A collection of essays on European language policy, each by one or both of the authors, are: "Lessons for Europe from Language Policy in Australia"; "English Only Worldwide, or Language Ecology"; "Minority Workers or Minority Human Beings? A European Dilemma"; "Educational Language Choice--Multilingual Diversity or Monolingual Reductionism?"; "Linguicide and Linguicism"; "A Historical Outline of British Policy for the Spread of English"; "Is India Throwing Away Its Language Resources?"; reviews of two publications on language policy; reviews of Normand Labrie's "La construction linguistique de la CommunautŽe europŽeenne" and Christina Bratt Paulston's "Linguistic Minorities in Multilingual Settings"; and "Language Policy," a proposed 5-year policy plan for Denmark, written in Danish. Each of the papers was written as part of a project on language policy in contemporary Europe, supported by the Danish Research Council for the Humanities. Some are papers presented at conferences worldwide, and others were written for publication. (MSE)
Papers in European language policy

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and Tove
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Robert Phillipson and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas

Papers in European language policy

EUROLING Project, Department of Languages and Culture, with financial support from the Danish National Research Council for the Humanities (SHF)

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Preface


"English only worldwide or language ecology". Submitted to TESOL QUARTERLY, special issue on language policy. ed. Nancy Horberger and Thomas Ricento, 1996 (RP & TSK).


Preface

These papers have been written in the framework of the EUROLING project. They represent a first set of attempts to stake out some of the dimensions and contours of language policy in contemporary Europe, and to consider what Europe can learn from experience in other parts of the world. The goals of the project were set out in provisional form in a previous ROLIG-papir ("Papers from the Round Table on Language Policy in Europe. April 22, 1994. appendix 2). The route followed in pursuing these goals took us to Australia for two months of field work in the autumn of 1994, followed by a briefer visit to Singapore and two months in India.

Each paper or book review is due to appear in a scientific journal or book shortly. Bibliographical details are given in the list of contents. We have also included a submission to the Danish Research Council for the Humanities proposing that language policy is accorded the status of a priority topic in the coming 5-year strategy plan. Several colleagues in the Department of Languages and Culture of the University of Roskilde contributed to this document.

This is not the place for a detailed description of our non-European studies, but we wish to record our deep gratitude to a substantial number of institutions and people who made our globe-trotting analysis of language policy possible and stimulating.

- The EUROLING project is supported financially by the Danish Research Council for the Humanities.
- Tove Skutnabb-Kangas’ visit to Australia was as the guest of the Australian Vice-Chancellors’ Committee.
- TSK’s expenses in Singapore and India were covered by a grant from Julie von Müllens Fond.
- Professors Michael Clyne and Anne Pauwels of the Language and Society Centre, University of Monash, Melbourne generously hosted our visit to Australia, and with Professors Jurek J. Smolicz (Adelaide), Manfred Pienemann (Canberra), Howard Nicholas (La Trobe, Melbourne) and John Gibbons (Sydney) provided for intellectual and practical comfort, and made countless arrangements for people to talk to us, school visits, guest lectures and lively encounters.
- In Singapore we were made very welcome at the National University of Singapore, thanks to Dr Anne Pakir, and at the Regional Language Centre (RELC) of the Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization (Edwin Goh, Director RELC).
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To all our heartfelt thanks, as well as to Ambedkar, the Annamalai family, Ishwara Bhat, Joe Lo Bianco, Jan Branson and Don Miller, Colin Bourke, Chris Candlin, Jean Clayton, Jean D’Souza, Devaki, Paulin Djité, the (Hans) Dua family, Costas Fotiadis, Pauline Gibbons, Barbara and Ron Horvath, Deirdre Jordan, Thiru Kandiah, the Khubchandani family, the (Ajit) Mohanty family, Panchanan Mohanty, Peter Mühlhäuser, Sulakhyana Pattanayak, Helena Pienemann, Giridhar Rao, Judy Redden, Ludgero Rego, Margaret Secombe, Efrosini Stefanou-Haag, Makhan Tickoo and Ildi Wetherell for making professional delights personal (and for spoiling us gastronomically).
Lessons for Europe from Language Policy in Australia

Robert Phillipson & Tove Skutnabb-Kangas

1. Introduction

Language learning is credited with a major role in forming the Europe envisaged by European Union policy-makers. The key document, the Maastricht Treaty of 1993, commits the member states to a policy of full respect for the cultural and linguistic diversity of the member states. Increased language teaching is to foster the "European" dimension in education, though what this covers is unclear. The treaty, like its predecessor the Treaty of Rome of 1958, has the full force of international or supranational law, taking precedence over national law. Such treaties codify the efforts of European Union states to concert their policies in a wide range of fields, now including culture, and to shed part of their sovereignty.

One can question whether the ongoing processes of economic and political integration and homogenisation are compatible with the goal of maintaining linguistic and cultural plurality and diversity. There are varied and conflicting interpretations of all such concepts and their reciprocal compatibility. It is therefore important to explore how explicit "European" language policies are, which interpretations of integration and plurality they support, and whether implementation of declared policy is taking place and likely to succeed.

Granted the current fluid state in Europe of policy-making for dominant "international" languages, official and/or national languages and a mosaic of other languages, indigenous or immigrated, it may be helpful to assess what lessons can be learned from countries that have attempted global language policy formation, where Australia is one of the most eminent examples. Australia is exceptional in that it has in recent decades moved from a harsh policy of assimilation and imposed monolingualism towards accepting the linguistic diversity of indigenous and immigrated languages. Whether the Australian policy is being successfully implemented is another matter, but few if any countries in the world have formulated a comprehensive language policy covering all languages internally and those needed for external geopolitical and trading purposes.

Possible lessons for Europe from the language policy experience of Australia will be explored by analysing how linguistic identity shifts as national identities evolve, the main features of Australian language policy, current moves in European language policy at the supra-statal and statal interface, by setting out some evidence for means and goals in multilingual education, and by drawing some provisional conclusions.

Exploring language policy issues is demanding because of the sociolinguistic diversity in each context, the intermeshing of language policy with broader social structures and goals, and because of the prevalence of fuzzy concepts and strategies. There is a need for a conceptual framework for comparative language policy analysis which goes beyond consideration of language in a few domains, and that permits valid comparison of fundamentally different sociopolitical units. It seems to us that this is precisely the challenge of language policy as an explicit concern. There is a substantial amount of documentation and description of language policy, and of language dominance, but our impression is that relatively little effort has gone into clarifying how language policy can be approached in a more rigorous, inter-disciplinary way, although there are significant approaches within political science, the sociology of language, applied linguistics, and economics and language.

There is an unfortunate tendency in political discourse and even some academic discourse to blur the distinction between politics and policy. This is a problem that many European languages compound by using the same lexical item (French "politique", Danish "Swedish "politik". Finnish "politiikka") for both. While we are not in this paper concerned with the politics of language, or political language, we do hope that politicians are interested in language policy, though we sometimes wonder whether this is so. It is
our belief that language specialists can and should contribute to language policy in a scientifically informed way.

**Language policy** is a broad over-arching term for decisions on rights and access to language and on the roles and functions of particular languages and varieties of language in a given polity. Such policies, and the decisions that underpin them, may be more or less overt or covert. Not providing for the implementation of a policy is mere posturing. Khubchandani's term for much language policy in India (private communication). Language policy is concerned with language matters at the collective level, whether state, supra-state or sub-state. Language policy is a super-ordinate category, within which fall operational concerns such as language planning and, as one form of normative regulation, language legislation. Both of these exemplify the more centralistic, government-induced or government-controlled aspects of language policy. Language policies in such domains as business, tourism, the mass media and entertainment (each of which may be state, supra-state or sub-state) are at least partially government-external, and may be overt or, as is more often the case, covert. Language policy is guided by overall policy concerns such as appropriate educational policy or the facilitation of democratic citizenship. Ideally it is guided by a will to respect linguistic diversity and the linguistic human rights of all, at both individual and collective levels. The formulation and implementation of policies which respect linguistic human rights (see the book Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a) presupposes a recognition of the reality of linguistic hierarchies and the need to mitigate these. Thus addressing the reality of the power relations between users of different languages is a necessary prerequisite for language policy to go beyond posturing.

**Language legislation** is the regulations at state and sub-state level which guide, specify and implement language policy. The European Union has supra-state rules for the choice and functioning of official languages, for working languages, for language requirements in employment, language use in commercial transactions, products, and the media (Labrie 1993b). In state education it is governments that decide on choice of language as medium of instruction, sometimes delegating this to a regional authority.

**Language planning** conventionally consists of corpus, status and acquisition planning. Language planning is necessary in a multidialectal and multilingual world, and reflects political and economic choices and the value judgements of the planners. Thus, to take the example of a state that has been more explicit about language policy than others, the French have done corpus planning for centuries (via the Académie Française), and have buttressed the status of French through promoting its acquisition worldwide for a century (via the Alliance Française, the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie ...). The French are currently seeking to curb the invasive thrust of English, nationally and internationally. One of their plays is a condemnation of the corrupt, bastardized shortcomings of "international" English. Paradoxically this seems to represent the French doing corpus planning for the guardians of English, which may at the same time be a form of status planning against the English language.

The conventional categories of language planning tend to overlap each other. In Australia there is an increased acceptance that Australian English exists in its own right, for which there exist appropriate corpus instruments (dictionaries, descriptions etc.). This may strengthen the status of Australian English (also as a commodity to be sold on the Asian linguistic market) and facilitate Australia's role as an Asian power, with much regional cooperation and many Asian students studying in Australia. In both Australia and Europe there is an intermingling of status and acquisition planning in the contemporary language policy exercise, and probably a lack of clarity in specifying how various types of language acquisition can lead to desired goals of multilingualism, as our discussion of education below will demonstrate. The EU recommends foreign language learning in member states for the purpose of facilitating the goals of the Maastricht treaty (the free movement of goods, services, capital and labour) while simultaneously serving to create or imagine (in Benedict Anderson's sense. 1983) European identities. The multiple linguistic identities of our children's generation are being forged in EU-funded programmes such as ERASMUS, LINGUA and SOCRATES, just as they are being informally shaped through the media and youth culture of increasingly mobile and diverse societies.

2. Would the real Europeans and Australians please identify themselves

2.1. Identity as a construction
An individual can have positive regional, national and continental identities, each cohabiting harmoniously, and with linguistic variation correlating with and constituting each. Education systems reinforce particular identities, and have tended to strengthen the dominant national identity and its standardized language rather than others. One outcome is that most people probably feel more strongly about being French or Danish than about being European. Efforts to promote European integration are implicitly and explicitly attempting to reinforce what is distinctive (familiarity with "other" languages and countries) and what is shared ("the common European heritage"), at the same time as major political, economic and cultural forces are generating new sub-national, national, and supra-national identities. A supra-national European political identity can easily cohabit with a national cultural and political identity (Waver et al 1993). Such identificatory processes are fluid and need constant negotiation and reinforcement. They will vary across groups (some Europeans are more multilingual than others) and individuals (reflecting different professional, social and experiential variables). Forces of mobility, technology and unification are compelling much larger sections of the population to clarify their supra-national identity as well as to renegotiate their traditional identities. "European" identity will take many forms for many years to come, just as "national" identity in Europe is diverse.

Approaching policy concerns in both Europe and Australia requires not merely concept clarification, and identifying who qualifies as a "real" Australian or European. We also have to ask what the role of language is in the unequal allocation of societal power and its legitimation, and to explore the capacity of dominant groups to set a hegemonic agenda. This is where an approach that sees many of the relevant concepts (European, Australian, integration, minority, ethnicity, etc) as relations rather than or in addition to characteristics may prove more powerful analytically. The hegemonic view is that "being ethnic", "being a minority", "not being integrated" and "not being European" are characteristic which "justify" the fact that individuals/groups which are "different" (i.e. "deficient") not only do have but should have less power and (material) resources than "non-ethnic, integrated, majority-group Europeans or Australians", until they have stopped "being different", i.e. lost their ethnic traits, become integrated into the "mainstream" and worthy of admission to the European Club or acceptance as "real Australians".

Comparison brings out difference. If some people are treated as "different", they have to be different from something which is implicitly or explicitly posited as a (desirable) norm. Our position is that differences of this kind can be more profitably understood if they are conceptually treated as socially constructed mutual relations between the definer and the defined, rather than as characteristics of the defined. This approach makes it not only possible but necessary to ask questions about the validity of particular definitions of concepts like European or Australian, ethnically/linguistically non-European or non-Australian, European/Australian culture or integration, and the language policy of Europe and Australia. In essence it is a question of who has the power to define and who is being defined.7

2.2. Identities, Europe and European

What then are the European identities or dimensions that the EU wishes to promote through many of its activities, among them its language policy? It is important to clarify who and what is referred to by "Europe" and "Europeans" (or by "Australians"). These designations of groups of people or places can be toponyms, referring to geographical places, politonyms, referring to political entities, ethnonyms referring to the ethnicities and cultures of the people concerned, or linguonyms where the reference is to people speaking specified languages.9

The toponym Europe can be prefaced by a geographical modifier, for instance northern or western, but sometimes "western" Europe refers to both north and west, and may include the south. Does eastern or central Europe stretch to the Ural mountains or not, including which former Soviet republics? In popular speech, people from the topographical fringes of Europe such as the British, Danes and Finns appear to regard their countries as lying outside Europe, but here there may be a blurring between a toponym and a politonym.

There are plenty of examples of suprastatal European politonyms. The "European" Union and the "European" Parliament now number 15 member states. Presumably the new members of this club, the Austrians, Finns and Swedes, regarded themselves as European in some sense prior to January 1995, and Norway may or may not still do so. The pliable nature of the politonym can be seen from the fact that the Council of Europe currently (July 1995) has 36 members, including Turkey. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), by contrast, included Canada and the US as founding members in...
1975, when 35 states were signatories of the Helsinki accords, whereas in 1995 the OSCE (Organisation on Security and Cooperation in Europe, formerly the CSCE) consists of 51 states.

What does the ethnonym "European" culture refer to? Or the "European" heritage? European Studies? Is the borderline between Europe and the Orient a question of Christianity versus Islam and "alien" faiths, in which case is Turkey really more European than the Maghreb? If what distinguishes Turkey and Russia from the Maghreb is that they are secular, is not Turkey then more European than Ireland or southern Italy? And how could the ungodly Soviet Russia qualify? "Fortress Europe" probably has elements of both ethnonym and politonym, conforming to the classic orientalist mould of Us versus Them. The others. There are manifestly many unclarities in Europe as an ethnonym, meaning that the concept Europe can lead to a diverse harvest of interpretations, as it did in earlier generations.11

What then of languages, and "European" as a linguonym? Are "European languages" those that are "traditionally used within a given territory"12, when "tradition" is an unclear concept in a world of change. when the "territory" where "European" languages are spoken does not have firm boundaries or coincide with the toponymic Europe? Are Finnish and Estonian, non-Indo-European languages, more European or less European than Panjabi or Hindi, which are Indo-European languages?13 Are only Indo-European languages or only the toponymically European ones of the Indo-European family real European languages, as is often implicitly claimed? When the architects and drafters of the Maastricht treaty referred to European languages, which languages were they thinking of, only the official EU languages. or all languages spoken natively in Europe? Why are European languages "modern" in education in some countries, "living" in others and "foreign" elsewhere? Why in schools is there the widespread pecking-order of modern/foreign languages, with English with the sharpest beak, French and German slightly less greedy but often going hungry, and most other languages, including immigrant languages, starving because they are not seen as "European"?14

Does a "European" language have certain characteristics, or is it rather to be found in the eye of the observer? By pointing out the multiple denotative and connotative references of "Europe" and "European", and suggesting that one needs to consider whether a designation is toponymic, politonymic, ethnonymic or linguonymic, we are keen to demonstrate that in this way we may be able to render more public and accountable the covert agendas of "European" integration, and the role of language generally and of specific languages in such policies. Definitions of "Europe" are often ethnicist or linguicist15, taking the dominant groups or languages as the norm and ignoring the rights of others. Such practices may be unintentional, which means that this process falls into the pattern of how hegemonic ideologies are reproduced.

Likewise, references in the dominant discourse to "minorities", "ethnic groups" or "minority languages" are often exclusionary: only minorities or certain minority groups or languages are seen as ethnic, while majorities are seen as devoid of ethnicity. "National" languages tend in Europe to refer to the languages of the dominant group, and coincide with official languages, while the opposite may be true in Africa or India. "All languages of India are national languages. No language is anti-national". according to Pattanayak, former Director of the Central Institute of Indian Languages (1988: 379).

A team of Scandinavian and British peace researchers has identified the following four political forces as being decisive in forming Europe over the previous decade (Wæver et al. 1993: 1):

1. the political stagnation and economic bankruptcy of the Soviet Union; 2. the revitalisation of Western European integration, initially under the banner of "1992", and latterly, and with much more trouble. under "Maastricht"; 3. the widening acceptance that pluralism and markets were essential ingredients for any successful modern society; and 4. the releasing and/or revival of nationalism and xenophobia.

There may be a contradiction between "the revival of nationalism and racism/xenophobia" and "the acceptance of pluralism", as the reference here is to market forces, rather than linguistic and cultural pluralism. When supporters/representatives of the European Union refer to "European integration" (2 in the list), what is generally intended is integration among the members of the self-selected Western European club, and particularly its elites. These have arrogated to themselves the use of the label "European". Neither eastern and central Europe. nor ordinary people, nor minorities in western Europe are agents in this "European integration" process. Within a very narrow definition of "Europe", the marriage between the plurality of market forces and the integration of European elites may prove very successful. But the integration and multiple identities picture is more complex when one considers the
entire population of Europe, east and west, south and north, majorities and minorities, with their rich diversity of languages and cultures.

In contemporary processes of integration and disintegration, globalisation and europeanization, regionalisation and self-determination, the sovereignty of individual states is being re-thought. Some states are willing to concede part of their sovereignty, either to supra-statal institutions like the EU (on language policy, see Fishman 1994. Labrie 1993b) or internally to autonomous regional authorities (e.g. Catalonia). New states come into existence (e.g. Slovenia, Czechia). A state may wish to concede part of its sovereignty to supra-statal institutions but fiercely oppose internal regional autonomy (e.g. Turkey). States escaping from one type of supra-statal structure may wish to join another (e.g. the Baltic states). Throughout the cold war and the period of decolonisation there was an uneasy marriage between the principle of the indivisibility of states and the right to self-determination. The relationship is now looser, and the principles should not be irreconcilable, in the view of the Secretary-General of the UN, but there can be no doubt that language plays a role in processes of statal, sub-statal and supra-statal formation. This is manifest in the complex mosaic of "Europe", where identities are currently being refashioned and old certainties challenged.

2.3. Australian identities

Australian identity too has experienced a major process of cultural and linguistic redefinition in recent decades. The continent of Australia has been inhabited by Aboriginal peoples for 40,000 years, by others for 200. The dominant Anglo-Celt group pursued a policy of eliminating the Aboriginal peoples, and assimilating or ignoring other groups, of whom there have always been many (Clyne 1991). Since 1945 a vigorous immigration policy has led to an extremely heterogeneous population. The attempt to adapt to changed political and economic circumstances and to promote social justice for all groups through a policy of multiculturalism (a term borrowed from Canada) was accompanied by soul-searching about the essence of Australian identity, its distinctiveness (geography, life-style, ethnic mixture, etc) and its relationship to the cultures of origin of immigrants (see contributions to Price 1991). Perceptions of Australian identity have fluctuated substantially, as has the tension between diversity and the commonality of Australian values. One dimension of evolving multiculturalist policies is language policy.

Australians of European origin are increasingly coming to terms with their past and the realities of the history of their continent. While European Australians tend to be regarded as having history, generally starting two centuries ago, the Aboriginal peoples have timeless dreaming. What for the one group is seen as "pioneer settlement", was invasion and dispossession for the others. European "progress and civilisation" meant subjugation and genocide for the indigenous population (e.g. Fest 1993. O'Donohue 1995).

One of the important concerns of the Australian national languages policy is to address this legacy. However, only a small proportion of the 270 indigenous languages of Australia are in a viable condition. Australian society generally is poorly informed about Aboriginal languages, their uniqueness and fragility, and existing support has yet to lead to any Aboriginal language being taught at upper secondary level, where 31 languages other than English are accredited (Amery & Bourke 1994).

The second is a recognition of the reality of Australia's geopolitical position in Asia, rather than considering Australia as a European outpost. and, because of this, a wish to equip Australians to function in languages other than English, particularly Asian languages.

A third central feature of the languages policy is a shift from monolingual assimilationism to a desire to validate the languages other than English that generations of immigrants have brought to Australia, and build on them (Clyne 1991). Multiculturalist policy has traversed several phases (Jupp 1991): euphoric celebration of cultural maintenance, and equality of opportunity and access (1973-78), a consolidatory period based on multi-party support (1978-83), disillusion and retreat (1983-88) under economic pressures, and ambiguity since then, with a wide variety of critiques that cut across a political left-right spectrum. The official focus (in the National Agenda for a Multicultural Australia, 1989) is on three dimensions: social justice, economic efficiency, and cultural identity, which includes "the right of all Australians, within carefully defined limits, to express and share their individual cultural heritage, including their language and religion" (Jupp 1991, 151). Such rights are based on the premise that all Australians "should have an overriding commitment to Australia, to its interests and future", its basic
democratic principles, and English as the national language (Jupp 1991, 151).

The official policy of multiculturalism is interpreted in widely different ways (summarized in Gobbo 1995), which exemplify the tension between diversity and commonality and the political processes through which Australian identities are being negotiated and legitimated. Mary Kalantzis (1995) sees such processes as involving a creative dynamic between the local and the global "in which negotiating cultural diversity is now a critical necessity ... access to resources and participation is increasingly articulated through the discourse of identity and recognition" in public life, in working life, in private life. Although Australia is not involved in a supranational structure like the EU, it is in a comparable postnationalist phase of changed technologies, media and work processes, and multiple identities. "Notions of nation that construct national homogeneity by suppressing varieties of language and custom are no longer relevant and can only be maintained with repressive laws and unacceptable, anti-democratic levels of enforcement (Kalantzis 1995: 5). In her vision of "civic pluralism", "every citizen will need to become a multilingual and multicultural subject" (1995: 6) and the state will need to evolve new ways of mediating diversity, a path that Australia has already adopted. Factors that contributed to this were a weak sense of traditional nationalism, immigration and the multiculturalist policy, an outward-looking economy, addressing the right of self-determination for Aboriginal peoples, and a commitment to social equity. Other analysts are less optimistic about the strengths of Australian democracy (Pilger 1992). Much of Kalantzis' argument could be transposed to the European context.

3. Australian language policy

In Australia there developed over a period of almost two decades a concerted effort on the part of academics, representatives of minority ethnic communities, bureaucrats and politicians to address issues of linguistic diversity and identity. These efforts led to a considerable succession of reports, and culminated in the National Policy on Languages of 1987 (Lo Bianco 1987). The mechanics and politics of engineering this consensus are dealt with in Ozolins 1993.

In Canada the process of initiating work on a language policy was set in motion by a sense of injustice and crisis (Laporte 1994, 99). In Australia this process was a logical outcome of a rights and equality orientation in the 1970s and later multiculturalism. Lo Bianco, the principal architect of Australia's language policy, stresses the mix of social, political and social psychological elements in a process beginning with a language-related group consciousness, and the demonstrable crystallisation of language problems (1990: 67-73). This involved a complex process of forming alliances across groups and creating shared interests, ultimately generating a new political discourse, a rhetoric of "national interest" and good citizenship which could reassure the established order while articulating a case for change.

Lo Bianco states (1990, 77) that a policy must blend together what is 1) intellectually defensible, 2) realistically feasible, 3) equitable to all groups, and 4) in the national interest in that it meets the linguistic needs and opportunities of the mainstream sections of the society.

The social goals of the Australian language policy relate to the four E's: equality, economics, enrichment and external (Lo Bianco 1990). Equality refers to the correlation between language on the one hand and social and economic equality or lack of it on the other. Language policy must serve to correct any systematic injustice, manage the linguistic ecology. The economic goal has to do with multilingualism as a productive asset. The enrichment goal draws on arguments for the cognitive, educational and cultural benefits deriving from multilingualism. The external goals bring in the geopolitical situation of the country, development cooperation, the transfer of technology and supporting bi- and multilateral relations with other countries. The relationship of the "national" interest to "international" interests is opaque, which the formulation of goals in vague political terms serves to aggravate.

Implementation of the national languages policy of 1987 has led to a major effort in a number of spheres, particularly ESL, Aboriginal languages, cross-cultural training, adult literacy, testing, second foreign language learning, and Asian studies. The volume of these activities, and the dynamism they represent, is impressive (see the quarterly Australian Language Matters). Many language policy issues have been worked through in the past 20 years, and the current focus is on implementation (Djité 1994). There are major contradictions and challenges (Lo Bianco 1994): does an avowedly multiculturalist policy involve a multilingual education system? How do particular language-in-education policies relate
to perceived economic prerogatives? Can the various constituencies and competing ideologies underlying the language policy be reconciled?

It is difficult to assess how successful the activities are in promoting the goals of the policy, and it would not be fair to expect major change within a short span of time. On paper the Australian achievement represents a significant advance for those who value bilingualism not only for minorities but also for the linguistically dominant group. Whether language policy implementation will achieve the vision of a more balanced relationship between English and the many European and Asian languages with a strong presence in Australia, only time can tell. The same uncertainty holds for the future of Aboriginal languages. A provisional balance sheet, on the basis of our fieldwork interviews and the extensive written evidence would stress the following.

1. The politicians and civil servants who endorsed the policy have been unpredictable in the follow-up of the policy, and have tended to focus on instrumental and essentially export-oriented foreign language needs (particularly Japanese and Indonesian) as opposed to indigenous bilingualism and its potential.

2. There seems to be a mismatch between the declared policy goal of equipping all Australians to function in two languages and the way language needs are seen in the business world, which is sceptical about its employees needing multilingual competence. This is an example of inflated views of theubiquity and supremacy of English, though Australia in fact currently generates a surplus in its trading in Asia. There is no simple correlation between present and future needs and the foreign language competence created through formal and informal education.

3. There are widely divergent assessments, ranging from enthusiastic optimism to disillusioned scepticism, among language professionals on whether Australia is really shifting away from a monolingual assimilationist world view, and on whether appropriate multilingual competencies are in fact being created in the educational system. It is probably also inevitable that there should be a range of views on whether the funds administered to effect the policy, by the National Languages and Literacy Institute of Australia, are being optimally spent, but an independent review in 1995 of the cost efficiency of the Institute was very favourable.

4. The high number of languages learned out of school, and the relatively high number now taught in schools as part of the official syllabus reflect healthy diversification and significant legitimisation of minority indigenous and immigrant languages. But whether this represents more than a quantitative increase in foreign/second language learning (for which figures are lamentably low in Australia compared with continental Europe) or a qualitative step towards bilingual education is in doubt. There are some early and late partial immersion programmes, where children (mostly English-speakers) learn content through the medium of other languages, mainly German. There are a few private schools where languages other than English (e.g. Greek or Italian) are used as media of instruction for part of the time.

Joshua Fishman was gloomy in his assessment in the late 1980's of how far language policy in Australia would contribute to reversing language shift (RLS) and result in fewer additions to the "graveyard" of Aboriginal and immigrant languages: "Unfortunately ... good intentions are not enough and the steps taken or about to be taken are either largely unrelated, non-productive or even counter-productive as far as intergenerational RLS-payoff is concerned ... Australian policies and processes constitute a positive but ineffective approach to RLS on behalf of recent immigrant languages and a negative but potentially effective approach to RLS on behalf of Aboriginal languages" (1991: 277).

Smolicz (1994) is also sceptical about achievements, but hopes there is a changed awareness of the benefits of multilingualism. Gibbons, White and Gibbons (1994) stress that educational policy-makers are still insensitive to the bilingual needs of children and plead for more informed decision-making.

4. The European language policy scene

The amount and type of foreign language learning in EU countries can be seen as a barometer of ongoing processes of "Europeanisation". Equally important is language policy at the supra-state level and the
significance attached to languages as lingua francas, working languages and official languages both within EU institutions and other international fora, private and public. What can be attempted here is not a comprehensive description of the considerable variety of policies at the state and sub-state levels in each European country, but rather an assessment of overall trends and the evolution of policies and practices at the supra-state level that are likely to impinge on language policy at other levels. Supranational language policy is fuzzy and unclear at some points, crystal clear at others. It is being played out against a backdrop of the language policy structures and ideologies of the member states, few of which accord much credit to any principle of multilingualism. Yet multilingualism, paradoxically, is a cornerstone of supranational policy.

There are parallels between the constitutional structure of Australia, with a central "commonwealth" level but education as the responsibility of the individual states (Victoria, New South Wales, etc), and Europe with an emerging "union" level but education as the preserve of each of the 15 states. There is a constant dialectic between the two levels, with many individuals (politicians, bureaucrats, scholars) functioning at both levels. As Monica Heller points out in a review, forthcoming, of Normand Labrie's book "The linguistic construction of the European community", what he documents is "the logical extension of the ideology of the monolingual nation-state, but an extension to what may perhaps be such an ideology's limit", because traditional notions of language and nationhood act as a constraint on the development of supranational structures and processes. A particular tension is that "while national bureaucracies mainly function as agents of linguistic uniformisation, the Community's bureaucracy exists to allow its linguistic compromises to function (through translation and interpretation)."

According to the Canadian sociolinguist, Corbeil (1994), there is a straight choice in EU language policy between free market forces and a conscious effort to organize European multilingualism. His study focuses on the onward march of English, but a possibility of German advancing, on inroads on national languages in particular domains, and on the desirability of the conflict between national and international languages leading to grassroots democratic involvement in language policy. He pleads for national and supranational language policy to advance jointly and harmoniously.

Corbeil's analysis is brief and programmatic, but has the merit of addressing the issue of linguistic dominance and the maintenance of multilingual diversity. His focus is though on the "big" languages, the struggle between "international" languages (essentially English, German and French - some languages are more "European" than others) and dominant state languages (like Dutch and Spanish), while marginalized languages, immigrant and indigenous, are ignored. His study is thus symptomatic of much work on European language policy that exemplifies how structural and ideological forces of dominance rationalize a linguistist hierarchy.

During the French presidency of the EU in the first half of 1995, the French government raised two language policy issues, each of which encountered major resistance from their EU partners, who were doubtless unconvinced by French advocacy of multilingualism when the hidden agenda is probably a strengthening of French and concern about the advance of English.

4.1 Working languages, the real supranational languages

One proposal was a restriction of the number of working languages in EU bodies. "European multilingualism" builds on the principle that the 11 dominant languages of the 15 member states (Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish) have equal validity as official languages. This is a vital means of ensuring that citizens from and in each member state know and can influence what happens in Brussels and Strasbourg. In theory the languages have the same validity and rights as working languages, but in practice this principle is respected only in the European Parliament. in some of its functions, and the production of certain types of written document in the Commission. It is scarcely surprising that France's partners are not willing to support a proposal to restrict the rights of their own languages as working languages. On the other hand there is evidence that parliamentarians appreciate that the logistics of working in so many languages creates real problems. and that EU bureaucrats favour a reduction in their number (Schlossmacher 1994).

The complexity of rules governing language use in EU institutions is analysed in Coulmas 1991. several contributions to Sociolinguistica 8, 1994. and particularly Labrie 1993b. who describes the origins and genesis of suprastatal regulation of language use. The principle of linguistic equality or parity between all official and working languages coexists with a de facto pecking order of languages.
particularly in preparatory meetings and documents, with French and English securely at the top. The suggestion has been put, informally, to the EU Commission that English should become the sole lingua franca, but there is major resistance to such a proposal, both on grounds of principle (parity, democratic insight and participation in decision-making), and political and economic clout (for instance Germany's perceived self-interest, Volz 1994). The multilingual principle was confirmed by the European Parliament in May 19953, but is likely to be raised again at a summit to prepare a new treaty in 1996.

It is mostly in the European Parliament that language policy issues are discussed. 231 written questions were asked on language policy matters over a 20-year period (Labrie 1993b). Thus it was a European Parliamentary report in 1982 that assessed the question of the expense of the multilingual operation of EU institutions. At the European Commission, the administrative headquarters of the EU in Brussels, the translation service in the early 1990s had a staff of 1700, 1200 of whom were translators, producing nearly one million pages of translation a year. The Parliament's conclusion was that although there were major costs involved, these represented only 2% of the budget of the EU, and were therefore a reasonable charge in order to guard the right to use all the nine languages. As Labrie points out (1993: 143), the cost of facilitating the exchange of ideas needs to be held up against the cost of other services which promote the free circulation of goods, such as transport systems and environmental protection (assessing relative costs and benefits is a matter that the field of economics and language is likely to shed light on, Grin 1994).

The expansion of the EU in 1995 to 15 members and the concomitant increase in the number of official languages from 9 to 11 increases pressure to further restrict translation and interpretation between all official languages in EU institutions. There is clearly a need for more analysis of the principle of "ethnolinguistic democracy" (Fishman 1994) and the de facto hierarchy of languages in the internal affairs of the EU. The current pecking order is perceived as serving the interests of the British and the French, but not the Germans (Volz 1994) and presumably not other groups. The attitudes of members of the European Parliament from Germany (Schlossmacher 1994) and Denmark (Haberland and Henriksen 1991) towards such issues have been studied, but in general there is a striking absence of empirical data on such topics and of attempts to clarify the principles that should undergird the system and its reform. The perspective of "small" EU languages such as those of Scandinavia has been explored, including the difficulty of their speakers getting a democratic hearing (Haberland 1993, Henriksen 1992).

In general there is an absence of explicit language policy documents at both state and suprastatal levels. There are supranational treaty rights for particular languages25, but everyday functioning is determined by rules of habit and constraints of budget and time. With 9 languages, the number of possible combinations for interpretation is 72, and with each enlargement of the EU the logistic problems expand exponentially.26 Possible future developments are not being consciously explored, except perhaps in the privacy of national foreign ministries, where the relationship between the national interest and "European" interests is decidedly unclear. Possibly the fact that most governments follow a suprastatal language agenda which is not explicit might explain why French proposals for change were met with such resistance.

Ammon (1994) has attempted to predict possible scenarios, on the basis of the limited research evidence, in an introduction to a volume addressing the question of whether English is on the way to becoming a sole lingua franca in Europe. He regards "English Only" as improbable, "English generally" as probable, "an artificial language generally" as desirable so as to restrict the advantages that accrue to native speakers of a lingua franca, but as a scenario that is obstructed by the logistics of changing the entire structure of foreign language teaching in Europe, "several languages generally" as a model that only speakers of the "big" languages seem to approve of, "polyglot dialogue", on the principle of productive competence in a choice of languages and a multilingual receptive competence, is unlikely to be practicable, "the language(s) of your neighbour(s)" could be good for the speakers of "smaller" languages but is impracticable.

Each of these scenarios would in fact need detailed scrutiny and analysis at the level of principle and of the realities of supranational language use. Otherwise potentially useful strategies will remain unexplored: for instance, polyglot dialogue is widespread worldwide and could be made "practicable". Use of an artificial language such as Esperanto is invariably rejected without serious consideration being given to the issue.27

The overall position at the supranational level is fluid, evolving and unpredictable. This state of affairs probably implies a strengthening of the interests associated with the dominant lingua francas, primarily English (for a host of reasons, see Phillipson 1992, the various contributions to Sociolinguistics...
French (initially established as the dominant language of the EU and in many ways still so) and possibly German (historically a widespread lingua franca in eastern Europe, Ammon 1991, and also in regional bodies elsewhere, Gellert-Novak 1994).

