This paper presents findings of a study that described and analyzed the first 5 years (1985-90) of the Spanish experience in school-based management (SBM). The Spanish experience is instructive because the country, formerly comprised of independent territories, made a swift and peaceful transition to democracy. As a means of reinforcing the democratization process, local school governance committees made up of elected parents, teachers, and students were established in all public and private state subsidized schools. A significant amount of authority was delegated to the SBM committees, including the authority to elect the school director from teacher-candidates. Data were gathered through document analysis and interviews with teachers, local and regional administrators, and senior Ministry of Education officials. Findings indicate that a considerable gap existed between theory and practice. The School Councils failed to demonstrate a high degree of influence in directing school affairs and the number of teachers willing to run for the directorship declined. A conclusion is that SBM plays an important symbolic role in democratic participation at the local level, but has not demonstrated the anticipated improvement in administrative processes. The practice of SBM can be improved by introducing meaningful incentives to attract teachers to stand for election, establishing requirements for administrative training, opening up the election process to qualified candidates from any school, and delegating additional power to the School Councils. Two tables are included. (LMI)
DEMOCRACY, DECENTRALIZATION AND
SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN

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Abstract

DEMOCRACY, DECENTRALIZATION AND SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT IN SPAIN

The objective of this study is to describe and analyze the first five years (1985-90) of the Spanish experience in school-based management (SBM). In order to reinforce the democratization process, local school governance committees made up of elected parents, teachers, and students were established in all public and private state subsidized schools in the country. A significant amount of authority was delegated to these SBM committees including the authority to elect the school director from among teachers who were candidates for the office. Data were gathered in Spain through document analysis and extensive interviews with teachers, local and regional administrators, and senior Ministry of Education officials. The study concludes that SBM is playing an important symbolic role in democratic participation at the local level, but has not as yet demonstrated the anticipated improvement in administrative processes.

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For any nation the transition from a strong autocratic government to a democracy is arduous, traumatic, and unpredictable, as the newly liberated East European countries are demonstrating. The transition is particularly difficult if the nation is a cobbled together collection of once independent territories that possess distinct cultures, hold to their own traditions, and speak diverse languages.¹

Under these latter conditions the attempt at democratic transition may result in a fractured nation with breakaway republics, as occurred in the Soviet Union, or outright civil war, as happened in Yugoslavia. As these events took shape in the early 1990s, the potential for conflagration, civil war, or return to a hard-line dictatorship was always present.

Fifteen years before the troubled transitions to democracy began in Eastern Europe, Spain successfully faced a similar challenge. Within its borders were vestiges of ancient kingdoms with distinct cultures and diverse languages that demanded their independence. Reminiscent of the Soviet experience, Spain also withstood a coup d'etat attempt by right-wing military officers demanding a return to the old ways.

In the final analysis, the Spanish experience is instructive because in its case the result was a unified nation that made a swift and pacific transition to democracy.² The result is
sometimes called the "Miracle of Spain."

Regarding the field of education, what the Spanish found in the late 1970s the East Europeans are discovering in the early 1990s. That is, establishing a democracy requires the reform of an educational system that reinforces the democracy as well as makes effective and efficient use of human and material resources. Many countries, like Spain, begin their educational reforms through a process of decentralization.

The initiative toward establishing local control through decentralization was principally a reaction to a series of powerful forces that were products of forty years of autocratic, centralized rule under the Franco regime. Politically and administratively, the educational system and its policies were dominated by tight centralized control. Gunther writes:

All key decision makers (the Council of Ministers, civil governors, mayors of large cities, high-ranking bureaucrats, and others) were either directly or indirectly appointed by, and responsible to, him. Moreover, even though he rarely played an active role in the actual formulation of public policy, he imposed constraints on the range of possible policy options available to the state administration, thereby preserving the basic characteristics of that regime until his death in 1975.

Prior to the democratic transition of 1977 (when the first free elections were held), the system of public education at the elementary, secondary and university levels was frequently characterized in the research literature as administratively and organizationally centralized, economically underfunded, politically controlled, and academically conservative (e.g., restrained from innovative tendencies).
Democracy and Decentralization

A Ministry of Education and Science (MEC) analysis of the Spanish model of reform stresses that "administrative decentralization...aimed at improving management procedures, could not of itself constitute a factor capable of giving an impulse to the democratization of the educational system." Decentralization alone, the delegation of decision-making authority to a subordinate unit, might result in little more than transferring authority from a higher to a lower level of the bureaucracy. Such an change would not necessarily aid the democratization process.

