This publication contains two papers on the implications of school decentralization for teacher education, student achievement, and democracy. The first paper, "Devolution in Education Systems: Implications for Teacher Professional Development and Pupil Performance" (Geoff Whitty), explores the way education reform movements for decentralization have developed generally by looking at how reforms have worked in England with some cross references to experiences in New Zealand and the United States. In doing so it reviews several studies and discusses the context in which reforms were installed. The conclusion notes that the overall benefits are not yet apparent and that reforms seem to intensify the links between educational and social inequality. The paper also notes that these reforms were part of a larger Thatcherite political project that must have influenced their effects. The second paper, "Decentralisation and Democracy" (Terri Seddon), argues that current educational reform is limited by its neglect of the interdependencies of development, democracy, and education; and that the character of decentralization is the key issue for debate. In three sections the paper comments on contemporary educational reform in Australia, discusses the consequences of decentralization for democracy, and suggests a way to reframe the problem of education reform to recognize the interdependency of development and democracy. (Contains 53 references.) (JB)
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October, 1994
TEACHERS AND DECENTRALISATION

Papers prepared for the National Industry Education Forum Seminar held in August 1994

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DEVOLUTION IN EDUCATION SYSTEMS:

Implications for Teacher Professional Development and Pupil Performance

Geoff Whitty
London University
In a paper I gave in Auckland recently (Whitty 1994a), I argued that the current shifts in the nature of education policy and administration reflected a repositioning of education in relation to the state and civil society. Wherever one stands on the broader sociological significance of recent reforms, some aspects of devolution are almost certainly here to stay. Alongside, and potentially in place of, collective provision by public bodies with a responsibility to cater for the needs of the whole population, there are increasing numbers of quasi-autonomous schools with devolved budgets competing for individual clients in the marketplace. While currently most in evidence in the Anglophone world, and in Britain, New Zealand, and parts of the USA, in particular, interest in such reforms is currently spreading to other parts of the world, including parts of continental Europe.

These administrative arrangements for managing education and other public services can be seen as new ways of resolving the problems facing the state in a situation where the traditional 'welfare state' is no longer able to function effectively (Dale 1989). The political rhetoric accompanying the educational reforms often seeks to suggest that education has been taken out of politics as normally understood. The former British Education Minister John Patten argued that one of their aims was to 'depoliticize' education by removing it from the local political arena and giving power to parents and school governors. In practice, though, the recent education reforms in Britain are as much to do with transferring power to central government as with giving autonomy to the schools. Janet McKenzie (1993) argues that 'British governments have actually increased their claims to knowledge and authority over the education system whilst promoting a theoretical and superficial movement towards consumer sovereignty' and Kevin Harris has argued that this is more generally the case (Harris 1993). Nevertheless, the appearance of devolution does make it easier for governments to make cuts in education expenditure and then blame the consequences on poor school management practices.

But, although it is sometimes tempting to be cynical, we also have to remember that this sort of 'buck-passing' has not been the only or even perhaps the main motivation for devolution. Nor is it even the case that all the support for these policies comes from New Right politicians who argue that social affairs are best organised according to the 'general principle of consumer sovereignty', which holds that each individual is the best judge of his or her needs and wants, and of what is in their best interests. I seem to recall that when I visited Victoria in 1982 some of the early moves to devolution were being talked of in terms of progressive ideals of
community empowerment. This was also one of the influences on the Picot reforms in New Zealand in the 1980s, even if they have subsequently been taken over by those more concerned with market freedom than with equity (Grace 1991, Gordon 1992). A similar tension has also been evident in the reforms in Chicago (Hess 1990). Other advocates of school autonomy base their support on claims that it is an independent variable in enhancing school effectiveness, though they too sometimes differ about the relative significance of community involvement and teacher empowerment in the process. In Britain, though, devolution and institutional autonomy has come to be closely linked to individual parental choice of school, the unleashing of market forces and an effective abandonment of an equity agenda.

I say all this because, while in some senses we are talking about tendencies of global proportions, perhaps associated with post-fordism or post-modernity (Whitty et al 1993), we are also looking at the working out of those tendencies in very different social and cultural contexts. This means we have to be very careful about using the experience of one context and applying it to others. Education systems have particular structures and embody particular assumptions which are deeply embedded in their time and place. Halpin and Troyna (1994) argue that 'fine-grain detail of their implementation' is necessary before reforms in one context can be used as models for policy-making in another and much the same might be said about the lessons that can be learnt from them. So, although I shall point to some disturbing consequences of our own reforms in practice, the outcomes might just be very different here. As Terri Seddon and her colleagues point out, 'decisions at proximal [or school] level are circumscribed by decisions at higher levels' and these higher level frames may differ from context to context (Seddon et al 1991).

I should also preface my comments with three other health warnings. Firstly, in Britain and to a lesser extent in New Zealand, self-managing schools came in at the same time as a whole range of other reforms, so it is virtually impossible to separate out the specific effects of any one of them. You will therefore need to bear in mind throughout my presentation that devolution policies in England are currently intimately linked to policies of parental choice and a National Curriculum and system of national testing at ages 7, 11, 14 and 16.

Secondly, many of the most ardent neo-liberal advocates of school autonomy and parental choice, such as Stuart Sexton, argue that the reasons for the current inadequacies of the reforms in countries like Britain and New Zealand is that the reformers were too cautious and that they would have worked better if taken to their logical conclusion - ultimately perhaps a fully privatised system with vouchers.

Finally, it is actually very early to judge the reforms even in the British case. Indeed, it struck me recently that the left often attacked the right for declaring comprehensive education a failure before it had a chance to get established, but that is now what the left often does in attacking the right's reforms. The right not unreasonably replies that you can't effect a culture shift overnight and that schools and their communities will only really reap the benefits once they have escaped from the welfare state dependency culture and appreciate that they now have real choices.
However, our government’s own approach is to declare their policies a success and to extend them even before they have been properly evaluated - and sometimes before they have even started - so it is probably useful to air some of the concerns that early research evidence gives rise to. Let me therefore try and lay out for you what evidence we do have about how school autonomy is working out so far. Given where I come from and how little time I have to present the evidence, I will talk mainly about how the reforms have worked in England, and make some cross references to the experience of New Zealand and the USA.

