This theme issue of the serial "Educational Foundations" contains five articles devoted to the topic of "Alternative Conceptualizations" of the foundations of education. In "The Concept of Place in the New Sociology of Education," Paul Theobald examines the notion of place in educational theory and practice. Janice Jipson and Nicholas Paley, in "Fiction as Curricular Text," studied six professors who utilize fiction as text while teaching education courses. The findings suggest that fiction in education courses may give abstract concepts memorable concreteness, acquaint students with multiple ways of knowing, and elicit student self-interrogations concerning large life questions. In "Knowledge, Practice, and Judgment," Hugh G. Petrie analyzes the elements of teachers' knowledge and practice through a Deweyian framework and develops a model of knowledge in action that is embodied in professional judgment. In the fourth article, "The Illusion of Education Reform: The Educational System and At-Risk Students," Clark Robenstine examines the detrimental effects contemporary educational reform proposals may have on at-risk students. The final article, Ken Kempner's "Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: Positivists Masquerading as Phenomenologists?," analyzes educational philosophy and concludes that many researchers fall between positivists and phenomenologists. (Author/CK)
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Editorial Overview

_Educational Foundations_ seeks to help fulfill the stated mission of the American Educational Studies Association to enhance scholarship in and among the educational foundations disciplines by providing a vehicle for publication of articles and essays which feature analysis of the foundations, of foundations methodology, of applications of such methodology to key issues of the day, and of significant research which evolves from and unifies the foundations disciplines, all focusing on the interdisciplinary nature of the educational foundations fields.

_Educational Foundations_ seeks articles and essays in four primary areas:

1. Exposition on the nature of the educational foundations--essays exploring the foundations, highlighting definition, interrelationships, strengths, difficulties, and other aspects of the combined fields.

2. Application of the foundations disciplines to an issue of significance--collections of articles around a specified theme, bringing to bear the nature of the various foundations disciplines on such themes. Information concerning themes for future issues of the journal may be obtained from the co-editors.

3. Methodology--articles exploring methodological issues of the foundations fields, stressing similarities and differences among the disciplines.

4. Research--articles describing or reporting on new research in the foundations fields, with emphasis on interdisciplinary aspects of such research.

Contributions to _Educational Foundations_ are solicited from members of the American Educational Studies Association as well as from all other scholars in the foundations of education and related fields of study. While the journal is open to submissions from all interested scholars, the standards for review and acceptance of articles and essays are stringent. Submissions should follow the _Chicago Manual of Style_, with a suggested length of 25-30 doubled-spaced pages, and be sent in triplicate to: (through March 31, 1992) Kathryn M. Borman, Co-Editor, _Educational Foundations_, College of Education, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221; (after April 1, 1992) Jane Van Galen, Co-Editor, _Educational Foundations_, Foundations of Education Office, Fedor Hall, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, Ohio 44555. When an article is accepted, authors are asked to submit the final version as an ascii textfile on computer disk.
Introduction: Alternative Conceptualizations

We are delighted to present five thoughtful and provocative articles in this Winter 1992 issue of Educational Foundations which employ alternative conceptualizations within and of the foundations of education.

In the first article, "The Concept of Place in the New Sociology of Education," Paul Theobald introduces the notion of place and examines its treatment in educational theory and practice. After exploring the relationship of place to reproduction and resistance theories, he considers the proliferation of place options previously identified by educational and social researchers. Theobald concludes the essay by drawing implications of the concept of place for the sociological study of education.

Janice Jipson and Nicholas Paley, in "Fiction as Curricular Text," employ elements of the Deweyian tradition in their analysis. Faculty members who utilize fiction as text while teaching education courses are the focus of their study. The authors pursue questions such as the following: How do students respond to unconventional pedagogical approaches? How are works of fiction integrated into the course? Their
findings suggest that utilizing fiction in education courses may serve to give abstract concepts memorable concreteness, to acquaint students with multiple ways of knowing and myriad voices, and to elicit student self-interrogations about large life questions.

Hugh G. Petrie, in "Knowledge, Practice and Judgement," analyzes the elements of teachers' knowledge and practice through a Deweyian framework. He argues that a conception of knowledge as separate from action is a mistake. Using primarily the ideas of Mary Kennedy, Lee Shulman, and Donald Schon, Petrie develops a model of knowledge in action that is embodied in professional judgement. He contends that his teacher judgement model provides a better means of assessing teacher performance than the commonly used behavioral checklists or students' standardized tests scores.

Clark Robenstine, in "The Illusion of Education Reform: The Educational System and At-Risk students," analyzes the detrimental effects contemporary educational reform proposals may have on at-risk students. He employs Emile Durkheim's explanation of suicide to explain dropping out of school as the failure of the student to be integrated into the academic and/or social subsystems of schools. Robenstine argues that educational reform movements fail to address this aspect of schooling, and instead concentrate upon raising standards and getting students to work harder by holding out false promises of economic rewards. His analysis marshals theoretical and empirical evidence that suggests that educational reform, because of its economic and individualistic focus, has had an alienating rather than an integrative effect upon a large number of students who find themselves heading toward failure.

The final article, Ken Kempner's "Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: Positivists Masquerading as Phenomenologists?," weaves a witty analysis of educational philosophy around the featured metaphor. Kempner focuses upon the philosophies of educational researchers in the positivistic and phenomenological traditions, and argues that each researcher views the world through a disciplinary matrix which shapes the researcher's understanding of research. Kempner contends that it is the researchers' disciplinary matrix—not methodology—that determines whether the research takes on the role of a positivist (wolf) or a phenomenologist (sheep). He claims that some researchers may be misled, and therefore will mislead others, into thinking that because they use qualitative methods, for example, they are phenomenologists; however, a deeper analysis often reveals that research using qualitative methodology actually adheres to the canons of positivism. Ultimately, Kempner's analysis breaks down the barrier between phenomenologists and positivists, concluding that there are many researchers who fall somewhere between the two.

--Felecia M. Briscoe
Editorial Assistant
The Concept of Place in the New Sociology of Education

By Paul Theobald

Introducing Place

Place has long been considered too abstract or too esoteric to bring into discussions of practical matters. Traditionally, it has been left to literary critics to grapple with place and the extent to which it moves fictional characters of whatever genre. Recently, however, sociologists have begun to give serious attention to the concept of place and the structure it provides or fails to provide in the lives of people. It is the purpose of this essay to demonstrate how the study of the concept of place may complement established theories of reproduction and resistance in explaining widespread student disengagement in America's educational system.

Place, as a word, possesses two meanings with particularly poignant connotations for educational thought. One can speak objectively of place in terms of both physical and social location. Beyond this, there is a more subjective literary connotation concerned with
a feeling of belonging. One, perhaps, may have a sense of rootedness to a physical location and feel secure knowing the predictable behaviors (governed by social location) one will encounter there. Even in terms of place construed as a sense of belonging, however, physical and social location are difficult to separate. Meyrowitz argues that it is only when we communicate through an electronic medium that an individual may separate where one is physically from where they are socially.²

Some contend that part of the American educational dilemma is that we have sent the imperative message that students belong in school (a function of the social location imposed on youth), and have overlooked the nurturing role that comes with a sense of voluntarily belonging to a place.³

On the surface, it looks like a good argument. But there is a problem with it, for it assumes that one can foster attachment to a physical place without the added baggage of differentiated social place. Again, in my view, the two are inseparable. Take home as an example. Certainly most would admit that it often provides a sense of belonging. But in how many homes are behaviors not structured by the social position of the members?⁴ One may "sense" a feeling of being "at home" in a physical place. Part of this feeling is the knowledge of what behaviors one may expect from others together with the knowledge that one's behaviors are likewise known and acceptable. With this understanding, however, comes concomitant knowledge that one knows, as well, where one's behaviors may not be acceptable or where the behavior of others may not be accommodating. That is, in developing a sense of place, one also learns to "know their place" in a social hierarchy. Place, therefore, is at once a physical and social location.

When people speak of a sense of place in the literary sense, they are describing a sort of emotional attachment to a physical location. This feeling of belonging or rootedness, however, tells us little about whether individuals thus affected are satisfied with their social position in the physical location. The attraction of the concept of place for schooling discourse is that it facilitates our understanding that the impediment to creating an emotional attachment to schools for most children is that schools allow children only a subordinate social position. This essay will argue that advances in the technology of electronic media have created a proliferation of "places" where students may find both emotion-evoking experiences and a social location more to their liking. If this is, in fact, the case, it suggests that the pervasive passivity and "elsewhereness" in our schools is not so much student reaction to the theft of their time, but a reaction to the theft of their ability to choose their place.

The propensity for students to get to a physical location that will evoke emotion infinitely preferable to the emotional flatness of the traditional classroom is entirely understandable. This essay argues that widespread intellectual disengagement among students of all social classes is largely attributable to the seductive power of endless place options in the "communication age." After a review of reproduction and resistance theories and their relation to the concept of

or
place, I will argue that the proliferation of place options in our communication age have resulted in student indifference within the classroom that transcends the lines of ethnicity, class, and gender. Next I will discuss a few of the more popular reactions to student disengagement and the fact that they fail to employ the implications of the concept of place in their analysis. Last, I will take up the question of what schools might do after considering place as a variable in schooling success. The fact that institutional mechanisms and various schooling practices reify a subordinate social position for many American students suggests that these students are doubly compelled to find a place that will erase an undesirable social location while infusing life with emotions that are intense and immediate. The implications of the concept of place in the lives of minority and subordinate groups overlap with theories of reproduction and resistance in American schooling. Before going on, therefore, a review of these theories seems merited.

Reproduction and Resistance Theories

The essence of reproduction theory, of course, is that the game is rigged for working class and minority students in our nation’s schools. Furthermore, these theories contend that nothing can be done to change the way subordinate groups are set up to fail. Reproduction theories may differ as to whether the action of the dominant culture is overt or subtle, but the essential message is that one’s social place is reified by the experience of public schooling.

The central criticism of reproduction theory is that it denies cognitive and emotional choice at the level of lived experience. Individuals, generally, do not make behavioral choices based on their perception of class dialectics. On the other hand, resistance theory seeks to account for the logic of class reproduction while providing a framework for understanding individual intentionality in the school setting. It provides keen insight into the school experience of belonging to a subordinate group. Whereas an individual from such a group may become upwardly mobile, the entire group cannot. Instances of success from the ranks of dominated classes legitimate the structure of schooling, but do not in any way signal serious reflection concerning class mobility of the subordinate group on the part of a majority of its members. Resistance, as some have suggested, can be expected to thrive in such circumstances.

There are problems with resistance theories, however. For example, Giroux points out that “not all oppositional behavior...is a clear cut response to domination.” The reasons for active resistance on the part of the learner are many and varied; and they include the fact that intellectual engagement in the schools is arduous activity made more difficult by bland, text-driven curricula and authoritarian teaching. Another disappointment of resistance theory is the fact that oppositional behavior is often merely an attempt to acquire a superior social place in the school. Everhart refers to this phenomenon as the “interactional dimen-
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sion." However, he does not adequately tie this to thought-out opposition to authority.

The drawback of both reproduction and resistance theories is that they fail to consider the fact that although school achievement breaks along class lines, intellectual engagement does not. The fact that our system of assessments are accurate measures of cultural inheritance accounts for achievement discrepancies between socioeconomic classes. These same assessments, however, offer little information regarding differing levels of engagement. Philip Cusick found in his naturalistic studies Inside High School and The Egalitarian Ideal and the American High School that students are simply not kept active and involved in academic processes. "The great majority of students, while civil and decently behaved, did not seem terribly interested in pursuing any topic beyond what was minimally required." Recent work by Boyer, Sizer, and Goodlad reinforces Cusick's conclusion.

Advancing a discussion of the concept of place is an attempt to account for rampant intellectual student disengagement that transcends the lines of class, race, and gender. The conception of social place provides the opportunity to advance that part of reproduction theory which contains theoretical merit. By this I mean the continued superordination of social place among members of dominant groups via the schooling process, and its reverse. The conception of physical place, as I will shortly attempt to demonstrate, accounts for disengagement among middle and upper class levels of American youth, and contributes to a better understanding of the intentionality of individual resistance among members of minority and subordinate groups.

The Proliferation of Place Options

Before going further, let me discuss "place" in light of my interpretation of Joshua Meyrowitz's valuable sociological contribution No Sense of Place (1985). Meyrowitz is a self-professed disciple of Goffman and views human behavior as intimately entwined with social situations. He connects the advent of electronic media to the proliferation of human ability to experience situations. Meyrowitz states:

Television tends to involve us in issues we once thought were "not our business," to thrust us within a few inches of the faces of murderers and Presidents, and to make physical barriers and passageways relatively meaningless in terms of patterns of access to social information (p. 308).

Electronic media, according to Meyrowitz, has created a merging of situations. Therefore, Meyrowitz has found it necessary to extend the concept of situation to encompass place because while situation speaks of physical location, it lacks the connotation of social position. Applied to the educational enterprise,
The added dimension is crucial. The merging of situations through electronic media has separated physical place from social place. Members of Chicago's working class can attend a Hollywood roast for Ronald Reagan. Farm children can cheer for Michael Jackson's performance in concert. The information age has created a proliferation of place options, and Meyrowitz concludes that Americans, then, are in reality placeless. Peter Berger put it this way:

The individual, wherever he may be, is bombarded by the multiplicity of information and communication. In terms of information, this process proverbially "broadens his mind." By the same token, however, it weakens the integrity and plausibility of his "home world."10

The literary conception of place, typically, yields the following generalized understanding: we suppose that this "home world," composed of persons with a well-defined sense of place, is a desirable place to live. In such a community we expect to find little ennui or anomie. In the commitment to their place community members learn to treat their home world responsibly and in the process find a sort of fulfillment unattainable for those without a sense of place. The sociological interpretation I would like to advance, with support from Meyrowitz and others, is that while certain communities may promote emotional attachment, this does not necessarily sweep away concerns about one's social place. Some inner city neighborhoods, for example, seem to exude a pull of place among youth yet often these youth fail to cultivate their physical place in what mainstream America would consider a responsible manner. It is easy to read resistance in gang participation or acts of neighborhood vandalism.

The development of society prior to the communication age is where notions of reproduction are most powerful. Place, of course, was a primary concern for the dominant groups that sought the subordination of lower classes. The experience of the American South is a classic example, and I suspect that is why one occasionally hears reference to a sense of place in the South today, or why fictional characters of the South's best literature have well-defined conceptions of place and its importance to society.11 However, particularly in the South, one should not praise a notion of place sensed as a stabilizing factor without acknowledging place known as a subjugating factor. Goffman contends that all of an individual's behavior either confirms or disconfirms "that he knows and keeps his place."12 A question worth asking, it seems to me, is to what extent have schools operated to put people in their "place?"

Michel Foucault describes the origins of the control aspects of schooling in Discipline and Punish (1977). For Foucault, the key variable in the lives of subordinate groups (which includes children) is time. Dominant groups sought to control the time of children by breaking down and separating their activities. Foucault writes:

It is this disciplinary time that was gradually imposed on
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pedagogical practice—specializing the time of training and
detaching it from adult time, from the time of mastery; arranging
different stages, separated from one another by graded exami-
nations; drawing up programmes, each of which involves exer-
cises of increasing difficulty; qualifying individuals according

to the way they progress through these series (p. 159).

I believe it would have been more significant for Foucault to have observed that
the place of training was detached from adult places and
that the various programs and graded examinations separated children into one place or another. Thus school
became the physical and the social place of children. There were few alternatives.
The paucity of place options resulted in a predictable structure of behavior.

I do not mean to suggest that there was no resistance in, say, pre-World War
II schooling. Indeed, the fact that class distinctions were more obvious earlier in
our history suggests that there may have been more active learner resistance and
thus high levels of disengagement. My contention is that in schools today there
is a much wider variety of behavioral manifestations with which the teacher must
deal, because there is a much greater variety of place options open to students.
Some of the behaviors are culturally specific; most, however, are related to the
structure required of that place which dominates their thoughts. “Jock” behaviors
are an example which cut across lines of class, race, and gender. Even kids who
are academically engaged and see school as their chosen place exhibit a predictable
behavior structure.

Cultural and economic reproduction theories explain minority and working
class student indifference to the extent that disengaged passivity is required in the
workforce. The logic of reproduction theory, however, would suggest that upper
and middle class students should not be indifferent in the classroom. A discussion
of the concept of place in the lives of youth may explain what reproduction theory
does not, i.e. the indifference of upper and middle class students.

Resistance theories contend that students actively work at failure because they
see a reality they do not like and intentionally reject it. I suggest this may be true
of a small portion of American students, but the majority are indifferent to the
realities of schooling because there is another place which preoccupies them. The
“place” of school is not all there is, physically or socially. There are countless
places to be—rock concerts, movie theaters, practically anywhere they choose to
be via an electronic medium.

This is why Foucault, at least in terms of schooling, was working with the
wrong variable. Students do not object to the theft of their time, the objection is
to theft of place. Piaget has demonstrated that it is not until children reach
adolescence that they begin to understand time as adults do. When I was
conducting a lesson in which all my students were engaged, the sound of a class
dismissal bell was unexpected, almost startling. Time studies show that children
almost always underestimate the amount of time they spend watching television.
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When they are mentally engaged, their ability to gauge duration diminishes. Piaget contended that it was the immediacy of youthful thought which served as the impediment. Jean Baudrillard provides some insight into why the multitude of place options resulting from the information age has intensified the immediacy of youthful thought.

