A study of national identity and social integration in two multilingual societies, Canada and Switzerland, examines the relations between Quebec and anglophone Canada and between French and German Switzerland. First, the historical setting for the emergence of multilingualism is outlined for both countries, and the demography of the major language groups is summarized. Then the role of group attitudes in preserving ethnic and national identity, and the degree to which majority and minority language groups adhere to the same core values, are analyzed. Finally, the relative social and political stability in Switzerland and the more tenuous linguistic equilibrium in Canada are reviewed. It is concluded that attitudinal differences between language groups do not disappear, even in contexts with low intergroup tension, but that mediating factors such as the unity of common political and civic culture in Switzerland affect social integration. Survey data on multiple loyalties, divergence/consensus on political issues and core values, and attitudes toward diversity and multilingualism in each country are appended. Contains 59 references. (MSE)
Comparative Intergroup Relations and Social Incorporation in Two Multilingual Societies
Canada and Switzerland

Carol Schmid

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COMPARATIVE INTERGROUP RELATIONS
AND SOCIAL INCORPORATION IN
TWO MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES:
CANADA AND SWITZERLAND

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This paper is the eighth of a series on Nationalism, National Identity and Interethnic Relations

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CONTENTS</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Management: Short-run Adjustment Measures</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural Measures</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Changes</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Actions</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Considerations</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This paper compares identity and social incorporation in two multilingual societies: Canada and Switzerland. Switzerland has been referred to as "the most successful multilingual state in modern history" and a "persistent counterexample" to the instability of many plural societies (McRae, 1983:229). Canada, on the other hand, seems to be plagued with a perennial constitutional dilemma and identity crisis. Are Canada and Switzerland as different in the late 1980s and 1990s as some political and social scientists have led us to believe? In analyzing the two countries and the relations between Quebec and Anglo Canada and French and German Switzerland, three major areas will be examined. The first part of the paper discusses the historical setting out of which multilingualism emerged in the two countries. It also includes a brief demographic overview of the major language groups. The second section concentrates on the role of mass attitudes in preserving ethnic and national identity, and analyzes the degree to which majority and minority language groups adhere to the same core values. Finally, the paper concludes by reviewing the various explanations advanced to explain the relative social and political stability in Switzerland and the more tenuous linguistic equilibrium in Canada.

Since Canadian language relations have been overwhelmingly preoccupied with the relationship of Quebec in opposition to the rest of Canada, this is the major emphasis in the sections on Canada. In Switzerland, tension and misunderstanding between language groups more often takes place between French- and German-speakers than among the much smaller Italian- and Romansh-speaking groups. To simplify the analysis and to make it more comparable, sections on Switzerland concentrate on this relationship. Both French-speaking groups encompass slightly less than a quarter of their respective populations, however, French-speakers in Canada are highly concentrated in Quebec, while in Switzerland they are distributed in four unilingual French cantons and three bilingual French-German cantons.

AN OVERVIEW OF LANGUAGE HISTORY AND DEMOGRAPHY IN CANADA AND SWITZERLAND

In this section I shall briefly outline the chief social forces which gave rise to multilingualism in Canada and Switzerland. Very different factors have influenced the uneasy official recognition of French in Canada and the late emergence of a plurilingual society in Switzerland.
**Historical Factors Explaining Quebec Nationalism**

The 60,000 or so French who were abandoned to the English by the Treaty of Paris in 1763 outnumbered the English speakers in what was eventually to become Canada. It was not until the mid-1800s that French speakers became a minority, and not until the 1871 census that they comprised only 31.1 percent of the total population (Wardhaugh, 1983). Although the French in Canada initially outnumbered the English, the French found themselves a minority in North America and faced the prospects of dispersal or absorption. The twin pillars of their survival were their religion and their language. In contrast to French Swiss who are divided between the Catholic and Protestant faiths, the French in Canada share a common Catholic background.

Territorial concentration, relatively large numbers of French speakers, and parallel development of the two societies, and the absence of a central government that could dictate terms of inclusion produced a reluctant official bilingualism in Canada. Their history began with defeat for the French on the Plains of Abraham, and continued through the Constitutional Act of 1791. The Act of 1791 while confirming the Quebec Act of 1774 and therefore the rights of the French to much of their distinctive way of life, nevertheless, subordinated the French legislature of Lower Canada (Quebec) to an English executive and established a separate Upper Canada (Ontario) for the English. The common experience of facing the hardships of life in the colony and physical isolation from France led the population to develop a certain sense of identity (McRoberts, 1981).

By the turn of the century, the status of the French in Canada was influenced by three major factors. First, French speakers comprised a large share of the country's population that remained remarkably stable in view of the lack of any significant French-speaking immigration after 1759 and a large exodus of French Québécois to the New England states during the second half of the nineteenth century. By Confederation individuals of French background made up about a third of the Canadian population, but French speakers were about three-quarters of the population of Quebec. A second factor was the unreceptiveness of the other provinces toward granting language rights to French speakers. For example, an 1890 provincial statute abrogated early guarantees for the French language in Manitoba. Therefore, French speakers remained largely concentrated in Quebec. Finally, francophones were largely excluded from Canada's economic elite. Even in Quebec, the English dominated the economic life of the province.
(Brooks, 1993). The Rebellion of 1837 was a French protest against the ways of the mercantilist minority who controlled them and threatened to subvert their culture, religion and language.

The British joined Lower Canada to Upper Canada in the Act of Union of 1840. Further changes became necessary in the 1860s, both for economic development and to protect the north from a post-Civil War United States (Wardhaugh, 1983). The British North America Act of 1867 officially recognized the bilingual character of Canada. Article 133 of the British North America Act declared that both English and French were the official languages of the national parliament and of Quebec's provincial assembly. Under its provisions, an individual had the right to use either French or English before Parliament or any court created by Parliament and federal courts. There was no nationally recognized right to be educated in one's own mother tongue. Section 93 of the BNA Act placed culturally sensitive policy areas such as education and social services under the control of the provinces. While there was some recognition of the French fact, at the national level the lingua franca of the state was clearly English.

Before the early decades of the twentieth century the traditional society of Francophone Canada--with its high birthrate and extended families, its rural, agricultural base, and its common religious faith--had few points of sustained contact with Anglo-Canadian society (Gill, 1980). By the 1930s, there was evidence of profound changes in French Canadian society, although the extent of the change to "traditional" Québécois society was not widely perceived until the 1950s. Where before French Canada has been a rural, agricultural society, by the 1930s a steady migration to the cities was taking place, and by 1961 most French Canadians lives in urban areas and worked in industrial settings. With the passing of traditional Quebec society, the French Canadian extended family structure lost its reason for being and the birthrate began to decline. Finally, the breakup of traditional society also signaled a weakening in the position of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec.

The first hints of nationalism in Quebec came in reaction the quickening pace of economic development. In the 1930s, with the onset of the depression, this reaction took the form of anti-modernism and a cultural critique of capitalism. The Union Nationale, formed in 1936, reaffirmed traditional social structures and authority patterns. Under its best-known political figure, Maurice Duplessis, the Union Nationale sought to revert Quebec to its preindustrial, habitant past. During his leadership of the province, between 1936 and 1939 and again between 1944 until his death in 1959, Duplessis was an avid defender of
provincial rights and the farming interests. On the other hand, he never challenged the unity of Canada and had no objection to extensive economic development. As a consequence of his pro-farmer and pro-business policies, as well as the corrupt and authoritarian style of his rule, nationalism began to develop in new directions.

**Quebec Nationalism and the Quiet Revolution**

The frustration of French Canadian nationalists at the inferior position of French-speaking Quebecers and their language and culture in the Quebec economy led to a widespread determination to use Quebec's provincial government to build a modern, French-speaking Quebec (Gill, 1980). Many observers view the Quiet Revolution of the early 1960s as the single most important turning point in Quebec's recent history (McRoberts, 1988; Gingas and Nevitte, 1983).

Two major themes in relation to language policy and practice surfaced during the Quiet Revolution. The first was the use of French as a language of work in the modern sector of the economy, including commercial, financial and industrial enterprises. In 1961, the Quebec economy was characterized by ethnic and linguistic stratification that weighed heavily against French-speaking Quebecers. Average yearly incomes during this year stood at $5,502 for unilingual anglophones, $4,772 for bilingual individuals (most of whom were French Canadians) and $3,099 for unilingual francophones (Government of Quebec, 1972).