As you may know, prior to the 1980s, all but a small minority of English children were educated in state schools maintained by democratically elected local education authorities (LEAs) who exercised considerable political and bureaucratic control over their schools but also provided them with considerable professional support. However, the Thatcher and Major governments have tried to break this LEA monopoly with the following policies:

- **Reformed Governing Bodies** for state schools, introduced in the 1986 Education Act. This removed the inbuilt majority from the allegedly self-serving local education authorities (LEAs) that had hitherto controlled most of the schools and increased the representation of parents and local business interests.

- **City Technology Colleges (CTCs)**, announced in 1986, as new secondary schools for the inner city, entirely outside the control of LEAs, with curriculum emphasis on science and technology run by independent trusts with business sponsors who were expected provide much of the capital funding but with recurrent funding coming from central government.

- **Grant Maintained Schools**, created by a clause in the 1988 Education Reform Act which allows state schools to opt out of their Local Education Authorities (LEAs) after a parental ballot and run themselves with direct funding from central government.

- **Local Management of Schools (LMS)**, another aspect of the 1988 Act, which gave those schools that remained with the LEAs control over their own budgets and day to day management, receiving funds according to a formula which ensures that 80% of a school’s budget is determined directly by the number and ages of its pupils. This severely limits the scope for positive discrimination to counter disadvantage. The formula includes teachers’ salaries and teachers are now *de facto* (though not in all respects *de jure*) employees of the governing body.

- **Open Enrolment**, which was also part of the 1988 Act and goes much further than the limited enhancement of parental choice introduced in the 1980 Education Act. It allows popular schools to attract as many pupils as possible, at least up to their physical capacity, instead of being kept to lower limits or strict catchment areas in order that other schools can remain open. This is seen as the necessary corollary of per capita funding in creating what might be termed a quasi-market in education, which is expected to make all
Although elements of the reforms have been concerned to enhance both parental 'voice' and parental 'choice', the emphasis has been firmly on the latter. The 1993 Education Act has now extended the principles of diversity, choice and institutional autonomy throughout the school system. It extended LMS and the right to opt out to virtually all schools, permitted schools to apply to change their character by varying their enrolment schemes, sought to encourage new types of specialist schools and made it possible for some private schools to opt in to grant maintained status. While the rhetoric has been largely about devolving power to schools, parents and communities, the Act has also created a potentially powerful national Funding Agency for Schools (FAS) which will take over the planning function from LEAs where grant maintained schools are in the majority. This was widely expected to reduce the role of LEAs to a marginal and residual one over the next few years, though schools have so far been much more reluctant to opt out of their LEAs than the government anticipated. Two other Acts are also relevant, the 1992 Schools Act, which privatised school inspection, and the 1994 Education Act which encourages schools to take over teacher training from higher education institutions (Whitty 1994b). Meanwhile, following a union boycott of national testing last year, the original and cumbersome National Curriculum is to be made less prescriptive and the system of national testing is to be simplified.

If we look at the whole package of reforms, linking parental choice, school autonomy, the National Curriculum and national testing, I think the conclusion has to be that the reforms in England and Wales are tending to exacerbate differences between schools and between the pupils who attend different schools. There is a disproportionate representation of socially advantaged children in the schools deemed to be most 'successful', and of socially disadvantaged children in those schools identified as 'failing'. All this is creating a vertical hierarchy of schools rather than the responsive horizontal diversity which the advocates of the reforms claimed would emerge.

The Smithfield Project in New Zealand suggests much the same sort of social polarisation is taking place there (Lauder et al 1994). In another New Zealand study (Fowler 1993), schools located in low socio-economic areas were found to be judged negatively because of factors over which they had no influence, such as type of intake, location and problems perceived by parents as linked to these, so that schools in such areas there were more likely to be losing students to other schools. If we could be sure that that their poor reputation was deserved, this might be taken as evidence that the market was working well with effective schools reaping their just rewards. But judgements of schools tend to be made on social grounds or narrow academic criteria and with little reference to their overall effectiveness or even their academic effectiveness on value-added measures.

Furthermore, as in England, popular schools are choosing to become more selective rather than to expand, so the schools perceived to be poor are not actually closing but rather remaining open with reduced rolls, declining funding and low
morale, thus producing a self-fulfilling prophecy. The current funding regimes in both countries make it extremely difficult for schools in disadvantaged areas, usually in the inner city, to break out of the cycle of decline. Yet the research studies suggest that many of the differences between schools result from factors largely beyond the control of parents and schools, except the power of advantaged parents and advantaged schools to further enhance their advantage and thus increase educational inequalities and social polarisation. In addition, schools and their communities are far from equally endowed with material and cultural resources for self-management (Gordon 1993).

For these reasons, my own conclusion, like that of Michael Adler (1993) who studied choice policies in Scotland, is that there is therefore an urgent need to find a 'better balance between the rights of parents to choose schools for their children and the duties of [public] authorities to promote the education of all children'. In other words, we need a reassertion of citizen rights alongside consumer rights in education.

However, insofar as it is possible to focus more narrowly on the research relating specifically to school-based management, as distinct from parental choice, the evidence about its efficacy is more equivocal and I would probably have to offer you the Scottish verdict of not proven. Few people would wish to revert to the old system and, on that measure, the reforms have been a success. However, I was asked to concentrate on the impact of the reforms on pupil learning and teacher professionalism and, even more specifically, to alert you to some of the consequences as far as teachers are concerned, and here there have certainly been some problems.

The major study exploring the impact of LMS or self-management on schools in England and Wales was carried out by a team led by Hywel Thomas at Birmingham University. It was carried out over three years with funding from the National Association of Head Teachers and was largely based on national surveys of headteachers' views, followed up by visits to a sub-sample of schools to interview staff. The study is broadly positive but concedes that direct evidence of the influence of self-management on learning is elusive. On this, the results of the team's initial survey (Arnott et al 1992) were quite revealing:
LOCAL MANAGEMENT ALLOWS THE SCHOOL TO MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF ITS RESOURCES

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AS A RESULT OF LOCAL MANAGEMENT, MEETINGS ARE TAKEN UP BY ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES WHICH LESSEN OUR ATTENTION ON PUPILS' LEARNING

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CHILDREN'S LEARNING IS BENEFITING FROM LOCAL MANAGEMENT

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While heads overwhelmingly felt that self-management allowed the school to make more effective use of its resources and most were enthusiastic about it, they also felt that their own time was now too taken up with administration and that this often diverted their attention away from pupils' learning. They were almost equally divided as to whether or not children's learning had benefited from self-management, so it was rather unclear what their concept of greater effectiveness related to. Presumably more than the fact that they could get a broken window mended rather than wasting time chasing central services, though I don't underestimate the significance of such petty frustrations in bringing about the reforms or in explaining why headteachers prefer the new systems.

