʔasarr ‘insist’ is one that allows both indicative and subjunctive complements. When ʔasarr is followed by an indicative complement, the complement must be introduced by the complementizer, regardless of coreferentiality:

21. ʔasarr-eet ʔin-ni ruhit
    insist.PERF-1S COMP-1S go.PERF.1S
    ‘I insisted that I had left.’

22. * ʔasarr-eet ruhit

23. ʔasarr-eet ʔin-him raah-u
    insist.PERF-1S COMP-3PL go.PERF-3PL
    ‘I insisted that they had left.’

24. * ʔasarr-eet raah-u

On the other hand, when ʔasarr is followed by a subjunctive complement, we get a phenomenon very similar to the one observed in 15–20, namely, if the matrix and embedded subjects are coreferential, the complementizer is disallowed; but if the matrix and embedded subjects are non-coreferential, the complementizer is obligatorily present. Exx. 25–30 are parallel to 15–20.

25. ʔasarr-eet aruuh
    insist.PERF-1S go.SUBJ.1S
    ‘I insisted on going.’

26. ʔasarr-u yruuh-u
    insist.PERF-3PL go.SUBJ-3PL
    ‘They insisted on going.’

27. * ʔasarr-eet ʔin-ni aruuh
    insist.PERF-1S COMP-1S go.SUBJ.1S
    for: ‘I insisted on going’

28. * ʔasarr-u ʔin-him yruuh-u
    insist.PERF-3PL COMP-3PL go.SUBJ-3PL
    for: ‘They insisted on going.’

29. ʔasarr-eet ʔin-him yruuh-u
    insist.PERF-1S COMP-3PL go.SUBJ-3PL
    ‘I insisted that they go.’

30. ʔasarr-eet yruuh-u
    insist.PERF-1S go.SUBJ-3PL
    ‘I insisted that they go.’

From these examples we may conclude that it is the complementizer—not the like/unlike subjects—that is responsible for lessening the commitment of the main-clause subject to the event in the embedded clause when the main and embedded subjects are non-coreferential. In the ungrammatical 17–18 and 27–28, where the main and embedded subjects are coreferential, the introduction of ʔinna creates a distance, iconically represented, between the controlling main verb and its subject and the achievement of the event in the embedded clause. The interpretation of the subjunctive verb cannot be properly understood without the emotive matrix verb on which it depends. Thus main-subordinate status with subjunctive complements is blurred, and the two clauses are semantically more unified than in the ʔinna clauses.
In fact, this dependence is seen in the syntax. Compare the complements in 31–32, which are extracted from 23 and 29, respectively:

31. * raah-u
   ‘They went.’
32. * yruuh-u

4. ḪINNA WITH INDICATIVE COMPLEMENTS. The examples in this section show that the presence of Ḫinna in indicative complements serves to lessen the degree of subordination of the embedded clause (i.e. to weaken the bonding between the main and embedded clauses) and to lessen the commitment of the main-clause subject to the proposition in the embedded clause. Let us begin with the following examples:

33. a. bifakkir biṣrifni
   he.thinks he.knows.me
   ‘He thinks he knows me.’
   b. bifakkir Ḫin-na biṣrifni
   he.thinks that-he he.knows.me
   ‘He thinks that he knows me.’

On the face of it, there does not appear to be a discernible semantic difference between these two examples. However, if one tries to follow the sentences with the clause bas ma-āḍinnii-f ‘but I don’t think so’, an interesting contrast can be observed:

34. a. ?? bifakkir biṣrifni, bas ma-āḍinnii-f
   he.thinks he.knows.me but NEG-I.think-NEG
   for: ‘He thinks he knows me, but I don’t think so’
   b. bifakkir Ḫin-na biṣrifni, bas ma-āḍinnii-f
   he.thinks that-he he.knows.me but NEG-I.think-NEG
   ‘He thinks that he knows me, but I don’t think so.’

Ex. 34a is only marginally acceptable. The reason for this appears to be that the clause bas ma-āḍinnii-f ‘I don’t think so’ is doubting not the embedded clause biṣrifni ‘he knows me’ but rather the main clause bifakkir ‘he thinks’. But the main clause bifakkir is what the speaker is asserting and conveying as her/his belief. This assertion is being doubted in the clause bas ma-āḍinnii-f. One cannot doubt one’s own assertion, and hence the marginality of 34a. In 34b, on the other hand, bas ma-āḍinnii-f doubts the embedded clause biṣrifni, a reasonable doubt. One may conclude from the above examples that the complementizer in such sentences is a marker whose function is to lessen the degree of dependence of the embedded clause. The examples in 35 further illustrate this point.

