The International Media section of this collection of conference presentations contains the following 15 papers: "Testing the Interaction of the Third-Person Effect and Spiral of Silence in a Political Pressure Cooker: The Case of Hong Kong" (Lars Willnat); "The Use of Small State Variables in Research on Coverage of Foreign Policy: New Zealand and the ANZUS Crisis" (Lianne Fridriksson); "Romance Reading in the Third World: A Postcolonial Intersection of Gender, Ethnicity, and Sexuality" (Radhika E. Parameswaran); "Ethnic Culture and Television News: An Ethnographic Study of Hispanic Journalists" (Don Heider); "John William Powell and 'The China Weekly Review': An Analysis of His Reporting and His McCarthy Era Ordeal" (Fuyuan Shen); "The Growth of Television Advertising following Deregulation in Western Europe" (Debra Reece); "The South African Broadcasting Corporation's Coverage of the 1987 and 1989 Elections: The Matter of Visual Bias" (Maria Elizabeth Grabe); "From Enemies to 'Colleagues': Relations between Palestinian Journalists and Israeli West Bank Beat Reporters, 1967-1994" (Orayb A. Najjar); "Freedom of Expression and Editorial Cartoons: Political Change in Taiwan, 1972-1992" (Diana Beeson); "Content Analysis of the United States' Television Networks Coverage of Foreign News from June 11, 1983 to January 1, 1988" (Stephenie A. McLean and Maccamas M. E. Ikpah); "The Nairobi Women's Conference, the World Bank, and 'The Weekly Review': Defining Development in a Kenyan Newsmagazine" (Nancy Worthington); "Ethnic Media Serve Varied Roles: Miami's Haitian Media" (Douglas Walker); "Broadcasting for National Development in the New South Africa" (Christopher Paterson); "Postcolonial India: Journalistic Constructions: National Identity in the Contemporary Elite Indian Press: An Analysis of Selected Articles in 'The Times of India', 1991-93" (Sujatha Sosale); and "A Non Racial Political Campaign in a Racially Polarized Society: The Case of the Working People's Alliance of Guyana" (Donna A. Allen). (RS)
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
ASSOCIATION FOR EDUCATION IN JOURNALISM AND MASS COMMUNICATION
(77th, Atlanta, Georgia, August 10-13, 1994).

Part IV: International Media
Testing The Interaction Of
The Third-Person Effect And Spiral Of Silence
In A Political Pressure Cooker: The Case Of Hong Kong

by

Lars Willnat

The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Department of Journalism and Communication
Shatin, N.T. HONG KONG
Tel. (852) 609-7702
Fax: (852) 603-5007
Internet: B442742@VAX.CSC.CUHK.HK

Paper presented to the Mass Media and Society Division of the Association for Educators
and Journalism in Atlanta, Georgia, August 1994.
Abstract

Testing The Interaction Of The Third-Person Effect And Spiral Of Silence In A Political Pressure Cooker: The Case Of Hong Kong

This telephone survey of 660 respondents in Hong Kong supports the third-person effect hypothesis to the extent that people overestimate mediated messages on others when they are more educated and more exposed to newspapers. However, this effect was found only for one-third of the respondents and does not affect communication behavior. Respondents perceptions of public opinion only affected frequency of talking about politics with other people. Political outspokenness was affected by political interest, newsmagazine exposure, education, being a registered voter, and political knowledge and efficacy.
One of the most influential recent theories of public opinion formation has been Noelle-Neumann's "spiral of silence." Defining public opinion as views the individual can safely express in public, Noelle-Neumann claims that individuals constantly scan the information environment, attempting to determine whether their own opinion is shared--or not shared--by the majority of people, and only then express their views in public. She stresses that the mass media play a crucial role in the development of the spiral of silence because people heavily depend on the media for facts and for the evaluation of the climate of opinion (1984). According to Noelle-Neumann, if individuals find support for their position in the media, they engage in more public communication of this dominant opinion, thus changing the climate of opinion by "speaking out". On the other hand, if individuals do not find support for their position, they remain silent and therefore do not affect the opinion climate. Thus, it is the fear of social isolation that constitutes this pressure to conform. Her theory sparked a long debate on the question of whether individuals accurately perceive the opinions of others, and if not, what does this mean for processes of opinion formation, change, and aggregation? (Kemamer, 1990:393).

A closely related idea about the formation of public opinion was proposed in 1983 by Davidson in the form of the third-person effect which hypothesizes that people are psychologically predisposed to overestimate the effects of mass communication on others. According to Davidson (1983), individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to a potentially persuasive communication will expect the message to have greater effects on others than on themselves. Thus, "the greatest impact of mediated messages will not be on "me" (the first person) or "you", (the second person), but on "them"--the third persons" (Davidson, 1983:3).

Davidson (1983) also maintained that these perceptions have an impact on behaviors, a relatively unexplored component of Davidson's hypothesis (Perloff, 1993). He suggested that perceptions might influence such behaviors as attempts to censor media materials or unwillingness to participate in political discussions (Davidson, 1983:12-14). The effect that the communication achieves, however, is not due to
any direct persuasive influence of the message itself, but rather to the behavior of those persons who anticipate, or think they perceive, some reaction on the part of others, and behave differently as a result. Combining this idea with the theory of the spiral of silence, Mutz (1989) suggested that the perception that the media influence others more than oneself may alter perceptions of the distribution of public opinion, which in turn may influence the willingness to publicly speak out. There is also reason to believe that third-person perceptions may have a different impact on political outspokenness, depending on whether individuals are highly interested in politics, feel highly efficacious politically or are convinced that their opinion is the correct one (Lasorsa, 1991).

Similar to Mutz's study, the present paper proposes to empirically test the link between the two theories by examining the impact of the third-person effect on communication behavior in the form of willingness to publicly express one's opinion. To evaluate the relationship between the third-person effect and political outspokenness about an issue that might actually lead to a "fear of isolation", a telephone survey was designed asking respondents about their perceptions of public opinion in regard of the dispute between China and Britain over the political future of Hong Kong. The focus of this study is on the influence of the third-person effect on people's willingness to publicly express their opinion about British Governor Patten's highly controversial proposal for establishing a democratic structure in Hong Kong before the 1997 takeover date. In his first major policy speech, on October 7, 1992, Patten proposed a series of measures to broaden the voting base for the next Legislative Council election in 1995. The Governor had not sought China's approval for the proposals, and, had he done so, would not have received it, because China regarded the proposals as breaching "agreements and understandings" which it insisted had been reached between British and Chinese foreign ministers in 1990. As Chan observes: "public opinion wars are often waged between China and Britain with the Hong Kong news media serving as the battlefield and as participants" (1993:120).

---

1 Patten proposed that in addition to the 20 directly elected Legislative Council seats (out of 60) blessed by China in 1990, 9 seats should be attributed in 1995 to new and very broadly defined "functional constituencies", the effect of which would have been to give an additional vote to each worker in Hong Kong; to extend the right to vote in the 21 other, more narrowly defined, 'functional constituencies'; and to invite elected members of District Boards to constitute the "electoral college" which would choose the remaining 10 members of the Legislative Council who were to be indirectly elected. China said, however, that "convergence" with the Basic Law required functional constituencies to have only a very narrowly defined franchise, and the electoral college to be a body of appointees. See: Robert Cottrell, *The End of Hong Kong*, London: John Murray Publishers Ltd., 1993, p. 238, Note 27.
This topic was chosen because political control of Hong Kong will be ceded to China on June 30, 1997, leaving many people with the fear that voicing opposition or criticism of the Chinese government now might have negative repercussions after the political transition. Moreover, a high proportion of residents in Hong Kong have escaped China, and often harbor great distrust given their past experiences in that country. As Hong Kong is currently in a period of political crisis, it is assumed that concerned residents will rely heavily on the mass media for information not only about the dominant public opinion climate, but also about the degree of political tension between China and Britain and the chance of success for Governor Patten's reform proposals.

**EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE**

**The Third-Person Effect**

Efforts to explain the third-person effect can be found in experimental research and surveys. In support of the third-person hypothesis, Davidson (1983) presented some anecdotal evidence and four experiments that illustrate the tendency that an individual who is exposed to a persuasive message via the mass media will see this communication as having a greater effect on other people than on himself or herself, and that very few evaluated the effect as being greater on self than on others. However, because all experiments were conducted with only a small number of participants and lack any control variables, results should be evaluated carefully.

A number of more recent experiments and surveys have examined aspects of the third-person effect hypothesis as outlined by Davidson (1983) with a variety of issues. Gunther (1991b) notes that studies have demonstrated the discrepancy in judgments of impact on self versus impact on others in media reports about apartheid (Mutz, 1989); effects of the mini-series “Amerika” (Lasorsa, 1989); the influence of political advertising (Rucinski & Salmon, 1990) and pornography (Gunther, 1991a); news broadcasts of Middle East conflict (Perloff, 1989); and defamatory articles about prominent people (Cohen, Mutz, Price & Gunther, 1988; Gunther, 1991b).

In an overview of third-person effect studies, Perloff (1993:169-70) notes that most of these studies support the third-person effect hypothesis. However, he also notes that the third-person effect emerged only under certain conditions and not equally strong for all people. Other researchers (Cohen and Davis, 1991; Gunther and Thorson, 1992) even reported, that for certain issues, a reversed third-
person effect can be observed—i.e., respondents perceived that they would be more influenced than others.

The third-person effect, according to Perloff (1993),

"...appears to be particularly likely to emerge when the message contains recommendations that are not perceived to be personally beneficial, when individuals perceive that the issue is personally important, and when they perceive that the source harbors a negative bias."

Thus, the strength of the third-person effect seems to be dependent on conditional variables which have to be taken into account. Various recent studies have examined the impact of conditional factors such as education and political efficacy. In telephone surveys conducted in two Midwestern cities, for example, Tiedge et al. (1991) found that 88 percent of the respondents thought that their perceived buying behavior was less influenced than that of others by the mass media. However, the authors also found that the third-person effect strongly depended on the respondent's education level. According to Tiedge and his colleagues, for better educated respondents the third-person effect was due to the perception that the mass media exerted a strong influence on others rather than to the belief that it had relatively few effects on the self. By contrast, for older respondents the effect was due to the perception that mass media had relatively few effects on the self (Tiedge, 1991). In a telephone survey of 624 randomly selected respondents living in Austin, Texas, Lasorsa (1991) found that political outspokenness is positively associated with one's interest in politics, level of self-efficacy, attention to political information in the news media, and certitude in one's position. Those who were interested in politics, attentive to political news, and felt self-efficacious or certain that their position on major issues was the right one, tended to speak out regardless of the perceived climate of opinion.

Davidson's argument that the third-person perception influences behavior has been tested in only three studies providing mild support at best for the third-person view. Mutz (1989) examined the role of perceptions of others in the context of public opinion with a random sample of 254 Stanford faculty, staff, and students in 1985. She found that perceived effects of media coverage of campus protest involving divestment of university financial holdings in South Africa decreased willingness to engage in a public discussion on this issue. However, in an experiment that manipulated the trustworthiness of the source of a defamatory newspaper article, Gunther (1991) reported that the degree of discrepancy between message effects on self and others was not significantly associated with amount of money awarded in damages to the subject of a defamatory news story. Griswold (1992) found that there was a negative correlation
between the third-person effect and voting intentions; however his findings are open to serious question in
that he did not control for relevant demographic or political partisanship variables. Overall, the behavioral
component of the third-person effect hypothesis remains unsubstantiated at the present time (Perloff,
1993:172).

The Spiral of Silence Theory

Noelle-Neumann suggested that the best predictor of public behavior (expression or action) is not
individual information aggregates but the individual's perception of what others believe. She assumes that
individuals are capable of making meaningful assessments about the climate of opinion because they
possess a "quasi-statistical organ" which enables them to scan the mass media or the social environment
and estimate the climate of public opinion. Thus, people who perceive that their opinion is popular or
gaining support express it with confidence, while those who perceive that their opinion is in the minority
or losing ground remain silent. According to Noelle-Neumann, "an opinion that is being reinforced in this
way appears stronger than it really is, while an opinion suppressed as described will seem to be weaker
than it is in reality" (1977, p.144). She predicts that those holding a particular position who see
themselves as a minority and/or losing support, even though they may actually constitute a majority, will
lose confidence and withdraw from public debate and provide the conditions for the demise of their own
position. The tendency of the one to speak up and the other to be silent starts off a spiralling process
which increasingly establishes one opinion as the prevailing one (Noelle-Neumann, 1974).

The spiral of silence theory has invited criticisms on both the conceptual and operational grounds.
While most affirmative findings come from Noelle-Neumann herself (1974, 1977, 1984), the theory has
received only limited empirical support. Replication or supplementation on Noelle-Neumann's work
(Taylor, 1982; Glynn & McLeod, 1983; Salmon & Rucinski, 1988) have reported ambiguous or even
contradictory evidence and failed to confirm several propositions central to the theory.

Criticisms of the theory focus mainly on Noelle-Neumann's assumption that fear of isolation is a
motivating factor in suppressing expressions of opinions. Glynn and McLeod (1985), for example, found
that holders of minority views tend to be not less but more willing to express their opinion. Salmon and
his colleagues (Salmon & Neuwirth, 1987; Salmon & Rucinski, 1988) have shown that people's social and
demographic characteristics, the nature of the issue under consideration, and the issue's salience, not
general fear of isolation, are primary determinants of willingness to express an opinion (Price & Allen, 1990:373).

A second criticism arises from Noelle-Neumann's assertion that people can accurately assess the distribution of public opinion. Scherer (1991), for example, argues that people cannot estimate accurately majority opinion, and put forward the projection hypothesis as a better alternative to explain conformity, which suggests that people, in the absence of any strong evidence to the contrary, usually simply estimate that others think the same as themselves. Others (Katz, 1982; Taylor, 1982; Rimmer & Howard, 1990) also seek to explain conformity by the "pluralistic ignorance" phenomenon, wherein people mistake an actual majority position for a minority view. In a 1986 telephone survey of 348 randomly selected respondents living in southern Indiana, for example, Rimmer and Howard (1990) did not find an association between mass media use and accuracy in the perceptions of the climate of opinion on the issue of toxic waste. Although newspaper use had some positive influence on the accuracy of perceptions of the climate of opinion and the willingness to express opinions, Rimmer and Howard did not find such an association for the use of television news. These findings clearly contradict Noelle-Neumann who argues for a substantial role for the mass media in the spiral of silence hypothesis, particularly for television news.

RATIONALE

As Noelle-Neumann noted, a spiral of silence will only develop where there is public debate, particularly where there is a change in attitudes about emotionally charged topics, and especially when the moral dimension of "good" and "bad" is included (1985). Following closely a study conducted by Mutz (1989), a potential link between the two theories is tested by analyzing the impact of the third-person effect on people's communication behavior in the form of willingness to express their opinion about Governor Patten's highly controversial reform proposal which will affect the democratic future of Hong Kong. Patten's democratic reform proposal was chosen to test the third-person effect and the spiral of silence because it represents an important and politically sensitive issue which strongly polarized public opinion in Hong Kong during the months preceding this survey. Generally, those in favor of the proposal praise it for introducing more democracy to Hong Kong before the takeover by China in 1997. Those who disfavor the proposal, on the other hand, see it as a British attempt to undermine the stability of Hong
Kong before her retreat from the colony. At the same time, many people who originally supported the
democratic reforms proposed by Governor Patten are now becoming increasingly concerned about the
strong opposition of the Chinese government. Public opinion polls, which are regularly published in the
mass media, show that the satisfaction for Governor Patten’s proposal has steadily declined between
October 1992 and June 1993. Thus, people’s willingness to express their opinions on this issue might be
strongly influenced by their media-based perception of whether a majority of people support Patten’s
reform proposal or not.

In answer to the above mentioned criticisms of the spiral of silence theory, this study will
reexamine the validity of the third-person effect and the spiral of silence hypothesis with improved
statistical measures, including several control variables such as media use, issue salience, education,
political efficacy, and other more standard demographic characteristics of respondents.

Two major questions are addressed in this study. First, do people perceive mediated
communication as having a greater effect on others than on themselves? Second, do perceptions of the
distribution of opinion relate to social behavior and, more specifically, to communication behavior?
Specifically, the study will test the following three main hypotheses:

H 1: Third-Person Effect Hypothesis: Respondents will perceive mediated communication about
Governor Patten’s reform proposal as having a greater effect on others than on themselves.

H 2: Spiral of Silence Hypothesis: Willingness to publicly express one’s political view about Governor
Patten’s reform package will be greater if respondents believe they hold the dominant opinion or
believe that they will hold the dominant opinion in the future.

H 3: Third-Person Effect and Spiral of Silence Interaction Hypothesis: The perception that the mass
media influence others more than oneself will alter perceptions of the distribution of public
opinion, which in turn will influence willingness to express one’s opinion publicly.
METHOD

The data used in this study were part of a representative survey conducted by 45 undergraduates in a public opinion course taught by the author. Students were trained to conduct telephone interviews with a random sample of adults living in Hong Kong between November 2 and November 11, 1993. Pages were randomly selected from the residential section of the Hong Kong telephone directory (including New Territories, Outlying Islands, and Hong Kong Island). A different starting point was randomly selected for each page and, on each page, every seventh phone number thereafter was called, until 12 calls were made from each page. Businesses, non-Cantonese-speaking households, and children under 18 were not interviewed. In all, 660 people were interviewed, with a completion rate of 56 percent. Interviews lasted about 15 minutes each. Respondents were asked 40 closed-ended questions assessing the following variables:

I. Dependent variables

Third Person Effect: A set of questions addressed the perceived role of mass media in influencing public opinion toward the reform proposal. To test the hypothesis that people ascribe greater media influence to others than to themselves, respondents were asked how much influence they thought these media reports had on their attitudes toward the reform proposal and on the opinions of other people in Hong Kong. Similar to Mutz’s study (1989), a three-point third person effect scale was created for each pair of questions based on levels of self and other attributions. Respondents who attributed more influence to self than others were scored as -1, those perceiving equal amounts of influence as 0, and more influence on others as 1.

Political Outspokenness: Noelle-Neumann’s conformity hypothesis, that one’s public outspokenness is affected by one’s perception of the opinion climate. Three dependent variables measure

---

2Questionnaires were constructed in English, along with a Cantonese translation, which was translated back into English by a second translator to check for translation errors. The final questionnaire was then printed in Cantonese. The survey was pretested in Cantonese, suggesting minor revisions in the wording of some questions. All interviews were conducted in Cantonese.

3The wording of these questions was as follows: “How much influence do you think the media reports have had on your attitudes toward Governor Patten’s reform proposal? Have they had a lot of influence, some influence, not much influence, or no influence at all?” “How much influence do you think media reports have had on other people’s attitudes toward Governor Patten’s reform proposal? Have they had a lot of influence, some influence, not much influence, or no influence at all?”
respondents' political outspokenness in this survey: The first measure assessed respondents' willingness to join in a conversation about the reform proposal at the annual business dinner on a four-point scale. A similar second measure demanded a greater degree of public expression by asking about respondents' willingness to call in a radio program describing their views on the reform proposal (4 = very willing, 1 = not willing at all). Finally, respondents were asked on a five-point scale (5 = very often, 1 = never) how often they talk about politics in general with other people.

II. Independent variables:

Issue Salience: Because past studies (Mutz, 1989; Rimmer & Howard, 1990) on the third-person effect and the spiral of silence have shown that issue salience is the most consistent predictor for public expression of opinions, perceived salience of Governor Patten's reform proposal was measured by asking respondents to answer on a four-point scale (4 = very important, 1 = not important at all) how important they considered Governor Patten's reform proposal to themselves.

Own Opinion, Public Opinion Climate, and Public Opinion Trend: Personal opinions about Governor Patten's reform proposal were measured by asking respondents on a four-point scale (4 = strongly disfavor, 1 = strongly favor) whether they favor or disfavor the proposal. Third-person reactions to perceptions of public opinion were measured by asking respondents about three different aspects of their perceptions of the opinion climate surrounding Patten's reform proposal. First, to assess respondents' perceptions of what other people in Hong Kong thought about Patten's proposals, they were asked in an open-ended form to judge the percentage of people in Hong Kong they thought favored the proposal.

Second, respondents were asked on a three-point scale about whether the current trend in opinion in Hong

---

4 Measures of willingness to express political opinions publicly included three questions: "How often do you talk about politics with other people? Do you talk very often, often, occasionally, seldom, never?" "If you were at an annual dinner and they were discussing Governor Patten's reform proposal, how likely would you be to join in the conversation? Would you be very likely, likely, unlikely, or very unlikely to join in?" "How willing would you be to phone into a radio program to express your views on Governor Patten's reform proposal? Would you be very willing, probably willing, probably not willing, or not willing at all?"

5 Respondents' issue salience was measured by the following question: "How important is Governor Patten's reform proposal to you? Would you say that it is very important, somewhat important, not of much importance, or not at all important?"

6 Respondents' own opinion and their perception of the opinion of others was measured by the following two questions: "How do you feel about Governor Paten's reform proposal? Would you say that you: strongly disfavor, disfavor, favor, or strongly favor this?" "Leaving aside your own view, what percent of the people in Hong Kong would you say favor Governor Patten's reform proposal?"
Kong was toward greater or less support for the reform proposal (1 = staying the same, 2 = decreasing, 3 = increasing). Finally, respondents were asked on a four-point scale (4 = very likely, 1 = very unlikely) for their personal evaluation of the likelihood of success of the reform proposal.

The relationship between these three opinion perception measures and respondents' willingness to express their own opinions publicly was examined to determine whether perceptions of the opinion climate influence the likelihood of entering into public debate. According to the theory of the spiral of silence, people who favor (or disfavor) the reform proposal and who also do believe (or do not) that it will eventually succeed, should be more likely to express their opinion publicly because their own opinion matches that of what they perceive as majority opinion. People who favor (or disfavor) the reform proposal, however, but do not (or do) believe in its eventual success, should be less likely to voice their opinion publicly because their own opinion is at odds with what they perceive as majority opinion.

Measures of Opinion Congruence: Based on whether respondents perceived the reform proposal as gaining support, losing support, or staying about the same, three similar indices were created to represent the congruence between one's own opinion and one's perception of the current trend in public opinion (see Glynn and McLeod, 1984; Mutz, 1989). The creation of these three indices followed Mutz's (1989) study to ensure an easy comparison of findings. The first index (Spiral 1) measured the congruence between the respondent's own opinion and the perceived percentage of people favoring the reform proposal. The second index (Spiral 2) measured the congruence between the respondent's own opinion and the perceived trend in support for Governor Patten's reform proposal. A third, similar index (Spiral 3) was created that involved the interaction between the respondent's own opinion and the perceived likelihood of a breakdown in the Sino-British talks. All three indices measured congruence on a three point scale ranging from low congruence to high congruence. Respondents who perceived their own viewpoint as losing support were considered low congruence (score = 1), while those who perceived a trend in favor of their viewpoint were designated high congruence (score = 3). Respondents who did not perceive a trend in either direction were considered moderate congruence (score = 3) (Mutz, 1989:10).

Perceived trend in opinion and likelihood of success were measured by the following questions: "Do you have the impression that public support for Governor Patten's reform proposal is increasing, decreasing, or staying about the same?" "What do you think the chances are that the Sino-British talks will break down? Would you say that this is very likely, likely, unlikely, or very unlikely to happen?"
Media exposure: One's exposure to news media and attention to political information were addressed by a series of questions assessing the respondent's exposure and attention to newspaper and television news as well as their average political newsmagazine exposure. To obtain an accurate measure of the average time spent using newspapers and television news, respondents were first asked how many minutes they watched the news yesterday and read the paper yesterday, and then about how many days in a week they usually read the newspaper or watch television news. Scores for both questions were then multiplied and divided by seven, resulting in an average daily time in minutes spent reading the newspaper or watching television news. The use of political newsmagazine (for example, Asian Newsweek or Nineties) was measured in terms of weekly or monthly exposure.

Political Interest: Political interest about the issue was measured by asking respondents on a four-point scale (4 = very interested, 1 = not at all interested) how interested they are in following the Sino-British talks—which mainly focused on the negotiation of Governor Patten's reform proposal between China and Britain. General political interest may affect one's willingness to take a stand on an issue in a hostile environment. Noelle-Neumann has shown that greater willingness for discussion among those who agree with the opinion climate is due to a more pronounced political interest. This should not surprise since people generally tend to discuss subjects that interest them (Garramone, 1985).

Political Efficacy: One's level of political efficacy was assessed by asking respondents to agree or disagree on a four-point scale (4 = strongly agree, 1 = strongly disagree) with five standard political efficacy statements which were slightly changed to take into account Hong Kong's special political situation: "I usually feel sure of myself when talking with other people about politics." "People like me don't have any say about what the Hong Kong government does." "If public officials in Hong Kong are

---

8The wording of the media use and attention questions was as follows: Newspaper news exposure and attention: "On average, how many days a week do you read a newspaper?" "How much attention do you pay to news about public affairs in Hong Kong when you read the newspaper? Would you say that you pay a lot of attention, a little attention, or no attention?" TV news exposure and attention: "About how many days a week do you usually watch evening news?" "How much attention do you pay to news stories about public affairs in Hong Kong when you see them on television news? Would you say that you pay a lot of attention, some attention, or no attention?" Magazine exposure: "How often do you read a political newsmagazine, such as the Asian Newsweek or the Nineties? Would you say you read them every week, every other week, once a month, less often, never?"

9Respondents' political interest was measured by the following question: "At this time, how interested are you in following the Sino-British talks? Would you say that you are very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, not at all interested?"
not interested in hearing what the people think, there really is no way to make them listen.” “Sometimes politics seem so complicated that a person like me can’t really understand what’s going on.” “There are many legal ways for citizens to influence what the Hong Kong government does.”

**Issue Knowledge:** Respondents’ familiarity with the Governor’s reform proposal was measured by reading five statements containing factual items contained in the Governor’s constitutional package to the respondents. They were then asked to tell whether these statements were correct or not. Correct answers to all five statements were and then added into a five-point knowledge index (0 = small issue knowledge; 5 = great issue knowledge). Cronbach’s alpha for this composite scale reached an acceptable .67. The variable of political knowledge was included in the study because some researchers suggested that an individual’s familiarity with the issue can be used as a determinant judging whether it is the projection hypothesis or the spiral of silence at work in driving conformity. Salmone and Kline (1985), for example, note that in the absence of knowledge about an issue or which societal groups take what stand on the issue, an individual might simply project his or her opinion onto others. In regard of the third-person effect, Davidson noted that scholars have speculated that “experts” are particularly likely to overemphasize the effects of the media.

**Demographics:** Assessment of the demographic characteristics of the respondents included measures of gender (coded male=1), age, education, income, and a question about whether respondents are registered as voters in Hong Kong. Noelle-Neumann (1973) argues that one’s willingness to speak up is influenced by one’s perception of the climate of opinion, and varies with one’s age, gender, education, income and residence. According to the spiral of silence theory, a person will remain silent if he or she perceives that the climate of opinion goes against him or her. Men, younger persons, and the middle and upper classes are generally the most likely to speak out. Perloff (1993:175) noted that education may

---

10The following five factual statements about the reform proposal were given to the respondents who were asked to state whether they are correct or false: “In his first policy speech, Governor Patten proposed to add more functional constituencies.” “In his first policy speech, Governor Patten proposed that the voting age should be decreased from 21 years to 18 years.” “In his second policy speech, Governor Patten mentioned the "through train".” “Governor Patten’s reform proposal was handed to the Legislative Council for discussion.” “The next round of the Sino-British talks will be the 16th round.”

11The study also included questions of place of birth (Hong Kong, Macau, China, or other), number of years lived in Hong Kong, and marital status. However, these variables were not included in the analysis because they showed no relationship with the tested variables.
be indicative of perceived expertise, which increases the strength of the third-person effect. Age may be reflect of accessibility of social attitudes and confidence in one's ability to resist influence attempts.

FINDINGS

General Findings

The average respondent in this survey is about 35 years old, male (55%), with a relatively low level of education (Form 4 to Form 5) and an average income between HK$10,000 and HK$15,000 (US$1280 - US$1900). Most respondents are not registered as a voter in Hong Kong (57%), which is not surprising in view of the colonial heritage of Hong Kong. Overall, this distribution of average characteristics closely matched data from the most recent Hong Kong census.

Measures of media exposure and attention suggest that most respondents read one newspaper a day for about 15 minutes, while watching about 22 minutes of television news a day. Attention to news in both media was fairly high. Sixty-eight percent paid some or a lot of attention to television news, while 57 percent paid the same amount of attention to newspaper news.

However, it seems that people, at least at the time of this study, were not that interested in the development of the Sino-British talks. Sixty percent of the respondents confessed to be not very or not at all interested in the progress of this important political issue, while only nine percent said that they are very interested. This might be due to the fact that all rounds of the Sino-British talks were held behind closed doors and little substantial news leaked into the mass media. Respondents' low interest in the Sino-British talks is also reflected in the low frequency found for talking about politics with other people. Only ten percent of the respondents often talked about politics with other people, while 42 percent seldom or never did so. On the other hand, this tendency also could be an indication that people are not very willing to talk about this politically sensitive issue in public.

Interestingly, the survey found that 40 percent of the respondents favored Governor Patten's reform proposal, while only about 20 percent disfavored it. Also, a majority of 52 percent of the respondents thought that Patten's proposal is at least somewhat important to them personally. However, a majority of the respondents gave Patten's proposal only a slim chance for political success. Fifty-four
percent thought that public support for the proposal is decreasing, 35 percent thought it will stay the same, while only 11 percent thought that it is increasing. On the other hand, only 43 percent of the respondents thought that the talks would eventually break down (which they did in March, 1994).

As expected, most respondents evaluated their political power or efficacy in colonial Hong Kong as fairly negative. Sixty-eight percent felt that they had no say in politics, 53 percent agreed with the statement that public officials are not interested in hearing what the people think, while almost 82 percent said that politics is too complicated. Somewhat contradictory to these previous findings, a majority of the respondents said that they usually feel sure when they talk about politics with their friends (59%) and that there are many legal ways for citizens to influence what the Hong Kong government does (53%).

Perceptions Of Mass Media Influence

The first hypothesis proposed that people would perceive mediated communication about Governor Patten’s reform proposal as having a greater effect on others than on themselves. This hypothesis is partly supported by the findings. While Mutz (1989) found that 50 percent of respondents ascribed greater influence to others than to themselves, results of this study indicate that only about 33 percent of all respondents estimated that media reports had a greater influence on other people in Hong Kong than on themselves. A majority of 52 percent of the respondents reported being influenced the same amount as others. However, only 15 percent thought they were more influenced themselves. The absolute level of media influence, measured on a four-point scale ranging from one (no influence at all) to four (a lot of influence), indicates that the amount of perceived influence on attitudes was quite high, with a median of two for self and a median of three for others.

One of the major questions that remains to be answered in the research about the third-person effect is to clarify under which conditions people tend to overestimate the impact of media messages more or less. One possible answer has been provided by Davidson himself by noting that:

we are all experts on those subjects that matter to us, in that we have information not available to others... Other people, we reason, do not know what we know. Therefore, they are more likely to be influenced by the media.(1983:9)

This idea can be tested empirically by looking at the magnitude of third-person perceptions.

---

12 Statements were presented to respondents in an agree/disagree form. The above mentioned percentages are based on responses that fall into the two categories "agree" or "strongly agree".
among those for whom this issue is highly salient compared to those who deem it unimportant, the hypothesis being that those who are highly concerned with Governor Patten's reform proposal will perceive a greater discrepancy between influence on self and others.

Figure 1 shows the magnitude of these discrepancies by levels of issue importance. Differences between self and other attributions were fairly consistent across all levels of issue importance, increasing only slightly for the highest and lowest level of salience. As Figure 1 indicates, the biggest attribution gap between self and other appears at the lowest level of issue salience (not at all important: -.50), is then reduced at the two medium salience levels (not of much importance: -.28 and somewhat important: -.21), and again increases slightly at the highest salience level (very important: -.33).

As expected, statistically significant differences between self and other attributions were found at all salience levels (p < .01). However, contrary to Mutz's (1989) findings, one-way analysis of covariance (controlling for the effects of media exposure and attention) testing mean levels of third-person effects across salience groups was not significant [F(3,471) = .163, p > .05]. This indicates that although there are significant differences between self and other attributions at each salience level, these differences do not increase significantly with issue salience, a finding that contradicts Mutz (1987:12-13) who found linear increases of the third-person effect with issue salience for one of two issues tested.

Overall, findings suggest that issue salience is not always a good predictor for the magnitude of the third-person effect and that the observed mean differences for self and other attributions probably are not driven by those who are most concerned with the issue at hand. In view of the ambiguous findings provided by Mutz and the results presented here, the degree of the third-person effect is more likely to depend on the type of issue used in the analysis.

---

13 Mean differences for Third-Person Effect by Salience 1 = -.50 (p = .003); Salience 2 = -.28 (p = .000); Salience 3 = -.21 (p = .000); Salience 4 = -.33 (p = .014).
Figure 1: Attributions of Media Influence to Self and Others by Level of Issue Salience

A second way to test the role of "expertness" empirically is by looking at the magnitude of third-person perceptions across different education levels. Following Davidson's (1983) argument that experts tend to overestimate the impact of media messages on others, this study hypothesizes that people who are more educated should also think that they know more about Patten's proposal or understand better its political implications and thus perceive a greater discrepancy between influence on self and others.

Figure 2 examines this question by plotting levels of influence on self and others by level of education. Quite different from the relatively weak and non-linear relationship between third-person effect and issue salience, the gap between attributions for self and others seems to increase with level of education. While the mean difference between self and other attributions is relatively small for the two lowest levels of education (1 = -.22 and 2 = -.10), the gap significantly increases at the highest education level (5 = -.35). Differences between self and other attributions were found to be statistically significant at all education levels (p < .01). Additionally, one-way analysis of covariance testing mean levels of third-person effect across salience groups controlling for media exposure and attention were

---

14Mean differences for Third-Person Effect by Education 1 = -.22 (p=.023); Education 2 = -.10 (p=.253); Education 3 = -.32 (p = .000); Education 4 = -.29 (p = .003); Education 5 = -.35 (p=.000).
significant \( F(4,477) = 1.01, p < .06 \) with newspaper exposure having a significant effect as a covariate \( F(1,477) = 4.44, p < .05 \). Thus, while people overestimate media influence on others at all levels of education, people with higher education levels are especially prone to this effect. As Figure 2 shows, this is especially due to the fact that influence attributed to self remains flat from education level 2 on while estimates on others increase, thus allowing the gap to widen.

Overall, the data suggest that highly educated people tend to attribute more media impact on others than on themselves. Moreover, this effect is partly due to a higher exposure to newspaper news as analysis of covariance suggests. Thus, the combination of higher education and more newspaper exposure tends to increase the magnitude of the third-person effect. While this relationship is not strong, it supports Davidson's (1983:11) original claim that people take into account what they have read in the press when they estimate the effect of mass mediated messages on self and others. If that is true, perceptions of bias in the mass media might indeed affect the magnitude of the third-person effect, which in turn could alter perceptions of the distribution of public opinion and thus political outspokenness.\(^{15}\)

---

\(^{15}\)It should be noted here, however, that such a relationship between the magnitude of the third-person effect and "expertness" is not observed when "education" is substituted by "issue knowledge" as an independent variable. One-way analysis of variance testing mean levels of third-person effect across knowledge (about Patten's reform proposal) groups were not significant \( F(5,480) = .40, p > .05 \)
The Third Person Effect On Communication Behavior

The spiral of silence hypothesis as employed in this study states that willingness to publicly speak about one's political view about Governor Patten's reform proposal should be greater if respondents perceive their own opinion to be in the majority or will be in the majority in the near future. This hypothesis is divided into three sub-hypotheses, adopted from Mutz (1989):

(1) the greater the perceived support for one's viewpoint (i.e.; ratio of agreement), the more willing a person will be to express his or her views publicly. This hypothesis is tested by the variable Spiral 1, which measures the congruence between a respondent's own opinion and his or her perception of what percentage of people in Hong Kong support Patten's reform proposal.

(2) The more people perceive a trend toward greater support for their issue position, the more likely they will be to express their opinions publicly. This hypothesis is tested by the variable Spiral 2, which measures the congruence between a respondent's own opinion and his or her impression of whether public support for Patten's reform proposal is decreasing or increasing.

(3) The greater the likelihood of success a person perceives for his or her issue position, the more likely that person will be to express that viewpoint publicly. This hypothesis is tested by the variable Spiral 3, which measures the congruence between a respondent's own opinion and his or her perception of what the chances are that the Sino-British talks would break down.

Within each of these hypotheses, the more public measure of willingness to speak up, that is, the question asking respondents whether they would be willing to phone into a radio program to express their views on Patten's reform proposal, should produce greater differences than the less public indicator questioning respondents about their willingness to join a discussion of the proposal at a dinner party.

As expected, results of the survey interviews show that a vast majority of the respondents would not be willing (94%, "not willing" or "probably not be willing") to express their opinions on Patten's proposals on a live radio program. Only about 5 percent of the people interviewed said that they were willing to do so. The less public measure of willingness to express one's opinion at a dinner party, on the other hand, reveals much less reservation of publicly expressing one's opinion. In this case, only about 55 percent of the respondents would be unlikely or very unlikely to join a discussion about Patten's reform proposal. Thirty-three percent said they would be likely to do so, while 12 percent said they would be
very likely to join such a discussion. Overall, both measures of political outspokenness show how politically sensitive Patten's proposal has become in Hong Kong and how cautious people are about exposing their own opinion—probably in view of the political changes that will happen in 1997.

Because of the significant interrelations between the third-person effect and the spiral of silence variables with variables related to media exposure, demographics, and political self-efficacy, a multivariate analysis was performed that takes into account the simultaneously shared contributions of the independent variables explaining willingness to speak out publicly. The results of these hierarchical regression analyses are reported in Table 1, 2 and 3.

**Willingness to express opinions publicly in a live radio program**

As Table 1 indicates, willingness to call into a radio program is most strongly affected by the block of demographic variables, accounting for nine percent of the total variance (adj. \( r^2 = .13 \)). However, only interest in the Sino-British talks (beta = .15, \( p < .01 \)) and being registered as a voter (beta = .11, \( p < .05 \)) have a positive influence on willingness to express one's opinion. The impact of the three spiral of opinion conditions (Spiral 1, Spiral 2, Spiral 3) and that of the third-person effect, on the other hand, is insignificant. While the variable Spiral 1 has a significant negative impact on willingness to speak out in the first two regression steps (beta = -.11, \( p < .05 \) and beta = -.12, \( p < .05 \)), this effect is wiped out by the regression block introducing the demographic variables.

More attention to newspaper news and higher newsmagazine exposure (beta = .13, \( p < .05 \)) has a positive effect on willingness to voice one's opinion, however, this effect also disappears when controlling for demographics and political efficacy. Within the block of variables testing political self-efficacy, only people who tend to feel sure about politics when talking to other people were more willing to express their opinion on a radio show (beta = .13, \( p < .05 \)).

Overall, Table 1 shows that neither the third-person nor the three spiral of silence conditions had any impact on the respondents' willingness to express their opinions about Patten's reform proposal on a radio program. What remains significant after entering all variables simultaneously is the positive effect of interest in the Sino-British talks and the negative impact of feeling politically unsure on political outspokenness.
Willingness to express opinions publicly at a dinner party

The hierarchical regression shown in Table 2 reflects the influences of independent variables on willingness to join a discussion about Patten's reform proposal at an annual dinner party. Because of the assumed casual setting at a dinner party, it was originally expected that spiral of silence conditions (Spiral 1, Spiral 2, and Spiral 3) and the third-person effect should be weaker than in the previously analyzed condition which tested the impact of these variables under a more public setting (radio program) for voicing one's own opinion. However, because no relationship between the third-person effect and the spiral of silence was shown in the first hierarchical regression, no significant relationships were expected in the next regression analysis as well.

As Table 2 indicates, this is indeed the case. Similar to the previous regression analysis, demographic variables add most of the explained variance (r change = .13) together with the block of media variables (r change = .12). Controlling for all other variables in the regression, interest in the Sino-British talks (beta = .30, p < .001), being registered voter (beta = .13, p < .05), and education (beta = .12, p < .05) all have significant positive influences on willingness to join in a discussion. This time, however, none of the spiral of silence variables nor the third-person effect has any significant impact on willingness to speak out, even before controlling for other factors.

Within the regression block testing the effects of media exposure and attention, only the initially positive influence of more newsmagazine exposure (beta = .23, p < .001) survives the introduction of the demographic and political efficacy control variables (beta = .13, p < .05), while the positive influence of attention to television news on political outspokenness (beta = .15, p < .05) is cancelled out after controlling for demographics. Within the block testing the effects of political efficacy, only the variable that assesses a respondent's confidence when talking about politics with others has a positive impact on one's willingness to join a discussion about Patten's proposal at a dinner party (beta = .15, p < .05).

In sum, neither the third-person effect nor the spiral of silence variables have any significant effect on the willingness to express one's political opinion in a casual setting. However, as Table 2 reveals, more political interest in the Sino-British talks, being a registered voter, higher education, more newsmagazine exposure, and feeling politically sure when talking about politics all increase the degree of political outspokenness. In fact, the overall influence of the tested independent variables is stronger in the
case of willingness to join a discussion at a dinner party (adj. \( r^2 = .23 \), \( p < .0000 \)) than on willingness to express one’s opinion in a live radio show (adj. \( r^2 = .13 \), \( p < .0000 \)).

Willingness to talk about politics with other people

The argument for testing political outspokenness in terms of frequency of talking about politics with other people is based on the assumption that when people talk about politics in Hong Kong they will certainly talk about the Sino-British dispute (at least during the weeks before and after the survey) and that frequency of talking about politics with other people can be seen as an indication of willingness to voice one’s own political opinion in public. Thus, both the third-person effect and the three spiral of silence conditions should affect this variable the same way as they should affect willingness to join a discussion or to call in a live radio show.

As Table 3 indicates, the variable which measures the congruence between the respondents’ own opinion and their perception of what percentage of people support Patten’s proposal (Spiral 1) has indeed a negative influence on frequency of talking with other people about politics (beta = -.11, \( p < .05 \)). This means that people who think that the public opinion climate in Hong Kong is against their own beliefs are less willing to join a discussion about Patten’s reform proposal at a dinner party. Interestingly, this relationship appears only after introducing the demographic control variables, probably indicating a relationship with level of education or political interest.

As in the previous hierarchical regression analysis, the second block of variables introduced, testing the effects of media exposure and attention, adds quite substantially to the explained variance (Table 2: \( r^2 \) change = .12; Table 3: \( r^2 \) change = .11 here). More newsmagazine (beta = .17, \( p < .01 \)) and television news exposure (beta = .11, \( p < .05 \)) as well as more attention to newspapers news (beta = .12, \( p < .05 \)) all tend to increase the frequency of talking with others about Patten’s reform proposal. However, only newsmagazine exposure (beta = .11, \( p < .05 \)) remains significant after introducing the two blocks of control variables in the next regression steps.

In sum, results indicate that, similar to the effects on the other two dependent variables testing political outspokenness, political interest (beta = .31, \( p < .001 \)), education (beta = .14, \( p < .01 \)), feeling sure about politics (beta = .13, \( p < .05 \)), and a higher level of political knowledge (beta = .11, \( p < .05 \)) have a positive influence on one’s frequency to talk about politics with other people.
Table 1: Hierarchical Regression Results Of Effects Of Spiral Of Silence, Third-Person Effect, Media Exposure And Attention, Political Efficacy, And Control Variables On Willingness To Voice Own Opinion About Patten Reform Proposal On A Live Radio Show. (standardized OLS-regression coefficients).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Regres. 1</th>
<th>Regres. 2</th>
<th>Regres. 3</th>
<th>Regres. 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 3</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.05</td>
<td>-.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 2</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Person Effect</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 1</td>
<td>-.11*</td>
<td>-.12*</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television News Exposure</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to Newspaper</td>
<td>.12*</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Exposure</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsmagazine Exposure</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to TV News</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Voter</td>
<td>.11*</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor Reform</td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No say in politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many legal ways</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publ. officials not interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics too complicated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel sure about politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R Square</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>3.38</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signif F</td>
<td>.0586</td>
<td>.0005</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R Square Change: -- .05 .09 .02

*p <= .05
**p <= .01
***p <= .001
Table 2: Hierarchical Regression Results Of Effects Of Spiral Of Silence, Third-Person Effect, Media Exposure And Attention, Political Efficacy, And Control Variables On Willingness To Voice Own Opinion About Patten Reform Proposal At An Annual Business Dinner. (standardized OLS-regression coefficients).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Regres. 1</th>
<th>Regres. 2</th>
<th>Regres. 3</th>
<th>Regres. 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 3</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 2</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Person Effect</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 1</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.07</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television News Exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to Newspaper</td>
<td></td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsmagazine Exposure</td>
<td>.23**</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to TV News</td>
<td></td>
<td>.15*</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Voter</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>-.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.30***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.13*</td>
<td>.12*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.10</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No say in politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many legal ways</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publ. officials not interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics too complicated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel sure about politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.15*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R Square</td>
<td>-.00009</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.86</td>
<td>.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>6.61</td>
<td>5.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signif F</td>
<td>.412</td>
<td>.00000</td>
<td>.00000</td>
<td>.00000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square Change</td>
<td></td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05
**p < .01
***p < .001
Table 3: Hierarchical Regression Results Of Effects Of Spiral Of Silence, Third-Person Effect, Media Exposure And Attention, Political Efficacy, And Control Variables On Frequency Of Talking About Politics with Other People. (unstandardized OLS-regression coefficients).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Regres. 1</th>
<th>Regres. 2</th>
<th>Regres. 3</th>
<th>Regres. 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 3</td>
<td>-.02</td>
<td>-.01</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 2</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Person Effect</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>-.003</td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiral 1</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>-.11&quot;</td>
<td>-.11&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Television News Exposure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to Newspaper</td>
<td>.11&quot;</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper Exposure</td>
<td>.12&quot;</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newsmagazine Exposure</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attention to TV News</td>
<td>.17&quot;</td>
<td>.12&quot;</td>
<td>.11&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered Voter</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>.13&quot;</td>
<td>.11&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.32***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favor Reform</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.14&quot;</td>
<td>.14&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No say in politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many legal ways</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Publ. officials not interested</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics too complicated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel sure about politics</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.13&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple R</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>.54</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R Square</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Error</td>
<td>.79</td>
<td>.75</td>
<td>.68</td>
<td>.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>.90</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>8.00</td>
<td>6.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signif F</td>
<td>.4635</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
<td>.0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R Square Change</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p <= .05
** p <= .01
*** p <= .001
CONCLUSION

This study provides only limited evidence for the third-person effect as proposed by Davidson (1983). Only about 33 percent of the respondents in this sample overestimated the effects of media messages on other people as they related to the Sino-British talks and Governor Patten’s reform proposal. From an aggregate point of view, statistically significant differences between self and other attributions were found at all issue salience levels and also at all levels of education. However, these differences did not increase significantly with issue salience, a finding that contradicts Mutz (1987:12-13) who found linear increases of the third-person effect with issue salience for one of the two issues she tested.

On the other hand, results of this study confirm Davidson’s (1983) speculation that highly educated people (the “experts”) tend to attribute more media impact on others than on themselves. Moreover, it appears that overestimates of media messages are also influenced by higher exposure to newspaper news as analysis of covariance suggests. Thus, the combination of higher education and more newspaper exposure seems to increase the magnitude of the third-person effect. This finding provided some indication that there might be indeed a link between the third-person effect and the spiral of silence—in that perceptions of bias in the mass media (and here, more specifically, newspapers) could affect the magnitude of the third-person effect, which in turn could alter perceptions of the distribution of public opinion and thus political outspokenness.

Unfortunately, this study does not provide any further evidence on this speculation. Hierarchical regression results confirm findings of previous studies which have shown that the strongest influence on political outspokenness comes from demographic factors such as political interest, political knowledge, political efficacy, or education. Overall, third-person effects were not found to have any impact on the communication behavior of the respondents.

Also, not much support was found for Noelle-Neumann’s hypothesis that people’s perceptions of the dominant opinion climate influence their willingness to publicly express their opinions. As this study has shown, even when a highly sensitive political issue is used to test her theory, not much support can be found for her assertion of a “fear of isolation.” Only in one of the three tests of willingness to express one’s opinion publicly, respondents who perceived that a majority of people (in terms of percentage) held beliefs that were incongruent with their own political opinions, tended to be less willing to talk about politics with
other people. Thus, only the first spiral of silence sub-hypothesis, which stated that the greater the perceived support for one's viewpoint, the more willing a person will be to express his or her views publicly, found support.

Overall, this study supports Davidson's hypothesis of a third-person effect to the extent that people overestimate mediated messages on others when they are more educated and more exposed to newspaper news. However, this effect takes place only for a minority of people and does not affect subsequent communication behavior in the form of willingness to express one's opinion publicly. Also, it seems that people's "quasi-statistical" perceptions of public opinion climates, as postulated by Noelle-Neumann, do not substantially affect political outspokenness. However, willingness to express one's opinion on Governor Patten's reform proposal was found to be strongly affected by political interest, and, to a lesser extent by newsmagazine exposure, levels of education, being registered as a voter, political knowledge, and political efficacy.
References


I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: Entering the 1990s: in Effect and Social Influence in a

Author(s): 

Corporate Source (if appropriate): 

Publication Date: 

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

CHECK HERE □ Permission to reproduce this material in microfiche only

□ Permission to reproduce this material in microfiche and paper copy

□ Permission to reproduce this material in paper copy only

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor: 

Address: 

Price Per Copy: 

Quantity Price: 

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address: 

Signature: 

Printed Name: 

Date: 

Tel No.: 

Address: 

Zip Code: 

ERIC/RC56

150 Smith Research Center 
Bloomington, IN 47408-2698
Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11"
reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
The Use of Small State Variables in Research on Coverage of Foreign Policy: New Zealand and the ANZUS Crisis

by

Lianne Fridriksson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Study
Department of Journalism
Baylor University
Waco, Texas 76798

Paper presented to the International Communication Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication at the August 1994 National Conference, Atlanta, Georgia
The Use of Small State Variables in Research
on Coverage of Foreign Policy:
New Zealand and the ANZUS Crisis

by
Lianne Fridriksson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Study
Department of Journalism
Baylor University
Waco, Texas 76798
(817) 755-3261

ABSTRACT

Considered a small state in the international hierarchy of nations, New Zealand exhibits certain attributes and behavioral tendencies common to such countries, including seeking of the company of greater powers in conducting its foreign affairs. The country’s anti-nuclear policy eventually led to its being expelled from the ANZUS security pact. This study examines whether the behavioral variables of small states are evident in domestic media coverage of a country’s foreign policy, in this case, specifically the coverage of anti-nuclear policy and ANZUS by New Zealand media.
The Use of Small State Variables in Research

on Coverage of Foreign Policy:

New Zealand and the ANZUS Crisis

by

Lianne Fridriksson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor and Director of Graduate Study
Department of Journalism
Baylor University
Waco, Texas 76798
(817) 755-3261

ABSTRACT

Considered a small state in the international hierarchy of nations, New Zealand exhibits certain attributes and behavioral tendencies common to such countries, including seeking of the company of greater powers in conducting its foreign affairs. The country's anti-nuclear policy eventually led to its being expelled from the ANZUS security pact. This study examines whether the behavioral variables of small states are evident in domestic media coverage of a country's foreign policy, in this case, specifically the coverage of anti-nuclear policy and ANZUS by New Zealand media.

This research involves a full census of coverage of New Zealand during a period of highly rare, tense relations between the United States and a member of the Western Alliance. A number of traits of behaviors of small states were examined, including the coverage of the moral and ethical position of the New Zealand government, the coverage of trade and economic effects as inseparable from foreign policy coverage, the focus on geographic and historical alliances and friendships in coverage of foreign policy, and the place of public opinion in a small state's dealings with greater powers.
INTRODUCTION

Considered a small state in the international hierarchy of nations, New Zealand exhibits certain attributes and behavioral tendencies, including seeking of the company of greater powers in conducting its foreign affairs. The anti-nuclear policy of New Zealand's Fourth Labor government drew wide international attention to the small South Pacific nation and threw it into a foreign policy crisis with the United States and Australia over the trilateral mutual security pact ANZUS. New Zealand was expelled from the alliance after more than a year of diminished intelligence and military cooperation. As is the case with other small states, New Zealand has a limited capacity to exert military, economic or political influence, and its membership in ANZUS had allowed New Zealand to improve its position in the international arena.

This study, which encompasses nearly five years of media coverage of nuclear issues in New Zealand, examines whether the behavioral traits of small
states are evident in domestic newspaper coverage of a country's foreign policy. This research involves a full census of coverage of New Zealand during a period of highly rare, tense relations between the United States and a member of the Western Alliance. Because small states tend to adopt moral positions on international affairs, this research focused on whether the moral and ethical position of the New Zealand government in its dealings on ANZUS and anti-nuclear policy was covered by the New Zealand media. Because foreign trade and economics are seen as inseparable from foreign policy in small states, this research also focused on the incorporation of trade and economic effects of anti-nuclear policy in media coverage. And, because small state security is concerned with geographical and historical alliances and because New Zealand has, since the ANZUS policy crisis, focused more on its regional friendships, this research also focused on the inclusion of regional and colonial ties in coverage of its anti-nuclear policy.

**NEW ZEALAND FOREIGN POLICY AND ANZUS**

New Zealand's geographic isolation has dictated much of its foreign relations, which broadened significantly under the Labor government of Michael Savage in the late 1930s. New Zealand had no territorial disputes and no resources significant enough to invite intense foreign interest. Though it has little overt strategic importance, New Zealand does spend a higher percentage of its GNP on defense than Finland or Austria, both of which border on former
Warsaw Pact nations (Alley, 1984). At the United Nations and elsewhere, the New Zealand government has spoken out widely on issues of international significance. Former Prime Minister David Lange pointed out New Zealand’s broad sanctions against South Africa and its intent to implement further measures if apartheid were not abolished, during a speech at the United Nations General Assembly (Lange, 1988). Former Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer addressed the international issue of driftnet fishing at the General Assembly a year later. New Zealand was a founding member and has been a continual supporter of the United Nations and its activities.

Having been without an independent foreign policy while under British influence, after World War II New Zealand geared much of its external relations to the area of the world closest to it—the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia, which were seen as its first line of defense. Critical to New Zealand’s policies were not only its isolation, but the limited financial resources generated by a small population. Overseas trade was crucial, therefore, and once Great Britain, its major trading partner, entered the EEC (European Economic Community), New Zealand had to seek alternative trade outlets wherever it could, including the Middle East and Soviet bloc nations. Foreign trade became inseparable from foreign policy.

The crux of New Zealand foreign policy for more than three decades had been its participation in the ANZUS (Australia/New Zealand/United States) alliance. Other agreements and United Nations obligations led New Zealand into a number of military conflicts. Beyond the two world wars and the war in
Vietnam, however, New Zealand has not been widely involved elsewhere militarily. The major exception was the South African Boer War of 1900-1902. The 1970s set the stage for a number of foreign policy changes by New Zealand, including its diplomatic recognition of the People’s Republic of China and its staunch protests of nuclear testing in the Pacific, particularly that by the French in Polynesia. Economic difficulties and particularly the soaring overseas debt in the mid-1970s prompted New Zealand to develop a more refined trading stance, which included greater attention to the bargaining power it held in territorial fishing rights. It was during the 1970s as well that New Zealand’s participation in Pacific or regional associations expanded.

The Labor Party’s anti-nuclear policy regarding ship visits had been around since the early 1970s but it was only when the Labor government was in power and faced with a specific test of that policy in 1985 that it was first exercised. The beginning of the end of the ANZUS alliance for New Zealand came as then Prime Minister Lange refused a request for port access to a U.S. Navy ship, the USS Buchanan, in early February 1985. In accord with U.S. policy, the ship would neither confirm nor deny any nuclear capability. Lange stated flatly on numerous occasions that his stance was not anti-American, nor anti-ANZUS, but anti-nuclear. (Shortly before the Buchanan was banned from port, a national poll indicated that 78 percent of New Zealanders supported the ANZUS alliance.) By the middle of August 1986, after diminishing defense and intelligence cooperation between the United States and New Zealand, the security agreement was formally ended. The ban on American ships by New
Zealand continues, despite the Clinton Administration's announcement in February 1994 that it would resume top-level contacts with Wellington. The U.S. government, however, will not restore defense ties cut in 1987 after New Zealand passed a law in Parliament banning nuclear ship visits.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SMALL STATE THEORY

Many international political scholars agree that war and conflict have become increasingly common ways for states to interact. This pattern of thinking has led to the recent, serious study of "game playing" between nations, in which the players and their moves (actors and actions) form strategic and predictable patterns (Spanier, 1987). The field of international relations, however, has been split into particular approaches, including those of historical studies, foreign policy decisions, and research from a scientific or quantified perspective, a divisiveness which Coplin and Kegley (1971) have argued against for more than two decades. They maintain that any meaningful understanding of international relations must combine these three strains into one coherent method in order to adequately describe, explain and predict international events and processes. To this end, the analysis of media messages has been a helpful addition to scholarship.

Reynolds (1973:11) observed that one of the difficulties international relations scholars face in using the media as a basis for research is that
international events have tended to be reported in the media according to partisan or governmental biases. He stated that:

On major issues where policy objectives are ... the subject of controversy, or transcend the national scene, there may be a freer discussion in the press, but even this trend tends to be cast in a prescriptive mold. Discussion concentrates on the question of which particular action should be taken by government, without regard for the contextual relationships of foreign policy.

Within the study of international relations, Handel (1981), among others, divided the nations of the world into five categories of influence: super powers; great powers; middle powers; weak (or small) states, and mini (or micro) states. Although the designations vary somewhat in the literature, this five-tiered pyramid is the most useful for discussion in the present study. The assignment of countries to categories such as these involves the detailed analysis of an overwhelming number of variables and non-quantitative nuances.

Super powers, according to this breakdown, are differentiated by their high scores or levels in such areas as degree of nuclear development, size of land mass, level of gross national product (GNP), amount of natural resources and energy, level of military strength and size of population. The United States and the Soviet Union, quite obviously, are considered super powers. Great powers, then, are generally defined as those countries which have lesser degrees of those determinants, such as fewer citizens than super powers, a lower GNP and a smaller degree of technological and nuclear advancement. That designation
would include such countries as Great Britain, France, West Germany and Japan. Middle powers, according to Handel, exhibit a number of the characteristics of both super or great powers and also of weak states. They may have large populations and extensive territory, but may also have limited resources and a limited GNP. Middle powers, then, are more conveniently subdivided into those with small populations and highly developed GNPs (such as Australia and Sweden), and those with large populations but with less developed economies (such as India and Mexico). Weak or small states, which make up the largest division in the pyramid, generally score low on all the aforementioned criteria. In particular, weak states do not generally excel in military might. Typically, as stated earlier, these smaller countries seek the company of greater powers in conducting their foreign affairs. New Zealand is considered a small state in the international hierarchy of nations and has enjoyed freedom from aggressors thanks primarily to its isolated location. The last category, mini states, generally includes countries with very small territories and populations and many of those are colonies or isolated islands. They tend to have very weak economies and weak military capabilities.

Small states such as New Zealand are distinctive from others in that they have a limited capacity to exert military, economic or political influence. Any country which demonstrates extensive influence in any one of these areas is considered small. Much scholarly literature on small states has tended to focus on the super and great powers' relations to small states and not vice versa. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of small states in the international
arena is possible, for example, through an examination of the diplomatic behavior of small states in their relations with a super power or great power. The relationship between small states and super or great powers involves a delicate balance of cooperation and independent actions. In a seminal study, Fox (1959) stated that small states gain valuable leverage and maneuverability in difficult relations with super powers by relying on economic pressure and on world public opinion. By doing so, small states learn to balance their preoccupation with short-term costs and benefits and the preoccupation of super powers with long-term interests.

Fox focused her research on Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Spain and how each exercised influence in international affairs. She found these countries to pay strict attention to timing in their international initiatives. Each had procrastinated over sticky issues with super powers to their own advantage. They also were able to avoid formal commitments, such as alliances, with super powers by providing trivial concessions in exchange for material benefits which helped to strengthen their defense postures nonetheless. The five countries generally had healthy military and intelligence systems which could make information available in advance regarding the intentions of the super powers. With regard to major international decisions, the countries Fox studied ordinarily preferred to adopt a low profile, seeking to influence super power actions indirectly. One of the most important diplomatic initiatives a small state may take centers on its need to chart its own foreign policy and diplomatic course, according to Fox. She pointed to the small states' reliance on procrastination,
negotiation and the provision of goods and services to great and super powers in
their attempt to monitor short-term effects of the great or super powers’ policies.

A basic difference between the states that Fox studied and a small nation
such as New Zealand is that fact that New Zealand is a former colonial society,
historically unlike the neutral independent states she studied. Fox distinguished
between colonial states and independent states by noting that a range of
diplomatic options is available to neutral independent countries, while some
diplomatic restrictions apply to former colonial states.

Vital (1968), in another seminal study, found that the viability of small
states in the face of super or great power pressure depends upon their human
and material resources, on social and governmental cohesion, and on their
physical distance from super or great powers. While no small state can
withstand major military pressure from a super power or great power, some
economic pressures can be fended off when there is economic self-sufficiency on
the part of the small state.

Fox and Vital agree that for a small state to maintain political
independence and consistent foreign policy, several characteristics must be
present. Those include: (1) the citizenry of the small state must be united behind
its government; (2) the government is under strong and stable leadership; (3)
economic resources must be healthy; and (4) its leadership pursues a diplomatic
policy based on enlightened national self-interest. Both note that diplomacy can
be effective for the small state in its foreign policy dealings with a great or super
power. In order to indirectly influence a great power, they state, the small nation
must try to shape whatever it is the great or super power expects of it. To do so, the small state must have good military and diplomatic intelligence so it may detect what the great or super power wants or expects of it. Part of the problem with this reasoning, however, as both note, is that small states have a tendency to maintain short-sighted foreign policy approaches in their dealings with great or super powers, whereas great or super powers tend to have a far-sighted approach in their dealings with small states.

It is in the first of the four characteristics that Fox and Vital have discussed that the influence of the media is important. The media are, at the very least, the conduits by which government officials are connected to a small state's citizenry. A number of studies have dealt with the connection between media messages and public opinion, beginning with the works of Lasswell (1927) and Lippman (1922) who said that individuals act according to “pictures” in their heads, and that these pictures are oftentimes drawn for them by the media. Early empirical tests of what Cohen (1963) called agenda-setting suggested a very strong relationship between the media emphasis on issues and voter judgment of the saliency of those issues (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Shaw and McCombs, 1977). It can be assumed, then, that the media do play some part in a government's attempts to unite its citizenry behind its goals.

Building upon the works of Fox and Vital, De Raeymaeker, et al. (1974), focused on the involvement of small states in international alliances. They stated that a small power becomes involved in an alliance with a great or super power in order to maintain or improve its position in the international, regional or
domestic arena. Further, they identified five motives a small state must have in order to adhere to or withdraw from an alliance. First, the security of the small state in relation to its geographical situation bears on the decision. Indeed, location is the most important motive in determining a small state’s decision whether to enter into an alliance. So, too, does the historical aspect to its geography play a part: whom does it perceive to be friend or foe? Prestige or rank within the international hierarchy of nations is a second motive for alliance entry or withdrawal—whether an alliance will enhance or diminish a small nation’s status. Third, a small state must be aware that membership in an alliance may threaten domestic stability by what Liska (1957) called the material and political burdens and strains flowing from an alliance. The length and/or scope of an alliance and how that relates to domestic pressures from the press, public opinion, interest groups or the government is an important consideration. Fourth, the small state must decide whether an alliance will enhance its economy and its military or defense base. And, fifth, there must be ideological affinity in order to have a successful alliance. De Raeymaeker, et al., state that cultural affinity may or may not be tied to such a shared ideology.

In theory, states are sovereign entities isolated from one another and entitled to their own autonomy and to non-interference in their internal affairs. In practice, states seek to modify the behavior and policies of other states using a range of inducements and sometimes threats, which form a large part of the major activity of embassies and diplomatic organizations. Not only do they seek to influence the behavior of one another, they seek, too, to change that behavior.
on a permanent basis by inducing structural changes in governments they perceive as hostile and by supporting governments they perceive as friendly in a way that incurs a sense of mutual obligation, such as that under the ANZUS alliance.

Researchers have identified a number of behavioral traits exhibited by small states. Henderson (1980) listed a series of characteristics which described those behavioral tendencies in a discussion of New Zealand’s foreign policy. These included the level of participation in world affairs, which in the case of New Zealand, would be considered quite high participation because of its previous military involvements, not the norm for small states. Second, limited financial, political, social and natural resources narrow the scope of a nation’s foreign policy, which is evident in New Zealand’s primarily regional focus. Third, small states tend to take an economic focus to their affairs being that their resources are limited. Fourth, to compensate for their limited resources, small states tend to conduct their foreign affairs through international organizations, agreements or alliances. New Zealand focused most of its foreign policy on the ANZUS alliance. Fifth, small states such as New Zealand, often take moral positions on international issues, as did the Labor government with its anti-nuclear policy.

A sixth characteristic has elicited differing opinions from foreign policy and international relations analysts on the effect of a nation’s size with regard to its place in the international affairs arena. Henderson noted that traditional
studies have held that a nation such as New Zealand would avoid alienating more powerful nations, while other, more empirical research has tended to show that small states engage in more conflict-laden activity because they see themselves as having little influence in the world.

New Zealand has recently focused more on regional security, regional environmental problems and its own development of defense and intelligence resources, but by and large, it considers the allies of Great Britain and the United States as its allies, and the enemies of those countries as its enemies. New Zealand still holds that its security is enhanced by its continued commitment to the Western Alliance, even without ANZUS and even though such a super power alliance was not designed to protect territorial or regional integrity.

The present study has investigated whether several behavioral traits of small states could be applied to the media coverage of the policy of a small state as well. Because small states tend to adopt moral positions on international affairs, this research focused on whether the moral and ethical position of the New Zealand government in its dealings on ANZUS and anti-nuclear policy was covered in the media. Because foreign trade and economics are seen as inseparable from foreign policy in small states, this research focused on the incorporation of trade and economic effects of anti-nuclear policy in media coverage. And, because small state security is concerned with geographical and historical alliances and because New Zealand, has, since the ANZUS policy crisis, focused more on its regional friendships, this research focused on the inclusion of regional and colonial ties in coverage of its anti-nuclear policy.
Based on this review of small state theory, four hypotheses involving the mass media of New Zealand were tested. H₁ stated that the New Zealand media will tend to focus on economic and trade effects more often before the policy crisis than after it. H₂ stated that the New Zealand media will focus coverage of nuclear issues on regional ties more often after the policy crisis than before it. H₃ stated that the New Zealand media will consult regional sources in nuclear issue coverage more often after the policy crisis than before it. And, H₄ stated that the New Zealand media will tend to focus coverage of nuclear issues on the moral or ethical positions of the New Zealand government more often before the policy crisis than after it. A major theoretical linkage considered in these hypotheses is Rosenau's (1961) statement that any changes in foreign policy will result in changes in media coverage. These hypotheses were designed to look for changes in coverage associated with some aspects of foreign policy in a small state. In its status as a small state, New Zealand has a limited capacity to exert military, economic and political influence in the international arena, and, therefore, it is hypothesized, tend to focus its foreign policy behavior on regional ties, on moral or ethical positions of the government, and on the possible economic and trade effects of its policies. For these reasons, it is expected that the New Zealand media will tend to focus nuclear issue coverage on these same areas.

METHOD IN THE PRESENT RESEARCH

The universe of this content analysis was limited to news items regarding
nuclear issues which appeared over a recent and critical period in the three major daily newspapers of New Zealand. The newspapers selected for analysis were the *New Zealand Herald* of Auckland, the country's largest newspaper, with a circulation of 246,000; the *Dominion* of Wellington, the country's capital city, with a circulation of 72,662; and the Christchurch *Press* of the South Island's largest city, with a circulation of 85,500. These three newspapers were chosen because they were the major newspapers in the three largest cities in New Zealand. They also were selected for their combined large circulation. Together, these three newspapers reach 404,162 New Zealand readers, or 89.4 percent of the combined populations of those cities. Another reason these newspapers provided a worthwhile base of research is that a 1987 media survey in New Zealand found that 55 percent of New Zealanders thought newspapers gave more complete news coverage than did radio or television and 41 percent felt newspapers presented the fairest, most unbiased news reports (IRIS Audience Research, 1987). That study also found that 40 percent of New Zealanders thought newspapers presented the news more intelligently than did the broadcast media.

Only those nuclear news items which had specific reference to New Zealand were included in this study. By this definition, nuclear issue stories concerning arms control talks, Star Wars, verification agreements and U.S. and Soviet negotiations, for example, were not coded unless New Zealand was mentioned explicitly within the text of the item. A census, rather than a sample, of coverage between July 1983 and March 1988 was examined. This allowed for the ability to make more accurate observations of media treatment of nuclear
issues specifically during three distinct 19-month periods in New Zealand foreign affairs. The time frame also afforded the opportunity to follow the New Zealand government's anti-nuclear policy, from 1984 and 1987 elections, through the bill's passage in Parliament, and the rift in the ANZUS alliance.

Items regarding nuclear issues were located by surveying individual editions of each newspaper in New Zealand using several libraries as no index or guide was available. Copies of the New Zealand newspapers were available at a number of private depositories in Wellington through prior arrangement by the researcher with directors or curators, including the National Library of New Zealand, the General Assembly Library of the New Zealand Parliament, and the research library of the Broadcasting Corporation of New Zealand. Only the first of those facilities is public. Although this was a very lengthy and tedious process, it ensured that all, or nearly all, nuclear issue items were found.

Individual news stories were photocopied in most cases. This also allowed them to be used later in coder reliability checks, qualitative analysis and as background in the research. New Zealand television and radio news reports were not included in the analysis for one primary reason. While these reports were available in abstract form, similar to abstracts found the Vanderbilt's Television News Index and Abstracts which provides data for U.S. television news, complete transcripts of individual news stories were mostly unavailable. Some nuclear news stories had been transcribed in full, but these cases were sporadic and did not provide a complete collection of either radio or television's coverage of nuclear news. Here again, the broadcast news report abstracts and
available transcripts were not indexed, and had to be searched by hand by special permission by Newztel, which owns the collection.

A news "item" was defined as a soft (feature) or hard news story for the purposes of this study. Although appearances of artwork were recorded in the coding, they were treated as part of the news item and not a separate units of analysis. Opinion and commentary were excluded from the research because the nature of their discourse does not include the basic source and message stages of the communication process (Bruck, 1989). Each news item constituted a single coding unit and each unit was given equal measure regardless of length or where it appeared in the newspaper. Budd, Thorp and Donohew (1967) said that using an entire article in coding is workable when comparing several newspapers or news broadcasts for content. Budd (1984) noted that measures of amount of news and volume of that news are strongly correlated. There were four units of analysis: nuclear issue; time period; country and source.

Three 19-month periods were used in the analysis. T1 included coverage between July 1, 1983, and January 31, 1985, the period before the foreign policy crisis between the United States and New Zealand began. T2 covered the period between February 1, 1985, and August 31, 1986, beginning with New Zealand’s refusal to allow a port visit by the USS Buchanan and ending with New Zealand’s expulsion from the ANZUS alliance. T3 covered the period between September 1, 1986, and March 31, 1988, the period after the policy crisis.