In the final report published very recently (Bullock and Thomas 1994), the proportion of headteachers making a positive assessment concerning improvements in pupil learning has increased somewhat over the past three years, but significantly this assessment has come mainly from those schools which have experienced an increase in funding as a result of self-management.

One would expect this on the basis of work carried out by Bruce Cooper (1994) in the USA which suggests that, as more money is passed down to the instructional...
Context, including paying for better qualified or experienced teachers, there are tangible benefits for pupil performance. Bulk funding of teachers' salaries in England is done on the basis of average rather than actual salaries and schools whose budgets have been squeezed by the effect of this can therefore expect negative consequences. And Cooper's research would also suggest that if the funding that is passed down to schools does not reach the instructional context, that is teachers and classrooms, then its benefits will be more questionable. In Britain, the linking of self-management with parental choice, has sometimes meant that resources are diverted into marketing rather than instruction and, indeed, successful marketing becomes essential to protect future years' budgets. So some headteachers may divert funds from the classroom on the basis of a judgement that it is in the best long-term interests of the school, but producing little evidence of immediate benefits as far as teachers and pupils are concerned.

While the Birmingham team conclude that self-management is broadly a successful reform, they rightly argue that, before a more definitive conclusion can be drawn, more evidence is needed particularly on the relationship between resourcing levels and learning outcomes. If the link is a close one, as Cooper suggests, then it argues against the current funding formula which can reward or punish a school with sharp year-on-year changes in resourcing as a result of changes in school rolls. Indeed, it almost argues for a retreat from the extreme form of pupil-based funding we now have either to funding based on average rolls over a number of years (as the research team suggest) or a return to curriculum led staffing - or even, dare I say, some form of positive discrimination. This is particularly important in that the schools most affected by budgetary difficulties, and therefore least likely to report a positive impact on pupils' learning, were often those with pupils from disadvantaged communities. Cathy Wylie's study of the fifth year of self-managing schools in New Zealand (Wylie 1994) also identified schools in low income areas, and schools with high Maori enrolments, as experiencing greater resource problems than others. However, she did not find this correlated with perceptions of the success of the reforms nor with evaluations of the influence of the reforms on pupil learning and she admits to being puzzled by this. Apart from in a few pilot schools, New Zealand does not yet have bulk funding of teacher salaries and there remain more opportunities to apply for equity funding, so it may be that the funding differences there are less severe in their impact.

The English results I quoted came, as I said, mainly from headteacher respondents, i.e. from those responsible for the efficient management of the delegated budget and whose authority has been significantly enhanced by the self-management reform. There is, as yet, no similar study of classroom teachers or pupils. But it may be significant that the relatively few classroom teachers who were interviewed by the Birmingham research team were far more cautious than their headteachers about the benefits of self-management for pupil learning and overall standards. This takes on even more significance when we learn from a recent report from OFSTED that 70% of primary headteachers are failing to monitor how well their pupils are being taught. It says that 'most attempts by heads to evaluate their staff's performance centred on what lessons covered rather than their quality or the standards of children's learning' (OFSTED 1994). One has then to be somewhat
sceptical about the value of claims by these same headteachers that self-management has improved pupil learning.

Another recently published study, by Marren and Levacic (1994), this time independently funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, also found classroom teachers less positive about self-management than either governors or headteachers. Heads generally welcomed self-management even where their school had lost resources as a result of it, while classroom teachers were far more sceptical about its benefits even in schools which had gained in resources. In New Zealand, Wylie reports that 41% of teachers, compared to 46% of principals, felt that the quality of children’s learning had improved since the shift to school-based management.

As I indicated earlier, one of the difficulties about making sense of the British evidence about decentralisation is that budgetary autonomy and school-based management came in at the same time as a highly centralising measure, the National Curriculum and national testing. It is therefore difficult to separate their different effects on teachers’ work and pupil learning. Interestingly, though, a recent survey conducted by Warwick University (Campbell and Neill 1994) on the effects of the National Curriculum on infant school teachers, this time funded by a teachers’ rather than a headteachers’ union, concludes that there has been no overall improvement in standards but teachers have been driven to burnout. A 54 hour week is now the norm for infant teachers, with one in ten working more than 60 hours. Another recent study, for the School Teachers’ Pay Review Body, has found that primary heads work on average 55.4 hours a week and classroom teachers 48.8 hours a week, but this includes junior school teachers who have so far been less affected by the demands of national testing than their infant school counterparts. The equivalent figure for secondary heads was 61.1 hours and for classroom teachers 48.9 hours per week (Rafferty 1994a). The publication of these figures coincides with evidence of a steep rise in the numbers of heads and deputies retiring early (Rafferty 1994b).

The infant school respondents in the Warwick study talked of tiredness, irritability and depression, of sleeping badly, increased drinking, occasional crying in the staffroom, and a sense of guilt that they were neglecting their own families. Again, this has to be seen as coming from a particular pressure group, but the research was actually sponsored by one of the least militant unions and one broadly in favour of the reforms.

Even in New Zealand, where the National Curriculum loading is a less significant factor, Wylie (1994) found principals working 59.85 hours a week and teachers working 48.18 hours, while in more urban samples Susan Bridges (1993) reported 51 hours for primary teachers and Ian Livingstone (1994) an average of 54.5 hours for teachers and principals. As a result, New Zealand teachers reported high levels of stress, declining job satisfaction, and a desire to leave the profession, even where they felt the reforms had brought some benefits. Wylie (1994) concluded that New Zealand school communities had probably reached the limit of what could provide to support the reforms in terms of money and time. Teachers varied
considerably in their views about the influence of the reforms on relationships within
the school, but Wylie herself alerts us to the fact that a significant proportion of them
- 20% - reported some deterioration in their relationship with their principal
attributable to the reforms.