On the other hand support for a multilingual principle is not mere tokenism. In addition to schemes promoting the full range of official languages (see section 4.2), there is supra-national funding for the activities of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, which works with the "problems" of over 30 European "regional" minority languages, some of which represent numerically and politically influential constituencies such as the Catalans. Dónall Ó Riagáin, its Secretary General, sees the minority language speakers as the pioneers of European multilingualism:

Although marginalized in many senses, the speakers of the European Union's minority and regional languages are the original proponents of the new Europe which all of us are now committed to build. Bilingual before the LINGUA Programme was even dreamt of, preaching tolerance and advocating unity in diversity before Schuman and Monet were born, they are now building pan-European networks to promote cooperation and the sharing of information. (Introduction to the brochure "Mercator Information Networks. A resource for European languages", 1994)

The budget for the Bureau is minute as compared with many EU schemes, but the Bureau has contributed to focussing attention on minority languages and their rights. It has championed the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, which is a comprehensive document (reproduced in the appendix of Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a) setting out principles for the use of minority languages in education, the media and public services. Few states are so supportive of their minorities that they are likely to implement the Charter fully. However, it has major symbolic and norm-setting significance, even if it is riddled with escape routes for assimilationist governments (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994b), starting with the fact that it is left up to each state to decide to which minority languages the Charter is to apply. When states grant more linguistic human rights to "their" minorities, this reflects the success of a given minority language constituency (like the Sámi in Norway, Magga 1994) in asserting their rights. On the other hand a rhetoric of endorsing the rights of all languages, as in several European Parliament resolutions, contributes to a public awareness of processes of linguistic hierarchisation and to the codification of norms in international law for the enjoyment of linguistic rights.

4.2 A three language formula

In India the management of multilingualism is supposed to rest on a foundation of children in Indian schools learning three languages in schools. This was the political compromise reached roughly a decade after independence, in an attempt to reconcile the rival claims of English, Hindi, and dominant regional languages, many of which have as many speakers as the "big" European languages. The "three language formula" attempts to meet the need for local authenticity, understanding between the various peoples that make up India, and union ("all India") nation-building. In the event, the formula has been interpreted differently in the constituent states of India, and Hindi has not replaced English as the language of power and unity, meaning that the constitutionally declared language policy has not been achieved.

There are definite parallels between the Indian language policy experience and European language policy, where for several years the desirability of all EU schoolchildren learning two foreign languages has been canvassed. The second French proposal in 1995 was for the adoption of a European inter-governmental convention requiring all schoolchildren in EU countries to learn two foreign languages. Other measures frequently invoked are an early start to foreign language learning, and the diversification of languages learned in schools and in professional training. The proposal generated discussion and a resolution that merely confirms the status quo, which is that school foreign language learning varies widely.

One factor influencing French policy-makers is an awareness of their own limited competence in foreign languages and the lack of success of school foreign language learning. Research in the Netherlands also indicates that there is a tendency among relatively competent foreign language users to over-rate their competence. The summary of the annual report of the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie
for 1994 comments on the worldwide crisis in education, and describes the teaching of languages as "a planetary defeat that needs to be remedied". One wonders whether the British government would express similar worries. An equivalent verdict could not emanate from one of the smaller EU countries (the Netherlands, Scandinavia), where people are relatively more successful as foreign language learners and users. A report for the EU's LINGUA bureau echoes the conventional wisdom that foreign language learning can be seen as "the Community's Achilles heel" (Savage 1994: 12), but this ignores the fact that foreign language teaching in continental Europe overwhelmingly favours English - and this can be seen as desirable by English-speaking monolinguals and possibly others. This is perhaps a planetary disaster from a language ecology perspective, to which we return in section 6.

What the French are keen to do is to ensure that other languages are learned as well as English, particularly French, hence French endorsement of multilingualism. Trim, policy adviser to the Council of Europe Modern Languages Project, in a review of the European foreign language learning scene (1994), refers to the dead hand of the status quo impeding reform of foreign language learning. He suggests that the valuing of foreign language proficiency is closely associated with trade patterns: exports and imports from European countries represent a vastly higher proportion of their GDP, as compared with the US or Japan. (Similar arguments also apply in Australia). Also significant are the size of the country, smallness encouraging L2 learning, particularly if the L1 is not spoken elsewhere (Finland, Hungary,...), largeness often implying a perception of linguistic self-sufficiency (France, Britain,...). Trim also points out that in some countries (Finland, Belgium, Switzerland) the language of another group within the state is learned as well as "foreign" languages, this clearly being in the "national" interest, with possible international spin-offs, because the language is also used elsewhere (German is spoken in several states, for instance). Other factors that influence national language policies, explicitly or implicitly, are changing teaching paradigms, goals, and diversity in how different education systems dispense these; communications changes, which have eroded national constraints on foreign travel, and opened up mass tourism; multinational industries, satellite TV, youth culture; the appeal of particular cultures (stereotypes about France, Spain,...); external political relations; near neighbours; and the languages of migrants, which may compete as "foreign" languages.

The LINGUA bureau of the EU has compiled detailed statistics on the teaching of foreign languages in each state, documenting its expansion in primary schools and its extent throughout formal schooling, and noting that English is overwhelmingly learned as the first foreign language in continental Europe (Eurydice 1993), but as a later study for LINGUA shows, the data are "collected on different bases and do not allow proper comparison" (Savage 1994: 5). Language learning has undoubtedly acquired greater prominence, and LINGUA evaluations suggest that pupil and teacher mobility has increased, as have networking for the in-service training of language teachers (Shaw 1993). A report for LINGUA by an independent consultant on the current state of foreign language teaching and the impact of EU initiatives sees foreign language learning as a key measure for Europeanisation:

With the coming into force of the Treaty on European Union, Article 126 establishes for the first time a role for the European Community in the field of education. In discussions in all Member States, there was general agreement that it is right for the European Community to have a special interest in the teaching of languages. It is thought that national governments will respond more readily to a European Community initiative in the languages field than they might in other curricular areas. (Savage 1994: 12).

Savage's assessment (1994: 11) is that "most Member States have not yet reached the position of defining their own strategy for languages in a coherent form". It is in fact only in the Netherlands that there has been a major effort to create a coalescence of interest groups, particularly the business world, the state administration and scholars, in order to put foreign language planning on a surer footing (van Els 1992, 1993). Within each state there is a great deal of activity aimed at improving the learning of foreign languages. some of it spurred and aided by EU schemes. EU policies reflect a compromise between respect for "subsidiarity" in the sense of local responsibility, and global European perceptions and identities in the making. What exactly is intended by the reference to "a European Community initiative" is unclear. If one assumes that Australia's four E's might also apply in Europe, a fifth could be added. Europeanisation. One could hypothesize that this could be specified in terms of linguistic and cultural competence at the supranational level, but this has probably not yet been attempted.

Patterns of language use and learning are evolving fast, in tandem with changes in technology.
commerce and political life. Competence in using English is built up in higher education in smaller countries through its extensive use in textbooks and scientific literature, which secondary school has equipped students for, in addition to texts in the L1. Increased student mobility has had a marked influence on higher education in EU states, as a direct result of suprastatal schemes, ERASMUS in particular. In theory a “multilingual principle” applies to EU schemes, and LINGUA in particular is supposed to encourage the learning of languages other than the dominant ones. On the other hand the increasing use of English in higher education in smaller countries means, for instance, that students who come to Denmark for a term from Spain, Italy or Germany are more likely to use and learn English than Danish. The cultural benefits of study abroad are manifold and manifest, but language policy in this area is a hit or miss affair. A more active policy for strengthening multilingualism would be needed.

As yet the contours of any such policy are imprecise, though attempts to delineate significant variables have been made since at least 1990, particularly in France (Truchot 1990, 1994, Carton & Odéric Delefosse 1994). Hugo Baetens Beardsmore has documented and analysed various types of bilingual education programme (1993, 1995), and reviewed a number of supranational initiatives, which leads him to conclude that “there is no centralized language planning policy at a European level, nor is this desired” (1994: 104). Professional associations such as the Fédération Internationale des Professeurs de Langues Vivantes (FIPLV) and the Association Internationale de Linguistique Appliquée (AILA) have elaborated detailed statements of language policies for the future (Batley et al 1993, Trim 1992), with recommendations to UNESCO and governments. The general picture is one of a vast number of explicit and implicit language policies and a lack of coherence.

Possible coordination of policy between three areas in which the EU has funded a great deal of work, namely language pedagogy, terminology, and machine translation/linguistic engineering was raised in 1995 at a conference in Besançon, France supported by the EU and the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research (coordinated by Claude Truchot, see the preliminary report “Plurilinguisme: Quelles initiatives dans l'Union Européenne”). If work in developing terminology is to progress in parallel in all official languages, if computer translation is to be possible between them, and if a diversity of languages is to be learned, there is a need for a comparable effort of investment and development in each language, not merely the dominant ones. The preliminary report identifies obstacles in the way of forming a European policy (structural, logistic, psychological and political), and considers promising developments in each field. The conference made a substantial number of recommendations for submission to national and supranational authorities. A major effort, theoretical, pragmatic, and organizational, is needed if coordination and policy formation is to match up to the sociolinguistic realities of language use and learning and if policy goals are to be attained. It is unclear whether there is the political will to undertake this.

In India, several researchers have identified lack of political will to implement the declared language policy as one of the main reasons for the goals of the policy not being achieved (e.g. Annamalai 1994). As a result, the linguistic hierarchy remains mainly in place, official policies are posturing, and covert policies and influences largely set the agenda. If European language policies are to succeed, they would have to be much more explicit than what has been attempted in India and, thus far, in the EU.

5. Exemplification of multilingual policy means and goals

We shall now briefly consider criteria for multilingual education policy, in order to assess whether achieving policy goals in Australia and Europe is likely to suffer through a failure to take into account the available research evidence.

We shall do this by invoking the four E's named in Australia's policy goals. We shall then relate educational models which are known to promote high levels of bi- and multilingualism to the four E's, and consider their relevance to the implementation and achievement of declared language policy goals. This can only be done in outline, because of constraints of space.

"Early foreign language learning", which is being campaigned for energetically in Europe, is a policy initiative that largely derives from a recognition that foreign language learning in formal education is insufficiently successful. It is assumed that this is due to the age at which foreign language learning began, rather than because teachers were under-qualified, or the teaching aimed at passing written exams rather than communication, or could have been organized differently. The proposed solution, say starting at age 8 rather than 12, is thus based on a partial diagnosis of the problem, an inadequate understanding
of differences, similarities and interrelationships between L1 and L2 learning and between informal and formal language learning. It embodies an unscientific hope that the education system can deliver the goods without major changes. This also has implications for budgets and training.

As the practice of multilingual education has expanded, different models have been developed to respond to various purposes. The classic definition of bilingual education requires that the educational system uses two languages as media of instruction, in subjects other than the languages themselves (Andersson & Boyer 1978). We divide the types of education which have been labelled as bilingual education into three different groups: weak forms, strong forms, and non-forms of bilingual education.15

The non-forms are so termed because although they go under the name of bilingual education, they do not properly fall within the terms of the classic definition. They are types of education where saying "bilingual" is sheer rhetoric. The weak forms of bilingual education have monolingualism, strong dominance in the majority language, or limited bilingualism as their linguistic aim rather than multilingualism and multiliteracy. Some of them belong to the category of bilingual education in its classic sense because they use two languages as media of instruction. This is true of all transitional models. The strong forms of bi- and multilingual education have as their linguistic aim to promote multilingualism (or, minimally, bilingualism) and multiliteracy for all participants in the programme. It is only the strong forms of bilingual education that we shall relate to the 4 Australian E's.

Four types are relevant: the plural multilingual model (also called mainstream bilingual/multilingual), the immersion model, the two-way dual language model (also called bilingual immersion), the maintenance model (also called language shelter or heritage language model) (for detailed presentation see Skutnabb-Kangas & Garcia 1995).

1. Plural Multilingual model. The European Union Schools are the prototype for this model.16 There are currently (1995) 10 schools of this type in 6 EU countries, with roughly 15,000 students. They encompass grades 1-12 and lead to the European Baccalaureate. The schools have 8 to 11 subsections. The languages of the various subsections, which are initially used as media of instruction, are the official languages of the member states. In this sense, all children are considered "language majority students" and each language is a "majority" language. The students differ in nationality and language background therefore "plural". Several languages are used as media of instruction, according to a carefully planned progression, and teachers are bilingual as a minimum. The goal is that all students become not only bilingual but multilingual - therefore "multilingual".

The societal aim is clearly one of enrichment and pluralism, while the linguistic aim is to make students high level multilinguals and multiliterates, able to function in the EU and beyond.

2. Immersion model. This originally Canadian model has spread to many countries.17 Immersion programmes typically involve ethnolinguistic majority children, although there are some exceptions.18 Two languages are used as media of instruction, initially the students' second language, and the teachers are bilingual, even if they only speak the students' L2 in class. Early, partial and late immersion models aim to make students bilingual (or, in Europe, multilingual) and biliterate so that they can function in (and draw benefit from) plural societies.

The societal goals have hitherto related less to equity than to middle class populations maintaining advantages and privileges or gaining new ones.

3. Two-way Dual Language model. The bilingual immersion schools in California and elsewhere in the United States are the prototype.19 There are both majority and minority students in the same class, and both languages (in most cases English and Spanish) are used as media of instruction with both groups. with the minority language dominating initially. Again, the objective of this type of bilingual education model is enrichment and pluralism, and bilingualism and biliteracy, for both the majority and the minority group. Alternate days programmes can be seen as a sub-category of two-way programmes.20

4. Maintenance model. These classes/schools are often organized and/or requested by an ethnolinguistic minority community. Most typically they educate minority children using both the minority and the majority language. Initially, the students' native language is used for most content matter education, especially in cognitively demanding, decontextualised subjects, while the majority language is taught as a subject only. Later on, some (but by no means all) maintenance programmes use the majority language as a medium of education for part of the time, but in proper maintenance programmes the minority language continues as a medium of education in several subjects throughout the school.

For a few national minorities, maintenance programmes are a self-evident, "normal" way of educating their children, a natural human right. It is indicative that most minorities of this type, e.g. the Swedish-speakers in Finland, Afrikaans- and English-speakers in South Africa, or Russian-speakers in Estonia.
Latvia and Lithuania, are either former power minorities and/or are in a transitional phase where they have to accept the fact that they no longer have the power to impose their will on a numerical majority, but where they still have the power to organize their own children's education through the medium of their own language.

Of course, it should be a fundamental, self-evident linguistic and educational human right for any ethnolinguistic minority to use its own language as the main medium of education. A few indigenous peoples (who are mostly numerically a minority in their own countries) have maintenance programmes (see e.g. Black 1990, Harris 1990, Karetu 1994, Magga 1994, McLaughlin 1992, McLaughlin & Tierney (eds.) 1993, Stairs 1988, Vorih & Rosier 1978 for examples). Most of them do not (see e.g. Hamel 1994a, b). Most immigrant and refugee minority children do not have access to maintenance programmes either, even if it has been shown that such programmes result in high levels of bi/multilingualism, enhanced school achievement and more societal equity.

The purpose of this type of multilingual programme is to ensure that language minority children continue to maintain and develop their mother tongue up to either a native level (national minorities, indigenous peoples) or at least near-native (immigrant minorities), learn the majority language at a native level, become biliterate, and achieve academically. In a European context, they typically also learn further foreign languages. This type of multilingual programme enriches society at large by ensuring that minorities gain access to the linguistic and educational prerequisites for social, economic and political integration.

Although the strong forms of multilingual education have different sociolinguistic realities with regard to the linguistic background of the students and the language(s) of the classroom, and different sociopolitical realities with regard to the power relations between the groups attending and the rest of society, they all share an aim of cultural and linguistic pluralism, with the multilingualism and multiliteracy of students as an avowed minimum aim.

The reasons for choosing bilingual or multilingual education often vary for diverse groups. Some have recognized multilingual education as a means to make their own children bilingual, thereby improving opportunities for doing business, getting ahead and maintaining privileges. Immersion programmes, the European Schools and International Schools are examples of this approach.

For other groups, multilingual education represents a means to better understanding of other ethnolinguistic groups with which they are in contact. Immersion programmes and two-way programmes may have an element of this "integrative" motivation.

For others, such as threatened ethnolinguistic groups, multilingual education represents a means of linguistic survival. Maintenance/language shelter programmes or revitalization programmes for minorities, e.g. the Frisian schools in the Netherlands or the Finnish schools in Sweden or Kōhanga Reo programmes in New Zealand, are of this type.

Yet another use of bilingual education has been the provision of education in the mother tongue to ethnolinguistic groups which had previously been excluded from equal educational opportunity. Again, maintenance and two-way programmes may belong in this category. Education in some African countries might be considered a type of maintenance programme.

Thus the reasons for using two languages in education vary greatly. as do the goals. among which are ethnolinguistic survival, and an increase of knowledge and potential economic gains, of improved educational opportunity, or of increased mutual understanding. Many programmes are multipurpose and combine several of the goals.

If we relate the educational models presented here to the four E's, they can be characterized, admittedly oversimplifying somewhat, as follows:

Immersion programmes work against the equality goal. They support the enrichment goal and the economic goal for the participants in the programmes but not for the rest of the society. Several European countries have started or are starting immersion programmes. Australia also has some.

Maintenance or language shelter programmes for minorities support the equality goal and the enrichment goal for the minorities themselves, and help them economically. but do not do anything for majorities directly. Indirectly majorities benefit because maintenance models aid a better integration of minorities into the broader society. as Mohanty (1994) shows.

Two-way programmes and the European Schools plural multilingual models can function as the solution for the educational system, supporting all four goals. but certain preconditions have to be met first. to be outlined below.
Several European countries have maintenance programmes for the most established national minorities, and are building them up for some indigenous peoples. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages can provide some support for national minorities, but the open question is whether all national minorities will be accepted as such. Several countries are contesting the principle for some minorities (e.g. Sweden for Finns, Italy for Sardinians, France and Greece for most, and the Turks deny that they have any minorities). A few European countries have maintenance programmes for some immigrated minorities, but they are contested in most countries and have to struggle to survive. Australia does not have full maintenance programmes for any minorities or indigenous peoples in the state-financed education system.

Neither Europe nor Australia has proper two-way programmes, and no variant of the European Schools model exists in Australia. Europe has more experimentation (including immersion programmes, which abound in Finland and Catalonia and are rapidly spreading in other European countries) than Australia (which has some immersion programmes - see section 3 above). Neither Europe nor Australia has large-scale programmes which would make everybody multilingual at a high level. In both, the likely long-term consequence of the most widespread minority education for immigrants is linguistic genocide. Majorities undergo education which represents monolingual reductionism, possibly with a leavening of additive foreign language learning. Several European countries offer more appropriate education than does Australia to indigenous peoples (which Australia also has) and national minorities (which, in the strict sense, Australia does not have), despite Australia's much more diversity-oriented rhetoric. On the other hand, many European countries work directly against the four E's in relation to immigrant minorities, and have still a negative, fairly openly expressed, strongly assimilationist ideology, with some racist overtones. This is not the case in Australia's rhetoric, and there are more grounds for hope in Australia than in most European countries that the gap between rhetoric and so far rather patchy implementation will be bridged.

6. Analogies between Europe and Australia, lessons?

We shall in conclusion draw some of these many threads together into a set of tentative generalizations. As might be expected, it is not so much a case of there being lessons for Europe from the Australian language policy exercise but of analogies and pointers in both directions.

(a). Both Europe and Australia are experiencing political uncertainty and redefinitions of national cultures and identities vis-a-vis the international. Does Danish identity include or exclude a European Union identity, which may or may not be federal? Is Australian identity monarchist or republican, and how far is it Asian? Is language identity a central constituent of all of these? These tendencies, and the education policies derived from them, may consolidate elite multilingualism (business, political or academic) and entrench monolingualism as the hallmark of both more marginal groups and those who believe English unlocks all the world's secrets. The Australian language policy exercise has unquestionably been helpful and productive in bringing language policy into mainstream political discourse, even if many of the outstanding problems remain. Whether a comparable development can be anticipated in Europe is unclear.

(b). "Internationalisation" pressures, typically associated with "international" languages (which of course are national somewhere) are intensifying. There is in parallel a process of increased legitimacy for some minority identities (those of speakers of national regional or minority languages in Europe and of Aboriginal groups in Australia). The corresponding language rights seem to be forthcoming in Europe through the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages for some groups (e.g. Frisian in the Netherlands) but not in Australia. However, the social context is still one of the marginalisation of many minorities and widespread racism towards immigrants/foreign nationals in Europe and towards Aboriginal peoples and some immigrant minorities in Australia. Also indicative of a lack of sociolinguistic awareness are the widespread ignorance of the languages of the Deaf Communities\(^4\), resistance to minority rights (e.g. France, Turkey) and to immigrated minorities developing into new national ethnic minorities (e.g. Finns in Sweden\(^5\)), and to groups or communities peoples naming themselves and their languages (e.g. Macedonians). The Australian attempt to more visibly legitimate the presence of and promote the learning of (some) immigrant languages for all (not only and not specifically native speakers) in schools could well be helpful in the European context, where these are generally deprived of any rights, though in several countries some figure as "foreign" language subjects in
(c). There is an intensification of *market pressures* in the economy and the media ("globalisation"). in education systems (privatisation, "internationalisation"), while simultaneously a rhetoric of human rights and social justice is articulated (e.g. Maastricht, Australian equity). In both the European and Australian contexts it appears that language learning for general educational purposes is increasingly subordinated to language learning for potential export earnings. This does not mean that cultural dimensions of foreign language learning are forgotten, but the inspiration appears to be a Thatcherite ideology of virtuous "liberalisation", which promotes linguistic imperialism, particularly that of English, and militates against an equitable ecology of language (as advocated, for instance by Mühhäusler 1995 and Tsuda 1994). The Australian catchphrase "productive diversity" is a clever play on words on this theme.

(d). As one element dovetailing with these tendencies, there is a recognition by policy-makers (except for some diehard monolingual English-speakers) that *multilingual competence* really is essential (in the EU, two foreign languages for all, in Australia, a second language for all). This leads to a substantial investment in foreign language learning, but fundamental ambivalences remain unresolved, such as whether ethnic minority languages belong in the mainstream curriculum; how the learning of "international" languages can be in the national interest, more specifically why the French and Germans should invest in the learning of a language (English) that threatens their cultural identity; and ultimately what cultural and linguistic diversity mean for the individual, the group and the wider community.

(e). One of the challenges in both contexts is for *multilingual and multicultural education* to be organized in ways which help to resolve the contradiction between models which make elites multilingual and models which prevent minorities or powerless groups from reaching high levels of multilingualism. Linguistic plurality and multilingualism have to be seen as enriching, positive, normal and necessary for all, not only for minorities or majority elites. They must not be seen as a deficits, negative, abnormal, avoidable. where bilingual education is equated with "language X + English" (or another dominant language). Multilingual education has to encompass more than L1 + one "big" language (or two), in schools which are accessible to all, not only elites. Minority groups should be offered appropriate support for learning their L1s and the dominant language and foreign languages. Equality goals, economic and political, must not remain mere postures or the preserve of a small set of members of western European, North American or Japanese clubs, but should be implemented widely.

(f). Popular myths and misconceptions about language, the role of native speakers, and what can be achieved through school foreign language learning are widespread. There is, for instance, a naive faith that if foreign language learning is started earlier, more or less in its existing form (with a quick fix from LINGUA), or if the languages to be learned are changed (a switch from French to an Asian language in Australia, or from Russian to English in eastern Europe), education can deliver the goods: enhanced success in the market economy, intercultural understanding, democracy and human rights, and a common European identity in Europe, a diversified Australian identity. Efforts to ensure that all European children become functionally trilingual need to focus on diversification of the languages to be learned and a range of learning routes, among them strong forms of multilingual education.

(g). *English* is seen as a *panacea* in continental Europe, as it is elsewhere. The arguments in favour of such a potentially lucrative language competence are so vague, abstract and intuitively obvious that there is an uncritical linguist glorification and favouring of this language, an implicit or explicit correlative stigmatization of many other languages, and a hegemonic rationalisation of the overall language hierarchy, which frustrates the exploration of alternative models of multilingual competence. Many of the arguments are false, or favour a privileged minority (Phillipson 1992. chapter 9, Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1994). The Dutch National Action Programme on Foreign Languages documents that the popular assumption that English will serve anyone's purpose anywhere is "insufficiently supported" (van Els 1992: 71). "Almost everyone also needs German, and in view of the rapid internationalization of a great many jobs it is extremely desirable that more Dutch people should also learn French or Spanish" (van Els 1992: 21). In Australia an excessive focus on Japanese or Indonesian could fall into the same pattern. If linguistic and cultural imperialism are not counterbalanced, "multilingualism" will result in the integration of English-speaking elites worldwide who are unlikely to favour a more equitable global integration and power-sharing.

The Japanese scholar, Yukio Tsuda, brings many of these elements together by postulating that ultimately we have to choose between a "diffusion of English" paradigm and a "language ecology" paradigm. which he sees as characterized by the following (1994: 49-61):
The diffusion of English paradigm
- capitalism
- science and technology
- modernization
- monolingualism
- ideological globalization and internationalization
- transnationalization
- Americanization and homogenization of world culture
- linguistic, cultural and media imperialism

Ecology of language paradigm
- a human rights perspective
- equality in communication
- multilingualism
- maintenance of languages and cultures
- protection of national sovereignties
- promotion of foreign language education.

We see multilingual education models, i.e. advanced versions of the strong models above, as working mainly within a language ecology paradigm, and preferable to education systems which reproduce unequal power structures. The fact that they may be morally more acceptable and scientifically sound does not mean that they will spread by themselves, except where the prerequisites for major language policy changes are present or can be created. Just as racism, classism, sexism and imperialism are not information problems (if we as researchers inform the politicians about problems and scientifically sound solutions, they will make laws and regulations accordingly, and everybody will live happily ever after). Language policy is at the cutting edge of competing political and economic interests, national and supranational. As the Australian and European experience show, the number of variables, scientific, pragmatic and political, is large but essentially finite and identifiable, and it is in unravelling these variables that language policy work in future should have much to contribute, and for which a multidisciplinary applied linguistics is needed. As "Australian identity" and "European identity" change, educational, social and economic dimensions of language policy can validate language competence and cultural competence in terms of rights and resources which will in turn generate more equity locally and globally. A more differentiated description of goals and means will mean that the necessary implications for implementation and the concomitant allocation of resources can be specified more exactly. If we do not wish to let the politicians set the language policy agenda undisturbed by scholarship, we need to make our own agendas clearer and to refine our persuasive skills in formulating counter-hegemonic beliefs and influencing a much wider audience than the academic community.
Notes:

1. Relevant extracts from the Maastricht Treaty, 1992 (with effect from 1 January 1993) are the sections on education, training and youth, and culture:

"... The EC will encourage co-operation between member states in the fields of education, vocational training and youth. If necessary, the EC will support and supplement their action. It will fully respect the cultural and linguistic diversity of the member states, and their responsibility for the content of teaching and the organisation of education systems. EC action will be aimed at developing the European dimension in education, particularly through encouraging the teaching of languages, the mobility of students and teachers, the recognition of diplomas, co-operation, exchanges of information, and youth exchanges. The council will adopt incentive measures, but the harmonisation of laws and regulations of the member states is excluded. The council will do this on a qualified majority vote, while the parliament will have a right of amendment and veto."

"... The community will contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the member states, while respecting their national and regional diversity. At the same time it will bring the common cultural heritage to the fore. Action by the community will be aimed at encouraging cooperation between member states. If necessary, it will also support and supplement their action to improve knowledge of the history of the European peoples, conservation of cultural heritage of European significance, non-commercial cultural exchanges, and artistic and literary creation ..."

2. Beernaert and Sander (1994, 1) focus on this conceptual unclarity and the lack of a "generally accepted definition of what is meant by the European dimension." See also Comparative Education Review 36:1, 1992. In the work of the "Standing Conference" of European Ministers of Education, under the aegis of the Council of Europe (reported in its Education Newsletter, e.g. 5/94), the primary thrust for Europeanization appears to be school links and exchanges, which are being encouraged in order to promote understanding, open-mindedness, etc.

3. Several political science approaches are presented in Weinstein 1990 and the thematic number of the International Journal of the Sociology of Language, volume 103 (1993), on "Language in Power". There is of course a substantial literature on the politics of language in particular countries, e.g. McRae 1983 and 1986 on Switzerland and Belgium. The 1994 Annual Review of Applied Linguistics is devoted to language policy and planning, with an overview article by the editor, Grabe. Few papers are theoretically explicit. The volume is eclectic, and uneven in quality, reflecting the callow state of the art of language policy in applied linguistics. There are also factual errors in several of the contributions to the volume, including the article on Australia. Much of Fishman's work in the sociology of language is relevant and inspiring, e.g. Fishman 1991. Many scholars refer to language policy, but seldom in more than a programmatic way, but see Truchot 1994, Labrie 1993a, Hornberger 1994. Davis 1994 distinguishes between language policy intent, implementation and experience. On economics and language, see Grin 1994, Vaillancourt 1995 and the thematic number of the International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 121. 1996, edited by François Grin.
4. The speakers of some loan-hungry languages such as Danish now borrow the English form "policy".

5. These may of course draw on supra-statal agreements, international covenants and the like.

6. There is a substantial literature on language planning, as well as such journals as *Language problems and language planning*, the *New Language Planning Newsletter* (of the Central Institute of Indian Languages, Mysore) and *Sociolinguistica*. Relevant recent collections are Baldauf & Luke (eds.) 1990, Lambert (ed.) 1994, Sajavaara et al (eds.) 1993. The relevant parameters of acquisition planning are relatively under-explored (but see Cooper 1989: chapter 7).

7. See Skutnabb-Kangas 1991a,b,c, in press a,b, for application of this.

8. See also the discussions on the meaning of "Europe" in Wæver et al. 1993, 4, 10.

9. These concepts are based on the work of the Soviet ethnographer Bromley (1984).

10. Are fluid toponyms the explanation for some ex-Soviet Central Asian republics bidding for support simultaneously from "Eastern European" and "Asian" development banks?

11. As the following excerpts from *Anna Karenina* show, for Tolstoy Russia was not toponymically part of Europe (examples 1, 2, 3). Ethnonymically, Russian peasants were not Europeans whereas the Russian aristocracy was (example 4), and politonymically again Russia was not considered part of Europe (example 5):

1. "Oh, rental value!" Levin exclaimed with horror. "There may be such a thing in Europe, where the land has been improved by the labour put into it; but in this country the land is deteriorating..." (pp. 357-358).

2. "But Europe is not satisfied with this system."
   "No, and is looking for new methods..."
   "But if it doesn't do for us? If it is stupid?" said Levin.
   "... We've found the secret Europe was looking for! ... are you aware of all that's been done in Europe on the question of the organization of labour?" (p. 359; Levin, Sviazhsky).

3. "...Schools will not help..."
   "Yet all over Europe education is now compulsory." (p. 362; Levin, Sviazhsky).

4. "We [i.e. the Russian landowners] have pushed on in our own way - the European way - a long time, without stopping to consider the nature of labour. Let us try seeing labour not as abstract man power, but as the Russian peasant with his instincts, and organize our system of agriculture accordingly." (p. 363; Levin)

5. Koznyshev ...His book, the fruit of six years' labour - Sketch of a Survey of the Principles and Forms of Government in Europe and Russia - had been finished ... (p. 803; Levin's brother).

12. This formulation is used in Article 1, Definitions, of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, along with exclusions (dialects and migrant languages) and a definition of "non-territorial languages" aimed at covering the Roma and Jews. The text of the Charter is reproduced in the appendix of Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a.

13. Or are Panjabi and Hindi only "European" when the speakers stay outside Europe, and "non-European" when the speakers move to the British school system and want their
languages to be studied as "modern European languages"?

14. Corbeil's analysis below (see section 4 of the paper, footnote 19) could be analysed: when he refers to "the national language/European language interface" and the learning of "all European languages", which languages are covered? Are they toponymically, politonymically or ethnonymically European, and according to which definition?


16. "Globalism and nationalism need not be viewed as opposing trends, doomed to spur each other on to extremes of reaction. The healthy globalization of contemporary life requires in the first instance solid identities and fundamental freedoms. The sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of States within the established international system, and the principle of self-determination for peoples, both of great value and importance, must not be permitted to work against each other in the period ahead" (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 9-10).

17. "Multiculturalism' implies a variety of social interactions between individuals and groups who differ in their cultural inheritance while sharing a common geographical basis. As public policy, multiculturalism suggests a range of programs aimed at integrating those of varying cultures into a cohesive society. They do not feel obliged to submerge their cultural differences except at a pace and in ways chosen by themselves ... it is both pragmatic and idealistic." (Jupp 1991, 139). Curiously this survey article does not consider the contribution of the Australian languages policy to multiculturalism.

18. Gobbo argues for an emphasis on shared Australian values, rather than funds going to "sustain or preserve different cultures" (1995). In the eyes of one of the early architects of multiculturalism, Zubrzycki (1995), "the polysyllabic noun "multiculturalism" has outlived its purpose". He stresses equality of access to the nation's resources and argues against equality of outcome, stressing tolerance of ethnic diversity as the principal means of reaching the goal of developing Australia's potential.

19. Implementation involves, in Corbeil's view,
   - guaranteeing national language use in all domains,
   - organizing the use of foreign languages in external relations (political, commercial, professional, scientific) along principles of functional language use, determined by the communicative needs of real partners,
   - "to reconcile the generalized use of the national language in each country with functional multilingualism in external communication. it is necessary to install linguistic bridges in institutions. the function of which is to ensure the national language/European language interface" (Corbeil 1994: 312. our translation),
   - achieving this presupposes the learning of all European languages, in many forms and contexts.
   - special measures are needed in the fields of the labelling and description of consumer products. contracts. and policy documents in order to maintain multilingualism.
   - the role of translation in European policy needs clarification. to achieve goals of public information.
20. See the papers for the press conference of 14 December 1994 on "Priorités de la présidence française pour la culture et le plurilinguisme". Haut Conseil de la Francophonie 1994. The French position is put unmistakably clearly in a document entitled La francophonie et l'Europe in the section on multilingualism, which begins by stating "The best means of defending the position of French in Europe is by promoting multilingualism" (our translation). Earlier the French Minister for European Affairs had called for a "global plan" for languages in Europe but confined his attention to a severely limited set of policy issues.


The cultural identity and diversity of Europe must be maintained, and there must be explicit recognition of the value of the wealth that results from the diversity, cultural and linguistic, national and regional, of the European Union.

There can be no restriction in the number of official EU languages and EU working languages.

In view of the multicultural nature of the European community, the need to promote an intercultural dialogue aiming at strengthening mutual understanding and tolerance must be stressed.

22. Irish and Luxemburgish are also treaty languages, but do not have the status of official languages or working languages.

23. The new Commission headquarters building taken into service in 1995 did not have enough booths for interpreters from the newly admitted countries.

24. An experienced UN interpreter regards Esperanto as the victim of a taboo (Piron 1995). It is rejected a priori, without study of how it operates, or of the research evidence, or comparative study of interpretation into natural languages and investment in learning these. Esperanto is in fact used constantly in international conferences, in different parts of the world (more than 100 countries), and two to three books are published in it each week. It is easy to learn and use, and could be vastly more cost effective than interpretation, and be more functional in transmitting messages directly. There are also now native speakers of Esperanto growing up.