Each news item was coded according to certain variables. These categories were determined according to the study’s particular needs. The
author coded 4,597 items (84 percent of all data) and one additional coder coded 877 items (16 percent). There were no remarkable problems during the coding, except that a small number of newspapers were missing from the New Zealand depositories. An item was coded as having mention of ethical stance if a source explicitly mentioned the ethics or morality of an anti-nuclear or nuclear posture. If a source mentioned economic effects associated directly with New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy, then it was coded, regardless of the positive or negative nature of the effects. Such associations included trade relations with the United States, trade relations with Great Britain, trade relations with Australia (CER or Closer Economic Relations agreement), the EEC and general economic references. If an item mentioned the ANZUS security alliance or other military or non-military alliances in which New Zealand is a member, it was noted. Those alliances also include the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, the United Nations, the EEC and CER. Mentions of the South Pacific—by region or individual countries—and use of regional sources also were coded.

The overall reliability coefficient in the present study was .95. Two coders assisted in determining coder reliability in this research. Both were college graduates, and, although one had studied university-level journalism, neither had conducted social science research before nor had worked as a journalist. Neither was previously familiar with the anti-nuclear situation in New Zealand, except for recollections of the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior. The coders repeated the researcher’s coding on a random sample of 200 news stories from
the New Zealand newspapers, or 4.4 percent of all nuclear issue items published in the three newspapers. Reliability was tested by applying Scott's pi (1955).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Overall the New Zealand media tended to include the mention of alliances, associations or agreements when reporting news of nuclear issues. Formal alliances among small states and greater powers have been seen not only in ANZUS, but in NATO, the former Warsaw Pact and SEATO as well. Such alliances, made by the free choice of member nations, are seen by political scientists as necessary on the part of the small states involved, even though they are not seen as absolute guarantees of security or military support (Handel, 1981). Through alliances, small states such as New Zealand then become part of an international community where previously they may have only been part of a regional one, if any. Such alliances may have psychological benefit for the small state in that the small nation sees itself as having support in and connection to and possibly clout in the international arena (Handel, 1981; Harden, 1985).

Important facets of a small state's foreign policy, alliances were found to have been included in coverage of nuclear issues in New Zealand, lending support to small state theorists who have found that these alliances are a focus of a small state's foreign policy. It should be noted that small states, however, may have few options other than to conduct foreign policy within the frameworks of such agreements or alliances.
A second attribute of small states, attention to economic factors, which was evident in coverage of ANZUS, may be a part of the interest to internationalize. Great Britain’s entry into the EEC was harmful to New Zealand’s export industry and had ill effects on the overall New Zealand economy. New Zealand then had to actively seek out other international importers, a move which broadened its participation in international affairs, since New Zealand expanded its diplomatic ties in an effort to secure greater trade with other nations (Jackson, 1980). The United States had become an essential trading partner of New Zealand and the possibility of losing that policy and ANZUS, both of which had a direct effect upon trade with the United States.

The majority of items regarding nuclear issues did not mention the moral or ethical aspects of an anti-nuclear policy. Henderson (1980) stated that the promotion of ideals is relatively easy for small states since they yield little influence in world affairs. Instead, a small state such as New Zealand can promote its moral leadership or ethical stances without eliciting resentment of greater nations and the present study examined the coverage of nuclear issues to see if this form of promotion was evident. Certainly some moral or ethical aspect may be implicit in an anti-nuclear stance, but explicit mention of such concern occurred only in about one-third of all nuclear items analyzed. Perhaps, for the Labor government, nuclear issues became less rhetorically ethical or moral and became more a part of the reality of foreign affairs. Also, the emotional nature of the nuclear debate and the comparisons to David and Goliath were not lost on the media nor on New Zealand’s politicians. The inherent ideological
dimensions of the anti-nuclear posture have been important for New Zealand. The image of New Zealanders as strong-willed in the face of enormous pressure from a super power was a stunning reminder of the intensely emotional elements of the anti-nuclear stance and foreign coverage of that stance helped to put an isolated small state on the map of international public consciousness.

In analyzing sources, this research found a greater flow of information from sources in Great Britain than from sources in neighboring Southwest Pacific nations, with the exception of Australia. This is due in large part to New Zealand's historical ties with Great Britain and New Zealand's status as a member of the Commonwealth, although Great Britain had no part in the security debate over ANZUS. Richstad (1986) noted this colonial pattern of communication in a study of Pacific broadcasting media. He also said that Pacific nations are among the last in the world to cling to colonialism. This finding, too, supports international political researchers' findings that small states tend to look toward greater powers than to lesser powers in their foreign relations (Spanier, 1987; Holsti, 1967; Reynolds, 1973). Nuclear-free initiatives, however, have been regional efforts in the Pacific community, and because of this, it was interesting that sources from the Southwest Pacific were so few in the coverage of nuclear issues in New Zealand. The nuclear peril, so to speak, is seen as affecting the entire South Pacific, which is reported to be the most nuclear contaminated area of the world. New Zealand is not alone in its concern about the fate of the region as the United States, France and Great Britain continue to use the area for nuclear tests.
In addition to a qualitative analysis of media content, four hypotheses focusing on the changes in several small state variables over various time frames during the ANZUS policy crisis were tested. Also, frequency analysis and crosstabulations were performed for the variables in a general data analysis to identify possible trends or patterns in coverage of New Zealand’s nuclear issues. An overall total of 5,409 items over a 4.75-year period were studied. Of these, 2,345 (43.4 percent) appeared in the Dominion (Wellington), 1,750 (32.4 percent) in The New Zealand Herald (Auckland), and 1,314 (24.3 percent) in The Press (Christchurch). According to time period, New Zealand’s anti-nuclear policy was covered most heavily before and after the foreign policy crisis between the United States and New Zealand, whereas ANZUS itself was covered most heavily during the crisis. Most coverage of nuclear issues other than the anti-nuclear policy and ANZUS occurred during the period of the crisis between the United States and New Zealand, in which 49.1 percent of all nuclear issues appeared. In the period before the crisis, 29.4 percent of nuclear issues were covered, and in the period after the crisis, 21.4 percent of nuclear issues appeared. A chi-square of 314.859, which is significant at the .001 level, denotes a significant difference in nuclear issue coverage among the three time periods.

It was hypothesized that the evidence of behavioral traits of small states in newspaper coverage of ANZUS would vary according to time frame, i.e., evidence of small state attributes would vary in the media depending on the state of the ANZUS debate. H1, which stated that the New Zealand newspapers would tend to focus on the economic and trade effects more before the policy
crisis (65.0 percent of 2,587 mentions) than after it (35.0 percent), was supported by the findings. A chi-square calculation of 233.37 is significant at the .001 level, with a phi of .3. The research hypothesis is therefore accepted: the focus on economic and trade effects was found significantly more frequently before the policy crisis than after it. New Zealand clearly was concerned with the possible effects of its anti-nuclear policy. H2, which stated that the New Zealand newspapers would tend to focus coverage of nuclear issues on regional ties more often after the policy crisis (55.0 percent of 1,535 mentions) than before it (45.0 percent), also was supported. A chi-square of 5.25 is significant at the .05 level, meaning the research hypothesis is accepted. The difference between the mention of regional ties in the two time periods is a significant one. A phi of .099 showed a relatively low strength of association between the mention of regional ties and time period. Once out of ANZUS, New Zealand turned its security attentions back to its own neighborhood.

H3, which stated that the New Zealand media would tend to use regional sources in nuclear issue coverage more often after the policy crisis (62.2 percent of 1,616 mentions) than before it (37.8 percent), also was supported. Australian sources outnumbered Pacific sources in the research, most of these appearing after the ANZUS crisis. A chi-square of 36.526 is significant at the .001 level. By rejecting the null hypothesis, it is accepted that the use of regional sources was significantly more frequent after the policy crisis. The phi coefficient of .244 indicated a somewhat low strength in association between variables. Here again, New Zealand newspapers, as did the New Zealand government, focused again
on regionalism after the ANZUS dilemma. H4, which stated that the New Zealand newspapers would tend to focus coverage of nuclear issues on the moral or ethical position of their government more often before the policy crisis (55.1 percent of 904 mentions) than after it (44.9 percent), was supported by the findings. A chi-square of 9.362, p<.01, means the null hypothesis may be rejected in favor of the research hypothesis, meaning there is a significant difference between the mention of a moral or ethical position before and after the policy crisis. The phi coefficient of .102 shows a low strength in the relationship between the variables.

Though not considered a variable solely for small states, this research found that coverage of New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy (56.4 percent supportive) and ANZUS (57.3 percent supportive) tended to be supportive of the New Zealand government during all time frames. A chi-square of 13.799, significant at the .001 level, indicates a high level of public support for the government's anti-nuclear policy. A chi-square of 15.934, significant at the .001 level, indicates there was also a high level of public support for the government's stance on ANZUS. In their treatment of ANZUS and the anti-nuclear policy, the New Zealand newspapers framed the presentation of the issues in a manner similar to the government's official accounts, while sometimes including, though not necessarily highlighting, conflicting information from non-government sources. The notion that the country's anti-nuclear policy could coexist with its membership in ANZUS—the position expounded by the government—was also set forth in the media. Even when alternative or conflicting information
appeared, which may have initially appeared to undermine the existing official frame, the possible threat to official accounts was quickly defused in favor of further government rhetoric. The most likely explanation behind the government position was that it wanted to keep public support for its anti-nuclear policy. Since earlier polls had shown that New Zealanders wanted both to remain in ANZUS and to have an anti-nuclear policy, such a duality had to be supported by the government if public support were to continue.

The case of New Zealand also underlines the importance for small, relatively weak states of the role that is played by public opinion as a strategy or an instrument of national policy. That its anti-nuclear policy relied heavily on domestic and world public opinion can be seen as having provided leverage and maneuverability in a test of ripple in the Western Alliance. Dominion reporter Anthony Hubbard (1985) noted that anti-nuclear issues moved from being the concern of the political fringe in New Zealand to being a full-fledged middle class concern and this has accounted for the overwhelming support of the anti-nuclear policy by New Zealanders, and has accounted for the growth and strength of anti-nuclear groups in the country. One of the catalysts for this, and for worldwide sympathy for New Zealand's anti-nuclear stance, was the 1985 bombing and sinking of the Rainbow Warrior. Also lending credibility to peace movements over the past decade in New Zealand was the active involvement of high profile New Zealanders, including members of Parliament, the medical community, the academic community and the clergy, and the high profile visit by noted peace activist Dr. Helen Caldicott in 1983.
Jackson and Lamare (1988:187) noted that the ANZUS crisis played a "dominant" role in New Zealand's domestic politics in that it "focused attention on party factions, on constraints on party policy, and has prompted the public to express its views and opinions." They further noted a strong role played by the United States in New Zealanders' anti-nuclear sentiments: "Whenever the United States is perceived as retaliatory, threatening, or even brusque, national solidarity appears to be reinforced." This was certainly the case during the ANZUS crisis. After the United States decreased defense cooperation and intelligence with New Zealand, former Prime Minister Palmer, who was acting prime minister at the time, said the U.S. retaliation on New Zealanders anti-nuclear policy was "extremely harsh," a definite overreaction (Hubbard, 1985).

Also important in determining the quality and extent of media coverage of a foreign policy conflict, according to Mowlana (1984:78), are national interest and loyalty of the media. "In international conflict ... the media often side with the perceived national interests of the system of which they are part, making it difficult to maintain journalistic independence and neutrality in the face of patriotism and national loyalty," he stated. Commercial and political factors also contribute to media performance, according to Mowlana, as the media become instruments by which individuals, organizations and government officials can manipulate public opinion. The media potentially can contribute to the resolution of conflict between two countries by helping each nation understand the other's position, Mowlana noted. Further, the media might offer alternatives to existing policies and influence the mood of government elites and public,
thereby diffusing the conflict, he said. There is no doubt among scholars and governments that a democratic nation wants to secure the approval of its own people for its foreign policies and that the media are a part of that process. How influential a part of the process is unclear: in some studies, the media play a powerful role in foreign policy and in others, that role is minimal. At the very least, as Nimmo (1964) noted, the news media are channels of political communication which serve to connect government officials and citizens. Also important to note is that a number of studies have noted that changes in foreign policy are frequently preceded by similar shifts in public opinion (Page and Shapiro, 1980; Gans, 1979). Also important to recognize here, McGowan and Shapiro (1973) have stated that results from foreign policy and media studies have not led to a general integrated theory, but instead have suggested the need for longitudinal and systematic empirical analysis of the relationship between press and foreign policy. Most existing studies in the area are basic content analyses, many of them focusing on how various U.S. foreign policies were covered by the U.S. media. Scholars have contended that a synthesis of studies from various fields related to foreign policy and the media is in order if an integrated theory is to emerge.

As stated earlier, much scholarly activity on small states has tended to focus on the super and great powers’ relations to small states and has largely ignored small states’ relationships to greater powers. As can be seen in the present research, examination of a small state’s foreign relations, and how the behavioral traits of small states are also evident in their mass media coverage of
foreign policy, can provide useful information for scholars. The significance of the present study lies in its emphasis on the relations between New Zealand and the United States principally from the perspective of a small power. By carefully examining the behavior of small powers in their relations with a greater power, scholars can gain a better understanding of both the strengths and weaknesses of small states in the international arena.

Finally, as noted in agenda-setting research, the media tell the public which issues and events are important to think about (Cohen, 1963). Research has shown that the media do that by illuminating certain issues over others, by such means as continued coverage, placement in a newspaper or news broadcast, length or duration of such coverage and other variables. (One of the striking findings in the present research was the overall buoyancy of nuclear issues in the selected media over the nearly five-year period. Considering that each newspaper under analysis is published six days a week, the average appearance of nuclear issue items was 1.2 per day per newspaper.) Research also has shown that the media have been shown to have an effect on weakly held attitudes and have been shown to reinforce existing attitudes and cognitions. Such findings have wide possible implications for small states in shaping public opinion and even in disseminating propaganda. In the coverage of foreign affairs and foreign policy, such media power is attractive to political and governmental elites and policy-makers, who will seek to influence public opinion about such matters through media outlets.

In a small state such as New Zealand, where anti-nuclear attitudes are
found by pollsters to be strongly and widely held, the media may only have the power to reinforce and not change attitudes. Propaganda researchers have found that even large doses of opposing information do little to change well-established attitudes held by the public. With regard to attitudes that are weakly held, the media may hold much greater influence. Research has shown that political propaganda influenced public attitudes more between elections, when issue salience is low, than at election times (Davison, 1974). This holds importance for small nations such as New Zealand, where the Labor Party and National Party, for example, might be better off attempting to gain support for nuclear or other positions through the media in the years between elections and not to concentrate on issues mostly at election times. Between the 1984 and 1987 elections, this was the case. Nuclear issues remained on the media agenda and ranked in the top ten in polls as important concerns among the New Zealand public during these years. Nuclear issues will remain important in New Zealand and will gain in importance elsewhere into the next century. The relationship of the media, government and nuclear policies should remain on research agendas, but scholars also should consider additional variables in their exercises with foreign policy and the media. The use of small state variables in such endeavors can shed useful light on a difficult subject.
References


I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: The Use of Small State Variables in Research on the Coverage of Foreign Policy: New Zealand and the ANZUS Crisis

Author(s): Licnne Fridriksson

Corporate Source (if appropriate):

Publication Date:

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

CHECK HERE  Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8½" x 11") reproduction

OR  Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY [PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

"I hereby grant to the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) nonexclusive permission to reproduce this document as indicated above. Reproduction from the ERIC microfiche by persons other than ERIC employees and its system contractors requires permission from the copyright holder. Exception is made for non-profit reproduction of microfiche by libraries and other service agencies to satisfy information needs of educators in response to discrete inquiries."

Signature:  Printed Name: Licnne Fridriksson

Organization: Professor

Address: Baylor University P.O. Box 97313

Waco, Texas 76798

Date: 5/4/94

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:

Address:

Price Per Copy:

Quantity Price:

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

ERIC 63 (Rev 4/96)
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
Romance Reading in the Third World: A Postcolonial Intersection of Gender, Ethnicity, and Sexuality

Radhika E. Parameswaran
Doctoral Program
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
205 Communications Center
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA 52242

(O) (319) 335-5811  (H) (319) 339-0755

Presented at
Commission on the Status of Women Division
Panel: “Women, Media, and Cultural Contexts”
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
AEJMC Conference
Atlanta, Georgia
August 10-13, 1994
Romance Reading in the Third World: A Postcolonial Intersection of Gender, Ethnicity, and Sexuality

At the end of her review essay on feminist theories and media studies, Leslie Steeves raises an important issue for feminist media scholars from the third world. She writes, "In the third world new media are being introduced rapidly, but little research exists on how women are faring in the process" (1987, p. 12). She points out the lacuna in gender-related studies in the field of development communication. Acknowledging the contribution of recent work in the newly emerging field of "women in development," Steeves suggests that efforts are being made to redress the neglect of women and to include analyses of women's issues in development communication.

Steeves' concern for the neglect of third world women in scholarship, while genuinely expressed, is symptomatic of a larger problem in women's studies in the West today. Her location of third world women solely within the framework of "development" is not only problematic but also restrictive and confining. Such a perspective fails to address the lack of studies with a feminist perspective in the area of women in development and also does not articulate the necessity of going beyond development to understand third world women's encounters with mass media in their everyday lives. If development studies, which have always been the preserve of men, ignored the existence of women, the "women in development" studies are guilty of producing representations of third world women in the West as victims oppressed in ways beyond the comprehension of feminists in the more industrialized nations.

In the past, studies of underdevelopment focused on compiling information on third world women in terms of variables such as oppressive traditions, high illiteracy, rural and urban poverty, population explosion, and fertility. Chandra Mohanty (1991, p. 6), an Indian feminist scholar, documents the numerous books and articles that have shaped the discourse of "third world woman" in the West today and finds that objective indicators of well-being such as life-expectancy, sex-ratio, nutrition, and educational level have become the predominant categories of analyses found in social scientific studies of women in developing countries.

Arguing that these indicators fail to adequately portray the lives of these women, Mohanty notes:

While such descriptive information is useful and necessary, these presumably "objective" indicators by no means exhaust the meaning of women's day-to-day-lives. The everyday, fluid, fundamentally historical and dynamic nature of lives of third world women is here collapsed into a few "frozen" indicators of their well-being (Mohanty, 1991, p. 6).
Mohanty finds that more recent research in the area of women and development has attempted to go beyond these restrictive parameters, but is still not completely free of some of the problems with research in the past. Works on women in development such as the Zed Press Women in the Third World Series, although written with a feminist intent, ignore specific local and historical context, assume women in the third world to be a homogenous and seamless category, and finally define third world women as objects (Mohanty, 1991, p. 72).

Purpose of this Analysis

There is therefore a need to go beyond these studies to capture the complexities of women's lives in the third world. The problems identified with the "women in development" studies continue to plague communication studies in the third world.

This paper identifies the problems with media studies of and in the third world, especially with reference to their treatment of women's issues. These problems include a lack of gender-specific analysis, a persistence in superficial treatment of issues related to women, and the empirical invisibility of women. I then argue that feminist communication studies of third world women's experiences with popular culture provide an opportunity to go beyond unidimensional and reductive analyses to more historical and multidimensional approaches to understanding intersections of ethnicity, gender, class, and colonialism.

Keeping in mind this larger project, I subsequently evaluate and analyze Janice Radway's ethnographic study of romance readers to explore its potential as a way of investigating the inextricably interrelated issues of female sexuality, gender roles, and female subjectivity. After briefly touching upon the work of scholars in the United States who have borrowed heavily from Radway's work, I discuss the significance of studying the reception of romances in other non-Western cultural settings. Here, I outline the issues underlying romance reading in India, a third world postcolonial country, underscore the problems of "exporting" Radway's study to the third world and suggest that her study, while offering rich possibilities, has to be judiciously adapted to postcolonial third world cultures.

On quickly assessing the nature of media studies in the third-world context we find that they roughly fall into the three areas of development communication, cultural imperialism, and indigenous social scientific media studies. Most studies in development communication have focused on descriptions of rural programming, Western models of development, and quantitative analyses of media content and media audiences with regard to women (Vohra and Chowdhary, 1986; Bhagat, 1989; Rani and Malaviya, 1991). In fact, development communication research, which has always been of a highly positivistic
nature, has never managed to investigate audiences in depth. Due to its self-imposed
definition of "development," which has come to connote economic development, research
in this area has not addressed other kinds of programming such as soap operas, films for
television, and foreign entertainment programming on television; popular fiction such as
magazines and pulp novels; and popular cinema.

Studies of cultural imperialism, on the other hand, have tried to address the impact
of cultural products from the West on audiences living in the growing urban metropolexes
and suburban areas in third world countries. Scholars of the cultural imperialism school of
thought have analyzed the economic and psychological ramifications of Western
imperialism from a structural and institutional standpoint (Tomlinson, 1992; Fejes, 1981).
These studies have assumed that media messages from the monopoly media industries of
the West have enormous power over passive and uncritical people who find themselves at
the mercy of multinational corporations (Fejes, 1981, p. 351).

Such a simplistic rendering of a more complex issue does not explain how people
may assimilate aspects of the West in quite ingenious and complex ways; ways which
cannot be studied theoretically but have to be investigated empirically. Expressing the need
to study interpretations of media messages by women in the third world, Leslie Steeves
writes:

...almost nothing is known about how these Western products are interpreted
by women in other cultures. Even though it is likely that in most cases audiences
"read" representations as they are intended, there are indications that --at least
under certain conditions--Third World women may actively resist dominant
messages (Steeves, 1993, p. 41).

Indigenous academic studies of media within the postcolonial third world nations,
strongly influenced by the positivistic sciences, have themselves failed to investigate how
audiences interpret media messages. Still enmeshed in the colonial ethos, these nations
continue to revere the "infallibility" of the objective sciences and to use Western models of
communication that do not take into account traditional power structures and social
practices. As a consequence they have focused on producing rather superficial analyses
of media audiences (Mahajan, 1990; Brown and Cody, 1991; Richter, 1977) or have
studied only media content (Eashwar, 1984; Bharadwaj, 1987; Rao, 1989), both of which
fail to take into account the complex construction of gender through the various epochs of
history. Thus, communication studies of the third world have not attempted to understand
the influence of the mass media on the everyday lives of women inhabiting historically
specific postcolonial spaces. The emergence of cultural studies, however, has posed a
challenge to mainstream communication research that is not only guilty of being ahistoric,
but also of ignoring issues of sexual identity, patriarchal oppression, and forms of resistance.

With the emergence of cultural studies in the West, traditional forms of investigation such as those described above are being challenged. In the last decade, in the United States and Great Britain, with the emergence of cultural studies and feminist studies there has been an explosion in academic investigations of women's encounters with popular culture. One of the ways in which feminist scholarship has intervened in cultural studies has been its politicization of the private sphere achieved through analyses of women's experiences with popular culture. Driven by the urge to reveal and explore female experiences, British and American feminist cultural studies scholars began focusing on issues such as female subjectivity and female sexuality.

Two such studies that have been acclaimed as path-breaking in their investigation of how women use popular culture are Janice Radway's *Reading the Romance* (1984) and Tania Modleski's *Loving with a Vengeance* (1982). Recognizing the value of the work of these two scholars, Kathleen Newman (1988, p. 244) observes:

> The two works of Modleski and Radway, which treated directly class as well as gender, were among the first book-length studies in the United States on popular formulaic narratives marketed to women and were contributors to debates that have since moved far ahead.

The next few sections of this paper focus on Radway's study of romance reading and its potential as a model for the investigation of third world women's experiences with popular fiction produced in the West. I attempt to critically evaluate Radway's contribution to the study of popular culture, assess the strengths and weaknesses of her approach, and finally examine the potential of her theoretical and empirical work for studies of women living in third world countries.

**Janice Radway and the Smithton Readers: A Brief Description**

It is fairly impossible to summarize Janice Radway's work in an inclusive manner since the scope of her work is broad in its examination of the romance phenomenon from the complicated business of paperback publishing to the actualization of the text by readers. It is possible, however, to highlight the important aspects of her critique and the frameworks that she draws upon to support her analyses.

Radway (1984) argues that an understanding of how cultural products like romance novels function in women's lives cannot be achieved by textual analyses that she says are
produced by a process "hermetically sealed off from readers" (p. 7). Finding fault with critics who confine themselves to the text, she writes:

> It is, then, this belief in the irreducible givenness of the literary text and in the coercive power of its features to control reading that permits the romance critics to maintain that they can account for why people read romances by reading those romances themselves (p. 7).

Emphasizing that reader interpretations have to be taken into account, Radway draws on reader-response theory to assert the importance of the reader over the text. Reader response theorists, although not homogenous in their conceptions of the reading process, posit that it is ultimately readers who are responsible for what is made of literary texts. While none of them would go so far as to argue that literary texts exert no force at all on readers, most would agree that literary meaning is the "result of a complex, temporally evolving interaction between some kind of verbal structure and socially situated reader" (Radway, 1986b, p. 12). Radway combines her belief in readers' interpretations with an anthropological perspective of human behavior; with a view of human behavior and culture described by cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz as "... a context, something within which [such things] can be intelligibly—that is thickly described," she views reading as a ritual.

Although she does offer some text-based analysis of romance characters and plot, the main emphasis of Radway's work is her ethnographic study of 42 romance readers who reside in a midwestern suburb. Radway contacted her informants through the efforts of "Dot," a bookseller who recommends and sells many romances to women in her small shop, thus functioning as a mediator between the corporate publishing structure and the individual buyer.

Radway's consciously feminist perspective emerges through her description and analysis of conversations with these romance readers. Refusing to fall into the trap of the earlier mass-culture critics who saw audiences as passive victims of a repressive ideology, she probes the complex relationship between romance reading and the other aspects of these women's lives. These conversations bring forth two issues that had escaped earlier textual critics of romance novels—the significance of the "act of reading" itself and the readers' rejection of certain kinds of romances which Radway calls "failed romances." Radway finds that the act of reading itself is a minor act of independence that these readers use to claim time for themselves, away from the demands of their family. She also finds that readers reject romances that feature brutal men who are cruel to rather passive heroines.
Radway's Theorizing of Gender: A Contribution to Cultural Studies

The beginnings of feminist work in the area of popular culture in the U.S. can be traced to the work of British cultural studies feminists at the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (McRobbie, 1980; Brundson, 1981; Hobson, 1982). These feminists challenged the exclusive attention paid by scholarly work to the public sphere, the focus on media studies at the centre that privileged news and public affairs over other popular cultural practices, the privileging of class as the basis of analysis, and the idea that resistance is always expressed rationally (Long, 1991, p. 114-115).

Discussing the influence of British cultural studies work on American feminist cultural studies, Elizabeth Long points out that in the tradition of feminists in Britain, American feminists have challenged mainstream feminism and mainstream cultural studies by "foregrounding a multidimensional understanding of power, domination, and possibilities of resistance (Long, 1991, p. 119). Janice Radway's (1984) study of romance reading, Long's study of women's reading groups (1986; 1987), and Modleski's (1982) work on soap opera audiences are examples of projects that tried to bring such an understanding to the ways in which audiences construct the meaning of texts.

The "audience perspective" can be traced back to U.S. communications research in the 1940s (Lazarsfield, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944; Berelson, 1954) and to British cultural studies in the late 1950s (Hoggart, 1957; Williams, 1961). However, empirical studies of media audiences that went beyond the hypodermic needle model and beyond the conception of the audience as an abstract "theoretical construction" did not emerge until the 1960s and 1970s in the U.S. when developments in literary theory, cultural anthropology, and feminist scholarship began to embody the potential of studying real readers located within particular social spaces (Long, 1986, p. 593). Noting the influence of "reader response theory" and semiotic anthropology on the study of audiences, Elizabeth Long suggests that these two theoretical approaches questioned the immutability of textual meanings and challenged the conception of reading as simple consumption.

These theoretical influences can be clearly discerned in Radway's study of romance reading. In a self-reflexive account of the strengths and limitations of her work on romance readers, Radway (1986a) writes about the theoretical framework of her study:

The reader-response critique of literary formalism was attractive to me precisely because it appeared to offer a hypothesis that would not only explain why I was disturbed by the "mass man" theory and its accompanying critique, but because it might also suggest fruitful ways to test the validity of both (p. 96)

And later, she notes:

More specifically, I was working with the concept of culture that has been
developed by Clifford Geertz (Geertz, 1973). I assumed that culture is a system of beliefs, values, and ideas about the world that meaningfully organizes an entire way of life (p. 100).

Assessing the theoretical contributions of feminist research to critical audience studies, Martin Allor (1988, pp. 222-223) argues that the most significant contribution of feminist criticism to revisions in notions of audience has been its investigation of relations between gender and reading. Allor finds that the work of feminists such as Radway on romance novels not only challenged the textual "maleness" of the literary canon, but also opened up the possibilities of studying readers who are inscribed within particular sites of social difference.

Elaborating further on Allor's brief treatment of feminist cultural studies work in audience research, feminist scholar Andrea Press (1991) observes that Radway's study has led to new theoretical developments in American feminism; she suggests that Radway's work has contributed to women's culture and gender-based theories of media reception. Other cultural studies feminists find that Radway's theoretical framework has enabled the investigation of female subjectivity, an issue which in turn has led to a critical examination of female sexuality and its forms of expression (Schwichtenberg, 1989; Newman, 1988). Take, for example, the following comments on feminist interpretations of popular culture texts:

They contribute to the project of theorizing gender by highlighting the significance of female subjectivity and its material corollary, female sexuality (Schwichtenberg, 1989, p. 202).

They contributed to the project of theorizing gender that has long been understood by feminists both to be an interdisciplinary, collective undertaking and to require a theorization of all social determinants (Newman, 1988, p. 244)

Thus Radway's study has produced new ways of thinking about audiences, women's popular culture, and female sexuality. Her effort to converse with romance readers and to begin her analysis from readers' evaluations of their reading experiences represents a good example of how audience research should privilege readers' interpretations over the fitting "the theory" to the material of one's research. Her methodology has also drawn the attention of scholars. Since the publication of her study in 1984, feminist scholars in communication (Press, 1991; Moffit, 1990; Bird, 1991), particularly, have also used ethnography to study audiences. The following section will attempt to discuss Radway's methodology and its suitability for studying women's popular culture.
In order to place feminist work on popular culture within an analytical framework and to give this body of work coherence and form, Lana Rakow (1986) suggests that feminists have approached popular culture from four perspectives: the Images and Representations Approach, the Recovery and Reappraisal Approach, the Reception and Experience Approach, and finally the Cultural Theory Approach. Rakow locates Radway's work in the Reception and Experience Approach which argues that women have played a central role as consumers of certain popular genres and that it is critical to understand how these genres function for women within the context of their own lives (p. 33).

To achieve this understanding, feminist scholars like Radway, interested in engaging questions of reception, have used ethnographic methods of research. Ethnography has been a method of particular pragmatic and political appeal to feminist scholars (Radway, 1984; Press, 1991; Amesley, 1989), who have in addition to theorizing about it, have also begun using it to investigate the reception of media messages. Ethnography has been of particular interest to feminists since it captures some of the basic commitments of feminist scholarship: to enable women to speak their experiences, to construct theory based on such experiences, and finally to intervene and effect changes. Stressing the interactive nature of ethnography, which makes it particularly useful for feminists, Radway (1986a) observes:

To be more specific, in an ethnography, one is at least attempting to record a conversation rather than providing an account of one's own solipsistic reverie on the interpretive possibilities of an inert and inarticulate text (p. 104).

There has been a great contribution by feminists such as Janice Radway (1988) to the thinking about doing ethnography and other related qualitative approaches. Radway's work is interesting methodologically because she attempts to combine audience research techniques with critical methods used in literary and film studies (Spigel, 1989). Discussing the methodological implications of Radway's work, Andrea Press suggests, "Radway's innovative ethnographic study of female romance readers has helped to pave the way toward a new methodology for studying the female audience" (1991, p. 23). The innovativeness of Radway's work lies not so much in her textual analysis or her analysis of the paperback publishing industry, but in her empirical work on readers.

Radway's work is liberally sprinkled with quotes from her readers; one gets a sense of the collaborative nature of her research. Her conversations with the readers yields interesting insights about how romance reading connects with their everyday lives. Apart from this, Radway's work is a good example of how ethnographic work often results in
unexpected findings; as Ien Ang suggests, ethnography allows us to "keep our interpretations sensitive to concrete specificities, to the unexpected, to history" - to the possibility of, in Willis's words, "being surprised, of reaching knowledge not prefigured in one's starting paradigm" (Willis, 1981, p. 90). Radway stumbles onto two important aspects of romance reading that she did not expect, the significance of the "act of reading" itself and readers' perceptions of "failed and ideal romances."

Radway's analysis of the "act of reading" is crucial since it demonstrates that readers' decisions to engage with romances is as important as the narrative structure itself. Radway finds that when they pick up these novels, it is a way of claiming time for themselves, of signaling a need for privacy, and of defying the restricted nature of their lives. Radway's examination of the "failed" romances has been a valuable model of analysis since it suggests that readers do not randomly and uncritically choose their novels. As a consequence of this the assumption that romance readers can be studied by randomly sampling these novels and by psychoanalyzing them has been challenged. John Markert praises Radway for privileging readers over texts: "Radway does not delve into the text to emerge with broad generalizations because she believes that critics do not know how to read as romance readers do (Markert, 1985, p. 683)."

Radway's work, therefore, brought to light aspects of romance reading that could not have emerged without personal contact and conversations with readers. She demonstrated the potential of ethnography as a method to study why women over the years have been attracted to certain genres of popular culture. Implicit in her work and in her approach to readers is also her feminist politics, that is, what she considers her work to be as part of the larger project of feminism. The next section will attempt to probe Radway's feminist politics and how this influenced her work.

**Radway's Feminist Politics and its Influence on her Work**

In the introduction to her work, Radway clearly identifies her feminist perspective and its influence on her interpretation of romance reading. She situates romance reading within the analytic category of patriarchy, which she defines as the constitution of women through their relationships to men. Although Radway does not elaborate further on her feminist position, Leslie Steeves (1987, pp. 106-118) locates her as a socialist feminist; Steeves explains that Radway's focus on patriarchal ideology as well as class oppression is the framework adopted by socialist feminists. While Marxist feminists believe that class oppression is one of the primary factors contributing to women's oppression, socialist feminists argue that women's oppression is a complex matrix of gender and class oppressions. They attempt to understand and deconstruct women's devaluation in the
economic sphere and also in the private sphere (Donovan, 1992, p. 83). Also, unlike Marxist feminists who emphasize the dominant ideology of the ruling classes, socialist feminists, Steeves explains, assume the relative autonomy of expressions in popular culture (1987, pp. 106-108).

As a feminist, Radway chooses to study women's oppression in the private sphere, challenging the stereotypical representations of passive romance readers and arguing that this stereotyping is the result of the secondary status accorded to women in a patriarchal society. However, she maintains that the power of patriarchy is not absolute. In an article "Identifying Ideological Seams: Mass Culture, Analytical Method, and Political Practice," published two years after her study on romance readers, Radway reflects on her work and elaborates on her feminist position. She writes:

... we might say that patriarchy should not be thought of as a single, uniform, completely successful system or thing. Instead it must be conceived as a dynamic set of institutionalized but variable power relations, practices and activities. Although it tends to produce a world that can be experienced as a coherent and organized whole... patriarchy is nevertheless a set of practices that are, in reality, riven by conflicts, slippages, and imperfect joinings (pp. 109-110).

To understand and identify these slippages and imperfect joinings, socialist feminists like Radway who investigate popular culture have referred to Stuart Hall's description of dominant, negotiated and oppositional readings. Radway finds that romance readers, contrary to the assumptions of traditional mass-culture critics who imagined readers as passive and inert, actively question their status and identify with heroines who are independent and feisty. Radway suggests that these readers are thus reading these novels oppositionally, and she finds concealed in their interpretations an incipient feminism. Radway (1986a) points out that as feminists are interested in change, it is crucial to identify such oppositional readings, since it presents opportunities to initiate change:

What I mean by opportunity, here, is the possibility of initiating a conversation that can move from the acknowledged connection between romance reading and a woman's daily life to a new account of that life that might persuade romance readers to see their dissatisfaction precisely as dissatisfaction with the features highlighted in that account (pp. 111).

Radway is troubled that feminists have too often in their research, forgotten that they have a political project; she locates this problem in the attitudes of researchers who analyze popular cultural products with the conviction that readers are victims of false consciousness.8

Radway argues that feminist scholars have to look for ways in which readers' opinions and understanding of their own situations intersect with feminist perspectives.
According to Radway, these points of intersection offer legitimate starting points for articulation of political messages (Radway, 1986a, pp. 107-108). It is this urge to find common ground between feminist scholars and romance readers that leads Radway to be sensitive to the minor ways in which these women assert their independence. Radway finds that the books that sell poorly with the Smithton readers are precisely those that feminists would criticize—books that denigrate women and subject them to brutality.

Radway's interest in conversing with women and in identifying possibilities for change leads her to adopt a concept of the female individual that does not implicitly evaluate women's psyche against the dominant male standard of individualism. This can be seen in her choice of female-centered frameworks of analysis; she adopts Nancy Chodorow's theory of female individuation to explain readers' fascination for heroes who are tender and caring beneath their rugged exterior. Many feminists have rejected the theories of Lacan and Freud because they find that these theories are inadequate to explain women's ego development and presume that women are abnormal and are represented by what they "lack" (Steeves, 1987, p. 112). Radway uses Chodorow's theory to analyze the more flexible and relational nature of women's primary identities, which are shaped by the contradictory messages they are subjected to as they grow up (p. 112). Ultimately, this leads her to be alert to subtle ways in which women may resist patriarchy. In the course of her conversations she finds within readers "seeds of resistance" manifested in the act of reading, in the yearning for a nurturant hero as opposed to a macho one, and in their attraction for strong and independent heroines.

Yet another characteristic of feminist scholarship that is exhibited by Radway's work is her self-reflexivity. In Radway's (1986a, pp. 93-124) self-reflexive examination of her work two years after the publication of *Reading the Romance*, she dwells on the strengths and weaknesses of her work. She agrees that she overestimated the potential for resistance in her readers and says that she is willing to slightly alter the claims made for the method she used. She once again reiterates the fruitfulness of using ethnography and the scope it offers for feminist interventions.

Radway reflects on the inaccessibility of her work to non-academic readers and finds that the practice of academic feminists to write only for academic audiences robs their writing of its political potential to initiate change and may also be an imposition of the feminist viewpoint on audiences who may not prefer that position. Discussing the weaknesses of her own project, she suggests:

One of the first things we must do, I have come to believe, in the course of reflecting on the weaknesses of my own book, is to abandon the activity of writing only for academic audiences. If we do intend to respect the people

82
we study and believe that their analysis of their situation is elaborated seriously and in good faith, then I think we must not only respect their right to hear what we have to say about their situation, but we must also give them the opportunity to reject that interpretation and our political message as well (Radway, 1986a, p. 115).

Radway admits that redoing her work may be impossible; to compensate for this she says that she has endeavored to use the media to discuss her interpretations and findings and therefore reach wider audiences. Finally Radway clarifies the form political intervention may take in the case of romance reading—she says that people do not have to be weaned from their fantasies, rather the fantasies could be altered to focus on relationships between two equal and autonomous individuals.

**Critical Response to Reading the Romance: Exploring its Limitations**

Radway's work has drawn attention from scholars across disciplines like feminist studies, communication studies, anthropology, and literary studies, who while acknowledging her contributions have also pointed out her work's limitations. Scholars have elaborated on problems related to her sample size, her methodology and interviewing strategies, her psychoanalytic framework, and her explication of "resistance" to patriarchy inherent in romance reading.

The limited nature of Radway's sample makes it difficult to go beyond the immediate situation of Smithton in order to construct a theory of the "hypothetical female reader" of popular cultural products. Andrea Press (1986, p. 148) finds Radway's limited sample disturbing since these readers seem to be heavy readers of romance in comparison to the average romance reader. It is quite possible, Press says, that their excessive devotion to this genre of fiction might have skewed their view of romance reading.

Radway's Smithton readers belong to the middle and upper-middle class, however, she makes no effort to be self-conscious about the class bias inherent in her sample. Although she stresses the exploratory nature of her work and admits the limitations of her sample, which is not scientifically designed, she fails to confront the specific ways in which this sample may have influenced her interpretations of romance reading. Andrea Press (1991) raises questions regarding the class bias of Radway's sample and says:

Radway's sample is predominantly middle-class. One cannot help wondering how her readers' discussion of romances were shaded by their class position. Would working class-women have identified so strongly with the female heroines the middle class preferred? (p. 24)
A more serious charge leveled against Radway pertains to her methodology itself. Tania Modleski, another feminist literary scholar of the romance novel, finds Radway guilty of overprivileging audience responses. Indirectly referring to Radway's work, Modleski argues that the danger of ethnography lies in the fact that "critics immersed in their [the audience's] culture, half in love with their subject are incapable of achieving a critical distance from it" (Modleski, 1986, p. xii). As a result she fears that they end up producing apologias for mass culture and embracing its ideology. Attacking "ethnographic" studies, Modleski charges these critics who conduct such studies as being guilty of cooperating and colluding with the capitalist industry in maintaining people in a state of false consciousness. Alluding to Radway's work, she says, "Thus one 'ethnographic' critic compares women's reading of romances to 'folk performances' which 'contest the hegemonic imposition of bourgeois culture .... on subordinate groups' " (p. xii).

Modleski thus attacks Radway for overestimating the potential of readers' resistance to patriarchy through the mere act of reading--she feels that Radway is stretching theories of resistance to fit readers' interpretations of romance. Although Modleski's criticism of Radway's work may seem extreme, there are some valid points that she raises regarding the efficacy of ethnography. Radway's ethnography, as other critics have pointed out, does have some "hair-raising methodological" problems (Taylor, 1986, p. 389). One such problem is the rather exclusive attention given to Dot, Radway's primary informant (Press, 1986, p. 148). One gets the impression that Radway avoids discussing how much she relied on Dot; Dot's role as an opinion leader and as a primary informant should have been discussed more in depth.

In a more detached fashion than Modleski, British cultural studies critic Angela McRobbie (1990), acknowledges Radway's contributions, but at the same time deals with specific problems related to Radway's conversations with readers. She does not question the validity of ethnography as a method of studying audience responses to media texts, rather she locates certain consequences arising from Radway's sympathy for her readers. McRobbie (1990) finds that Radway does not probe enough the role of the romance in the material life of the romance readers and argues:

This over-reliance on the statements made by readers manifests itself in the absence of detail about the lived experience of these women on a day-to-day basis. Radway does not dwell on the specificities of financial independence of these women (p. 140).

According to McRobbie, Radway's failure to consider the concrete and material realities of the lives of romance readers resulted in the lack of a wider social context for this
phenomenon. Romance reading, according to McRobbie, could be a medium for the gratification of sexual energies; she is troubled that Radway does not pursue this point further (pp. 139-140). She suggests that the reluctance and unwillingness of women to discuss the role of romance reading in their sexual lives is one instance of how readers, in their extreme anxiousness to please Radway, are rather guarded about the less cheery circumstances in their lives.

Angela McRobbie suggests that some of the problems with Radway's work arise because Radway pays too much attention to the autonomous act of reading and is rather inattentive to the other activities which surround it. Pointing out the negative aspects of Radway's primary concern with the reader-text interface, McRobbie argues, "This restricts her line of vision and makes it difficult for her to look at the relationship between gender and leisure time in the context of household labour" (McRobbie, 1990, p. 140).

Thus Radway's attempts to "suspend disbelief" and accept readers' statements at face value tend to influence her interviewing strategies at certain moments. Along with this, the loss of critical distance affects her analysis of readers' responses to romances. As Andrea Press (1986, p. 147) notes, "In her desire to preserve the integrity of her informants Radway is sometimes too uncritical of the conclusions she draws from their statements." Press finds that Radway seems hesitant to challenge their words and one is left feeling a little frustrated. A good illustration of Press' observation is Radway's easy acceptance of readers' emphatic expressions of low interest in love scenes, sex, and the body of the hero, contentions that can hardly be borne out by the sexually explicit covers or content.

Yet another problem that critics have raised regarding Radway's work is her psychoanalytic explanation for readers' interest in the narrative of romance novels. Radway uses Nancy Chodorow's female-centered theory to account for readers' responses since she, like many other feminist scholars, does not believe that Freudian analysis adequately explains female development in a patriarchal society. However, critics like Jean Franco find that ultimately Radway's analysis differs from traditional Freudian psychoanalysis only very superficially (Franco, 1986, p. 125). Franco argues that readers' urge for reading romances is explained by Radway as an alternative route for women who cannot fulfill their desires for a caring and nurturant relationship. This explanation, Franco argues, does not differ from the Freudian view which suggests that people avoid painful tensions and if their pleasures cannot be directly satisfied, they then adopt a more circuitous route to satisfaction.
Ella Taylor (1986) takes Jean Franco's objections a step further—she wonders about the validity of psychoanalytic interpretations themselves, either Freudian or female-centered ones—and she poses questions that Radway leaves unanswered:

Can the seasoned critic, alert as she is to the deeper mechanics of the text, "read" a book in the same way as a less self-conscious reader would? If texts have multiple meanings, how can she know she has isolated the salient ones? Is the composite reader a legitimate construct? Can a group of readers who never meet be called a community? (p. 389).

Feminist scholars have also criticized Radway for her feminist politics. Feminist scholar Ien Ang finds that by interpreting the reading of romance as a search for nurturance, Radway constructs a "progressive potential" for romantic fiction. Ang (1986) observes that in Radway's work, popular fiction is seen as a potential vehicle for reaching the mass of women who are not yet mobilized for feminist, emancipatory ideas. The danger in this view, Ang argues, is that the relevance of popular fiction for feminism is reduced to one of consciousness-raising. She urges critics to interpret romance as something that women read not because they are unhappy, but as an expression of happiness no matter how temporary. She wants feminists to make the pleasure of popular fiction a more collective public experience by deliberately celebrating it.

Radway's study also makes certain assumptions about female sexuality and how it is constituted; she refuses to acknowledge the strong heterosexual bias in her analysis of gender relations. She does not mention the marginalization of lesbians by the publishing industry itself or the implications of lesbianism as an alternative to heterosexual relations. In short, she assumes what has been called "the bias of compulsory heterosexuality" by Adrienne Rich (1980, p. 23) who suggests that assumptions of compulsory heterosexuality by feminist scholars contributes to the erasure of lesbian existence from scholarly literature.

Thus Radway's study poses many problems, problems that may continue to persist in future studies. Despite these limitations, her work documents the ambiguous relationship between women and patriarchal culture and it represents a pioneering effort in the ethnography of audiences (Taylor, 1986, p. 397). This pioneering effort has been taken up by other scholars who have used Radway's study as a model to investigate women's interactions with popular cultural texts.

Reading the Romance: A Model for Future Studies

In expanding the scope of Radway's study, other researchers have attempted to include romance readers belonging to the working class, other races, and age groups, and also readers' experiences with television. Since the publication of Radway's study
romance became identified largely as a white, middle-class genre particularly popular among women between the ages of 25-50 years. Linda Christian-Smith's work *Becoming a Woman through Romance* (1990) challenges this assumption and attempts to study the relationship between gender and popular literature for adolescents. Unlike Radway, Christian-Smith includes black and working-class teen romances among the novels she studies.

Yet another study, modeled after Radway's work, which looks at the ways in which adolescents use their leisure time is Mary Anne Moffit's (1990) comparative study of adolescent and adult readers of romance novels. Focusing, however, on adolescent readers, this study observes that reading romances holds significant importance in the lives of adolescents. Moffit's study, unlike Linda Christian-Smith's work, concentrates on white and middle-class readers.

It is only with Andrea Press' (1991) study of women and television, a study in which she invokes Radway's theories of gender and reception early on, that we find Radway's work truly expanded to include working-class women's experiences of popular culture. Although Press has definitely enlarged the scope of Radway's study, it is disconcerting to note that she, along with other researchers of the romance novel (Thurston, 1988), do not dwell on the absence of considerations of race or ethnicity in their studies.

Diversifying Studies of Romance: Western Romances in the Third World

Research on women and popular culture continues even today to be focused on white women and to be primarily a conversation among white feminist academics. As Lana Rakow (1989) observes:

Collaborations among white feminist academics is not enough, however. We must do some soul-searching to uncover the reason why feminist scholarship in the field of communication is so white (p. 212).

Specifically discussing research on women and romance novels, she argues that academics have rushed to investigate white women's reading of romance novels and urges feminists to acknowledge the limitations of their theories for studying women of color.

Extending Lana Rakow's argument further brings us back to the beginning of this paper; how do women in other non-white cultural settings situated within different forms of patriarchy interpret romances? A quick survey of research on romance will reveal that very little has been done on the reception of romances in other countries. It is a little known fact that popular romances published and produced in the West are marketed to countries in

87
Asia like Japan and India. Romance novels like the Harlequin series are translated into several languages and distributed in more than 90 countries with an estimated worldwide annual readership of 200 million (Thurston, 1988, p. 92). In some countries like India where English is widely spoken in the urban areas as a consequence of British colonial rule, these romances are not translated, but are sold in their original form as they are to consumers in the United States and Great Britain. Very little research has been carried out on the romance's impact on other cultures. Pointing to the significance of such studies, Margaret Jensen (1984, p. 161) writes:

> The home market is nearly saturated, but Harlequin's sales abroad have steadily increased. (This international cultural penetration is another phenomenon worthy of study. What messages do readers in developing countries receive from North American romances? What impact do romances have on diverse national, racial, and ethnic cultures?) [my emphasis]

Jensen's comment gives us an indication of the need for studies of women's interactions with Western cultural products in other cultural settings such as the third world.

Radway's study of romance readers could be extended to study the reception of romance novels by female readers in other countries. Her ethnographic approach would in fact be well-suited to studying the romance phenomenon in other cultural settings since textual analyses alone will not explain why these women seek the accounts of romances (even if they are fictive) of white women living in the West. Such studies of third world women's engagement with popular culture are imperative, especially given the nature of development communication work, cultural imperialism studies, and social scientific media research, which fail to interrogate the complex relationship between gender and cultural phenomena. As a third world feminist media scholar, the reception of romances in the third world is of special interest to me, particularly its reception in post-colonial nations like India, where romances are read in English. There is also a need to explore women's interactions with popular narratives in other post-colonial nations, especially in Africa and Asia, which have been colonies of European nations such as France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain.

A critical examination of Radway's study brings forth the advantages and disadvantages of an ethnographic investigation of women's interactions with popular culture. It is clear that there are several limitations inherent in an ethnographic investigation--some of which are related to sample size, class bias, textual analysis, the oscillation between readers' interpretations and critics' interpretations, and the prescriptions for social change emanating from one's feminist perspective. Some of the problems related to Radway's work still persist in studies that were carried out subsequently. The
advantages of Radway's work, however, outweigh the limitations, as seen by the overwhelmingly positive response to her study (Schwichtenberg, 1989; Newman, 1988, Press, 1991; Moffit, 1990).

Some of the important points, relevant for future studies, which emerge from an analysis of her work may be summed up as: (1) the critical need to be self-conscious about the demographics of the subjects of research, that is, to acknowledge openly the class, race, or sexual bias inherent in one's study (such an acknowledgment is often missing in most of the work carried out by white feminist scholars) (2) to strive to achieve the fine balance between overcelebrating women's informal powers and overemphasizing women's oppression; (3) to look at romance reading, not in isolation, but as part of the social, sexual, and economic lives of women; 4) to establish a critical distance from one's subjects, a distance that will enable probing beneath surface responses throughout; (5) to be self-reflexive about one's research; (6) to avoid over-reliance on one informant; and finally (6) to outline as explicitly as possible the future directions and implications of one's work.

Keeping these considerations in mind, Radway's study still offers rich possibilities for studies of third world women; participant observation and ethnography would enable the voices of these women to be heard, a necessity if third world women are to be invested with agency. Stressing the theoretical and empirical invisibility of women from Africa and Asia, Chandra Mohanty questions the ramifications of the production of "Third World Woman" as a discourse in Western feminism and asks what the prevailing image of victimization does to their agency within feminism (Mohanty, 1991). Feminist scholar Lata Mani (1991) also expresses her concern for the totalizing discourses of salvation within which third world women are inscribed. These concerns point toward the need for studies which explore how these women negotiate their lives despite the hegemony of the patriarchal structures in place.

In the case of romance novels, as pointed out before, little research exists on how women in other cultural settings make meaning of this fiction. It is important to make a distinction here between those countries in which romances are translated into the vernacular and those in which they are read in the languages of the previous imperialist colonizers. For instance, Harlequin romances, which landed in Japan in 1979, delivered an impact that soon reached beyond women's fiction to influence the publishing world at large and to trigger what is called the Harlequinization of best-sellers. Chieko Mulhern (1989), a scholar in Japanese and comparative literature writes, "By 1985 nearly two thousand Western romances had been translated into Japanese" (p. 51). The success of Harlequin romances prompted a corporation in Japan, Sanrio Company, which used to import the Silhouette series of romances, to launch their own project for homegrown
production of original New Romances to be written by Japanese women (p. 51). Chieko profiles the authors of these new romances and analyzes the plots and characters of these novels, paying special attention to Western influences on the romances. Similarly, the plots and characters of popular narratives such as the fotonovelas, which are sold in Mexico and in Latin American countries have also been studied by feminist scholars (Flora and Flora, 1978; Franco, 1986).

These studies have attempted to study how Western narratives have been adapted to fit indigenous cultural constructions of women within certain ethnic groups. An area that remains little explored, though, is how romances are received in those third world countries where they are read in the same language as their Western counterparts. For investigations of romance reading in this context, textual analysis is not the solution, since it will not yield any insights into how women of a certain ethnic group understand not only romance, but also the West as an analytic category. In this case, Radway's study presents tremendous potential; it offers opportunities for observation, conversation, and in-depth investigations of the subtle influences of colonialism and indigenous patriarchal structures on women's reactions to romance reading.

To get a glimpse of the popularity of romance reading in postcolonial third-world countries, I would like to elaborate on the significance of this phenomenon in a country I am most familiar with—India. The popularity of romances in India¹⁰ is discussed by Vijay Joshi, an Indian journalist, who writes (Joshi, 1994, p. 7A):

Bashful Indian teen-agers for years have secretly lived out their fantasies in the pages of romance novels imported from Britain.

Known among aficionados as "MBs," the British publishers' series has provided a daily fix to a generation of Indian women who devoured the novels between classes, at beauty parlors or while commuting to work on buses.

The popularity of these imported romances are so high that Indian publishers, according to Joshi, are beginning to produce romance novels written in English by Indians in order to rake in some of the profits that multinationals are earning. Some of the crucial issues underlying romance reading in India can be understood (1) by explicating the nature of the postcolonial urban middle-class milieu in which romance reading takes place, (2) by sketching out some of the traditional patriarchal forms that continue to restrict the lives of middle-class women, and (3) by looking at how womanliness and female sexuality are being harnessed in the shaping of "nationhood," an important element of political discourse in independent India.
Romance reading in India takes place primarily in urban and suburban areas where urban Indians as a result of their close association, frequent exposure, and socialization to the British colonialists were the most affected by Westernization psychologically. If one could discuss the degrees to which colonialism affected the social, political, and economic fabric of the lives of Indians, it could be convincingly argued that urban Indians were much more "colonized" than rural Indians. Discussing the profound and deep impact of colonialism on India, Ashis Nandy (1983), a scholar of postcolonial psychology, suggests:

In spite of the presence of a paramount power which acted as the central authority, the country was culturally fragmented and politically heterogeneous. It could thus partly confine the cultural impact of imperialism to its urban centres, to its Westernized and semi-Westernized upper and middle classes, and to some sections of its traditional elites (pp. 31-32).

One of the most important legacies of this Westernization, relevant to romance reading in India, is the ability of middle-class urban Indians to speak and write fluently in English. The degrees of familiarity and fluency with English in India indicate the strata and class to which Indians could belong to. In a postcolonial nation, intimacy with the language of the imperialists, ironically, is today an indication of one's socioeconomic position in society—it indicates one's family background, financial ability to have access to English-medium instruction, and clearly enhanced chances of upward mobility. Thus, beneath private phenomena like romance reading in urban India lie larger theoretical and ideological implications.

To unearth the tacit meanings of romance reading in India, it is useful and critical to gain familiarity with the work of postcolonial scholars who are beginning to unpack the meanings of urban phenomena like the emergence of cookbooks published in English for the middle-class. Arjun Appadurai (1988), a social anthropologist, discussing the recent popularity of cookbooks in India, describes the middle-class audiences for cookbooks and writes that the middle-class in India are found in her cities, which comprise not only the international centers like Bombay or New Delhi, but also smaller industrial, railroad, commercial, and military towns of varying orders of size, complexity, and heterogeneity. Delineating the significance of the cookbook in middle-class India, he comments:

Cookbooks which usually belong to the humble literature of complex civilizations, tell unusual cultural tales... They reflect shifts in boundaries of edibility, the proprieties of the culinary process, the logic of meals, the exigencies of the household budget, the vagaries of the market, and the structure of domestic ideologies (Appadurai, 1988, p. 3).

Language and literacy, cities and ethnicity, women and domesticity, all are
examples of issues that lie behind these cookbooks (Appadurai, 1988, p. 4).

Appadurai also writes that cookbooks are bought by an important class of consumers in India characterized by mutliethnic, mult caste, polyglot and Westernized tastes. I cite Appadurai here to demonstrate that underlying even the most seemingly innocuous urban phenomena like the emergence of cookbooks are issues that carry implications for larger questions in the spheres of ideology, politics, and the marketplace. Similarly, beneath the reading of imported romances written in English by a relatively Westernized urban middle-class Indian women, lie larger questions of post-colonial psychology, female sexual politics, religious and national rhetoric on womanhood, the complex nature of traditional patriarchal structures, and most important, subtle forms of resistance that allow women to negotiate their lives.

It is important at this juncture to qualify the use of the word "Westernization," since the above discussion was not intended to imply that the West has completely displaced indigenous cultural practices or ways of living. It is fascinating that the West has been peculiarly incorporated into the lifestyle of urban Indians without dislodging important cultural and religious values; the result of modernization can be seen in the strange (I mean to Westerners) and apparently contradictory lives of Indians who oscillate back and forth between the Western world and their traditional worlds with an amazing fluidity. For instance, it is not uncommon to find Indian astrophysicists from the so-called rational world of Western science consulting astrologers or comparing horoscopes before the wedding of their children or expert computer programmers worshipping their computers on one day of the year a part of a Hindu ritual where one is supposed to pay obeisance to the tools of their trade.

These contradictions can also be seen in the lives of middle-class Indian women in urban India; although many women are economically independent through success in terms of careers, work or politics, they continue to lead restricted social and private lives (Narayan, 1992, p. 266). Vijay Joshi (1994, p. 7A) touches the tip of the iceberg when he writes: "... romances still challenge the conservative values of a country where most marriages are arranged by elders and many love-starved teens dare not hold hands in public." Even today, certain social rituals like dating, body contact with men in public, and public exhibition of romantic love are taboo in urban India, despite the overtly superficial Westernized veneer. Women in India lead highly sheltered lives in comparison to their Western counterparts; the most prevalent form of marriage is the arranged marriage system which demands that women be virgins, women have to be home before sundown, are formally initiated into housework and cooking, have to seek approval from parents or
authority figure for their activities outside of home, and are expected after marriage to take care of elders in their husband's family. Most urban young Indian women live with their families, either with parents or with their husbands and children, even if they are economically independent, perform a bulk of the domestic chores, and negotiate their everyday lives between the public and private realms of work, college, and home.

It must be noted here that Indian men enjoy much more freedom than the women; men are rarely warned of the consequences of losing their chastity or of having poorly developed culinary skills. Thus we find that although Indian women are not constrained any less or more in terms of intellectual achievements than women in the West, when it comes to the realm of sexual politics, we find that there are considerable differences. It is these differences, which may be located in the nature of Indian culture, that make romance reading in India a fascinating phenomenon.

Romance reading takes place within the culture of contemporary India, a culture that comprises a variety of signifying practices—practices that at times seem disparate due to contradictions between colonial legacies and traditional practices. Various cultural phenomena in India appear at the intersections of various discourses, including those of gender, class, caste, and religion in the contemporary context. Postcolonial Indian scholars have not only foregrounded the contestation of what constitutes an "Indian" and the notion of "culture" in India, but they have also emphasized the need to understand India not as a unified whole or as a way of life, but as a struggle. This "struggle" over the meanings of rituals and cultural practices is important for the ritual of romance reading in India precisely because one of the most important sites of ferment in independent India has been in the two arenas of female sexuality and womanhood and their juxtaposition with nationhood. Since India achieved independence, there has been an effort on the part of the government, entertainment industries, and other institutions to recast the nature of public discourse and the idea of nationhood, with the ostensible purpose of discarding colonialism and constructing a genuinely Indian cultural identity.

One of the ways in which this identity is being constructed is by presenting the image of the West as amoral and licentious and as a foil to this image, contrasting the traditional images of womanhood in India associated with chastity and purity. Discussing this slippage between womanhood, nationhood, and "authentic" Indian culture, Rosie Thomas (1989), a feminist Indian film critic, argues that while the use of the figure of woman as a vestibule of traditional purity and power oppresses women on many levels, in the context of the nationalist struggle, it can also be seen as a tool to counter imperialist oppression (p. 21).
In a very sophisticated analysis of female chastity in the film *Mother India*, she points out that female chastity has come to function in independent India as a metaphor for purity and for a pure and ideal society uncontaminated by colonial oppressors (p. 20). The pressure on women, therefore, to be pure and chaste is a complex part of the rhetoric of national identity. The young women who read romances in India read these novels about the courtship rituals and sexual lives of Western women against the backdrop of such a rhetoric which insists that they lead lives very different from those of Western women if they want to be respected.

In a study of working-class Indian women's perceptions of the "disrobing" of Draupadi, one of the most important female characters in India's ancient epic Mahabharata, on television, Purnima Mankekar (1993), an Indian feminist anthropologist, studies how discourses of nation, gender, and sexuality overlap in viewers' interpretations. Emphasizing the importance of working on trajectories followed by postcolonial Indian nationalism, Mankekar observes that it is critical to understand and explain how mainstream nationalist ideologies constitute Indian womanhood and also how the conflation of their construct of Woman with "individual women has attempted to deny women a complex subjectivity (p. 486)."

An important aspect of this attempt to deny women subjectivity is the denial of a sexual self to Indian women, a denial that Sudhir Kakar, an Indian psychoanalyst, locates in the cultural unease present in marriages in India. Kakar suggests that this unease is born out of the fear of women as sexual beings. Quoting proverbs from some of the vernacular languages, he demonstrates the construction of womanhood in India as being primarily identified with motherhood, a construction that he argues is indicative of the fear of the potential danger of female sexuality in India (Kakar, 1989, pp. 17-18). Confirming Kakar's hypothesis, Rosie Thomas (1989, p. 17) also points out that the emphasis on chastity in India is related to a fear of sexual energy in women. The fear of women's sexuality, according to Thomas, is related to Hinduism's conceptualization of woman as both destroyer and protector.

The issues discussed above clearly indicate the highly complex nature of women's contemporary lives in postcolonial India; romances are read by young Indian women embedded within discourses that identify womanhood with nationhood, chastity, and motherhood. The implications of the popularity of romances in India may be explicated through a series of questions that probe the relationship between these discourses and a private phenomenon like romance reading: How do Indian women reconcile the vastly different worlds of the white women they read about with their own? How is female sexuality as depicted in these novels realized and understood by these women who lead
relatively sheltered lives? How does the negotiation of their sexual identity form part of a larger struggle they experience in their socialization? How is the psychology of postcolonial women shaped by their reading of romance novels? How "colonial" is postcolonial and how have these women resisted the insidious effects of colonialism and their oppression within patriarchy?

It is critical that these complex issues raised by these questions are captured in all their subtle forms within the specific history of India and not cast as "exotic" or "primitive," which may well be the case if India is evaluated against Western standards as previous scholarship has had a tendency to do so. While anthropology has been used in the past to study third world peoples such as East Asian Indians and compare their self-identity to the self-identity held by their Western counterparts, Kalpana Ram (1992) comments that these studies have never attempted to understand Indians within the historical framework of India:

The logic of comparison—which is, on the face of it, concerned with difference—functions rather as a logic of identity, in which the Indian subject does not enjoy independent status, and is made intelligible only in opposition to the fundamental or privileged values of Western modernity (p. 589).

Radway's ethnographic study, if extended to the third world, could provide third world feminist scholars to study women in their countries to reverse the oppressive monolithic representations of these women as constructed by Western discourses and to attempt to understand their situation within their unique, historically specific, and concrete conditions.

It is important that while third world feminists draw on Radway's study to investigate romance reading, they should also be wary of importing her theoretical frameworks en masse into cultural settings where they be inappropriate. For instance, Radway's psychoanalytic framework may not help to delineate the ego development of women who grow up in non-Western nations. Her analysis of female sexuality and her explanations for women's fascination with the formulaic nature of romance may not be suitable to explicate third world women's attraction for romances from the West. There is therefore a need to supplement her study with post-colonial theories (Nandy, 1983; Appadurai, 1988) and the theories of third world feminists (Mani, 1991; Ram, 1992, Mohanty, 1991) that specifically analyze the constitution of identities within third world nations today where culture as pointed out earlier has become a complex blend of the indigenous and the Western.

Feminists in the third-world nations have to contend with the fact that feminism itself is seen as an imperialist Western discourse, as a consequence of which the politics of
the third world feminist has to be very sensitive to women's attitudes regarding feminism. Third world feminists have to also confront extremely powerful traditional structures that may resist suggestions for change. Uma Narayan (1992), an Indian feminist, touches the pulse of the tensions inherent in the work of third world feminist when she writes:

The danger is that, even if the nonwestern feminist talks about the value of women's experience in terms totally different from those of the traditional discourse, the difference is likely to be drowned out by the louder and more powerful voice of the traditional discourse, which will claim that "what those feminists say" vindicates its view that the roles and experiences it assigns to women have value and that women should stick to those roles (p. 259).

Speaking specifically of India, Radway's study would open up possibilities of inquiring into young urban Indian women's engagement with Western romances. It would enable an understanding of why these women read romances about white women who live in a world vastly different from their own. It would allow the third world researcher who has an intimate knowledge of the culture to investigate how the West as a concept fits into the contradictory lives of these women and how this intersects with gender and sexuality.

Romance reading in third world postcolonial nations represents a fascinating phenomenon whose complexities can be investigated using Radway's feminist and anthropological framework. Clifford Geertz observes that in attending a cockfight, the young Balinese receives from this ritual a kind of sentimental education. He says, "Attending a cockfight and participating in them, is for the Balinese, a kind of sentimental education. What he learns there is what is his culture looks like when spelled out in a collective text . . . "(Geertz, 1973, p. 449). In the context of the cultural ritual of romance reading in third world nations where women read romances from the West, I would ask, "What happens when these women participate in rituals that are not essential to their culture the way the cockfight is to the Balinese?" Radway's study could be a useful starting point to begin to answer this question.

NOTES

1 I am fully aware of the problems associated with using the term "third world." It has been contested as hierarchical and derogatory. However, even today people from postcolonial and developing nations continue to be classified as "third world people" within the dominant discourses of the West, for instance, in reports of the United Nations and the World Bank. I use the term self-consciously; Chandra Mohanty (1991) points out that the term not only makes concrete the economic relationship between the first and the third world, but it also takes into account our history of colonization and relationships of dominance between first and third world peoples.
2 Mohanty (1991) focuses on the Zed Press Women in the Third World Series since this is the only contemporary series that addresses third world women as a category worthy of study as a separate unit. Although she finds that these books have been conceived of as feminist, anti-racist, and anti-imperialist, Mohanty argues that the Zed Press books objectify third world women by persisting in portraying them as victims of their socioeconomic systems.

3 The obsession with quantitative methods and models will become obvious on a perusal of issues of Media Asia and other journals related to development and third world issues. I also speak here from personal experience—I have often had friends in India come up to me and say, "Which method is better? Survey or content analysis? Which of these looks more respectable?" The research question is often decided after a methodological choice has been made.

4 To put their contribution in historical perspective, it is useful to look at research on romance reading since its beginning in the late 1970s. Early criticism of romances condemned them as pornography and readers were scornfully described as anti-feminist and as passive consumers of an oppressive ideology (Snitow, 1979; Douglas, 1980). Gradually this view of the readers of romance changed due to the challenge presented by feminist cultural studies critics who refused to adopt the hypodermic needle approach to study romance readers (Modleski, 1982; Radway, 1984; Cohn, 1988; Christian-Smith, 1990; Thurston, 1988; Moffit, 1990).

5 Although ethnography has been enthusiastically espoused by cultural studies scholars in the United States, very little has been done by way of empirical work. Elizabeth Bird (1991, p. 4.) points out that much of the problem with ethnography is that it has been inserted in cultural studies in the United States as a theoretical enterprise, and often discussed in increasingly abstract terms, while in Britain it has been very much a part of cultural studies work.

6 She also finds that romances allow these women to disengage themselves from their daily chores and enter a realm of fantasy. Claiming, however, that they do not read for fantasy alone, these readers argue that romance reading also allows them to learn about far-away places, improve their vocabulary, and learn about different careers for women. Radway's encounters with readers shows us that readers do not read to satisfy "feelings of revenge" alone, as pointed out by Tania Modleski (1982).

7 Tania Modleski (1982) studied Harlequin romance novels and the psychology of readers using textual analysis and Freudian psychoanalysis. She describes the situation of the reader as an oscillation between detachment and identification, and concludes that concealed in the desire to be "raped" is in fact a longing for power and revenge. John Markert (1985, p. 683) has been one of Modleski's harshest critics—he argues that Modleski, ignoring variations within the formula, picked up three or four books, attacked the plots, and assumed that she could extrapolate from these novels to assign qualities to readers. He suggests that critics like Modleski choose texts that support their conclusions and analyses.

8 A good illustration of what Radway is alluding to is provided by feminist critic Ann Douglas' (1980) observation of romance readers: "... but the women who couldn't thrill to male nudity in Playgirl are enjoying the titillation of seeing themselves, not necessarily, as they are, but as some men would like to see them: illogical, innocent, magnetized by male sexuality and brutality (p. 28)." Implicit in Douglas' observation is her assessment of
readers as a passive and brutalized audience. Douglas identifies romance readers as "voices of opposition" to the feminist movement.

9 Tania Modleski and Janice Radway take radically different approaches to the subject matter they study. Although they focus on female readers of popular literature, their works emerge from highly diverse contexts and critical traditions; Modleski's work is influenced by film theory, particularly feminist Freudian psychoanalysis, while Radway grounds her work in a more anthropological and semiotic framework (Angus et al., 1989, p. 445).

10 The popularity of romances in India in terms of readership is very difficult to gauge from actual sales figures because romances unlike in the West, are not bought, but checked out from small "lending libraries." This is because, given the average middle-class person's salary, the prices of these novels are beyond her/his purchasing power. The lending libraries I am referring to in the Indian context are small rooms/shops where only popular fiction and maybe video tapes of popular films are stocked. There is very little room in these libraries to sit down and read; the customer is expected to walk in, look around, choose what they want quickly, and check them out for a certain affordable fee a day. To clarify further, these libraries can be best thought of as similar to the video stores in the United States, excepting that these are not glittery chain stores, but little businesses opened by individuals who hope to eke out a modest living.