The second theme was the growing fear of French as an "endangered" language both within North America and the province of Quebec (Esman, 1985). Immigrants to the province overwhelmingly adopted the English language. In addition, with industrialization and urbanization, the fertility rate declined from 4,348 children ever born per 1,000 married women in 1941 to 2,632 in 1981. The comparable rates for Canada as a whole were 3,341 in 1941 and 2,493 in 1981 (Census of Canada, 1983: Tables 1 and 4). Currently Quebec's birthrate is the lowest of all the Canadian provinces (Joy, 1992). These trends, along with evidence that francophones were excluded from much of the province's economic structure, formed the basis for the policy recommendations of the Quebec Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Position of the French Language on language rights in Quebec.
The Quiet Revolution also brought in its wake an increasingly critical examination of the Canadian constitutional system and the extent to which it acted as a barrier to the realization of French Canadian demands for national determination. The ensuing changes in Quebec under Liberal leader Jean Lesage included provincial control of education and welfare institutions away from the church, increased industrialization, and saw the provincial government, rather than the English-speaking business class, as a primary engine of development. During Lesage's administration, the provincial government sought to increase its powers, either through a general evolution of powers to the provinces or through granting a "special status" to Quebec (Weaver, 1992:23). In 1967 prominent ex-Liberal René Lévesque left the Liberals to establish a new political movement dedicated to the sovereignty of Quebec. In 1976, after almost a decade of grass roots organizing, the Parti Québécois was capitulated into power. Although the PQ lost the referendum for sovereignty-association in 1980, it had an important influence on both Quebec and Canadian politics. According to McRae (1990:205) "...the nine years period from 1976 to 1985, during which Quebec was governed by a legally elected regime actively committed to Quebec independence, constituted the most fundamental challenge to the federal system in this century."

As the challenge of Quebec nationalism emerged on the political scene, Ottawa lacked anything that could be called a language policy (Brooks, 1993). The origins of current language policy in Canada lie in developments in Quebec during this period. According to Waddell (1985:97) "The federal government was facing a legitimacy crisis in the 1960s and 1970s and had the immediate task of proposing a Canadian alternative to Quebec nationalism." As a response to the initiative of the Quiet Revolution, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was set up in 1963. It was a first step toward adoption by Ottawa of a policy of official bilingualism. This policy was intended to defuse the indépendantiste sentiment building in Quebec.

The B & B Commission put into motion both symbolic and statutory changes in Canadian language policy. Since the 1960s there have been significant alternations in what Breton (1984, 1986) calls the "Canadian symbolic order." These include a new flag, national anthem, the renaming of Dominion Day to Canada Day, and new stamps and coins. A deliberate effort was made to create symbols that did not alienate French Canadians. Another important change involved the passage of the Official Language Act in 1969, which gave statutory expression to the policy of bilingualism. Furthermore, it attempted to
equalize the status of French and English at the federal level by giving the right of the public to be served in either French or English, providing for the equitable representation of francophones and anglophones in the federal service, and allowing public servants of both languages to work in the language of their choice (Brooks, 1993).

The independence movement in Quebec was the most important catalyst for change in language and ethnic policies in Canada after World War II. The immediate threat of Quebec nationalism led to the adoption of a federal language policy. Ironically, the B and B "commissioners came down in favor of integral coast-to-coast bilingualism at the very time when Quebec was abandoning such an option" (Waddell, 1986:90). The 1960s onward were characterized by a reformation of ethnic identity among Québécois from religion to language, and to the province of Quebec from the nation-state. This new understanding was in direct conflict with the commission which opted for an interpretation of language and culture as separable.

**Current Sources of Quebec Nationalism**

The resurgence of Quebec nationalism in the late 1980s can be traced to three major factors. First is the continued fear of assimilation. One of the main reasons why nationalist sentiment has re-fueled a powerful secessionist movement in Quebec is the fragility of the French language in North America. The entire history of Quebec from the Quiet Revolution onward is haunted by the fear of Anglicization. From a high of 29 percent in the 1940s, the proportion of the French-speaking population has steadily declined. Even in Quebec most immigrants prefer the utility of English to the French language. Currently French-speaking Canadians comprise almost a quarter (24 percent) of the total population. In 1986, Canada's 25 million people included 5.3 million French speakers in Quebec and nearly .5 million in northern New Brunswick and the north and east of Ontario, regions that are adjacent to Quebec. Less than 4 percent of Canada's francophones were scattered in the vast expanse that includes southern Ontario, the four western provinces, the northern territories, and most of the Atlantic region (Joy, 1992: 8, 124-125). Quebec is increasingly French and the rest of Canada is increasingly English. Since proportional politics in Ottawa is related to population, Quebec fears the loss of political clout and leverage within the federation. This demolinguistic situation has exacerbated linguistic tension within Quebec.
The second factor is related to optimism in the profitability of sovereignty. This feeling is inspired by a "self-confidence rooted in the economic progress of francophones, the development of provincial institutions, and their condition relative to the federal one" (Dion, 1992:117). Federal institutions are under attack. Québécois increasingly believe that the help of the federal government is not essential. In a 1991 poll, 26 percent of Quebecers said that Quebec had gained from its relationship with the rest of Canada, 38 percent believed the relationship had been detrimental, and 36 percent answered it has made no difference (Blais and Nadeau, 1992:90).

Finally there is a feeling of rejection born from the constitutional crisis, as embodied most recently in the Meech Lake Accord in 1990 and the Charlottetown Referendum in 1992, both of which failed to endorse a special status for the province of Quebec. Breton (1992:34) observed:

"The Meech Lake episode offered a great opportinity for the PQ to reorganize itself, to promote its cause, and to bolster its support among the electorate. It could mobilize its members and gain additional support among those who sympathized with the sovereignty-association cause. It should be noted that as long as there was consensus on the accord, many pro-independence Quebecers opposed it, as recorded in newspaper accounts. But when opposition to it grew in English-speaking Canada, they changed their position. As a Quebec commentator observed, the reaction was: "If English-speaking Canadians are opposed to it, than it must contain something valuable for us."

A 1991 poll, after the failure of Meech Lake indicated that 70 percent of Canadians outside of Quebec would not endorse further concessions to Quebec, even if it meant that the province would separate (Dion, 1992:113-114). This reality has spurred the federal electoral victories of the Reform Party in the west of Canada and the Bloc Québécois in the province of Quebec.

Despite the uneasy movement to a bilingual country, there remains a significant tension between Quebec and the rest of Canada. Language policy in Quebec has been shaped with the idea that French Canada is co-extensive with the boundaries of that province and therefore occupies a unique or "distinct society." This interpretation continues to be a source of unresolved conflict between Quebec and Anglo Canada. Recent failures at constitutional change that would have recognized Quebec's special status, by
reducing the Quebec question to "one among many others" has given a strong impetus to Quebec nationalist and separatist sentiment.

The Swiss Enigma

Cultural and linguistic diversity is a relatively recent phenomenon in Switzerland. In the five centuries following the birth of the Swiss state, it remained primarily a loose confederation of German-speaking cantons. The original defensive alliance formed in 1291 of the three mountain cantons of Uri, Schwyz and Underwalden, gradually increased to thirteen by 1513. Only Fribourg, which was admitted in 1481 had a significant French-speaking population, and the urban aristocracy which ruled it attempted to Germanize the entire population. The Confederation of thirteen cantons was bound together mainly as a system of military alliances. Effective central institutions did not develop. The major cleavages arose between rural and urban cantons, and after the Reformation between Catholic and Protestant cantons. There is no history of organized conflict between language groups before the nineteenth century, although German remained the only official language of the Confederation until 1798 (Haas, 1982:62; Weibel, 1986).

The population of the Confederation became affiliated with French, Italian and Romansh speakers from the sixteenth century onward. The League of Grisons, Valais, Neuchâtel, and the ecclesiastical principality of Basel (which became the Jura district of Bern) were associated as allies of the Confederates. Ticino and Vaud, as well as part of present-day Switzerland (including the present day canton of Thurgau and much of Aargau), were ruled as subject territories by one or several cantons. These allies and subject territories did not obtain equality with the thirteen cantons of the Old Regime until much later. However, a strong heritage of communal independence which can be traced back to the beginnings of Switzerland helped to mediate a tendency to dominate the minority language groups by the ruling cantons (Mayer, 1952:358-360). This respect for local autonomy and linguistic diversity was an important factor in attracting the allegiance of the subordinate areas—which when they had the option, decided to remain with their overseers and protectors (McRae, 1983).

Minority Recognition and Outside Intervention

Invasion by the French army in 1798 spelled an end to the ancient Confederation of thirteen cantons. This network of feudal obligations and aristocratic privileges could not be maintained under the
impact of the ideas of the French Revolution. It was replaced by the Helvetic Republic, whose constitution was based on the conceptions of the Enlightenment and the rights of man. Embodying the French tradition of centralization and authoritarian executive power, the new regime found support only in a few areas like Vaud and Aargau, which were enjoying their newly acquired independence. Despite opposition, it transformed Switzerland almost overnight into a modern state. The 1798 Constitution abolished all privileges and established the equality of individuals and territories (Bonjour, 1952:230). As Bonjour (1952:230) notes "...by raising the French and Italian districts to the status of cantons with equal rights the Helvetic Republic founded a multilingual Switzerland. In this way it checked the growth of different languages for rulers and ruled wherever there were signs of it..." This experience sharply contrasts with the Canadian historical experience in which the French language minority suffered a humiliating defeat, and language rights had to be battled for in the political and social arenas.

Despite its benefits to the linguistic minorities, the Helvetic Republic conflicted too strongly with the entrenched sentiments of local autonomy and of traditional diversity. The citizenry revolted against uniformity, and widespread unrest rendered the constitution unworkable. In 1803 Napoleon intervened and imposed his Mediation, which restored to each canton its own government. The new Constitution of 1803, which was intended to keep Switzerland in a state of weakness and dependence on France, however, was more in harmony with the country's mood than that of the Helvetic Republic (Bohenblust, 1974:380-381). It maintained the chief gains of the Helvetic period: old subject districts and the tangled network of ancient privileges were abolished, and international or foreign alliances were prohibited. The linguistic equality of 1789 was also maintained, with the inclusion of the cantons of Ticino and Vaud. The other subject German-speaking territories of Aargau and Thurgau, and the associated lands of Grisons and St. Gallen were admitted as cantons with equal rights, bringing the total of sovereign cantons to nineteen.

