Designs for Change is a multiracial research and advocacy group with a commitment to understanding why large urban school systems fail and what can be done about it. After 5 years of study, Designs for Change reached the conclusion that parent organizing and advocacy would not be sufficient to change the problems of Chicago (Illinois) schools without a total restructuring of the school system. This paper describes why certain key choices were made about features of the Chicago restructuring strategy as Designs for Change envisioned its unfolding over 10 years. Some mechanisms through which Designs for Change believes that major improvements can be made are described. They include: enabling and encouraging school attendance and graduation; creating a decent, humane school environment; facilitating educational excellence; and analyzing policies, resource allocations, and practices that shape the quality of students' educational experiences. A Quality of Experience Model is proposed. It takes the position that students have a right to specific types of day-to-day educational experiences and that these experiences must be equally available to the full range of students, including those at risk who have historically been shortchanged by the educational system. Features of the model and standards for its application are outlined. Ten tables present major points of the discussion. (Contains 73 references.) (SLD)
CHICAGO SCHOOL REFORM: THE NATURE AND ORIGIN OF BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Donald R. Moore

Standard 1. Policies, resource allocations, and practices that enable and encourage school attendance and graduation

Standard 2. Policies, resource allocations, and practices that minimize student sorting

Standard 3. Policies, resource allocations, and practices that create decent, humane school environment

Standard 4. Policies, resource allocations, and practices that facilitate educational effectiveness

Standard 5. Policies, resource allocations, and practices that facilitate educational excellence

STUDENT EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCES

Paper presented to the American Educational Research Association
Chicago, Illinois
April 1991
To borrow a phrase from the anthropologist Ray Rist, the Chicago Public Schools have historically been a "factory for failure" (Rist, 1973). Designs for Change is a multi-racial research and advocacy group with a long-term commitment to understanding why large urban school systems like Chicago fail and what can be done about it.

Table 1 indicates the kinds of data that we have brought to light in documenting the Chicago school system's failure. Table 1 presents data about the Class of 1984 in the eighteen Chicago high schools with the largest percentage of low-income students (Designs for Change, 1985; Moore and Davenport, 1990). Of the 6,700 students who entered these high schools in fall 1980, only 300 of them (4% of the original class) both graduated and could read at or above the national average on a standardized reading test. A single selective high school in Chicago, Lane Technical High School, had twice as many graduates who read at or above the national average as these eighteen high schools combined. Forty-nine percent of the original class dropped out. Twenty-two percent of the original class graduated, but, as seniors, they were reading at junior high school level, too low to pass the basic skills tests for most entry-level jobs in Chicago, which now require modest basic skills. Combining dropouts and functionally illiterate graduates, 71% of the Class of 1984 in these eighteen high schools had virtually no hope of finding a stable well-paying job in Chicago's changing economy, where good blue collar manufacturing jobs that do not demand at least modest reading, writing, and mathematics skills have largely disappeared. These dismal statistics have not significantly improved in the intervening years (Chicago Board of Education, 1988a; Chicago Board of Education, 1988b).

In summer 1986 after carrying out five years of parent organizing and advocacy aimed at improving the Chicago school system, Designs for Change reached the conclusion that these deplorable results would not change significantly without a total restructuring of
Table 1. Class of 1984, Chicago Non-Selective Low-Income High Schools

Class of 1984 Entering Freshmen:
6,700 students

1980-81 Freshman Year:
- 1,000 students
- 3,300 Dropouts (49% of Original Class)
- 2,800 Graduates (42% of Original Class)
- 600 Transfers (9% of Original Class)

1981-82 Sophomore Year:
- 300, or 11% of Graduates Read Above the National Average
- 1,000, or 37% of Graduates, Read Above 9th Grade Level But Below the National Level
- 1,500, or 53% of Graduates, Read Below 9th Grade Level

1982-83 Junior Year:

1983-84 Senior Year:

2,800 Graduates (42% of Original Class)

the school system. Further, as I will explain below, we had a very specific conception of how the school system should be restructured that grew from our past research and reform activities. The basic purpose of this paper is to describe why we made certain key choices about the features of the Chicago restructuring strategy, as we envisioned that it would unfold over a ten-year period, and to spell out some key mechanisms through which we believe that this reform process will bring major improvements in students' educational experiences and in their academic performance.

The methods that I have employed in this presentation draw ideas from Louis Smith's discussion of "model-building" (Smith and Geoffrey, 1968; Smith and Keith, 1971) and from Argyris and Schon's analysis of "theories of action" (Argyris and Schon, 1978). I want to spell out some of our important theories of action, which reflect our hypotheses about what has led to the school system's record of failure and how these results can be fundamentally improved over a period of years.

As the first step in our involvement in the restructuring campaign, Designs for Change became one of the founding members of Chicagoans United to Reform Education (C.U.R.E.) in summer 1986, a coalition dedicated to school system restructuring through state legislative action. C.U.R.E. drew heavily in its reform proposal on previous research and analysis by Designs for Change, and was active for three years, throughout the complex set of events that ultimately led to the passage of the Chicago reform law in the Illinois General Assembly. I have described elsewhere the key events that transpired in this campaign, including C.U.R.E.'s role in the reform process (Moore, 1990). C.U.R.E.'s leadership role is underscored by data from two separate studies of the history of Chicago school reform, now in preparation (Lewis, in preparation; O'Connell, 1991). As part of both studies, approximately 60 key participants in the final stages of the reform process that took place in the Illinois General Assembly were asked who was most influential in bringing about the reform. In both studies, the C.U.R.E. Coalition and Designs for Change were more frequently named than any other group or individual. Thus, the reader can have some confidence that the explanations provided in this paper as to why Chicago restructuring has the features that it does bear some relation to the reality of school reform's history.

Although some newspaper accounts have portrayed the restructuring of the Chicago Public Schools as the impulsive action of an exasperated state legislature, restructuring was in fact the culmination of a three-year campaign, whose basic reform proposal and strategy were laid out by C.U.R.E. in fall 1986 in a position paper titled "Needed: A New School System for Chicago" (Chicagoans United to Reform Education, 1986). In the strategy that we formulated, we envisioned restructuring the school system through action by the Illinois
General Assembly, as noted above. However, we also viewed legislative approval of the restructuring law as only one of a series of critical steps in the reform process, and we formulated plans for the implementation of the reform for a period of years.

It is our claim that both the restructuring design itself and the campaign for putting this design in place once it became law has drawn heavily on social science research carried out by Designs for Change and on mainstream findings and concepts from political science, sociology, and anthropology — a claim that will, no doubt, horrify many educational researchers.

Based on substantial experience in explaining this reform strategy to academic audiences, I have identified several characteristic barriers to communicating effectively about how we have conceptualized school reform, Chicago style. Let me mention two such problems as a way to begin explaining our reform strategy.

One common error that many make in analyzing Chicago is to reduce Chicago school reform to a single catch phrase and then to draw simplistic conclusions based on this stereotyping. We are most frequently dumped in a bin labeled "decentralization" or a bin labeled "school-based management" or one labeled "governance reform." Once we have been so classified, commentators then proceed to make broad generalizations about the effectiveness of all reforms that they lump into a particular category and about the simple-minded assumptions allegedly made by individuals who advocate this particular type of reform (see, for instance, Cohen, 1990). I would urge those of you who truly have inquiring minds to resist such stereotyping and take a closer look.

For example, Chicago continues to be lumped with New York City, as an example of "decentralization." Yet as Table 2 indicates, the key decision-making unit in the "decentralized" New York City school system, the community school district, serves 20,000 students and is larger than 98% of the school districts in the United States. In contrast, Chicago's Local School Councils, the basic governing units in Chicago's restructured school system, typically oversee a school with an enrollment of 750 students, well below the size of the average U.S. school district. In creating a basic governance unit of this size, we were heavily influenced by lessons drawn from the New York experience (see, for example, Rogers and Chung, 1983; Manhattan Borough President's Task Force on Education and Decentralization, 1987), and it would seem that any fair-minded researcher should investigate the possibility that this dramatic difference in scale, as well as numerous other basic differences between the Chicago and New York reforms, make it inappropriate to lump them in the same category.
Table 2. Average Student Enrollment:
New York Community School Districts,
U.S. School Districts, Chicago Public Schools

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Average Student Enrollment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York Community</td>
<td>20,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School Districts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. School Districts</td>
<td>2,548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Public Schools</td>
<td>744</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The "Quality of Experience Model" that Shaped the Restructuring Strategy

A second misconception that we commonly encounter is that the Chicago reform plan was basically conceived as a change in governance without any clear analysis of how changes in governance would lead to improvements in the quality of education and student performance. However, in fact, our approach was just the opposite. Our thinking about how to restructure the school system began with an analysis of factors that were limiting the quality of students' educational experiences and then worked backwards to identify the kinds of changes in the school, school community, and school system that were needed to improve students' educational experiences.

To begin to explain this critical point, let me return to the low-income neighborhood high schools whose reading achievement and dropout rates I discussed earlier, and describe some key aspects of the educational process in these schools. Consider the school experience of a typical student entering ninth grade at one of these eighteen high schools in the period prior to school reform, as Designs for Change, the Chicago Panel on Public School Policy and Finance, and others have documented these experiences through research and direct experience.

An entering ninth grader in one of these eighteen neighborhood low-income high schools was among the 80% of Chicago's ninth graders who had failed to secure admission to one of Chicago's selective academic or vocational high schools, and further, was entering one of the neighborhood high schools with the highest incidence of poverty. As we have documented in our research about student admission to high schools in Chicago, this student was at the bottom of a six-tiered secondary education structure, and had to contend with the pervasive low expectations that were consistently articulated by school system staff about how little the school system could be expected to accomplish with the students in these schools (Moore and Davenport, 1990). These low expectations were frequently articulated by the Superintendent of Schools, who expressed the view that the school system was doing about all that could fairly be expected of it for students in these low-income schools, given the crippling impact of poverty. These expectations were also reflected in the comments of the Field Superintendent for high schools, who said that most high school teachers see students in these low-income schools as "... leftovers. They are children of a lesser God" (Chicago Tribune, 1988). These expectations are reflected in the comments of one high school teacher whom we interviewed who said that teachers in her school simply had to wait for many of their students to "age out," that is, to reach the legal dropout age and leave (Moore and Davenport, in preparation). In another of these high schools, teachers reported that they viewed the assignment to teach regular
classes at the freshman and sophomore levels as punishment by the principal (Grimes and Washington, 1984).

This typical ninth grader had a high percentage of fellow student with serious academic deficits. Ninety percent of entering ninth graders in these high schools read at or below the national average. Fifty-one percent of them had been held back for one or more years before entering high school. And low academic achievement and previous retention in grade are the best statistical predictors of dropping out in Chicago (Hess and Lauber, 1985). These schools also had the heaviest concentration of special education students and students with histories of absence (Moore and Davenport, in preparation).

Clearly, for a student who entered one of these high schools and was at risk of dropping out, the first contact with the high school was critical. Yet in most of these schools, the first month was characterized by bureaucratic indifference and confusion. Had the student entered a selective high school, this selective school would have previously received the students' records as a result of the admissions process and thus would have programmed the student into classes, would be certain as to the size of its fall enrollment, and would have its staff in place; instruction would begin almost immediately. However, low-income neighborhood schools had uncertain enrollment levels, since they had to accept whoever came through their doors in September. Further, the school system kept teacher hiring “tight” to minimize costs, and there was a high level of teacher turnover in these schools. Thus, the entire first month of school was often taken up with student scheduling and the shuffling of students from one class to another, as the school’s scheduler or “programmer” attempted to match students with courses and teachers. Students often sat in study halls for several weeks, waiting for their individual schedule or for a teacher to arrive to teach their class. The school’s administrative staff was preoccupied with the mechanics of scheduling, which they typically approached as a technical task that entailed little or no student counseling.