REFERENCES


I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: Romance Reading in the Third World: A Postcolonial Intersection of Gender, Ethnicity, and Sexuality

Author(s): Radhika Parameswaran

Corporate Source (if appropriate): 

Publication Date: 

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

CHECK HERE [ ] Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8½" x 11") reproduction

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

OR

[ ] Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY

HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

Signature: 

Printed Name: Radhika Parameswaran

Organization: University of Iowa, School of Journalism & Mass Communication

Position: Graduate Student

Address: 205 CC, School of Journalism, University of Iowa

Tel. No.: (319) 335-8117

City: Iowa City

Zip Code: IA 52242

Date: Aug 19, 1994

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or, if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor: 

Address: 

Price Per Copy: 

Quantity Price: 

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

[ ]
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
Ethnic Culture and Television News:
An Ethnographic Study of Hispanic Journalists

Don Heider
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
University of Colorado at Boulder
Campus Box 287
Boulder, CO. 80309
(303) 492-2729

To be presented at the Association for Education of Journalism and Mass Communication Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, 1994.

Minorities in Communication Division
People of color have long been underrepresented in the media, and in the news media in particular. As we strive to better understand the impact of this historical fact, it may be helpful to examine both the audience and those who produce media products. This particular study is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the relationship between ethnic communities and local television newsrooms. Do they impact each other? If they do, how? If they do not, why not? This study starts to ask those questions with the help of a group of Hispanic* journalists in a local television news market.

Through the researcher's own observations during ten years working in television news, a pattern of neglect seemed apparent when it came to covering issues facing people of color. This study and others are an effort to understand better why such a pattern persists. Part of that understanding needs to center around the experience of ethnic reporters, producers, photographers and managers who are a part of the local news business.

Literature Review

The media in general, and the news media in particular, may be a good site for investigating cultural beliefs about race. According to Rosengren and Reimer (1990); "As part of the socialization process, the mass media constitute one of the most important linkages between societal and individual culture" (p. 266). In others words, through the use of media, individuals internalize

* In this study the term Hispanic will be used throughout, though in some cases the term Chicano, Mexican-American, or Latino may have been more appropriate.
shared sets of beliefs and values. Given that, one wonders how the news media deals with issues of race and portrayals of ethnic peoples. According to the research, apparently not very well. Part of this may be linked to a traditional lack of minorities represented in media jobs.

In 1985 Clint Wilson and Felix Gutiérrez summarized the status of minorities in the media. They concluded people of color historically had not been gatekeepers in mainstream mass media, and that even by the mid 1980's, that had not changed (Wilson and Gutiérrez, 1985). Members of the dominant culture, i.e. white males, were still determining how ethnic groups and individuals would be portrayed in drama, comedy and even news. Furthermore, that meant most racial minorities and others outside the mainstream would be represented by stereotypes. The problem with stereotyping is that it rarely offers complete or even realistic representations of complex and diverse peoples. Not only are these stereotypes incomplete, they are often negative. For instance, Gutiérrez had noted earlier that news stories tended to focus on Latinos as problem people, people who were characterized as often causing problems (Gutiérrez, 1980).

Problems in coverage of minorities has been documented by others as well. In a study of six southwestern newspapers in 1983, it was shown the papers varied markedly in coverage of Mexican Americans (Greenberg, Heeter, Burgoon, Burgoon, & Korzenny, 1983). Overall Hispanic coverage was well below population proportions even in reporting simple facts such as births, deaths and weddings. Still, the group did find some papers doing a better job than others.
A 1989 study seemed to contradict these findings. In a study of newspapers in San Antonio and Albuquerque, Hispanics were apparently receiving ample and fair coverage (Turk, Richstad, Bryson, Jr. and Johnson, 1989). However this study examined only two papers and that may be problematic, since it grossly under represents the number of newspapers in the U.S. Yet even this study found evidence supporting Gutiérrez' contention that Hispanics are often classified in news stories as "problem people." Pritchard (1985) discovered in a study of the Milwaukee newspapers that homicides allegedly committed by Hispanics or blacks were covered less extensively than homicides committed by whites.

There are not just problems in print media, but in broadcast media as well. Entman (1990, 1992) concluded in a study of Chicago television news that expressions of traditional racism have all but disappeared from media, but that a newer form of racism has emerged. This newer form sends conflicting messages. Entman determined that coverage of crime made blacks look threatening, and coverage of politics emphasized black politicians' special interest politics. At the same time, Entman found an increase in the number of black anchors and reporters on the air is giving viewers the impression that racism may no longer exist.

Campbell (1993) has discovered that it may be too soon to say that all vestiges of traditional racism can no longer be found in television newscasts. In his look at local newscasts from 29 cities he found evidence of persistent racial insensitivity in at least two cases, one regarding a Hattiesburg, Mississippi station's coverage of the Martin Luther King day celebration, the other in a Minneapolis,
Minnesota station's coverage of a fishing dispute involving a Native American tribe.

Dissecting a problem as complex as racism is not a simple task. But one approach to begin to understand what is going on in media outlets is to look at the people who are making news content decisions, especially in broadcast news operations. As Gutiérrez pointed out, it has traditionally been white males. Evidence of this contention is plentiful, ranging from reports from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1977, 1979) to Vernon Stone's work. Stone has been conducting research for the Radio and Television News Director's Association for a number of years, and has documented time and again the lack of women and people of color in broadcast newsrooms. In Stone's latest survey (1993) he found that minorities make up 18.5% of the broadcast news work force. Hispanics account for only 6% of the television news work force. Often times news content is influenced by news managers. Stone has found that minorities make up only 8.7% of television news directors, with Hispanics accounting for just 4.2% of television news directors. In an earlier survey Stone (1988) discovered a disproportionate number of minority workers were holding positions as camera operators, one of the lowest paying jobs in TV news. He also found because of "dead ends" in broadcast news, minorities in general, and blacks in particular, had been leaving broadcast news for better opportunities in other fields.

What this study will look at is how minorities that are working in the media perceive their own industry. The goal is to take a more in-depth look at questions of media's coverage of Hispanics from the
perspective of Hispanic television journalists. Traditionally, media research has often treated Hispanics (and other minorities) as a homogeneous group (Traudt, 1990). The hope is by using a more individualized, ethnographic approach, one might be able to illustrate the diversity of opinion and perception even within an ethnic minority. At the same time, it may be desirable to gain further insight into Hispanic journalists' own perceptions of what is good and bad about media coverage of at least one ethnic community.

Methodology

This is an ethnological study of Hispanic journalists working in television news in a major metropolitan city in the West. The researcher conducted interviews with five television journalists from three different network affiliates. The interviews were conducted on-site at the television stations and each interview lasted roughly an hour. Each interview was based upon the same set of open ended questions, which were drawn up after reading the pertinent literature.

In addition, just over forty hours were spent observing these journalists and others in the three respective newsrooms. Field notes were usually taken on-site.

The journalists interviewed varied in job responsibilities. Two were managers, both who had also worked as news photographers. The other three worked as reporters, one had additional responsibilities as an anchor. The journalists' experience ranged from 3 years to 23 years in television news.
The journalists who participated were promised anonymity, what follows is some background on each of them:

Brian is 43 years old and holds a top management position in his newsroom. He has spent over two decades working in television news and has worked as a photojournalist, an editor, a chief photographer and a news director. Brian's family history can be traced back through New Mexico. Though he's not sure, he believes his family may date back to Spanish occupation of the region.

Lisa is in her mid-20's and was born and raised in the city where she now works, though she had to spend time in a much smaller market before returning home. Her family is originally from Mexico, though they have been in this state for three or four generations. Lisa is a general assignment reporter.

Theresa, is 31 years old and has spent three and a half years working in commercial television news, all that time as a reporter. Racially Theresa is more Chinese than she is Hispanic. But she identifies herself culturally as Hispanic and was raised in a Hispanic border community, not far from Mexico.

James has worked in television news for 18 years, the last fifteen in this market. He has spent most of his career as a photojournalist, though he has been a manager for the past several years, and now oversees the visual aspects of the stations news broadcasts. Culturally John's family tree is a blend of Mexicans, Native Americans and French.

Amy, in her early 30's, worked for a major metropolitan newspaper, and in radio news before starting her career as a
television reporter and now as a reporter and anchor. Amy's parents are Cuban, and she was raised in New York, Miami and Puerto Rico.

All of these people operate in a number of different communities, in a number of different contexts. On one hand they are Hispanic, and for each of them that means they are operating in a cultural context that is at the same time unique for each individual and yet is a context where some sets of beliefs and meanings may be shared. At the same time, they work each day in a newsroom. A television newsroom, like many other organizations, has values and norms of its own. Within these newsrooms there is a socially constructed set of norms for behavior, and there is shared meaning represented initially by a vocabulary of jargon. Though this community differentiates at several points from the larger Anglo culture, it remains a community dominated by white males, for reasons explored above. That means for people of color, some of the views and values in the newsroom may differ from views and values held in different ethnic cultures. Through observation and interview, the hope was to gain insight into how in these people's cases, ethnic culture interacts with a television newsroom, with the individual becoming the site for the investigation. At what points do the values and beliefs come together, at what points do they conflict? These are the types of in-depth questions that may be answered best by a qualitative approach.
Delimitations

This study is not meant to provide broad-based, generalizable results, but instead is focused on helping answer some questions about what Hispanic journalists own perceptions are of the television news. At least two factors may have influenced this study. First, the very fact the informants knew generally what area I was researching may have framed the interviews and the time spent observing. In several cases conversations, even before the interview started, were framed by ethnic concerns. This may not have been the case if I had met and talked with these people under different circumstances. The other factor was where the interviews took place. In several instances the informants seemed all too aware of their surroundings during the interview. Yet despite this, all five seemed to speak fairly freely about where they worked and their ideas and opinions about the station. It would have been interesting, however, to see if these professionals might have felt even less encumbered in their responses if the interviews had taken place somewhere other than the workplace.

Analysis

Employment and Pay

For the journalists interviewed for this study, the issue of race was apparent from the very start of their careers. Several of them were made aware of the fact early on they were being hired at least in part, not only because of what they could do, but also
because of their ethnic heritage. Of the five journalists, all mentioned that they believe now their first job came as a result of minority recruitment. Theresa did not know initially her ethnicity was the reason she was hired, but that was soon made clear to her by a news director.

I just want to think that we're hired based on our ability and because we can do the job and because we deserve an opportunity, and it'll pay off. I mean we all want to believe that. I talked to one News Director and I said; how is it that you hire us? And he says, frankly, we know we need a black male, an Asian female, a Hispanic female, whatever. And they call up agents or they look for a specific type and that's how you're hired.

Theresa said although she can accept the fact that ethnicity might have helped her get her foot in the door, she feels once inside, she had to perform at the same levels as others in the newsroom and perhaps even better to keep her job. This attitude was also expressed by James and Amy. Lisa put it this way:

It gets your foot in the door. But very few people are able to stay standing, get their other foot in and walk through and make a place for themselves. But I believe my education, my will, and my passion for this business has kept me going.

It is interesting to note that in the interviews none of the journalists ever questioned whether any preference was given to their Anglo co-workers when they were hired, or whether they were performing at adequate levels to justify their continued employment. Theresa does say she has noticed the tension these kinds of issues have caused in a newsroom and made reference to the fact that co-
workers have told her at times that because she is a minority, that somehow she is guaranteed a successful career. This a myth she dispels.

They say you guys are getting all the jobs. If it's a white male, he's going to be thrown out of that job for you, well, it's this hysteria that's out there. But all you have to do, again, is walk into any newsroom, look around and see how we're taking over. It's simply untrue, it's not true. Maybe there's one Hispanic in every newsroom, one Asian. Still, look at the numbers, that's against a whole newsroom of people.

Theresa is backed up by the figures Vernon Stone has compiled. In fact, the numbers of Hispanics, or any other people of color, in newsrooms are not commensurate with numbers represented in the general population. This is likely to become even more disparate as the minority population increases over the coming years.

Theresa also says she believes minority reporters are not getting pay equal to that of Anglo co-workers. From her conversations with co-workers at one of the stations where she worked, she discovered that she and other minority reporters were getting paid about $10,000 less than Anglos in similar positions. The others interviewed were not aware of any such discrepancies, though Lisa admitted she had never tried to discover if her salary was the same as her colleagues.

**News Coverage**

As is demonstrated in the literature, coverage of Hispanic communities seems to be lacking. All five journalists interviewed
said they believed the media was not doing enough when it came to coverage of the Hispanic community. Yet, at the same, each of these journalists feels they have tried in their own way to improve that coverage. Upon arriving at the T.V. station and meeting Theresa for an interview, the first thing she did was go to a viewing room and show some of the work she had done. She showed six pieces in all. Five of them had distinctively ethnic themes, either involving an issue particular to an ethnic community or involving people of color as the the primary news-makers. Only one piece, a breaking news story about a fire, did not. This may be partly due to the fact that Theresa says she enjoys covering stories on the "ethnic" beat. That such a beat is recognized within a newsroom is somewhat telling. In other words, it is as if when stories involve people of color, somehow they are different than the rest of the news. This may be evidence of the white male orientation of newsrooms, revealing an underlying assumption that stories involving white men are the important stories, other stories involving people of color are part of the "ethnic beat." In this regard there are also stories about women, which are often identified as different than the normal news of the day and are often assigned to reporters who identify with women's issues, i.e. female reporters.

Coverage of the ethnic beat or exclusively ethnic stories is a sensitive issue for ethnic reporters. All of the journalists interviewed indicated they do not like being typecast as a journalist who will cover strictly ethnic issues. The reporters indicated they, like other reporters, are most interested in working on the A-Block stories, that is, stories that will appear in the first section of the
newscast. Therefore, says Theresa, "you don't want to be doing, like, the new taco recipe story." But Theresa, Amy and Lisa said they do get opportunities to cover stories involving the ethnic community which are substantive. All three of them believe they add something to these stories that other reporters may not be able to. Lisa says her perspective brings diversity to issues that may not be labeled as ethnic stories, "I may see things in a story that someone else may not see, it's just a unique perspective because of who you are." Brian said that being Chicano helps him bring a sense of appreciation for culture to his work, and a keener sensitivity to other cultures. Theresa says being a woman, and woman of color, she can not help having a different world view than some of her colleagues.

We're hired because we're different, because maybe we can speak a different language or whatever and so therefore you hired me, you also have to understand that we're going to have a different approach, perhaps.

But by acknowledging that ethnic stories are different, Hispanic journalists to some extent participate in a newsroom culture that identifies and categorizes stories about non-whites as "different."

Determining why there is not adequate coverage of the Hispanic community is a complex matter. As mentioned above, all of the journalists interviewed indicated they believe there presently is not adequate coverage, Theresa put it this way:

I mean all the demographics show that we are an audience to be reckoned with, but you look at the average station and what do you see? Cinco de Mayo maybe once a year, you know. I mean are we covering the issues? Are we covering things that really mean
something to these people? You know, that would be like covering the Fourth of July and that takes care of all Americans. I feel we need to do a better job of trying to hit on some issues that count.

Theresa says that while she thinks she has good contacts within the Hispanic community, people of color in general are not getting the access they need to consistent news coverage. For instance, she says only African Americans have done a good job of getting access to news coverage, but the Hispanic community, the Asian community and the Native American community have not done a good job of accessing media coverage. Amy said that in a smaller market in California where she worked, there was more coverage of Hispanic issues, and that was called more often by people seeking coverage.

Here I feel people are not calling me as much and I wonder is it because maybe they feel that we don't... I think that we just have to make more of an effort, because maybe people just don't identify us as someone who has common interest with that community.

James attributes the lack of coverage to the deterioration of the beat system of reporting. He said that reporters are not assigned to cover specific groups, so that often times things are missed. As an example, James pointed out that the station where he works subscribes to several Hispanic newspapers, which are often full of potential story ideas, but;

I see them sitting in piles. I've seen them over in the corner. I see the Hispanic community and the Jewish community newspapers on top of the pile in the corner. It's just nobody's assigned to it, nobody is told to monitor it.
Who is at fault? Several of the journalists said the responsibility may lie with both the media and the groups themselves. One journalist mentioned it would be helpful if the Hispanic community groups could put together slick public relations packages that are hard for the media to ignore. Another alternative would be for Hispanic community organizers to make contact with reporters, that also lead to more success in getting media coverage. Herein lies another conflict. On one hand the journalists admit ethnic groups aren’t getting access and need money to help get that access, yet at the same time they say if these groups only had a contact within a newsroom, coverage could be better. It seems there two different beliefs operating here, one that indicates that there are barriers to Hispanics getting better coverage, the other is the hope that the coverage could improve if only a few contacts were made. Which ever belief is true, one thing was apparent to these people, that is Hispanics are still not getting adequate news coverage.

News Management

All of the journalists interviewed pointed to one factor that contributes to the lack of coverage of Hispanic issues. That is the the fact that majority of the daily news decisions about coverage are still being made by primarily white, male, news managers. Theresa explains.

Just simply go into any newsroom, into a morning meeting and look who’s there and that will tell you, it’ll tell you about the people who are making those calls.
A lack of consistent coverage being linked to Anglo news managers has been supported in other studies mentioned earlier. Theresa cites as cause not an intentional exclusion of ethnic issues, but instead, neglect.

The people making decisions may not be aware. You know, maybe it's not a conscious effort to exclude, but because they're simply not aware, they've simply not lived some of these realities. I mean, would you be as interested in immigration as someone who's constantly watching the immigration law to see which way it will go to figure out how they're going to work in this country? It's just experience, you know, what you live, where you're coming from so if you don't have that and you're making those decisions then it's, maybe you're going to just look them over.

Amy made a very similar point during her interview.

I mean racism nowadays, you know, thirty years ago it was more blatant. Now it's subtle. Decisions are made, it's more like insensitivity. I don't know if it's racism, it's just sort of insensitivity.

During the researcher's observation time, this idea was evident in at least one news meeting. The discussion in this particular morning news meeting had turned to gang violence. In the midst of the discussion, a black journalist, the only person of color in the news meeting, suggested it might be time to start looking at the causes of the violence. There was a period of brief silence after the suggestion, and then conversation moved back to the more recent incidents. Several minutes later, the black journalist restated his idea, suggesting that perhaps coverage was needed of issues such as lack of education in the ethnic community, or a look at how poverty might
be impacting the increase in youth violence. Again several moments of silence followed. Again the suggestion was ignored and conversation moved on. The journalist did not press his point any further.

Theresa, Amy and Lisa all reported they have suggested story ideas about the Hispanic community, and at times have been ignored. Amy reported that she believes too many of the Anglo producers do not believe the stories will interest the entire audience.

I definitely notice than when getting stories on, you have a hard time convincing people that stories are important. There may be things that I feel are important happening in the Hispanic community, and people just don't see the broad appeal.

Ultimately Theresa, Amy and Lisa have limited ability to influence editorial decisions, but Brian, as a manager, does have the ability to exert more control. As evidence of his influence, Brian pointed out a story his station was covering the day of the interview. It was a story about two Hispanic men who were best friends during their lifetimes, they grew up together, went off to war together, married sisters and remained close their whole lives. They had both recently died, within a day of each other. Brian suggested the station cover the story, and he was pleased a reporter had been assigned to tell viewers the details about what these men had meant to the community.

I don't know if anyone else is going to do it, I know we're doing it today and I think it will add some perspective, it will add some flavor, it will add some color and some pacing to the newscast. Here's a unique story, a different
story, it's got some irony, it's got some love, it's got some tenderness, it's got some, you know, it's death, it's final, but it also has some sense of community.

Yet even though Brian has been able to, at times, influence news coverage, overall he feels very little progress has been made when it comes to covering the Hispanic community. Brian said even when Hispanics get jobs in newsrooms, often time they are not management positions, and even when they are, there is often a reluctance for these journalists to rock the boat, because of fear of reprisals. Brian himself experienced a cool reception when he raised diversity issues when he was a News Director.

I raised the issue at the highest level (of the company) and I wouldn't say that I got the best reception from one particular person. And I just think there's fear, that if you raise it, you're going to be labeled a troublemaker, you're going to be labeled, there he is, you know, using that old discrimination, you know they discriminated against me and the whole concept. But I just think at some point it needs to happen.

Brian feels his own career may have been thwarted because of his tendency to speak frankly about race issues. After four years as a News Director, he was then demoted to Managing Editor.

Whether a news manager or a photographer or a reporter, there seems to be a daily struggle over whether to cover Hispanic issues, and how to cover them. Another example from time spent observing came when Theresa was assigned a story where she was to cover the dedication of some altars which had been constructed in a Chicano community center to commemorate those who died in gang violence. Theresa and a photographer went to the center, shot the altars, did several interviews and then raced back to the station to
try and get the story on for the 5:00 p.m. news. In the car on the way back to the station, Theresa wrote her story. At one point she got stuck. She asked the photographer whether he thought either of the anchors, who are both Anglo, would be able to pronounce Dia de los Muertos, a Mexican holiday directly related to the construction of the altars. The photographer said he doubted whether the anchors would be able to pronounce the holiday.

This incident may be representative of the struggle ethnic reporters face in covering daily news stories. On one hand, to include the name of the holiday would be informative, perhaps even instructive to the audience. It would clearly be a nod toward the fact that this is a multi-cultural city, with wide ranging perspectives. But to leave the Spanish name out would be safer, though it also minimizes the importance of the Mexican holiday in favor of helping Anglo anchors and a predominantly Anglo audience understand and deal with the story. Theresa left Dia de los Muertos in the script, and on air one of the anchors read it, not with perfect pronunciation, but it did get out over the air. This incident is one example of a larger struggle.

Ethnic reporters must decide routinely whether they should attempt to change traditional news coverage. They must decide whether they are willing to fight for change, and at times they must decide whether to challenge dominant news values. As long as the majority of owners, managers, employees and audiences are Anglo, ethnic reporters will continue to struggle with these types of issues. In this story Theresa decided to stand her ground, and a small change occurred. Of course, even this change has taken place within
the context of a story which again links the Chicano community with gang violence, indicating the complexity of the relationships between newsrooms and ethnic communities.

Media Images

All the journalists interviewed said they believe the media can and does influence the Hispanic community, as well as the larger public's view of Hispanics. Brian recalled growing up and watching television, and seeing few positive images of Mexican-Americans.

I remember the Frito Bandito, a crook of a Frito Bandito. The Frito Bandito was a thief, you know and it was always the Irish cop that brought him to the judge. 'I caught him, I caught him.' 'Who'd you catch?' He caught the Mexican stealing the Fritos, you know, I think that created some perceptions about people. I think the media has been very, very damaging to the Hispanic community, or to people of color in general. We're always the bad guys, we're always the maids, we're always the laborers. we're never the professionals.

Negative images come not just from commercials, and not just from entertainment programming, but also from news. All of the journalists mentioned the deluge of images of African American and Chicano youth as gang thugs, often pictured wearing handcuffs and being led to jail by the police. Amy said that it has gotten to the point that when someone mentions doing a story on Chicanos at her station it often means:

Oh, let's just go out and do something on the gangs. That's what people think of and we've created that perception and that those are the only issues out there. I mean its horrible when you stereotype and people get
these stereotypes and I think you really need to dig beneath and look at other issues not just focus on that all the time.

Lisa says the media can be seen as a tool of oppression when "four-year-old Andrea and Juan watch TV and they see people of color being taken off in handcuffs, or you know, delivering crack babies."

Brian sums it up this way:

I think that it (the media) creates a strong stereotype, or strong perception and I'm a great believer in perception. That's what we do here every day is we create perceptions in the minds of viewers. To some its news, to others its perceptions, and I think we create stereotypes and we destroy or we create villains.

These perceptions tie in to what Gutiérrez found about Hispanics being often classified as "problem people." All of the journalists believe there continues to be a stereotyping of Hispanics and other people of color on television news. What impact this has on audiences is difficult to determine and is beyond the scope of this study, but it is clearly an area of concern to this group of Hispanic journalists.

Conclusion

Analyzing how ethnic communities and television newsrooms interact is not a simple task. Having said that, there are several themes that have come forward that need to be explored further as research continues. There are a number of conflicts, even contradictions, it seems ethnic journalists must wrestle with in a business which is hegemonically controlled. From these interviews it
seems that from the very beginning of an ethnic journalist's career there are questions about how that individual secured the job, whether they will be able to perform, and whether they are being fairly compensated for the work they do. Next come conflicts over the way ethnic reporters will cover the news, whether they will acknowledge and/or cover an "ethnic" beat, or whether they will be asked to cover a broader range of stories. Ethnic journalists must resolve whether they want to fight with mostly Anglo, male managers over what will be covered and how it will be covered, and whether these fights may be worth jeopardizing their own careers. From this study it seems that dominant news values are somehow infused with white maleness, and that Hispanic journalists' view of news may conflict with this perspective. As well, these Hispanic journalists seem to believe that local news is still filled with a number of negative stereotypes, and that these stereotypes are taking a toll.
References


Traditional Racism and the News. Paper presented at the 
Association for Education of Journalism and Mass 
Communication Convention, Kansas City, MO.


Entman, R.E. (1990) Modern Racism and the Images of Blacks in Local 
Television News. Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 7, 
332-345.

Greenburg, B. S., Heeter, C., Burgoon, J. K., Burgoon, M., & Korzenny, F. 
Journalism Quarterly, 60, (4), 671-676.

Overview. Paper presented at the International 
Communication Association Conference.


Rosengren, K. E. & Reimer, B. (1990), The Cultivation of Values by 
Media. In S. Thomas (ed.) Communication and Culture: 
Language, Performance, Technology, and Media (pp. 265-277) . 
Norwood, NJ: Alex Publishing.

p. 69.

Stone, V.A. (1988) Pipelines and Deadlines: Jobs Held by Minorities 
and Women in Broadcast News. Paper presented at the
Association for Education of Journalism and Mass Communication Convention, Portland, OR.


I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: **Ethnic Culture and Television News: An Ethnographic Study**

Author(s): Don Heider

Corporate Source (if appropriate): 

Publication Date: Aug 1994

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

☑ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8½" x 11") reproduction

☐ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

“PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE] TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).”

“PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE] TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).”

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor: 

Address: 

Price Per Copy: 

Quantity Price: 

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

Signature: 

Printed Name: Don Heider

University of Colorado

Campus Box 247, School of Journalism

Tel. No.: 303-482-2799

Date: 8/9/94

University of Colorado, Boulder, CO

Zip Code: 80309

Date: 8/9/94
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
John William Powell and The China Weekly Review:
An Analysis of His Reporting and His McCarthy Era Ordeal

Fuyuan Shen
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
Howell Hall, CB # 3365
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3365

A paper presented to the International Communication Division of Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication annual convention, Atlanta, August 1994. The author thanks Dr. Charles E. Hood, University of Montana, and Dr. Donald Shaw, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, for reviewing an early draft and for their valuable suggestions.
ABSTRACT

John William Powell and The China Weekly Review: An Analysis of His Reporting and His McCarthy Era Ordeal

This study examines the life of John William Powell with particular emphasis on his controversial tenure as editor of The China Weekly Review in Shanghai after World War II, and the difficulty he and his family went through after he returned to the United State during the McCarthy Era.

During the Korean War, Powell was strongly criticized in the United States for The China Weekly Review articles charging that the U.S. military who using germ warfare against North Korean and China. He was indicted for sedition and treason after his return to the United States in 1953. Although the charges were eventually dismissed, Powell's journalistic reputation was ruined.

The author concludes that Powell did not knowingly falsify his stories; rather, he was biased toward the Communist point of view. What happened to Powell demonstrates that the rules for proper behavior of reporters covering unpopular wars have never been clearly defined and that those who cross the indistinctly drawn lines of propriety will suffer serious consequences.
John William Powell and The China Weekly Review:
An Analysis of His Reporting and His McCarthy Era Ordeal

(Abstract)

This study examines the life of John William Powell, who edited The China Weekly Review in Shanghai after World War II. Because of his negative coverage of U.S. involvement in the Korean War, Powell was indicted for sedition and treason after his return in 1953. The author concludes that Powell did not knowingly falsify his stories and that his suffering might have had a chilling effect on the freedom of journalists to report news or write opinions from abroad.
John William Powell and The China Weekly Review: An Analysis of His Reporting and His McCarthy Era Ordeal

Journalists who covered foreign nations and overseas wars in the past have often been criticized for being unpatriotic, disloyal to their home country, or even pro-Communist, when they brought home unwelcome news. Some had to face Congressional hearings, official investigations and indictment after their return to the United States. This was what happened to numerous American journalists who covered China during the 1940s and 1950s. Consequently, many of these correspondents lost their careers and reputations.

However, of all the China beat journalists at the time, none suffered from the witch-hunt of the McCarthyism as much as John William Powell. Powell edited The China Weekly Review, an English-language journal of news and opinion, from 1945 to 1953 in Shanghai, China. He was also the most controversial of the China beat journalists. Considered to be a "fearless and fair" journalist by his colleagues in the news profession at one time, he later would be characterized as a turncoat—a "Red China Boy", as Newsweek labeled him.1

During the Korean War, Powell published scathing criticisms of the United States' involvement in the Korean War and echoed the Communist allegations that the United States engaged in germ warfare in Korea. He went through years of Congressional hearings, sedition and treason charges after his returned to the United States in 1953. Although later dismissed of all the charges against him, Powell eventually lost his
journalistic career.

This paper studies Powell’s experiences, and his reporting as editor of The China Weekly Review. It argues that although Powell could have been more objective in his reporting, he did not deserve what he suffered during the McCarthy era. This research demonstrates that journalists covering foreign nations, especially during time of war, would face particular difficulties and dilemmas; and that the attempt to prosecute them could have a chilling effect on the freedom of present-day journalists to report news or write opinions from abroad.

Powell was born in 1919 in Shanghai where his father, J.B. Powell, published The China Weekly Review for a small but influential community of English-speaking foreigners and Chinese. Powell went to school in the United States and after the United States entered War II, he quit college and took a job with the U.S. government. He served a short stint with the Federal Communication Commission, then joined the Office of War Information, and which assigned him to Chungking, the war capital of the Chinese Nationalists in 1943.2

During the 1920s and 30s, Powell’s father was strongly committed to a free and independent China, and opposed what he saw as the imperialism of foreign powers. He supported the Nationalists in their struggle with the Communists. His journal reflected those views. The Review attracted Chinese intellectuals and students of mission and municipal schools. It also attracted reader from the Anglo-American community of 10,000 in the port city of Shanghai.

Under the editorship of the J.B. Powell, the journal became known for its
criticism of Japanese militarism in China. On Dec. 8, 1941, shortly after the Japanese occupied Shanghai, they closed the Review’s office, and jailed the editor. The elder Powell suffered terribly in a Japanese jail and finally lost his feet to frost-bite. He was released in 1945, but never able to return to China to run the journal and died in 1947 in the United States, where he had gone to recuperate.³

After the Japanese surrendered, Powell left the Office of War Information, moved to Shanghai, and resumed publication of his father’s journal. The first issue of the new Review, dated Oct. 20, 1945, promised readers it would aim at the same high standards of journalism and to follow the same basic principles of truth and accuracy as those established by J.B. Powell.⁴

During the next four years, the Review focused primarily on the internal struggle in China, and tried to steer a middle course between the Nationalists and the Communists. It also published articles and commentaries on the developing Cold War, domestic insurrections in Indochina and Malaya, and international trade issues. Powell began to build the journal’s circulation and develop a reputation as a journalist by broadening the paper’s scope with articles by Chinese and American contributors and expressing editorial criticism of the inefficiency, corruption and press censorship of the Nationalist government.

In 1947, Powell defied the Nationalists’ censorship and reported their massacre of about 5,000 people on the island of Taiwan, which was torn by revolt on the eve of the Nationalist occupation. The story was picked up by major U.S. newspapers, and gained Powell the respect of many America journalists. Newsweek called him "fearless"
and characterized him "one of the best-informed newspaperman on China conditions."\(^5\)

As the Nationalist forces retreated and the Chinese Communists took over Shanghai in 1949, the Review published an optimistic front-page editorial, saying: "We therefore welcome the change that has come about and hope that the arrival of the People's Liberation Army will mark the beginning of a new era in which the people of China can now begin to enjoy the benefits of good government."\(^6\) In the following issue, it also published laudatory reports of conditions in the Communist-held regions.

A year earlier, however, the Review had editorially disparaged Communist claims that the United States was spying in their territory, and charged that the Communists used the claim "purely for propaganda purpose."\(^7\)

By 1950, deteriorating business conditions and the departure of Westerners from China reduced the number of foreign-owned publications in Shanghai from seven to four. In July, limited circulation and the loss in revenues prompted Powell again to consider closing the Review. But, a few weeks later, he dropped the idea, deciding instead to change the magazine to a monthly called The China Monthly Review, thus reducing his operating costs. The Korean War had begun in June, Powell considered it necessary to preserve the magazine as a forum to challenge the United States' "adventuristic policy" in Korea.\(^8\)

Powell subsidized the journal with operating a translation service and putting out two other publications. Everyday, the Review would put together a 10-to-12-page translation of China's economic regulations and items of trade and commercial interest, and distribute it to the foreign business community in Shanghai. At the end of each
month. Powell published a "Monthly Report" on the situation in China and an economic magazine, which turned out to be short-lived. The Review also published and marketed Who's Who in China, a reference book. These efforts proved quite profitable and helped keep the Review going.9

The Review was printed by Millingtons, a British-owned publishing house in China; Powell bought his own newsprint on the open market. The Review was available on newsstands in China. It also had subscribers in the United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, India and Southeast Asia. Powell did not handle distribution, but instead concentrated on editorial tasks. A typical day for him was checking the local press for leads, assigning staff to cover events and writing the editorial. Occasionally, he would travel, covering important events himself.10

The revamped Review reflected the concerns of the new regime in China. Articles described the building of new sewer lines in Shanghai, tax reform, the abolition of labor corruption, government assumption of YMCA activities, and the new relationships between foreigners and Chinese. Most of the articles were written by members of the editorial staff, correspondents and independent contributors. The Review also routinely used foreign and Chinese sources such as The New York Times, Time, the British news agency Reuters, the New China News Agency, and a few other Chinese newspapers.

When the Review was criticized by Walter Simmons, the Chicago Tribune's Tokyo correspondent, for being a Communist publication, Powell counterattacked by attributing the criticism to a desire to cash in on the then-popular anti-Communist mood in America. He said that, because of the Review's "accurate and objective" reporting,
new subscriptions from out of China had increased substantially.11

Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June of 1950, and especially after the Chinese intervention in November, the Review offered strident attacks on the American conduct of the war and its policy toward the People’s Republic of China. It was his reporting of the Korean War, especially his allegations concerning the use of germ warfare on the part of the U.S. forces, that got Powell into his most serious trouble with the U.S. government. The trouble eventually culminated in a sedition charge brought against him after he and his wife, Sylvia, returned to the United States in August 1953.

Covering the Korean War

When the Korean War broke out in 1950, the Review criticized U.S. involvement. Its editorials charged that the UN sanction supporting intervention was unjustly adopted, because the U.S. government had used its economic powers to sway the votes and because large countries such as China and India had not been fully represented in the UN. It printed lists of alleged violations of the Korean-Chinese border by U.S. aircraft. Powell contended the conflict in Korea was a civil war, and that foreign intervention would be criminal, as it would only bring more suffering and destruction.

The Review quoted U.S., British and Japanese sources who contended that the United States was using Japanese troops in Korea and that the regime of South Korea’s Syngman Rhee had committed atrocities against its own people.12 In June 1951, the magazine began a series of features about POWs, using the New China News Agency as the main source. Excerpts of Peking Radio broadcasts made by POWs to their
American families were reprinted. Photos of happy, well-fed and well-clothed U.S. POWs were published to counter, the Review reported, "officially-inspired reports in the American press that U.S. prisoners are being mistreated by their Korean and Chinese captors."13

The Review also reported that American captors maltreated Chinese and Korean POWs and tattooed their bodies with anti-Communist slogans. It ostensibly published names, serial numbers, ranks, units or addresses of U.S. POWs, so that their relatives would know they were alive. The magazine made clear that the lists were not official, but were compiled by the Review’s own editors from the Chinese dispatchs and local newspapers. It also noted that many of the prisoners had given their names and messages to correspondents of the New China News Agency during interviews so that their families at home might know they were safe.14

After truce talks began in July 1951, the Review continued to criticize the U.S. government, charging the United States with stalling the negotiations and the exchange of POW lists. In August, after U.S. forces launched an offensive against the Chinese and the North Koreans, the Review charged that the action was designed to prolong the Korean War. While censorship kept most of the Western press from reporting about the offensive, the Review used the New China News Agency figures to report that the United States lost nearly 20,000 soldiers in less than a month.15

The coverage of the Korean War took a dramatic turn in early 1952 when North Korea and China charged that the United States was engaged in germ warfare against their troops and civilians. When North Korean Foreign Minister Bak Hun Yung protested
to the United Nations in February 1952. The China Monthly Review supported the germ warfare allegations, saying in an editorial that the American invaders had committed "a crime against humanity." The same editorial, citing Newsweek and North Korean officials, traced the record of American preparation and use of bacteriological weapons in Korea. The editorial concluded that the use of germ warfare was a trick by the Americans to obstruct the truce talks and to indiscriminately annihilate the Korean and Chinese people. Based on a report by the North Korean foreign minister, the Review’s editorial recounted alleged instances of U.S. forces spreading large quantities of bacteria-carrying insects by planes over Chinese front-line positions and elsewhere in North Korea. It also charged that Americans had used prisoners of war for experimental purposes and had collaborated with Japanese germ warfare criminals, who, through U.S. pressure, had been released from prison and absolved of charges that they conducted such warfare in China during World War II.16

In April 1952, the Review reported that the United States had extended its bacteriological warfare from Korea to China. Pictures, ostensibly of U.S. germ bombs and bacteria-carrying insects dropped in China occupied several pages. It quoted Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai as stating that American aviators who flew over China and used bacteriological weapons would, on capture, be dealt with as war criminals.17

in America. Also used were the New China News Agency and the Central News Agency of Korea.¹⁸

In May 1952, the Review reported that the U.S. engagement in germ warfare had been fully proved by a group of lawyers, journalists, and doctors who visited areas where U.S. planes had allegedly dropped infected insects. Specifically, the group was made of lawyers from Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Britain, China, France, Italy, and Poland; a team of Korean, Chinese, and foreign correspondents; and Chinese medical and scientific workers. According to the Review, this international group had personally examined remains of germ bombs, infected insects and the material used to spread the lethal germ.¹⁹

To further prove the credibility of its germ warfare reporting, the Review also compiled findings of various other international groups. Most notable was the International Scientific Commission for Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacteriological Warfare in Korea and China. The commission included such well-known scientists as Dr. Joseph Needham, a Cambridge University bio-chemist and embryologist. After more than two months of investigation, the commission concluded that "the people of Korea and China have indeed been the objectives of bacteriological weapons".²⁰

Besides covering the Korea War, the Review continued to report the domestic situation in China. Most of its editorials commented on the progress and success of the new republic in science, production and its fight against poverty.

The American media published the germ warfare charges made by China and North Korea, but readily dismissed them as typical Communist propaganda. Newsweek
attributed the charges to a "world wide epidemic of Red propaganda," and it quoted U.S. officials as saying that the charges reflected "the inability of the Communists to care for the health of the people."\(^{21}\)

After the International Scientific Commission publicized its report, *Time* called the contents ridiculous and unscientific, and reported that the scientists all had strong pro-Communist leanings. It said the germ warfare accusations were a "monstrous and incredible Big Lie."\(^{22}\)

*The New York Times* also labeled the charges a propaganda. Before publishing the germ warfare photos that had appeared in China's papers, *The New York Times* asked military and scientific experts to verify their truthfulness. The experts concluded that the deadly bugs in the picture were harmless insects incapable of carrying diseases and that the "germ bomb" supposedly dropped by the United States was a picture of a nonexplosive bomb used to distribute propaganda leaflets.\(^{23}\)

**The Trial of Powell After His Return**

During its eight years of publication after World War II, the *Review* suffered continual economic problems. In June 1953, the Powells decided that they could no longer absorb the journal's increasingly heavy losses, and closed the business. Contributing to the *Review*'s demise were the Nationalist blockade of the China coast, the U.S. post office's periodic interference with the mail between China and America, Washington's trade embargo against China. Nevertheless, Powell expressed satisfaction that his magazine had survived as long as it did, and that it had served its readers well.\(^{24}\)
The Powells and their sons left Shanghai for the United States in August 1953 and then settled in San Francisco. Powell, not fully aware of the extent of the anti-Communist hysteria developing in his home country, continued to praise publicly the improved living conditions in China.

Finally, in September 1954, 13 months after he had returned home, Powell was summoned to Washington, D.C., to testify before the Senate Internal Security subcommittee chaired by Indiana Republican Senator William Jenner. The subcommittee’s hearings began with witnesses who had allegedly been adversely affected by the Review. Former POWs of the Korean War testified that they had been terribly maltreated at the hands of the Chinese and North Koreans, and that The China Monthly Review was one of the pro-Communist publications used by their captors for propaganda and compulsory ideological indoctrination. According to the witnesses, although the prisoners were often short of food and medicine, truckloads of the Review always arrived on time. Prisoners were forced to spend an average of six to eight hours every day studying articles in the Review and that failure to endorse its line had resulted in severe punishment and even death. 25

When it was Powell’s turn to testify, he admitted that as editor of the Review, he was fully responsible for the contents of the magazine. However, when he was asked about his associations, his writings, his beliefs and the other Americans whose names appeared in the journal, he routinely refused to answer, invoking the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of expression or the Fifth Amendment’s provisions protecting against self-incrimination. 26
The Senate hearings were moved in December to San Francisco, where the Powells maintained their residence. However, when Sen. Herman Welker (R-Idaho) of the subcommittee called Powell as the first witness, the editor decided not to appear, even though he technically was still under subpoena. He made himself unavailable to the committee by moving into the home of a friend. Years later he explained that he was tired of the hearings, which he said were recalling many of witnesses, and that he believed the subcommittee moved the hearings to San Francisco in order to embarrass him publicly and to make life difficult for him and his family.²⁷

His wife, Sylvia, was then called to testify. A native of Oregon, Sylvia had, after college graduation, worked for the United Nations in Washington, D.C., and China. After her marriage to Powell in 1947, she became a contributor and then associate editor of the Review. After supplying the committee with her personal history, Mrs. Powell refused to answer questions about her role at the Review or about her husband's whereabouts. She took her constitutional privilege under the Fifth Amendment and declined even to acknowledge the name of her husband.²⁸

When the hearings were over, the subcommittee concluded that Powell knew the falsity of much of the material he published in his journal and that the Review was both controlled and supported by the Chinese government. Sen. Welker accused Powell of hiding from justice, and reiterated the subcommittee's pledge to press for a treason prosecution against Powell.²⁹

The San Francisco hearing cost the Powells dearly. Mrs. Powell was soon fired from her job with the National Foundation for Infantile Paralysis.³⁰ Shortly after the
hearing, Powell appeared in Palo Alto at a China forum on China, and said he saw evidence of germ warfare collected in Korea. He said he had seen evidence himself and that plague, cholera, and smallpox suddenly erupted in areas where such diseases had been completely wiped out.31

On April 25, 1956, Powell, his wife and the Review’s associate editor Julian Schuman were indicted for sedition under Section 2388 of Title 18 of the United States Code. A federal grand jury in San Francisco returned a total of 13 counts of sedition against them. The indictment charged that Powell had published statements, knowing them to be false, with the intention of causing disloyalty and mutiny among U.S. soldiers and obstructing recruiting and enlistment. The statements were as follows: (a) U.S. forces in Korea were engaged in aggressive, criminal acts; (b) the United States used Korea as a testing ground for gas weapons and germ warfare; (c) U.S. casualties were higher than was actually the case; and (d) U.S. negotiators deliberately stalled and sabotaged the Korea truce talks that eventually ended the Korean War.32

Julian Schuman was the Review’s associate editor in Shanghai from spring 1950 until the publication closed its doors. Born in Boston in 1920, he had studied Chinese at Harvard and Yale through the Army’s language training program. After serving in the army, he traveled to China as a civilian in 1947. He did freelance writing for several U.S. media and finally landed a job with the Review.33

Powell and his co-defendants pleaded not guilty in September 1956 and chose to prove the truth of their statements. They maintained that they had to go to China to obtain evidence supporting their claims that the U.S. had engaged in germ warfare and
refuting other allegations against them. They claimed that the trip was made necessary by the United States' failure to release classified government documents that would support their case. However, the United States did not recognize China diplomatically at that time, and the State Department would not issue passports for American travel to that country.

In the meantime, the Chinese government also refused to honor the defense lawyers' request for assistance in acquiring evidence. Defense lawyers filed for a dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the government's refusal to validate the passport for travel to China deprived the defendants of an adequate opportunity to prepare for their defense.

Federal Judge Louis Goodman was inclined to agree with the defense. He expressed concern that the defendants were being deprived of their constitutional rights of due process and of fair trial by acts of the United States, which prevented their counsels from gathering evidence for their defense. He agreed that evidence necessary for their defense was in China and North Korea, and stated that if the government chose not to issue such passports, it would mean a "discontinuation of the present prosecution."34

Three weeks later, the State Department reluctantly agreed to issue defense counsel A.L. Wirin a passport for China, believing that it was more important to try the Powell case than to violate passport policy. Wirin entered China on Jan. 7, 1958, and left at the end of February. He obtained depositions from about 50 witnesses who said they saw American planes dropping germ-carrying insects. But the witnesses could not
appear at a trial unless the two countries had a judicial agreement, and that was not a possibility. Wirin therefore moved for a dismissal of the indictment just before the scheduled opening of the trial on July 14, 1958. The motion was unsuccessful, however. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to issue a writ of mandamus directing a dismissal.

As part of the defense, Powell’s lawyers subpoenaed various federal departments and congressional committees in an effort to obtain release of documents related to the alleged American aggression, germ warfare, and the conduct of the truce negotiations. Officials refused to offer any evidence on these issues, arguing that the materials requested would threaten military security. A defense lawyer, Doris Walker, responded that she would not allow the government to define the boundary of proof or the defense.

Finally, after several postponements, the trial began on Jan. 26, 1959. The government offered the testimony of a former American POW who was to testify as to the effect of The China Monthly Review on POWs. The court questioned, however, whether the testimony was inadmissable, seeming to agree with the defense’s objection that sedition law is limited to acts committed in the United States. Judge Goodman ordered the argument on the objection be held in the absence of the jury.35

During that argument, Assistant U.S. Attorney James B. Schnake contended that the evidence had established actual treason on the part of the defendants. At one point, Judge Goodman acknowledged that the evidence presented so far would be "prima facie sufficient" to prove treason, since treason law did not have the same jurisdiction limitations as sedition law. Reporters, after checking the official court transcript to insure
accuracy, quoted the judge's comments. Some newspaper headlines stated that the judge declared "the Powells guilty of treason," and that "the judge had flayed the Powells."
The next day, defense lawyer Walker tendered a motion for mistrial on grounds that newspapers in the San Francisco area had published inflammatory articles and headlines indicating that the trial judge had declared the defendants guilty of treason.

Judge Goodman agreed to the mistrial motion and explained that he had made the remarks about treason in response to prosecution arguments and during the absence of the jury. He criticized the media for thwarting the administration of justice.36

However, the government immediately filed a new charge of treason against the defendants and asked that they be held without bail. The Defense argued that there had been no prima facie showing of treason and that the government had not offered two witnesses to any overt act of treason, as required by law. The court agreed again. The Justice Department was never able to offer witnesses for the treason charge; and, in the end, the treason complaint was dismissed by the U.S. Commissioner in San Francisco.

Finally, in 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy ordered to close the entire investigation, saying that because of the existing conditions in mainland China, direct testimony of two witnesses to an overt act of treason could not be obtained.37

Conclusions

Although the sedition charges against Powell and his co-defendants were dropped, the Powells paid a high price. To pay their $40,000 in legal bill, they had to borrow money from relatives and friends, and raised funds on their own. The American Civil Liberty Union (ACLU) stepped in to oppose the prosecution, claiming it constituted a
serious threat to the press freedom guaranteed under the First Amendment.

Powell's journalistic career was ruined. He was turned down repeatedly for jobs with U.S. newspapers and magazines, and believes he was "blacklisted" by an American journalistic community swept up by the anti-Communist feeling of the time. While the trial was still on, the Powells decided to fix and enlarge their tiny house. Powell, who had read some books on carpentry, added another room to the house and sold the expanded one. Soon the Powells started their own business, buying old houses, fixing them and reselling them. This developed into a shop on Church Street where they bought and sold antique adornments for Victorian homes. They are now retired.38

Today, Powell does not regret what he and his staff wrote in the Review 40 years ago. He remains as convinced as he was in the 1950s that the United States had engaged in germ warfare against the North Koreans and the Chinese. He recalls that although he had not personally talked any victims of the alleged germ warfare, he had regularly interviewed Chinese and foreign friends who had been to areas affected by air-dropped germs. "This is not a rehearsed story," Powell said, and argued that fake stories would have been better rehearsed and more consistent. "But villagers did not tell the same thing, and they argued among themselves," he says.39

Although Powell had heard about the Red hysteria in the United States when he was in China, he never realized that it was going to affect him and his family the way it did when they returned to the United States. He did not know whether his journal had ever been used to indoctrinate Americans in the prison camps, he said, since it was available on any newsstands.

17
He emphasized that he is a "cause journalist" and that his magazine was an opinion journal. He wanted to use the magazine to explain China to the West. He tried to balance everything he wrote, but it was hard, he said. "I was very sympathetic with China because I thought China always got the short end of the deal with the West from the days of the Opium War on," he said. "If you read the American papers during the same period, you could not find anything good about China in them. They were not (an example of) textbook journalism."40

In retrospect, Powell said that if had anticipated his subsequent ordeal, he would have written the same thing, but in a legally more cautious way. For example, in reporting the germ warfare charges, he would have made it clearer that the charges had been reported in China, and that he was offering his opinions on their validity, based on the examination of the evidence.

The lapse of time has not dried up Powell’s interest in germ warfare. In 1977, he sat down in his study above his antique shop and resumed his writing about Asia and germ warfare. Today, to prove the truthfulness of what he had written during the Korean War, he continues his efforts to obtain previously classified documents form the government through the Freedom of Information Act.41

After years of research, Powell found that, among other things, the U.S. government had pardoned Japanese war criminals and used their research fruits for its own biological weapons program.42 Powell’s findings, which made international headlines and were confirmed by other sources, seem to support his early reports about U.S. germ warfare program, but they are by no means evidence of the alleged U.S. use
of germ warfare techniques in the Korean War.

In fact, Powell's charges that the United States used germ warfare in Korea and the casualties were of a certain number can only be seen as opinions. After reading his articles, few would believe that the writer had been to the battlefield to count the dead or the writer had been present in a germ warfare attack. He was charged with attempting to influence public opinion and to cause disloyalty, but only a few hundred copies of the journal were even circulated in the United States. He could have been more objective or thorough in his reporting. Yet an examination of his writing does not suggest that he knowingly falsified anything. He did his best to check his facts in the kind of environment he had in China. He certainly lost his balance in using Chinese sources almost exclusively. Still, what he wrote did not warrant the suffering that he and his family went through.

A mistrial based on some technical mistakes may have seemed an appropriate solution for the government. The defendants' careers and lives were devastated because of the publicity of their case, yet the government's denial of germ warfare charges remained intact. The U.S. government obviously had something to hide when it sought to punish the defendants. Powell recalled that the Justice Department tried to work out a deal with him—that is, if Powell would plead guilty to any of the counts he had been charged with, Sylvia Powell and Julian Schuman would be pardoned, and the government would make the punishment for Powell very light.43

Powell's germ warfare charges remain unproved. Western historiography of the Korean War has largely treated Chinese charges of germ warfare as an isolated and
transparent ploy, whereas Chinese history books still treat it as a matter of fact that the United States committed germ warfare during the Korean War.44

Powell’s defense of the Communists in China and his laudatory reports about the new-born republic were a product of history. He ran the Review during a unique period of China--during the last three years of the Nationalists and the first three years of the Communist rule. The corruption and hopelessness of the Nationalists during their finals in mainland China contrasted with the progress and improvements that the Communists made after they took over. The first three years of the Communist rule were a period of euphoria and it was difficult to achieve balanced reporting in that atmosphere, Powell acknowledged. The Communists made a lot of mistakes, Powell said, but they were nothing in comparison with those of the Nationalists. Other Westerners in China during the same period shared Powell’s impressions. It must be noted, however, that Powell did not stay in China long enough to see the development of more serious problems, which culminated in the Cultural Revolution and Tiananmen Square.

Powell was a victim of the Red fear prevalent at the time. Had he returned earlier, he would have run into the same trouble as other U.S. foreign service officers and China beat journalists, who were accused of losing China to the Communists during McCarthy era. Instead he stayed for three or four more years in China. His charges against the U.S. government were far more serious and that inevitably brought him more trouble with the government.

Powell’s ordeal shows present journalists how difficult it can be to cover a foreign, especially an unfriendly, country during time of war. When tension is high
between nations, government sources tend to manipulate the media to their own advantages. Unskeptical journalists can be easily led astray by propaganda or simply by the lack of adequate information. On the other hand, foreign correspondents are often accused of being unpatriotic if they report things that people back home do not want to hear.

Powell’s story demonstrates that the rules for proper behavior for journalists covering unpopular overseas wars are by no means clear, and that those who step over the indistinctly drawn lines of propriety suffer consequences. Such consequences can not help but have a chilling effect on the freedom of journalists to report news and write opinions from abroad.
Endnotes:


14. Ibid.


19. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.


35. Section 2388 of Title 18 of the United States Code says that activities affecting armed forces during war shall be punished and it shall apply within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and on the high seas, as well within the United States. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Sta. 811).


39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Ibid.


44. Discussions of the alleged germ warfare by Chinese scholars can be found in: Shen Zonghong and Meng Zhaohui, History of the War to Resist Americans and Aid Korea (Beijing: The Military Science Press, 1988); and Deng Liqung, Ma Hong, and Wu Heng, Chiba Today: War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea (Beijing: Press of Chinese Academy of Social Science, 1990).
I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: John William Powell and The China Weekly Review: An Analysis of His Reporting and His McCarthy Era Criticism

Author(s): Eugene Shen

Corporate Source (if appropriate):

Publication Date:

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract Journal of the ERIC system, Resources In Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY [PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE] TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY [PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE] TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

Signature: Eugene Shen
Printed Name: Eugene Shen
Organisation:

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:
Address:
Price Per Copy:

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

...
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
THE GROWTH OF TELEVISION ADVERTISING FOLLOWING Deregulation IN WESTERN EUROPE

Debra (Warren) Reece  
812 Malabu Drive, Apt 7  
Lexington, KY 40502  
(606)-277-0448

University of Kentucky  
245 Grehan Building  
(606)-257-4099  
e-mail: DJWARR00@UKCC.UKY.EDU
The Growth of Television Advertising
Following Deregulation in Western Europe

Abstract

The deregulation of the broadcasting industry within Western Europe during the mid-to-late 1980’s, accelerated by the introduction of new communication technologies such as satellites and cable, has changed the nature of television broadcasting in Europe significantly. The subsequent rise in advertising as a means of financing public and private channels has challenged the long standing public service tradition that undergirded broadcasting policies in Western Europe for decades. In light of these changes, this paper addressed the growth of regional pan-European advertising as a subset of global advertising. Global advertising is moving towards the incorporation of cultural differences within the writing and production phases of standardized advertisements. Pan-European services such as MTV, CNN, and Euronews as well as pan-European productions foster the concept of pan-European ad campaigns in an effort to remain financially viable.
The Growth of Television Advertising
Following Deregulation in Western Europe

The deregulation of the broadcasting industry within Western Europe during the mid-to-late 1980's, accelerated by the introduction of new communication technologies such as satellites and cable, has changed the nature of television broadcasting in Europe significantly. The number of media outlets, private television services, and satellite enterprises have grown tremendously (Blumler, 1992; Shaughnessy & Cobo, 1990). With the increased outlets for programming, the nationally-owned television services have experienced increased competition for significant audience shares. In order to maintain major portions of their national audiences, these public services have resorted to importing large amounts of programming, predominantly from the U.S. (Doyle, 1992). As the cost of producing local or national programming has increased, the public service-oriented stations have had to consider raising more financial resources through increased advertising, rather than raising their license fees from each individual user. These changes have not occurred without intense debate within each country and within the European Community (EC). In 1989, the EC issued a Directive on Television without Frontiers that sought to regulate the expansion of transnational media systems across Europe (Ang, 1990; Council of EC, 1989). The progression from centralized government-owned television services in most Western European countries in the early
1980’s to the current explosion in satellite services, distributed by cable or direct-to-home (DTH) satellite dishes, has created the phenomenon of pan-European broadcasting. This, in turn, has created the potential for enormous growth in the advertising sector. The purpose of this paper is to examine the growth of pan-European broadcasting and pan-European advertising campaigns within the four progressive nations of Britain, Italy, France, and Spain. These countries were selected due to their prominence in Europe and their lead in terms of pan-European program productions (Doyle, 1992; EBU, 1992). The phenomena of pan-European broadcasting and advertising is likewise examined in light of the role that the media play in shaping collective identities (Schlesinger, 1993). The emergence of an European identity through the integration of Europe under the direction of the EC is also discussed.

The Cultural Implications of Advertising

The deregulation of European television broadcasting and the subsequent rise in advertising as a means of financing public and private channels has challenged the long standing public service tradition that undergirded broadcasting policies in Western Europe for decades. The debate over the cultural implications of commercial television on the quality of European programming has been addressed by the two leading pan-European organizations within Europe: The Council of Europe and the EC. Each organization deliberated over the rise in imported programming, advertising, and sponsorships. Their respective documents, European Convention on Transfrontier Television and Television Without Frontiers,
highlighted the need to protect the European heritage of quality programming through specific guidelines. The Council's document affirmed their support of the following principles (Council of Europe, 1989):

1. Freedom of expression and information are essential elements of a democratic society.

2. Each human being shall be shown dignity and equal worth.

The Council of Europe, seeking to safeguard the cultural heritage of Europe and promote European audio-visual productions, set the following restrictions on advertising:

1. The amount of spot advertising should not exceed 15% of the daily transmission time.

2. The amount of spot advertising should not exceed 20% within a given one-hour period.

3. All advertisements should be clearly distinguishable from other programming by the use of an optical or audible signal.

4. Persons regularly associated with news/current affairs programming should not participate in advertisements.

5. Advertisements shall be inserted between programs or at natural breaks (such as intermission during a concert). News, current affairs, children's and religious programming should not be interrupted if they last less than 30 minutes. A film lasting more than 45 minutes can be interrupted once for each complete period of 45 minutes.

6. Advertising of tobacco products and prescription medicines shall not be permitted.

7. Advertisements for alcohol must not appear to be targeting minors, promoting immoderate consumption, and promoting alcohol as a means of resolving conflict (Council of Europe, 1989).

Each of these guidelines is rooted in principle. The Europeans value the free flow of information for the expression of diverse ideas. They consider the preservation of their news programming as
essential in safeguarding their democratic processes. This principle underlines numbers 3, 4, 5 above. The other items seek to protect the audience, especially minors, from harmful advertising. By limiting the amount of advertising overall, they sought to minimize the commercial emphasis that is so prevalent in the U.S.

Brown (1991), contrasting the European perception of television with the American concept, stated that Americans view their audience as consumers living in markets while the Europeans perceive their audience as citizens living in communities. The U.S. (media industry personnel, Congressmen) reacted rather swiftly to the EC's Directive, Television without Frontiers, calling it protectionism which restricts free trade. The Directive sought to establish quotas on imported programming in an effort to promote European production and protect European culture from the onslaught of American cultural imperialism. Brown (1991) mentioned that advertisers, seeking to reach the largest audiences, sponsor programming that appeals to the largest sector of society. This concept violates two of the principles underlying public service broadcasting: Broadcast programs should cater to all tastes and interests and disadvantaged minorities should receive particular provision. While the market system stresses the majority, especially those with purchasing power, the public service model narrowcasts to subgroups in the society, seeking to maintain pluralism and diversity.

Walle (1990) examined the historical example of the "Voice of
Firestone" within the U.S. as evidence that uncontrolled expansion of commercial television ultimately leads to lower quality programming in its attempt to attract high ratings in order to command higher advertising revenues. The "Firestone" case is especially poignant because of the tire company's willingness to sponsor cultural, artistic programming, regardless of the size of the audience. It sought to provide an alternative type of programming as a public service, featuring operatic vocals and orchestra selections. However, the major networks perceived the low ratings as impacting their entire programming schedule and eventually offered the program only fringe time slots. This finally forced the program off the air in 1959. Walle (1990) applied this historical example to the present situation in Europe. He stated that unrestrained commercialism does not ensure the diversity in programming that the Global Media Commission publicizes, but leads to homogenization of content. Following the removal of "Firestone," the three networks each presented a crime drama during the same time slot. The article encouraged Europeans to place some type of restrictions on the commercial media in order to ensure diversity of programming.

Pollay (1986) wrote about the cultural by-products of advertising within a culture, listing the following consequences:

**When advertising appeals to:**  **It indirectly promotes:**

- mass markets  
  - conformity
- status  
  - social competitiveness
- fears  
  - insecurities
newness  disrespect for history
youth  disrespect for age
sexuality  pornography

This list of consequences may be simplistic, but it summarizes many of the concerns in Europe toward the increased commercialization of television broadcasting over the past ten years. With the dawn of satellites which transmit cross-frontier services, the national services have had to consider the increased use of advertising to replace license fee shortfalls due to increased costs for production and programming. However, this increased commercialization carries cultural baggage that often conflicts with the cherished values embodied in the public service tradition.

The Debate over Global Advertising

The principle of global advertising has been championed by Theodore Levitt, a professor of Business Administration at Harvard University, who proposed the globalization of markets model. This theory states that the dawn of international telecommunications, television services, and travel has created a worldwide cultural homogeneity. This concept of the commonness of all people is used to promote standardized commercials for products throughout the world. Walle (1990) suggested that this theory was initiated by firms, rather than being inspired by the public's desires or needs. These international firms reap appreciable cost savings by standardizing the product design, corporate strategy, and advertising of products that are marketed in various regions of the world. Walle (1990) utilized a quote from Levitt (1981) that
depicts the driving force behind his theory:

Instead of adapting to superficial and even entrenched differences within and between nations, it will seek sensibly to force suitably standardized products and practices on the entire globe.

The use of the word "force" implies an element of manipulation by multinational companies to control the tastes and purchases of millions of people.

Lyons (1988) discriminated between the reality of one world and many different market places. He asserted that only certain products can travel worldwide, such as Levis Strauss, Coca-Cola, McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Malborough. Lyons (1988) stressed the cultural differences that still remain between people around the globe, especially in terms of food preferences. The article cited the example within the Muslim world of the prohibition of pork products and alcohol. Those in favor of global ad campaigns speak of the "cultural common denominators" that all people share such as personal hygiene, parental instincts, and romance. They minimize the differences in skin color, language, and local customs for fashion and entertainment. Lyons (1988) challenged the validity of the "global village" concept, stating that people in a village are neighbors who share much more in common than the cultures of the world presently share.

Kanso (1992), in writing about the debate over the feasibility of localized or individualized advertising and standardized or universal appeals, argued that the use of standardized approaches have declined. He surveyed 118 marketing executives from U.S. manufacturers of consumer durable goods. The response rate for the
mail survey was 81.4 percent. The survey indicated that 75% of the respondents followed a predominantly localized approach, while the remaining 25% preferred a predominantly standardized strategy. Concurrently, only half of the managers demonstrated a "cultural orientation," exhibiting sensitivities toward the following cultural elements: language, aesthetics, values, economics, kinship, social structure, technology, religion, and traditions. Forty-three percent of the nonculturally-oriented managers used standardized campaigns. Kanso (1992) implied that all standardized approaches do not take into account the cultural differences represented around the world. However, Wells (1992) clearly showed that the trend in global advertising is moving towards the incorporation of cultural differences within the writing and production phases of standardized advertisements, as demonstrated in the Dove soap commercial above. These advertisements affirm the richness of cultural differences while stressing the commonality of human needs and desires.

The unified European market now represents one of the most lucrative markets for advertisers worldwide, representing 350 million people in the 12 Western European nations (Stevenson, 1994). Therefore, it is not surprising that global ad campaigns often incorporate some European flavor through the use of European actors and accents. A recent newspaper article described an advertisement for Dove soap in which models from Australia, France, Italy, Germany as well as other countries extolled the virtues of the gentle cleanser in their own languages (Wells, 1992). The
closing line is the one that the Unilever Group has used for two generations: "Dove contains one-quarter cleansing cream." Sales within Italy have risen significantly over the past two years, reaching the number one spot. The strategy of a global campaign that incorporates cultural differences within the writing and production of advertisements has paid off. Wells (1992) reported that Dove is not alone. Twenty other companies also have turned their resources toward unified global ad campaigns, including products such as disposable diapers, shampoos, and diamond watches. These advertisers believe that such campaigns not only boost short-term sales, but also build long-term product/brand identities. Levi Strauss recently produced "sublingual" ads featuring 1960's American rock music and nonspeaking actors in amusing situations. The company has recorded record sales of its jeans within Europe. The common bond appears to be the worldwide appeal of rock music. In addition, the use of nonspeaking actors successfully eliminates the debate over appropriate language choice within the nations of the world.

Hachten (1992) highlighted the growing globalization of the advertising industry, especially detailing three mergers that formed several large advertising agencies with extensive international services. Transnational corporations, looking to promote their products via standardized advertising across transnational media services, are selecting their advertising agencies based upon their worldwide capabilities. Negrine and Papathanassopoulos (1991) discussed the trend toward global
advertising, stating that conglomeration of advertising agencies must coincide with centralized decision-making within multinational corporations and deregulation of advertising across borders. The major decision to be made by multinational companies is in the design of common products with common names which can be marketed around the world. At present, the advertising rates within Europe are low. Companies can afford to experiment with regional advertising, cutting across various subcultures. However, as the cost of pan-European advertising increases, companies will have to evaluate the desirability of marketing across borders and whether the advertisements are effectively reaching customers.

The Emergence of Pan-European Broadcasting

The growth in pan-European programming initiatives and pan-European broadcasting services have grown significantly within the past ten years. Negrine and Papathanassopoulos (1991) outlined the emergence of pan-European services (such as CNN, MTV, Super Channel, TV 5, and Eurosport) as further evidence of the internationalization of television. However, these services rely heavily upon imported programming, especially from the U.S. Between 1983 and 1988, sales of American programs within Europe rose from $212 to $675 million. In the area of film production, the European film industry showed a modest growth, while U.S. production went up from 300 film in 1985 to approximately 600 in 1988-89. In addition, these authors cited increased examples of Anglo-American, British-European, and European coproductions, furthering the internationalization of television programming.
One example of a pan-European program initiative is a $40 million series entitled Riviera. The five broadcasters who purchased the show from EC TV, a unit of Interpublic Group of Companies, a global media enterprise, are TF-1 in France, Rete-4 in Italy, Studio Hamburg in Germany, Granada TV in England, and the regional Forta stations in Spain. Two hundred and sixty episodes are being produced in France. This soap opera features the power plays of an old-line European family involved in an international perfume business (Doyle, 1992).

Another example of European cooperation is an animated series entitled The Animals of Farthing Wood which is being distributed by BBC Enterprises. The 26-episode series was produced and financed by 20 television organizations in 16 countries. The series was unveiled in Cannes in October 1992 (EBU, 1992).

The recent start-up of Euronews within Europe in January 1993 represents another pan-European initiative. It seeks to create a European identity by providing news coverage from a European viewpoint. Schlesinger (1993) discussed the role of an "European audiovisual space" in molding an European identity in light of the resurgence of nationalism following the collapse of communism, stressing the uphill battle that the supernational organization, the EC, has in managing the cultural environment within Europe. However, services such as Euronews, which functions solely as a post-production channel, accessing material from Eurovision and the news agencies via 12 satellite circuits and five terrestrial circuits, is seen as a step in that direction. The service does
not maintain any reporters in the field at present (EBU, 1993). The broadcasters involved are RAI of Italy, ARD and ZDF of Germany, TF-1, Antenne 2, and FR-3 of France, and TVE of Spain (Doyle, 1992). Euronews broadcasts in six languages simultaneously: English, French, German, Italian, Spanish and Arabic. The use of six languages represents a clear recognition on their part of the entrenched language use of the various sectors within Europe. Any new European identity will not be based on one unique language, but must somehow incorporate their language and cultural differences.

Eurosport Consortium, resulting from the recent merger between Eurosport and The European Sports Network, features two versions:

1. A multilingual version (Dutch, English, German) transmitted throughout Europe via Astra and Eutelsat II satellites.


It is interesting to note that the Spanish and Italian speakers within Europe will be left out of this enterprise directly. Most likely, they will resort to the international language of English. The shareholders of the multilingual version include TF-1 (34%), Canal Plus (33%), and ESPN (33%) (EBU, 1993). It is interesting that the French enterprises of TF-1 and Canal Plus represent 67% of the multilingual venture, demonstrating their desire to reap profits from producing sports programming that will appeal to many across Europe.

Despite these pan-European initiatives, program preferences
across Europe differ somewhat, with the Spanish preferring operas and novellas while the British choose documentaries and mysteries (Rothenburg, 1990). However, as the political and economic integration of Europe proceeds, the homogenization of culture will most likely result. As the transnational television services expand, viewers will increasingly be able to sample alternative programming from across Europe. However, the director of Nestle Company, Michel Reinarz, believes that as the harmonization within Europe progresses, a counterbalance will emerge, fueling regional identities within national boundaries. He further stated that while English grows in popularity as a second language in Europe, the defense of national languages will be further entrenched (Doyle, 1992). Therefore, successful pan-European programming ventures must appeal to common interests, while upholding the value of each country’s culture and language.

In an effort to promote the trafficking of television programs between countries, the European Commission authorized $250 million for the establishment of Media 92. The program consisted of 12 projects to encourage multilingual television programs through dubbing and subtitling and independent productions through underwriting the costs of scripts and pre-production costs. Some of the code names for these projects are BABEL—Broadcasting across barriers of European language—and EURO-AIM—European Organization for an Independent Audio-Visual Market.

The CEO of Thames Television, Richard Dunn, stressed that while European partnerships are important, European companies
should not exclude American or Australian partners. He also felt that advertising income should be maximized, either by increasing the number of minutes allowed each hour or increasing the number of pan-European advertising campaigns sold to national broadcasters.

A final source of revenue championed by Dunn is subscription television such as Canal Plus and Sky Broadcasting (Doyle, 1992).

Such pan-European broadcasting services continue to emerge, seeking to establish their share of the market. Wells (1992), focusing on the growth of global ad campaigns, mentioned that within Europe there are more than 80 satellite-borne television channels. However, one major satellite service, MTV, has encountered resistance to global campaigns within the multinational companies themselves. These corporations are often organized as a "confederacy of national or regional offices." Representatives of the satellite services must therefore obtain approval from each of the company's area marketing directors before a pan-European campaign can succeed. This process makes pan-European ad campaigns less feasible due to the increased number of negotiations required.

Brown (1991) stressed the fact that the increase of pan-European services such as Sky Channel and Super Channel address the audience as consumers, envisioning national boundaries as inconveniences to sales. These media networks provide avenues for multinational companies such as Toyota, Sony, Coca-Cola and Volvo to promote their global message. At the beginning of 1992, Coca-Cola announced a global campaign utilizing CNN and MTV to reach viewers in 100 countries on six continents. The total buy of 48
spots cost less than $750,000 (Brunelli & Goldsand, 1992).

Farhi (1992) reported that demand for CNN and MTV's continental feeds, such as all-Europe or all-Asia, exceeds demand for full global coverage. MTV's pan-European feed incorporates 30 nations. The following advertising accounts are representative of those they carry: Swatch watches, Braun shavers, Coke, Levis, and various Japanese goods. The language utilized throughout is English. The director of global marketing for Coca-Cola stated that the idea of a "global teenager" is very real. This idea that teenagers around the globe share many common interests in fashion, music, and food is continually utilized in marketing strategies aimed at this target age group, believing that teenagers in Tokyo, London, and Paris desire similar products.

