This brief issues booklet provides basic information about the arms control issue in Europe, as of 1988. The table of contents includes the following: (1) "Trying Again"; (2) "Prelude to Arms Control"; (3) "The First Attempts: MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions) and CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe); (4) "CAFE (Conventional Armed Forces in Europe): The Political and Military Environment"; (5) "The Future of Conventional Arms Control"; and (6) "Western Concerns and Options." A list of discussion questions, an annotated reading list, and a key to abbreviations also are included. A map of the region and several tables highlight the booklet. (EH)
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Conventional Arms Control and Europe’s Future

by Stanley R. Sloan

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The Foreign Policy Association

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Diplomats from all 16 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 7 Warsaw Pact countries took their seats in Vienna, Austria, in March 1989 to begin new negotiations on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CAFE)* aimed at reducing forces in the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union. They convened some 16 years after an earlier generation of negotiators representing the same alliances had first met in the capital of neutral Austria to negotiate Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe. Since that time, several U.S. Administrations, governments in Western Europe, and general secretaries in the Soviet Union have come and gone. Détente bloomed, withered on the vine, and then came to life again. But no troop reduction agreement was ever reached.

Now, conventional arms control appears to have been given new life. As a prelude to the negotiations, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev raised expectations for

*These negotiations have been known in the West as CST (Conventional Stability Talks). The U.S. Department of State now appears to prefer referring to them as CFE.
progress with his December 1988 promise to make substantial unilateral reductions in Soviet armed forces. And President George Bush has said that his Administration would devote a high priority to conventional arms control. If the participants exploit fully opportunities presented by the new negotiations, they could revolutionize political and military relations in Europe.

The 1973 and 1989 negotiating efforts share more than their Viennese setting. The earlier talks came at a time of warming East-West relations, as do the new CAFE negotiations. The mutual force reduction negotiations and the concurrent Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which had been sought by the Soviet Union and its East European allies to confirm the post-World War II boundaries in Europe, including the division of Germany, followed on the heels of successful negotiations to resolve outstanding East-West differences over Berlin. The negotiations were given impetus by West Germany's Ostpolitik (policy toward the East), which sought to open new diplomatic doors to the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) East European neighbors.

The current CAFE talks follow on the successful conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles. They may well benefit from dramatic improvements in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and from prospects for an accord in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which have been moving slowly toward substantial reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals. Parallel negotiations in Vienna among all the CSCE participants will seek to strengthen confidence-building measures in Europe.

In addition, both negotiations began in times of strong pressures to reduce U.S. defense commitments overseas. In 1973, Senator Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) was continuing his efforts to reduce troops in Europe to bring U.S. commitments more in line with his view of U.S. political interests and economic capabilities. In the late 1980s, many Americans
once again view the United States as overextended militarily and disadvantaged economically by the costs of trade and security relationships with its major allies.

In the early 1970s, President Richard M. Nixon's Administration used the prospect of negotiated cuts in NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to deter congressionally mandated unilateral cuts in U.S. forces. The opening of the CAFE negotiations appears to have diminished support in the U.S. Congress for, and probably postponed, unilateral cuts in the U.S. presence in Europe.

These similarities notwithstanding, there are some striking differences. Perhaps most important are the potentially revolutionary changes in Soviet attitudes toward defense and arms control introduced by Gorbachev. When the MBFR talks began, the West had little hope or expectation that the negotiations would fundamentally alter the military confrontation with the East. Most observers assumed that the Soviet Union did not have the political flexibility or military restraint that would be required to build a more cooperative European security system. Accordingly, NATO participants set relatively modest goals for the MBFR talks. Today, while there are no guarantees that negotiations will succeed, the signals from Moscow are much more hopeful than they were in 1973. Recent changes in Soviet policy suggest that the new conventional arms talks could become a means for overcoming the East-West confrontation rather than simply a forum to record its perpetuation. In all likelihood, the negotiations in their early stages will include a blend of competitive and cooperative impulses, reflecting the period of transition in East-West relations that the two sides appear to have entered.

Although there are many uncertainties about future Soviet policies, the NATO countries cannot afford to miss what may be a unique opportunity to encourage the Soviet Union to redefine its political goals and restructure its military forces so as to reduce in real terms the threats to Western values, interests and security.

The new Bush Administration and the new Congress may
have to give serious thought to the broader goals the United States should seek in this highly political arms control process. Some Americans may see the negotiations as a way for the United States safely to disengage from active involvement in European security affairs. Others may see the negotiations as a way for the United States to help shape and participate in a new European security system. Yet others may see the negotiations simply as a vehicle for maintaining the status quo, protecting the Western alliance and preserving the U.S. role
in that alliance while rebutting Warsaw Pact proposals for change.

This Headline Series surveys prospects for this new phase of European security negotiations against the backdrop of previous efforts to mitigate the military confrontation in Europe. It examines the factors that could determine whether the negotiations will lead toward a new era in East-West relations or simply back into the deadlock of data disputes, political propaganda and continuing mutual mistrust. Along the way, it suggests the range of important choices that the United States and its allies will have to make in this dynamic period in relations between East and West and among the Western allies themselves.
Even before the final surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945, the anti-Axis alliance between the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union had begun to break down over issues related to the future shape of postwar Europe. Initial East-West differences focused particularly on the status of Germany. The Soviet Union had moved swiftly after the defeat of Germany to consolidate its political and military control of Germany's eastern half while supporting Communist takeovers of East European governments. Moscow demanded reparations and influence over the economic and industrial development of all Germany, including areas occupied by the Western allies. The United States, France and Britain rejected the Soviet demands and decided in 1948 to establish a German government in their occupation zones. The Soviet response was quick and decisive. Soviet-backed Communist took over the government in Czechoslovakia and, in June 1948, the Soviet Union blocked all land access to Berlin, the former capital of Germany, which was in the Soviet zone but under four-power occupation. Joint Western efforts to defeat the blockade peacefully through the Berlin
“airlift” signaled the West’s determination not to back down to Soviet intimidation. Challenged by the Soviet Union’s expansionist behavior in Central Europe and by fears that Moscow would attempt to use military power to spread communism over the rest of Europe, the Western nations organized to defend themselves.

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, by Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, West Germany in 1955, and Spain in 1982. NATO became the principal framework for coordinating Western defense efforts, and the United States agreed to deploy substantial numbers of forces in Europe to help defend against a potential Soviet or East European attack. In peacetime, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), a position held by American generals since December 1950, has only token forces under his command. But in a crisis, substantial European and North American forces would become an integrated fighting force operating under SACEUR command.

The Soviet Union and the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania formed the Warsaw Pact in 1955, after West Germany joined NATO. (Albania formally withdrew from Warsaw Pact membership in 1968.) The Soviet Union justified the East European alliance as a response to the formation of NATO in the West, but the Warsaw Pact clearly served to strengthen Moscow’s control over its allies as well as integrate their military efforts. The Warsaw Treaty expressly supported “the adoption of effective measures for the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction,” reflecting Moscow’s deep concern about the Western lead in nuclear weapons technology. By the mid-1950s, Europe was clearly split into competing ideological, political, economic and military groupings, with a divided Germany at its heart.

The military forces the Soviet Union built up in Eastern
Europe were numerically superior to those of the Western countries. The NATO allies had agreed at Lisbon, Portugal, in 1952 that they would cope with this superiority through a large expansion of their own conventional forces. Efforts to achieve a conventional balance, however, fell by the wayside as West Europeans gave precedence to economic reconstruction and recovery and the United States pledged that it would use nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union should Soviet forces attack Western Europe.

As a consequence, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained substantial numbers of troops and military equipment in Central Europe. In both cases, however, the forces were intended to play roles beyond the apparent tasks of preparing for a potential conflict. The U.S. forces were in part a symbol of American leadership of the Western coalition and a “trip wire” to activate a U.S. nuclear response against Soviet aggression. Soviet forces were both a symbol of the preeminent role of the U.S.S.R. in its alliance and a tool for maintaining by force, or the implicit threat of force, the internal cohesion of that alliance.

U.S. and Soviet forces throughout the postwar era have continued to perform important political as well as military functions in their respective alliances. This basic point illustrates why conventional arms control efforts should be understood as negotiations about the political future of Europe and the U.S. and Soviet roles in that future.

From Cold War to Détente

At the peak of the cold war in the 1950s, both the Soviet Union and Western nations made a number of proposals to end the division of Germany. Such proposals inevitably included arms control, although in the deeply mistrustful political environment there seemed little chance for serious negotiations. In March 1952, a month after the NATO allies had agreed to include West German military capabilities in Western defenses, the Soviet Union presented a draft peace treaty that proposed reunifying and neutralizing Germany,
allowing it minimal armed forces. The Western allies rejected the proposed treaty as an attempt to undermine their necessary and legitimate defense efforts, and proposed free elections to permit a united Germany to make its own choice of alliances. The Soviet proposal was a forerunner of numerous attempts in subsequent years to avoid the establishment of West German armed forces and to block improvements in NATO defense capabilities.

Even after the FRG had joined NATO, the maneuvering continued and Western and Eastern arms control proposals became more complex. At the July 1955 summit meeting among the Big Four wartime allies, Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin proposed a ban on the first use of nuclear weapons, a proposal that has since become a standard feature of the Soviet arms control repertoire. Bulganin also called for a system of control posts at ports, railroad junctions and airfields to report on potentially dangerous military activities. President Dwight D. Eisenhower contributed to the summit the suggestion that the United States and the Soviet Union allow aerial inspection of their territory—the open-skies inspection proposal—to help give warning of preparations for surprise attack.

When the foreign ministers of the four powers met in the fall of 1955 to discuss the status of Germany, the Western allies produced their own reunification plan, which included arms control provisions. They proposed limits on military force deployments in zones of demarcation between a reunified Germany and its East European neighbors and on-site inspection and other cooperative measures to ensure compliance and also to enhance warning of surprise attack.

Of the smaller East European countries, Poland played the most active part in advancing proposals for arms control in Europe. Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki in 1957 called for a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe, covering West and East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Subsequent versions of the Rapacki Plan included reductions of and controls on nonnuclear forces in this area.
In November 1958, a surprise-attack conference was convened in Geneva at President Eisenhower's initiative. In answer to the West's plan for detecting preparations for surprise attack, the Soviets put forward an elaborate version of the Rapacki Plan, which included mutual inspection provisions for European, Soviet and U.S. territory, ground observation posts, aerial observation and cooperative interpretation of photographs resulting from the observation flights.