Baudrillard has taken the Marxian notion of the "universe of the commodity" and applied it to the information age and formulated a notion of the "universe of communication." Communication, which always entails the transmission and reception of information, has become all-pervasive in the postmodern period. Baudrillard says "I pick up my telephone receiver and it's all there; the whole marginal network catches up and harasses me with the insupportable good faith of everything that wants and claims to communicate." What is not available to children on a telephone? The options are endless, from pornography to prayer. The telephone becomes the prerequisite physical place for participating, potentially, in a social place ordinarily reserved for adults.

For Marx, the "sensuous human activity" was commodity production. For Baudrillard the sensuous human activity is communication, "the promiscuity that reigns over the communication networks is one of superficial saturation, of incessant solicitation." The commodity of the postmodern period is the communication of human experience. Human experience is nothing if it is not emotional. The information age provides a plethora of emotion-evoking experience if one can only get to the right place; in the case of Baudrillard's argument, the right place is the telephone. The "ecstasy of communication" is its ability to evoke emotion, incessantly solicit one's attention, and provide rather immediate gratification.

The constant call of emotional experience in a place other than school may explain student disengagement more satisfactorily than a theory of resistance. Giroux touched on this when he utilized Aronowitz's notion of the "counter-logic" that pulls students away from schools into the streets, the bars, and the shopfloor culture." He goes on to say that "for many working class students, these realms are 'real time' as opposed to the 'dead time' they often experience in schools." Without wishing to belabor the point, I would like to suggest, again, that time is not the key variable. However, the notion that what is outside the school walls is "real" has some obvious merit. A discussion of place, however, may elevate Giroux's argument to encompass greater numbers (with more explanatory power) than merely the children of working class parents.

The seduction of the postmodern world for students is the fact that emotional experience is available if one can choose the right place. This is especially true in the case of minority and working class students for, as noted earlier, Meyrowitz suggests that an electronic medium is the one avenue of communication which liberates physical place from an attached social place.

Those who have spent time in the public schools know that students often bring alternative "places" to school with them. Lockers become an alternative. They are
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often plastered with signs of human experience which evoke emotion. Males may put pictures of attractive females in their lockers, or vice-versa. In some cases, students bring the opportunity to escape to a rock concert via a walkman radio. These places constitute Giroux’s and Aronowitz’s counter-logic as much as do bars and shopfloors. Their counter-logic is the seduction of evoked emotional experience. Even when students cannot bring an alternative place to school, another place often dominates their thoughts. Using a Bloomian sample of 1000, students I can attest to student concern for places other than the classroom. I have seen students from upper middle class homes pull out combs and mirrors during the last few minutes of class to prepare themselves for that place (the hallway, the lunchroom, the gymnasium, or a wall of locker space) which daily holds at least the potential for eliciting emotional experience. Although they are better at handing in homework on time, they are no more engaged in the intellectual life of the classroom than their peers from working class homes.

A further dimension of the concept of place concerns the utilization of place options to increase one’s social position. The athletic field has traditionally been such an alternative place, but electronic media have opened a host of other places as well. Drugs may be used to achieve a social place in the schools, or chewing tobacco, or sexual activity. To the extent that children and adolescents want to belong, there is usually a social and physical place for them somewhere, but perhaps not at school. And as Meyrowitz suggests, every place prescribes a normative behavior structure. The more places there are to appeal to students, the more differing sets of behaviors will vie with that structure set up by the school or the teacher. In only a minor percentage of cases will such a contest result in active learner resistance. In the majority of cases, it will result in an indifference toward what is going on in class. In short, disengagement will reign.

Responses to Student Disengagement

Pursued along the lines of either physical or social location, the concept of place leads back to the reality of schooling in the postmodern period. This reality has been perceived as so undesirable, many have advocated potential remedies. Allan Bloom in The Closing of the American Mind (1987) and E. D. Hirsch in Cultural Literacy (1987) are two of the most popular examples.

Their prescription is to impose (or reimpose) homogeneity in the schools, to get at that core curriculum that everyone needs to know. What they fail to recognize is that American schools are already largely homogenized. Children starting in kindergarten are sent to school to associate almost exclusively with children of their own age for twelve years. As if spending six hours a day with age-mates were not enough, within classes students are often further divided into small ability groups or they are tracked into large groups by ability. How much information about reality can they be expected to learn in such an unreal situation? Outside
school walls, real lived experiences are shared with persons of mixed ages, abilities, and personalities. Yet students are remarkably tolerant of the fact that school is not like the real world.

John Goodlad pointed out that there is "considerable passivity among students and emotional flatness in the classroom." But he also adds that "students' views of the classroom were not correspondingly negative." Most kids report that they like their classes and believe that their teachers are interested in them. The reason active resistance in schools is at relatively low levels (depending on a variety of sociocultural factors) is that students are indifferent to the superficiality of school reality. Why? Because alternatives to school are at their fingertips, be it a telephone, a radio, or a conversation with a classmate about some emotional experience outside the school walls. Indifference is rampant in America's schools, and quite obviously, it is not conducive to intellectual engagement. On a classroom level, the latest research indicates that homogeneous ability grouping and tracking is detrimental to learning achievement. Many see more advantage to heterogeneous grouping. Because the homogenized place of school has typically been synonymous with emotional flatness, we need to explore the potential for emotion-evoking experiences in heterogeneous classrooms and curriculums.

Both Bloom and Hirsch complain about the intellectual misfits who move on to college campuses each fall, and each in his own way has advanced the argument that the increasing heterogeneity of American culture is to blame for the sorry state of American education today. What they have failed to do (because it cannot be done) is show that increasing heterogeneity in American culture and the slack in student engagement in the schools are anything other than correlated phenomena of the postmodern period.

Hirsch has been sarcastically applauded for turning a popular parlor game into a proposal for school reform. The Bloom treatise, unlike the contribution of Hirsch, seems to speak to the concept of place for a time. I have no doubt that the information age has created conditions wherein youth look and act very much as if their souls have become impoverished, as in the subtitle to Bloom's book. Impoverished souls, to me, sounds very much like indifference in the classroom. When Bloom discusses at some length his notion of "separateness," he seems to be describing the propensity of school-aged youth to cling to that which evokes emotion in their lives. The fact that individuals are increasingly separate today is in keeping with what we know about the proliferation of place options. Bloom draws near with this pronunciation: "'The aptest description I can find for the state of students' souls is the psychology of separateness.'"

Ann Berlak has argued that she and other educators must teach for outrage as a way of responding to student indifference. Her prescription, an admirable one, is to compete in the classroom head to head with the plethora of emotion-evoking place options our information society presents. Her presentation reminded me of a powerful anecdote shared by Lois Phillips Hudson in the preface to her fine
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collection of short stories, *Reapers of the Dust*, when she talks about: a mother who has left friends and family and gone to a frighteningly distant and strange land, labored inhumanly to clear the jungle and grow food, all to give her baby a better life than she could foresee for that baby here—a mother standing in a line falling before her into individual human beings dying their individual deaths in agonizing retching convulsions, looking down into the face of a baby who is not going to have any life at all and giving it the drink of Kool-Aid laced with cyanide. Although it happened only six years ago, I have many students, even some graduate students, who recognize no significance in the words ""Jonestown, Guyana."" How incredible! (p.xvi).

But students today have personally witnessed (via the television or the movie screen) many more deaths than the hundreds which occurred at Jonestown. Compare the drama of a mother willingly taking cyanide-laced Kool-Aid with the special affects of Jason in *Friday the 13th*. Remember, too, that there have been many sequels to just this one horror film, and that these movies are as available as the nearest video-cassette recorder. I caution the reader to avoid a quick dismissal of this vignette by suggesting that Jonestown was ""real"" and Jason is not. Reality for most students, as Giroux has suggested, is that real time (I would say place) away from the school.

It has been pointed out that Israeli schoolchildren frequently are not able to identify Adolph Hitler or the years of the Holocaust on standardized assessments. It seems unlikely that reproduction or resistance theories alone account for the disengagement which could make such a circumstance possible. It is shocking that the words ""Jonestown, Guyana"" have no relevance for many American youth, and perhaps a bit more shocking that a disconcerting proportion of Israeli youth do not recognize the name Adolph Hitler. But this is the reality within which the American teaching force labors. A discussion of place helps illuminate these circumstances in a way that previous theories do not.

**Implications of the Concept of Place**

One could reasonably question my contention regarding the proliferation of place options and the decline of student engagement by pointing to Japan, a postmodern nation with highly engaged schoolchildren. However, there are a number of differing dynamics at work in such a dichotomy. Testing policy, one similar to Japan’s, as a predictor of social divisions of labor ties social place to the physical place of school to a degree not yet conducive to American conceptions of freedom of opportunity. But we appear to be moving in that direction. Should we decide to carry a testing program to its extreme, we could perhaps duplicate Japanese student engagement for many at the expense of increasing the number of
students who actively resist schooling. Whereas there are things which could be
done (like testing) to treat symptoms, nothing in the current educational reform
movement addresses the cause of problems in our schools because, I believe,
theorists have overlooked the manifestations of the seductive power of place
options.

My intention in advancing a sociological discussion of place in relation to the
educational enterprise is certainly not to discount the theoretical gains of reproduc-
tion or resistance theories. I believe there is a valid argument to be made concerning
econo-cultural hegemonic reproduction. There is also a valid argument to be made
concerning active learner resistance at the individual level. However, I do not think
either of these theories totally account for the low level engagement in today’s
classroom.

If one’s social and physical place accounts, in large measure, for one’s
behavior, and the information age has expanded the opportunities to experience
numerous physical places as well as the ability to divorce the unwanted baggage
of an undesirable social place, does this suggest any plausible solutions to
America’s educational dilemma? Perhaps. Meyrowitz suggests that schools “must
strive to teach students more than they can learn elsewhere.” He says that schools
must maintain the “knowledge-edge.”12 In an information age, I do not think this
is plausible. Where might this knowledge-edge be? Teachers cannot know more
than students about everything. The pervasiveness of electronic media in today’s
world will inevitably convey more knowledge to youth in 365 days than the schools
can in 165 days.

Another alternative would be Berlak’s notion of teaching to evoke emotion on
a scale which would rival the seduction of other emotion-evoking places. I find
more merit in this suggestion than the one promoted by Meyrowitz. After all, I
believe it was Spinoza who said that the only way to overcome an emotion was with
an emotion. Neil Postman, in Amusing Ourselves to Death, paraphrases Plato and
Dewey as individuals who maintained “that reason is best cultivated when it is
rooted in robust emotional ground.”28 Creating emotional ground as fertile as that
within the available communication networks may be an impossible task. But I
believe teachers need to move in that direction by letting the power of place work
for them.

I have seen successful classrooms within which a surprising number of
alternative places have been created. All manner of nooks, alcoves, coat rooms,
etc. have been employed in the promotion of learning. Even at the secondary level,
many veteran teachers see great value in converting their room into a place like
no other in the building. Granted, the emotion which can accompany what is
available in school places will never match the intensity of emotional experience
available just outside the door. However, the existence of legitimate alternative
school place options has the potential, it seems to me, to generate positive effects.

Moving to place construed as social location is a bit more problematic.
However, as I see it, the concept of place should suggest some pedagogical implications for children who most abhor their social place in school. There are researchers currently seeking to establish heterogeneous groups of children based on their abilities in a wide range of activities. In a scenario such as they propose, the boy who struggles to keep up with his group in math class may occupy a totally different social place when he helps his group win a touch football game in physical education class. The idea has possibilities.

I certainly do not believe the suggestions I have made here exhaust the relevant options for educative practice based on the implications of the concept of place, but it was not my intention to provide such suggestions. My discussion of place has simply been an attempt to account for what matters in the lives of children and adolescents. It complements theories of resistance, for the seduction of a variety of place options, including the ability to separate social from physical place, and feeds the attractiveness of active learner resistance, be it individual or group motivated. Indeed, the relationship is symbiotic. But the implications of the concept of place move beyond members of minority and working class groups to address the problem of intellectual disengagement among middle and upper class students as well.

As Meyrowitz has suggested, the information age has all but wiped out the sense that individuals have a physical place to which they belong. Certainly school no longer functions in this way for youth. Some rural areas and urban neighborhoods may still exert a pull of place; but it is a phenomenon that is disappearing fast and there is reason to both mourn and celebrate its departure. With the sense of belonging came the notion that one had an obligation to care for and cultivate the physical place. On the other hand, the attachment to physical place carried the inherent identification of one’s social place, thereby perpetuating class distinctions.

In today’s society, students are placeless because of their ability to be every place. To increase student engagement for all youth, we must conduct further research on the interaction of children and adolescents with electronic media as well as conduct more research on the power of place options and its implication for pedagogical practice.29

To this point, I believe we have neglected or dismissed the power of external place realities in the lives of students. We make school the imperative place for children and force them to conform to rigid time structures that make no sense to them. If we live in a two-dimensional world of time and place, then we have tried to minimize the constituent element of place in education while maximizing the constituent element of time. As the rapidity of communication devalues time in our information society, the discrepancy of multitudinous place options outside school and the paucity of place options inside school will continue to erode the engagement levels of our youth.
Notes


11. While this essay was in the review process, Joe Kincheloe and Bill Pinar published a book entitled *Curriculum as Social Psychoanalysis: The Significance of Place* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991). The emphasis of their book is on the South and a Southern attachment to place. While acknowledging some of the negative characteristics sometimes associated with the concept of place, Kincheloe and Pinar argue that perhaps a curriculum of Southern studies in higher education could explore the value of the concept of place as a socially reconstructive mechanism.


13. Whether or not this is actually the case is of little concern for the purposes of this essay. Historical research on rural schools, including Wayne E. Fuller's *The Old Country School: The Story of Rural Education in the Middle West* (Chicago: University of
The Concept of Place

Chicago Press, 1982) and Thad Sitton and Milam C. Rowold's Ringing the Children In: Texas Country Schools (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), suggest that there was little pre-World War II student resistance. However, this analysis has not gone unquestioned. See Paul Theobald's "Democracy and the Origins of Rural Midwest Education" in Educational Theory 38 (1988) 363-368. As far as urban schooling is concerned, Joseph L. Tropea's study entitled "Bureaucratic Order and Special Children: Urban Schools, 1890s-1940s" in the History of Education Quarterly 27 (1987) 29-53, indicates that the number of pre-World War II students aggressively resisting school authority was quite significant and would have been even greater had schools not had the recourse to exclusionary practices then available to them or the ability to pigeon-hole misbehaving students into "special classes."


17. Ibid., 131.

18. This phrase is from Marx's Theses on Feuerbach quoted and paraphrased in Jurgen Habermas' Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973) xviii-xix.


21. Reference here is to Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education Has Failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), page 22, where he contends that his "sample" for the book are the thousands of students he sees attending some of the nation's better colleges. My sample is the better than one thousand students I have taught over the course of seven years in rural and suburban high school settings.


27. Meyrowitz, No Sense of Place, 257.


29. The National Society for the Study of Education dedicated part two of its fifty-third
yearbook to the study of *Mass Media and Education* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Obviously, at such an earlier date, there was very little of theoretical merit for today's situation regarding mass media and education. James S. Coleman's study entitled *The Adolescent Society: The Social Life of the Teenager and Its Impact on Education* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961) also included a short study of the impact of media on students. More research is needed.
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Fiction as Curricular Text

by Janice Jipson and Nicholas Paley

Part 1

Any general review of the required reading lists of most teacher education courses in foundations, methods, issues, and curriculum reveals a fairly predictable array of academic, content-oriented texts. For many sensible reasons, including ready availability and the need to provide a "scientific" knowledge base, such materials have traditionally provided the basis for most teacher education students' reading and study programs.

A growing number of educators, however, aware of the value of such cognitively-based reading selections yet sensitive to their limitations, are regularly assigning works of fiction as part of their course reading assignments. While the use of fiction as curricular text in teacher education courses may initially seem surprising, the idea has long enjoyed considerable support among many influential curriculum specialists and teacher educators.

As early as 1934, for example, John Dewey alluded to such practice. In Art as Experience (1958), Dewey
noted that encounters with literature and the arts enable individuals to cast off "the covers that hide the expressiveness of experienced things" (p. 104), thereby deepening "the delight of experiencing the world about us in its varied qualities and forms" (p 104). Educators will recognize that this recommendation is, of course, in line with Dewey's repeated observations that all too often those "covers that hide the expressiveness of experienced things" are the ways knowledge is presented to students--abstracted in form and remote from any meaningful connection to the experience of ordinary life. Encounters with literature and the arts, Dewey argued, clarify with special emphasis abstract material, condensing it into concrete form by "intensifying and amplifying" (p. 103) the particular and the personal as they are reflected in the daily events, scenes, and complexities of human life. For Dewey, such kinds of experiential reference were fundamental to the development of fruitful programs of study for students at all levels. These advisements are also consonant with Dewey's wider efforts encouraging teachers to integrate subject matter across traditional curricular boundaries in order to promote more meaningful opportunities for student learning.