Melody (1988), in focusing on the EC's role in the establishment of pan-European television broadcasting, stated that part of the EC's mission is:

> to knock down artificial barriers among member countries in order to enhance the creation of a common European market, a common European identity, a common European presence in the world, and the flowering of a European culture that is distinct from a collection of European national cultures. (p. 274)

However, such cooperation among nations requires that each country surrender some of their control over broadcasting signals entering and exiting their borders. Melody (1988) felt that the EC's Television without Frontiers (1984) provided a compromise in which the individual nations would determine what programming is produced in and sent from their respective nations, while the EC would determine what could be received across all EC member nations.
Furthermore, the emergence of pan-European broadcasting provided legitimacy for the EC, enhancing its power among the individual states. Therefore, the EC promotes pan-European broadcasting, programming initiatives, and advertising because they see such endeavors as the means for creating an European culture that will foster its power and credibility and thereby promote the economic and political integration of Europe.

However, the economic viability of pan-European services is questionable. Few of the satellite services are profitable. Sky Channel, the oldest service, lost money consistently during the mid-80’s. Melody (1988) stated that the EC, seeking to protect its own vested interests, joined forces with the transnational companies and global advertising agencies to elicit support for reducing broadcasting restrictions and thereby protecting the future of pan-European satellite services. Such backing by transnational companies, eager to promote their products and services across Europe, may threaten the public service ideals which the EC itself champions. It is ironic that the very bodies who wrote official documents in hopes of protecting European programming from excessive market forces would be seen to be aiding the marketing efforts of multinational corporations.

The Growth of European Advertising

Loosened restrictions on the amount of television advertising across Europe have created an enormous advertising market potential within Western Europe. Many advertising agencies are gearing up to handle pan-European advertising campaigns. Doyle (1992) cited the
creation of The Media Partnership, a European media buying entity established by the joining of BBDO Worldwide, DDB Needham Worldwide, and Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide. This partnership will service all three companies' clients. The president of EC TV, Larry Lammatina, believes that certain luxury goods lend themselves more readily to pan-European campaigns. The targeted elite segment of the market, the top five or ten percent within various countries, hold more in common that the lower 25 percent (Doyle, 1992). Perhaps the desired European identity will most closely fit the lifestyle of the affluent of each European nation, rather than the average working person.

David Barker, head of planning for the ad agency J. Walter Thompson (JWT) of London, said that pan-European strategies do not necessarily achieve marketing economies of scale whereby a company realizes cost savings by harmonizing formulations and packaging immediately, but sometimes represents a long-term investment in brand building. However, one of JWT's clients, Lever Brothers, saves money by making single commercials for use in 10-15 different countries. As of May 1992, pan-European brands formed 80% of Lever Brothers' total business (Product marketing, 1992).

The deregulation of television in Europe in the 1980's as well as the growing power of media magnates such as Silvio Berlusconi of Italy have created the phenomenon of specialist media shops which use the clout of their many clients to buy air time or print space at lower rates, but do not participate in the actual creative productions. In return, they receive a commission of 2-5% of the
advertiser's media spending. Carat of France, Europe's largest media buying house, has spread across Europe through a series of mergers, giving it nearly 10% of the total European market. Carat also invests some profits in its audience research department, seeking to dispel concerns about uninformed media purchases. At present, these independent media specialists account for approximately 40% of Western Europe's $55 billion advertising market. By contrast, specialist shops only accounted for 7% of the U.S.'s $130 billion advertising market (Media buying, 1991).

The actual television spots exhibit increased use of English slogans, universal objects of appeal, and entertainment value. The use of English slogans is not uncommon mainly because young Europeans recognize English as the international language. A recent campaign in the UK, Germany, Spain, and Italy featured silent television advertisements for KitKat chocolate bars with an English slogan, "Have a break, have a KitKat." France, where English is banned in television advertisements, required that the slogan be translated into French (Product marketing, 1992).

The use of universal objects of appeal ensures the effectiveness of global advertisements. However, local customs must often be considered as well. Recently, the Kellogg Company utilized the worldwide appeal of the game of tennis to promote Tony the Tiger in Europe (Lev, 1991). The company selected teenage actors for their "generic good looks, neither too Latin American or too Northern European." The company made subtle changes in order to accommodate local cultural differences. For example, the
American ad featured the winner of the match leaping over the net in celebration, while the European commercial showed the winners merely exchanging a "high five." This example is an illustration of "pattern standardization" in which a campaign is designed for use in multiple markets, but adapted to local markets as needed. This strategy incorporates the benefits of global ad campaigns while allowing for cultural variation. However, such cultural sensitivity requires audience research and testing.

Michel Reinarz, Director of Visual Communication for Nestle, stressed the changes that have occurred in advertising over the past twenty years. The individual consumer no longer wants to be informed and convinced about a product’s usefulness. Rather than accepting a hard sell, the consumer of today wants a more indirect approach that incorporates entertainment and emotional value. Advertisers now spend more time and money creating a relationship between the brand and the consumer. The brand, once established, helps the consumer to minimize the risk involved in the purchase of products (Doyle, 1992).

Snyder, Willenborg, and Watt (1991) examined the changes in advertising messages within Western Europe from 1953-1989, looking at the national and international character of magazine advertisements in France, West Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Although this study does not pertain directly to television advertising, it is useful in demonstrating the prevailing attitudes of advertisers during this time of economic and cultural convergence within Europe. The study also sought to
use advertising as a "cultural barometer" to reflect possible tensions between national identity and internationalism as expressed through the EC. They did this by completing a content analysis of 1562 adverts from 200 magazine issues from the four countries over the 36 years and then compared this data with public opinion data from the same countries on their attitudes toward the EC. They found that over time the adverts featured: slightly less text and more product portraits; more domestic visual cues for local products and more foreign visual and linguistic cues for foreign products; and the visual cues for foreign products were more often national insignias than specific locations or models. For our purposes, it is most significant that culturally neutral advertisements declined over time. The number of advertisements for foreign products increased over time. In addition, the foreignness portrayed in these ads increased, openly utilizing foreign visuals and languages, especially English. Yet at the same time, the local product advertisements developed a more national flavor. Using correlation analysis, the researchers showed that public opinion on the EC preceded changes in the use of foreign European languages (French and German), but followed changes in the use of pan-European visuals in advertisements by 4-6 years. Therefore, the use of European-wide symbols since the early 1970's may have created positive perceptions toward economic unity in people's minds. It would be interesting to conduct a similar examination of television advertising from 1974-1994, noting the changes in the advertising strategies and relating them to pro-EC
feelings in light of the prominence of television in popular culture. In addition, it is interesting that the authors did not detect any evidence of a "growing Americanization of advertising images" (Snyder et. al, 1991) despite the clear influx of American programming following deregulation.

In an effort to forestall regulatory action by governments and institutions such as the EC and Council of Europe, various trade associations formed the European Advertising Tripartite (EAT), championing self-regulation within the advertising industry as an alternative. The EAT is an advertising lobby made up of representatives from ad agencies, advertisers, and the media. A similar organization, International Advertising Association (IAA), also represents the interests of these three components, including American agencies and media organizations. The IAA and European Association of Advertising Agencies (EAAA) promote the concept of advertising within Europe, stressing that consumers need information on goods and services in order to choose between alternative products. They also suggest that advertising will stabilize employment within Europe by ensuring the steady disposal of goods, while making vital contributions toward the high cost of media production and distribution (Mattelart & Palmer, 1991).

Likewise, Mattelart and Palmer (1991) detailed the opposition to Article 14 of the Council of Europe’s document on transborder television by some European countries, particularly Britain. Article 14 addressed the insertion of advertising within programming, limiting advertising breaks to one every 45 minutes.
during telefilms and prohibiting advertising during news, religious and children's programming of less than 30 minutes. Britain took the lead in organizing the opposition to Article 14, claiming that the limitations would have negative effects on existing national television and commercial television in mainland Europe. Within Britain, some of the highest advertising rates occurred during the mid-program break within News at Ten, which was just under 30 minutes. In addition, A2, France's second, public-service channel depended on advertising for 70% of its income in 1991. Both services would experience a loss of revenue under Article 14's advertising limitations (Mattelart & Palmer, 1991).

Article 14, originated by Germany, favors those countries who prefer "block" advertising to "natural breaks," including Belgium, Greece, Portugal, and the Netherlands. France and Italy abstained during the drafting of the proposal. The opponents of Article 14, including Britain and Spain, sought to prove the harmful effects through an intensified research effort. They cited one multinational company, a significant advertiser throughout Europe, whose sales were 43 percent less in block countries than in natural break countries. They projected revenue losses for several commercial channels in France and Britain. On the same topic, Reinarz of Nestle cited some exploratory research which indicated that the loss of audiences exceeds 50% during advertising breaks (Doyle, 1992). Ward, Robertson, and Brown (1986), while summarizing the effects of advertising on European children, stated that studies have shown that recall, comprehension, and learning
from both advertising and the actual program content may be inhibited by the blocking of advertisements. This is attributed to fatigue and loss of attention during unbroken programming. In the end, the members of the Convention were grouped in the following manner towards Article 14 (Mattelart & Palmer, 1991):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm Supporters</th>
<th>Willing to Compromise</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Opposed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Italy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Malta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lobbying efforts of the EAT were successful in attaching an amendment to the restriction on the maximum number of minutes (15 percent overall, 20 percent any given hour), authorizing three natural breaks in a telefilm of 110 minutes. This amendment represented a compromise between the two extreme groups listed above.

Finally, advertisers and ad agencies are hindered by the lack of reliable data on pan-European consumer habits, advertising expenditures, and media reach. As the concentration of ownership within the media multinational companies (such as Time Warner, News Corporation and Fininvest) increase, the ad agencies are forced to grow bigger in order to negotiate with these firms as equals (Mattelart & Palmer, 1991). Some corrective factors are being applied to some countries’ statistics in order to correct for differences in the way the statistics are gathered and differences in what costs are included. There are three major costs incurred by ad agencies: 23% for creative production costs, 25% for client...
relationship costs, and 12% for media buying costs. Some nations do not take production costs into account; therefore the EAT's figures add an additional percentage to roughly equate their figures with other European nations. The growth of pan-European research organizations that can provide trustworthy data on the European market will greatly enhance the feasibility of pan-European advertising.

Conclusion

The deregulation of television broadcasting in Europe, fueled by the introduction of new communication technologies, has yielded changes in both the philosophy and practices of the television industry since the early 1980's. Many European nations have moved from state monopolies to a mixture of public service and commercial channels. Four prominent nations identified within this paper as leading the way in pan-European programming ventures possess the following number of channels (Blumler, 1992):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Public</th>
<th>Private</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the number of channels within each of these countries has significantly increased within the past ten years, the need to finance the various services has intensified the competition for advertising dollars. Occasionally the amount of available advertising revenue is not sufficient to support all the available channels. In France, several of the private enterprises operate in the red, failing to attract significant audience share in order to
compete for advertising revenues.

The proliferation of channels within Europe has created increased demand for programming as well. As the cost of producing local or national programming has increased, many of these public service outlets have resorted to importing significant amounts of American movies, sitcoms, and action series. Schlesinger (1993) described American programming as "the real common currency of the European audiovisual space" that crosses national borders with ease. Both the EC and the Council of Europe specifically produced guidelines to protect European media ideals and media outlets from the cultural invasion of American media practices and programming. The guidelines set limits on the types and amount of advertising allowed as well as establishing quotas on the amount of imported programming permitted. If Europe desires an European identity that is unique from the popular culture exported by the United States, it must limit imports and promote European programming initiatives.

Another means of reducing production costs has been the formation pan-European and Euro-American partnerships such as Euronews, Eurosport Consortium, and MTV. The presence of Canal Plus, a French media conglomerate, within the American movie industry is visible proof that the Transatlantic exchange is a two-way street. Likewise, Stevenson (1994) detailed numerous Euro-American joint ventures involved in the following endeavors: the expansion of cable services, the distribution of American programming in Europe, and the production of European programming facilitated by American capital. Two specific examples of American
investment in European productions which simultaneously allow the programming to depict an European flavor are MTV and Disney Europe. By respecting the cultural sensitivities of the EC and general public of Europe, American media interests can achieve long-term growth through co-productions and investments in their media enterprises.

Pan-European services (such as CNN, MTV, and Sky Channel) will continue to foster the concept of pan-European ad campaigns in an effort to remain financially viable. By addressing cultural differences across Europe within the writing and production phases, advertising agencies hope to accommodate a pan-European audience with similar tastes. Often advertising agencies refer to the youth of Europe as holding more in common with the youth in the U.S. and Japan than they do with the older generation within Europe. This phenomenon of commonality in food, fashion, and music preferences is clearly seen in the popularity of British and American pop artists, fast food, and jeans and T-shirts throughout Europe. The study of English as a second language throughout Scandinavia, the Netherlands, and Germany contributes to this phenomenon of solidarity. Perhaps the young generation which has been raised in the era of European unification will embrace pan-European television more easily than their parents who still exercise control over the broadcasting sector.

Finally, the success of pan-European services will most likely be affected by the continuing debate over the Maastricht Treaty. The social and political climate directly and indirectly impacts
the viability of pan-European programming and advertising through direct intervention by the EC or Council of Europe and indirectly through increased or decreased nationalism. The initial rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danes triggered uncertainties about the monetary and political unification of Europe. The close vote in France further eroded confidence in an unified Europe within the near future. Public opinion in favor of an unified Europe works to bolster pan-European media partnerships, while renewed nationalism threatens to diminish the prospects of continued pan-European cooperation. The collapse of the communist bloc, the increased feelings of nationalism and ethnic divisions (especially within Yugoslavia), and the reunification of Germany to yield a more powerful leader in the 1990’s all illustrate the challenge that faces those who seek to integrate Europe. While the EC seeks to promote an European culture and identity through pan-European programming, the main supporters of pan-European services continue to be the transnational corporations who view such channels as excellent ways to consolidate brand names, product packaging, and advertising, strengthening their long-term posture and occasionally reaping short-term profits.
References


DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: The growth of delinquency among following disregulated

Author(s): Abar J. Reese

Corporate Source (if appropriate):

Publication Date: Conference date 9/16/94

REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

Signature: Abar J. Reese

Organizational Title: University of Kentucky

Address: 812 Malaban Dr

Tel. No.: 257-4099

Date: 7/22/94

DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or, if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:

Address:

Price Per Copy:

Quantity Price:

REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

192
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
The South African Broadcasting Corporation's coverage of the 1987 and 1989 elections: The matter of visual bias

Maria Elizabeth Grabe
(STUDENT AUTHOR)

Program in Mass Media and Communication
Temple University
Philadelphia, PA, 19122

Electronic Mail:
bgrabe@astro.ocis.temple.edu

Accepted for presentation at the annual conference of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (International Division).
Atlanta, Georgia
August 1994
The South African Broadcasting Corporation’s coverage of the 1987 and 1989 elections: The matter of visual bias

Abstract

Investigations into the fairness of the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s (SABC) coverage of general elections have produced either stop watch measurements of the time allocated to different political parties, or verbal analyses of election issues. An important element of bias, i.e. visual manipulation, has virtually been ignored. This study is a content analysis of visual bias. Following a review of research on the applications and implications of camera and editing techniques, twelve categories are derived. Each of these categories is conceptually labeled as positively or negatively biased and applied to an exhaustive sample of the SABC’s 1987 and 1989 election rubrics. Results provide evidence that the governing National Party benefited from visual portrayals during both elections.
This content analysis endeavors to achieve two goals. First, it is an attempt to assess visual bias in the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s (SABC) television coverage of the all white 1987 and 1989 election campaigns. These two elections are important because they were administered during the 5 year state of emergency under the P.W. Botha administration. The state of emergency enforced severe press restrictions, and during this time, critics accused the South African Broadcasting Corporation of being a mouthpiece of the National Party government more vehemently than ever before or since. Ken Andrews, a Progressive Federal Party candidate remarked as follows after the 1987 election: “The National Party’s propaganda and smears, given prominence by the SABC’s news department, saw them carry the day” (Gleeson, 1987).

Unlike in the United States, there is a semi-state controlled broadcast monopoly in South Africa. Audience research conducted by the South African Human Science Research Council (1987; 1989) reveals that, during the 1987 and 1989 elections, 60 percent of white South Africans used television news as their primary daily source of information. Approximately 74.5 percent of the respondents viewed television news as the most credible news source. On questions about the trustworthiness of news content, 80.7 percent of respondents answered that everything or almost everything reported on television news was believable. In response to questions about the SABC’s coverage of domestic political affairs, 81.1 percent of the sample replied that it was very or fairly objective (South African Human Science Research Council, 1987; South African Human Science Research Council, 1989; South African Human Science Research Council, 1989a). That is vast discrepancy between the views of critics and the mass electorate concerning the SABC’s coverage of the two elections. As the so-called New South Africa is unfolding after its first multi-racial general election, it is important to take stock of the last two all white elections. To document the past practices serves not only as a reference point, but also as a tool for investigation into future South African governments and their relationships with the SABC.

Second, this study is an attempt to contribute to a generally neglected focus of academic inquiry, i.e. the communicative abilities of visual components of television messages. More specifically, past investigations into the SABC’s coverage of election campaigns have not included
the visual component of the message (Conradie, 1984; Finn, 1982; Stewart, 1987; Van Rooyen and Conradie, 1984). Researchers including Adams (1986), Fyfe (1988), Graber (1986), and Tilly (1988) lament the absence of visual analysis in studies of audiovisual messages. In specific reference to television advertising, Kraft (1987) displays concern: “There are documented methods for detecting verbal deception, but not for detecting visually mediated deception” (p. 306). Adams (1986) attributes the exclusion of visual components from television studies to the “less explicit and direct” mode of visual expression. This statement reflects the biases of a verbally dominated culture.

The limited inquiries into visual components of mass communication typically focus on the fairness of content (gender role portrayals, racial stereotypes, etc.) or on the effects of structural techniques on the audience. Although research approaches and emphases vary, there seems to be a shared suspicion about the power of television images. There are repeated calls for “visual literacy” to protect the audience against the visual seduction of advertising, political campaigns, Hollywood films, and newscasts (Ewen, 1988; Adams, 1986; Messaris, 1991; Williamson, 1991). This study is therefore motivated by a general lack of research on the visual components of television election campaign messages, with specific emphasis on the South African Broadcasting Corporation’s broadcasts of television rubrics during the last two all-white general elections. The major research question is whether the then governing National Party was the visual beneficiary of the SABC’s election broadcasts. This paper presents a review of research evidence which points at the communicative abilities of visual images and reports the method and results of a content analysis of the visual component of the SABC’s election rubrics.

Structural features

The categories of this content analysis are rooted in theory and research findings about the communicative abilities of the visual components of messages. It relies on this empirical and descriptive definitions of the conventionalized uses of structural techniques. Knight (1989) views highbrow news as one of the most conservative and conventionalized television genres in its
application of structural features. Furthermore, due to time and financial restrictions, television news is marked by a less flamboyant application of structural features than films or advertising. The focus of this study is therefore on basic techniques of shot length, camera angle, camera movement, and editing. Conventionalized meaning and uses of structural features may become an ambivalent matter as one reviews the existing body of literature. There are seemingly contradictory experimental findings about the impact of certain structural features on an audience. However, it is possible to identify the most supported notions pertaining to the basic techniques which are under investigation in this study.

**Shot length**

The close-up shot supposedly creates intimacy between the object/person and the viewer. The medium shot establishes a comfortable personal relationship between object/person and viewer, and the long shot creates distance and detachment between object/person and viewer (Baggaley, 1980; Edmonds, 1982; Gianetti, 1982; Lambert, 1966; Millerson, 1970; Monaco, 1977; Peters, 1974; Peters, 1977; Tuchman, 1978; Zettl, 1991). Meyrowitz (1986) discusses the relevance of the above shot variables in terms of their para-proxemic function. The term para-proxemic refers to the perceptual similarities between face-to-face interaction and viewing images with different shot lengths. The relative size of people on a TV screen therefore serves as an indication of the distance between the viewer and the person or object on the TV screen. The para-proxemic feature may lead the viewer to an illusionary face-to-face relationship, or para-social relationship with a television persona.

The results of an early experimental study by Aylward (1960) suggest that shot length has no effect on the amount of information gained from televised speeches. Another experimental study conducted by Williams (1964) indicates that a static medium-shot may be as effective in capturing the interest of an audience than the multi-camera method which intersperse shots of varying length. However, Williams (1964) does not provide conclusive evidence of how interest levels associated with long shots compare to interest levels associated with close-up shots. It appears as if Williams (1964) sees the process of cutting between different shot lengths (rather than...
the length of the shot) as interfering with the audience's interest level in visual material. In 1968 Williams continued his research on shot length and concluded that close-up shots do not significantly affect subjects' interest levels in films. However, Williams (1968) also reported that long shots tend to decrease the attention of viewers. On the other hand, Cobin and McIntyre (1972) found that audience members have the most favorable attitudes towards objects or people portrayed in close-ups and Salomon (1972) found that long shots decrease involvement with portrayed objects or people because attention is diverted to the detail surrounding the object or person. Galan's (1986) experimental research on commercials produced evidence that close-up shots and point of view shots enhance identification with fictional characters.

McCain and Repensky (1972) concluded that the individual physical characteristics of objects or people may interact with shot length. In their study of the perceived attractiveness of comedy performers, one performer was rated as significantly more attractive when presented in a long shot. At the same time the other performer's task attractiveness was rated as significantly better when presented in a close-up shot. McCain and Wakshlag (1974) found in a post hoc analysis of their data that an unknown newscaster's perceived sociability was rated significantly higher when he appeared in a medium shot than when he appeared in a close-up shot. It is necessary to point out that newscasters conventionally appear in medium shots and this may explain why subjects preferred the medium shot of the newscaster to a close-up shot. Moreover, considering the results of the studies on para-proxemic relationships with newscasters, there is reason to believe that subjects may feel socially uncomfortable with a close-up shot of an unknown television news presenter.

In a content analysis Merritt (1984) used the notion of the close-up camera shot as establishing intimacy and long shots as provoking detachment. She concluded that Jesse Jackson was politically handicapped by his portrayal on network television during the 1984 New Hampshire debates. Although Merritt (1984) reports limited quantitative results and used no statistical analysis to support her findings, she argues that Jackson was seen in long shots which potentially distracted the viewers. Tiemens (1978) acknowledges the somewhat contradictory
results of experimental studies on the impact of close-up and long shots, but included these variables in an analysis of the televised 1976 presidential debates. According to Tiemens (1978) there were subtle differences between Carter's and Ford's visual portrayals. Carter was the overall beneficiary, i.e. appeared in significantly closer shots than Ford.

**Camera angle**

According to Adams (1986); Baggaley (1980); Caldwell (1985), Gianetti (1982); Livingston (1958); Monaco (1977); Millerson (1970); Tuchman (1978); and Zettl (1991) a low angle camera shot signifies power and dominance. Edmonds (1982) traces the conventional meaning of low angle shots back to childhood experiences of power and status. The first status figures in a child's social development are his/her parents. The physical reality of a child looking up at status figures is often portrayed in children's drawings: Adults are represented with distorted small heads, huge bodies, and long legs. When the camera simulates this perspective, the audience associates with these childhood memories and attributes power, dominance, and status to those objects that are presented through low angle camera shots. The high angle shot, also termed "The Godly View", represents weakness, while the eye-level shot apparently represents parity (Caldwell, 1985; Edmonds, 1982; Fell, 1975; Gianetti, 1982; Livingston, 1958; Monaco, 1977; Stupp, 1975; Zettl, 1991).

Chilberg (1972); McCain and Wakshlag (1974); and McCain, Chilberg and Wakshlag's (1977) experimental studies of camera angles produced results which contradict the general thrust of the above mentioned theories about camera angles. McCain, Chilberg and Wakshlag (1977) found that high angle shots enhance a televised subject's perceived character, sociability, composure, competence, and task attractiveness. McCain and Wakshlag (1974) found that high angle shots improve the perceived sociability and character of unknown newscasters, but concluded that low angle shots may enhance credibility and attraction if used sparingly. Chilberg (1972) reports significantly higher source credibility ratings associated with high angle shots than with low angle shots. On the other hand, there are numerous experimental studies which offer differing degrees of support for the notion that low angle shots lend power and status to portrayed
objects and people, and that high angle shots evoke perceptions of insignificance and weakness. Kraft (1987) confirmed the operation of these angled shots in research on their influence on the comprehension and retention of narrative pictorial events. He used slides to construct stories about characters which were photographed from low angle, eye-level, and high angle viewpoints. The results reveal that characters appear progressively taller, stronger, bolder, and more aggressive as one changes from the high angle to eye-level and low angle shots. Shoemaker (1964) also confirmed the effects of the three camera angles on the connotative judgments of still photographs. Tiemens (1970) and Mandell and Shaw (1973) used video material in experimental studies and found support for the above mentioned notions of the meaning of high, low and eye level camera shots. In fact, Mandell and Shaw (1973) found that the lower the angle, the more active and potent subjects were willing to rate the portrayed person.

Many researchers (Fields, 1988; Kervin, 1984; Merritt, 1984; Kepplinger, 1982; Hellweg and Phillips, 1981; Tiemens, 1978) have used the conventional meaning of these camera angles in content analyses of visual material from news or election campaigns. Merritt (1984) reports that coders did not notice subtle differences in camera angle, but elaborates on the diminishing effects of a high angle shot of Jesse Jackson during his closing statement at the California debate. Kepplinger's (1982) content analysis of the visual portrayals of the two candidates for the office of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany during the 1976 election shows significant differences between negative (high angle and extreme low angle shots) and positive (eye level) perspectives of the candidates. Helmut Kohl was more frequently given a negative portrayal and a survey of journalists revealed that they saw him as a poorer politician than Helmut Schmidt. Kepplinger (1982) therefore argues that, although verbal coverage of political party members may be unbiased, journalists tend to deliver - deliberately or unconsciously - biased "optical commentary" through the application of structural features, such as shot angle (p. 445). Hellweg and Phillips (1981) report an overall equal visual treatment of Ronald Reagan and George Bush during the 1980 Houston Republican Presidential Primary Debate. The researchers included shot length, camera angle, and camera movement as some of the categories of potential visual bias.
Among the visual factors under the control of the two candidates, e.g. eye contact with the camera, use of gestures, and facial expression, Bush benefited by employing frequent gestures to augment his arguments and by appearing to make eye contact with members of the audience. Tiemens (1978) conducted a content analysis of the 1976 televised presidential debates between Ford and Carter. Ford apparently benefited from the use of more frequent low angle shots during the first and third debate, while Carter benefited from more frequent low angle shots during the second debate. Duncan and Sayaovang (1990) used the three camera angles in a content analysis of gender discrimination in sports photographs. The researchers concluded that low angle shots were used to place women in a position of weakness (i.e. they were more often seen in high angle shots than men).

A last comment on camera angle involves the distinction between extreme low angle shots and moderate low angle shots. To achieve an extreme low angle shot, the camera and the object or person must be in relatively close proximity to each other in order to create a sharp angle. This may lead to grotesque distortions of the physical features of the object or person, such as an over emphasis on a double chin or a big nose. In such extreme instances the conventional attributes of power and authority may be exchanged for the dehumanizing attributes of grotesqueness and repulsiveness. This argument is in line with Kraft’s (1987) observation that extreme camera angles functions as visual adjectives: the more extreme the angle, the stronger the adjectival meaning.

Camera movement?

Camera movements such as tilt, track, pan, dolly, and zoom serve as an active evaluation of objects (Baggaley, 1980; Caldwell, 1985; Gianetti, 1982; Millerson, 1976; Peters, 1974; Peters, 1977; Scott, 1975; Zettl, 1991). The vertical tilt-up movement is often used as an inch by inch evaluation of physical attractiveness. Caldwell (1985) traces the origins of structural features back to German silent films and argues that the tilt-up camera movement attributes power to the portrayed object or person, while the tilt-down camera movement signifies weakness. Therefore, like low angle shots, the tilt-up establishes power and, like high angle shots, the tilt-down establishes weakness. In a content analysis, Kervin (1985) found patterned uses of tilt-up and tilt-
down camera movements as attributions of power and weakness in network news reports on the civil war in El Salvador.

Like the close-up shot, a zoom-in camera movement supposedly increases the viewer's involvement with a subject. Like long shots, zoom-out movement decreases the viewer's involvement with the subject (Millerson, 1970; Zettl, 1991). Susman (1978) conducted an experimental study with preschool children which suggests that camera zoom-in movements produce lower attention levels than static shots. However, it is noteworthy that Susman's (1978) study involved preschool children and that an experimenter, sitting at a 45-degree angle facing the children, was responsible for scoring presence and absence of attention every 15 seconds. It is not possible to generalize the results of this study to an adult audience. Moreover, the experimental environment appears far from a natural viewing situation and the reliability of the measurement of attention can be questioned. On the other hand, Salomon's (1972 and 1979) experimental studies with adolescents suggest that zoom-in camera movements indeed facilitate attention and learning. Salomon (1979) argues that this is the case because, through continuous movement, the zoom carries out the necessary transformation from a long shot to a closer shot. By contrast, a cut from a long shot to a close-up shot will be more demanding because it requires mental skills to connect parts as a whole.

Despite these seemingly contradictory experimental findings about the zoom movement, researchers like Hellweg and Phillips (1981); Kervin (1984); Kervin (1985); McCain and White (1980); Merritt (1984); Kepplinger (1982); and Tiemens (1978) used the two zoom movements in content analyses and there is agreement among them about the supposed meaning of these structural features (i.e. zoom-in movements signify involvement and focus and zoom-out movements evoke feelings of detachment with the portrayed person or object).

Editing

Messaris (1991) refers to associational juxtaposition as a compositional or editing device by which assumed positive qualities of an object or person are transferred to another. He uses the example of political candidates appearing in front of the flag in their political advertisements.
Messaris (1991) also discusses implicit propositionality as an editing technique which juxtaposes two seemingly unrelated scenes as a way of implicitly comparing them and thereby drawing an analogy. This technique is apparently the filmic version of the word "like". In this regard, Licker (1982) refers to Eisenstein's collision theory. Through implicit propositionality, different objects are compared and associated with each other. Licker (1982) uses Eisenstein's juxtaposition of a fat capitalist banker with a jackal as an example. In this way the qualities of the jackal are transferred to the banker. Peters (1977); Fell (1975); and Monaco (1977) describe the functions of juxtaposition as transmission of meaning. When two shots which have no logical relation to each other are edited together, the signs represented in both shots will be blended in association. Zuckerman (1990) found support for the effectiveness of associational juxtaposition. High school students' reactions to certain consumer goods seemed to have been conditioned by the magazine advertisement images of these products. Drawing from the above editing theories, Messaris, Eckman and Gumpert (1979) conducted a content analysis of the 1976 televised presidential debates. Their results illustrate that, through the combination of camera shots, the interaction and confrontation between political candidates can be overemphasized to create a perception of greater overall forcefulness and conflict between candidates during a particular debate.

From the discussion of theory and research related to camera and editing operations, it is clear that there are subtle differences in the emphases of the research endeavors into these structural features. For example, McCain, Chilberg and Wakshlag (1977) investigated the impact of camera angle on a televised person's perceived character, sociability, composure, competence and task attractiveness, while Tiemens (1970) tested the impact of camera angle on the televised person's perceived communicative skills, knowingness, and authoritativeness. These different emphases often lead to seemingly contradictory findings, but also make comparisons between findings difficult. However, there are many theorists and numerous research findings which support the notion of structural features as a conventionalized means of constructing visual evaluation. Berger (1981, p. 110) went so far as to create a summarized dictionary of camera and editing techniques. Table 1 is based on Berger's (1981) visual dictionary.
Table 1: A visual dictionary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sign</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Referential meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Close-up</td>
<td>Face only</td>
<td>Intimacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium shot</td>
<td>Face and chest</td>
<td>Personal relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full shot</td>
<td>Full body</td>
<td>Social relationship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long shot</td>
<td>Setting and characters</td>
<td>Context, scope, public distance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilt-up</td>
<td>Camera view moves up</td>
<td>Power and authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tilt-down</td>
<td>Camera view moves down</td>
<td>Smallness, weakness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low angle shot</td>
<td>Camera angle upwards</td>
<td>Power, authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High angle shot, the Godly view</td>
<td>Camera angle downwards</td>
<td>Smallness, weakness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoom-in or dolly-in</td>
<td>Camera moves in</td>
<td>Observation, focus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoom-out</td>
<td>Camera moves out</td>
<td>Distance, deemphasis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cut</td>
<td>Switch from one image to another</td>
<td>Simultaneity, excitement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the above discussion of theories and research findings about structural features it is clear that there is support for the idea that shot length, camera angle, camera movement, and editing techniques may influence the way in which viewers evaluate the objects or people presented in visual images. Moreover, it appears as if a number of research endeavors have identified specific evaluations associated with specific structural features. For example, the high angle shot apparently attributes weakness and insignificance to objects and people. Therefore, when the high angle shot is used more frequently on representatives of one political party, there is reason to argue that it indicates the negative bias of a communication institution towards that political party. As already mentioned, the South African Broadcasting Corporation as a semi-state controlled institution was often publicly accused of being a mouthpiece for the National Party which governed South Africa from 1948 to 1994. If these accusations are true, the SABC's promotion of the National Party should be particularly visible during election campaigns. The actual intentions of SABC personnel to manipulate structural features in order to promote the National Party or to demote other political parties cannot be exposed by this study. However, it is possible to assess if all of the participating political parties received equal visual treatment during the 1987 and 1989 televised election campaigns. The following political parties participated in the two general elections:

- The governing National Party (NP) which is expected to be the visual beneficiary of the SABC's election rubrics for both the 1987 and 1989 elections.
• The Conservative Party (CP). The CP was the official parliamentary opposition to the NP during the 1989 election and therefore posed the most significant threat to the NP during the 1987 election. Their political stance can be described as far more conservative than the NP's.

• The Herstigte (reformed) National Party (HNP). Although this far right wing party won no parliamentary seats in either elections, it enjoyed a noticeable amount of coverage.

• The Progressive Federal Party (PFP), New Republican Party (NRP) and Democratic Party (DP). These three parties are grouped together for the purposes of this study since the PFP and NRP had a election alliance during the 1987 election. The DP did not exist during the 1987 election and was established as a blend of the PFP and the dissolved NRP members before the 1989 election. These three parties were very similar in political viewpoints. They represented the more progressive and tolerant left wing of the white South African political spectrum.

• Independents (IND). Independent candidates provided color and controversy in the 1987 election and formed no alliances with any other party. However, by 1989 the majority of independent candidates of the 1987 election were absorbed into the DP.

Method

Overview

An exhaustive sample of the 1987 and 1989 election rubrics produced a total of 62 rubrics or 792 minutes of televised material which was content analyzed. Three television news producers participated as coders, as well as contributed to the design of categories. Based on existing literature and research, 31 structural features were identified as potential categories for this study. Based on rubrics from the 1983-referendum, coders evaluated each of these structural features for their appropriateness and usefulness for this content analysis. A total of 22 features were selected and collapsed into twelve final categories.

Sampling

The population of this content analysis is election rubrics. Approximately two months before each election, the SABC would broadcast election rubrics as part of the daily, hour long,
prime time "Netwerk/Network" news program. These segments can be described as the most focused and prominent SABC presentations of election issues. The format of the individual rubrics was very similar. Typically, each political party was invited to present its policy and viewpoints on a specific election issue, chosen by the SABC. These election segments are thus always an attempt to compare political parties. The production format and content of the rubrics varied slightly. One of the following four formats was used throughout both elections:

- Interviews with different party candidates in different locations, which were assembled in post production editing. Each party's official logo preceded their statement.
- Segments from speeches at different political party meetings which were later edited together. Each party's statement was preceded by the party's logo.
- Television debates in a studio setting.
- Telepelation in a studio setting where an anchor person assigned speaking turns to different political candidates using a stopwatch.

The election rubrics of both the 1987 and 1989 elections were exhaustively sampled for analysis. The first election rubric for the 1987 election was broadcast on March 6, 1987 and the last one on May 4, 1987 for a total of 33 rubrics. However, only 29 rubrics were sampled for analysis. Rubrics which dealt with either general voting information or political party manifests were excluded because they did not provide coverage of political candidates. For the same reason, only 21 out of a total of 30 1989-election rubrics were used for analysis. The total duration of all the 1987 rubrics was 415 minutes, while the duration of the 1989 election rubrics was 377 minutes.

Categories

The unit of analysis in this study is the single political candidate. The unit of observation is the single camera shot. Gianetti (1982) views the camera shot as the most basic unit of audiovisual message construction. A shot is defined as a fragment of visual material which has no break in continuity of action (Gianetti, 1982).

With consideration of existing literature and practical experience, three television news...
producers identified 31 structural features in election rubrics and rated them on a scale of 1 to 10 for their prominence in the election rubrics. The rating process was done during a viewing session of 15 randomly selected election rubrics from the 1983 referendum. In order to increase the validity of the categories, 22 structural techniques, which received an average rating of 7 or above, were selected for further use. At closer examination these techniques are reminiscent of the seven propaganda categories that were developed by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937 (Severin and Tankard, 1979). Although these supposedly outmoded propaganda techniques were developed for the analysis of verbal language, their conceptual significance for a contemporary analysis of visual material is obvious. Moreover, if the selected 22 structural features are collapsed into fewer categories, a more parsimonious and workable set of categories is generated. The 22 structural features were therefore refined and then absorbed by these broader categories of bias. Because politicians are likely to either enjoy benefits or disadvantages from the application of structural features, it is necessary to qualify each category as positively or negatively biased in terms of the potential outcome for the political candidate. The final categories which were used in the coding process are as follows:

1. Name Calling (negatively biased):

   Negative stereotypes label objects, ideas, and behavior. Through the investigative camera viewpoint, nervousness, tension or unflattering physical qualities of the political candidate is scrutinized. For example, close-up camera shots or zoom-in camera movements can emphasize sweat on the upper lip, a twitching eye, bad complexion, a double chin, etc. Moreover, a cut-away shot of nervous hand movements may contradict the assertiveness of a politician in debate. By breaking shot framing conventions negative closure is established. This includes shots where too much or too little head room is allowed, shots framed as horizontal cut-off lines on limbs, or where background objects appear as if they are part of the foreground object (for example, where plants appear as if they “grow” out of a political candidate’s head). Such unconventional framing, within the context of highbrow news, has ridiculing physical implications for the portrayed object. Each shot implementing the investigative camera
technique and each shot breaking framing conventions were coded.

2. Glittering Generality and Card Stacking (positively biased):

Glittering generality involves exaggeration and card stacking involves selection and twisting of supposed "facts". Wide implication and great impact are suggested by the way the "twisted" message is constructed. Because these two techniques are conceptually similar they were grouped together in order to improve the mutual exclusivity of the categories. Both techniques can be applied beneficially or disadvantageously to political candidates.

Glittering generality and card stacking as a positively biased category include cut-away shots that emphasize enthusiasm of individual audience members (affirmative nodding, applauding, etc.) during political speeches. The low angle shot as a portrayal of power was added to this category. Extreme low angle shots were excluded since extreme angles potentially cause distortion of physical features. Each shot presented through the application of these techniques was coded.


Glittering generality and card stacking can also be applied as a negatively biased viewpoint of the politician when boredom (yawning, sleeping, talking to each other) or any other negative reactions of individual audience members attending a political meeting is emphasized. Moreover, high angle shots which are used to assign weakness or extreme low angle shots which cause distorted and grotesque physical features, were also included in this category. Each of these shots was coded.

4. Transfer From The Environment (positively biased):

The mise-en-scene may attribute positive characteristics to the object. Symbolic meaning can be transferred from an object to the politician. For example, when interviews are conducted at national monuments, patriotism can be transferred to the politician. The identification of this technique demanded rigorous observation and interpretation from the coders. Each shot which revealed the potential for transfer was coded. Although this category was comprised of the content of camera shots rather than a structural feature per se, it is important to note that a
structural feature (i.e. shot framing) produced a mise-en-scene which may have had the potential for positive transfer.

5. Transfer From The Environment (negatively biased):

Transfer from objects in the mise-en-scene can also be disadvantageous to the portrayal of the political candidate. For example, during the time of both the 1987 and 1989 election, the African National Congress as well as the South African Communist Party were banned as "terrorist" organizations. Mainstream white thought condemned the two political organizations as a threat to peace and stability in South Africa. Any association of these two political organizations with politicians could affect their credibility negatively. Thus, if interviews were conducted against the backdrop of ANC graffiti or with books about either organization on shelves behind the politician, an association might be established. Each shot which had the potential for negative transfer was coded.

6. Testimony (positively biased):

This technique involves famous and popular people's support of the politician. When shots of authoritative figures attending political meetings are edited in such a way that it is interspersed with the video material of the politician addressing the audience, there is a suggestion of endorsement for the politician. Each shot which cut away from the politician to an authoritative person was coded. It is also argued that in those election rubrics where different interviewers conducted separate interviews with political candidates, the seniority and credibility of each interviewer should be coded. A credible interviewer, such as an anchor person or the political editor of the television news department, adds weight and stature to the politician. The argument is that there is qualitative difference between the presence of Ted Koppel and a lesser known news reporter on the interview set. First, it was determined if different interviewers conducted the interviews for a specific election rubric. Second, only those rubrics in which interviewers with different levels of credibility and stature appeared were coded. The argument is that if all political representatives within one rubric were interviewed by anchor people or if all of them were interviewed by lesser known news reporters, each party received equal treatment.
within that specific rubric. However, if within a specific rubric, some candidates were interviewed by high profile anchor people while others were interviewed by lesser known news reporters, there is reason to doubt unbiased treatment. In such cases each shot where the politician and high profile interviewer appeared together and each shot which cut away from the politician to the high profile interviewer were coded as positively biased testimony.

7. Testimony (negatively biased):
Cut-away shots of controversial or scandalous persona attending a political meeting in support of the politician evokes negative testimony. In addition, as it is argued above in the case of positive testimony, a lower profiled interviewer suggests lesser importance of the political candidate. Coding was done on the same bases as with positive testimony.

8. The Plain Folks Principle (positively biased):
Employing this technique brings the object and his/her audience closer to each other. Through the intimate viewpoint of close-up shots or slow zoom-in movements, the candidate and viewer can potentially be brought into close proximity. In this way the candidate's arguments are emphasized. The intimate viewpoint is distinguished from the investigative viewpoint by the former's attempt at para-proximity and para-social relationships between object/person and the audience versus the latter's evaluative perspective. Each shot presenting attempts at spatial intimacy between object and audience was coded.

9. The Plain Folks Principle (negatively biased):
Long shots or obvious zoom-out movements can decrease the rapport between the audience and the party spokesperson and therefore de-emphasize the politician's arguments. Every shot or zoom-out movement that was evaluated as establishing distance between the politician and audience was coded. Studio debates which included microwave link-ups with some candidates while others were present in the studio were also coded. The microwave link-up placed the politician either on a television monitor as part of the studio decor or on a larger chroma key screen. In both cases the candidate was distanced from the first order space of the image. Zettl (1985) argues that objects which appear in the second order space of an image are graphicated

2.1.1
and appear not only less realistic than the objects in the first order space, but also that viewers identify more closely with those objects in the first order space of the television image. Each long or medium shot where a politician was visible on a TV monitor and every shot where a politician appeared on a chroma key screen were coded.

10. Bandwagoning (positively biased):

With application of this technique, it is implied that, because the majority of people support an idea, the individual should join the bandwagon in support. According to Noelle-Neumann's Spiral of Silence Theory, people who hold a minority opinion may change their opinions to that of the mainstream opinion, even when this viewpoint is the opposite of their beliefs or behavior (Glynn and McLeod, 1984). This phenomenon is attributed to a minority group's fear of isolation from the majority. Cut away shots, pan or tilt camera movements that emphasize mass attendance at political meetings suggest massive support for the politician. Each of these shots was coded.

11. Bandwagoning (negatively biased):

Cut-away shots and pan or tilt camera movements that emphasized poor attendance at political meetings (i.e. camera movements which focused on empty chairs during the candidate's public address) were coded as negative bandwagoning.

Two structural features did not fit into any of the above categories. Therefore a twelfth category was therefore developed to accommodate these techniques.

12. Comparison (positively biased):

This technique can be described as comparing two or more objects with the result that one object dominates the other. In over-shoulder shots the object closest to the camera dominates other objects. Van Vuuren (1987) describes the Goldilocks-effect as a comparative technique which pertains specifically to the South African Broadcasting Corporation's election rubrics. In contrast to the primacy-recency findings of Miller and Campbell (Petty and Cacioppo, 1981, p. 78-79), Van Vuuren (1987) describes the beneficial "last say" in election rubrics as the "Goldilocks-effect." He argues that the first position is a little too hot, the second is a little too
cold, but the last is “just right.”

In addition to the above categories, the time allocated to each political party was also coded. Although these stopwatch recordings of exposure may not necessarily be indicative of bias, they were used to standardize simple frequency in terms of exposure⁹. It is important to control for differences in the amount of coverage given to political parties because some political parties received longer exposure and may, as a result, have higher frequency counts. The discussion of results therefore distinguishes between simple frequency counts and its standardization by exposure.

The intensity of supposed biased portrayals of political candidates lies outside the scope of this study. The reasons for this are as follows. First, although the total duration of each political party's exposure and that of all the election rubrics have been recorded, the duration of each categorical incident was not recorded. The reason for this is simply because the duration of all categorical occurrences are not measurable. For example, the duration of a cut away shot of a bored audience member can be measured, but the "Goldilocks-effect" can only be nominally recorded. In order to keep the instrument of measurement consistent, frequency counts were used as a measurement of categorical occurrence. Frequency counts may at best lead to indications of overall density and not to indications of intensity of biased portrayals of political candidates. Second, coders often based their coding on interpretative and evaluative decisions, but the instrument of analysis did not measure scaled intensity of bias. However, the results do provide insight into the negative and positive directions of bias because categories were designed as such.

Coders and Coding

Three television news producers were involved in creating the categories and coding the visual material. Not only are the three coders familiar with television news production techniques, but they also have academic training in the field of communication. All three of them had ties to the SABC at some point in their careers and therefore their anonymity was a precondition for participation. It is also noteworthy that the coders' personal political bias was unlikely to have considerable impact on the way they coded the rubrics. One coder was disinterested in party
politics and had never voted in a general election. The other two coders were ambivalent about their political affiliation but indicated likely support for two different political parties. Because the coders had been involved in developing the categories only two one hour training sessions were conducted after the coders were provided with a codebook. A pretest was done on 15 randomly selected election rubrics from the 1983 referendum. The results indicated sufficient agreement among coders. However, because of the complexity and high level of qualitative evaluation in the coding process, each coder coded the election rubrics three times. Each coding was conducted over a week period where a maximum of four hours per day were spent on coding. A month between codings served to potentially desensitize the coders to the visual material. The order of the election rubrics was randomly determined for each of the codings. High coder reliability was produced. Intracoder reliability for the three coders was respectively 94.07 percent for coder one, 95.47 percent for coder two, and 95.12 percent for coder three. The overall intercoder reliability was 91.64 percent.

The categories of this content analysis are based on empirical exploration and descriptive definitions of structural techniques but the coding process involved interpretation of visual material. In this sense there was reliance upon the qualitative judgments of coders in order to explore the latent elements of the visual mode of communication. In defense of qualitative content analysis, Adams and Scheibmann (1986: 128) argue that a stopwatch cannot entirely measure matters of judgment, and that counting words omits nuance. Pryluck (1973) puts it bluntly: “Any theory, description or analysis of visual communication which does not consider aesthetic insights is bound to be sterile” (p. 17). As the coder reliability results indicate, this study attempted to counteract the potential shortcomings of qualitative content analysis with rigorous and quantifiable observation.

Results

The results of this content analysis are presented in three sections. First, an examination of each political party’s exposure (in minutes) reveals inequity. Second, the distribution of frequency
counts, for each category across political parties, produced a number of significant chi-square values. Thus there is an indication of unequal visual treatment of the political parties in some instances. Third, positively biased categories were collapsed together for each election to produce an overall positively biased frequency count for each party. The same was done with negatively biased categories. Chi-square analyses of these simple frequency counts across political parties produced significant values in all but one instance. In addition, these overall positive and negative frequencies were standardized by exposure and chi-square analyses of these indices across political parties produced significant values in all instances.

Exposure and number of parliamentary seats

From Tables 2 and 3 it is clear that for both the 1987 and the 1989 elections, there is inequality in the amount of coverage given to each of the political parties. The governing National Party (NP) received strikingly more coverage than any of the other parties. Although it is hardly fair or unbiased to provide some political parties with more air time than others, it may be necessary to consider a few conditions surrounding the SABC's election coverage. During both elections, opposition parties to the political left and right of the governing NP were more agreeable to debates with the NP because their election campaigns promoted them as an alternative to the NP's long reign in parliament. It is also noteworthy that political parties on the far right (Conservative Party and Herstigte National Party) refused to debate each other as a token of general political unity on the right wing of the South African political spectrum. Thus there is reason to believe that the different political party candidates were most interested in debating the NP candidates. Moreover, it is not uncommon for political parties who enjoy the greatest support of the electorate to receive more exposure in the mass media. The observed exposure and the number of parliamentary seats of each party were therefore used to calculate expected exposure in minutes. Results of chi-square analyses of observed and expected exposure are presented in Tables 2 and 3.
Table 2: Chi-square analysis of SABC coverage of political parties (in minutes) during the 1987 election campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Observed time</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Expected time</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¹National P.</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>²Conservative P.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>³Progressive Federal, New Republican and Democratic P.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⁴Herschung National P.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⁵Independent</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>171</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. X² = 25.42; df = 1; p < .001
2. X² = 7.90; df = 1; p < .01
3. X² = 2.61; df = 1; n.s.
4. X² = 98.00; df = 1; p < .001
5. X² = 192.2; df = 1; p < .001

Table 3: Chi-square analysis of SABC coverage of political parties (in minutes) during the 1989 election campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Observed time</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Expected time</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¹National P.</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>²Conservative P.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>³Progressive Federal, New Republican and Democratic P.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>163</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. X² = 23.27; df = 1; p < .001
2. X² = 24.02; df = 1; p < .001
3. X² = 48.09; df = 1; p < .001
In absolute terms, the governing National Party (NP) received twice as much exposure during both elections as any other political party. However, relative to the number of parliamentary seats, the NP is the only political party which received less coverage than what can be expected for both elections. By contrast, all other parties received more exposure during both election campaigns than what is justifiable by their number of seats in parliament. These differences between observed and expected exposure were significant for all political parties except for the Progressive Federal/New Republican/Democratic (PFP/NRP/DP) political party during the 1987 election. With regard to exposure based on seats in parliament, it can be argued that the analysis of election rubrics reveal that the NP was at a disadvantage during both elections. Yet, scrutiny of visual portrayals of the different political party spokespeople reveals a different scenario.

**Simple frequency counts by category:**

The frequencies of the 12 categories for both elections are represented in Tables 4 and 5 and the contributions of the different political parties to significant chi-square values are represented in Tables 6 and 7. There are two discernible patterns. First, for both elections, the National Party (NP) not only has the highest frequency counts in positively biased categories with a significant chi-square value, but also contributes 66 percent and more to the significant distributional difference between parties in each of these categories. In addition, all four political parties opposing the governing NP have frequencies of zero for two of the five positively biased categories in the 1987 election and four zero frequencies for positively biased categories in the 1989 election (see Figures 4 and 5). It appears as if the NP not only benefited from higher frequency counts in positively biased categories, but also from a wider diversity of positively biased categories which impacted the portrayal of their candidates. Second, the NP can be singled out as the one political party which escaped more negatively biased instances than any other party. In fact, during both elections the NP has frequency counts of zero for three negatively biased categories (see Figures 4 and 5). From Tables 6 and 7 the NP also seems to be a minor contributor to significant chi-square values of negatively biased categories. In addition, the CP and
PFP/NRP/DP, as the two most prominent opposition parties to the governing NP, generally had the highest frequency counts and contributed the majority of overall significant difference between the frequency counts of different political parties in negatively biased categories.

Table 4: Chi-square analysis of the SABC coverage of political parties by category during the 1987 election campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>National P.</th>
<th>Conservative P.</th>
<th>Progressive Federal/New Republican/Democratic P.</th>
<th>Herstigte National P.</th>
<th>Independent</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Namecalling (-)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Glittering generality/ Card stacking (-)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transfer (-)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Testimony (-)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Plain folks (-)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Bandwagon (-)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Glittering generality/ Card stacking (+)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Transfer (+)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Testimony (+)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Plain folks (+)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Bandwagon (+)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Comparison (+)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. \( X^2 = 36.63; df = 4; p < .001 \)
2. \( X^2 = 3.94; df = 4; \text{n.s.} \)
3. \( X^2 = 8.46; df = 4; \text{n.s.} \)
4. \( X^2 = 9.20; df = 4; \text{n.s.} \)
5. \( X^2 = 14.60; df = 4; p < .01 \)
6. \( X^2 = 5.40; df = 4; \text{n.s.} \)
7. \( X^2 = 64.00; df = 4; p < .001 \)
8. \( X^2 = 6.4; df = 4; \text{n.s.} \)
9. \( X^2 = 93.87; df = 4; p < .001 \)
10. \( X^2 = 85.20; df = 4; p < .001 \)
11. \( X^2 = 89.86; df = 4; p < .001 \)
Table 5: Chi-square analysis of the SABC coverage of political parties by category during the 1989 election campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>NP</th>
<th>CP</th>
<th>PFP/NRP/DP</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Namecalling (-)</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Glittering generality/ Card stacking (-)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Transfer (-)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Testimony (-)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Plain folks (-)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Bandwagon (-)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Glittering generality/ Card stacking (+)</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Transfer (+)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Testimony (+)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Plain folks (+)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Bandwagon (+)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Comparison (+)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. $X^2 = 3.39$; n.s.  
2. $X^2 = 25.48; df = 2; p < .001$  
3. $X^2 = 2.18$; n.s.  
4. $X^2 = 5.36; n.s.$  
5. $X^2 = 2$; n.s.  
6. $X^2 = 6.05; df = 2; p < .05$  
7. $X^2 = 20; df = 2; p < .001$  
8. $X^2 = 8; df = 2; p < .02$  
9. $X^2 = 13.50; df = 2; p < .01$  
10. $X^2 = 4; n.s.$  
11. $X^2 = 29.36; df = 2; p < .001$  
12. $X^2 = 30.34; df = 2; p < .001$

From Tables 4 and 5 it is clear that namecalling is the most prominent negatively biased category during both elections. However, only the 1987 election produced a significant difference between the observed and expected frequencies across all political parties. The Conservative Party (CP) and Progressive Federal Party/New Republican Party/Democratic Party (PFP/NRP/DP) appear to be most affected by namecalling during the 1987 election. Table 6 reveals that the CP and PFP/NRP/DP together contributed to 59 percent of the significant difference, while the NP only contributed to 3 percent. Therefore it seems as if the major parliamentary opposition parties
Visual Bias to the political left and right of the NP were significantly more often visually scrutinized for physical signs of nervousness like sweat and for potentially unattractive physical qualities, like bad complexion or double chins, than the NP candidates. In fact, NP candidates were significantly more often portrayed as confident and the camera viewpoints used on them were more flattering to their physical characteristics.

The results of chi-square analyses for negative glittering generality and card stacking reveal that only the 1989-election’s frequency counts are distributed with significant difference between political parties. The NP frequency counts were the lowest and the CP’s counts were the highest for both elections. From Table 7 it is clear that the CP is solely responsible for 63 percent of the significant chi-square value for the 1989 election. Emphasized boredom of audience members at political meetings, as well as the attribution of weakness to candidates through high angle shots, contributed to possible negative exaggerations of the CP’s stature as a credible political party during the 1989 election campaign. At the same time it is evident from the significant chi-square results of positive glittering generality and card stacking that during both elections the NP candidates were exclusively portrayed through authoritative low angle shots and that regular emphasis was placed on enthusiastic audiences applauding NP candidates at political meetings (see Table 3 and 4). Examination of Tables 6 and 7 reveals the NP’s 100 percent contribution to the significant chi-square values during both elections.

Both positive and negative transfer produced low frequency counts. As discussed earlier, coding of transfer entails close scrutiny and a high level of interpretation of visual material. Low coded frequencies within these categories possibly reflect conservative coding, but also make their validity questionable. Negative transfer did not produce significant chi-square values for either of the two elections. However, the chi-square values for positive transfer were significant for both elections. It is noteworthy that the NP can be singled out as the political party which benefited most from positive transfer, while it was virtually unaffected by negative transfer. From tables 4 and 5 it is clear that the NP frequencies for positive transfer is higher than that of any other party’s. In addition, the NP contributed exclusively (100 percent) to the significant chi-square value for
positive transfer during the 1989 election and it is accountable for 97 percent of the significant
difference in the distribution of frequencies across parties for the 1987 election (see Tables 6 and
7). This means that NP candidates were significantly more often portrayed in a way which
potentially allowed their on-screen environments to attribute positive qualities (such as expertise,
patriotism, prestige, etc.) to them. In addition, the NP candidates were never negatively affected
by their portrayed environment (see Tables 4 and 5). For both elections, without significant
difference, only the CP and PFP/NRP/DP were affected by negative transfer.

There is a noticeable decrease in negative and positive testimony from the 1987 to 1989
election. The decrease in both testimony categories can be attributed to the fact that the majority of
1989 election rubrics comprised of debates in a television studio. As a result there was less
opportunity to link political candidates to either credible or controversial figures or to have
interviewers with differing levels of stature and credibility interview candidates separately. Unlike
negative testimony, positive testimony produced significant chi-square values for both elections. It
is also noteworthy that positive testimony has the highest score of all positively biased categories in
the 1987 election. The NP had the highest positive testimony frequency counts in both elections
(see Tables 4 and 5). From Tables 6 and 7 it is clear that the NP contributed 77 percent (1987
election) and 67 percent (1989 election) of the overall significant difference in the distribution of
frequency counts across political parties within the positive testimony categories. Although chi-
square values for negative testimony were insignificant for both elections, it is noteworthy that the
CP and PFP/NRP/DP, as the NP government's leading parliamentary opposition, were
respectively the parties with the highest and second highest frequency counts during both elections.

The results of chi-square analyses of negative and positive plain folks categories produced
significant differences between observed and expected frequency counts across political parties
only for the 1987 election (see Tables 4 and 5). For negative plain folks, the NP had the lowest
frequency count and is accountable for a mere 9 percent of the overall significant difference (see
Table 6). By contrast, the official parliamentary opposition to the NP at the time, the
PFP/NRP/DP, had the highest frequency count and contributed 60 percent of the overall significant
difference between frequency counts (see Table 6). This illustrates that during the 1987 election, the NP candidates seldom appeared in long shots, while other party candidates were significantly more often portrayed through a disengaging camera viewpoint which counteracted possible para-social relationships between political candidates and viewers. At the same time during the 1987 election, NP candidates had the exclusive benefit from the positive plain folks camera viewpoint which potentially promotes para-social relationships between the audience and the viewing electorate. Table 6 clearly presents the NP's 100 percent contribution to the significant chi-square value.

Negative Bandwagoning had relatively low frequency counts and only the CP and PFP/NRP/DP were impacted by this category during both elections. The NP's negative bandwagon frequency count is zero for both elections. However, only the 1989 negative bandwagon frequency counts produced a significant chi-square value (see Table 4 and 5). The CP, as the official parliamentary opposition to the governing NP during the 1989 election, has the highest frequency count in this negatively biased category and is accountable for 100 percent of the significant chi-square (see Table 7). This indicates that during the 1989 election, the CP was significantly more often presented as having little support from the electorate. For both the 1987 and 1989 elections, the NP was the sole beneficiary of positive bandwagoning (see Table 4 and 5). Only the 1989 frequency counts for this positively biased category produced a significant chi-square and the NP is 100 percent accountable for it (see Table 7). This result indicates frequent portrayals of the NP's popularity with the masses.

The NP benefited significantly from the positively biased category comparison (see Tables 4 and 5). For both elections this category produced significant differences in the distribution of frequency counts across the different political parties. The CP had the lowest frequency counts during both elections, while the NP had the highest frequency counts for both elections. From Table 6 and 7 it is clear that the NP is accountable for respectively 86 percent and 66 percent of the significant chi-square values for both elections. This means that during visual comparisons, NP candidates triumphed significantly more often over the other party candidates than vice versa. The
NP also dominated significantly by having the Goldilocks "last say" in election rubrics.

Table 6: Contribution to significant chi-square values for categories during the 1987 election campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Significant Chi-square</th>
<th>% NP contribution</th>
<th>% CP contribution</th>
<th>% PFP/NRP/DP contribution</th>
<th>% HNP contribution</th>
<th>% Independent contribution</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Namecalling (-)</td>
<td>36.63</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plain folks (-)</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glittering generality/ Card stacking (+)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer (+)</td>
<td>30.82</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimony (+)</td>
<td>72.25</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plain Folks (+)</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison (+)</td>
<td>60.09</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Contributions to significant chi-square values for categories during the 1989 election campaign

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Significant Chi-square</th>
<th>% NP contribution</th>
<th>% CP contribution</th>
<th>% PFP/NRP/DP contribution</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Glittering generality/ Card stacking (-)</td>
<td>25.48</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandwagon (-)</td>
<td>6.05</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glittering generality/ Card stacking (+)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer (+)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Testimony (+)</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bandwagon (+)</td>
<td>29.37</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comparison (+)</td>
<td>30.34</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Positive and negative bias:

The results of the sum of all the positively biased categories, all the negatively biased categories, and the balance between these two groups for each of the political parties are presented in Table 8.

Table 8: Chi-square of observed positive and negative bias for all political parties during the 1987 and 1989 election campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>1987</th>
<th>1989</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1^Positive</td>
<td>2^Negative</td>
<td>3^Balance</td>
<td>4^Positive</td>
<td>5^Negative</td>
<td>6^Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National P.</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative P.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Federal, New Republican, and Democratic P</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horstigte National P.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. $X^2 = 371.26; \text{df} = 4; p < .001$
2. $X^2 = 76.90; \text{df} = 4; p < .001$
3. $X^2 = 108.79; \text{df} = 4; p < .001$
4. $X^2 = 124.63; \text{df} = 2; p < .001$
5. $X^2 = 5.82; \text{df} = 2; \text{n.s.}$
6. $X^2 = 103.06; \text{df} = 2; p < .001$

Chi-square analyses across parties for positive and negative bias, as well as for the balance between the two groups, produced significant differences between parties in all instances except negative bias during the 1989 election. However, beyond these simple frequency counts it is important to examine the above results in terms of exposure. The political parties did not receive equal exposure during either of the elections and this may cause exaggerated frequency counts associated with political parties which received longer exposure. The argument is that the more exposure a political party receives, the higher the frequency counts one can expect across all categories. To control for this unequal exposure the simple frequency counts presented in Table 8 were standardized by the percentage of exposure which each party received. The results are presented in Table 9.
Table 9: Chi-square of positive and negative bias for all political parties during the 1987 and 1989 election campaigns, standardized by exposure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National P.</td>
<td>67.13</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>52.43</td>
<td>49.29</td>
<td>50.88</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative P.</td>
<td>1.87</td>
<td>13.94</td>
<td>12.07</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>29.21</td>
<td>27.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Federal, New Republican, and Democratic P</td>
<td>3.78</td>
<td>15.75</td>
<td>11.97</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>23.28</td>
<td>20.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herstigte National P</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>1.71</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. $X^2 = 225.68; df = 4; p < .001$
2. $X^2 = 22.74; df = 4; p < .001$
3. $X^2 = 111.85; df = 4; p < .001$
4. $X^2 = 82.38; df = 2; p < .001$
5. $X^2 = 13.68; df = 2; p < .01$
6. $X^2 = 21.64; df = 4; p < .001$

Unlike simple frequency counts, all the chi-square analyses for standardized frequency counts are significant. It can therefore be concluded that the political parties received significantly different visual treatment during both elections. The contributions to the significant chi-square values are presented in Table 10.
Table 10: Contributions of political parties to significant chi-square values of standardized positive and negative frequency counts during the 1987 and 1989 election campaigns

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Significant Chi-square</th>
<th>% NP contribution</th>
<th>% CP contribution</th>
<th>% PFP/NRP/DP contribution</th>
<th>% HNP contribution</th>
<th>% Independent contribution</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1987 Positive bias</td>
<td>225.68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 Negative bias</td>
<td>22.74</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987 Balance</td>
<td>111.85</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Positive bias</td>
<td>82.38</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Negative bias</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989 Balance</td>
<td>21.64</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For both elections, in absolute and in standardized terms, the governing National Party (NP) had significantly higher frequency counts for positive bias than any of the other political parties (see Tables 8 and 9). The NP was also the major contributor to the significant chi-square values for positive bias during both elections (see Table 10). The standardized negative bias results, presented in Table 9, indicate that for 1987, the Herstigte National Party (HNP) and the independent candidates received low frequency counts and that the governing National Party (NP), Conservative Party (CP) and the Progressive Federal/New Republican/Democratic Party (PFP/NRP/DP) received relatively equal frequency counts. From Table 10 it is also clear that the HNP and the independent candidates contributed most significantly to the difference indicated by the significant chi-square value. However, it is noteworthy that in absolute terms, the NP's frequency counts for negative bias are lower than the two major opposition parties, the CP and the PFP/NRP/DP (see Table 8). From Table 9 it is evident that the NP had the largest discrepancy between standardized positive and frequency counts for negative bias during the 1987 election. It was the NP's positive bias which outweighed its negative bias. In fact, the NP was the only political party during the 1987 election which had a higher standardized positive than negative.
frequency count.

The 1989 standardized negative bias results presented in Table 9 indicate that the NP had the highest frequency count. However, consideration of the balance between standardized positive and negative bias frequency counts for this election makes the NP's overall benefit from visual portrayals apparent. Table 9 clearly presents significant differences between the observed and expected balances between positive and negative bias for each of the political parties. It is furthermore clear that for all parties, negative standardized frequencies exceed positive standardized frequencies. However, the NP's overall balance between standardized frequency counts for positive and negative bias is significantly smaller than any other party's balance. From Table 10 it is apparent that the NP contributed 62 percent of the significant chi-square value for this election. It is therefore possible to conclude that the SABC's visual portrayal of the NP during the 1989 election appears to be less biased than the overly favorable portrayal during the 1987 election campaign. However, as far as the SABC's overall treatment of political parties during the 1989 election is concerned, it is possible to conclude that the NP benefited from significantly higher frequency counts for positive bias, both in standardized and in absolute terms.

Conclusion

There appears to be a discrepancy between the quantitative exposure that the governing National Party (NP) received and the "qualitative" analysis of this broadcast coverage. The NP received less exposure than what can be justified by the number of seats it held in parliament during both election campaigns. However, by closer investigation it becomes clear that the NP benefited significantly through positively biased visual portrayals of its own candidates and negatively biased visual portrayals of other political party candidates. In that sense this study provides evidence that neither stop watch measurements of exposure nor verbal analyses provide comprehensive indications of bias.

From significant chi-square values it is clear that the South African Broadcasting Corporation's (SABC) visual portrayals of political candidates differed during both elections.
When the overall positive and negative biased incidents for each party are considered, it becomes clear that the SABC’s visual portrayals favored the NP. Although this tendency is more pronounced in the 1987 election, there is enough evidence to support the same scenario for the 1989 election portrayals. It is difficult to conclude which of the political parties occupied the most disadvantaged position. However, it is possible to comment on the portrayal of the Conservative Party (CP), which posed the greatest threat to the governing NP during both elections. For the 1987 election, the CP had the third lowest standardized positive bias frequency count and the third highest standardized negative bias frequency count. The possibility of disadvantage becomes even more visible in the 1989 election when the CP was the official parliamentary opposition to the NP. Not only did the CP have the lowest standardized positive bias frequency count, but also the second highest standardized negative bias frequency count.

Since the Republic of South Africa now has its first democratically elected multi-racial government in parliament, the white South African vote will cease to be all-important. Far right wing white political parties, like the Conservative Party, have lost their impact on South African politics. In fact, the Conservative Party boycotted the past election saying it would not bring closer its ideal of an Afrikaner homeland. The new conservative Freedom Front participated in the election but only drew 2.2% of the vote. The National Party who won 20.4% of the votes, has moved from its uninterrupted 46 year reign, into the chair of the official parliamentary opposition to the ANC-government. Nonetheless, what remains at stake is a continuation of the South African Broadcasting Corporation's function as a mouthpiece of the government. The Mandela-administration inherited the SABC's hierarchical system with government appointed board members at the top of the structure. As high ranking posts such as the chair position of the SABC board have become vacant, the ANC has, thus far, responded with politically strategic appointments. The question thus remains; will the new players continue to play the same television news game?
References cited


Notes

1This study was completed in 1990 as a fulfillment of the requirements for a Masters degree at the Rand Afrikaans University’s (Johannesburg, South Africa) Department of Communications. The degree was granted with distinction but attempts (during 1991) at publishing an article based on the thesis in South African Communication Journals were unsuccessful.

2The effects of structural features on the comprehension of images have been studied by (Baggaley, 1980; Caldwell, 1985; Hobbs, Frost, Davis, & Stauffer, 1988; Huston-Stein, 1981; Huston-Stein & Wright, 1979; Kraft, 1987; Mandell and Shaw, 1973; McCain, Chilberg and Wakshlag, 1977; Metallinos and Tiemens, 1977; Salomon, 1979; Susman, 1978; Tiemens, 1970; Williams, 1964)
Biased portrayals of political parties, race and gender groups through the application of structural features have been studied by (Duncan & Sayaovang, 1990; Entman, 1992; Graber, 1986; Hellweg & Phillips, 1981; Kepplinger, 1982; Kervin, 1984; Kervin, 1985; McCain and Wakshlag, 1974; Merritt, 1984; Messaris, Eckman, and Gumpert, 1979)
There is also a body of literature on the physiological effects of structural features. See Reeves (1985); Reeves (1986); Reeves (1986); McBride (1965); Geiger (1989).

3Election rubrics are approximately half hour long segments which were broadcast as part of the only prime time national news program "Network" over approximately a three month period preceding general elections.

4Close-up:
Emphasis is placed on a part of the whole object through mere optical closeness. Close-up shots are easily identifiable on the human body. The cut-off points are either on the forehead and chin or on the shoulder and top of the head. However, close ups can also be used on other body parts like the hand, feet, breasts, rear-end, neck, etc. When a specific body part is singled out by mere optical proximity, it is as a close up.
Medium Shot:
The medium shot provides less optical proximity with the viewer. This shot includes the shoulders and arms and upper body of the human. It does not reveal the full body within the frame.
Long Shot:
This shot is often used to reveal the environmental context of objects. In this instance the whole human body in its environment is revealed.

5Horton & Wohl (1956) were the first researchers to argue that television viewers engage in para-social relationships with television personalities. This notion of para proxemic and para-social relationships has been applied to television news audiences (Beniger, 1987; Levy, 1979; Perse & Rubin, 1989; Rubin, Perse, & Powell, 1985).

6The low angle shot:
This shot reveals the object from below eye level. The camera is looking up at the object.
The eye level shot:
The camera position is at eye level with the object. This shot creates a face-to-face portrayal.
The high angle shot:
The camera is placed higher than the object. This portrayal could result in a "god’s view" or a "looking down" on objects.

7Tilt-up:
The camera view moves vertically upwards.
Tilt down:
The camera moves vertically downwards.

Zoom/dolly in:
The camera moves from a wider shot to a closer shot. The movement could vary in speed.

Zoom/dolly out:
The camera moves from a closer shot into a wider shot.

Pan left or right:
The camera moves horizontally across objects.

8See also Caldwell (1985); McCain (1974); Baggaley (1980).