Some of the small-scale ethnographic evidence from Britain and New Zealand
chronicles the effects of this intensification of teachers' work and its consequences
for industrial relations in schools. One of the ironies in England is that it seems that
both the devolution of self-management and the centralisation of the National
Curriculum are having detrimental effects on teacher morale and teacher workload.
Bowe, Ball and Gold's book *Reforming Education and Changing Schools* (Bowe et
al 1992) points to real problems with both self-management and the National
Curriculum as they are working out on the ground in secondary schools and sees
them as contributing to a growing gulf between senior managers and teachers and
a clash between managerial and educational values. Broadbent et al (1993),
however, report evidence from other schools that the demands of local
management were (initially at any rate) absorbed by a core 'coping group' of senior
managers whose efforts were able to leave the core educational values of the
school relatively unscathed. But, according to other work, including some from New
Zealand (Murfitt, in progress), it seems to be middle managers in secondary schools
who experience the greatest pressures, both from above and below.

Marren and Levacic (1994) are not sure whether their own evidence that classroom
teachers are more critical of self-management than are senior managers is
necessarily evidence of a cleavage in values between teachers and managers.
They do say it may be that greater class teacher involvement in financial decision-
making will be needed if self-management is to result in significant improvements in
teaching and learning, but there is a contrary view that financial management is a
specialised task and that senior management needs to get better at it rather than to
share it. David Hargreaves (1994) goes further and argues for a formal separation
between non-teacher chief executives and headteachers as leading professionals,
making an analogy with the health service. However, few doctors in NHS Trust
hospitals in Britain feel that this separation has enhanced their professionalism and
colloquiality and I heard much the same about their experiences in Crown Health
Enterprises in New Zealand.

Nevertheless, a key issue is how far it is possible to give classroom teachers a
sufficient degree of involvement in resource management decisions to empower
them without diverting them from pupil-related activities in the same way as had
happened to headteachers on the evidence of the Birmingham study. Thus, all
these studies raise some serious questions about the effects of self-management
on the nature of the school community. While headteachers themselves often claim
that local management has increased the involvement of teaching staff in decision-
making, a study of the effects of self-management on industrial relations in schools,
by Sinclair et al (1993) at Keele University, suggests that the very logic of the
reforms is that 'headteachers are no longer partners in the process of educating
pupils - they become allocators of resources within the school, managers who are
driven to ensure that the activities of employees are appropriate to the needs of the
business, and givers of rewards to those whose contribution to the business is most highly regarded'. This seems more consistent with the conclusions of Bowe and Ball than of Levacic and Marren or even Broadbent et al.

When schools were managed from a more distant bureaucracy, there was often a sense of headteacher and teachers being the professionals fighting a common cause against the distant bureaucracy. With self-management, there has sometimes been a much sharper sense that the school governors and the senior management team are 'management' and teaching and other staff the 'workers'. Halpin et al (1993) suggest that, in the case of grant maintained schools, the very process of running a self-managing unit can result in an increase in the distance of headteachers from classroom teachers.

At the same time, many teachers are feeling the loss of some of the more positive aspects of being part of a larger concern. In the past, LEA support networks have fulfilled an important function in Britain. With the devolution of most funds to individual schools, local teachers' centres and other forms of support have often been removed or reduced in scope, even for teachers in LEA schools operating under local management. This problem can be even more acute in the case of grant maintained schools and city technology colleges, whose staff can easily become isolated from the broader professional community.

A major source of support for teachers has traditionally been their trade unions. As a result of the reforms, teachers face increased workloads, attempts to use them more flexibly to counter the effects of budget restrictions, divisive approaches to performance related pay, and the substitution of full-time, permanent, qualified and experienced staff by part-time, temporary, less qualified and less experienced and therefore less expensive alternatives. A recent report by the National Foundation for Educational Research confirms that many of these trends have accelerated since the introduction of local management, particularly in those schools adversely affected by the use of average staffing costs in the funding formulae (Maychell 1994). This, of course, has potential implications not only for teachers' conditions of service but also the quality of education.

It also poses new challenges for the teacher unions. The research carried out by Sinclair et al (1993) suggests that the atomisation associated with self-management has not yet entirely succeeded in breaking down the traditional power of teacher unions within the state education system. Old networks from LEA days are still active and many national and local agreements remain in place or have been accepted as the basis for site-level agreements. Legal confusion about who is technically the employer in LEA schools operating under LMS means there are a number of issues that still have to be tested in the courts.

Partly for these reasons, right-wing critics of the progress of the reforms now want conditions of service - and perhaps even salary scales (Flew 1994) - entirely determined at school level, as already happens in City Technology Colleges and, to a more limited extent, in grant maintained schools. In those contexts, unions are often finding themselves marginalized by management and this points to the need
for unions to establish strong plant-bargaining capacity if they are to be effective in self-managing schools. In some CTCs, trade unions are not recognised for bargaining purposes and in-house staff associations have been established without any teeth. In other cases, the less militant unions have been offered 'no-strike' agreements.

These CTCs are run by trusts dominated by business sponsors, and they have sometimes been seen as the model for all schools in the future - post-Fordist schools for a post-modern society. But, while pay in these schools is usually at a higher level than in other local schools, conditions of service are also very different. It is a moot point whether free private health insurance is adequate compensation for longer working hours, fixed term contracts, performance related pay, etc - though it may well prove necessary in the circumstances! Flexibility and claims of enhanced professionalism can too easily become a cover for exploitation of teachers and worsening conditions of service.

There have been suggestions, for example by Charles Kerchner in the States (Kerchner and Mitchell 1988) and Michael Barber (1992) in the UK, that the teaching unions need to develop a new mode of operation, sometimes termed 'third generation' or 'professional' unionism, in which they negotiate educational as well as industrial issues and potentially become partners with management in educational decision-making to serve the best interests of learners. Self-management has been seen to pose a threat to traditional styles of trade unionism, but provide real opportunities for this new style version. It could also be a way of giving classroom teachers a voice in management without diverting them from their primary role. However, at the present time, this might be more realistic in the USA, where the rhetoric of reform made rather more reference to teacher empowerment and shared decision-making as ways of enhancing teacher professionalism than has hitherto been the case in Britain, where the reforms have been accompanied by swingeing attacks on the integrity of the teaching profession in general and the teachers' unions in particular.