The Spanish Constitution establishes that democratization will be tied to decentralization through "the effective participation of all sectors." The mechanism of participation was provided for principally through the creation of the State School Council (Consejo Escolar del Estado) and the local School Councils (Consejos Escolares del Centro).

The State School Council functions at the national level and provides a forum for the major organized educational interest groups and selected individuals to come together, and, in theory play a participative role in shaping the education of the nation. On this Council are representatives of: teachers, parents of pupils, administrative and service staff, trade unions, private schools, universities, Ministry of Education and Science administrators, and distinguished educators.

The State School Council is not a decision-making body.
However, the Education Law of 1985 (LODE) requires that it be informed and consulted by the central government on such things as new laws affecting the educational system, the educational program, and minimum graduation requirements. The Council is authorized to formulate proposals for the MEC to consider as well as write an annual report on the condition of the educational system. The Council is obligated to meet at least once a year.

The Education Law of 1985 (LODE) also provides for the creation of educational Councils in each of the 17 Autonomous Communities. They are to provide for democratic participation of selected groups and individuals at that level. Very few of these regional Councils had been created by 1990 when this study was completed.

Democratic participation in its broadest form in the educational institution comes through the creation of a local School Council, or Consejo Escolar, in every public school and private school (receiving a government subsidy) in the nation. Unlike the State School Council, through the decentralization process the local School Councils are decision-making bodies. Democratization and decentralization are intended to come together at the local level when decision-making authority is placed in the hands of the elected parents, teachers, and students who make up each School Council.

In theory, the State School Council (at the national level), the 17 Autonomous Community School Councils (at the regional level), and the individual School Councils (at the local level)
are to provide a type of interacting umbrella of participation with each level reinforcing and facilitating the other two. At least during the first five years of existence, no form of collaboration between School Councils at these levels existed.

Study Objective

When linked at the local level through decentralization, citizen participation and administrative development can be referred to as school-based management (SBM). The focus of this study is to describe and analyze the first five year (1985-1990) of the Spanish experience in school-based management.

The specific objectives of this paper are to respond to the following questions:

1. How is the Spanish model of SBM organized and structured?

2. How effective has the process of SBM been during its first five years in linking local democratization through citizen participation with administrative development?

3. What modifications might be made to the Spanish model of SBM to improve its effectiveness?

Data for this study were gathered in Spain in 1987 and again in 1990. The Ministry of Education and Science (MEC) gave helpful cooperation in allowing access to educational officials and documents. Data were gathered in six of the 17 Autonomous Communities including the three historic territories of Galicia, the Basque Territories, and Catalonia.

Along with an extensive analysis of documents, over 100 interviews were conducted with parents, teachers, university
The concept of local school governance is rooted in the 1978 Constitution which lays the foundation for a democratic Spain. The Constitution functions as an instrument which delicately balances the need for regional autonomy and local citizen participation in governance with the simultaneous need for sufficient centralized control to provide for a necessary degree of national unity. Beltrán refers to this as a quasi-federal structure of government designed to provide for regional autonomy within a unified Spain.

The regional autonomy came through the creation of 17 Comunidades Autónomas (C.A.), or Autonomous Communities which were to receive decentralized powers after completing specific constitutionally prescribed tasks. By September of 1990, seven Autonomous Communities had acquired decentralized power (competencias) and operated with a significant degree of autonomy (Andalucía, the Canary Islands, Catalonia, Galicia, the Basque Territory, Navarre, and Valencia).

Within the framework of regional (C.A.) autonomy, a decentralized educational system was to operate with significant power devolved to the regions and specific decision-making authority delegated to each individual Consejo Escolar, or School Council.
The school-based management model of local school governance was officially initiated with the new Education Law (LODF) promulgated in 1985. School-based management is based on the premise that an educational system that relies on democratic practices will produce strong local leadership that advances the quality of education in response to the special needs of students and their communities. In practice, SBM calls for each school community: (1) electing its own governing body, the School Council; which (2) elects the school director, who; (3) executes a specific program he or she has proposed to improve the quality of education in that school.

School-based management should break up the traditional "uniformity" of the educational system. Within the SBM context, schools should be neutral politically, unaligned ideologically, efficient administratively, well supported economically, and governed democratically.