These early proposals failed because their implementation would have required East-West agreement on a cooperative political framework for Europe. In the 1950s and for most of the years since, there has been little agreement on that framework. The U.S.S.R.'s proposals appeared intended to extend the sphere of Soviet power. Western proposals undoubtedly looked to the Soviets like attempts to ensure the integration of a united Germany into the Western community of nations—which, in fact, was the only outcome acceptable to the FRG government and its Western allies. As a consequence, the early proposals for conventional and nuclear arms control in Europe made no headway. In the early 1960s, however, two major events dramatized the intensity of the East-West political confrontation, also highlighting its dangers, and the context for arms control began to change. In 1961 East Germany constructed the wall separating East and West Berlin, and in 1962 the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba.

The fact that the West did not use force to challenge the wall's construction symbolized its political acceptance of Germany's division—at least for the foreseeable future. The Soviet deployment of offensive nuclear missiles in Cuba in 1962, which led to the brink of nuclear war, focused worldwide attention on the possibility of accidental or inadvertent nuclear conflict. The United States and the Soviet Union became more serious about the need to regularize their nuclear relationship. This led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 in which the United States, the Soviet Union and Britain agreed to stop testing nuclear weapons in the atmos-
phere and subsequently to the U.S.-Soviet agreement to begin the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The opening of the SALT talks was postponed but not prevented by Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, demonstrating the priority the West had placed on arms control in spite of continuing differences over the division of Europe.

In addition, the Soviet Union under the new leadership of General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev had begun in the 1960s to show a more benign face to the West. The less belligerent Soviet approach, featuring calls for a European security conference, ushered in a period of great expectations about the possibilities for improved East-West relations. The NATO countries, responding to the transition from cold war to détente, modified their objectives along the lines of a study conducted under the leadership of Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel. The Harmel report, adopted by the allies in 1967, asserted that NATO would not only continue to prepare to defend against and hopefully deter aggressive Warsaw Pact behavior to ensure Western security but in the future it would also seek actively to expand cooperation with Eastern Europe. As part of this new NATO approach, the allies subsequently proposed mutual and balanced force reductions of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. NATO argued that real improvements in East-West relations would require that the Warsaw Pact remove the military threats that remained the major cause of East-West tension.
The First Attempts: MBFR and CSCE

In January 1973, representatives of 12 NATO and all 7 Warsaw Pact states gathered in Vienna to start negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe. Only one major European power, France, refused to participate: its government judged that negotiations were likely to intensify rather than overcome the division of Europe.

NATO had conceived of the MBFR talks essentially as a diplomatic counter to Soviet proposals for a European security conference. In secret bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union conducted by President Nixon’s national security adviser and later secretary of state, Henry A. Kissinger, the West signaled its willingness to begin to arrange a security conference if the Soviets would help complete a new quadripartite agreement on Berlin and take part in preparatory talks aimed at reducing military forces in Central Europe. The Berlin agreement, regularizing access to Berlin from the West, was concluded in June 1972 after West Germany had ratified normalization treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland. In May 1972, President Nixon had signed the SALT I accord in Moscow placing limits on U.S. and Soviet strategic
nuclear forces, and the NATO foreign ministers agreed "to enter into multilateral conversations concerned with a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe" and "that multilateral exploration on mutual and balanced force reductions should be undertaken as soon as practicable, either before or in parallel with multilateral preparatory talks" on such a security conference. The CSCE discussions opened in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1972.

Even though the Western allies had proposed MBFR, they entered the negotiations with a politically weak position. For more than 20 years, the NATO countries had failed to match the conventional force efforts of the Warsaw Pact. They were, in effect, asking the East to abandon military advantages that NATO countries had not been able to offset through their own defense efforts.

Two additional factors weakened the West's negotiating position: diminishing support in the United States for a continued troop presence in Europe and the growth of détente expectations in Western Europe. The Vietnam War had turned the U.S. public against all foreign entanglements. With the United States under pressure to make unilateral cuts, it was, in fact, something of a mystery why the Soviets agreed to the negotiations in the first place. Almost all observers were surprised when Soviet leader Brezhnev challenged the West in a speech in Tiflis, U.S.S.R., in May 1971 to "taste the wine" of mutual reductions.

Benefiting from hindsight, Soviet motivations are clearer. Moscow wanted a security conference—the CSCE—to ratify the postwar status quo in Europe and wanted it badly enough to agree to force-reduction negotiations. Willingness to talk did not require any commitments to reduce forces, and the simple existence of the negotiations could serve to augment the aura of détente that had already had a positive effect—measured by Soviet interests—on West European public opinion. The Soviets also might have foreseen opportunities for disrupting the Western alliance and possibly winning a formal role in the determination of future West European,
Participants in European Arms Control Negotiations

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¹Albania has chosen not to participate in the CSCE or other European security negotiations.
²Direct MBFR participants were those who had territory or forces in the agreed Central European reduction area who would take decisions by consensus. The others had a "special status" that permitted involvement in the talks but not in decision.
³Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Holy See, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Malta, Monaco, San Marino, Sweden, Switzerland and Yugoslavia.
and particularly West German, military capabilities. It is also possible that the Soviet Union may have regarded a unilateral American withdrawal from Europe as potentially destabilizing, particularly to the extent that it would have increased the relative importance of West Germany.

The second factor that weakened the Western negotiating position was the growing belief in Western Europe that Soviet intentions were essentially benign. The combination of U.S. weakness and West European perceptions of a reduced Soviet threat put the Soviet Union in a very strong bargaining position.

For the first half of 1973, Eastern and Western delegations in Vienna slowly worked out the ground rules for the negotiations. For a few months, they took turns hosting “cocktail plenaries” in and around Vienna. Formal plenaries could not be held in part because the negotiators could not agree on the order in which delegations would be seated or on the more serious issues of whose territory and forces were to be included in reductions. Those present that spring nonetheless sensed that they might be participating in something creative—never suspecting that they were launching negotiations that would go on without result for over 15 years!

The opening positions of the two sides guaranteed deadlock. The West sought asymmetrical reductions in Warsaw Pact forces, based on the premise that the Eastern bloc enjoyed clear advantages in geography, manpower and the structure and equipment of its forces over NATO and that these disparities were the principal threat to security in Central Europe. The West therefore pressed for an equal ceiling for both alliances on full-time, active-duty ground and air force manpower in the reduction area.

The Warsaw Pact wanted equal percentage cuts in armed forces in the reduction area. It initially appeared to acknowledge it had more men in uniform in the area but argued that the existing “correlation of forces” was a stable one. Within two years, the Warsaw Pact changed its line: it argued that rough parity existed between its forces and NATO’s, and that
an accord should simply reduce those forces to lower levels.

In 1975, NATO deviated from its exclusive focus on reducing manpower and sweetened its earlier proposal with a "mixed-package" deal. It offered to trade cuts in U.S. nuclear delivery systems in Europe, including 1,000 nuclear warheads, for removal of a Soviet tank corps (5 divisions, 70,000 personnel and 1,700 tanks) plus other Warsaw Pact manpower reductions to a ceiling equal to that of NATO. The proposal was never accepted by the East and was withdrawn in 1979.

Over the years, agreement was nevertheless reached on a number of points:

△ the overall goal to reduce active-duty manpower to 700,000 ground force personnel and a total of 900,000 ground and air force personnel on both sides;
△ reductions in phases, with the United States and the Soviet Union making initial cuts;
△ the return of withdrawn forces to national territory and no redeployment in a way that would undermine the agreement;
△ certain measures accompanying the reductions to ensure confidence in future compliance with the accord.

In spite of this progress, disagreement over how many forces the Warsaw Pact maintained in the reduction area remained a major obstacle. In December 1985, the West proposed that this "data dispute" be put aside, initial small U.S.-Soviet cuts should be taken, and intensive monitoring measures should be implemented to help establish an agreed data base.

The Warsaw Pact rejected the West's 1985 proposal, arguing that the highly intrusive inspection measures (25 ground and 5 air inspection trips on six hours notice for each side each year for three years) were excessive for such a limited reduction accord. Instead, the Warsaw Pact nations, meeting in Budapest, Hungary, in June 1986, unveiled a "comprehensive approach" to the reduction of nuclear and conventional arms in Europe based on ideas originally proposed by Gor-
bachev on April 18 in East Berlin. The “Budapest appeal” called for substantial NATO and Warsaw Pact troop reductions from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains in the Soviet Union, accompanied by reductions in nuclear weapons, air forces and other armaments. The appeal incorporated a much broader geographic framework than that provided by MBFR, importantly including the European portions of the Soviet Union in the potential reduction area.

Just prior to the Budapest meeting, the foreign ministers of NATO had announced the formation of a “high-level task force on conventional arms control” to reexamine its approach in the light of emerging new Soviet positions. In December 1986, this study led the NATO foreign ministers to issue the so-called Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control supporting new negotiations with the East “covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.” This was the entire territory covered by the mandate of the CSCE.

The Brussels declaration was the final nail in the coffin for MBFR. Western analysts for some years had argued that the MBFR framework did not serve Western interests. The Central European focus did not include Soviet territory, and forces in the Soviet Union's western military districts neighboring Eastern Europe would play a key role in any European war. Further, France’s refusal to participate in MBFR had left a major European power out of negotiations that could be crucial to the future shape of European security. West Germany never felt comfortable with its principal European ally out of the picture. Finally, the fact that the CSCE framework was making at least some progress fortified arguments for a new approach.

In spite of the failure of MBFR negotiations to produce an agreement, they made a number of positive contributions to Western interests and the arms control process. The negotiations gave the participating NATO countries extensive experience in developing concepts and approaches to force reductions. They also demonstrated the substantial unity of the
Western alliance: at no time did MBFR talks produce serious public divisions among the participating NATO countries. MBFR negotiations were also an East-West learning process, and this could perhaps enhance the prospects for agreement in the new CAFE talks. The Warsaw Pact countries learned much about the military advantages that they will have to sacrifice to get a reduction accord. They also learned that intrusive inspection and cooperative measures will be required to move the military confrontation to a lower and more predictable level. From this perspective, although MBFR could not be called a success, it also was not a total failure.