More recently, Maxine Greene (1978, 1987), Kieran Egan (1986, 1988), Diane Brunner (1990), and George Willis and William Schubert et al. (1991) have similarly discussed the merits and potentialities of using such an approach with education students, associating encounters with the literary imagination with the development of a fuller attention to the lived world, a heightened perceptual fluency, and a discriminating consciousness--all of which, they submit, enlarge the capacity for effective teaching.

In our view, these well-reasoned linkages between literature and education are most useful. At one level, they contribute to the development of a theoretical framework for moving thinking about the preparation of teachers beyond an exclusive focus on instrumental/practical concerns to a broader understanding of determinants that might give such preparation more generous impress and form. This framework points to the generative power of narrative in educational discourse, if for no other reason than it makes problematic long-held distinctions between the ideologies of what is "fact" and what is "fiction" in pedagogic practice. At a more personal level, such recommendations coincide with much of our own recent research in literature, curriculum, and teacher culture. A considerable part of this work has been a natural extension of our undergraduate programs of study in the humanities as well as our later graduate and professional interests investigating the place of literature in teacher education. More specifically, for the past several years, we have been collaboratively looking at teachers' use of literature in classroom settings--and the corresponding implications that such activity suggests for the development of curricular discourse and school knowledge (Paley, 1988; Jipson and Paley, 1991a, 1991b).

Given this set of personal and theoretical interconnections linking literature
to education, we found ourselves asking the following series of questions: What happen then contemporary teacher educators build on the impressive theoretical base articulated by Dewey et al. and incorporate works of fiction into their courses? What issues guide book selection? How do they use them in class? What is the nature of student response to such unconventional instructional approaches? This article—the result of a study examining how contemporary teacher educators use literary works as part of their required course readings—provides some answers to these questions.

Six professors of education, including the authors, at three different universities (large and medium-size, public and private) participated in the study. Participants were identified on the basis of their experience using fiction as textual material in their courses, and all of them have been recognized as outstanding teachers by institutional award and/or by their colleagues and students. Case study methodology was used to capture the process of selecting and using fiction as curricular text. Course syllabi for each faculty member were examined, and course evaluations were reviewed when available. Participants provided, either in a 20-to-30 minute audio-taped interview or in a written statement, information about his or her reasoning, methodology, and recollection of student response to the use of fiction in their courses during a recent school year. Prior to the final draft of this article, participants had the opportunity to review their initial statements as situated in the completed text of the article, and to make needed rewordings to insure statement clarity and fluency. The following section, highlighting portions of the responses of four participants, suggests a complex landscape of opportunities for critical inquiry about issues germane to educators interested in the preparation of teachers for today's schools.

Part II

1. Professor X teaches graduate courses in psychological development, social issues, and curriculum theory. Her discussion of why she found literature valuable in her teaching included the following statements:

"I try to connect the formal knowledge base for each of my courses with the personal experiences of my students. One way I can do this is by using literature, including poetry, drama, autobiography, and fiction. My students, who are primarily female teachers and among whom are quite a large number of international and North American minority students, respond empathetically to non-traditional voices—those typically unheard in academic discourse. I use these materials to create an interwoven pattern of content and experience and to focus on the complex inter-relationships between faculty students, text, and curriculum. Also these materials allow me to incorporate the perspectives of women and North American minorities into disciplines such as Developmental Psychology or Curriculum Theory where they are either absent from available textual materials.
or are represented in the objective, decontextualized manner of someone who has become the 'good academic.'"

"In my classes...it's an issue of whose knowledge is reflected in the curriculum of my courses and how it is experienced. I want to include many forms of knowledge, multiple ways of knowing, and myriad voices so that my courses resonate with the [complexity of peoples' lives]."

She then talked about how this process actually "worked" in class, citing several examples:

"I share with my curriculum classes from Virginia Woolf's Three Guineas where she talks about the educated woman who reads three daily papers and three weeklies, too. She reminds us that different texts vary about the facts and that to 'know' anything you must compare different versions and come to your own conclusions. We talk, in my seminar, about these multiple realities and the problematic nature of knowledge. I encourage their diverse theory making and interpretations, validating them as well as their ideas.

"I also teach a class called Families and Schools and I use fiction to share alternative realities with my largely middle class teacher-seminar students. Last term they chose from a list of contemporary fiction which I provided and which included texts that reflected a diverse cultural and gendered perspective. Students were asked to analyze images of the good mother, the strong father, and the competent child as we defined 'Family' and looked at family process.

"Barbara Kingsolver's The Bean Trees, Buchi Emechata's The Joys of Motherhood, Doris Lessing's The Fifth Child, and Tony Morrison's Beloved stand out as the stories that spoke most clearly to my students last term. Some said they had not taken the time to read a novel in years and were afraid to start--afraid, I suppose, of getting caught up in that more real world of the imagination where one must feel as well as understand. For many of the students, the novels presented an alternative to the ideal 'middle class' nuclear family they held as a model. It was particularly interesting as we talked about the 'family plot' idea from analytic psychology and how characters in very different novels and from very different cultural perspectives lived out similar dilemmas."

In addition to pointing out the problematic nature of "knowing," Professor X also mentioned other reasons for using literary works in her courses:

"Sometimes I use fiction for very specific teaching purposes. In my Child Development class last term, I used short stories as part of an activity to clarify differences between major psychological theorists including Piaget, Freud, Erikson, and Skinner. Small groups of students were asked to analyze the experiences of children and adolescents in a short story according to a particular theoretical perspective. Then we compared what Freud, for instance, would say about a child's behavior to the explanation Piaget might give. In this case, fiction was used as an activity starter.

"I use quite a bit of poetry in my classes too--deliberately to engage attention,
passion, and response. Susan Griffin [whose poem-play, Voices, is used in class] talks about poetry as a way of knowing. She says that poetry gives to the political imagination a dimension of meaning without which it loses its way. She talks about the political nature of poetry and its ability to reintegrate mind and body, intellect and imagination. This makes a lot of sense to me and speaks to my efforts to relieve the paralysis of what they call Cartesian anxiety, to step away from those horrible oppositions which define much of our academic discourse, and to renew our recognition of the multiplicity of human experience.

"Finally, the language. I'm a former English teacher and I like to read aloud to my classes. We do a lot of listening to the way words carry meaning in their rhythm and sounds. I choose books, sometimes, because of the sound of the words and the poetry--like May Sarton and Adrienne Rich. Or because of the color of the book. I believe things like color, sound, and story can transform the experiences of the reader--my students and I can help them invent a whole new world where text can be both an aesthetic symbol and a tool for a different understanding. The sounds and visions echo the meaning and amplify it."

**2.** Professor Y, who was recently honored as the outstanding teacher of the year at his university, teaches a three-course foundations sequence: Culture and Human Relations in Education and Society; Contemporary Issues: Culture, Curriculum, and Communication; and Multi-Cultural Curriculum. In each of these courses, he regularly assigns fiction in combination with traditional academic materials, films, and guest presentations "to give [my students] a broad-based perspective, to include the voices of cultural groups who are not represented or non-existent in the usual academic texts and courses. I want [them] to explore their personal and cultural values, behaviors, perceptions, and assumptions, and I want them to map their primary cultural and cross-cultural awareness, development, and experiences. Through this process, they can develop an awareness of, and identify, diverse cultural systems, potential points of conflict, and mediation or negotiation strategies that let them create teaching/learning experiences which address the full spectrum of human and cultural relations within their classrooms."

He then specifically discussed how this actually occurred in class:

"In the first course, by reading and discussing books such as James Welch's Fool's Crow, Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart, Forrest Carter's The Education of Little Tree, and Sandra Cisneros' The House on Mango Street, in conjunction with Howard Zinn's People's History of the U.S.A., Edward Hall's The Dance of Life, and the Sunday New York Times' Review of World News, students begin to look at history and current events from many perspectives and begin to see the interrelationship between them and cultural issues.

"During one of the first sessions of the class we talk about the interactions between mainstream North American cultural values and assumptions and those of other cultures, addressing the question 'Is there a North American culture?'"
They've read Lisa Delpit's article, 'The Silenced Dialogue'; we [then] talk about whose experiences are part of the mainstream discourse.

"During the second term we continue to explore personal and cultural interactions. We read both non-fiction and biographic literature [primarily written by and about women and North American minority cultures] and also excerpts from Jonathan Kozol's *Rachel and Her Children*.

"We look at issues of culture and racism through people's experiences. For example, one guest speaker used material from Women's *Way of Knowing* and *Rachel and Her Children* as well as her personal experiences with children in contemporary society. The class became very involved as they shared their own experiences as parents and children. They became very upset by the conditions Kozol talked about in his book. One class member, who works in a shelter, told how they (the staff) were encouraged not to get involved with the families so they wouldn't become dependant. Then the discussion turned to nurturance and how the professionalization of teaching has made it difficult to be a caring teacher. We also talked about how caring is more acceptable in other cultural contexts. We also consider issues related to peace studies and environmental issues as we explore the inter-relationships between culture, community, and curriculum. Spring term we'll focus more on curriculum development and how teachers can integrate those perspectives into a relational curriculum."

Student response to Professor Y's approach has been enthusiastic. Written evaluations expressed a layered series of engagements, identifications, recognitions, and revelations of/with story characters and the dilemmas they encountered. Many students also commented on the patterings and rhythms of language and voice in the readings, expressing their surprise at how much these elements contributed to a deeper sense of understanding, command, and insight of/into course material.

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3. Professor P teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in educational foundations. For the past ten years he has taught one of the most highly-regarded courses in the School of Education at his university: Philosophical Foundations of Teaching and Learning. Required readings include selections from John Dewey, A. S. Neill, B. F. Skinner, J. J. Rousseau, and G. H. Bantock. Toward the end of the semester, students read a selection that many literary critics have long considered as one of the summits of Western literature: the section in Fyodor Dostoyevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov* where Ivan Karamazov describes to his younger brother, Alyosha, his haunting vision of human nature in *The Grand Inquisitor*. Professor P. reflected on his reasons for including such a reading selection in a course primarily concerned with issues teaching and learning:

"I think the fact that I liked the text a lot. I found it very compelling when I first read it when I was 16 years old, and I continue to find it compelling in the years thereafter. It speaks to so many different issues that interest me, so it's not very hard..."
to weave it into teaching and writing. So many issues are richly depicted: the problem of evil, my own interests and questions having to do with freedom and authority, the capacity of human beings to be genuinely autonomous. [In Dostoyevsky's text] these issues lose their abstract quality; they acquire personality, acquire intensity, acquire a human face that makes them come alive to people who hear about them...these issues are implicit in story, [but] what's compelling is the story: The Inquisitor is locking Jesus up. What's going on here? We're drawn into the story, and issues that might seem remote [become very immediate] through story.

Professor P. then discussed how he used The Grand Inquisitor in class:

"Students read it in conjunction with a series of readings that extol human freedom and autonomy. It functions to question the course. The course worked with competing interpretations of what it meant for a person to become autonomous. Dewey gave one interpretation; and other educators different ones. The Inquisitor challenged the foundation of that debate and what is taken for granted in our culture, namely, that autonomy is an attainable and desirable state. Skinner does the same but from a different perspective. I find the Grand Inquisitor's perspective more compelling. It speaks to issues I worry about that are intimately connected with education, such as the possibility of autonomy and the place of limits and guidance in education. It is a wonderful device for triggering thinking about these issues.

"Another part is a not so hidden agenda to just get [my students] to read a great piece of literature and realize that good literature speaks to fundamental questions concerning our situation in the world."

When asked how his students have responded to his use of The Grand Inquisitor, Professor P replied:

"Very positive. Students generally enjoy reading the text and often get very excited about it. Not always, though: once, a student stopped me in the midst of some introductory remarks and complained that this was an anti-religious diatribe. Another student once complained that books dealing with religion have no place in a public university. Generally speaking, though, this selection from The Brothers Karamazov seems to make an important existential issue come alive for my students."

Professor P then concluded his remarks by reflecting on other literary materials he has incorporated into his course:

"Yes, I still use The Grand Inquisitor, but I use some different literary works as well, for example, William Blake's poem, The Schoolboy, Langston Hughes's Ballad of the Landlord. I've been wanting to use Huckleberry Finn to get at a variety of issues that are germane to the work of educators--issues that concern the legitimacy of different dialects, and non-standard forms of English, dialect, issues of growth and development, as well as issues concerning the relationship, or lack thereof, between schooling and education. Was Huck better off growing up outside
of school? Did his out-of-school experiences provide him with a superior education? There are also questions concerning racism and censorship triggered by Twain's description of Jim and his use of the word 'nigger.'

4. Professor Q teaches undergraduate and graduate courses in teacher education. For the past 15 years he has been incorporating works of fiction into his methods, foundations, and curriculum courses. For this study, he discussed why and how he used fiction in the course, Social Issues in Education:

"In this course we explore a number of issues in contemporary American education and how they relate to the changing social order: the question of inequity in school and community, the dilemma of welfare, the debate over federal assistance to education, the controversy over what shall the schools of tomorrow teach in an increasingly pluralistic democracy, and so on. We also explore the issue of phantom students who have turned their backs to formal education. Students read Virginia Hamilton's *The Planet of Junior Brown* during this part of the course. *The Planet* is a young adult novel about two African-American boys, Junior Brown and Buddy Clark; both are in their early teens and both are growing up in New York City, alienated from mainstream culture. I use it for a variety of reasons. In the first place, it brings into our class the voices and images of individuals who exist at the very margins of society, and whose existence is conspicuously absent from most content-based texts. As we begin to focus our attention on their lives, numerous issues emerge from our reading: minority/majority relations, youth/adult interaction, the question of whether Buddy's and Junior's intellectual and personal development is enriched or effaced by formal educational settings, and the issue of legitimacy/believability raised by fictional representation."

Student reactions to the use of Hamilton's book to get at these considerations have been, on balance, enthusiastic:

"Most students have tended to like the text quite a bit and when we discuss it their response is lively and energetic--but often unpredictable. Last semester, for example, one student raised an important issue. She insisted that this book shouldn't be read by children--or by preservice teachers either--precisely because it was so strange and unsettling. She referred to the total craziness that permeated the boys' shadowed lives in New York; Buddy's planets of homeless children living in the ruins of abandoned buildings in Manhattan, and Junior's unbalanced, dominating mother and crazy piano teacher. Why does anyone need to read about this distorted way of life? Her deeply-felt remarks prompted other students to defend the book. A discussion about the kinds of literature suitable for children followed, which then led the class into a consideration of censorship. This wasn't what I had planned, but it suggests the level of engagement this class experienced with the book.

"I also like to use *The Planet* because it's so artfully crafted. I want my students to encounter powerful literature and enjoy its complex aesthetic satisfac-
tions and tensions beyond the academic level. I want them to see how a piece of writing can dazzle you like a beautiful jewel can dazzle--I mean, if you really look into it, and if you look carefully, you're confronted with a stunning series of internal reflections and counter reflections and you say: 'What is this?' I want my students to be stupefied that this kind of beauty can happen at any moment, even in a course concerned with issues in teacher education.

"Finally, I use it because of my own educational background. My undergraduate minor was French Literature and one of the clearest memories I have about it was when we read Camus--and the difference I felt in his writing about Existentialism in his novels and then again in his more formal works like The Rebel or the Lyrical and Critical Essays. I don't recall anything, really, from The Rebel or the Essays, but I do remember The Stranger and the hero, Meursault. In fact, even today I can remember the very first sentence of the book, you know: 'Mama died yesterday or maybe it was last week...' or something like that. I also remember Camus' description of the blinding summer sun of Algeria and how when Meursault shot the Arab on the beach on one of those blinding days, Camus very carefully wrote: 'and the trigger gave way...' So did Meursault really mean to shoot him, I wondered? Was he really guilty after all? How can we be certain? To what extent is this elusiveness in Camus' story characteristic of things I do in my life? The point of all this is that, for me, 'existentialism' became a much more vivid--and memorable--experience in Camus' fiction than in his philosophic investigations. It's been more than 25 years since I first read The Stranger, and Meursault seems to have taken up permanent residence in my life. The same with Stendahl's Julien Sorel, or Dostoyevsky's Ivan Karamazov and Raskolnikov and Prince Myshkin. Or Jack Burden from All the King's Men and [Doris Lessing's] Martha Quest. Robert Coles talks about this persistent, powerful, invasive quality of literature in his recent book, The Call of Stories. I want my students to sense the power of these invasions too--and perhaps as a consequence to be able to communicate it at some future point to their students when they become teachers."

Professor Q. concluded with these reflections:

"Recently, I've been thinking about using Flannery O'Connor's short story, The Artificial Nigger, as a kind of final reading in the last course [Seminar in Student Teaching] our students are required to take before they start looking for teaching positions. Her way of placing the entire intellectual enterprise in jeopardy. She says something important to all of us in this story, but her observations seem especially pertinent for teachers. Yes, the knowledge-base is important. Yes, content must be mastered. But I'm convinced that Thomas Merton was on to something when he suggested somewhere in his writings that knowledge wasn't necessarily the greatest attribute of a 'learned' person; nor was it the most important part of intellect. There's the whole issue of humility too. To teach with clarity, of course--but also with a fundamental sense of charity. I've always felt that this quality needed to be addressed and I've never really come across it in any
required books in education courses. Maybe Kohl’s *Children*. Anyway, it would be interesting to see how our students might respond to O’Connor’s devastating insights into human pride and individuals’ use--and abuse--of knowledge.”