The school's decision-making body, the Consejo Escolar, may consist of any given number of people, although proportional representation must be respected. The members are as follows:

* The director of the school, who serves as Council chairperson;
* The chief of academic programs;
* Teachers, comprising not less than one-third of the Council membership;
* Parents and students, comprising not less than one-third of the Council;
* A representative of city government;
* A school secretary with neither voice or vote.

Elections for School Council members are held typically every two years during the first trimester, with at least one
month's advance notice. Voting is secret and can even be done by mail if attendance at the polling place is inconvenient. The School Council is the body that elects the school director from among the teachers at the site. A Council from one school is not permitted to elect a teacher who works in another school.

The director's tenure in office is three years with the possibility of being reelected one time for an additional three years. After a director completes his term in office, he or she returns to full-time teaching in the same school.22

The process of electing school directors comprises a key component of the school-based management theory behind improving the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the educational system. Rather than depend on policy makers in the Ministry of Education and Science, as was traditionally the case, making standardized decisions about the needs of schools distant from the capital city, local residents and educators decide on what to do about the developmental needs of their own schools.

Not unlike candidates for public office, teachers of a school who wish to be elected the school's director develop a proposed program that outlines the developmental changes they will, if elected, introduce in the school. The changes proposed can cover any or all of the range of considerations important to schools, such as, student discipline, inservice training, instructional techniques, curricular content, and so forth. These proposed changes, of course, would have to respect the frameworks established by law, but nevertheless considerable room
for developmental changes exists.

Once elected, the school director receives a stipend of US$15 to US$30 per month in most regions, but in a few the stipend can range up to US$500 for a large secondary school. However, the director must continue to teach at least 50 percent of the time. If there are no teacher candidates for the directorship of the school, a teacher from the school is appointed for one year by a higher administrative authority at the province or Autonomous Community level.\textsuperscript{23}

As established by law, the School Council has authority and responsibility over, among other things, the following tasks:

*to elect the school director, and recommend the appointment to higher authorities.
*if deemed necessary, by two-thirds vote, to propose to higher authority the dismissal of the school director;
*to decide on student admissions, being sure to adhere to established law and policy on the matter;
*to approve and evaluate the general school program developed annually by the school director;
*to approve and oversee the school budget;
*to approve the rules for the internal running of the school;
*to serve as a disciplinary tribunal for major student offenses;
*to establish guidelines for extracurricular activities (e.g., cultural, sports, field trips).
*to initiate the renewal of school equipment.
*to supervise the general functioning of the administrative and instructional activities of the school.\textsuperscript{24}

The next section of this paper identifies and analyzes some of the principal forces that influenced significantly Spain's efforts to introduce administrative development and democratic governance at the local school level during its initial five years.
The Practice of School-Based Management: 1985-1990

Elections for members of the School Councils as well as the selection of school directors began for the 1985-1986 school year. Among teachers, interest in the School Councils ran high as 95 percent of the teachers voted for the teacher representatives and 66 percent of the teachers even ran for Council positions. As the governing body of the school, the teachers wanted to put themselves in a position of maximum influence.

Parents, on the other hand, were not nearly so eager to participate in the new governance process. While 45 percent of the parents voted in the first elections, only 4.4 presented themselves as candidates for Council positions.25

Perhaps the most critical aspect of the initiation of the school-based management process can be seen in the election of school directors. These educational leaders are elected in three year cycles, with the first cycle initiated in 1985-86 and the second in 1988-89. Interim elections are held in off years for about 40 percent of the schools because, for example, they are new, undergoing reorganization, or had no candidates the previous year and are making another attempt.

As Table I illustrates, from the beginning in 1985-86 a problem existed in a significant percentage of schools (in the range of 36 percent) at all levels were appointed because there were no teachers willing to be candidates for the position of
school director. In those cases where there are no teachers willing to be candidates, the senior educational official in the autonomous community or, if in the territory of the MEC, the province chief, appoints a teacher as school director for one year.

When the next three-year election cycle began in 1988-89, the number of schools lacking teacher candidates was approaching 50 percent. As Table 2 illustrates, in the off year elections the number of schools without elected directors goes considerably higher than 50 percent.