**Military Security Issues in the CSCE: Helsinki Final Act**

Throughout their history, the MBFR talks ran parallel to the CSCE negotiations. But while MBFR remained deadlocked, the CSCE yielded agreement in Helsinki in 1975. The Helsinki Final Act included three separate areas of agreement (known as baskets, a term coined by the Netherlands), dealing with various aspects of international relationships in Europe. Basket One deals with issues relating to security, specifying 10 principles governing relations among states and calling for confidence-building measures (CBMs) to help clarify the military intentions of participants. Basket Two calls for expanded cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment. Basket Three deals with cooperation in humanitarian and related fields, providing the mandate for subsequent East-West discussions of human rights issues. Follow-up meetings to Helsinki have been held in Belgrade, Madrid and, most recently, Vienna.

The Helsinki Basket One included measures relating to military maneuvers that the participants agreed to implement on a voluntary basis. These measures called for prior notification of military activities exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with air or naval components. The accord suggested that information provided in the notification should include the designation, purpose, type of
activity, numerical strength and estimated duration. Prior notification should take place 21 days in advance of military activities, or, in the case of a maneuver arranged at shorter notice, at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date. Notification could also be given of smaller-scale military maneuvers for the benefit of those nearby.

CSCE participating states were encouraged to invite observers on a bilateral basis to attend military maneuvers. The inviting state would determine in each case the number of observers, the procedures and conditions of participation, and give other information that it might consider useful. In addition, the Final Act stipulated that participating states could give notification, at their own discretion, of any major movements involving the military.

These measures were limited both in terms of commitment required and military value realized, but they opened the door to further development as part of the CSCE process. In 1986, some six years after French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing had proposed a European disarmament conference covering the Atlantic to the Urals, a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) opened in Stockholm, Sweden. Its goal was to expand the military security components of the Helsinki Final Act.

**Stockholm CBMs**

In September 1986, the CDE participants agreed on a much more-detailed package of CBMs than those adopted at Helsinki. While implementation of the Helsinki measures was “voluntary,” the Stockholm measures were “politically binding,” although no sanctions were provided against states that failed to comply. The agreement requires parties to accept on-site inspection of military activities. Each state is obliged to accept no more than three challenge inspections annually, and no state is required to accept more than one inspection from the same challenging state in one calendar year. Inspectors must be permitted to enter the area of inspection within
36 hours of the request. They have 48 hours to complete their inspection.

The Stockholm package also included exchanges of data on the nature and purpose of military activities exceeding 13,000 troops (3,000 if airborne or amphibious) or at least 300 battle tanks. Information on participating air forces must be included when 200 or more fixed-wing aircraft sorties are planned. Notification is to be made by November 15 of each year for the following year.

In addition to the above-mentioned calendar of activities, parties to the accord are to make available preliminary information on any military activity involving more than 40,000 troops planned for the second subsequent year. The accord provides that parties should give prior notification of at least 13 months for military activities involving more than 75,000 troops.

Participants in the accord are also to give prior notification of 42 days in the case of military activities exceeding 13,000 combat/support troops (3,000 if airborne or amphibious) or at least 300 battle tanks. Military activities carried out without advance notice to the troops involved (i.e. practice alerts) are exempted from this notification requirement. Parties to the accord are expected to give 42 days prior notification of transfers of forces from outside the zone to arriving points in the zone, and from outside the zone to points of concentration in the zone when they are participating in military activities exceeding 13,000 troops (3,000 amphibious or airborne) or at least 300 battle tanks.

The Stockholm confidence-building agreement represented a significant breakthrough for East-West cooperation in Europe. The Soviet Union accepted a much greater degree of openness than it had even been willing to contemplate just a few years earlier. Breaking Moscow's objection in principle to on-site inspections, the Stockholm accord may have opened the way for more-intrusive and cooperative measures in future arms control agreements.

So far, according to most accounts, implementation of the
Stockholm measures has been largely successful, and it is generally viewed as benefiting Western interests. The task before the West in the next phase of East-West arms control negotiations is to test the willingness of the Soviet Union to transform its rhetoric about restructuring military relationships in Europe into much more demanding and militarily significant measures.
The most important cause for optimism concerning talks on conventional armed forces in Europe is the apparent change in the national priorities and policies of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev. Gorbachev has made clear that his major objective is to restructure the Soviet economy, and that radical changes in the Soviet system may be required to accomplish that restructuring. The Soviet leader appears, at least for the time being, to have subordinated foreign and military policy to economic requirements. He apparently believes that he must avoid a high-technology arms race with the West in nuclear and conventional forces so that he can devote most of his human and material resources to restructuring the economy.

Gorbachev has advocated the concept of mutual security with the West and adopted a standard of "reasonable sufficiency" for determining the size of Soviet military forces. In keeping with these principles, he has suggested that Soviet conventional forces should be capable only of defense and that they should neither be postured for a surprise attack on
the West nor large enough in peacetime to mount a general offensive.

While most of these promising principles have not been translated into practice, the West has seen some signs of basic change in Soviet arms control practices and East-West relations. In the context of the INF treaty with the United States eliminating intermediate-range nuclear force missiles, the Soviet Union accepted more-intrusive and thorough inspection of facilities on Soviet territory than would have been thought possible a decade ago. In addition, the Soviet Union has cooperated in the successful implementation of the CSCE Stockholm inspection measures.

Further, Gorbachev has promised to back his words with additional actions. In a major speech before the United Nations General Assembly on December 7, 1988, Gorbachev said that by the end of 1990 the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces by 500,000 men and withdraw six tank divisions from East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary and disband them. In addition, Gorbachev promised to:

- withdraw assault landing troops and other particularly offense-oriented forces from Eastern Europe;
- reduce Soviet forces in Eastern Europe by 50,000 men and 5,000 tanks;
- restructure forces remaining in Eastern Europe toward a "clearly defensive" orientation;
- cut Soviet forces in the Atlantic Ocean-to-the-Ural Mountains area by a total of 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft; and,
- reduce "significantly" Soviet forces stationed in Mongolia.

In January 1989, Gorbachev elaborated on his plans, promising, among other steps, to cut the Soviet military budget by 14.2 percent and production of weapons and military hardware by 19.5 percent. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze announced that Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe would include dismantling of some short-range nuclear missiles and nuclear-capable artillery pieces. East Germany and other Warsaw Pact countries have followed the
Soviet Union’s lead, promising cuts in their military efforts. Gorbachev made his initiative outside the conventional arms talks, but it will nonetheless have an important political impact on them. The way in which Gorbachev carries out his promises will affect the spirit with which participants in the CAFE talks approach their task. Although it is too early to tell whether the changes in Soviet policy will mean enduring long-term change in Soviet behavior, the shifts in Moscow’s approach presumably require that the Western nations devote a high priority to the direction they want the East-West dialogue on military security to take.

**Pressure for Reductions in the West**

Resource pressures suggest that members of both alliances should seek negotiated reductions in their forces located in Europe. Budget pressures are forcing American officials to consider ways to control growth in defense spending, following the substantial increases in the first half of the 1980s. West European governments also face political and financial constraints on defense-spending growth for the foreseeable future. In addition, the NATO countries, including, most importantly, West Germany, will have substantially less manpower available for military service over the next decade. (West Germany has the lowest birthrate in the world, and most other NATO countries are in a similar, although slightly less dramatic, position.) Some analysts have projected that the West German Bundeswehr could shrink from 495,000 active-duty personnel to around 300,000 by 1995 unless additional measures are taken to compensate for the shrinking manpower pool.

Neither alliance would appear to have any reason seriously to contemplate an attack on the other. The potential costs of hostilities would be higher than any rational leadership on either side could accept. The Soviet Union seems more intent than ever on demonstrating its “peaceful intentions” to the West. Soviet political goals in Western Europe could, in the near term, incline Moscow to accept negotiated asymmet-
rical cuts in force levels. Under these circumstances, the East-West political climate might bring success to attempts to reduce the level of military forces in Europe and to remove possible sources of instability that could lead inadvertently to an East-West military conflict.

**Western Threat Perceptions**

Americans have become accustomed to a familiar litany of the differences between U.S. and West European perceptions of the threats to Western interests. Most American analysts have traditionally viewed Soviet behavior as fundamentally aggressive and expansionist. Many European observers share this view, but a substantial school of thought in Europe interprets Soviet security motivations as more benign and defensive in nature. The Soviets are paranoid, they argue, based on Russian historical experiences, and the Soviet Union maintains forces in Eastern Europe to constitute a defensive barrier against any future threat as well as to guarantee the loyalty of its Warsaw Pact allies. Seen from this perspective, the Soviet force presence in Central Europe is objectionable but not particularly threatening.

Gorbachev's policies have added strength to the argument that Soviet behavior is basically benign and growing more so. Even as President Ronald Reagan sought cooperation with the Soviet Union in his last term, it was Gorbachev who captured West European fascination with his internal policies of restructuring (*perestroika*) and openness (*glasnost*) and his more flexible approach to European arms control issues. West European public opinion polls in 1987 found a Soviet leader more popular than an American President for the first time in postwar history. Gorbachev also outpolled both French President François Mitterrand and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in West German public opinion polls. These outcomes did not suggest any wavering of allegiance to NATO or the United States, but demonstrated that everything is relative; and relative to previous Soviet leaders, Gorbachev is seen as a dramatic and positive change.
As for Soviet activities in the Third World, the prevailing American perception from the mid-1970s into the 1980s was that they were a menace to Western interests. Most European governments, backed by public opinion, saw the Soviet role in the Third World as only tangentially relevant to European security and sought to insulate détente in Europe from the growing U.S.-Soviet confrontation. The European view has been strengthened in recent years by the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a constructive Soviet role in agreements for Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola and Vietnam’s withdrawal from Cambodia.

Geographic realities have also continued to influence how Americans and Europeans perceive the Soviet Union. From an American perspective, the ultimate threat to U.S. interests in Europe is that the Soviet Union, believing that NATO’s conventional defenses and political will are weak, might risk a confrontation that could eventually invoke the U.S. nuclear guarantee. This view calls for conventional forces sufficient to blunt a Warsaw Pact attack, thereby reducing the necessity to use nuclear force. From a European perspective, any war in Europe—nuclear or nonnuclear, beginning there or spilling over from an “out-of-area” conflict—would be devastating, and so the main threat is war, of any sort. The European focus therefore is more heavily on deterrence. In the view of many Europeans, the threat of nuclear escalation, when it is feared by both the United States and the Russians, is the most effective deterrent.