Students in these schools were placed in individual classes with the “ability group” designations “Honors” or “Regular,” or with a variety of designations that were considered remedial (Essential, Chapter 1, Special Education). Although automatic placement of a student in a track that determined all the students’ courses was officially forbidden, this practice was widely continued informally (Moore and Davenport, in preparation). Because of a push to raise standards in the mid-1980s, about 80%-90% of students in these high schools began by taking courses that were allegedly college preparatory, such as first-year algebra. Yet the school system had never given teachers any in-depth training or special materials to help them teach algebra to students with severe academic deficiencies. Although some teachers sought innovative ways to address this problem, others adopted
one of two strategies. Either they taught remedial arithmetic in a class called algebra, or they taught algebra in a traditional fashion, and the students failed. In these low-income high schools, 47% of ninth graders failed freshmen math, and 39% failed freshman English. Characteristically, students with multiple course failures did not receive significant counseling help. They were simply reprogrammed to take the courses that they had already failed for a second time (Moore and Davenport, in preparation).

Those students who were programmed into remedial classes and many of the "Regular" track students took part in an educational process characterized by repetitious drills on discrete skills, similar to exercises they had already carried out endlessly in elementary school. Further, students doing remedial work were characteristically not eligible for sequences of courses that students viewed as more interesting, such as some vocational education sequences. A study of classroom process in eight Chicago neighborhood high schools indicated that teachers actively taught during more than 50% of classtime in only one of them. In seven of the eight high schools, teachers spent more than 50% of their time behind their desks or walking around the room while students completed seatwork or on disciplinary or administrative tasks (Hess, et al., 1986). Investigations of these schools highlighted other clear disincentives for remaining in school. Schools lacked basic supplies and were frequently in severe disrepair. We repeatedly observed conditions in schools like those described at Manley High School by a Chicago Tribune reporter:

More than half of the toilets in the first floor girls’ washrooms at Manley High, 2935 W. Polk St., are unusable — stopped up, boarded over. Graffiti everywhere. There are no doors on most of the stalls. There is no toilet paper or paper towels (Chicago Tribune, 1988).

Teachers were also in short supply. Not only did students experience high rates of turnover among regular teachers and numerous substitutes, their classes sometimes had no teachers at all. Again, as the Chicago Tribune reported:

Jaton Felton arrives at Du Sable High school to find that her typing class has no teacher, not even a substitute teacher to keep order. It is not the first time, nor is this an isolated case. On an average day in Chicago Public Schools, more than 5,700 students, like 15-year-old Jaton, have no teacher. Sometimes an adult shows up, sometimes not (Chicago Tribune, 1988).

Presiding over such schools was a principal with lifetime tenure, who could only be removed “for cause.” The courts had established criteria for meeting this standard of proof that were virtually unattainable. We can find no instance in the past 15 years in which a principal was dismissed for any action other than conviction for a felony. This job security gave sanction to a lack of leadership and often basic dereliction of duty. For example, the
principal of one of these schools frequently left the school at noon on nice days to play golf.

If students stopped attending class, there was seldom any follow through. Official attendance was taken once a day in homeroom, but in most high schools, systems for keeping individual classroom attendance and following up with absent students had broken down (Hess et al., 1986). Some students officially dropped out. Others simply stopped attending. Still others stuck it out in this environment to graduate, but as the achievement data summarized in Table 1 indicate, most failed to graduate with minimally marketable skills.

The set of debilitating educational experiences that have been documented in the Chicago Public Schools is reminiscent of Rist's summation of his detailed study of an inner city elementary school in St. Louis:

Throughout the various levels of the St. Louis educational system we found commonly shared assumptions about "how things really are." Middle class students can learn, lower class students cannot . . . teachers can save a few, but will lose many; the school tries, the home doesn't; and finally only the naive would dispute these beliefs, as the wise know (Rist, 1973).

In summarizing its investigative series about the Chicago Public Schools, the Chicago Tribune spoke in a similar vein, but more succinctly. They called the policies and practices that they documented as a case of "institutionalized child neglect against the powerless" (Chicago Tribune, 1988).

Analyzing the day-to-day realities of schools in Chicago and other big cities not only underscores the extent of the problem, but points out the most productive focus for research and reform aimed at improving these schools: the key to understanding how to improve urban school systems is to begin by focusing on the quality of students' educational experiences and to determine what changes in educational policy, resource allocation, and practice will significantly improve the quality of this experience. This focus on the quality of students' educational experiences has been the common thread running through the varied research activities carried out by Designs for Change over the past 14 years, research that has led to the development of the Quality of Experience Model, the model that served as the basis for designing Chicago school reform.
Past Research Contributing to the "Quality of Experience Model"

As reflected in Appendix A, key research staff at Designs for Change had carried out a series of research studies aimed at understanding a variety of different urban education reform strategies, including:

- The development and impact of an alternative school (Moore, 1975).
- The methods and effectiveness of groups providing on-site assistance to schools that were attempting to improve (Moore et al., 1977).
- The impact of student sorting on the nature of the reading instruction that students received (Moore et al., 1981; Hyde and Moore, 1988).
- The organization and costs of staff development in big city school systems (Moore and Hyde, 1981).
- The methods and impact of child advocacy groups focused on improving the quality of education for various groups of children at risk (Moore et al., 1983).
- The process and results of expanded high school choice in big city school systems (Moore and Davenport, 1990).

These studies have employed a similar methodology that combines focused qualitative analysis through semi-structured interviewing and observation aimed at answering a limited number of research questions, with quantitative investigation to follow up key hypotheses generated through the qualitative data-gathering and analysis. Since the focus of much of this research has been on big city school systems, we have had the opportunity in the course of these studies to spend a significant amount of time observing and analyzing both the functioning of individual urban schools and the functioning of central administrations in 13 of the 50 largest cities in the country.

The most critical study that shaped our thinking about Chicago school reform was an analysis of eight child advocacy groups that focused on educational equity issues, carried out for the Carnegie Corporation of New York (Moore et al., 1983). These advocacy groups focused on improving the quality of education for various groups of students who had, historically, been poorly served by the public schools, including low-income students, racial and ethnic minorities, handicapped students, and females. Our research team spent 50 weeks in the field analyzing the reform efforts of groups like the Children's Defense Fund, Massachusetts Advocacy Center, and Chicano Education Project.

We studied 52 specific projects carried out by these groups, documenting the advocacy methods used by these reform groups and gathering data through which we
assessed the advocates' effectiveness in improving the equity of access and the quality of education provided to specific groups of children at risk. We found that a substantial percentage of the advocacy projects that we studied had brought about major improvements in the quality of students' educational experiences, and we identified a set of advocacy methods that were employed in those projects that brought about the greatest improvements. These advocacy methods, refined through our subsequent experience in Chicago, became the basis for our strategy and tactics in the Chicago school reform campaign.

However, this study of advocacy groups also changed our basic framework for thinking about the operations of urban educational systems and the determinants of educational opportunity for the at-risk students in these systems. Following the advocates' work opened our eyes to many school and school system policies and practices to which we had previously paid little attention, but which drastically limited students' opportunities to benefit from schooling or, in many cases, even to attend school at all. For example, we interviewed handicapped teenagers in Mississippi who had been barred from school and never attended. We visited schools where more than half of the African American students were suspended each year, and the most common reason for suspension from school was absence from school. We reviewed the history of the federally funded development of a network of Area Vocational Education Schools from 1963 through 1980, a vast new national network of schools that was supposed to bring special benefits to "disadvantaged students," but had systematically excluded racial minorities and females from access to their best programs through a combination of site location, attendance boundaries, admission requirements, and internal tracking. Thus, we concluded that equality of educational opportunity was much more than a question of instructional method, because a range of inequitable admissions, placement, discipline, and counseling practices often formed a virtually impregnable barrier between students at risk and quality instruction.

Additional conclusions drawn from our research data about child advocacy put us at odds with the prevailing educational wisdom of the early 1980s, when this study was being finished.

At the time we completed our study of advocacy groups, the viewpoint was becoming popular among many policy analysts that the network of state and federal policy initiatives that had been put in place from 1965 through 1980 aimed at improving the quality of education for children at risk had been a failure, and had, in fact, simply functioned to undermine the ability of teachers and other local educators to serve these children appropriately. The data gathered in our child advocacy study contradicted this broad negative assessment in many important instances, since it documented the specific
ways in which a number of laws and court decisions from the 1965 to 1980 reform period had significantly improved the quality of educational experiences for various groups of children at risk, the reform strategy had included the focus of new legal mandates on those policies, practices, and resource allocations most important in determining the quality of students' school experiences; focused financial incentives for implementation; formal opportunities for program beneficiaries and their advocates to monitor implementation and subsequent monetary efforts by these groups; and coherent government regulatory activity to press for implementation.

Further, at the time when we completed the study, many policy analysts had concluded that the best strategy for improving educational quality was to unchain teachers and other local educators from state and federal bureaucratic requirements that were allegedly stifling their initiative, so that they could effectively serve at-risk students. Yet in our research, we had repeatedly documented patterns of action by teachers and principals that were detrimental to children at risk, but were not the result of federal, state, or school district mandates. Rather, these harmful practices reflected the prevailing belief systems and organizational routines of the schools we studied. For example, we found that many teachers, left to their own devices, referred high percentages of African American children to classes for the mentally retarded, and we noted a related body of research (recently summarized by Gamoran and Berends, 1987), which indicated that very few teachers prefer to teach children who present significant academic and behavior problems. And we found that the only voices speaking against such abuses as misclassification were advocates and parents.

Thus, we came to believe that significant improvement in the quality of the day-to-day educational experiences of children at risk would come through a complex interweaving between fundamental restructuring through state law, on the one hand, and school-level initiative on the other. Through a complex balancing between the roles of educators and the roles of parents and other citizens.

The major vehicle for continuing to organize and develop the conclusions that arose from the varied research studies summarized in Appendix A was a model for analyzing urban school systems that we now call the "Quality of Experience Model." After this model was initially formulated in the course of the advocacy group study, it became the basis not only for our subsequent research, but also for developing the content of the restructuring plan for the Chicago school system. Further, the efforts of Designs for Change staff in organizing Chicago parents from 1982 through 1986 and in conducting studies of specific educational problems in Chicago (see, for example, Designs for Change,
1982; Designs for Change, 1985) provided further data that contributed to the refinement of the Quality of Experience Model and ultimately to the design of the Chicago reform plan.

Basic Features of the Quality of Experience Model

The basis for the Quality of Experience Model is our conclusion that the most productive strategy for pursuing equality of educational opportunity is to take the position that students have a right to specific types of day-to-day educational experiences and that these quality educational experiences must be equitably available to the full range of students, including those at-risk students who have been historically short-changed by urban educational systems.

In Coleman’s influential 1969 essay on the concept of equality of educational opportunity, he entertains only two basic conceptions of equal opportunity (equity): equality of resource inputs and equality of results (Coleman, 1969). As many have pointed out, Coleman’s approach considers the educational process that intervenes between input and results as a black box (see, for example, Bryk et al., 1990). It is also important to note that the processes by which the students’ larger school community (home, peer group, neighborhood, etc.) affects educational results is also a largely unexplored black box in Coleman’s 1969 formulation, and we place a strong emphasis on achieving a better understanding of how processes, not only in the school, but also within the larger school community, affect student outcomes.

Our past research has convinced us (along, of course, with many other researchers and reformers) that educational improvement hinges on a better understanding of what happens inside these black boxes and how the process taking place within them can be changed.

The Quality of Experience Model is one of a number of perspectives developed by various researchers and reformers that places a central emphasis on analyzing the educational processes that occur within schools and school communities as the missing link in an adequate conception of equal educational opportunity. However, our varied research studies in urban schools and neighborhoods, especially the advocacy group study, coupled with our direct reform experience in Chicago, have led to some basic differences between our analysis of the important determinants of the qualities of students’ educational experiences and the models developed by others who have analyzed this issue (see, for example, Hallinan, 1987; Bryk et al. 1990).

(We first formulated the Quality of Experience Model in the late 1970s and first described it in Moore et al., 1981, in which it is called the Service Quality Model. Since
then, the basic features have not changed, but the model has gone through periodic refinement. The version described below is the most recent formulation, but it does not differ in any significant way from the version that we drew on in designing Chicago school reform.)

The Quality of Experience Model has four major features:

- **Feature 1. Focus on Analyzing the Quality of Students' Educational Experiences.** A central focus on analyzing the quality and equity of students' educational experiences in their classrooms, schools, and school communities, and the associated classroom, school, and school community policies, resource allocations, and practices that structure these experiences.