9The total duration of each occurrence was determined by setting the playback video machine to 0 on the first appropriate frame of the occurrence and spooling to its last frame. The total duration was revealed on the machine. Frames are rounded off to the nearest second.
I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION


Author(s): MARIA ELIZABETH GRAPE

Corporate Source (if appropriate):

Publication Date:

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

CHECK HERE □ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8½" x 11") reproduction

“PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).”

OR □ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

“PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY
HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).”

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

I hereby grant to the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) nonexclusive permission to reproduce this document as indicated above. Reproduction from the ERIC microfiche by persons other than ERIC employees and its system contractors requires permission from the copyright holder. Exception is made for non-profit reproduction of microfiche by libraries and other service agencies to satisfy information needs of educators in response to discrete inquiries.

Signature:

Printed Name: MARIA ELIZABETH GRAPE

Organization: Temple University, Program in Mass Media and Communication

Address: 78 East Ontario Street, Apartment G, Philadelphia, PA 19144

City Code: 19144

Tel. No.: 215-572-5516

Date: 1 August 1986

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:

Address:

Price Per Copy:

Quantity Price:

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I)  Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requesters to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
FROM ENEMIES TO "COLLEAGUES": RELATIONS BETWEEN PALESTINIAN JOURNALISTS AND ISRAELI WEST BANK BEAT REPORTERS, 1967-1994

Orayb A. Najjar
Assistant Professor
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115
Tel.: 815-753-7017

Paper read at
The Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
International Communication Division

AEJMC National Convention
Atlanta, GA, August 12, 1994
ABSTRACT

FROM ENEMIES TO "COLLEAGUES": RELATIONS BETWEEN PALESTINIAN JOURNALISTS AND ISRAELI WEST BANK BEAT REPORTERS, 1967-1994

Using the agenda-building perspective developed by political scientists to examine group characteristics that have a bearing on the discussion of issues in a conflict, I trace the evolution of relations between Israeli and Palestinian journalists.

I describe how Palestinian journalists have attempted to gain support for freedom of expression issues by enlarging the scope of the conflict from the Palestinian identification group (journalists of East Jerusalem), to the Israeli attention group (Israeli reporters covering the West Bank beat), to the attentive group (foreign correspondents covering Israel and the occupied territories), and to the Israeli mass public. I document how the disputants used appropriate symbols of historical weight to gain support for freedom of expression for Palestinian journalists.

I conclude that various developments on the Israeli and Palestinian news-gathering scene changed the cleavages of the conflict and made the Palestinian cause visible: the increasing independence of Israeli journalists from their military spokespersons after the 1973 and 1982 wars, the improved interaction between Israeli and Palestinian journalists, the improved access of the Western press to Palestinian sources, and the Palestinian use of key human rights symbols to attract supporters. All these developments enlarged the scope of the conflict from the original identification group to the attention and attentive groups, but failed to enlarge it to the mass Israeli public. The developing relationship between Israeli and Palestinian journalists, however, affected the relations between Palestinian journalists and the Western Press, and altered the pattern of source use in the coverage of the occupied territories.

Orayb A. Najjar
Assistant Professor
Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL. 60115
Tel.: 815-753-7017

Paper read at
The Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
International Communication Division

AEJMC National Convention
Atlanta, GA, August 12, 1994
FROM ENEMIES TO "COLLEAGUES": RELATIONS BETWEEN PALESTINIAN JOURNALISTS AND ISRAELI WEST BANK BEAT REPORTERS, 1967-1994

ABSTRACT

Using the agenda-building perspective, this study traces the evolving relations between Israeli and Palestinian journalists. It examines group characteristics that affect the Palestinian-Israeli interaction, and identifies key symbols disputants use to gain allies and change the cleavages among different groups. In the process, the study describes how the improved working relations between some Israeli and Palestinian journalists have affected the relations between Palestinian journalists and the Western Press, and altered the pattern of source use in the coverage of the occupied territories. The study concludes, however, that the same human right symbols that influenced Israeli and Western reporters have been less effective with the Israeli mass public.

INTRODUCTION

As early as June/July 1980, New Outlook, an English-language magazine published by the peace camp in Israel, noted that the coverage of the occupied territories "has become considerably more liberal and open than the position of the Government and the public" (Shaham, 1980, p.10). The magazine identified such reporting as "a recent development" and added that most of the reporters and correspondents covering the occupied territories "refuse to yield to the dictates of the military government and assorted 'authorized sources.' Their continuing reports are a devastating expose on the futility of repression" (p. 10).

Conversations with several Palestinian reporters and editors in 1989 revealed that they have arrived at a good working relationship with at least some Israeli journalists working on the West Bank

PURPOSE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS STUDY

The purpose of this study is to trace the evolution of relations between Israeli and Palestinian journalists as a case study in the agenda-building perspective, and to describe the role human rights and freedom of expression symbols played in bringing about that change. The study is important because it addresses the role of communication among different national groups in international society, and explains how Israeli and Palestinian journalists communicated at a time when communication between their leaders and people was nonexistent. The study discourages looking at national groups as single units by tracing the evolution of relations between journalists from two opposing camps.

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Most studies of issues focus on the dynamics of the conflict once an issue reaches the formal agenda of decision makers. I have chosen to examine relations between Israeli and Palestinian journalists using the agenda-building process, however, because it starts at an earlier point and focuses on the ways in which groups articulate/define grievances and transform them into viable issues that require decision makers to provide some type of ameliorative response. The agenda-building approach, developed by political scientists to examine group characteristics that will have a bearing on a conflict, also focuses on language, or the types of symbols conflicting parties use to gain the attention of possible allies (Cobb and Elder, 1972).

Roger Cobb and Charles Elder (1972), using the work of several researchers, identified four kinds of groups within publics: the "identification group," whose members tend to be the most involved in the conflict; the "attention groups," or "issue publics," whose members become easily mobilizable once an issue is raised in their sphere of concern; the "attentive public," whose members are generally
informed and interested in issues, and come disproportionally from the more educated or higher income
groups; and the general (mass) public, whose members react mostly to general stimuli, but also contain
a variety of groups which are responsive to both general and specific stimuli.¹

Cobb and Elder (1972) noted that the formation of an issue does not just depend on a
cataclysmic event [like a rebellion], but on the dynamic interplay between the initiator and the trigger
device that converts the problem into an issue for a private or public reason. Because conflicts are
highly fluid and elastic, how an issue is defined affects its progress in the political arena, and changes
its scope, intensity and visibility. The initial composition of strength often changes because one side or
the other will enlist more support for its position by changing the cleavage lines or by redefining the
conflict to make it attractive to the potential audience it is trying to reach. For a successful definition
of an issue, the right symbol with the right historical weight must be used for the right group. Cobb
and Elder (1972) stressed that language must be correct for followers and for potential supporters.

SOURCES FOR THE STUDY

To trace relations between Israeli and Palestinian journalists, I conducted an extensive search
in the indexes of books, periodicals and newspaper and magazine articles for literature on journalists
especially during and after periods of intense conflict between Palestinians and Israelis (1967, 1973 and
1982, and the uprising). I used interviews with Palestinian and Israeli journalists conducted by me and
others to learn about how they view each other. I also used Israeli poll results to measure public
opinion on various subjects related to freedom of expression and media issues.

METHOD

Relations between Palestinian, Israeli and foreign (mostly Western) journalists are analyzed
using the agenda-building perspective. Cobb and Elder (1972) note that the agenda-building perspective
leads us to ask:
1. How did the original disputants define the issues that concern them?

2. How was the conflict enlarged to different subgroups?

3. What types of symbols were used to add emotive connotations to the issue?

4. How did the setting in which these issues were fought help lead to the resolution of the conflict?

5. What characteristics of issues are the most salient for predicting how they might ultimately be resolved? (p. 77)

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Applied to the Palestinian-Israeli situation, the agenda-building perspective suggests the following specific questions:

1. Given the fact that Israeli and Palestinian journalists come from populations engaged in a state of protracted conflict, how did the two sides handle their relationship with each other and with the other “publics” involved in the conflict?

2. How did Palestinian journalists and their supporters define the issue of freedom of expression for Palestinians in order to expand it from the Palestinian identification group, (Palestinian journalists), to the Israeli attention group (West Bank beat journalists), to the Western attentive group (foreign correspondents covering Israel and the occupied territories), and the Israeli mass public.

3. What are the characteristics of various publics that made them receptive to certain definitions over others.

4. What was the practical outcome of that interaction between Israeli and Palestinian journalists, and between the latter and the foreign press.
The changing relationship of Israeli journalists to their government

The changing characteristics of the Israeli press that contributed to the changes in the relationship between Israeli and Palestinian journalists are: the increasing independence of Israeli journalists from the party system in Israel; the distrust that developed between journalists and military spokespersons after the 1973 and 1982 wars; the redefinition of what was at stake in the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, and the resultant change in the redefinition of the role of the journalist in Israeli society.

Before the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, Jewish newspapers were ideologically differentiated from one another, and were financed and controlled by political parties that also appointed their editors. Despite their differences, all papers fought for nationhood (Caspi, 1986). This previous role led to the reluctance of most journalists to take on an adversarial role to the Israeli government after the establishment of the state. "During its first decade and the half," says Avner Yaniv (1993), "Israeli democracy was patently paternalistic, personalistic, bureaucratized and top heavy" (p. 3).

An Editors' Committee, started as an informal channel between the Jewish leadership and the press, developed into a mechanism that allowed highly placed Israeli policy makers to brief journalists on- and off-the-record as a way of advancing their purposes, sometimes to suppress and sometimes to shape news (Frenkel, 1994). Even though the fortunes of the party press showed a decline after statehood, and the fortunes of the independent press began to improve, the press as a whole was still a long way off from taking an adversarial stance towards the government (Caspi, 1986).

The 1967 Arab-Israeli war was a cataclysmic event for the Middle East, but at least at first, not for the Israeli press which continued its symbiotic relationship with official government sources. The Rafi faction of the Labor Party (represented by General Moshe Dayan) and the mainstream faction of the Labor Party old Mapai (represented by the prime minister and the finance minister) competed over the control of the occupied territories. Dayan won, and the West Bank military governor was
given full legislative and executive authority similar to that of a head of state (Peretz 1986). This arrangement gave the military spokesperson control over the dissemination of information, with consequences for the type of news to which Israeli journalists were exposed.

Israeli journalist Rafik Halabi (1981) wrote that most of what the press published "dealt with military affairs, if only because journalists had easy access to the military" (p. 56). In the early days of the occupation, Israeli journalists entered the West Bank when General Dayan visited the area, and wrote their stories from the handouts they were given, as some later confessed to Palestinian editor Dao'ud Kuttab (interview with the author, Washington D.C., 12 March 1988). Predictably, distortions resulted both in the type of news disseminated and in the image of Arabs projected in the Israeli media. When the press reported on the civil unrest it "fell back on such words as 'incitement,' 'unruliness,' and 'hostility' to explain the reasons behind the incidents" (Halabi, 1981, 56), rather than attribute them to the Palestinian desire for independence.

Moshe Negbi (1986), Israeli Senior News Editor at Israel Radio (Hebrew edition) and member of the Israeli Bar, wrote that before the 1970s, the army spokespersons who briefed the press consistently sought "to nullify and completely paralyze the deductive and analytical capabilities of the military correspondents and analysts" (p. 27). Journalist Yehuda Litani, who has seen the view from the other side when he served as the military government spokesman between 1971-1972, said his experience taught him "what we should not do" (Friedman, 1982, p. 32). The 1973 Arab-Israeli War became a triggering event for Israeli journalists when editors agreed at the request of chief-of-staff, Lieut. Gen. David Elazar, not to make too much of the concentration of Egyptian and Syrian troops on the border. The surprise attack by Egypt convinced the editors that they shared responsibility for not sounding the alarm and demanding a general mobilization (Bar-Natan, 1988). After the war, editors felt they should no longer allow "army assurances, army assumptions, and army censors to deter our pens," as former editor of The Jerusalem Post, Erwin Frenkel put it (1994, p. 76).
The period between the years of 1973 and 1982 was seen as the period of the "emancipation of the military correspondent" (quoted in Negbi, 1986, p. 28). That period saw a decline in centralized party power, and a rise in importance of the press and public opinion, and by necessity, a redefinition of the role of the Israeli journalists vis a vis the Israeli government and polity.

After 1977 when the Likud Party came to power, the fact that Premier Begin did not meet with the editors for three years, and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon boycotted meetings with the editors and forbade the Chief-of-Staff to meet with them also helped journalists take a more confrontational attitude towards the government (Negbi, 1986). The 1980s also saw some important changes in Israeli press-government relations. Says Frenkel (1994), "Israel of the 1980s was not Mandatory Palestine or the fledgling state of the 1950s. Government was no longer bunkerized and the press was no longer prim" (p. 90).

Israel’s invasion of Lebanon and the sometimes unreliable statements made by the Israeli military spokespersons triggered the realization that, to serve the Israeli public, the press had a role to play independent of the government. David Shipler, then correspondent of The New York Times in Israel, said that the Israeli press did not do very well the first few days of the war because of military as well as self-censorship. He added, "It was only later, in the context of a growing disaffection in the country as a whole -when it became acceptable to oppose the war and to question it, when the soldiers themselves began to disbelieve the official spokesmen- that the press became critical and questioning" (Schenker, 1984, p. 23). A vigorous debate ensued over the aim, necessity and conduct of the Lebanon war.

The changing relations between Israeli and Palestinian journalists

As mentioned earlier, Israeli coverage of the West Bank has evolved over time. Israeli journalists increasingly turned to Palestinians for their news about the occupied territories, and veteran Palestinian journalists and intellectuals sometimes successfully mobilized the support of some Israeli attention groups by using key symbols of weight to certain segments of Israeli society.
At his 1974 trial by the Israeli government on charges of spying, Palestinian veteran journalist Bashir Barghuti used salient symbols with historical meaning for various publics: for Jews in general, for human rights advocates everywhere, and for Israeli communists in particular when he said to the Israeli judges:

Seventeen years ago, in this same courtroom, ..., I was sentenced by the Jordanian court to sixteen years in prison for the crime of Communism ... I was accused of spying to cover up the political oppression of Communists, an old and dishonest game, and sadly, it was a Jew who first fell victim to it. He was defended by Emile Zola, and I am sure that there is an Emile Zola in Israel too (Langer, 1979, p. 79).

Several Israeli intellectuals defended him. The Israeli Communist Party paper Zu Ha-Derech on October 2, 1974, described the proceedings as "a staged trial." The League of Human and Civil Rights in Israel sent a delegation to the trial, and noted that arrests like Barghuti's "hurt the image of the state." Barghuti was acquitted (Langer, 1979, p. 79). But during that period, links between Israeli and Palestinian journalists were still restricted to the few pioneers who used Palestinians as sources. The attitude of the Likud government inadvertently encouraged contacts with Palestinian journalists. Israeli officials did not cooperate with the press, believing it to be hostile to them. "Therefore," says Robert Friedman (1982), "the prime sources for the Israeli media have not been the authorities, but the [Palestinian] residents themselves" (p. 34). Among the journalists New Outlook named as pioneering in their objective reporting on Palestinian affairs in the 1980s were Danny Rubinstein of Davar, Yehuda Litani of Ha'aretz, and Dr. Amnon Kapeliuk of Al-Hamishmar (Shaham, 1980, p. 10). Their fluency in Arabic and access to Palestinian sources enabled them to cover the territories effectively.

The relationship between Israeli and Palestinian journalists was mutually beneficial, yet it also carried risks for both, says Friedman (1982),
disregarded by the government as self-hating Jews, scorned by much of the public as
harbingers of bad news, physically threatened by Jewish extremists, insulted in the streets,
these committed Israeli journalists are convinced that the Zionist state must be liberated from
the territories or it will perish as a democracy (p. 32).

There are also emotional costs to reporting from the occupied territories. Zvi Gilat, 
correspondent for the Hebrew daily Hadashot says,

To see and hear about more wounded, more arrests, the mounting frustration of agonized
soldiers. A reporter working in such poor conditions eventually gets worn down. I know at
least one who required psychological treatment as a result of his work in the territories during
the intifada (Gilat, 1989, 39).

Palestinian journalists found it frustrating not to be able to publish their own news, or to translate items
they had leaked to the Israeli press and publish them as interpreted by Israelis. But the regular
interaction created a working relationship between the two. Perhaps a turning point in the relationship
came when the owner of the most rejectionist Palestinian newspaper and magazine, al-Mithaq and al-
Ahd, threatened with closure, appealed to The National Federation of Israeli journalists to intercede
with the Israeli government on his behalf in July 1986. The appeal, described by The Jerusalem Post as
"unprecedented," failed to keep the publications open despite the efforts of the Federation (Greenberg,
1986). But the fact that the editor made it, self-interest aside, meant he understood that, to a certain
extent, professional considerations, rather than the occupation, defined his relations with Israeli
journalists. Appeals by Palestinian writers and journalists continued to be made even after the uprising.
In 1988, fifteen Palestinian writers, poets and journalists held under administrative detention in the
desert prison camp Ansar III used key symbols when they asked Israeli journalists "to raise their voice against the suppression of freedom of speech," and told Israeli writers that Palestinian writers had rushed to conduct a dialogue with them "believing that words have a more powerful impact than even an Uzi," ('Palestinian Writers ....,' 1988, 4), words that are music to every writer's ear.

The agenda-building perspective suggests taking into account the setting in which issues are fought. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is played against the history of both people. Palestinians see Israelis as one more conqueror in a line of conquerors that goes back to the Crusaders. Many Israelis cannot see Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation on its own terms, as a struggle over land and water, but view it in the context of anti-Semitic pogroms. But the same Jewish history that creates some blindness to the exile of others also acts as a deterrent to some acts of oppression because it invites some Israeli journalists to draw parallels between their past, and what Palestinians are experiencing. In an article titled "Please--Deny It!" B. Michael (1989) of HaAretz writes:

A small and horrifying item of news appeared in HaAretz May 11. Some inhabitants of Nablus claim that soldiers broke in and entered an office which deals with translations and publishing, threw all the books out the window into the street, and ignited them. ... Thank God! The Israeli army is denying it. ... The burning of books is a red line which we do not cross, as of yet. Is that not so? (Michael, 1989, p. 13).

The journalist investigates and discovers that the soldiers did indeed burn Palestinian books. Michael ends the piece by writing:

Please--the commanders of the army--please deny this! ... That maybe the fire commissioner was mistaken about the date, that it was Eve of the Passover and the
soldiers merely burned the leavened bread . . . I promise to believe everything you
say... in order that I will not be compelled to believe that on the day of May 1, the
Eve of the Holocaust Memorial Day of the Jewish calendar year 5749, Israeli soldiers stood in
the central square of a town around a stack of burning books (Michael, 1989, p. 13).

There is a danger in recounting the development of a working relationship between Israeli and
Palestinian journalists to over-romanticize it, so to keep that development in perspective, it is important
to note that there is what Israeli philosopher Avishai Margalit calls the "shooting and crying" literature
of some Israeli intellectuals, who do the dirty work of the Israeli army, while professing to oppose
government policies (Finkelstein, 1992). Then there are also Israeli settlers who firebomb Palestinian
newspaper offices, demonstrate for the closure of Palestinian publications, and threaten editors by letter
and by phone.4 There are also Palestinian journalists who cannot imagine any type of reconciliation
with Israelis of any stripe. With the exception of al-Quds newspaper, many publications took years
before they could bring themselves to condemn the killing of Israeli civilians, or to make public
statements in support of Israeli moderates despite their private contacts with them. But with time,
several statements appeared that broke away from that practice. Raymonda Tawil, co-founder of the
Palestine Press Service (and later, mother-in-law of Yasser Arafat), in an open letter thanked Israelis
who demonstrated to protest the Sabra and Shatila massacre ('Raymonda...,' 1982). On Dec. 8, 1983,
al-Fajr Arabic daily published a statement that condemned attacks against Israeli civilian targets. The
statement was signed by five Palestinians, among them, a publisher and an editor-in-chief. The item
struck a nerve among Israeli peace camp activists who placed it on the cover of their magazine New
Outlook of January 1984. In 1986, Palestinians released a statement in which they condemned the
stabbing of a 60-year-old Jew, and asserted that the attack was "in cultural opposition to the just
Palestinian struggle, and to the humanistic and religious principles supported by Palestinians" (p. 38).
Among the signatories were al-Fajr editor Hanna Siniora, Arab Journalists Association head, Radwan
Abu Ayyash, and al-Sha'ab editor Ali Ya'ish. The statement was widely and appreciatively reported by the Israeli media, according to the Nov./Dec. 1986 issue of New Outlook.

After several years of the uprising that started in 1987, Palestinians felt confident enough to practice public self criticism in print. Former political prisoner, journalist Adnan Damiri, condemned the murder of Palestinian collaborators and warned against sweeping unsavory Palestinian acts under the rug (Biner, 1991). That type of criticism made it easier for some Israelis to associate with Palestinian journalists.

Prolonged coverage of the Intifada (uprising) against Israeli occupation also sensitized some Israeli journalists to what the Palestinian population was up against. Zvi Gilat, while noting that news from Arab sources is no less one-sided than news from Israeli army sources, was still able to write:

Here is another report I came across during the intifada:

"A 17-year-old youth died from electrocution after he was asked by and IDF soldier to take down a PLO flag from an electricity pole." The pitfall here is the word "asked." Was he really asked? Could he have refused? (Gilat, 1989, p. 39).

But the improved working relationship between Palestinian and Israeli journalists was unmistakable and important because it ultimately affected the way Palestinian journalists related to the Western press; the press that disseminated news to the rest of the world.

The Changing Relations Between Palestinian and Western Journalists

The changing relations between Palestinian and Western journalists was brought about by the re-establishment and improvement of the Palestinian press, as well as by the tension between the Israeli "guardians of the image," and the foreign press corps. Between 1948 and 1973, Israel as a comparative media backwater, covered mostly by stringers and part-time reporters, who came during wars and other special events (Chafets, 1985). Foreign journalists based in Israel in the 1970s got most
of their information from the Hebrew Press or from Israeli stringers and tipsters. More than half the resident "foreign correspondents" in Israel were actually Israelis (or long-time residents) who worked for foreign publications (Blitzer, 1985, p. 289). Foreign correspondent Georgie Anne Geyer recounts that when she arrived in Israel in 1973, she was stunned when and Israeli official at the government press office told her the government had been following her coverage in the Arab world and referred to her as "an Arab lover." Geyer writes, "Shouldn't the Arab world be covered by the press? ... I did not believe that this kind of prejudice existed in Israel. Certainly not" (Geyer, 1983, 11). But Geyer persisted, even though she learned that "to the Begin people and thus to the professional American Jewish community ... I could not criticize anything about Israel" without being called in letters a "vulgar anti-Semite" (Geyer, 1983, 12).

In 1977 Begin moved his political and government offices to Jerusalem in order to cement the Israeli claim to Jerusalem as the capital, but his decision had some unintended consequences. Whereas the offices of foreign journalists used to be in Tel Aviv, three hours away from the West Bank, the offices in Jerusalem were only 10-50 minutes from the site of any story, and correspondents based in Jerusalem began to venture into the West Bank (Chafets, 1985, pp. 219-20). The establishment of the Palestine Press Service (PPS) in East Jerusalem in 1978 facilitated contacts between the foreign press and the Palestinian population. This was especially true in the Palestinian rebellion of 1976 where the foreign press found it difficult to cover events because of Israeli restrictions. After the withdrawal of the PLO from Lebanon, the attention of Western correspondents shifted to the West Bank, which after a few days of stunned silence at the start of the war in June 1982, erupted in support of Palestinians in Lebanon.

The courtship between the Palestinian press and the foreign, mostly Western, media was at first slow and clumsy. Explains former al-Fajr (English) editor Dao'ud Kuttab,
In the early days of our contacts with the Western press, many Palestinian journalists did not understand what the foreign press corps wanted, so they gave journalists ideological lectures, but slowly, our reporters realized that they could help more by supplying tips about important news events, taking Western reporters to villages and refugee camps they had never set foot in, and generally making the Palestinian population accessible to them (Dao'ud Kuttab, Interview by author, Washington D.C., 12 March 1988).

Through their contacts with Palestinians, Western reporters became aware of what Palestinian journalists had to face to disseminate their news, and were able to take action on their behalf. The practice of placing Palestinian journalists under town arrest became an issue for some Israeli journalists when The Norwegian Journalists Association reminded Israeli journalists in a Nov. 19 letter that, as members of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), they are committed to "defending and advancing the human rights of journalists" and those rights include the "freedom to criticize and oppose governments and political bodies." The Norwegians urged Israeli journalists to investigate the detention of a Palestinian editor for possessing a magazine, and scored the refusal of the Israeli prosecution to allow his lawyer to see what his detention order was based on ('Norwegian Press...,' 1982, 16).

Palestinian journalist Awad Abdel Fattah (1982), accused Israeli journalists "liberals and rightists alike" of being "completely passive towards the suppression of free press in the occupied territories for the 15 years of occupation. The escalation of this suppression in the last few years has culminated in placing three editors and several journalists under town restrictions, increasingly strict censorship and frequent closures. All this apparently has not been enough to spur Israeli journalists ... to drop passivity and rise against this policy" (Abdel Fattah, 1982, p. 16). When some Israeli journalists finally decided to visit the three Palestinian editors under town arrest, Abdel Fattah wrote that, although he feared that the Israeli journalists were undergoing "an awakening" only oecause the Norwegian journalists' letter, he was "encouraged by this positive step" (p. 16).
In his appeal to Israeli journalists, Abdel Fattah used the rhetoric of freedom of the press to enlarge the scope of the conflict from the Palestinian identification group to the Israeli attention group. Abdel Fattah (1982) told Israeli journalists that "it is their duty" to call for the freedom of expression no matter who is under attack, because

The principle of free expression cannot be selectively applied. It is one and indivisible and whenever it is violated it should be defended, regardless of race, nationality and religion. Israeli journalists should realize that infringement of the Palestinian press is an infringement on them. They insult themselves if they take a spectator's stand (Abdel Fattah, 1982, p. 16).

The case of Palestinians was being heard in Israel as well as abroad. A number of influential Jews who can be considered the attentive public in the conflict (like Noam Chomsky, Anthony Lewis, Nat Hentoff and others) wrote articles and columns that defined the need for Israeli respect for Palestinian human rights in terms of preserving Jewish values (Chomsky, 1983; Hentoff, 1982 and 1982a; Lewis 1991).

Salient human rights symbols were used by various parties to appeal against the deportation of Akram Haniyyeh, the head of the Association of Arab Journalists. Haniyyeh described himself as "a prisoner of conscience," and charged that Israeli authorities want to deport him because he has asked for freedom for his people (Fletcher, 1986).

The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) in a telegram of protest to the Israeli government said that "Haniyeh was charged with political activism and not terrorism, CPJ believes he was targeted for outspoken journalism and politics and thus we urge that the order be revoked" ("Campaign to stop...", 1986, p.1).
Nadim Rouhana (1986) (a Palestinian who holds Israeli citizenship) also used key symbols of weight designed to make the Palestinian experience parallel the Jewish experience when he wrote:

The same week that Soviet emigrant Inessa Florova entered the country, Akram Haniyyeh was served with a deportation order from his home. ... Inessa Florova's arrival in the country was a local and international media event; meanwhile, Akram Haniyyeh sat in a prison in Nablus ... Akram Haniyyeh cannot choose to remain in the only homeland he has. Inessa Florova is a Jew; Akram Haniyyeh is a Palestinian. It is not the first time the entry of a so-called Soviet refusenik has coincided with the deportation of a Palestinian. The same week that Anatoly Sharanski arrived in his new homeland, a forsaken doctor was deported from his .... Did you hear about him? His name is Azmi Shu'abi ... The same system which appeals to the Jews of the world to realize Zionism and leave their "exile" for the sake of ... "normality" makes it difficult for Palestinians to remain in their homeland and encourages their emigration into exile (p. 14).

Ziad Abu Zayyad, Palestinian editor, used key symbols when he told the Israelis who attended a demonstration protesting the proposed deportation of Haniyyeh: "Fascism may start with us, but it could end with you, if you do not stand with us" ("Demonstration...," 1986, p. 38). The Jerusalem branch of the Israeli Journalists' Association protested on November 6, 1986 the planned expulsion of Haniyyeh (Fletcher, 1986a). And although Haniyyeh was deported, his case enlarged the conflict to various publics and made the plight of Palestinian journalists visible to various international human rights groups.

Foreign correspondents were also aware of the growing importance of Palestinian sources because they were relying on them with increasing frequency. Mary Curtius, writing for The Christian...
Science Monitor, noted that "the Palestinian press has become increasingly sophisticated and influential." Curtius added that Palestinian journalists "provide a conduit of information to the foreign press and to Israeli politicians and journalists. ...The Palestine Press Service ... has developed working relationships with several Israeli journalists, steering them to stories Palestinians think Israeli military censors might suppress" (p. 8).

Cleavages were beginning to change and foreign journalists no longer felt Israelis were the underdog. For example, the Canadian Newspaper Guild in Vancouver, in a resolution adopted at its 55th Annual Convention, criticized the restrictions imposed on Palestinian journalists by using key words designed to appeal to values Israel says it holds dear:

Israel's press policy is making a travesty of its democratic tradition. Directed against Arab journalists, it makes the use of words as great a crime as the use of stones ('Israel's Clampdown ...', 1988).

Time magazine wrote that "Cameras have been smashed and film confiscated. Israel's Foreign Press Association estimates that nearly 100 journalists have been attacked by Israeli soldiers" (Serrill, 1988, p. 56). Such actions constituted a source of friction between Western journalists and Israeli officials.

Despite the difference in the salience of the issue to the respective Israeli and Western journalists, Frenkel (1994) observes a circular effect at work,

The Israeli press' irreverence opened the door for the foreigners to be even more severe in their reports of the violence, and though Israeli newsmen sometimes bridled at the foreigners' excess, the comparisons prevented complacent submission to [Israeli] official accounts (p. 147).
But neither Palestinian, Israeli or Western journalists succeeded in expanding the issue of freedom of expression for Palestinians to a larger Israeli mass public. The Israeli public, says Zvi Gilat, grew weary of the Intifada:

A newspaper is a product, and the product must be sold. The consumer -the Israeli public- must want it. The Intifada is putting the Israeli public through one of the toughest moral-ethical tests in its history. It raises question marks about the justness of Zionism, "purity of arms," the army's courage, and Jewish morality. ... The public often wants to avoid facing these subjects ... In the act of the refusal and stubbornness of the political system and public opinion, the warning cry of the press often sounds pathetic (Gilat, 1989, 39).

Polls show that civil rights were upheld by Israeli public opinion, especially in their abstract form, but as they became more concrete, support for these principles dwindled. In a 1988 poll of a representative sample of the adult Jewish population of Israel, 66 percent of 873 Israelis agreed with the principle that "everyone must have the same rights before the law regardless of their political views," but only 41 percent of that same sample disagreed with the statement that "Jews who commit illegal acts against Arabs should be punished less severely than Arabs who commit illegal acts against Jews" (Arian, 1993, p.137).

When asked if criticism was permitted during wartime, more than half of the 1990 sample of 1,153 Israelis allowed criticism, but of a subdued and restrained manner. More than one-third said no, only 9 percent said that even vocal and strenuous opposition was permitted (Arian, 1993, p. 138).

Pnina Lahav (1993) cites research that shows that more than 60 percent of Israelis believe that freedom of the press endangers national security, "(p. 194) and the Israelis polled were not even talking about the Palestinian press.
The Israeli public did not like hearing bad news from the foreign press during the Intifada. Akiba Cohen (1993) Cohen found that "there was a marked and consistent difference in what was felt should be allowed for Israeli and foreign journalists: There was a clear preference for local journalists compared with those from other countries" (p. 90).

Even though the Israeli mass public has yet to be reached with messages about the freedom of the press for Palestinian journalists, the agenda-building perspective demonstrated how an issue can be expanded from the original identification public, to other publics. At this point, the human rights and freedom of expression symbols used by Palestinians are not as salient to the Israeli mass public as they are to Israeli and Western journalists and to some Israeli intellectuals, but that does not mean that they cannot be made salient to a larger public in the future or that other symbols the mass public finds more relevant may not be used instead.

Akiba Cohen is encouraged by one finding that might suggest that increased education, "particularly concerning such values and human equality and the role of the media in democracy - may bring about some narrowing of the gap between left and right " (p. 91). He adds that "since the teaching of values can be promulgated across ethnic groups and political parties, it is perhaps also the only avenue to creating greater understanding of the role of the media in society, and hopefully to the alleviation of some of the hostility towards journalists and the press"(p. 92). Palestinian grassroots organizations and human rights groups in the occupied territories are also discussing the need to teach human rights concepts in the West Bank and Gaza after the end of the occupation to ensure that Palestinian practice democracy.

**CONCLUSION**

Various developments on the Israeli, Western and Palestinian news-gathering scene changed the cleavage lines of the conflict: the increasing independence of Israeli journalists from their military spokespersons after the 1973 and 1982 wars, the improved interaction between Israeli and Palestinian journalists, the increasing dependence of the Western press on Palestinian sources, and Palestinian use
of key human rights symbols to attract supporters. All these developments enlarged the scope of the conflict, and made the Palestinian quest for independence visible to a world-wide audience.

International scrutiny of Israeli practices helped Palestinian journalists in their dealings with the Israeli censors because, while the outside world could not stop the administrative detention and imprisonment of journalists, Israel could no longer take such measures without losing one of its valuable assets in its relations with the West: its status resource as part of "the free world." Ultimately, it was the characteristics of the issue of freedom for Palestinian journalists, its amenability to definition in human rights terms, that made it salient to Israeli and Western journalists, and slowly transformed relations between them and Palestinian journalists. It was also this same characteristic that made the issue less salient to the mass Israeli public.

There are some lasting effects brought about by the developments described above: Israeli journalists have come to realize the importance of their role in keeping the discourse about Palestinians honest. Palestinian journalists have come to understand that the Israeli government and Israeli journalists are not interchangeable, and that a national group does not necessarily speak with one voice on all issues. Western journalists have come to rely more on Palestinian journalists for their news, abandoning their early reliance only on Israeli sources.

One would be tempted to say that, for the relatively brief period of time when Palestinians took center stage in the world at the start of the uprising, Palestinian journalists benefitted most from the changes in the perception and source-seeking activities of the Israeli and the Western press. But it is more accurate to say that the principle of freedom of the press and the professional values of journalism were the real winners in this development because, after some delay, they managed to function even under the restrictions imposed by the Israeli occupation.
REFERENCES


'Campaign to Stop Deportation Escalates' (1986) al-Fair (English), Nov. 14: 1,3.


Cohen, Akiba. 'Intifada Voices in Jerusalem: On Media, Politics, and Behavior.' In: Akiba Cohen and Gadi Wolfsfeld (Eds.) pp. 76--92.


Fletcher, Elaine (1986) 'Arabs Pledge Campaign to Free Editor'. The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 5: 2.

-------- (1986a) 'Journalists Back Arab Editor'. The Jerusalem Post, Nov. 7.


'Israel's Clampdown on the Press' (1988) Index on Censorship, Sept: 3.

Kaplan, Robert (1981) 'Life in Israeli Fish Bowl Frustrating to Arab Editors'. The Globe and Mail (Toronto), Jan. 11.


Langer, Felicia (1979) These are My Brothers (London: Ithaca).

Lewis, Anthony (1991) 'In Israel, Just Being a Journalist Can be a Crime'. The News and Observer [Raleigh, NC], 6 March.


'Palestinian Writers in Detention Write Their Israeli Counterparts'(1988) al-Fajr (English), June 12: 4.


Serrill, Michael (1988) 'In Israel, Wounding the Messenger', Time, April 11: 56.

Shaham, David (1980) 'The Occupation—the View from Israel' New Outlook, June/July, 10–14.


Tommer, Jonathan (1981) 'El-Sayyed is Staying Home These Days'. Newsweek, 12 July: 18


NOTES


2. This is not to suggest that relations between the government and the press were always smooth. The daily press' opposition to the draft of a 1954 "Press Law" that would have forced publications to obtain licenses shelved that draft. In 1965, the Israeli government tried to pass legislation that prohibited libel and imposed severe penalties on the editor or publisher of any paper that defamed a person's honor and reputation. Uri Avneri, editor of *Ha'olam Hazeh*, (not a member of the editors' committee) was one of the most vehement opponent of this law and claimed it was aimed primarily at him. In 1965, he successfully ran for the Knesset (which provides its members with immunity). Following Avneri's election, the law was defeated (Caspi, 1986, pp. 13, 14, 20, 21), and (Pnina Lahav, personal communication, 28 April 1994).

3. There were exceptions. For example, for an early criticism of the war, see an excerpt from Benny Barabash's June 9, 1982 *Ha'ir* article, quoted by H.S (1982, 9).

4. An Israeli settler was indicted for throwing an incendiary bomb into al-Fajr's offices on Aug. 1, 1983. The offices were vandalized and some equipment burned on July 8, 1985 (al-Fajr (English), July 2, 1985, 3). On Sept. 11, settlers demonstrated, demanding al-Fajr's closure (al-Fajr (English), Sept. 13, 1985). An undated letter in Hebrew that threatens the editor was sent to former editor of al-Fajr Ma'am'un al-Sayyid. A copy of it was given to me by al-Sayyid.

5. No Palestinian newspapers functioned the first 15 months of the occupation. The first paper reappeared in November 1968, the second and third papers did not publish until 1972, then others followed.


7. The words "Haniyyeh" and "Ha'aretz" are spelled in different ways in the original citations.

8. Asher Arian notes that upholding civil rights especially in their abstract form is not uncommon in democratic countries.


10. For a glimpse of what the foreign press was showing that most Israelis could not get from their own television station, see (Clines, 1988).

11. Perhaps what is needed is a redefinition of Israeli security from the way it was previously defined in the early days of the state of Israel (and is still defined by most of the public), to a new definition of security that encompasses the definition of Israelis as good neighbors (possible only after they leave all of the occupied territories).
12. For Palestinian discussions of human rights issues, see 'Yes to Freedom! No to Intellectual Oppression' in Sparks, August 1992. The bi-monthly bulletin, issued in Arabic and English by The Women’s Study Center, East Jerusalem, was responding to Islamic fundamentalist disruption of its feminist film week. For discussion of the need for democracy and democratic institutions within Palestinian society, see al-Talia Palestinian weekly paper (Arabic), especially editorials by its editor-in-chief Bashir al-Barghuti and columns by editor Issam Aruri in 1993 and 1994.


14. As Cobb and Elder note (1972), conflicts are fluid and alliances shift. Gadi Wolfsfeld reports that the Gulf War changed the context of the Intifada and affected the source-seeking activities of the foreign press. The number of contacts between foreign reporters and Palestinians was dramatically reduced as foreign reporters turned to Israeli journalists for information (Wolfsfeld, 1993, xxiii). The fact that Palestinians were under curfew for most of the war also reduced their mobility, access to information and contacts. The implementation of the partial peace agreement between the PLO and Israel led to the resumption of contacts with the Palestinians press, but Israelis are also contacted.
I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: "From Enemies to "Colleagues": Relations Between Palestinian Journalists and Israeli West Bank Reporters"

Authors: Rayyan Aref Najjar

Corporate Source (if appropriate): Department of Journalism

Publication Date: Aug 12, 94

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

**CHECK HERE**

- [ ] Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8½" x 11") reproduction

- [ ] Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

“I hereby grant to the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) nonexclusive permission to reproduce this document as indicated above. Reproduction from the ERIC microfiche by persons other than ERIC employees and its system contractors requires permission from the copyright holder. Exception is made for non-profit reproduction of microfiche by libraries and other service agencies to satisfy information needs of educators in response to discrete inquiries.”

Signature: Rayyan Aref Najjar
Printed Name: Rayyan Aref Najjar
Organization: Department of Journalism
Position: Assistant Professor
Address: Dept. of Journalism, NIU
Tel. No: 815-753-7017
Date: 00-00-00

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:
Address:
Price Per Copy:
Quantity Price:

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addresses, please provide the appropriate name and address:

[Signature]
[Address]
[Telephone]
[Date]

BEST COPY AVAILABLE
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND EDITORIAL CARTOONS:
POLITICAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN, 1972 - 1992

Diana Beeson
Graduate Student
School of Journalism and Mass Communications
The University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA 52242
(319) 335-5730
Internet: Diana-Beeson@uiowa.edu

Paper submitted to the International Communication Division of the
Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND EDITORIAL CARTOONS:
POLITICAL CHANGE IN TAIWAN, 1972 - 1992

Introduction

The mass communication system of a society cannot be much more democratic than the political institutions among which it operates, nor can it lag too much behind the society's institutional values ("Democratization" 440). In view of Taiwan's recent transition from an authoritarian, quasi-Leninist regime to an emerging democracy and its sustained economic growth, Taiwan makes for an interesting case study indicating the parameters of allowable freedom of expression in countries undergoing transitions from restrictive government control of the press to periods of reform and greater openness.

Examples of what freedom of expression is not abound at different times, under various circumstances, in almost every nation. Publication bans, confiscations, publishing license revocations and other forms of censorship, either alone or in combination, are a part of the worldwide media landscape and are an indication of political and civil rights within a political system, according to the annual Freedom House reports (Gastil, 18). Each year, Article 19, an international organization based in London that promotes freedom of expression, collects information from individuals and organizations, such as Asia Watch, Amnesty International and Index on Censorship, and publishes a continent-by-continent compendium of what freedom of expression is not. It outlines examples of restrictions on journalists, censorship of publications and restrictive press laws in some 77 countries. Documenting what freedom of expression is not, as most First Amendment scholars will agree, is often easier than trying to document examples of what it is.

This study looks, briefly, at the tradition of press censorship in modern Chinese society and recent economic changes and political reforms in Taiwan. It then looks for evidence of accompanying changes in freedom of expression by examining cartoons that appeared on the editorial pages of Taiwan's Independence Evening
Post (Zi Li Wan Bao) over a 20-year period from 1972 to 1992. The study contends that a benchmark of freedom of expression is a society's ability to laugh at itself, to appreciate its foibles and find humor in lampooning its institutions, heroes and sacred cows. As Northrop Frye writes, "Satire. . .break(s) up the lumber of stereotypes, fossilized beliefs, superstitious terrors, crank theories, pedantic dogmatisms, oppressive fashions, and all other things that impede the free movement of society" ("Nature of Satire" 20).

Editorial cartoons, while surely not the definitive example of freedom of expression, no doubt provide an important indication of its existence. According to Frye, for a society to exist there must be a delegation of prestige and influence accorded to organized groups: the church, the army, the medical and teaching professions, and the government. All consist of individuals given more than individual power by the institution to which they belong. "Whether they are given this power for good or evil depends largely on them. If a satirist presents a clergyman, for instance, as a fool or a hypocrite, he is primarily attacking neither the man nor his church. The former is too petty and the latter carries him outside the range of satire. He is attacking an evil man protected by the prestige of an institution. As such, he represents one of the stumbling blocks in society which is the satirist's business to clear out" ("Nature of Satire" 20).

Another feature of editorial cartoons is the assumption that the exaggerated or distorted portrayals that distinguish caricature from portraiture are executed to ridicule, humiliate or direct hostility toward their targets (Streicher 428). Cartoons that make fun of government leaders and institutions in a public way on the pages of newspapers are not a characteristic associated with repressive societies. It's likely that the existence of editorial cartoons in a nation's established press indicates a tolerance for freedom of expression.

In an article entitled, "Journalism's Wild Man: The Cartoonist," Doug Marlette writes, "Journalism is about fairness, objectivity, factuality; cartoons use unfairness, subjectivity and the distortion of facts to get to truths that are greater than the sum of
the facts. Good cartoonists are also the point men for the First Amendment, testing the boundaries of free speech" ("Wild Man" 29).

Although Marlette is an American, his statement appears to have growing cross-cultural application. A compilation of articles from press outlets published in the October edition of the World Press Review discussed the extent to which cartoonists from France to Korea are "stirring things up" by skewering their societies' mores and taking on political subjects ("Cartoonists Abroad" 26). With the contention that editorial cartoons are an indication of freedom of expression and considering the evidence that they are turning up on the pages of non-Western newspapers, this paper looks at the case of Taiwan over a twenty-year period, from 1972 to 1992, as it moved from a quasi-Leninist, authoritarian regime to an emerging democracy.

An Overview of Press Freedom in China

Chinese history provides no sustained precedent for freedom of expression. In a society that attempts to ground nearly all of its actions and institutions in the context of history and tradition, the lack of a sustained and indigenous freedom of expression ethic has proved to be dangerous, even fatal, for those who have tested the limits, both in dynastic and modern times (Ting 188-189). For most of its history, the Chinese press has had to contend with the vagaries and vicissitudes of persons in power, most often led by a single, powerful individual, whose attitudes toward freedom of expression could swing to extremes wildly and unpredictably as their political fortunes rose or fell.

In twentieth century China, one of the most striking characteristics of the press laws promulgated by its governments is their overall similarity in terms of the state's right to control and censor. As Daniel K. Berman writes, "We see this assumption in the laws of the last imperial dynasty, the would-be emperor Yuan Shi-k'ai, the Nationalist regimes both on the mainland and on Taiwan, the Japanese puppet administration headed by Wang Chin-wei in
Nanking, as well as the Communist government that succeeded all of them" (Berman 118). Another characteristic shared by almost all of China's twentieth century governments is a periodic easing of restrictions on the press.

The Tradition Continues in Taiwan

When Taiwan was returned to China from Japan in 1945, there were some 16 paper plants operated by the Japanese. After retreating to Taiwan in 1949, one of the Guomindang's (KMT) first actions was to nationalize the paper industry and set up a single entity as the sole producer of paper while forbidding importation of paper from the West. The government then limited the size of newspapers to six pages (Ch'en and Chu cited by Berman 124). Although at various points the government increased the number of pages allowed in newspapers, it continued to restrict the size of newspapers for some 39 years.

Both government-supported and privately-run newspapers co-existed on Taiwan, but government-run newspapers enjoyed considerable advantages. They had better printing facilities and privileged access to a pool of valuable resources, including money, newsprint, information and special treatment by authorities. All newspapers were expected to propagandize for the government and exercise self-censorship by confining their editorial content to certain parameters, but government-run newspapers also were expected to print material according to government directives (Berman 125). Often this meant printing texts of official announcements, proclamations and long-winded political speeches in full.

Privately-run newspapers had the freedom to edit such material or not run it at all. They also had the independence to test the limits of the regime. Despite the superior product of the government-run newspapers, people apparently preferred the content of the rougher-looking independent newspapers. From 1949 to 1957, the circulation of government-supported newspapers increased 58 percent. The circulation of privately-operated
newspapers grew by 560 percent, nearly ten times the rate of their quasi-official counterparts (Berman 125). The content that boosted circulation figures often came at a high price. Punishment for expression the government deemed unacceptable ranged from suspension of publication to prison sentences for the transgressors.

Martial law was declared by the KMT on the mainland in 1934 and was continued by that government for nearly 40 years following its retreat to Taiwan. Under martial law, the reasons for suspending publication often seemed arbitrary, even whimsical. For example, on October 10, 1953, the 42nd anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China, the Independence Evening Post was accused of using "inelegant language" in describing a military parade. It was closed down for three months (Ch'en and Chu cited by Berman 126).

Punishment was harsh and swift for criticisms of the government both outright and perceived. For example, in 1962 the writer of a poem in a literary journal which mentioned "a lonely man on an island" was given a 20-year prison term ("Straight" 26). In 1968, Po Yang received a nine-year sentence for his translation of a Popeye cartoon which was printed in the China Daily. The cartoon depicted Popeye and his son, Sweet Pea, establishing a kingdom on an island and competing with each other for the presidency (Berman 126).

In both examples, the protagonist of the poem and the cartoon was perceived as a thinly-veiled reference to President Chiang Kai-shek. While this might seem arbitrary and ludicrous to Westerners, the Chinese literary tradition is steeped in allusion, metaphor and allegory. Given this tradition, Popeye might be more quickly perceived as Chiang Kai-shek than an actual likeness of the president.

Chiang Kai-shek's Experiment in Openness

For an 18-month period from 1956 to 1958, the KMT government relaxed its controls on the press. In October 1956, President Chiang issued a call for the nation to give him advice "on
national affairs and to make suggestions regarding his public and private life." The nation took him at his word and both his policies and personality were attacked ("Freedom" 38). Chiang must have been surprised at the volume and candor of response to his call. In a special edition, published on the President's birthday, the Free China Fortnightly called for Chiang to step down. The United Daily News spoke out on the need for an opposition party. Even the government's mouthpiece, the Central Daily News, got into the act, publishing an editorial by Chiang Yun-tien (no relation to the President) which said the KMT must give up its special position and "respect the people's rights and freedoms and no one should be arrested or retained without a warrent issued by a court of law" ("Freedom" 38-39).

In the spring of 1958, the government moved to squelch further criticism by passing amendments to the country's already strict Publications Law. The strengthened Publications Law gave officials at all levels of government the power to revoke, without court action, the licenses of newspapers that violated the Publications Law. It also provided for heavier fines, contempt of law provisions, harsh penalties for "licentious" articles, and more stipulations for suspensions and license revocation ("Freedom" 40).

The restrictive climate served to reinforce a rigorous system of self-censorship for most established press outlets. Opposition and dissent, however, remained a part of Taiwan's media landscape, sporadically but continuously, in the form of tsa-chih (miscellaneous record). Any publication that comes out less frequently than six times a week is categorized as tsa-chih, an umbrella term that refers to journals, periodicals and magazines. Common themes of these publications included democratization, civil rights, political prisoners, freedom of the press, government reform and legalization of opposition parties. Between 1975 and 1985, more than one thousand issues of opposition magazines were published (Wei Ch'eng cited in Berman 173). A considerable number also fell victim to the restrictive Publications Law. According to the International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan, between 1980 and 1986, the number of publications
banned, confiscated or suspended increased nearly 20-fold, from 16 in 1980 to 302 in 1986 (Tien 209). These statistics would hardly indicate that democratic reform was afoot during the same period of time.

Martial Law Lifted/ Press Restrictions Relaxed

The unprecedented prosperity of Taiwan's economy in the past 20 years frequently has been referred to as the "Taiwan Miracle" ("Bombshell" 72, "Great Step" 91, Berman 3). Taiwan has had one of the highest sustained rates of economic growth in the world and has achieved its prosperity with a reduction in income inequality ("Deviant Case" 1064). It has one of the world's largest foreign exchange reserves and the world's highest savings-to-income ratio (Berman 1).

The reduction of income inequality has led to the development of a preponderant middle class for the first time in Chinese history. The development and growth of a middle class has led to a more educated populace. Further, this group has more disposable income which has enabled many families to send their children abroad for study. "During any of the last 25 or so years, 10,000 students from Taiwan enrolled in American universities, with most going on to take advanced degrees. In 1986, there were almost 30,000" ("Great Step" 86). Although this trend is changing now, this resulted in a "brain drain", with the majority choosing to remain abroad, particularly in the United States (Tien 34). The vast numbers of foreign-educated expatriates influenced the political reform movement. They, and their naturalized American cousins, returned for periodic visits and quite naturally brought with them preferences for a more open, less authoritarian political system ("Great Step" 86).

Certainly, other factors unfolding nearby in the Philippines and South Korea in the early and mid-1980s also must have had an effect on Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-kuo, who assumed power on the island following his father's death in 1975, and his decision to accelerate the pace of political reform ("Marketization" 386,
"Democratizing Transition" 283). Both the Philippines and South Korea faced popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes. In Taiwan, roiling internal discontent against the unrepresentative nature of the KMT and severe restrictions on individual freedom were expressed by a small but vocal Taiwan independence movement (Spence 669-70).

In July 1987, President Chiang suspended martial law, the "temporary" provision that had colored every aspect of Taiwan's political life and conferred virtual unlimited authority to the Office of the President on the island for more than 40 years (Tien 111). It was arguably the most significant step in the reform process for both its real and symbolic value. Other reforms followed quickly. In January 1988, the newspaper industry was substantially deregulated (Tien 201) and in May 1989, the major opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was granted legal status (Berman 194).

Although the press was a beneficiary of reform, it also was a catalyst toward it. In many ways, the opposition press acted as a de facto political party during the period when opposition political parties were outlawed. At his trial for sedition in 1980, Huang Hsin-chieh, who later became chairman of the DPP, said that the purpose of his magazine was not for the magazine's sake but to develop his organization and to recruit supporters (Berman 11-12).

The fact that an opposition press remained viable despite harsh and heavy-handed government tactics to suppress and eliminate it was arguably a stabilizing force in the transition from an authoritarian regime to a two-party system. Harvard Political Scientist Samuel P. Huntington maintains that political stability in either established single-party systems or democratic competitive party systems" is measured by the degree to which the system possesses the institutional channels for transforming dissenters into participants" (Huntington, Moore 44). The opposition press in Taiwan acted as a channel by attracting and organizing support and offering a forum for opposition views. Presumably, viewpoints
contained in the opposition press in Taiwan have been substantially subsumed by the mainstream press in response to the sweeping political reforms and lifting of restrictions on the press.

Testing the Boundaries

The study focuses on editorial cartoons that appeared in Taiwan's *Independence Evening Post (Zi Li Wan Bao)*. The *Evening Post* is a privately-owned newspaper. It was established in Taiwan in 1947 and is the oldest, privately-run newspaper on the island. It is considered relatively independent on many politically-sensitive issues and is the most widely-read evening newspaper in Taiwan with a daily circulation of around 100,000 (Tien 198-99). The *Evening Post*’s publisher, for most of its history, was Wu San-lien, a well-regarded, non-KMT political figure. Wu, who died in 1988, served as Taipei’s mayor in the 1950s and was involved in an unsuccessful effort in 1960 to form an opposition party. His personal ties with Taiwan’s former president, Chiang Kai-shek, and Chiang Kai-shek’s son, Chiang Ching-kuo, reportedly account for the newspaper’s relative freedom from KMT interference (Goldstein cited in Tien198). Relative freedom from interference means that it has never lost its license to publish. Relative freedom means that it has only been ordered to suspend publication three times in its history.

The study examines five data points: 1972, when Chiang Kai-shek was still in power; 1981, the third year of Chiang Ching-kuo's term as president of Taiwan; 1987, the year martial law was suspended; 1988, the year press restrictions were eased; and 1992, the fourth year in the term of Taiwan's first native-born and democratically-elected president, Lee Teng-hui. The first four data points are examined together since they represent periods of transition from a tightly-controlled press to a deregulated one. The fifth data point is examined separately as a check on press reform four years after the press restrictions were eased.
Editorial Cartoons: Suppositions and Sensitive Issues

The cartoons were examined against ten suppositions:

1. There would be fewer cartoons appearing on the editorial pages of the Independence Evening Post during the years in which martial law was in force:
2. The number of cartoons would increase after martial law was lifted:
3. Political cartoons during the early period of the sample (1972 and 1981) would focus on international issues because they are less likely to be interpreted as seditious;
4. The cartoons would make no reference to the issue of Taiwan's independence from mainland China, either obliquely or overtly, prior to the suspension of martial law;
5. Established press outlets, such as the Independence Evening Post, would not test government tolerance of sensitive issues while Taiwan was under martial law;
6. The press would express its dissatisfaction with its inability to address sensitive issues by taking occasional editorial pot shots at the issues of press freedom and censorship;
7. After press restrictions were lifted, editorial cartoons would begin to address the seven sensitive issues, but freedom of expression and censorship would remain their primary concern;
8. Editorial cartoons would not feature caricatures or other recognizable portrayals of government or KMT leaders during the period of martial law;
9. Portrayals of opposition party leaders and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders would not appear prior to the lifting of martial law;
10. Portrayals of leaders from all political parties would appear in 1988 after press restrictions were eased.
Figure 1 deals with the first three suppositions. Under martial law, there were several levels of legal and administrative controls, both formal and informal, which affected the press. One was the Publications Law, concerned primarily with registration and licensing of newspapers, magazines and other publications. Another was the "regulations for control of published materials under martial law" which was enforced by the military's Garrison Command ("Straight" 26). It seems likely that under the restrictive climate, the Independence Evening Post would avoid editorial cartoons since their content often relies on satirizing members of established institutions and such cartoons might infringe on the "seven sensitive issues." It also seems likely that the Evening Post would begin to include editorial cartoons on its editorial pages when the climate became less restrictive after martial law was lifted. Finally, if the Evening Post included editorial cartoons during the period between 1972 and 1981, the cartoons would deal with international issues because they are less likely to be interpreted as seditious.

The first three suppositions were not supported by the data. The number of editorial cartoons did not increase after martial law was suspended; however, the number increased dramatically after press laws were eased. Also, the samples yielded few editorial cartoons dealing with international issues. The vast majority in each sample dealt with domestic topics.
Figure 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editorial Cartoons</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

December 1972 (The 23rd year of President Chiang Kai-shek's military regime in Taiwan.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editorial Cartoons</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

November 1981 (Chiang Ching-kuo's third year in office after assuming the presidency upon the death of his father, Chiang Kai-shek.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editorial Cartoons</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

July 1987 (Chiang Ching-kuo suspends martial law some 53 years after its declaration by the KMT on the mainland.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Editorial Cartoons</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

November 1988 (Numerous laws restricting press freedom were modified or repealed.)

Nearly 68 percent of all cartoons dealing with domestic issues appeared in the November 1988 sample.

The Issue of Taiwan's Independence from Mainland China

The issue of Taiwan's independence from mainland China was arguably the riskiest of all editorial topics. Both the governments of Beijing and Taipei claim to be the legitimate government of China, despite the fact that these governments have operated separately in discrete territories for some 43 years (Fairbank 357, 460-61). The official KMT stance since its establishment on Taiwan in 1949 has articulated its primacy as the inalienable government of China (Tien 1). Article 3 of Taiwan's Martial Law defined as seditious any
speech and writing that "stirred up any animosity between the
government and the people" (Berman 135). In 1985, Taiwan's
Garrison Command issued a statement outlining its reasons for
continued press censorship. "(Some political journals) continue to
advocate the separatist idea of Taiwan independence, agitating bad
feelings between the government and the people" (Tien 209).
Obviously, expressing sentiments supporting Taiwan independence
could be interpreted as seditious and, for the individual expressing
such sentiments, could result in a prison sentence from seven years
to life.

The fourth supposition, that editorial cartoons in the Evening
Post would make no reference to the issue of Taiwan's
independence from mainland China, either obliquely or overtly,
prior to the suspension of martial law, was supported in the data
samples.

Figure 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cartoons Addressing the Independence of Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>December 1972</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November 1981</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 1987</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November 1988</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Seven Sensitive Issues in Editorial Cartoons

One can identify seven sensitive political issues that, in post-
1949 Taiwan, have been forbidden topics in the mass media. The
issues are: 1) Any discussion of Taiwan as a nation independent of
mainland China; 2) Questioning the legitimacy of the KMT as the
government of China; 3) Any discussion of personal or political
transgressions by members of the Chiang or Soong (Chiang-kai
shek's inlaws) families; 4) Discussions of freedom of the press and
government censorship; 5) Discussion of political prisoners; 6)
Normalization of relations with mainland China; and 7) Discussion

2:0
of diplomatic isolation caused by de-recognition of the government in Taipei as the government of China by the vast majority of the world's nations. This list was compiled from descriptions of circumstances leading to license revocations, prepublication censorship by the Garrison Command, publication confiscations, convictions for sedition and publication suspensions in works by Carl Goldstein, Tien Hung-mao and Daniel K. Berman ("Straight" 26-27, Tien 204-10, Berman 151).

The cartoons in all four samples were examined for content dealing with the seven sensitive political issues that, historically, have been forbidden topics in Taiwan's mass media. The cartoons were examined with the supposition that an established press outlet, such as the *Evening Post*, would be unlikely to test the tempestuous waters of government tolerance toward sensitive issues while Taiwan was under martial law (Supposition 5). The press, instead, would exercise self-censorship during this period. However, chafing under the burden of restrictions on freedom of expression guaranteed in the constitution adopted by the KMT, the press would express its dissatisfaction with its inability to address certain topics by taking occasional pot shots at the issues of press freedom and censorship (Supposition 6). These suppositions were largely confirmed by the data.

Also supported by the data was the supposition that after press restrictions were lifted in 1988, editorial cartoons would begin to address topics concerning the seven sensitive issues; however, freedom of expression and censorship would remain their primary concern (Supposition 7).
**Figure 3.**

**Number of Cartoons Addressing the Seven Sensitive Issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Independence of Taiwan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Legitimacy of the KMT Government</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chiang/Soong Family Members</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Freedom of Expression/Censorship</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political Prisoners</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Normalization with Mainland China</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Diplomatic Isolation</td>
<td>(does not apply)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cartoons Featuring Government and Party Leaders*  

282
Another supposition largely supported by the data was that editorial cartoons would not feature caricatures or other recognizable portrayals of government or party leaders in editorial cartoons during the period of martial law (Supposition 8). In his article, "The Mexican Revolution and the Cartoon," Victor Alba maintains that caricature organizes mass hostilities and aggressions (121). Similarly, W. A. Coupe writes, "It suffices here to say that what in literature is satire, in pictorial art is caricature. Satire typically deals with demonstration and exposure of human vices or follies in order to scorn or ridicule humans; graphic caricatures ridicule pictorially. . .'Political caricature' is understood to deal with ridicule, debunking or exposure of persons, groups and organizations engaged in power struggles in society" ("Theory" 431-32).

Certainly, one of the purposes of a tightly-controlled press is to circumvent attempts to denigrate the government and its functionaries in the mass media. Therefore, it's likely that editorial cartoons within a restrictive climate will feature either unremarkable characters representing "everyman" or "mythologized" types ("Theory" 93), such as Thomas Nast's gangly, white-haired gentleman known as Uncle Sam who has become the ubiquitous symbol of the United States (Bush 2), in place of actual political actors (See Appendix, pg.2).

The data supported these suppositions in the samples drawn from the two data points during the period of martial law (1972 and 1981), with one exception. The exception was Cheng Fu-sheng who was impeached from his position as section chief of the government's Transportation Department for improprieties in office ("Fight" 2). In this instance, he was the proverbial exception to the rule. A cartoon ridiculing Cheng casts the government in a favorable light by indicating its lack of tolerance for improper behavior on the part of public servants (Appendix, pg.2).

By 1977, the KMT faced electoral opposition in the form of Non-party (非) candidates (Tien 95). The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was organized in September 1986, but it was not given legal status until May 1989 (Tien 2). The DPP is the main
opposition party. Although many involved in the original Non-party Movement later joined the DPP, the term "Non-party" is still used to refer to the number of smaller opposition parties that have been organized in recent years.

In addition to looking at the data for portrayals of KMT, DPP and Non-party leaders, the data were examined for portrayals of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leaders. The suppositions for this examination were that portrayals of opposition party and CCP leaders would not appear in samples prior to the lifting of martial law (Supposition 9), but that portrayals from all parties would be found in the 1988 sample when press restrictions were eased (Supposition 10).

These suppositions were not well-supported. For example, portrayals of officials from Non-parties did not appear in any of the samples. Although portrayals of KMT and CCP leaders were represented in the 1987 sample, portrayals of KMT leaders virtually exploded onto the editorial pages in the 1988 sample while portrayals of DPP leaders appeared only twice.

Figure 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cartoons Featuring Government or Party Officials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-party KMT Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-party Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-party Government/Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Understanding the significance of editorial cartoons in general relies on understanding editorial cartoons in the particular. That is, when a reader encounters a particular cartoon, does he or she "get it"? One contention is that imagery is more readily grasped than the printed line of type ("Political Caricature" 434). While images may be more easily perceived, the point of the cartoon may be lost on the reader. One empirical study indicates that readers interpreted a given editorial cartoon in a multitude of ways and only a small fraction understood the cartoons in the ways the cartoonists intended ("Fail" 533).

Another study attempted to discern the effectiveness of editorial cartoons in achieving opinion change. It found that a thematic pairing of editorial and editorial cartoon has a synergistic effect and resulted in a "greater opinion change" than the presentation of an editorial or a cartoon alone ("Editorial" 725).

A study that attempts to determine whether editorial cartoons reinforce readers' opinions, change their opinions, or have no effect at all on their opinions assumes that readers correctly interpret the meaning intended by the cartoonist. Another study, in which subjects were shown editorial cartoons on topical issues but without the context of the editorial page on which they appeared, indicates that readers correctly interpret the cartoonist's intent in only a small percentage of cases ("Fail" 533). It seems reasonable to assume that an editorial cartoon accompanied by an editorial on the same theme enhances the likelihood of understanding, providing the reader reads both.

The four data points were examined to determine whether or not they appeared on the same page as editorials or news stories on the same subject. Editorial and editorial cartoon pairings diminished markedly in the 1988 sample, the year press laws were
eased. This may indicate that cartoon/editorial pairings are more likely in restrictive climates because such restrictions limit the range of topics cartoonists and editorial writers can address.

Figure 5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Total # of Cartoons</th>
<th># of Cartoon/Editorial Pairings</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1972</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1981</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1987</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1988</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued Freedom of the Press

As mentioned earlier, humor that makes fun of government officials and institutions in a public way on the pages of newspapers is not a characteristic associated with repressive societies. A benchmark of freedom of expression is a society's ability to laugh at itself, to appreciate its foibles and find humor in lampooning its institutions, heroes and sacred cows. Editorial cartoons, while surely not the definitive example of freedom of expression, no doubt provide an important indication of its existence.

The data from the 1988 sample of editorial cartoons that appeared in Taiwan's *Evening Post* indicate that cartoonists were taking on a growing number of politically-sensitive issues and also felt free to draw caricatures of high-ranking KMT leaders. Of
course, the question that looms ominously in the background, given the Chinese tradition of periods of relative openness followed by severe crackdowns, is: Can the current period of freedom of expression be sustained?

As a check, cartoons that appeared in the *Independence Weekly Post (Zi Li Zhou Bao)* during a four-week period in February and March 1992 were examined. The *Weekly Post* is a Chinese-language newspaper distributed in North America. It is a weekly digest of the *Evening Post* from which the data for the 1972, 1981, 1987 and 1988 samples were drawn. An analysis of the data according to the same methods resulted in the following:

**Figure 6. February 21 to March 13, 1992**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International and Domestic Content in Editorial Cartoons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-political</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cartoons Addressing the Independence of Taiwan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan-Mainland Relationship</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cartoons Addressing the Seven Sensitive Issues</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Independence of Taiwan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Legitimacy of the KMT Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Chiang/Soong Family Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Freedom of Expression/Censorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Political Prisoners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Normalization with Mainland China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Diplomatic Isolation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cartoons Featuring Government or Party Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KMT Government/Party Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP Government/Party Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-party Government/Party Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP Government/Party Officials</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It appears that editorial cartoonists are still taking on issues that were once considered off-limits. They still feel free to draw...
satirical caricatures of high-ranking government leaders. KMT leaders no longer overwhelmingly predominate as targets of caricaturists' pens. Although they still constitute the majority of subjects in the editorial cartoon samples, the caricatures of leaders from other parties appear with regularity, indicating that opposition parties are becoming institutionalized.

Finally, freedom of the press and censorship appear no longer to be the primary issue on which cartoonists focus their concerns. Instead, as indicated by four examples within the 1992 sample, they have turned their attention to the issue of Taiwan's independence, a topic that surely would have resulted in license suspension for the newspaper and a jail sentence for the cartoonist only five years ago.

**Conclusion**

Taiwan has made remarkable progress in a short time, but it is by no means a citadel of free speech. The KMT retains control over the broadcast media and the Government Information Office works closely with the KMT's Cultural Affairs Department and the National Press Council in issuing guidance to the media on sensitive issues.

Suspensions and bannings of opposition publications have decreased but not disappeared. In 1988, the Kaohsiung city authorities suspended the publishing license of a monthly magazine for "disseminating separatist sentiment." In 1989, a magazine in Taipei was ordered to suspend publication for one year on similar grounds. Also in 1989, Cheng Nan-jung, editor-in-chief of *Freedom Era Weekly*, was charged with treason for publishing a new draft constitution for Taiwan. He set himself on fire during a police raid on his office. His staff published a special memorial issue of the magazine which was banned (Information 234).

An analysis of editorial cartoons that appeared in Taiwan's *Independence Evening Post* and its North American weekly digest, the *Independence Weekly Post*, combined with an examination of events and laws governing the press in Taiwan over a 20-year period from 1972 to 1992, indicate that freedom of expression in Taiwan is expanding. Freedom of expression became apparent in cartoons examined in the 1988 sample when cartoonists began to take on
issues that had previously been avoided in the self-censoring Taiwan press. This trend was continued in the 1992 sample. The fact that this apparent freedom of expression continued over a four-year period, 1988 to 1992, is significant in that it represents the longest period of relative press freedom in modern Chinese history.
Appendix

Examples of editorial page cartoons from the Independence Evening Post, 1972 - 1992
"The doctor says the election contest is a long-distance race. One should not shout oneself hoarse all at once, but should maintain energy, move ahead steadily and strike sure blows. That is the best strategy."

*The Independence Evening Post*, December 18, 1972

"Do you need our help?"

*The Independence Evening Post*, November 27, 1981
Cheng Fu Sheng, The Exeception Who Proves the Rule

"Everyone according to one's own route mercilessly reaps profits."

The Indepedence Evenig Post, November 27, 1981
Freedom of Expression and Censorship

"Here I am, the reporter who reads the news like announcements from a loudspeaker."

*The Independence Evening Post*, November 9, 1988

"How much did the cake cost?"

"I can't tell you because our news dispatches are centrally distributed."

Celebration of the 94th Anniversary of the KMT

*The Independence Evening Post*, November 24, 1988
Freedom of Expression and Censorship

"It's full." "No seats available."

The Independence Evening Post, July 30, 1987
Normalization of Relations with China

President Chiang Ching-ko

Martial Law

Premier Deng Xiao Ping

Path to Democracy

The Independence Evening Post, July 17, 1987

"This military strategy exists only on paper."

"The organization (of the state) is very important."

Mongolia and Tibet Committee Conference

The Independence Evening Post, November 8, 1988
"Thank the Lord! My wife has finally become severely ill!"

"That's great! My father is 120 years old and still alive."

This refers to a policy enacted in 1988 allowing Taiwan residents to visit mainland China only if a death or serious illness had occurred among immediate family members who lived in China, or if Taiwan residents were over 80 years old and planned to visit immediate family members.

The Independence Evening Post, November 4, 1988

"Ask those two pandas if they have ever been members of the Communist Party."

"Oh my God. . . ."

Referring to the same policy, Taiwan allowed immediate family members to visit their relatives in Taiwan only if they had never been members of the Communist Party.

The Independence Evening Post, November 29, 1988
"If you're not afraid of a bee hive, please go ahead and do it."

Attempt to break up the Democratic Progressive Party

The Independence Evening Post, February 28, 1992

228 refers to February 28, 1947 when Chiang Kai-shek gave orders to shoot hundreds of Taiwanese residents. A statue of Chiang is in the foreground.

The Independence Evening Post, March 13, 1992
In 1992, the Independence Evening Post dealt with a number of sensitive issues in ways that surely would have resulted in a license suspension for the newspaper and a prison sentence for the cartoonist five years earlier.

Lee Teng-hui:
"Thank you for coming."

"We welcome you!"

"Please watch your step."

The Residents Make Their Own Decisions

Huang Hsin-chieh, DPP Chairman: "The political wisdom of the KMT is quite impressive."

The Outline of the Party for an Independent Taiwan

Grand Justice Explains the Constitution

*The Independence Evening Post, March 6, 1992*
In 1972, the non-political cartoons that appeared on the editorial pages of the Independence Evening Post were public service oriented and paternalistic in nature. In 1992, the non-political cartoons often featured undiluted sexual content.