These admittedly oversimplified viewpoints remain relevant in the late 1980s. But there have been some changes, particularly in the American view, and more changes are possible in the future as a consequence of contemporary trends in East-West relations. Perhaps the most important change is in American perceptions of Soviet intentions. The recent tendency in U.S. assessments of the threat has been for even the most skeptical of defense analysts to acknowledge that the Soviet Union is very unlikely to attack Western Europe under current circumstances. This has shifted their
focus toward contingencies seen as more likely, particularly in the Third World. In addition, a substantial school of thought has emerged in U.S. political opinion maintaining that traditional U.S. perspectives on the threat consistently overestimated Soviet and Warsaw Pact military capabilities relative to those of the West.

The public’s perceptions of the Soviet threat are much more volatile than the perceptions of the experts, based as they are on reactions to events that capture the headlines, and have shifted noticeably with the great improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations in the mid-to-late 1980s. According to public opinion surveys, in mid-1984 49 percent of those polled saw the Soviets as “an enemy.” By May 1987, however, only 32 percent characterized the Soviets as “an enemy” even though 44 percent continued to see them as “unfriendly” to the United States. Perhaps most important in terms of the “imminence” of the Soviet threat, the number of those who believed that the Soviet Union would risk war to achieve global domination dropped more than 50 percent between 1980 and 1986. Further, as the polling results in Table 2 demonstrate, there is growing support in U.S. public opinion for efforts to reduce tension with the Soviet Union versus taking a hard-line approach toward Moscow.

In sum, American perceptions appear to have moved progressively toward viewing the Warsaw Pact threat as substantially less imminent than it was seen 10 or 20 years ago. The INF treaty, the Soviet decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, the dramatic expansion in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and Gorbachev’s promise of unilateral conventional force cuts, if not followed by new crisis developments, are likely to encourage support for further sound East-West arms control accomplishments.

At a time when American as well as West European perceptions of the Soviet threat have receded, public opinion could play an important role in influencing the Western approach to the negotiations. Some fear that “détente fever” could run rampant in Western Europe, undermining the Western nego-
Table 2
U.S. Attitudes Toward
U.S.-Soviet Cooperation/Confrontation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question:</th>
<th>64%</th>
<th>44%</th>
<th>42%</th>
<th>-38%</th>
<th>20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;the United States should try harder to reduce tension with the Russians versus getting tough in its dealings with them?&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Percentage who agreed is at right.)

Based on similar table in Daniel Yankelovich and Richard Smoke, "America's 'New Thinking.'" Foreign Affairs, Fall 1988, p. 5.

Tianging position. On the other hand, at the peak of détente in the 1970s, the West European allies—particularly the FRG government led by the Social Democrats—increased their defense expenditures while U.S. defense spending dropped.

Obstacles to Agreement

In spite of substantial arguments for governments on both sides to reduce the military confrontation in Europe, a number of factors militate against easy solutions. Some of these factors are beyond the realm of the possible to change through negotiations because they are the product of geography and history; others are more politically rooted and, although susceptible to change, cannot be expected to do so overnight.

The most prominent immovable object blocking conventional arms control in Europe is the fact that the Soviet Union, with its massive military power and impressive resource
base, has relatively easy land access to the rest of Europe. The United States, the main counterbalance on the Western side to Soviet power, lies an ocean away, its defense, population and resource base far from the area of potential conflict. Recent Soviet acknowledgment that there are asymmetries between the two alliances and Gorbachev’s announcement of unilateral Soviet force cuts may eventually provide new opportunities for negotiations. But the willingness of the Soviet Union to accept negotiated reductions may not extend as far as the West would like or might require a price the West is not prepared to pay.

Further, Moscow’s relationship with its allies creates strong disincentives for the Soviets to accept deep force reductions in Central Europe. Unlike the voluntary obligations and commitments made by all the Western allies to the NATO alliance, the Soviet Union in practice imposed Warsaw Pact membership on the East European countries. Moscow still has good reason to suspect that if it were not for overwhelming Soviet power in Central Europe and its forces stationed in East European countries, the Warsaw Pact might begin to disintegrate and with it Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. The Solidarity labor union movement in Poland and the nationalistic rumblings within the Soviet Union are dramatic reminders of the potential challenges to Soviet control of Eastern Europe and even to the cohesion of the Soviet Union itself. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union must determine the minimum force level necessary to maintain Warsaw Pact cohesion and to guarantee that no temptations arise among its East European allies as a result of any accord. Presumably Gorbachev has already judged that this minimum is well below the new levels that would be established by the unilateral reductions he announced at the UN.

In addition, recent emphasis on the growing importance of conventional forces in Soviet military doctrine, accompanied by an apparent willingness to negotiate dramatic cuts in U.S. and Soviet nuclear inventories, could raise obstacles to major reductions in or limitations on conventional forces.
After being called on to eliminate a major class of nuclear weapons (the INF) and to make unilateral reductions in conventional forces, the Soviet military might be reluctant to cut much further into conventional forces on which their European strategy could in the future become more dependent. From a more optimistic perspective, Soviet officials continue to emphasize the goal of ultimately moving the forces of both alliances toward much more defensive postures. The dramatically revised Soviet strategic concept required if such a posture were adopted would fundamentally alter Soviet military requirements.

In the West, political trends have also been pushing NATO away from nuclear weapons and toward greater reliance on conventional forces. These trends have been supported by disparate political forces, including the antinuclear left in Europe, U.S. advocates of improvements in conventional forces, and by former President Reagan, with his vision of a defense-oriented nonnuclear future. The logic of these combined perspectives leads toward more and better nonnuclear forces—not toward reductions. As a consequence, most U.S. and allied officials wince little interest in force reductions on the Western side, while expecting the Soviet Union and its allies to make substantial cuts in Warsaw Pact forces.

Western governments would like the Soviet Union to make major withdrawals of tanks, artillery and other equipment from Central Europe, but it would be difficult for the West to match them. The NATO countries, throughout the MBFR negotiations, resisted Warsaw Pact attempts to include major equipment items with U.S. troop cuts. This problem is directly linked to the geographic asymmetry discussed earlier. In a crisis, the United States would face serious logistical problems returning heavy equipment to Europe over an embattled Atlantic while the Soviet Union would have much easier access to the European area, even if it had withdrawn equipment beyond the Urals.

In addition, many Western analysts believe that NATO’s forces are close to the minimum levels required to defend
the alliance's front in West Germany. From this perspective, there are absolute (as yet undefined) limits below which Western reductions could not go unless Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces are not only substantially reduced but also restructured to limit their offensive capabilities. In addition, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly fear, probably with good reason, that negotiated American withdrawals from Europe would lead Congress to reduce the personnel ceiling for the entire U.S. Army.

The 'Military Balance' and Conventional Arms Control

The balance—and how it is interpreted—between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces is probably the central factor influencing governmental attitudes toward and prospects for conventional arms control. The problem is that there is no single interpretation of the balance accepted by both NATO and Warsaw Pact members. For that matter, NATO governments and Western analysts still differ among themselves on what the balance is.

Interpretations of the military balance create broad political, psychological and conceptual frameworks that influence approaches to conventional arms control. Before agreement is reached on reducing forces, there must be a common understanding of the numbers of troops and weapons systems on the two sides that are to be reduced and those that will remain after reductions are taken. Without such an understanding, it would be impossible to verify compliance with any degree of confidence. Even if American politicians were willing to take a chance on such an accord, the agreement would remain politically vulnerable to the slightest hint of violation or shift of winds in the overall East-West relationship.

The U.S.-Soviet agreements on strategic nuclear arms reached in the 1970s were based on understandings about the numbers of forces to be allowed each side. In SALT I, the Soviets refused to table data and the agreement was based on statistics provided by the United States. In SALT II, at U.S.
insistence, the Soviets tabled their own data and the ultimatum accord was based on an agreed data base. The continuing U.S.-Soviet START talks are based on generally agreed data about the strategic nuclear capabilities of the two nations.

The U.S.-Soviet nuclear data base was constructed through exchanges in the negotiations, confirmed or clarified with the use of the intelligence-gathering capabilities of the two countries. But no such common understanding exists concerning conventional forces, even within the relatively narrow Central European area.

Obstacles to Data Base Accord

The failure to reach agreement on a common data base in the MBFR talks can be attributed to many factors. For one, conventional military forces simply are much more numerous and difficult to count than strategic nuclear forces. Further, each country and alliance has developed forces in different patterns. Broadly defined, a wide range of national organizations that could support or participate in a military conflict—such as paramilitary units, border police, internal security police, etc.—could be included in addition to regular military units. Negotiators must therefore first decide on definitions of the forces and weapons systems. In the MBFR talks, this process was stymied by the refusal of the Warsaw Pact, on grounds of military secrecy, to break down its total figures. Now the CAFE negotiators must resolve such issues for a much larger area—a task of staggering technical and political complexity. However, the talks are focusing on selected major armaments, which are more easily verified than defense manpower, and the Warsaw Pact has offered on-site inspection to reconcile differences. In addition, senior Soviet military officials have indicated that the U.S.S.R. accepts the necessity of providing the locations of units and permitting the actual counting of selected armaments as part of the reconciliation process. A much more cooperative and open Soviet approach could make a major contribution to solution of the data problem in the CAFE talks.
The Western Debate on the Balance

For many years, Western experts and politicians of the traditional school have argued that the Warsaw Pact not only enjoys numerical superiority, as measured by forces in place, but also enjoys other important edges over the West, including the Soviet Union’s location next to Central Europe and its dominant position in the Warsaw Pact, which features a Moscow-directed military-command structure and wide interoperability among Warsaw Pact forces and weapons systems compared to the more-individualistic NATO forces and less-compatible weapons systems. While this school of thought acknowledges NATO’s superior economic and technological base, the bottom line for the traditional proponents is that, as Lenin once observed, “quantity has a quality all its own,” and that edge goes to the Warsaw Pact.