Despite the harsh demands of Swiss troops in Napoleonic service, the Mediation period secured ten years of well-being and order for the nation at a time when most European lands suffered from wars and revolutions. The 1803 Constitution remained a source of inspiration for the Swiss liberals in the troubled decades ahead (Schmid, 1981).

After Napoleon's downfall, the cantons resumed most of their old authority; of aristocracy, privilege, and decentralization, and reverted to German as the official language. Under the new Federal
Pact of 1815, Switzerland became a confederation of sovereign states. One important achievement of the Revolutionary period was the addition of three French-speaking cantons: Geneva, Neuchâtel, and Valais and the continued independence of the six newly incorporated cantons (McRae, 1983). After considerable squabbling the Congress of Vienna finally awarded the Jura district to Bern as compensation for Bernese territorial losses in Vaud and Aargau. With the addition of these territories, Switzerland assumed the basic boundaries it has today, with the exception of the separation of the Jura into its own canton in 1979.

**Religious and Linguistic Conflict**

Through the extension of civil rights initiated by the revolutions, language differences gained in importance in Switzerland. This was especially the case when the followers of the progressive and conservative parties did not belong to the same language group. In the canton of Bern, the French and Catholic districts of the Jura attempted to break away from the old German-speaking Protestant canton. Unlike other plurilingual cantons, which developed linguistic pluralism within more organically integrated communities, the new canton of Bern formed from the addition of the Jura territory, was decreed by the Congress of Vienna. This involuntary arrangement proved to be a source of future conflicts (McRae, 1964; 1983). There were also conflicts in the bilingual cantons; in Fribourg, the German and Protestant district of Murten defended itself against the French and Catholic majority of the canton, in Catholic Valais, a civil war broke out between the German-speaking groups of the upper Valais and the more liberal French-speaking groups in lower Valais (Weilenmann, 1925:207-208).

The Reformation split Switzerland into two opposing camps. From the first religious battle in 1529 until the nineteenth century, the division between the two was clear and remained unchanged. The present-day cantons of Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden (both halves), Lucerne, Zug, Fribourg, Solothurn, Ticino, and Valais, as well as Appenzell Inner Rhoden and Jura, remained Catholic, while Zürich, Bern, both Basels, Schaffhausen, Appenzell Inner Rhoden, Vaud, Neuchâtel, and Geneva adhered predominantly to the Protestant faith. In Glarus, Grisons, Aargau, and Thurgau the two faiths co-existed.

Religious bitterness, which had temporarily died down, reappeared in 1815. This discord rose with the revival of the spirit of the French Revolution in the Switzerland of the 1830s, and in 1832 the seven leading "regenerated" cantons—Zürich, Bern, Lucerne, Solothurn, St. Gallen, Aargau and Thurgau—united...
to protect their new constitutions and to press for a revision of the 1815 Pact along more liberal lines. Spearheaded by the decision of the Confederation not to enforce Article 12 of the Federal Pact (which guaranteed the maintenance of religious orders in the cantons), seven Catholic cantons—Lucerne, Uri, Schwyz, Unterwalden, Zug, Fribourg, and Valais—formed the Sonderbund (or separatist confederation) in 1845. This conflict was aggravated by religious and economic differences as well as memories of former religious battles. The cantons of the Sonderbund were Catholic, rural, and conservative. They feared the prevailing liberalism of the Protestant cantons and the drive toward Swiss unification, which they saw as a threat to their religious and political traditions.

By 1847 the Radicals had a majority in the Diet and demanded that the Sonderbund be dissolved as being "irreconcilable with the Federal Treaty." When the Catholic cantons refused, the Diet ordered the dissolution by force of arms (Remak, 1992:5). The war was short-lived. The Catholic cantons were defeated in 25 days with a loss of only 128 men on both sides. The division between Catholic and Reformed has been a moving force in Swiss history since the Reformation. Religious differences, even in those instances where religious and linguistic boundaries reinforced each other, have almost always been more salient than linguistic ones in Switzerland (Linder, 1994).

**Modern Switzerland**

The victors in the Swiss civil war were free to lay the foundation for the new nation. Although it was in their power to impose upon Switzerland a centralized authority, disregarding the need of the religious and linguistic minorities, they chose instead to compromise between the excessive federalism of the old regime and the complete unity advocated by the more extreme Radicals. Although it underwent a thorough revision in 1874, the 1848 Constitution in its basic aspects remains the constitution of Switzerland today. Both the 1848 and 1874 constitution guaranteed the complete equality of languages by declaring that German, French, and Italian are the national languages of Switzerland. The constitution established a Council of States on the model of the old Diet, each canton being represented by two deputies. This Council allowed the linguistic and religious minorities—taken together—to have a blocking role in federal legislation. In the National Council, the second chamber, each canton is represented by delegates in proportion to its population.
Respect of the language territories, which have stayed constant for several centuries, has prevented a unified Romand nationalism in Switzerland. This is reinforced by a more than equitable representation of linguistic minorities in the organs of the state and military, and self-rule by one's linguistic group in the communities and cantons (Donneur, 1984). Although French Switzerland has tended to show lower rates of fertility than German Switzerland, this gap has been partially overcome by two important trends, in contrast to Canada. First, there has been a relatively greater immigration to French Switzerland from German Switzerland and abroad than to the territory of the majority language group, and second, there have been more language transfers to French in French Switzerland than to German in German Switzerland (McRae, 1983).

The provisions of the 1848 Constitution failed to put an end to religious and linguistic tensions. Religion again became a vital point of contention during the time of the Kulturkampf. The struggle between Liberals and Conservatives broke out in Europe following the declaration of papal infallibility in 1870. Radicals and Catholics in Switzerland were drawn into this struggle, which rekindled old animosities of the Sonderbund War. The revision of the Federal Constitution in 1873-74 was influenced by the Kulturkampf. The constitution of 1874 attempted to fully secularize the state by prohibiting Jesuit activities, banning the founding and restoring of new monasteries (both eliminated from the constitution by popular vote in 1973), requiring the cantons to establish confessionally neutral schools under the direction of the state, and allowing complete freedom of religion without privilege of one of the Christian faiths (Linder, 1994:19-20).

The most critical period for Swiss linguistic unity came during the early years of the twentieth century. With the outbreak of World War I, both French and German Swiss felt the pull of conflicting nationalisms toward their respective cultural kin. A deep fissure which came to be known as the trench (Graben or fosse), opened between French and German Switzerland and threatened to destroy the moral unity of the country. The Deutschschweizerischer Sprachverein founded in 1904, followed three years later by the Union Romande, were organized explicitly to defend the interests of German and French Swiss in the face of perceived threats from the other group (Stevenson, 1990:230). For the German Swiss, this included the linguistic assimilation of German Swiss migrants to French Switzerland, especially in the Bernese Jura, where it sought German schooling in traditionally francophone territory (McRae, 1983:44).
The Swiss Federal Council found it necessary in an appeal on October 1, 1914 to reassert "the ideal of our country as a cultural community and as a political ideal above the diversity of race and language" (Kohn, 1946:128). Carl Spitteler, a famous Swiss poet, re-echoed this sentiment in 1914 in a famous address before the New Helvetic Society entitled "Unser Schweizer Standpunkt." As the war dragged on, relations between French and German Switzerland became entangled with the issue of neutrality. General Ulrich Wille came under suspicion for his prior-German bias. In a letter addressed to the Federal Council on July 20, 1915 he suggested that Switzerland join Germany in the war. Arthur Hoffman, the Federal Councilor who headed the Political (foreign) Office, was forced to resign for his breach of neutrality. In the end, by deliberate effort and self-control, neutrality was precariously held together. The enormous cost related to mobilization and inflation precipitated a militant general strike in November 1918, that shifted attention away form the language Graben to the class division, which cross-cut linguistic and cantonal borders (Jost, 1983:134-138).

Twenty years later, when World War II approached, Switzerland found herself in a strategically more precarious but intellectually more secure position than in 1914. The rise of European dictatorships led to a reinforcement of national unity. Italian and German Switzerland recoiled from the savage nationalism propagated in Italy and Germany. Even the ties between French Switzerland and France cooled down after the establishment of the Vichy regime.