25. Among the factors contributing to resistance to change have been opposition to Hindi in southern states, the promotion of Sanskrit as one of the three languages, some states not insisting on three at all, and in general a focus on education through the medium of a single language, particularly English, rather than bi- or multilingual education.

26. The pressure group "Le monde bilingue" is campaigning along similar lines and appealing for the adoption of "A European Charter for Multilingual Education" within its Pax Linguis programme, with the support of several senior French politicians. See, for instance, the booklet "La paix par les langues". Jean-Marie Bressand, 1995 and Hagège 1995. The address of the organization is 9. rue de la famille, F-25000 Besançon, France.

27. "The Dutch are not fully convinced of the usefulness and necessity of a knowledge of foreign languages. The consequences of ongoing internationalization for our foreign languages are underestimated, even in trade and industry. Besides, the Dutch are too impressed by the fact that foreigners speak very highly of their command of foreign languages and their ability to learn foreign languages ... The fact that their foreign language competence compares very favourably with that of other Europeans does not mean that they have enough foreign language skills to meet their own objectives." (van Els 1992: 35).
28. At one point only two members of John Major's cabinet had any competence in a language other than English. This is worrying enough, as one can fairly conclude that this limits the understanding of British ministers of continental European cultures, and presumably their negotiating position in Brussels, though not necessarily more than that of those who choose to function in a foreign language with inadequate competence in it. What is perhaps more worrying is whether the two atypical ministers are suspected by mainstream monolinguals of letting down the side by being suspiciously interested in other cultures and languages. For a survey of efforts to strengthen foreign language learning in Britain, including details of private sector attitudes, see Hagen 1994. On monolingual British teenagers' attitudes to foreign cultures and languages, as compared with their contemporaries in France, see Young 1995.

29. Hugo Baetens Beardsmore reports (private communication) that when he was invited as a language policy expert to address the European Parliament, the representatives of Britain, France and Germany were absent.

30. Foreign language teaching in the smaller EU countries benefits substantially from learners being exposed to foreign films in their original language on television, subtitled, whereas countries like France and Germany dub them.

31. The EU has assisted in the birth of "European" degrees, for instance "European MA" programmes in which faculty and staff from several states participate and which go beyond the student mobility of ERASMUS schemes. There are also plans for encouraging such links at the Ph.D. level. While this is highly desirable culturally, it is likely to strengthen the hold of the strongest supranational languages, particularly English.

32. A conference was held in Stockholm in 9-10 June 1995 on "Language studies in Europe. Co-operation in higher education", organized by the Sigma Scientific Committee on Languages for the European Commission (DG XII - Education. Training and Youth). National reports on each country were prepared, covering language degree programmes offered by universities, initial and in-service training of language teachers, language provision for students of other disciplines, the training of translators and interpreters, language studies in non-university institutions of higher education, new needs and measures to satisfy these. This EU programme does not fund research activities, but is encouraging links to increase mobility at all levels, from undergraduate to doctoral.

33. The following section builds on Skutnabb-Kangas & Garcia 1995, developing Baker's distinction between weak and strong models of multilingual education. For these and typologies of bilingual education, see Baker 1993, 153ff. and Skutnabb-Kangas 1984, chapter 6, which Baker in turn developed.

34. See references to Baetens Beardsmore (especially 1995) in the bibliography for descriptions and evaluations of these schools. See the analysis of the European Schools model and its applicability elsewhere in the contributions to Skutnabb-Kangas (ed.) 1995.

35. For the concepts of linguistic and societal goals, especially when these do not tally with the officially expressed goals, which sometimes function as a smokescreen, see Skutnabb-Kangas 1988, 1991b. in press b. and the introduction and final comments by the editors in Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins (eds.) 1988.

36. Early, late or partial immersion programmes that have been studied and reported on exist in many countries. e.g. Australia (e.g. Clyne (ed.) 1986), Canada (e.g. Genesee 1976, 1985, 1987, Lambert & Tucker 1972, Swain & Lapkin 1982), Catalunya (e.g. Artigal 1995), Finland (e.g.
Helle, in press), Hungary (e.g. Duff, 1991), USA. Many countries are trying them out, but without much research follow-up. Others are planning them (e.g. Estonia; see Ülle Rannut 1992). For further references on immersion programmes in other countries, see Artigal 1995, Cummins 1995 and Genesee 1987.

37. See e.g. Taylor, in press, on indigenous Mi'kmaq children in Canadian French immersion. See also Swain et al 1990.

38. Except when clearly indicated, we use "L2" or "second language" to mean the language which is the second in the order of learning for the student (as opposed to the first language or a third or fourth language). A second language in this sense may or may not be a language which is not the student's mother tongue but which the student can hear and use in the immediate environment outside the home, one of the other common ways of defining a second language. In this definition the second language is opposed to a foreign language, which one does not use daily in the environment.


40. See Curtis 1988 for a description of an alternate days programme, from its inception to its preliminary but temporary death — it functions in Calistoga again. See also Tucker et al. 1970 for an early description of this type of programme, in the Philippines.

41. This is recognized, for instance, in Estonian regulations on education where, even in the future, Russian-speakers can have their entire education, including secondary schools, through the medium of Russian if they so wish, and study Estonian as a second language (Rannut & Rannut 1995). This is important to note because of the misinformation about the Baltic states that is common in some Russian propaganda.

42. See articles in Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson (eds.) 1994, for analyses and examples; see also Minority Rights Group (ed.) 1994.

43. See e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas 1987 and articles in Peura & Skutnabb-Kangas (eds.) 1994. for examples of Finnish migrant minority children in maintenance programmes in Sweden, where the Finnish working class migrant minority children, after 9 years of Finnish-medium classes, score somewhat better than Swedish middle class children in parallel classes in the same schools in a Swedish language test and almost as well as Finnish children in Finland in a Finnish language test: see also Eriksson 1994. Ethnic mother-tongue schools in the United States are of this type, see Fishman 1980, García 1988. García and Otheguy 1988.

44. Most International Schools (see e.g. Carder 1995) are not part of bilingual/multilingual education in the classical sense of the term, because they only use one language of instruction.

45. See e.g. Obura 1986. Akinnaso 1993. Birgit Brock-Utne's assessment (1993, 39) is that in many African countries the majority language is treated in the way minority languages are treated in the industrialized world. Therefore most African language speakers need much more educational support for their mother tongues, i.e. maintenance programmes.

46. For the varied aims of multilingual education, see e.g. Baker 1993; Ferguson, Houghton and Wells 1977; Fishman 1976; Hornberger 1991; Lo Bianco 1990; Mohanty 1994.
47. This does not apply to the truly international languages like Esperanto.


49. See e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas, in press b.
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EXAMPLES OF LANGUAGE POLICY IN THE MAKING

We shall set the scene for this study of language policy issues and triumphalist English by some brief examples which demonstrate the salience of language policy issues in the contemporary world. The exemplification has mainly a European focus, but comparable language policy issues could have been chosen virtually anywhere in the world.

■ In "international" activities there is a pecking order of languages, with English with much the sharpest beak, for a variety of reasons, political, economic and cultural. 18 states warned in a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations (reported in The Guardian, 27 July 1995) against the "tendency to accept a virtually monolingual United Nations", meaning English as the dominant language of UN bodies. They demanded that the 50th Annual Session of the General Assembly in September 1995 place on its agenda the issue of multilingualism. However, in this context, "multilingualism" only means equal rights for the six official languages of the UN (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish) and interpretation and translation between them. The countries behind the UN complaint were in fact mainly the "francophone" countries, which presumably wish French to be as widely used as English. Other languages than the six have no rights, which puts their speakers at a disadvantage, as an interpreter from within the UN system has documented (Piron 1994), and as a scholar from Japan has criticised in a study of the dominance of English, in which he quotes an eminent Japanese journalist as stating that Americans take it for granted that foreigners should speak English. That is linguistic imperialism and Americans should give up that idea. I believe Americans respect fairness, but as far as language is concerned, they are not fair. For example, the U.S. Ambassador has never held a press conference in Japanese. (Tsuda 1994, 59).

■ In the 15 member states of the European Union, language learning is ascribed a central role in promoting European integration and intercultural understanding. In 1995 the French government failed to persuade its EU partners to adopt a "Languages Pact" that would have committed governments to the principle of all European schoolchildren learning two foreign languages, and to a diversification of the languages learned. Recent years have seen an intensification of contacts at many levels between EU member countries, and major programmes designed to promote student and teacher mobility, and foreign language learning. However, in the supranational institutions of the EU, the European Parliament in Strasbourg, and the European Commission, the EU’s administrative headquarters in Brussels, the "multilingual principle" refers to the formal equality of eleven languages as official and working languages. These are Danish, Dutch, English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Swedish. Other languages have no rights, even if they have many speakers (e.g. Catalan, more than 6 million). The multilingual principle also ignores the fact that in practice some languages are more equal than others, in particular French and English (in different ways and for different reasons). Native speakers of languages other than the dominant languages are at a disadvantage, as the German government has pointed out to the EU on several occasions (Volz 1994). Likewise, German scholars have complained that the obligation to publish or address conferences in English puts them at an unfair disadvantage (Ammon 1989). How the hierarchies of language, official, international, indigenous, and minority languages, "national" and immigrated, will be worked through in contemporary Europe in the coming years is an open question.

■ In post-communist states, English is being vigorously promoted as the royal road to democracy, a market economy and human rights. The British Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, proclaimed that English should become the first foreign language throughout Europe, the lingua franca of the changed economic and political circumstances. The claims of competing dominant languages are pressed with equivalent rhetoric, particularly French, and substantial resources. German is traditionally a widespread lingua franca in eastern and central Europe and is still widely used in cross-border regional collaboration (Gellert-Novak 1994) and learned in schools (e.g. in Hungary, Radnai 1994). In the wake of the rejection of an ideology, communism, and a language, Russian, major language policy decisions are needed on what languages can
lead to the evolution of more democratic societies, and on how some of the promises and expectations, material and spiritual, that are associated with languages that represent success, English in particular, can be redeemed.

That the promotion of English is not a purely altruistic matter of assisting former victims of communism towards democracy and human rights can be seen in the thrust of the "English 2000" project, launched by Prince Charles for the British Council in early 1995. The press pack associated with this media event (which the noble Prince sidetracked by a gratuitous attack on the corruptions of American English, see The Times, 24 March 1995) declares that the aims of English 2000 are "to exploit the position of English to further British interests" as one aspect of maintaining and expanding the "role of English as the world language into the next century". Fundamental ambivalence about whose interests are served by an increased use of English can be seen in the project description: "The English language is in the full sense international: it is divesting itself of its political and cultural connotations. Speaking English makes people open to Britain's cultural achievements, social values and business aims."

The fascinating open agenda and unclear contours of the European language map have attracted the attention of scholars. Thus the 1994 number of Sociolinguistica, the International Yearbook of European Sociolinguistics (for which reading competence in English, French and German is necessary), brings together articles by scholars from seven countries on the theme of "English only? in Europe". A Canadian sociolinguist has written a monograph on EU language policy and how EU institutions manage their multilingualism (Labrie 1993). Joshua Fishman has pinpointed some of the dimensions (1994a) and impressionistically charted the complexity of the European language map, which leads him to the provisional conclusion that "English can and will continue to be a mighty force in Europe even without becoming a dominant or domineering one" (Fishman 1994b, 71). Others are less cautious and, after a cursory inspection, and without careful clarification of concepts, adopt a triumphalist stance:

".. it is, in my view, likely that English will become the primary language of the citizens of the EC. Whether or not it is ever officially declared as such, it will be even more widely used as a vehicle for intra-European communication across all social groups. (Berns 1995, 9).

PRINCIPLES OF LANGUAGE POLICY

The contours of language policy as a scientifically explicit and theoretically based concern need to be delineated more thoroughly and clearly. This is particularly important if scholars are to contribute to the clarification, let alone the solution of salient language policy problems, national and international. Hierarchies of language substantially influence social reproduction and intercultural communication in a world characterized by the contradictory pressures of vigorous ethnolinguistic identities and strong global homogenizing tendencies. It is important therefore to assess how language policy is formulated, and what role language professionals play in the linguistic market place.

Many types of language policy issue are in evidence. There are the familiar issues in education of how schooling leading to high levels of bi- or multilingualism can best be organized, both for minority and dominant groups. Also prominent is the learning of "international" foreign languages when this is seen as being in the national interest, often primarily for economic reasons. There are also language policy issues in broader sociopolitical domains - the maintenance of indigenous cultures, the promotion of language rights, and choice of "national" and official languages in contemporary states, the de facto multilingualism of which is increasingly recognized. Language policy is therefore a barometer of identities at the sub-national, national and supra-national levels, and of how languages and identities are encouraged or subdued in education systems and in society at large.

Language policy issues are invariably entangled with non-linguistic matters, ranging from military collaboration or peace-keeping (e.g. the UN or NATO in Bosnia, Jordan or Somalia) through commercial transactions (much trade being transnational) to the media (where the massive flow of products from California worldwide contrasts with a mere trickle in the reverse direction). In virtually all these relations, economic, cultural and linguistic, there is a lack of symmetry. A further characteristic is interlocking national and international pressures and influences.

It is also likely that the bargaining in the linguistic market place is asymmetrical in that the case for dominant languages is put constantly and reinforced in myriad ways, most of them covert hegemonic processes, whereas alternative linguistic hierarchies are seldom considered and tend to be regarded as
counter-intuitive and in conflict with a common sensical, "natural" order of things.

It would be important for language professionals to consider how to promote a better understanding of language policy issues among politicians and bureaucrats. In very few countries has there been a coalescence of political and academic interests such as took place in Australia over a period of years leading up to the National Policy on Languages (Lo Bianco 1987, 1990), or the more limited fusion of interests in the Netherlands, in the business, political and academic worlds, leading to the Dutch National Action Programme on Foreign Languages (van Els 1992). Language policy tends to be made piecemeal and ad hoc. In the foreword to a recent volume of papers on "Language education in the national curriculum" in Great Britain, Stubbs (1995) states that there is a lack of coherent language policy: "Indeed, it is doubtful if the Ministers involved could make much sense of the concept of 'language policy'. This is so, despite a flurry of official reports (26 are listed for the period 1975-1993. Brumfit 1995, xiii-xvi) on various aspects of English learning, foreign language learning, language awareness, drama, etc. in the British national curriculum.

In addition to such domestic policy work, the authorities in all fifteen member states of the European Union are involved in a great deal of supranational activity, for which language is not only the medium but also a central concern (choice of official and working languages in supranational institutions, and in regulating all manner of communications with citizens). Since the Maastricht treaty of 1993, culture and education figure more prominently in the European integration process, along with economies and political links, and collaboration in atomic energy. In the EU, explicit language policy formulations are relatively rare (Labrie 1993, Baetens Beardsmore 1994), which does not mean that there is no language policy. On the contrary, there are competing policies at the national and supranational levels. Even within official rhetoric, there is an inconsistency between cultural and economic homogenization and unification on the one hand, and a declared principle of respect for the distinctive cultural and linguistic heritage of the diverse member states on the other. Both dimensions are regarded as central to European identity (Baetens Beardsmore 1993).

Exploring language policy issues is demanding because of the sociolinguistic diversity in each context, the intermeshing of language policy with broader social structures and goals, and because of the prevalence of fuzzy concepts and strategies. There is a need for a conceptual framework for comparative language policy analysis which goes beyond consideration of language in a few domains, and that permits valid comparison of fundamentally different sociopolitical units. It seems to us that this is precisely the challenge of language policy as an explicit concern. There is a substantial amount of documentation and description of language policy, and of language dominance, but our impression is that relatively little effort has gone into clarifying how language policy can be approached in a more rigorous, inter-disciplinary way, although there are significant approaches within political science, the sociology of language, and economics and language.

In applied linguistics the contours of a more systematic approach to language policy are becoming visible. The 1994 Annual Review of Applied Linguistics is devoted to language policy and planning, but few of the papers are theoretically explicit and the volume is very uneven. The overview article by the editor suggests that applied linguistics has expanded so as to take policy decisions on board in at least the following areas or dimensions:

1) by recognizing the de facto multilingualism of our contexts;
2) by realizing that it is inherently political;
3) it operates at several levels, the pan-national, national and sub-national;
4) education is central;
5) it involves sociolinguistic concerns such as language maintenance, shift and death, and minority rights;
6) it is predictive as well as descriptive;
7) the relationship between policy and planning needs clarification (Grabe 1994, viii).

We cannot do more here than point out that there are unsolved problems in theorizing language policy, and provisionally attempt to clarify what we regard as being covered by some central concepts.

Language planning conventionally consists of corpus, status and acquisition planning. Language planning is necessary in a multidialectal and multilingual world, and reflects political and economic choices and the value judgements of the planners.

Language legislation is the regulations at state and sub-state level which specify the implementation of language policy. The European Union has supra-statual rules for the choice and functioning of official languages, for working languages, for language requirements in employment, language use in commercial transactions, products, and the media (Labrie 1993). States that ratify UN human rights charters and
covenants are supposed to ensure that domestic law conforms to the principles in the documents. In state education it is governments that decide on choice of language as medium of instruction, sometimes delegating this to a regional authority.

Language policy is a broad over-arching term for decisions on rights and access to language and on the roles and functions of particular languages and varieties of language in a given polity. Such policies, and the decisions that underpin them, may be more or less overt or covert. Not providing for the implementation of a policy is mere posturing, Khubchandani's term for much language policy in India (private communication). Davis 1994 distinguishes between language policy intent, implementation and experience. Language policy is concerned with language matters at the collective level, whether statal, supra-statal or sub-statal. Language policy is a super-ordinate category, within which fall operational concerns such as language planning and, as one form of normative regulation, language legislation. Both of these exemplify the more centralistic, government-induced or government-controlled aspects of language policy. Language policies in such domains as business, tourism, the mass media and entertainment (each of which may be statal, supra-statal or sub-statal) are at least partially government-external, and may be overt or, as is more often the case, covert. Language policy is guided by overall policy concerns such as appropriate educational policy or the facilitation of democratic citizenship. Ideally it is guided by a will to respect linguistic diversity and the linguistic human rights of all, at both individual and collective levels. The formulation and implementation of policies which respect linguistic human rights (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a) presupposes a recognition of the reality of linguistic hierarchies and the need to mitigate these. Thus addressing the reality of the power relations between users of different languages is a necessary prerequisite for language policy to go beyond posturing.

The focus in language policy studies on the collective level implies a concern with social structure and power. This is the framework within which individuals or families operate and can attempt to maximize language maintenance (inter-generational continuity being of decisive importance. Fishman 1991) and language learning at the individual and group level.

THE DIFFUSION OF ENGLISH PARADIGM

The Japanese communication scholar, Yukio Tsuda, posits two global contemporary language policy options, a "diffusion of English paradigm" and an "ecology of language paradigm". Tsuda sees the paradigms as characterized by the following (1994: 49-61, our lettering and numbering):

Diffusion of English Paradigm
A. capitalism
B. science and technology
C. modernization
D. monolingualism
E. ideological globalization and internationalization
F. transnationalization
G. Americanization and homogenization of world culture
H. linguistic, cultural and media imperialism

Ecology of Language Paradigm
1. a human rights perspective
2. equality in communication
3. multilingualism
4. maintenance of languages and cultures
5. protection of national sovereignties
6. promotion of foreign language education.

The two paradigms can be regarded as end points on a continuum. Language policy initiatives can thus be seen as attempts to shift the political or educational ground towards one end (e.g. English Only in the US, English as the sole European lingua franca - Diffusion of English) or the other (e.g. the multilingual principle in the European Union, minority language rights - Ecology of Language). The characteristics listed are not binary oppositions, the presence of one of which excludes a corresponding feature in the
other, but rather a bundle of features and tendencies that are manifest in the structures and processes supporting either the diffusion and domination of English or the ecology of language.

A language policy is basically monolingual (Tsuda's D) when there is a linguicist allocation of resources primarily to one language and a corresponding idolization and glorification of this dominant language and demonization, stigmatization and invisibilization of other languages, along with a rationalization of the relationship between dominant and dominated, always to the advantage of the dominant. Linguicism is defined as "ideologies, structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language" (Skutnabb-Kangas 1988). This has been the dominant paradigm in the past two centuries, with nation states positing the notion of a close fit between the state and a single language (French, German, Indonesian, Turkish, ...). Monolingualism has a long pedigree, in Europe deriving from Judaeo-Christian ancestors and the book of Genesis (XII 6):

And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language ... and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.

This could be paraphrased in contemporary professional language as

God decreed that we are all citizens of one nation state and monolingual... if you accept this constraint, there will be no limits to your communicative and socio-cultural competence.

This was Jehovah’s image of the monolingual world before the curse of Babel was inflicted on the peoples of the world. We now know, of course, that the Babel myth of the origins of language is incorrect, as the socio-historical and biological evidence is that languages evolved in a multitude of cultures to respond to a variety of interactional needs. The myth is though still widely but erroneously believed in, with monolingualism regarded as normal and language contact as a source of conflict (Skutnabb-Kangas, in press).

The Diffusion of English Paradigm is a convenient label for many of the key developments affecting language policy within the dominant paradigm. English is the language that has been more triumphant than its rivals, though it may be successfully challenged by these (e.g. Chinese, Arabic, German) in the coming century. What is indisputable is that English has spread worldwide in conjunction with a capitalist economic system (Tsuda’s A) and the science and technology associated with it (B). The monolingualism (D) that Spanish, French and English speakers attempted to impose in their spheres of influence has had devastating effects on the languages and cultures of other parts of the world, in processes of internal and external colonialism. In the ensuing postcolonialist phase, "modernization" (C) was marketed as the key to the future of economies and cultures that were seen as being in need of this and "development", along with the western belief that states optimally operate with a single national language. Language policy was not left to chance, neither in colonial times (Calvet 1974, Heath 1972), nor in the postcolonial period (Phillipson 1992).

We are currently in a phase of the "internationalization" (E) of commerce, entertainment, communications, and many domains of public, professional and private activity. UN bodies and supranational alliances are now more prominent. On the heels of European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) agreement has been implemented, without the language policy dimensions being thought through, except in attempts by Quebeckers to at least raise the issue (Labrie 1995). In Asia, comparable international trading links are being formed. A major thrust of language policy in Australia is to promote the learning of Asian languages of geopolitical and economic importance, particularly Japanese and Indonesian. This perceived economic prerogative is influential, even though Australia currently has a balance of payments surplus with its partners in Asia, and Australian businesses would be happy to continue exporting and importing through the medium of English.

These symptoms of "internationalization" reflect changes in economic patterns in the postcolonial, postnational and post-Cold War world, but there is nothing new about a focus on economics. Whereas French was for a couple of centuries actively construed as the language of reason, human rights and logic (ce qui n'est pas clair, n'est pas français), from the 1950s, when colonial empires were being converted into a different type of North-South relationship, French was promoted because, as official discourse then put it, "lui ou on parle français, on achète français". Exactly the same with British diplomacy, which was increasingly geared from the 1960s into an instrument of economic promotion. English is seen as a major
The English language is fundamental to Britain's export-led recovery. It makes it possible for British companies to develop markets, sell into them and form commercial alliances. (British Council press pack at the launch of English 2000, March 1995).

It therefore makes economic sense for the "English-speaking" countries to attempt to make as much of the world as possible "English-speaking". For this it is important to facilitate the learning of the language by those unfortunate enough to have been born with another language as their mother tongue. Which is where TESOL comes in. English for business is business for English, big business for the British economy, for publishers, language schools, teachers, experts, professional associations et al. TESOL's logo represents TESOL spanning the globe. Its publicity covers job opportunities worldwide, just as the London-based EL Gazette claims that it "opens doors across the world" and documents "the key role the English language and its teaching industry has to play in providing a link between disparate nations" (editorial, July 1995). It is revealing that what many would regard as a liberal profession is projected as an "industry".

The professionalism that most of us imbibed in our training was unduly narrow, as TESOL luminaries are increasingly admitting. The foreword to the Annual Review of Applied Linguistics on "Language policy and planning" (LPP), 1993/94, records the failure of applied linguistics prior to the 1990s to address the social and political contexts of its operations and the fact of "the inherently political nature of LPP", both in its formation and implementation (Grabe 1994, viii). The socio-political and ethical dimensions of English teaching and language policy are in fact increasingly being addressed (Kachru 1993, Pennycook 1994, Phillipson 1992, Tollefson 1991, 1995, the thematic number of Issues in Applied Linguistics, vol.4 no.2, 1993), and TESOL has encouraged this process through the activities of its Socio-Political Concerns Committee.

However, the unclear nature of the "internationalism" of TESOL is manifest in the organization's "vision statement" on this topic, reported in Nunan 1995, which looks like new missionary wine in old bottles. Kaplan, in an astonishing confession that he has been wrong earlier in advocating that TESOL should avoid taking political stances, specifically recommends caution internationally:

If the membership, which lives and works largely in the US, cannot begin to meet its objectives domestically, to what extent can it hope to play a significant role in its international member organizations, in the internal affairs of other states, and in the face of recalcitrant government establishments? (Kaplan 1995, 16).

One place where there has been major resistance and resentment is Japan, in particular on the issue of a language teachers' association functioning in English only (Oda 1994).

Concepts such as "international language" and "world language" need to be deconstructed, just as we need to scrutinize and critically analyse all language policy issues. If we live in a world characterized by ideological globalization (F), transnationalization, Americanization, and the homogenization of world culture (G) (Pax Anglica?), does English serve the interests of all the world's citizens? Granted that English is the dominant language of the UN, the principal language of the dominant world power, the USA, and of elites in many other countries worldwide, of the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD and many other "world" policy organizations, it is the language in which the fate of most of the world's citizens is decided, directly or indirectly. If "English as a world language" is expanding, is this compatible with the promotion and protection of the human rights of all, and what sorts of role does English play as a "world" language?

We are not suggesting that there are simple answers to such questions, nor that there is a straightforward correlation between global injustice in North-South relations, and English as the dominant world language and a range of uses to which English is put internationally and intranationally. There are major complexities in the relationship between global homogenization and heterogenization, and the intermeshing of economic and cultural forces (Appadurai 1990). However, we need as people concerned with language matters to consider how and why English is expanding worldwide, whose interests this process has served, and what ideologies and structures currently favour the increased expansion of English, and what the implications are for other languages. We need increased sensitivity to diverse language policy goals, and to the potential of a range of educational language policy measures, particularly in formal
schooling. We need to know whose agenda we are following, both as intellectuals (Said 1994) and as teachers responsible for the educational development of fellow humans.

Linguistic imperialism

Whether triumphant English is evidence of linguistic, cultural and media imperialism (Tsuda's final point in the Diffusion of English paradigm, H) is an empirical question that can be answered if the concepts are sufficiently clearly defined and adequate evidence analysed. Linguistic imperialism has tended to be described by those who have been at the receiving end, Africans, Indians and non-English speaking Europeans. In recent years, more theoretically based analyses are emerging in several parts of the world:

- The Ghanian sociolinguist, Gilbert Ansre, describes linguistic imperialism as:

  The phenomenon in which the minds and lives of the speakers of a language are dominated by another language to the point where they believe that they can and should use only that foreign language when it comes to transactions dealing with the more advanced aspects of life such as education, philosophy, literature, governments, the administration of justice, etc... Linguistic imperialism has a subtle way of warping the minds, attitudes and aspirations of even the most noble in a society and of preventing him from appreciating and realizing the full potentialities of the indigenous languages. (Ansre 1979, 12-13).

- Mühlhäusler has studied patterns of language dominance in Australasia and Asia:

  Linguistic imperialism is the expansion of a small number of languages at the cost of a large number of others. Linguistic imperialism is a promoter of one-way learning, the flow of knowledge and information from the powerful to the powerless. (Mühlhäusler 1994, 122).

- The Japanese suffer from an "Angloholic consciousness of an uncritical and unconditional admiration for English and Western culture, while developing a very negative image of their own language and culture", the position of English as the most dominant international language preventing the linguistic and cultural self-determination of the speakers of other languages (Tsuda 1992, 32).

- In our approach, imperialism is conceptualized as a structural relationship whereby one society or collectivity can dominate another. The key mechanisms are exploitation, penetration, fragmentation and marginalization. Linguistic imperialism is a sub-type of cultural imperialism, along with media, educational and scientific imperialism (Phillipson 1992). *English linguistic imperialism* is seen as a form of linguicism and can be defined as the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural inequalities between English and other languages. *Structural* refers broadly to material properties (for example institutions, financial allocations). *Cultural* to immaterial or ideological properties (for instance attitudes, pedagogical principles).

  Asymmetrical exploitation involves language learning and language use being subtractive rather than additive, for instance when competence in a dominant language entails the marginalization and loss of others.

  A central aspect of English linguistic imperialism is how the language is taught. In the TESOL profession in its formative years a number of *key tenets* evolved:
  - English is best taught monolingually.
  - the ideal teacher of English is a native speaker.
  - the earlier English is introduced, the better the results.
  - the more English is taught, the better the results.
  - if other languages are used much, standards of English will drop.

  Adhering to these tenets has had major consequences, structural and ideological, for the entire ESL "aid" operation in post-colonial education systems. Close scrutiny, in the light of the knowledge now available to us, indicates that the tenets are all false (see Phillipson 1992, chapter 7, a detailed study of the genesis of the tenets and their validity). They can be more appropriately labelled as
- the monolingual fallacy.
- the native speaker fallacy.
- the early start fallacy.
- the maximum exposure fallacy.
- the subtractive fallacy.

They are in conflict with the scientific evidence on the role of LI in L2 learning, even though an understanding of these issues underpinned the seminal UNESCO report of 1953 on the use of the vernacular languages in education. They represent a misunderstanding of the nature of bilingualism and cognitive development, rooted as they are in a monolingual world view.

They are highly functional in making the "world" dependent on native speaker norms, expertise, textbooks and methodologies, even though these are unlikely to be culturally, linguistically or pedagogically appropriate.

They have contributed to linguist policies in resource allocation, to language policies which have perpetuated the neglect of African and Asian languages, and to the underpinning of linguistic imperialism as one element of global dominance of the South by the North.

They are thus a pillarstone of global linguistic hegemony, and conform to the classic pattern of hegemonic structures and ideologies in being complex and largely covert, so that their nature and function and the injustice they entail are often unnoticed and uncontested.

TESOL in some European scenarios

While there are obviously major differences between western European countries, former communist countries, and the former colonies which were at the receiving end of TESOL tenets, there are more similarities between former colonies and former communist countries than one might expect: acute economic and social problems, unequal terms of trade with the west/North, and investment and aid being made conditional on vaguely defined principles of "democracy" and respect for human rights (mainly the civil and political ones. Tomaševski 1993). It is therefore important to attempt to see in what way any TESOL mission to Europe fits into some possible language policy scenarios. We cannot do more here than adumbrate a few parameters that might be explored in future studies.

The linguistic marketplace is at the play of market forces unless active measures are taken to achieve specific language policy goals. In Europe it does not appear that many countries have attempted to draw up comprehensive language policy plans. A report for the EU's LINGUA office by an independent consultant on the current state of foreign language teaching and the impact of EU initiatives sees foreign language learning as a key measure for Europeanisation, but assesses that "most Member States have not yet reached the position of defining their own strategy for languages in a coherent form" (Savage 1994: 11). This confirms the analysis quoted earlier about language policy in Britain. Former communist countries such as the Baltic states and Hungary, have engaged in a good deal of language policy work, but are in a difficult transition phase, with many constraints on their freedom of movement.

One factor influencing the formation of language policy in present-day Europe is the awareness of decision-makers of their own limited competence in foreign languages and the lack of success of school foreign language learning. The summary of the annual report of the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie for 1994 comments on the worldwide crisis in education, and describes the teaching of languages as "a planetary defeat that needs to be remedied". A report for the EU's LINGUA bureau states that foreign language learning can be seen as "the Community's Achilles heel" (Savage 1994: 12). It is unlikely that such a verdict would emanate from one of the smaller EU countries (the Netherlands, Scandinavia), where people are relatively more successful as foreign language learners and users.

Trim, policy adviser to the Council of Europe Modern Languages Project (which has promoted reformist measures such as communicative language learning, threshold levels, and learner autonomy), in a review of the European foreign language learning scene (1994), refers to the dead hand of the status quo impeding reform of foreign language learning. He suggests that the valuing of foreign language proficiency is closely associated with trade patterns: exports and imports from European countries represent a vastly higher proportion of their GDP, as compared with the US or Japan. Also significant are the size of the country. smallness encouraging L2 learning, particularly if the L1 is not spoken elsewhere (Finland, Hungary,...), largeness often implying a perception of linguistic self-sufficiency (France, Britain,...). Trim also points out that in some countries (Finland, Belgium, Switzerland) the language of another group
within the state is learned as well as "foreign" languages, this clearly being in the "national" interest. With possible international spin-offs, because the language is also used elsewhere (German is spoken in several states, for instance, and learning Swedish, one of the two official languages in Finland, gives Finnish-speakers a solid base for Nordic cooperation with not only Sweden but the linguistically related Norway and Denmark as well). Other factors that influence national language policies, explicitly or implicitly, are changing teaching paradigms, goals, and diversity in how different education systems dispense these; communications changes, which have eroded national constraints on foreign travel, and opened up mass tourism; multinational industries, satellite TV, youth culture; the appeal of particular cultures (stereotypes about France, Spain, ...); external political relations; near neighbours; and the languages of migrants, which may compete as "foreign" languages.

There is evidence in western and eastern Europe that diglossia, with English as the intrusive dominant language, may be imminent. If the state language is construed or presented as being unable to function adequately for certain purposes, for instance as the medium for higher education, or as the in-house language in commercial enterprises aiming at the export market, it is arguable that linguist structures and ideologies will gradually result in the spread of the dominant "international" language, in a diglossic division of labour which marginalizes the state language. There are trends of this sort in Scandinavia, the implications of which have been little explored (but see Haberland et al 1991), and in former communist states. Essentially the issue is whether the situation is subtractive or additive. For a diglossic division of labour of this sort to be realized presupposes that English (or just possibly one of its rivals) remains the dominant foreign language in schools. It is this hierarchy of foreign languages that the French were attempting to counteract with the Languages Pact referred to earlier. Former communist countries are generally deficient in the supply of well qualified teachers of English, and may be in a better position to ensure that a diversified range of languages is learned in schools.

In contrast to virtually all African ex-colonial countries, most of the eastern and central European countries have long-established and well-developed official languages, and extensive experience of foreign language teaching and learning in formal education (though apparently this was often unsuccessful when Russian was the target language, when motivation was low). The marketing of English is often linked to professional skills (classroom management, modern methods, multi-media teaching materials, etc.), but it seems more than unlikely that young ESL teachers from Britain and the USA are culturally or linguistically qualified to take on major responsibilities in eastern or central European education systems.

On the other hand, because of the miserable economic plight of most post-communist countries, and the shortage of local people qualified to teach English, it is likely that there is a substantial temptation to accept well-intentioned offers from the West and the chance of getting "something for nothing". This however was exactly the position of many underdeveloped countries, where western "aid" in language in education has had disastrous effects (Phillipson 1992, and many references in this to work by scholars from underdeveloped countries, particularly Kachru, Ngugi and Pattanayak). Here the lure of linguistic arguments for English and a legacy of linguistic imperialism was too strong. It has continued virtually uninterrupted.