A little ray of light

Whether dim or bright

While studying and drawing

Be careful about near-sightedness

The Independence Evening Post, December 9, 1972
"You slut!"

The Independence Evening Post, February 21, 1992

"Stick it in deeper."

The Independence Evening Post, March 13, 1992
Works Cited


U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT (OERI)
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

Please return to:
ERIC/RCS
150 Smith Research Center
Bloomington, IN 47408-2698

I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Title: Freedom of Expression and Editorial Cartoons: Political Change in Taiwan, 1972-1992
Author(s): Diana Beeson
Corporate Source (if appropriate): 
Publication Date: 

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

"I hereby grant to the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) nonexclusive permission to reproduce this document as indicated above. Reproduction from the ERIC microfiche by persons other than ERIC employees and its system contractors requires permission from the copyright holder. Exception is made for non-profit reproduction of microfiche by libraries and other service agencies to satisfy information needs of educators in response to discrete inquiries."

Signature: 
Printed Name: Diana Beeson
Organization: University of Iowa, School of Journalism and Mass Communication
Position: Ph.D. Candidate
Address: Iowa City, IA Zip Code: 52242
Tel. No.: 319-335-6736

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or, if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor: 
Address: 
Price Per Copy: Quantity Price:

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

BEST COPY AVAILABLE
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
Content Analysis of the United States' Television Networks Coverage of Foreign News From June 11, 1983 to January 1, 1988

By
Stephenie A. McLean
and
Dr. Maccamas M.E. Ikpah

Salem-Teikyo University
Salem, WV 26426
FAX # 304-782-5395
Telephone # 304-782-5240, 5507

Presented at the International Communication Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication Research Session August 10-13, 1994, in Atlanta, Georgia.
Content Analysis of the United States' Television Networks Coverage of Foreign News From January 11, 1983 to January 1, 1988

ABSTRACT

Because the controversy surrounding the United States' television networks' coverage of foreign news continues, the authors have content analyzed the United States' three major television networks' coverage of foreign news between June 11, 1983 through January 1, 1988. A review of some criticisms from Second and Third World countries' advocates are included to help readers to both understand the debate and appreciate the controversy. Both the study's hypotheses and questions are constructed to elicit answers which address the controversy. Some of the hypotheses used in the study include, U.S. television networks give significantly greater coverage to the First World than to the Second or Third World countries with significantly greater coverage to the Second World countries than to the Third World countries was not supported, and the distribution of items for the three worlds are the same for all three U.S. television networks was supported. The population was comprised of news broadcasts from 237 weeks. The population was drawn from 54 random selected weeks of five weekdays each. Chi-square tests for establishing significant differences accompany the analysis. There are tables in the study to enable reader comprehension. Because of the crudeness and flexibility of quantitatively derived data three recommendations were made to help cap the generalizations Third World advocates make on the coverage U.S. television networks devote to foreign news.

Introduction

The focus of this paper is on the frequency of coverage the three major U. S. television networks (American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC), Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc (CBS), and National Broadcasting Company. (NBC),) devote to foreign news, from June 11, 1983 to January 1, 1988.

The aim was to determine from the data collected the validity of the charges Second and Third World spokespeople make about the nature of the television networks' coverage of foreign news. The researchers sought to determine if there was a significant difference between the amount of coverage--as shown by the frequency of news items the networks, collectively or individually devoted to First, Second and Third World countries.

The research will be built around the following questions:

i.) Is the overall frequency of the First, Second, and Third World countries significantly different among the three television networks?

ii.) Is the distribution and frequency of items in the foreign news coverage of each television network equal?

Some of the work that has been done on the coverage of foreign news by the Western Media has been on factors influencing the flow of international news. 1, biased emphasis, 2 the nature of themes and 3, space devoted to foreign news 4. This study focuses on news items the major networks devoted to foreign news.
Background of Study

According to James Larson, television serves as a window to the world not only for viewers in the United States, but also for an increasing number of viewers around the world. Today, the availability of new communication technologies has made it easier for television to serve as the window to the world. We can see and hear network anchorpeople report news anywhere in the world.

The first live television broadcast between the United States and Europe came with the launching of Telstar I in July 1962, since then it has been possible for the networks to transmit live television from one part of the world to another. At first, this transmission was possible only in First World and some parts of Second World countries. Later, live broadcasts was possible from any part of the world. After Telstar I was launched, Wilbur Schramm predicted that satellites would make a real difference in news availability throughout the world. Soon after, his prediction became a reality.

By the end of the 1970's television networks began to offer instantaneous visual news from many parts of the world. Recently, a Gannett Foundation report showed that the media can easily transmit instantaneous news accounts from any part of the world, as was evidenced during the course of the Gulf War.

Mass media professors Frederick Shook and Dan Lattimore, attest that the development of electronic news gathering (ENG) and similar new communications technology equipment has enabled the transmission of
photographs and other visual forms from many countries across the world.\textsuperscript{10} This transmission fulfills a prediction made by a former president of NBC News, Lester Crystal, who said that the invention of videotapes would completely eliminate the problems the media had with film processing.\textsuperscript{11} Similarly, a veteran correspondent for CBS News, Tom Fenton, commented on the effects of ENG equipment stating that we have the ability to provide foreign news today because of the technology available in the U.S.\textsuperscript{12}

Despite all these developments and the availability of several new communication's gadgetry, complaints continue on several aspects of the U.S. television networks coverage of foreign news. Critics say that the coverage: i) demarcates the rich and poor nations;\textsuperscript{13} ii) makes some parts of Latin American, Africa and Middle Eastern countries for example, seem invisible;\textsuperscript{14} iii) is bad, and sometimes emphasizes street demonstrations and putsches;\textsuperscript{15} and iv) is one-way.\textsuperscript{16}

Additionally, several other authors have worked on other aspects of the coverage of foreign news by the U.S. media. For example, George Gerbner and George Marvanyi, conducted a study of nine U.S. papers and found that the papers did not devote much time to the coverage of foreign news.\textsuperscript{17} Andrew K. Semmel did an analysis of editorial content of New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune and Miami Herald and found that about 15 percent of the news was Third World related, whereas, over 40 percent of the news was developed country related.\textsuperscript{18} Similarly, a newspaper study by Herbert Schiller, found that too little space was devoted to Third World countries.\textsuperscript{19} A more
recent study by Daniel Riffe, explored the stability of "bad news" in the New York Times, and found that the Times consistently reported bad news for a twenty-two year period. 20

Why is the U.S. media, especially television at the heart of the controversy surrounding the Western media's coverage of foreign news? Several reasons seem to make the answer obvious:

First, according to Larson, "promotions for the three television networks are meant to portray them as 'the leading source of foreign news'." Larson continues that they:

"stress the global or worldwide nature of their news coverage in their titles or graphics. ABC titles its half-hour program "World News Tonight" while both "The CBS Evening News" and "NBC Nightly News" use a globe or a map of the world." 21

In fact, at one time, ABC's promotion was based on the fact that they were "uniquely qualified to bring you the world."22

Second, the influence the U.S. media has on both the development and practice of mass media in the World puts it in the middle of the news coverage controversy. According to Jeremy Tunstall, the United States' media have disproportionate influences on the development of media in the Second and Third World countries. He says that Second and Third World countries perceive the United States as the traditional leader in the development an advancement of news media in the world today.23

Jeremy Tunstall's opinion is supported by the work of both Elihu Katz and George Wedell, and Maccamas Ikpah. According to Katz and Wedell, several countries model their news after the pattern in the United States.24
Similarly, Ikpah found that radio and television managers in some West African countries patterned or want to pattern their broadcasting after the United States' model.\textsuperscript{25}

Third, research findings, published in Broadcasting magazine, show that Americans are inclined to believe television news more than any other medium.\textsuperscript{26} Television networks seems to be considered the main source of news trusted by an overwhelming majority of Americans. Also, a study of 4,000 persons by the Roper Organization, which was commissioned by the Television Information Office, showed television as the U.S. public's main source of news.\textsuperscript{27}

Fourth, Davison, Shanor and Yu's finding make it clear that the content and quality of foreign news could influence on foreign policy. Public attitudes, these scholars indicate, are largely formed by television and may exert decisive influence on public officials in the legislative and executive branches of government.\textsuperscript{28} Again, though not yet in any published work, the authors believe that the decision by the Clinton government, to withdraw from Somalia at the end of March 1994, was made as a result of the public's attitude, which may have been influenced by television news presentation.

Fifth, according to W. P. Davison, government officials sometimes rely on major mass media for intelligence reports and diplomatic dispatches. That may be the reason one of the presidents had three television monitors installed in the Oval Office so as to monitor all the networks' evening news at the same time.\textsuperscript{29}

Because of these, the authors agrees with P.V.A. Ansah that if U.S.
television networks do not give a "true" picture of Second and Third World countries on their evening news, many Americans may continue to have negative attitude toward them.30 Furthermore, Davis Paletz and Robert Entman, say that because of the bad and/or inadequate coverage on television, Third World citizens fear the negative views portrayed about them on television will compel both the American people and the policy makers to make unfavorable policy decisions with reference to them.31

Rationale for the Study

This study is unique, for the following reasons: First, Marshall McLuhan's "global village" concept is already upon us. This is really the age of "allatoniceness" even though the composition of the world-East and West- as we once knew it, when the study was conducted, is no more. There seems to be a need for both mass media educators and practitioners to know how the media covered the world before the demise of the Soviet Union. That is why the angle of this study is on the amount of news stories the network devoted to the First, Second, and Third World countries.

Second, the duration of this study closely follows Larson's 1972-1979 study, which looked at international news items and other issues on the subject.32 This study seems to be the last study on the issue before the Soviet Union split-up, making it possible for future studies to concentrate on the coverage following the demise of the former Soviet Union.

Third, this research is important because the issues and controversies are as relevant today as they have been over the years. Although UNESCO may
not be the debating ground, the controversy is still hot in the minds of those who advocate more information flow between North-South: "industrialized countries of the Northern Hemisphere and developing, mainly nonaligned nations of the Third World, located psychologically if not always geographically in the southern half of the globe." Furthermore, it is imperative that as we get closer to the twenty-first century, and think of ways to improve our "global village." We should know how the coverage has changed since Larson's major network study and think of ways to improve future news coverage.

Since past views suggest that the television networks do not devote much coverage to Second and Third World countries, this study is designed to determine whether or not its hypotheses are supported.

**Methodology**

This study attempts to focus on one of the assumptions: that the networks devote less coverage to Second and Third world countries. The methodology follows after Larson. The total sample of each television network includes an average of five weeknights per month of evening newscasts. Since the study covered a fifty-four month duration, it was assumed that the five weeknights would generate enough data to answer the following research questions.

**Study Questions**

i.) Is the overall frequency of the First, Second, and Third World countries significantly different among the three television networks?

ii.) Is the distribution and frequency of items in the foreign news coverage of each television network equal?
The following are the hypotheses and questions this study seeks to address:

**Study Hypotheses**

1. U.S. television networks give significantly greater coverage to the First World than to the Second or Third World countries, and significantly greater coverage to the Second World than to the Third World countries.
2. The distribution of foreign news items for the First, Second and Third World countries are the same for all three U.S. television networks.

**Operational Definitions of Variables**

All news stories on the television networks' evening broadcasts during the 54 month period made up the population of this study. All regularly-scheduled news programs on ABC's "World News Tonight", "CBS Evening News" and "NBC Nightly News" were included in the study population.

An attempt was made to measure news story frequencies, and also present the overall distribution of foreign news reported by the three networks (Festus Eribo and Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi. The selection of the study period was based on the following procedure: The researchers used a table of random numbers which come from Fred N. Kerlinger to randomly select five weeknights per month for fifty-four months.

The variables considered here were borrowed from the method used by Larson and Stevenson. The country where news occurred, nationality of the person involved in the news and the organization where the news item originated.
Foreign news was operationally defined as any news that mentions a country other than the United States, regardless of its thematic content or dateline.\textsuperscript{41}

**Different Worlds** The definition of First, Second and Third World countries used here is a modified version of a widely-accepted global trifurcation used by: Chinese Chairman Mao Tsetung,\textsuperscript{42} Erwin Atwood,\textsuperscript{43} The Economist,\textsuperscript{44} and Stevenson and Cole,\textsuperscript{45}. The operational definition for the three worlds was as follows:

- **First World countries** were the industrialized countries of the West including Japan.
- **Second World countries** were all countries that have had communist and/or socialist governments irrespective of the hemisphere in which they are located.
- **Third World countries** refered to all developing countries of the world.

For example, all the countries in Africa, excluding South Africa, South America and Asian countries excluding such countries which, by definition of this study, fall under the Second World category.\textsuperscript{46}

**Study Instrument**

A content analyst of the Television News Index and Abstracts, a monthly publication of the Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee was used to answer the research questions. Larson and Hardy in William C. Adams,\textsuperscript{47} have already established the instrument's reliability. They found that the instrument "revealed a very high degree of reliability."
The total sample of each television network includes an average of five weeknights per month of the evening newscasts. Since the study covered a fifty-four month duration, it was expected that the five weeknights generated enough data to answer the research questions.

**Unit of Analysis**

The Unit of analysis in this study was the news item. This follows the definition of Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Robert Stevenson. Both authors used the smallest segment of content for scoring purposes.

**Procedure**

Two days of broadcast schedule were given to six coders who analyzed and coded each item according to the coding procedures described in our pilot study which the coders used. The authors coded the same material and all work was cross-checked for reliability in terms of coders and measuring instrument's agreement.

Coding instructions followed the definition listed under the operational definition of variables. If a news item involved two countries, instead of splitting the item into two and awarding half to each country, it was decided that the country with the most emphasis be coded. The only exceptions were in cases of war, in which instance, each of the warring countries was counted.

For example, in the coverage of the Iranian-Iraqi war, each of the countries was awarded a point instead of one country receiving a point and the other nothing. As a result, the total frequency of countries featured is greater than the number of items tested.
The coding reliability score was 94 percent and was based on students from Africa, Asia, Russia and Latin American countries who are presently living in the United States.

**Data Analysis and Recommendations**

When Mustapha Masmoudi accused the Western media in 1979, of devoting, "only 20 to 30 percent of the news coverage to the developing countries, despite the fact that the latter account for almost three-quarters of mankind," he may have thought that news coverage should parallel population. That may be his reason for accusing Western media of lack of coverage.

The three networks together reported 1,398 items which met this study's, and other studies' definition of foreign news described elsewhere in this paper. Of these, 430 or 30.76 percent focused on First World countries, 393 or 28.11 percent were on Second World countries, and 575 or 41.13 percent were on Third World countries. Thus, the Third World countries received more network coverage than either the First or Second World countries, and the First world countries received more coverage than the Second World countries. (see Tables I and II)

**TABLE I**

BAR GRAPH OF VARIABLE WORLD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>PERCENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First World</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>30.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second World</td>
<td>393</td>
<td>28.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third World</td>
<td>575</td>
<td>41.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases</td>
<td>1,398</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Differences in item distribution by the world for all three networks combined were significant at the .001 level, producing a Chi square of 39.72 (df=2). Third World coverage was significantly greater than First or Second World coverage, producing Chi Square coefficients of 20.92 and 34.22 respectively (df=1, p.<.001). Although more First than Second World items were reported, differences between these two were not significant.

Thus, findings fail to support the first hypothesis that the U.S. networks report a lesser proportion of Third World items than First or Second World items. Masmoudi's assumption, as already stated, that quantity of news coverage should parallel population, is not accepted by the U.S. media. While no U.S. news organization ascribes to any quota systems of foreign news distribution, it appears that distribution by worlds provides some guidelines, the greater population of the Third World being offset by the greater economic and political impact of the First and Second Worlds.

**TABLE II**

FREQUENCIES FOR THE THREE WORLDS BY NETWORKS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WORLD</th>
<th>ABC</th>
<th>CBS</th>
<th>NBC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>136 (.29)</td>
<td>171 (.34)</td>
<td>123 (.29)</td>
<td>430 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>128 (.28)</td>
<td>135 (.27)</td>
<td>130 (.30)</td>
<td>393 (.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third</td>
<td>201 (.43)</td>
<td>199 (.41)</td>
<td>175 (.41)</td>
<td>575 (.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>465 (1.00)</td>
<td>505 (1.00)</td>
<td>428 (1.00)</td>
<td>1,398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hypothesis II:

The distribution of items for the three worlds are the same for all three U.S. television networks. Second and Third World press advocates do not differentiate between foreign news coverage by the three major U.S. networks. Data supported this hypothesis, as no significant differences were found between proportional distribution of items by world between the networks.

Findings Discussed

The first hypothesis suggests that U.S. television networks gave significantly greater coverage to the First World countries than to the Second and Third Worlds, and significantly greater coverage to the Second than to the Third. The three U.S. television networks reported a total of 1,398 items. Out of these, 430 or 30.76 percent were on First World, 393 or 28.11 percent were on Second World countries, and 575 or 41.13 percent were on Third World countries.

The first hypothesis is not supported because the Third World, not the First World, received the highest total network coverage. The list of countries in the appendices shows that only one Second World country, the former Soviet Union, had more items than almost all the items of the First World countries.

The second hypothesis suggested that the distribution of items for the three worlds would be the same.

As data in Table II show, there was only a significant difference if within world coverage is considered. That is, of ABC’s 465 foreign items, 201 focused on Third World, 136 on First World and 128 on Second World. CBS reported a
significantly greater 505 items, and NBC reported 428 foreign news items.

Both ABC and NBC showed Third World coverage to be significantly
greater than First or Second Worlds' coverage. CBS also gave the greatest
coverage to the Third World. Data partially supported, and partially refuted the
hypothesis that no significant difference existed within the three networks'
coverage patterns. No evidence supported the conclusion that First World
countries got more coverage on U.S. television than did the Third World.

Perhaps, the most significant aspect of this study is that the it has
shown that the U.S. television networks do not cover First World countries
more than they cover Second and Third World countries. This is important
because it supports Larson's prediction that the coverage of foreign news would
increase. James Larson's 1984 study showed an increase in the number of
international news items from 1976-1979 when those years were compared to
the preceding four years. Although Larson did not find the coverage to be
"extensive," he predicted that there was a great possibility of the networks
changing the pattern of their coverage.

This study supports that prediction. Therein lies the importance of this
study. The importance is not so much that the networks devoted more news
items to Second and Third World countries as they did to First World
countries, thus, disproving Third World advocates' claims, but it lays the
foundation for more research.

In reflecting on Second and Third World claims, however, the
researchers acknowledged the possibility of a type 1 error, that is, rejecting a
hypothesis which may actually be true. The following could have accounted
for a type 1 error:

First, the operational definition of the variables in this study could have influenced the scoring method used during coding, hence influencing the scores that were eventually used to compute the different tests.

Second, error may have occurred because of the division of the worlds. Many of the countries classified as the Second World might be more realistically categorized as Third World countries. Some economic books classify the world based on economic strength. In such cases, S. Korea is grouped in the Second World group, while countries like Cuba, Angola and Nicaragua, classified here in the Second World, are classified under Third World categories.52

Third, the other variable that may have contradicted the validity of findings was a trend toward topical analysis that was obscure as the data was computed and analyzed. It appeared that the networks were most likely to give coverage to certain topical issues of the time. The following seems to support the point:

First, over 50 percent of the coverage given to Iran was on its war with Iraq. The Middle Eastern countries' oil may have made the networks to devote more items on the war. Furthermore, the Persian Gulf route was followed by many ships that sail under the U.S. flag. The presence of the U.S. ships alone in that area seemed to suggest the interest of the people or government of the United States, hence the need for the coverage of the Iranian-Iraqi war.

Second, another trend in networks' coverage had to do with Lebanon, the country with the third highest combined network coverage. Over sixty percent
of the coverage on Lebanon had to do with terrorism, an issue of interest to the American people, since terrorist acts of kidnapping and hijacking frequently threatened U.S. citizens.

Third, the coverage devoted to the former Soviet Union, both on political and military issues, seemed to suggest an obsession with the Cold War. The coverage seemed to have been on the former Soviet Union's deviation from its previously perceived aggressive stance. Over 60 percent of the news on the former Soviet Union was on political and military disarmament talks.

Fourth, economics appeared to have carried substantial weight in news item selection from First World countries. Over 80 percent of the overall coverage of Japan had to do with trade, economics, or related matters. Coverage by the American television networks seemed to have centered on its relative economic standing in the world today.

With these caveats the author, reacts to Masmoudi's claim that, the criteria governing the selection are consciously or unconsciously based on the political and economic interests of the transnational systems and of the countries in which this system is established....

by saying that this study does not show that to be the case.

The authors did not find enough evidence from this research to support such claims. It appears from our findings that what networks considered newsworthy was whatever seemed to be of interest to the American people. Again, throughout the study no military coup or assassinations occurred in the First World countries. During the course of the study, for example, military coups and assassinations in the Third World countries were covered. This may
not have been because they were from Third countries, but because coups and assassinations fit the news values that the major U.S. television networks used to select news items for broadcasting.\textsuperscript{54}

There seemed to be no items on disaster in the coverage given to Second World countries' media, presumably because of the closed nature of those societies during this study period. Subsequent catastrophic events have received vast coverage, such as the Armenian earthquakes, although not analyzed in the time frame of this study.

From the foregoing it seems, therefore, that before the Gorbachev era, it was the nature of Second World countries not to report nuclear disasters that threatened their health or possibly killed them. As a result, one would wonder if they would have mentioned small scale disasters.

Therefore, the study indicated that both the Second and Third Worlds' perception, that they do not receive adequate coverage on the American television, is unfounded.

\textbf{Recommendations}

A big disadvantage of nominal data quantification is its inability to express the nature of the content. That is, the method obscures much of the richness of the data. This shortcoming reduces the effectiveness and force of conclusions that the authors could have drawn from this study. For example, note that the country receiving the most coverage is the former USSR (see Appendix). Now, did the former Soviet Union receive this amount of coverage because of politics or military related issues? Neither can we say what aspects of Soviet military news were covered. Was it disarmament, sale of arms, or
Strategic Defense Initiative related? These are the problems associated with such quantified studies. It is because of the flexibility and crudeness of quantitatively derived data, that it seems, Second and Third World countries make such generalizations on the coverage of foreign news. Because of this, future research is recommended to:

First, redefine the variables used in this study in such a way that conclusions drawn from them will not be as vulnerable to attach or question from any of the worlds.

Second, field experiment be undertaken by future researchers to observe the process that gatekeepers go through to select foreign news items for broadcasting.

Third, researchers could send questionnaires comprised of news items or topics to network news people in Washington DC or New York asking them to rank their newsworthiness. The researcher may be able to determine from the network gatekeepers the criteria used in selecting foreign news items.
Endnotes


10. Shook and Lattimore, op. cit.
11. Lester M. Crystal, "Using Technology: Improve Substance, or Just Appearance" Radio/Television Age (October 77, p. This NBC News president said:

Ten years ago, producers would have been worried about locations from where film of the event could be processed and transmitted. Not today. Water and chemicals won't be needed. Because of the electronic news camera, the lab is obsolete. Even the television station isn't necessary. The closest ground station will do...

... Ten years ago, there were ground stations only in Europe to transmit the daily reports of a presidential trip. Today, there are ground stations at every point along the way in Venezuela, Nigeria, India, and Iran, as well as France, Poland and Belgium.


22. Larson, op. cit. page 2


20


34. Larson, 1984, op. cit, p36

35. Larson, 1984, ibid.


39 James Larson. 1984, op. cit
40. Stevenson and Shaw op. cit.

41. Stevenson and Shaw ibid.


44. *The Economist*, March 20-26, 1982


46. Maccamas Ikpah, op. cit. pp. 38-39


49. Stevenson and Shaw, op. cit. p25

50. Masmoudi, op. cit. p173


53. Masmoudi, op. cit.

# APPENDIX I

## PERCENTAGE OF COVERAGE BY COUNTRY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>198</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>S. Africa</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>West Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

23
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>.7</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>.6</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>World</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>.3</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>.4</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>NETWORKS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>NBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTRY</td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>NBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Germany</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Salvador</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenada</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27

334
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>NETWORKS</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ABC</td>
<td>CBS</td>
<td>NBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ireland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Content Analysis of the United States' Television Networks
Coverage of Foreign News from June 11, 1993 to January 1, 1998

Stephanie A. McLean, Maccanas M. F. Ikpa

Salem-Tokyo University

Microfiche (4" x 6" film)

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION,
AS APPLICABLE
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

OR

Microfiche (4" x 6" film)
reproduction only

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY
HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION,
AS APPLICABLE
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

I hereby grant to the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) nonexclusive permission to reproduce this document as indicated above. Reproduction from the ERIC microfiche by persons other than ERIC employees and its system contractors requires permission from the copyright holder. Exception is made for non-profit reproduction of microfiche by libraries and other service agencies to satisfy information needs of educators in response to discrete inquiries.

Signature: Stephanie A. McLean
Printed Name: Stephanie A. McLean
Organization: Salem-Tokyo University
Address: 223 West Main Street P.O. Box 30
City: Salem
State: WV
Zip Code: 26426-0500
Date: 8/10/94

STEPHENIE A. McLEAN

Salem-Tokyo University

Please return to:
ERIC/RCS
150 Smith Research Center
Bloomington, IN 47408-2696

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
OFFICE OF EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT (OERI)
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: Content Analysis of the United States' Television Networks
Coverage of Foreign News from June 11, 1993 to January 1, 1998

Author(s): Stephanie A. McLean, Maccanas M. F. Ikpa

Corporate Source (if appropriate): Salem-Tokyo University

Publication Date: 8/10/94

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract Journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:
The Nairobi Women's Conference, the World Bank, and *The Weekly Review*: Defining Development in a Kenyan Newsmagazine

Nancy Worthington  
Ph.D. Student in Mass Communications  
Indiana University  
School of Journalism  
Ernie Pyle Hall 200  
Bloomington, IN 47405

Presented to the Commission on the Status of Women at the 77th Annual Convention of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication  
Atlanta, Georgia, August 10-13, 1994
The Nairobi Women's Conference, the World Bank, and

The Weekly Review: Defining Development in a Kenyan Newsmagazine

As we look forward to the 1995 Beijing United Nations conference for women, it is instructive to look back to the last UN women's conference nearly a decade ago in Nairobi, Kenya. Even though thousands of women attended and the conference drew significant attention to Kenya, the UN activities resulted in little meaningful change in lives of Kenyan women. Another international organization, the World Bank, fostered a different sort of policy in Kenya during the mid-1980s: structural adjustment of the economy to battle the debt crisis. Although such programs are supposedly "gender-blind" in that they prescribe policies without specifying that males and females be treated differently, the resulting cuts in social services and the currency devaluation create additional stresses on households, and women in particular (Gladwin 1991).

A nation's policies for social change and the international forces that shape those policies carry implications for how women are represented in that country's mass media. Conversely, the media can be seen as Antonio Gramsci viewed them, engaging in a struggle with other social institutions in an ever-shifting battle over ideology, including cultural norms related to gender equity (Mouffe 1981). This paper focuses on coverage of two international strategies to shape

---

'The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of Michael Curtin on an earlier draft of this paper.'
Defining Development

Kenya's future. I trace out how journalistic conventions and restrictions mesh with the interests of genders, nations, and international capital to legitimize a particular understanding of Kenyan social change, or development.

Recent feminist research in mass communication has considered women and the Kenyan mass media. Leslie Steeves (1993b) examined print coverage of the St. Kizito incident involving mass murder and rape at a girl’s school in Kenya, and found that the stories reinforced rape myths and women's secondary status. A textual analysis of Nairobi's leading newspaper, the Daily Nation, suggests that seemingly positive portrayals of women may actually support continued female subordination in Kenya, especially for poor women (Worthington 1993). Finally, a book on gender portrayals in Kenyan children's textbooks found stereotypical representations of males and females with males more widely represented (Obura 1991).

Each of these studies reinforces the point that mainstream mass media in Kenya have a poor record with respect to gender equity. By focusing on a particular historical moment, this paper examines how Kenyan journalism works with other forces to include or exclude women in discussions that define the direction of their nation's social change as it is encapsulated in the vague term, development. I treat a Nairobi newsmagazine, The Weekly Review, like a prism through which one might view how international forces vie to define Kenyan development through linguistic struggle. By thinking of the magazine
Defining Development

as a prism, I assume that the mass media filter and distort how news figures frame issues related to development by privileging some voices and issues over others. This process is not necessarily intentional on the part of journalists, but rather it results from strategies related to news production in Kenya, which I will discuss in greater detail below. Additionally, drawing on the arguments of Raymond Williams, Michel Foucault, and Stuart Hall, this paper attempts to look closely at the usage of value-laden language as a way to undercover the relationship between language and power relations.

In some ways, what takes place in the pages of The Weekly Review can be seen as running parallel to the debate that has characterized the literature on development communication, with an important caveat: Development communication scholars treat definitions very overtly, whereas news figures and media more subtly assume and reinforce certain meanings through usage. Certainly, for those concerned with fostering development through communication, the first step resides in defining what constitutes development. This paper proposes that our understanding of what development means can be enhanced by looking at how the term is used in a specific historical context, in this case how a mass medium presented two 1985 development-related issues in

---

2See Leslie Steeves and Rebecca Arbogast (1993) for a feminist critique of the different theoretical perspectives that have characterized the development debates in mass communication. Steeves (1993a) proposes how an explicitly feminist vision could transform development.
Defining Development

Kenya's capital city of Nairobi. Examining The Weekly Review's 1985 coverage of the both the UN women's conference and the World Bank's activities in East Africa that year provides an opportunity to view how the interests of genders, nations, and international capital are played out in development debates as they are presented in the press. I make no pretense to a comprehensive analysis of all voices vying to define development in the particular moment that I examine. My goal, rather, is to contrast competing voices and the role that the media assume in the linguistic struggle.

Two Types of Mid-1980s Development Policies in Kenya: Women in Development and Structural Adjustment

In an attempt to foster international gender equity, the United Nations proclaimed the decade from 1975 to 1985 the Women's Decade. Among other activities, the UN sponsored three international conferences to promote dialogue among women from throughout the world. The last of those conferences took place in Nairobi, Kenya in 1985. Kenyan political scientist Maria Nzomo (1989, 9) characterizes its local reception this way:

The 1985 Nairobi Conference to close the United Nations decade dedicated to women of the world caught Kenyan women (and men) by storm. Indeed, the majority of Kenyan women did not know, until the eve of this conference, that there had been an entire decade dedicated to them, and committed to the achievement of Equality, Development, and Peace.

The relative surprise exhibited by Kenyans is in concert with Kenyan women-in-development policy that emerged during the UN Women's Decade. The Kenyan government's view of the need to prevent gender
Defining Development

discrimination is summarized concisely by Nzomo (1989, 9):

[T]he Kenya government has remained consistent in maintaining the position that Kenya women are not discriminated against and therefore do not need to struggle for rights they are already enjoying.

Even though issues related to women began to find their way into policy documents, such statements proved to be more rhetoric than substance (Nzomo 1989; Nzomo and Staudt 1993). Even the formidable forces of the United Nations seemed to be weak in effecting change toward integrating women into the nation's development policies.

In contrast, another set of development-related policies promoted by outside organizations were more obviously implemented by the Kenyan government in the 1980s: the structural adjustment policies promoted by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. No doubt Kenyans of both sexes were much more cognizant of their government's adoption of these policies as they watched their access to social services plummet with the value of their currency.

Structural adjustment policies are geared toward re-structuring economies toward an export-orientation to reduce trade debts and draw more nations into the global capitalist economy. Typically, such policies include reducing civil employment and freezing wages, eliminating food subsidies, reducing public expenditures for health care and schooling, and introducing user fees for these services (Buchmann 1994). Women are disproportionately affected by this strategy to solve the debt crisis because their domestic labor, which often includes subsistence farming and caretaking of the extended

342
Defining Development

family, has to stretch further to close the gaps left by diminishing public services (Gladwin 1991; Buchmann 1994). Thus, even though structural adjustment policies and their advocates tended not to mention women, such policies have impacted women much more visibly than those emerging from the UN Decade for Women. Although structural adjustment policies typically reinforce inequities of both class and gender, impacting those who already suffer the most from poverty, governments adopt them in order to obtain a favorable international credit rating from the IMF, a prerequisite to obtaining loans from virtually all international lenders, including the World Bank.

Language as a Site of Struggle

How development is defined on Kenyan soil reveals much about power relations in the country. Tracing how the term is actually used can be much more revealing than checking its official definition. Raymond Williams has argued that the search for dictionary definitions of "words that involve ideas and values," can be "not only an impossible but an irrelevant procedure" in (Williams 1985, 17). Such a procedure obscures not only the range of possible contemporary definitions, but also the history and complexity accompanying the continual transformation of a word's meaning. The mechanisms that attach meaning to language cannot be understood apart from social relations, as Williams points out:

In the matters of reference and applicability, which analytically underlie any particular use, it is necessary to insist that the most active problems of meaning are always primarily embedded in actual relationships, and that both the meanings and the
Defining Development

relationships are typically diverse and variable, within the structures of particular social orders and the processes of social and historical change (Williams 1985, 22).

Similarly, Michel Foucault’s work makes the explicit link between meaning production and power-laden social institutions that set boundaries around what can be said at any particular moment in history (1980). For Foucault, power and knowledge are intertwined in concrete practices, especially in language, which becomes the medium of institutionally based truth production. Knowledge is a discourse invested with "truth value" attached by power and tied to specific historical conditions. Discourse here refers to the meaning that emerges from the continual process by which a variety of structural and cultural forces shape a specific activity in a specific historical context. Through discursive practices, knowledge defines how power operates while power shapes knowledge production, often through bureaucratic techniques and procedures that sustain unequal relationships by manufacturing a "truth" that makes those relationships seem natural and inevitable. In this perspective, power is exerted in many forms including rule, discipline, and policy.

Stuart Hall rightly cautions, however, that by excluding the ideological dimension of meaning, Foucault’s perspective does not account for sources of resistance or political struggle (Grossberg 1986, 48-49). For Hall, the need to theorize relations of power within the field of knowledge points back to the concept of ideology. Hall draws on Louis Althusser (1971) to argue that ideology should be seen...
Defining Development

as ideas that form frameworks for how people understand the social world and behave accordingly. Althusser's emphasis on language as the central practice "where ideas appear" is particularly crucial to this understanding of ideology as it relates to power/knowledge (Hall 1991, 97). This view of language amends Foucault's (1980) perspective with one that accounts for the inequitable distribution of power that can be exerted in the construction of meaning.

**Journalism and Linguistic Power**

Carl Bybee (1990) has integrated Hall's perspective on ideology with Foucault's power/knowledge in an analysis of print journalism that provides a useful model for studying how meaning becomes associated with a particular term. For Bybee, the dynamics of journalistic institutions embody certain rules and regularities for determining who says what in media content. Thus The Weekly Review represents a specific kind of linguistic authority, or power to assert meaning, in defining development in Kenya. To a Western (or Western-facing) audience, a printed, archival source like The Weekly Review constructs "history" with more authority than the more accessible medium of radio, whose content is much more fleeting (Bybee 1990, 199). However, to an African audience, the reverse may hold true in a context where low literacy rates, prohibitively expensive printed

---

In addition to the fleeting quality Bybee associates with broadcast media, the scarcity of television sets in Kenya limits the extent to which that medium contributes to the writing of Kenyan history.
media, and a cultural emphasis on oral tradition pervade."

Because it is an independently owned commercial enterprise, the magazine sells news whose commodity value depends on its "truth value," so that the publication can also sell its readers to advertisers (Bybee 1990, 206). The Weekly Review's appeal to truth was made explicit in a year-long advertising campaign during 1985:

Over the years The Weekly Review has earned an international reputation for objective reporting, for incisive news analysis, for capturing the real significance of news stories and for fearless but fair comment: all the things which distinguish excellent journalism (Weekly Review 1985d).

In the context of Kenya under President Daniel arap Moi, however, The Weekly Review must also toe the line of self-censorship lest it become subject to the very real threat of overt censorship, often exercised through the arrest of Kenyan journalists (Hachten 1993; Maja-Pearce 1992). The magazine is considered by many Kenyans to favor the government's perspective in its choice and manner of political coverage (Maja-Pearce 1992, 60), decisions that some observers see as bowing to the pressure of a government-instigated advertising boycott (Hachten 1993, 41). Yet another perspective asserts that the magazine is well-respected both nationally and internationally, having offered "thorough coverage and well considered criticism of public affairs while skillfully avoiding government censure" (Heath 1992, 38).

---

*Western historians can be suspicious of the historical accuracy of East African oral tradition. See, for example, the debate surrounding John W. Nyakatura's (1973) *Anatomy of an African Kingdom* (e.g., Buchanan 1975). Moreover, much of the oral tradition focuses on kings and lineages to the exclusion of lower classes and women.*
Defining Development

Equally debatable is the extent to which The Weekly Review can count Kenyan women among its readers. The magazine's total circulation reached its height of 60,000 in the mid-1980s, according to Maja-Pearce (1992). Yet an advertising campaign during 1985 claimed that over 200,000 Kenyan women read the magazine (Weekly Review 1985d). Although no definitive gender breakdown of The Weekly Review's circulation figures is available, given Kenya's disproportionate male literacy and its legal, economic, and political institutions that concentrate wealth into male hands (Boserup 1970; Nzomo and Staudt 1993), the magazine's readers are, no doubt, predominantly men. Certainly The Weekly Review addresses its readers as primarily male. Even material targeted at women is made palatable to male readers, with results that can be highly contradictory for women. For example, the magazine's 1985 advertising campaign contained full-page ads that asked, "Why do more Kenyan women read The WEEKLY REVIEW...than any other magazine?" The answer was juxtaposed against a series of photographs depicting women engaged in domestic activities, generally food preparation: "Because Kenyan women know there's more to life than recipes, fashion or baby nappies. There is the world of sports, of politics, of business, of art and ideas" (Weekly Review 1985d). There is a distinction between knowing about that world and participating in it, a distinction that goes unchallenged by how the magazine addresses women as though it were "acutely conscious of being overheard by men"
Defining Development

(Heilbrun 1990, 92). Further, beyond addressing its readers as male, The Weekly Review hails them alternatively as Kenyans or Africans, terms which implicate "the ideologies of identity, place, ethnicity and social formation" (Hall 1991, 106). More specifically, each term takes on certain connotations in the context of Nairobi in 1985. By addressing its readers as Kenyans, the magazine promotes a sense of national identity to the exclusion of ethnic identity. In the context of Kenya, the distinction is important in that ethnic rivalries forge political affinities so that minimizing ethnic identification is also a way of forestalling opposition to government legitimacy (in this case the government of President Moi, a Kalenjin).

To refer to Kenyans and their neighbors as Africans serves a similar purpose. It blurs the borders laid down by the colonials, erasing a moment of history by creating a sense of solidarity and homogeneity that transcends those borders, even while the word itself evokes the language of the colonists.

It is significant that the magazine is printed in English, one of Kenya's two national languages and a language that many rural Kenyans do not speak. The other national language, Kiswahili, is used for many print and broadcast media, and a number of local languages are used in

---

5 This metaphor is borrowed from Carolyn G. Heilbrun, who uses it to convey Adrienne Rich's (1975, 92) point that Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's Own displays a "dogged tentativeness" with respect to its analysis of gender relations.
Defining Development

government radio broadcasts (Steeves 1992). As the print-language used in Kenyan institutions such as formal education and politics, however, English takes on particular meaning as one of the languages in which Kenyans imagine themselves as part of the nation (Anderson 1991, 135). English is also, of course, a colonial remnant that conjures up historical relations of domination, a reminder that Kenyans and other anglophone Africans were dominated and "obliged to adopt the language of the dominant" (Bourdieu 1992, 143). To use that language more than two decades after independence is to maintain links to Western cultures and their models of nationalism (Anderson 1991, 116). Further, because Kenyan journalists are usually trained in Western journalist convention, their editorial decisions often reflect the influence of that training, including the use of Western news values.

The Nairobi Women's Conference and the World Bank: Articulations of Development

Some insight into the struggle to define development in Kenya can be drawn from The Weekly Review's coverage of two issues in 1985: The UN Decade for Women End of the Decade Conference and the World Bank's development assistance in Kenya. The former represents an overt attempt to create links between development and the concerns of women, to the extent that those concerns can be agreed upon by the conference participants. In The Weekly Review's coverage of the conference, any agreement on the issues is shrouded in political debate that shows the highly contentious nature of official definitions. In contrast, the
Defining Development

World Bank’s representation in the magazine can be seen as a much more subtle force in defining development by creating associations with the term in ways that assume a common-sense character.

The relative effectiveness of the voices arising from the Nairobi Conference and the World Bank can be traced, in part, to how the sources themselves are treated (Bybee 1990): Who gets to speak and what gets said? The Weekly Review’s articles on the women’s conference and on World Bank policies demonstrate how journalistic sources can be afforded different levels of authority, manifested in how directly sources shape media content.

In The Weekly Review, it was the official delegates whose voices were featured most prominently in news accounts of the ten-day conference, although thousands of women attended. Thus the female perspectives heard were those legitimated through the authority of national governments in the selection of official delegates. The UN decade theme of "Equality, Development, and Peace" reveals an intention to link two other concepts with development. However, as in the case of Western press coverage of the women's decade (Cooper and Davenport 1987), The Weekly Review’s coverage of the literal struggle to articulate those connections in the conference document focuses on the dissent sparked by different perceptions of what equality, development, and peace meant for different women. Coverage was particularly attuned to the debates between delegates from Western countries, the United States in particular, and those from the self-
proclaimed non-aligned countries.

As mentioned earlier, The Weekly Review's own position in Kenyan power relations affects how it presents content, although the publication assumes a certain primary voice by virtue of editorial decisions, news values, and journalistic routine (Bybee 1990). Yet, the frequent absence of by-lines in the magazine creates the illusion of distance between the journalists and their coverage. An example of such distancing is evident when The Weekly Review recounts how the U.S. delegation lacked the legitimacy to silence others who would associate development and women with the issues of apartheid, zionism, and the international economic order:

In the end, however, reason prevailed as a sulking United States desisted from opposing the adoption of the document as a whole by consensus, saving the Nairobi conference from a repeat of the previous two world conferences on women...

The U.S had come to Nairobi determined to steer the conference from being dominated by "divisive political issues". Besides feeling that such issues as apartheid, zionism and the international economic order were not relevant to the unique problems of women, the US also feared the discussion of these issues would turn the conference into an anti-US forum (Weekly Review 1985b, 4).

Certainly Ronald Reagan's foreign policy helped create a climate that encouraged Kenyan criticism of the U.S. at the women's conference. Reagan's policies defended the U.S. maintenance of financial interests in South Africa and strong political ties between the U.S. and Israel. Those policies substantially accounted for why the U.S. delegation to the Nairobi conference opposed official sanctions of both apartheid and zionism. American opposition to the international economic order
Defining Development

also was highly visible in Reagan's foreign policy. This opposition was particularly evident in Reagan's decision to curtail multilateral assistance through agencies like the World Bank in favor of bilateral assistance, which was tied specifically to programs deemed most likely to bring returns on U.S. investments in Kenya and other recipient nations.

Even though the broad interests of the Kenyan government coincided with those of the women representing Kenya and other non-aligned countries, The Weekly Review's coverage emphasized the drama of the proceedings over the specific issue of debate or the success of the representatives from non-aligned countries in shaping the contents of the conference document. The voices of women were discredited generally, regardless of their stance, although Western women were particularly vulnerable to such editorial treatment. The attempts of the American delegates (female and male) to silence their opponents in the argument over whether the women should be concerned about international affairs drew the magazine's attention. From the American perspective, it would seem that the personal might be political for women, but the reverse was definitely not true. More specifically, international politics should be absent from the pages of the Nairobi conference document, in the view of the Americans. The Weekly Review reacted to the attempted silencing by questioning the legitimacy of the American delegates.

One way this questioning becomes visible is in how The Weekly
Defining Development

Review attributes authority (or the lack of it) to sources through the use of titles, adjectives, and other related descriptive language (Bybee 1990). For example, the U.S. is personified in the person of an African-American man: "An angry Mr. Alan Keyes (the only man in the American delegation)" who "shouted above the booing" but the "rest of his outburst was drowned in the heckling and the amended paragraph was adopted without a vote" (Weekly Review 1985b, 4). Thus Keyes' pretense to authority is undercut by the mass media representation of his losing tactics to be heard. He even merits his own article, "Something of a surprise," in which The Weekly Review singles him out for more pointed scrutiny:

For those naive Africans who think black Americans are any less American than white Americans, or any more sympathetic to African problems, Keyes came as a rude shock" (Weekly Review 1985c, 6).

Maureen Reagan, who headed the U.S. delegation to the conference, is described in similar fashion:

Still stinging from their ordeal over the issue of Zionism, the US delegation was in no mood to hear appeals about consensus on the matter. Shouted Ms. Maureen Reagan (leader of the American delegation and daughter of President Ronald Reagan), "We shall record our objection in the vote" (Weekly Review 1985b, 5).

The speech of these two American delegates is prefaced by commentary that focuses on their inability to exert power in the conference forum, as illustrated by their muted dissent. Yet, because that dissent creates dramatic conflict prized by news values, The Weekly Review devotes much coverage to it, which detracts from the ability of the other delegates, including the Kenyans, to legitimize the contents
of the conference document or, indeed, the conference itself.

In other references, conference delegates are referred to by the name of the country they represent, as in the following example:

Even as the committees were haggling over the matter, Kenya and Cuba were putting up a new draft resolution calling on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women to contribute towards the establishment of a new international economic order (Weekly Review 1985a, 4).

In this case, the delegates retain the legitimation conferred by their own governments, although the conflict surrounding the forum still mitigates their ability to draw direct connections between international politics and the concerns of women. Because the delegates tended to ally with their own governments on the most contested issues, there was a lack of female solidarity that could exert pressure on those governments to bring about changes in country-specific gender inequity. As mentioned earlier, in the Kenyan case, results of the decade's work were visible mainly in the addition of female concerns to selected policy documents, but those concerns were still lacking in policy implementation (Nzomo 1989).

World Bank officials are treated very differently as sources in the articles that outline the Bank's activity in East Africa. Familial ties and personal history are neither mentioned nor scrutinized, as they had been with the conference delegates. Names are preceded only by World Bank titles, indicating the positions held within the institution. The use of the titles succinctly indicates that the Bank executives possess relevant expertise. Edward Jaycox, for example, is
Defining Development

simply "the bank’s vice-president for the eastern Africa region" (Weekly Review 1985f, 20).

Further, the magazine allows the Bank to frame its discussion of development much more directly than the conference participants. Where the UN conference delegates’ speech was edited, the speech of World Bank vice-president Jaycox is printed verbatim (Jaycox 1985). As an expert, Jaycox is allowed to speak uninterrupted, to "create truth" without opposition. The only person afforded the same privilege with respect to the UN Women’s conference is President Moi, whose introductory remarks were reproduced by The Weekly Review. The World Bank is again given similar power when the magazine summarizes without criticism the Bank’s 1985 Development Report (Weekly Review 1985g). Even when The Weekly Review intrudes on a World Bank monologue, as in its coverage of the announcement of projected aid levels (Weekly Review 1985e), the Bank’s officials are quoted without editorial commentary.

Articulation and Power

There are other ways in which The Weekly Review’s treatment of the World Bank in 1985 bears a strong contrast to its coverage of the Nairobi women’s conference. The concept of articulation, as Hall defines it, is helpful for thinking about how certain associations with development are made to seem natural:

I mean the connection or link which is not necessarily given in all cases, as a law or a fact of life, but which requires particular conditions of existence to appear at all, which has to be positively sustained by specific processes, which is not
Defining Development

"eternal" but has constantly to be renewed which can under some circumstances disappear or be overthrown, leading to the old linkages being dissolved and new connections--re-articulations--being forged (Hall 1991, 112).

When World Bank representatives explain how the Bank plans to facilitate development in East Africa, they build links with the term development. The Bank's broad objective to draw Kenya and its neighbors into the global capitalist economy is evident throughout articles covering the Bank's activities. Often this is done by linking development to both transnational trade and crisis alleviation. The latter was particularly pertinent to the many African nations suffering the effects of drought and famine in the mid-1980s.

Jaycox's (1985) speech associates development of the "vulnerable countries" of East Africa to the remedying of crisis, tragedy, emergency, problems, and external shocks. The alleviation of suffering teeters on three economic solutions: policy reform, the improvement of public and private investment and expenditure, and the rapid increase in the "domestic capacity to manage national economies through human resource and institutional development." In other words, they need structural adjustment. The World Bank's activity is then legitimated by a reference to other "donors" and African countries that have "asked" for its help.

In his speech, Jaycox links development to crisis-solving by attributing drought and famine to structural causes, which can be transformed through policy changes. Africa's ecosystem is vulnerable because of its "structure of production and its low level of
Defining Development.

devlopment. After a brief admission that some of Africa's plight can be traced to "deformed production structures inherited from the colonial era," Jaycox makes the transition to contemporary economics, which he constructs with statistics that verify that what he says is indeed the "truth." With the swift return to the present, he is, in effect, erasing the historical processes that contributed to the current crisis and heading off questions of responsibility.

Through the presentation of facts and statistics that define development as the solutions to certain problems, mainly the debt crisis, Jaycox employs a form of institutionally based knowledge production, using what Foucault has called a technology of power (Foucault 1980). Foucault traces the roots of this technology to the eighteenth century advent of the table, which provides the means for ordering and mastering knowledge (Foucault 1977, 148). Such ordering ultimately implies behavioral control of individuals so that they become "docile bodies" in the service of capital accumulation:

...how one was to observe, supervise, regularize the circulation of commodities and money and thus build up an economic table that might serve as the principle of the increase of wealth (Foucault 1977, 148).

From the World Bank's perspective, it would seem that the most important docile bodies are male, since the statistics used to gauge economic development tend to measure male wage labor and commodities produced for exchange. Such statistics render invisible African women's domestic labor such as child rearing and food production, since those tasks are generally not acknowledged with wages and they
Defining Development

are consumption-oriented (Beneria 1981). Female bodies become relevant to the discussion only in the sense that they may obstruct development by becoming pregnant, as in Jaycox's brief reference to the need for family planning in East Africa.

Conclusions

The delegates at the Nairobi Conference and the World Bank representatives are technically not engaged in a debate in the sense that they do not address each other directly. Yet, by talking past each other in the pages of The Weekly Review, they engage in a linguistic struggle over defining development for both Kenyans and the larger international community. Each has vested interests in making certain associations with the term, but the World Bank's interests are closer to those of the watchful audience that The Weekly Review targets. Therefore, the Bank speaks virtually on its own terms. Conversely, the issues of interest to women in general and Kenyan women specifically are lost in the magazine's conference coverage in favor of the conflict at the conference, which is consistent with Western news values and Kenyan gender ideology.

Although World Bank policies are often seen as neo-colonialism by Kenyans, during the mid-1980's the Kenyan government saw the Bank's loans as essential to economic progress, even if those loans were tied to the desperate measures implied by structural adjustment policies. The perceived lack of options therefore fed into the interest in making the Bank seem welcome in Kenya, which, in the context of media
Defining Development coverage, creates a seeming convergence between how the Bank and the nation define development. Yet women continue to be marginalized in both development policy and media representation, in part because, in the international arena, female concerns take a back seat to those of the nation and the international flow of capital.

Development discourse like that played out in the pages of The Weekly Review demonstrates how meaning is tied to power relations, in this case, those fostered by global capitalism and the gender ideology that silences women in Kenya. Tracing language usage in the media to power relations helps explain the persistent gap between the inequitable practice of development and the normative redefinition of development, including its redefinition in mass communications theory and policy.
References


Defining Development


Defining Development


Williams, Raymond. 1985. Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society. New York: Oxford University Press.


I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: The Nairobi Women's Conference, the World Bank, and The weekly Review: Defining Development in a Kenyan News Magazine

Author(s): Nancy Washington

Corporate Source (if appropriate): 

Publication Date: 8/13/94

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

**CHECK HERE**

Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8½" x 11") reproduction

“PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Nancy Washington [PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE] TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).”

OR

Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

“PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE] TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).”

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

“I hereby grant to the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) nonexclusive permission to reproduce this document as indicated above. Reproduction from the ERIC microfiche by persons other than ERIC employees and its system contractors requires permission from the copyright holder. Exception is made for non-profit reproduction of microfiche by libraries and other service agencies to satisfy information needs of educators in response to discrete inquiries.”

Signature: Nancy Washington
Printed Name: Nancy Washington

Organization: Indiana University School of Journalism
Position: Ph.D. Student
Address: Ernie Pyle Hall B201, Indiana University
Tel. No.: (812) 855-1324
Bloomington, IN 47408-2698

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:
Address:
Price Per Copy: 

Quantity Price:

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
Ethnic Media Serve Varied Roles: Miami's Haitian Media

by Douglas Walker

Asbury College
1 Macklem Drive
Wilmore, KY 40390

Presented to the International Division of the Association for Educators in Journalism and Mass Communication

August 10, 1994
Ethnic Media Serve Varied Roles: Miami's Haitian Media

Any immigrant to a new country faces a bewildering number of challenges. One way immigrants deal with these adjustments is to seek information that will help them to reduce the uncertainties and stress that accompany this process.¹

For more than a century, ethnic media have played a significant role in providing such information for immigrants. Robert Park in his classic 1922 study, The Immigrant Press and Its Control, said the press of the early 20th century helped immigrants adjust to the novelty and change of the United States.² But, Park noted, the immigrant press was also a significant source of news about the newcomer's former home.

Many others have identified these same two primary (though very different) purposes of the ethnic media -- to provide information on the immigrants' new and old homelands. Oscar Handlin echoes Park's first conclusion by saying that the ethnic media provide immigrants with the means to "interpret the issues and events of the larger American society..."³

Charles Husband, in his research on the ethnic minority press in the United Kingdom, emphasizes the second role of the


². Robert E. Park, The Immigrant Press and Its Control (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1922). Park also discussed the role of the immigrant press in developing an immigrant political power base and in maintaining communication with other immigrants.

ethnic press when he notes that immigrants often have the keenest interest in news of their homeland. Such news is valuable to immigrants because it is often ignored by the media in the immigrant's new society and because most immigrants find it easier to read the news in their mother tongue.

Ethnic Media and Adaptation

Those who have studied the immigrant media in recent years have often investigated how the media assist or inhibit an immigrant's adaptation to a new society. This research has been done with a variety of approaches and vocabularies. Some consider immigrant assimilation, others look at acculturation and still others at socialization.

Y.Y. Kim has suggested using the term adaptation to include acculturation, assimilation and adaptation, and to refer to the adjustment process that occurs when an individual comes into "continuous, prolonged first-hand contact with a new and unfamiliar culture." That is the approach I will take in this study.

The term "adaptation" does not imply that all immigrants become part of a melting pot, but it does suggest that all

---


immigrants do go through a process of change because they live in a new environment and cannot avoid some degree of change.

Adaptation may often be multi-cultural, in the sense that immigrants may retain elements of their traditional culture while adding elements of the new culture. The media can contribute to this process. Battistelli found that Italian-Canadian ethnic media played a dual role—encouraging assimilation in matters concerning the dominant group's sociopolitics, but facilitating pluralism in areas concerning the ethnic person's own culture. McCardell concluded that the news copy in the Spanish-language newspaper El Diario-La Prensa of New York tended to promote socialization into Spanish-speaking society, while the advertisements encouraged socialization into American society.

Y.Y. Kim and Lee and Stamm have suggested that greater ethnic media use will improve immigrant adaptation in the short


run, while long-term use may hinder adaptation. This raises some interesting questions. What is it about the content that might provide immediate help in adaptation, but might stymie longer-term growth? Is the content too restrictive to be of long-term help? Will such differences be consistent across media type (broadcast vs. print)?

One of the reasons Kim says that long-term ethnic media use may inhibit adaptation is because use of the ethnic media may imply an inability to get more deeply involved in the immigrant's new homeland. In fact, Hurh and K. Kim as well as Y.Y. Kim have found that interpersonal contacts usually provide the greatest amount of information about the new society, although the media are a significant source.

Although several studies have looked at the use of various forms of ethnic media, a significant majority of the available studies on ethnic media content have focused on the print media. Yet, for the many immigrants who are illiterate, radio and television are much more likely to assist them in their

---


adaptation. Chaffee et al. found that among newer Korean-American immigrants television use was a stronger predictor than newspaper use of their learning about political issues.¹³

One example of a group that has used non-print media extensively is the Haitian immigrant population in Miami. Many of the estimated 100,000 Haitians in Miami have arrived in the last two decades.¹⁴ Although this group is infrequently studied, they have developed media that have helped them to cope in a society where they have been repeatedly ostracized, both by color and by an unfair association with AIDS.¹⁵ The content of the Haitian ethnic media should suggest patterns of how the print and broadcast media of a more recent immigrant group have presented news of both the new and old societies. It is too easy for studies to employ ethnic media use as a predictor of adaptation without studying carefully what is in that content.¹⁶

In addition, we need to learn more about differences or similarities between ethnic print and broadcast media in


¹⁴ The precise count is uncertain, due to the number of illegal aliens. Stepick estimated that 80,000 Haitians lived in South Florida in 1990 (see Alex Stepick and Carol Dutton Stepick, "People in the Shadows: Survey Research Among Haitians in Miami," Human Organization 49 (1990): 66. Others have put the number at anywhere 60,000 to 150,000.

¹⁵ For a picture of how Haitians have reacted to these unfair stereotypes, see Joel Dreyfuss, "The Invisible Immigrants," The New York Times Magazine, 23 May 1993, 20.

¹⁶ The need to study content more carefully was pointed out by Pamela Shoemaker, Stephen D. Reese, Wayne Danielson and Kenneth Hsu in "Ethnic Concentration as a Predictor of Media Use," Journalism Quarterly 64 (Summer/Autumn 1987), 593-597.
presenting information to immigrants.

With this in mind, the following research questions were developed to see how Miami's Haitian ethnic media content might play a role in the adaptation process:

Research Question 1: What is the amount and type of content within Haitian radio and print media in Miami that deals with the immigrant's new environment, as opposed to his or her old environment?

Research Question 2: What is the amount and type of content in Miami's Haitian radio and print media that provides specific information related to adaptation to the new environment?

Operationalization

The first part of the content analysis looks at what content was about the immigrant's new environment (either about Miami or the United States) or about the immigrant's old environment (Haiti or other world affairs not related to the United States). If the ethnic media assist in the adaptation process one would expect to find significant information about living in the immigrant's new home.

The second part of the content analysis looks specifically at what content has potential adaptation value for the immigrants. Adaptation value has been defined as specific information useful in adjusting to and taking part in life in the new society (specifically matters related to health, living (or...
rent) situation, legal matters affecting immigrants, safety, societal relationships and obligations, and leisure activities). By this definition, information about everything, from where to shop (whether a Haitian, Cuban or American store) to how the American political system works, would all have some adaptation value. Some items obviously have more potential value than others.

Methodology

There are three Miami radio stations that carry Haitian programming. Random half-hour periods were recorded from each of the three stations during three different months of 1992. This resulted in a random sample of 27 hours of radio programming.

At the time of this study, there were two weekly Haitian newspapers published in Miami, Haïti en Marche and La Nouvelle Haití. Issues from the same time period as the radio programs were randomly selected for analysis.

The coding scheme was developed and tested by the author after consultation with a Haitian linguist and other Creole-speaking coders. This was to ensure the face validity of the

---

17. This definition was developed from McCardell's study, which was based on similar earlier studies.

18. Programs were recorded during January, February and May of 1992.

19. Since these papers were weekly editions, this resulted in use of three different issues of the newspapers. Each issue was coded in its entirety (16 to 24 pages per issue). NOTE: Mention here if you check this against other later papers.
categories. The actual coding was done by the author to ensure consistency and in order to collect specific quotes from each of the media. Both intracoder and intercoder reliability were computed and were above standards suggested for content analysis research.

Since there were only two hours of Haitian television programming each week in Miami and since some of this was only on cable television, a content analysis of the television programming was not conducted.

The Findings
Research Question 1: Newspaper

Both La Nouvelle Haiti and Haïti en Marche are four-column tabloids that use bold headlines on pages highlighted by the red and black colors of Haiti's flag. Political articles about Haiti dominate the pages. More than a third of the newspapers' space was devoted to advertising.

There were some noticeable differences between the emphasis on the immigrant's new environment and old environment. For one, while advertisements usually focused on Haitians in the United States, articles were much more likely to focus on Haiti or

---


21. The Holsti intracoder reliability was .95 and the Scott's Pi was .94. The Holsti intercoder reliability (on two hours of the radio programming) was .81 and the Scott's Pi was .76. Scott's Pi is considered the more rigorous of the two measures. A Pi of .75 or higher is considered adequate for scholarly research. See B. Carol Eaton and Joseph Dominick, "Product-Related Programming and Children's TV: A Content Analysis," Journalism Quarterly 68 (Spring/Summer 1991): 71.
Haitians in Haiti (see Figures 1 and 2). Ninety-six percent of the advertisements dealt with Haitians or Haitian companies in the United States or with American companies, while only four percent of the advertisements were primarily concerned with Haiti or Haitians in Haiti.22 Anyone reading the Haitian newspapers' advertisements would soon be aware of the U.S. environment. Ads featured everything from the Poupette Unisex Beauty Salon to Haitian doctors' clinics.

By contrast, well over half of the articles were about Haiti (57 percent) with much smaller amounts dealing with Haitians in the United States (20 percent), U.S.-Haitian relations (13 percent), the United States (5 percent) or other parts of the world (5 percent).

Research Question 1: Radio

As with Haitian newspapers, advertising is a popular part of Haitian radio programming. An average of 18 minutes every hour (30 percent of the time) is taken up by advertising. When one includes sponsored programming (program-length commercials), more than 36 percent of all radio time (about 22 minutes an hour) is given to advertising. This is more than any single type of programming (news and analysis--19 percent; music--18 percent; call-in/talk shows and panel discussions--17 percent; religious--3 percent; and other programming, such as public service announcements--7%).

22. Haiti en Marche is sold in Haiti, so advertising for Haitian businesses is included in the paper.
Figure 1 Percentages of Content in Miami's Haitian Newspaper* Articles and Advertisements that Focus on Haitians in the United States

* Includes items from the February 6, 1992 issue of La Nouvelle Haiti and from the February 12-18 and May 27-June 2, 1992 issues of Haiti en Marche.
Figure 2 Percentages of Content in Miami's Haitian Newspaper* Advertisements and Articles that Focus on Haiti

Newspaper Advertisements

- Focus on Haiti: 57%
- Other focus: 4%

(N=123)

Newspaper Articles

- Focus on Haiti: 57%
- Other focus: 43%

(N=61)

* Includes items from the February 6, 1992 issue of La Nouvelle Haiti and from the February 12-18 and May 27-June 2, 1992 issues of Haiti en Marche.
Almost all of the advertising on the radio is for local businesses (98 percent). A majority of all non-advertising programming also has a local focus (55 percent), although a number of the radio programs (35 percent) deal with international issues (almost all of those are about Haiti).

A majority of all radio items focus on Haitians in the United States (sixty-five percent do) rather than other aspects of American culture. This is most noticeable in the advertising. Eighty-nine percent of the advertising is about Haitians or Haitian businesses in the United States, while 47 percent of the other programming focuses on Haitians or Haitian businesses in the United States.

Still, in contrast to the newspapers in which local articles are rare, the radio programs frequently deal with local topics such as health care, education, drivers education and insurance.

Twelve percent of all radio items concern Haiti, but almost all of these items are non-advertising programming. Only one percent of the advertisements deal directly with Haiti, while 28 percent of the non-advertising programming focuses on Haiti. One program, for instance, featured a half-hour tape of a speech given by ousted President Aristide before he was expelled from Haiti the preceding year.

The news, in particular, is primarily about Haiti and not the United States or the international scene (except as they relate to Haiti). Eleven percent of all items are about the

---

23. For the purposes of this aspect of the content analysis, music was not included. This is because music is often not about a specific locale.
United States society, businesses or people. This includes 10 percent of the advertising and 17 percent of the other programming. There are much smaller percentages devoted to U.S./Haitian relations, world affairs and other immigrants in the United States.

Research Question 1: Comparison of Radio and Newspaper Findings

When the radio and newspaper findings are compared side by side, some differences in emphasis are noticeable. First, as Table 1 shows, although both mediums rely mostly on local advertising, radio advertising is more likely to be local than is newspaper advertising. The Haitian newspapers tended to focus on a more national audience and so the advertising reflects that stance. Second, the difference between the two mediums is even stronger in their focus on news, features and other non-advertising items. Radio programming is much more likely to be local (55% of all non-advertising items as compared to 12% in the newspapers--see Table 3). Newspaper stories, by contrast, are twice as likely as radio stories to deal with international issues.

The other key difference between the two mediums is in language. The newspaper content is primarily in French, while the radio content is largely in Creole.
**TABLE 1**

Percentage of Local, National and International Content in the Advertisements in Miami's Haitian Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>is Local</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is National</td>
<td>&lt;1%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is International</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=470     N=59

**TABLE 2**

Percentage of Local, National and International Content in the News & Non-Advertising Items in Miami's Haitian Media

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Radio</th>
<th>Newspapers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>is Local</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is National</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>is International</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N=261     N=59

* Location was defined as local if the item dealt primarily with Miami or south Florida, national if it was about locations elsewhere in the United States and international if its primary focus was on a company or issue outside the United States.
Research Question 2: Newspaper & Radio

A person moving to a new area needs a wealth of information to adjust to the new environment. The advertisements in newspapers provide simple, but necessary information about basic needs such as housing, medical and household needs. One does not adapt by simply reading advertisements, but the information in those advertisements can aid an immigrant who is looking for specific information. As a result, most of the advertising in the newspaper issues surveyed did have some adaptation value. As Table 3 shows, 86 percent of the advertising had some adaptation value, while only 14 percent was not of value. The material that was not of value was primarily ads from Haiti or elsewhere in the United States that had no local value to an immigrant in Miami.

By contrast, most of the articles did not have adaptation value. Slightly less than one-tenth of the articles had any adaptation value. The large majority of articles dealt with Haiti and not with Miami or the United States, so they did not provide any information that might help an immigrant adjusting to life in the new society.
TABLE 3

Adaptation Content in Newspapers
(from the February 6, 1992 issue of La Nouvelle Haïti and the February 12-18 and May 27-June 2, 1992 issues of Haïti en Marche)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Advertisements</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=123)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Articles</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=61)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi Square=103.61; df=1; P<.001

The percentage of radio commercials with adaptation value was slightly higher than the percentage of newspaper advertisements (see Table 4). The number of non-advertising radio items with adaptation value was much higher, however, than the number of newspaper articles (48 percent for radio as compared to 8 percent for newspaper).
TABLE 4

Adaptation Content in Radio Programming

(includes content from 27 hours of Haitian programming aired during January, February and May of 1992. The programs were recorded from AM stations WKAT, WOCN and WLQY in Miami)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Advertisements</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=470)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In other programs</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N=272)*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* this total only includes non-musical items

Chi Square=239.04; df=1; P<.001

Haitian immigrants moving to Miami, must adapt not only to United States society in general but to a Haitian environment in Miami that is potentially very different from where they lived in Haiti. As noted earlier, some of the adaptation content immigrants receive will acquaint them with this ethnic environment as well. The content analysis reveals that most Haitian newspaper and radio material does prepare the immigrant much better for this ethnic situation than it does for adaptation to the broader American society. For instance, in both newspaper and radio programming nearly 85 percent of all the items with adaptation value were specifically dealing with Haitians or Haitian society in the United States. Most of the radio ads, for
instance, were for Haitian insurance agents, Haitian restaurants and Haitian stores. This information is needed by a new immigrant but it only acquaints the immigrant with the Haitian society in the United States.

Only 14 percent of the items with adaptation value dealt with U.S. society or non-immigrant Americans. For example, some of the non-advertising radio items with adaptation value dealt with social service programs sponsored by Haitian organizations, so although such information helped in adaptation, it did not familiarize the immigrant with the broader U.S. society. The newspapers had even less adaptation information than the radio programs concerning the American society. In fact, when considering all items in the newspapers (not just those with adaptation value), less than nine percent had any adaptation value in introducing the immigrants to the broader American society. The percentage for radio was only slightly higher.

In addition, despite being located in a city with more than half Hispanic residents, less than one percent of the newspaper and radio items related to adaption to other immigrants and cultures in the United States.

When considering just the newspaper articles, only 8 percent (five of 61 articles) had any adaptation value. Three of those were about Haitians in the United States and only two were about the broader United States society. The radio totals were noticeably higher (see Figure 3 for a graphic representation of the differences). About one-third of the non-advertising programming had adaptation value. Twenty-three percent of those
Figure 3
Adaptation Value
in Miami's Haitian Newspaper* and Radio** Content

Adaptation Value in Haitian Newspaper Articles

- No Adaptation Value
- in US society
- in US society

Legend:
- No Adaptation Value
- in US society
- in US society

(N=61)

Adaptation Value in Radio Programming (excluding ads)

- No Adaptation Value
- in US society
- in US society

Legend:
- No Adaptation Value
- in US society
- in US society

(N=362)

Note: An item was coded as having adaptation value if it provided information useful to someone who needed to live in Miami. This included information on health, housing, safety, politics, social contacts, food, clothing, customs, and entertainment.
** Radio content was from Jan., Feb., and May 1992 broadcasts on Miami stations WKAT, WLQY, and WOCN (27 hours total). Each ad and news story was coded as a separate item.
non-advertising radio items had adaptation value related to Haitians or Haitian society in the United States, while 11 percent had adaptation value related to the broader United States society.

About one-fourth of the newspaper items were about politics. Of these items on politics, only one out of 46 items had adaptation value. That one item was an article giving the positions of different American politicians on allowing Haitian refugees to enter the United States. Almost all of the other political items were strictly about Haitian politics or government and were of no adaptation value to an immigrant trying to adjust to life in the United States. By comparison, the second most common topic in the newspapers was health and personal care issues. For this topic, more than four-fifths of the time it occurred, the item had some adaptation value. Most of these items were as simple as advertisements for a doctor's clinic or a beauty salon, providing the readers with basic information needed to live in their new environment. Several other content topics, such as economic and job matters and legal issues, were also associated with adaptation value more than four-fifths of the time. The topics that were less likely to include adaptation value were leisure activities and religion.

In the Haitian radio content, as in newspapers, politics was the least likely topic to have adaptation value (again because these programs or items most often dealt with Haitian politics). However, a larger percentage of the radio stories on politics did deal with the United States. As a result, 21 percent of the
political items on radio were noted as having some adaptation value. Other items with a lower likelihood of adaptation value were music (only 2 percent of the items coded had adaptation value), and social and ethnic contacts (44 percent of those items had adaptation value). The period around Haitian Mother's Day (in late May) provides an example of how programs with themes of ethnic contacts often did not have adaptation value. During that time one program devoted a half-hour to letting people call in and wish their mothers a Happy Mother's Day, even though most of the mothers were still in Haiti.

As with newspapers, the percentage of religious items on radio that had adaptation value was fairly low. This may be in part because of the political nature of many religious programs (they often focused on the situation in Haiti). For instance, one preacher urged the people of Haiti not to become discouraged in their political struggle against an unjust government (even though his immediate listeners were all in the United States).

Comparative Observations from the Newspapers & Radio Stations

The content analysis showed that, in general, advertising items were more likely to have some adaptation value (though often simple) than were newspaper articles or radio programming (because the articles and programs often concentrated on international matters rather than local affairs).

The advertising was sometimes very practical for a newcomer. For instance, in one radio ad, an insurance agent came on the air for two minutes and warned people to be cautious about signing
insurance documents without reading them carefully. The
insurance salesmen then gave his phone number and encouraged
people to call him (fulfilling the advertisement portion of his
purchased time). Another insurance agent spent several minutes
explaining what different types of insurance were available in
the United States (helpful information to many immigrants who are
unfamiliar with insurance), while another agent explained
deductibles and how the premium goes up if you reduce the
deductible. He said he discussed these issues because "it is
there that many (Haitian) people are wounded (by unprincipled
agents)."