- **Feature 2. Applying Five Standards for Judging the Quality of Students' Educational Experiences.** Use of five standards for judging the quality and equity of students' educational experiences and thus for judging the adequacy of classroom, school, and school community policies, resource allocations, and practices that structure these experiences. These five standards focus on policies, resource allocations, and practices related to the following issues: (1) enabling and encouraging student school attendance and graduation, (2) minimizing student sorting, (3) creating a decent, humane school environment, (4) fostering educational effectiveness, and (5) fostering educational excellence.

- **Feature 3. Analyzing the Multi-Level Network of Policies, Resource Allocations, and Practices that Shapes the Quality of Students' Educational Experiences.** A focus on understanding the ways in which a network of policies, resource allocations, and practices at multiple levels of the educational system and larger society affect students' educational experiences and of how this network of activities can be carried out in ways that improve the quality and equity of students' educational experiences.

- **Feature 4. Applying Six Alternative Social Science Perspectives in Understanding the Functioning of this Multi-Level System.** The use of six social science perspectives as alternative conceptual lenses to help in understanding the nature of students' educational experiences and the multi-level policies, practices, and resource allocations that shape student experiences. These six perspectives are: systems management, conflict and bargaining, economic incentives, organizational patterns, subculture, and professional participation and development.

**Feature 1. Focus on the Quality of Students' Educational Experiences**

Organizations, like classrooms and schools, carry out a set of key recurring activities or organizational routines (Cyert and March, 1963) that either directly or indirectly structure students' educational experiences (hereafter key activities). Such key activities in schools include, for example, placing students in grades or courses, counseling students, disciplining students, and instructing students. (Of course, one can break key activities down into smaller ones, or focus on a set of key activities that structure a particular aspect of students' educational experience.) The same activity can be carried out
in a variety of ways in different schools and classrooms or for different subgroups of students within the same schools; these variations are carried out through differences in policies, resource allocations, and practices. Thus, schools serving similar student bodies and with similar resources available often create widely differing educational experiences for their student body as a whole or for particular subgroups within their student body.

For those concerned with achieving equal educational opportunity, the specific nature of these policies, resource allocations, and practices is the most productive focus for reform. Identifiable subgroups of students who historically have been short-changed through critical policies, resource allocations, and practices—including low-income students, racial and ethnic minorities, limited-English proficient students, handicapped students, and females—should have equitable access to high-quality experiences. In our view, the task of educational reformers should be to carry out strategies that will secure equitable access to quality educational experiences.

In the past, many educational researchers have focused on evaluating educational quality and equity primarily by measuring student outcomes (for example, reading achievement and graduation rates), in isolation from analyzing the student educational experiences associated with these outcomes. Progress toward desired student outcomes should be rigorously evaluated. However, efforts to measure outcomes in isolation, without analyzing student educational experiences associated with these outcomes, are of limited value and often have negative effects. In contrast, three benefits occur when outcomes are analyzed in close interconnection with the analysis of student educational experiences. First, irregularities in measuring outcomes, which have been endemic in school systems like Chicago, are diminished, and negative impacts of the evaluation process on educational practice, such as teaching to the test, are exposed. Second, when improvements in student outcomes are documented, researchers can begin to understand their linkage to policy, resource allocation, and practice, increasing the likelihood that successful methods for carrying out key educational activities can be identified, refined, and subsequently implemented elsewhere. Third, it becomes possible to hold educators accountable for carrying out key activities effectively; educators cannot argue that poor outcomes are caused by influences beyond their control if they do not play their part by carrying out practices known to facilitate improved outcomes.

These same basic concepts can be extended beyond the school and applied to the school community, including family, peer group, social service organizations, neighborhood, etc. With respect to the family, for example, different practices for carrying out such key activities as responding to their children’s homework obligations have important impacts on the nature of children’s educational experiences and their longer-term
performance. While many educators have bemoaned the correlations between student outcomes and family background characteristics, few have sought to understand these school-community linkages and to determine how they can become resources for improving educational experiences and outcomes. As argued later in this paper, a critical priority for urban educational reform is to enlist the entire school community in providing the kinds of beneficial educational experiences that lead to desired educational outcomes.

**Feature 2. Five Standards for Judging the Quality of Students’ Educational Experiences**

By what standards should the quality of students’ educational experiences be judged? Prevailing views about the determinants of educational quality continue to stress the preeminent importance of classroom instruction as the most crucial school-based activity that determines student performance. Our research and direct experience in schools suggests, however, that while instructional activities are critical, instruction must be understood in combination with other key school and classroom activities that are also critical in determining what benefit students derive from school.

The brief description of students’ experiences in Chicago’s low-income high schools presented earlier touches on the multiple areas in which we have concluded that students are entitled to major improvement in the quality of their educational experiences. Based on our past research and reform efforts, the Quality of Experience Model sets out five standards for judging the quality of students’ educational experiences, which are indicated in Table 3. Table 4 provides examples of ineffective and effective practices that we have observed in Chicago that relate to each standard.

Table 3 reflects the fact that the five areas of student experience that are the focus of these standards are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. For example, lack of instructional effectiveness in elementary schools leads to low elementary school achievement (Standard 4) and retention in grade (Standard 2), which contribute to the likelihood that students will drop out of high school. Thus, policies, resource allocations, and practices at the high school level aimed at preventing dropouts are running against a strong tide of earlier practices related to other standards.

At the same time, the standards do, in some respects, constitute a hierarchy. For instance:

- If educational policy and practice systematically discourage students from attending school and students therefore do not attend school (Standard 1), students are unable to benefit from the quality of the instructional program, whatever that quality may be.
Table 3. Interrelationship of Policies, Resource Allocations, and Practices Facilitating the Five Standards for Judging the Quality of Students' Educational Experiences

Standard 1. Policies, Resource Allocations, and Practices that Enable and Encourage School Attendance and Graduation


Student Educational Experiences


Table 4. Examples of Ineffective and Effective Practices for Implementing the
Five Standards for Judging the Quality of Students’ Educational Experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard</th>
<th>Examples of Ineffective Practices</th>
<th>Examples of Effective Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standard 1. Enabling and Encouraging School Attendance and Graduation. Policies, resource allocations, and practices should enable and encourage students to attend and complete school from prekindergarten through twelfth grade.</td>
<td>• Limited availability of preschool slots.</td>
<td>• Expansion of preschool availability, coordinated with expanded daycare, so that working parents can send their children to preschool.</td>
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<td>• Failure to record attendance accurately and to follow-up with absent students.</td>
<td>• Identification of chronic truants, coupled with joint staff/parent visits to their families to determine how truant students can be helped to attend school.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Disorganized course registration procedures and lack of available instructors during the first month of the school year in high schools.</td>
<td>• High school teachers enlisted and trained as student advisors, with the goal that all students have a teacher on the staff with whom they develop a personal relationship.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| | • Student course failure is not followed-up with any counseling assistance. | | ```
| Standard 2. Minimizing Student Sorting and Related Inequitable Resource Allocation. Policies, resource allocations, and practices should minimize the sorting of students into hierarchical tracks, programs, schools, and ability groups and the inequitable allocation of resources to particular tracks, programs, etc. | • Formal and informal requirements and procedures for admission to magnet schools that create student bodies unrepresentative of the overall school district enrollment. | • Strictly enforced random admission to magnet schools, with extensive parent outreach about admissions procedures. |
| | • Hierarchical ability grouping of students in elementary schools into separate classrooms at each grade level, based on ability and achievement tests. | • Heterogeneous grouping of elementary classrooms, coupled with coaching for teachers in how to work with heterogeneous classes. |
| | • High rates of student retention in grade. | • A multi-age classroom structure that minimizes the need for retention. |
| | • Allocation of the best teachers and extra resources to selective magnet schools and higher track classes. | • Single high school classes that combine regular college prep and honors students, with honors students expected to do extra work, and all students in the class eligible to opt for honors work. |
| | | • Extra funds provided to schools, based on their percentage of low-income students, over and above their basic per pupil allocation. |
Table 4. Examples of Ineffective and Effective Practices for Implementing the Five Standards for Judging the Quality of Students' Educational Experiences

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<th>Examples of Effective Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard 3. Creating a Decent Humane School Environment.</strong> Policies, resource allocations, and practices should create decent, humane school environments.</td>
<td>- Building repairs that threaten health and safety not made for periods of years.</td>
<td>- Neglected repairs are made as a result of joint staff and parent campaign to force central administration action.</td>
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<td>- Repeated shortages of such supplies as ditto paper, pencils, toilet paper, and paper towels.</td>
<td>- Shortages of supplies alleviated as schools gain the right to order them directly and have them delivered directly to their school.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Widespread use of corporal punishment and verbal abuse of students by teachers.</td>
<td>- Parent patrols help insure children's safety on the way to and from school and during recess.</td>
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<td>- Disrespectful treatment of parents by school clerical staff and principal.</td>
<td>- Parent rooms are established in schools, where parents can meet, participate in adult education classes, help teachers.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Standard 4. Fostering Educational Effectiveness.</strong> Policies, resource allocations, and practices should be those shown through research to bring students to sufficient levels of educational performance so that they can profit from the next level of schooling.</td>
<td>- Principal never ventures into classrooms, except to carry out mandated evaluations or to deal with breakdowns in teacher control of the class.</td>
<td>- Principals or assistant principals make regular visits to classrooms to help teachers work on clearly specified academic goals for the school.</td>
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<td>- Teachers spend little class time actively teaching students, devoting most time to overseeing student work on dittoed worksheets aimed at teaching discrete skills.</td>
<td>- Teachers are well-prepared for class and spend most of the available class time actively teaching and engaging students.</td>
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<td>- A succession of temporary teachers repeatedly disrupts the continuity of students' learning experience.</td>
<td>- Parent leaders and school staff initiate training experiences for parents to teach them what they can do at home to help their children learn.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Staff make demeaning remarks about the capacities of students to learn within their hearing.</td>
<td>- The school implements a program for regularly recognizing a range of student progress in such areas as attendance, behavior, and academics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard 5. Fostering Educational Excellence.</strong> Policies, resource allocations, and practices should bring students to exceptional levels of educational performance.</td>
<td>- Teachers who achieve exceptional results but violate established administrative procedures are harassed rather than praised.</td>
<td>- Principals and parent groups use creative tactics to obtain materials and provide support to talented teachers.</td>
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<td>- Advanced course-work is not available to students in many neighborhood high schools.</td>
<td>- Schools conduct nation-wide searches to attract principals with exceptional records of past accomplishment in heading up schools serving low-income students.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• If the school system is highly stratified into selective schools and tracks, this stratification spawns pervasive low expectations about the capabilities of students in the lower reaches of the system. These pervasive low expectations then make it very unlikely that these low status students will be offered an educationally effective school experience that employs challenging educational materials and methods.

• If the school environment is overcrowded, shows obvious signs of physical neglect, and is characterized by physical and verbal abuse of students, it similarly makes an educationally effective experience unlikely. For example, teachers who believe that students can only be controlled through corporal punishment are unlikely to embrace an instructional strategy centering on student inquiry and challenging academic content.

Below is a brief explanation of the five standards for judging the quality of students’ educational experience.

**Standard 1. Enabling and Encouraging School Attendance and Graduation.** Policies, resource allocations, and practices should enable and encourage students to attend and complete school from pre-kindergarten through twelfth grade. In Table 4, we list examples of ineffective practices that we have observed in Chicago related to this standard, such as the failure to record attendance accurately and to follow up with absent students, and the disorganization of high schools during the critical first month of school, discussed earlier.

**Standard 2. Minimizing Student Sorting and Related Inequitable Resource Allocation.** Policies, resource allocations, and practices should minimize the sorting of students into hierarchical tracks, programs, schools, and ability groups and the inequitable allocation of resources to particular tracks, programs, etc. Sorting includes such issues as the creation of selective schools and programs, within-school tracking and ability grouping, misclassification into special education, and retention in grade. There is a growing body of research indicating that the minimization of rigid sorting procedures, and effective instruction of almost all students doing challenging academic content is key to the long-term effort to improve student performance (Bryk et al., 1990).

