In the early 1940s the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) created its Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination (CARD), whose members were pioneers in the attempt within the U.S. labor movement to overcome the divisiveness of racial discrimination. Although the CIO's racial policies were a significant advancement over those of the American Federation of Labor, racial discrimination plagued the CIO during its entire existence. The origins, evolution, and administration of CIO racial policy at the international level, within four major affiliates, and within several smaller CIO unions showed both the successes and failures of those policies. Even if CIO leaders naively accepted the importance of including black workers, they realized by 1942 that the dynamics of physical integration were quite complex and required a great deal of deliberation. The creation of CARD was the major bureaucratic attempt by CIO leaders to move beyond the rhetoric of racial equality within the organization. However, no matter what the CIO did in regard to racial discrimination, African Americans inside and outside the labor movement consistently considered the merit and necessity of an independent black labor interest group. Despite all its achievements, CARD was unable to remove completely the misgivings many blacks had about the CIO's commitment to challenging the roadblocks to racial equality because of a hesitancy to implement an aggressive and militant policy of redressing racial grievances. (Contains 84 endnotes.) (YLB)
CHALLENGING THE ROADBLOCKS TO EQUALITY: RACE RELATIONS AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE CIO 1935–1955

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"Challenging the Roadblocks to Equality: Race Relations and Civil Rights in the CIO 1935-1955"

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This article seeks to reconsider past conclusions as well as offer new insights about race relations and African American in the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) along three lines. First it attempts to extend the interpretation offered by several recent scholars but most adroitly by August Meier and the late Elliot Rudwick in their Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW (1979). Focusing on a single affiliate, they show that while the CIO’s racial policies were a significant advancement over the American Federation of Labor’s (AFL), racial discrimination plagued the former organization during its entire existence in various degrees and circumstances. An examination of the origins, evolution and administration of CIO racial policy at the international level, within four major affiliates (United Automobile Workers (UAW), the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), the United Packinghouse Workers (UPWA), and United Rubber Workers (URW)), and within several smaller CIO unions, provides a representative assessment of the successes and failures of those policies.

The second aspect of this article argues that even if CIO leaders like John L. Lewis, Philip Murray, John Brophy and Sidney Hillman naively “accepted without question the importance of including black workers”, which initially limited racial discussions, they realized by 1942 that the dynamics of physical integration were quite complex and required a great deal of deliberation. A genuine concern for the plight of black workers and the largely second-class position of most African Americans in the 1930s, 40s, and 50s could no longer be masked in rhetoric. The CIO’s creation of the Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination (CARD) was the major bureaucratic attempt by CIO leaders to move beyond the rhetoric of racial equality within the organization.

The Committee to Abolish Discrimination dealt with the critical issues of hiring, job upgrading, wage differentials based upon race, union office holding and the role of blacks in influencing union policies aside from racial issues. This is the first in depth look at the creation of CARD, its membership, and how it went about the task of not only trying to eliminate racial discrimination within the CIO, but serving as a model for the larger society as well. Through CARD, the CIO became the preeminent political socioeconomic institution working on behalf of racial equality in the United States between 1936 and 1955. As institutional bureaucratic “race pioneers” CARD members engaged in numerous confrontations over racial issues within the labor movement and in society in general, and achieved a mixed record of success.
The third aspect of race relations in the CIO this essay explores grew out of the way in which the organization's white leadership chose to handle certain racial issues. Simply put, no matter what the CIO did or did not do in regards to racial discrimination, African Americans inside and outside the labor movement consistently considered the merit and necessity of an independent black labor interest group. Despite all of its achievements, the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination was unable to remove completely the misgivings many blacks had about the CIO's commitment to challenging the roadblocks to racial equality because of a hesitancy to implement an aggressive and militant policy of racial grievance redress.

**Historiography**

Since the early 1980s, historians of the CIO have begun to trace in earnest the role of blacks in that organization and the role of race relations during the union's existence. Early histories such as J. Raymond Walsh's *CIO: Industrial Unionism in Action* (1937) and Ben Stolberg's *The Story of the CIO* (1938) do not mention black union organizing in the CIO, or the role of black unionists. Walter Galenson's, *The CIO Challenge to the AFL*, which appeared in 1960 at least mentioned blacks and the problem of racial discrimination within organized labor, but black workers were treated as objects rather than active participants who made a dramatic impact on the CIO's success. Art Pries's *Labor's Giant Step*, written in 1964 still remains the only single history of the CIO. Far from being definitive, Pries went beyond his predecessors in at least mentioning the importance of blacks in the unionization of Ford Motor Company in Detroit and Bethlehem Steel in Lakawanna, New York. Furthermore, he stressed that the CIO "represented a great step forward in many spheres including racial integration."²

Nonetheless, Pries's periodic referral to the issue of race relations in the CIO was at best superficial. More recent studies of individual CIO unions, particular industries, and union politics have revealed that race relations were constant points of discussion and led to conflict throughout the CIO's existence. In the CIO's challenge to the AFL in the latter 1930s, the former's leadership realized from its inception that a concern and commitment to black workers was a necessity. This became all the more apparent in light of the growing number of blacks in heavy industries such as steel, auto, meatpacking, rubber, longshoring and the maritime trades, that had no unions or weak and collaborative AFL Locals.³

In comparing the AFL and CIO on the issue of race, historians have not had to go far to conclude that the latter organization was pioneering in its attempt to overcome the divisiveness of racial discrimination. About all black workers could count on from the AFL at this time was assurances that it would request national and international affiliates to consider policies to eliminate racial discrimination.⁴
According to previous historians, three topics dominated CIO engagement with the role of black workers in the new industrial unions in the late 1930s and 1940s. The active recruitment of African American workers and the establishment of institutional mechanisms to deal with racial discrimination, notably the Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination; white worker reaction to the introduction of black workers in the workplace which led to wildcat strikes during World War II; and the role of race in the CIO's ill-fated postwar attempt to organize the South in its "Operation Dixie" campaign.

Political factionalism and the influence of the Communist Party (CP) has seemingly been the most controversial and most written about aspect of the CIO. This subject is even more intriguing when one looks at race relations inside the CIO. Most scholars, ex-CIO unionists, CP members and fellow travelers alike have concluded that those unions which worked the hardest towards improving race relations and removing racial discrimination were largely leftist (Communist) influenced. According to several former CIO members in one of the most recent accounts of the organization's attempt to unionize the South after World War II, the unions racial record ranged from "good, but not good enough", to "good as the times permitted," to finally "good by left-wing unions, much less so by the rest."8

Indeed it was the emphasis upon racial equality that drew most blacks to the Communist party or leftist-factions in CIO unions. While non-Communist CIO leaders like Lewis, Murray, Hillman, Carey, and Reuther emphasized the organization's commitment to non-discrimination, they were in many instances forced to shape their views and policies according to the racial sentiments of the white majority rank and file unionists. These views were further affected by regional racial mores as well as the leftist-Communist approach towards challenging racial discrimination.