As a monolingual approach is the hallmark of Anglo-American English teaching, both in its internal variants and its export version, its inappropriacy may be apparent to central and eastern Europeans. Here the long history of foreign language teaching in schools builds on the principle that the teacher of a foreign language generally has the same mother tongue as the students and has gone through the process of learning the foreign language in question herself. This is also the pattern in "small" European countries, e.g. the Nordic countries, where foreign language learning is relatively successful, and in the "big" ones such as France and Great Britain, where results are more patchy. This "bilingual" tradition may be seen as an essential foundation for a reinvigorated and redirected language teaching in many post-communist countries, supported by locally produced teaching materials in addition to "authentic" British or American ones.

Again, economic constraints may lead to departures from this norm. If so, it would be extremely important to appreciate that under-qualified native speakers may be a bad bargain, and that they are being marketed for spurious reasons. Among the demands that might be required for functioning as a foreign language teacher might be proof not merely of insight into linguistic structure (of source and target languages) and culturally appropriate pedagogy, but also a proven capacity for foreign language learning to a high level of proficiency.

There is currently a good deal of imaginative educational experimentation in foreign language learning in Europe. Many member states of the Council of Europe are providing for the learning of at least
two foreign languages. There has been an increase in the number and type of bi- or multilingual schools (Baetens Beardsmore 1993, Sociolinguistica 7, 1993, Skutnabb-Kangas 1995), and in scattered efforts to establish the presence of immigrant minority languages on the "mainstream" school curriculum. Innovation is increasingly based on the principle that different groups have different points of departure and needs, so that there must be different educational routes and strategies to reach the goal of high-level multilingualism (Skutnabb-Kangas & Garcia 1995). But what the successful experiments have in common is that they all regard bilingual teachers as a sine qua non. This is true of immersion programmes for majority children (see e.g. Duff 1991 for English immersion in secondary schools in Hungary), of European Community Schools (e.g. Baetens Beardsmore 1992, 1993, 1995), of maintenance programmes for minority children (e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas 1984, 1990), and of two-way programmes (e.g. Dolson & Lindholm 1995). It is perhaps therefore unlikely that methods that only suit monolingual English teachers would gain ground.

These observations on the limitations of mainstream TESOL in relation to the expanding European "market" would need to be incorporated into much broader analyses of educational and language policy goals in particular contexts. Some possible contours that such a study might involve can be identified by considering the experience of managing language policy in Australia (for a more detailed study of the relevance of this for Europe, see Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas in press).

Inspiration from language policy in Australia

The process of initiating work on a language policy at the national or state level may be set in motion by a sense of injustice and crisis, as in Canada, or by processes of redefinition of national and supranational identities, as in contemporary Europe. In Australia it was a logical outcome of a rights and equality orientation in the 1970s and later multiculturalism, and an awareness of changing Australian collective identities. Lo Bianco, the principal architect of Australia’s language policy, stresses the mix of social, political and social psychological elements in a process beginning with a language-related group consciousness, and the demonstrable crystallisation of language problems (1990, 67-73). This involved a complex process of forming alliances across groups and creating shared interests, ultimately generating a new political discourse, a rhetoric of "national interest" and good citizenship which could reassure the established order while articulating a case for change.

Lo Bianco states (1990, 77) that a policy must blend together what is 1) intellectually defensible, 2) realistically feasible, 3) equitable to all groups, and 4) in the national interest in that it meets the linguistic needs and opportunities of the mainstream sections of the society.

The social goals of the Australian language policy relate to the four E’s: equality, economics, enrichment and external (Lo Bianco 1990). Equality refers to the correlation between language on the one hand and social and economic equality or lack of it on the other. Language policy must serve to correct any systematic injustice, to achieve broadly egalitarian goals. The economic goal has to do with multilingualism as a productive asset. The enrichment goal draws on arguments for the cognitive, educational and cultural benefits deriving from multilingualism. The external goals bring in the geopolitical situation of the country, development cooperation, the transfer of technology and supporting bi- and multilateral relations with other countries.

The goals of the official Australian language policy include a language other than English for all Australians. Implementation of the policy has led to a major effort in a number of spheres, particularly ESL, cross-cultural training, adult literacy, testing, second/foreign language learning, and Asian studies. Some support also goes to Aboriginal languages. The volume of these activities, and the dynamism they represent, is impressive (see the quarterly Australian Language Matters), but there are major contradictions and challenges (Lo Bianco 1994): does an avowedly multiculturalist policy involve a multilingual education system? How do particular language-in-education policies relate to perceived economic prerogatives? Can the various constituencies and competing ideologies underlying the language policy be reconciled?

It is difficult to assess how successful the activities are in promoting the goals of the policy, and it would not be fair to expect major change within a short span of time. On paper the Australian achievement represents a significant advance for those who value bilingualism not only for minorities but also for the linguistically dominant group. Whether language policy implementation will achieve the vision of a more balanced relationship between English and the many European and Asian languages with a
strong presence in Australia, only time can tell. The same uncertainty holds for the future of Aboriginal languages. The Australian language policy experience represents a departure from a Diffusion of English paradigm, but one that many decision-makers have been reluctant to endorse, as fitful follow-up has demonstrated. It has certainly contributed to a higher degree of public awareness about language issues than in most other countries. It can usefully contribute to clarifying an Ecology of Language paradigm.

**THE ECOLOGY OF LANGUAGE PARADIGM**

It is probable that everyone can agree that a human rights perspective (Tsuda’s 1), an equity perspective, should be an integral part of any language policy, just as the policy should lead to greater enjoyment of all human rights. It is therefore somewhat ironic that when pressing the case for their language, both the British and the French, countries with a long history of depriving their linguistic minorities of basic rights⁹, plead that English and French are “the” language of human rights. English 2000 publicity declares: “The English language underpins human rights, good government, conflict resolution and the democratic process by ensuring that communities have access to the information society, to the world media and to freedom of opinion.” As fundamental human rights are often a question of freedom of political expression or not being imprisoned without trial, one wonders whether the British really think that such existential matters are best ordered for all the world’s citizens in English rather than the other 6-7000 oral languages of the world - plus possibly an equal number of sign languages. Such ethnocentric or linguocentric special pleading may appear innocuous, but represents an abuse of the concept of rights for the crude purpose of harnessing human rights to the Diffusion of English cause. Human rights are meaningless if they do not apply to all languages.

One of the first to write about the ecology of language, in an essay in 1970 (published in a volume of the same name, edited by Dil, 1972) was Einar Haugen, a seminal figure in the establishment of bilingualism studies, language planning and sociolinguistics. Language ecology is defined by Haugen as the study of interactions between any given language and its environment. Haugen states that the linguist’s concern with language forms and the psychology and sociology of language should be combined with those of other social scientists who are interested in the interaction of languages and their users, for more than descriptive purposes (Dil 1972, 329). Just as ecology is a “movement for environmental sanitation”, the ecology of language should be concerned with the cultivation and preservation of languages. It should be a predictive and even a therapeutic science, typically concerned with the status of languages, functions, attitudes, and ultimately with a “typology of ecological classification, which will tell us something about where the language stands and where it is going in comparison with other languages of the world.” (op.cit., 337).

Peter Mühlhäusler has considered the impact that language teaching has on linguistic ecology. “When speaking of linguistic ecologies we focus on the number of languages, user groups, social practices and so forth that sustain this language ecology over longer periods of time. Language teaching involves the introduction of a new language into an existing language ecology” (1994, 123), so that what needs studying is the impact of such teaching on the inhabitants and the long-term sustainability of the system. Mühlhäusler considers that language teaching may but need not serve imperialist purposes (echoing Phillipson 1992, 318), but his verdict on the spread of English, French, Indonesian and Chinese in the Pacific and Australasian region is that the teaching of these languages is unlikely to lead to a more stable equitable world or more social justice (op.cit., 128).

When considering Tsuda’s Ecology of Language paradigm, we shall mainly focus on his first two points, a human rights perspective, and equality in communication. Of the remaining ones, multilingualism (3) and the maintenance of languages and cultures (4) are matters that we have implicitly endorsed when analysing the Diffusion of English paradigm. We have also shown the need for care in identifying what multilingualism refers to in different fora (UN, EU, ...), and the tendency for “big” languages to be promoted and less powerful ones to be marginalized (official and working languages, ...).

This risk is also apparent in connection with foreign language education (6), as almost invariably “foreign” languages are languages that are dominant somewhere. The advantages of learning foreign languages have already been referred to in connection with language policy developments in Europe and Australia. In both contexts it is accepted that schoolchildren should learn at least one foreign language, and that this is desirable for cultural, practical and general educational reasons. This is a position that the United States could learn from, one that would increase its citizens’ capacity to be sensitive to global
diversity, as well as providing them with skills that would be necessary in their dealings with other parts of the world (as many publications from the Washington-based National Foreign Language Center have argued), quite apart from capitalizing on the wealth of languages actually present in the country. In Europe it is essential that choice of foreign language is not simply understood as meaning the learning of English, hence the efforts in many states to ensure that two languages are learned. This is a small contribution to maintaining vitality in the language ecology we have inherited.

Linguistic human rights

The struggle for linguistic rights represents an attempt to harness fundamental principles and practices from the field of human rights to the task of rectifying some linguistic wrongs and granting to less favoured languages some of the support that is the rule for dominant languages. We believe, and have argued at length elsewhere (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994a, Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1995) that it is axiomatic that

- linguistic rights are one type of human right and as such one intricately interlocking element in a set of inalienable, universal norms for just enjoyment of one's civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights;

- depriving people of their human rights leads to conflict. If the rights of minorities are respected, there is less likelihood of conflict. Linguistic diversity is not causally related to conflict, though of course language is a major mobilising factor in contexts where an ethnic group feels itself threatened.

Efforts are currently under way to codify language rights at the inter-state level, both global (UN bodies such as the ILO and) regional (e.g. European, African). Some documents are applicable to all (a "Universal" declaration/covenant), some are restricted to specified groups which are in need of particular support (e.g. children, migrant workers or indigenous peoples). They have in common the principle that agreement at inter-state level is normative and may hopefully lead to better practice at state level.

Professional associations are increasingly aware of the significance of language rights. TESOL's mission (President's message, TESOL Matters, June/July 1993) "is to strengthen the effective teaching and learning of English around the world while respecting individuals' language rights." This presupposes familiarity with what linguistic human rights (LHRs) are.

LHRs in education can be summarized as follows. Observing LHRs implies at an individual level that everyone can identify positively with their mother tongue(s), and have that identification respected by others, irrespective of whether their mother tongue is a minority language or a majority language. It means the right to learn the mother tongue(s), including at least basic education through the medium of the mother tongue, and the right to use it in many (official) contexts. It means the right to learn at least one of the official languages in one's country of residence. It should therefore be normal that teachers of minority children are bilingual. Restrictions on these rights may be considered linguistic wrongs, an infringement of fundamental LHRs.

Observing LHRs implies at a collective level the right of minority groups to exist, i.e. the right to be "different". It implies the right of minorities to use and develop their language and to establish and maintain schools and other training and educational institutions, with control over the curriculum, and with teaching through the medium of their own languages. It also involves guarantees of representation in the political affairs of the state, and the granting of autonomy to administer matters internal to the groups, at least in the fields of culture, education, religion, information, and social affairs, with the financial means, through taxation or grants, to fulfill these functions. Rights should be enforceable, which presupposes financial resources, and appropriate democratic, constitutional and legal procedures. Restrictions on these rights may also be considered linguistic wrongs, an infringement of fundamental LHRs.

This enumeration of LHRs builds on principles that should be observed when forming language policy in any state. They represent a norm, a standard that states should aspire to, which can be a significant reference point in struggles to influence language policy and wrest rights from an unwilling state. A human rights approach in language education involves the fostering of attitudes - at the local, national and supranational levels - and the elaboration and maintenance of a structure within which the individual and the group do not suffer from oppression, specifically linguistic oppression. If the proclamations of professional associations such as TESOL are to be more than pious rhetoric, the rights in question need to be specified and publicized so that individuals and groups know what they are.
Equality in communication

Tsuda’s second point in the Ecology of Language paradigm is that participants in communication should be in a position of equality, irrespective of mother tongue, gender or other distinctions. Equality in communication presupposes that everybody has equal access to information and that the principle of freedom of expression is respected. Equality relates to all participants in a speech event, to all speech communities, and to interaction between members of different speech communities. A major reason for advocating this position is a conviction that native speakers of English have unfair advantages in many contexts over speakers of other languages, a belief that is widely held on the continent of Europe, not least at academic conferences.

Such a principle would not only mean, for instance, that under the NAFTA agreement, speakers or companies that use French or Spanish should be in the same position as those who use English. Restricting language policy considerations to the three “big” languages perpetuates inequalities; the fact that the rights of all the indigenous and minority language speakers to equality in communication are mostly not even considered, or their use is deemed unrealistic, shows how far we are from equality in communication. In considering the language policy implications of NAFTA, Labrie (1995) points out that there are major differences and incompatibilities between the three countries in their sociolinguistic make-up, and in language ideologies and the extent of language legislation. Language policy differs substantially between Canada, with explicit laws to ensure the equality of the two dominant languages, and the USA, where much language policy is implicit, and Mexico, which has more actively addressed the bilingualism of its indigenous population (see Hamel 1994). The supremacy of economic over political considerations in NAFTA makes it likely that equality between the English, French and Spanish languages will remain a fiction. Because of the dominant position of English in business, science and culture, and the prestige of the language, English is likely to strengthen its position and impinge on the language ecology in ways that disadvantage non-users and non-native users of English.

Adherence to a principle of equality would also mean that the needs of sign language users would need to be met much more widely.

English only worldwide, or English plus

It is clear that following the principles of the Ecology of Language paradigm has costs, financial and human. On the other hand it would be quite false to assume that adherence to the Diffusion of English paradigm does not have costs, both of a practical kind (for education systems, for interpretation in international organizations, Piron 1994, etc) and for the global linguistic ecology. This is where western countries could learn from other parts of the world.

Many of the eastern and central European countries have for decades accorded more rights to linguistic minorities in education than most western European countries, this reflecting the focus on minority protection that was a major feature of the treaties enacted at the conclusion of the First World War. It has been seen as natural that (many) national minorities (regardless of whether they are designated nations, nationalities, or minorities) have had at least part of their education through the medium of their own language, and that the majority language has been taught by bilingual teachers. This trend does not seem to be diminishing, although some post-communist governments seem to be set on a path of ethnic and linguistic intolerance and “cleansing”. It is perfectly possible to simultaneously protect national sovereignties (Tsuda’s 5) and promote multilingualism internally, two principles that are often seen as contradictory. It is also obviously in the “national interest” of every country to invest in foreign language education for external, “international” purposes.

Awareness of the role of language in what has been termed “ethnic” conflict may be increasing throughout Europe, though the conclusions being drawn may vary. One view is that either the (voluntary or forced) repatriation of minorities or their rapid linguistic and cultural assimilation are ways of avoiding “ethnic” conflict, meaning the mere presence of (unassimilated) minorities is seen as a threat. This is a false analysis of the causal factors in such conflict, leading to a false conclusion that is likely to fan the flames of conflict (Phillipson, Ramut & Skutnabb-Kangas 1994). A more democratic and just analysis regards a higher degree of awareness of linguistic and cultural rights as a hallmark of a civilized society, and the granting of these rights as a way of avoiding or containing conflict. Policy of this kind should contribute to the reduction of linguistic and economic inequalities or linguistic and political cleavages.
between the groups that make up a polity. The recognition at the continental level of the rights of "minority or regional" languages (e.g. in the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages) is, despite the shortcomings of the Charter (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994b), a step in this direction.

English can serve many useful purposes, but will only do so if the linguistic human rights of speakers of other languages are respected. The historical evidence seems to indicate clearly that linguicism and linguistic imperialism need to be resisted actively. Just as the subtractive, oppressive monolingualism of the "English Only" movement in the United States is being countered by demands for "English plus" (i.e. English in addition to other languages), Europeans should build on their linguistic diversity by promoting all languages, including English. An immediate way of contributing to this is by building on Tsuda's productive dichotomy when analysing language policy and by working to promote a healthy and just ecology of language.

REFERENCES


Notes:
1. In addition to "French-speaking" states, the signatory countries were Portugal, Cap Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Greece, Egypt and Romania.

2. Details of the French proposals are described in several pronouncements by government Ministers in 1994 and 1995 and in several publications of the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie (for instance the Actes de la Xème session. 22-24 mars 1994. La Francophonie et l’Europe). Many European children already encounter two foreign languages in their schooling, and some learn 3 or 4, but the picture varies in each country, as does whether first or second foreign language learning is obligatory, see Eurydice 1992.

3. "The (British) Council responded with speed and imagination to the truly enormous demand in the former communist states of Europe for what Britain signifies to them: liberal democracy, the free market and, above all, the English language" (Chairman’s Introduction to the British Council Annual Report. 1991-92. 2).


6. French has been, and still is, energetically promoted at home and abroad, (with the advantage, for researchers interested in such matters, of massive documentation of official policy and legislation). One of the major reasons for French language promotion is the encroachment of English, the rival, and hitherto victorious "world language". One element in contemporary French strategy is to stress the miserable command of the language of most L2 users of English. This purist streak is nothing new in France, but it has been extrapolated and redefined so that in contemporary official French discourse "ce qui n'est pas clair, c'est l'anglais international". This kind of argument is being used in many fora, in particular in European Union institutions. English as a world language is seen as bastardised, truncated communication.

7. This publication was earlier called the *EFL Gazette*. From mid 1995 it has columns in each number by the president of TESOL and the chair of IATEFL. The journal is monthly, and has a section entitled "A to Z, working your way around the world", which describes the job market in ESL/EFL country by country.

8. The TESOL statement declares that the association is expansionist (TESOL will work "within the TESOL world and beyond") and will attempt to work through "existing structures" outside the United States, and "respect regional, national, and cultural distinctiveness and autonomy while at the same time promoting mutual understanding" (cited in Nunan 1995, 3). Quite apart from the fuzziness of much of such language, and an ambivalent view of partnership, the statement looks uncannily like a re-run of the ideology that served to underpin the expansion of English and TESOL a generation ago. It echoes the Report of the Makerere Conference in Uganda, 1961 (regarded by the Ford Foundation as the most central one in the formative period of ESL) on the Teaching of English as a Second Language, which reassuringly declares: "Nor can there be any question of believing that we propose, by our efforts, to supersede or weaken or dilute any of the cultures of Asia and Africa." It appears that little changes in cultural and linguistic imperialism... See the detailed analysis of this in Phillipson 1992

9. "The globalization of culture is not the same as its homogenization, but globalization involves the use of a variety of instruments of homogenization (armaments, advertising techniques, language hegemonies, clothing styles and the like), which are absorbed into local political and cultural economies, only to be repatriated as heterogeneous dialogues of national sovereignty, free enterprise, fundamentalism, etc. in which the state plays an increasingly delicate role." (Appadurai 1990, 307).

10. Foreign language teaching in the smaller EU countries benefits substantially from learners being exposed to foreign films in their original language on television, subtitled, whereas countries like France and Germany dub them.

11. The French government declared in 1994 that it could not support the Eurocan Charter for Regional or Minority Languages on the grounds that it was anti-constitutional (Annual Report, 1994 of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages, page 20).
Minority workers or minority human beings? A European dilemma
Tove Skutnabb-Kangas & Robert Phillipson

Summary

"European" identities may be politonymic, toponymic, ethnonymic or linguonymic. Each dimension may influence whether migrant minorities are treated as "European", and influence their schooling, integration, and rights to citizenship and to form national minorities. Treatment and terminology vary in different states and periods of migration, and different scenarios can be envisaged. However, the position for immigrated minorities is that they are still largely seen as workers rather than human beings with equal rights. Thus Turks, despite their numerical strength and length of residence, are still "foreigners" in Germany. Lack of success in schools is blamed on migrants rather than the German/Danish/... school system. This construction of migrants as being deficient dovetails with educational practice which falls within a UN definition of linguistic genocide, and contributes to mis-education. If current efforts in supranational fora to codify educational linguistic human rights were to lead to greater support for minorities, this could assist in a redefinition of national identities corresponding to the de facto diversity of these societies, and a reduction of racism and conflict.

Introduction

Education has always been about inclusion and exclusion, along lines of class, "race" and gender. In this article we shall discuss some aspects of how education has been and is being used to exclude migrant minorities from acquiring the attributes needed for negotiating about and the right to their fair share of "political power, economic resources, social services, and, most importantly, cultural symbols" (Kalantzis 1995, 2), including language. We will concentrate on the "Europe" of the powerful western and northern European club, because this is where the most sophisticated exclusionary strategies are being perfected. What constitutes the real "European dilemma" for us minority workers/human beings is the struggle over multiple identities, over who is included and who excluded and on whose terms.

Which "Europe" are we going to "integrate" into and who is deciding? "Europe" can be interpreted in many ways. A restrictive one is to interpret "Europe" as only the 15 countries of the European Union. In 1994 that would have meant that the problems faced by the Finnish labour immigrant minority in Sweden (the largest migrant minority group in Scandinavia) would not have been a "European" dilemma. Sweden and Finland only joined the Union in 1995. But in 1995 it would be an internal "European" dilemma, whereas the problems that the Baltic states face with the Russian-speaking labour (im)migrant minorities (or that these face with the Baltic states) would not be a "European" problem. Neither the Russian Federation nor the Baltic states are members of this Club which tries to appropriate the label "Europe" for itself. But if Russians or Poles or ex-Yugoslavs or Bulgarians or Romanians try to enter the German or Italian labour market, that is a "European" dilemma.

This "Europe" is a specific politonymic reading of Europe. Another politonymic "Europe", that of the Council of Europe, is much larger (37 countries, including Turkey), and the OSCE (Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) has over 50 countries (including Canada and the USA).

A toponymic reading of Europe also opens up several possibilities. Some of the ex-Soviet Central Asian republics are trying to get support from both European and Asian development banks (Tomaševski 1993) which is symptomatic of the definitional problems that diversity and multiple identities may give. Where are the eastern and south-eastern borders of the toponymic "Europe"? Does "Europe" stop at the Urals?

When schools are supposed to teach about "European" culture or include a "European" dimension in the curriculum, or inculcate a "European" identity into the students, we supposedly have to do with an ethnonymic and linguonymic reading of "Europe". But are the cultures of all those ethnic groups who toponymically live in Europe or who politonymically claim a "European" identity really included? Are the literatures and oratures of all the peoples whose languages are spoken in toponymic Europe (reaching at least to the Ural mountains) really included in the "European" heritage that migrants from outside the toponymic "Europe" are supposed to learn? Are their own languages and cultures included? To one of us, Eino Leino's Helkavirret is one of the greatest books of poetry in the world. The other is ignorant of this...
part of "European" heritage because it has not been translated from Finnish into any of the seven "European" languages he knows.

Focussing on identities has been seen by some researchers as fussing about less important issues and diverting people away from the decisive political and economic questions. Quite the opposite. Mary Kalantzis has captured the relationship between economic, political and identity struggles in a integral way:

"The global moment is one in which the Cold War has ended. And with it has the politics of East/West boundary drawing, an argument essentially about economic systems. Into the space have stepped arguments that are still about access to social resources, but arguments that are now expressed through a discourse of culture, identity and nation." (1995, 1).

Identities are about different degrees of belonging and inclusion - or not belonging and exclusion. Which Europes are the grandchildren of migrants going to be integrated into - or will they be forced to assimilate in some and be marginalised in relation to others? Are all toponymic Europeans also allowed to be polonymic Europeans: are those who live in "Europe", whatever that may be, also allowed (or, in some cases, forced) to belong polonymically, i.e. become citizens? Are all toponymic Europeans allowed to maintain their ethnonymic and linguonymic identities (become national ethnic minorities, learn their own languages and cultures, and use them - also in some official contexts, including schools), in addition to taking on (some of) the cultures and languages of the dominant groups in the countries where they live? Or are they instead being forced to assimilate to the new ethnonymic and linguonymic identities subtractively, at the cost of their own? Are multiple identities allowed in the beautiful multicultural Europe, celebrating diversity - or is the "European diversity" just nation-state monolingualism and monoculturalism multiplied (as Monica Heller (forthcoming) puts it)?

Did imported workers become multilingual bicultural citizens?

Different scenarios

Before we focus on education, a few structural and ideological conditions/prerequisites have to be mentioned. What has happened to all those millions of people who came to work in (other) European countries after the Second World War? The range of types of experience and outcome of migration are highlighted by Tara Mukherjee, the President of the European Union Migrants' Forum:

... there are just over a million and a quarter Asians in Britain, about two and a half percent of the population... Asians provide nearly a quarter of the doctors in the UK National Health Service, and nearly a fifth of British General Practitioners. They also provide nearly six percent of British accountants and just under fifty percent of British retail traders (all working 25 hours a day and eight days a week). The contribution of the Turkish community to the German economy is likewise enormous ... Just about everywhere in Europe the transport, laundry, hotel and catering sectors would fall to pieces without migrant labour (Mukherjee 1995).

The analyses of migration researchers can be regarded as building up to five possible scenarios:

A. Have immigrants happily integrated and formed new national minorities, where home and school cherish their bi- or multilingualism and bi- or multiculturalism?

B. Are they segregated, still doing the shitwork (Castles & Kosack 1973), with the school non-educating or miseducating their children and grandchildren to continue doing the shitwork, i.e. a permanent dual labour market (Wadensjö 1981) in a two-thirds society?

C. Are they specialising along ethnic lines or taking over certain niches (e.g. Hannerz 1974), regardless of their status, pay and working conditions (Turks: corner shops, greengroceries, Greeks: cleaning, Pakistanis: restaurants; Finns & ex-Yugoslavs: heavy industry)?

D. Are they marginalised, outside political influence, with a different hunger (Sivanandan 1982), are they the ticking time-bomb (Castles 1980) which will turn Europe into the same type of civil-war-like conditions as in inner cities in the US (where Europe, in contrast to the USA, hopefully still does not spend more money on internal as compared to external control of violence even if it is growing (see articles in Bunyan (ed.) 1993 for the growth of internal control in Europe)?
E. Or will they be contained and coopted, despite often experiencing appalling conditions (Mukherjee 1995). Have they been assimilated ideologically and culturally, though not incorporated structurally (Schermerhorn 1970)?

There are no simple answers, because each of the scenarios applies to some migrant minorities, in some countries, with the possible exception of the happily integrated scenario A. Education plays a major role in each of them.

From imported foreign labour to national ethnic minorities of citizens?

Kjell Öberg, the former Director General of the Swedish National Board of Immigration and Naturalisation, lists (1981) the terms used after the Second World War in official documents to refer to people who came to Sweden to work: “1. imported labour; 2. foreign labour; 3. foreigners; 4. immigrants; 5. (ethnic) minorities.” Is it correct to interpret the change of attitudes reflected in the labels as meaning that 1. may be goods that can be exported again when their labour is no longer needed; 2. are Others, aliens whose only characteristic is that they work; 3. are still aliens who are visiting, i.e. they are not allowed to stay, but they are people who might do other things too, not just work; 4. are allowed to stay if they so wish; 5. (in use since 1975) are allowed to integrate and to maintain their languages and cultures if they so wish?

This interpretation might though be wishful thinking for Sweden. It seems that current labels (since the late 1980s) have changed again. Now either “ethnic/cultural groups” or “immigrants” is used, no longer “minorities”. The Swedish state has not accepted the declaration of Finnish organisations in Sweden that the Finns now see themselves as a national ethnic minority and want the Swedish state to acknowledge this officially, nor have they or other immigrant minorities been accepted by Sweden as groups that the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages should apply to. It does not seem that Sweden is willing to allow the children and grandchildren of immigrants to develop into national minorities (see Skutnabb-Kangas 1991, in press).

One might have thought that many European “receiving” or “host” countries would have gone through a similar development to Sweden. In Germany, the Swedish phase 1 has not led on to 4. immigrants, but only to 2. Gastarbeiter, guest workers. For decades, Germany categorically denied being an immigration country. Even if many politicians, often grudgingly, now start admitting that that is what Germany is, Barbara John, Commissioner of Foreigners’ Affairs in Berlin (our emphasis), writes (1995) of 420,000 foreigners living in Berlin, 13 percent of Berlin’s population (and roughly 8 percent of the population of the Federal Republic of Germany). More than half of these “foreigners” in Berlin were in fact “born here or grew up here” (1995, 2) - but still to her they are “foreigners”.

Most of these “foreigners” are foreign nationals, though. It is very difficult for Turks, for instance, to obtain German citizenship. One of the basic prerequisites for integration is a right (but not duty) to citizenship. Immanuel Wallerstein writes (1990: 42-43) that citizenship is

“... a principle which today usually asserts that all persons born in that state are citizens ... and that all such citizens enjoy equal rights. (The most notorious exception, South Africa, which is a state refuses to acknowledge the legitimacy of this theory of citizenship, is considered for that very reason a world scandal).”

Wallerstein, living in the United States, does not seem to be aware of the fact that both Sweden and Germany as states “refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of this theory of citizenship” and should maybe therefore also be “considered for that very reason a world scandal” in the same way as South Africa under apartheid. Neither in Sweden nor in Germany is a person entitled to citizenship automatically on the basis of jus soli when born in the country. In Germany, it is extremely difficult for people of Turkish origin to become German citizens, despite being born in Germany and having lived all their lives in Germany. In Sweden it is much easier but certainly not automatic.

But even those who become citizens are not necessarily allowed to form a national ethnic minority. Britain is a good example: most of those who have migrated to Britain to work there are citizens of former colonies. But none of the rights accorded to regional or minority languages in the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages are deemed to apply to them - nor to any other minorities in Europe that have been formed through migration this century.

A national ethnic minority has many more rights in international law than any migrant groups. It is
not likely that any migrants will be allowed to form officially accepted national ethnic minorities. In that sense, they are to remain (migrant) workers, not human beings. But what about their grandchildren?

**Education**

**The social context**

What structural prerequisites apply when migrant minority children start their schooling? The situation of immigrant and refugee minorities in Germany is fairly representative of western Europe, including Britain and France. We will merely add a few observations from other countries.

At the end of 1993 there were 6.5 million Ausländer ("foreigners"/foreign nationals) in Germany (Arbeitsplatz Deutschland 2, 1994, p. 2). There are over 1.5 million "foreign" children under the age of 18, over 2.5 million under 25. There are around 160,000 "foreigners" over the age of 60 and in ten years' time there will be more than half a million elderly "foreigners" (p. 3). 60% of the "foreigners" have been in Germany more than 10 years, 40% more than 15 years. 25% more than 20 years. Three quarters of the "foreign" children and youngsters were born in Germany. There are around 1.4 million people in Germany with dual or multiple citizenship (pp. 3-4).

80% of the "foreigners" live with their families in Germany. Only 20% of the "foreigners" live alone, as compared to over 33% of "Germans". Marriages between Germans and "foreigners" have increased from around 28,000 per year in 1980 to almost 40,000 per year in 1990. 55.4% of these were between German women and "foreign" men. Two "foreigners" divorce much less often than two "Germans", but the divorce rate is higher among mixed marriages than among "German" marriages. The number of children is going down but the birth rate is still higher among "foreigners" than "Germans": 1.6 children per family in "German" families. 1.87 for "foreigners" in general. 2.2 for Turks (who are the group with the highest fertility).

"Foreign" families live in less attractive housing. They are often discriminated against when trying to find places to rent. "German" families have over 34.5 square meters per person. "foreigners" 21.5.

The familiar statistics for all "receiving" countries on differences between the dominant group and the minorities have not changed much during the last decade (as one can ascertain by looking at SOPEMI, ILO etc reports). They relate to type of work (more physical labour and services), working conditions (more dirty, heavy and dangerous work, monotonous movements, less independence, long and inconvenient hours, long commuting times etc). much higher rates of unemployment, and so on.

**Explanations**

There are many migrant minority children of obligatory school age in all European countries who are not in schools at all. Some are undocumented (e.g. in Switzerland and France), some are children of refugees who do not get (full-time) schooling while waiting for a decision on asylum (e.g. Denmark), some have "adjusted education" (a Danish concept for children in grades 7-9 who only spend a few days per week in school and the rest working as apprentices - needless to say most of them are migrant minorities), many are pushed out' before reaching the end of obligatory schooling.

There were over 800,000 "foreign" children and young people in the German comprehensive (allgemeinbildende) schools at the end of 1993. 11.5% of the school population. Young "foreigners" between the ages of 14 and 19 make up over 14% of the age group but only 7.6% of the school population. Most of those "foreigners" who continue their education go to Hauptschule (vocational stream) after the comprehensive school, but an increasing tendency of going to upper secondary school (Gymnasium) is reported. But many are pushed out without getting a school leaving certificate of any kind, and few get a vocational training.

For many of those who do go to school, school achievement is at a group level below that of the majority children as a group. Why do young "foreigners" not get Berufsausbildung (vocational training) in Germany? We will compare what the German editors of the official state publication Arbeitsplatz Deutschland (2; 1994) report about what Fachleute (professional people) say, with what the editors themselves think. Fachleute give, according to the editor, the following reasons (p. 12; our translation):
- lack of knowledge of the German language
- gaps in knowledge because of irregular schooling
- adjustment problems
- prejudices of German employers against foreigners.

It is interesting to note that not even the professionals in Germany voice any criticism of how the school functions as a system, according to the editors, i.e. the editors’ account does not reflect the full range of German professional opinion.

Then the editors express their own opinion (unserer Meinung nach) (p. 12; our translation):

- Many foreign youngsters and many parents have not yet understood that vocational training is very important, in many cases even necessary, in order to find a job.
- Many of them do not know to whom to turn in order to get advice and help.
- Many foreign parents still demand of their children that they earn money as soon as possible and help the family. For them, years spent on education are a waste of time (verlorene Zeit).
- Many foreign youngsters believe that it is possible to manage well in life even without formal schooling, provided one is clever and has good connections. Therefore they seek a job immediately with relatives or good acquaintances, where they instead of vocational qualifications can learn more self-assertion.
- According to the views of many foreign parents, girls do not need to learn a profession because even without one they will marry and have children.

This confirms Stacy Churchill's diagnosis more than a decade ago of the reasons for problems faced by immigrant minorities (1985; see also Skutnabb-Kangas 1984, 1988): the German editors of the official state publication place the blame squarely on the minority youngsters, their parents and their culture. The parents are the ones who "do not know", "have not yet understood", who have old-fashioned cultural values which prevent their children from achieving and learning. There is not one reason on their list which would even hint at the need for the educational system to change, to "integrate" - changes are required only of the "foreigners".

The Danish Ministry of the Interior is equally blunt in their definitions and diagnoses. In their report suggesting measures for better integration of immigrants, their definition of "immigrants" includes "only foreign nationals who do not come from the Nordic countries, the countries of the European Common Market and North America and who do not have political asylum in this country" (1990: 15). Why? Because the aforementioned groups "in general are expected to be able to manage". "Immigrants" are those who are not expected to be able to manage, i.e. they are the ones who are deficient and need help. And their major deficiency (which is repeated several times on most pages of the report) is "their lack of competence in the Danish language". Consequently, the main suggestions in the report have to do with coaxing, urging, forcing and threatening the immigrants into learning Danish (and teaching it to their children before these come to school). Minority organisations' severe criticisms of the report (including statistics documenting the wish of immigrants to learn Danish and long queues for Danish courses) have not seemed to lead to much enlightenment in more recent ministerial and other reports emanating from the Danish authorities. The immigrants are still the deficient ones, to be blamed, the ones who have to change.