Although both radio and newspaper advertising had fairly
similar adaptation value, radio programs were much more likely
than newspaper articles to have adaptation value. The only
newspaper articles with any adaptation value were about Haitians
in the United States and about computers.

By contrast, radio programming featured a wide array of
topics. On one program, a Haitian educator discussed the
problems Haitian youth face in adapting to the new culture,
particularly the changing sexual mores. The educator mentioned
courses in sexual education and told where cassettes on the topic
could be found locally. Another interview featured the director
of the Haitian Refugee Center who provided information to
refugees about where they could seek help and also how to find a
job. Another panel discussion talked about why many eligible
Haitians do not register to vote and what the consequences are.
Some of these programs were more valuable to newcomers, while
others appealed to immigrants that had been in the United States for a longer period. The combined result was that radio programming provided much more potentially relevant adaptation information to immigrants than did the newspapers.

In both newspapers and radio, the content analysis showed a higher percentage of items with adaptation value that were about Haitians in the United States than about the United States society in general. The newspapers, for instance, had a story about a Haitian singer's struggles in the United States and about the re-opening of the shops at the (Haitian) Caribbean Marketplace in Miami. So, readers of the newspapers received more information about Haitian society in the United States than about the society in general.

That greater emphasis on the Haitian environment in the United States is also noticeable in the radio programming. For instance, one live program from a local restaurant provided information on what Haitian children were learning in school. Most advertisements were for Haitian companies or for companies that had Haitians working there. For instance, Dade Lumber advertised itself as having a "Haitian team to serve you," while Evergreen Financial Services says: "They (we) speak Creole."

Yet, the radio programs were more likely than newspapers to deal with broader issues in American society. Several segments discussed racial prejudice in the United States (with a perspective that was often far different than one would hear on most white-owned radio stations, but that was broader than just a Haitian perspective). Another talk show host gave some basic
lessons in dealing with American society: "Don't go home with anyone you meet. Do not open the door for anyone you don't know, even someone who looks like a policeman or mailman. Teach children to say, 'My mom or dad is busy, can I ask them to call you back?'" Other radio programs dealt with issues such as education to metropolitan life and voter registration.

**Conclusions**

Constantakis-Valdés suggests that there are two different types of media produced by ethnic groups in the United States. The first--the immigrant media--are small and usually only last a few years. They focus on new immigrants, their homeland and their immigrant experience. The second--ethnic media--often grow out of the immigrant press. These ethnic media expand, however, and become more similar in operating structure to the American press. Their content, meanwhile, is designed for an ethnic audience that is American as well as part of a specific national ethnic group. So, their content includes a greater percentage of information about the "news and politics of the group" in the United States rather than about the home country.

---

24. From a radio program aired from 10:30 to 11 a.m. on February 4, 1992, on 1320 AM. Unfortunately, the announcer (a Haitian who grew up in the Bahamas) gave this information only in English and did not translate into Creole as she did for most of the rest of her program.


It is difficult to label the Haitian newspapers published in the United States. On the one hand, they appear to be an ethnic paper reaching for a large ethnic audience in the United States. In actual content, however, the Miami papers feature a key element of the immigrant media: the focus of almost every article is on the home country (in this case, Haiti). Leara Rhodes recent study of the three primary Haitian newspapers in the United States suggests that the Haitian newspapers are actually alternative presses, trying to reach and sell to a broad Haitian audience, both in the United States and in Haiti. The American-based Haitian newspapers might also be called national media in exile, publishing stories that could not be published in Haiti.

Other than that openness, the only thing that would distinguish these newspapers from ones in Haiti is the advertising. The advertising is very much from and for the Haitian community in the United States. From Haitian rock concerts to Miami medical clinics, the advertisements remind the reader of their ethnic environment in the United States. But beyond that, the Haitian newspapers in Miami provide little that could assist an immigrant trying to understand the new culture.

It is not unusual to expect that the Miami newspapers would have a great deal of content about Haitian politics, but it does appear that the emphasis on only politics—to the exclusion of local immigrant issues—puts the Miami papers on one extreme of

---

immigrant papers. For instance, The New York Times noted that the ethnic newspapers in that city have "one eye trained on the mother country and the other on the mayor's office." 28 There is little systematic study of immigrant newspapers nationwide, however, so it is hard to say whether Miami's Haitian newspapers' lack of space for immigrant issues is unusual.

Downing's study of Spanish media in New York suggests that the Miami pattern may not be so abnormal: "The interest of immigrants, especially, seem very low on the agenda of these [New York ethnic] media, with information about their various homelands prominent in a way that specific advice on dealing with the Immigrant and Naturalization Service is not." 29

It is also possible that the number of years a newspaper is in existence in the United States may be a much better predictor (rather than location) of its focus. Even though Rhodes found that all three large American-based Haitian newspapers had heavy emphasis on Haitian news, the oldest newspaper (Haiti Observateur) has the smallest percentage of news on Haiti. 30 A quick reading of Haiti Observateur shows that it has many more articles on Haitian community events in the United States than does Haiti en Marche (a much more recent newspaper). More research concerning this lack of immigrant-related stories in the


30. Rhodes, 179.
immigrant media would be useful.

Miami's Haitian radio stations' content is noticeably different from the local Haitian newspapers. The radio advertisements are almost entirely local and the programming is much more local (although items about Haiti are still the most popular programming item). The Haitian radio programs are more representative of one of the immigrant media. They have a strong emphasis on Haiti (especially in the news items), but there is also an effort to present information to help an immigrant deal with his or her new experiences.

In his book on the ethnic media, Dirk Hoerder notes that the immigrant (often labor) press of the early 20th Century was filled with local news about clubs, drama circles, women's groups and even community picnics. These newspapers "were written for a specific local audience and slowly replaced the oral traditions carried over from the old culture. In addition to the general news from the old and new cultures, they also contained specific information about community-building and community life."

Strangely enough among Miami's Haitian media, the medium with such a local emphasis is no longer the newspapers, but radio. Radio stations, rather than newspapers, present more community announcements, more local news and more items dealing with the U.S. society than do newspapers.

---


32. Other ethnic radio stations have been similarly noted for their emphasis on immigrant concerns. Radio Bilingue in Fresno, California has had a specific outreach to undocumented workers and political refugees. See Downing, J., Ethnic Minority Radio in the
There are at least three reasons for these differences between the two media. For one, the Haitian newspapers are trying to reach not only a national audience but an audience in Haiti (where papers published in the United States are sold on the street). The radio stations, on the other hand, have a greater local directive, speaking to the Haitian immigrant community in Miami. As a result, they are much more of an immigrant medium than the Miami newspapers (and, also are becoming more of an ethnic medium by providing a greater amount of programming for longer-term ethnic residents).

Second, a newspaper published in French requires journalists who are fluent in French. The journalists' language immediately constrains the type of audience they are trying to reach and the articles tend to reflect that. French was originally used as the language of the elite in Haiti. Now, it is still used in newspapers, sometimes as a symbol of the political elite, while at other times it is used because its writers argue it allows clearer expression. For whatever reason it is used, however, it immediately excludes the majority of Haitians who cannot understand French. Creole was only used in a few less significant newspaper articles on the back pages.³³

By contrast, the radio stations' dependence on Creole—

---

³³ The use of Creole is also sometimes an ideological choice, since Creole signifies the language of the masses rather than of the elite who have controlled Haitian politics for so long.
language programming makes them accessible to all Haitian immigrants. Call-in shows and panels in Creole deal with issues that immigrants face—from problems with the local school system to getting American politicians to respond to the plight of the Haitian boat people. The news is still predominantly about Haiti, but other radio programs are more responsive to local needs and questions.

Another aspect of these Creole-language radio programs is that the spoken Creole itself reflects the changing culture to which the announcers and listeners are also adjusting. The result is a language in flux. This does not in itself encourage adaptation, but it is a reflection of that adaptation process and certainly reminds the listeners of their changing environment. One Haitian sports announcer gave a perfect example of that transitional Creole when he commented on a Chicago Bulls basketball victory by saying, "Chicago té (was) hot." Then, after a few more Creole phrases, he concluded: "Don't drink and drive." This weaving of Creole and English is a reflection of an immigrant medium that is also going through a transition to a more ethnic-American medium.

A third difference between the two Haitian media is that the radio stations have more time to deal with a variety of issues. There are more than 100 hours of radio programming per week compared to 16 to 20 pages of printed newspaper material each week (both Haitian newspapers are weeklies). This difference is

---

34 A doctor's radio advertisement, in a similar way, begins in Creole and then in the last phrase concludes: "Dr. Edward is going to make you OK."
not as critical in explaining the divergence of the two media, but it does point to radio's flexibility to deal with a broader spectrum of issues (especially since the radio programs are produced by dozens of different individuals, which is a far greater number than the combined staffs of the two newspapers).

Even in radio, however, the majority of programming still dealt with the Haitian environment in Miami and not that of the broader American society. This is not wrong. In fact, it makes perfect sense that the focus should be on the local environment within which the Haitians are adapting. But, it does create an emphasis on an environment that provides only a limited perspective on what the broader American culture is like. As a result, the role of the Haitian media in the adaptation process likely becomes more limited the longer an immigrant stays in the United States. Such an observation also coincides with Kim's as well as Lee and Stamm's conclusion that the ethnic media may be initially helpful in encouraging adaptation but if used over the long term can be stifling.

This study also suggests that those examining the role of ethnic media use should study the content carefully because the potential influence of that content in adaptation may vary by medium (print or broadcast), by age of the medium and by ethnic group. In other words, all ethnic media use does not mean the same thing in terms of facilitating or slowing adaptation.
# DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

**Title:** Ethnic Media Sector Visual Roles: Marijuana, Haitian Media

**Author(s):** Douglas Walker

**Corporate Source (if appropriate):**

**Publication Date:** Aug '94

## REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHECK HERE</th>
<th>Microfiche (4&quot; x 6&quot; film) and paper copy (8½&quot; x 11&quot;) reproduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OR</td>
<td>Microfiche (4&quot; x 6&quot; film) reproduction only</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY [PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE] TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY [PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE] TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

### SIGN HERE

**Signature:**

**Printed Name:**

**Organization:**

**Position:**

**Address:**

**Tel. No.:**

**Zip Code:**

**Date:**

"I hereby grant to the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) nonexclusive permission to reproduce this document as indicated above. Reproduction from the ERIC microfiche by persons other than ERIC employees and its system contractors requires permission from the copyright holder. Exception is made for non-profit reproduction of microfiche by libraries and other service agencies to satisfy information needs of educators in response to discrete inquiries."

### DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or, if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

**Publisher/Distributor:**

**Address:**

**Price Per Copy:**

**Quantity Price:**

### REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) **Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction**

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) **Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only**

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) **Document may not be reproduced by ERIC.** (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

**NOTE:** It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
Broadcasting for National Development in the New South Africa

by

Christopher Paterson
Department of Radio-Television-Film
University of Texas at Austin
Austin, Texas 78712-1091 USA
Internet: paterson@utxvm.cc.utexas.edu

Submitted to the International Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC) for the annual convention in Atlanta, GA, August, 1994
Broadcasting for National Development  
in the New South Africa  

(Revised July, 1994)

Introduction

This paper is a case study of a national broadcasting system in transition. South Africa is in the midst of a complete restructuring of broadcasting as part of the march toward democratization. The broadcasting policies adopted by the new government will directly impact upon its success in raising the living standards of the disenfranchised majority. This paper reviews the history of broadcasting in support of national development objectives in South Africa, and urges that the ongoing broadcast policy debate in South Africa consider the imperative of maintaining coordinated control of much of the national broadcasting infrastructure in order to support the massive development efforts upon which the country must now embark.

Specifically, it is argued here that despite its shortcomings, the national public broadcaster of South Africa has an important role to play in coordinating communications support of future development efforts.

The definition of development communications as used in this paper, and its potential applications, will be examined after setting the scene by reviewing the history of electronic media in South Africa. This paper then addresses the role broadcasting has played in the development (and under-development) of the poorest segments of South African society, and suggests what role it can conceivably play in the future. Finally, I will propose that ongoing and future development broadcasting projects require coordination under the rubric of a powerful national public broadcaster.
This paper argues for maintaining a strong national public broadcasting entity in South Africa, but one far more suited to serve national development objectives than is the current South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). This argument runs counter to the prevailing trend in South Africa, where people have reasonable concerns about public broadcasting and its connection to government. Public broadcasting can be a political instrument of government or corporate sponsors, it can be elitist, and it can be too large and bureaucratic to be responsive to the needs of society. Rather than address each of these and innumerable other criticisms of public broadcasting here, I maintain that while most are well founded, none represent problems inherent to public broadcasting. A well designed and democratic public broadcasting structure can serve society effectively, and in the South African case, is the appropriate solution to development communications needs.

With the most sophisticated and extensive broadcasting infrastructure on the African Continent already in place, and a number of projects already underway which utilize broadcasting to address problems faced by South Africa's impoverished majority (for examples, see appendix), South Africa would be best served by a marriage of these phenomena—a marriage which cannot occur in the current environment of hostility toward public broadcasting and widespread commercialization and internationalization of the broadcasting sector.

South Africa's newly established Independent Broadcasting Authority has been charged with evaluating the viability and necessity of public broadcasting services. The recommendations of the Authority will be forwarded to the National Assembly, and are likely to dictate the degree to which South Africa
commits to public broadcasting for the foreseeable future. It is hoped that the recommendations presented herein will contribute to the ongoing dialogue concerning the role of public broadcasting in South Africa.

This study attempts to integrate recent South African analysis with the work of other international scholars in the context of the latest broadcasting developments. The study was facilitated by several weeks of research in South Africa, where primary documentation was located and over twenty interviews were conducted with broadcasters, educators, and academic researchers currently embroiled in these issues. Additional interviews have been conducted in the U.S. and Britain with persons researching these issues and others involved in the restructuring of South African broadcasting.

This case study is intended to advocate a specific policy objective - the preservation of a powerful national public service broadcasting entity to serve development. Key policy recommendations of a similar perspective which precede this study include those by Wilna Botha (1993), writing for the South African Education Foundation; John Van Zyl (1991a, 1991b); Naidoo and Galombik (1993) writing for the Electronic Media in Education Initiative; and the reports of other South African conferences on the future of broadcasting.

Certain limitations of this study should be noted at the outset. While a wide range of primary and secondary documentation have been consulted, and interviews conducted with many important sources, a shortage of South African resources in the U.S. and the limited duration of my research in South Africa has undoubtedly left gaps. Language has reduced access to some sources of information, although the key policy documents and studies addressed here were in English. I am satisfied that in spite of such limitations this study is sufficiently thorough.
Broadcasting in South Africa

This paper proposes reorienting the state broadcaster of South Africa toward national development. The current national broadcaster is well suited to this mission only because it incorporates a sophisticated and comprehensive broadcasting infrastructure; an infrastructure of far greater sophistication than most other countries which are predominantly under-developed. It is important to understand how and why that broadcasting system came into being, and why the change recommended herein, while substantial and problematic, is entirely possible.

With minor exceptions, South African broadcasting has always been the domain of the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC). Control of the SABC, in turn, has traditionally rested in the hands of the ruling elites of the National Party, the major party most closely connected with South Africa's Afrikaner population, the ethnic group descended from Dutch settlers. The National Party has ruled South Africa since 1943. SABC hegemony has been considered by many scholars as crucial in legitimizing South Africa's minority led governments and their despised policies of population control, popularly totalised as Apartheid.²

The South African Broadcasting Corporation was formed out of the private African Broadcasting Company in the Broadcast Act of 1936. The Corporation is now nominally independent of the government, although the SABC Chairman reports to the Minister of the Interior, and the Board of Directors is government appointed.³ The SABC is funded by a combination of television licence
fees and advertising on some program services. It also leases some broadcasting time to outside organizations.

Early SABC programming was primarily in English, which led to calls from the Afrikaner community for greater Afrikaner control. Antagonisms between people of English and Afrikaans descent peaked during World War Two, with Afrikaners generally opposing South African involvement with the Allies, or actively supporting Germany. When the predominantly Afrikaner Nationalist Party took over control of the government in 1948, the SABC Board of Governors became overwhelmingly Afrikaner.

Broadcasting gradually came to reflect a conservative Afrikaner ideology. In 1950, the SABC stopped broadcasting the BBC. Also in 1950, commercial radio, operated by the SABC, began with the introduction of the English language Springbok Radio service. In 1952, the SABC's "Bantu" service began on wired close circuit loudspeaker systems in townships near Johannesburg.

Radio service was expanded again in the 1960's. According to Head (1985), South Africa "embarked in 1961 on what may be a unique example of a highly rationalized, preplanned project for achieving total FM coverage of a large national territory". SABC radio penetration is now largely complete, a substantial achievement given South Africa's mix of vast sparsely populated desert and rugged mountains, not to mention the many artificial divisions of the country. By 1990 there were FM services in Afrikaans, English, and nine African languages. Head adds that a South African motivation in the widespread adoption of FM broadcasting was to make it harder for Africans to listen to foreign broadcasts (unavailable on FM receivers), which might question the legitimacy of South African institutions (Head, 1985, 250). By the early 1980's it was estimated that 98% of the entire South African population
had access to FM radio (Merrill, 1982, 803). Radio Zulu alone is believed to reach 3.4 million listeners (McKay, 1991, 253). A service specifically for black urban populations, Radio Metro, was also introduced. In 1992, the SABC estimated that 8.13 million black South Africans listened to SABC radio programming every day.4

The SABC now operates 21 national and regional radio stations, some commercial, some non-commercial. The commercial SABC stations compete with South Africa's two private broadcasters, Capital Radio, based in Durban and covering much of the southern part of the country, and Radio 702, based in Johannesburg and covering the Reef area (the population centers around Johannesburg and Pretoria).

"Radio Bantu", the original name for all the SABC's African language radio services, had been designed along ethnic lines, and has served to divide the black population by creating a dependency upon different channels among each major ethnic group. Many have argued that this was always its primary objective. Under the guiding hand of the SABC, the nominally independent homeland nations of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, and Venda have developed their own (primarily) African language FM services. Many of these maintain large audiences in South Africa proper. Radio Transkei has the largest listenership at around 635,000 people. By encouraging ethnic language programming in homelands areas the government hoped to build national identities for the homelands, helping to legitimize them (they are unrecognized outside of South Africa) and defeat calls for reunification with South Africa.5 Yet despite its destructive and divisive nature, radio is immensely popular throughout South Africa. Collins (1992b, 27) has called it
"the most important mass medium in South Africa", noting that less than half
the population is literate and fewer than 40% have access to electricity.

The SABC's African language radio does regularly carry school programs,
which again, are largely centered around building cultural identities.6 In
the SABC's own breakdown of programming categories on the African language
stations, 78 percent of all programming was news, sports, or entertainment,
leaving just 12 percent of airtime for programming of a developmental nature.7
Without even considering program quality, the lack of quantity is clear.

The implementation of television broadcasting in South Africa was
debated for 25 years before being carried out in 1976. Whether the long delay
resulted from Dutch Reform Church and National Party fears that it would
empower Africans through education and decrease the use of the Afrikaans
language in broadcasting, or from more rational technical, economic, and
cultural concerns is an unsettled question.8 By way of example, Harrison and
Ekman (1976) quote Rand Afrikaans University Professor Tom de Koning, the
chairman of a government panel tasked with studying the implementation of TV
broadcasting, as stating,

The greatest effect on blacks will be the raising of their
cultural aspirations. They will see other blacks with cars,
houses, and so on and ask, 'Why can't I have that?' In a real
sense there will be a 'westernization' of blacks because of tele-
vision. And their political claims will escalate as a result.

While the racist connotations of de Koning's claim are clear in the
South African context, his is essentially a traditional "rising expectations"
argument of the sort first advanced by Daniel Lerner in the late 1950's; an
argument widely discredited as an over-simplification and over-generalization.
Television began as a "whites-only" VHF service, broadcasting in Afrikaans and English on alternate nights. Two channels for blacks were later introduced. One broadcast in Zulu and Xhosa, the other in Sotho and Tswana. Critical scholars have written that the content was heavily laden with the values of the white ruling classes. A second English and Afrikaans channel for entertainment and sports was also added.

In the mid-1980's localized UHF television broadcasting was started in the homelands. Bophuthatswana began broadcasting in English in 1984 as "Bop TV", and its broadcasts soon became extremely popular with blacks and whites living around Johannesburg, causing considerable consternation in the government (Head, 1985, 35-36). In a typically Orwellian response, the SABC, which rebroadcast Bop TV in the Johannesburg area, altered the rebroadcast to include only the large black townships around Johannesburg, using highly directional antenna to prevent reception of Bop TV by white South Africans. Bop TV remains the most popular television channel in Soweto Township (Van Zyl, 1991a, 11). Bophuthatswana, and the other Homelands states, are now being reintegrated into South Africa. The new South African broadcasting legislation makes note of this possibility, and provides for the licensing of these broadcasters within the South African system.

The historic steps toward the restructuring of South African society undertaken in February, 1990, by State President F.W. DeKlerk began an unstoppable process of reform which culminated in the country's first democratic elections in April, 1994. Media reform, and in particular, an end to SABC hegemony, were recognized early on as integral to democratization.
At the beginning of 1992, SABC television was reorganized into three channels, two of which broadcast SABC programming through most of the day. The third is considered a spare channel, and is used for special SABC programming or leased to outside programmers. The channels are TV1, the original television broadcaster, Contemporary Community Values television (CCV), formed from the merger of the black oriented channels, TV2 and TV3, and the spare channel, Teleschool Series (TSS). TSS is also the SABC's primary educational channel. They claim to screen educational programs to 260,000 secondary school students daily (Pearson, 1992, 80).

It is noteworthy that despite the SABC's current efforts to restructure itself into profitable business units and shed its draconian image, the division of revenue between services geared toward white audiences and those geared toward black audiences remains a tightly guarded secret. This is an indication that although the SABC has undergone dramatic change, its founding apartheid oriented philosophies remain intact.

The SABC also rebroadcasts the encrypted satellite programming of M-Net, an entertainment television channel along the lines of Home Box Office, which is owned by a consortium of South African newspaper publishers. Although most of M-Net's programming consists of foreign films, they have had a huge impact on South African broadcast restructuring, serving as an influential lobby for the pro-free market position which gradually came to dominate negotiations toward restructuring. The popularity of that philosophical position has led to widespread demands that the SABC be privatized or otherwise dismantled.

Van Zyl (1991a) writes that the SABC board, as well as most of the ranking members of the government's radio and television secretariat have traditionally consisted entirely of members of the Broederbond ("Brotherhood"), a
secretive society dedicated to the maintenance of the South African power structure, regarded by some as the core echelon of the National Party. Thus the SABC's role in preservation of the South African status quo, including deliberate underdevelopment of the majority, is not surprising.

Despite widespread distrust of the SABC, use of electronic media in South Africa is extremely high, regardless of which of the vastly disparate audience data one consults. This, in combination with technological sophistication of South African broadcasting, is further evidence of the potential usefulness in support of development of South Africa's national broadcasting system.

AMPS (Associated Media Products Survey) is South Africa's major commercial audience survey, and is widely used in both administrative and academic analysis of South African media. As summarized by Botha, AMPS finds radio listenership "well established at levels of over 50%, and mostly at over 60% among the African population in all provinces, and rural and urban areas, and across the range of income levels and age groups." AMPS also found that with the exception of the population of Natal, a larger proportion of Africans in all areas, of all ages and incomes, watch television than read newspapers. About 27% watch television daily.11

Broadcasting and Development

The vast inequities in South African society have been exacerbated by a policy of devoting only the barest resources toward the economically disenfranchised majority of South Africans, the majority disenfranchised primarily
by virtue of skin color. Few of the rules normally applied to the economic and social development of societies apply in South Africa, for unequal development has been routinized since the country was first settled. Systemized inequality has denied most South Africans access to adequate health care, education, and economic opportunity. The result is a state of crisis in most population centers. The children of the 1980's are considered "the lost generation", for the near total lack of education they have received as a result of poor schooling and social unrest.

Conditions of extreme poverty comparable to other African LDCs prevail through most of the country. The average light skinned person lives a modest, but comfortable lower middle class existence, the average dark skinned person lives in extreme poverty and appalling conditions. People of other skin colors and shades tend to fall somewhere in between. A white literacy rate of 99% in contrast with a black rate of 50% or less points to the inequalities in education. Through the end of the eighties, the government spent about five times more money on the education of each white student in the country than on each black student (Van Zyl, 1991a, 15).

Although not the principal focus of this paper, it is vital that development be defined for our purposes prior to addressing the potential role of broadcasting. The definition of development is particularly problematic in the South African context, for by some definitions most of South African society is developed. For example, if development is "the process by which individuals change from a traditional way of life to a more complex, technology advanced, and rapidly changing style of life", as suggested by Rogers, then most of South Africa's poor urban majority are developed. Given the abysmal living conditions of these people, and their obvious
oppression by a system not of their own making, that definition clearly falls short. More appropriate to the South African case is a more human centered definition of development, such as that offered by Wang and Dissanayake:

... a process of social change which has at its goal the improvement in the quality of life of all or the majority of people without doing violence to the natural and cultural environment in which they exist, and which seeks to involve the majority of the people as closely as possible in this enterprise, making them masters of their own destiny.\textsuperscript{14}

But such an abstract definition must be combined with the more tangible definitions of development as the accomplishment of specific problem-centered objectives, such as the elimination of malnourishment, the provision of economic opportunity, etc. This is known as a "basic needs approach". Given the partial and very uneven development that has occurred in South Africa, it is all the more necessary to define development by its objectives.

Conversely though, the uniquely oppressive and socially disruptive nature of South African society calls primarily for a human centered form of national development, a form which can not be accomplished through the fulfillment of social indicator goals alone. Haq and Kirdar's Human Development approach is helpful. This emphasizes development of human resources in terms of:

a) education ... because technology cannot flourish in societies where illiteracy reigns supreme;

b) nutrition and health, which require simultaneous action in several sectors - agriculture, public health, basic health education, and mass media support in spreading information and helping to mobilize nationwide action;
c) enhancement of the position of women and the promotion of women's involvement in decisions affecting their lives, families, and communities;

d) the new scientific and technological revolutions taking place in such disparate areas as informatics, biotechnology, materials, and energy.

This approach not only provides an appropriate framework for development in South Africa, but alludes to the potential importance of mass media in support of development. This paper's advocacy of the extensive use of mass media in development should not be construed as a reversion to the early paradigm of development communications which suggested that powerful media messages could lead development efforts. Current thinking tends to either place mass media in a crucial and integral supporting position for development (what is now widely known as "Development Support Communications"), or dismisses the utility of mass media altogether in favor of more efficacious localized and indigenous communications efforts.

This is a necessarily reductionist perspective on the evolution of development communications. I do not mean to suggest that the vital lessons learned through decades of mostly unsuccessful development communications efforts are to be ignored. I believe that they can be applied within the mass communications oriented development paradigm recommended herein. It is argued here that both "big" and "small" communications paradigms are valid means of communicating development messages, but in the South African case, a highly developed mass media with a large and loyal audience, along with the widespread breakdown of more traditional and localized communications make the former approach - utilization of mass media - the most appropriate communications model for South Africa's development planners. But it cannot be the
sole approach. A multiplicity of communications methods sensitive to local needs, as advocated by Servaes, is clearly necessary. South Africa's unique circumstances, however, call for a restoration of electronic mass media as a central component of development.

Just as there is little consensus on the future of broadcasting in South Africa, there is also little consensus on the future of social and economic development. Collins and his colleagues (1992a) argue for the rapid integration of South Africa with the global information economy, contending that emphasis on Fordist industrial or agricultural development is inappropriate and potentially destructive to South Africa's already weak economy. Distance education services provided by a public broadcaster can go far in teaching the skills appropriate to such an objective.

South Africa's broadcasting infrastructure is also well positioned to serve rural development. Other scholars have called for the widespread encouragement of appropriate small scale farming, which would help to create rural employment and reduce rural to urban migration (Lipton & Lipton, 1993; Christiansen, 1993). McAnany (1980) and others have written that mass media can provide a great deal of information to rural populations which overextended rural development workers cannot, and can bring information to the rural poor at far lower cost. However, it can only do so as part of integrated development efforts which have the full commitment of governments and development agencies alike.17

Explosive urban population growth rates, especially among the poorest population segments, combined with disastrously misplanned urban development, make sustainable urban development South Africa's greatest challenge.18
Massive urban development efforts are required, consequently necessitating large scale development support communications. South African state broadcasting is already well situated to provide such support in education, primary health care, and many other areas.

The form of development communication advocated here is primarily the type known as distance education, though, like other terms in the field, this means different things to different people. Distance education is differentiated from other uses of media in development in various ways. Rampal (1991) distinguishes it from development communication, which he sees as programming of an instructional nature aimed at solving specific problems, and development journalism, discussed later. Jamison and McAnany (1978) similarly distinguish development communication and formal education. I suggest its use in the broadest sense, for what McAnany and others term "non-formal" as well as "formal" education. That is, supplementing the teaching of language, math, and science in the classroom as well as literacy, vocational, and other training programs for adults.

Few issues in South Africa elicit such broadbased agreement as the crisis state of the country's education system. Mass media is being widely viewed, perhaps naively so, as the only potential solution to the education crisis. South African educators have greeted broadcast democratization with enthusiasm. A number of grass-roots initiatives have developed in recent years to lobby for educational broadcasting. These groups have undoubtedly had some influence in broadcast restructuring, but their pursuit of similar, but distinct and even contradictory agendas, has lent a sense of anarchy to educational broadcasting in South Africa.
Botha suggests several important areas in which mass media can bring about useful change in education in South Africa:

a) Promoting cross-cultural communication, easing the transition to multicultural education, and helping to introduce African culture and experience into mainstream education.

b) Promoting awareness and increasing the status of vocational and technological training.

c) Helping to boost self esteem and morale, and lessen the isolation of, South Africa's underqualified, under-equipped, and over-burdened teachers, especially in rural areas.

d) Helping to promote new language policies.

These objectives, in concert with basic formal education, should be the focus of educational broadcasters in the future, but that can only happen if the many educational programmers which now exist agree to coordinate their efforts both pedagogically and logistically. The current educational efforts of the SABC are so poorly regarded that it is unlikely that the state broadcaster could transition into this coordinating role in anything like its current form. A thorough restructuring, not a scrapping, of the SABC, is required.

That the SABC failed to plan for quality development broadcasting as broadcast technology was introduced is not in itself surprising. Katz and Wedell (1977) observed that most countries failed to incorporate development planning into the establishment of national broadcasting. It is South Africa's motivations that are unique. Virtually from the outset, South African broadcasting was owned and operated by the architects of the apartheid system. The broadcast system that has developed has done little to improve
the lives of South Africa's poor majority, but has instead served to effectively separate and isolate cultures and ethnicities in the spirit of apartheid. And since two thirds of the SABC's income comes from advertising revenue, it is not surprising that the system is geared around economic, rather than public service, principles. Phelan (1987) contends that nearly all South African media has historically contained an "intrinsic marketing mentality".

The failings of the SABC have not prevented the beginnings of a wide variety of useful development projects using broadcasting. However, the lack of coordination of these projects under a national broadcast superstructure are resulting in minimal benefit and substantial confusion among development communicators and audiences alike. A restructured national broadcaster could provide national and regional broadcasting to the most efficacious development communications efforts. With a reorganized, development oriented SABC, educators and other development workers could be offered unified development support communications from a single source, instead of the confusing assortment of often inappropriate options now available.

Current Development Communications Efforts

The appendix provides a list of major educational development projects currently underway in South Africa utilizing broadcasting. It is not intended as a complete survey of such projects, but as an indicator of the diversity
and sophistication of projects now underway, as well as evidence that better coordination of such efforts is urgently needed.

With coordinated planning and funding, several of these projects could together produce the core programming for the development and educational programming of a national public service broadcaster, or could effectively supplement its efforts. But in the current situation, these projects are working against each other as each strives for legitimacy, funding, and audience.

Before getting to the recommendations of this paper, there are three additional forms of mass media which are generating considerable discussion in South Africa and which warrant some mention. These are community broadcasting, development journalism, and satellite broadcasting. The first two topics take us back to the crucial role of "small" media in development.

Community broadcasting has already had a strong start in South Africa with the temporarily licensed transmissions of some organizations such as Rhodes University, the unlicensed transmissions of "Bush Radio" in Capetown, and others. The new Independent Broadcast Authority legislation clears the way for the eventual licensing of community broadcasters, although the exact qualifications needed to get on the air remain unclear. Hornik expresses the spirit of community broadcasting advocates, writing,

If individual change is impossible because resource constraints permit only trivial improvements, the favored role for communication is one which enables the mass of the population to organize politically. Then they can demand their fair share of society's resources...21

The concept of Development Journalism has been revived in South Africa as a potentially important tool in national development. The concept entails mobilizing journalists as watchdogs of development efforts, ensuring that the
needs of communities are being met. Because it remains closely linked to New World Information and Communications Order (NWICO) philosophy, widely disparaged in South Africa, as in the United States and Britain, the advocates of this paradigm of development communications face an uphill struggle. Its widespread acceptance, however, would add another promising dimension to prospects for coordinated development communications in South Africa.

While not integral to these recommendations, any longer term recommendations concerning broadcasting in South Africa must consider the uses of a South African direct broadcast satellite (DBS). The prospects for DBS in South Africa are in flux at the moment, after considerable efforts by the SABC to bring DBS to fruition. The SABC had hoped to acquire Ku band spot beam transponders capable of transmitting directly to South African viewers by 1995, but recent indications suggest that all DBS plans are on hold until the many uncertainties of broadcast restructuring are resolved.22

South African interest in DBS must be adapted to include development applications. As demonstrated in the Indian SITE experiment, more recently in China, and in other cases, satellite transmissions can be effectively used to bring development programming to remote populations who are either out of reach of terrestrial transmission, or it can do so at lower cost per audience member than can terrestrial broadcasting. The potential exists for ground-breaking regional cooperation in the use of satellite broadcasting for development throughout Southern Africa.23 Only South Africa has the means to lead such an effort, however, and only through the efforts of a strong national broadcasting entity.
Future Policy Directions

South Africa broadcast regulation is rapidly evolving, and is doing so with little regard for the importance of public broadcasting at the national level, instead focusing on privatizing broadcasting capabilities currently in government hands and opening the broadcast spectrum to the private sector to the greatest possible extent.

Negotiations on broadcast restructuring originally amounted to a choice between a predominantly public service oriented system, or an almost entirely commercially driven broadcasting system along the lines of the United States. And thanks to an extraordinary amount of pressure from American government officials and commercial broadcast interests, the tide has shifted toward the interests of big, commercial media, and away from the interests of public service broadcasters and producers. It is by no means a given that the foreign media conglomerates anxious to exploit the South African market will discourage development oriented programming, but high revenue programming must be their normal fare in order to justify investment in South Africa. Pro-social programming generally does not turn a profit, and will likely be pushed from the airwaves of South Africa by a market-oriented broadcasting system, a system virtually free of government guidance. Since that is the direction South African broadcast restructuring appears to be taking, the recommendation of this paper takes on new urgency.

Broadcast restructuring began in earnest in March, 1990 with the State President's appointment of a Task Group to recommend changes to South African broadcasting. The task group lacked credibility for its unrepresentative
composition, but its recommendations have had a substantial impact on the
course of restructuring (Louw, 1993, 68). The Task Group had the often
conflicting charge to democratize and reform broadcasting to serve the best
interests of all South Africa, to provide for "freedom of speech", to
"depoliticize" broadcasting and to accommodate the needs of new commercial
broadcasters. Although their report, known as the Viljoen report after the
group's chairman, was controversial, it generally did a good job of providing
for these conflicting goals. A key recommendation was the establishment of an
Independent Broadcasting Authority prior to democratic elections, as did
occur.

The Viljoen Report, and the broadcast restructuring process more gener-
ally, is inherently problematic in its temporal relationship to the democra-
tization process as a whole. It imposes a new national broadcasting system on a
new national political system to which it may not be well suited. To the
extent that new political system will likely require massive social and
cultural adjustments, the Viljoen timeframe very definitely puts the cart
before the horse. It is possible, but unlikely, that a new government could
revisit broadcast restructuring plans after it is fully in power, on the basis
of the illegitimacy of the parliament which legislated the changes. The
Kempton Park negotiations, however, have attempted to produce agreements
designed to prevent just such second thoughts in this and other crucial
arenas. The process started by Viljoen will likely yield the broadcasting
system South Africans must live with.

At around the same time of the Viljoen report, several conferences on
media restructuring were organized by elements of the South African Left. The
most important of these was the Jubulani conference in 1991. Considering
Jubulani and similar forums, Collins (1992b) writes that, "Broadly, the left has envisioned a post-apartheid South Africa with three broadcasting sectors; public, commercial and community", along with an independent regulatory body. The legislation recently passed by the South African Parliament authorizing the Independent Broadcasting Authority calls for precisely such a structure, but also does much to placate commercial interests by leaving considerable leeway for self-regulation and reserving the bulk of broadcast spectrum for commercial use.

The dominant power in South Africa's new government is the African National Congress (ANC). ANC media policy has been shaped by a wide variety of sources. Especially influential has been the Film and Allied Workers Organization (FAWO), whose position is progressive and democratic up to the point that their essentially protectionist stance is not compromised. ANC media policy has exhibited a fascinating philosophical shift in orientation from revolutionary to libertarian. The ANC, in recognition of the popularity of American advice on broadcast issues has sought the counsel of officials from the United States' Federal Communications Commission and other American broadcasting "experts", most offered up by the United States Information Service in an extensive but little known effort to destroy public broadcasting in South Africa and pave the way for media multinationals to fully exploit the South African market.  

The ANC is formulating media policy now with little consideration of the role of broadcasting in community development and education. While the ANC has called for maintenance of a public broadcasting service in its Media Char-
ter, it did little to define the role of such an entity. Botha quotes ANC education planner John Samuel as acknowledging,

In the short term, traditional education delivery structures alone cannot begin to remove the backlogs created by apartheid. Creative intervention is needed, and there is widespread consensus that the media could and should provide a vehicle for education reconstruction.

Unfortunately, such statements by ANC officials are in greater supply than coordinated policy mindful of the development needs of the country they will inherit. The ANC has been slow to develop a comprehensive media policy, preferring instead to react to the course of negotiations and government actions. Their overriding objective was to ensure that they had equal access to media as the elections approached.26

Recommendations

There are many topics which are beyond the scope of this paper, but which are integral to the issues addressed here. These include the following questions:

-Should South Africa adopt English as a lingua franca for education, or continue to provide educational broadcasting in the student's first language?
-How will a large Public Broadcasting Service be funded?
-To what extent should and could a national public broadcaster work for national unity, the creation of a national identity and culture; or more appropriate to South Africa, the building of a plural culture? Would such a mission make the state broadcaster a political tool of whatever party is in power?
Can a public broadcaster serve to protect and develop the indigenous production industry, which may be threatened by over-commercialization and internationalization of broadcasting?

Are the forces responsible for the disintegration of public broadcasting in Europe and other parts of the world significant in South Africa?

What is the relationship between Public Broadcasting and Democratization; are they complementary or contradictory?

In answer to the final question, this paper assumes that through its power to inform, public broadcasting is conditionally empowering, and therefore serves the process of democratization.27

By highlighting the failures of development broadcasting efforts in South Africa to date, and the uncoordinated nature of ongoing efforts, I have hoped to demonstrate the need for development broadcasting coordinated by a powerful national broadcaster. But South Africa, given its experience with the SABC, is wary of such an entity, and it seems most South Africans would rather see the SABC dismantled. That would be a mistake.

The SABC must be substantially depoliticized, and operated as a genuinely independent quasi-governmental, public service oriented corporation along the lines of the British Broadcasting Corporation or several other European systems. It must be structured as primarily an educational organization. Its role should be buying, producing, and coordinating educational programming in close consultation with all education and development organizations operating in South Africa. It is ironic, perhaps, to be advocating that South Africa adopt a BBC style national broadcasting system, for doing so would be very much a return to the roots of South African
broadcasting. The BBC was instrumental in the establishment of South African broadcasting, and arguably, in the establishment of the hegemonic and divisive instrument that South African broadcasting became (van der Veur, 1993, 4-5).

Van Zyl (1991a) criticizes the SABC for devoting air time on the original black stations for entertainment, thereby giving short shrift to the educational requirements of the black audience. But it is unlikely that these broadcast channels would have acquired the audience loyalty they now possess had they had any other emphasis. Maintenance and exploitation of that loyalty is now crucial to begin seriously addressing educational needs of South African society as a whole. The very entertainment strategies used by the SABC to propagate apartheid ideology can now be turned to society's advantage, coopted for developmental purposes.

This paper does not propose that development efforts in South Africa depend exclusively on broadcasting. Development must always be a coordinated effort between planners, practitioners, and communicators. Nor is it suggested that the focus of technological efforts in support of development should be broadcasting. South Africa already has an impressive track record in grass-roots video and radio, experience which can be turned from oppositional political goals to community level development efforts. But, like community broadcasting, non-broadcast video cannot play a major part in national unification and reconciliation—what the traditional development communications theorists called nation-building. A new South African government must carefully reverse the old system of divide and rule, for if they are to rule effectively, they must unite, within a pluralist framework. This is where national public broadcasting must also be employed. This necessarily
implies a political mission for what should be as non-political a system as possible. In this writer's view, it is a necessary and legitimate mission.

South African communications professor Keyan Tomaselli recently observed that the ANC, "does not yet appear to have a clear understanding of the relationship between broadcasting and development." That failure must soon be rectified, for it will almost certainly be the ANC's vision of broadcasting which has the greatest impact upon shaping a new broadcast structure. If planning for future broadcasting fails to take into account the potential of broadcasting for development, especially where such an extensive broadcasting infrastructure already exists, then a system could easily develop which is even more hostile to pro-social broadcasting than the current one. Just as it must use national broadcasting to support development, the future government of South Africa must also remember that development cannot take place in a vacuum - government must be committed to improving the conditions of the poor, and must have a full range of policies in place to facilitate and accommodate that gradual improvement.

Under the guidance of local and foreign experts from government, academia, and the commercial sector, South African electronic media is plunging toward a state of entertainment dominated uselessness. It is not too late to rectify that mistake - if action is taken now to preserve the role of the Public Broadcaster in South African national development.

While many people have assisted with this project, I would particularly like to thank Keyan Tomaselli, Ruth Tomaselli, and Eric Louw of the University of Natal for their generous assistance and hospitality.
APPENDIX

Current Development Communications Efforts

CHILDREN'S TELEVISION WORKSHOP

Educational television programming is being developed by the creators of Sesame Street for South Africa. Despite ample funding, the project has run into various obstacles during its several years in South Africa, and has struggled for legitimacy. Its current status is unclear.

EDUTEL

The educational broadcasting service of the Bophuthatswana Broadcasting Corporation, broadcast on the homeland's second channel, Mmabatho TV, and available by satellite through much of Southern Africa, as well as to audiences within reach of Bop TV's transmitters. EDUTEL programming is generally well regarded, and considered superior to similar fare on SABC, but details of content were unavailable for this study.

LEARNING CHANNEL

Although broadcast by the SABC on leased channels, the Learning Channel has an antagonistic and competitive relationship with SABC educational programmers, despite their identical basic formal education and adult literacy objectives. Learning Channel founder William Smith claims his programming is far more popular with students and teachers alike, but there is little reliable data to prove or disprove his claim.

Smith's method is unique. His broadcasts show a single teacher who conducts lessons with the aid of videotape roll-ins, a chalkboard, and studio demonstrations. Extremely low production costs enable him to generate a large quantity of programming, apparently enabling him to make a tidy profit from his sponsorship by the Star Newspaper chain and videotape sales. In spite of this, he continues to seek additional support from international NGO's and private donors in order to expand the project.

The Learning Channel is also involved with the distribution of solar and generator powered video playback equipment for use in remote areas, but could not provide information on the extent of this effort. Some Learning Channel programming recently became partially interactive through the use of telephone connections between the Learning Channel studio and some schools. Smith was not concerned that the lack of telephones in many areas might exclude much of his audience from interacting with his teachers.

MAXLITE (PTY) LTD

A small project to distribute generator powered televisions to schools in areas without electricity.

OPEN LEARNING SYSTEMS EDUCATION TRUST (OLSET)

One of the largest ongoing educational broadcasting efforts, OLSET, has the backing of many leading mainstream media figures, and considerable international support. Its primary mission has been the production of literacy training tapes for schools, which it is currently testing. They refer to their pedagogy as interactive only because it is designed to engage students.
PROGRESSIVE PRIMARY HEALTH CARE NETWORK

Community health care programming produced by a Cape Province doctor, and broadcast by an SABC radio station. A similar effort has been reported in another part of the country using an unlicensed radio transmitter. Further details were unavailable.

RURAL TELEVISION NETWORK (RTV)

A small, innovative, effort to provide televisions and videocassette players to remote, rural audiences, and distribute some developmental programming for them to view. Viewing centers are usually the verandas of rural trading stores. Over 500 such video displays screen at least six hours of material daily. There appears to be no coordination between this project and other rural development communications efforts.

SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (SABC)

Extensive educational radio programming, broadcast in many languages. Some programming is produced by the Ministry of Education, and broadcast by the SABC. It has been reported, however, that all programming is planned in consultation with the Ministry of Education, and for this reason lacks popular legitimacy among teachers and students.

TELESCHOOL

The educational television programming of the SABC, produced mostly by their SAPRITEL division. Although of considerable quantity, this programming is widely criticized as over-produced, of little educational value, and poorly programmed. Most of it is transmitted after students have left school for the day, when few are likely to watch educational programs. The SABC has only recently introduced printed materials to support their educational programming.

COMBINED MEDIA HEALTH EDUCATION CAMPAIGN

One South African communications scholar has recently maintained that any development communications efforts need to be aimed primarily at urban township areas where an ever growing majority of poor black South Africans live, and where health and education problems are severe. This privately sponsored health campaign is attempting to do that. This project of the Institute of Urban Primary Care was developed by a medical doctor who discovered extraordinary readership of a health education column he wrote for the Sowetan and Star newspapers. The proposal takes a "social marketing" approach, providing information with multiple media channels in unison. One of the project's greatest achievements to date is assuring the cooperation of the SABC's Radio Zulu, Sotho and Metro, and local television. The project intends to use a professionally produced television and radio serial to introduce primary health care themes to its audience, and proceeds to reinforce those messages with instructional materials for use by health care workers and others involved with community development, as well as newspaper supplements directly reinforcing the messages to the mass audience.

The project's architect, Dr. Garth Japhet, may be creating an important model for development communications in South Africa, a model which applies the strengths of commercial, governmental, and public service organizations to development issues. However, given the spotty track record of social market-
ing, South Africa should not pin its development communications hopes on this concept alone.

UNISA
University of South Africa's open university program, broadcast by the SABC.

HANDSPRING PUPPET COMPANY
A South African puppet company which has extensively researched the possibility of producing educational programming along the lines of the Muppets.

DURBAN MEDIA TRAINER'S GROUP
Although currently inactive, this organization has pioneered a number of creative training projects over the years, bringing media production skills to individuals and groups which would normally have no such access. Affiliated with:

UNIVERSITY OF NATAL EDUCATIONAL BROADCAST INITIATIVE
An initiative coordinating the activities of a number of Durban based media and educational organizations under an umbrella educational broadcasting project. The intent was to produce educational audio cassettes for classroom education, begin transmitting that material when radio licences became available and also in cooperation with existing broadcasters, and work toward establishment of a University of Natal based educational television channel (Tomaselli, 1991). At this time, it appears that political divisiveness among the organizations and individuals involved has stalled the project.

CASSETTE/BUSH RADIO
A project training media workers in the Capetown Flats area. Has produced a large collection of audio tapes for education, development, and political mobilization. The same organization attempted to begin community level broadcasting, but was shut down by the government.

ELECTRONIC MEDIA IN EDUCATION INITIATIVE (EME)
An effort by educators, broadcasters, and academics to begin to coordinate educational media projects, and develop a unified curriculum for such projects. Although an important effort, its influence to date has been minimal.
Bibliography


Coetzee, Gerrit, Production Director, Educational Programs, South African Broadcasting Corporation (1993), Interview.


Gibbons, Chris, Programme Director, Radio 702, (1993), Interview.


Japhet, Garth, founder, Combined Media Health Education Campaign (1993), Interview.


Learning Channel (South Africa). Promotional Material.


Lotriet, Pietie, General Manager, Commercial Radio Services, South African Broadcasting Corporation (1993), Interview.


Marais, Hendrik; Conradie, Pieter; Malan, Charles; Schuring, Gerard. (1993) Perspectives on Intercultural Communication in a Democratizing South Africa. Paper delivered to the World Communications Association, Pretoria, July.


Notes


2 The seminal analysis of this nature is Tomaselli, et al, 1989.

3 A new and extremely diverse SABC Board was appointed in 1993. Although it includes some of the SABC's harshest critics, it is continuing to struggle for popular legitimacy. As of this writing, the new ANC dominated government had not made significant changes in these structures.


6 Tomaselli, ibid, 97.


8 Drury and Orlick represent these opposing views.


12 Merrill, 801. Botha (5) places overall South African functional illiteracy at 70%.


14 Wang and Dissanayake, 5.

15 In Awa, 426.

16 The use of terms such as Development Support Communications is inevitably problematic. Some writers consider this term indicative of a distanced, journalistic role of mass media in development, while others see it as indicative the primacy of mass media in the process of development.


18 See, for example, Rogerson.

19 Paraphrased from Botha, 4.

20 Republic of South Africa (1989), 675.


22 SABC Annual Report, 1991-1992, 6,16; and interviews with SABC officials and South African media researchers.

23 Van Zyl (1991) proposed such a plan in 1991, suggesting that the satellite transponder already leased by Bophuthatswana Television's Mmabatho TV be used to carry a public broadcasting service for Southern Africa. p.8., 11-12.

24 The Campaign for Open Media, a key player in broadcast restructuring negotiations, has led the argument that an IBA established by Parliament will not be legitimate. Theirs seems the minority position, however.


26 Giffard, 143; ANC Draft Media Charter, sec. III. Electoral oversight addressing most of the concerns of the ANC and other parties was accomplished by an Independent Media Council, agreed to in Multi-Party negotiations. A board of 21 independent media experts oversaw media through the election
campaign, attempting to ensure that all parties received equal access and treatment.

27 Marais, et al., deal more extensively with these issues, advocating the role of the media in national unification.

28 For several examples see Prinsloo.

29 Professor Keyan Tomaselli, from personal correspondence. Zaffiro (1992) presents a concurrent argument.

30 A point emphasized by McAnany, 17.

31 William Smith, Interview.

32 Based upon a project proposal by Dr. Japhet, and interview with him in Johannesburg.

434
I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: BROADCASTING FOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA.

Author(s): CHRISTOPHER PATTERSON.

Corporate Source (if appropriate):

Publication Date: 

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

CHECK HERE □ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8½" x 11") reproduction

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION.]

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).

OR

□ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION.]

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC).

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:

Address:

Price Per Copy:

Quantity Price:

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

SIGN HERE □ Where to send complimentary microfiche

[Name and organization]

[Address]

[Signature] [Printed Name: CHRISTOPHER PATTERSON]

[Position: ASS'NT INSTRUCTION] [Tel. No.: 512-424-4971]

[Organization: DEPT OF ADVANCED TECH] [Date: 8-31-94]

[Address: 465 W. TX 78712] [Zip Code: 78712]
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
Postcolonial India: Journalistic Constructions
National Identity In The Contemporary Elite Indian Press
An Analysis Of Selected Articles In The Times Of India, 1991-93

Sujatha Sosale

Graduate Student
School of Journalism and Mass Communication
University of Minnesota
111 Murphy Hall
206 Church Street S.E.
Minneapolis, MN 55455
Phone: (612) 625-9824 Fax: (612) 626-8251

Presented to the International Communication Division of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, Atlanta, Georgia, August 1994.

The author wishes to thank Prof. Raymond Duvall and graduate student Himadeep Muppidi, International Relations, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, for guidance and help with the paper. Appreciation is also expressed to the anonymous reviewers who provided valuable comments and feedback on the paper.
Postcolonial India: Journalistic Constructions
National Identity In The Contemporary Elite Indian Press
An Analysis Of Selected Articles In The Times Of India, 1991-93

A brief anecdote would perhaps best illustrate the questions of concern to this study. The anecdote appeared in a story in The New York Times, as an illustration for another, quite unrelated problem; nevertheless, it helps articulate succinctly the problematic of "postcolonial national identity" in the context of this project. A filmmaker had some buzzards flown in for a film shoot. The birds were required to sit in a row, on a tree branch, and were to fly at a given signal. Unaccustomed to having their movements controlled, the birds took off from the branch at will. After many trials and much frustration, it was suggested that the feet of the birds be wired to the tree till the moment of signaled "take-off," when the wire would be removed. The wire did not stop the birds’ attempts to fly. They would fall over, hang upside down from the branch, flap their wings, and would be set upright again, only to repeat their actions. After a few trials, the birds decided to remain on the branch. Even when the wire was removed.

Obvious parallelisms apart, many recent editorial page columns in the newspaper used for this study seem to raise several questions about Indian national identity today that tap into the bird-flight analogy. Some of these questions include — the wire was removed 47 years ago; why isn’t India flying yet (persistent colonization by the political "neo-Brahmins")? Why isn’t India flying far enough (the social categories created for administrative convenience by the British continue to wield a powerful influence over the current Indian "secular" society)? Has she flown too high (an attempted voyage into the Nehruvian realm of science and technology for progress that elided existing religious and caste differences) only to return to hover near the branch? These questions take on acute significance, especially in light of incidents such as the particularly virulent brand of Hindu-Muslim hostility since 1989, leaving in their wake a trail of debates surrounding the issue of national identity in contemporary India.

The paper aims to present a composite picture of postcolonial India as seen through the contemporary journalistic lens, between 1991-1993. Journalistic endeavors (the mass media) disseminate information, mold public opinion, and wrestle constantly with questions of national identity. The media may not be solely responsible for the emergence of such identities; nevertheless, the importance of the media in "the construction, articulation, and maintenance of...collective identity" has been termed practically as "an article of faith." Schlesinger, in quoting
Elias, defines a "state" as "pacified social spaces" that the monopoly of force confers within a given territory. He extends these spaces to include "communicative spaces" where national identity is cast and recast, and a certain membership dialectic is played out, thereby providing a "cultural defence" of collective identities. The shaping and interpreting of national identity by the national press, a prominent mass communication institution in this "communicative space," is of particular interest to this project.

The terms "national identity" and "postcolonial" need explication before entering the realm of media, national identity, and postcoloniality. A section on the selection of journalistic text and the newspaper for the study follows. An analysis of selected columns comes next, ensuing which is a concluding section that attempts to bring together journalists' constructions of an Indian national identity as apparent in the selected articles.

**Defining National Identity**

The paradoxical conditions of blurred boundaries in a "global society" on the one hand and a nation's clear geopolitical boundaries on the other challenge attempts to define the term, "national identity." Nevertheless, efforts at constructing national identity continue both among producers of popular culture as well as scholarly work, either as a hangover of the protest against colonial regimes (which have held sway until recently) or as a continuing confirmation of the "self" as differentiated from the "other(s)" in the present global society. Alternately, constructions of regional or minority identities also continue to be loosely grouped to enable constructions of "national" identity.

The terms "nationalism" and "national identity" often appear in the same or related contexts in debates about a (nation's) collective identity. Diverse perspectives on collective and national identities include the anthropological, ideological, and both cultural and political. Of interest here is Dirks' perspective which emerges from the context of colonialism. He views nationalism as a concept beyond a movement to win political freedom, as "a system for organizing the past that depends upon certain narratives, assumptions, and voices [that] continue to have important stakes throughout the social and political order."  

Creating a national identity involves the "construction of a past" and a connecting of images from history to current themes, to link representations across a temporal spectrum. This linking device enables a construction of identity. Such a history "empowers" a people who claim that
history as their own. Former colonies consciously seek such empowerment through self-definition, a definition that occurs in a "world already defined." The efforts at self-definition do not culminate in a static end point at the apex of a movement; rather, as Dirks points out, identity is constantly in the process of being redefined.

Given this brief examination of the concepts of nationalism and identity, national identity can be defined for the purposes of this project as a cultural and political construct comprising tangible historical images and representations intrinsic to a group of people.

Nationalism and National Identity In India

The concept of a single national identity in a nation with multiple ethnic, linguistic, racial, and religious groups seems questionable. Precolonial India comprised Bengalis, Sikhs, Marathas, Hindustanis and other independent groups. Historians ascribe the beginnings of an "Indian" nationality to anti-imperialist protest; the struggle against the common oppressor united these relatively disparate ethnic groups. They hold that a sense of unity as a result of common political aspirations helped transform India from a "geographical expression" into a "nation-in-the-making." Many Indian nationalist historians believed too that the desire for self-government was innate rather than an inspiration from the West. Chandra presents an alternate set of historians' claims that the nationalist spirit in India existed over centuries, was dormant for a period of time, and was brought back to life during the colonial period. The spirit of accommodating the "others" is traced back to the eclectic nature of the dominant religion in India, Hinduism. More recently, the concept of a Nehruvian national identity has constituted a secular, modern India, given to economic, scientific, and technological development; cultural components such as religion, ethnicity, caste, and language were backgrounded in the national picture.

Media debates on identity center around India as a "secular" state embracing all races, religions, castes, and ethnicities. Questions about "minorities," and regional and sub-national demands for a position in the politico-social mainstream abound, riding on the notion of a "secular India." Regional and sub-national outbursts tempt political commentators to view India more as a "nation-in-the-unmaking." Indigenous definitions of self jostle with west derived definitions used as molds for "pour[ing] in...symbols and sentiments pulled out of Indian history and myths," resulting in a "secular idiom" of European origin. Concerns associated with these themes, as raised by columnists in a contemporary elite Indian newspaper, are examined in this study.
The Concept Of Postcoloniality

Scholars have argued and analyzed "postcoloniality" as a historical moment, an escape from resistance, a form of resistance, and as too readily accepting of the "hybrid." Shohat understands postcolonialism as a set of "issues emerging from colonial relations and their aftermath, covering a long historical span." The term is both an indicator of a contemporary intellectual condition (as are post-modernism, post-structuralism, or post-deconstructionism) as well as a chronological designator of a certain period that has succeeded "anti-colonial nationalist theory." Spurr views postcoloniality as "an historical situation marked by the dismantling of traditional institutions of colonial power," as well as a "transcultural condition that includes, along with new possibilities,...crises of identity and representation." The spatial and temporal difficulties in using the term postcolonialism are raised by both Shohat and McClintock. For example, "postcolonial" could be applicable to former colonies as diverse as the United States (no more a colony since the late eighteenth century), India (one of the group of countries gaining independence after World War II), and Algeria (independent in the sixties). Additional problems are posed by rampant neo-colonialism in many so-called postcolonial nations (African, Middle Eastern, Latin American); Shohat suggests that it is "perhaps...the less intense experience of neo-colonialism...that has allowed for the [frequent] use of 'postcolonial' " in related discourse, particularly in the case of India. The term is inclusive of and recognizes multiple ethnicities, and overrides dichotomies evident in "colonizer-colonized", and "neo-colonizer neo-colonized." Shohat points out that overlooking such dichotomies renders postcolonialism much less of a political, analytical tool than neo-colonialism.

Madhava Prasad discerns more than a suggestion of resistance in the construction of the "postcolonial." He defines postcoloniality as a "historic moment" that "signal[s]" the creation of a "private realm," a realm that is "off-limits" to the public, the public here being the neutral, international space. Defending the private realm would involve the reconstruction of the formerly erased "multiple subjectivities" of the past, and giving these "figures of the past" an identity. Prasad makes reference to postcolonial individuals physically relocating to the former colonial centers where they construct a picture of themselves with the aid of "tools" available to them at these centers. He holds that such an understanding would have been impossible to gain had the individual continued to live in the home country. It is participation in the "dominant economy of knowledge" that enables the postcolonial individual to "encounter the former self." The diasporic
postcolonial subject is intent on restoring a sovereignty to this identity, a sovereignty which the subject has perceived as lost in the "public sphere."24

This study takes into account the historical, the chronological, and the transcultural conditions associated with the postcolonial condition. Prasad's understanding of postcoloniality provides the cue; the concept is extended to include non-diasporic, "at home" journalists and their efforts to construct a private realm (an "India") in the public (international) sphere. Journalists who work for the elite national media possess the background, access, and professional opportunities to avail themselves of the "representational apparatus" similar to the one available to the diaspora. Their debates on constructions of national identity are responses to events in the immediate environment and fulfillment of professional requirements, as well as attempts to preserve a "sovereign" space for the nation in the public (i.e., international) sphere.

In the case of India, the postcolonial period to date spans 47 years. Many issues raised during the time of independence continue to persist among decision-makers as well as the general public. Since the growth of its influence reached national proportions in British India, the Indian press has been extensively involved, as both instrument and instigator, with complex questions related to the issue of self-definition. The reexamination and reformulation of "India" in terms of past religions, ethnic groups, linguistic groups, and regions continue. The grafting of western ideas of rationality in religion and secularization of the state and society also continue to animate discussions of national identity. The objective here is to look at continuing attempts by a national Indian newspaper to define national identity, as "indigenous" (precolonial), hybrid (melding of the colonial and the indigenous), or multiple subjectivities (can there be one defined nation, given the several possible sub-nations?).

The Media And National Identity

It has been pointed out that the mandate for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) of the late seventies stemmed from concerns and questions about the national identity of new and emerging Third World states. More recently, the possibility of a European "audio-visual space" (one European broadcasting system) has stirred debates on the validity of such a concept, especially in the face of the numerous European nation-states, their individual histories, identities, and ethnic self-definitions.25 Similar questions on national identity and the media have been raised in the cases of Canada26 and Latin America.27 These are a few examples of the works
focusing on media and national identity addressing print, broadcast media, and new technologies (satellite communication, in particular). These works share a common theme in that they examine national identity from the perspectives of cultural imperialism or technological determinism (and the corresponding threat to national cultures). They treat the concept of identity as a defense against the all-pervading American media content, Japanese media-economics muscle, or a generic, mass-mediated urban culture. For example, corresponding to the recent works listed above (25, 26, 27), Schlesinger holds that the European Community's efforts to establish a European audio-visual industry is in effect an attempt to counter American and Japanese media threats. Ferguson observes a distinct Canadianness in the Canadian media that disproves wholesale accusations of the U.S. media ("video imperialism") swamping Canadian identity. Barbero calls for the treatment of popular culture as a space in which subcultures fight to preserve their identities against what they perceive to be an increasingly engulfing urban anomie.

Questions of power, economics, images, and lifestyles are bound up in and set the parameters for these discussions of collective identities and the media. As has been mentioned earlier, most studies of this genre examine the more "modern" media of broadcasting and video industries, and satellite communication. These questions are more tacit in the case of the present study which involves the print medium. (For example, professionalization of journalists and journalism, the role of advertising in newspapers, etc., are for the most part derived from western democratic capitalist states. These factors, of course, influence news content). This project is concerned with the manifestations of debates of national identity in the press content, factoring in the historical images, sentiments, figures, and the lingering influences of an earlier colonial regime.

The Indian Press And National Identity

Anderson attributes the "origins of national consciousness" to the birth and growth of what he terms "print capitalism" (the use of the printing press and the related economies of scale for large markets). Reproducibility and mass dissemination of information made possible the creation and mobilization of public opinion among a "new reading public" able to absorb printed material in vernacular languages.24 This is very much evident in the case of the Indian press.

The development of the Indian press has been closely wedded to nationalism and nationalist movements, particularly since the early 1850's.29 The conscious creation of a national identity in the press evidenced itself first as a Hindu identity, appearing in the late 17th and early 18th
centuries. A major part of newspaper content of the colonial era comprised religious reform and the celebration of early Hindu culture, along with criticism (which gradually turned more virulent and continued to remain so through the first half of the 20th century) of the British administration. Articles on economic losses for Indians and military expenditure incurred by the British formed part of the newspaper content at the time, serving to create anti-British public opinion, and preparing the ground for the "nationalistic" sentiment that was to follow.

Beginning with the early 1920's, the Indian press was divided along two distinct lines - "nationalist moderate" (accepting Dominion status for India) or "nationalist radical" (demanding independence). The radical newspapers took their lead from Gandhi who considered "one of the objects of a newspaper to understand the popular feeling and give expression to it; another...to arouse among the people certain desirable sentiments." The radical section of the nationalist press gave shape to these objectives by calling for unity among Indians (unity overriding caste and religion) and independence from British rule.

Following independence in 1947, the emergent structure of the Indian press closely resembled the western press (Britain, the United States). Consolidation of ownership under a few major industrial houses has resulted in nearly all press control among the hands of a few industrialists. Sharp criticisms of the Indian press as industries rather than keepers of "public trust," as voices in unison preventing a plurality of views, and as conceding to the political views of the proprietor notwithstanding, the opinion columns in the selected newspaper continue to wrestle with issues challenging national identity — issues such as communalism and religious fundamentalism that test the brittle "unified" image and the validity of an "Indian" identity in the face of tremendous essentialist diversity.

The Project

The Times of India, one of the largest-selling papers in India, is part of the Bennett Coleman Group, a Jain family conglomerate. Known to be one of the oldest and most influential English language dailies in the country, The Times enjoys a circulation of about 600,000 in several major Indian cities. This figure reflects the small but critical, influential percentage of the urban population. The editorial and opinion columns, as is the case in many countries, are read by this influential group Converse terms as the "effective" public. These elites, and to a large extent, among them political elites, vigorously debate issues of national identity. The platform, the agenda,
and the scope for the discussions are defined by these elites as well. In this sense, the study confines itself to the issue of national identity as debated among the Indian elites. Consideration of debates on national identity among the non-English speaking yet literate public (also a small percentage in comparison with the total population) would involve examining vernacular press content — the selection of such papers from among the fourteen official languages and effective translation for analysis pose logistical problems. Again, many readers of the vernacular press may well fall within the sphere of the effective public. As such, the project focuses more closely to examine how elite journalists "work to produce identity about..." their national culture, utilizing their privileged position and participating with the ruling power in this endeavour.36

As has been pointed out in several instances, concentration of (media) ownership and its industry-driven consequences tend to homogenize media content and viewpoints and keep critique of the establishment to an "acceptable" minimum.37 This observation is applicable to the Times of India as well. The nature of the content and the highly skewed ratio of the elite/non-elite publics notwithstanding, the paper is nevertheless a national institution, with international readership. The Times of India, in this sense, represents a space not only for the acting out of the dynamics of national identity within the country, but also for culturally defining a recently independent ex-colony in the international sphere.

The period selected for the project (1991-1993) represents a time when debates about the cultural content of "Indian" identity in the colonial period have been rekindled, perhaps with similar intensity. The crux of the identity question at present lies in the Ayodhya incident. The Hindu-Muslim clash over the the Babri Masjid, a mosque in Ayodhya, in 1989 (Hindus claimed that the mosque was built on what was formerly a Hindu temple), the razing of the mosque in 1992, and the ensuing country-wide violence in 1993 have underscored the nearly 150-year-old efforts of the press at constructing "India," the "secular" state, and the reexamination of the "establishment" (the Congress party) and its role in continuously defining and maintaining a collective identity. A state of flux now pervades the country, both within and without (reconfigurations in the international sphere due to the collapse of communism and the Second World). In such conditions, efforts at understanding and evaluating the viability of an "India" in public debate (specifically, the media) seem to have taken on a new urgency.

Articles from the editorial page opinion columns as well as editorials in The Times of India have been selected for the study. The opinion columns contain "room" for discussion, more so than
news stories, and often provide a forum for in-depth observations, critique, and on-going debates. The editorials represent the paper’s stand on issues of national importance. The paper’s national stature commands attention to its opinions on issues, and is attributed with much source credibility and influence on public opinion.

No systematic selection of a sample was involved; articles were selected on a quarterly basis beginning November 1991, for both purposes of newspaper availability (starting date) and for setting limits for the scope of the study (quarters), and ending November 1993. To explain the basis for the selection of individual articles, it would be helpful to go back to Madhava Prasad’s concept of postcoloniality (refer section) in the Indian diaspora and the extension of this concept (in this study) to the "at home" non-diasporic Indian journalists, for the purposes of this project. Two levels are discernible here - constructions of identity in the early 1990’s, from within (references, symbols, events, history, personalities confined to the nation), and identity through a conscious juxtaposition of one nation against others. This is not to imply that these levels represent watertight divisions.

An amalgam of influences from outside the nation and the so-called indigenous history, perhaps true of almost all countries, and particularly in the case of countries like India, inevitably directs the construction of a collective identity. Debates in the opinion columns with a marked leaning toward the first level have been selected for this project. In this sense, articles were selected for their debates and discussions of "self-definition from within." In other words, identity discussed in relation to other events and players in the international arena today (such as foreign policy issues, relations with the west, transactions with international bodies such as the International Monetary Fund) have been excluded.

Though not in strict keeping with a defined rhetorical analysis, this analysis draws part of its inspiration and explanatory devices from Spurr’s work on colonial discourse. Spurr develops a series of tropes or patterns (as part of a pattern of repetition) in his analysis of literary journalistic texts. A similar effort is made to identify patterns in identity construction; however, the analysis is not as closely linked to literary analysis as is the case with Spurr’s work. An interpretive analysis of newspaper content has been attempted here, to sift through and trace historic consciousness, both ancient and recent, the indigenous and the "imported," the roles assumed by the establishment, and perceived roles of prominent personalities in the ongoing efforts at constructing identity. The analysis does not involve numerical classification of newspaper content in predefined categories. The categories, as such, emerge from the analysis in the form of patterns, themes, and recurring influences.
motifs. Some of these patterns and motifs read differently in diverse contexts. Such a phenomenon also precludes the construction of predefined, unique categories. Thoughts and observations of individual journalists may provide flashes of the past (such as a historical reference in passing) or at times may contain more extensive treatments of national identity and culture. Though the opinion columns provide for some depth in discussion, journalistic requirements impose constraints on space, and hence the length at which the columnist may debate about issues. Arguments and observations are therefore sharply focused and often event-specific. The interpretive analysis attempts to derive an understanding of national identity evident in journalistic debate by filling in the "gaps," and by providing the broader historiography within which much of the identity question is embedded.

Given the selected newspaper and the mode of analysis, the analysis attempts to identify dominant themes and strands relating to the construction of national identity, and in the process, attempts to address the following points:

a. The vantage point(s) that these journalists occupy and their representations of national identity from these vantage points — elite positions with a predominantly Hindu leaning and disposition.

b. The main framework of identity construction — religion.

c. The advocacy position of the newspaper — secularism, assimilation of minorities, in keeping with a "Hindu" openness.

d. The proximity of most journalists’ advocacy position to the government in power’s (Congress) advocacy position.

**Embracing The Universal: From "Hindu" To "Indian"**

Since the eleventh century, India has experienced an influx of "western" religious influence, predominant among them being Islam from the Middle East (through Muslim occupation in the north) and Christianity from Portugal, Holland, and England. Frequently, as is evident in the selected articles, constructing an "Indian" identity revolves around attempts to retrieve an indigenous Hindu past from ancient India as well as the pre-western period. Questions of culture, social practices, and political and economic power often seem to be subsumed under the broad rubric of religion.