The Communists and their allies in the CIO were the most militant in promoting racial equality and integration. As a result, non-Communist CIO leaders attacked this stance as one that fueled the already intensely burning racial attitudes of the white community and industrial management leading to the defeat of CIO unionism. This was most prevalent in the CIO's post World War II "Operation Dixie" within the tobacco, textile, mining, and steel industries. Yet even the Communist Party in some cases was reluctant to go to extremes on the issue of race if it meant jeopardizing the overall stability and contract negotiating leverage of a particular union.9

The historical assessment of the Communist role in shaping CIO racial policy has been ambivalent and controversial. Communist unionists and allies were of course expected to support and promote the entire CP line on foreign and domestic issues in the workplace and community. For many, racial policies were the easiest to accept because they usually overlapped with official CIO policy. Particularly among blacks there was a tendency to only want to accept the CP's position on race. Blacks in the UAW in Detroit after the war knew full well that they could never be "sincere Communists" since that sincerity would
have placed Soviet interest ahead of their own in the struggle for full equality. Yet they tended to follow the CP program on civil rights as far as they could because they "had greater admiration for the direct approach technique of their Communist friends as against the more dilatory hair-splitting approach of their Socialist friends."^10

Nonetheless, in a number of local situations the practical application of CI's racial policy in leftist influenced CIO unions remained intertwined enough with other "contemptible" policies that they created major problems of legitimacy and stability. Moreover, because of the inability to separate racial policy from other issues, non-Communists readily argued that the CP's commitment to racial equality was in fact no commitment at all, but rather a shallow and sometimes racist strategy to draw blacks into its overall conspiratorial program.12

This work and future works on the CIO, race relations, and civil rights, must aim for a greater understanding of the African American role in these three historiographical cases as well as search for new areas of African American initiative during this phase of 20th century industrial unionism.

The CIO and African American Workers: The Initial Thrust, 1936-1941

During the first five years of CIO organizing activity (1936-1941), the attitudes of the white leadership toward the inclusion and participation of blacks in the organization ranged from earnest commitment to paternalistic expediency. The lack of references to racial issues and the tone and inference when these matters were discussed suggests that the leaders were not prepared to deal with the repercussions of racial integration and discrimination outside of their perceived understanding of class conflict.

The overwhelming concern of the CIO leadership during the organization's formative years was in establishing and securing its position in the struggle with employers and the rival AFL. The initial interest of the CIO with black workers resulted from an expediency to create organizational stability. On the other hand, the "acceptance" of the CIO by black workers lies more with the efforts of several dozen black organizers concentrated in the key industries the organization targeted for unionization and the hundreds if not thousands of volunteers from the black community committed to the CIO program who assisted them. Their struggles have been difficult to document and are usually slighted. Likewise, more credit needs to be given to John P. Davis and the National Negro Congress (NNC), an organization most scholars have been quick to disregard because of the participation of Communists. Without the efforts of Davis and these little known black workers who by no small chance were connected with the NNC (and in some cases were CP members), the CIO organizing campaigns would have been much more difficult.
The CIO drive to organize steel workers conducted by the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) is generally regarded as the first significant episode where blacks not only accepted industrial unionism as it was conceptualized by the new organization, but became important local labor leaders within the black communities of various steel towns like Pittsburgh and Erie, Pennsylvania, Youngstown and Warren, Ohio, Sparrows Point, Maryland and Birmingham, Alabama. According to one account written at the time, because white SWOC leaders like Philip Murray, Van Bittner, John Owens and William Mitch had come from the United Mine Workers (UMW, an integrated union that had more blacks than any other labor organization at the time) they were "experienced in working with Negroes." Therefore, according to the account, blacks joined the union in most places.14

However, a great deal of the motivation and success that SWOC had lies largely with John P. Davis and the National Negro Congress (NNC). Conceptualized in 1935 as a "federation of forward thinking organizations in America to coordinate the struggle for justice for the Negro," the NNC placed the unionization of black workers as its foremost priority. Even as the CIO was still planning its initial campaigns, blacks connected with the NNC, particularly its executive secretary John P. Davis, viewed any improvement in the black socioeconomic condition intimately tied to the "progressive forces of organized labor." These forces were represented in the CIO.15

Several days after the creation of the SWOC in June of 1936, the NNC issued a "Proposed Plan for the Organization of Negro Steel Workers in Youngstown, Ohio" that was to serve as a model strategy by which the CIO could draw blacks into the union. As far as the NNC was concerned any effective organization of the steel industry hinged upon placing the problems of black steelworkers "at the very core" of the SWOC's organizational campaign. Youngstown was chosen for several reasons. Foremost was the fact that the number of steelworkers involved was small enough to be optimistic about success during the proposed period of organizing (August 1-December 1). Likewise, it was assumed a relatively small amount of money would be required. Of special importance was the belief that community leadership in Youngstown was more directly tied to the working-class than corporate interests. Last, but certainly not least, was the belief that racial animosities would not play as divisive a role as they would in a Southern steel center like Birmingham.16

CIO leaders did not wholeheartedly accept or reject the NNC Youngstown plan. Rather they concluded it would be better to use black organizers where there were significant numbers of black steelworkers in the larger steel towns that the SWOC intended to focus on first. The SWOC agenda for the remainder of 1936 was to incorporate company unions into the organization. As early as July thousands of steelworkers began joining SWOC and denouncing the paternalistic efforts of steel owners to pacify workers through "Employees Mutual Protective Associations."17
About a dozen male and female black organizers were hired by the SWOC. Some like George Edmonds and Milford Jackson had been organizers with the United Mine Workers (UMW), and SWOC leaders knew of their ability. Edmonds labored in St. Louis while Jackson canvassed western Pennsylvania. Most others were chosen after recommendations from NNC executive secretary John P. Davis. Among those were Eleanor Rye, Henry Johnson, Leonidas McDonald, Arthur Murphy, Ben Careathers, and A.W. McPherson. Johnson, Careathers, and Murphy were also members of the Communist Party, but they were experienced unionists who could relate to the burdens of other black steelworkers and pledged not to let their politics interfere with organizing. Careathers and the Socialist Ernest Rice McKinny played key roles in organizing the Jones and Laughlin mill in Aliquippa, Pennsylvania. According to one source, two weeks after being hired by SWOC, Careathers shocked both Phil Murray and Clinton Golden by bringing them a stack of application cards and initiation fees.  

Numerous other ideologically independent black steelworkers like Bartow Tipper and John Thornton, members of the AFL's Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers in Aliquippa, quickly accepted the appeals of the black SWOC organizers and began rallying their peers to the CIO cause. By August NNC head Davis optimistically informed SWOC chairman Murray that with the exception of Birmingham, Wheeling, and Chester, Pennsylvania, black organizers had made significant inroads among black steelworkers. Furthermore Davis planned visits to every steel area in the Midwest and South with an emphasis on developing volunteer organizers, seeking the endorsement of recognized leaders in the various black communities, and generating publicity through leaflets and radio broadcasts. Davis also told Murray of his desire to have a conference in October of 1936 devoted to improving cooperation between NNC and SWOC.  