Many politicians and even researchers who are confronted with the figures for poor school achievement claim that all of these can in fact be explained by inherent characteristics in the migrants themselves. They are mostly working class, the parents have little formal education, and dominant group children with those characteristics are not doing well as a group either. Besides, many claim, immigrants are in fact already often doing better than dominant group children, and that shows that there is nothing wrong with the schools.

The tendency for some minority groups to do better than the majority population which can be seen in the United States and Canada for several Asian groups (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Vietnamese, etc) is not common in western Europe, though there are some tendencies towards this among Indian and Pakistani nationals in a few countries (e.g. Britain). In most cases this seems to be despite the school, not on the basis of how the schools are organised. Often it can be explained by either factors which correlate with high levels of school achievement also in the majority population (e.g. parents' high level of formal education, unusually long hours of homework, coupled with very high expectations) or with factors which have strengthened the mother tongue and the knowledge base of the children outside the majority school (e.g. several years of education in the home country, literacy in the mother tongue, acquired outside school.
frequent visits to the home country, presence of grandparents, other relatives or recent arrivals who strengthen
the need and/or wish to develop the mother tongue, etc. A further analysis of the figures (Liljegren 1981)
from the only global study done in Sweden of all obligatory school leavers with mother tongues other than
Swedish in 1979, seems to show that both factors which are decisive for majority students' further education
(e.g. parents' SES) and factors which are often thought to be important for the minorities' school achievement
and their learning of the dominant language (e.g. linguistic and cultural similarity to the dominant language
and culture) explain very little of the variation and relative hierarchisation between different minority groups.

A lot of effort in all "receiving" countries has gone into trying to change and "help" migrant minorities. Much
money has been spent on employing dominant group "experts" to do this changing and "helping", and the
minorities themselves have in these attempts been constructed as deficient and helpless.

Our claim is that most migrant minority education in industrialised Western European countries is
organised in ways which counteract most scientific evidence of how minority children best achieve in school
and become high-level multilinguals. The educational systems prevent the use of minority mother tongues
in schools, through organisational measures and through prevailing ideologies. They are thus committing
linguistic genocide according to the definition included in Article III in the final draft of what became the
Article III was voted down, and is not part of the final Convention, but the definition is still valid:

(1) Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing
and circulation of publications in the language of the group.

Our claim is that "prohibition" can be direct or indirect. If the minority language is not used as the main
medium of education and childcare, the use of the minority language is indirectly prohibited in daily
intercourse in schools, i.e. it is a question of linguistic genocide. When the children are prohibited from
using and learning their own languages in school, this often leaves them without one of the basic supports
for learning other languages to a high level. Lack of other basic supports for L2-learning (e.g. bilingual
teachers) is another hurdle. Most of the basic requirements known from research to support the development
of high levels of multilingualism for all children (see Skutnabb-Kangas & García 1995 for a summary
of these; see also Cummins 1981, Hakuta 1986. Baker 1993 for overviews) are not fulfilled in the education
of most migrant minority children. Still, it is the children who are blamed: their exclusion from the
acquisition of the attributes needed for the right to and negotiations about a fair share of power and resources
is legitimated by reference to shortcomings and deficiencies inherent in migrant minorities rather than the
educational systems.

The conclusion must be that despite the manifest good will of many teachers and administrators,
the real problems are not being addressed adequately, if at all.

Tendencies

Some of the general tendencies in relation to migrant minorities in all the rich western and northern European
"receiving" countries can be summarised.

- The presence of immigrant minorities is seen as the main reason for racism. If this presence is
  somehow hidden, through forced assimilation or forced marginalisation, there will, according to this
  reasoning, be less racism. "Integration" has often been understood as synonymous with assimilation
  and the main choices given to migrants are thus between assimilation and marginalisation. In both, minorities
  are invisibilised. In assimilation, minorities are made invisible by "thinning them out", by spreading minorities
  out physically, in order to "avoid ghettos" and "prevent racial unrest" (not more than x "foreign" families
  in an apartment block, not more than x percent "foreign" children in a school or class). In marginalisation,
  minorities are likewise made invisible, but through measures which superficially may look the opposite:
  by forcing them into "ghettos" so that the "mainstream" can feel that they are still comfortably in their
  own country and do not need to "hear all these foreign languages" or "feel like we are in Istanbul" (all
  examples from Denmark, see Skutnabb-Kangas 1993, Information 19.8.1993 'At sprede flygtninge og
  indvandrere eller ej'?). Integration has also been understood as something that only the migrant minorities
are to do (they have to change).
- Solutions to structural (economic and political) problems are often proposed using cultural measures. Racism, xenophobia and intolerance are treated as matters of lack of information about migrants and their cultures in the dominant group populations and information and multiculturalism are seen as The Solutions: multiculturalism is often understood in a vague and superficial way and it seems in most cases to exclude multilingualism.
- Problems that migrant minorities face are "of their own making", seen as due to "their" characteristics, rather than unequal power relationships and the ways the dominant group organises social institutions.

Educational linguistic human rights

Immigrant minority languages have been excluded from the educational system in several ways. One effective way has been international law. Immigrants have not been seen as minorities (and even the linguistic human rights of minorities have notoriously been weak, especially in education, see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994, Skutnabb-Kangas, in press b). And international law grants migrants no binding linguistic human rights, especially mother tongue related rights in education.

Among the bodies currently codifying language rights for minorities are the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the OSCE, the UN and UNESCO. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has great symbolic value, but explicitly excludes migrant languages. In addition, the countries signing it can decide which minorities they want to apply it to, i.e. even if they accept that a group in their country is a minority, they do not necessarily need to extend the rights to this group. The Charter is full of escape clauses and alternatives which make it possible for an unwilling state to sign it and still grant very few rights (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994 for details). The European Parliament's Directive on the education of the children of migrant workers (77/466/EEC of 25.7.77) is fraught with difficulties of interpretation and implementation, as the Parliament's own Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee of Inquiry into RACISM and XENOPHOBIA indicates (A3-195/90, PE 141.205/FIN, 111). The Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy through Law drafted a Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of Minorities (CDL 91 - 7), which could also have applied to those migrants who have changed citizenship, but it included very little on language rights and is under complete revision in any case. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) stated unambiguously in its Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990) that national minorities should have the right to maintain their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, the right to seek voluntary and public assistance to do so in educational institutions, and should not be subjected to assimilation against their will (CSCE 1990a: 40), but has so far not agreed on any binding conventions, and has not included immigrant minorities. An OSCE High Commissioner on Minorities was appointed in 1992. The UN Draft Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights in its present form would give indigenous peoples the right to all forms of education, including in particular the right of children to have access to education in their own languages, and to establish, structure, conduct and control their own educational systems and institutions. But again, many states will probably want to change the positive formulations (see e.g. Daes 1995, IWGIA Yearbook 1994, Morris 1995). It is in striking contrast to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers and Their Families, which accords minimal rights to the mother tongues and is assimilation-oriented (see Hasenau 1990).

Article 27 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, in force since 1976) grants the best binding minority language protection so far:

"In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."

This article has been one of the most important for the protection of linguistic minorities, as both Capotorti (1979, the UN Special Rapporteur on minorities) and more recent UN reports confirm. Both the UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child (1959 and 1989), and several Council of Europe and CSCE documents have used approximately the same formulation.

In the customary reading of Article 27, rights were only granted to individuals, not collectivities. And "persons belonging to ... minorities" only had these rights in states which accept that the minorities exist.
This has not helped immigrant minorities in any countries because they are not seen as minorities in the legal sense by the states.\(^6\)

Recently (6 April 1994, Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5) The UN Human Rights Committee adopted a General comment on Article 27 which interprets it in a substantially more positive way than earlier. The Committee sees the Article as

- recognizing the existence of a "right":
- imposing positive obligations on States:
- protecting all individuals on the State’s territory or under its jurisdiction (i.e. also immigrants and refugees), irrespective of whether they belong to the minorities specified in the Article or not;
- stating that the existence of a minority does not depend on a decision by the State but requires to be established by objective criteria.

It remains to be seen to what extent this General comment will influence the State parties. If the Committee’s interpretation ("soft law") becomes the general norm, and if the Western European countries where migrant and refugee minorities live start observing this norm, the educational linguistic rights might improve.

However the ideology of the isomorphism of one state, one nation, one language that has dominated Europe in the past two centuries is still prevalent, and has meant that it is only in a few states that multilingualism has been actively encouraged and even then only for national ethnic minorities, not migrant minorities. Some states (like Britain in the example below) have even discouraged the maintenance of multiculturalism:

A national system of education must aim at producing citizens who can take their place in society properly equipped to exercise rights and perform duties which are the same as other citizens. If their parents were brought up in another culture or tradition, children should be encouraged to respect it, but a national system cannot be expected to perpetuate the different values of immigrant groups (Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council 1964. 7).

This "European" policy of the state having an "ethnic" and linguistic identity and repressing or barely tolerating the cultural and linguistic identities of others, especially migrant minorities, i.e. denying to others basic linguistic and cultural human rights, is a peculiarly European dilemma (and here the Neo-Europeans have followed suit). Educational tokenisms (migrant minorities may, for instance, be allowed to study their mother tongue as a subject, sometimes as a foreign language, together with those for whom it is a foreign language) are part of the exclusionary processes. The risks of such a policy are stressed by Jurek Smolicz (1986, 96):

... attempts to artificially suppress minority languages through policies of assimilation, devaluation, reduction to a state of illiteracy, expulsion or genocide are not only degrading of human dignity and morally unacceptable, but they are also an invitation to separatism and an incitement to fragmentation into mini-states.

Just as absence of economic and social rights in the period between the world wars promoted the emergence of totalitarian regimes (Eide 1995, 29-30), absence or denial of linguistic and cultural rights can today be regarded as an effective way of promoting "ethnic" conflict and violence. In contrast, granting linguistic and cultural human rights to everybody, including migrant workers (i.e. making them "human beings") is a step towards avoiding "ethnic" conflict, avoiding disintegration of (some) states and avoiding anarchy, where the rights of even the elites will be severely curtailed because of increasingly civil war-like conditions, especially in inner cities. But this promotion of civic pluralism (instead of the monolingualism/monoculturalism-oriented nation-state reductionism) requires a pluralistic state, as Mary Kalantzis formulates it:

Civic Pluralism means that all people have access to political power, economic resources, social services, and, most importantly, cultural symbols regardless of their cultural affiliations and styles. This cultural symbols point is in some important respects the key to the others. The State can no longer have an 'ethnic' identity as it did in the era of traditional nationalism. Under Civic Pluralism, the nation's cultural symbols are open and inclusive. One shouldn't any longer have to take on the cultural and linguistic demeanour of the so called 'mainstream' in order to enjoy access to political power,
economic resources, social services and the symbols of nation. Far from fostering tribalism or fragmentation, Civic Pluralism is their only antidote. It is a means to create a postnationalist sense of common purpose." (1995, 2: our emphasis).

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Européenne. Multilingua.


Notes:

1. The concepts politonym, toponym and ethnonym were developed by the Soviet academician Yu. Bromley (1984).

2. "Push-out" is a more realistic term for the customary "drop-out", in expressing where change has to be sought if the children are to be retained in school.

3. We (Rahbek Pedersen & Skutnabb-Kangas 1985: 206-207) showed for instance for the late 1970s, that of those Turkish nationals between the ages of 12 and 15 who were resident in Denmark according to census statistics, less than a third were to be found in the school statistics. Similar figures were reported for (West) Germany (e.g. Kühn 1979: around 25% of the "guest worker" children of obligatory school age, living legally in the country, were not in school). Widgren's estimate for Unesco in 1975 was that up to half a million school-aged migrant children in western European industrialised countries were not in school (see Skutnabb-Kangas 1984, 291ff.). Even the oldest of those children are still under the age of 35. There is no reason to believe that the figures have changed considerably since then even if we know that some improvement has taken place.

4. There is a tendency in many countries not to admit this, interpreting statistics in misleading ways, focussing on and emphasizing those (often small) groups which are doing well, and making optimistic noises about migrant minorities catching up within a few years.

5. See Marianne Gronemeyer's (1992) brilliant analysis on the construction and historical development of the concept "help".

6. Finns in Sweden have tried and the Swedish response has been negative - see Skutnabb-Kangas, in press a.

7. Neo-Europes or Europeanised countries are those colonised by Europeans, e.g. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. For several criteria and definitions of Neo-Europes, see Crosby 1984, 2-7, 148-149.
Educational language choice - multilingual diversity or monolingual reductionism?

Tove Skutnabb-Kangas

1. Introduction

There are essentially three inter-related types of language planning: corpus planning (to do with language form and structure), status planning (to do with the uses to which a language is put in various domains, and the prestige attached to the relevant languages) and acquisition planning (the arrangements made, generally by a Ministry of Education, for the learning of languages).

The important issues in educational language planning belong to both status planning and acquisition planning. The key choices which influence each other are the choice of official state languages, the choice (and status) of "national" languages, and the choice of which languages are to be used as the media of instruction and which (if any) (foreign) languages are to be obligatory or possible to study as subjects in schools.

Most Western European countries have traditionally had explicit plans for foreign languages to be learned in school, whereas the choice of the medium/media of education has often been more implicit or presented as more or less self-evident.

An explicit (educational) language policy presupposes language planning which is sensitive to a range of pressures: social, political, economic, technical, ideological, etc. These can be seen as being generated internally, within a state, and externally, stemming from outside sources (neighbours, the region, the world). It might have been possible earlier to relate the choice of medium of education to internal pressures, and the choice of foreign languages to external pressures (trade, military interests, international cooperation, etc).

Today the borders between internal vs. external pressures, and foreign language learning vs. medium of education are increasingly blurred. On the one hand, the choice of foreign languages to be learned by majority children might in positive situations increasingly be influenced by internal factors, e.g. which immigrant minorities are present in large numbers in a country (immigrant minority mother tongues being offered as foreign languages to majority children in secondary education, as in new plans in Britain or Denmark). On the other hand, the choice of the medium of education might be influenced by (elite) concerns about "international" cooperation (e.g. immersion programmes or European or international schools being offered for majority children, with a foreign language (often English, French, so far not often German) as the medium of education for part of the time). The medium of education might also to some extent start to be influenced by trade concerns, if the former home countries of immigrated minorities appear to become possible trade partners on a larger scale - this could lead to a more tolerant view on using a minority mother tongue as the main medium of education, at least transitionally, for minority children themselves, or even for some majority children (two-way programmes through the medium of Spanish in the United States, which originally could be seen as emerging from internal pressures, might grow in this direction, with the NAFTA agreement).

It seems to me that Europe today faces choices in its educational language planning which may have repercussions also globally. In an "integrated Europe" it is imperative that many children become high level multilinguals. Many minority children are already multilingual, despite educational language policies which have often not been conducive to it. What is needed now is a policy which makes both minority and majority children high level multilinguals. Educational language choices are decisive if this is to succeed.

There are both positive and negative lessons to learn from elsewhere. As a contrast to Europe and Europeanised countries where official policies in most cases are negative towards linguistic diversity, there is in most other parts of the world a widespread acceptance of natural multilingualism. But this has, sadly, been constrained by many negative educational choices (see e.g. Brock-Utne 1993). The educational system, often modelled on inappropriate European ideas and paradigms, has often (through the (wrong) choice of a former colonial language as medium of education, especially in Africa) stifled and certainly not encouraged the natural multilingualism. On the other hand, some positive educational models leading to multilingualism or bilingualism have been developed (for instance in the United States), despite official attitudes geared towards seeing monolingualism as "natural" and positive. The contrast here is thus that monolingually oriented countries are developing (some) educational models to support multilingualism, whereas multilingually...
oriented countries are practising educational models, eventually planned to lead to monolingualism.

What is needed, in my view, is a combination of the African/Asian positive attitudes towards multilingualism and diversity in general as a natural state of life (linguodiversity, cultural diversity, biodiversity etc), with some of the positive educational models developed in many parts of the world. Often despite negative general attitudes towards diversity, models which are more in tune with the African/Asian attitudes but which are in many ways in contradiction with the official linguist attitudes prevailing in several of the countries which have developed these educational models.

It seems to me that the educational language choices facing Europe and other countries can in a simplified way be placed onto a continuum where the positive end implies an acceptance of multilingual plurality and diversity in deed (not only in the phraseologies of planning documents and folkloristic celebrations), and where the negative extreme can be called monolingual reductionism or monolingual stupidity/naivety.

In this article, I will first discuss the ideology of monolingual reductionism/naivety/stupidity, which I see as one of the most decisive factors in preventing the adoption of educational policies leading towards multilingualism, acceptance of linguistic diversity and linguistic human rights. Then I will contrast them with some educational models which seem to succeed in supporting children to become high level multilinguals, models which support diversity and honour linguistic human rights.

2. Monolingual reductionism - the ideology of the "homogenous nation-state"

2.1 The homogenous nation-state

The ideology of monolingual reductionism/naivety/stupidity seems to me to be connected with the idea of an imagined community (Anderson 1983): the mythical, homogenous nation-state (a state with one nation and one language) which does not exist anywhere in the world.

The traditional stereotypical image of a nation-state sees the nation-state as a product of an evolutionary process starting with small tribal societies and developing via many phases towards higher forms of social organization of people's lives together, where the nation-states was supposed to represent the currently most developed form (e.g. Hobsbawm 1991). A nation-state was comprised of one ethnic group, one "nation", and this imagined community was, especially in the German nationalist tradition, ideally seen as united by one single language. Other nations within this Nation would then either be seen as disruptive, as an anomaly, or, if they were very small in numbers and insignificant in terms of power - as most indigenous nations/peoples have until very recently been perceived to be - they could be seen as colourful, non-threatening remnants from an earlier phase. In order not to be seen as disruptive, they had to accept that they "have no independent future" (Hobsbawm 1991: 35), that they are "small and backward" and "have everything to gain by merging into greater nations", i.e. that they and their languages are "doomed to disappear" (all Hobsbawm 1991: 34), because of "the laws of progress", because they "could not be adapted to the modern age" (Hobsbawm 1991: 35).

All these are ethnicist and/or linguist arguments, glorifying dominant languages and groups, stigmatizing dominated languages and groups, and rationalizing the relationship between them so that the domination is made to seem beneficial to the dominated (see Preiswerk 1980 for an elaboration of these concepts in relation to racism). I define racism, ethnicism and linguicism as "ideologies, structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and non-material) between groups which are defined on the basis of "race" (in biologically argued racism), ethnicity/culture (in ethnicism, ethnically and culturally argued racism), or language (in linguicism, linguistically argued racism)" (Skutnabb-Kangas 1988).

Since the "natural" development would be for every "nation" to have its own nation-state with its own language, the existence of unassimilated minority groups, of several "nations" within The Nation was is seen as leading in a "natural" way to fragmentation: a complete or partial disintegration of the nation-state, with the formation of several new nation-states or some kind of a federal structure as a result. Since a nation-state is "indivisible" (as for instance expressed in the constitutions of Turkey or France), this cannot be allowed. Very few nation-states can be expected to voluntarily work towards this type of disintegration.

There are many different ways of avoiding this imagined threat of disintegration. One is reducing the number of potential nations. This includes preventing groups from acquiring or maintaining their own languages as one of the central prerequisites needed for nation-building. "Old" minorities who already exist on the territory of the nation-state can be "starved" to assimilation, at the same time as assimilationist
educational and other policies attempt to prevent the creation of new "national" minorities (from immigrated, settler or refugee minorities).

2.2 Linguistic genocide

The most dramatic way of reducing the number of (potential) nations is physical genocide. The prevention and punishment of physical genocide is regulated by a UN Convention but physical genocide is nevertheless attempted in relation to some groups.

Another way of reducing the number of possible nation-states is to commit linguistic genocide, which would be (actively) killing a language without killing the speakers (as in physical genocide) or (through passivity) letting a language die (see Juan Cobarrubias taxonomy (1983) where he discusses the following policies which a state can adopt towards minority languages: 1. attempting to kill a language; 2. letting a language die; 3. unsupported coexistence; 4. partial support of specific language functions; 5. adoption as an official language. Unsupported coexistence mostly also leads to minority languages dying).

When the United Nations did preparatory work for what later became the "International convention for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide" (E 793, 1948), linguistic and cultural genocide were discussed alongside physical genocide, and were seen as serious crimes against humanity (see Capotorti 1979). When the Convention was accepted. Article 3, which covered linguistic and cultural genocide was vetoed by some nation states (the "great powers"), and it is thus not included in the final Convention of 1948. What remains, however, is a definition of linguistic genocide, which most states then in the UN were prepared to accept. Linguistic genocide is defined (in Art. 3, 1) as

"Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group".

The use of a minority language can be prohibited overtly and directly, through laws, imprisonment, torture, killings and threats, as in Turkey today vis-a-vis the Kurds (e.g. Human Rights in Kurdistan 1989; Helsinki Watch Update 1990; Besikci 1990: "Silence is killing them" 1994, Skutnabb-Kangas & Bucak 1994). The use of a minority language can also be prohibited covertly, more indirectly, via ideological and structural means, as in the educational systems of most European and North American countries.

My claim is that the use of a minority language is in fact prohibited "in daily intercourse or in schools" every time there are minority children in day care centers and schools, but no bilingual teachers who are authorized to use the languages of the minority children as the media of teaching and child care most of the time. This is the situation for most immigrant and refugee minority children in all Western European countries and in the US, Canada and Australia. Immigrant minority education in these countries is thus guilty of linguistic genocide, as defined by the UN. So is the education that most indigenous first nations have had and that many of them still have (see e.g. Hamel 1994; Jordan 1988).

Linguicism is a major factor in determining whether speakers of particular languages are allowed to enjoy their linguistic human rights. Lack of these rights, for instance the absence of these languages from school time-tables makes minority languages invisible. Alternatively, minority mother tongues are seen as handicaps which are believed to prevent minority children from acquiring the valued resource (= the majority language), so minority children should get rid of them in their own interest. At the same time, many minorities, especially children, are in fact prevented from fully acquiring majority resources, especially the majority languages, by disabling educational structures, when their instruction is organised through the medium of the majority languages in ways which contradict most scientific evidence (see e.g. Corson 1992: Cummins 1984, 1989, 1992: Cummins & Danesi 1990: Cummins & Swain 1986; Genesee 1987; Hakuta 1986; Hernández-Chávez 1988, 1994; Padilla et al 1991; Padilla & Benavides 1992: Pattanayak 1981: Ramirez et al 1991; Skutnabb-Kangas 1984, 1988, 1990).

A covert way of making languages disappear at the same time as the state retains its legitimacy in the eyes of (most of) its citizens and the international community, seems thus to be for a state to observe (or to be seen as observing) several of the basic human rights for all its citizens, including minorities, but to deny minorities those human rights which are most central for reproducing a minority group as a distinctive group, namely linguistic and cultural human rights. This has been the preferred strategy of most Western states. It can be seen in their opposition to any binding, promotion-oriented linguistic rights, especially in education, in international and European covenants.
It can also be seen in the fairly irrational and scientifically unsoundly based opposition to any type of maintenance education for minorities, especially migrant minorities, in Western states. The lack of linguistic and cultural rights has been "hoped" to lead to the assimilation of minorities and thus to a reduction of possible nation-builders. The opposite strategy, granting (some) linguistic and cultural human rights to minorities but denying them (many) economic and political rights seems to have been used in many ex-communist or socialist countries, or, for instance, to some extent in South Africa and earlier in Namibia (see e.g. Rannut 1994, Phillipson, Skutnabb-Kangas & Africa 1985). This has been thought to lead to a voluntary merging of languages and cultures, with first the elites from the minority groups and later others, assimilating into the larger community in order to get access to more political power and material resources. Here also a reduction of possible nation-builders has been attempted.

The difference between the way that such countries as Turkey and for instance Sweden, the US or Canada commit linguistic genocide lies in that it is done more openly and brutally in Turkey (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Bucak 1994) whereas it is more covert and sophisticated in Sweden, the US and Canada (Skutnabb-Kangas 1991; see also Schierup 1992 and Ålund 1992 for critical accounts of Swedish multicultural policy). Covert linguistic (e.g. of the type that most Western states use in their educational systems) appears to be extremely effective, as compared with the overt version (as in Turkey). Within 2-4 generations, there are fewer speakers of most minority languages in these countries than in more openly linguistic countries. Kurds still speak Kurdish and resist linguistic oppression, whereas many former Spanish-speakers in the USA and Finnish-Sami-speakers in Sweden have assimilated. It is often more difficult to struggle against covert violence, against the colonization of the mind, where short-term "benefits" may obscure longer-term losses.

Monolingual reductionism/stupidity could then be characterized as an ideology which has been/is being used to rationalize the linguistic genocide (in education) committed by states which "see" the existence of (unassimilated) linguistic minorities as a threat leading to the disintegration of nation-states.

2.3 Monolingualism: normal, desirable and unavoidable?

Monolingual stupidity seems to me to be characterized by three myths. These claim or imply that monolingualism at both the individual level and the societal level is normal, desirable and unavoidable. I will present these myths and criticize ("dissect") them.

2.3.1. Myth I: Monolingualism is normal

2.3.1.1. The myth

What dominant groups see as ideal for themselves has to be rationalized so that it seems ideal to everybody. This is often done by presenting it as "normal". According to the myth, the homogenous nation-state is "normal". It is an ideal formation, one of the most highly developed ways of social organization of peoples’ lives. Since the homogenous nation-state only has one nation, it is also "normally" (ideally) monolingual because there is only one ethnic group. This means that only one official language is accepted at a societal level. The myth also implies that most states and people are essentially monolingual (disregarding foreign languages learned at school).

At an individual level the myth means that a monolingual individual is seen as the norm. Of course she may learn foreign languages at school or when she visits other countries, but not in the family or the neighbourhood.

2.3.1.2. Critique

In fact monolingualism is abnormal, if we by "normal" mean the way most countries and people are. There are maybe up to 7,000 languages in the world (depending on how languages are defined), but fewer than 230 states (both "language" and "state" are difficult to define and the exact numbers are unclear for languages, see Skutnabb-Kangas 1984: 59--65). There are extremely few countries in the world without national minorities, and every state in the world has speakers of more than one language. Here is one possible scenario: Even if there were an accelerated division of present states into many more states, e.g. if the number of present states were to double, and if an accelerated linguistic genocide were to occur (i.e. for instance, 10 additional languages were to die every year), we would need to wait until at least the year 2600 before
it could be "normal" for states to be factually monolingual (i.e. to be "real" nation-states, with one ethnic group and one language only in each state).

It is not the granting of linguistic and educational rights to minorities that leads to the disintegration of nation-states, quite the opposite. It is more likely that the deprivation of people's human rights, including linguistic human rights (LHRs) is what leads to conflict. If the rights of minorities are respected, there is less likelihood of conflict. Linguistic diversity is in no way causally related to conflict, though of course language is a major mobilising factor in contexts where an ethnic group feels itself threatened, and/or where ethnic and linguistic borders coincide with other borders along which access to power and resources is (unequally) distributed.

Despite the wealth of languages, more than half of the world's states are officially monolingual. English is (one of) the official language(s) in almost 60 of these states. The number of languages used as media in primary education is probably much less than 500. Speakers of more than 6,500 languages thus have to become minimally bilingual, at least to some degree, in order to have any formal education, to read, to receive any public services, to participate in the political life in their country, etc. Even if some of the remaining official or semi-official languages have many speakers (like Chinese, English, Arabic, Russian, Hindi, Spanish, Japanese, etc), there are still more multilingual than monolingual individuals in the world.

Thus claiming that monolingualism is normal is absurd, both at state level and at individual level.

2.3.2. Myth 2: Monolingualism is desirable

2.3.2.1. The myth

It is often claimed that monolingualism is efficient and economical and connected with and leading to rich and powerful societies. Individuals who are monolingual, can use more time than multilinguals for learning the one language really thoroughly and for learning other things. Besides, it has been claimed that bi- or multilingualism is harmful to a child: it confuses, takes time, prevents the child from learning any language properly.

2.3.2.2. Critique

At a societal level monolingualism is inefficient and uneconomic. It represents dangerous reductionism (see e.g. Pattanayak 1981, 1988). There is no causal connection between multilingualism and poverty, as e.g. Joshua Fishman (1989 and Fishman & Solano 1989) has shown. A monolingual state oppresses the linguistic human rights of the minorities and can often commit linguistic genocide. It prevents political participation of many of its citizens and an integration of the society. It often ruins trust and cooperation between different ethnic groups. It often breeds arrogance, ethnocentrism, racism, ethnicism and linguicism in the majority group and bitterness, hatred and colonised consciousness in minority groups. It increases waste of talent, knowledge and experience, and prevents "free movement of goods, services, people and capital" (the goals of the European Community) (for these claims, see Skutnabb-Kangas, in press).

A monolingual individual may experience drawbacks, compared to a high level bi- or multilingual (i.e. someone who knows two or more languages well). High level bilinguals as a group have done better than (comparable) monolinguals on the following types of test:

- several types of subtest of general intelligence
- cognitive flexibility
- divergent thinking
- creativity
- sensitivity to feedback cues
- sensitivity to and interpretation of non-verbal messages
- metalinguistic awareness
- learning of further languages (faster and often better)

(for evidence, discussion, and relativizations, see e.g. Bialystok (ed.) 1991; Bossers 1991; Cummins 1984, 1991; Cummins & Swain 1986; Genesee 1987; Hakuta 1986; Padilla et al 1991; Ricciardelli 1989; Skutnabb-
Kangas 1984; Swain et al 1990, and literature in them). Thus monolingualism is not desirable for societies or individuals.

2.3.3. Myth 3: Monolingualism is unavoidable

2.3.3.1. The myth

According to the myth, bilingualism is at an individual level seen as a (negative) temporary phase on the way from monolingualism in one language to monolingualism in another language. According to this view, the first generation Latvian in Manitoba, Canberra or Siberia knows her mother tongue, and learns a little English (or Russian). Her children know Latvian as children, but the language of the new environment, English (Russian), becomes her main language as an adult. The third generation Latvian in Manitoba, Canberra or Siberia maybe knows some words of the grandparents' language, but is fairly monolingual for all practical purposes, and in the fourth generation nothing is left of the Latvian language (even if the national costume may still be in the cupboard). This is seen as an unavoidable (and positive) development.

At a societal level, it is believed that modernisation and development necessarily lead to the disappearance of many of the "lesser used languages" - having several languages is seen as uneconomical. Linguistic assimilation of groups is mostly seen as voluntary, and good for the individual and necessary for the group, if they want to participate in the economic and political life of the new environment/country. Maintaining the old language is a nice romantic dream. You must choose.

2.3.3.2. Critique

In fact many minorities have kept or tried to keep their old language while learning the new one. Latvians in Manitoba, Canberra and Siberia have certainly tried. There is no need for "either-or" solutions (either you "cling to" your old language, and it means you don't learn the new one, or you learn the new and it inevitably means losing the old). "Both-and" is better for the individual and for society. Both are enriched by bilingualism, intellectually, psychologically, culturally, socially, economically, politically. It is perfectly possible to become a high-level bilingual or multilingual if the educational language policy is geared towards it, as is shown in the last section of this paper.

2.4. Synthesis: monolingualism should be eradicated

At an individual level monolingualism is a result of a wrong educational policy and of linguicism. The patients, i.e. those individuals who suffer from monolingual stupidity, are in need of care.

At a societal level monolingualism is a social construction which is unmodern, underdeveloped and primitive. It might have been seen as a necessary concomitant to the development of the first phases of a Western-type nation-state (and even that is doubtful), but now it is definitely outmoded and dangerously reductionist. It prevents political and economic global development, justice, equity, cooperation and democracy. Like cholera or leprosy, monolingualism is an illness which should be eradicated as soon as possible. It is dangerous for peace in the world.

3. How to make all children multilingual

If monolingualism is negative for the patients/victims and for the society as a whole, how can educational language planning help in getting rid of it? How should education be organised, so as to make everybody bilingual or multilingual at a high level? I will mention a few recent experiments which have shown relative success in this, and, on the basis of both them and additional experiments, draw tentative conclusions about principles which seem important to follow if high level multilingualism is the educational goal.

3.1. "Traditional programmes"
A common development often preceding the experiments is as follows:
The educational starting point in a monolingually oriented country is usually monolingual instruction through the majority language to both majorities (who stay monolingual) and minorities (who at a group level do not become high level bilinguals).

In the next phase where big societal changes have occurred, majorities are still taught through the medium of their own languages, with teaching of foreign languages as subjects (and they stay fairly monolingual).

3.2. Maintenance programmes for minorities
(Some) (national) minorities have succeeded in getting maintenance or language shelter programmes, where they are taught through the medium of their own languages, at least during the first six years, often longer, with good teaching of the majority language as a second language, given by bilingual teachers. As we know from national minorities in several countries (Welsh in Britain, Swedish-speakers in Finland, Frisian-speakers in the Netherlands, Danish-speakers in Germany, etc), they often become high level bilinguals. This presupposes extensive contact with the majority and positive attitudes towards them and bilingualism. As Joshua Fishman (1993: 2) notes, though, "few immigrant cultures anywhere have been able to develop the diglossic arrangements that would permit participation in mainstream econopolitical processes, on the one hand, and the fostering of their own language and culture maintenance, on the other hand." It has been more difficult for immigrant minority groups to succeed in getting proper non-transitional maintenance programmes, even when research shows that these tend to achieve higher levels of proficiency in the majority language too than submersion or early exit programmes (see Ramirez et al. 1991). In my own study (1987), Finnish immigrant minority youngsters in Sweden with working class parents did, after 9 years in Finnish-medium classes, almost as well as Finnish children in Finland in a Finnish language test and slightly better in a Swedish language test than Swedish mostly middle class children in paralale classes in the same schools. In addition, their school achievement was slightly better than that of the Swedish children.

3.3. Immersion programmes for majorities
But if we are interested in how majority children become bilingual, we have to go further. The only type of educational programme where this has been achieved on a broad basis, is the Canadian immersion programmes (see e.g. Genesee 1985. 1987; Lambert & Tucker 1972: Swain & Lapkin 1982; see also Ramnutt 1992 for an Estonian-language presentation of them, Duff 1991 for a Hungarian experiment, and Baetens Beardsmore & Swain 1985 for an early comparison between immersion and European School models).

An immersion programme is a programme where majority language children with a high status mother tongue voluntarily choose to be instructed in a minority language, in classes with majority children only, and with a bilingual teacher who understands what the children say in their mother tongue, but speaks L2 only. There are more than 400,000 children in Canada who have gone through immersion programmes or are in them now - they are the best studied language learning programmes on a large scale in the world.

Results from early immersion programmes, the most common model, show that the children's mother tongue competence initially is not on a par with English-speaking children in English-medium programmes, but as soon as they start getting instruction in English (from 3rd grade), they catch up, and are at the latest in grade 5 at the national norm level in English or higher. Their school achievement is often higher than the mean in Canada. The competence in French comes up to a native or near-native level in listening and reading comprehension. In productive French skills, speaking and especially writing, the children make more mistakes, are not as fluent as native speakers and generally lag behind. Despite this, their productive French is at a much higher level than anything reached by good foreign language teaching. They are especially good in situations where they can themselves choose the topic and the level of formality of the discourse. The attitudes towards French language and culture and towards francophones in Canada are positive, but maybe not quite as positive as many people might hope or expect.

The majority of immersion programmes are still in French, but there are programmes in other languages too, especially in Ukrainian and Spanish but also some in Hebrew, German, Chinese and Arabic. Some trilingual programmes also exist (see Genesee 1985. 1987 and Taylor 1993). Immersion programmes have spread from Canada to the United States and, increasingly, also to other countries (Australia, Catalunya, the Basque country, Finland, Holland, Hungary, Germany, and some additional countries (e.g. Switzerland.
Estonia) are investigating the possibilities of starting up.