A second school questions the traditionalists’ quantitatively oriented “bean counting” approach and calls for broader consideration of qualitative factors. Proponents of this school argue that the West not only fields qualitatively superior troops and equipment but also benefits from its defensive mission. (Historical experience has suggested that offensive military operations, to be successful, generally require substantial numerical advantages of two or three times over the defensive forces they are challenging.) They argue further that it is unrealistic to include, for example, all 230,000 Polish army troops in estimates of the balance when the Soviet Union surely cannot count on the Polish army’s willingness to fight the West under most conceivable scenarios. Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), a leading critic of the traditional approach, has maintained that a “‘bean count’ analysis of the military balance is not only incomplete, but misleading as well.” In his study “Beyond the Bean Count,” Levin reasons that “[f]ocusing solely on the bean count could lead us to address only the numerical disparities between the two sides, when in fact other aspects of NATO’s military posture may need more urgent attention, or could yield us greater return on our conventional defense investment.”
Table 3

Perspectives on the NATO-Warsaw Pact
Conventional Military Balance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FACTORS</th>
<th>NATO advantage</th>
<th>Roughly equal</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact advantage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major weapons systems:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quantity</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quality</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military personnel:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quantity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quality</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deployment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Readiness*</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mobilization for attack</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interoperability</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Command, control, communications and intelligence</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Defensive mission</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Alliance political cohesion</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Economic, industrial and technological strength</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Crisis decisionmaking</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Readiness refers to manning levels and training, equipment on hand and the condition of equipment.
The sum of the arguments of these two schools yields a mixed picture of advantages and disadvantages for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact that might be portrayed in general terms, as Table 3 on page 37 attempts to do.

As the CAFE negotiations begin, Western observers have no single detailed unclassified data base on which they can rely with any confidence. Western publications frequently cited for statistics on the balance include *The Military Balance*, published by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Pentagon's annual report on *Soviet Military Power*, the British government's *Statement on the Defence Estimates*, and publications of the West German government, among others. Defense specialist Anthony Cordesman has found differences across-the-board in the manner in which these various publications define categories, count manpower, units and weapons, and, as a consequence, portray the balance. Cordesman's advice is not to trust any count of the balance "that does not show its data in detail, reveal all its counting rules, properly distinguish combat-ready forces from the major categories of reserves, and explicitly separate its counts of manpower and equipment in units from those in war reserve stocks and prepositioned equipment."

Though the politics of conventional arms control probably require that the West seek a "balanced" quantitative outcome, a numerical balance will not necessarily yield a "stable" outcome. True stability must be measured both in terms of an agreement's effect on the arms race and its effect on potential crisis situations. Balanced limits on a defined set of weapons systems, for example, may simply channel the military competition into other weapons systems. Similarly, crisis stability in the wake of an agreement may depend more on the limits placed on the nature and deployment of remaining systems than on the numerical balance established.

In spite of the continuing differences among experts and the recognized limitations of bean counting, the NATO countries in November 1988 issued an agreed-upon assessment of the strengths of the conventional ground forces and
aircraft in Europe of the two alliances. This report provided a foundation for the assumptions that the NATO countries took to the CAFE talks, even though it did not prejudge the positions they might take or data they might submit in the negotiations. NATO experts also cautioned that "The data...may differ in some respects from those available from other sources. It is, therefore, important that differences in counting rules and definitions, as well as in the forces covered, are fully understood. The figures...for the Warsaw Treaty Organization [Warsaw Pact] members are necessarily estimates...." The Warsaw Pact published its first detailed breakdown of troops and weapons in January 1989. According to the Eastern alliance's assessment, East and West are about evenly matched in overall military strength. The differing NATO/Warsaw Pact assessments ensure difficult negotiations on how to define and count military forces. The general conclusions of the NATO study are portrayed in Table 4 on page 40.

Initial Approaches to the CAFE Negotiations

On January 15, 1989, NATO and Warsaw Pact negotiators finally reached accord on a mandate for the CAFE talks. They agreed they would be convened two months later in Vienna and would be held "within the framework of the CSCE process," but would remain largely independent of that process. At Western insistence, the forces of the neutral and non-aligned countries are not included. The neutral and non-aligned nonetheless are participating with NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in the parallel Conference on Confidence-and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, also in Vienna. The negotiators agreed that the NATO/Warsaw Pact talks would focus on conventional ground forces initially, with particular concentration on armored and artillery forces. Air forces in the area may be considered at a later phase of the negotiations. Nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as naval forces, are excluded.

The Western objective in the new negotiations, recorded
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main battle tanks</td>
<td>16,424</td>
<td>51,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored infantry-fighting vehicles</td>
<td>4,153</td>
<td>22,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other armored vehicles (includes light tanks, armored personnel carriers, command vehicles and military support carriers not covered in preceding category)</td>
<td>35,351</td>
<td>71,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery pieces (artillery, mortars and multiple-rocket launchers with tubes of 100mm and above)</td>
<td>14,458</td>
<td>43,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antitank weapons (vehicle-mounted and nonvehicle-mounted antitank guided missile launchers, antitank guns and recoilless rifles, plus armored fighting vehicles and helicopters with antitank missiles)</td>
<td>18,240</td>
<td>44,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defense systems (anti-air artillery and fixed and mobile surface-to-air missiles)</td>
<td>10,309</td>
<td>24,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters (includes attack helicopters equipped with antitank guided missiles and machine guns and assault/transport helicopters)</td>
<td>2,419</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicle-launched bridges (includes assault bridges integrated on armored carrier)</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>2,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel (full-time military personnel of land forces including army personnel performing ground-based air defense duties)</td>
<td>2,213,593</td>
<td>3,090,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft</td>
<td>3,977</td>
<td>8,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1This table is based on the figures included in “Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts,” released by NATO in November 1988, reflecting data current to January 1988.

2Includes only equipment in fully or partially manned units. Both alliances have additional equipment in storage. According to NATO estimates, Warsaw Pact countries have more of each type of equipment in storage than do NATO countries.
in a declaration issued at a summit meeting in March 1988, is “to establish a situation in Europe in which force postures as well as the numbers and deployments of weapon systems no longer make surprise attack and large-scale offensive action a feasible option.” NATO members further agreed that the new negotiations should shift away from the MBFR talks’ focus on manpower reductions to reductions of and constraints on equipment, particularly military equipment that could be central to a Warsaw Pact offensive against NATO. There was also consensus that Warsaw Pact reductions must be substantially larger than NATO’s and that NATO can afford to make minimal reductions at best.

The NATO allies seek cuts in NATO and Warsaw Pact tanks, armored troop carriers and artillery based on a complex formula designed to accommodate the French desire to avoid a “bloc-to-bloc” formula and to result in reductions down to approximately 95 percent of current NATO levels. Overall limits would be set on total holdings of armaments in Europe by NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; for example, the total of NATO plus Warsaw Pact tanks could not exceed 40,000. Within these limits, no one country could deploy more than 30 percent of the total (in the case of tanks, therefore, no country would be entitled to more than about 12,000).

The NATO countries promised to propose specific limits on stationed forces, particularly those in active combat units, and sublimits to prevent concentrations of forces in any one particular part of Europe. The allies said they would propose “stabilizing measures of transparency, notification and constraint applied to the deployment, movement and levels of readiness of conventional armed forces,” and would require a “rigorous and reliable regime for monitoring and verification.” The allies additionally proposed that the 35 participants in the CSCE seek in parallel negotiations to improve transparency (observability) of military activities in Europe.

Less information is publicly available on the dynamics that shaped the approach of the Warsaw Pact to the CAFE talks,
but its members have hinted at some positions that may emerge in the negotiations. At the May–June 1988 summit meeting in Moscow with President Reagan, General Secretary Gorbachev proposed a data exchange, verification of the data, and then cuts of 500,000 troops on both sides. A meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Warsaw, Poland, in mid-July 1988 proposed data exchanges with associated verification measures. The Warsaw Pact declared that the negotiations should “focus attention on...mutually removing asymmetry and disproportions in individual types of conventional weapons and armed forces” of both alliances. It also called for the creation of zones between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in which the “more dangerous destabilizing kinds of conventional arms would be removed.” A verification commission would handle points of contention.

Soviet officials, along with Western analysts, have acknowledged the need for creative approaches to the data problem to avoid another MBFR-like impasse. This ensures a certain parallel structure and terminology in the approaches of the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to the talks. Previous Warsaw Pact statements suggest, however, that the Eastern participants likely want Western reductions that are much more substantial than the West has been willing to contemplate and that might, if agreed, require the NATO countries to rethink their entire force posture and defensive strategy in Europe.

Gorbachev’s promised unilateral cuts announced at the UN, though technically outside the context of the new negotiations, fit within the agreed framework for the CAFE talks. Perhaps the most intriguing suggestion is Gorbachev’s promise to “restructure” Soviet forces to make them defensively oriented. Discussion of force structure could make the CAFE negotiations even more complex. Should the negotiations lead toward restructured force postures on both sides, however, they might create a military balance in Europe that is both much more stable and less expensive for nations in both alliances.
**Important Issues**

In the two years that preceded the opening of the CAFE talks, discussions among the NATO allies revealed some of the difficult issues that will be revisited in the negotiations or which will remain part of the political and military environment for the negotiations.

One of the more important choices for the allies is the size of cuts that the West should take. Some official allied military analyses had concluded that NATO could make no substantial reductions without compromising the alliance's ability to defend the entire West German border. The West German government, supported by others, felt that NATO would be open to public ridicule if no Western reductions were proposed, and the allies therefore settled on a 5 percent cut in NATO forces.

This outcome reflects allied difficulties in identifying what the West could afford to offer the Warsaw Pact that would be of value to the East and yet not detrimental to Western security interests. Because the conventional wisdom is that NATO forces pose no threat to the East, there is little in the current Western force structure that could tempt the Soviet Union, in return, to make substantially asymmetrical reductions. Some allied officials quietly considered the possibility that the West could offer the Soviet Union economic advantages, including better access to nonstrategic Western technology, as a tacit incentive for the Soviets to agree to asymmetrical force reductions. The readiness of West European governments late in 1988 to extend financial credits to the Soviet Union to encourage bilateral trade suggested that such a strategy was being deployed implicitly and not necessarily with the support of the United States.

Western analysts strongly suspect that the Soviet Union's main concern is the West's potential for technological breakthroughs, some of which, in the future, could enable NATO forces to strike deep and accurately into Warsaw Pact territory with nonnuclear as well as nuclear weapons. The Soviet leadership undoubtedly is not only worried about the strate-
gic consequences of such breakthroughs but believes that engaging in a high-technology conventional weapons race with the West at this time would block the transfer of resources needed for economic modernization. Restricting this potential might be technologically and politically difficult to incorporate in an arms control agreement. Nonetheless, limits on deep-strike forces might be the strongest military inducement the West could offer the Soviet Union to remove destabilizing capabilities from its deployments.