In one recent case, linguistic cooperation failed in Switzerland. The Jura region, once the northern district of Switzerland's second-largest canton, Bern, engaged in riots and violence for more than forty years. The Jura region contained a double minority--French-speakers practicing the Catholic religion in a Protestant canton populated by German-speakers. At the outbreak of the crisis Bern was 85 percent German-speaking and 15 percent French-speaking (Steiner, 1990:112). Despite the fact that there were long-standing grievances, with the exception of the short-lived period from 1867 to 1878, separatist sentiments only surfaced after War II (Jenkins, 1986; Linder, 1994). The separatist movement was triggered by the Moeckli affair in September 1947 when members of the legislature of Canton Bern rejected the Bernese government's nomination of Georges Moeckli for Director of Public Works on the grounds that the office was too important to be filled by a francophone member of the Cabinet.
The Moeckli affair ignited old hostilities and long-term claims of economic and political neglect in the Jura region. The overlap between separatist grievances and language was not equally distributed throughout the region. The southern Jura was economically better off and had a Protestant majority. The pro and antiseparatist movements, and later votes to create a new canton, closely paralleled language and religious divisions. Jenkins (1986:144-145), in his analysis of Jura separatism, found that the presence of both the French language and the Catholic religion were necessary for a commune to vote separatist in 1974. On January 1, 1979, after a long struggle—which included several referenda by the communes involved, the canton of Bern and a national vote—the three predominantly Catholic, French-speaking districts of the Jura were able to form their own canton. The southern districts voted to stay with the canton of Bern. The creation of the new canton has been praised as an innovative solution to moderate linguistic conflict. French Swiss elites exerted restraint in involving themselves in the Jura conflict. Even in the canton of Bern, none of the political parties had been wholly identified as for or against separation of a new canton. In contrast to Canada, “Swiss political history is noteworthy and unique for the fact that no significant or political movements have ever emerged to promote the interests of any language group or language region as such in the Confederation” (McRae, 1983:111).

The French-speaking Swiss are a slightly smaller percentage of the Swiss population, and are more heterogeneous in terms of rural and urban residence than their counterpart in Canada. In 1990 the almost 6.9 million Swiss inhabitants (including 1.25 foreigners) speak four languages, as well as several dialects. French-speakers are 20.5 percent of Swiss citizens (19.2 percent of the resident population), 73.4 were German-speaking citizens (63.9 percent of the resident population), 4.1 were Italian-speaking Swiss (7.6 percent of the resident population), and .7 percent spoke Romansh, a minor Swiss language spoken in a few Alpine valleys in the Grisons. Since the Reformation, the Swiss citizenry has been fairly evenly divided along religious lines. The French, German, and Romansh Swiss populations find adherents among both Protestants and Catholics. Only the small Italian-speaking population is almost exclusively of the Catholic faith (Annuaire Statistique de la Suisse, 1993:252-253; Bickel, 1994:46).

While Switzerland, unlike Canada, is not facing a separatist challenge, the decades after World War II have brought some critics to question whether the same commonality of outlook still prevails between Swiss linguistic groups. Some social observers maintain that there is currently a general “Helvetic
malaise in Switzerland (Imboden, 1964). Recent newspaper accounts are filled with the renewed opening of a Graben or fossé between French and German Swiss. The trench widened at the end of the 1980s, when several decisions split the two major language groups. Particularly important has been the area of foreign policy. In 1992 all the French-speaking cantons voted to join the European Economic Area, with majorities of up to 80 percent, whereas all but two German-speaking cantons voted against it, with majorities of up to 74 percent (Linder, 1994:175). Because the German Swiss occupy a large majority of the population and cantons, the measure failed.

For much of Canadian history there were two separate societies kept together by a centralized government framework (Ramirez, 1990). Quebec, from the times of its inclusion in the Canadian federation, has contained key elements of a submerged nation including differences based on language, religion, and history (Schmid, 1990) that has “gravitated between a concern for cultural survival and a messianic sense of mission providentielle” (Waddell, 1986:73). Switzerland, on the other hand, with the exception of the Jura problem, is characterized by an organic historical evolution of different language minorities, extensive power-sharing, economic equality between French- and German-speakers, and proportional representation of linguistic groups (Steiner, 1974, 1990; Schmid, 1991; McRae, 1983; Linder 1994).

One would hypothesize, then, that French Swiss would be better integrated into the Swiss polity, despite recent tensions, than their Canadian French-speaking counterpart. No strictly comparable surveys analyze the French-speaking language minorities and majorities in Canada and Switzerland. In the 1980s and early 1990s there has been a renewed interest in intergroup consensus and dissent on political issues and political values in both countries. The body of opinion data, while it does not ask identical questions, allows exploration of attitudes toward cultural diversity, the level of tolerance for intergroup difference, and the role of mass attitudes in preserving ethnic and national identity in Canada and Switzerland. The next section turns to this subject.

ATTITUDES TOWARD IDENTITY, DIVERSITY AND MULTILINGUALISM

Pollsters in Canada and Switzerland have measured the strength of multiple loyalties by inquiring about three major areas of majority-minority language attitudes: 1) the degree to which national and sub-
national identities are an important aspect of ones self-identification; 2) the extent of divergence and consensus on political issues and core values between language groups; and 3) the belief in diversity and multilingualism.

In Canada several surveys have measured national versus provincial identity, whereas in Switzerland additional sub-identities are important such as one’s community, language group, and cultural/linguistic group in Europe. A second group of questions in Canada examines attitudes toward separatism and various constitutional alternatives. No parallel set of questions are pertinent for Switzerland. The Swiss, however, have also analyzed the relationship between the four linguistic groups. Both countries are interested in the values that hold (or fail to hold) the language groups together. Finally, there are a variety of questions that tap the sympathy of linguistic compatriots and attitudes toward multilingualism.

Multiple Loyalties in Canada and Switzerland

A sense of linguistic identity, which for most French Québécois is synonymous with la belle province, is much more strongly felt among French than the rest of English Canada. As Table 1 shows less than a third of Quebecers in 1991 had a deep attachment to Canada, and slightly less than a half in 1994 were saddened by the thought of leaving Canada. In 1991 there were also almost 30 percent more individuals outside of Quebec who showed strong agreement (6 or 7 on a 7 point scale) to the statement “I am proud to be a Canadian citizen.”

Attitudes toward separatism are closely related to language and feelings of attachment toward Quebec rather than the Canadian state. Blais and Nadeau (1992) in an analysis of a 1991 survey found that francophone Quebecers are 40 percent more strongly attached to Quebec than to Canada, and the great majority of them are sovereignists. One-third of the Quebecers have divided loyalties between Quebec and Canada, and are strongly supportive of federalism. Finally, there remains a group, representing more than a quarter of the sample, slightly more attached to Quebec and equally divided between sovereignists and federalists.

Financial considerations make a difference in feelings toward separation, as well as outside events. In time of economic insecurity and recession, there seems to be a drop in support for sovereignty. A 1995
poll conducted August 11-14 asked respondents to choose, from a list of six topics, what should be the Quebec government's top priority. Of those who answered, 52 percent chose employment/economy; 20 percent named maintenance of health services; 14 percent mentioned the deficit; 7 percent selected maintenance of the quality of schooling; 6 percent said sovereignty. The pollster also asked respondents about voting intentions for the referendum on sovereignty. Forty-four percent said they would have voted against independence, 30 percent were in favor and 26 percent said they didn’t know or declined to answer (Montreal Gazette, August 17, 1995). The ebb and flow of support for sovereignty is also related to highly symbolic events such as Meech Lake and the Charlottetown referendum which are interpreted as a rejection of Quebec's distinct society, and reinforce a closer attachment to Quebec and consequently support for independence.

The attachment to a territorial sub-nation is not absent among French-speakers in Switzerland, although it takes a quite different form. As Table 2 shows, almost a third of the francophone Swiss respondents in a 1972 voter survey saw their primary identity in linguistic terms, against one in six for the German-speakers. A different question given to all army recruits in a 1985 survey found essentially the same results. Almost half of the French Swiss but only slightly more than a third of the German Swiss agreed that belonging to ones linguistic group was important, and almost twice as many Romands as Alemands agreed that belonging to ones linguistic/cultural group in Europe was important. A greater awareness of linguistic identity is consistent with French Swiss consciousness of minority status in the Confederation.

In contrast to Canada, both French and German Swiss are equally very proud to be Swiss (see Table 2). In answer to the question “Are you a patriot?” 37 percent of Swiss Germans, but 57 percent of Romands answered yes (Schwander, 1992:769). Although being proud of being Swiss or a patriot may mean different things to the two linguistic groups. In an earlier study, Kerr (1974:21-22) concludes that

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1One of the most comprehensive studies of attitudes between the four Swiss national language groups was led in 1985 by Robert Schlüfter. Approximately 34,000 Swiss male recruits, born between 1964 and 1966, were polled on their attitudes toward many aspects of language relations (Kreis, 1993:96). Switzerland has a militia system in which all able-bodied Swiss men are required to do basic training between 19 and 21 years old. This is an excellent cross-section, with close to a 100 percent return of Swiss young men in all language groups and cantons. The survey’s major drawback is that it excludes older men and women (although a non-representative sample of 3,500 young women was obtained for purposes of comparison). In contrast with Canada, there has been few attitude studies of the relationship between the language groups in Switzerland.
the Swiss Alemands have a stronger sense of specifically Swiss identity than do Swiss Romands, who express a stronger sense of linguistic identification. These findings do not necessarily imply that French Swiss feel less Swiss than their German-speaking compatriots. In fact, Fisher and Trier (1962:18) conclude in a study of the stereotypes that the two groups hold of each other that "Whereas a Swiss Alemand brings his Swissness into full harmony with his native attachments to the German-speaking part of Switzerland, the Romand feels, in a greater measure, a sense of belonging to the Swiss Romands and, as such Swiss."