Some of the "gaps" in immersion programmes have to do with children having little (informal or formal) contact with other children (or indeed adults) speaking the target language as their native language. Immersion programmes have mostly been located in English-speaking schools, without any French-speakers. Some of the difficulties in producing fully "correct" French may also be due to the facts that French has not been taught as a subject, it has only functioned as the medium of education, and that English language arts have only started in grade 3 (Cummins 1995 suggests an earlier start). Both these factors, in addition to a belief in the importance of cross-lingual and cross-cultural contacts for attitude formation, have influenced the development of the European school model and partly also the two-way programmes in the United States.

3.4. "European Schools"

The presentation of the European schools here is mainly based on Hugo Baetens Beardsmore's and his colleagues' writings (see bibliography). In the European Schools an attempt is made to combine good sides from maintenance programmes for minorities and immersion programmes for majorities, and to avoid the few weaknesses which these models may have.

The first European School, K-12 (Kindergarten through grade 12), was founded in Brussels in 1958 for children of European Community officials. There are presently 9 European Schools in 6 countries and the tenth will start in the autumn of 1993. There are 12-13,000 pupils. Everybody who works for the European Community can have their children in these schools: cleaners, ministers, janitors, secretaries, interpreters. If there is space, local children can attend: one of the schools has many children of former miners, another one has immigrant steel-workers' children. European Community officials' children have no fees whereas local children pay a nominal fee.

The goal is to "guarantee the development of the child's first language and cultural identity," and to "promote a European identity through instruction for all pupils in at least 2 languages, compulsory learning of a 3rd as a subject matter, and options regarding a 4th language" (Baetens Beardsmore 1993: 28), to "eliminate prejudice and nationalistic antagonisms", and "use multilingualism as a tool for both scholastic achievement and harmonious ethnolinguistic relations" (Baetens Beardsmore 1993: 28).

All or most official languages of the European Community (EC) function as the principal medium of education initially in their own subsections in every school. Normally a child attends a subsection for her own mother tongue, i.e. Danish, Dutch, English. French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese or Spanish. There are some children from other language groups, and these attend the subsection the language of which they know best. Most Arabic-speakers are for instance in the French language subsection.

The medium of education is initially the child's mother tongue (= the language of the subsection), and all cognitively and linguistically demanding decontextualised subjects continue to be taught through the medium of the mother tongue (first language, L1) at least up to grade 8.

All lessons/periods last for 30 minutes in grades 1-2 and 45 minutes from grade 3 upwards. The mother tongue is taught as a subject 16 periods per week (hereafter 16p) in the first two grades. 9p in grades 3-5. 5p in grades 6-7 and 4p in grades 8-12. The second language (L2) also starts as a subject in grade 1 and has 5p in grades 1-7. 4p in grade 8 and 3p in grades 9-12. The pupils can choose between English, French or German as their L2 (meaning the children in these three subsections only have a choice between two languages whereas all the other children have three choices). All the teachers are native speakers of the languages which they teach, but the absolute majority of teachers are bi- or multilingual - this also applies to the other staff in the schools: the adults must be good models of multilingualism. Every child thus has adults in the school who speak their language.

From grade 3 a couple of subjects are taught in mixed groups and they may be taught through the medium of L2. The subjects chosen are always cognitively and linguistically less demanding and context-embedded, e.g. 1p physical education and 3p "European Hours" with excursions, planning of parties etc. "European Hours" could, for instance, be taught through French to 5 Italian, 3 Danish, 6 Greek, 7 German and 5 Portuguese children, and through German to 6 English, 5 French, 4 Spanish, 2 Greek and 3 German children. The medium of education is mostly L2 for all the children, but there may also be some children present for whom the language is an L1.

From grade 6 the amount taught through L2 increases, so that e.g. music (2p), arts (2p), physical education (3p) and complementary activities (2p - handicrafts, computers, photography, electronics, typing, painting, etc) are taught in mixed groups. But until grade 8 all subjects taught in mixed groups through the
medium of L2 are cognitively and linguistically less demanding and context-embedded.

In grade 8 a 3rd language (L3) starts as a subject, with 4p. (in grades 9-12 3p), and the pupils can choose between every subsection’s language: all are offered. If, for instance, a Greek and a Danish child have become friends, having been taught physical education together through French since grade 3, they can choose to study each other’s languages from grade 8.

In grade 8 L2 becomes the medium of instruction also in one or two cognitively demanding decontextualised subjects (e.g. history, 3p), often in mixed groups but without mother tongue speakers of the medium of instruction. The teachers use multilingual dictionaries or word lists and ensure understanding in several ways. The subject matter has often been discussed earlier through the medium of the respective mother tongues of the pupils so the concepts are familiar.

In grades 9-10, physical education, history and geography are taught through L2, the other compulsory subjects (there are not many) through L1. Of the elective courses, only Latin and classical Greek are taught through L1. everything else through L2. The 4th language (L4) starts as an elective subject in grade 9, with 4p (in grades 11-12 3p).

In grades 11-12, only L1 and L2 are compulsory while L3 and L4 are optional. Philosophy and mathematics are taught through L1. all other compulsory subjects through L2 (or L3). Of the elective subjects, Latin, classical Greek, physics, chemistry, biology and advanced courses (including one in L1 as a subject) are taught through L1. everything else through L2 (or L3 or even L4). In grades 9-12, those elective courses which are not prescribed as courses to be taught through the medium of L1. are taught in mixed groups. and the language of instruction can thus be a pupil’s L2 or L3 or L4. or, as it may sometimes be, L1.

The results seem to show that the children learn at least two languages at a native level, both receptively and productively, both orally and in writing. They are supposed to be able to take content matter tests in both L1 and L2 at a native level, and many take some subjects through L2 in the European Baccalaureate. Some even do it in their L3. Many of the children reach high levels in L3, and some even in L4. The results in the final exams are above medium. with, for instance, 95,5% of the 1,002 candidates passing the European Baccalaureate in 1992 (see Baetens Beardsmore 1995. table 8).

When immersion pupils reach a near-native level in L2-reception. European School pupils seem to reach a native level in L2-reception AND production, in addition to, for many, high levels in a 3rd and sometimes also a 4th language. Research on attitudes also shows preliminary positive results.

4. Necessary principles

It is, of course, possible to make many different kinds of cautionary generalisation on the basis of experiments. I will not discuss other experimental models here, but my conclusions about general principles are drawn on the basis of several others, not presented here: two-way programmes (see e.g. Dolson & Lindholm 1995: Lindholm 1992), alternate-days programmes (e.g. Curtis 1988), early reading (e.g. Doman 1975: Past 1976: Söderberg 1971), Kōhanga Reo (see Benton 1979, 1981: Kāre 1994: Nicholson & Garland 1992: Report of the Review of Te Kōhanga Reo 1988) and, to some extent, International Schools (e.g. Carder 1995).

It seems to me that the principles which have to a large extent been followed in most of those experiments which have reached the best results (i.e. high levels of bi- or multilingualism, a fair chance of success in relation to school achievement, and positive intercultural attitudes), could be formulated as 8 recommendations:

1. Support (= use as the main medium of education, at least during the first 8 years) the language which is least likely to develop up to a high formal level. This is for all minority children their own mother tongue. Majority children can be taught through the medium of a minority language. (Here the European Schools are an exception, because they teach also majority children initially through the medium of their mother tongues (e.g. Italian for Italian-speaking children in Italy).

2. In most experiments, the children are initially grouped together with children with the same L1. Mixed groups are not positive initially, and certainly not in cognitively demanding decontextualised subjects. (Exception: two-way programmes (50% minority, 50% majority children, all taught through the medium of the minority language initially, later through both), but this may be a relevant factor in accounting for the Spanish-speaking children’s sometimes relatively less impressive gains in both languages, compared to English-speaking children in the same programmes. The mere presence of majority language children
in the same classroom may be too overwhelming for minority children, despite the minority language being
the medium of education).

3. All children are to become high level bilinguals, not only minority children. This seems to be
especially important in contexts where majority and minority children are mixed.

4. All children have to be equalized vis-a-vis their knowledge of the language of instruction and
the status of their mother tongues. Nice phrases about the worth of everybody’s mother tongue, the value
of interculturalism, etc. do not help, unless they are followed up in how the schools are organised. Equality
has to show in the demands made on the children’s and the teachers’ competencies in the different languages
involved, so that everybody has the same demands (both minority and majority children and teachers must
be or become bi- or multilingual). Equality has to show in the place the languages are accorded on the
schedules and in further education, in testing and evaluation, in characters given for the languages, in the
physical environment (signs, forms, letters, the school’s languages of administration, the languages of
meetings, assemblies, etc.). In the status and salaries of the teachers, in their working conditions, career
patterns, etc.

It is possible to equalize the children vis-a-vis their knowledge of the language of instruction in several
different ways:

A. All children know the language of instruction (maintenance programmes, European Schools initially):

B. No children know the language of instruction or everybody is in the process of learning it (immersion
programmes, European Schools in certain subjects in a later phase):

C. All children alternate between “knowing” and “not knowing” the language of instruction (two-way
programmes in a later phase: alternate-days-programmes (50% minority and 50% majority children, the
medium of education alternates daily).

5. All teachers have to be bi- or multilingual. Thus they can be good models for the children, and
support them (through comparing and contrasting and being metalinguistically aware) in language learning.
Every child in a school has to be able to talk to an adult with the same native language.

This demand is often experienced as extremely threatening by majority group teachers, many of whom
are not bilingual. Of course all minority group teachers are not high level bilinguals either. But it is often
less important that the teacher’s competence in a majority language is at top level, for instance in relation
to pronunciation, because all children have ample opportunities to hear and read native models of a majority
language outside the school, whereas many of them do NOT have the same opportunities to hear/read
native minority language models. High levels of competence in a minority language is thus more important for
a teacher than high levels of competence in a majority language.

6. Foreign languages should be taught through the medium of the children’s mother tongue and/or
by teachers who know the children’s mother tongue. No teaching in foreign languages as subjects should
be given through the medium of other foreign languages (for instance, Turkish children in Germany should
not be taught English through the medium of German, but in Turkish).

7. All children must study both L1 and L2 as compulsory subjects through 1-12. Both languages
have to be studied in ways which reflect what they are for the children: mother tongues, or second or foreign
languages. Many minority children are forced to study a majority language, their L2, as if it was their L1.

8. Both languages have to be used as media of education in some phase of the children’s education,
but the progression seems to be different for minority and majority children.

For MAJORITY CHILDREN the mother tongue must function as the medium of education at least in
some cognitively demanding, decontextualized subjects, at least in grades 8-12, possibly even earlier.

MAJORITY CHILDREN can be taught through the medium of L2 at least in some (or even all or almost
all) cognitively less demanding context-embedded subjects from the very beginning, and L2 can also be
the medium of education, at least partially, in cognitively demanding decontextualized subjects, at least
in grades 8-12.

For MINORITY CHILDREN the mother tongue must function as the medium of education in all subjects
initially. At least some subjects must be taught through L1 all the way, up to grade 12, but these subjects
may vary. It seems that the following development functions well:

- transfer from the known to the unknown
- transfer from teaching in a language to teaching through the medium of that language
- transfer from teaching through the medium of L2 in cognitively less demanding, context-embedded subjects,
to teaching through the medium of L2 in cognitively demanding decontextualized subjects. The progression
in the European Schools for minority children seems close to ideal:

The progression IN RELATION TO THE MOTHER TONGUE is as follows:
1. All subjects are taught through the medium of the mother tongue during the first 2 years.
2. All important cognitively demanding decontextualized subjects are taught through the medium of the mother tongue during the first 7 years.
3. There is less teaching through the medium of the mother tongue in grades 8-10, and again more teaching through the medium of the mother tongue in grades 11-12, especially in the most demanding subjects, in order to ensure that the students have understood them thoroughly.
4. The mother tongue is taught as a subject throughout the schooling, from 1-12.

The progression IN RELATION TO THE SECOND LANGUAGE is as follows:
1. The second language is taught as a subject throughout the schooling, from 1-12.
2. The second language becomes medium of education already in grade 3, but only in cognitively less demanding context-embedded subjects. The teaching can be given in mixed groups, but ideally together with other children for whom the language is also an L2.
3. Teaching in cognitively demanding decontextualized subjects only starts through the medium of L2 when the children have been taught that language as a subject for 7 years (grades 1-7) and have been taught through the medium of that language in cognitively less demanding context-embedded subjects for 5 years (grades 3-7). Children should not be taught demanding decontextualized subjects through L2 with other children for whom the language of instruction is their L1 before grade 8. In European Schools this is mostly not done even in grades 9-12 in compulsory subjects, only in elective courses.

5. Conclusion

One of the basic human rights of persons belonging to minorities is - or should be - to achieve high levels of bi- or multilingualism through education. Becoming at least bilingual is in most cases a necessary prerequisite for minorities to exercise other fundamental human rights.

Observing linguistic human rights (LHRs) implies at an individual level that everyone can identify positively with their mother tongue, and have that identification accepted and respected by others, irrespective of whether their mother tongue is a minority language or a majority language. It means the right to learn the mother tongue, orally and in writing, including at least basic education through the medium of the mother tongue, and the right to use it in many (official) contexts. It means the right to learn at least one of the official languages in one's country of residence. It should therefore be normal that teachers are bilingual. Restrictions on these rights may be considered linguistic wrongs, an infringement of fundamental LHRs. Observing LHRs implies at a collective level the right of minority groups to exist (i.e. the right to be "different" - see Alfredsson 1991; Hettne 1987, 1990; Miles 1989; Stavenhagen 1990). It implies the right to enjoy and develop their languages and the right for minorities to establish and maintain schools and other training and educational institutions, with control of curricula and teaching in their own languages. It also involves guarantees of representation in the political affairs of the state, and the granting of autonomy to administer matters internal to the groups, at least in the fields of culture, education, religion, information, and social affairs, with the financial means, through taxation or grants, to fulfill these functions (see UN Human Rights Fact Sheet 18, Minority Rights; Alfredsson 1991; Leontiev 1994). Restrictions on these rights may also be considered linguistic wrongs, an infringement of fundamental LHRs. It would be perfectly feasible to grant many of these rights to minorities, without infringing on the rights of majorities (see e.g. Grin, 1994 and Fishman, 1991. 1994, for a discussion).

If all education were to follow the principles sketched above, educational linguistic human rights would be met and educational linguistic wrongs could be avoided in relation to minorities (many majorities have most LHRs anyway). In addition, high levels of multilingualism would be likely follow for both minorities and majorities, together with many of the advantages that this is likely to lead to. But today only a minute fraction of the world's children have the opportunity of enjoying an education according to these principles.

The education of both majorities and minorities in most European countries functions against most scientifically sound principles about how an education leading to high levels of multilingualism should be organised. Education participates in attempting and committing linguistic genocide in relation to minorities. Regrettably, there is little in international and regional human rights instruments to prevent this in practice (see Skunnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994, for an analysis of them). In relation to linguistic majorities, education today in most cases deprives them of the possibility of gaining the benefits associated with high levels of multilingualism. Present reductionist educational language choices do not support the diversity which is necessary for the planet to have a future.
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Report of the Review of the Kõhanga Reo. Language is The Life Force Of The People

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Notes:
1. This article draws heavily on several of my earlier articles which are, though, less accessible to a wider audience, e.g. in press a, b, c). These have more detailed bibliographical references.

2. "The state of Turkey is in its state territory and state citizens an indivisible whole. Its language is Turkish." (Constitution. 1982. Article 3). Article 8, Propaganda against the indivisible unity of the State, in the Turkish Law to Fight Terrorism (3713. in force since 12 April 1991, stipulates: "Written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demonstrations aiming at damaging the indivisible unity of the State of the Turkish Republic with its territory and nation are forbidden, regardless of the method, intention and ideas behind it. Those conducting such an activity are to be punished by a sentence of between 2 and 5 years' imprisonment and a fine of between 50 million and 100 million Turkish pounds."

3. There have been numerous suggestions for including binding language-related rights in international human rights instruments (i.e. not only recommendations, like, for instance, CSCE-process documents). Thus far, this has not succeeded. It seems that it is often the same states objecting to international or regional instruments for protecting minority languages. The victorious states in the First World War who imposed clauses on language-related minority rights on the losers in the Peace Treaties, did not grant the same rights to minorities in their own countries, and voted down proposed internationally binding rights (Capotorti 1979, 16-26). The same countries vetoed Article 3 on linguistic genocide (see later) after the Second World War. Greece, Turkey and the United States, for instance, have not signed the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (with Art. 27, the best formulation for linguistic rights so far). Germany, and the United Kingdom have not ratified its Optional Protocol. At the CSCE Copenhagen meeting on the Human Dimension (June 1990) Bulgaria, France, Greece, Rumania and Turkey "did not agree with some far-reaching formulations for the benefit of minorities" (Suppan & Heubergerová 1992, 68). When the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was accepted (June 1992), France, Turkey and United Kingdom abstained, Greece voted against (Contact Bulletin 9:2, 1992, 1).

4. This point has been forcefully argued by most researchers in the Symposia organised by the Scientific Commission on Language and Education in Multilingual Settings of AILA (The International Association for Applied Linguistics) at the two previous World Congresses in Thessaloniki 1990 and Amsterdam 1993 (Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson (eds). in collaboration with Rannut, in press, and Skutnabb-Kangas (ed). in preparation).
LINGUICIDE and LINGUICISM
Tove Skutnabb-Kangas & Robert Phillipson

1. Definitions and interpretations

Although sociolinguists and language planners are concerned with many aspects of linguistic inequality, and have documented how languages contribute to the constitution and maintenance of social inequality, there is a dearth of unifying theories in this area (as noted by Hymes, 1985, v). The concepts linguicide and linguicism serve to clarify the ideologies, structures, and processes involved in linguistic inequality, and their results. This requires distinctions between the fate of languages vs. the fate of their speakers, the fate of individuals vs. the fate of groups, ideologies, structures, and processes vs. results.

LINGUICIDE is the extermination of languages, an analogous concept to (physical) genocide. LANGUAGE DEATH is the withering away of languages, an analogous concept to natural death. There has been extensive study of language maintenance and shift, and factors contributing to language death (see Fishman 1989 and, for a survey article, Dressler 1987). Linguicide and language death should be seen as pertaining to languages, not their speakers: the speakers or their descendants will be assimilated, i.e. the speakers will experience language shift or loss at an individual level. but language loss only leads to linguicide or language death if ALL speakers of a certain language experience language loss. Linguicide and language death describe the end results of processes, not the processes themselves. LINGUICISM, an analogous concept to racism, sexism, classism etc (and coarticulating with these), has been defined as “ideologies, structures and practices which are used to legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material and immaterial) between groups which are defined on the basis of language” (Skutnabb-Kangas 1988, 13). Linguicism can relate to both languages and their speakers. It precedes (but does not necessarily lead to) linguicide and/or language death. Linguicism has mainly been studied in connection with the education of immigrant and indigenous linguistic minorities (Skutnabb-Kangas 1988) and in relation to the prominence of English as a “world” language and the role of applied linguists in promoting English (Phillipson 1992).

Some languages may have died. A great many of the world’s languages have been eliminated in recent centuries as a (direct or indirect) result of European settlement and colonisation. The remaining ones have, through linguist processes, been hierarchised so that speakers of some languages and varieties have more power and material resources than their numbers would justify, simply because of being speakers of those languages and varieties. These dominant or majority languages expand at the expense of minority (or minorized) languages. Learning dominant languages has often been a subtractive experience for minority language speakers, whereas those dominant language speakers who learn other languages mostly do so in an additive way (see Lambert & Tucker 1972 for these concepts).

Juan Cobarrubias (1983) has elaborated a taxonomy of policies which a state can adopt towards minority languages. For some, only the first policy would be linguicial, for others the first three:
(1) attempting to kill a language;
(2) letting a language die;
(3) unsupported coexistence;
(4) partial support of specific language functions;
(5) adoption as an official language.

The concept LANGUAGE DEATH does not necessarily imply a causal agent. Language death is seen as occurring because of circumstances beyond the control of any agents. The “effects”, for instance language death as a result of “modernization”, are often regarded as inevitable concomitants of social change. Language death is seen as comparable to the evolution of natural organisms which develop, bloom and wither away.
When some liberal economists (e.g. Friedrich List, 1885, 174ff.) a century ago considered that nations had to be of a "sufficient size" to be viable, it followed that smaller nationalities and languages were doomed to disappear, as collective victims of "the law of progress". Their speakers were advised to reconcile themselves to "the loss of what could not be adapted to the modern age" (Hobsbawm 1991, 29-39). Several Western European liberal ideologists and Soviet language planners in the early part of this century held that nations (each with their own language) were but one phase in a development towards a unified world with a world language, coexisting with national languages which would be "reduced to the domestic and sentimental role of dialects" (ibid., 38). This liberal ideology of development is still alive and well. When discussing "small ethnic groups and languages", we are warned not to "be idealistic and feel blind pity for everything which in its natural course is transformed, becomes outdated or even extinct". (Satava 1992, 80: our emphasis). The concept of language death can be associated with this type of liberal ideology, whether in Eastern Europe, North America (the "English Only" movement), or in aid policies worldwide, these invariably supporting dominant languages. At the individual level, language death would within this paradigm be seen as a result of a voluntary language shift by each speaker.

LINGUICIDE, by contrast, implies that there is an agent involved in causing the death of languages. The agent can be active ("attempting to kill a language") or passive ("letting a language die"), or "unsupported coexistence", also often leading to the death of minority languages. In liberal ideology, only an active agent with the intention to kill languages would cause linguicide, whereas the other two would fall within the domain of language death. Linguicide is the extreme end result of linguisticism at the group level. Seen from the perspective of a conflict paradigm, the causes of linguicide and linguicism have to be analyzed from both structural and ideological angles, covering the struggle for structural power and material resources, and the legitimation, effectuation and reproduction of the unequal division of power and resources between groups based on language. The agents of linguicide/linguicism can also be structural (a state, e.g. Turkey vis-à-vis Kurds: an institution, e.g. schools: laws and regulations, e.g. those covering linguistic rights or the position of different languages on time-tables in schools: budgets, e.g. for teacher training or materials in certain languages) or ideological (norms and values ascribed to different languages and their speakers). There is thus nothing "natural" in language death. Languages cannot be treated in an anthropomorphic way, as organisms with a natural life-span. Language death has causes, which can be identified and analysed.

The analysis necessarily also involves an ethical dimension. Whether humanity has a moral obligation to prevent linguicide, or whether this would be interference in an inevitable process in which only the fittest survive, has been debated at several levels, some partly inspired by primordial romanticism, some by instrumentalist "modernism". An attachment to one's language or mother tongue as a central cultural core value seems, like ethnicity, to draw on primordial ascribed sources but to be shaped and actualised by (achieved)economic political concerns (Fishman 1989, Smolicz 1979). This also means that language shift can be "voluntary" at an individual level, a result of more benefits accruing to the individual who agrees to shift than to someone who maintains her mother tongue. "Preservation of the linguistic and cultural heritage of humankind" (one of Unesco's declared goals) presupposes preventing linguicide. This has been seen by some researchers and politicians as a nostalgic primordialist dream (creating employment for the world's linguists). The perpetuation of linguistic diversity can, however, be seen as a recognition that all individuals and groups have basic linguistic human rights, and as a necessity for the survival of the planet, in a similar way to biodiversity.

When the United Nations did preparatory work for what was to become the INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE (1948), linguistic and cultural genocide were discussed alongside physical genocide, and were seen as serious crimes against humanity. When the Convention was accepted, Article 3, which covered linguistic and cultural genocide, was vetoed by some nation states (the "great powers"), and it is thus not included in the final Convention of 1948 (see Capotorti 1979, 37). What remains, however, is a definition of linguistic genocide, which most states then in the UN were prepared to accept. Linguistic genocide is defined (in Art. 3.1) as

"Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group".

2. Processes and causes of linguicide and linguicism

2.1. Genocide involves the destruction of "the Other", which can be those who are linguistically...
different. Appropriate in-group pronunciation is recorded as a test of ethnic identity in the Old Testament, where an "alien" way of saying "shibboleth" resulted in the deaths of 40,000 people (Judges XII, 6). The Greeks stigmatized non-Greek speakers as "barbarian", meaning speakers of a non-language, mumbo-jumbo. The "Welsh" were foreigners, people who spoke a "strange language" that "one does not understand" (cited in the Oxford English Dictionary, 1648). Language is a significant group boundary marker, and the dominant group has frequently taken it upon itself to label outsiders pejoratively.

Several scholars have noted the occurrence of linguicide. It was, for instance, an element of US policy in Pacific islands such as Guam (Kloss 1977, 255). Calvet's Linguistique et colonialisme: petit traité de glottophagie (1974) is a detailed analysis of the links between linguistics and the furtherance of the French colonial cause. He describes as "glottophagie" (linguistic cannibalism, Sprachenfressen) the pattern of stigmatized languages eating up and extinguishing dominated languages. In other words they, or more rightly their speakers, commit linguicide.

2.2. From the 17th century French gradually took over from Latin the role of a European lingua franca in international affairs. A position it maintained until 1919. Belief in the intrinsic superiority of French was widespread throughout Europe. A grammar written in 1660 declares that the structure of the French language corresponds more closely to the natural order and expression of thoughts than do other languages (quoted in Chomsky 1965). Diderot, the main editor of the French Encyclopédie, endorses this principle, and concludes that French is the most appropriate language for the sciences, enlightenment and wisdom, whereas Greek, Latin, Italian and English are better suited to literature, persuasion and the emotions (ibid.). A cannibalistic hierarchy of languages, and their correspondent cultures, was a logical consequence of an ethnocentric belief in cultural evolution (Calvet 1974, 31). The languages of the "Other" were regarded as needing to go through the same processes of refinement as the dominant language had. They were by definition imperfect rather than merely different. "Other" languages therefore serve the purpose of demonstrating the superiority of "Our" language.

The Academy of Berlin held a competition in 1782 on the theme of why French was a "universal" language (Calvet 1987, 71). One of the winning essays, by Rivarol, argues that languages which do not follow the syntax of French, with subject, verb and object in that order, are illogical and inadequate. In fact it is only the syntax of French which is "incorruptible. C'est de là que resul te cette admirable clarté, base éternelle de notre langue. Ce qui n’est pas clair n’est pas français." (cited ibid., 74) This linguistic racism was in place long before it was needed in the dissemination of the message of the French Revolution and in the justification of the colonial venture.

Maintenance of a linguistic hierarchy typically involves a pattern of stigmatization of dominated languages (mere "dialects", "vernaculars" or "patois"), glorification of the dominant language, and rationalization of the relationship between the languages, always to the benefit of the dominant one. One’s own language was therefore projected as the language of God (Sanskrit. Arabic in the Islamic world, Dutch in South Africa), the language of reason, logic and human rights (French both before and more generally after the French Revolution), the language of the superior ethno-national group (German in Nazi ideology), the language of progress, modernity, and national unity (English in much post-colonial discourse). As other languages are explicitly or implicitly deprived of such functions and qualities, it is "logical" that speakers of stigmatized languages can only benefit from using the "superior" languages.

2.3. Linguist policies were an important weapon in the colonial armour. In French colonies an elaborate belief system bolstered the idea of a "mission civilisatrice", with proficiency in the dominant language as the key to the "superior" culture. This required the sacrifice of the cultures and languages of origin. These were in any case branded as being less than full or real languages by being referred to as "patois", "dialects", mere "vernaculars".

Although the British were less verbal about the merits of their dominant language, in the British empire linguistic policies favoured English in an equivalent way. In the mid 19th century a grammatical knowledge of the English language was regarded as "the most important agent for the coloured population of the colonies" (quoted in Ashby 1966, 150). Education fulfilled the same structural role in each empire. Even though greater use was made of local languages in the early stages of education in the British empire than in the French, local languages had low status, and education through the exclusive medium of English was the norm after the initial years - English was the key to success in a colonized society (Phillipson 1992, chapter 5).

A study of language policy in the Pacific region (Mühlhäuser 1990) challenges the belief that the alphabetization of indigenous languages has served to strengthen these cultures and languages. Those who introduced literacy (often missionaries) and those who accepted it were unaware of the consequences, and
the most general long-term effect of literacy in the vernacular has been language decline and linguicide (ibid., 190). Literacy has not been a medium for expressing the indigenous point of view, as it effectively involves acculturation to the dominant group. When education in a local language is merely transitional to education through the medium of French or English, the languages which give expression to a centuries-old heritage are destroyed.

2.4. This is the situation in many former colonies. The language of the colonial power has been reinforced as the key language of power internally and externally. Educational policies have changed little and tend to neglect the potential of the indigenous languages. European languages are inappropriate in most Asian and African contexts (Bangbose 1991. Mateene 1985, Ngugi 1986, Pattanayak 1986. Rubagumya 1990). Linguicidal policies ensure the allocation of resources to the dominant language in education, the media, public life and the “modern” sector of the economy. As a result, most people in the “Third World” are governed in a language that they do not understand. The presumed superiority of the West is now less represented by the gun and the bible than technology and the textbook. Language is therefore of even more central importance in the maintenance of social structure nationally and internationally.

2.5. Some countries commit linguistic genocide openly and brutally. Turkey is the most blatant example in the contemporary world. The 1982 constitution states in its Articles 3 and 66 the congruence of state, territory, nation and language unambiguously: “The state of Turkey is its state territory and state citizens are governed in a language that they do not understand. The presumed superiority of the West is now less represented by the gun and the bible than technology and the textbook. Language is therefore of even more central importance in the maintenance of social structure nationally and internationally.”

The oppression of minority languages has been severe in many countries. There is widespread evidence of schoolchildren being subjected to corporal punishment for the “crime” of speaking their mother tongue, for instance the Celtic languages in Britain or France or Sami in Scandinavia. The same system was used in the Europeanised countries of the Americas and Australasia, and in colonial Africa. It has also often been the experience of immigrant children.

2.6. By contrast, linguistic genocide is today mostly committed in a more covert and sophisticated way, e.g. in educational systems. Here the use of a minority language is prohibited more indirectly, by ideological and structural means. The use of a minority language is in fact prohibited “in daily intercourse or in schools” every time there are minority children in day care centres and schools, but no bilingual teachers who are authorized to use the languages of the minority children as the media of teaching and child care most of the time. This is the situation for most immigrant and refugee minority children in all Western European countries and in the US, Canada and Australia. Immigrant minority education in these countries is thus guilty of linguistic genocide, as defined by the UN. So is the education that most indigenous first nations have had and that many of them still have (see, for instance, on Latin America. Hamel 1994).

3. Linguicide and the nation state

Linguicide is a logical expression of belief in a monolingual nation state (“one nation - one language” seen as normal, desirable and inevitable). A common language for the state was a principle of the French
Revolution, for mainly instrumental reasons, and Herder-inspired German romanticism, for more primordial reasons. Whenever definitions of STATE, NATION, or NATION-STATE specify anything about communication between the people belonging to the entity in question, they refer to a (common, unifying, developed, official) LANGUAGE for the entity. In order to form a nation or a state you have to have a language. Having a language thus becomes symbolic of a nation and a state (and even a people), in much the same way as a national flag, a national anthem, etc. Every state "needs" a (highly developed) language which can function as its official language (regardless of whether this is formalized in its constitution or not). If it does not have one which is "developed" enough, it may borrow one from a "developed" state, often the old colonial power. This is also often done if there are several candidates, the implication being that a state only has one official language (or two or, at the most, three - see Pattanayak's critique of this Western idea. 1986). The other languages, which by implication are not "developed" enough, may then be ignored or their existence denied altogether.

There are, according to current estimates, approximately 7,000 languages in the world, whereas the number of states is less than 250. If one was to believe in the myth of the nation-state as the most developed form of social organisation, and if the principle of self-determination were to be applied fully, so that every language group (every "nation") was to have its own nation-state, the present states would disintegrate into around 7,000 states. One way of avoiding the "threat" of disintegration is to redefine and restrict the concept of self-determination as presently understood in international law. Another is to reduce the number of potential nations. This includes preventing groups from acquiring or maintaining their own languages, one of the central prerequisites "needed" for nation-building.

Reducing the number of languages and thus potential nation-states is being attempted in a variety of ways, of which physical genocide is the most dramatic one. This was one of the routes chosen by Europe in Australia and the Americas. It has resulted in the permanent loss of hundreds of languages. Even though the prevention and punishment of physical genocide is regulated by a UN Convention, physical genocide is nevertheless still attempted in relation to some groups in Latin America and Asia. Committing linguistic genocide, killing a language without killing its speakers (as in physical genocide), is another way of reducing the number of potential nations.

But languages can also be made invisible qua languages, by labelling them dialects, vernaculars or patois. None of the definitions of a nation-state or state (see above) use DIALECT, VERNACULAR or PATOIS in their definitions, the implication being that speakers who form a dialect, vernacular or patois community do not and cannot form a nation or a state or a nation-state. It is thus possible to hierarchize different groups which might want to form a nation and therefore eventually a nation-state, through labelling them so that only some groups are seen as possessing the necessary prerequisite, a language, whereas others are labelled as not possessing a language, but only a way of communicating, an idiom, which is not a language. This idiom can then be called something else, in order to differentiate it from a language. Dialects (or vernaculars or patois) are not seen as developed enough to fulfil all the official functions of a nation or a state. The same linguist policy which deprives them of recognition also deprives them of resources for building on their potential. In some states, some idioms may also be invisibilized by being designated national (as opposed to official) languages, thus confining them to the type of emotional role envisaged by liberal ideologists in the late 1800s.

The hierarchization, the creation of Us and Them. Self and Other, typical of most negative -ismic discourses, can be seen how a language is defined, as opposed to how a dialect, a vernacular or a patois is defined. Languages are defined positively or neutrally, as the general, abstract, unspoken norm, whereas dialects, vernaculars and patois are defined partly negatively, with connotations of some kind of deficiency, commonness, lack of cultivation and civilisation, partly as undeveloped or underdeveloped forms of communication, something to be got rid of, to be subsumed under languages (see e.g. the definitions of these in The Random House Dictionary of the English Language. Second Edition. Unabridged. 1987. New York: Random House, pp. 546-547, 1081, 1421 and 2114).

Just as the underdeveloped Other has tribes, we the developed Self have nations. The Other has chiefs, Self has presidents or kings. The Other has primitive rituals. Self has civilized ceremonies. The Other has medicine men. Self has doctors. When the Other comes to our country, the Other's children become NEP- or LEP-children (No English Proficiency or Limited English Proficiency) or LOTEs (Languages Other Than English) or NESBs (Non-English Speaking Background), i.e. they are defined with Self as the norm, negatively, in terms of what they are not do not know or do not represent, whereas Self is taken as the self-evident norm. What the Others are, know and represent, is made invisible, negated, or reconstructed as a non-resource, a handicap, stigmatized as of less value. We. Self. speak languages. they, the Other.
speak only dialects, vernaculars or patois.

4. Colonising consciousness

Control of access to structural power and material resources has changed form. Where colonisers earlier colonised land, water and natural resources (colonialism proper) or the bodies of the dominated (slavery), the focus is now on the colonisation of the mind, via the consciousness industry (education, mass media, religion, etc.). Understanding the language of the coloniser is a prerequisite for this type of control. Where control was earlier accomplished through physically punitive means, physical violence, the focus is today more on psychologically punitive means (shame), remunerative means (bargaining for benefits and rewards) and ideological means (making the victims feel guilty if they do not obey, and persuading them to believe that it is in their best interest to do so).