Michael Barber and I mounted a small research project, with funding from the National Union of Teachers, to see how far teacher unions in England were actually involved in school-based decision making on the ground. During the school year 1992/93, we conducted a survey amongst a sample of NUT school representatives to discover the extent to which they were involved in decision-making about budgets, curriculum and school development planning. School development planning is now a requirement on English schools and is seen by its gurus, Hargreaves and Hopkins (1991), as aiming to 'improve the quality of teaching and learning in a school through the successful management of innovation and change'. Yet the vast literature on this subject makes virtually no mention of trade unions and our survey confirmed their marginalisation on the ground. Only 14% of school union representatives had ever been consulted about the budget, 15% about the curriculum and 17% about the school development plan. Our subsequent fieldwork suggested that even these figures exaggerated the extent of genuine consultation, let alone formal involvement of unions in school management.
Given the broader political and industrial context of deskilling, reskilling, intensification and substitution of labour in which the British reforms have been introduced, this is hardly surprising. Nor is it surprising that both unions and management were sceptical about whether greater union involvement in management was feasible in present circumstances. There was therefore little evidence of the union representatives participating in issues other than those associated with 'second generational unionism', that is, giving advice to members, negotiating with management over grievances and campaigning on issues related to pay and conditions of work.

We also found that school governing bodies tended to operate with a traditional view of employer-employee relations and of the legitimate role of trade unions within educational establishments. The image of the union representative as confrontational and having a tendency to put the interests of teachers before the interests of pupils seems to have made many headteachers worried about the union representative even meeting the governing body. Some headteachers stated that playing down their members' interests was a prerequisite to the unions becoming more involved in school development planning, but school representatives pointed to the danger of their unique critical perspective thereby disappearing to the detriment of all concerned.

If pressure for the abandonment of national and local agreements intensifies, leaving more and more issues to be resolved within individual schools, it will become increasingly important for school representatives to be able to explore the relationship between resources, conditions of service and educational outcomes at institutional level. It was therefore disturbing to find that both headteachers and union representatives felt that a central concern with the needs of learners might involve union representatives abandoning their more traditional concerns.

Although shared decision-making seems to be a more central part of the reforms in the USA than it is in England, the literature there suggests that it is anyway not a panacea for effective schools. Discussing the evidence in the context of employee participation in business corporations, Clair Brown (in Hannaway and Carnoy 1993) concludes that participation in decision-making 'cannot be expected to overcome serious shortcomings [in an organization]. Once schools are at a functional baseline, however, innovative EI [employee involvement] can be a powerful tool for making continual improvements and maintaining high performance'. This is broadly consistent with the findings of a study of school development planning being undertaken by some of my colleagues in the UK (MacGilchrist et al 1994). Meanwhile, following a report for one of the teachers' unions in New Zealand which emphasised the considerable potential of shared decision-making for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of schools (Hill 1992), some interesting action research on the value of various models of shared decision-making is currently being undertaken there (Capper 1994). However, unless they are handled very carefully, any positive moves in this direction may be stymied by their implications for already excessive workloads (Livingstone 1994).
Nevertheless, if devolution is to produce positive effects throughout schools, there is surely an urgent need to find ways of reasserting the collective values of teaching as a profession as a counter-balance to the overemphasis on self-interest that is currently fostered by the reforms. It is not entirely clear whether the recent successful union boycott of national testing in England was a return to old-style trade unionism or a new-style alliance between professionals and their clients in the interests of the community as a whole. Either way, it was not widely anticipated. It was expected that, by setting school against school, the reforms would put a stop to such displays of solidarity. Indeed, it is sometimes tempting to believe that one of the intentions of the reforms was to prevent anyone taking a broader view.

Yet, as I indicated earlier, the conclusion of studies of the overall effects of the reforms is that someone needs to because, although the rhetoric of reform suggests that the hidden hand of the market will produce the best possible outcome, the reality suggests that this may well not be the case. Until England faces up to this challenge, other countries should be wary of the suggestion by Chubb and Moe (1992), the leading American proponents of school autonomy, that the English experience offers them a useful lesson in school reform - unless that lesson is that some approaches should be treated with extreme caution. Empirical research does not, indeed in principle could not, show that such reforms can never have beneficial effects. What it does seem to show is that in the particular circumstances of contemporary Britain some of the positive educational benefits claimed for them have yet to forthcoming and that, far from breaking the links between educational and social quality, they seem to intensify them.

But having painted a less than ecstatic picture of the reality of school self-management, I return to the point with which I began. These policies in Britain were part of a broader Thatcherite project. In that context it is hardly surprising that they have had the effects I have chronicled here and they may not have the same effects in a different political culture. Nor, indeed, can the solution be merely to return to old forms of organisation. There are clearly progressive moments within devolution, as was recognised in some of the early moves in that direction in this state and this is also probably reflected in the desire of teachers in both Britain and New Zealand to retain some version of self-management. But it is difficult to realise those progressive moments at site level in a situation of diminishing resources and when the broader political climate is pointing firmly in the opposite direction.
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DECENTRALISATION

AND

DEMOCRACY

Terri Seddon
Monash University
Thank you for the invitation to participate at this National Industry Education Forum (NIEF) seminar. I welcome the opportunity to speak in this context and would like to congratulate the NIEF for its work in establishing channels of communication between the industry and education sectors where matters of mutual concern can be debated.

Let me also say that the prospect of talking at this forum, across sectors, is a challenge about which I am a little apprehensive. There is good research which shows that industry and education are two different rhetorical contexts (e.g. Freedman, 1994). Different understandings, assumptions and expectations frame what is said and thought in each sector. This means that while common words may be used, they often have different meanings and significance.

Rather than shying away from this fact, in this paper I want to tackle it head on and build on the NIEF's agenda of developing cross-sectoral conversations about education and its reform. Specifically, I want to suggest that, firstly, current educational reform is limited by its neglect of the interdependencies of development, democracy and education, and secondly, the character of decentralisation, rather than the general fact of decentralisation is the key issue for debate.
I have organised the paper into three sections. In the first section I comment about the way contemporary educational reform, specifically decentralisation, is being approached in Australia. In the second, I consider the consequences of decentralisation for democracy. Finally, I begin to reframe the problem of education reform in a way which recognises the interdependency of development and democracy.

**Framing education reform in Australia**

As I was preparing this paper I was struck by a number of curious features of Australian education reform.

In Australia, when we meet to consider educational reform we discuss decentralisation. In other countries of the world, in Europe, the Russian States, South Africa, the key debate in education is about democracy.

In Australia, while we talk about decentralisation, decision making has become more and more centralised and exclusive. In Europe there are serious discussions about inclusion and exclusion in decision making, about what is meant by social membership and the rules that govern belonging. These issues are fundamental to democracy because they determine the nature of participation in society.