**Standard 3. Creating a Decent, Humane School Environment.** Policies, resource allocations, and practices should create decent, humane school environments. Table 4 indicates examples of policies, resource allocations, and practices frequently documented in Chicago that fail to meet this standard, including unrepaired buildings, regular shortages of such supplies as ditto paper and toilet paper, and frequent use of corporal punishment by teachers (officially prohibited in Chicago). It appears clear that a humane school environment can contribute to educational effectiveness (see, for example, Johnson, 1990, on the impact of the school’s physical environment on the intentions of the
best teachers to continue in teaching). However, we believe that students, teachers, and parents have a right to experience a decent humane school environment for its own sake, since schools are not only institutions intended to achieve certain student outcomes, but also small communities in which students and adults spend a substantial portion of their lives.

**Standard 4. Facilitating Educational Effectiveness.** Policies, resource allocations, and practices should be implemented that bring students to sufficient levels of educational performance so that they can profit from the next level of schooling. This standard has repeatedly been articulated by urban school reformers; for example, Levin (1991), in articulating the mission of “accelerated schools” focuses on the “goal of bringing all students into the educational mainstream by the end of elementary school so they can perform at levels appropriate to their age group.”

In using the term “educational effectiveness,” we wish to clarify two points. First, we are not suggesting a dichotomy between “effective education” and “excellent education,” in which, for example, low-income students must be taught through repetitious drill to achieve some minimal level of basic skills achievement, while middle class students are exposed to academically challenging content. We see “effectiveness” and “excellence” as part of a single continuum.

Second, we are not suggesting acceptance of a specific unchanging list of ingredients of instructionally effective schools and classrooms, such as those originally proposed by Edmonds (1979), nor are we suggesting that the process for implementing effective practices is simple. Clearly, the understanding of what school and classroom practices lead to educational effectiveness and of how implementation can be accomplished is in a constant state of refinement. Yet reviews of relevant research evidence (see, for example, Purkey and Smith, 1984; Bryk, et al., 1990) indicate that general agreement exists about some key characteristics of educationally effective schools, such as effective principal leadership, disciplinary order achieved without punitive, abusive methods, high expectations for students’ ability to achieve that are reflected in teachers’ day-to-day practice, and the use of challenging academic content with students. Existing knowledge of what constitutes effective practice provides a sufficient foundation for major improvements in the kinds of educational outcomes documented in Chicago, given the compelling evidence of practices in the Chicago Public Schools that fail to reflect generally-accepted conclusions from the research about educational effectiveness (see Table 4 for examples).

**Standard 5. Facilitating Educational Excellence.** Policies, resource allocations, and practices can bring urban students to exceptional levels of educational performance beyond the standard of educational effectiveness or adequacy described above, as
individual educators and schools have demonstrated (see, for example, the analysis of Central Park East in New York City, Chion-Kenney, 1987). A long-term agenda for educational equity should include support for the development of such excellence, and the analysis of how excellence can be fostered on a wider basis in urban public schools.

Feature 3. Analyzing Multi-Level Network of Policies, Resource Allocations, and Practices that Shapes the Quality of Students' Educational Experiences

As reflected in Table 5, the quality of students' educational experiences in the school, classroom, and school community are shaped by a network of policies, resource allocations, and practices at multiple levels of the educational system and the larger society. These influences affect each of the five areas in which we have specified standards for judging the quality of students' educational experiences. For example, in Chicago:

- State reimbursement practices create financial disincentives for keeping potential dropouts in school after the first three months of the school year, since state reimbursement is based on the enrollment during the three best months of attendance, and these are almost always the first three months (Sween et al., 1987). (Standard 1)

- Before school reform, schools were supposed to receive extra funding in proportion to their enrollment of low-income students. However, research about the actual school-by-school per pupil expenditures in the school system indicated, for example, that schools with less than 30% low-income students (including many of the selective magnet schools) were receiving an average of $2,304 per pupil, while schools with between 90% and 99% low-income students were receiving $1,995 per pupil (Chicago Panel, 1988). (Standard 2)

- A retired business executive recently hired to overhaul the school system's purchasing procedures found that it was a customary practice of the central administration not to buy more of a commodity (like cheese for the school lunch program) until the school system had run out. One advantage of this approach is that it allows the system to designate the situation as an emergency and to waive established competitive bidding procedures (Jones, 1991). (Standard 3)

- Prior to reform, principals had lifetime tenure under state law and could only be removed "for cause." Because of the ways in which the courts had defined "cause," it was virtually impossible to remove a principal for the failure to provide leadership for instructional improvement. (Standard 4)

As we noted earlier, some have concluded that the best course for reformers is simply to free school staffs from most top-down regulation. In contrast, we conclude that careful analysis of the linkage between policy, resource allocation, and practice at various levels of the system and their impact on children's school experiences can indicate the types of changes at higher levels of the system (such as changes in state law) that can contribute to major improvements in the quality of children's school experiences, when judged in light
Table 5. Multi-Level Network of Policies, Resource Allocations, and Practices that Shapes the Quality of Students' Educational Experiences

State and Federal

School District

School

Classroom

Student Educational Experiences

Community
of the five standards described above. Several such strategies or "theories of action" that are central to Chicago school reform are described later in this paper.

**Feature 4. Alternative Social Science Perspectives for Understanding the Functioning of this Multi-Level System**

Allison (1971) was the first to point out that existing partial theories of human behavior could be productively applied successively as "alternative conceptual lenses" for understanding an event or issue. Building on the application of this approach carried out in education by Elmore (1978), the Quality of Experience Model applies six social science theories or "perspectives" to help analyze the nature of student's educational experiences and the network of policies, practices, and resource allocations that shape these experiences. These six perspectives are:

- **Systems Management Perspective.** The educational system is viewed as a single hierarchical system in which persons with formal authority at various levels define policies, develop plans for carrying them out, and then insure compliance with these plans through the systematic use of various rewards and sanctions (see, for example, Elmore, 1978).

- **Conflict and Bargaining Perspective.** The educational system is shaped by a constant process of conflict and bargaining, as individuals and formal and informal groups strive to maintain and/or increase their power and resources (see for example, Wirt and Kirst, 1972).

- **Economic Incentives Perspective.** The level of financial allocations and the procedures through which the funds are to be spent create incentives or disincentives to carry out policies and practices in particular ways. However, economic incentives interact in complex ways with non-economic incentives in shaping policy and practice in a multi-level system (see, for example, Pincus, 1974; Wildavsky, 1979).

- **Organizational Patterns Perspective.** The educational system comprises hundreds of semi-autonomous work units that exercise substantial discretion about how they carry out their jobs day-to-day. Within these units, members develop informal work routines that may be at variance with formal procedures. And they fragment reform plans into bits and pieces in ways that distort and frustrate broad reform initiatives that require coordinated action by numerous work units (see, for example, Cyert and March, 1963; Lortie, 1975).

- **Subculture Perspective.** People in different parts of the educational system develop substantially different ways of looking at the world, different frames of reference about what schools are like. Frames of reference can allow those charged with implementation of reform to develop potent rationales for continuing present practices (see, for example, Berger and Luckman, 1967; Mehan and Wood, 1975).

- **Professional Participation and Development Perspective.** Reforms will be carried out at the school and classroom level only if those who bear ultimate responsibility for implementing them are permitted to participate in their formulation and receive
supportive assistance in acquiring new skills needed to do things differently. Further, they must have a major voice in defining their needs for assistance and in determining how it will be provided. If this participation is not permitted, those responsible for implementation will find ways to circumvent it (see, for example, Schmuck et al., 1977).

Our basic method in applying these varied perspectives in both our research and reform activities has been to draw on them as a source of orienting questions and hypotheses for initial data-gathering and later as possible explanations that were employed in analyzing what we observed or in analyzing how the educational system reacted to a particular reform initiative that we carried out. In Table 6, we provide a few examples of the kinds of specific hypotheses that we draw from each of the six perspectives, as well as examples of some ways in which we applied these hypotheses in designing the reform law and the strategy for implementing it.

For example, the Conflict and Bargaining Perspective, which views decision making at all levels of the educational system as consisting of partisan conflict and bargaining in the pursuit of self-interest fit many of our observations about how the Chicago school system functioned at all levels, from the school to the school district headquarters at Pershing Road. Thus, we became convinced that parents had to be organized on a school-by-school basis to press for concrete improvements in educational practice that would benefit their children and, later, that this political effort had to be organized citywide and focused on the arena within the political system in which we believed that it was possible to exert most leverage: the state legislature.

To cite a different example of our application of the six perspectives, the Organizational Patterns Perspective and the Subculture Perspective helped explain why we observed teachers persisting in practices that were obviously not helping their students, such as failing about 45% of students in ninth grade math year after year, without rethinking their mathematics program. Indeed, some of the classic social science studies of teachers beliefs and practices, such as Lortie (1975) and Sarason (1971), were pivotal in convincing us that we could not accept the viewpoint that merely turning control of the schools over to teachers was going to lead to significant improvement, if improvement was defined in light of the five standards for judging the quality of educational experiences described above.

Overall, we found that each of the six perspectives offered an important kernel of truth as a partial explanation of the functioning of the educational systems we analyzed and as a source of plans for improvement. Many reform strategies that we view as misleading select one perspective and take it to an extreme, disregarding its limitations and the need to temper its insights through explanations provided by the others.
Table 6. Six Social Science Perspectives that Inform the Quality of Experience Model, with Examples of Hypotheses Drawn from Them and Their Application to the Chicago Reform Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspective</th>
<th>Examples of Related Hypotheses</th>
<th>Examples of Application in the Reform Process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Systems Management Perspective</td>
<td>• The four main ingredients for effective implementation of reform are (1) clearly specified tasks and objectives that accurately reflect the intent of the policy; (2) a management plan that allocates tasks and performance standards to sub-units; (3) an objective means for measuring sub-unit performance; and (4) a system of social controls and sanctions sufficient to hold subordinates accountable for their performance (Elmore, 1978).</td>
<td>• The school improvement planning and implementation process in the law represents an application of the Systems Management Perspective. The principal is the key manager responsible for helping develop and implement the Improvement Plan. The school's budget is to be tied to plan priorities. The principal is accountable to the Local School Council for implementing the Improvement Plan, and the Improvement Plan is intended to be a major focus of the Council's assessment of the principal's performance and a basis for the decision about whether or not to retain the principal.</td>
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<td>• Many critics of the systems management perspective fail to study implementation over a sufficiently long time frame, and thus short-range implementation problems obscure the fact that compliance with reform objectives is secured incrementally over a period of years (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conflict and Bargaining Perspective</td>
<td>• Educational decision making consists of partisan conflict and bargaining among organized interest groups who have access to decision-making arenas; even large groups of individuals affected by a particular decision will not see their interests served unless they organize to intervene actively in the bargaining process (Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950).</td>
<td>• The reform coalition sees the necessity for remaining active over a period of years in the partisan battle to protect reform as it unfolds. The reform coalition is attempting to organize the 5,400 elected Council members to become politically active in the process of protecting reform.</td>
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<td>• Educational decisions reflect temporary accommodations among partisan interests; &quot;losers&quot; will continue to press in subsequent related activities to pursue their preferences (Elmore, 1978).</td>
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<td>• New regulatory structures set up by consumers typically come to be dominated by the interests they are supposed to regulate, as consumers curtail organized pressure once initial victories have been won and as interest groups adversely affected by the change become increasingly better organized to oppose it. (Edelman, 1964).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perspective</td>
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<td>Examples of Application in the Reform Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Incentives Perspective</td>
<td>- Patterns of actual fund use are a graphic reflection of a school system's real priorities, and these patterns are often inconsistent with publicly stated priorities (Moore and Hyde, 1981).</td>
<td>- The reform law contains very specific requirements for closing loopholes that previously allowed State Chapter 1 funds to supplant, rather than supplement, other funds.</td>
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<td>- By specifying levels of funding and rules for fund use, educational policy makers can create significant incentives for stimulating desired educational reforms. However, no level of the educational system passively implements the resource allocation decisions from higher levels. Decision makers at each level down to the school and classroom actively shape resource allocations (Pincus, 1974; Monk, 1981).</td>
<td>- The reform law places significant new discretionary resources at the school level, to give the Councils flexible resources to implement their plans and to provide immediate tangible evidence that school reform represents substantial change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Patterns Perspective</td>
<td>- Intricate patterns of accepted behavior develop within and between work groups, and these patterns are often at odds with official procedures. Organizational change should be conceived as an effort to change existing organizational routines, a process that requires a detailed understanding of present routines and a long-term commitment to press for new ones to be implemented (Allison, 1971; Knapp, et al., 1983).</td>
<td>- Designs for Change recognizes that there is a long history of school-level planning in the school system that has been basically a paper-shuffling exercise. Designs for Change is working with some key schools to help them become models for the planning and implementation of improvement, so that these schools can subsequently become sites for educating key leaders from other schools who initially approach improvement planning as an empty bureaucratic exercise.</td>
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<td>- At the school level, the principal is viewed as having legitimate authority to alter organizational routines. Although principals often succumb to existing patterns of fragmentation and discretion, those who exercise their authority skillfully can bring about basic changes in these routines (Becker, 1971; Paden, 1975).</td>
<td>- The law places major emphasis on the role of the principal as the key school-level leader in making reform work, and the reform coalition has invested substantial effort in training and assistance to Local School Councils concerning the principal selection process and the recruitment of principal candidates from across the country.</td>
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### Table 6. Six Social Science Perspectives that Inform the Quality of Experience Model, with Examples of Hypotheses Drawn from Them and Their Application to the Chicago Reform Strategy