Over the next several weeks Davis spoke to hundreds of black steelworkers. In Baltimore more than one hundred agreed to allow SWOC organizers like Arthur Murphy to visit their homes and explain in detail what the CIO stood for. This was the beginning of the long but eventually successful campaign to organize Bethlehem Steel in Sparrows Point, Maryland—a victory SWOC district organizer Nicholas Fontecchio credited to the black workers. The situation in Birmingham was much more difficult. While SWOC had made some progress, it faced a largely anti-labor and anti-black white citizenry. Davis lamented the misgivings of black steelworkers and SWOC to "go slow," but appealed to the latter to hire at least two part-time black organizers. Although director William Mitch agreed to do so, he had reservations about Davis' choice of Joseph Howard who Mitch labelled a Communist. He felt that the Communist Party in the South was more concerned about "running things" than going along with CIO activities.  

By the fall of 1936, despite Davis' continued recommendation, SWOC leaders implemented personnel changes but did not foresee hiring any new
black organizers. Murray and the rest of the SWOC leadership were not as optimistic as Davis and concluded that "the organization of black steelworkers would follow rather than precede the organization of white mill workers." In an effort to improve the situation, Murray agreed to a conference involving SWOC leaders and the active black organizers already employed by the CIO. Because of previous commitments by both sides, this important meeting did not convene until February of 1937.

The "Pittsburgh Conference" represented one of the most diverse yet unified gatherings of African American leaders and organizations to that time. It was especially pathbreaking in that a predominantly white organization was patronizing the black community for support. In his keynote address SWOC chairman Philip Murray regarded the conference as perhaps the most important since the beginning of the steel drive. Murray attacked the discrimination of the AFL craft unions and pledged complete equality for black workers in the CIO shop and union hall. He also warned African American Steelworkers... if they did not join, they were "doomed to economic degradation."

Despite the publicized success of the Pittsburgh Conference, all the black delegates had to rely on were the promises of Murray. It still remained for black SWOC organizers to do the footwork and persuasion among black steelworkers. This was a formidable task, especially in the "Little Steel" towns of Warren, Youngstown, Massillon, and Canton, Ohio where the SWOC staged strikes in early June of 1937. Canvassing these areas in the months after the conference, Pittsburgh Courier journalist George Schuyler found many black steelworkers apathetic and tied to the paternalism of the steel companies. As a result, racial animosity ran high. James Gallagher, a white SWOC organizer in Youngstown, complained that of the 5,000 employed by Youngstown Sheet and Tube, Republic, and Carnegie, "only 2% of the colored joined up" by the middle of the year. Even the diligent efforts of black SWOC organizer Ernest Rice McKinney, "a man of great intelligence and unusual ability," according to Gallagher, yielded disappointing results.

Daniel Blakely, a black steelworker hired at Republic Steel in Warren in 1932 to work on the labor gang, was one of many black workers torn between the exploitive racist ant-union policies of management and the racist sentiments of some white local CIO officials. Blakely felt unionism was good because of the benefits (eight hour day, lunch break, etc.) it accorded white bricklayers he knew. He was prepared to join the union during the 1937 Little Steel Strike, but held back when he overheard the SWOC chairman in the Republic plant claiming that the CIO would win the strike "without the niggers," and to "keep the SOBs out." Blakely and a handful of other blacks eventually joined SWOC, but only after assurances from whites that they wanted them in the union.

At the same Republic plant, which employed 400 of Warren's nearly 3,000 black citizens, one black steelworker described the CIO as a "Bolshevik movement." As he saw it, whether the CIO won or not, blacks would still be relegated to the lowest occupational positions. The local Urban League and
black churches were "dependent on industry" for support and informed their members "not to worry about joining the union." Indeed corporate paternalism posed a major stumbling block for SWOC among blacks in the little steel cities like Warren.28

According to William Howard, president of the Youngstown NAACP and a former steelworker, the CIO was to blame for the poor record of enlistment of blacks into the union. Howard stated that the CIO did not enlist the aid of leading blacks such as himself who were familiar with and had the confidence of blacks in its preliminary staging meetings. Instead, white CIO officials relied upon blacks who had joined the union but were not best suited to organize other blacks.27

The CIO continued to struggle with the "Little Steel" companies until late 1941. Slowly but surely black steelworkers learned that CIO unionism was in their best interest and joined the union. Credit lies with black organizers like McKinny, Caraathers, and Pauline Taylor, the only black woman on the picket line in Youngstown in 1937. Taylor went as far as to threaten her husband, a steelworker who did not support the strike, that she would go live with her sister in California rather than not see him take part in the struggle.26

In larger cities like Chicago, organizing black steelworkers proved no less difficult but resulted in greater black responsiveness. According to Henry Johnson, a graduate of City College in New York and SWOC organizer stationed in the Windy City, nearly all the black steelworkers working in the Republic, Inland, and Youngstown Sheet and Tube plants had joined the CIO at the beginning of the SWOC drive in mid-1937. Moreover, several black steelworkers in Gary such as Stanley Cotton and Theodore Vaughn had been elected to local union offices. The smaller Wilson and Bennett Company in Chicago which employed 700 blacks out of 1100 workers was organized by Eleanor Rye who avoided a police barricade and daringly scaled a 15 foot fence to organize striking workers.29

By 1938 the CIO was well on its way toward becoming an accepted ally of the African American working class across the United States. Black workers in major industries as well as representatives of the black middle class who were either somewhat leery or outright reactionary to organized labor realized the CIO was different. Even in Detroit where Henry Ford was able to keep the CIO at bay for another three and one half years, a number of cracks were appearing within his "entente."30 A year earlier Detroit Urban League Executive Secretary John Dancy, an ardent supporter of Ford, admitted that unionization was the most important step black workers could take toward improving their economic standing. Moreover, Dancy realized that discrimination would continue inside the union, but blacks would have to "fight it out within." Since union consciousness was increasing among all workers, the refusal of any labor minority to join trade unions would only increase prejudice.31
Other leaders, no less than Dancy’s superior, National Urban League head Lester Granger, warned blacks about being too overly optimistic about the CIO. It was not, in Granger’s estimation, a “militant pro-Negro organization.” The fact that there was not one black in an important executive organizing capacity in the CIO national office was proof enough for him. Those blacks in leadership positions had been chosen at the local level and Granger was of the opinion it was time for the CIO to “show outward manifestations of inward democracy.”

Indeed, the national CIO leadership had taken a rather casual attitude toward blacks in the new organization since the early days of the SWOC drive. In late 1938 a reporter for the Amsterdam News inquired of the CIO the number of black members. Walter Smethurst, aide to President John L. Lewis, could not even estimate, but assured the reporter that the CIO did not discriminate. There had been black organizers “from time to time,” suggesting that they were only necessary when blacks were reluctant to join. He confided further that in some cases regional directors and organizers had the discretion to “temporarily depart from the general rule of non-discrimination and Jim Crow as an expedient.” In a similar vain, the national office informed the Virginia Commissioner of Labor in late 1938 that it did not have any information it could provide him for a presentation he was preparing on “The Negro and the American Labor Movement.” Instead, he was told to consult “Mr. Davis of the National Negro Congress.” Before the 1941 Ford drive, CIO Director of Organization John Brophy made only one reference to blacks in his annual reports on organizational activities. This was a vague comment on the “unity with Negro workers” in the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC) in 1939.