35. a. fhimit kasrat is-saafa
   I.understood she.broke the-watch
   ‘I understood she broke the watch.’
   b. fhimit Ḫin-ha kasrat is-saafa
   I.understood that-she she.broke the-watch
   ‘I understood that she broke the watch.’
c.  
\[ \text{fhimit} \text{ ?in-ha kasrat is-saa\textsuperscript{a},} \]
\[ \text{I. understood that-she she.broke the-watch,} \]
\[ \text{bas ma-\textit{\textsuperscript{n}}} \textit{nii-fi} \]
\[ \text{but NEG-I.think-NEG} \]
\[ \text{‘I understood that she broke the watch, but I don’t think so (i.e., I} \]
\[ \text{don’t think that she broke the watch).’} \]

d.  
\[ ?? \text{fhimit kasrat issa\textsuperscript{a}, bas ma-\textit{\textsuperscript{n}}} \textit{nii-fi} \]
\[ \text{(Doubting fhimit.)} \]

It is interesting to note that 35a implies a stronger sense of understanding than 35b. Ex. 35a may be uttered if the speaker had been witness to some deliberation were evidence—or a confession—was presented, whereas 35b may be uttered if the speaker came to her/his understanding through indirect sources. One would expect, therefore, that in 35b the speaker would not be as committed to her/his assertion as in 35a. The claim here is that it is the complementizer that is responsible for this lower commitment.

To argue further that the function of the complementizer is to set up the embedded clause as one that is less subordinated to the main clause, one which is introduced as an assertion that becomes available to be questioned or doubted, can be seen in the following examples:

36.  
\begin{align*}
\text{a.} & \quad \text{bitsaddik} \text{ fusit zalama buhluk la kalba?} \\
& \quad \text{you.believe I.saw a.man he.shave PREP his.dog?} \\
& \quad \text{‘Do you believe I saw a man shaving his dog?’} \\
\text{b.} & \quad \text{bitsaddik } \text{ ?in-ni} \text{ fusit zalama buhluk la kalba?} \\
& \quad \text{you.believe that-I Lsaw a.man he.shave PREP his.dog?} \\
& \quad \text{‘Do you believe that I saw a man shaving his dog?’} \\
\end{align*}

What is in fact questioned in 36a is the surprising nature of the event in the embedded clause. The speaker in 36a is inquiring whether the hearer shares in the speaker’s surprise about the event. A paraphrase of 36a is something like ‘Do you believe this surprising thing ...?’ An appropriate response to 36a might be ballaahi \text{ ?an d\textsuperscript{a}d?} ‘By God, really?’ In contrast, 36b—with the complementizer—introduces the embedded clause as a kind of statement. A paraphrase of 36b is something like ‘Would you believe the statement that ...?’ or ‘Would you believe it/me if I tell you that ...?’ An appropriate response to 36b might be \text{la? basadki} ‘No, I don’t believe it.’

5. \textit{\textsuperscript{n}INNA AFTER PERCEPTION VERBS}. Related to the hypothesis that the function of the complementizer \textit{\textsuperscript{n}nna} is to weaken the commitment of the subject of the main clause to the propositional content of the embedded clause is the sub-hypothesis that \textit{\textsuperscript{n}nna}, when it introduces an embedded clause following a main-clause perception verb, functions as an evidential marker, a marker of indirect (or less-than-direct) evidence. Commitment and evidence are correlated in the following way. If one’s evidence for a proposition is indirect or second-hand, one would be less committed to the proposition than to a proposition that contains an event the evidence for which is attained through direct experience. The following examples illustrate this point:
Ex. 37a has two interpretations. For the first interpretation, the evidence is direct auditory perception. In 37b, on the other hand, the subject most likely was TOLD that the children were playing; i.e., the evidence in 37b is indirect—hearsay.

With the verb *fufit* ‘see’, *?inna* also functions as a marker of indirect evidence:

Ex. 38a has the same sort of ambiguity associated with 37a. On the other hand, 38b, with the complementizer, is not ambiguous. The evidence for the event coded in the embedded clause in 38b is perforce indirect, as can be seen from the use of the word ‘realize’ in the English translation, an indirect evidence verb by definition. Exx. 39a–b are the pronominalized versions of 38a–b, respectively:

The examples in 40 provide more support for the hypothesis that the function of *?inna* with perception verbs is to mark indirect evidence. If we look at the imperfective counterpart of the embedded perfective verb *yirkit* in the four sentences in 38 and 39, we find that only the imperfective counterparts of 38a and 39a (i.e. the direct perception sentences) are acceptable, whereas the imperfective counterparts of 38b and 39b are infelicitous. Note that the unacceptable strings 40b and 40d are the ones that contain the complementizer.
In some sense, there is a strong interaction between tense/aspect and the visual modality in the examples in 40. The infelicity of 40b and 40d seems to be associated with the incompatibility of perceiving an event directly simultaneous with the presence of a marker that indicates indirect evidence: One can only see directly when the ship is sinking but cannot ‘realize’ indirectly that the ship is sinking at the same time one is seeing it sinking. Put differently, if one has direct visual access to an event, it is contradictory to introduce a device (i.e. 2inna) to mark one’s evidence as indirect.