Another choice confronting the alliance was created by the Warsaw Pact’s offer, tendered by its heads-of-state meeting in East Berlin on May 19, 1987, to confer with NATO leaders on military doctrine in order to remove the fear of attack by either side. Western observers for many years have been concerned by the offensive character of Warsaw Pact doctrine and forces. The Warsaw Pact’s offer was accompanied by a pledge that “the Warsaw Pact will never, and under no circumstances, open hostilities, and will never be the first to use nuclear weapons.” The context for the Warsaw Pact initiative led Western observers to suspect that the East hoped to use such a discussion to critique NATO’s policy of reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict if necessary and the alliance’s follow-on-forces attack doctrine that envisages expanding NATO’s ability to interdict the advance of Warsaw Pact forces deep behind the front lines.

NATO officials reacted cautiously to the initiative, appearing somewhat uncertain what pitfalls lay in such a proposal and how to respond constructively. According to one report, “Western sources quickly indicated some skepticism about the proposal...,” and what interested NATO leaders more than a general and potentially propagandistic discussion of military doctrine was “concrete discussions that included confirmed data on military strength.”

Ironically, because the Warsaw Pact’s proposal responds, in effect, to a Western complaint, NATO presumably will want to deal with the initiative in a way that can be defended before Western public opinion. Furthermore, discussions of
how to modify strategy, doctrine, tactics and training, as well as force structure, would be quite logical now that both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have agreed that one of their objectives in the new negotiations is to enhance the defensive characteristics of forces while reducing offensive capabilities.

The Question of Aircraft

Another important question for the allies was whether or not aircraft should be included in the negotiations. The allies agreed that aircraft should not be included in the initial focus of the talks because aircraft are not the principal weapons used for seizing and holding territory. The Western countries finally convinced the Warsaw Pact countries to accept this approach. The Soviets nonetheless believe that aircraft must eventually be included, and many allied officials and private analysts accept that some constraints on aircraft may figure in any eventual reduction accord.

Initial Eastern and Western positions on the balance in air forces are at odds. The Soviets have asserted that NATO has a quantitative advantage in strike, or ground attack, aircraft based in Europe. NATO claims that the Warsaw Pact has a slight quantitative advantage. At some point in the talks such differences will have to be resolved.

Many aircraft, as well as artillery systems, are capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear weapons. In spite of the inclusion of such delivery systems in the CAFE negotiations, the talks will not include nuclear weapons directly. But nuclear weapons issues will likely remain close to, if not on, the bargaining table. The Soviet Union has traditionally sought the removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Western Europe, particularly those carried by delivery systems capable of reaching Soviet territory. After agreeing in the INF treaty to eliminate all intermediate-range nuclear missile systems, the United States and its major European allies hoped to solidify and modernize NATO's remaining nuclear posture. Well before the INF treaty was concluded, the allies had, in
their 1983 “Montebello Decision,” agreed on the broad outlines of a modernization process, including a continuing program of unilateral reductions in short-range nuclear systems.

NATO judges that until the large disparities in conventional forces are removed, the West will have to rely on nuclear weapons to deter the Soviets from believing that they could mass armor for a breakthrough assault. Many Western experts believe that even with a relatively stable balance of conventional forces in Europe, nuclear weapons will be required. They argue that history has demonstrated that “there is no such thing as conventional deterrence.”

The U.S. nuclear-armed short-range (110 kilometers) Lance missile has been a key system for this deterrent concept. The missile is now aging and will not remain viable much past the mid-1990s. The NATO countries, in keeping with the Montebello modernization program, had planned to replace the Lance in the near future. Now, Gorbachev’s promise of unilateral force cuts has put this decision on hold temporarily, until the alliance has reached agreement on a “comprehensive concept” for its defense and arms control policies and most likely until after West German elections in 1990.

Prospects for an Early Accord

In spite of the many apparent incentives on both sides, the prospects for an early reduction accord are somewhat bleak, even in the heady atmosphere of a new negotiating forum. Years of mistrust between the two sides and continuing East-West ideological differences remain substantial obstacles to deep cuts in force levels in Europe. In addition, differing political and military priorities within the Warsaw Pact and among the NATO members will continue to make agreement difficult. This means that in the next several years progress toward enhanced military stability in Europe may be realized only through unilateral measures by the two sides or negotiated steps short of reductions. Gorbachev’s promise of
unilateral Soviet force cuts may provide an opening for the allies to propose mutual monitoring and inspection measures to help ascertain the relationship between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces after the unilateral cuts have been made, and to facilitate agreement on negotiated reductions.
Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by changes in Soviet policy will require the West to develop concepts and approaches that reach beyond traditional thinking about the military confrontation in Europe. Creative new approaches to a European security system are already under discussion both inside and outside Western governments, but they have not developed sufficiently to be fully reflected in Western policies. The concepts of “stability” and “stabilizing measures” are central to these approaches.

**Stabilizing Measures**

For the purposes of this discussion, the term “stabilizing measures” includes steps or procedures agreed upon by potential adversaries that remove or mitigate sources of instability in their political and military relationships and thereby reduce the possibility of conflict. There are three categories of stabilizing measures—reductions, constraints and CBMs.

**Reductions** diminish the numbers of weapons or forces in
a specified geographic area through withdrawal and/or destructi-

Negotiated reductions can, but do not necessarily, stabilize military relations. If an arms reduction accord is deemed acceptable by potential adversaries, then presumably it will have a stabilizing effect on their relationship. The INF treaty would fall into this category, as would the agreements sought since 1973 in the negotiations on MBFR and more recently in START.

**Constraints** are negotiated measures that impose limits on the composition, levels, deployment and activities of military forces and/or weapons systems. The SALT I treaty is an example of a constraining accord because it placed numerical and qualitative limits on the strategic forces of the United States and the Soviet Union without requiring reductions. The U.S.-Soviet accord on incidents at sea of 1972 could be seen as a constraint measure to the extent that it limited the activities of U.S. and Soviet naval units operating in proximity to one another.

**CBMs** are intended to increase mutual confidence and stop short of directly constraining military force composition, levels, deployments and activities of the parties to the accord. Such measures could include political declarations, information exchanges, mutual observation of military activities, communication "hot lines" and crisis-avoidance arrangements, and a variety of other steps intended to increase transparency—the extent to which one side can observe the force structure, deployments and activities of military forces of the other—and predictability in the relationship between security policies and military forces of potential adversaries. The CBMs in the 1975 Helsinki accord and their further extrapolation in the 1986 Stockholm agreement have provided a foundation for additional measures in Europe.

Constraints and CBMs taken together are frequently referred to as falling within the realm of **operational arms control**, meaning steps short of reductions which seek to regularize the operations of military forces.
Approaches to Stabilizing Measures

**Threshold conditions.** Participants in arms control talks may have a variety of tactical reasons for negotiating stabilizing measures (in addition to or instead of agreeing to such measures). Those reasons could include the goal of affecting adversarial behavior, influencing public opinion, and so forth. The minimal or “threshold” conditions for agreement on stabilizing measures are:

1. There should be **no ongoing military conflict** among potential signers of an accord (a state of hostilities has to end and a new status quo must be established before stabilizing measures can be applied to govern that status quo); and,

2. There should be a **basic perception of common danger** (i.e. war) or **mutual interests** (such as budgetary savings, improved trade, and so forth) shared by potential adversaries. (One party may be motivated more strongly by a specific perception of danger or common interest than the other, but each must see its self-interest served by the accord. It would be logical to assume that more intensive and far-reaching stabilizing measures require a progressively stronger perception of common danger/interest.)

**Interrelationships.** As might be expected, the three categories of stabilizing measures are closely related. It is clearly possible to agree on and implement CBMs without imposing constraints or reductions, as demonstrated by the Helsinki and Stockholm accords. It is also possible to implement constraints without reductions. But constraints almost inevitably are supported by some form of CBMs. (For example, certain elements of the SALT accords intended to enhance verification and compliance are, in their own right, constraints.) Finally, no reduction accords have been negotiated or seriously contemplated by the West in the postwar era without accompanying constraints and CBMs.

**Bilateral or multilateral?** Stabilizing measures can be arranged on a bilateral or multilateral basis. The SALT accords illustrate bilateral application, and the Helsinki and Stockholm accords are examples of multilateral application. The
new negotiations on European security issues are being conducted on a multilateral basis, and presumably any measures agreed upon will be applied on the same basis, even though it is conceivable that bilateral U.S.-Soviet measures could play a part as well. (Both Western and Eastern proposals in the MBFR negotiations, for example, envisaged a relatively small first-stage withdrawal limited to U.S. and Soviet forces.)

**Conventional or nuclear?** Stabilizing measures can be applied to conventional military forces and weapons, nuclear forces and weapons, or a combination of both. The Helsinki and Stockholm accords applied strictly to operations of conventional military forces. The SALT accords, INF treaty and the potential START agreement deal with nuclear force relationships.

Even when measures are applied to nonnuclear forces in the East-West context, however, there are potential nuclear implications. To the extent that measures reduce the potential for instability in nonnuclear force relationships, the risk of escalation to nuclear confrontation may be decreased. In addition, the nature of force structures and weapons capabilities can make it difficult to separate conventional from nuclear elements in a negotiating framework. For example, while the INF treaty reduced only nuclear systems, it also blocked future application by the United States or the Soviet Union of the INF delivery systems in a conventional mode, eliminating some nonnuclear force options. Another difficult case is presented by “dual capable” systems, such as aircraft and artillery tubes that can deliver both nuclear and nonnuclear munitions.

**Area of application.** All stabilizing measures can be applied on one or many geographic levels: global, regional or zonal. Global measures obviously cover all relevant forces and weapons of the parties to the accord, irrespective of their geographic location. The SALT accords are global agreements, as are the U.S.-Soviet accord on incidents at sea and the INF treaty. It is also possible to apply stabilizing measures within a specific region, for example as the Helsinki and Stockholm
Table 5

Negotiations for Stabilizing Military Relations in Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CDE(^1) (post-Stockholm)</th>
<th>CAFR(^2) (post-MBFR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation (see Table 1)</td>
<td>Multilateral (NATO, Warsaw Pact, neutrals/nonaligned)</td>
<td>Multilateral (NATO and Warsaw Pact nations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic coverage</td>
<td>Regional (Atlantic-to-Urals)</td>
<td>Regional (Atlantic-to-Urals)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forces/weapons</td>
<td>Nonnuclear</td>
<td>Nonnuclear; dual capable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Types of measures:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Reductions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Constraints</td>
<td>Maybe</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- CBMs</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal status of possible accord</td>
<td>Political accord</td>
<td>Treaty</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

\(^2\)Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

measures apply to Europe “from the Atlantic to the Urals.”