In Australia, decentralisation encourages us to understand participation as an individual, private, process of choosing ready made goods and services. In Europe, the nature of participation is debated but participation is understood to be more than a matter of private choice. This is because, firstly, there is unequal opportunity to exercise choice, and secondly, because the making of choices says nothing about the definition of alternatives from which choices can be made. It is the opportunity to make choices and be involved in the determination of what the choices options are to be that is recognised as crucial to participation. And this participation is seen to be fundamental to both the experience of social membership and the formation of a social cement which binds communities, nations, societies together.

In Australia, ethnocentric, them-us, attitudes prevail, racism is endemic and ethnic violence is reported in the press but the role of education is understood in economic terms. The NIEF goals, for example, begin by stating:
The task faced by the Australian community is to be among the best in the world in all areas which affect economic performance. For education this means improving the nation's schools so that their students are performing at the forefront of world standards.

(NIEF, 1991: 4)

In Europe, faced with the hideousness of what was Yugoslavia, the fragmentation of the Russian States, a massive influx of refugees and guest workers, and the challenges of building a United Europe, people are addressing the contribution that education can make to social solidarity.

As these counterpoints suggest, Australia is unusual in adopting a narrow, one-eyed, economic focus in educational reform. In this approach the problem of education is framed as a simple and spurious polarity of state versus market. The problem is defined as too much state. And 'the' solution put up is decentralisation. As Caldwell notes, this solution

... is a form of administrative decentralisation rather than political decentralisation. Administrative decentralisation or delegation occurs when a government or centre of authority determines that decisions formerly made at a central level may be made at a level in the organisation which is closer to the point of service or manufacture.

(Caldwell, 1993: 2-3)

Expressed simply, significant responsibility, authority and accountability are being shifted to the level of the operational unit, where a service is provided or a product manufactured, all within centrally-determined frameworks of missions, vision, goals, priorities or standards.

(Caldwell, 1993: 1)

What is notable about all this is that, in Australia, we have moved down a narrow, economically framed, pathway to educational reform which makes issues of democracy invisible. It pushes them just over the horizon.

By contrast, in Europe, talk about democracy is mainstream. They approach the question of education reform from a perspective which accurately recognises that development, democracy and education are intertwined. They face the implications
of the times we live in by accepting that education, democracy and development will all have to change. As Mitter comments:

In our own time, 20, or even 10 years, seems to us to be too long to wait for the solution to the various existential problems with which the whole globe is confronted. The recent World Conference held in Rio de Janiero drastically underlined the need for a radical reconsideration of strategies and policies in the area of environmental protection. It goes without saying that the reconsideration necessary requires new approaches to development, but also, at the same time, to democracy. Unless these are developed, the task of linking development to fundamental values, focused upon human rights and human dignity, is likely to be left to self-appointed or empowered 'saviours'. In the final analysis, however, development and democracy must both depend upon the effectiveness of an education which supports both of them and also links their functions to the fundamental human values ...

(Mitter, 1993: 470)

**Consequences of the decentralisation solution**

The narrow, economistic, approach to education reform which has become paradigmatic in Australia has arisen from a number of convergent developments. These include the adoption of a institutionally limited view of education, a selective misreading of history, a dependent and subservient preoccupation with developments in the UK and USA, a naive acceptance and application of management ideology, and a dauntingly simplistic understanding of social life and its organisation.

The actual and likely practical consequences of this narrow approach to educational reform can be summarised in four points.

**Firstly, there has been a profound transformation in the social relations of schooling.** A partnership model of devolution which provided a framework for the sharing of wisdom (Cahir, 1994) between citizen members of the school and educational community has been dissolved. A market model has been established in its place, in which education producers and consumers confront one another around educational service provision.
Meanwhile government oscillates between providing an arm's length framework within which the educational market will operate and being a line manager in what is virtually a quasi-1950s, authoritarian, centralised bureaucracy.

The effect has been to permit parental community involvement at the local school level but to limit participation at central levels. It has also extended industry involvement because industry is a consumer of education's products but this participation occurs more at the central than local level.
Secondly, this transformation of the social relations of schooling has created substantial ambiguity in the actual relationships between groups and individuals. This ambiguity has two dimensions, a structural and cultural dimension which is perhaps most clearly revealed in the relationships between school principals and school councils.

Structurally, the school principal is defined as the educational leader in a school, employed by the school system and therefore, responsible to the director of the school system. Similar to the managing director of a business, the principal is responsible for educational and financial decisions in the school, albeit within the state government’s defined mission, vision for schooling in the state.

The school council is, as Caldwell (1993: 30) comments, akin to a board of directors being ‘representative of the “shareholders” in school education at the local level’. Except that the composition of the school council is carefully defined, by the state government, in terms of occupational or attributed status rather than in terms of social membership. According to the Department of School Education's (DSE) newspaper, Education News, the council must include a majority of non DSE-employed parent members, no more than one third DSE-employed members and this must include the principal, and it may also include coopted members who are brought onto council because of their particular expertise (Education News, School Council Lift Out, 8/4/93: 1). The implication of this composition is that educational decision making does not occur between equal citizen-participants in education, but between different occupational groups whose claim to expertise depends upon, and is limited by, their attributed characteristics and qualities.

The relationship between these two agencies is ambiguous because of the way the responsibilities of school principals have been defined. A summary in Education News makes this quite clear:

The principal is accountable for the overall management and development of the school within statewide guidelines and Government policies.

At the same time, the principal, as executive officer of the school council, must ensure that adequate and appropriate advice is provided to the council on educational and other matters, that the decisions of the council are implemented and that adequate support and resources are provided for the conduct of council meetings.

(Education News, 14/12/93: 7)
As Caldwell (1993) recognises, there is considerable scope for conflict here, particularly if the school council takes its responsibilities of representing the school community seriously rather than simply rubber-stamping whatever is presented to them by the principal.

The cultural dimension of this ambiguity in the social relationships of schooling has arisen because of the dramatic changes that have occurred in education. People have been thrust from one context in which they understood their place in education as citizen-participant members of an educational community to another context in which they are expected to be either education consumers or education service providers in a line management structure. This substantial change has occurred very rapidly, leaving many people uncertain about the actual context and their practical status within it.

The challenge for central authorities is to pursue their educational reform agenda by encouraging individuals to take up their new market identities and to forget their old status as citizens-participants in the educational community. The challenge is, in other words, to induce social amnesia so that issues of democracy and citizenship are forgotten. As R.D. Laing wrote:

> If Jack succeeds in forgetting something, this is of little use if Jill continues to remind him of it. He must induce her not to do so. The safest way would be not just to make her keep quiet about it, but to induce her to forget it also.2

(Laing, 1967: 31-32)

Thirdly, the ambiguity of these relationships, coupled with the occupational basis for participation in school and educational governance, accentuates the likelihood of conflict.