Lüthy (1962:18) goes even further in this comparison, noting that:
A Breton, Basque, or Alsatian nationalist is very likely to be a bad Frenchman, a Welshman in favor of self-government for Wales will be a doubtful Britisher; in other countries too, separatist movements endanger national unity...But the believer in self-government for the cantons of Valais or Grisons or Appenzell is a model Swiss patriot, in fact the type of man to whom Switzerland owes her existence...All modern states have come into being through struggling against the regionalism of their component parts; Switzerland, however, was a product of such regionalism and has been sustained in the often serious crisis of her history by the local patriotism of her "twenty-two peoples..."2 Quebecers also have an attachment to Canada3 through Quebec, although too often provincial and national loyalties are seen in conflict, rather than complimentary, with one another. Unlike the Swiss situation in which strong cantonal and federal identities are perceived to be fully compatible, in Canada there is a lack of official support for simultaneous attachment to ones province and the nation. Often questions are asked in a format that makes the informant choose between loyalty to ones province or Canada. McRae (1983:109) observes that in Switzerland among the elite and at the official level there is a deliberate effort to "discourage and downplay identification in term of language and ethnicity as potentially

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2The extreme variety of Jurassian nationalism is, however, certainly an exception. This is not the first partition in Swiss history. Switzerland has been the site of three other partitions. The canton of Appenzell was partitioned in 1597 as a way of ending religious strife between Catholics and Protestants that had driven the canton to the brink of civil war. Unterwalden was partitioned into two halves in the fourteenth century. Basel was partitioned in 1833 as a result of severe tension between rural and urban areas (Reid, 1992:23).

3According to Maclean's/Decima poll conducted between June 9-13, 1994 of 1,000 Canadians--including 257 Quebecers, 222 of them francophones, there is an untapped and unexpected reservoir of attachment for Canada. Ninety-four percent of respondents agree that Canada is the best country in the world to live. Among Quebecers, the figure is 90 percent--with 83 percent of them confirming they meant all of Canada (Maclean's, July 1, 1994:16)
dangerous for political equilibrium, and to emphasize the expressions of diversity in cantonal rather than linguistic terms." This task is made somewhat easier in Switzerland since that are significant differences between French cantons in terms of religion, socio-economic status, and urban-rural setting. Most Romand social scientists observe that French Switzerland is not a unified block. Unlike the Romansh-speakers who are geographically concentrated in part of one canton (the Grisons) or the Italian Swiss, 95 percent of whom live in the canton of Ticino, the French Swiss are distributed among many cantons4 (Schwander, 1992; Donneur, 1989; Pichard, 1978).

**Political Issues and Core Values**

We turn next to political attitudes toward language relations between Quebec and the rest of Canada, and the linguistic relationship between French and German Switzerland. Of special interest in this section are the similarities and differences between attitudes of the French-speakers and dominant language group on core values and mass attitudes toward politics and politicians.

Perhaps what is most striking in Table 3 is the degree of disagreement on the importance of separatism and bilingualism between Quebecers and the national average. Almost 4 in 10 Quebecers put bilingualism and language at the top of their list of "the things that most divide us," as compared to less than a quarter nationally. Further examination of Table 3 shows that Quebec separatism elicits a much greater response nationally than in Quebec—with Quebecers seeing it as significantly less important (26 percent nationally versus 10 percent in Quebec). Canadians nationally and residents of Quebec are united in recognizing what divides them, about half put separatism and bilingualism at the top of their respective lists.5

Roughly three-fourths of Canadians outside of Quebec, and 54 percent within Quebec blame politicians for pushing the divisive issue of Quebec into the limelight. There is considerable agreement (about two-thirds outside Quebec, and almost three-fourths inside Quebec) that it is the ineptitude of politicians, or the public's lack of faith in them that stands in the way of a resolution to Quebec's place in

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4 A seldomly discussed "solution" to Quebec separation, following the Swiss example, would be to separate Quebec and the surrounding francophone areas into two or more predominantly French-speaking provinces.

5 Multiculturalism is named by only 6 percent nationally and 2 percent of Quebecers as "the thing that most divides us" (Maclean's, July 1, 1994:18).
Canada. While English Canada expresses very little support for a special status for Quebec, both language groups give significant support to decentralization of powers to all provinces or offering all provinces the same deal as Quebec. The majority of Canadians, both inside and outside of Quebec, would prefer a Swiss solution with extensive provincial autonomy within a federal framework. In this sense the political elite is out of step with the mass of Canadian citizens. McRae (1990:7) argues that "one special problem in the functioning of the Canadian system...is a chronic lack of cohesion between political elites and their mass support." This gulf between provincial and federal politicians and the citizenry of both language groups is a source of continued tension in Canada.

Table 4 shows that even though the German and French Swiss show relatively high levels of satisfaction with the political system, the Helvetic "solution" is not immune from a heightened minority feeling and alienation of the smaller linguistic groups. The French Swiss are much more likely than their German-speaking counterpart to believe that the relationship between Romand and Alemand is unsatisfactory (65 percent versus 44 percent) and to perceive that there is a trench between the two language groups (51 percent versus 36 percent). Tables 2 and 4 indicate that both Swiss majority and minority language groups are more likely to believe that government does not care what individuals think, and to agree that politics is sometimes too complicated than their Canadian counterparts. Since the surveys were administered almost two decades apart and the questions were slightly different, direct comparison between the two countries is not possible. The greater skepticism toward government may be related to the Swiss type of decentralized democracy. Voters in Switzerland are asked to vote on about eight federal issues every year, which are sometimes very complicated, in addition to 20 to 30 cantonal and local issues a year (Linder, 1994:95).

An examination of qualities that make one proud to be Swiss or tie Canadians together elicit different responses in the two countries. The questions and possible responses, although very different in the two countries, point to the difficulty of establishing a unique Canadian identity that cross-cuts language barriers. The health care system and hockey came out much higher than the two political responses: a national culture and bilingualism. Bilingualism was rated much lower by English Canada than by Quebec. Political qualities, neutrality and democracy, and the quality of life were named by two-thirds of the French Swiss and over three-fourths of the German Swiss. In contrast to Canada, in Switzerland there is a
common culture which exerts a powerful effect in moderating social conflicts and promotes stability, particularly in times of conflict between linguistic, religious and cultural groups.

In an earlier study (Schmid, 1981), I analyzed the contents of several history school books used in French and German Switzerland, in Catholic and Protestant cantons. There is a tendency to emphasize both sides of disputes. One particularly important theme was the need for mediation of differences. Toleration is a value that is very highly regarded by both French and German Swiss speakers in socializing their young (see Table 4). Attitudinal differences do not necessarily disappear between linguistic groups with low levels of intergroup tension in Switzerland. Linguistic boundaries do persist and may easily become sensitized on specific issues. In comparison to Canada, however, there exists a common civic culture and core political values and attitudes that help to hold the Swiss polity together.

**Attitudes toward Diversity and Multilingualism**

At least superficially, the relationship between French Quebecers and British Canadians is closer than between French- and German-speaking Swiss (see Tables 5 and 6). Exact comparisons are hard to make since different questions are asked in the two societies to tap sympathy toward ones linguistic compatriots. There is a noticeable tendency for the majority language group to feel more comfortable in Canada or find the minority more sympathetic in Switzerland than the contrasting feeling of the French-speaking minority toward the majority language group.

A more striking comparison between the two countries concerns attitudes and behavior toward multilingualism. In Canada official bilingualism is much more highly favored by the French minority than the English majority (see Table 5). Forty percent of Canadians outside of Quebec would prefer only one official language. If Quebec separates, the majority of English-speakers believe that official bilingualism should be abolished in Canada as well as in Quebec. This attitude is not shared by Quebecers, two-thirds of whom believe that Canada and Quebec should remain bilingual even in the advent of separation. A 1990 public opinion poll showed that 57 percent of English-speaking Canadians did not agree with the proposition that "in view of the dominance of English in North America, the French language needs special protection in Quebec to insure its survival." Ninety-four percent of francophones, on the other hand, agreed with this statement (Breton, 1992:23; see also Fleras and Elliott, 1992:160-161). Multilingualism is
such an accepted part of Swiss life that questions asking about official recognition of plurilingualism tend to be absent, even from works entirely devoted to language relations in Switzerland. Unlike the francophone minority in Canada, all of the linguistic groups except Romansh are contingent to countries in which they share a linguistic tradition.6

Despite a sensitivity of French Swiss to their minority status in the Confederation, this is partially offset by the willingness of the German-speaking majority to converse in French, and to assimilate to the Romand language and culture, when they move to French Switzerland. When Romand and Alemand come in contact with one another, German Swiss are more than twice as likely to speak French as the French Swiss are to speak German. This is in part due to the difficulties of mastering both high German, which is the written language of German Switzerland (and taught in the schools of French Switzerland) and dialect, which is the usual spoken language of German Switzerland (Schläpfer, Gutzwiller, and Schmid, 1991). German Swiss are far less likely to perceive language as a hindrance to living in French Switzerland than the reverse situation. In an earlier study of school children, I found that the preferred canton of future residence most favored by francophones were all Latin or mixed cantons, while the germanophone list included all the Latin and mixed canton as well as several German-speaking ones (Schmid, 1981:101-102).