<table>
<thead>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subculture Perspective</strong></td>
<td>- Distinctive ways of defining one's experience, distinctive &quot;frames of reference,&quot; for interpreting events, are frequently shared among the same &quot;subculture&quot; within the educational system. Frames of reference become powerful filters through which reality is viewed and action is justified (Spradley, 1970; Pressman, 1973).</td>
<td>- Designs for Change training and assistance to Local School Councils and school staffs places a major emphasis on &quot;vision development&quot; aimed at questioning previous frames of reference about the relationship between the school and community and the extent of changes that are possible under the reform. This assistance effort is aimed at developing a new common subculture in at least some leading-edge schools that includes both educators and non-educators.</td>
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<tr>
<td>People in different parts of the educational system develop substantially different ways of looking at the world, different frames of reference about what schools are like. Frames of reference can allow those charged with implementation of reform to develop potent rationales for continuing present practices.</td>
<td>- A powerful frame of reference for most educators at various levels of the system is one of &quot;pragmatism&quot; or &quot;making do.&quot; Most educators view themselves as operating within a set of constraints that severely limit possibilities for implementing major changes in prevailing organizational practices (Lieberman and Miller, 1978).</td>
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<td><strong>Professional Participation and Development Perspective</strong></td>
<td>- Teachers, the direct providers of services to children, have the greatest potential to improve the quality of students' educational experiences and are in the best position to decide what changes in practice will benefit children (Leiter and Cooper, 1978).</td>
<td>- The reform law gives teachers a substantially increased role in school-wide decision making, in selecting the specific educational methods and materials for the school, and in defining staff development needs and the nature of staff development experiences.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reforms will be carried out at the school and classroom level only if those who have ultimate responsibility for implementing them are permitted to participate in their formulation and receive supportive assistance in acquiring new skills needed to do things differently. Further, they must have a major voice in defining their needs for assistance and in how assistance will be provided. If this participation is not permitted, those responsible for implementation will find ways to circumvent it.</td>
<td>- Reforms often fail because educators are provided with inadequate staff development experiences to help them carry these reforms out. School staff are in the best position to determine their own professional needs for staff development, so they should have a major role in shaping staff development experiences (Hall and Loucks, 1978).</td>
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Thus, the Chicago reform strategy draws on all six perspectives, as illustrated by Table 6. For example:

- Drawing on the Conflict and Bargaining Perspective, the strategy aims to change the balance of interest group influence at the school level by giving parent and neighborhood leaders a majority voice on the Local School Council.

- Drawing on the Systems Management Perspective, the strategy seeks to create a step-by-step process of school improvement planning, plan implementation, and accountability for plan implementation at the school level.

- Drawing on the Professional Participation and Development Perspective, the strategy gives teachers a substantial role in school-wide decision making, and a strong voice in developing the specific methods and content of the curriculum and in developing the nature of the staff development assistance they need to carry it out.

In the subsequent description of theories of action concerning specific aspects of the reform, we will make further reference to specific hypotheses drawn from these six social science perspectives that informed our thinking.

**Eighteen Key Elements of the Reform Plan**

I argued earlier that the effectiveness of urban school system restructuring depends on numerous important specifics of both the restructuring plans themselves and the strategies for implementing these plans over a period of years. In Table 7, we summarize eighteen key features of Chicago's school reform plan that we believe are critical to its potential to improve children's educational experiences and their subsequent performance. They constitute the basis for our theories of action about how Chicago school reform will improve students' educational experiences and performance. The basic form of a theory of action is the assertion that, in a particular type of situation that embodies a particular set of preconditions, taking one or more specified actions will produce a desired result or set of results. Some theories of action are extremely simple, specifying a single action that its initiator is confident will consistently achieve the result that he or she desires, regardless of the characteristics of the situation. As I discussed earlier, Chicago school reform is often stereotyped in this way — for example, "they think that just by turning the schools over to the parents, everything will get better." As I will try to illustrate, our theories of action, while they may of course be wrong, are quite complex, and those who wish to analyze Chicago school reform should take the time to understand this complexity.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Key Element</th>
<th>Hypothesized Beneficial Impact</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Reform Embodied in State Law</strong></td>
<td>Makes basic reform elements resistant to short-term reversal because of changes in school system leadership or because of central administration opposition. Gives Councils legally enforceable rights and avenues for protecting them. Enlists State Legislature as ally for reform implementation.</td>
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<td><strong>2. Key Specific Powers Delegated to Local Council</strong></td>
<td>Gives Councils clear prerogatives for action that are focused on school improvement.</td>
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<td><strong>3. Council Includes School Stakeholders; Parent Majority</strong></td>
<td>Gives parents, who have the most immediate stake in the school's success, a strong voice in school decision making. Creates a rough equivalence of power between school staff and non-school staff, given staff influence that flows from their expertise and formal positions within the school. Teacher representatives on Council will be particularly influential through presenting staff viewpoints about school problems and proposed solutions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. School Improvement Plan Key Council and School Responsibility</strong></td>
<td>Focuses school energies on achieving particular systemwide performance goals. Creates a locally-developed plan for pursuing these goals that key local factors have strong incentives to implement. Allows Council and school to tailor plans to local conditions.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5. Budget Control and Increased Discretionary Funds for Council</strong></td>
<td>Provides Councils and schools with financial flexibility and extra resources to implement improvement plans.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Element</td>
<td>Hypothesized Beneficial Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>6. No Principal Tenure; Four-Year Contracts</strong></td>
<td>Abolition of principal tenure and of all other requirements for the principalship, except state administrative certification, with the Local School Council empowered to sign the principal to a four-year performance contract. Opens principal selection process so that more principals are selected who are committed to school improvement. Creates long-term incentives for the principal to work for school improvement.</td>
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<td><strong>7. Increased Principal Authority</strong></td>
<td>Increased principal authority in hiring, supervising, and dismissing school staff. Gives principal the opportunity to assemble a staff responsive to school priorities and more formal authority to supervise their activities, increasing the likelihood that staff will work together for school improvement.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>8. School Staff Develops Specifics of Curriculum, within Systemwide Framework</strong></td>
<td>Authority for the principal and teachers to develop the specific content and methods of their school's curriculum, within a framework of systemwide curriculum standards and objectives specified by the Board of Education and a set of goals for improved student performance spelled out in the law. Gives school staff the motivation to implement plans that result from their having a role in developing these plans. Allows staff to tailor plans to local conditions. Achieves desirable balance between systemwide curriculum standards and local initiative.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>9. Increased Teacher Authority and Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Increased teacher decision-making through teacher membership on Council. Increased involvement in decision making about curriculum through Professional Personnel Advisory Committee and through shift in responsibility for developing specifics of the learning program at the school level. Gives teachers a voice in selecting their boss and in school decision making. The influence of teachers on the Council will be out of the proportion to their numbers. Advisory Committee involvement and local development of the learning program will result in increased teacher implementation of improved instructional practices.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>10. Appointed Central Board Screened by Council Members</strong></td>
<td>An Interim Board of Education appointed by the Mayor replaces the previous Board of Education upon the effective date of the law. A permanent Board of Education is appointed after one year by the Mayor, who must choose from slates of nominees recommended by a Nominating Commission composed of elected representatives who come from Local School Councils. A central Board of Education is appointed that is motivated to support the implementation of school-level reform and to press the central administration to be responsive to the schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key Element</td>
<td>Hypothesized Beneficial Impact</td>
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<td>11. Central Administration Does Not Supervise Schools Day-to-Day, Has Oversight Role</td>
<td>Elimination of the direct supervisory role of the subdistrict administration, central administration, and central Board of Education over the school and principal. These administrative entities are now required to play a monitoring role to insure that schools operate within certain basic parameters, similar to the relationship between a state board of education and a local school district. Included in Board of Education responsibilities is the development of systemwide curriculum standards and objectives. School-level exercise of new powers is not stifled by continued oppressive day-to-day supervision by central administration. Inappropriate performance at the school level that is outside of the boundaries of acceptable behavior (such as discrimination or misappropriation of funds) is identified and dealt with.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Central Administration Provides Specified Services</td>
<td>Central administration provides specified services that require systemwide coordination in such areas as special education, bilingual education, transportation, food services, and school construction. The central administration focuses on carrying out a few responsibilities effectively, in areas where systemwide initiative is more efficient or equitable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Central Administration Assesses Student Progress</td>
<td>Central administration carries out assessment of the progress of individual schools and of the school system as a whole in meeting student performance goals spelled out in the law, feeding information about progress back to individual schools. Quality assessment of school progress focuses school energies on achieving systemwide performance objectives and provides feedback to schools on their progress.</td>
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<tr>
<td>14. Cap on Central Administration Size</td>
<td>The size of the central administration is limited through a financial cap that requires a reduction from the administration’s past size. Central administration is forced to rethink its priorities, given its new role. Funds saved at the central administration level are shifted to support the schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td>15. Independent Oversight Authority Monitors Central Administration</td>
<td>The Board of Education submits a yearly plan to an independent oversight authority, spelling out how the central administration will carry out its new role, and the oversight authority has strong intervention powers to correct failures of the central administration in implementing this role. The oversight authority forces the school system to develop a coherent plan for aiding schools and evaluating the progress of reform and intervenes if the central administration is undermining reform.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Key Element</td>
<td>Hypothesized Beneficial Impact</td>
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<tr>
<td>16. Regulated School Choice</td>
<td>After the Councils and schools have been given an opportunity to improve the quality of their program, an equitable program of school choice is phased in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Long-Term Assistance to Councils and Schools, with Local Choice of Providers</td>
<td>Training and assistance are available over a period of years for Local School Councils and school staff, from both independent organizations and from the central administration, and schools have funds for purchasing help and these have choice in deciding who to turn to for this help.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Long-Term Independent Advocacy for Implementation</td>
<td>A vigorous, independent advocacy movement monitors the process of reform over a period of years.</td>
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<td>If schools in all neighborhoods are given a fair opportunity to improve, a phased-in program of family choice of school, carried out with strong equity protections, can provide a further beneficial incentive for school improvement.</td>
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<td>Long-term training and assistance for Councils and schools is essential for improvement. In the past, the central administration has acted as a major barrier to direct school involvement with a range of independent resources for training and assistance. If Councils and schools have the discretion to choose sources of help and the funds to hire them, the central administration will be forced to compete with independent service providers, increasing the likelihood that high quality help will be available to schools.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long-term resistance to the implementation of reform can be expected from those whose interests are adversely affected by reform. Long-term independent advocacy is essential to protect its appropriate implementation.</td>
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As I stated earlier, the eighteen key elements of the Chicago reform strategy were not deduced from some abstract theory, but were instead created through a process that began with identifying basic deficiencies in the quality of education experienced by Chicago's students; analyzing how current policies, resource allocations, and practices structured these existing experiences; and then spelling out an alternative set of policies, resource allocations, and practices that we concluded would improve the quality of students' experiences in the five areas identified by the Quality of Experience Model. Given the fact that we followed this painstaking process to develop a coherent reform strategy with a substantial number of interrelated features that we believe are crucial to the reform strategy's success, it is particularly galling when critics simply pick out one of these key features in isolation and assert that it represents the essence of the Chicago plan.