Many journalists in the selected articles hold that it is the spiritual quality inherent in this
version of (ancient) Hinduism that has accommodated the pluralistic society in a predominantly Hindu nation. Jain notes that the present-day Indian secularism originated in the "Yogic foundation which placed no limit on the freedom of the human spirit." A similar breadth of mentality was advocated by many nationalist leaders during the colonial regime, cited a century later to address the still-turbulent Hindu-Muslim questions. For instance, Vivekananda approached religion from a socialist perspective; concerned with reform, unity, and equality at the time (1892), he recognized the "Vedantic concept of unity of mankind" as being truly realized in Islam (where all believers of the faith are considered equal). While Vivekananda did not believe in religious conversions, he did believe in the equality of all religions; Sengupta traces the roots of such notions of equality to ancient Hindu thought. Similarly, Sathe highlights the overarching quality of Hinduism by tapping into ancient religious history. The epics' "higher values of life" (unspecified; presumably, the oneness that Sathe brings up in the following paragraph), later embodied in Buddhism (an offshoot of Hinduism), and most prominently in the Gita, found essentialist distinctions among peoples unacceptable. Sathe raises the issue of Hindus' conversion to Islam or Christianity at various points in history; for such people to be able to slough off their "ancient" heritage, in Sathe's view, is impossible. Rather, he recommends assimilating the Indian Muslims into the "Vedantic ocean."

The columnists' analyses of the Hindu-Muslim clash (1989-) over the mosque site also elicit a broad and general (period unspecified) appeal to tolerance, drawing from the "magnificently eclectic nature of Hinduism." A less defined and more dilute "Hindu" reference is apparent in an article on the cultural organizations responsible for the promotion of Indian writers -- the National Akademies. Writers and poets of about 1000 years ago (in particular, southern poets Kalidasa and Pampa) are upheld as figures to emulate, in their essentially "Indian" yet diverse writing -- "multicentered in its (India's) cultural expression...a universally valid sense of excellence." These writers were known for their poetic retelling of Hindu epics. The columnists advocate fighting the onslaught of the homogenizing "demon," global culture, with the help of a strong multi-centered "Indian" cultural heritage, a heritage he compares to an ancient Hindu "legend...armed by several diverse deities." A similar drawing of identity from Hinduism is apparent in Madan's critique of the prevailing religious intolerance. Appeals to return to the "Hindu cultural tradition" with its "catholicity, its openness to external influences and internal criticism" are followed by a citation of Islamicist Wilfred Smith's observation that "...Hindus...have gone furthest in making room in their religious philosophy for...other faiths." Not all columnists attribute Hinduism's spirit of tolerance
to "any unique and superior virtue" characteristic to the followers of the faith; rather, Sarkar suggests that perhaps the lack of a powerful, centralized priesthood in both Hinduism and Islam contributed to the historically enduring "secular" mentality that is still being debated extensively in the early 1990's, in the wake of the Babri Masjid-related riots.

Some journalists see roots of the "universal" nature of Hinduism in a more recent past — the early nineteenth century — during what has been termed as the Bengal Renaissance. This term is associated with British Orientalism, a time and a movement when western logic and rationality and the Unitarian Church heavily influenced the Bengal intelligentsia's interpretation of Hinduism (Bengal Renaissance). It must also be noted, however, that the British Orientalists (scholars, teachers, historians from Britain) played an important role in bringing to the "native" intellectuals' attention the past glories of Hinduism (a "golden age"). The beginnings of a national identity under colonial rule were manifested in these twin strains of a "Hindu" openness characteristic of its spiritual "nature", retrieved from under centuries of ritual and Brahmin dominance, and a reinterpretation of the religion using a western rationality and logic (tools that had been used to question and change the pre-Renaissance church-state relationship in Europe). For instance, in one of his articles, Jain attributes the birth of secularism in India to the Brahmo Samaj (a "modern" Hindu institution created during the Bengal Renaissance); the leaders of this institution, beginning with Ram Mohan Roy, represented what Jain calls the "westernised and modernising intelligentsia."

A Nehruvian construction of an all-embracing Indian culture, or as Jain has termed it, the "cultural-civilizational personality of India" is apparent in his address to the Aligarh Muslim University (often cited in instances of a modern and secular India) — "India's strength has been two-fold: her own innate culture which flowed through the ages and her capacity to draw from other sources and...add to her own." His article, "Toward a mighty goal," was reproduced in March 1993, immediately following the riots in Bombay in January and February, presumably to remind the public of a need to revive Nehru's vision of a unified and "developed" India. In his appeals for a unified front, he employed the "rich" ancient Indian heritage (unspecified) as a source of inspiration. But Nehru denounced "vague idealistic or religious...processes" in favor of science,
and underscored the need for a clearly defined India in the international sphere. For Nehru, science and technology often overrode questions of cultural identity. This cultural component to nationalism, according to Jain, cannot be "sidestepped" in the present era of post communism and regional conflicts. In his opinion, the present "ideological debris" that India has to pick her way through successfully mandates a cultural self-definition.

An "Indian" Identity: The Validity Question

If "India" has been accommodative of the "others" over a period of about 1000 years, the question then arises as to whether she can claim a single national identity in the face of such diversity in faiths and cultures. The debate surrounding this question is woven into attempts at holding together a currently perceived precarious national self-definition.

In an analysis of cultural identity and regions, Jain examines the frequently invaded and thereby heavily influenced northern regions against the more confident "self-affirmation" of the states in South India. For instance, frequent invasions by Muslims and their influence in North India gave rise to a "Persianised," or "Arabised" language such as Urdu. Bengal in the north-east was impacted by British occupation; the western influence is critical to the history of this region, with no really comparable parallel in any southern state. Vivekananda's socialistic approach to religion and national identity provides a close-up of a microcosm of the Indian mosaic. He believed that Islam had truly realized the Vedantic concept of unity. Sengupta's presentation of Vivekananda's desire for an "Islamic body with a Vedantic head," while expansive and accommodative, blurs the demarcation between the two faiths, a demarcation that could serve to separate both religions. For Sarkar, India under Moghul rulers such as Aurangzeb, prior to British occupation, represented a true mosaic — Moghul kings appointed several Hindus in an administrative capacity. The possibility of developing a third "form of piety...independent of purohits and mullahs" (Hindu and Muslim priests) and of combining the two religions existed in this environment. Adhikari highlights the visibly apparent British Raj component — he suspects that remnants of the Raj mentality in the present establishment pose an obstacle to a strong self-definition. The "neo-brahmins," in his opinion, continue to remain colonized. Adoption of political values from the Raj and seeking approval from the West ("parental accolades") have served to maintain a "brown elite," a group at the apex of power, possessing a "low national self-esteem."

A minor digression into Frykenberg's work on Hinduism provides a starting point for the
validity of an "India" as raised by the selected articles. Evident in Frykenberg's treatment of Hinduism and India (which he sees as "twin concepts" born about 200 years ago) is a political foundation underlying the mosaic — he views Hinduism as a political ideology designed to contain power among the social and racial elite in India since the period of the ancient Persians and Greeks. He questions the validity of Hinduism as a "religion" of a people; rather, Hinduism has served more as a catch-all for diverse ideas and phenomena; "Hindu" meant "a vehicle for carrying abstract ideas about institutions," a meaning that was an outcome of "political logic (and necessity)."

According to Frykenberg, "...political theory, ...misty antiquity, ...Indo-Islamic or Indo-Mughal, and...Indo-British precedents," served as sources for the construction of Hinduism.57

Padgaonkar's observation of present-day attempts to define nationalism resonates with Frykenberg's catch-all Hindu entity. He considers the term "identity" irrelevant in the case of India:

...the very open-endedness of Indian civilisation, not to speak of its eclecticism, does not allow for a clear identification of the other without which identity cannot be defined.58

Sham Lal speculates on the extremes that such eclecticism may produce, particularly in relation to the role of politics in identity. He contends that the poor (the majority) electorates respond to appeals to narrow identities in the hope of escaping poverty — a more immediate concern when compared with the "larger national goals" imbued with delayed gratification. The extent of diversity in the country obstructs the "establish[ment] of hegemony" by any one group or community. The result, as Sham Lal predicts it, is a very fragile structure heading toward collapse. Further, he believes that this very eclecticism does not allow the people to inherit "socially integrating myths;" the result is an Indian "mosaic" constituting diverse faiths, rather than a single entity representing a "synthesis" of faiths.59

The selected articles seem to indicate that the validity question has not deterred elite journalists and prominent public figures past and present, from attempting to construct a national identity or at least appeal to the public for a "unified India." The absorption of such diversity has often been located in a "secular Indian state." Secularism as defined in the Indian context and its viability are discussed in the next section.
Uneasy Co-existence: From Secularism To Communalism

Secularism is a much bandied about term in discussions of a collective identity in the selected articles from The Times of India. In light of the recent communal clashes, the issue of secularism has come under thorough scrutiny in most of the selected articles. Tolerance for other faiths and rejection of fundamentalist religious ideas represents the dominant meaning of secularism in most of the articles. Secularism has served as the umbrella under which all the subcultures and even subidentities have been absorbed. Various "brands" of secularism have developed in course of time. This would include the European derivations, Nehruvian secularism, and even pseudo-secularism. Sarkar has attempted to understand what is true secularism and what is not. In the context of the fundamentalist Hindu movement at the present time, secularists are branded as the westernized and privileged intelligentsia, disassociated from the "ordinary people," and ironically, representative of the British colonialist label for Indian nationalists -- "a microscopic minority." Fundamentalists have named this minority as the "pseudo-secularists." Given this picture, Sarkar recalls the origins of the term "secularism" as propounded by the German Anabaptists of the sixteenth century -- that individual choice dictate adopting or practising a religion rather than the state. This argument served as a foundation for tolerance of other faiths, in general.

India's "innate culture" along with her "capacity to draw from other sources and...add to her own" forms the basis for Nehruvian secularism. This brand of secularism advocated pride in a glorious but relatively unspecified past, but Nehru's goal was more to achieve national development, overriding religious sentiments. Advancement of science and technology, as opposed to solving problems of cultural identity, was his primary concern. Nehruvian secularism has served as the focus of attacks on center-heavy administrations that are frequently seen as insensitive to ethnic compositions at the state level.

Present debates on secularism show that its viability as a national attitude and culture is being seriously eroded by the onset of communalism. An introduction to communalism can be approached from Sarkar's perspective of "secularism in its...20th century Indian form" as the "logical opposite of modern communalism." The basic premise of communalism is the "inevitable conflict between Hindus and Muslims that is...more basic than any other national issue." Sarkar takes this idea further in pointing out that the anti-British struggle was "displaced" by the Hindu-Muslim conflict, under colonial rule. Jain traces a chain of events that gradually led to a disintegration of what at one time was a considerably more comfortable coexistence of Muslims and Hindus. Where once
Hindu soldiers comprised the bulk of Moghul armies and nawabs worshipped at temples, decennial census-taking under British rule (for administrative convenience) ended this "fluid" situation and preaced what was to become the "majority-minority syndrome" in post-independence. Castes as rigidly-defined hierarchical and ethnic groups (hitherto considered occupational groups) now added a new twist to...is majority-minority syndrome. But religion overshadowed all other issues:

Under religion, the census discussed the size of each group, its percentage of the total population, relative and absolute decline, and geographical distribution....Information on education was...subdivided in a series of tables by geography and religion.

Jain holds that in this way, the majority-minority syndrome was "manufactured." In his article on the proceedings of the Dialogue India conference, Padgaonkar raises M.J.Akbar's (a leading Indian journalist) argument -- that the Muslims during the Moghul rule might not have perceived themselves as minorities. Today, the Muslim minority feels threatened by the Hindu majority. The source of this threat and the "minority" sentiment lies in "perceptions of security and power."

Counterarguments to Hindus as a "majority" also exist; as Jain has pointed out, there are those who do not consider Hindus a "majority;" rather, they consider themselves a "community."

The communal split along the lines of the "majority-minority syndrome" is emphasized by the portrayal of prevailing Hindu arrogance and Muslim insecurity dominating discussions of identity in the selected articles. The Hindu extremists draw heavily from pre-Islamic history to reinforce the Hindu-majority profile of India. For the Hindu non-extremist, or even a non-Hindu, the political climate is extremely sensitive; "talking of human rights [even]...would be mistaken for a Hindu reactionary" sentiment. In fact, in Madan's opinion, "to be a Hindu" at the present time "is to be opposed to those who are not." Siddiqui raises objections from the Muslim end by accusing editor Jain (among others) of manipulating history to suit the Hindu fundamentalist perspective (he uses the term Hinduva which will be introduced and discussed in the following section). He finds Jain's reference to Raja Ram Mohan Roy (founder of the Brahmo Samaj in the early 1800's) as "Hindu" very simplistic and problematic. Roy was also highly proficient in Arabic and Persian and this dimension to Roy was overlooked. Further, Siddiqui contends that Jain's characterization of the faraizi movement led by Haji Shariatulla (in British Bengal) is not an appropriate "Muslim response to the West" (on Hindu-Muslim Divergence), an unfair comparison with Roy's response. Siddiqui takes exception to Jain's treatment of the faraizi movement as fundamentalist when in fact it represented a nexus of religion and social class. He quotes Jain:
"...while the emerging Hindu elite linked itself with dominant Western civilization and adopted the road to modernity and progress, Muslims turned their gaze towards a past incapable of being restored."

These articles have established a divide. Muslims are considered victims of a "belated revenge" for occupying India prior to the British. Hindus are either hesitant to declare their religion or are strident in their declaration. Journalists do not view the role of the establishment in this dissident atmosphere as having a positive or beneficial influence. In the multi-party system characterizing Indian politics, some parties are intolerant of non-Hindus and some, in their eagerness to "unify," are often insensitive to basic ethnic differences. The increasing tendency toward fundamentalism among certain parties has taken the guise of Hindutva, a concept that is discussed in the following section.

Religion In Politics: From "Indian" to "Hindu?"

A sentiment now spread on a national scale, an "emotive onrush" called Hindutva, instigated by certain political parties commands considerable attention in several of the selected articles. The origin of the term has been traced to the time of the ancient Persians when native non-Muslims used "Hindutva" to differentiate themselves from the Muslims. As Frykenberg explains, "ideological exclusivism" was absent at the time the term Hindutva was coined. The present usage of the term continues to demarcate the difference between Hindu and Muslim, with a difference. Again, this difference as articulated by Frykenberg is perhaps most germane to this section of the analysis. He holds that the confusion caused by the term "Hindu," was due mainly to its diffuse meaning and usage meant to indicate peoples, practices, and geographical boundaries (the sub-continent). This usage did not permit a clear distinction between the religious and the political. Apparent in the selected articles (which agree with Frykenberg in this respect) is the convenience such a diffuse term gives to "votaries of Hindutva," the highly pro-Hindu parties such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishat (VHP), the Bajrang Dal, and the now subdued Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). These parties, active in the state of Uttar Pradesh, site of the Ayodhya fracas, were instrumental in the state government's acquiring the lands around the masjid, ostensibly, to develop tourism. Prof. Bashiruddin Ahmed of the Jamia Millia University is said to have remarked that in destroying the Babri Masjid, claimed to be built on an ancient, desecrated temple, "the unfinished agenda of Indian nationalism" has been fulfilled. Breman supports and extends this view -- "...the victimisation of
Muslims is a belated revenge for their political domination of the sub-continent in the pre-colonial era."

Political parties promoting Hindutva draw support from the middle-class electorate and village populations where, as Dasgupta points out, they are "relatively untainted by liberal assumptions." Secularism is now equated with "a...subterfuge for building up a Muslim vote bank." The recent efforts by the Hindu-oriented opposition party, BJP, to remove itself from the Ayodhya syndrome (where, earlier, the party was an active participant) has not found favor with Kothari. In his opinion, the post-Ayodhya violence would be associated with the BJP and would, in all probability, scare away the "pro-Hindu" electorate. His continues:

Never before in India's political history has there been so much fear induced by an opposition party, especially among intellectuals and large sections of the media."

This observation underscores the religio-political dimension and its role in attempting to essentialize the national profile. Ganguli's analysis provides a greater texture to certain parties' attempts to establish Hindu supremacy in the north eastern state of Uttar Pradesh. A "proxy war" between the historically secular Congress (the party now in power) and the BJP is being fought by "Godmen" (see title of article). The Congress has "turned to...the Shankaracharyas [Hindu religious leaders] to bail it out of its current political difficulties." The BJP has turned to these leaders for sanction to construct the temple in the mosque site. The danger lies in the religious leaders' potential to gain political power, a situation that Ganguly likens to the Muslims and the Sikhs; this would serve to hasten the "regressive trait" of essentialist sentiment.

Secularism, a much-prized attitude that Indian leaders adopted to define India, has gradually taken second place as the parties attempt to realign themselves in the eyes of the public. Historically, the Congress party has utilized secularism as its pitch for securing and maintaining its political leadership. The press now observes a decline in this source of and strength for secularism that the party had hitherto represented. For instance, according to Ganguli, Congress continues to reiterate its "secular" outlook; nevertheless, its twin problems of trying to win back Muslim votes and " placate" the BJP-influenced Hindus have taken precedence over maintaining the image of a "secular" India. Padgaonkar attributes VHP-BJP's staunch anti-Muslim stance partly to the secularists' (he does not specify them as the secularists in power, i.e., the Congress party) refusal to be confronted with the Muslims' "repressive," "highly conservative...even bigoted interpretations of sacred texts" and their "oppos[ition] to progressive legislation on social issues."
Thus, with religion now occupying center stage in politics, the tension between maintaining an India with an almost endlessly elastic quality of its assimilation on the one hand, and the precarious teetering toward a primarily Hindu nation is mounting. Political configurations, as discussed above, suggest that the latter could seriously undermine the national image that India has built, from independence to the present. Some columnists in the selected articles anticipate a state of chaos should the Hindutva parties come into power. The articles indicate that the desire of the press is to maintain a secular state, allowing for co-existence of all faiths, and at times, it has prescribed or suggested remedial situations.

Appeals Of The Press: Attempts To "Re-secularize"

From a "return to old values" of acceptance and accommodation of ethnic groups, through advocacy of a "left takeover" to "renewing faith in god," the appeals apparent in the selected articles call for a restoration of secularism. Whether the appeals lie in the "ancient Hindu" beliefs and practices or the repeated raising of the modern "Nehruvian lexicon," the message from the selected articles press reads "re-secularize." For such re-secularization to take place, journalists frequently suggest diverse courses of action. Individuals and institutions have been applauded for taking what is perceived to be a firm stance, as well. For instance, Padgaonkar sees in Prime Minister P.V.N. Rao the traits of a "good ruler" as specified in India's "classical treatises on statecraft" such as Kautilya's _Artha Shastra_. Equally, Padgaonkar endorses PV's drawing on the concept of _samavanya_ or harmony, presumably as an appropriate source of strength in the present conditions. Similarly, the editorial of November 18, 1991, applauds the Supreme Court for the stay order on construction of the temple on the mosque site until the "temple-beneath-the-mosque theory" is validated:

[The judgment]...reiterates the positive and affirmative role and responsibility of the state to rise above sectarian demands and interests. This will...bring down the communal fever, ensure the preservation of historic monuments, protect the invigorating pluralisms of the country's "little traditions..."

Padgaonkar's article concurs with the editorial on the Supreme Court's role. Regardless of the ultimate decision and its impact on the Hindus or Muslims, it would open up a space for negotiation between the now intransigent groups.

Khosla discusses with a case the problem of a center-heavy administration that many of the selected articles have frequently hinted at. In his analysis, Uttar Pradesh, the home state of
conflictridden Ayodhya, presents a "microcosm" of India. Its geographical and ethnic compositions and variations, according to him, call for a local-culture-sensitive rule which he advocates establishing primarily at the local level, with a lesser role for the state government. Such a decentralized structure, because of increased sensitivity to local needs and "devolve[d] power," could stem communal conflicts from assuming regional and national proportions. Kothari advocates a somewhat different change to ensure continued secularism in India. He traces the decline of the "establishment" (the Congress and the leading opposition party, the BJP) from the emergency in 1975 through several national conflicts up to the recent communal clash and concludes that the establishment is no longer capable of maintaining a "national consensus." His solution to the situation involves bringing in "non-congress" and non-BJP," "secular" parties, a "left-of-centre" coalition to power, to ensure "democratic politics" in the future.

Some of the articles do not specify a mechanism for reducing or removing the communal conflict. Rather, the article ends with a warning about the gravity of the current national condition or an open-ended appeal to return to a "glorious and Hindu tradition" often equated with a certain cosmopolite nature innate to the religion. Dasgupta alerts the reader to "the need to evolve mechanisms to ensure that competitive politics does not degenerate into genocidal politics." Bidwai sees the solution as coming from "concerned intellectuals" and "a new political leadership" outside of the existing establishment.

The press sees need for a change to enable India to return to a relatively quieter, precommunalist self. The re-secularized India would again face the validity question. This question is no doubt an ongoing project. Nevertheless re-secularization would reduce the essentialist character of the country that is now reaching a new height in history (as these articles interpret it). The "us" and "them" issues and constructions which during colonialism involved the British, the Hindus, and the Muslims in complex permutations, have given way to a Hindu "us" versus a "Muslim" them, in the eyes of the press. the British influence, at times, indirectly serves to feed Hindutva's opposition to secularism.

* * *

As a final observation, it is ironical that the appeals of the selected articles toward maintaining a clearly-defined, secular, collective identity are grounded very much in Hinduism, the reigning "hegemonic" religion. In the selected articles, the majority of the writers were Hindu, protecting Muslim interests by drawing upon Hindu "openness" and Hindu "eclecticism." This
raises the question as to whether the press may be promoting a benign Hindu worldview in the guise of Indian secularism.

The protection of private space and the construction of a secular India in relation to the international sphere underscores the postcolonial element of this analysis. Apparent in many of the articles is the idea often tagged on to the very end of the column that India must be concerned about the projection of her image in the global arena. Political changes such as the fall of communism, social and intellectual movements such as multiculturalism have all rendered several modes of defining collective identity either questionable or invalid. This is the ideological debris that Jain refers to and calls for the reinstatement of the cultural component to national identity in his article on Nehruvian secularism. This nagging reminder that some of the journalists raise echoes the postcolonial angst that Prasad’s diaspora face outside India.

NOTES


6. Ibid.

7. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, second edition (Verso, 1991), p. 4. According to Anderson, the notion of "nation-ness" is a consciously constructed "cultural artifact;" nationalism would be easier to handle as a concept if treated from an anthropological perspective such as kinship or religion rather than as an ideology such as liberalism or fascism.


9. Tzvetan Todorov, On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought, translated by Catherine Porter (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 171. We see in Todorov a consideration of cultural and political nationalisms. The former has to do with the distinguishing qualities and works of a nation, and the latter, in its extreme forms, takes on a highly essentialist color.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid.

14. Dirks, *Colonialism and Culture*.


23. Shohat, *Notes on the "Postcolonial."*


32. Ibid, p. 49.


38. Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire*.

39. Reference is made here to Bernard Berelson’s classic, *Content Analysis in Communication Research* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1952). See the chapter, "Qualitative Content Analysis."


43. Dileep Padgaonkar, *Solution for Ayodhya*.


50. T.N. Madan, *Menace of Intolerance*.


60. Sumit Sarkar, *Roots of Secularism*.


66. T.N. Madan, *Menace of Intolerance*.

67. Asiya Siddiqui, "History As Seen By Hindutva Lobby," *The Times of India*, March 16, 1993. Siddiqui’s article is a response to Girilal Jain’s, "Response To The West: Hindu-Muslim Divergence in India." *The Times of India*, February 11, 1993. This article by Jain is not included in this study since it did not fit in with the quarterly selection scheme.

68. Ibid. The farangi movement involved the struggle between Hindu landlords and Muslim peasants in Bengal. Muslims refused to pay unjust taxes under the Islamic code. According to Siddiqui, Jain treated the movement primarily as religious.

69. Ibid.


72. Robert Eric Frykenberg, Constructions of Hinduism at the Nexus of History and Religion.

73. "Status Quo In Ayodhya." Editorial. The Times of India, November 18, 1991. The editorial held the "frenzid votaries of Hindutva" responsible for the (national) "hysteria" caused by the Ayodhya affair.

74. Swapan Dasgupta, Space For Dissent: Pitfalls Of the Concertina Raj.

75. Jan Breman, The Hindu Right: Comparisons With Nazi Germany.

76. Swapan Dasgupta, Space For Dissent: Pitfalls Of the Concertina Raj.

77. Dileep Padgaonkar, The Language of Politics.


80. Amulya Ganguli, Godmen In Politics.


84. Dileep Padgaonkar, Solution For Ayodhya.


86. Dileep Padgaonkar, Solutions For Ayodhya.


88. Rajni Kothari, Future of Indian Polity.

89. Swapan Dasgupta, Space For Dissent: Pitfalls Of the Concertina Raj.

List of Selected Articles (The Times of India – Bombay Edition)


(Review of Arvind N. Das, India Invented: A Nation In The Making.)


464
I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION
Title: "Postcolonial India: Journalistic Constructions of National Identity in the Contemporary Elite Indian Press: An Analysis of Selected Articles in THE TIMES OF INDIA, 1991-93"
Author(s): Sujatha Sosale
Corporate Source (if appropriate): 
Publication Date: 

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE
In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

CHECK HERE □ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8 1/2" x 11") reproduction
□ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only
□ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
[PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE]
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)
If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor: 
Address: 
Price Per Copy: 
Quantity Price: 

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER
If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

Signature: 
Printed Name: Sujatha Sosale
Organization: School of Journalism & Mass Communication, University of Minnesota
Position: Graduate Student
Address: Murphy Hall, 204 Church Street S.E. Tel. No.: (612) 625-9824 (Dept. #)
Minneapolis, MN 55414
Date: Sept. 28, 94
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level II:) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.
A Non Racial Political Campaign in a Racially Polarized Society:  
The Case of the Working People's Alliance of Guyana

by

DONNA A. ALLEN

Master of Arts

THE PUBLIC COMMUNICATION GRADUATE PROGRAM
SCHOOL OF COMMUNICATION
THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Prepared in Communication Theory
Dr. R. S. Zaharna

1383 F Street, N.E.  
Washington, D.C. 20002  
Office: (202) 383-2193  
Home: (202) 397-8498
A Non Racial Political Campaign in a Racially Polarized Society: 
The Case of the Working People’s Alliance of Guyana

by
Donna Allen
1383 F Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002

ABSTRACT

The study analyzes the print advertisement campaign of a multi-racial political party in a racially polarized society and tests Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence (1974), Davison’s Third Person Effect (1983) and Milne’s Exchanged Hegemony theses. It investigates the campaign messages of a multi-racial party -- Guyana’s Working People’s Alliance -- in a country with a history of racial conflict and voting patterns. A content analysis of 15 WPA newspaper advertisements during the three-week period leading up to the October 5, 1992 election date is done. The moral tone of the WPA’s ads -- multi-racial solidarity, economic security, a new political culture -- are examined within the context of the aggressive racial messages of two opposing race-based parties.
I. INTRODUCTION

Communication scholars have focused on the effects of group conflict on public opinion formation and, consequently, voting behavior (Davison, 1983; Noelle-Neumann, 1974; and Price, 1989). While one of the most potent factors motivating group conflict appears to be race, little study has been done on the effects of this variable on public opinion formation in the Global South. With the intensification of racial and ethnic conflicts in various parts of the world — Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Caribbean — it is important for communicators to investigate the influence of this variable on public opinion formation. The people in multi-racial societies seem to condone violence as a means of maintaining ethnic and racial domination. Recent elections in multi-racial countries such as Fiji, Trinidad, and Guyana suggest that racial insecurity and the threat of racial dominance heavily influence peoples' voting patterns even when they are presented with multi-racial or non-racial alternatives.

This study is concerned with the latter development. It attempts to investigate the effect of racial solidarity on public opinion formation and, consequently, voting behavior. The study focuses on the print advertisement campaign of one multi-racial party in Guyana, a country where two parties have historically exploited the conflict between the two major racial groups — East Indians and Africans — to achieve and maintain power. With the emergence of a third party which espouses a multi-racial message, many observers believed that racial voting would decline. However, despite a campaign which emphasized racial security for all races, the people again voted for the two race-based parties in the country's October 5, 1992 general elections.

The hypothesis, therefore, is that although many people may find the messages of multi-racial parties morally acceptable, when faced with conditions of group conflict, high personal consequences and the threat of isolation from their ethnic group, these people vote for the party which they perceive as representing or protecting their racial group interests. A supporting hypothesis is that the fear of reprisal from and discrimination by the other group influences racial voting.

In this paper the 1992 elections campaign of the Working People's Alliance (WPA) of Guyana — a party which campaigned on a multi-racial platform — will be studied in order to analyze the methods used to convey the multi-racial message in that ethnically polarized society. While this study is useful in studying how political campaign strategists use various themes to influence voters, no polling has been conducted to measure the effects of these campaign messages on actual voting behavior. Such polling would have several limitations in Guyana. First, administering a poll in Guyana would be very costly since very few homes have telephones. Further, in a country where political intimidation by the ruling party has
been the order of the day (Hinds, 1993), it is quite unlikely that respondents would openly discuss their opinions in a face-to-face interview. Therefore, conclusions about the effect of the campaign on voting behavior are drawn solely from the elections’ results.

This study is divided into six parts. First, the introduction includes background information on Guyana with particular emphasis on racial group conflict and voting patterns leading up to the 1992 elections’ campaign. Second, the literature review looks at relevant theories of public opinion formation. Section three describes the methodology which is content analysis of a sample of fifteen print advertisements from two newspapers taken over a period of three-weeks prior to the elections date. Section four presents the findings of the content analysis and descriptions of the advertisements. Section five is an analysis of the symbols and images used to portray the WPA’s messages. In this section Noelle-Neumann’s (1974) Spiral of Silence theory and the Davison (1983) Third Person Effect hypothesis are advanced to suggest some reasons why the campaign may have failed. The study concludes with suggestions for future research.

In order to understand how public opinion has affected voters’ behavior in Guyana during the 1992 general elections, one must first understand the political history of the country and the country’s historical development of racial voting patterns. To do this, it is necessary to trace these developments from 1953 when the first elections were held under adult suffrage.

A small English-speaking country of 83,000 square miles located in the northern part of South America, Guyana identifies with the eastern Caribbean islands with which it shares a common history and language. Its diverse population makes race a key issue in the political process as the different racial groups attempt to ensure that the government considers issues of particular concern to their respective groups. This former British colony known as “the land of six races,” has a population of approximately 788,000 with 51 percent East Indians (descendants of indentured servants); 31 percent Africans (descendants of slaves); two percent Chinese, Portuguese, and other Europeans; four percent Amerindians (indigenous people); and 12 percent people of mixed races (Singh, 1988). Guyana first achieved self-rule and adult suffrage in 1951 and gained its independence from Britain in 1966.

During the early period of the struggle for independence (1947-1955), politics was based mainly on class. But as independence became imminent, race became a dominant factor. The People’s Progressive Party (PPP) -- at this time a multi-racial party campaigning on an anti-colonial, class-based platform -- won the first election held under adult suffrage in 1953. The PPP, because of the multi-racial composition of its leadership and its anti-colonial rhetoric, convinced the workers that racial unity would help to free them from colonialism (Spinner, 1984). However, the anti-colonial rhetoric caused the British
and Americans to fear that the colony was leaning towards communism. Therefore, 133 days after the PPP’s victory, the British suspended the constitution, dismissed the cabinet, and landed troops in the country under the pretext of preventing the spread of communism (Jagan, 1966).

Subsequently, the PPP experienced internal difficulties based on ideology, race and personality. In 1955 the party experienced the first of two splits when one of its African leaders, Forbes Burnham, left the party. At this time, the differences seemed to be based on ideology as several African leaders remained with the Marxist faction of the PPP led by Cheddi Jagan, an East Indian, rather than going with the right-winged Burnham faction.

However, during the following year, politics in Guyana took on a more racial overtone. Most of the remaining African leaders left the Jaganite PPP; they charged that “Indian racists” were taking over the party. Thus, Guyanese politics became racially aligned with the East Indians supporting the PPP and the Africans supporting the newly-formed People’s National Congress (PNC) led by Burnham. In 1960 the United Force (UF) emerged as a third political party which gained the support of Portuguese and Amerindians (Spinner, 1984).

The results of the next three general elections generally reflected the racial division in the country. In 1957 the PPP received 47 percent of the popular vote while the PNC received 31 percent. In the 1961 elections the PPP received 42.5 percent of the popular vote, the PNC 40.9 percent, and the UF 16.3 percent. Finally, in 1964, the last free and fair elections until October 1992, the PPP received 45.8 percent, the PNC 40.5 percent, and the UF 12.4 percent of the popular votes (Jagan, 1966).

As a result of a new system of proportional representation, the PNC and the UF formed a coalition government in 1964 ousting the PPP although the latter had received a plurality of the votes. Subsequently, the African-dominated PNC quickly out-maneuvered the UF and instituted a "single-dominant party" authoritarian system based on repeated fraudulent elections (Spinner, 1984). The PNC rule, which East Indians widely perceived as African domination, ended on October 5, 1992 when the PPP returned to power in the first "free and fair" elections held in Guyana since 1964.

During the years of PNC dictatorship, the Working People’s Alliance (WPA) emerged on the scene as an alternative to the two race-based parties (Spinner, 1984). For the first time since the PNC came to power, an opposition force staged anti-government demonstrations in which both East Indians and Africans participated. The PPP had opposed the government mainly through strikes initiated by its affiliate sugar union — Guyana Agricultural and General Workers Union (GAWU). However, the fact that the sugar workers were mainly East Indian made it easy for the African-based PNC government to use Africans as "strike breakers," playing on their fears of an Indian takeover.
Because the WPA attracted support from both races, they drew sharp responses from both the PNC and PPP (Spinner, 1984). The PPP apparently feared that its East Indian base of support would be eroded by a multi-racial party willing to overtly oppose the government. Similarly, the PNC saw the first threat to its control of the African constituency who had made little economic advancements under its control (Milne, 1988). Therefore, the PNC reacted by branding the WPA a terrorist organization. Several activist were imprisoned, denied employment and even assassinated because of their association with the WPA. Furthermore, the PNC allegedly assassinated WPA leader and world-renowned historian Walter Rodney in 1980 (Spinner, 1984).

In spite of opposition from leaders in both race-based parties in Guyana, the WPA continued to gain the support and attention of the academia in Guyana and within the Caribbean. Horace Campbell a leading pan-Africanist contends that as the only multi-racial political party to emerge from the pan-African movement within the Caribbean, the WPA could serve as a model for other pluralistic societies within the region. The WPA's 1992 presidential candidate Dr. Clive Thomas, an African and world-renowned economist, attracted the support of middle-class and professional individuals of both races to the party. Perhaps these individuals saw Thomas as a symbol of a new political culture in Guyana and the Caribbean. Many concluded that Thomas did not represent the old race-based politics. As an economist and "technocrat" (a term used for the new leaders in the Global South with technical and professional skills) many believed that Thomas would be instrumental in leading the country out of its economic woes which resulted from corruption and mismanagement in the 1970s and 1980s.

The concentration of professionals and intellectuals in the WPA and its growing respect from the working poor resulted in one of the most progressive political parties in the Caribbean. Consequently, the WPA produced "the most comprehensive manifesto" in the history of the Caribbean (Stabroek News, September 16, 1992). Moreover, the Stabroek News, which during the pre-election season some consider biased towards the PPP, suggested that whichever party won the election should draw from the WPA's platform for racial harmony and economic growth among other ideas. The WPA attracted huge crowds at their political rallies and both the PPP and PNC found themselves on the defensive as people appeared to be leaning towards the WPA. However, in spite of the attractiveness of their policies and perceived support, the WPA received only two percent of the popular votes in the 1992 elections. The PPP received a working majority under the proportional representation system with 52 percent, and the PNC assumed the PPP's former role as leader of the opposition with 44 percent. The results of the election reflected the ethnic breakdown of the voting population. Even though multi-racial societies which are dominated politically by one racial group have a high potential for conflict and violence which sometimes leads to
secession, each group in Guyana has apparently ignored the multi-racial alternative as they strive to gain political power.

The following literature review first examines Robert Milne's (1988) theory of hegemonic exchange to provide some insight into the reasons why individuals vote along racial lines in spite of multi-racial alternatives. Then, Noel Neumann's Spiral of Silence (1974) and Davison's (1983) Third Person Effect hypothesis are presented to demonstrate how public opinion may have formed allowing the population to reject the WPA's multi-racial messages.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Milne contends that one way in which the competition for power tends to be resolved may be "one ethnic group's assumption of hegemony" (1988, p. 103). In other words, he suggests that if one group controls the state, then the government may be able to promote social and economic stability which could lead to racial harmony. Moreover, he assumes that the group in government could rule with consensus or support from the other group(s) in order to avoid conflict. However, in most third world countries with multi-racial populations, while these governments often succeed in thwarting ethnic confrontation through authoritarian rule, they have not succeeded in gaining popular support from other ethnic groups. Instead, as the racial group in power expands politically, the other groups, even when they may be expanding economically, feel subjugated by the group with political power (Mars, 1990). Therefore, the "subjugated" group organizes with the hope of gaining political power. Once in power, the formerly subjugated group often becomes oppressors themselves, institutionalizing the same authoritarian policies which they have campaigned against (Despres, 1967). As Milne notes "The most likely alternative to an ethnic group's hegemony is not 'balance' but the hegemony of the other ethnic group" (1988, p. 104). Formerly "subjugated" peoples who gain political power may feel a need for revenge against their perceived oppressors. In order to understand reasons why for some communities theorists have supported single-race dominance as well as why leaders and voters have discounted multi-racial alternatives, one needs to investigate theories of public opinion formation. Specifically, how individuals process campaign messages.

Noelle-Neumann (1974) posits that the dominant opinion, not necessarily the majority one, becomes the public opinion because the majority opinion often gets hidden in the spiral of silence which results from individual's failure to express themselves for fear of isolation. The act of self-expression, Taylor (1982) argues "changes the global environment of opinion, altering the perception of other persons and, ultimately, affecting their willingness to express their own opinion" (p. 311). In other words, since
individuals monitor their environment for cues as to the public opinion before voicing their own opinion, the perception of public opinion may well be formed by a minority of individuals. Furthermore, the perception of the dominant opinion becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy; those who perceive themselves in the minority do not only remain silent, but often act in accordance with the perceived majority position (Glynn and McLeod, 1984).

Glynn and McLeod contend that public opinion, usually a relatively constant phenomenon, undergoes substantial changes during short-term events where high uncertainty about the issue, and an increased flow of information influence the public, such during elections campaigns. This "substantial" change, they suggest, does not occur randomly. Rather, they argue, the perception of public opinion influences this change by affecting individuals' willingness to express their opinions. They base their hypothesis on Noelle-Neumann's Spiral of Silence theory (1974).

Another theory, "The Third Person Effect" agrees with Noelle-Neumann's observation that perceptions of public opinions influence individuals' opinion and behavior. Davison (1983) hypothesizes that people overestimate the effect of persuasive communication on others while discounting its effect on themselves. As a result, "third persons" sometimes take actions to protect the masses from persuasive communication. He calls this hypothesis "the third person effect" because it involves third persons from two standpoints. First, persons evaluating the message conclude that the message does not affect "me" or "you", but it will affect "them"—the third person. Second, propagandists influence a "third person" by apparently directing their messages to someone the third persons seeks to protect. Davison also suggests that the third persons may underestimate the effects of persuasive communication on themselves rather than overestimate its effects on others.

In a later study, Glynn and Ostman contend that while individuals see themselves and society as being affected by public opinion differently, "individuals do not perceive greater impact of public opinion on others than on themselves" (1991, p. 299).

One may conclude from the review of the literature that studying public opinion formation theories may provide a key in understanding how audiences reject campaign messages. Given the nature of this study, people's identification with the moral message of a campaign yet rejecting it in the face of the threat of racial domination -- Noelle-Neumann's Spiral of Silence (1974) and Davison's Third Person Effect seem to offer the best theoretical framework. Milne's thesis of "Exchanged Hegemony" is also quite pertinent for this study.
III. METHODOLOGY

One way of analyzing how a political party has attempted to affect public opinion formation would be to analyze its campaign messages. Therefore, a content analysis of an available sample of fifteen print advertisements collected over a three-week period prior to the October 5, 1992 elections was done. The advertisements (including inserts) appearing in two newspapers — The Stabroek News, the only independent newspaper in the country and Dayclean, the WPA’s party organ, were sampled. Since either special interest groups or other political parties owned and controlled all of the other newspapers in the country, the WPA had little or no access to them. Furthermore, it was highly unlikely that the WPA would even be mentioned in the other partisan media much less be permitted to advertise in them. The three-week period prior to elections was chosen because in a five-week campaign, it was believed that the advertising would have intensified by this time.

In order to determine how the WPA attempted to affect public opinion, the content analysis identified each symbol and image used to portray the WPA’s messages. Particular attention was given to slogans which Guyanese political leaders believe appeal to a cross-section of the population, including individuals who may be less able to analyze complicated issues. Slogans often depict the themes in a short, simple phrase that resonates with the lives of the majority working class population within Guyana. The following section describes the findings of the content analysis.

IV. FINDINGS

Four themes reoccurred within the advertisements analyzed: (1) multi-racial politics as alternative to race-based parties, 75 times; (2) a new political order to replace the PNC authoritarian rule, 46 times; (3) the name “Walter Rodney” as a martyr, 16 times; and (4) the term “dictatorship” to characterize the present regime, 15 times.

All of the advertisements seemed to appeal to the need for some type of security. This need for security represents the first psychological need marketers found compelling (Packard, 1946). Moreover, the themes reflected in the advertisements stressed national safety through power sharing rather than racial security through dominance. A description of each advertisement including the main theme(s) follows. (For copies of each advertisements, see appendix).

Description of advertisements analyzed

Advertisement number one appeals to all Guyanese not to be influenced by the two race-based parties’ attempt to play one race against the other. In this slogan “The old politics is fighting for its life.
Vote WPA, the freedom way" WPA is presented as the logical choice for freedom from the racial divisiveness experienced in Guyana.

Advertisement number two portrays multi-racialism as the key to a future where all races can live in peace. "WPA broke with race to make Guyana a better place" reinforces the appeal to vote against the race-based parties.

Advertisement number three directs the theme of economic/political empowerment to women who have been traditionally excluded from the political process in Guyana. The slogan "When WPA wins, women win. When women win, everyone wins" simplifies the long detailed description of WPA's policies which states that Guyanese women are a valued untapped resource in the country whose inclusion in the economic/political structure could only benefit all Guyanese.

Advertisement number four stresses multi-racial politics as a solution to Leaderism (one-man rule). The line “The Bell has one word to tell the two one-man parties: Only the leader has a political following” contrasts the old party system to the WPA's new ideology of collective leadership. The WPA symbol, the bell, represents a new day. The symbol comes from the traditional New Year's ringing of the bell to herald the new year.

Advertisement number five portrays multi-racialism as a method for peace in Guyana. The advertisement says that the WPA "has opposed African domination and it will not support Indian domination." The slogan "When WPA wins, all races win" implies that unless the electorate breaks with racial voting patterns, the problems in the country could only be reversed not resolved.

Advertisement number six deals with WPA's qualifications to govern. The targeted audience could have been the intellectuals within the race-based parties who supported those parties because of race. The slogan "The party with the best programme will give you the best government" appeals to the electorate to deal with the issues, rather than vote according to their respective races.

Advertisement number seven declares elections day "Walter Rodney Day of Self-Emancipation." Walter Rodney, the most famous WPA leader and African Guyanese has attracted respect from most Guyanese regardless of race, especially after his assassination allegedly conducted by the ruling African-based PNC.

Advertisement number eight advocated economic reform in order to combat hunger and homelessness. It points out that "WPA's Manifesto 'Justice, Opportunity, Security' has 357 separate policies which working together will bring an end to hunger and homelessness in Guyana." This advertisement speaks directly to the majority working poor within the country.

Advertisement number nine combines four themes — multi-racialism, new political order, anti-
Leaderism, and economic empowerment — in a poetic device:

To put WPA in government,
Mark X next to the Bell
To get out of the racial prisons,
Mark X next to the Bell
For the party with the best plan,
Mark X next to the Bell
To end 28 years of rule by one party,

**Vote WPA**
For the best chance for better race relations,
**Vote WPA**
To end hunger, homelessness and human wastage,
**Vote WPA**
WPA is the way out
Mark X near the bell to vote WPA

This advertisement includes all themes previously mentioned in simple lines shaped like the WPA symbol, the bell, which might easily be grasped by the working class.

Advertisement number ten which begins "Why you will vote well when you back the Bell" outlines a list of four reasons to vote for the WPA: (1) WPA portrays the best program for rebuilding Guyana in its manifesto; (2) Everyone wins when the WPA wins (multi-racialism); (3) "WPA will not sellout, nor are we for sale" suggest that the party is not obliged to special interest groups; and (4) WPA has no fear of the results of a free poll. Thus, it has faith in its positions as the moral choice. "If you believe we deserve to win, but may not win" reflects WPA’s belief in its positions as well as their awareness of the race factor in voting.

Advertisement number eleven warns that racial insecurity breeds racial conflict. The theme appears to be directed to the youth who have not been a part of the racial disturbances of the past, but suffer from its effects. The slogan "A vote for WPA is a vote for racial security" shows the youth how they can free themselves from the errors of their foreparents.

Advertisement number twelve directs the theme of economic empowerment to the working class. It points out the problems of unemployment and poor housing facilities. "A vote for WPA is a vote for revival and renewal" implies that a new political order of racial harmony may be able to revive the country economically.

Advertisement number thirteen emphasizes the need for economic reconstruction in the capital city of Georgetown. Directed to Georgetown dwellers, who are mostly African-Guyanese of all classes, this advertisement blames the deterioration of the infrastructure within the city on the African-based ruling party. The slogan "Vote them out! Vote WPA in!" positions WPA as the opposite of the PNC ineffective
government.

Advertisement number fourteen takes advantage of the skills of its presidential candidate, Clive Thomas "a world famous development economist." This advertisement contends that the WPA is the only party with the skills to reform Guyana's "serious" economic problems.

Advertisement number fifteen posits the theme of dedication in order to achieve success. It points out that even after the assassination of Walter Rodney, the party's most famous leader, "the WPA has continued to organize and grow." Furthermore, the party has held on to its principles of multi-racialism, multi-culturalism, and equality between the sexes. The slogan "We are solid as a rock in defence of the rights of all people" further reflects a commitment to multi-racialism. In order to understand why the wide appeal of the WPA only translated into 2 percent of the vote, the themes in the advertisements were analyzed.

V. DISCUSSION

Analysis of WPA campaign themes in their advertisements

First, by stressing multi-racial politics, it appeared that the WPA campaign strategists attempted to appeal to the need for multi-racial and economic security. Guyanese had experienced racial discrimination in a country characterized by political instability under both race-based governments. During the pre-independence era of Jagan's government, African leaders cited agricultural labor reform bills, and rural education development projects which benefited the East Indian population (the African population concentrated in the urban areas) as contributing to the civil disturbances and riots between 1962 and 1964 (Spinner, 1984). Similarly, Indian leaders cited state policies which denied East Indians employment and access to government housing as causes of their plight today (Singh, 1988).

Consequently, the WPA's policies which claimed to guarantee multi-racial security may have been an important part of its platform. Advertisement number five captures the need for racial security in a simple slogan: "When WPA wins, all races wins." Another advertisement, advertisement number eleven attempted to direct the message of multi-racial security as the key to economic security, especially to the youth who may not have experienced the more intense racial strife during the race riots of the 1960s. The advertisement stated that "the youth of 1992 are not responsible for the errors and the evils of 1961. But they are suffering from them. And will continue to suffer as long as the politics of racial insecurity and racial manipulation continue. Unless all races stand together, Guyana will never advance to REAL economic revival." (Dayclean, September 26, 1992).

Second, the "new political order" messages may have attempted to appeal to the people's need
to regain their civil liberties. Most Guyanese may have become quite frustrated with the PNC dictatorship holding power by repeated fraudulent elections, thus excluding them from the political process. This may have led the WPA to advertise that a new political order would promise racial unity based on power sharing, guarantee an end to the dictatorship, and ensure economic and social security.

Advertisement number three emphasized new policies to ensure economic security for women who the WPA calls "the most undervalued workers" in the country. This advertisement included the following statement from WPA women: "As WPA policies... drop prices and raise incomes, some of our time and energy will be freed up so that we can take part in politics, so that we can organize in our communities. We can say how we feel houses should be built, where roads should go, what services health centers must have." This message was apparently directed to working-class women given their virtual exclusion from the political process in Guyana.

Third, the use of the name "Walter Rodney" may have been intended to play on the sympathy of the people. Advertisement number four drew attention to the harassment of WPA leaders: "WPA leaders have been the target of assassination attempts before and after the WPA was born: Josh Ramsammy, C. Y. Thomas, Rupert Roopnarine, Walter Rodney, and most recently Eusi Kwayana," (Dayclean, Sept. 19). Walter Rodney who was allegedly assassinated by the PNC, may be able to arouse sympathy in all voters. Even though Rodney was an African, his name commanded great respect within the Indian community. In an interview (Allen, 1991) Walter Rodney's brother Donald recounted an incident in which an East Indian woman was shocked after someone introduced him as Walter's brother. She said that the name "Walter Rodney" had been such a household word within her community, that she "naturally" assumed that he was an East Indian.

Finally, the use of the term "dictatorship" to characterize the PNC echoes the need for a new political system to restore civil liberties. Indian-Guyanese tend to view the dictatorship as African-dominated politics which subjugates them. Therefore, the WPA may have attempted to suggest that Indian-dominated politics similarly could subjugate or "dictate" policies to Africans. The WPA may have also been suggesting that the only alternative to assure democracy for all could be their multi-racial option.

Why the WPA campaign may have failed

Two theories of public opinion formation tend to suggest some reasons why the WPA campaign for a multi-racial government has failed — "the spiral of silence" (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) and "the third person effect" (Davison, 1983). First, the spiral of silence theory states that the perception of the
distribution of public opinion motivates individuals willingness to express their own political opinions. Self-expression, in turn, changes "the global environment" of public opinion by first altering the perception of public opinion and ultimately by affecting individuals' voting behavior (Glynn and McLeod, 1984). Glynn and McLeod contend that "during short-term events such as elections, there may be substantial changes in opinion because people are continually receiving new information about political candidates, information that helps them adjust their voting decisions" (p. 731). With the pressure to analyze all the new information about candidates within a short period of time, they suggest, people rely on public opinion. Thus, they are most affected by the spiral of silence (1984).

Possibly, the race-based political parties exploited the racial defensiveness among Guyanese in order to secure their constituency. A WPA post-election statement supports this argument:

As the WPA's popularity grew, especially after the launching of the manifesto, the two old parties began to select issues other than policy to fight the WPA. Each of these parties, the one banded almost exclusively in the Indo-Guyanese community and the other in the Afro-Guyanese community, sensing a loss of support which was becoming critical (but mainly affecting the PNC), waged a house-to-house campaign to have the WPA hanged on its own gallows. The PPP felt forced for its own survival to tell Indo-Guyanese that the WPA was not what it claimed to be, but was an African party with a secret plan to join the PNC in a coalition. The PNC was equally vicious. It told the Afro-Guyanese that the WPA was an Indian party with a secret plan to join the PPP in a coalition (WPA Election Bulletin, October 7, 1992).

Perhaps, those who agreed in principle with the WPA's platform saw their opinion losing ground with the threat of racial-group conflict as advertised in the media and visible at political rallies. Because of this conflict they may have suppressed their multi-racial support for the WPA for fear of isolation from their ethnic groups in accordance with the Noelle-Neumann's Spiral of Silence theory (1974).

The WPA attempted to appeal to its silent supporters by advertising "There is a WPA supporter in each home in Guyana — at least one, in some homes that support is silent, but it is there and will come out to vote...." (Dayclean, October 3, 1992). This advertisement tends to suggest that the WPA assumes that Guyanese silently supported their position, but they have remained silent because they perceived the position as the minority position.

That the WPA appealed to a silent public supports the main hypothesis of this study that although many people find the messages of multi-racial parties morally acceptable, when faced with conditions of group conflict, high personal consequences and the threat of isolation from their ethnic group, these people vote for the party which they perceive as representing or protecting their racial group interests. Consequently, the WPA may have also run this advertisement to convince voters that their opinion would become the dominant one in the future which could make them more willing to continue to support it.
The WPA campaign may have also failed because they overestimated the strength of their "morally correct" position; therefore, they probably thought that the Guyanese people would not revert to the racial voting as they did when there was not a multi-racial alternative. Advertisement number ten in Dayclean said "If you believe we deserve to win, but may not win, then make sure you canvass people in your community to vote..." (October 3, 1992). This advertisement may have convinced some voters that the WPA's position actually represents the majority which could have encouraged them to identify with it.

The failure of the WPA campaign may also be explained by Davison's third person effect hypothesis (1983). Davison hypothesized that individuals often overestimate the effect of persuasive communication on others while discounting its effects on themselves. He posits that the individual's perception that the persuasive communication will affects others in society forms the basis for his action. Thus, when the two race-based parties presented the elections as a group conflict between Africans and East Indians, voters may have decided to identify with their ethnic groups from fear that the perceived solidarity within the other ethnic groups would exclude them from political power. This idea reflects the supporting hypothesis that the fear of reprisal and discrimination influence racial voting.

The failure of the WPA campaign may also be explained by Davison's third person effect hypothesis (1983). Davison hypothesized that individuals often overestimate the effect of persuasive communication on others while discounting its effects on themselves. He posits that the individual's perception that the persuasive communication will affects others in society forms the basis for his action. Thus, when the two race-based parties presented the elections as a group conflict between Africans and East Indians, voters may have decided to identify with their ethnic groups from fear that the perceived solidarity within the other ethnic groups would exclude them from political power. This idea reflects the supporting hypothesis that the fear of reprisal and discrimination influence racial voting.

The failure of the WPA campaign may also be explained by Davison's third person effect hypothesis (1983). Davison hypothesized that individuals often overestimate the effect of persuasive communication on others while discounting its effects on themselves. He posits that the individual's perception that the persuasive communication will affects others in society forms the basis for his action. Thus, when the two race-based parties presented the elections as a group conflict between Africans and East Indians, voters may have decided to identify with their ethnic groups from fear that the perceived solidarity within the other ethnic groups would exclude them from political power. This idea reflects the supporting hypothesis that the fear of reprisal and discrimination influence racial voting.

The following advertisement by the WPA in The Stabroek News suggests one method the race-based parties have used in attempt to play the races against one another:

The PPP is telling Indians WPA will form a government with the PNC.
The PNC is telling Africans WPA will form a coalition with the PPP.
The PPP is telling other audiences that WPA will form a coalition with the PPP.
The PNC is telling cocktail audiences that the WPA will form a coalition with the PNC.

The old politics is fighting for its life (The Stabroek News, October, 4, 1992).

The above advertisements suggest that the two race-based parties have attempted to portray the WPA as more sympathetic to one race or another. Thus, suggesting to voters that the only safe choice may be to vote for the party certain to protect their ethnic group interest. According to WPA co-leader Eusi Kwayana, it became clear as elections approached that people began to close ranks behind the PNC and PPP in order to ensure racial security. Therefore, as the voters realized the increased tension between the two races, they probably began to overestimate the effect of these racially charged accusations by both race-based parties on individual voters' choice. Thus, they probably reverted to racial voting.
VI. CONCLUSION

By analyzing newspaper advertisements from the WPA’s 1992 general elections’ campaign, this study attempted to evaluate public opinion and racial voting behavior in the presence of a non-racial alternative which promised power-sharing among all races. The findings demonstrate that in a racially charged atmosphere, people reject moral appeals as they perceive the threat of racial domination by another racial group. The findings also support Robert Milne’s observation that the “most likely alternative to an ethnic group’s hegemony is not ‘balance’ but the hegemony of the other ethnic group” (1988, p. 104).

An indication of this thesis of “exchanged hegemony” is the composition of the government’s cabinet named by the Indian-based party which wrested power from the African party. In a seventeen member cabinet, four African Guyanese were named. This is the reverse of the cabinet of the African-based party which was always predominantly African.

Another example of this “exchanged hegemony” is the high number of Africans relieved of their government positions by the Indian-based government. The current opposition PNC continuously accuses the government of witch hunt against Africans. The front page of the PNC party organ, *New Nation*, features a weekly list of individuals who they claim have lost their jobs because of their affiliation with the former government. The fact that 90 percent of those named featured on *New Nation’s* “Roll Call of the Victimised” are Africans seems to further support Milne’s thesis.

Finally, the WPA’s campaign may have failed because it represented a new idea and its sympathizers suppressed their support for it from fear of isolation. Furthermore, as the group conflict between the two race-based parties heightened with advertisements in the media, voters tended to overestimate the effect of the race-based communication on others. Therefore, they closed ranks behind the party which seemed to represent their racial group interest.

However, to fully understand why the campaign has failed, further study needs to be done to determine what other strategies multi-racial parties may employ in order to effectively portray their message. A comparative analysis of the PNC, PPP and WPA’s advertisements may also help campaign strategists tailor future advertisement campaigns to offset the other’s attacks. A study to investigate to what extent individuals are coerced into suppressing minority opinions is also desirable.
References


Appendix: The Working People’s Alliance Print Advertisements

Brothers & Sisters in all Guyana

The PPP is telling Indians WPA will form a coalition with the PNC.

The PNC is telling Africans WPA will form a coalition with the PPP.

The PPP is telling other audiences that WPA will form a coalition with the PPP.

The PNC is telling cocktail audiences that WPA will form a coalition with the PNC.

The old politics is fighting for its life.

Vote WPA, the freedom way.

The Stabroek News, October 3, 1992
Brothers & Sisters

Come alive on October Five
Vote well. Vote the Bell.

If all they do is rely on race
or put on lamp post a grinning face,
when you reach the polling place
mark your x against the bell
and send them packing off to hell

WPA broke with race
to make Guyana a better place
That is the story our children will tell.
You'll be the story ... who vote for the Bell.

The Stabroek News, October 4, 1992
Appendix: The Working People's Alliance Print Advertisements

Open Letter from WPA Women to Guyanese Women

Dear Sisters,

If you feel you can't be bothered to vote because you don't have any time for yourself when the day comes, much less time to go and vote, please take the time to read these few lines.

WPA policies mean more money for women:

* NIS pension for housewives at the same time your insured partners qualify for their own. All the time you were doing housework, they were paying one wage for the price of two people's labour. Now they must pay two pensions.
* Higher wages for the most undervalued women workers, beginning with domestics, nurses and teachers. Employers will get tax relief to encourage them to pay domestics a living wage.
* Easier credit for women who don't have any collateral so they can start up a small business for themselves. Banks that cater especially for lending to poor women are doing very well in places like India and Bangladesh. New income-earning activities will carry tax-free concessions.
* Small plots of land for farming or gardening, with credit for fence and pen-building.
* The opening up of avenues for women's development in rural and hinterland areas.

Take time out to vote WPA because WPA policies will cut down on the time and energy you have to spend on housework.

WPA has pledged to make all efforts to restore water, at least to the doors of all households, in the first six months of a WPA government.

WPA will introduce special exchange rate arrangements for essential items like kerosene and diesel. These will not be priced through the cumbersome system. Taxation and distribution costs will be reduced with an eye towards reducing fuel prices. GEC will be reorganised to provide a better service.

WPA will promote a programme of free school meals and worksite canteens so that every worker and school child can afford at least one nutritionally balanced meal per day at work and school. This will mean less work for women.

* WPA will promote competition to keep down prices and ensure a wide spread of consumer information so that women will know where to go for the best buys.

Our other policies for improving health, education, transport, drainage will also reduce the burdens women have to bear.

If you feel you can't be bothered to vote because women make all the decisions about how the country is run, take time out on October 5th and start outlining a move to that.

* A WPA government will make it possible for women to decide what kind of life we want for ourselves and our families and our communities.
* As WPA policies reduce the amount of housework women have to do, drop prices and raise incomes, some of our time and energy will be freed up so that we can take part in politics, so that we can organise ourselves in our communities. We can say how we feel houses should be built, where roads should go, what services health centres must have.

* WPA has proposed a Women's Commission which will examine all government policies with a fine-tooth comb to see whether they suit women or not. For this Commission to work, it has to represent all the women of Guyana; it has to be independent of any party, and it has to be answerable to the women of this country, organised in their communities.

We believe there are good policies.
We believe these are reasons for you to vote.
We believe these are reasons to vote WPA October 5.

When WPA wins, women win.
When women win, everyone wins.
Vote WPA. Vote the Bell.

The Stabroek News, October 3, 1992
Why Do They Fear WPA?

The PNC dictatorship was built on the racial division of the people. The PPP says the PNC is not an African government because it has rich Indians inside it and they all joined in the exploitation of the people. While this is true, it was an all-African Political Directorate. But it was not a government for poor and powerless Africans, nor for Indians who are poor and powerless. The two top posts were always held by Burnham and Green or Hoyte and Green. Everyone knows that the Indo-Guyanese in the PNC Cabinet have no following apart from the Leader's following.

If Hoyte resigns, who will become President?

In the case of the PPP, if the Leader becomes President and resigns, who becomes President? Under the Constitution, the answer is the same: the Prime Minister takes over. It is known that Sara Hinds has no political following, apart from his Leader.

If you vote for a party where only the Leader has a political following, you are voting for a one-man party. That is not modern politics. This is not the case with the WPA. That is why its leadership level has been the target of assassination attempts before and after the WPA was born: Josh Ramsammy, CY Thomas, Rupert Roopnaraine, Walter Rodney, and most recently, Eusi Kwayana.

Dayclean, September 19, 1992
Reasons to vote for the BEll

1. It is not a one-man party. If you vote for a one-man party, you get one-man rule. Others simply have to obey the leader!

2. It is the party of all races, not of any one race. That is why no race feels threatened by a WPA victory. When WPA wins, all races win!

3. It speaks with fairness and justice about the race problems and about Guyana. It has opposed African domination and it will not support Indian domination. It stands for a rightful place for Amerindians in the political life of the country.

4. WPA fought the PNC dictatorship when it was most powerful and cruel. It never offered critical support. It paid the price.

Put yourself in a strong position by voting for the only party that can make peace among Guyana's peoples.

The old supporters of the PNC must accept that for 25 years it destroyed the country and people. They have a duty to vote against it now and win the respect of other Guyanese. Then they can talk about democracy.

The old-time supporters of the PPP must vote for real change. They cannot get it by voting for a party that never saw anything wrong in Eastern Europe until the people overthrew the system the PPP spent 41 years asking people to accept, admire and copy.

Dyclean, September 19, 1992

488
"The WPA has produced the best, most comprehensive and most interesting manifesto."

(Stabroek News Editorial, 17 September 1992)

"In the end, the inescapable conclusion is that the WPA's manifesto towers above all others ...

(Catholic Standard, 27 September 1992)

The party with the best programme will give you the best government

Put WPA in government

The Stabroek News, October 4, 1992
DECLARATION

The Working People's Alliance declares October 5, 1992

Walter Rodney Day of Self-Emancipation

Vote WPA
Vote the Bell

The Stabroek News, September 30, 1992
**Hunger & Homelessness**

The *Stabroek News* in its editorial of September 17, 1992 described the WPA Manifesto as the "best, most comprehensive and most interesting." The *Catholic Standard* of September 27, 1992 said the WPA Manifesto "towers above all others ... if manifestos cause parties to win elections, then WPA will walk away with the prize on October 5th."

WPA does not view winning elections as a prize, but we do believe that the party with the best programme will give the best government. Good government is about agreeing on good plans and putting them into action. WPA has the best programme. To get the best government, you must vote the Bell and put WPA in government.

WPA's Manifesto "Justice, Opportunity, Security" has 357 separate policies which working together will bring an end to Hunger and Homelessness in Guyana.

So on October 5, put your x next to the Bell. Vote WPA.
To put WPA in government,
Mark X next to the Bell

To get out of the racial prisons,
Mark X next to the Bell

For the party with the best plan,
Mark X next to the Bell

To end 28 years of rule by one party,
Vote WPA

For the best chance for better race relations,
Vote WPA

To end hunger, homelessness and human wastage,
Vote WPA

WPA is the way out
Mark X near the Bell to vote WPA

Rodney House, 45 Croal Street, GT [53679, 61490]

Dayclean, October 3 1992
Appendix: The Working People’s Alliance Print Advertisements

WPA Candidate for President
Dr Clive Thomas

WPA Candidate for Prime Minister
Dr Rupert Roopnaraine

Why you will vote well when you back the Bell

Page 1.

Everyone wins when WPA wins

WPA has the best programme for rebuilding Guyana.

WPA has no fear of results of a free poll.

WPA has no tear of results of a free poll.

Dayclean, October 3 1992

*This advertisement is reduced 130 percent.

Dayclean, October 3 1992
RACE & REVIVAL

Let us get serious. We have wasted too many years in the politics of racial insecurity which made Guyanese do evil things to each other and to Guyana.

The youth of 1992 are not responsible for the errors and evils of 1961. But they are suffering from them. And they will continue to suffer so long as the politics of racial insecurity and racial manipulation continue. Unless all races stand together to advance together, Guyana will never advance to REAL economic revival.

Guyanese must vote for racial security for all if Guyana is to get the healing space for real economic revival and for social, cultural and spiritual revival. The one-race support of both the PNC and the PPP make them both unfit to lead Guyana to racial security and renewal.

A Vote for WPA Is a Vote for Racial Security

Dayclean, October 3 1992
A Vote for WPA Is a Vote for Revival & Renewal

WE MUST REVIVE GEORGETOWN!

This is the state of unemployment and earnings in the city:

* Unemployment in Georgetown is over 20 percent of the labour force.
* Underemployment, that is, those working less than a regular 40 to 44 hour week is another 20 percent of the labour force.
* Georgetown provides about 75 percent of the workforce in the public service. Public service wages have driven most of these persons into poverty. Nurses, teachers, clerks and typists now earn a below subsistence wage. Long ago, these were part of a proud middle class who could have hoped to own their own home and means of transportation.
* Those who work in the private sector are not much better off.
* Prices of most goods and services doubled in 1991. Already for this year they have increased by more than 25 percent.

This is the state of housing in Georgetown:

* Fewer than 1% of families can rent a house to suit their needs.
* Less than one-tenth of 1% earn enough to pay the mortgage on a house sufficient to their needs.

LOOK AT THE STATE OF OUR OTHER SERVICES!

Roads full of craters; trenches full of filth and stagnant slime; smelly water in our taps; a hospital which closes its laboratory and X-ray services on the weekend; street lighting which is a thing of the past.

This is the state of health in Georgetown:

* Fewer than 5 percent of families earn enough to buy enough food and nutrition for their needs. A day's pay (minimum wage) can't buy two loaves of bread. Mothers are going to sleep hungry so that their children can eat.
* In some clinics, 40 percent of the children show some sign of malnutrition or are underweight for their age.
* Child deaths below the age of 5 are the highest of any capital in CARICOM.

Dayclean, October 3 1992
THIS IS A CAPITAL CITY?

Whether it is sanitation, water, or the upkeep of the markets, the Hoyte-appointed city council provides not one single service that is acceptable. Instead we have a comic opera mayor and a council providing lightweight antics.

The Burnham/Hoyte/Green government and the boys and girls who work for them have turned the capital city into the poorest and dirtiest city in the region.

It is time to call a halt. Vote them out! Vote WPA in! WPA in government will give priority to restoring a democratic city council.

*To restoring essential services like sanitation, roads and water;*  
*To building homes for city dwellers;*  
*To developing squatters' associations;*  
*To upgrading and maintaining public markets;*  
*To ending flooding and restoring good drainage and irrigation;*  
*To eradicating the mosquito menace;*  
*To providing regular power supplies;*  
*To paying a living wage to workers in the public service and city.*

*Dayclean, October 3 1992*
Why WPA Means Serious Business
Our Presidential Candidate is Dr Clive Thomas, because the economic recovery of Guyana is too serious a business to be left to amateurs.

The economic recovery of Guyana will demand Guyana’s best skills. And the best skills are in the WPA - in a management team headed by Clive Thomas, a world famous development economist.

We put Clive Thomas as President because we mean serious business.
In 1980, they assassinated Walter Rodney to deprive the WPA of leadership and kill the party.

Instead, the WPA continued to organise and continued to grow. Today, WPA is present in the communities of Guyana from the coastal villages to the Pakaraimas and the Rupununi savannahs.

We are present in Parliament and have used our presence to represent ALL the people of Guyana - all races, all ages, men and woman, country and hinterland, people of all religious and political beliefs. All of the people.

Our record, our programme, our skills are known and respected nationally, regionally and internationally.

We Are Solid As a Rock in Defence of The Rights of All the People

Dayclean, October 3 1992
I. DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION

Title: A Non-Racial Political Campaign in a Racially Polarized Society: The Case of the Working People's Alliance of Guyana

Author(s):

Corporate Source (if appropriate):

Publication Date:

II. REPRODUCTION RELEASE

In order to disseminate as widely as possible timely and significant materials of interest to the educational community, documents announced in the monthly abstract journal of the ERIC system, Resources in Education (RIE), are usually made available to users in microfiche and paper copy (or microfiche only) and sold through the ERIC Document Reproduction Service (EDRS). Credit is given to the source of each document, and, if reproduction release is granted, one of the following notices is affixed to the document.

If permission is granted to reproduce the identified document, please CHECK ONE of the options and sign the release below.

CHECK HERE □ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

(PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE)

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

OR □ Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL IN MICROFICHE ONLY HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

(PERSONAL NAME OR ORGANIZATION, AS APPROPRIATE)

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

Documents will be processed as indicated provided reproduction quality permits. If permission to reproduce is granted, but neither box is checked, documents will be processed in both microfiche and paper copy.

III. DOCUMENT AVAILABILITY INFORMATION (Non-ERIC Source)

If permission to reproduce is not granted to ERIC, or if you wish ERIC to cite the availability of the document from another source, please provide the following information regarding the availability of the document. (ERIC will not announce a document unless it is publicly available, and a dependable source can be specified. Contributors should also be aware that ERIC selection criteria are significantly more stringent for documents which cannot be made available through EDRS.)

Publisher/Distributor:

Address:

Price Per Copy:

Quantity Price:

IV. REFERRAL TO COPYRIGHT/REPRODUCTION RIGHTS HOLDER

If the right to grant reproduction release is held by someone other than the addressee, please provide the appropriate name and address:

Signature: Donna A. Allen

Printed Name: DONNA A. ALLEN

Organization: THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

Address: 1333 F STREET, NW (Home)

WASHINGTON, DC

Z1 Code: 20002

Tel. No.: 202-391-8498

Date: 8-2-95

Position:

Where to send complimentary microfiche:
GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE REQUEST FOR REPRODUCTION RELEASE FORM

Under the present copyright law a reproduction release must be obtained for each document before it can be processed for the ERIC system. There are three options:

(Level I) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) and paper copy (8-1/2" x 11") reproduction

This option, which allows ERIC to make the document available on microfiche or in paper copy is most frequently chosen by authors. (77% of ERIC documents are entered as Level I.) This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document or sale of a printed version by author or institution. However, if you have a limited supply of printed copies or if the document should go out of print, a copy of your document from which other copies can be made will always be available in ERIC.

(Level II) Microfiche (4" x 6" film) reproduction only

This option allows ERIC to make the document available throughout the system on microfiche only. It is most useful if you have a large supply of printed copies but would like to refer requestors to ERIC once your supply is exhausted. This arrangement does not preclude later publication of the document, or sale of the printed document by the author or institution. The ERIC copy of the paper serves an archival function. (13% of ERIC documents are entered in this way.)

(Level III) Document may not be reproduced by ERIC. (Complete Section III of the form.) The document will be cited with bibliographic information, an abstract, and availability information.

NOTE: It is recommended that materials be submitted at Level I or Level II to insure their future availability.