We can conclude from these data that attitudinal differences between linguistic groups do not disappear, even in countries such as Switzerland with low levels of intergroup tension. We have identified a greater sensitivity among Romand which is characterized by a stronger linguistic identity, a more critical view of language relations and less sympathy toward the language majority than is characterized by German Swiss. Therefore, our initial hypothesis that French Swiss are much better integrated into the Swiss polity than their Canadian French counterpart in Canada can only be partially accepted. Nevertheless, in Switzerland there are mitigating factors such as high levels of pride in the Swiss state by both French and German Swiss, a generally accommodating attitude of the majority language group to the Latin language minorities, and a common civic culture. Heiman (1966:338) in comparing the Swiss and Canadian situation

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Language alone does not promote closeness with ones cultural kin. German Swiss are much more likely to see themselves as distinct from the German culture and Germans than French Swiss from the French and the French culture (Schmid, 1981:90-91).
observed: "Whether he is of French Swiss, German Swiss, or Italian background, the citizens of that country subscribes to one common political tradition. Such is not the case in Canada."

Several institutional adaptations deeply rooted in the political system assist in accommodating the diverse linguistic and cultural interests in Switzerland. The final section reviews the most important explanations advanced to explain the relative social and political stability in Switzerland, and contrasts them with intergroup relations and social integration in Canada.

DEMOGRAPHIC, POLITICAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL FACTORS PROMOTING SOCIAL INTEGRATION

Several demographic, political and institutional factors have helped to neutralize conflicts among language groups in Switzerland in comparison to Canada. Four major explanations of accommodating conflict in multilingual and multiethnic countries will be analyzed with respect to the two countries. The first explanation concentrates on cross-cutting cleavages. The second explanation looks at legal and informal rules for accommodating language diversity on the federal level. The third explanation focuses on decentralized federalism and communal autonomy. Finally, political accommodation and power-sharing is analyzed as a way to reduce conflict in multilingual societies.

The fact that religious, and socio-economic cleavages cross-cut linguistic borders is often invoked as an explanation of the stability and cohesion of the Swiss polity (Mayer, 1968; Steiner, 1974, 1990; McRae, 1983; Linder, 1994). This hypothesis asserts that cross-cutting cleavages such as religion, language, etc. tend to create cross-pressures among the population which serve to moderate the intensity of political conflict. One of the difficulties of this hypothesis is that it has become so popular and so frequently used in such a wide variety of circumstances that it is in danger of losing its explanatory power (Schmid, 1981).

While this assessment of Swiss society is probably currently correct, it has not always been the case. McRae (1983:117) observes that one can identify four distinct stages in Swiss political development since the Restoration in 1815: 1) a period of decentralized autonomy similar to the first five centuries of the Old Confederation; 2) a long period of Radical hegemony, particularly at the level of federal politics, roughly from the 1830s through the end of the nineteenth century; 3) highly segmented cleavages along party and ideological lines between Catholic and Socialist subcultures between the World Wars; and 4) the multiple, cross-cutting cleavage structure of the postwar period. The political system has operated with relatively low
levels of conflict in all these periods. By failing to take into consideration the changing hierarchy of cleavages and their successive replacement over time, proponents of the cross-cutting hypothesis are in danger of ignoring the regulatory processes previously responsible for the depoliticization or ontzuiling of the cleavage structure which are important contributing factors to the current moderation of inter-subcultural conflict. From a practical perspective, over-emphasis on ascribed demographic characteristics of the population also limits the possibility of transferring solutions to other more conflict-ridden multicultural and multilingual societies.

In contrast to the cross-cutting cleavages representative in Switzerland, Canada is currently characterized by two blocs in which Quebec is pitted against the rest of Canada. All the other provinces are predominantly English-speaking, while Quebec is predominantly French-speaking. While the majority anglophone provinces are either predominantly Protestant or fairly evenly balanced between Protestants and Catholics, Quebec is primarily Catholic. Quebec, therefore presently exhibits a situation of overlapping and reinforcing cleavages. The demographic basis for identifying French Canada with Quebec has become stronger over time.\(^7\)

In Canada the salience of language has changed over time. One can identify three major historical periods with respect to the importance of language. During the first period, from the 1840s until approximately the first half of the of the twentieth century, religion and language coincided. The second period, from the 1840s until approximately the first half of the twentieth century, religion increased in salience. During the early part of this period, Irish Catholic immigration gave rise to a substantial population of English-speaking Catholics. Religious issues were intensified in Canada by the importation of ideas from England. Quarrels between Orangemen and Irish Catholic, and the Catholic church's counter attack on liberalism produced a politics of significant confrontation. Publicly supported denominational schools, hospitals, newspapers, and charitable welfare institutions were established. "Linguistic issues might arise from time to time within the Catholic community, but the primary line of cleavage was religious

\(^7\)The proportion of Canadian francophones residing in Quebec increased from 78 percent in 1921 to about 90 percent currently (Brooks, 1993:250). The explanation of overlapping cleavages neglects the role of anglophone Catholics, who have played a bridging role between English-speaking Protestants and French-speaking Catholics. Cross-cutting cleavages has been less successful in reducing intergroup tensions in Canada than in Switzerland.
during this important formative period" (McRae, 1974:243). The final period dating from the 1960s and the Quiet Revolution onward has been characterized by the increased salience of language.

Unlike Switzerland, which has experienced a depoliticalization of cleavages, Canada has experienced an escalation of segmentation coinciding with language, religion and provincial boundaries. The changing hierarchy of cleavages in the two countries helps to explain minority attitudes and behavior in Canada and Switzerland. While both countries have experienced minority linguistic discontent in the last two decades of the twentieth century, only Quebec has elected a provincial government and a federal delegation committed to separation. While overlapping cleavages are important, an understanding of linguistic conflict and social incorporation in Switzerland and Canada is incomplete without an examination of constitutional and informal rules for accommodating language diversity.

The second explanation emphasizes the recognition of formal language equality and adequate political and social participation of linguistic minorities. Article 116 which appeared unchanged from the 1848 Constitution in the revised Constitution of 1874, proclaims German, French, and Italian as the official languages of Switzerland. This simple provision has been construed to allow for the complete equality of languages. Members of both Swiss houses of parliament are free to speak in the language of their choice. The texts of federal laws are published in all three languages, and all three texts have equal status before the courts (Malinverni, 1986). However, because Italian (which is spoken by only 4 percent of Swiss citizens) is the weakest of the three official languages, and is not understood by a majority of French- and German-speakers, it suffers practical disadvantages in both the public and governmental spheres (McRae, 1964).

In 1938 Romansh was recognized as the fourth "national language" in Switzerland. As opposed to the three "official languages," Romansh does not have official status in the parliamentary, administrative, and judicial spheres of the federal government. The group which campaigned for the recognition of Romansh as one of the national languages of Switzerland was aware of the burden and expense of an

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*The increased salience of language and decline in the importance of religion in both countries can be traced to similar factors. These include a decreased interest in religion, especially among younger adults (for Switzerland, see Schmid, 1981:109-111; Kreis, 1993:219-237); a climate of ecumenism, increased urbanization, industrialization, and federal intervention in cantonal and provincial affairs.
additional administrative language (less than one percent of Swiss citizens speak Romansh). By adopting a referendum to this effect, the Swiss people stressed the political importance of the Latin element in the Confederation. The federal government authorizes yearly sums for the preservation and furtherance of the Ticino and the Italian and Romansh-speaking communities of the Grisons. In 1992, for example, Radio Television della Svizzera received 25 percent of the whole budget of public radio and television, about five times its proportional share (Linder, 1994:24). Part of the success of multilingualism in Switzerland is attributable to public expenditure and fiscal distribution in favor of the linguistic minorities in explicit recognition of their otherwise disadvantaged status.

Although the informal policy of public expenditure for the language minority in Canada is less established than in Switzerland, formal equality and participation in the federal services have made significant strides since the passage of the Official Languages Act of 1969. Among important actions to increase the bilingual bureaucracy has been the designation of an increasing share of positions as bilingual. As of 1990, about 36 percent of positions in the public service were designated French or bilingual. A clear majority of appointments to bilingual positions are filled by francophones (Brooks, 1993). In 1962 the Royal Commission on Government Organization noted that the number of francophone officials was "insignif 'ant." Currently francophones constitute 21 percent of the management category and 28.1 percent of the public service proper (Thérien, 1989:34). This representation compares favorably with Switzerland, where 21 percent of senior staff, and 19 percent of the top management are Romand (Linder, 1994:23).

While formal language equality had been achieved in Canada in the federal sector, its institutionalization was achieved a half century later than in Switzerland. Linder (1994:24) observes that Canada, probably because it has a more serious problem with the linguistic minority, goes much further than Switzerland in requiring that every document be published in French and English. In contrast with the organic development of federal language parity in Switzerland, in Canada formal language equality on the federal level came only after a substantial threat to national unity.