**Part III**

While each of these educators has selected different works of fiction for use in a wide array of education courses, and while their choices seem deeply embedded in a complex framework of individually determined curricular and pedagogical factors, we think that there are several themes common to all that merit attention and brief discussion.

The first is the use of fiction to ensure the representation of a diverse cultural perspective in course material. The experiences of women, people of color, and certain social classes are particularly highlighted. This suggests that the professors we interviewed were aware of the recent criticism by a diverse group of educational sociologists, curriculum specialists, and literary theorists who have pointed out that the representation of such voices is too often excluded from the curriculum in favor of books featuring predominately white, Anglo-European, and male authors and subjects. The professors we interviewed also seemed alert to the fact that such exclusion has pedagogical consequences; that is, it diminishes the legitimacy of one group in favor of another and presents students with an ideologically biased, culturally exclusive, and ultimately false view of society. By incorporating works of literature by and about groups whose existence is traditionally depicted as marginal to mainstream society, these professors present their students with a more accurate, more complex, perhaps more problematic view of education and school knowledge. As one instructor remarked: “It’s an issue of whose knowledge is reflected in the curriculum of my courses and how it is experienced. I want to include many forms of knowledge, multiple ways of knowing, and myriad voices so that my courses resonate with the complexity of peoples’ lives.”

The second common theme that clearly emerges from our interviews is professors’ use of fiction to make concrete in the minds of their students course material that is too frequently abstracted from any meaningful human experience. Several professors specifically described how issues of authority, autonomy, and minority/majority relations lose their abstract qualities when expressed in fiction; or, as one professor positively cast it: “they acquire personality, acquire intensity, acquire a human face that makes them come alive to people who hear about them.” While the practice of firmly connecting abstract principles to experiences in everyday life is hardly a revolutionary concept, it bears repeating since so much conventional educational activity continues to encourage the study of an impersonal, a historical body of material that is divorced from the interests and lives of students. Again, reference to Dewey is instructive on this point. Referring in *Art as Experience* to the educational power of literature, Dewey observes:
Words as media are not exhausted in their power to convey possibility. Nouns, verbs, adjectives express generalized conditions—that is to say character. Even a proper name can but denote character in its limitations to an individual exemplification. Words attempt to convey the nature of things and events... That they can convey character, nature, not in abstract conceptual form, but as exhibited and operating in individuals is made evident in the novel and drama, whose business it is to exploit this particular function of language. For characters are presented in situations that evoke their natures, giving particularity of existence to the generality of potentiality. At the same time situations are defined and made concrete ... Ethical treatises in the past have been impotent in comparison [to literature] in portraying characters so that they remain in the consciousness of mankind. (Dewey 1958, 243)

When abstract material is connected to the vicissitudes of daily life through fictional structures and characterization, its intensity seems to have an existence that is remarkably enduring. Long after the course is completed and forgotten, story characters—and the "situations that evoke their natures"—continue to live. Conversely, abstractions seem to have an impermanent, unstable life-span; one professor's recollection of his undergraduate readings in existentialism by Albert Camus is a case in point.

Finally, several of these instructors deliberately incorporate literature into required course readings for its artistic value. Two features are important to note about this theme. First, the faculty members we interviewed all expressed a lively sense of what it means to be well-read beyond one's own academic specialty, and they exhibited a commitment to encouraging the development of similar values in their students. They considered encounters with literary works and with their constitutive elements—the rhythms of language, the intricate layerings of meaning, the artful reconfiguration of the human condition in ways so new that their appearance is often startling—valuable for future teachers to experience and enjoy, not merely in isolation in English courses, but as a fully integrated component of students’ professional study in education.

But there is more than just this. The responses also allude to a deeper, more complicated value than encountering literature for mere aesthetic pleasures. As several of these instructors suggest, and as George Steiner (1989, pp. 142-143) more explicitly points out, literature—and its address to the reader—is totally direct and overwhelming in its indiscrétion. If it is good, if it is authentic, literature unremittingly asks us the most penetrating questions: "What do you feel, what do you think of the possibilities of life, of the alternative shapes of being which are implicit in your experience of me, in our encounter?"

These persistent interrogations—and the complications they provoke in the
very center of our being--are rarely formalized with such intrusiveness, such immediacy in content-based texts. When incorporated in students' professional education programs, their pertinence may well awaken future teachers to a much more powerful, complex image of what teaching is, and what it also surely can be.

References


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1. How many of the articles in this issue did you read?
   All ______  Many ______  Some ______  None ______

2. Which articles did you find particularly interesting, and why?
   ____________________________________________________

3. What topics, themes or authors would you like to see in future issues?
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Knowledge, Practice, and Judgment

By Hugh G. Petrie

Introduction

The traditional conception of the relationship between research and practice is that we somehow "apply" the knowledge gained from research to practice. With respect to teachers' knowledge this presupposition is enshrined in teacher education through the routine of presenting prospective teachers with research-based theories of learning and instruction and then giving them experience in applying this knowledge to classroom situations during student teaching. This model also pervades the in-service workshops so prevalent during a teacher's career.

I want to argue that except in the most routine of situations, the conception of teachers "applying" knowledge to practice is fundamentally flawed. This suggests that if we persist in the notion of teachers applying knowledge to practice, we are largely committing ourselves, albeit unwittingly, to a conception of teaching as routine, technical, and susceptible to top-
down micro-management. On the other hand, if we can provide a better conception of the relationship between teacher knowledge and teacher action, we may be able to defend a more professional vision of teaching.

My objectives are four-fold. First, I will demonstrate that the conception of applying knowledge to practice is adequate only in the most routine situations. Second, I will urge that the currently popular and promising conception of the teacher as reflective practitioner ultimately requires a notion of professional judgment which joins both thought and action. Third, I will sketch a preliminary analysis of what professional judgment is. Finally, I will have some suggestions as to how a properly explicated notion of professional judgment can contribute to understanding the kind of accountability appropriate to a true profession of teaching.

**Professional Expertise**

Mary Kennedy (1987) has identified a number of ways in which we might conceive of the relationship between knowledge and action, theory and practice. One of these ways, the technical skills version of what Kennedy calls "professional expertise," does, indeed, consist of "applying" a kind of knowledge to action. This kind of knowledge involves a notion of "technical skills" which can be readily identified and taught to would-be practitioners and which, if utilized, have some sort of clear relationship to improved practice. There are skills, like planning lessons, waiting after asking questions, calling upon silent members of a class, and the like, which clearly are appropriate things teachers should do and can be taught to do. Furthermore, such skills are typically applied in fairly routine, straightforward situations.

The problem, as Kennedy points out, is that an overemphasis on the identification and acquisition of skills often ignores the issue of the rationale for their use. If teachers' work were highly structured and routine, say, like an assembly line, then it might be sufficient to make sure that teachers simply acquired the requisite skills. The rationale for the enterprise would be found in its overall organization or in the detailed supervision of the "assembly line" by more knowledgeable persons, perhaps principals or curriculum specialists. Teachers would only need to apply their skills to absolutely predictable and regular classroom situations. Unfortunately, as we all know, classrooms are nothing like assembly lines, despite the attempts of some to make them so.

Kennedy's second conception of expertise, the application of theory or general principles, would seem to remedy the problem of focusing solely on the nature and acquisition of the specific technical skills. If one learns not only the technical skills, but also the rationale and general principles underlying the skills, then one will be able to apply the skills to situations more diverse than an absolutely predictable assembly line. The conception here, one which is largely, if implicitly,
followed in teacher preparation programs, is that as one comes to understand the principles and general theory underlying the use of technical skills, one will be able to adapt one's behavior to changing circumstances.

There are, however, several problems with this view of expertise as well. First, real situations do not present themselves as obviously identifiable cases of general principles. One of the key requirements for applying general principles is that a kind of perceptual learning take place so that the teacher can learn to see this situation as a case of that principle and this other situation as a case of a different principle (Kennedy, 1987; Petrie, 1976, 1981). This observation lends credence to the continuing strong support for a "case" methodology in preparing teachers. Indeed, it may be that what education needs most of all are exemplary cases of the central concepts of teaching. One does not "apply" knowledge to neutral cases, rather one structures experiential situations in terms of certain concepts exemplified by paradigmatic cases.

Second, however, even if one recognizes a particular situation as a case of a general principle, the problem is that the situation is particular and the principle is general. How does one come, on this view, to be able to adjust the general principle to the particularities of practice? We are all familiar with teachers who know their theory and who can even recognize a situation as calling for a particular principle and yet be totally unable to adjust the principle to the situation. For example, it is not at all unusual to observe a teacher who knows that one ought not reward disruptive student behavior, who recognizes that a given student is being disruptive, but who is unable to do anything other than scream at the student, thereby providing precisely the attention the student craves. At the same time other teachers are marvelously adaptive in avoiding the situations which lead to the disruption or changing the focus of attention if the disruption occurs. What explains the difference?

One of the problems in accounting for those who can and those who cannot adapt to varying situations may lie in our not fully realizing that real-life situations can often be seen as falling under a multiplicity of propositionally formulated principles. The question then arises as to which principles we should apply, or how we should weight or modify them. Is it that we simply need to identify higher order principles and also teach these to our would-be teachers? These second-order principles would also be propositional in nature and would, on this conception be taught as a kind of higher order theory, which would then be applied to cases of choosing among lower order theoretical principles in a given situation. But how would the decisions be made on "applying" these higher order principles?

Indeed, we are caught here in a kind of logical infinite regress. Whenever we have trouble "applying" principles stated as propositional knowledge to practical situations, we postulate a knowledge that tells us how to make the application. But how do we know when and in what situations to apply this new knowledge of applications? Do we need a higher order knowledge connecting the propositional
knowledge of how to apply knowledge to the propositional knowledge which we wish to apply? Could the process ever end? It would seem that the notion of "applying" knowledge may be at the root of our problems here (Petrie, 1981). We really only apply knowledge in the most routine of situations, situations for which a recipe can be constructed and which do not vary much at all from case to case.

We can speak of "applying" knowledge to situations like cooking and theorem proving because the situations are all reasonably well-defined, easily recognized, and fall under only a few principles. However, as soon as the situation becomes even a little bit complex, as, for example, when we try to formulate "important" theorems to prove, adaptations must be made. Even cooks must sometimes adapt their recipes to unusual circumstances. Perhaps they only have larger eggs (more liquid than the recipe calls for) or a flour which absorbs more liquid than usual. Human beings are able to vary their behavior constantly in order to do the same thing time after time, e.g., keep the class on track. The notion of "applying" knowledge to practice completely fails to capture our ability to behave in constantly varying ways which bring the situation under the general principles which are guiding our actions.

Kennedy's third conception of expertise is that of "critical analysis." The critical analysis conception of professional expertise is best exemplified by legal education where the goal is to get the students to "think like lawyers." Essentially, such an approach takes very seriously the notion of bringing people to see the situations they encounter in terms of the principles of the field. It is little wonder, then, that the case method is so popular in legal education. As I noted above, case knowledge is precisely devoted to getting students to "see" situations as falling and failing to fall under key concepts and principles.

A notion of expertise which focuses almost exclusively on how to perceive and understand the situations one encounters in the appropriate terms is what Kennedy has in mind when she speaks of "critical analysis." However, there is a distinct possibility that not all situations are most felicitously analyzed from just one view point, no matter how powerful. As the old saw has it, once one has a hammer, then it is all too easy to see the whole world as something to be hammered, even if that is inappropriate. Furthermore, the critical analysis approach downplays the transition from understanding the problem in a certain way to acting on that way of seeing the situation. The link between thought and action is often ignored.

Kennedy's fourth notion of expertise is what she calls "deliberate action," taking the term from Schwab (1978). The idea is that of a reflective practitioner who both analyzes the given situation and acts within it. This approach gives promise of a direct attack on the problem of just how to relate thought and action, although the exact nature of the connection remains unclear. It also presupposes that there is a constant interplay between the ways in which we understand the problems and the means we contemplate for dealing with those problems. In short, means and ends are in constant interaction, both in actual experiments and in
thought experiments as one tries to deal with a constantly changing world. This approach would seem to have some potential for providing a truly illuminating account of the relation between teacher knowledge and teacher action.

Although less widely discussed than his popular notion of pedagogical content knowledge, Lee Shulman (1986, 1987a, 1987b) has also raised the question of just how teachers possess and use their knowledge. His discussion of what he calls "strategic knowledge" is relevant to the question of the relationship between thought and action. Strategic knowledge for Shulman is that knowledge which is used to decide what to do in particular cases. It is used when principles collide, when a situation can be seen as a case of x or a case of y and we need to decide how to treat it. In short, strategic knowledge for teachers is that which enables them to make the myriad non-trivial decisions called for each day regarding the actual conduct of teaching. It is the knowledge which would allow a teacher to go beyond the "applying general principles" conception of expertise identified by Kennedy. Furthermore, Shulman's well-known emphasis on teacher reflection suggests a way of fleshing out the "deliberate" in Kennedy's notion of deliberate action. Deliberate action would be that in which we consciously deliberate or think about what to do using all of the knowledge we have.

However, in order to account for wise decision-making, strategic knowledge must be of a different order than theoretical knowledge, conscious deliberation, or understanding. Theoretical knowledge is still propositional knowledge. Strategic knowledge, however, must be logically connected to decision and action. It cannot be just another proposition about decision and action. Shulman senses this difference in a revealing footnote. He says (1986, p. 14):

It may well be that what I am calling strategic knowledge in this paper is not knowledge in the same sense as propositional and case knowledge. Strategic "knowing" or judgment may simply be a process of analysis, of comparing and contrasting principles, cases, and their implications for practice.

The suggested move away from structures of knowledge to the processes of knowing is exactly right as a way of understanding the relation between thought and action.

In his two influential books, The Reflective Practitioner: How Professionals Think in Action (1983) and Educating the Reflective Practitioner (1987), Donald Schon provides perhaps the best current description of what a process of knowing would have to be like in order to relate thought and action. Schon's conception of reflective practice forges an indissoluble bond between thought and action in the practice of professionals, precisely the kind of bond I have urged must be found if we are to avoid the problems I have noted above.

Reflective practice for Schon includes what he calls "knowing-in-action," "reflection-in-action," and "reflection on reflection-in-action." Knowing-in-action is the intelligence actually revealed in competent professional performance,
as in a superb musical rendition, or a brilliantly delivered lecture. Only rarely can knowing-in-action be described discursively. As close as we could come to a discursive description would perhaps be the musical score or the lesson plan for the lecture. Reflection-in-action involves the ability to change course during some complex performance in response to changing and unanticipated circumstances. Jazz improvisation is one example, reshaping a lecture in response to a student's question would be another. Reflection on reflection-in-action is when we actually stop and try to describe knowing-in-action and reflection-in-action discursively. It can be done only by someone who already knows pretty much how to perform at a reasonable level of skill. Unlike Shulman, Schon seems to believe that we do not often reflect in order to practice more effectively, but rather we must have reached some level of competent practice in order to profitably reflect.

This leads Schon to describe the situation in professional practice as analogous to Plato's *Meno* paradox (See also Petrie, 1981). How can we ever learn anything new, for, if we do not already know what we are seeking, how could we recognize it when we learn it? On the other hand, if we already know what we are to learn, what is the point of learning? The answer to the dilemma for Schon is to put an emphasis on the professional practicum as the centerpiece of a curriculum to educate the reflective practitioner. The notion of cases as paradigm examples of good practice fits neatly into the practicum. In the beginning the student does not know what he or she is to learn. Nor could the teacher explain what is to be learned in any straightforward sense. However, through a variety of coaching strategies, involving joint practical problem-solving, occasionally an insistence by the coach that the student simply do as the coach does, and joint reflection by student and coach on the process, amazingly most students become independent practitioners. They are able not only to see the situations in generally the same ways as other mature professionals do, Kennedy's conception of critical analysis, but also to perform as a professional does, not in slavish imitation of their mentors, but as independent, adaptive, reflective practitioners.

In this sense Schon's notion of reflective practice goes beyond Kennedy's notion of critical analysis noted above. Schon's reflective practice involves both issues of framing and issues of actually dealing with the problems. Sometimes "recipes" apply, but more often for Schon the situation is one of framing the problem, trying out solutions, reframing the problem, trying new solutions, and so on until a reasonable adaptation is reached. In short, reflective practice is a process of knowing rather than a structure of knowledge. The process is one of actually performing in the company and with the help of other professionals.