In 1991 the State School Council (Conseio Escolar del Estado) declared the situation of appointed rather than elected directors as a grave situation that was getting progressively worse. In its report the State School Council urged the Ministry of Education and Science "to take urgent steps and identify alternative actions that will stimulate and motivate the teachers to assume the role of school director." Organizational Forces Behind the Lack of Candidates for Director

As noted previously, the successful practice of school-based management hinges on three actions: (1) the practice of democratic governance at the local school level, (2) the election of the school leadership, and (3) the preparation and introduction of a school development plan. The key to making SBM work revolves around the election of a school director. As the State School Council points out when the Ministry Administration has to appoint a director, which can last only one year, that
individual can not identify well with a school program he or she did not develop. In addition, "it is impossible to conduct any meaningful planning, in conjunction with the educational program, which is essential to improve the quality of instruction."28

Teachers, school directors, and senior administrators who were interviewed in the six Autonomous Communities visited, identified four main reasons as to why teachers were often reluctant to be candidates for school director. First and foremost, is the lack of incentives.29 For all the headaches that the job entails, the school director in most schools will receive only a modest stipend as well as be required to teach approximately half of the same number of classes as before.

Interestingly enough, the teacher corps itself is principally responsible for the lack of higher monetary rewards going to school directors. There exists a generalized belief among them that a school administrator is really a teacher and should be paid as such even if performing other duties. The norm of retaining equality within their ranks is important to the teachers. In other words, temporary duty in another capacity is no cause for a salary increase.

Second, the fact that a teacher who becomes a school director is suddenly a supervising authority figure over his or her own friends and colleagues is also a serious problem. In order to introduce a school development plan involving educational change, strong leadership must be exhibited by the director. This frequently entails supervising, directing and
even sanctioning friends and colleagues. Problems of accepting the challenges of leadership, and the potential organizational conflict and personal stress that go with them, are complicated by the fact that the school director will in a relatively short time be a full-time teacher once again in the same school.

Third, the ambiguity surrounding the mandate of the new directors poses problems for individuals thinking about becoming candidates for election. If SBM is to work effectively, the voting parties must focus on selecting leaders who will strive to introduce developmental change that will improve the quality of education. Almost all of the individuals interviewed made the point that the desire to produce qualitative improvements was only one reason, and not necessarily the most important, behind specific votes. Other reasons given behind voting patterns were that the candidate for director happened to be, for example: a personal friend, someone who wants to keep things the way they are, an individual who will back the proposals of a specific group (e.g., irate parents, conservative teachers, cultural minority), or a teacher who is primarily interested in challenging MEC policies. Because the mandates of school directors are often ambiguous, attempts to move the school program in a specific direction can, and frequently do, generate unwanted tension or conflict between teachers and/or parents who support other goals.

A fourth cause mentioned frequently by school directors is the tension of being caught between the conflicting demands of
higher authority (e.g., provincial, Autonomous Community, Ministry) on the one hand, and the teachers or School Council members on the other. For example, there are cases on record when the Council has instructed a school director to condone a purchase or activity unauthorized by the Ministry of Education and Science. Another type of conflict can happen, for example, when higher administrative authority instructs a school director to send the names of teachers who are out on strike and the School Council instructs the director not to send the names.

When queried as to why a creative and industrious teacher in one school cannot be elected by another school as director, thus avoiding the problems associated with friendship bonds, the negative responses almost always were a reflection on previous experiences. During the years of the Franco regime, appointing school directors to specific schools was commonly used as a tool of control. For example, when the regime felt some real or imagined threat coming from statements or public displays associated with a school, a new director was sent in to stop the practice. Memories of abuses of power by "outside" school directors are long lasting.

A key component in the theory of school-based management involves the ability to the School Council to recommend to higher administrative authority that the director be discharged if his or her performance is judged to be unsatisfactory. No record of a single instance of such a recommendation could be found, nor could anyone interviewed recall such an occurrence. Thus, one
could conclude that, in practice, the elected school director does not face the accountability pressures of being removed from the position if performance is lacking.

Perceptions on School Council Influence

By 1990 no nation-wide study had been completed regarding the amount of influence that School Councils have on school activities. However, a study on the perceptions of Council influence was conducted in 1989 in the Autonomous Community of Madrid. A stratified sample was drawn of 1,060 public and private elementary school (EGB) teachers, parents, students, and non-teaching personnel. While no suggestion is made that the results can be generalized to other regions of Spain, interviews around the country suggest that the views recorded are not unusual.