Proportional representation at the federal level of French-speaking minorities has not solved the language problem in the two countries. In Canada, increased representation of francophones has not necessarily led to the equality of French and English as languages of work in the federal state. Outside of federal departments located in Quebec, the language of work remains predominantly English (Brook,
1993). In Switzerland, where the capital is located in the Swiss German city of Bern, there are complaints by French Swiss of the public service being organized along Germanic norms and work habits in which their own different mentality and cultural perspective are not always appreciated. For this reason there is a general reluctance for Romands to live in Bern (McRae, 1983).

Differences in linguistic policy between Switzerland and Canada are far more pervasive on the local level than on the federal level. The third explanation of conflict management in Switzerland emphasizes decentralized federalism and cantonal autonomy. The federal principal and the geographical concentration of the languages have given rise to the principle of territoriality. The four national languages are not only guaranteed public usage, but furthermore, each language territory has the right to protect and defend its own linguistic character and to insure its survival (Schäppi, 1971; Linder, 1994). The principal of territoriality is not expressly guaranteed in the Constitution. However, as the Swiss jurist Walter Burckhart has noted:

> It is now a tacitly recognized principle that each locality should be able to maintain its traditional language regardless of immigrants of other languages, and consequently that linguistic boundaries once settled should not be shifted, neither to the detriment of the majority nor of minorities. It is trust in this tacit agreement that provides a foundation for peaceful relations among the language groups. Each group must be sure that the others do not wish to make conquests at its expense and diminish its territory, either officially or by private action. Adherence to this rule, as well as respect of each group for the individuality of the others, is an obligation of Swiss loyalty. It is not less sacred because it is not laid down in law; it is one of the foundations of our state itself (quoted in McRae, 1983:122).

*Federalism has also helped to reduce the intensity of conflict in the Canadian context in two major ways: 1) by relegating some elements of intergroup conflict to various provincial areas or to joint federal and provincial level; and 2) by providing a substantial political separation between a primarily French-speaking Quebec and several primarily English-speaking provinces (McRae, 1990:199-200). The territorial principle is less ingrained in Canadian law and political and civic culture than in Switzerland, and therefore less effective in maintaining demographic stability and reducing language conflict on the federal level. The Canadian federal solution to the Quebec "problem" has leaned toward power-sharing at the center rather than decentralization and formal recognition of language territories.*
Swiss authors refer to the ability of the canton to regulate all cantonal affairs involving language as kantonale Sprachhoheit or linguistic sovereignty. Thus the canton (in accordance with the principle of territoriality) determines the official cantonal language (or in a few cases, languages). The cantonal language is the medium of instruction in the public schools. There is an obligation of the citizen to enroll their children in the local schools and acquire a sufficient knowledge of the local language. Even in the bilingual cantons the principle of territoriality finds further application in communal governments, services and schools. In predominantly French-speaking Valais and Fribourg, which tend to see themselves as part of French Switzerland and are sensitive to their minority language position in the Confederation, the minority-language function of local autonomy benefits the German-speakers which constitutes almost a third of the population in both cantons. Bilingual municipal administrations such as those of Biel and Fribourg are the exception, most communal administrations are unilingual. All cantonal laws and regulations are issued only in the official language(s). While compromises are made in practice, the cantons have no legal obligation to provide translations or deal with citizens in languages other than their own.

The consequence of the territorial solution is that linguistic autonomy is guaranteed. While restricting individual freedom of schooling and other services in one's mother tongue in the whole of Switzerland, the territorial solution has been instrumental in maintaining language stability and establishing French, German, and Italian (at least in the last decade or so) melting pots.19 Only Romansh Switzerland has lost substantial mother-tongue speakers as some communities have chosen the utility of German over Romansh as the official language of the community (Schäppi, 1974; Schmid, 1981; McRae, 1983).

In contrast to the principle of territoriality, which operates on the cantonal level, is the principle of personality (Personalitätsprinzip), on the federal level, which regulates relations between the individual and the federal government. According to Article 116 of the Constitution, in direct dealings between the citizen

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19The territorial solution in Switzerland has been important in assimilating the large second generation of foreign workers, and at the same time maintaining the relative proportions of the three official language groups in Switzerland. The children of foreign workers in Switzerland face more problems than their counterpart in Canada since Switzerland does not think of itself as an immigrant country. Citizenship is not automatically granted when a child is born on Swiss soil, and it is possible for foreign worker families to live several generations in Switzerland without the privileges of citizenship.
and the Confederation, and vice versa, the federal government must adapt to the language of the individual within the limits of the official languages. Furthermore there is an obligation of the federal authorities to deal with cantonal authorities in the official language or languages of the canton (McRae, 1983).

In Canada, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism explicitly rejected the territorial solution, arguing that because French is a "pan-Canadian reality"...bilingualism therefore cannot have a local or regional character, as in Belgium or Switzerland" (Gagnon, 1989:5). The principle of personality prevailed over the principle of territoriality. This conception of bilingualism, with the passage of the Charter of the French Language in 1977 by the Parti Québécois, has been firmly rejected by many French Quebecers whose linguistic laws have evolved progressively toward a territorial solution (Nelde, Labrie and Williams, 1992). The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights was widely seen by French Quebecers as an attempt to strike down Bill 101, Quebec's charter of the French language, and to reduce Quebec's power to legislate in the area of language within its borders. French Quebecers continue to be weary of assimilationist assumptions behind equal rights as "same treatment," which they believe erodes the position of French in Quebec (Laxer, 1992:206, 210).

Can Switzerland offer any guidance to reconcile Quebec's and English-speaking Canada's conceptions about the nature of the country, given the ambivalence about bilingualism and the constitutional impasse in Canada? While there are significant differences between the two countries several formal and informal practices have aided the Helvetic Confederation in realizing political unity while maintaining diversity. Two of the most salient practices are a guarantee of identity and autonomy of the linguistic territories, and financial help for economically disadvantaged language groups. These two practices may be more important than a constitutionally ambivalent "distinct society" status for Quebec. Recent opinion polls in Canada indicate that both Quebecers and English-speaking Canada favor transferring significant powers to the provinces. The costs incurred by the French-speaking minority should be taken into consideration as a federal responsibility if decentralized federalism is to work in Quebec, and other provinces with substantial French-speaking minorities.

The fourth explanation of neutralizing conflict between language, cultural and religious groups in Switzerland emphasizes political accommodation and power-sharing. Informal traditions embedded in the Swiss political and civic culture are as important as formal constitutional arrangements. Steiner (1990:107)
notes that "Executive power-sharing by language groups is a custom rather than a constitutionally or legally mandated rule. Therefore, the system can be practiced with some flexibility." The Federal Council, the seven member executive body of Switzerland corresponds roughly to the population share of the three largest language groups, and the four major parties. It is composed of two Liberals, two from the Christian Popular Party, two Socialists, and one from the Swiss Popular Party. This allocation of positions on the Federal Council has been called the Magic Formula. The federal council is led by a chairperson which rotates every year according to seniority. Each federal councilor heads a department, such as foreign affairs, defense, or interior.

The constitution provides that no two federal councilors may come from the same canton. But a complex network of rules, has shaped the pattern of representation. Zürich, Bern and Vaud have been almost continuously represented since 1848, with the Vaud seat assuring at least one French-speaking councilor. Generally there are two non-Germans, with a seat occasionally going to a Ticinese. Two Catholic seats are assured by the composition of the parties, the Christian Popular Party members naturally choosing Catholics. The Liberals and the Swiss Popular Party members select Protestants, and Socialists choose a personality whose confessional loyalty is not too pronounced (Hughes, 1962; Linder, 1994). Thus the collegial executive may be considered as an expression of the linguistic, religious, and regional differences within Swiss society.

Similar conventions for representation of the diversity of language and religion also apply to parliamentary committees, the judiciary, the public service and federally supported institutions, including the military. At the highest level the seven three-star generals are selected in such a way that there are usually four German-speakers, two-French-speakers, and one Italian-speaker. If a French-speaking three-star general retires, the search for his replacement is practically limited to French-speakers. Steiner (1990:109) observes that Switzerland operates to a large extent by a quota system, which would be unconstitutional in the United States. "According to Swiss political thinking, not only individuals but also

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11The practice of having all or most major parties represented on the Council has a long tradition in Swiss political history. The last step was taken in 1959 when the Socialists were accorded a proportionate share of seats.
groups have rights." A group's right of representation, however, cannot be enforced in court. Swiss power-sharing is part of the Swiss political culture rather than a legal right embodied in the constitution.

By sanctioning group rights outside the political sphere, Switzerland has been spared some of the current constitutional battles going on in Canada. Since 1982 with the inclusion of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the Canadian Constitution has acquired considerable symbolic value. The Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords enlarged the symbolic component of the Canadian constitution and exacerbated conflict between Quebec and the rest of Canada without solving the tension between the three principles of equality: between individuals, between the provinces, and between the two main linguistic communities (Breton, 1992).