A simple analogy that I have found helpful in explaining how we think about the importance of the eighteen elements and of their interrelationship is to compare the process of restructuring to making bread. Like successful bread-making, we see the reform as a multi-step process in which certain essential ingredients must be combined in particular proportions and under particular conditions at various steps. While we have concluded some particular ingredients are essential, we do not believe that any single ingredient by itself — such as giving parents majority control of a school governing council — is sufficient to yield the educational improvements for which we are striving. Nor have we been content merely to dump all the ingredients in a bowl and stare at it, hoping that this action will somehow magically give us our desired end result — we are currently absorbed in a process of mixing, kneading, and baking that will continue for many years.

As I stated, Table 7 reflects key specifics of our overall strategy for successful Chicago restructuring. Without reiterating every point in the table, let me briefly discuss a few of these key specifics and their interrelationships.

The first key element of the reform strategy was our decision to seek reform through state legislative action. We adopted this approach because we sought a clear shift of decision making authority from the central administration to the school site, and our analysis of previous school-based management initiatives in Chicago and other cities, as well as the implementation of other types of school reform initiatives, had indicated that little had changed at the school site when the nature of the authority delegated was ambiguous, or when the delegation of authority was initiated by a school superintendent or school board who characteristically did not follow through over a period of years in supporting the needed change process (Malen et al., 1990; Moore and Davenport, in preparation). At the same time, we were aware of research literature about the long-term beneficial impact of laws and court decisions that conferred specific rights to students and...
their families, such as Brown v. Board of Education (Scheingold, 1974) and the Education for All Handicapped Children's Act (Wright, 1980; Yurchak et al., 1981). Further, our own previous research had indicated positive impacts of legislative change on the quality of educational services and programs for vulnerable children, when the legislation and the campaign to implement it had a specific series of characteristics, including the focus of legal mandates on those policies, practices, and resource allocations most important in determining the quality of students' school experiences; focused financial incentives for implementation; formal opportunities for program beneficiaries and their advocates to monitor implementation and subsequent advocacy efforts by these groups; and coherent government regulatory activity to press for implementation (Moore et al., 1983).

Section 34 of the Illinois School Code applies only to Chicago. We concluded that rewriting Section 34 to incorporate basic elements of our reform strategy would make the reform process difficult to reverse before the reform strategy had had a fair chance to succeed, would give Local School Councils and reform advocates legally-enforceable rights and thus avenues for protecting their efforts when they were challenged by interest groups adversely affected by the reform, and would enlist the state legislature as an ally in the process of reform implementation.

Elements 2 through 16 listed in Table 7 are key elements of the reform strategy that were directly incorporated into the Chicago School Reform Act. Because we did not have to make many significant compromises in the legislative process, the resulting law embodies a coherent strategy for restructuring, reflecting the specific theories of action that we concluded were essential, if reform was going to make a difference in improving the quality of students' educational experiences. For example:

- The law creates an elected Local School Council at each school, which represents all key groups who have a direct stake in the school's operation and success: parents, community residents, teachers, and the principal (Element 3). However, it makes no sense to create a school site council, if that council has no clear authority to make changes that will improve the quality of the educational program. Thus, the law delegates three clear policy-making powers to the Council: selecting a principal, helping develop and approve a school improvement plan, and helping develop and approve a school budget tied to the improvement plan's priorities (Element 4, 5, and 6).

- For principals to have incentives to respond to the priorities of the Council, they must be clearly accountable to the Council. Thus, principal tenure is abolished, principals are placed on four-year contracts to the Council (Ingredient 6), and the old line of supervisory authority between the principal and the central administration is severed (Element 11).

- Principals are more likely to exercise leadership for school improvement if their formal authority over the school's operation is clear. Thus, the law gives principals
the authority to select all new educational staff for the school; gives principals the
authority, working with teachers, to develop the specific methods and content of the
school's learning program; and makes it easier for the principal to remove non-
performing teachers (Element 7 and 8).

• While we concluded that it was desirable for the Council to set priorities for school
improvement (Element 4) and for school staff to develop the specifics of the
school's curriculum (Element 8), we also believed that this effort needed to proceed
within the context of a set of systemwide curriculum objectives and standards
(Element 11), and that it was essential that schools received regular feedback about
their progress in reaching objectives for student performance spelled out in the law
(Element 13). Thus, the reform plan aims at achieving a balance between school-
level curriculum planning, on the one-hand, and systemwide curriculum objectives
and student progress goals, on the other.

• Delegating formal budgetary authority to the Council means little if they have no
real discretion in spending money. Thus, the law requires that increased
discretionary funds (averaging $250,000 per school in 1990-91) be allocated to
schools, based on their percentage of low-income students (Element 5).

These are some basic examples of the ways in which we hypothesized that various key
elements of the law would reinforce each other. However, as I have repeatedly
underscored, we did not merely secure the passage of the law and hope that it would be
self-implementing. This conviction about the need for long-term support to make the
school reform process work is reflected in Elements 17 and 18 of the reform strategy:

• Long-Term Assistance to Councils and Schools, with Local Choice of Providers.
Training and assistance must be available over a period of years for Local School
Councils and school staff, from both independent organizations and from the
central administration, and schools must have a choice in deciding who to turn to
for this help. Further, their ability to choose must be guaranteed by their control
over resources to purchase services.

• Long-Term Independent Advocacy for Implementation. A vigorous independent
advocacy movement must monitor the process of reform over a period of years.
DFC's previous research about effective child advocacy (Moore et al., 1983)
analyzed a number of successful advocacy campaigns for the implementation of a
law or court decision, and this analysis serves as the basis for our current strategy
and tactics in pressing for the law's implementation.

Below, in discussing our theories of action about several specific aspects of the Chicago
reform strategy, I will elaborate on some specifics of these long-term plans for supporting
reform.
Four Controversial Aspects of Chicago School Reform: Theories of Action

Behind each of the eighteen key elements of the Chicago reform plan briefly summarized in Table 7, there lies an extremely detailed analysis of past experience in Chicago, relevant research and experience in other cities, our own past research, and concepts drawn from the Quality of Experience Model. In the final section of this paper, I describe in more detail the theories of action that underlie four controversial elements of the Chicago plan:

- The changed role of the principal.
- The composition and role of the Local School Council.
- The vision that underlies the reform concerning the prospects for building school communities that work together to support students’ learning.
- The relationship of the reform plan and our long-term implementation strategy to improving educational performance.

My primary purpose is to spell out the thinking that led us to make certain choices in designing the reform strategy, not to provide a comprehensive evaluation of how well strategies are working in practice and what impact they are having. However, in the course of explaining our theories of action, I cite some illustrative information about the initial stages of implementation.

The Changed Role of the Principal

Chicago school reform makes basic changes in the selection and formal accountability structure for principals. Although more than 100 principals have signed a “manifesto” strongly supporting reform, the Chicago Principals Association has fought the law at every turn, and won a lawsuit challenging the reform law in November that nearly succeeded in derailing the whole process. Why did we change the principals’ role and the system for principal accountability so fundamentally?

Over the five years preceding the reform campaign, Designs for Change staff had spent thousands of hours in Chicago schools, and we had almost never seen significant improvements in such areas as discipline, staff development, and reading instruction without vigorous leadership from a school’s principal. We had also followed the national research about the role of principals in school improvement, and had ourselves conducted research indicating the critical role that principal leadership played in shaping the quality of reading instruction in elementary schools, through either coordinating or failing to
coordinate teachers' reading instruction activities (Moore et al., 1981; Hyde and Moore, 1988). Given the conclusion that principals are one vital key to school improvement, we identified a set of policies and practices that were in place before reform that were throttling principals' initiative to provide vigorous leadership for school improvement in Chicago. These policies and practices are summarized in Table 8.

As Table 8 indicates, these factors included interlocking policies and practices for principal eligibility, selection, supervision, and job security. To briefly summarize some key points spelled out in Table 8:

- Before reform, Chicago employed a restrictive principal examination process that periodically allowed about 200 individuals to become eligible to apply for principalships. This exam was only offered every three or four years. Further, favoritism in the exam process had been documented over the years, and the examination process gave special preferences to insiders that made it virtually impossible for outsiders to pass.

- Principals who passed the exam were free to apply for specific principal openings, and a committee of the Local School Improvement Council at each school interviewed candidates and then made a recommendation to the Subdistrict Superintendent, the principals' immediate supervisor under the old system. The Council's recommendation was usually accepted, giving an appearance of parent control. However, Subdistrict Superintendents, in fact, controlled the selection process in most instances, by identifying their choice for a particular position, discouraging others from applying, influencing the composition of the school's review committee, and lobbying members of the committee for the Superintendent's selection.

- Once selected, principals were aggressively supervised, particularly concerning their compliance with routine administrative procedures, by Subdistrict Superintendents. Further, principals served a three-year probationary period, after which the Subdistrict Superintendent decided whether or not they would be granted tenure. Once a principal was granted tenure, a principal could only be removed "for cause," and court decisions had made this standard of misbehavior almost impossible to prove. Thus, once principals were granted tenure, the main source of rewards and sanctions for them remained the Subdistrict Superintendent, who could harass them if they displeased him or her and who was pivotal in any decision about the principal's future promotion.

- The interlocking impact of eligibility, selection, supervision, and job security combined to stifle the motivation of most principals to work actively for school improvement. Indeed, principals who did so almost inevitably ran afoul of established school system procedures and informal norms, and were characteristically harassed by their Superintendents.

Given this diagnosis, we developed a strategy for legal changes and for activities in the years after the new legal structure was put in place that we believed would create potent incentives for a substantial number of principals to initiate school improvement activities.
### THE CHICAGO PRINCIPALS' EXAMINATION

The principals' examination employed in Chicago allowed only about 200 individuals to be designated as eligible for principalships every three or four years, dramatically limiting the pool of available candidates. Irregularities in the conduct of the exam, in which some applicants were given special study guides, have previously been successfully challenged in court.

Almost no one from outside Chicago applied to be a Chicago principal, due in part to extra points awarded in the exam process to individuals from within the system and the lack of clear procedures for outsiders to obtain salary credit for past experience.

As principals were selected from the pool to head individual schools, it consistently decreased in size, sometimes leaving only a handful of candidates with basic eligibility for all openings systemwide.

### THE PRINCIPAL SELECTION PROCESS

Local School Improvement Councils were given the right to evaluate principal candidates who had passed the Principals' Examination and who applied to head their school. They then submitted an advisory recommendation to the Subdistrict Superintendent. This recommendation was usually accepted.

When individual principal vacancies occurred, Subdistrict Superintendents typically worked actively to control the selection process by encouraging a particular candidate to apply, discouraging other candidates, and lobbying the Local School Improvement Council for a particular choice.

The impact of the Local School Improvement Council's advisory role was severely limited by the small available pool of eligible candidates and the efforts of Subdistrict Superintendents to control the selection process.

### PRINCIPAL SUPERVISION AND LIFE-TIME TENURE

Principals were closely supervised by Subdistrict Superintendents, their line superiors, who often had been responsible for determining their initial selection.

After a three-year probationary period, principals received life-time tenure, based on a decision by the Subdistrict Superintendent. After that point, they could only be removed "for cause," which requires a standard of proof of wrong-doing that is virtually impossible to meet.

### IMPACT ON PRINCIPAL INITIATIVE

Because life-time tenure shielded principals from negative consequences for their behavior, it decreased the motivation of many principals to work actively for school improvement.

Because the Subdistrict Superintendent was the main source of potential sanction for principals (through granting or withholding of favors and through harassment) and a key decision maker concerning further promotion, most principals sought to please their Subdistrict Superintendent.