**Binding or nonbinding?** The status of measures under international law is another important consideration for future stabilizing measures in Europe. The Western allies sought an MBFR agreement in the form of a treaty, believing that a treaty would provide greater assurance of compliance. On the other hand, the Helsinki and Stockholm accords are not binding treaties. Based on past practice, the follow-on CDE negotiations presumably will continue without seeking a treaty foundation, whereas the new conventional arms negotiations will seek a treaty governing force limitations and reduction commitments. (The likely distribution of responsi-
bilities, structure and approaches of the Conference on
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarma-
ment in Europe and the CAFE talks are displayed in the
matrix presented in Table 5.)

Beyond the Stockholm Accord

The Stockholm measures may represent the beginning of
a sea change in Soviet thinking about the best ways to achieve
military stability in Europe, but they have scarcely made a
dent in removing uncertainties concerning the intentions of
participants in the accord and limiting the offensive potential
of their military forces.

Going beyond Stockholm, Western observers have consid-
ered several directions. One obvious direction involves ex-
pansion of the Stockholm measures to increase transparency
and predictability of military activities in Europe. This pre-
sumably will be the CDE’s principal task.

Another direction calls for development of CBMs and
constraints to accompany a reduction accord produced by
the CAFE talks. Such measures would be designed to ensure
compliance with a reduction accord and to establish a frame-
work for relations between NATO and Warsaw Pact military
forces after reductions have been taken.

A third direction calls for development of CBMs and con-
straints on military forces as building blocks toward a reduc-
tion accord. This approach might necessitate building a
framework for verification and compliance and not only es-
tablishing the ground rules for force operations but also
practicing them before negotiated reductions are imple-
mented.
A key to the ability of the Western nations to sort out where and in what order to negotiate force cuts and nonreduction stabilizing measures is some greater degree of consensus on what they are hoping to accomplish with those measures. Discussions among the allies have begun to clarify their objectives and priorities, but there are still a number of competing preferences.

Western Concerns

For many years, and particularly since a number of military analysts in the mid-1970s highlighted the threat of a "bolt out of the blue," standing-start Warsaw Pact assault on NATO, the alliance has spent much of its military resources and arms control attention on the "short-warning attack" scenario. This priority is quite understandable given NATO's need to be able to defend its forward area, the limited depth of its territory and the political requirement to defend West German territorial integrity.

The emerging consensus now is that it is most unlikely that
the Soviet Union would choose to mount an unreinforced attack on the West. Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces are not properly deployed or prepared for Moscow to be confident of successfully attacking NATO with little or no advance preparations or mobilization. Gorbachev's unilateral cuts will strengthen this consensus.

The more important problem for NATO, many analysts now say, is Soviet "force generation": the potential for the Soviet Union to mobilize its defense resources over a period of a few weeks, thereby achieving force ratios over NATO that would greatly increase the chances for success of an attack or perhaps lead NATO to make concessions to Warsaw Pact positions on the political issues underlying the crisis.

Even if the consensus seems to be shifting toward the concern about a mobilized attack, NATO still presumably cannot politically afford to ignore the short-warning scenario. It therefore appears that both short-warning and mobilization concerns will be reflected in NATO's approach. This suggests that NATO will focus on attempting:

1. to slow down the speed at which Warsaw Pact forces move, mobilize, deploy and make the transition to war;
2. to decrease the effective numbers and ratios of Warsaw Pact forces that can be brought to bear against NATO; and
3. to diminish the advantage of the Warsaw Pact holding the initiative by making preparations for war more visible.

The short-warning and mobilization scenarios provide the most important military rationale for Western approaches to stabilizing measures, but there are some other important reasons that influence perspectives on future European security arrangements. Some observers believe that stabilizing measures should also seek to develop means of both avoiding and defusing crisis situations. This objective calls for intensified, cooperative East-West arrangements for clarification of intentions and resolution of differences that, if not dealt with successfully, could lead to war.

In addition, a long-standing Western objective, and a top priority of the West German government, is to "overcome the
division of Europe." From a Western perspective, the division is caused by Soviet domination of the East European nations. The desire to weaken that domination at the very least requires that stabilizing measures not intensify in any way the division of Europe or of Germany. The government of France sees removing Soviet troops from Eastern Europe as the principal key to overcoming the division. This goal is prominent in France's approach to the new conventional arms negotiations.

Another important consideration identified by Western analysts is the need to protect NATO's vital political and military interests. These interests include, in particular, maintaining the political cohesion of the alliance and ensuring the viability of its military strategy, meaning, in the broadest sense, the credibility of deterrence. This "defensive" motivation is important in particular because most stabilizing measures that the West would like applied to Eastern forces could have significant consequences for the West if applied equally to its own forces. NATO will likely seek to preserve aspects of its defensive capability that pose the greatest obstacles to a potential Warsaw Pact attack. These include the ability to reinforce from North America, superiority in tactical airpower, higher quality of training, and superior technical capabilities in command, control, communications and intelligence. Should the potential for major reduction and restructuring of forces emerge in the CAFE talks, the allies may have to make some difficult choices between preserving NATO strategy and possibly altering fundamentally the military confrontation in Europe.

It should also be noted that most of the Western nations have particular national concerns that affect their approach to stabilizing measures, based on their different geographic locations, proximity to the Soviet Union, military capabilities, historical experiences with military conflict, relationships to Warsaw Pact nations, and other factors. For example, while West Germany is primarily focused on the threat posed by Warsaw Pact forces located in Central Europe, the Turkish
government is more concerned with troops in the Transcaucasion region of the Soviet Union. And, while the Czechs and Norwegians are particularly worried about the threat to their security posed by nuclear weapons, the French are intent on protecting their national nuclear capabilities from even implicit limitations. These and many other differing perspectives complicate intra-Western discussions of conventional arms control, to say nothing of the problems likely to be encountered in negotiations with the East.

**Western Options for Negotiating Approaches**

Against this backdrop of complex motivations and priorities, there is a growing range of proposals for nonreduction stabilizing measures that might be considered in the negotiations. As mentioned earlier, these include:

1. measures to expand the Stockholm provisions to increase predictability and transparency of military activities in Europe;

2. measures to accompany a reduction accord produced by the CAFE talks; and,
3. measures to serve as building blocks toward a reduction accord in the CAFE talks.

**Expanding the Stockholm measures**

There are many possibilities for building on the Stockholm measures. Such expansion could be negotiated in the new CAFE talks as well as in the CDE. The primary goal would be to make force operations, deployments and exercises even more apparent to the other side to remove sources of potential misunderstanding concerning the nonaggressive nature of military forces and their activities.

**Enhancing predictability.** Measures intended to enhance the ability of each side to anticipate the planned training and deployment activities of the other could be expanded substantially. The Stockholm measures could include a wider range of activities among those that must be announced, requiring more-detailed information in the notice, increasing the lead time required for notification of an activity, and expanding substantially the exchange of information on troop deployments and activities.

**Increasing transparency.** A detailed exchange of data on military manpower, units and equipment is a fundamental requirement for increasing transparency of military deployments and activities. The Soviet Union has indicated its willingness to go further in this area than it has to date, and the West will have to determine what sort of data exchange would be most useful. Such exchanges may take place in the CDE, but they will be absolutely essential in the CAFE talks.

The Stockholm provisions for observation and inspection could also be strengthened. Observers at exercises could be given greater flexibility, mobility and scope. Permanent observation facilities could be established at major exit and entry points for military forces moving toward the NATO-Warsaw Pact dividing line, such as airfields, rail centers and major highway intersections. Automatic sensors could be placed along key transportation lines to detect unusual or unexpected increases in military traffic.

A system allowing both sides to make low-level inspection
flights along the East-West dividing line could provide another means of increasing transparency. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have satellite surveillance systems that reportedly yield high definition, excellent quality photographs. But frequent cloud cover over Central Europe limits the effectiveness of satellite photography for conventional arms control. In addition, access to U.S. and Soviet satellite photographs remains largely restricted to officials of the two superpowers. Overflight surveillance photographs, however, could be made available to all participants in such an arrangement.

**Improving consultation and crisis-avoidance capabilities.** Another category of measures that could be included in either the CDE or CAFE talks is a better dialogue among NATO and Warsaw Pact representatives. Meetings between NATO and Warsaw Pact military officials could be regularized to discuss military doctrine and other issues of concern. Officers from NATO and Warsaw Pact nations could be exchanged and assigned to military academies, key military installations and other locations.

A "crisis-avoidance" or "risk-reduction" center could be established to bring together NATO and Warsaw Pact (and possibly neutral and nonaligned) military officers, experts and diplomats. Such a center could promote the exchange, on a continuing basis, of information on military activities; raise issues about those activities of concern to either side; and encourage discussion and resolution of low-level incidents involving military personnel. Such a center could serve as a clearinghouse for information exchanges worked out under the auspices of the CDE or the CAFE talks and provide inspection teams to participate in the implementation of current and future cooperative measures.

A related idea would be to establish a NATO-Warsaw Pact hot line similar to the U.S.-Soviet one. It has also been suggested that an agreement could make use of observers and on-site inspection as crisis-management tools. They could be instrumental in helping to confirm that, after increased ten-
sions have raised alert levels, forces are returning to normal alert status.

**Measures to accompany a reduction accord**

All of these CBMs, especially all arrangements that enhance knowledge about the levels, locations and activities of the other side’s military forces, could complement an agreement reducing conventional military forces. In particular, an agreed approach to the numerical size of manpower, units and equipment would be crucial to any reduction accord.

Going beyond the predictability and transparency contributions of CBMs in support of a reduction accord, a wide variety of constraining measures might be used with it.

Measures that **prohibit or control certain activities** could accompany reductions. For example, maneuvers or out-of-garrison military activities exceeding a certain size or duration could be banned. Mobilization exercises that exceed a certain size, location and/or duration could be limited. The number of divisions permitted to leave their garrisons at any one time could also be limited. Troops and equipment entering an area could be required to pass through designated transit points. A cap could be placed on the quantities of military equipment brought forward in specified time periods, with compliance monitored by remote sensors and permanently stationed inspectors.

**Exclusion zones** could be established in which specific types of forces, equipment or military activities are not permitted. For example, ammunition and fuel depots could be banned from designated areas on either side of the East-West dividing line. Bridging equipment, which would be required for sustaining offensive operations on the ground, could be excluded from frontline zones. The concept of an exclusion zone has been widely proposed for nuclear and chemical weapons, and could be applied to tanks, armored personnel carriers and a wide range of other equipment.