The Swiss have attempted to solve the Canadian problem of the tensions between the three equalities, at least in the constitutional amendment process, by acknowledging that cantons as well as individuals should have an equal existence in the political process. The Swiss system has been effective in "non-centralization" because it is able to prevent new powers from being assumed by the federal government since all new constitutional amendments need a majority in both chambers of parliament, as well as a majority of the cantons and the people at a popular vote (Linder, 1994). Swiss democracy works slowly since proposed amendments often fail several times before being accepted by both a majority of cantons and the popular vote.12

Under the Swiss system of direct democracy, the electorate has the last word in most important decisions. The popular referendum provides a substantial check on the federal parliament. At the demand of 50,000 citizens, federal legislation must be submitted to the electorate for acceptance or rejection. The people also have a right of "initiative," which entitles any citizen or group of citizens who can obtain 100,000 signatures to propose constitutional amendments, which must be considered by parliament and be submitted to a referendum. Through the referendum process, the cantons of French, Italian, and Catholic Switzerland can combine to form a majority, thus enabling them to constitute a check on the powers of the majority. Linguistic groups are not formally recognized in the constitutional process. However, power-

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12This was the case, for instance, with women's right to vote which was first introduced in 1959, but was not approved until 1971. At the cantonal level, the majority of French-speaking cantons allowed women suffrage before most German-speaking cantons.
sharing between language groups and the recognition that groups not just individuals have rights is an enduring part of the Swiss political culture, and an important ingredient of social integration of the French- and Italian-speaking minorities in Switzerland.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Switzerland has been successful in accommodating linguistic, cultural, religious, and regional differences over a 150 year history because, contrary to the prevailing Anglo-Saxon model, it has rejected the notion that minority status is a temporary phenomenon, and today's political minority will become a nucleus to build tomorrow's majority. Our review of historical developments in Canada and Switzerland has shown diverse patterns of dealing with language diversity. While neither country was free from excesses of the majority language group, in Switzerland a strong emphasis on local particularism, linguistic equality imposed from the outside, successful techniques for conflict moderation and resolution, and the stability and relative equality of the language groups proved important factors with the advent of mass politics and the forces of nationalism, and centralization in the twentieth century. In Canada, a common identity among Quebecers was formed by defeat, religion, and isolation. Economic subservience, fear of assimilation, and the fragility of the French language in North America have shaped the current tensions between Quebec and English-speaking Canada.

Our examination of current attitudes toward diversity and multiculturalism has shown that attitudinal differences between linguistic groups do not disappear, even in countries such as Switzerland with low levels of intergroup tension. In both Canada and Switzerland, French-speaking minority groups have a stronger linguistic identity, a more critical view of language relations, and less sympathy toward the linguistic majority. There are, however, more mediating factors in Switzerland than in Canada. The French- and German-speaking Swiss are united in a common political and civic culture, and are equally proud to be Swiss. This is not the case in Canada, where there is a less developed common tie between language groups, and identity and allegiance continue to be strongly correlated with one's mother tongue and province of residence. Members of the linguistic majority in Switzerland are more likely to assimilate to the French language and culture, and speak French when they encounter a minority speaker than is the case in Canada. Plurilingualism, fostered by the principle of territoriality is an accepted part of everyday
life. Bilingualism lacks this acceptance in Canada, where it is much more highly favored by the French-speaking minority than the English-speaking majority.

While Swiss democracy is not perfect, it may provide valuable insights where sharp and lasting cleavages occur. The Helvetic strength lies in its solutions to the tensions between the three principles of equality, between individuals, between cantons, and between language groups. Social integration is fostered by language equality, decentralized democracy, communal autonomy, political accommodation, and power-sharing among the linguistic groups. The Swiss civic and political culture recognizes individual, cantonal, and linguistic rights informally and on the constitutional level. If Canada is to remain a single nation, it must also come to grips with the fundamental fact that French-speaking Quebecers are a permanent minority in Canada and North America. In such a setting, solutions that rely primarily on majoritarian principles can be divisive and dangerous. Social integration in permanently segmented societies requires permanent recognition of individual and group rights.
REFERENCES


### TABLE I

**CANADIAN MULTIPLE LOYALTIES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province of respondents</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Rest of Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Proud to be Canadian¹</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Canadian primary identity (compared to national average)²</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Province primary identity (compared to national average)²</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Satisfied with life in Canada (% agreeing)²</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Deep emotional attachment to Canada (% agreeing)²</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Canada is the world's best country to live in (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. All of Canada is the best (not just area where one lives) (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. The thought of Quebec leaving makes me sad/heartbroken (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2

SWISS MULTIPLE LOYALTIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>German</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Proud to be Swiss¹</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Swiss primary identity²</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Canton primary identity²</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. French/German linguistic group primary identity²</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Belonging to one’s community is important (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Belonging to one’s canton is important (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Belonging to one’s linguistic group is important (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Belonging to French/German culture in Europe is important (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3

DIVERGENCE AND CONSENSUS ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND CORE VALUES IN CANADA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province of respondents</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Rest of Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Quebec separatism is the thing that most divides Canadians (compared to national average)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bilingualism/language is the thing that most divides Canadians (compared to national average)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Quebec politicians are currently raising the issue of Quebec's place in Canada</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Quebec's future is still unsolved because of the failure of politicians</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Quebec's future is still unsolved because of the public's lack of faith in solutions offered by politicians</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Would agree to these changes in order to keep the country united (% agreeing)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) give Quebec special status and more powers than other provinces</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) transfer significant powers to all the provinces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Things that most tie Canadians together as a nation (% agreeing)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) health care system</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) hockey</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) national culture</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) bilingualism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Political officials don't care what we think (agreement - 5, 6, or 7 on a scale of 7)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Politics and government are too complicated (agreement - 5, 6, or 7 on a scale of 7)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4

DIVERGENCE AND CONSENSUS ON POLITICAL ISSUES AND
CORE VALUES IN SWITZERLAND

|   | Believe the relationship between French and German Swiss is satisfactory or very good<sup>1</sup> |   | A "trench" (*Grab en or fosse*) exists between French and German Switzerland<sup>2</sup> |   | Qualities that make one most proud to be Swiss<sup>2</sup> |   | Tolerance as a value important in raising children<sup>3</sup> |   | See Swiss political system in general as good or very good (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   | Government gives equal chances to all (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   | Government does what it likes (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   | Government does not care what we think (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   | Politics is sometimes too complicated (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |
|---|---------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------------------------------|---|----------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. |   | 35 |   |   | 51 |   | 81 |   | 64 |   | 20 |   | 53 |   | 62 |   | 61 |
| 2. |   |   |   | A "trench" (*Grab en or fosse*) exists between French and German Switzerland<sup>2</sup> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 3. |   |   |   | Qualities that make one most proud to be Swiss<sup>2</sup> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 4. |   |   |   | Tolerance as a value important in raising children<sup>3</sup> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 5. |   |   |   | See Swiss political system in general as good or very good (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 6. |   |   |   | Government gives equal chances to all (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 7. |   |   |   | Government does what it likes (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 8. |   |   |   | Government does not care what we think (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
|   |   |   |   | Politics is sometimes too complicated (% agreeing)<sup>4</sup> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |

TABLE 5

ATTITUDES TOWARD DIVERSITY AND MULTILINGUALISM IN CANADA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province of respondents</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Rest of Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Comfortable around British Canadians¹</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Comfortable around French Quebeeners¹</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Name Quebec as biggest complainers (compared to national average)²</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. If Quebec separates, Canada should abolish official bilingualism (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. If Quebec separates, Quebec should abolish bilingualism (% agreeing)³</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Prefer only one official language (compared to national average)³</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Favor official bilingualism (compared to national average)³</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Rate Canadians' ability to get along with one another as good or excellent⁴</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Shared values are more important than differences in language in binding people together¹</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6

ATTITUDES TOWARD DIVERSITY AND MULTILINGUALISM IN SWITZERLAND

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mother tongue of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>French</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Find French Swiss sympathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Find German Swiss sympathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Feel near French Swiss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Feel near German Swiss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Language is a hinderance to living in German/French Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>French Swiss converse in German to German Swiss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>German Swiss converse in French to French Swiss</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>German language is expanding at the expense of French in Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Large difference between German and French Swiss in art and character</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>90-01</td>
<td>&quot;Gorbachev's Perestroika: Records and Prospects&quot;</td>
<td>Vladimir Treml</td>
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<td>90-02</td>
<td>&quot;Gorbachev's Management Philosophy&quot;</td>
<td>Thomas Naylor</td>
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<td>90-03</td>
<td>&quot;Global Commodity Networks and Leather Sourcing in Argentina and Brazil&quot;</td>
<td>Miguel Korzeniewicz</td>
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<td>92-01</td>
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<td>John Charles Chasteen</td>
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<td>&quot;Why Nationalism? Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Identity in a World-System of States&quot;</td>
<td>Craig Calhoun</td>
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<td>93-01.2</td>
<td>&quot;Nationalist Movements in Advanced Societies&quot;</td>
<td>Edward A. Tiryakian</td>
</tr>
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<td>93-01.3</td>
<td>&quot;Nationalism and National Sentiment in Post-Socialist Romania&quot;</td>
<td>Katherine Verdery</td>
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<td>Horst Ungerer</td>
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<td>&quot;Group Identity Change in Post-Communist Romania&quot;</td>
<td>Doina and Nicolae Harsanyi</td>
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<td>95-01</td>
<td>&quot;In Defense of Area Studies&quot;</td>
<td>John Richards</td>
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<td>Miguel de la Madrid H.</td>
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<td>&quot;Comparative Intergroup Relations and Social Incorporation in Two Multilingual Societies: Canada and Switzerland&quot;</td>
<td>Carol Schmid</td>
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