African American workers were mindful of such a nonchalant attitude and were reminded by leaders like Granger that despite the AFL’s shortcomings, it too had given thousands of black workers a protection that they could not have found elsewhere. Yet workers and leaders expected the CIO to go beyond the AFL by allowing blacks to become nationally recognized labor leaders. The hope of such a development in the CIO’s first five years was directly related to the role and influence of John P. Davis and the NNC. Of the early black organizers involved in the SWOC drives of 1936-37, only Henry Johnson rose to a position of national importance in the CIO. Johnson was appointed assistant national director of the PWOC in 1937 in response to the larger number of blacks in the meatpacking industry in comparison to steel, auto, and rubber. It was much more crucial for a visible black presence in the PWOC drive because the 38-40% black minority was just enough to make or break CIO success. The white leadership felt that the meatpacking industry was strategically more important to CIO organizational success and stability than other industries like tobacco where blacks held numerical superiority. Thus CIO president Lewis turned a deaf ear when NNC head Davis urged him to appoint a “Negro hardened in the labor movement” as his executive assistant to organize tobacco.
Despite early achievements in the PWOC, Johnson fell victim to both ideological factionalism and an unwavering support of John L. Lewis. During the Spring and Summer of 1933, PWOC Regional Director Don Harris assigned Johnson and another black, Frank Alsop, to organize meatpacking workers in Omaha, Nebraska. According to a Lewis confidante from the UMW, these were positions "better suited for white organizers" since the plants were 60-70% white. Furthermore, the majority of workers at the Swift Plant were ready to organize with the CIO, but refused to do so under Alsop because he "lacked experience and was inflated with egotism." Harris, Johnson, and Alsop had not only allegedly made promises "they never fulfilled," but upon their arrival in Omaha they made contact with the state secretary of the Communist Party and had "quite a clique going" with a significant black following.36

Over the next two years dissension increased as the left-wing-element of the PWOC charged Director Van Bittner with autocratic control and stifling rank-and-file attempts to form as international union. Johnson led a core of approximately 30 dissident meat packing locals who agreed with CIO president John L. Lewis's support of Wendel Wilkie in the presidential election of 1940. Johnson likewise staged a futile coup to unseat Bittner as head of the PWOC. During the struggle Bittner allegedly avoided firing certain black staff members for fear of being accused of racism—a charge leveled at him nonetheless. Once the CIO national office carried out its investigation of the entire ordeal, few blacks sided with Johnson whom they felt was not working in the best interests of blacks. This episode marked the end of Johnson's career in the CIO.37

Despite advocating a policy of racial equality, the CIO encountered numerous problems when it actively attempted to carry it out. This was no more evident than in the South, where a tradition of anti-unionism and racial segregation posed serious barriers to industrial unionism. When the CIO began its organizing drive in Alabama in the late 1930s, the rival AFL played both sides of the race issue to thwart the new organization. Not to be outdone by the CIO on the race question, the local AFL attempted to strengthen its position among blacks by appointing a black unionist to a state council vice-presidency in 1938. Irregardless, black workers in Alabama continued to support the CIO during the initial thrust phase, a position that "puzzled and confused" state AFL officials.38

Black workers in Alabama were all too aware that in several instances local AFL unions worked in collusion with various companies to commit racial discrimination. When black and white workers of the Inland Waterways Corporation (under AFL federal charter 21426) signed requests for the CIO to represent them in bargaining, in the late summer of 1938, the union and company began denying blacks work assignments. When local UMW officials attempted to intercede, the AFL union announced that unless workers signed an oath allowing only the AFL to represent them, they could not work. This ploy did little to intimidate the black workers as only 6 of 50 signed with the AFL and two of these reneged by the end of the day. Local UMW and CIO officials asked for the federal government to investigate but encountered an unsympathetic
personnel director who refused to consider the grievances. In this instance the AFL was able to block CIO unionism at the expense of discriminating against black workers.\(^{39}\)

Although local CIO officials asked for assistance from the national office, they quickly came to realize that their superiors lacked any clear policy for the ever-growing complexities of integrated unionism. In circumstances like the above, local CIO officials feared the potential disruption of "all CIO locals in the South" if a few whites could "collude and get all the blacks discharged." Alabama CIO official, Yelverton Cowherd, requested that the NAACP "or any other organization that came to the rescue of their race when discriminated against" be called in. Yet his greatest fear was that black workers "quite naturally" would "take full charge of the situation and retaliate."\(^{40}\)

The South remained the most troubling area for the CIO to promote racial equality. The situation became even more tense when, according to local southern CIO leaders like William Mitch, the CP pushed "to get the negro [sic] to the top of the ladder in one jump." Leftist allies of black steelworkers in Alabama claimed that they could offer "limitless illustrations" ranging from the absence of blacks on the SWOC Staff in Alabama, to the "habitual referral to them as niggers" by SWOC secretary Noel Beddow as proof the local CIO leadership was tainted with racism. Responding to these charges, William Mitch admitted that the "Negro question was a ticklish one." Yet anyone designated a communist was allegedly more "on the taboo list" than one concerned with black equality.\(^{41}\) Despite such criticism, Mitch, Beddow, and Cowherd did more than any previous Southern white labor leaders to secure economic and industrial justice for blacks. It was achieved, however, through a policy that avoided "a wide open issue on the racial question." Ironically it was blacks and whites connected with the Communist Party in the South who were most committed to solving the "negro question."\(^{42}\)

The year 1941 was pivotal in terms of black support for the CIO. The first major event was the transfer of CIO leadership from John L. Lewis to Philip Murray. Lewis had supported Republican Wendell Willkie for president in the 1940 national election and vowed to resign if Roosevelt was elected for a third term. Blacks had no particular qualms in this change since both men commanded respect among the rank and file. Both were committed to the ideals of racial justice and equality within the CIO and in the larger society. Yet some leading blacks unionists like Walter Hardin, "Director of Negro Activities" in the United Automobile Workers (UAW) felt Lewis represented the "safest and soundest policy" for blacks. Other black rank and fileers applauded Murray and the CIO's stand on racial equality but emphasized that much more needed to be accomplished. Blacks were not "asking for any special favors just equal opportunity."\(^{43}\)

Black labor intellectuals like Horace Cayton expressed similar mixed feelings but went even further. Speaking before the annual NAACP conference in Houston in mid-1941, Cayton praised the CIO's vigorous and progressive
leadership, and its sprinkling of left-wing supporters who had made it a point to include blacks. However, Cayton said that the CIO had not done as much as it might have to convince blacks that it really had their best interests in mind. If black workers did not resort to constant pressure, it was easy to "forget about the brother in black."44

To insure that the CIO and AFL would maintain a diligent interest in their black membership, Cayton called for the formation of a national black trade union organization. Its function would be to break down the remaining black fear of organized labor as well as prejudice among white workers. Cayton had been advocating such an organization since 1939 when he and George S. Mitchell published Black Workers and the New Unions.45