However, Schon's process of reflective practice seems to many to reduce to trial and error or to remain mysterious. What is it about what good teachers know and do that results in a judgment to choose this book or that, this example or that? How do they decide whether or not to review the unit on fractions one more day or to press on?
Kennedy raises another objection to the concept of reflective practice. Essentially her concern arises over the fact that if we constantly consider both means and ends, ways of understanding the problem and ways of addressing it, we will have no standpoint from which to criticize any particular decision made by a "reflective practitioner." In Kennedy's view the notions of "accountability" or "best practice" seem to be lost. It would seem that "anything goes" and Kennedy quite rightly objects that such a consequence would be unacceptable, both for political and epistemological reasons. The point is that if we allow reflective practitioners constantly to adjust the means and ends they use for addressing a problem, we will be unable to tell whether they have chosen the "right" or "best" or even "better" way of dealing with the problem.

**Good Judgment**

It seems that teachers who are wise in the processes of actually using knowledge have what we call "good judgment." The sense of the term "judgment" which is of interest is the process of deciding what one ought to do or believe, often in the face of uncertainty and changing circumstances. But is judgment, then, a list of propositions? Of judgments written down somewhere? In its primary sense, I think not. There are people who exercise good judgment, but who cannot often write down, or even articulate, any set of propositions which constitutes that judgment. There are other people who do try to write down good judgments. They are the authors of the innumerable "how-to" books which, as we know, at best take us only a very little way toward developing our own good judgment. Converting strategic knowing or judgment into propositionally formulated rules may not be of much help. "Never smile until Christmas, usually." It is the knowledge of when to follow and when to break the rule that constitutes good judgment. As I have been arguing, it is impossible in principle to specify the rule with such completeness that we could ever make the rule explicit. The reason is that judgment is a process, and not basically a proposition.

The model of judging which I wish to propose has five main interrelated parts (see, for example, Powers, 1973; Sternberg, 1985; Gardner, 1983; and Brown, et al., 1989). People with good judgment have: first, a clear notion of the larger end or ends which they are pursuing; second, the ability actually to perceive situations in terms of the ends which structure those situations; third, the ability to monitor the extent to which their action succeeds or fails in bringing the situation closer to their desired end; fourth, the ability to modify their action so that the situation as experienced gets closer and closer to the desired end; and fifth, the ability to modify jointly the means and ends they are employing in light of the larger social and human purposes they are pursuing.

In more concrete terms this means that teachers who have good judgment usually have a pretty good idea of what they want to accomplish. This notion of
ends includes everything from what they may wish students to learn about reading to a view of what kinds of people they want their students to become. Seldom can teachers who view their roles as narrowly instrumental adapt to changing circumstances. The teacher who is confused about ends will be unable to tell whether or not progress is being made.

Teachers with good judgment also have a good knowledge of cases and exemplary practices. They can structure their experience in terms appropriate to the situation. They know, for example, what constitutes misbehavior and what is simply youthful exuberance. Teachers who lack this element of judgment often misinterpret the situation, and, therefore, act inappropriately. How one sees a situation already brings with it a significant tendency towards acting in certain ways.

Monitoring the on-going situation is crucial. Suppose a teacher sees an English class as one in which the students should be gaining experience in textual interpretation, and, therefore, structures the classroom discussion around close textual analysis. However, suppose further that the students do not yet even understand the general purpose of the writing they are supposed to be analyzing. It is crucial for the teacher in such a situation to be able to tell whether the attempts at textual analysis are getting anywhere.

This leads to the fourth element in good judgment--the ability to modify one's actions to achieve the goal. Does the teacher have a repertoire of actions from which to choose? If close textual analysis is not working, simulation or role-playing might help the students interpret the material better. Without a variety of instructional strategies and procedures at their disposal, teachers will be limited to narrow, technically-oriented means to achieve their goals. It is not that one could somehow exercise good judgment in knowing that a given activity was not working, but be totally unaware of alternatives. Judgment means being able to utilize a variety of alternatives. Without the alternatives, there is nothing upon which to exercise judgment.

Finally, the teacher with good judgment can modify jointly the means and ends being used in order to achieve larger social purposes. It may be that what the teacher basically wants to do is to bring the students to a fuller understanding of literature as a liberating force in their lives. In this larger picture, textual interpretation is only one instance of using literature as a liberating force. It may be that with these students, at their stage of development, textual interpretation is inappropriate as a goal and a very different set of means and ends, perhaps relating the story to events in the students' lives, would more adequately serve to liberate them. Note that without this broader adaptability, teachers are likely to blame the students for their inadequacies rather than looking at the larger picture and perhaps realizing that the teachers' own goals and ways of teaching could be modified.

The sense of judgment which I am explicating is not a series of propositions, but a process leading to action. It is not procedural or technical in the sense of
following explicit rules laid down by someone else. Rather it is value-laden, and in some cases it is the values themselves which are changed or the emphasis given to competing values altered. But this raises a familiar problem. If we can and sometimes should change the values we are pursuing, then how can we avoid the charge that anything goes? How can we tell good judgment from bad?

The answer is that judgment depends on an evolving tradition to give it point and purpose, and that communal tradition, whether it be conservative or radical, provides the source of the values in terms of which we judge a particular adaptation or alteration of means and ends as good or bad. Furthermore, activity within the tradition is constantly being monitored and adjustments to the tradition made in response to the monitoring.

The fundamental point is that we not only judge the success of teaching or any human activity in terms of how well a given set of means leads to predetermined goals, we also judge those goals by how well the means they call into play allow us to deal with all of the myriad conditions in our human situation. Within the human condition a variety of social arrangements—e.g., law, medicine, science, schooling—have evolved which provide the best means we have been able to create thus far to solve some of our basic human problems. These social arrangements and traditions are themselves subject to judgments, not only of how well and efficiently they operate, but also of how well those particular social arrangements contribute to social well-being. In short, the question is how adaptive are our individual goals and actions and our social organizations, taken together, in allowing us to adapt to the actual ecology in which we human beings find ourselves. The grounds of good judgment are whether or not it leads us to a reflective equilibrium of thought and action (Petrie, 1981, pp. 140-141, 148-150, 180-185, and 213-214).

A good way of testing the account that I have given is to see if there is anything like a notion of “bad” judgment? If judgment requires weighing not only means to predetermined ends, but also, sometimes, those ends themselves, what would constitute “bad” judgment? The answer lies in remembering the essentially social nature of judgment. Judgment is not simply the arbitrary decision of an individual. Rather, there is an unavoidably social nature to the larger norms and standards which inform the reflective practice and the education of reflective professionals. There are traditions and histories of practice which have evolved over time in ways that have captured at least a modicum of adaptability to the human condition. If they had not, they would have died out. This is, of course, not to say that these traditions have necessarily reached any ultimate truth, but rather to say that they are not simply matters of opinion. They have more or less stood the test of time, and, as such, they are worthy of our respect, however skeptical we, on specific occasions, may be.

“Bad” professional judgment thus turns out to be judgment which does not conform well to the socially and historically developed norms, maxims, practices, and reflections on practice of the profession. One can criticize those norms and
practices, but the right to do so must be earned by first learning how to act in accordance with them. Then the criticism will be that the norms and practices, taken as a whole, simply do not really allow us to deal as effectively as they might with that segment of our human ecology with which the profession is supposed to deal.

How does judgment work in specific educational situations? A few examples will help. Research in general pedagogy has confirmed the importance of "direct instruction." The more you actually teach, the more children learn. At the same time, research has also confirmed the usefulness of cooperative learning strategies where children learn from working with each other rather than from being "taught" in any traditional sense. Should a teacher use direct instruction or cooperative learning? The point is that one cannot write down a recipe for when a teacher with good judgment should do one and when the other. Building in even the half dozen or so most common differences in context which ordinary teachers face all the time would make the "recipe" for when to use one and when to use the other impossibly long. Issues of content, age of students, ability level of students, ability of teacher, place in the lesson, place in the curriculum, desire to set the lesson in the context of current events, racial or social background of the class, what the teacher or students had for breakfast, or did not have for breakfast, that morning—all of these and hundreds more play a role in determining whether the teacher with good judgment will use one or the other of the strategies.

Under the analysis I have given of judging, the teacher is constantly monitoring the situation. He or she must know all about the two instructional strategies as well as about the importance of contextual factors. Then, as progress toward learning is perceived to be occurring, the teacher will go ahead with what seems to be working. As the teacher sees the class floundering with a project because of an apparent lack of understanding of a basic concept, the teacher may abandon the cooperative learning strategy and turn to direct instruction to provide a review of the basic concepts underlying the cooperative learning project. Following Shulman, one could expand the example to include judgments concerning particular subjects and their place in the curriculum. Thus, a teacher might have to decide if it is more important within a limited time frame to have students memorize the Bill of Rights as fundamental to further learning in American History or if it would be more important for them to understand why the Bill of Rights needed to be written.

One can also easily imagine the larger social context influencing judgments made during particular moments of classroom instruction. If the teacher more or less accepts the tradition that the content must be "covered," then in-depth, time-consuming discussion will probably not be attempted very often. However, if the teacher is more interested in promoting critical thought, coverage may be sacrificed. One is reminded of Ted Sizer's (1984) slogan that "less is more." Sizer is precisely committed to cooperatively redesigning the curriculum and structure
of his Coalition of Essential Schools to cover less, but with more depth and understanding. The point is not that such schemes are simply changes in the goals schools are meant to serve, which then require a new selection from among the independently validated means we have available for pursuing different ends. Rather, the point is that such basic new conceptions structure our experience in very different ways and will define differently the questions and answers we will pose and seek in our schools and classrooms.

Principles of action in the form of linguistic propositions dealing with all of these situations can at best be provided only in those cases in which the situations are extremely routine, and routine in two distinct ways. First, assuming that the basic values of the tradition are not at issue, the situation must be extremely routine in terms of the instructional context. Introducing a new form of the lever in physics after the basic concept of the lever has been covered may be such a routine situation. Second, one must assume that the basic values of the tradition are not themselves at issue. The same situation which might call for one kind of routine practice assuming that “coverage” is a good thing might well call for a very different kind of routine practice assuming that coverage is not as important as, say, depth.

How does one go about developing good judgment? A full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, a full answer would involve laying out a fairly complete prescription for the reform of teacher education. However, a few suggestions derived from the model of judging I have proposed might be in order.

First, it is clear that the development of good judgment will depend upon a knowledge of the ends of schooling and the general place of teaching in society. In short, a good liberal education is necessary. However, the liberal education must be supplemented with work in the foundations of education, for it is here more than anywhere that questions of schooling and society arise. Second, in order to relate thought and action, a far more intensive use of case studies and paradigmatic examples must be made in teacher preparation. Again, foundations will be critical in providing alternative ways of conceiving of the paradigm cases. Third, experience clearly develops good judgment, but only experience in which a wide range of ways of interpreting the situation can be brought to bear in a reflective way. We do learn from experience, but sometimes we learn the wrong things. It is the collective and shared experience of the whole teaching profession from which we should be learning, rather than the individual, often idiosyncratic, experiences of teachers who, because of their isolation, cannot test their interpretations against the collective wisdom of the profession. Although such reflection on experience occurs in a number of places in the typical teacher education program, the foundations typically pay special attention to this aspect.

Teachers must also be equipped with and experienced in a wide range of teaching procedures and techniques in their fields, as well as in the characteristics
of diverse learners, so that they will have something upon which to exercise their judgment. Even here, foundational studies, especially history, can provide an antidote to the idea that procedures and techniques are simply a bag of tricks to be acquired and "applied." Finally, as the foundations have always held, teachers must see themselves and be seen as part of the great human and social enterprise of living well. Only if teachers are full participants in the best that is thought and done can they be expected to bring future generations to the level of contributing to the creation of a better life.

It is the great failing of much educational policy-making not to appreciate the morally, socially, and situationally bound context of education and to assume that if only we could analyze teaching in sufficient detail, we could provide the appropriate methods for teaching reading or mathematics or science, that is, specific instructions to be followed by teachers to guarantee learning. In any human activity as complex and morally and socially significant as teaching, that approach simply does not work. In any real-life ecology, there are almost always alternative ways of viewing and understanding situations which bring with them alternative ways of adapting to those situations. Judging wisely involves selecting from among the variety of alternative ways of understanding and dealing with the human and social situations in which we find ourselves.

Accountability

The accountability appropriate to the idea of a professional exercising good judgment is not an accountability of following or not following specific recipes, nor is it even an accountability of student outcomes where the nature of and standards for those outcomes are determined in advance. Indeed, to suppose otherwise was the great failing of process-product research. Such research took the products we wanted as being fixed and they looked for the processes which would lead most effectively and efficiently to those products. Such conceptions simply denied the obvious and important effects of context and variability on the complex situations of teaching and learning. The danger, of course, is that in recognizing the importance of context and variability, one will fall into the unacceptable relativistic position that anything goes.

The conception of accountability which emerges from considering judgment as the relation of research and practice, thought and action, steers the appropriate middle course between predetermined outcomes and anything goes. Furthermore, it is quite congruent with arguments recently being advanced in favor of the professionalization of teaching. Proponents of such professionalization quite correctly point out that the accountability of a profession is lodged not in some independent standard, externally imposed, but in how the profession manages itself within the larger society. This management includes rigorous standards for entry and careful and lengthy preparation, so that those who are accepted have
earned the right to criticize the profession and help its further evolution. It also includes the necessity of justifying to society why it should grant the profession such relative autonomy. The challenge for the teaching profession is to convince society that it will be better able to pursue its reasonable goals through granting teaching professional status.

It is not simply a political matter as to whether teacher unions have the power to force a professional conception of teaching on society. It rather has to do with the extent to which the norms, maxims, practices, and reflections on practice within teaching have come to define good practice. It is not merely a "knowledge base" which would justify teaching as a profession---at least if that knowledge is understood as a list of propositions. Rather it is a set of informed practices and activities which society can be brought reasonably to believe would further its own goals. In this way, the argument over whether teaching should be professionalized depends heavily on whether we can accept a notion of the relation of theory and practice which itself transcends the non-professional notion of "applying" theory to practice.

**Summary**

In summary, there are three main implications for teacher knowledge and practice of substituting a notion of professional judgment for that of applying research to practice. First, the notion of applying knowledge to practice all too easily suggests a technical rationality conception of teaching---a view which has come increasingly to be seen inadequate for thinking about what teachers ought to do. Second, the notion of judgment as the link between research and practice is much more compatible with the conception of teacher as reflective practitioner. In particular, it explains how teachers adapt their knowledge and action to constantly changing situations, but within reasonable parameters set by their profession. Finally, focusing on judgment allows us to begin thinking about professional accountability in much more appropriate ways than checklists of observable teacher behaviors or student scores on standardized tests. It provides a basis for an accountability fully in keeping both with the social responsibility of teachers and with their relative autonomy as professionals.

**Notes**

1. I have long argued that perceptual learning is a much neglected feature of teaching and learning situations. Indeed, I believe that much of the talk of sensitizing teachers, say, to racial stereotypes, can most fruitfully be addressed as a problem of perceptual learning.
2. See Powers, 1973, for a detailed description of the kind of revolutionary theory of action which gives promise of being able to account for this fact.
3. Shulman’s repeated insistence on the value of reflection on practice does not, I believe,
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count against this point. Reflection on practice is not the same as reflection in order to practice. It is the latter to which I am objecting. Reflection on practice is surely one way in which we improve the whole tradition of the practice.

References


The Illusion of Education Reform: The Educational System and At-Risk Students

By Clark Robenstine

Americans have always believed that good schools make a difference. Our faith is that a good education can help children overcome the most severe effects of poverty, and can provide our children with the traits of character and the shared knowledge and beliefs necessary for personal and economic success.¹

The rhetoric of the education reform movement, well-exemplified in the previous statement, has been a powerful and intended force on the direction that “a nation at risk” has taken in responding to the perceived crisis in education. At least one of the most significant emphases of the current education reform movement, as with those in the past, has been on raising student achievement outcomes, especially as measured by

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performance on standardized tests. This has been accompanied by continuing alarm over the dropout rate. Thus, the contemporary education reform movement has sought to relieve, if not eliminate, the continuing tension between the concerns of excellence and equity.

As such, one of the most obvious and consistent characteristics of contemporary education reform literature has been its language in justifying reform proposals on the basis of both universal excellence and equity:

We do not believe that a public commitment to excellence and educational reform must be made at the expense of a strong public commitment to the equitable treatment of our diverse population. The twin goals of equity and high-quality schooling have profound and practical meaning for our economy and society, and we cannot permit one to yield to the other in principle or practice.²

In any relatively brief analysis such as this one is, purpose is necessarily limited. This paper does not attempt, in any way, to provide a comprehensive treatment of the excellence-equity issue; nor does it intend to provide an in-depth study of the problem of the at-risk/dropout student. Both of those concerns are more exhaustively addressed in numerous other books and articles.³ The singular purpose of this paper is to focus attention on particular factors impinging greatly on the success of education reform efforts, especially as those efforts are directed toward the group of students who have traditionally succeeded least in schooling. Consequently, this paper is concerned with specific conceptual constructs which potentially mitigate any improved condition, notably for those students labeled at-risk, which might be expected as a result of contemporary education reform.⁴

In doing so, it is expected that what will be provided is part of the explanation of how and why there are negative consequences for some students in spite of the rhetoric of education reform. The 1980s have seen a dramatic increase in education reform efforts, marked by hundreds of pieces of reform legislation. But waves of reform, driven by differing ideologies and accompanied by policy-making zeal to eradicate perceived inadequacies, have washed across the education landscape many times before. Some waves of reform have broken up due to resistance on the part of affected groups, poor planning, and misconceived implementation. But many efforts at reform have failed also due to a lack of understanding regarding the education system’s basic structure.³ The current wave is likely to go the same way unless, first and foremost, there is more understanding of pertinent systemic characteristics. With this as the focus, two principles stand out.