Principals who undertook initiatives for school improvement that ran contrary to established procedures or that entailed active alliances with parents were often harassed by Subdistrict Superintendents.

Principals frequently did not keep commitments, made to Local School Improvement Councils during the selection process, which the Councils were powerless to enforce. Even those principals who were not the Subdistrict Superintendent's initial choice came under the Superintendent's control.
that would improve students’ learning experiences. Major points of this theory of action concerning the changed role of the principal are briefly summarized in Table 9.

One strand of our strategy was to substantially increase the probability that principals would be selected who were committed to carrying out school improvement. Through the reform law, we abolished lifetime principal tenure and prohibited the Principals’ Exam, as well as any other requirements for the principalship beyond state administrative certification. These changes expanded the potential pool of eligible applicants from a few hundred to more than 9,000 in Illinois alone. The law also gave elected Local School Councils the clear right to hire principals, and then to decide after four years whether or not to retain them. As the selection process spelled out in the law unfolded, the reform coalition conducted statewide and national searches for principal candidates and provided training and consultation for Local School Councils about principal selection, principal evaluation, and school improvement. We predicted that through this new process, Chicago would have a much expanded pool of applicants for principal positions and that many of the new principals selected would have a strong initial commitment to carry out school improvement activities.

Further, we put in place a set of incentives through which the principal’s commitment to school improvement would be sustained over a period of years, once principals were selected. As briefly summarized in Table 9, we predicted that:

- Making the principal accountable for performance to the Local School Council and eliminating the supervisory authority of the Subdistrict Superintendent over the principal will make the principal responsive to the priorities of the Council.

- Providing long-term training and assistance to the principal, key members of Local School Councils, and school staff concerning school improvement will increase the quality of improvement plans and of their implementation.

- Holding the principal responsible for carrying out a school improvement plan focused on improving student performance in areas spelled out in the law — a plan that the principal develops with the Council and that is approved by the Council — will encourage serious implementation of improvement plans in many schools.

- Placing the principal on a four-year contract, coupled with the emphasis placed on school improvement planning and implementation, will make the implementation of the school improvement plan a focus for the evaluation of the principal’s performance and rehiring and thus increase the principal’s motivation to implement the plan.

- Serious implementation of school improvement plans will lead to improved student performance.

What has occurred in the first stages of this process? Here are a few facts about principal selection and the initial implementation of school improvement plans:
Table 9. Hypothesized Relationship of Changed Principal Status Under Reform to School Improvement

**Principal Selection**

- Chicago Principals Exam abolished. Only state credential required.
- Lifetime principals tenure abolished.
- Pool of eligible individuals now includes more than 9,000.
- Reform groups and individual schools initiate national searches for principal candidates.
- Pool of actual applicants grows in size and diversity, includes more risk-takers and innovators.
- Principals hired by Local School Councils through four-year performance contract.
- Independent organizations provide training regarding principal selection and evaluation and effective school improvement.
- Councils more likely to select principals who will seriously work for school improvement.
- More principals selected who are committed to school improvement.

**Principal Initiative for School Improvement**

- Principal must develop three-year School Improvement Plan with Council, which Council approves.
- Principal has legal responsibility for implementing School Improvement Plan.
- Improvement Plan will typically serve as basis for Council evaluation of principal, in determining whether he/she will be rehired after four years.
- More principals likely to provide active leadership in implementing Improvement Plans.
- Significant implementation of Improvement Plans in many schools.
- Improved student performance in many schools.

- Subdistrict Superintendents no longer directly supervise principal.
- Number of Subdistrict Superintendents decreased from 23 to 11.
- Other aids and incentives for principal to pursue school improvement (see Table 7).
- Decreased influence of Subdistrict Superintendents on principal selection and principal initiative.
• Many Chicago principals are close to retirement. The average principal is aged 50. A large number of principals resigned after the law was passed and continue to resign.

• Half the principals were up for retention decisions in spring 1990; the decision making process for the second half of principals is taking place in spring 1991. In the 1990 decision making process, 82% of principals were retained; however, a significant percentage of those retained had recently been installed as temporary principals to replace a principal who resigned, so a number of Councils were retaining a principal whom they had recently had a role in selecting for the interim principalship.

• Those schools that did open up the principalship to consider a range of candidates in spring 1991 typically had about 35 applicants. Some schools had more than 100 applicants.

• Despite highly publicized charges by some principals that Local School Councils were making principal selections based on race, a research analysis indicated no significant statistical relationship between the race of the principal, the majority race of the Local School Council, and the likelihood that a principal would be retained (Designs for Change, 1989).

• By March 1990, one year ago, 30% of principals in the system were different from those who had headed schools at the time the reform law passed.

• Preliminary information from the second round of principal selections, now underway, indicate that approximately 80 schools are seeking new principals. We estimate that the principal turnover between the time the reform law was passed and July 1991 will approach 50%. By July 1991, all principals will have been selected by the Local School Councils and will be operating under four-year performance contracts.

• Local School Councils had from November 1989 through May 1990 to develop their first school improvement plans. During this period, they also were required to develop a school-based budget, and half of them selected a principal. The resulting plans were extremely variable in incorporating changes in practice consistent with the five standards of the Quality of Experience Model. In some instances, the plans reflected a basic departure from past practice and were developed with broad input from the school community. In others, the Council developed a plan modeled on the school's past improvement plans, or signed off on one prepared by the principal.

• In a survey of LSC members conducted in October 1990, more than 50% of teachers surveyed reported that they had seen significant improvements in safety and discipline, physical plant, and planning for the learning program since school reform (Richard Day Associates, 1990).

• As the Organizational Patterns and Conflict and Bargaining Perspectives would suggest, Subdistrict Superintendents and central administration staff persist in old patterns of behavior despite the changes in their role made by the reform law. Many are attempting to influence principal selection decisions and to maintain their hierarchical supervisory control over principals. These initiatives to maintain top-
down control and influence represent a significant threat to the implementation of strategy spelled out in Table 9.

The Composition and Role of the Local School Council

Perhaps the feature of Chicago school reform that has aroused the most controversy is the composition of the Local School Council, which includes six elected parents, two elected community residents, two elected teachers, and the principal. The rationale for this Council composition can best be explained by commenting on the most common criticisms of this decision.

Lack of Parent and Community Interest. Reform critics have predicted that parents and community residents, particularly in low-income communities, will lack the motivation to run for these Councils and will lack the resources to win Councils seats; that the elections will be low-turnout affairs controlled by local politicians; and that the Councils will come to be dominated by individuals who have agendas that had little to do with educational improvement. In contrast, the reform coalition based its strategy on the following propositions:

- The difference in scale between Chicago and other “decentralization” schemes, such as New York and Detroit, will allow low-cost access to the electoral process for large numbers of parents and community residents, and large numbers of candidates will participate in schools in both middle-income and low-income neighborhoods.

- Because the reform law gives the Councils substantial decision-making authority, this opportunity to make decisions that can make a real difference in improving the school will attract significant numbers of candidates and voters.

- Guaranteed representation on the Council for parents and teachers will motivate a significant percentage of parents and school staff to vote.

- By specifying that a majority of Council members must be parents of children in the school and must not be employees of the school district, the reform law strongly increases the likelihood that the primary thrust of the Council will be toward school improvement.

- Because the Council only oversees a single school (not thirty schools as do the community school boards in New York City), because the Council controls only one hiring decision directly (the hiring of the principal once every four years), and because a majority of Council members must be parents, the effort required to recruit viable candidates and to conduct a successful campaign to control a Council will not be attractive to large numbers of organizations or individuals whose primary motivation is to gain political spoils.
The initial Local School Council election in October 1989 provided some validation of key predictions made by the reform coalition about how the Council election process would play out:

- Over 17,000 candidates ran for their Local School Councils. The average school had eighteen candidates for six parent seats, nine candidates for two community seats, and five candidates for two teacher seats (Designs for Change, 1989).

- The number of candidates did not vary substantially in schools with a range of different percentages of African American students, Hispanic students, and low-income students (Designs for Change, 1989).

- Although the number of eligible parent voters is not well-documented and thus the percentage of parent turnout is somewhat difficult to estimate precisely, about 35% of elementary school parents voted, but only 12% of high school parents voted.

- Except in a few schools, there was no organized effort by local political organizations to run slates of candidates or to influence the election.

A "Parent Takeover." Because eight of the eleven Council members are parent and community residents, reform critics have characterized the Chicago reform plan as a "parent takeover" of the schools, a plan based on the concept "all power to the parents." Critics predicted that educators would rebel as parents attempted to "run the schools."

In contrast, the reform coalition advanced the following propositions about the rationale for Council composition under the Chicago plan and the way that it would play out in practice:

- The Council’s decision-making authority is focused on three key policy decisions that are tied to school improvement. The law distinguishes between these key policy decisions and the day-to-day management of the school. Day-to-day management is clearly placed in the hands of the principal. The law does not create the basis for parents to "run the school" day-to-day.

- One must analyze the formal and informal functioning of the school in their entirety, looking beyond the composition of the Council, to assess the relative power and influence of various stake-holders. School staff exert substantial power and influence that derives from their formal position and constant and long-term presence in the school, as well as their educational expertise and the deference given to this expertise by non-educators. Past research about school site councils with a minority of parents or an equal number of parents and educators indicated that such councils were dominated by educators (Berman and Gjelten, 1983). Thus, giving parents and community residents a clear majority of the seats on the Council will result in a rough parity of actual power and influence.

- The two teachers on the Council will exert influence out of proportion to their numbers, because they will be looked to in evaluating how the staff members who must implement proposed Council policy assess these proposals.
• In many instances, Councils will strive for consensus, so that the decision-making process will not often be a win-lose disagreement, split along staff versus non-staff lines.

• Decision making is not a zero-sum game (Weiss, 1990). The overall design for school reform vastly expands the opportunities for significant decision making for all stakeholders at the school level.

At the very least, the worst fears of reform critics have not materialized during the first year of school reform, and initial results provide the basis for optimism. Bitter long-term conflicts between staff and parents have occurred in only a small percentage of schools. A recent survey of a random sample of parents, community residents, teachers, and principals who serve on Local School Councils indicated that 65% of teachers and 74% of principals said that parent-staff relationships had improved significantly since reform had been instituted (Richard Day Associates, 1990).

Detrimental to Educational Improvement. Reform critics have argued that giving a substantial voice in decision making to parents and community residents, particularly parents and community residents in low-income communities, will be detrimental to the process of educational improvement, since non-educators will lack the professional expertise needed to improve the quality of education. As one commentator put it, "the patient shouldn't be allowed in the operating room to tell the surgeon what to do" (Pick, 1989).

The first point I want to make about this issue could be underscored most convincingly if each of you had the opportunity to meet a cross-section of 25 Local School Council members. It has been our consistent experience since we began organizing parents in Chicago that there are individuals in every neighborhood with exceptional leadership capacities who are willing to work to improve their children's schools. But the heads of many academics are unfortunately filled with stereotypes about the "underclass." Thus, it is difficult to successfully convey the fact that thousands of leaders exist in Chicago who are quite capable of analyzing a budget, or understanding what "time on task" means, or suggesting novel solutions to problems that the school staff have for years regarded as intractable, although this has been our experience.

Further, the view that only "professionals" can contribute to solving educational problems flows from a misunderstanding of the problem-solving process that is needed to improve Chicago's schools. From our perspective, one must carefully analyze the nature of each step in the problem-solving process that occurs in schools and other institutions through which:
A problem is publicly identified and placed on the agenda for attention by the school.

The specifics of the problem are defined.

Steps for solving the problem are defined.

Steps for solving the problem are implemented.

These problem-solving steps are not neutral and technical. For example, whether a problem is ever placed on the organization’s public agenda, as well as the way in which a particular problem is defined by the organization, are shaped, as the Quality of Experience Model suggests, by existing organizational routines, frames of reference, and political bargains.