This conflict is experienced at an interpersonal level. It is lived on a day to day basis as increased stress and personal distress, but it is not simply a consequence of individual behaviour, personality and interpersonal relationships. It is a consequence of the structural and cultural dimensions of the ambiguous educational context. Individuals' actions are shaped by these structural and cultural tensions, irrespective of their intentions, their personal commitments and their pursuit of good interpersonal relations. The scope for individual manoeuvring is limited and with endemic tensions, conflict is inevitable.
The scope for conflict is substantial in these ambiguous arrangements. Conflict between principals and their school councils can erupt over issues such as accurate reporting of school council business or the principals' consent to abide and be guided by school council decisions. Conflict between different sections of the community and its school council representatives, and principals is not inconceivable, particularly given the occupational basis of school council membership and the informal procedures which many schools use to get council nominations. But it is conflict between school councils and central authorities which is perhaps the most significant because it is in this conflict that the fundamental contradiction in decentralisation, and the incompatibility with democracy, is revealed.

The crux of the matter is that decentralisation establishes a structure which permits choice but only within centrally prescribed frameworks. Decentralisation 'empowers' by delegating authority down the line. It permits action and decision making but only within the parameters of the corporate mission. The employment contract means that central authorities can legitimately demand that employees be obedient to this centrally defined vision, and indeed, they should be thankful for their new 'empowerment' which comes from having particular authority delegated to them. But the school council represents parents and parents are the customers who choose the educational services they wish to take up for their children. According to management ideology, while staff are 'empowered' to act within a centrally-determined 'company' mission of education service provision, the 'customer' must be served.

Customers are not bound by the parameters of a centralised educational vision, nor by an employment contract. They may choose, individually and privately, to send their children to other schools which lie beyond the central authorities corporate mission but they may also choose not to. If they choose to stay, they are at liberty to present their demands for appropriate customer service to the school. They are represented in this by the school council which therefore must contest the corporate mission and requirements of the central authorities. The difficulty for the central authorities is how to bring parents and their school councils into the corporate structure as subservient and grateful customers rather than as citizens.

In Victoria, the opportunities for school councils to present customer demands are quite limited. They have been shaped by the way procedures have been established for determining school responses in relation to, for example, quality
provision and school charters, and by the way authority over staffing has been
delegated. Virtually the only point of leverage available to school councils’ is in the
process of principal selection and, already, conflict is evident. It is well illustrated in
the case of Camberwell High School.

At Camberwell, the local committee selecting a new principal has recommended an
appointment on two occasions but, in both instances, the recommendation has been
overturned by the Director of Education. The Director instated his preferred
candidate but this position is yet to be confirmed. Meanwhile, Camberwell parents,
through their school council, have indicated that they are outraged at the procedures
which make a mockery of their right to locally select their school principal, and that
they will not work with the imposed principal. The Premier, Jeff Kennett, effectively
supported the council, writing:

The School Council has the right to endorse or reject the decision of
the [principal selection] panel, thereby ensuring that an applicant who
does not have the support of the local community is not imposed on
the school.

(School Bell, 7/8/94: 6)

An appeal to the Merit Protection Board has now (24/8/94) upheld the appointment
of the imposed principal but the school council stands by its decision to work only
with the council’s preferred candidate. The council president is reported as saying,
‘If the director of school education) cares to confirm an appointment against the
express wishes of the council, then he must get a new council to work with them’
(Age, 24/8/94). A spokesman for the Minister for Education, Don Hayward,
indicated that the Department of School Education respected the judgement of the
panel of the Merit Protection Board but would not say if the Government would
consider sacking the council. Currently, there appears to be a stalemate, with a
meeting planned between the Director and the school council president this
afternoon (26/8/94).

This case illustrates the serious flaws in the economically framed notion of
decentralisation. Decentralisation depends upon consent to central authorities
definition of the product to be consumed and the consumers' consent to simply
choose a product on offer. It depends upon an inequality of information and
expertise, and an unequal capacity to participate in decision making. It establishes,
in other words, unequal power relations which permit the central agency to define
what will count as `quality' education and educational services, and to impose that definition on all others, not only its own employees but also the customers and, indeed, on all citizens, which includes both employees and consumers.

Employees can be disciplined into consent, but customers have to be subordinated to those definitions through manipulation of the decision making process. Restricting the scope and character of school council participation is one strategy. Presenting school councillors as `just parents', establishing categories of `expert' coopted councillors, overloading school councillors with routine administrative work - are other strategies which reduce the capacity of school councillors to participate fully in decision making. They erode or deny the resources which are necessary for equal participation, that is, equal opportunity to both determine choice options and to make choices in an independent way, and so press school councils and councillors toward corporate `empowerment'.

Basing decision making on occupational status is significant here. This is partly because it determines the claim to expertise which can legitimately be made. The principals' professional knowledge or the Department's authority is set against the parents lay knowledge irrespective of the actual knowledge base which parents bring to their work as school councillors. The occupational status is also significant because, in a conflict situation, it encourages the closing of ranks, particularly where there is sufficient cultural affiliation to develop a group identity. In the Camberwell case, for example, primary school principals were reported to be querying `Whatever do the Camberwell parents think they are doing?'

Finally, this context of ambiguous relationships encourages the consolidation of positions which reconfirms hierarchies and patterns of inclusion and exclusion. This consolidation occurs because a strong position provides groups with some protection in uncertain, ambiguous times and also, more opportunistic, competitive advantage. Again this is well illustrated in the Camberwell case.

The conflict at Camberwell encourages a closing of ranks in the principal class and affirmations of the professional rights of principals to shape education in their schools. For example, the Victorian Principals Federation (VPF) newsletter comments that some school councils 'are developing a view that they have more power, rights and authority than they have in fact'. Having argued that principal selection depends upon merit, the newsletter continued with reference to Camberwell,
There is a publicly stated view by some members of that school's council and certainly by a section of its parent body that the council 'appoints' the principal. This is not so and hopefully it never will be so. Whether this fact is inconsistent with the rhetoric of Schools of the Future is beside the point. The VPF will never accept a situation in which the school council becomes the employer.