In another sense, there may be no interaction between tense/aspect and modality in 40. In the context of a sinking ship where the verb ‘to see’ is involved, it is hard to resist the interpretation of the event of the sinking ship as not having resulted from direct visual perception. But a direct perception interpretation is not available for 40b or 40d under any circumstances. However, there may be contexts where the knowledge of the event of the sinking ship may have resulted from non-visual or indirect evidence with tense/aspect playing no part. One could, for example, imagine the following scenario. A woman who is driving back home from work on road X near a seaport sees a crowd of onlookers and rescue teams and decides to make a turn and take road Y instead. The next day she hears on the radio that a ship had been sinking at the time when she saw the crowd and took the alternative route. She later relates the experience to her friend saying:

41. *fufit 2inna is-safiina btiyrak, fa-2axa6-et faaric eaani*
   I.saw that the-ship it.sink, so-took-I road another
   ‘I saw that the ship was sinking, so I took another road.’

Now the string in 40b has become well-formed. At no time, however, did the speaker have direct visual perception of the sinking ship.

6. *2inna before direct quotes.* It is unusual and unexpected to find instances in any kind of writing, including very informal personal letters etc., in PA (or for that matter any Arabic dialect that has the equivalent of 2inna) of the complementizer introducing direct discourse. This is also true in formal written Arabic (as well as in English). However, in a corpus of recorded natural conversation, several occurrences were found of the complementizer preceding direct quotes. Here are two examples:

42. bitkuul 2inna ‘maa tkuul ?in-ni ana layla’
   she.says that ‘NEG you.say that-I am Laila’
   ‘She says, “Don’t say that I am Laila.”’
43. nashat-ni 2inna ‘maa tkuul la xaaltak
   she.advised-me that ‘NEG you.say PREP your.aunt
   wa-la la hada’
   and-NEG PREP one’
   ‘She advised me, “Don’t tell your aunt or anyone else.”’
These examples were uttered by a speaker who was narrating events that had taken place several years earlier, and so it is reasonable to expect that the speaker was not vouching for the accuracy of the quotes. If this is true, ًیننا seems in such examples to be employed as a device for the speaker to introduce the quotes as tentative/constructed, not as genuine/actual. That is to say, the quotes in 42–43 are not exactly what was said, but rather the speaker imagines the quotes to have been similar in content to the ones reported, and the speaker indicates by the use of ًیننا that he is not fully committed to the quotes, that the quotes are reconstructed approximations. (Awad 1995 discusses a parallel phenomenon involving the West Chadic language Bolanci.) A larger database must be examined before this hypothesis can be confirmed, however.

7. CONCLUSION. An outstanding issue not directly tackled in this paper but which deserves serious consideration concerns the role of ًیننا with those indicative complements where it appears to be completely optional—i.e. where ًیننا does not seem to make any semantic contribution whatsoever—e.g. examples 3 and 9. This issue notwithstanding, it is clear that ًیننا plays several functional roles. First, it creates a conceptual, semantic distance between the main clause and the embedded subjunctive clause when the subjects of the two clauses are coreferential. In a sense, ًیننا blocks the control that the matrix subject has over the achievement of the event/action in the embedded clause. Second, ًیننا sometimes functions as a device to lessen the matrix subject's commitment to the proposition in the embedded clause; this includes phenomena involving the so-called direct discourse as well as phenomena involving subjunctive, and to a lesser extent indicative, complements. Third, with indicative complements it sets up the complement as one that is semantically more self-contained or less dependent than otherwise. And fourth, with perception verbs it functions as a marker of indirect evidence. All these functions are significant communicative functions. The evidence presented in this paper at the very least suggests that the complementizer has an important semantic component, again a communicative function. It is not a formal functor whose purpose is merely to signal the subordinate status of the following clause.
NOTES

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1 The unmarked complementizer *inna 'that' should not be confused with its identical looking 3MS-marked variant *in-na 'that he' in ex. 5.
2 The subjunctive mood in PA, which only occurs in embedded clauses, expresses deontic modalities such as obligation, permission, and prohibition as well as modal categories like unreality and possibility.
3 In PA, the subjunctive occurs only in embedded clauses.
4 This sentence would be acceptable if the subject of the main clause and the subject of the embedded clause are interpreted as non-coreferential.
5 This sentence would be acceptable if the subject of the main clause and the subject of the embedded clause are interpreted as non-coreferential.
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