Cayton's idea was labeled as "reactionary" and "most unwise" by no less than the leading black labor intellectual closest to the CIO leadership in the late 1930s, John P. Davis of the NNC. Although conceding that prejudice against black workers was still a problem in the CIO, it would not be resolved by "pressure groups." Any attempt to form such a "factional clique" was to be "ruthlessly stamped out." These were the last "words of wisdom" accepted by the leadership of the CIO from Davis and the NNC. Within the year that organization suffered an internal shakeup from which it never fully recovered. While no national organization developed in the early 1940s, Cayton's idea took root among a number of black unionists in the CIO and AFL who established local labor councils or caucuses as they come to be referred to, devoted to addressing the problems of black workers in various unions. One of the more successful was the Metropolitan Labor Council of Detroit, formed in late 1942. It was here that black members of the UAW mapped strategy throughout the mid-1940s in the struggle to see a black elected to a high office in their union.46

The UAW-CIO drive to organize Ford Motor Company in the spring of 1941 was viewed by CIO leaders as the final step in solidifying their organization's stability. Blacks played a pivotal role in the success or failure of CIO efforts. The previous five years had witnessed the slow and steady erosion of anti-union attitudes in Detroit's black community through the efforts of the CIO, the younger members of the local NAACP, progressive black clergymen, and the NNC. Although Ford and his conservative allies in the black community did not succumb without a fight, the more objective and clear thinking Ford supporters like Detroit Urban League head John Dancy had come to realize that CIO unionization was in the best interest of blacks. Yet even Dancy did not take the inevitable in stride. Writing to an Urban League supporter in early April, he criticized the CIO for not having "played fair with the Negroes." Yet he informed his superior Eugene Kinckle Jones that "there were a good number of Negroes in the picket line," and that the UL was advising all black Ford workers to "connect with the CIO for we know full well they will eventually organize the factory."47
For its part, the national CIO staged an unprecedented publicity campaign in an effort to show that the organization's commitment to nondiscrimination was indeed real. The publication of the pamphlet "The CIO and the Negro Worker" which appeared in June of 1940 was envisioned as a vital tool in drawing unorganized blacks to the CIO. While attacking AFL craft exclusion of blacks, it also called for measures to abolish the poll tax and a federal law against lynching. Foremost though, according to the contents of the pamphlet was "the record of the CIO" in the basic sectors of American industry. Listing steel, meatpacking, auto and farming, the CIO claimed that "hundreds of Negro members enjoyed positions of responsibility and leadership." Such claims were exaggerated since they made reference to those blacks who had been able to win elections to local union offices in the UPWA, the UAW and in the largely black and leftist initiated organizing drives among tobacco workers. From the time of the release of this pamphlet until the spring of 1941, it was not unusual for CIO officials to canvass their affiliates as to the number of blacks holding positions in local district or national offices. The numbers beyond the local level were few and far between.

The CIO and CARD: A Bureaucratic Approach to Institutional Racism

The creation of the Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination (CARD) was no abrupt decision by CIO officials, but rather the logical conclusion to a series of crucial events that took place throughout 1942. Despite the fact that leading CIO officials such as John Brophy viewed the organization's racial policies as marking "a long step forward toward the achievement of real racial tolerance in the United States," black unionists felt the CIO would have to do more to promote racial equality within its own ranks.

The first major development that led the CIO to reassess its racial policies was the affiliation of the predominantly Black United Transport and Service Employees Union (UTSE) in May. Although a small, young union of only some 3,000 members it represented a variant of the AFL's all-black affiliate, the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters with its members consisting of train terminal porters, dining car employees and eventually Pullman laundry workers and other miscellaneous service workers in the transportation industry. The acceptance of the UTSE by the CIO made it the first national railroad organization to join the CIO. More importantly, one week after the close of the third biennial convention of the "Red Caps" on 30 May in Cincinnati, the union's president Willard Townsend became the first black member of the CIO's International Executive Board (IEB).

In the months leading up to the 1942 CIO convention, several other developments occurred that undoubtedly had a direct effect on Murray's decision to do more in the field of race relations. In May the SWOC gathered to form the United Steelworkers of America (USWA). Of the 1787 delegates, 125
were black and William Fowler and Joe Cook in particular praised the CIO for its efforts on behalf of their people. Cook had been president of a SWOC local in Chicago since 1937 even though the plant had less than a dozen black workers. Four other blacks were also local union officers. Despite such optimism, a contingent of black steelworkers pressed Murray on the absence of blacks on the executive board. Accordingly "to end any further discontent," he appointed Boyd Wilson to serve as his "liaison to represent the colored folks and a non-voting members of the union's executive board." 51

Despite Murray's placating gesture in the selection of Boyd Wilson as his advisor on black affairs in the USWA, black members were not overly impressed with the gesture. When Daniel Blakely, a black member of USWA Local 1375 in Warren, Ohio was asked to run for secretary on the ticket of a group known for its "lily-white" slates, Murray sent Wilson to intervene. According to Blakely, Wilson attempted to talk him out of running for office with this group because they were allegedly not sincere and only using him to garner black votes. Blakely informed Wilson that he was "not interested in what Phil Murray or anybody" thought and along with two other blacks, remained on what proved to be the victorious ticket. 52

The nearly 75 African American delegates to the UAW convention in August went even further than their fellow black unionists in the Steelworkers. According to Hodges Mason, one of the leading blacks in the left-center R.J. Thomas-George Addes caucus in the 1940s, the black delegates had decided beforehand to nominate one of their own for a vice-presidency or executive board position at the convention. Mason specifically targeted Walter Reuther for elimination in the UAW hierarchy. This strategy was opposed by a number of white supporters of the Thomas-Addes group on the grounds that it would destroy the solidarity of the union--a nice way of saying it would polarize the membership over the issue of race. Spurning this warning, Mason nominated Oscar Noble, one of the first UAW staff members hired in 1937, who promptly declined. Somehow, "wind" of what the black caucus was planning had reached CIO President Murray who, according to Mason, advised Noble not to accept the nomination. 53

While these events were not as yet part of a broad, well organized movement among blacks in the CIO, the proximity of their occurrence within various affiliates reflected a basic clash of agendas. By early 1942 black workers who had a chance to unionize, and more specifically a choice as to who would organize them, overwhelmingly supported the CIO. Nonetheless, the affiliation of the UTSE and the election of Willard Townsend to the CIO-IEB came none too soon. The CIO was nearly six years old and blacks were growing impatient with CIO claims of nondiscrimination and integration that ended largely with the rank and file. Townsend's selection was the least troublesome aspect of the black union leadership issue that would consistently rage for the remainder of the CIO's existence. 54
From yet another direction, Murray also had to be alarmed at the widespread racial antipathy most white workers held against their black co-workers regardless of the racial egalitarianism the CIO prided itself on. This was no more apparent than in the South. Continuing racial troubles in Alabama led local CIO leaders to be leery of pushing too far on integration. Likewise, when national officials like John Brophy toured the South, they were mindful to attack political restrictions like the poll-tax within a class context rather than along racial lines when speaking of the enemies of industrial unionism. Therefore, blacks in the CIO as well as racist whites who were either anti-union or vehemently opposed to interracial unionism helped keep the race issue high on the list of concerns union leaders had to deal with whether they wanted to or not. Sometime in late June or early July, of 1942, while in conference with CIO President Philip Murray, newly elected board member Willard Townsend suggested setting up a committee to enforce the provisions of the CIO constitution as it applied to racial minorities. Prior to this meeting with Murray, Townsend had met with a core group of black CIO unionists which included Walter Hardin and Horace Sheffield of the UAW about creating such a committee. Murray allegedly accepted the idea with “enthusiasm” and in August of 1942 appointed CIO Secretary-Treasurer James Carey and Townsend to study race relations and the position of black workers in American life.