(VPF Newsletter, 17/8/94: 4)

One effect of this kind of consolidation of principals' view of their role in education is to put themselves, as a group, in a dominant position vis-à-vis school councils. Yet at the same time the Principals' Federation is acting, as a proper union would, to defend their members interests. Faced with the prospect of displaced principals being passed over for promotion and the longer term problem of principals being employed on limited-term contracts and therefore more vulnerable to displacement, the VPF continues:

... we will defend any principal against unwarranted, disruptive tactics employed by local communities which are specifically designed to bring that principal down.

(VPF Newsletter, 17/8/94: 4)

In a nutshell, corporate decentralisation, ambiguous relationships and positional manoeuvring, creates a context with a high potential for conflict because there is a fundamental contradiction between corporate and democratic organisation. As a result decentralisation establishes a zero-sum game between the delegating and subordinating practices of the corporate command structure and the autonomous and independent practices of citizenship. As a result politics have high stakes. Winners and loosers are maximised and the basis for citizen-participation and social solidarity are undermined. For these reasons, I would argue that economic decentralisation represents a policy cul-de-sac which may or may not support development the (evidence is not clear) but which destroys the basis for democracy and social solidarity.

Another basis for education policy?

The challenge for education is not to perpetuate the economistic decentralisation paradigm which makes democracy invisible. Ultimately this will fail on social
grounds. The only significant questions concern how long will it take to fail? How much damage will be done to individuals and the social and cultural infrastructure of modern society in the meantime? And how individuals can survive and transform this educational arrangement?

The real challenge for all those concerned with education is to develop an approach to education policy and practice which renders democracy visible and recognizes that development and democracy are interdependent. This reframing does not make the existential problems we face at the end of the twentieth century any easier to deal with, but it does mean that solutions which are generated are less likely to be simply destructive of the social and cultural infrastructure which democracy provides in support of development. While there are no easy answers, this challenge of reframing is one we will in any case have to take up sooner or later because one-eyed economism is not sustainable in the long term.

The first step in this reframing is to begin to redefine the problem we are tackling in education. Clearly it is not simply to improve schools so that they educate on vocational lines and prepare a workforce which is internationally competitive. It is more about reform which creates a pattern of educational provision which supports, and contributes to the necessary redefinition of, both development and democracy in the twenty first century. What is called for is an education in courage and questioning, not merely competence and compliance. Work-related learning is important, so too is life-related learning. An internationally competitive workforce may be an outcome if it is defined in terms of skill formation, that is, an individuals' acquisition of intellectual and practical capacities for action, but not if it is about creating unprincipled conformity so that workers can be pressed toward Asian wage levels.

Another step is to assess the resources which will support the reframing of education policy and practice. We could turn our Australian eyes away from the UK, USA, New Zealand and the 200 schools at Edmonton which justifies Caldwell's inclusion of Canada in his list of decentralising countries. We could look towards Europe, not just to pick up quick tips about training reform, but to make a sustained examination of the way they deal with the interdependencies of development, democracy and education.

Other resources are closer to hand. Frank Castles has investigated the entwining of democracy and development through the twentieth century and argues that there is
a distinctly Australian response to economic vulnerability. Australia developed a strategy of domestic protection in the early years of this century based partly on the constitutional division of powers at federation and partly on legislative arrangements related to industrial relations and welfare provision. The result of this historic compromise between labour and protectionism was an institutional framework, a 'wage-earner's welfare state' (Castles, 1988: 129), which provided 'protection all round'. The erection of tariff barriers permitted the development of protected industries. Employers were protected because wage costs could be passed on through price increases and further protection. Workers were protected by the principles of wage indexation and comparative wage justice which were effected, by centralised union advocacy, through the industrial relations system. The control of immigration meant that organised labour would not be undercut in terms of wages and conditions and a residual system of income support was established for those individuals, other than women and children, who fell outside the labour market. The introduction of a family wage meant that women and children were dependent upon income support privately provided by the husband.

Domestic protection survived until the 1960s, Castles argues. Since then it has come under increasing challenge as the removal of tariff barriers has opened the economy to international competition and unzipped the public policy framework of domestic protection. The dissolution of this policy framework which articulated development and democracy in Australia, leaves us with inappropriate ghosts from the past but without a clear policy direction. On the one hand we face moves toward a domestic compensation strategy which builds on the individualist and labourist legacy of the wage-earner's welfare state to recompense individuals for the hardship they suffer in the process of economic restructuring. This has been, at least in part, the agenda behind the Accord. On the other hand we face a neoclassical economic approach which seems hellbent on recreating a mid-nineteenth century scenario in Australia with individuals disciplined by the labour contract and enterprises given free reign in development, with neither buffered by the social, economic and cultural infrastructure of a democratic state.

Castles work, as well as current debates about the welfare state and citizenship, provide a good starting point for grappling with the relationship between development and democracy in Australia. But these authors do not address the historical articulation of education with Australian democracy and development, nor, except in a few cases, do they address the place of education in the currently contested patterns of development and democracy. Yet the consolidation of liberal
meritocratic education systems was completed by the early 1920s, coinciding with the development of domestic protection. Liberal meritocracy also began to come apart in the 1960s. Since then the debates about protection, public policy, industrial relations, and welfare provision have proceeded alongside, but rarely integrated with the parallel debates in education.

This integrated analysis of education in the wider context of Australian development and democracy is crucial work for educators. It will enable us to identify the important issues related to the interdependence of education, development and democracy. It will permit us to ask key questions not just about schools, but about what counts as an appropriate total, society-wide, educational provision in the late twentieth century. It is this work which will begin to provide a sensible, and globally mainstream, foundation for reframing the policy and practice of education in Australia.

Endnotes

1. This paper has benefited considerably from discussions with Dr Lesley Farrell and from the debates generated at the NIEF seminar. It builds upon research undertaken by Dr Lawrence Angus, Mr Peter Rushbrook and myself as part of the 'Social Organisation of Educational Practice' project. This project is funded by the Australian Research Council.

2. This quote continues as follows: Jack may act upon Jill in many ways. He may make her feel guilty for keeping on "bringing it up." He may invalidate her experience. This can be done more or less radically. He can indicate merely that it is unimportant or trivial, whereas it is important and significant to her. Going further, he can shift the modality of her experience from memory to imagination: "It's all in your imagination." Further still, he can invalidate the content: "It never happened that way." Finally, he can invalidate not only the significance, modality, and content, but her very capacity to remember at all, and make her feel guilty for doing so into the bargain.

(Laing, 1967: 31-32)
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