In response to the question, "Do you consider the School Council to be an effective instrument to advance the development of the schools?" 83% of the school directors responded "very limited effectiveness;" 46% of the teachers responded "very limited effectiveness," (with 35% responding "somewhat effective"), and only 26% of the parents responded "very limited effectiveness," (with 50% responding "somewhat effective"). Consequently, the more distant the respondents were from the actions of the School Councils, the more effective these actions appeared to be. However, it should be noted that only 50% of the parents reported that they had any more than minimal information about School Councils.
When asked to identify where the greatest changes had occurred in schools because of Council activity, the directors, teachers and parents all identified increased "participation" the highest by a considerable margin.

Finally, when school directors were asked about the level of influence various groups had with respect to what took place in the schools, 50% declared that school directors had "a great deal" of influence, 67% of the directors said the teachers had "a great deal," and 17% said the School Council had "a great deal" of influence. Only 12% of the teachers felt that the School Councils had "a great deal" of influence. Parents also believed that School Councils had considerably less influence on the schools than the teachers or administrators.

Thus, with respect to the effectiveness of school-based management, it can be argued that there is a considerable gap between the theory of how it should function, and the practice of how it does function.

Should School-Based Management Be Retained?

Almost without exception, the interviews conducted for this study revealed that educators from one end of Spain to the other recognized that the practice of school-based management was not proving to be an effective mechanism for improving the quality of management and/or education in the schools. In fact, especially because of the relative inability to attract sufficient leaders from among the teachers to assume the role of school directors, the SBM approach was often viewed as an impediment to improving
Given the problems raised, several distinguished university professors were asked if the practice of SBM in Spain serves a useful purpose. The overwhelming consensus of views was that indeed it does. The real contribution made by SBM has little to do with improving the management capability through decentralization or establishing new directions for educational programs. The true contribution of SBM is symbolic. That is, it represents in a highly visible manner the practice of democracy at the local level to a nation long denied that basic human right. For this reason, the argument went, the practice of SBM should and undoubtedly will continue.

In the initial years of such a newly formulated model of educational reform, it seems reasonable to expect that sufficient time has not yet passed to resolve the trouble spots. Whether the differences between practice and theory can be resolved in the near future will no doubt determine the viability of the Spanish model of educational reform.

How Could the Practice of SBM Be Improved?

Aside from the important issue of contributing to the practice of democracy at the local level, there are ways that SBM could be strengthened as a management mechanism. At the top of the list comes the task of providing creative and strong leadership in the role of school director.

Incentives. In order to attract the best and brightest teachers to compete for the elected position of school director,
a substantial increase in salary and a significant reduction in teaching load is essential.

Time Limits to Appointment. The three year period in office of an elected school director is insufficient to carry forward a complex and difficult program of developmental change. Even six years, if reelected, may not be sufficient. Administrative skills and experience in planning, policy formation, decision making, and so forth, take time to develop. To routinely return school directors to the classroom after a relatively short time cycle almost certainly guarantees the schools will be led continually by amateurs inexperienced in the practice of management. Consequently, removing all time limits to holding the position may be an effective way to strengthen the leadership role.

Administrative Training. Because any teacher can be elected as school director, no specific training in administration (e.g., planning, budgeting, conflict management, information systems, supervision) is required. José Luis García Garrido argues that this process tends to "deprofessionalize" the role. Teachers who pursue specialized knowledge in management have no assurance that they will ever be elected to the role. With the added monetary incentives, more candidates will undoubtedly be drawn to the position. Therefore, higher standards for election, such as advanced administrative training, could be required. A significant amount of training while on the job would also be extremely useful.

Training for Elected Council Members. The responsibilities
of members on school councils are significant. Training programs for school Council members would introduce them into the norms and values associated with educational leadership as well as provide skills essential to their tasks, such as planning, evaluation, and decision making.

**Open Elections.** An argument exists that if the pool of school director candidates could include applicants from teachers at other schools, many of the problems already discussed that are associated with promotion from within could be resolved. Not only would this practice help resolve the predicament of lack of candidates, it would permit the School Council to elect directors who have specialized knowledge and have proven their leadership skills at other schools.