First, education reform policy is policy for the education system. This seemingly ordinary point, made by Thomas F. Green over ten years ago in Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System,⁶ is a point largely neglected in both the rhetoric and reality of current education reform. An incomplete understanding of the education system’s rational form, structure, and behavior, as
a system, places the success of any education reform in jeopardy at the outset.

Second, as a corollary, the education system behaves as a dynamic structure according to certain rules and laws. While the rules and laws of the structure are unaffected by any particular educational content, the converse may not be true. As a result, knowledge of the system is the necessary first step in thinking about specific education reform policy. Since little, if any, contemporary education reform seriously considered or thus far implemented requires major change in the structure, the dynamics and inherent processes of the system potentially limit the effectiveness of that reform.

The concern in this paper with at-risk/dropout students is primarily within the realm of these two principles. The assertion is that this group of students remains and will remain largely unaffected, in a positive way, by contemporary education reform. In other words, for significant numbers of students, the success of education reform measures, as currently conceived and implemented, is circumscribed by the structure within which those measures operate. The result has been and will continue to be "more of the same" for this group.

The Political Economy of Education Reform: Standards and Assumptions

In an introductory overview of current education reform, Christine Shea argues persuasively that the two competing, yet dominant, conceptions of education policy both appear "to rely for their success on the ability of the American public school system to produce a highly productive labor force with the required work skills and character traits." This "development of human capital" goal, as the fundamental driving force of education reform, exemplifies the conservative approach to domestic social and schooling policy as advocated in most of the major reform literature. That advocates of dominant contemporary school reform are interested primarily in schooling changes that will theoretically lead to greater economic productivity in the United States is evidenced in many of the more significant reform reports. The tone for school reform consistent with educational excellence for improved economic productivity was set early on by the National Commission on Educational Excellence in 1983.

In calling upon schools to solve economic problems in international competition, A Nation At Risk declared: "If only to keep and improve on the slim competitive edge we still retain in world markets, we must rededicate ourselves to the reform of the educational system for the benefit of all." The Commission's report served to rekindle an intense interest in the old idea that schools should function mainly to increase the productivity of the American worker.

Following suit, Action for Excellence also called for better schools to improve American economic development. In putting forward what was considered a comprehensive plan for the improvement of American schools by the turn of the
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century, *Action for Excellence* criticized public schooling of the 1970s and 1980s for what was perceived as an underdevelopment of the nation's human capital resources. In basing a call for school reform explicitly on human capital theory, the report claimed:

> We have expected too little of our schools over the past two decades, in terms of quality--and we have gotten too little. The result is that our schools are not doing an adequate job of education for today's requirements in the workplace, much less tomorrow's.\(^9\)

Especially revealing was the report's detailed discussion of a newly-developed, four-tiered occupational classification system. The vast majority of American students would find themselves in the new job category of "Learning to Learn." The *Action for Excellence* report then described in detail the entry-level minimum competencies required by this new job category.\(^10\) In other words, for the vast majority of non-college-bound students, the end of formal schooling would occur as soon as they demonstrated acquisition of such minimum competencies as measured by performance on exit exams.

Continuing in similar fashion other reports followed over the decade. Both *Schools That Work: Educating Disadvantaged Children and Dealing with Dropouts*, reports issued by the U.S. Department of Education, concerned themselves specifically with at-risk students, yet at the same time emphasized the primarily economic rewards of schooling even for these students.\(^11\) Education is not only the "way out of poverty," but subsequently benefits the economic standing of society as a whole. Such benefits as these are to be available to everyone because "the benefits of schooling are colorblind."\(^12\) Also, in *American Education: Making It Work*, William Bennett assessed the progress made since the publication of *A Nation At Risk*. Concluding that we are doing better than we were in 1983, Bennett warned that "we are still at risk."\(^13\) We have only begun the long climb back to reasonable and responsible educational standards.

The volume of education reform reports limits reference to all of those reports here. Clearly, the call for higher academic standards and stricter accountability schemes for regaining national economic competitiveness is a theme common in the dominant thrust of the contemporary reform movement.\(^14\) This common theme continues to be evident in President Bush's education goals for "America 2000" released April 18, 1991, among which is a call for national standardized testing. Though specifically targeted by the administration's education goals, the education of the "disadvantaged" student is considered essential mostly for its role in the general development of the American work force.\(^15\) In short, the plethora of reports on the inadequacies of American education and the call for higher academic standards have resulted in, among other things, conservative back-to-basics and minimum competency testing movements, standardized curricula, and top-down accountability schemes. The at-risk and dropout problems receive special scrutiny
because they are major educational, social, and economic problems.

In the rhetoric of producing excellence (and also supposedly equity), as a whole, education reform's call for higher standards is based on a number of assumptions. The obvious first assumption is that current standards are too low. More demanding content and higher expectations for results are assumed to produce greater student effort, which, in turn, will lead to higher levels of individual and collective student achievement. Thus, a second assumption is that more demanding content and higher expectations will lead to greater individual student effort.

A third assumption must then be that greater student effort will lead to improved achievement. Fourth, since reform recommendations are applied across the board, it is assumed that the relationship between standards and effort and the relationship between effort and achievement will hold for all students.

Finally, it must be noted that the underlying social and political context, that of a liberal democratic state, entails the belief stated at the beginning that schooling is very important in determining one's life chances, i.e. job opportunity, status, income, etc. Green refers to this belief as the principle of schooling efficacy. Concomitant is the requirement that this occur fairly. Consequently, a fifth implicit assumption is that no negative consequences will be associated with the more demanding standards except those brought on by students themselves.

The extent of the concern over low academic standards can be measured by the fact, for example, that some form of minimum competency exit tests exists in a large number of states. While exit exams are not necessarily minimum competency tests, they are typically so. The concern over low academic standards is evidenced also by the strengthening of the secondary core curriculum and the addition of more course units required for graduation.

Given Green's principle of schooling efficacy and with schooling conceived within the reform reports primarily as preparation for work, attention is focused not only on the fifth but also the fourth assumption—that the relationships between standards and effort and between effort and achievement will hold for all students. That is, the relationships will entail positive consequences for all students. However, it is not at all clear that these assumed relationships will hold for all students. A variety of characteristics, both systemic and those associated with at-risk students, complicates the picture and may lead to unintended negative consequences for that group.

Conceptual Framework:
Institutional Incorporation

Although perhaps unexpected from the topic, Emile Durkheim's major work on suicide supplies a good conceptual framework applicable to the current discussion. In *Suicide*, Durkheim's hypothesis is that an individual's failure to
attain social integration may lead that individual to break ties to the social system. The primary claim that Durkheim makes is that what looks like a highly individual and personal phenomenon is explicable through the social structure and its ramifying functions. The central construct of this framework is that of institutional incorporation, or integration for Durkheim.

According to Durkheim, an individual may break his or her ties to a social system when he or she fails to be integrated into the common life of that society. Two types of integration are critical—normative congruence and collective affiliation. Normative congruence refers to the compatibility of an individual’s attitudes, interests, and personality with the attributes and influences of that individual’s environment. Collective affiliation refers to supports provided by one’s peer group. In Durkheim’s model, failures to achieve either sort of integration underlie specific suicidal expressions.

While suicide is more final than dropping out of school, in the translation of the model the school can be delineated into two major sub-systems: the academic and the social. Thus, failure of the individual to be integrated into either of these sub-systems could lead to negative consequences. Lack of incorporation into the school’s academic sub-system could lead to failure, while lack of incorporation into the school’s social sub-system could lead to separation. Further, both would appear to be interrelated. This is borne out in the research by Slavin, who reports that academic self-concept and self-esteem are indeed correlated with achievement.

In the assumptions underlying education reform, the increase in student effort is the critical element linking higher standards with improved achievement. What, then, is the relationship between student effort as reflected through commitment to the central goals and values of the school, and incorporation into the school’s academic and social sub-systems?

The attention here to what is identified as a lack of incorporation into the school’s social and academic subsystems parallels Marty Sapp’s study in which he isolated two important variables related to the academic success of at-risk students. Finding in research what is suggested by Durkheim’s model, Sapp concludes that these variables—academic and general self-concept—correlate significantly with achievement. In a rather simplistic way, Sapp suggests that “increasing at-risk students’ academic self-concept should correspondingly increase academic achievement.” But increasing, academic self-concept, whether as the recommended conclusion in Sapp’s study or as the supposed goal of education reform, is expected to occur within the structures of an essentially unchanged educational system.
The Dynamics of the Educational System

Although a disservice to the finer points of his analysis, a rough summary of Thomas Green's work must focus on a few fundamental concepts. Green characterizes the system as an educational exchange involved in the distribution of three kinds of goods or benefits: 1) first-order educational benefits, 2) second-order educational benefits, and 3) non-educational social benefits.

First-order educational benefits are such things as the "appropriate" knowledge, skills, values, and attitudes. Although not distributed solely by the schools, this is what schooling is about. Second-order educational benefits are such things as grades, degrees, certificates, and diplomas. Finally, non-educational social benefits are social goods such as jobs, income, and opportunity. Unlike the first two, these are not distributed by the school but by society, on the basis of the distribution of both kinds of educational benefits. In the operation of the exchange, Green claims the presence of a normative principle that is essential to the structure of the system, especially in its relation to the larger social system. The normative principle in this operation is that "those having a greater share of educational benefits merit or deserve a greater share of non-educational social goods."

This is the principle which is reflected in the aforementioned principle of schooling efficacy. The principle is reflected also in the reform reports' conception of schooling as preparation for work, as well as in the continual pointing out of the economic advantages of possessing a high school diploma.

Now, at any point in time there is a level of schooling that the majority of the population has attained. This is referred to as the "nth" level. For example, today the nth level is high school graduation. But the normative principle suggested previously, as well as the reflection of that principle within the schools and society, is a relative matter. In other words, the distribution by society of non-educational social goods is relative to the distribution of educational benefits. This is because the "payoff" in the exchange between educational benefits and non-educational social goods is dependent upon the proportion of the population possessing roughly the same amount of educational benefits.

This is a systemic rule: if there is a level of schooling within the system that the majority of the population completes then completing that level has little relative value, especially when compared with the value of that level when only a few completed it. For example, while the nth level today is high school graduation that was not the case in, say, 1940, when the nth level was considerably lower. Thus, completing high school in 1940, when many more did not, provided a relatively high payoff in the exchange. Since the majority of the population now completes high school, a high school diploma has significantly less relative value today than it did for those in 1940. This is Green's law of zero correlation. This law states that there is a point in the growth of the system at which there is no longer any correlation between educational attainment and the distribution of non-
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Educational social goods ordinarily associated with educational attainment. In other words, succinctly put, a high school diploma was good enough in the past for an entry-level position in business, one providing opportunity for advancement. It is not any more.

One other concept in this summary—the group of last entry. Green says that it appears to be true that no society has been able to expand its total schooling enterprise to include lower status groups in proportion to their numbers in the population until the system is saturated by the upper and middle status groups. This principle is referred to as the law of last entry: “as we approach the point of universal attainment at any level of the system, the last group to enter and complete that level will be drawn from lower socioeconomic groups.” Green provides a thorough and convincing justification for this law of last entry.

Finally, the last task here is to combine the law of zero correlation with the law of last entry. The group of last entry is faced with a dilemma. With the system near its limit of attainment at the nth level, high school graduation, the group of last entry can persevere in school for one of two reasons: 1) to merely avoid a disaster, or 2) in order to benefit from the system as others have. Here Green says, “The first reason to persist constitutes an unsatisfactory kind of compulsion, and the second is destined not to be satisfied.” In other words, because of the law of zero correlation, getting a high school diploma provides relatively little payoff for the group of last entry; but not getting it would be a disaster. Both of these consequences are true because the majority of the population attains high school graduation.

Even though the system will not operate for the group of last entry as it previously has for others, there are still cumulative benefits for society in seeing that this group attains high school graduation. The trouble is that the cumulative good for society will never be sufficient as a motive for any individual to advance in the system. Few students trying to master chemistry or geometry are likely to be impressed or motivated by the knowledge that doing so will benefit or improve society. These are systemic dynamics, not highly individual phenomena, in operation here and they have serious implications for schooling in general, and for education reform measures in particular.

Education Reform and At-Risk Students

The dominant thrust of contemporary education reform is as such: “In literally every major report, school reform is considered to be the key corrective to America’s failing economy, and a more productive U.S. worker is heralded as the ‘missing link’ in recouping our global domination and supremacy.” This goal applies to no group more so than to those students labeled at-risk. But part of the difficulty in examining the issues of at-risk students lies in the absence of any standard definition of ‘dropout.’ Emphasis in this paper has been and continues
Robenstine

to be on what is termed the "classical dropout"—as characterized by low grades, poor attitude toward school, and other academic-related indicators such as previous grade retention and prior school suspension or expulsion.

In response to the question "Who drops out of school?" the report by the U.S. Office of Educational Research and Improvement responds that "Poor academic performance is the single best predictor of who drops out." Students with low grades are more apt to leave school than those with higher grades. Also, in their analysis of the High School and Beyond data, Ruth Ekstrom et. al report that there is a significant difference in attitudes regarding the academic aspects of school between sophomores who stayed in school and those who dropped out. Other reasons or predictors cited are those such as increased school standards and low self-esteem. All of these various characteristics and predictors of dropouts are indicative of students who are clearly alienated, academically, from the school.

Another significant characteristic of those who drop out is social class position (socioeconomic status). Both the report by the Office of Educational Research and Improvement and the analysis of the High School and Beyond data establish that students of minority and lower socioeconomic status consistently have been shown to have greater dropout rates than higher socioeconomic status or non-minority students.

Analysis of the High School and Beyond data further confirms that dropouts are frequently absent and truant, are more likely to be involved in school disciplinary matters, and are more likely to have been suspended. These students feel that they are held in less esteem by others in school and they participate infrequently if at all in school activities. This overall lack of self-esteem and participation in school activities suggests that what, in effect, are low levels of incorporation into the school's social sub-system parallel equally low levels of academic incorporation.

This parallel, between low levels of social incorporation and low levels of academic incorporation, is found in sets of reasons that students give for dropping out of school. Michael Loughrey and Mary Harris, for example, report such a list of reasons given by students for not doing better in school. Cited in the list are those which indicate a lack of both academic and social incorporation. Summarily put, then, at-risk students/dropouts are alienated from both of the school's subsystems. And, as Durkheim claims and Green illustrates, the behavior of these students in both sub-systems is explicable at least partially through the structure and its dynamics.

The High School and Beyond data show also that while the major reasons given for dropping out most frequently involve poor grades and not liking school academically, dropouts also exhibit a much more externalized sense of control; they are much more likely to feel that their destiny is out of their hands. That is, while dropouts obviously exert control over their immediate situation simply by dropping out, they also perceive that they have little control over their eventual
future. At the moment of dropping out there appears to be for them little sense of connection between present action and future consequences, or at least no connection that makes any real difference. As Green’s analysis of the system indicates, there is present a legitimate sense that staying in school, working hard, and doing what they are told, will not make much difference for this group. Unless students are very good at doing those academic tasks rewarded by schools and society, which this group is not, they are not likely to gain a greater sense of accomplishment or a greater sense of internal control over their future. Nor does their past and present experience enable them to see any likely or promising “payoff” in the exchange as a result of schooling.

It might here be suggested that this perceived lack of control over their individual destiny is an integral element in a lack of both social and academic incorporation which leads to an overall failure in school, and subsequently to a greatly diminished future. The key, then, to any successful effort at education reform directed toward at-risk students would be dependent upon the extent that reform addresses the social and academic, as well as cultural, rejection of the school by these students.38

What does the preceding discussion mean, then, for reform literature that constantly calls for higher standards? In considering exit exams for example, with the criteria for success set where they are, at the low percentage levels required for passing, one can easily conclude that the majority of those not attaining passing levels are also the ones academically alienated from the school. The exit exams have proven to be no challenge to those at the upper end of the academic scale, and little challenge to those near the middle. One of the greatest defects of the current reform movement as portrayed in the previous discussion is its assumption that the education of at-risk students, largely those of minority and low socioeconomic status, will somehow dramatically improve with the loyal implementation of the reform recommendations.

**Rhetoric v. Reality:**

**The Effects of Education Reform**

The rhetoric of this emerging new American meritocracy has functioned to camouflage the more repressive aspects of these social ideologies, especially their impact on American working-class poor (and Third World minority populations.) ...Thus it appears that the American working-class poor, in particular, are headed toward a school experience that seems designed to ensure passive enslavement to the immediate, the concrete, and the instrumental.39

Students at risk of dropping out, identified as belonging mostly in the lower
socioeconomic status group, are the same students Green identifies as constituting the group of last entry. Consequently, with education reform’s stress on helping students to gain employment as the primary objective of public schooling, we jeopardize that goal to a far greater extent through failure to certify these students than through failure to educate them.