This two man “committee,” originally called the “Minorities Economic Welfare Committee,” changed its name to the Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination (CARD) shortly before it made its report and recommendation to the CIO-IEB in September. The committee’s stated purpose was threefold. First, to insure economic protection to minority groups through the “utilization of all instrumentalities available to the trade union movement.” Second, to explore the reasons and causes of racial discrimination and correct them. Finally, the committee sought to bring about greater participation of blacks in the CIO in an effort to create an alliance between the black community and organized labor.

Carey and Townsend concluded that the best method to bring about such changes centered around concerted drives to see Executive Order 8802, which had created the President’s Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), become permanent legislation with power to enforce its decisions. Closely related to this was the passage of an anti-poll tax bill that would allow disfranchised workers in the South to elect politicians sympathetic to the plight of the working class. Of course CIO affiliates were admonished to follow democratic principles in their respective unions at the national, state, and local level as well as pushing for the upgrading of qualified black-skilled and semi-skilled workers. The original report even went as far as calling for the appointment of a qualified black as assistant Secretary of Labor, but this was reduced to positions in governmental agencies and boards.

The 1942 CIO Constitutional Convention marked the highpoint of the organization’s emphasis on racial matters to that time. Stirring speeches by Murray, Walter Reuther of the UAW as well as remarks by leading black
unionists Willard Townsend and Ferdinand Smith of the National Maritime Union served to indicate that "the Negro had come into a new day."\(^{69}\) Central to the conventions proceedings on racial issues was the official presentation of the CIO Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination which was now composed of five members. James Carey was chairman and Townsend secretary, while Ferdinand Smith, Boyd Wilson, and James Leary, Secretary-Treasurer of the Mine Mill and Smelter Workers now formed the Committee. It is not altogether clear why these three were chosen to serve other than the fact that they were either popular and leading black unionists in the CIO, (Smith); held a similar position in an affiliated union, (Wilson as Murray's liaison on racial matters in the USWA); or were white racial liberals belonging to racially progressive affiliates (Leary).\(^{80}\)

The creation of this Committee by the CIO leadership was a bold yet important and necessary step that reflected the progressive sentiment of white labor leaders like Murray, Reuther and Carey who envisioned race relations in the CIO as a model for the larger society. Over the first half of 1943 the Committee concerned itself with basic staff affairs, foremost of which was the appointment of a director to coordinate all of the committee's activities. All of the original members, but especially Chairman Carey, were concerned with numerous other labor matters. A director was chosen by President Murray in late January after consultation with Carey and Townsend. Townsend played no small role in the selection of George L.P. Weaver, a member of Local 1000 of the UTSE in Chicago and a former law student at Howard University. Between his days as a law student and involvement with the UTSE in Chicago, Weaver gained a sense of working-class consciousness while employed by the WPA in Harlem in the mid-1930s. His hiring marked the first appointment of a black to a position of high responsibility on the National CIO staff. At the time of his hiring, Weaver recalled that the only other blacks he saw on a frequent basis at 718 Jackson place, were the janitor and three elevator operators.\(^{81}\)

Initially Weaver had no office, working instead out in the open view of all who entered the CIO building as a living testimony of racial integration. When the time to get an office came USWA Vice-president Van Bitter complained that Weaver's quarters were next to his and had taken six inches of his space. Despite its liberal racial policies, the CIO still had a great deal of prejudice among its leadership as well as the rank and file.

The Committee began a dual agenda designed to deal with civil rights matters inside and outside of the CIO and the labor movement in general. Within its own ranks, CARD emphasized a greater organization of black workers and implementation of the non-discriminatory policy in the CIO. Through such efforts, it was envisioned that the black community as a whole, with help from the black press, would gain a clearer understanding of the basic principles advocated by the CIO. The Committee's early efforts focused on a broad educational program that stressed to the CIO membership the incompatibility of industrial unionism and racial discrimination. This was to be achieved through the publication and distribution of literature as well as the holding of regional
conferences and seminars devoted to the subject of race relations and civil rights. Specific instances of discrimination in individual CIO affiliates were to be brought before elected officials of the union in an effort to resolve the grievances. If this first step failed, then CARD would seek to bring about an acceptable settlement. If these measures failed, the particular case would than be presented to the regional office of the FEPC. While not a panacea, FEPC and other government agencies established during World War II made the work of CARD and the CIO much more successful. Furthermore, Weaver and the Committee established connections with government agencies like the War Manpower Commission and civil rights organizations like the NAACP and Urban League that were concerned with the economic welfare of black Americans. It also formulated strategies toward the passage of legislation favorable to blacks (minorities and labor) such as a permanent FEPC, anti-lynching and anti-poll tax.

Under Weaver's direction CARD encouraged each CIO affiliate to establish its own anti-discrimination department with the head becoming a member of the National Committee. Because of the numerous complaints that it received form the outset, CARD had to go even further by calling for the creation of such committees at the city, county and state level. In this way it was felt that the work would proceed much more efficiently and not create a "top heavy" department at the national level. As Weaver saw it, the advantage of the National Committee was "perspective" from which the CIO's racial problems could be seen as a whole, undisturbed by local pressures. At the same time, the advantage of local committees was one of detailed knowledge, and, hopefully, the ability to work out grievances as they arose. By the end of 1943 there were 16 of these committees at the state and local level.

Throughout the war years CARD spent a great deal of time monitoring the progress of local unions that created anti-discrimination committees and their success in resolving cases of discrimination and racial tension. By mid 1944 there were 65 such committees acknowledged to exist within various CIO affiliates. Nonetheless, their success was determined by the sincerity and commitment of the individuals involved as well as by the part of the country in which they were located.

In the North, local committees like the New York CIO Industrial Union Council (IUC) played a crucial role in defusing tension in the aftermath of the Harlem riot of 1943. Some 500 African American CIO members volunteered to patrol the streets to assist city authorities in preventing further lawlessness. While concluding that the Harlem disturbance was not a "race riot," New York IUC Committee officials blamed the outbreak of violence on widespread patterns of racial discrimination and exploitation against blacks. They cited the failures of the Office of Price Administration to enforce price ceilings, establish strict rent controls, and roll back food prices to September 1942 levels. Moreover, they saw the failure of the mayor and city government of New York to follow through on the constructive suggestion to alleviate the sub standard social and economic conditions of blacks in the aftermath of the 1935 riot. In
direct regards to discrimination, the New York CIO-IUC criticized the FEPC while establishing its own "Anti-Discrimination Service Bureau" that worked in conjunction with members of the National Lawyers Guild to "seek the vigorous prosecution" of all anti-discrimination law violators.85

As was the case with CARD, most local committees were breaking new ground in the area of race relations. Trial and error was the order of the day and most of the activities of 1943 and 1944 were a part of the "program planning stage." Early successes were not uncommon though. In Philadelphia several cases involving the upgrading of black steelworkers were resolved in a manner that led the local CIO Fair Practice chairperson to optimistically see future upgrading in previously "whites only" job capacities.86