Covert linguicide (e.g. of the type that most Western states use in their educational systems) appears to be extremely effective, as compared with the overt version (as in Turkey). Within 2-4 generations, there are fewer speakers of most minority languages in these countries than in more openly linguicidal countries. Kurds still speak Kurdish and resist linguistic oppression, whereas many former Spanish-speakers in the USA have assimilated. It is often more difficult to struggle against covert violence, against the colonization of the mind, where short-term "benefits" may obscure longer-term losses.

Just as colonialism has been superseded by more sophisticated forms of exploitation, crude biologically argued racism (Miles 1989) has, as official state ideology, largely been superseded by ethnicism (Mullard 1988) and linguicism. Instead of superior "races", certain ethnic groups (or cultures) and languages are now presented as fitter to rule and expand. Others are expected to adopt these cultures and learn the languages for the sake of "modernisation", "development", "democracy" and the technology and values associated with dominant market forces.

5. Resistance to linguicide and linguicism

Linguicide and linguicism are being successfully resisted in many ways. Many national minorities are involved in countering linguicide and demanding linguistic rights (for Europe, see Contact Bulletin of the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages). Information about comparable minorities needs to be collated and coordinated, as is done, e.g., in the Mercator project in Friesland. Linguistic revitalisation movements among the Māori (Kāretu 1994), the Sámi (Magga 1994), the Cree, the Inuit and other indigenous peoples may benefit from the UN Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights (see below). Immigrant and refugee minorities are less well placed, with fewer legal rights. But linguistic hegemony has been successfully challenged (e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas & Cummins 1988. Peura & Skutnabb-Kangas 1995. Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994).

Obtaining substantial support from the human rights system and international law presupposes enforceable, codified linguistic rights which are both individual and collective. In principle, human rights should apply to everyone, without discrimination on grounds of, e.g., language. Most human rights are individual. There are as yet no binding international covenants specifically on linguistic rights. Most language-related rights are to be found in articles on minority rights, and these have so far also been individual. Collective minority rights are essential tools through which minorities can get access to those rights which majorities are granted through individual rights.

Article 27 of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, in force since 1976) grants the best binding minority language protection so far:

"In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right to community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language."

This article has been one of the most important for the protection of linguistic minorities, as both Capotorti (1979, the UN Special Rapporteur on minorities) and more recent UN reports confirm. Both the UN Conventions on the Rights of the Child (1959 and 1989), and several Council of Europe and CSCE documents have used approximately the same formulation. Still, rights are only granted to individuals, not collectivities.

To assess the degree of linguistic rights in covenants, especially educational rights, we have developed a grid with two dimensions, the degree of overtness (from overt to covert) and the degree of support for minority languages (prohibition - toleration - non-discrimination prescription - permission - promotion).
(e.g. Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson 1994). In our assessment, no legally binding clauses in any international covenants (including Art. 27 above) go beyond semi-overt non-discrimination prescription. What is needed for minority languages to be maintained over several generations in countries where obligatory education is enforced is overt promotion of these languages ("partial support of specific language functions" or "adoption as an official language" in Cobarrubias' taxonomy in I.).

There have been numerous suggestions for including binding language-related rights in international human rights instruments (i.e. not only recommendations, like, for instance, CSCE-process documents). Thus far, this has not succeeded. It seems that it is often the same states objecting to international or regional instruments for protecting minority languages. The victorious states in the First World War who imposed clauses on language-related minority rights on the losers in the Peace Treaties, did not grant the same rights to minorities in their own countries, and voted down proposed internationally binding rights (Capotorti 1979, 16-26). The same countries vetoed Article 3 on linguistic genocide (see above) after the Second World War. Greece, Turkey and the United States, for instance, have not signed the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 27 of which we have quoted). Germany, and the United Kingdom have not ratified its Optional Protocol. At the CSCE Copenhagen meeting on the Human Dimension (June 1990). France, Greece and Turkey did not go along with some far-reaching formulations for the benefit of minorities. When the Council of Europe's European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages was accepted (June 1992), France, Turkey and United Kingdom abstained. Greece voted against (Contact Bulletin 9:2. 1992, 1).

Among the bodies currently codifying language rights for minorities are the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, the CSCE, the UN and UNESCO. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages has great symbolic value, but explicitly excludes migrant languages. The European Parliament's Directive on the education of the children of migrant workers (77/466/EEC of 25.7.77) is fraught with difficulties of interpretation and implementation, as the Parliament's own Report drawn up on behalf of the Committee of Inquiry into RACISM and XENOPHOBIA indicates (A3-195/90. PE 141.205/FIN. 111). The Council of Europe's European Commission for Democracy through Law, has drafted a Proposal for a European Convention for the Protection of Minorities (CDL 91 - 7), which could also apply to those migrants who have changed citizenship, but it includes very little on language rights. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) states unambiguously in its Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE (1990) that national minorities should have the right to maintain their ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity, the right to seek voluntary and public assistance to do so in educational institutions, and should not be subjected to assimilation against their will (CSCE 1990a. 40), but has so far not agreed on any binding conventions.

A CSCE High Commissioner on Minorities was appointed in 1992. The UN Draft Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights would give indigenous peoples "The right to all forms of education, including in particular the right of children to have access to education in their own languages, and to establish, structure, conduct and control their own educational systems and institutions." (Art. 10, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988.25). It is in striking contrast to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers and Their Families, which accords minimal rights to the mother tongues and is assimilation-oriented (see Hasenau 1990). An international seminar under Unesco auspices in Recife, Brazil in 1987, recommended "that steps be taken by the United Nations to adopt and implement a UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF LINGUISTIC RIGHTS which would require a reformulation of national, regional, and international language policies." Follow-up gatherings were organised at Unesco in Paris in 1989, and Pécs, Hungary in August 1991. The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities was adopted by the General Assembly in December 1992. It considers "that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to the political and social stability of States in which they live" (Preamble). This contest the popular but mistaken belief that the existence of minorities is divisive for nation states, and do several of the draft instruments in their preambles.

The nation-state is currently under pressure from globalization, transnational regionalization and local decentralization (democratic, root-seeking, environment-saving), and has probably outlived itself. States are by many researchers no longer seen as permanent constructions but negotiable. Linguicide as a strategy for preventing the disintegration of present day states has also become outdated. Linguistic diversity at local levels is a necessary counterweight to the hegemony of a few "international" languages. The "world languages" should, just as roads and bridges, be seen as tools for communication of ideas and matter, but the creation of authentic ideas and products (instead of mass-products) is in most cases necessarily best done locally.
6. Literature (selected)


A historical outline of British policy for the spread of English

Robert Phillipson

The purpose of this paper is to present British promotion of the English language internationally over the past two centuries, and briefly to consider some implications for contemporary Europe, and the desirability of approaching language policy matters in a theoretically explicit way.

I recall reading that only two members of John Major’s cabinet have any competence in a foreign language. This insularity reflects the triumph of English as an “international” language and the mistaken belief that speakers of English need no other languages. British monolingualism undoubtedly influences how British policy-makers conceive of European multilingualism, if they think about it at all. Even French policy-makers now regard francophonie as part of a multilingual world, though their motives have much to do with maintaining the strength of French. The historical reasons for Anglo-American supposed linguistic self-sufficiency need analysis.

British global language spread policy builds on the experience of consolidating English as the dominant language in the British Isles and in the neo-Europes, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. In each country, the triumph of English has been at the expense of local languages and of other immigrant languages. In each, the hegemony of English is contested, and it is possible that as a result a language policy which respects linguistic diversity will emerge in some neo-European countries. On the other hand the pressures, national and international, to maintain the supremacy of English, and ignore the rights of speakers of other languages, are immense. However, to explore this problematic would require an analysis of the Australian National Policy on Languages or the English Only movement in the US, and take us too far away from my topic, which is language empires and the spread of English to parts of the world where mother tongue English speakers have not settled in substantial numbers, but where the language is none the less prominent and influential. This is increasingly the case in continental Europe.

The present distribution throughout the world of such major “international” languages as Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish is evidence of conquest and occupation, followed by adoption of the invader’s language because of the benefits that accrue to speakers of the language.

The first modern European state to build up a major empire, Spain, was advised in 1492 by Nebrija, in a seminal language planning document, that Castilian Spanish was “a tool for conquest abroad and a weapon to suppress untutored speech at home... language has always been the consort of empire and forever shall remain its mate” (quoted in Illich 1981, 35). The results of this policy can be seen throughout what came to be called the Americas.

At the time when Castilian Spanish was being launched on the world scene, English was spoken by approximately the same number of people as currently speak Danish (5 million), and was regarded as unsuitable for scientific writing. Although the French have been relatively more active in claiming superior merits for their language, its “mission civilisatrice” being inconceivable in any language other than French. English is no exception to the rule of an ideology of linguistic superiority accompanying political power. By the mid-19th century English was being projected as

a strong, a harmonious, a noble language... Before another century has gone by it will. at the present rate of increase, be spoken by hundreds of millions... That language is rapidly becoming the great medium of civilization, the language of law and literature to the Hindoo, of commerce to the African, of religion to the scattered islands of the Pacific. (Edwin Guest. 1838. quoted in Crowley 1989, 71-72)

The more the British extended the boundaries of their empire, the more the English language was praised as a superior language and was subjected to extensive study (Crowley 1989, 71). The “civicising” properties of English were widely canvassed in Asia (as in Lord Macaulay’s dictum of 1834 on the production of “a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals and in intellect”, quoted in Khubchandani 1983, 120) and in Africa (a grammatical knowledge of the English language was “the most important agent of civilization for the coloured population of the colonies”, in a plan presented to the Colonial Office in 1847. quoted in Ashby 1966, 150).

There was considerable diversity in educational practice in the colonies of the British empire.
reflecting decentralisation and localised missionary initiative, but English was “the official vehicle and the magic formula to colonial elitedom” (Ngwe 1985, 115). In both the French and British empire… education served similar purposes’. One of the most durable legacies of colonialism has been language:

Years after the attainment of political independence, the majority of African independent states have continued to practise linguistic policies inherited at the time of independence, where, on the whole, foreign colonial languages are more favoured than the languages indigenous to the African continent’ (Organization for African Unity Inter-African Bureau of Languages 1985, 7).

The structural power of the former colonial languages is buttressed by a set of beliefs that glorify these languages and stigmatize local languages. This has major language policy implications, because “Africans have been psychologically conditioned to believe that only European languages are structured to aid development” (Kashoki, quoted in UNIN 1981, 41). despite the fact that in “English-speaking” countries such as Zambia, Nigeria and Pakistan, it is only a tiny fraction of the population who actually speak the language of power.

Continued use of English is also clearly in the interest of Britain and the USA. Indeed the maintenance of the position of English has been a key aim of foreign “aid”. The spread of English, according to a Director of the Center for Applied Linguistics in Washington, DC, was greatly abetted by the expenditure of large amounts of government and private foundation funds in the period 1950-1970. perhaps the most ever spent in history in support of the propagation of a language. (Troike 1977, 2)

A series of British government reports in the 1950s determined that investment in an academic infrastructure was needed if British interests in the postcolonial period were to be protected and maintained. A confidential Cabinet report in 1956 states:

Within a generation from now English could be a world language - that is to say, a universal second language in those countries in which it is not already the native or primary tongue. The tide is still running in its favour, but with slackening force... it is important that its expansion should take place mainly under Commonwealth and United States auspices. (Report of the Official Committee on the Teaching of English Overseas. Ministry of Education, 1956)

The spread of English was seen not as the marketing of an instrument that could serve any purpose, but rather as a means of political influence, a way of prevailing over rivals, as in the warning that the British government ought not to stand by - to take two recent examples - while Libya is offered a German professor of English for her new university and Egypt exports Egyptian teachers of English and other subjects to Kuwait (ibid., 4).

American activities were seen in this report as a threat to traditional British spheres of interest and markets, but it was felt that appropriate Anglo-American collaboration would avoid friction. Regular contact was in fact maintained between the British and American governments and their agencies concerned with language promotion, but at a fairly low key. The political agenda in spreading English was largely covert, while the overt agenda was educational and technical, and awaited the day when scholarship would make it more scientific.

International scientific exchange has boomed since 1960 in this area as in so many others, with all the paraphernalia of journals, conferences, and professional associations. Increasingly the language used in such discourse is English. AILA, the Association Internationale de Linguistique Appliquée, is now a virtually monolingual association. American foundations were not only vital in placing on the academic map such disciplines as sociolinguistics (Haberland 1988) and applied linguistics. They were also instrumental in confirming a particular way of perceiving the language needs and problems of newly independent nations, as a representative of the Ford Foundation states:
The World Second Language Survey was undertaken as the first major task by the Center for Applied Linguistics (with separate Ford Foundation support) in cooperation with the British Council, and the then Bureau d'Étude et de Liaison pour l'Enseignement du Français dans le Monde (BEL). This program produced the first body of data on the worldwide role of English and French as second languages and significantly increased international contacts and cooperation and exchange of information and scholars. It set the pattern for collaboration on the language problems of developing countries that CAL sparked for almost a decade through cooperative establishment with the British and the French of annual meetings of the International Conferences on Second Language Problems. (Fox 1975. 37; emphasis added).

The interesting question in contemporary Europe is whether an equivalent pattern is emerging. How is the agenda is being set for the resolution of language problems in a continent which is in a dynamic phase of disintegration, integration, redefinition and supranational identity formation? Who is deciding on language policy, and how can it best be approached in an informed way? What has happened globally is the incorporation of elites into a structure of North-South relations, one which fundamentally represents dominance of South countries by the North, and which can be interpreted as a neocolonialist or late imperialist structure, of which scientific, educational, media, cultural and linguistic imperialism are integral parts. Within this structure, the hegemonic position of English tends to be taken for granted. The corollary of the predominant use of English is the underdevelopment of other languages, as can be seen in much of India and Africa. Whether anything similar is evolving, or could evolve, in any part of continental Europe is an open question. I would claim that there are more similarities between the postcolonial and postcommunist worlds than might be expected (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas 1994).

The effort to promote English globally was part of an overall mission to ensure that the dominant world language was English rather than a different European language or Arabic or Chinese. A possible alternative to any of these national languages serving as international languages would be for the international community to opt for an artificial language such as Esperanto. This possibility was seriously investigated by the League of Nations in the early 1920s, but the "great powers", France in particular, were against this and voted against it (Piron 1994). The ironical outcome is that as English acquired the same status as French as a diplomatic language from the Treaty of Versailles onwards, French has since then been replaced by English at the pinnacle of the global linguistic hierarchy. The option of Esperanto as an international language (on the grounds that it is more democratic, more efficient than interpretation, and could save huge translation and interpretation costs) has seldom been investigated seriously since. Speakers of Esperanto do not regard the language as an "artificial" one, but consider it as rich a communicative instrument as any other language, also in "international" communication. Failing to consider as a possible international lingua franca an "artificial" language has assisted the spread of the "natural" language, English.

English was an inevitable accompaniment to American economic, military and political hegemony entrenched in international organizations like the UN and the World Bank, but policy for its spread was not left to chance, as the American investment in "world English" referred to earlier indicates. The British Council was established in 1935 to promote British interests and English, partly in response to the success of the fascist governments of Italy and Germany in using language teaching and higher education scholarships to promote their national interest. The British mission in promoting English is not without similarities to a Herrenfolk ideal, as can be seen in a wartime book on "The diffusion of English culture outside England" (Routh 1941). It is a blueprint for English as a "world-language", wrapped in a learned mantle of humanism and Darwinist cultural evolution.

"England will be the dominating force in international politics, the professed and confessed arbiter of liberty" (ibid. 31), the "world's leading nation" (50). Britain has a new responsibility which means that "we not only have a spiritual heritage of our own - a national soul - but that somehow this possession is incomplete unless shared with other nations" (134). A new career service is needed for gentlemen teachers of English with equivalent status to "the Civil Service, Army, Bar, or Church" (60), an "army of linguistic missionaries" generated by a "training centre for post-graduate studies and research" (12), and a "central office in London, from which teachers radiate all over the world" (13). The new service must "lay the foundations of a world-language and culture based on our own".
Cutting a fairly long story short, and ignoring Routh's historical blindness to Britain as a poor relative of the US from 1940, this is what happened. English Language Teaching expanded massively, in higher education in Britain (and in the US, though the America's English as a Second Language profession has always been more concerned with the learning of English by minority groups in the US), publishers, language schools, overseas jobs, aid, professional associations, British Council libraries and offices worldwide. This mission was formulated in the British Council Annual Report, 1960-1961, as follows:

Teaching the world English may appear not unlike an extension of the task which America faced in establishing English as a common national language among its own immigrant population.

Even if American power has set the agenda, or at least the framework, Britain is still possibly the "world's leading nation" in the global English teaching business. This is a paradoxical state of affairs, when one recalls that the British, like the Americans, are notoriously inept at learning foreign languages. The English language industry (which is what it calls itself) is certainly important for the British economy. English for business is business for English.

The degree and nature of its impact on well established education systems in continental Europe is debatable, and clearly the spread of English is influenced by a multitude of factors, just as the number of factors that influence how well people learn foreign languages is substantial. I assume that each state in Europe has hitherto decided which foreign languages its citizens should learn, with a modest level of "assistance" from foreign governments. One of the intriguing paradoxes in language policy is why governments invest substantially in the teaching and learning of a language, in particular English, that is regarded as a threat to local cultural values. It is of course not the language that is a threat but the functions to which a language is put. The argument that any language can serve any purposes, good or bad, needs to be held up against the empirical reality of the actual functions particular languages serve in particular contexts. This is not an easy task, nor is distinguishing between realities and political rhetoric in language policy formation. In the current fluid state of language policy in Europe, there is both plenty of rhetoric and a good deal of activity.

The British Foreign Minister greeted the fall of the iron curtain by proclaiming that English should become the first foreign language throughout eastern and central Europe, the lingua franca of changed times. The British Council is investing heavily in English teaching in former communist countries, has formed an "English Language Teaching Contacts Scheme" to link up teachers with British services to English teaching, and is vigorously marketing a British variant of "British Studies". British official rhetoric associates English with democracy, the free market, and human rights - as indeed does parallel French special pleading for their language. Claiming a symbiotic link between one language and human rights is an abuse of the concept of human rights, which are meaningless unless they apply to speakers of all languages. Linguistic human rights now figure prominently on many agendas, political and academic (Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson 1994. Phillipson and Skutnabb-Kangas 1995). The "English 2000" project was launched by Prince Charles for the British Council in early 1995. The press pack associated with this media event declares that the aims of English 2000 are "to exploit the position of English to further British interests" as one aspect of maintaining and expanding the "role of English as the world language into the next century". Fundamental ambivalence about whose interests are served by an increased use of English can be seen in the project description: "The English language is in the full sense international: it is divesting itself of its political and cultural connotations." That is a debatable proposition about the "internationalization" processes which English is part of, but apparently contradicted by the next sentence in the text, when the British connection is stressed: "Speaking English makes people open to Britain's cultural achievements, social values and business aims."

Clearly such British efforts in both western and eastern Europe need to be seen in the light of activities that are being undertaken at the national and supranational levels in language policy. Much is happening here, in a mobile linguistic market-place. Among the significant language policy areas are European Union institutional multilingualism, the prospect of minority language promotion, along the lines of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, secondary and higher education mobility schemes, multilingual schools, quite apart from private sector initiatives, in commerce, television and youth culture. Much of this activity is unanalysed, apart from modest articles in journals such as Sociolinguistica and the first book-length study of EU language policy, written, perhaps not surprisingly, not by a European but by a French Canadian (Labrie 1993).
In Europe it does not appear that many countries have attempted to draw up comprehensive language policy plans. A report for the European Union's LINGUA office by an independent consultant on the current state of foreign language teaching and the impact of EU initiatives sees foreign language learning as a key measure for Europeanisation, but assesses that "most Member States have not yet reached the position of defining their own strategy for languages in a coherent form" (Savage 1994: 11). This does not mean that there is no language policy, quite the opposite. There are competing, mostly covert, language policies, national and supranational, in an evolving world in which the nation state is being redefined in supranational, postnational ways. Relationships between national and international languages, the national interest and international interests are likewise being redefined. Absence of an overt overall policy, whether for a state or the EU, may well lead to imbalances between economic market forces (English for business) and other desiderata in educational and social policy (a diverse linguistic ecology, minority language rights, etc).

Analysis of language policy requires an adequate theoretical apparatus. A country's language policy or language spread policy may be more or less explicit, the degree of openness depending on whether documents are state secrets or intended for the general public. Policy may be reactive, or more proactive and missionizing. It may or may not be feasible, the educational status quo being notoriously difficult to budge. There may be implementation, or the policy may be mere posturing. There may be a local or more global focus. Language policy will dovetail with broader social policy, which is one reason why language policy is difficult to pin down, though there are significant approaches in political science, the sociology of language, applied linguistics, and economics and language. It is surrounded by myths, including for the British the convenient myth that the British did not impose their language anywhere.

Language policy would need more attention both in the political and academic worlds.

Notes:

1. I am grateful to Tove Skutnabb-Kangas for constructive suggestions for improving the manuscript. The paper draws heavily on Phillipson 1992. See also the shorter presentation of English language spread policy in Phillipson 1994. On current European language policy, see Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas forthcoming.

2. This is a belief that British business no longer shares, and that current work on the British National Curriculum, in which one foreign language is obligatory, may counteract. See Hagen 1994 on economic factors influencing an intensified effort to learn foreign languages, and the contributions to Brumfit 1995 on change in foreign language learning in schools. It is possible that some monolingual Brits regard members of Major's team who do speak a foreign language as being unpatriotic, suspiciously interested in foreign cultures, and therefore not to be trusted! For examples of Japanese resentment of Americans, for instance their ambassador to Japan, always using English and expecting others to do so, see Tsuda 1994.

3. Even at the personal level a historical approach is helpful. My last visit to Marburg was in 1973, when I was working for the British Council. Britain had just joined the European Economic Community, as the European Union was then, and the British government made funds available for an increased effort to promote British involvement in English teaching in Europe. I was sent to Marburg to find out from Professor Freudenstein what could be done.

4. Colonial education had the following characteristics:
   - local languages had low status, whether they were used in education or not,
   - local traditions and educational practice were ignored,
   - a very small proportion of the population was in formal (Western) education, particularly after the initial phase.
   - bookish, unsuitable education was offered, aimed at producing a class of compliant clerks and a loyal elite.
   - from the secondary level upwards, education attempted to copy what was on offer in London or Paris, and was monolingual.
   - education played a central role in 'civilizing the natives'.
   - the master language of empire was attributed civilizing properties.
5. The Ford Foundation report is extremely critical of the quality of the "aid" extended by America and Britain in the language in education field (Fox 1975, 86), as have been many scholars (e.g. Obura 1986, Kachru 1986). In a sense the appropriacy of the "aid" and its effectiveness were irrelevant, provided it was the western powers that set the agenda.

6. Any language which is learned in childhood as a first language or is transmitted by native speakers to their children is in no sense artificial, regardless of its origins. This is the case with Esperanto today.

7. Foreign governments assist in various ways, often supporting teachers practically (short courses, etc). In Australia certain foreign languages are only taught in some schools if a teacher has been sent out or financed by the country concerned, e.g. Italy.

8. Posturing is Lachman Khubchandani’s term (private communication) for much language policy and planning in India, where there is a glaring gap between statements of policy and reality.

References:


Is India throwing away its language resources?
Robert Phillipson and Tove Skutnabb-Kangas

An analysis of whether the expansion of English-medium education in India is baulking the evolution of Indian languages.

Note
This article presents an analysis without any of the paraphernalia of scientific packaging and documentation. There is a substantial scholarly literature on the topics raised, and some suggestions for further reading are included finally.

It was because we were taught in our own language that our minds quickened. Learning should as far as possible follow the process of eating. When the taste begins from the first bite, the stomach is awakened to its function before it is loaded, so that its digestive juices get full play. Nothing like this happens when the Bengali boy is taught in English, however. The first bite bids fair to wrench loose both rows of teeth - like an earthquake in the mouth! And by the time he discovers that the morsel is not of the genus stone, but a digestible bonbon, half his allotted span of life is over. While one is choking and spluttering over the spelling and grammar, the inside remains starved: and when at length the taste comes through, the appetite has vanished. If the whole mind is not functioning from the beginning, its full powers remain unexploited to the end.

Rabindranath Tagore. My reminiscences, 1911

We have been observing the Indian language scene for many years, and recently spent two months in India analysing language policy. And we are worried.

Our goal in visiting India was to see what lessons there are from the Indian experience of managing multilingualism that Europe might learn from. In Europe we are experiencing dynamic processes of integration in the west (“European” Union) and post-communist disintegration in the east. In both, language plays a central role. Some languages more than others, and probably English most of all. This is where the parallel with India is a close one. Our fear is that a headlong rush for English throughout Europe might be as myopic and culturally distorting as the current thrust for English in India.

Language policy has been a major issue in India for two centuries, of deep concern to British administrators, Indian nationalists, and politicians at all levels from the village to the Lok Sabha. Language policy has a high profile when vital decisions are needed on the use of particular languages in education, government service, political movements, the judicial system, local administration, etc. Language policy involves decisions about national and regional identities, national unity (or disunity), resource allocation, the nature of cooperation (economic, political and cultural) and desirable partners locally, nationally and internationally, and investment in and utilization of India’s immense wealth of languages. Differences of language have also been used as one factor in mobilizing inter-communal conflict.

Conflict mostly involves unequal access to power and material resources, and perceived threats to a group’s cultural identity. Conflict is often labelled as “ethnic” or “linguistic”, which is misleading shorthand for multi-faceted phenomena. Ethnic and linguistic co-existence and harmony have a much lower news value, despite or perhaps because of their prevalence. There is evidence that bilingualism can reduce conflict potential and enhance communication between different groups. Ajit Mohanty has shown that in Phulbani district, Orissa, where “riots” and killings between Kond “tribals” and “non-tribals” took place in recent years, they occurred only in monolingual areas and not in the bilingual ones.

Any official language policy in a democracy is a compromise. The roles assigned to Hindi and English in the Indian Constitution and the Three Language Formula are no exception. The compromise represents a concerted effort by a large number of parties to reach a maximum of consensus on a complex issue. This consensus has been a fragile one throughout this century, and still is. If political leadership is weak (and there appears to be a general feeling that this is the case in contemporary India), then it is unlikely that enlightened, informed decisions are being taken in the key area of language policy.
Some well-informed Indian scholars assert that there is no language policy in India. But this does not mean that policy is not being made. covertly as well as overtly. Parents are voting with their feet, or at least their children’s feet, when choosing schools. Politicians go through the motions of supporting the regional languages and mother tongues, but starve state primary schools of the necessary funding. Their own children, of course, go to English-medium schools.

Language policy is being made through decisions on choice of language in education (English or a regional language medium or other mother tongues), in the media (local or imported programmes and languages), business and administration (local, ‘regional’, ‘link’ and ‘international’ languages; language requirements for different jobs, salary levels, etc), and in countless everyday encounters. Taken together, these individual and societal choices amount to a pattern in which some languages are increasingly used while others are marginalized, at local, regional and national levels.

Essentially, a language policy involves government decisions on how the hierarchy of languages in the country can best be managed to serve the needs of the entire population of the country. This is why language rights figure prominently in the Indian Constitution, which attempts to provide guarantees to speakers of a wide range of languages. Worldwide, the struggle for language rights is part of the effort to ensure respect for human rights. Worldwide, there is also, alas, a pattern of the rights of minority language speakers being violated. India is no exception, witness the absence of tribal languages and many “minor” languages from school time-tables and teacher training.

Some languages are more equal than others then. Some are more powerful than others. And everyone, whatever their degree of formal education or their income, knows that English is the most powerful language, in India as in so many countries.

What ordinary people and politicians most probably do not know is that there is no reason why the learning of English needs to be at the expense of other languages. The Scandinavians and Dutch with a good command of English have not phased out their own languages or been educated through the medium of English. It is perfectly possible to organize education so that children develop high levels of competence in at least two languages, and a reasonable familiarity with a third and fourth. Bilingualism and multilingualism can be a source of great joy, increased intellectual development and creativity and cultural sensitivity, as a wealth of research evidence from many countries indicates (and as Mohanty demonstrates for India).

Many Indians who are 40 or over enjoy the benefits of such high level bi- or multilingualism. But their children are less likely to do so because of the inequality of languages in all walks of life, and the way education is organized.

The consequence of current language policy is that many among the younger generations of Indians are being deprived of familiarity with their cultural heritage, and quite probably of an education that would enable them to contribute to the solution of Indian problems in the future.

The children in schools which use Indian languages as media of instruction often suffer from much more severe constraints than do those in English-medium schools: lack of resources for facilities and materials, low teachers’ salaries, poorly trained teachers, etc. Many children are in submersion programmes in which their own languages are not used at all or are used initially but phased out after a few years and are accorded low status. Other languages replace the mother tongue, at least in cognitively demanding domains and written language functions. Many learn neither their own languages nor other languages to a high level, often with serious consequences for content learning.

The children in “English-medium” schooling often develop literacy skills in their mother tongues to only a very limited extent. If at all. The English language and a synthetic global American culture are taking over, with the result that Indian languages are not going through the processes of change and differentiated use that many European languages, Japanese and Korean have gone through in recent decades. As Harold Macmillan said in a comparable situation, it is like selling off the family silver.

English is a ticket to upward social mobility. It is manifestly a ticket that most Indians are unable to purchase. English-speaking elites are therefore rapidly moving even further away from the masses than in any earlier generations. Present-day language policy thus represents a major threat to the coherence and unity of the nation. Indian cultural traditions and strengths, which are accessible through the rich diversity of Indian languages, are being neglected.

A different language policy has been recommended for many years by virtually all Indian scholars who have researched in the field of language policy. They have provided research evidence which documents that Gandhiji and Nehru were right in warning, continuously over a half century, against an excessive focus on English. But the voices of the early leaders, from Rabindranath Tagore onwards, and...
of contemporary scholars have fallen on deaf ears. An enlightened language policy that builds on the foundations of Indian languages and adds English for certain purposes would lead to a totally different outcome, educationally, socially and politically.

We can exemplify why we are worried. We have met people from all parts of India whose family history reflects loss of the mother tongue in a short period of time. Grandparents are unable to communicate with their own grandchildren because of the shift to English that English-medium schooling, urbanisation and geographical mobility have facilitated. In this way the cultural resources and heritage of Kannada, Kashmiri, Malayalam, Marathi, Tamil, Telugu, and countless other languages are being lost. At the individual level, the loss of inter-generational communication and continuity is a personal tragedy. It is a consequence that most probably parents did not anticipate. They were trying to do the best for their children by sending them to the "best" school.

This change in linguistic habits in upwardly mobile middle class families may not apply throughout India, for instance in Gujerat and Maharashtra, but it appears to be a widespread trend. It may as yet apply only to a small proportion of the elite, but it is precisely these people who are trend-setters. Ordinary Indians are more likely to be influenced by what the materially successful do (promote English-medium education) than what they say (promote several languages). Presumably those responsible for education in India and language policy in general are unaware of what is happening. Or if they are aware, one can only conclude that they are not interested in maintaining and promoting the cultural heritage of India and are acting in conflict with the Indian Constitution.

India, which is known worldwide as a rich laboratory of functioning multilingualism, seems to be perpetuating the iniquities of colonialism. Economic "liberalisation" will intensify influences from the west, and increase dependence on a western language. The chorus of warnings from Indian experts over recent decades against obsession with English has been ignored, with a concomitant neglect of Indian languages.

We are aware that India is a highly complex society. The press is sophisticated, not least in English - but these "All-India" newspapers cannot be read by 95% of the population of all India. We are aware that there is a lively debate in books and many scientific journals about many social policy issues. One might expect that relevant scholarship in relation to the role of English in India should be a major concern of university Departments of English. Sadly, this is seldom the case. Such departments are currently debating the nature of their subject. But the bread and butter of these institutions is literature. The issue of how the study of literature, virtually all of foreign origin, can contribute to the solution of India's domestic problems, is barely addressed. With a few notable exceptions, language policy does not appear to interest them, either as a topic of social concern or as an object for scientific study.

Scholars concerned with language are located elsewhere in departments of linguistics. Here rival cliques owe allegiance to imported paradigms of obscure theoretical interest and little social accountability. Structurally there are only the most tenuous of links between departments of "English" and "Linguistics" and the education system or the policy framework within which they operate.

There are, of course, happily exceptions to these over-generalisations. There are brilliant individual scholars sprinkled over the country, but the overall picture is bleak. The Government of India Institutes in Hyderabad (for English and Foreign Languages) and Mysore (for Indian Languages) are concerned with many of the issues we have raised, but their impact on education policy and language policy seems to have been limited. They may have influenced policy-makers constructively, but the contours of policy remain unchanged.

Linguistic dominance is asserted in countless subtle ways. In terminology which glorifies one language and its ascribed virtues and stigmatizes others. In resources being allocated unevenly. Through discreet pressure from foreign governments packaged as "aid". Through westernization pressures in the academic, political and commercial worlds. Through favourable attitudes to some languages and hostility to others. Through ignorance about how education and language policy could be organized so as to achieve greater social justice, and a better functioning economy and democracy.

We shall conclude with one small example of the innocuous-seeming but insidious ways in which the dominance of English is asserted. One might fairly expect a book with the title "Language use in industries" in multilingual India to deal with the use of several languages. In fact the book is about English and people's attitudes to it in public and private sector undertakings. So "Language" = "English", the English of power and upward social mobility. This is the alchemy of English, in Braj Kachru's memorable phrase, just as an "educated" person is often synonymous with someone educated through the medium of English.
The title in question may reflect the wish of a sales-minded publisher for a crisp general title. But irrespective of that, it falls into the pattern of how dominant languages are marketed and others made invisible. It is symptomatic of the current state of play in Indian language policy. In our view, change is more urgently needed now than at any time this century.

Suggestions for further reading:


Robert Phillipson

Just as many Europeans are fascinated by things North American, there is a long tradition of "new world" intellectuals probing into European culture. Normand Labrie, a Canadian scholar, has written a book on the languages of European Union (EU) institutions and the ongoing formulation of language policy in contemporary western Europe. It is noteworthy that it was the Canadian government rather than any of the member states of the EU that thought fit to subsidize two years of postdoctoral study on such a topic. Likewise it is no surprise that the first monograph-length study of the "linguistic construction of the European community" has been published in French1.

Although language matters are taken seriously in French-speaking countries on both sides of the Atlantic, little work has been done in France on the sociology of language or overall language policy. Recently published books that celebrate European multilingualism have an essentially linguistic focus (Calvet 1993, Hagege 1992), or deal with indigenous minority languages and their rights (Giordan 1992). There are exploratory studies of language policy in Europe, with possible parameters for analysis (Truchot 1994, Wright and Ager 1995), of EU language policies (Coulmas 1991), and of linguistic practices at the EU (the thematic number of Sociolinguistica, 1991) and whether English is devouring other European languages (Sociolinguistica 1994), but Labrie's book is the first systematic study of the language dimension of the European integration process, particularly as seen from Brussels, the seat of the EU.

Big questions are raised in the introduction. As member states have given up part of their sovereignty, what is the status of "national" languages? In view of the substantial political and economic changes under way, how does language dovetail with all the other "European" activities? Is there a European language policy, and if EU language policy is not very explicit, what sets the agenda for the status and customary use of languages for a wide range of functions? What decides which languages can be used as official languages or working languages? What will current programmes of support for minority languages and the learning of foreign languages lead to? And what happens in language policy when and if the EU adds new member states?