The educational system is not without blame. Concentrating on individual correlates of dropping out reinforces the idea that dropping out, like suicide, is purely a form of individual deviant behavior. Actually, the most critical circumstance of dropping out is alienation from the school’s academic and social subsystems—or, put differently, membership in Green’s group of last entry. Minimum competency tests such as high school exit exams, as an example of education reform, are a classic case of “blaming the victim.” The educational system is thereby excused from its responsibility for the student’s failure. These exit exams are used to examine the performance of students as individuals, but not to examine the performance of the system, with both reward for success and penalty for failure imposed on individuals.

All of this is not to suggest that students should be held entirely blameless for their failure. It is, however, to recognize that a tradition of shared responsibility for academic success and failure is an appropriate one. There are many causes of student failure, some of which are systemic.

The major assumptions underlying education reform’s call for higher standards include that the relationships between standards and effort and between effort and achievement are to hold for all students. Positive effects should be expected especially for at-risk students. This is not what was presented in the General Accounting Office’s report to Congress in September of 1989. In Education Reform: Initial Effects in Four School Districts it was reported that in the study, education reform measures, including exit exams in three of the districts, resulted in 1) no substantial gain in achievement for educationally at-risk students, and 2) no change in dropout rates for at risk students. The assumptions necessary for relating higher standards with higher achievement were not supported.

While this government report shows that education reform did not benefit all students, Green’s characterization of the system suggests that education reform cannot benefit all students, at least not as that reform is currently conceived and structured. The institution of a minimum competency graduation exam, for example, may signal students that the school now means business when it comes to academic standards, but a significant segment of students already likely discounts the validity or legitimacy of the traditional academic structure. Since academic alienation and dropping out is a process extending over the many school years, then affixing an exit exam at the end is clearly irrelevant for many students.

Though the rhetoric of education reform claims to address both excellence and equity, the reality of the movement’s call for higher standards is much more likely to ensure future worker compliance, and to confirm a social division of labor—with
students of minority and lower social class status predominantly at the bottom. On the basis of the "coming wave of high tech" jobs, the major reform literature justifies its recommendations for an American public school system able to provide a highly productive labor force with the "required skills and character traits."

The reality is that this thesis of a vast increase in "high tech" jobs in the future has been strongly challenged. Not only will existing and future high tech industries employ only a fraction of the workforce, large numbers of jobs that will exist will require little or no extensive knowledge of high technology. In a well-supported article, Martin Carnoy observes that the nine fastest growing jobs in absolute terms are all service jobs, and these jobs will continue to be low-skilled and low-paying.41

As current education reform reinforces a conservative program and a we-them division of labor, the reality of the effects of that reform is quite likely to be much different from the language, especially as that reform affects those students at the bottom of the educational system. Though the reform literature's claim is that the benefits of schooling are equally available to all, many students necessarily will find themselves with less schooling (and with less knowledge and skills) and subsequently in the lower, poorly paid jobs. "Since one of the major objectives of high technology is to simplify work tasks and to reduce the skills required for jobs, most jobs in the future will not require higher skill levels."42

With an agenda of education reform implementing increased academic standards and requirements, based on a fallacious view of the future for the majority of low socioeconomic students, there will be no change in the dynamics of the systemic characteristics which so adversely affect these students. It is surprising only to the most naive that minority and low socioeconomic youth have little confidence in the deferred gratification that schooling promises, or in the mythical guarantee that a high school diploma will translate into equitable career/employment opportunities.

Conclusion:

The Failure of Education Reform

Education reform with a view to a future that will never exist exacerbates the present problems of at-risk students that do exist. In other words, not only do such reforms not do much for these students' future, they do even less to address their present circumstances. By not addressing, and perhaps reinforcing, these students' lack of social and academic incorporation, conformity-minded and standardized-directed reform proposals are rooted in a class-based business perspective which virtually dismisses an entire segment of the school population, most of whom linger as refuse at the bottom of the social system. (I contend that) if the proposed reforms were to become reality, most lower class students would face even greater academic
failure, higher dropout rates, and further social decline.43

We do not need "better educated workers for the future" nearly as much as we need human beings educated for social-political-economic empowerment. Those students that we label at-risk—that Green refers to as the group of last entry, or that Durkheim would classify as those not incorporated—continue to be ill-served by contemporary education reform. As Maxine Greene points out, public schooling that is oriented to raising standards of achievement and measuring those standards through such practices as exit exams rather than oriented to what Dewey called "growth and more growth" is not likely to provide the kind of education that promotes cognitive maturity or that empowers individuals.44 The problem must be resolved, not merely accommodated, within the traditional schooling paradigm.

This paper has intentionally avoided discussion of specific reform recommendations of specific reports. The nature of individual reform recommendations makes little difference, to the extent that the individual recommendations function collectively to reinforce the call for higher standards and to re-emphasize the explicit link between schooling and economic concerns. For example, one might expect that the report Dealing with Dropouts would seriously and critically address some of the fundamental problems of at-risk students. But, taking the view that education as defined within the report "is the way out of poverty," the heart of the recommendations calls for more rigorous academic standards, longer school days and years, evening and after-school classes, and summer school, as well as stricter discipline.45 Though a nod is given to the necessity of giving these students extra academic support, the sole purpose is to "help" them meet the higher standards.

What is missing from such reports, directed especially toward the problem of at-risk and other disadvantaged students, is any informed understanding of the actual situation and prospect for the future of these students. In this respect, individual recommendations of the dominant reform literature differ only in degree, not in kind. The focus of new research, and one might add of legitimate reform, "might be better directed toward understanding the institutional character of schools and how this affects the potential dropout."46

If there is any validity to the above discussion, then from the standpoint of school policy it is essential for educators to become more knowledgeable about the way school is perceived differently, and how it does affect different groups of students in different ways. Differing perceptions of the school by students and of their place in the present school, and future society, have much to do with social and academic success and with decisions to drop out.47 The commitment to work and sacrifice for the future requires a belief that such a future holds some perceived value. Increasingly then, the question for many students will not be "Why drop out," but "Why not?" Contemporary education reform, with its explicit emphasis on higher academic standards, transforms the at-risk student into a modern version of Sisyphus.

As a passing note, the phrase "education reform" strikes this writer as an odd
use of language. First, in what has been discussed in this paper, there has been little of the "reform" movement that has actually been engaged in any kind of restructuring change. The result is policy content confined within the parameters of a conservative set of systemic dynamics--or, more of the same for those benefiting least. Second, the meaning of "education" within the reform literature has been bastardized to the point of becoming a standardized and quantifiable triviality nearing meaninglessness. The result is not only a set of policy goals far removed from any legitimate sense of "education," but one also supportive of a technocratic and social division of labor--or, more of the same for those benefiting least.

This paper has attempted to explain the lack of beneficial outcomes for many students as the result of reform and why that is not exclusively the responsibility of those individual students. The economic rewards of schooling are supposedly available to all, but this is not true for significant numbers. And the reason this is not true has much to do with the system, its structure, and the implementation of dominant reform measures.

It is interesting to recall that, in his discussion of early 20th century school reform, Michael Katz says that education appeared to be an immediate and effective solution for social and economic problems. The prescription for reform became more education. He goes on:

The prescription, for one thing, unleashes a flurry of seemingly successful activity and, for another, requires no tampering with basic social structural or economic characteristics, only with the attitudes of poor people, and that has caused hardly a quiver.48

Today, the "tampering with the attitudes" is expressed in a strong reaffirmation of the principle of schooling efficacy and its attendant corollary that failure is individual failure alone.

While the dropout problem has been conceived as a mostly individual phenomenon, theoretical constructs offer support for re-defining the problem to take into account systemic and other school factors. Thus far, the reform movement has failed to adequately address in any realistic way the situation--socially, politically, and economically--in which large numbers of students heading toward failure find themselves.

Notes
3. See for example the following representatives with respect to the issue of at-risk/dropout students: Ruth Ekstrom, Margaret Goertz, Judith Pollack, and Donald Rock, "Who Drops Out of High School and Why? Findings from a National Study," Teachers

4. This is not to say, however, that there are not implications for broader issues pertaining to at-risk/dropout students. It is to say that detailing and investigating those implications in any legitimate and coherent way is a task beyond the present scope.


6. Thomas F. Green, Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1980).


10. Ibid., 16-18.


14. Other reports which have shaped education policy during the past decade at both state
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21. Sapp, "Psychoeducational Correlates."
23. Green, *Predicting the Behavior*, 41.
29. Loughrey and Harris, "A Descriptive Study," 187.
31. Ekstrom et. al., "Who Drops Out of School and Why?", 360, Table 2.
32. McDill et. al., "A Population at Risk."
36. Loughrey and Harris, “A Descriptive Study,” 191, Table 3.
42. Ibid., 101.
47. While my attention has been directed to the area of social learning theory and to the work of Albert Bandura in self-efficacy determinants [see for example, “Self-Efficacy Determinants of Anticipated Fears and Calamities,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 45, No. 2 (1983), 464-469], I refer the reader to the work of Paul Willis and Peter McLaren among others. As an outstanding effort at realistically integrating theory with practice, Learning to Labor, for example, stands out as one of the better descriptive accounts and theoretical explanations of real social and cultural factors shaping differing perceptions of the school, the school’s relationship to society, and student behavior.
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Wolves in Sheep's Clothing: Positivists Masquerading as Phenomenologists

by Ken Kempner

Many well-meaning researchers who use qualitative techniques think themselves to be phenomenologists. I argue here that merely employing qualitative methods does not constitute a phenomenological approach to research. Because researchers use qualitative information to draw rationalistic conclusions, the techniques they employ offer no assurances about the underlying ideology or philosophy guiding the researchers. For this reason I believe positivists often misrepresent themselves as qualitative researchers. I employ a metaphor here to illustrate this social and political nature of research by comparing positivists to wolves and phenomenologists to sheep. My purpose is not to prove that researchers' methods always match their philosophical intent, but to encourage a critical awareness of research through a metaphor that proposes, graphically, the basis of this argument. In particular, I suggest that positivists who employ qualitative methods, yet remain wedded to their rationalistic
Wolves in Sheep's Clothing

perspective are wolves in sheep's clothing. Masquerading as sheep by employing qualitative methods does not constitute a phenomenological perspective.¹

In this paper, I will argue that being interpretive is not simply a matter of technique. Scientists’ values affect the theories they generate regarding human affairs, how they interpret the meaning of social interactions, and what is taken and distributed as knowledge. Paradigms constrain the social production of such knowledge. Central to my argument is Keller’s (1985) view of the masculine and objectified nature of scientific truth. Keller explains (p. 7) “that science has been produced by a particular subset of the human race—that is, almost entirely by white, middle-class men.” Similarly, Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, and Tarule (1986, p. 6) present a number of authors who argue “that there is a masculine bias at the very heart of most academic disciplines, methodologies, and theories.” Belenky and her co-authors explain that the visual metaphors predominantly used in science are masculine, static descriptions of reality “that promote the illusion that disengagement and objectification are central to the construction of knowledge” (p. 18).

Science is a decidedly human activity and but one of the many social arenas “in which knowledge is constructed” (Latour & Woolgar, 1986, p. 31). Latour and Woolgar (p. 166) suggest that “the mysterious process employed by scientists in their setting is not strikingly different from those techniques employed to muddle through in daily life encounters.” Although scientists may appear a bit brighter than some other individuals in society, they are no less immune to the psychological and domestic travails that afflict the rest of the population.

Because scientists are as likely to have parents, siblings, lovers, and bosses as other people, they are subject to the same prejudices and stereotypes that affect all members of cultural groups. Certainly, scientists have found and will continue to find tangible phenomena or objects, but each must be encoded into the language of the discoverer. As history has shown, however, the language used to explain these phenomena is often subsequently discredited from the improved vantage of modern scientists. Unfortunately, many scientists and the societies in which they operate too often forget that the context of the “truths” they find, and in which they so passionately believe, will soon be judged by their descendants. The certitudes one generation holds are often seen as follies by succeeding ones.

I argue here that a cultural perspective is central to understanding how knowledge is constructed. Critical theory is particularly helpful in identifying the role culture plays in defining this knowledge. As Fay (1987, p. 66) explains, the aim of critical theory is to encourage “people to subject their lives and social arrangements to rational scrutiny so that they can re-order their collective existence.” I argue here that educational research, in particular, is critically deficient in its scrutiny and self-awareness of the bias of its enterprise, even though many researchers embrace qualitative approaches. It takes more than donning sheep’s clothing to embrace a phenomenological perspective.
In this paper, I address how the culture of positivism affects the construction and definition of educational knowledge and the role that social beliefs and values play in the construction of this knowledge. I then suggest that it is the disciplinary matrix of researchers, not the method they employ, that indicates their way of thinking and knowing, and I extend the wolf and sheep metaphor to illustrate this point. I argue further that merely employing qualitative methods do not constitute a critical and phenomenological approach to transforming the dominant social reality. Finally, I conclude by suggesting that positivists who masquerade as phenomenologists are wolves in sheep's clothing who are engaged in confirmatory research not intended to alter the dominant cultural realities.

Culture of Positivism

Much of the current debate in educational research is focused upon methods and techniques rather than the deeper philosophical constructs of rationalism and relativism that compose a "disciplinary matrix" (Kuhn, 1977). This matrix is composed of interconnecting relationships of a scientific community that incorporates the beliefs, values, and ideology the scientists share. Many of the individuals engaged in the debate on educational research are unaware that their arguments are deeply rooted in what Giroux (1981, p. 42) calls the "culture of positivism." This hegemony of positivism promotes the objectification of knowledge, and, as Keller notes (1985, p. 64) the mastery, control, and domination of nature. My point here is that the disciplinary matrix for researchers, not the method (or disguise) they employ, is what indicates their way of thinking and knowing. This is why we should not be misled when positivists employ qualitative methods and masquerade as relativistic sheep.

Although research in education has embraced "alternate" methods, Phillips (1987, p. 37) reminds us that "some researchers continue to believe in positivism because the demise was not widely advertised." Phenomenological approaches remain the "alternate" methods in educational research, while the debate focuses more on compatibility of technique rather than the larger issue of how knowledge is produced. Although a wide array of researchers see little problem with combining methods, Smith and Heshusius (1986, p. 8) note: "This disregard of assumptions and preoccupation with techniques have had the effect of transforming qualitative inquiry into a procedural variation of quantitative inquiry." Even though many positivists support the use of qualitative methods, they remain wedded to a rationalistic perspective. To quote Phillips (1987, p. 44) again: "To put it bluntly, some of the most boisterous celebrants at positivism's wake are actually more positivistic than they realize." We find wolves in sheep's clothing.

The current debate over methods, methodologies, and paradigms in educational research is not insignificant. What we are grappling with here, as educational researchers, is the very essence of what we do. What is the meaning of the
knowledge we produce and how is it affected by the social, cultural, and historical context in which we reside? If our task is to produce knowledge, we should be continually seeking a greater awareness of how our methods and motives affect the outcomes of our research. Not to continually question what we do, how we do it, and why we do it would be to trivialize educational research and make it merely intellectual gymnastics for the aggrandizement of academics.

To gain this understanding and self-awareness of our research, we must begin by understanding first that the approaches to educational research are multidimensional and cannot be explained by simple, linear concepts. To illustrate, consider an example of the linear relationship between income and education. Generally, as one's years of education increase, so does income, up to a point. As we know, this is not the whole story of one's income and we should at least add the dimension of social class to our example. On paper or the computer we can easily graph these two dimensions. But individual income is also affected by gender, so we should really add a third dimension; and income is also affected by age, so we best add a fourth; and by race, so we need to add a fifth, and so forth. Obviously, this model quickly becomes exceedingly complex to draw, to visualize, or to interpret in two or three dimensions. At this point, unfortunately, many quantitative researchers rely completely on multivariate analysis to reduce this complexity and to provide the meaning of the data. Statistically, the interrelationships of variables can be determined, but the computer cannot interpret the social meaning of this multidimensionality. It is here that researchers enter the data to seek meaning; a highly subjective act.

How knowledge is socially constructed and the multidimensionality of this process should be the focal point of concern for researchers. As human beings we are not dispassionate in what we observe or measure, whether the techniques are qualitative or quantitative. Similarly, the disciplinary matrix in which scientists operate composes their culture and what is the appropriate knowledge, language, and behavior for members of their scientific community. What scientists and the societies in which they live accept as knowledge depends not only upon how knowledge is produced but also upon the social and cultural context in which this knowledge is constructed. The theories that guide scientists are human interpretations of the world, not some inherent truth. It is the context or culture of the society that defines how individuals perceive the world and what is accepted as appropriate behavior and knowledge.

Scientific knowledge then can be understood as "constructed," rather than simply a process of discovery of facts waiting for the cleverest scientists to find them. Accordingly, Keller (1985, p. 7) notes that science is a decidedly human activity: "The laws of nature are more than simple expressions of objective reality." What is accepted as scientific knowledge is an expression then of the dominating culture and its values, reflected in the gender, class, and race of its scientists. The values and beliefs of these scientists are far more important in
understanding how knowledge is produced than arguments over which technique yields the best data.