The South posed the greatest challenge for the CIO in the area of race relations. This was a region that not only had a definite policy of black subordination, but was highly anti-union and especially abhorred the idea of the unity of black and white labor against economic injustice. The head of the Alabama IUC informed Carey that "we (CIO) in the South must especially be very careful in selecting committees;" but felt the CIO had done and would continue "to do a great deal" to abolish racial discrimination. Such was the same in Texas and Tennessee. In the latter case, Carey was told that the CIO was the only organization in that part of the country to make any real advance on the race problem, but it had been done "quietly and without fanfare." In his opinion, the creation of a state council committee on racial problems would be "the worst mistake we could make . . . we simply would be cutting our own throats if we worked like hell and make a lot of noise about the race question."87 Indeed, CIO officials continued to face the opposition of anti-union and racist communal leaders as was the case in Atlanta in mid-1943. Police officers prohibited white CIO and federal government representatives (James Thomas, Philip Murray's personal representative, and two other USWA officials, along with Judge M. L. Brazzel of the War Labor Board) from speaking before a gathering of local black CIO members in honor of national "Philip Murray Day."88 As in the formative years, the issue of race was still a "ticklish question" as far as the CIO in the South was concerned.

On the other hand, in cities like Chicago and East St. Louis, the anti-discrimination committees attempted to involve themselves in forming "city-wide alliances against racial tensions." Yet they were limited in their ability to really correct the economic and material needs of black workers. The president of the East St. Louis IUC confessed that the CIO could not compete against the coalition of politicians who "depended on their ability to buy Negro votes to stay in power." The local IUC claimed it had fought for better and more schools, set up an Urban League, and tried "to elect the right people to office to further the interest of the colored people." But to disturb the pattern of "segregation without legislation" would "immediately invite trouble."89 In areas and unions where blacks were few in number, committees were appointed but were deemed unnecessary because of "racial harmony."70
This ambiguous pattern prevailed into the post-war period and in most cases there was little CARD could do to bring about effective change other than continue its educational program. In many local cases the National Committee leadership received contradictory accounts of the racial situation and the progress or lack thereof that took place. In 1944, for example, the head of the Indiana State IUC informed Weaver that he had not "neglected to act in the field with measures that were . . . more concrete than exhaustive." Yet four years later he was informed that there was a "very serious situation in Indiana" in the local CIO unions in terms of discrimination. According to the observer, in many auto and steel locals, blacks were not allowed in the union halls while anyone else carrying a CIO card was. As far as civil rights conferences, continued the source, unless someone was assigned to see that the locals carried out the union's program, letters from CARD were "filed away and forgotten."71

Perhaps the most difficult area of race relations CARD and indeed the entire CIO had to deal with during the war and the immediate post-war period was the hiring and upgrading of black workers. The manpower needs of World War II required many industries to introduce or expand black workers into their labor force—either by willful consent or the force, pressure, and collusion of governmental agencies and labor unions with the help of the President's FEPC. The vast majority of African American workers in basic industry at this time—auto, steel, rubber, meat packing—were confined to the lowest paid, least skilled, and usually most hazardous jobs. Efforts to include increased numbers of black workers in basic war-time industries between 1940 and 1945 (but primarily 1942-45) "represented more industrial and occupational diversification than had occurred in the seventy-five preceding years."72 The greatest obstacles to overcome were the prejudice of various corporations and their white employees. Numerous "wild-cat" strikes were staged by white male and female workers as blacks entered into previously all white departments. The standard historiographical account of these kinds of struggles refer to workers in Detroit automobile plants who were UAW-CIO members.73 Indeed, shortly after the UAW secured itself at Ford in the spring of 1941, former CIO president John L. Lewis was warned that it would be a grave mistake to minimize the "danger threatening the very UAW posed by a Ku Klux Klan based anti-union Americanization Program" in all Detroit locals. Such activity led to a heightened period of racial tension within the UAW-CIO from the issuing of President Roosevelt's executive order creating the Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) until the outbreak of city-wide race riots in June of 1943.74 The auto industry and UAW were not alone however. The United Rubber Workers experienced the same kind of tensions when white workers staged strikes after Uniroyal Rubber in Detroit began hiring black women. The leadership of both Local 101 and the international took decisive steps on suspending the guilty parties for nearly five months in a situation described as "a state of rebellion" and refusal to abide by the racial policies of the United Rubber Workers.75

The often over looked fact is that black workers began the process of racial strikes in response to company discrimination as was the case at Chrysler's Dodge Division in Detroit shortly after executive order 8802 had
been issued in 1941.76 Racial unrest cropped up in several Steelworker locals in Covington, Kentucky and Cincinnati, Ohio because, according to CARD, white union officials dealt with blacks through a "paternalistic approach instead of sound trade-union approach" over the issues of wage differentials and upgrading. In May of 1943, 100 whites walked off the job when 27 black workers were upgraded to the "worst department." In an effort to placate the white workers, the company subsequently demoted these black workers, but this only served to convince the black workers to stage their own walk-out in protest and the workers retained their previous promotion.77 The union eventually took a firm stand with the aid of the regional FEPC. Similar experiences took place among steel companies and the Steelworkers Union in western Pennsylvania. The most serious involved a walk-out of some 600 black workers at the Carnegie-Illinois plant in Clairton in February of 1944. This situation, like most others involving the steel industry, was settled only after governmental intervention. Boyd Wilson, CARD member from the steelworkers, encountered "unsympathetic union officials," who turned deaf ears to black complaints. It was a sad irony that CIO president Murray's own union made a less than half-hearted commitment toward solving racial discrimination within the USWA.78

In response to these events, CARD director, George Weaver, lamented that the racial issue in the CIO had become "a political football in local union politics." He conceded that upgrading was difficult because it was almost solely a matter of contract negotiation--and many contracts were written to protect white workers. In a number of cases a combination of union "foot dragging" and managerial racism kept blacks from being hired or upgraded.79

A major endeavor of CARD, in conjunction with the leadership of the CIO, was to secure non-discrimination clauses in union-management contracts. As noted, this was difficult since management maintained the authority to hire whom it pleased. Yet, because of war-time labor shortages, the necessity of black labor led many industries to concede on the issue of racial non-discrimination. In early 1944 Weaver began canvassing all CIO unions about the implementation of non-discrimination clauses. United Automobile Workers president R.J. Thomas replied that they were in place in some but not the vast majority of UAW contracts because companies objected to the clause. The president of the URW estimated that such clauses were in approximately ninety-five percent of union negotiated contracts and further added that there were only "two or three instances" where the URW had any difficulty in respect to racial discrimination. The Aluminum Workers simply stated that they had them while the Textile Workers reported very few because they "never found it necessary." The UPWA reported that such clauses were in most of its contracts.80