**Secure storage of equipment** could be arranged to ensure that attempts to mobilize certain types of forces would be detected. Storage facilities could be monitored with on-site...
observers and remote detection equipment. Nations reluctant to destroy important investments in major weapons systems, such as relatively new tanks, might be willing to store them until greater confidence in the viability of a more cooperative security system has been achieved.

**Building blocks toward a reduction accord**

All of these measures could also be used as part of a strategy designed to develop the foundation for a reduction accord. Reductions in equipment and manpower are the most demanding steps in controlling conventional arms because they require nations to give up military capabilities. In theory, constraints demand somewhat of a lesser sacrifice, and CBMs less still. If the West should want to make progress toward a more stable military relationship in Europe in the near future, taking advantage of the apparently more flexible Soviet approach, then CBMs and constraints might prove more negotiable than reductions. The West could propose such a building-block approach as a constructive response to Gorbachev's unilateral force cuts.

In a building-block approach, exchange and discussion of data could be combined with a variety of inspection measures to establish a database for eventual reductions. The implementation of notification and observation measures could also be designed as potential components of a verification regime for a reduction accord. Given the political importance of compliance issues, prior development of a system for ensuring compliance with an accord might be crucial to implementation of reductions.

Consultation and crisis-avoidance measures, initially implemented to increase mutual confidence and understanding, could become part of the framework for postreduction East-West cooperation. Constraints on military movements, initially implemented to confirm the defensive purposes of military forces, could be designed to support compliance with and noncircumvention of a reduction accord. Storage of equipment in supervised sites could be used as an interim step toward removal and/or destruction of that equipment.
If such measures were negotiated and implemented with an eye to the manner in which their functions could grow and be adjusted, a positive synergism might develop among the various measures leading to the elaboration of a truly cooperative system for managing European security.

Key Questions for U.S. Policy

Each of the potential approaches outlined has critics as well as enthusiasts among Western observers. Many measures are put forward on the assumption that the Soviet Union and its allies are ready to cooperate. This assumption may turn out to have been unduly optimistic. Even if an optimistic interpretation is warranted, and the Soviet Union has made a decision to seek more cooperative security arrangements with the West and sticks with it, a number of factors will still complicate negotiations.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States will want to put vital interests at risk. Both will defend the integrity of their military strategies and will seek to preserve the cohesion of their respective alliances. The East European allies may not have much room for maneuver, but differing perspectives among them and antagonisms within the bloc (for example, between Hungary and Romania) may inhibit progress. The West European countries each have their own priorities and requirements for the CAFE negotiations, and they differ on some issues of principle as well as on many details.

In these circumstances, the United States will have to examine all proposed stabilizing measures, including more far-reaching reduction proposals, in terms of a broad and complex set of questions.

- How should measures be designed to achieve the most constructive effect on Soviet and Warsaw Pact military capabilities?

Stabilizing measures have little utility unless they have the effect of reducing in some way the threat posed by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces. Perhaps the most dangerous outcome for the West would be to reach agreement on cooperative and reduction measures that did not have the intended effect but
were perceived by Western public opinion as improving the military situation. This suggests that U.S. and NATO interests would be served by the most thorough professional military analysis of proposed measures. It would appear that neither the U.S. government nor NATO has devoted sufficient analytical resources to the study of nonreduction stabilizing measures at this point to determine which measures or combination of measures would be most beneficial.

The details governing the application of specific measures will in most cases determine their utility. On the fundamental issue of data, while an exchange could be a key element of further progress in CBMs and would be absolutely essential to a reduction accord, the way in which data will be handled in negotiations is crucial. A simple exchange of data without
discussion would undoubtedly not be a sufficient foundation for a reduction accord. Such an exchange could even undermine rather than build confidence, if major data discrepancies were left unresolved.

Any data exchange, to have any constructive purpose, should include the location, designation and current holdings of selected armaments and the manning levels of ground force units down to the brigade, and possibly battalion, level. Both sides presumably would like to avoid the impasse over data that blocked progress in MBFR talks for so many years. Such a detailed exchange, accompanied by ways of verifying the information, could avoid such an impasse.

What is the likely effect on U.S. and allied defense capabilities?

It is already clear that even though nuclear and naval forces are excluded from the CAFE negotiations, the Soviet Union will seek to limit such capabilities through other means. Western officials have seen enough in past and recent Eastern proposals and statements to know that these Western capabilities will be the object of Warsaw Pact proposals in the coming years.

The NATO allies are wary of Soviet proposals that might undermine key elements of Western deterrent capabilities. But the allies are beginning to examine how specific measures that they might want to apply to Eastern forces would affect NATO’s strategy and force posture. For example, measures that might usefully constrain the Warsaw Pact’s ability to mobilize for an attack, if equally applied to the West, would likely constrain the ability of NATO’s continental members to mobilize reserves in response to a threat of war. The United States clearly would like to constrain the Soviet Union’s ability to reinforce its frontline units in Central Europe in preparation for an attack, but at the same time would like to be unconstrained in its ability to send reinforcements to Europe in a crisis.

Ultimately, the United States and its NATO allies might have to face the question of the extent to which they are willing to adjust NATO’s strategy, doctrine and deployments in
order to achieve desired changes in the Warsaw Pact force posture.

Are there political or economic costs associated with desired military benefits?

If NATO reconsiders its initial reduction proposal and moves toward more-substantial reductions and restructuring of forces, deep cuts in the conventional forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could yield substantial long-term savings for the United States as well as others. However, most stabilizing measures that are likely to be achieved in the near future will probably not produce direct savings. In fact, some of the proposed schemes for permanent observation posts, remote sensors, and so forth could require both initial investments in equipment and continuing personnel costs to implement and monitor agreements, as in the case of the INF treaty.

More important, however, would be any political costs associated with pursuing certain measures. It would make little sense for the United States to promote steps that allies found objectionable. For example, the West Germans would strongly oppose measures that might compromise NATO's forward defense doctrine or inhibit the arrival of U.S. reinforcements in a crisis. Under current circumstances, neither the French nor the British want their nuclear capabilities limited in any fashion. The United States therefore would presumably want to assess any proposed accord in terms of its effect on alliance unity.

The NATO allies will also have to consider potential dangers in what otherwise appear to be interesting and useful proposals. For example, while there are good arguments to be made on behalf of establishing a crisis-avoidance center, skeptics point out that such a center could be misused by the Warsaw Pact as a forum for Eastern propaganda attacks on Western policy. Presumably with regard to each proposed measure, the United States and its allies will want to ask themselves what the Soviet Union and its allies would hope to accomplish with agreement on the measure, and then deter-
mine whether the goals of the two sides are compatible, and judge whether any perceived risks are worth taking.

What policy goals other than military security in Europe should the United States consider when elaborating its conventional arms control approach?

The CSCE process has traditionally depended on balance between progress in the various baskets of issues. The United States and the NATO allies, for example, have insisted on progress in the area of human rights in parallel with progress in the trade, cooperation and security areas desired by the Soviet Union. The relationship between military security issues and other East-West issues will likely remain a consideration for U.S. policy. In addition to the special CSCE human rights concern, the United States presumably will want to consider whether proposed measures tend to strengthen or weaken Soviet hegemony over Warsaw Pact nations. The United States might also want to weigh whether the West should offer trade and technology transfer incentives in implicit or explicit trades for Warsaw Pact constraints on military forces and activities.

What sort of European security system will best suit U.S. interests in the future?

In the period of flux discussed here, from the perspective of government officials attempting to conduct NATO affairs, planning that reaches beyond a year is a headache, and trying to look beyond a decade appears fanciful. However, the lack of a strategic consensus on a future European security system appears today to be a serious handicap for the shaping of Western policy toward East-West conventional arms control.

Should NATO and the Warsaw Pact remain central features of that system? What role, if any, will nuclear weapons play in Western strategy? Should the United States remain a central actor in determining directions for the European security system, or should its role diminish? Do the two Germanys have a special role to play in the evolving East-West relationship in Europe? These are just a few of the important
questions that help shape the contemporary debate on cooperative East-West military security policies.

As long as Soviet policy appears to be creating new possibilities for overcoming East-West differences, the West will be challenged to define its interests in the light of such new opportunities. The allies have made a start in this direction, but the crafting of an effective approach to measures for reducing forces and stabilizing military relations in Europe will very likely require a clearer vision of the preferred future than has been apparent to date.
Talking It Over

A Note for Students and Discussion Groups

This issue of the Headline Series, like its predecessors, is published for every serious reader, specialized or not, who takes an interest in the subject. Many of our readers will be in classrooms, seminars or community discussion groups. Particularly with them in mind, we present below some discussion questions—suggested as a starting point only—and references for further reading.

Discussion Questions

What are the principal factors behind the military confrontation in Europe? Which ones have changed significantly over the last 40 years? Which ones have remained more or less constant?

Are there any lessons to be learned from the failure of the MBFR talks? What contributions did the MBFR negotiations make to the future of European security? What contribution have the CSCE and CDE negotiations made?

How significant are Warsaw Pact numerical advantages over NATO? Does the West compensate adequately for those advantages? How does NATO strategy attempt to counter Warsaw Pact advantages?

How could conventional arms cuts and controls help reduce the chance of nuclear war? Is there a chance that such
cuts could have the effect of increasing the chances of nuclear war?

Gorbachev has challenged and changed some long-standing Soviet internal practices and foreign and defense policies. He has offered to cooperate in producing dramatic changes in military relationships in Europe. How should the Western countries deal with Gorbachev’s offers and initiatives?

Even if the United States is facing severe pressures on future defense spending, should it avoid making unilateral reductions in its forces in Europe in the hope that negotiations will produce cuts on both sides?

Should the United States work toward establishing a more cooperative European security system even if this probably would require placing more trust in the Soviet Union’s peaceful intentions? How can the United States and the other NATO allies protect their interests while pursuing a less dangerous European security relationship with the Warsaw Pact countries?

READING LIST


future European security arrangements within NATO and between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.


Key to Abbreviations

CAFE: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CBM: confidence-building measures
CDE: Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
CFE: Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
CSCE: Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CST: Conventional Stability Talks
FRG: Federal Republic of Germany
GDR: German Democratic Republic
INF: intermediate-range nuclear forces
MBFR: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SACEUR: Supreme Allied Commander in Europe
SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

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