**Increased Decision-Making Authority.** The Education Law (LODE) of 1985 identifies 17 tasks delegated to the School Councils, each task requiring some degree of authority. In an analysis of the tasks and the associated degree of authority, Carmen Elejabeitia Tavera argues that the actual degree of decision-making authority delegated to the School Councils is modest, but important. Many of the action verbs used in the law to define the level of task responsibility are limited in strength, such as: to elaborate, to propose, to know, to inform, and to promote. A few of the tasks use stronger verbs that suggest considerably more power, such as: to elect, to decide, and to approve.

However, as Tavera points out, even those areas where
stronger action verbs exist, such as to approve the school budget or to decide on student admissions, the School Council's degrees of flexibility are significantly limited by the frameworks of law and policy established at the level of the Autonomous Community or the Ministry of Education and Science. Tavera concludes that "the attributions or degrees of management authority of the Public School Councils are, in the final analysis, very limited and lack autonomy, although, without doubt, a breach has been opened in the centralized system and authoritarian past..."34

An important step toward strengthening the effectiveness of the School Councils would be to increase the degree of decision-making power they are allowed to exercise. Such an action would be consistent with the nation's announced policy of decentralizing its educational institutions and increasing democratic participation. Together they would go a long way toward providing the tools to bring more effective direction and management to the level of the local school.

Concluding Comments

Learning the mechanisms and techniques of organizing and managing the institutions of a newly formed democracy is a process which takes place over time. New structures of governance must be created, new forms of citizen participation initiated, and new mechanisms of administration formulated. In the Spanish educational institution, the theory behind the
educational reform is based on the decentralization of authority to local governing bodies. The creation of School Councils has become the means through which democratization and administrative development have been instituted and linked at the local level.

During the first five years (1985-1990) after the introduction of School Councils in all the public and private schools in the nation, a noticeable gap between theory and practice emerged. The School Councils failed to demonstrate a high degree of influence in directing the affairs of the schools they are supposed to govern.

In addition, the number of teachers willing to run for the elected office of school director declined at an alarming rate. By 1990 less than half of the public schools in the territory of the Ministry of Education and Science had an elected director, with the rest having to be appointed by higher authority. Clearly, during this first half decade, there were several areas that could be improved upon in the decentralization effort.

In that context, there are many Spanish educators who argue that the gap between the theory and practice of school-based management can be reduced significantly. Through such revisions as the introduction of meaningful incentives for attracting teachers to stand for election, establishing requirements for administrative training, opening up the election process to qualified candidates from any school, and delegating additional power to the School Councils, important developmental progress can be made.
Observing the progress of the next five years of reform (1990-1995) will be important in determining whether the gap between theory and practice can be reduced significantly. In other words, is the promise of democratization and development at the local level being fulfilled? In addition, the Spanish experience is important for many foreign nations to watch because there are few models of educational change on the scale introduced in Spain. Only time will tell if the "Miracle of Spain" will take root at the level of the local school.

1. Our special thanks to the following individuals for their suggestions on improving this manuscript: Dr. Roberto Pascual Pacheco, Universidad de Deusto; Manuel de Puelles Benítez, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia; Dra. María Eduvigis Sánchez Martín, Universidad Complutense de Madrid; and Dr. José-Ginés Mora Ruiz, Universitat de València. However, any errors of fact or judgment are strictly our own.


10. CIDE, *ibid.*

11. The legal foundations of the State School Council (Consejo Escolar del Estado) are found in the: Constitución Española (art. 27); Ley Orgánica 8/1985, de 3 de julio; Real Decreto 2378/1985, de 18 de diciembre; Orden de 24 de junio de 1987.


15. The Centro Nacional de Investigación y Documentación (CIDE), of the Ministry of Education and Science, and the Autonomus University of Madrid were particularly helpful in providing me with research bases of operation. They are in no way responsible for the findings of this study.


21. *Ley orgánica del derecho a la educación y reglamentos*, op. cit. article 41.


23. José Luis Mira Lema and José Luis Canosa Baldomir, op. cit., p. 220.

24. *Ley orgánica del derecho a la educación y reglamentos*, op. cit., artículo 42.


26. Consejo Escolar del Estado, *Informe sobre el estado y situación del sistema educativo: Curso 1989-90* (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, 1991), p. 89. These data report on the situation within the territory administered directly by the MEC and do not include the Autonomous Communities.


34. Tavera, ibid., p. 53.
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<td>— Por ausencia de candidatos</td>
<td>70.38</td>
<td>38.92</td>
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<td>— Centros de nueva creación</td>
<td>0.56</td>
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