If one assesses the functioning of urban schools in light of the five standards for judging the quality of students’ educational experience discussed earlier, one identifies a long list of deficiencies that are repeatedly observed in urban schools, but are never publicly defined as problems in particular schools or are never made the subject of concerted corrective action. As noted earlier in describing the experience of ninth graders in Chicago’s low-income high schools and explaining the Quality of Experience Model, these can include such problems as disorganization during the critical first month of school, failure to follow up with absent students, misclassification of students into special education, suspension of students for being absent, neglected building repairs, shortages of supplies, failure of the principal to supervise staff, and frequent turnover of the teachers in the school.

Principals and teachers typically avoid naming and acting on such problems, for example, when:

- These problems run counter to the professional norms that make teachers reluctant to evaluate each other’s performance (Weiss, 1990).

- An established practice that is harmful to students is viewed as helpful to teachers.

- The solution to a problem, such as getting neglected repairs completed, would require aggressive initiative by educators, whose prevailing frame of reference is to “make do” (Lieberman and Miller, 1978).

A related aspect of the urban school problems highlighted by the Quality of Experience Model is that the nature of the problem or the nature of its solution is often fairly straight-forward. It does not take an advanced degree in education to recognize, for example, that a school cannot follow up on absent students if it doesn’t have an accurate attendance-taking system, that outsiders roaming the halls without challenge pose a threat to
student safety, that late buses rob children of learning time, and that leaky roofs and long delays in the arrival of textbooks make it difficult to teach.

Even issues that relate to instructional quality are often not difficult for non-educators to understand, given some training. For example, our training activities indicate that parents can readily accept, understand, and act on the proposition that children learn to read better if they do substantial self-selected reading. The changes needed to encourage such independent reading at school and at home are reasonably straight-forward, and a parent member of a Local School Council can both suggest that the school encourage independent reading and analyze what would be needed to encourage independent reading both at school and at home. Chicago parents can and have pointed out, for example, that the common practice of prohibiting children from taking their books home in low-income schools is an obvious barrier to independent student reading.

When one analyzes the problem-solving process in this manner, it becomes apparent what kinds of resources a strong parent and community voice in decision making and problem solving can bring to an urban school. Because parents typically speak from the perspective of students’ needs, because they are not bound up in the school’s existing frames of reference and organizational routines, and because they are not a part of past political bargains internal to the school system, these “outsiders” can, as we have repeatedly observed in the past year:

- Place new problems on the schools agenda that weren’t previously acknowledged (for example, persistent teacher absence and the lack of sufficient substitute teachers; students’ fears of physical attack in bathrooms, on playgrounds, on the way home from school).

- Suggest and act on new ways of solving problems (for example, locating space that can be rented in the neighborhood to reduce overcrowding).

- Draw on their own political and organizational networks to get the problems solved (for example, making a major public issue of late bus arrivals through appeals to the media and to elected officials; getting their employer to donate management consulting help to the Local School Council).

- Bring to bear supportive parent and community resources that were not previously available (for example, recruiting community agencies to counsel students and families; organizing parent safety patrols).

While the reform process is only beginning and it is premature to systematically evaluate the effectiveness of our strategy, we can point to hundreds of individual examples in which tangible improvements in the five areas identified in the Quality of Experience
Building School Communities

As noted earlier, some reform critics have hypothesized that the primary orientation of parents and community residents elected to Local School Councils would be to attempt to “run the school,” by making demands on school staff. Further, for reasons that have never been clearly spelled out, some reform critics have characterized the involvement of parents in governance as somehow being in contradiction with other forms of parental involvement that have been shown to improve student performance, such as parents volunteering in the school and parental assistance to children at home that is supportive of their child’s learning experience in school.

In contrast, we view the significant involvement of parent and neighborhood leaders in school governance as opening the door to possibilities for coordinated effort on the part of the entire school community to create learning experiences that address the five standards of the Quality of Experience Model.

Before school reform, Chicago’s schools were typically viewed as isolated outposts of a distant bureaucracy. The typical school had limited parent involvement in its day-to-day life and limited involvement of community agencies, local and downtown businesses, and universities. When problems occurred within schools that school staff were committed to solve, they characteristically viewed the resources available to solve the problem as being limited to the school’s staff.

We are pressing a fundamentally different vision of what is possible in urban education, in which a range of individuals and organizations who are part of the school’s community contribute to improving the quality of students’ educational experiences. Our hypothesis is that such broader involvement is catalyzed, not inhibited, by the governance process established by Chicago reform. Steps toward this broader conception of school community responsibility for students’ education can include, for example:

- Local School Council leadership in pressing for coordination of services among the social agencies responsible for serving students in a particular community.
- School partnerships with businesses, universities, and local community agencies.
- Major expansion of parent and citizen volunteer programs in schools.
- Systematic programs for outreach to parents, including parent education classes, so parents can understand what they can do at home to help their children learn.
• The school as a day-and-night center for community learning, including adult education.

• Volunteer action by parents and community groups to address problems in the community that are undermining children's educational experiences, such as parent safety patrols to protect children going to and from school and Local School Council campaigns to increase police initiatives against drug dealers who operate near schools.

Every variety of initiative that I just listed has increased substantially in the first year of school reform in scattered individual schools across the city or in clusters of schools. If the resources remain available to educate Local School Council members and other school community leaders about such possibilities for school, parent, and community partnership and about practical ways to implement these partnerships, we believe that there is great potential for a fundamentally different set of institutional arrangements for the education of children to emerge in Chicago, as compared with other major cities.

School Reform and Student Performance

The final issue concerning Chicago school reform that I will discuss is the view that Chicago reform is irrelevant to the problem with which I began this paper—that is, the problem of deplorable student performance.

I have already pointed out aspects of the reform strategy that are focused on improving student performance.

First, I want to reemphasize that the reform law spells out clear objectives for improving student performance in areas in which there was broad agreement among parents, educators, business leaders, and elected officials that there needed to be major improvements: achievement in reading, writing, mathematics, and science; student attendance; student promotion from grade to grade; and student graduation. These are not only stated systemwide goals, but, more important, spelling out what steps the school will take to achieve these goals is part of the mandated content of the school improvement plan for every school in the system. Further, the Board of Education has an obligation to develop a systemwide evaluation program for assessing each school's progress toward the stated goals and feeding this information back to the school for their subsequent planning. In addition to the outcome goals that are the focus of school improvement plans, the Board of Education is obligated to establish a framework of systemwide curriculum standards and objectives toward which school-level curriculum planning must be directed.

We have not simply freed up Local School Councils and school staffs to pursue whatever priorities strike their fancy. Compared with Miami's initial school-based
management program, for example, Chicago's strategy is substantially more tightly focused on achieving specified student outcomes.

Second, as I discussed in explaining the restructured role of the principal, the reform plan contains a series of features intended to motivate the principal to provide effective leadership to implement the school improvement plan and to improve student performance, including the fact that school improvement and improved performance are likely to be a major consideration in deciding whether or not the principal's contract will be renewed.

Third, as just discussed, new possibilities for school, parent, and community cooperation created by school reform can include implementing programs and strategies shown through past research to increase the likelihood that students will remain in school and to boost student achievement, such as teaching parents how to help their children at home to succeed in school and improving parents own academic skills.

Finally, as Table 7 indicates, we are acutely aware that educational improvement will occur only if Chicago can provide long-term high-quality training and assistance for principals, teachers, and parent and community leaders in every school community in the city.

A superficially attractive approach to providing this assistance is to establish a new centralized training bureaucracy, either inside or outside the school system. However, as our past research about staff development indicates, the performance of such centralized training efforts has consistently proven inadequate (Moore and Hyde, 1981). In contrast, the highest quality of educational assistance that we have documented has come from small independent organizations, highly committed to assisting clusters of schools (Moore et al., 1977).

Therefore, we have proposed an alternative strategy for assisting Chicago schools in the improvement process, whose basic elements are presented in Table 10. The thrust of this alternative strategy is to give Local School Councils and schools the resources to purchase assistance, forcing various independent assistance organizations (such as universities and non-profit organizations) and the central administration to compete in providing help to schools (Moore, 1991).

Central to making this strategy work is the establishment of an Independent Resource Center (indicated in Table 10), which is not directly involved in the process of providing help to schools, but which regularly assesses which school communities are getting training and assistance and which ones aren't, and which educates the leaders of school communities about how to judge the quality of potential assistance providers. This Resource Center can then alert private funders, the school system itself, and independent
Table 10. An Effective Assistance Strategy for Developing School Community Leaders

Independent Resource Center
- Assesses assistance needs of school communities and recommends priorities
- Educates leaders of school communities about how to judge potential assistance providers
- Is not involved in the business of providing assistance itself

School Community Leaders
- Local School Council members, including parents, community residents, teachers, students, and principals
- Professional Personnel Advisory Committee members
- Other staff leaders
- Other parent, community, and student leaders

Advocacy groups to assure continued school-level autonomy and discretionary funding at the school level

Independent Sources of Assistance
- Mutual support networks among school community leaders
- Independent groups and individuals who provide assistance
- Mentors

Independent Funding Sources

Central Administration Assistance Programs for school communities, which must compete with independent sources of assistance
assistance groups about particular schools or particular categories of school community leaders who are not getting good help in improving the quality of their educational program. We see this market-oriented solution to aiding school improvement as having the potential to provide high quality assistance equitably across the city, without creating a new bureaucracy that soon becomes unresponsive to school needs.

We are fully aware that even if all these mechanisms are operating, there will be much slippage. Ineffective principals will be rehired in some schools because of political maneuvering. Some school improvement plans will be mechanically prepared and then filed away. Some Local School Councils will be divided by long-term disagreements. However, one of the strengths of Chicago school reform is that with 540 semi-autonomous school communities carrying out the change process, the failings of one school do not adversely affect the progress of a school six blocks away. Thus, one of the priorities in our long-term strategy to improve students' educational experiences and performance is to help create examples of successful schools in every neighborhood in the city, and then to aggressively assist the leadership from other schools to learn from these successes.

Conclusion

It's possible that you have found yourself in disagreement with many of the theories of action I've laid out describing how I believe that Chicago school reform will improve the quality of students' learning experiences and their academic performance. I hope that I have at least convinced you that, while our strategies may be wrong, they are not simplistic. We have not simply shouted "all power to the parents" and then stepped back to hope for the best.

By beginning to spell out our theories of action in some detail, by predicting about what will lead to what, I hope to spark reactions from researchers who will disagree with our hypotheses and will help us refine them. Spelling out Chicago's reform strategy in detail also highlights for the reform coalition itself, the places where things aren't turning out as we had hoped in the schools or where critical systemwide structures that should be in place by now are missing. It is disconcerting to note before an audience of educational researchers, for example, that the Chicago central administration has still not put in place the credible systemwide evaluation process that is vital to the success of our school reform strategy.

We believe that our experience thus far indicates that Chicago school reform is on the right track. However, we are, at bottom, researchers. Given a reasonable period of time to carry this reform strategy out, we will judge our success based on whether changes
take place in the deplorable practices and deplorable student performance I described earlier. If major improvements do not occur in a reasonable time frame for those students who have historically been most at risk of school failure, we will urge that the Chicago reform strategy be radically modified or abandoned. Good research and evaluation, based on an accurate understanding of the realities of big city schools, are thus highly valued by the reform coalition. We invite your scrutiny and your assistance.
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Research and Policy Reports on Chicago School Reform

1. The Bottom Line: Chicago's Failing Schools and How to Save Them, January 1985. Documented the true rates of reading achievement and dropout in Chicago high schools for the first time. Recommendations provided initial blueprint for subsequent restructuring efforts. Full Report: $5 Summary: $2

2. Voice and Choice in Chicago, March 1989. Examines the history of the Chicago restructuring campaign and the specific conception of school based governance that it espoused. $5

3. Shattering the Stereotypes: Candidate Participation in the Chicago Local School Council Elections, October 1989. Analyzes the participation of candidates in the October 1989 LSC elections. $3

4. Chicago Principals: Changing of the Guard, March 1990. Analyzes principal selection and turnover since the reform law was passed, and whether race was a factor in principal selection. Full Report: $5 Summary: $2


6. Turnover on Local School Councils, December 1990. Analyzes the staying power of LSC members after one year. $2

7. Racial Composition of Local School Councils, January 1991. Shows how Chicago school reform has nearly doubled the number of African Americans and Hispanics making educational policy decisions in the United States. $2

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