These issues are covered in eight chapters, entitled Language planning and the European Community, the Community workplace, Community languages or the free circulation of ideas, the concept of supranationality and national languages, regional languages in a Europe with no frontiers, responsibility for the languages of origin (i.e. those of immigrants), the learning of "foreign" languages, the linguistic construction of Europe. Finally, in addition to the bibliography, there is a substantial section of appendices which reproduce key treaties, rulings, and resolutions of the European Parliament. These are useful for reference purposes, though many are now readily available elsewhere.

The book is methodically signposted, and the reader gently but firmly guided into the complexities of the rules and regulations determining the status of particular languages in EU functions. It provides answers to what might appear to be fairly ponderous legalistic questions about the sources of European law, which body it is that has the right to legislate on choice of languages, and on the basis of what type of legal document (treaty, regulations, custom etc). These juridical questions are in fact of momentous importance for how the linguistic hierarchies in Brussels and Strasbourg, and ultimately for "Europe" as a whole, are being worked through. European Union (earlier "Community", and earlier still "Economic Community") law not only has the full force of law. It takes precedence over national law (as Labrie demonstrates in his chapter on supranationality), whereas many lower level regulations and decrees only have advisory status.

It is a measure of the quality and thoroughness of Labrie's book that he makes a coherent narrative out of a complicated process that most Europeans have only a vague awareness of. The book is a first effort to come to grips with the language dimension of the structures which have been put in place in recent decades, and which represent a significant departure from the nation state organization that Europe has known for a couple of centuries. In the EU an army of bureaucrats, serviced by battalions of translators, and supervised by an officer corps of politicians (members of state parliaments and the European Parliament), oversee operations and are accountable to their electorates. It was precisely the issue of democratic shortfall that caused the popular resistance to the Maastricht treaty throughout western Europe in the early 1990s, and democratic accountability is still a fundamental issue in member states. On
the other hand it would be false to suggest that the supranational EU is necessarily less democratic than its member states, many of which are fledgling democracies (Greece, Portugal, Spain). An example from Labrie’s book of how EU membership may increase rather than decrease the opportunity for citizens to participate in democratic processes is that the form of Greek that official documents are produced in is the demotic one rather than the more learned type that was otherwise used exclusively in Greek legal documents.

In language policy, as in international human rights standards, it is possible that supra-national pressures will trigger improvements in the enjoyment of language rights within individual member states. Practice varies substantially from state to state (e.g. Catalan and Basque speakers have far more rights in Spain than in France). The evolution of language policy at the European level is slow, reflecting the many compromises that the EU builds on and fundamentally the complexity of language policy when the dominant language of each member state is assumed to have the same rights as those of other languages.

It is to Normand Labrie’s considerable credit that he has brought all these issues together in a single substantial volume. The book provides a chronological record of language policy in supranational European institutions over 40 years. Details are provided of the size and mandate of EU bodies, with the relevant clauses from essential treaties reproduced. What is important is that not all treaty languages are official languages: Irish and Luxemburgish drop out. “European multilingualism” builds on the principle that the nine dominant languages of the 12 member states (Danish, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish) have equal validity as official languages. This is a vital means of ensuring that citizens from and in each member state know and can influence what happens in Brussels and Strasbourg. In theory the languages have the same validity and rights as working languages, but in practice this principle is respected only in some of the functions of the European Parliament and the production of some written documents in the Commission.

That there are valid pragmatic reasons for certain languages being more widely used, particularly French and English, can be seen from the fact that at the European Commission, the administrative headquarters of the EU in Brussels, the translation service has a staff of 1700, 1200 of whom are translators, which produced nearly one million pages of translation in 1990. The mechanics of this service and the interpreters’ service, even the human dimension underlying them, are described in some detail, and efforts to simplify procedures and seek economies through terminological work and technological aids, are fully documented. It is important to clarify the internal workings of the EU, not least in view of the fact that the EU has already been enlarged since the book was written, through the adhesion of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995. This causes new pressures on the language services, and raises the question of the overall viability of the system (see Fishman 1994, Volz 1994).

The principle of linguistic equality or parity coexists with a de facto pecking order of languages, particularly in preparatory meetings and documents, with French and English securely at the top. Representatives of less triumphal languages bewail this, and the evidence is that speakers of virtually all languages other than English and French, and especially “lesser used languages” (which is Europspeak for languages like Danish and Dutch), experience that their languages are less equal than others. The suggestion has been put to the EU Commission that English should become the sole lingua franca but there is major resistance to such a proposal, both on grounds of principle (parity, democratic insight and participation in decision-making), and political and economic clout (for instance as articulated by Germany, Volz 1994). The French government is preoccupied with ensuring that the strong position of French is maintained, is disturbed by the progressive advance of English, and increasingly articulates a policy of support for multilingualism.

It is mostly in the European Parliament that language policy issues are discussed. The multilingual principle was confirmed by the European Parliament in May 1995, in anticipation of a summit and new treaty in 1996. 231 written questions were asked on language policy matters over a 20-year period. Thus it was a European Parliamentary report in 1982 that assessed the question of the expense of the multilingual operation of EU institutions, and concluded that although there were major costs involved, these represented only 2% of the budget of the EU, and were therefore a reasonable charge in order to guard the right to use all the nine languages. As Labrie points out (p. 143), the cost of facilitating the exchange of ideas needs to be held up against the cost of other services which promote the free circulation of goods, such as roads, railways and harbours, and what has to be paid to protect our environment.

The European Court of Justice has the right to determine cases when there is a mismatch between state and European law, and Labrie quotes at length the relevant regulations and case law, demonstrating how issues such as the wording of “European” passports and supermarket product labelling on the one
hand exemplify the supremacy of European law and on the other that most policy is being made ad hoc.

Labrie faithfully records the official record and the official view, and is careful not to draw conclusions that are not fully justified. On the other hand his theoretical framework, which is a blend of a simple political science model of constitutional law and a slightly modified version of Cooper's language planning model, permits him to make a useful distinction between different levels of decision-making, from the constitutional to the covert. He refers to this level of "customary" language use in the new supranational organs as linguistic ordering (in French "régulain", following Corbeil).

It would have been helpful to see rather more analysis of such issues, in addition to the meticulous documentation, as it is clear that much of the European language policy agenda is covert and unpredictable. The principle enunciated in the Maastricht treaty of respect for the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is scarcely compatible with the reality of the onward march of economic and cultural homogenisation that "common market" is designed to achieve, with the same products being sold or seen on television throughout Europe, and commercial forces propelling some languages forward rather than others. It is also unclear whether the diversity proclaimed at Maastricht actually includes either minority languages (which is possible) or the languages that recent immigrants have brought to Europe (which is unlikely), to each of which Labrie devotes a chapter.

Each of these is a major topic in its own right, as indeed is the coverage of support from EU institutions to foreign language learning, which Labrie also summarizes. He makes little attempt to evaluate these schemes, perhaps because most of such pump-priming activities were still in their infancy when the book was written. His final chapter is recapitulatory, and mentions some of the variables that might be causal in the coming years (e.g. intensified military collaboration, a prophetic observation in view of what has developed in ex-Yugoslavia), but Labrie is very cautious in adumbrating what factors either at the national or supranational level may impact more than others.

As an introduction to each area, the coverage is admirable, with its strong reliance on official discourse, which occasionally reflects a diversity of views and perception (at least in the European Parliament). To those of us in Europe who are players in some of these games, much of the rhetoric about, say, support for the languages of immigrants, or the reform of foreign language teaching, remains programmatic and hollow, part of the Europe that is being actively "imagined". On the other hand, much is happening, covertly and overtly. Integration is being accomplished in myriad ways, and "European identity" is currently being designed and manufactured, with language as a central ingredient. It is important therefore to know what powers the EU has, as this is the overarching framework within which the member states operate.

Clearly any experiment in bringing nations together for peaceful purposes, and which attempts to follow democratic principles (including those of linguistic democracy), is of major importance in the fragile contemporary world. Judging by the number of states queueing up for membership, the EU is perceived as being a success as an economic club and as a political force, despite major problems remaining, ranging from unemployment to foreign policy disagreements and wide variation within and between member states.

Supranational language policy is fuzzy and unclear at some points, crystal clear at others. It is being played out against a backdrop of the language policy structures and ideologies of the member states, few of which accord much credit to any principle of multilingualism. National and local agendas are for the moment more decisive - but who knows for how long? Many of the significant "international" factors that influence "national" agendas, such as media policy and transnational business are of major importance but fall outside Labrie's brief. Others, such as whether universities continue to teach in the national language or shift to the "international" language English, are intimately bound up with EU policies and budgets.

Is it too optimistic to anticipate that just as supranational law takes priority over national law, supranational language policy, with its advocacy of multilingualism, will prevail over the monolingual principle that has dominated Europe in its colonizing, globalizing phase? It is without doubt going to be fascinating to watch these issues being worked through in the years to come. Normand Labrie has given us a vital tool for doing so.

References:
Coulmas, Florian (ed.) 1991 A Language Policy for the European Community. Prospects and


Notes:

1. See also the (unpublished) study, Schlossmacher 1994.

2. In particular from the EU-funded European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages. Publicity and the newsletter "Contact Bulletin" are available from the European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages's Information Centre: rue Saint-Josse 49, 1030 Brussels, Belgium.

3. A number of planning documents were produced by the French government in 1994, prior to the six-month period in 1995 when France assured the presidency of the European Union. Several policy statements were published by the Haut Conseil de la Francophonie. The French specifically proposed a charter endorsing the principle of all European schoolchildren learning two foreign languages, and a reduction in the number of working languages in EU institutions. Other governments resisted these proposals vigorously, and were doubtless unconvinced by French advocacy of multilingualism when the hidden agenda is probably a strengthening of French. Some scholars and administrators are seeking to strengthen multilingualism in Europe, and this was the topic of a conference organized in Besançon, France on 19-20 June 1995 by Claude Truchot, with support from the EU and the French Ministry of Higher Education and Research.

4. The cultural identity and diversity of Europe must be maintained, and there must be explicit recognition of the value of the wealth that results from the diversity: cultural and linguistic, national and regional, of the European Union.

   There can be no restriction in the number of official EU languages and EU working languages.

   In view of the multicultural nature of the European community, the need to promote an intercultural dialogue aiming at strengthening mutual understanding and tolerance must be stressed.


Tove Skutnabb-Kangas

Christina Bratt Paulston (CBP) has been one of the eminent people in bilingual education studies. She wrote some very powerful analyses of different paradigms in bilingual education in the early and mid-1970s, drawing heavily on Rolland Paulston. With the help of her students and others, she wrote some useful overviews, drawing on materials from a wider range than the usual North American research summaries did and showing less of the ethnocentricity than her often English monolingual peers. She was in many ways seen as one of the reliable researchers whose work one could draw on in championing minority rights. But over the years she has started to say the most curious things - sorry, old friend. The book reviewed here seems to me to be a culmination of the trend.

Some aspects of the theorizing in the book could be interesting if properly discussed. In my view, though, the major shortcomings of the book are too disturbing for the reader for the interest to last. Wanting to "explain language maintenance" (p. ix), CBP develops what she calls "a new theoretical framework", suggesting "four types of social mobilization, which come close to forming a continuum rather than four distinct types" (p. 29; on p. 25 she argues that they do form four distinct types - this is only one of the many contradictions and confusions that abound in the book). These types are 1. ethnicity, 2. ethnic movement, 3. ethnic nationalism, and 4. geographic nationalism. There is very little discussion of why some groups "choose" one or the other of these four. Language is not seen as a causal factor but either the dependent factor - the outcome to be explained - or an intervening factor. The causal factors are economic and political: a group (or rather elites within it) chooses to use language as a mobilising factor if they perceive that they can gain economic and/or political benefits from it. often in situations where the economic cake is not seen as large enough for all. The conclusion, after several "case studies", is that neither ethnicity nor ethnic movements are sufficient for maintaining languages, only nationalism may be. My main criticism is of three kinds, and I will just have space to exemplify each.

A. The book is more ideological than scientific but the ideological messages are often covert. (I do not agree with the ideology either, but that is not the main point - it is that ideology is being presented under the cover of something else.

The "main point" of the book

"is simply that ethnic groups within a modern nation-state, given opportunity and incentive, typically shift to the language of the dominant group." (p. 9).

This claim legitimatis the forced assimilation which is the covert policy towards minorities in many states, and makes it seem voluntary. Mother tongue education for immigrant children is in CBP's view "strictly speaking ... not necessary since the situation in which it took place was one of very rapid shift to Swedish" (p. 107). Maybe the shift can have something to do with the lack of mother tongue medium education, i.e. kill a language and claim then that it is not necessary to save it since it is dying anyway... Alternatively, countries where this predicted shift has not happened, despite centuries of contact, can be labelled non-modern, i.e. language shift becomes a criterion for modernity.

The tone of the book is also revealed in the following examples. representative of the ideology behind the book:

The three "possible linguistic outcomes of prolonged contact of ethnic groups within one nation" are according to Paulston "language maintenance, bilingualism, or language shift" (p. 7). Contrasting language maintenance with bilingualism means that maintaining a minority language is seen as excluding the learning of the majority language, i.e. as self-segregation. In fact, the bulk of minorities want (and need) to learn both languages. This destructive either-or thinking is in keeping with the horror pictures which English Only and similar organisations are creating. The next quote says:

"However, planners need to realize that the social costs of such continued language and culture maintenance tend to be high to the minority group members..." (p. 40).

This is a typical example of the rationalisations, used to legitimate oppressive and linguicial
policies: dominant groups know best what is good for minority groups: linguistic and cultural genocide is committed because it is (presented as being) beneficial for the groups themselves.

"While moral decency dictates the language rights of minority groups, it does not necessarily follow that the state is under any obligation to economically support such rights, nor does it follow that minority groups have a right to impose their language on the nation." (p. 40).

What are the language rights that moral decency dictates, if they are not economically supported? The majority's language rights, for instance the right to mother tongue medium education is economically supported with tax monies. Why do minorities not have the same right of getting economic support for mother tongue medium education from the taxes that they themselves pay? Language rights are not abstract entities - if economy is separated from minority rights (while claiming that economy is one of the independent factors in language maintenance) but not from majority rights, there is something wrong with the conceptualisation of rights. It also follows from the argumentation above that majorities do have the right to "impose their language on the nation". This is against all minority protection clauses in international law.

"Once it is clear, for instance, whom the children of migrant workers in Europe will marry, the setting of educational policy will be much facilitated. If they commonly marry nationals of the host culture, there will be no need of special or different educational policies for their children. If, however, they marry exclusively within their own ethnic group, learn the national language poorly and show other trends of strong culture maintenance (arranged marriages with partners from the home country, vacations in the home country, etc.); then a strong case can be argued for the case of bilingual education" (p. 31: my emphases).

CBP thus recommends for Europe the killing of the linguistic and cultural potential of children with parents with different mother tongues - these children could, with a little support from the educational system, become really high level bilinguals. Likewise, she equates, with no evidence at all, strong cultural maintenance with learning L2 poorly, i.e. again using the either-or approach, so typical of the traditional monolingual reductionism ideology, rather than the both-and approach. In my empirical study of Finnish 15-year olds who had had 9 years of Finnish-medium education in Sweden (and spent vacations in Finland, i.e. strong culture maintenance ...), these working class youngsters did better than Swedish middle class children in parallel classes in the same schools in CALP (=Cognitive-Academic Language Proficiency) type Swedish language tests (in addition to doing almost as well as Finnish children in Finland in Finnish language tests). The title of the book where the results are published (Peura & Skutnabb-Kangas (eds.) 1994) has a representative quote from one of the youngsters, Kirsi Salomäki: Man kan vara tvåländare också (You can be bicultural too). Most of the 15-year olds tried, just like Kirsi, to invent new words to describe their bilingual, bicultural, "bicultural" identity, so different from CBP's either-or views.

Pete Wilson (the California governor), English Only and others who blame the victims, will love the book. CBP claims that when ethnic groups ... see learning the national language well and fluently in the best interest of their children, there are very few problems associated with the educational policies for minority groups" (p. 59).

The proof comes from freedom-loving Singapore, where there "is no sign of ethnic strife or educational problems" (p. 59).

"The simple explanation is to be found in Singapore's very strong and expanding economy. There is enough of the good of this life to go around for everybody, and competition takes place on the basis of individual qualities, not along ethnic lines."

According to CBP, then, if minority groups face educational problems, it is because the parents do not want their children to learn the national language well and fluently (i.e. it is their own fault), and or because the economy is weak. According to this, Finns and others in Sweden should not have faced any
educational problems in the 1970s and 1980s (when the economy was strong, as the Singaporean economy is today) and could not do it now either (because the parents have always wanted the children to learn Swedish well - they are not stupid even if they are minorities). Likewise, Turks in Germany should not have any educational problems - the German economy is still strong and the parents want the children to learn German well. And what about Spanish speakers in the US...

CBP claims that

"Most language spread probably takes place as lingua francas, as LWC's (languages of wider communication), and English is a good example... On the whole, such spread is neutral in attitudes." (p. 9)

There is ample evidence that the spread of English has not been neutral in attitudes - it has had (see e.g. Phillipson 1992, Pennycook 1994) and has (see e.g. some of the latest British Council annual reports) a very clear political and economic agenda.

B. There is a lot of basic conceptual confusion and contradiction. It starts already in the first 2 sentences of the book (p. 3), where CBP confuses nation and state. In several places. also on p. 3, she confuses national and official languages. e.g. claiming that

"Tanzania is one of the very few African ex-colonies which has an indigenous African language as a national language".

Many African states have African languages as national languages while the old colonial languages figure prominently as official languages. (Official languages have all the rights whereas national languages often have only symbolic value). The same confusion is repeated on pages 5 and 20 (saving national and meaning official, she claims on p. 20 that language "shift only takes place if there are opportunity and incentive for the group to learn the national language").

Language is claimed to be "a prime symbol of the nation" in ethnic nationalism but not necessarily so with geographic nationalism on p. 38. On p. 57, in contrast, speaking the national language is claimed to be "an important marker of group membership" in geographic nationalism...

Occitania (in France) is on p. 47 claimed to represent a case of ethnicity and language shift while Catalunya is a case of nationalism and language maintenance. But on p. 58 Occitania is claimed to have "a weak ethnicity", and therefore the language is dying...

Ethnicity is typically "based on a shared biological past". CBP illustrates the fluid criteria for group membership in Catalunya with the declaration of a woman who grew up with her Turkish Jewish parents in Barcelona: "Sure. I am Catalan. I grew up in Barcelona." But then CBP continues (p. x): "By contrast, growing up in Watts or Eastern Los Angeles is not going to turn anyone into Black or Chicano." Elementary sociology distinguishes between the strategies of (and towards) those who can and those who cannot "pass". No amount of years in Barcelona might make a Black from Watts a Catalan, or CBP a Black or Chicana, simply because of phenotypical features, meaning the contrasting does not offer valid evidence for the fluidity of group membership criteria in Catalunya. A Turkish Jew can pass as a Catalan but not as a Black, and a Black person could not pass as a Catalan regardless of how many years she spent in Barcelona.

Only minorities and their languages are seen as ethnic. e.g.:

"... my own work with training teachers from ethnic groups" (p. 4):

"... Catalan. very different reactions from my previous experience with ethnic languages." (p. x).

Kurdistan (p. 26) is presented as either a state (which is isn't) or a tribe...

C. The book is in no way up-to-date or accurate, and contains many factual errors. Several of these seem to have been fabricated in order to support the underlying ideological stance, i.e. they make the "theory" seem plausible.

Most of the 7 chapters in the book have been published earlier - of these 2, 3 and 4 as long as 8-9 years ago (the book "has been some 14 years in the writing". p. ix) and they have not been updated. When developing a theory which is supposed to predict language maintenance and language shift, the opportunity to verify the theory by at least using up-to-date materials showing in which direction the cases
studied have gone during the last decade or two might be appropriate. Using historical material is of course good, but lack of present-day material is difficult to understand in a book which uses case studies to prove a theory. The theory might be more convincing if new data proved the predictions to have been accurate. Statistics from e.g. Peru are from late 1970s or from 1981 (pp. 64-65).关于斯瓦希里语使用者从1960和1970年代（p. 61）等。最新的描述对加泰罗尼亚和奥克西塔尼而言是从1988年。这些描述的语篇和教育状况对加泰罗尼亚、奥克西塔尼、坦桑尼亚等不但是无可救药的过时，而且极其不完全（正如许多一般理论参考文献也一样，例如关于双语教育，p. 21，双语教育，p. 18，种族，p. 28）。只有21个274个在著者列表中的参考文献是在1989年之后。

完全相同的句子被反复重复了好几次（例如同样的句子在第13页和第83页上，同样第18页和31页，30页和34-35页，31页和74-75页，32页和75页，37页和57页）。

语言是性别歧视。有许多是男性化的“他”、“男人”、“教士”，在如CBP可以有性别中立的表达。

成千上万是粗糙的、普遍的、基于缺乏证据或没有证据的假设。两个例子：

“确实，几乎所有的群体语言行为都可以用人们在自己的最佳和有利利益的假设来解释...”（p. 23）。我确实认为所有的行为都可以是如此解释... （我的观点）。

“改善自己或至少改善自己孩子的生活是所有民族运动...”（p. 35）（和所有其他人...我的观点）。

“土耳其人在欧洲”都被认为是频繁采取使用“原语作为战略，使语言保持和语言斗争成为一种附带因素”（p. 23）。唯一关于这个声明的参考文献（我在这里不讨论这个声明的正当性）是一本由Lisbet Sachs（1983）所著的《Evil Eye or Bacteria》。它可能是一个防御性的策略，仅给瑞典版（这本书也有英文版）来阻止读者去检查它在土耳其移民的动员中的作用。这本书实际上是关于瑞典和土耳其医疗系统和意识形态的。以“邪恶之眼”或“细菌”为符号，成为世界的不同...。

CBP声称，

“土著群体...属于同一国家并且有进入同一教育机构的机会...已经发生了缓慢的变化”（与外来移民群体）（p. 11）。

她的例子包括在路易斯安那州的法语使用者，美国西南部的西班牙语使用者和美国原住民（称作“印第安人”）。没有这些群体中的任何人拥有比哥伦布更准确的地理知识。这些机构中的物理机构作为英语使用者的“教育机构”，“教育机构”忽视了他们的母语（见e.g. Richardson 1993 for Canada）。CBP对瑞典的描述是一个痛苦的章节，因为所有的错误。最大的劳动力移民群体来自南斯拉夫、希腊和土耳其（p. 67）- 实际上芬兰是最大的群体，p. 69。许多的错误都来自CBP的早期瑞典报告（1982）被重复，尽管有历史和压倒性的证据。它没有推测和种族刻板印象，基于没有数据，如果它们有根据研究来研究，关于瑞典工作阶级是种族主义的，关于芬兰文化是不言的，因此父母没有告诉他们的孩子，因此芬兰儿童在瑞典的环境中没有得到足够的语言输入（即又一次指责受害者）。- 这是用"有时"作为修改（p. 69）。有声明，直接被研究证据反驳，例如她声称芬兰父母没有激励支持孩子的进一步教育（这被证明是父母要对芬兰儿童在瑞典严重地在中等和高等教育中被低估的父母要对）。
now claims that the Finns in Sweden have "little aspiration for upward social mobility, using such indicators as continued education and job selection". In fact every empirical study I know of in Sweden (and there are many) where questions about educational aspirations have been asked shows that Finnish parents, regardless of socio-economic background, value formal education very highly and want their children to get as much formal education as possible. This is in keeping with the Finnish tradition (100% literacy for over a century; more books published and borrowed from libraries per capita than any other countries in the world; world top reading results for both age groups studied in the big international IEA-studies, etc). So educational and labour market discrimination is by CBP explained away by again blaming the parents' lack of aspiration...

There are direct lies, e.g. when CBP still claims that the Finnish parents in connection with the long school strike in Rinkeby (the Stockholm suburb with the highest percentage of foreign nationals in Scandinavia), demanded Finnish-medium universities and Sweden becoming officially bilingual in Swedish and Finnish as Finland is (p. 36). At no point were there any demands whatsoever about universities or official bilingualism. One can ascertain this from the official press releases from the striking parents: the demands - which only discuss the first 6 years of education, at one particular school - are presented in English in an article written by four of the central women in organising the 7-week school strike (Honkala et al. 1988). There are several other descriptions of the strike by outsiders, some of them linguistically available for CBP (e.g. Jaakkola 1989). Still, these lies are repeated in the book. Finns in Sweden are also claimed to demand monolingual Finnish-medium schooling for their children - likewise a lie. Every Finnish school in Sweden (there are a dozen now) uses both languages. Counter to facts it is also claimed that immigrant children do as well as Swedish children in school - here the latest of the 3 references (which does not show this either) is from 1981...

The description of Finland is equally flawed, starting with simple things like not getting our year of independence right (p. 99), leaving out the indigenous Sámi whose linguistic revitalisation does not correspond to CBPs "theory" because there are no nationalist demands, and so we could go on and on.

This is a very dangerous book indeed. Theories and policies in the area need developing. The problems are still there, made a bit worse by this book. I hope to use it with first-year students as an example of how research should not be done.

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Sprogpolitik

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Sprogpolitik - en karakteristik af området


**Sprog** spiller en afgørende rolle i de aktuelle processer mod større europæisk integration og i de ændrede økonomiske og politiske forhold mellem vesteuropa og øst- og centraleuropa og med resten af verden. Fordelingen af verdens ressourcer og markeds produkter foregår i den moderne verden mere igennem forhandlinger og medieprocesser end ved vold og fysisk besættelse. Samtidig med at vi ser "store" sprog, specielt engelsk, spiller stadig store rolle i mange lande, er der en voksende erkendelse af at mindretalssprog ikke bare hører til kulturarven og folkeminde men har også legitime krav, der må tilgodeses i uddannelsessystemet og i den offentlige forvaltning. **Flersprogethed**, som er normen i mange dele af verden, er blevet en konsekvens af internationalisering i Europa. Kultur- og sprogmodeprocesserne intensiveres i og med at der er flere kulturer og sprog i Danmark, og danskere optærder i mange forskellige roller i flere kulturer og på flere sprog udenfor Danmark. **Sprogundervisning** tilskrives en central plads i uddannelsessystemer for at må bestemme sproglige, politiske, sociale og personlige mål.


**Sprogpolitik som samfundspraxis**

Alle sådanne beslutninger har langttrukknede **samfundsmæssige konsekvenser**. De er vigtige på individ- og lokalplan, da de vedrører den sproglige identitet såvel som funktionalitet. De kan medvirke til at visse sprog bliver store og andre mindre. De spiller en afgørende rolle i demokratiets funktionsmåder. Sprog er i vekselvirkning med etnisk, regional, national, international og postnational identitet og er hermed på gruppeplan afgørende for politisk stabilitet. for overholdelsen af
menneskerettigheder, og for retfærdige forhold på lokalt, nationalt og globalt plan.

Det officielle Danmark gør meget lidt for at sprogpolitiske mål bliver afklaret, valgt og nået. på trods af at vi lever i en tid, hvor alle institutioner er bevidste om behovet for langsigtet strategisk planlægning. Et "lille" land som Danmark er helt afhængigt af kompetence på flere sprog. Alle som kender uddannelsessystemetog det politiske liv ved at behersekelsen af fremmedsprog kunne være langt bedre. Alle ved at minoritetsprog. specielt indvandrersprog. har dårlige kår. som afspejler deres marginale status.

Det officielle Danmark gør meeet lidt for at sproepolitiske mål bliver afklaret. valet og nået. på trods af at vi lever i en tid, hvor alle institutioner er bevidste om behmet for langsiatet strateeisk planlwening. Et "li Ile" land som Danmark er helt afhmneiet af kompetence pa flere sproe. Alle som kender uddannelsessystemet og det politiske liv ved at beherskelsen af fremmedsprog kunne være langt bedre. Alle ved at minoritetsprog. specielt indvandrersprog. har dårlige kår. som afspejler deres marginale status.


Men der findes næsten ingen på de højere lærenanstalter, i ministerierne eller virksomheder, som arbejder intensivt med sprogpolitik og sprogpplanlægning. dvs det som i den engelsktalende verden hedder "language policy and language planning", på fransk "la politique linguistique et l'aménagement linguistique", begreber som henviser på at identificere og fremme bestemte sprogpolitiske mål. Dansk Sprogøvn arbejder med det danske sprogs form (retskrivning, ordforråd) og ikke med flersproget landkort i Danmark. Dets repræsentanter har dog i de senere år erkendt at sådanne problemstillinger trænger sig på.

Situationen i udlandet er anderledes, ikke bare i lande, som lwrige har erkendt at de reelt er flersprogede (Australien. Canada, Finland, Indien. USA) men også i lande vi "plejer at sammenliene os med". Der foregår meeen sprogpolitisk forskning og sproplanlægning i udlandet, som Danmark kunne drage nytte af.


Erfaringer med bevidst sprogpolitik i vestlige lande (specielt Australien og Canada) og ikke-vestlige lande (f.eks. Algeriet og Indien) tyder på at samspillet mellem forskere. politikere. private virksomheder og interessegrupper er kompliceret, men kan bidrage afgørende til ændringer. I de baltiske lande har flersproglige rettigheder haft en meget synlig profil. dels under kampen om selvståendighed. dels på grund af de baltiske staters politik med sigte på at styrke estisk/lettisk/ltaiisk kultur og sprog. samt med at de russisktalende minoriteters ret under international lovgivning respekteres. Eksemplet viser at sprogpolitik kan være politisk balsam eller sprogsprøg. og forholdet mellem interne og eksterne faktorer.

Videnskabsteoretiske overvejelser


Den sprogpædagogiske forskning. hvor Danmark står rimeligt stærkt internationalt. har hidtil

Der er ret få samfundsvidenkabelige forskere der har arbejdet med at afdække sammenhængen mellem sprogbrug og sociale hierarkier (for eksempel i Basil Bernstein's spor). eller forholdet mellem sprog, etnicitet og nation (for eksempel i forlængelse af Joshua Fishmans sprog sociologiske pionerindsats). Det er snarere humanister og uddannelsesforskere der forsøger at integrere elementer af samfundsvidenkabelig forskning i tværvidenskabelige forsøg på at finde mere dækkende svar på komplekse problemstillinger, hvor sprog er en vigtig faktor. Det er vigtigt at udvikle en teoretisk forståelse af konflikt situationer, både i over på vestlige lande præget af fejlslagne integrationsprocesser (koblingen racisme, etnicitet og sprog), og blandt rivaliserende etniske grupper i usikre opløsningssprocesser i øst- og centraleuropa (koblingen selvbestemmelse, nation, politiske og kulturelle rettigheder). I disse grundlæggende processer spiller identitet en vigtig rolle. både nationalt ("dansk") og supranationalt ("europæisk"). Er dansk for eksempel lige så "europæisk" som engelsk og fransk i alle eller kun visse situationer? Hvornår kan indlæringen af "internationale" sprog være i den "nationale" interesse? Og hvad med indivandersprog. hører de nu med til et lands "nationale" ressourcer, således at en sund integrationspolitik kan bygge på dem?

Den sprogopolitiske forskning kan bl.a. hente inspiration i fredsforskning (hvor Norden, herunder Danmark, står stærkt), men hvor det sproglige element endnu ikke er integreret. Der er en stigende interesse globalt for sproglige menneskerettigheder, både teoretisk og praktisk. i politiske kredse (f.eks. i Sydafrika), forskermiljøer (f.eks. etiske normer i forskning og undervisning) og Europarådets og FN's organer. Der er også et behov for at integrere sprogpolitikken i udviklingsforskning. Dette kunne inspirere bistandsorganisationer, både statslige og NGO'er. til at udarbejde en eksplicit sprogpolitik, eftersom deres aktiviteter normalt styrker de interesser der er forbundet med de dominerende sprog. og målsætningen at at nå den fattigste del af befolkningen indebærer afprøvning af nye veje, i retning af etno-udvikling og øko-udvikling, hvilket forudsætter anvendelsen af lokale sprog.

En forståelse for betingelserne for planlagte sproglige nyskabelser. og de forskellige trin i deres opståen og udmøntning, skal integreres i modeller til omsetning af den politiske vilje til handlingsmonstre for at nå bestemte sproglitiske mål. Videnskabsteoretisk er det vigtigt at afklare forskellen mellem beskrivende og teoridannende forskning (f.eks. i Adger Possis og styrker traditioner i Nordamerika for sprog sociologi og tosprogethethed, og globaliserende sandsynligheder, og grænser af politisk videnskab og jura. som efterhånden beskæftiger sig mere med sprogpolitik og sproglige menneskerettigheder). I Indien og Sydafrika forskes der i flersprogethetheden væsen, og betydningen af sprogpolitik på individ- og gruppeniveau for tilrettelæggelsen af undervisning.

Opgaver for den sprogpolitiske forskning i Danmark

Tyngdepunkter i det empiriske arbejde bliver følgende projekter.


3. Dansk sprog i europæisk regi. og belysning af det danske sprogs status i EUs forskellige organer. og
hvilke konsekvenser for vor demokratiske deltagelse og indsigt det vil have, hvis dansk. som det mindste EU sprog, udgik som officielt EU-sprog, eller hvis svensk og dansk skulle tælle som "et" sprog.

4. Spørgsmålet om talere af minoritetssprog (regionale og indvandrede) tilføjes konkret at udøve de menneskerettigheder som efterhånden er blevet anerkendt i flere internationale konventioner, ikke mindst Europarådets "European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages".

5. Danskernes sproglige identitet, årsagerne til det ekspanderende brug af engelsk, f.eks. i danske virksomheder, medier og uddannelsesinstitutioner, i hvilke stærker denne udvikling pågår, og hvilke konsekvenser den kunne få, holdninger til engelsk og dansk.

6. Hvordan uddannelses- og sprogspolitik kan føre til en styrkelse af dansk identitet, samtidig med at flere danskere får høj kompetence i et eller flere fremmedsprog, herunder både de "store" sprog og de mange indvandrerprog.

7. Modeller for flersprogetheth globalt, og i Europa: undersøgelser af hvordan flersprogetheth markedesfores og fremmes, specielt i uddannelsesystemet.

Forskning kan foreløbe i takt med konkrete bidrag til formulering af sprogspolitik i bestemte lande, ikke mindst Danmark, og i samarbejde med udenlandske partnere, i lande som Australien, Estland, Frankrig, Letland, Tyskland og Ungarn.

**Forskeruddannelsesforløb i sprogspolitik**

**Behovet for at uddanne ph.d.-er med kompetence i sprogspolitik** kan imødekommes igennem et forskeruddannelsesforløb på følgende områder (flere projekter grupperet klyngevis):


**Styrkelsen af de eksisterende miljøer**

Eftersom alle forskermiljøer i Danmark er små, er indfrielsen af disse mål afhængig af international samarbejde og et langt bedre ressourcetilgrundlag. I Danmark er der tæt kontakt mellem forskere i sprogpedagogik. delvis på grund af SHFs netværksbevillinger. der er planer om international samforskningsophold og etablering af et egentligt forskeruddannelsesnetværk på området sprogspolitik. Der stilles mod oprettelse af et nordisk netværk om sprogspolitik. En opbygning af området sprogspolitik vil være i logisk forlængelse af den hidtidige støtte og kunne styrke miljøer som allerede er anerkendt internationalt.
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