The structure of knowledge is more complex than the linear arguments that currently abound in educational research. At a minimum, our theories of how knowledge is produced should consider how the social and cultural values researchers hold affect the construction of that knowledge. Research is a humanly constructed endeavor, as is the structure of the disciplines and the institutions in which this research takes place.

**Behavior and Values**

Philosophers of science use a variety of terms and taxonomies to explain how scientists understand the world. To over simplify, those individuals who believe there is a "right way" and a knowable truth are termed positivists, and those who believe "it depends" are relativists. The taxonomy is more complex when we begin to distinguish the differences among positivists, logical positivists, empirico-deductivists, and rationalists. The common identity for this group, however, is the belief that the world is knowable and rational: all one needs is the proper tool to find the correct law. From these perspectives we find scientists believing that the data are merely out there waiting to be collected and can "speak for themselves." This conception is based on the primacy of science, laws, and causality. Objectivity, analysis, and mathematics are among the icons of these perspectives.

At odds with this view are the perspectives that include phenomenology and interpretation. Followers of these perspectives see knowledge as context specific. They are guided by the belief that the scientist is not external to the interpretation. For these individuals, truth is defined by the cultural context and, therefore, is relative. Contextual or cultural interpretation may be the primary values for adherents of these perspectives; however, their behavior may still be guided by definitive moral beliefs. For example, a phenomenologically-oriented researcher may believe that murder is not context specific; that is, it is wrong, whatever the situation, for one human to kill another. Such an individual, therefore, may be against capital punishment, yet believe abortion is acceptable, because the choice should be the woman's, not society's. Another individual, guided by a rationalistic perspective, may also believe murder is wrong, be against abortion, yet favor capital punishment. Although individuals' beliefs may appear inconsistent to those not holding them, because beliefs are culturally derived and not pre-existing scientific facts, why people believe and behave as they do may be incomprehensible to someone from another culture. Certainly, the lines between cultural relativism and rationalism are not always clear when we consider the social and moral questions that are the essence of our research.

Of importance to note here is the multidimensionality and complexity of an individual's belief structure. This structure can be pictured as a brick wall where
beliefs at the top level are based on conscious thought (and more easily changed), while those at the base are strong, deep-seated beliefs central to an individual’s being and not likely altered (Kempner, 1980). The nature of this belief structure is apparent in the attitudes individuals express, their judgments, values, and behavior. A striking example of the complexity of this belief structure and the culturally derived behavior of individuals is aptly illustrated by religious incidents during the civil rights movement of the 1950s, when white Southern Baptists armed themselves to prevent Afro-American Southern Baptists from attending the white’s church. Imagine the paradox of devout Christians sitting in church with rifles across their laps to prevent other Christians from praying. How do we interpret the paradox? How can the behavior of the whites be explained?

To understand the meaning of such paradoxical events we must rely on cultural interpretation. Quantification alone is not sufficient; a researcher cannot distribute a questionnaire in church asking if individuals are bigots. Qualitative observation would also be limited: What could we observe to understand why these people behave as they do? Simplistic categorization of their beliefs cannot explain their behavior. We would obviously be mistaken if we were to place both racial groups in the same category of devout Baptists who share a common spiritual language, if not the same hymnals.

In this example, the white’s hatred of Afro-Americans may be a basic belief in their interpretation of what it means to be a good Christian. If we did not understand that the white’s values are a product of their culture, we would fail to understand the meaning behind their behavior. There is no confusion in their minds. The confusion rests with the researcher who, without accounting for or understanding how culture defines values, cannot explain what may seem to the researcher to be a paradox in behavior.

This example, albeit extreme, illustrates how values lead to rational decisions from the insider’s perspective, but paradoxical outcomes for the external researcher. To understand why people behave as they do we cannot be dispassionate in our research. The historical and cultural contexts are necessary, if we are to understand the meaning that underlies an individual’s behavior. Popkewitz (1984, p. ix) explains that “the lack of situating concepts and techniques within their social and philosophical contexts produces knowledge that is often trivial and socially conservative.” To avoid such triviality, our theories should seek to incorporate the complexity of human behavior rather than to reduce them to law-like simplicity (Keller, 1985). Theory based only on the premise of reducing human behavior and motive to variables amenable to statistical manipulation offers a limited perspective on human affairs.

**Social Construction of Knowledge**

Theories are linguistic approximations of how a scientist believes the world
operates. Popkewitz (1984, p. 110) observes that we can understand theories as "symbols of reconciliation, as legitimation and as directing attention to alternate possibilities." Theories are humanly constructed hunches of reality that are subject to the vagaries and imprecision of the scientist's ability and language. Because theories are of human construction they are often only approximations of realities that may not be visible, detectable, or even yet imagined. Theories are created within a social context and are of necessity simplistic, often accepted as articles of faith, especially when the theory matches the individual's beliefs and values. For example, Keller (1985, p. 87) explains that the key to understanding modern science is that "truth has become genderized." She argues that the male, objective view of reality permeates science, defines the construction of our theories, and provides our current conceptions of reality. The autonomous nature of men's science and the power relationships and domination inherent in this decidedly political enterprise affect how knowledge is produced and defined in society; "the dream of a completely objective science is in principle unrealizable" (Keller, 1985, p. 70).

Thomas Kuhn's (1970) concept of paradigms is invoked, typically, at this point in methodological debates to support arguments of the social construction of science and knowledge, although it is not always well defined. I too shall draw on his work, by distinguishing the two different senses in which he uses the concept. Kuhn explains that the term "paradigm" is: 1) "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community," and 2) "one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science" (p. 175). For Kuhn, the second sense of paradigm is the "deeper of the two," philosophically, and, as he observes, the source of much criticism of his concept. He admits: "I allowed the term's application to expand, embracing all shared group commitments, all components of what I now wish to call the disciplinary matrix" (1977, p. 319).

It is precisely this multidimensional, "disciplinary matrix" that helps us identify the "common language or special dialect" that distinguishes one group of scientists or researchers from another (Kuhn, 1977, p. xxii). It is awareness of the complex disciplinary matrix, which includes not only a scientific consensus but a moral, social, and political one, that is needed to understand how a scientific community constructs and produces knowledge. Simply debating the differences between techniques does not allow us to understand the true nature of a scientific community.

A critical point to note is that the debate in educational research is often over the primacy of techniques among researchers who already share the same paradigmatic constructs or disciplinary matrix. This basic misconception among many educational researchers allows them to presume that when they employ qualitative methods, and don sheep's clothing, they share the disciplinary matrix
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of phenomenologists. Certainly, techniques of the phenomenologist’s matrix can be incorporated into the positivist’s research methods, but—and this is the main point of my argument—the positivist still approaches the world from a rationalistic perspective. An example of this perspective is the notion of “positivists with a heart” (Miles quoted in Guba & Lincoln, 1988, p. 89). We must ask if, conceptually, this is not an oxymoron, since being a positivist is to be dispassionate in research. My premise is that “positivists with a heart” still hold their rationalistic view of the world and are incorporating phenomenological techniques in their research, but not the philosophy. If there are “positivists with a heart,” are they not really wolves in sheep’s clothing?

Multidimensional Sheep

As I have argued, we cannot understand how knowledge is produced with simple, linear explanations. For this reason, my dichotomy between wolves and sheep is also too limiting and excludes the possibility of well-meaning positivists with hearts. If I were an artist, I might use an Escher-like drawing to merge the different elements of a wolf and sheep to explain this complexity. Instead, I attempt to capture the greater complexity by labeling positivists who employ qualitative techniques, yet remain rationalistic in how they produce knowledge, as Weeps. Phenomenologists who use quantitative techniques I then refer to as Sholves.

The serious point in my distinction between Weeps and Sholves, however, is that one cannot be guided by both a rationalistic view of the world and a relativistic one. It is for this reason that I disagree with Patton’s (1982, p. 190) belief that an individual can make “mind shifts back-and-forth between paradigms within a single evaluation setting.” If we are to follow either of Kuhn’s definitions, switching paradigms would seem impossible. It is not easy to shed one’s entire “constellation of beliefs” or to replace and then reacquire a specific element within this constellation. What we might see is the illusion of individuals shifting from one perspective to another, but all the while being guided by their disciplinary matrix. Individuals are not necessarily doomed to a specific constellation of beliefs for all time, but switching back and forth with alacrity between basic beliefs is unlikely.

When researchers refer to technique only, it does seem possible to move between quantitative and qualitative approaches, but not between positivistic and relativistic philosophies. We construct knowledge from a deeper conceptual level than mere technique. Our beliefs define how we interpret empirical evidence and the meaning we make of the world. If researchers believe the world to be knowable, they will collect facts accordingly, using rationalistic techniques even when they believe their ideology to be qualitative. If researchers believe knowledge to be relative they will interpret and interact with the data, the context, and the people, even when they employ quantitative techniques. Counting does not exclude
qualitative thinking. Similarly, individuals can engage in research to confirm the existing reality or to change it. The critical consciousness that Paulo Freire (1970) believes teachers should possess is equally important for researchers. Without this critical self-awareness, an individual's research will only mirror the dominant ideology. Critical science, however, "wishes its audience to reflect on the nature of its life, and to change those practices and policies which cannot be justified on the basis of this reflection" (Fay, 1987, p. 66).

Educational Research as Praxis

The debate over the competing traditions of educational research continues to be misfocused upon a concern over method and technique, rather than purpose, ideology, and praxis. Following Carr and Kemmis' (1986, p. 190) definition of praxis as "informed, committed action," we can understand that individuals who see their theories and research culminating in social and political acts are engaged in research that is transformative. Action researchers are "committed not only to understanding the world but to changing it" (Carr & Kemmis, 1986, p. 186). Rather than accepting the permanence of an objective reality, the action researcher strives to change the social construction of this reality. This is educational praxis, the transformation of consciousness that is the key to Freire's "pedagogy of the oppressed." Alternately, when researchers see their theories and research as objectified measures of reality their work is confirmatory. This research accepts the hegemony of the culture of positivism and is reductionist in nature. While it may be possible for a positivist to be an action researcher who is devoted to changing a tacitly accepted reality, phenomenologists, particularly feminists and critical theorists, are researchers whose basic premise is devoted to altering the dominant social reality.

The inherent problem with broad categorizations of research ideologies and methods is that such labeling fails to account for how knowledge is socially constructed among the individual researchers identified within a particular category; "action research" is no exception. For example, Carr and Kemmis (1986, p. 185) label action research that is problem-solving or achievement-oriented as "arrested action research." If we are to understand how knowledge is produced, our categories of research must incorporate the entire constellation of beliefs that comprise a disciplinary matrix, including variants and anomalies such as arrested action research. Simple dichotomies and dialectics do not explain sufficiently the structure of beliefs that underlie a social scientist's or a research community's conception of reality and, ultimately, how reality is altered. Phenomenologists devoted to social praxis may strive for an end to class oppression, yet be sexist in their definitions of such justice (i.e., equality of gender is a lower priority than class equality). Such a situation may not be moral, but it is not internally inconsistent for a researcher when we understand that values,
beliefs, and behavior are culturally derived. If we are to understand how knowledge is produced and how praxis is accomplished, our theories must consider the complexity of a research community's constellation of beliefs.

**A "Paradigm Crisis" in Education**

Because there are likely more realities in the social world than we recognize, our educational research should expand knowledge rather than reduce it. The positivistic viewpoint does not facilitate this search for the unknown, since it is based upon confirming a right and knowable truth. I do not dismiss completely the positivistic viewpoint; instead, I draw on Keller's work to situate it within the hegemony of the objectified, male-oriented ideology of science that dominates educational research today. In this current "paradigm crisis," the "symbolic sciences" offer an "alternative for the development of scholarly knowledge about schooling" (Popkewitz, 1984, p. 87). Only the interpretive, phenomenological approaches account for the historical, social, and political nature of educational research and how this context affects the meaning of the knowledge produced. Likewise, praxis can begin only through a transformational view of reality, a vision not readily available to the positivist, regardless of the research technique used or masquerade employed.

My warning for educational researchers is not only to be aware of their own ideology, but to be mindful of the complexity of the disciplinary matrix research communities share. Furthermore, researchers must consider the manner in which the knowledge they construct is affected by their gender, race, and class. It is not enough simply to know whether someone is a wolf or sheep, because such a dialectic does not account for how an individual's or a community's beliefs are structured. Sholves and Weeps add somewhat to our understanding of this complexity, but this metaphor is still incapable of encompassing the multiple dimensions of a disciplinary matrix. The point of my discussion is not whether multidimensional sheep offer the best illustration of this complexity, but that how we conduct our research, construct knowledge, and interpret reality is found deeply embedded within us. Not only do we, as researchers, need a critical awareness of the political and social nature of what we do, but we need to maintain a greater sense of the "humility" that Barbara McClintock encourages in our research endeavors (Keller, 1985, p. 162).

The effect of a research community's disciplinary matrix on how knowledge is produced, not simplistic arguments over the methods the community uses, should be the basis of our discussions in educational research. The level of the current debate needs to be deepened and extended to focus upon the basic beliefs that guide research communities. For Keller (1985, p. 43) it is the "role played by metaphors of gender in the formation of the particular set of values, aims, and goals" to which we should look if we are to understand "the development of
modern science." The conversation is not simply over methods. For Freire (1985), social reality and oppression are certainly not explained from the perspective of the dominant culture, nor are they understood only from an analysis of class oppression. Freire sees oppression as a complex interaction which incorporates not only issues of class, but also race, age, and gender. For Popkewitz (1984, p. 7): "The metaphoric quality of science is influenced by the issues, strains, and struggles that confront the social theorist." It is upon the complexity of these struggles and the priority placed on specific values within a community's constellation of beliefs that we should focus our arguments in educational research. To do otherwise is to trivialize our research.

Conclusions

In this discussion, I have used the metaphor of wolves in sheep's clothing to identify positivists who masquerade as phenomenologists. As I have suggested, it takes more than employing qualitative techniques, or donning sheep's clothing, to be a phenomenologist. Even when positivists support the use of qualitative methods, they remain rationalists in how they perceive their research and themselves. Merely employing qualitative methods does not constitute a phenomenological approach to research. It is the researcher's disciplinary matrix, not the method employed, that indicates the individual's way of thinking and knowing.

I further expanded this metaphor to capture the greater dimensionality of phenomenologists who use quantitative techniques and of positivists who use qualitative techniques. My distinction between Weeps and Sholves is to illustrate the complexity of how knowledge is produced, the primacy of beliefs and values in this productive process, and the varied purposes for engaging in this production of knowledge. Although these extended dimensions are intended to help explain the possibility of "positivists with a heart," they cannot capture the complexity of values and beliefs on race, gender, age, and class relations that guide a research community's production of knowledge and definitions of reality.

How knowledge is produced is a more complex phenomenon than can be captured by simple dichotomies. Kuhn's "disciplinary matrix," more so than "paradigms," provides a deeper philosophical concept to understand how the structure of an individual's and community's beliefs and the priority of their values affects how they produce knowledge and define reality. Keller's work is especially helpful in understanding how science has developed within the constellation of beliefs centered upon masculinity, autonomy, objectivity, and power. We need to know how an individual's or a research community's values are derived if we are to understand the meaning of their work. Because researchers often are more positivistic than they are aware, we find many wolves in sheep's clothing. It takes more than masquerading as a phenomenologist to understand the social construction of knowledge and to internalize the transformative goals of praxis.
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Ultimately, what is most important in any discussion about how we produce knowledge is our awareness of the ephemeral nature of truth. Certainly, as Phillips (1987, p. 49) observes, “all methods are on equally uncertain footing.” Researchers need to seek a greater awareness of how their beliefs and values affect their vision of social and educational reality. Foremost in this self-awareness is the need to distinguish between mere technique and the deeper philosophy that guides a disciplinary matrix. Wearing Weeps or Sholves buttons at research conventions might be a step toward the self-awareness and humility researchers need. At the very least, standing around with multidimensional sheep buttons would warn others of our true research identity and remind us all of our tentative grasp on reality.

Notes
1. The author wishes to thank Harry Wolcott, Philip Runkel, Bill Tierney, and C. J. Heaton for their help and comments on earlier drafts. They share no blame for the metaphor used.
3. The debate over the domination of science by a masculine-oriented, objectified view relies not just on empirical evidence, but on the meaning of such evidence, how it is interpreted, and the beliefs of the audience. Because the concept being argued is how reality is defined, there will be obvious disagreement over how to investigate this question, what constitutes evidence, and whether the findings are facts or simply reflect values. The reader is referred to the authors cited in the above note who explore this issue in greater depth.
4. See Howe (1988) for an example of this discussion.
5. See Soltis (1984) and Phillips (1987) for further explanation of these differences.
6. See Pettigrew (1959 and 1969) for discussion of the research on racial attitudes and values.
7. The importance of Freire’s pedagogy for researchers is to be found more in its philosophy of the dignity of the learner than the politics of its actual practice, which, unfortunately, often overshadows the deeper significance of his work. For a current example of the success of Freire’s methods with schools employing his philosophy with the poor in Brazil see Leonards (1990).
8. Wolcott (1980) and Fetterman (1982) offer effective arguments on this debate, but their advice has not been well heeded.
9. See, for example, Tierney (1991).

References


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