John Rackliffe, president of the United Shoe Workers of America, informed Weaver that there was "very little racial discrimination of any type" in shoe factories in the northeast, mid-west or western United States. However, in the South and border regions black workers, "if employed at all" were in the
lower paid routine jobs "with little opportunity for promotion."81 John Fox of the
Inland Boatman's Union of the Pacific replied that because the union had a
non-discrimination provision in its constitution, its membership contained
"negroes, Philipinos, Chianmen and other races." He continued by stating
that the union openly practiced "a mild and modified form of Jim Crowism" by
segregating whites from the other ethnic groups. Fox unapologetically
confessed that while this was Jim Crow, "the negroes and others preferred it
that way." In conclusion he assured Weaver that if the employers began
discriminating against the black members, the union would insist upon the
incorporation of non-discrimination clauses in its contracts.82

From these responses CARD decided to push for a resolution at the 1944
CIO Constitutional Convention calling for all international unions to seek
incorporation into collective-bargaining agreements providing that persons
seeking employment would not be discriminated against because of race,
creed, color or place of origin. This was passed, but only after a vigorous
debate within the resolutions committee over including "political affiliation" in
the clause. As a member of the resolutions committee, Townsend saw to it that
ideological issues were not to be confused with racial matters.83

The debate which had ensued at the convention convinced Townsend
and Weaver to decrease the amount of publicity devoted to advancing anti-
discrimination, somehow feeling that the less attention drawn, the more could
be accomplished. By the end of 1945, six CIO unions had been successful in
negotiating anti-discrimination clauses covering hiring in their agreements.
Yet in many unions like the UAW, there were qualifications which weakened the
provision despite vigorous demands by the union's Fair Practices director.
United Auto Workers agreements in 1946 with Chrysler, Briggs, and Ford did
not cover the matter of discrimination in hiring.

By the end of 1945 CARD membership had increased to eight with the
addition of Walter Hardin from the UAW, Harry Read of the American
Newspaper Guild, and Morris Muster from United Furniture Workers. The
addition of Muster was a response to the growing realization that other ethnic
minorities besides blacks were being discriminated against. As early as 1943,
the New York based Institute of Social Research submitted a proposal to CARD
to collaborate in an effort to determine the extent of anti-Semitism in the trade-
union movement. Unable to take on such a project because of administrative
liabilities (staff and financial), CARD agreed it needed a representative who
would focus on anti-Semitism.84 Morris Muster President of the United Furniture
Workers of American (UFWA) The UFWA was one of the few CIO unions in
which a sizeable number of executive board members and membership,
perticularly in the northeastern United States were Jewish. This was the case
from the time of the UFWA's first constitutional convention in 1939 through the
mid to late 1940s.85 was chosen for this task.

Muster wasted little time in making the Committee aware of anti-
Semitism. Moreover, he felt the Committee should work closely with Jewish
organizations like the American Jewish Congress and should speak out more forcefully against anti-Semitism. Ensuing discussions found certain committee members uneasy about Muster's desire to push the group into a direction it had not yet ventured. Secretary Townsend felt that such an approach would lead to a pattern of special preference for Jews, something CARD could not tolerate. He further emphasized that the Committee would be "deluding," itself if they challenged discrimination as a specifically black or Jewish problem. It would only create "division among forces who suffer most."88

Racial-ethnic preference, especially in connection with job security and seniority, loomed as one of the most pressing post-war issues CARD had to grapple with. A consensus was reached that the more it could dramatize its expanding work in all areas of discrimination, the more cooperation it would receive throughout the CIO. Thus "Racial" was dropped from the Committee's name soon after the war ended. While admitting that it had received complaints from a variety of ethnic and racial minorities, the committee attempted to view them as class problems that affected all workers. Despite its claim of being concerned with all members within its ranks, the CIO Committee waited nearly six years before acknowledging the status of women—the largest minority group. Townsend and Weaver both confessed to overlooking discrimination against women and in an effort to remedy this serious omission from committee work, appointed Bessie Hillman, wife of the late Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America president, Sidney Hillman, in 1948.87

Even though Hillman's appointment suggested a greater awareness by the Committee of discrimination against women, there is little evidence of discussion or action in this area. Undoubtedly, racial and ethnic matters continued to take precedence. Because of the bureaucratic structure of the CIO and the Committee's emphasis upon racial issues, women's concerns were left to be resolved by the Fair Practices Committees of CIO affiliates. More often than not, the issue of discrimination against women in unions found the male leadership less than responsive for fear of female job competition.88

The Debate over Black Representation on the Executive Boards of CIO Affiliates.

The controversy over African Americans holding office at the executive level of the CIO and among its major affiliates was one of the reasons Philip Murray moved to create CARD. Yet the Committee was by no means an advocate on behalf of the union political aspirations of black unionists throughout the 1940s and 50s. At the time of CARD's creation in late 1942, only a small number of black unionists had been or were members of the leadership of several CIO affiliates, and these were members of largely Communist influenced unions. Among the most notable were Ferdinand Smith, one of the founders and first vice-president of the National Maritime Union; Revels Cayton, brother of labor intellectual Horace Cayton, a leading official of the National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards and chairman of the California CIO's "Committee on Minorities"; Owen Whitfield of the United Cannery and
Agricultural Workers; Ewart Gulnier, head of the New York State County and Municipal Workers (later the United Public Workers); Clarence King of the Transport Workers Union; and Lyndon Henry of the Fur and Leather Workers Union.89

W. Richard Carter, who joined the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilders in 1941, was elected as an alternate member of that organization's executive board in 1942, and a full member the next year. Yet in practically every other non-leftist influenced CIO affiliate, there was a distinct absence of black office holders and policy makers. The other exception to this was in the United Rubber Workers (URW). Although the URW had fewer black rank-and-file members than the UPWA, UAW, or the USWA, it did as much if not more that the latter two in promoting racial equality during the 1940s. Through its union paper, The United Rubber Worker, stories and pictures told of how black rubber workers were elected to prominent state and local union offices or served on contact negotiating committees. Leonard Smith, a member of URW 101 in Detroit became the first black vice-president of the Michigan State CIO Council in 1938. At the 1943 annual convention, white executive board member Thomas Burns lauded the role of blacks in the union and especially Mason James, chairman of the Committee on Officers Reports. According to Burns, James' performance refuted "the charges that men of colored skin lack mentality equality to that of white." During the year three blacks were also elected as local union presidents. One of these, Elton Gladney of Local 222 in Buffalo, New York went on to become the union's first black IEB member in 1946.90

The Packinghouse workers were the leaders among CIO affiliates who integrated their leadership hierarchy. A great deal of the motivation for such an interracial policy was due to Communist Party influence in the union. Yet at the UPWA founding convention in 1943, the CP did not support the election of Philip Weightman as the union's vice-president because of their failed attempts at recruiting him into the Party. Nonetheless, he became the UPWA's first African American executive officer and board member as well as a leading black unionist in the CIO.91

At the 1943 UAW convention, the union's leading Communist, Nat Ganley, put forth the resolution calling for the creation of a minorities department headed by an elected person who would be an African American, at the request of the union's black caucus. Over the next few years, many, including members of the CIO Committee, tended to view this as yet another attempt by the Communist Party to draw black support. The CP did in fact begin advocating a policy of black preference in union officeholding and a revision of seniority rules to maintain black employment gains brought by war time manpower shortages. The earliest indication of such a position was in 1944. Black unionist in the UAW, however, had raised the issue of black office holders as early as 1938.92
Black unionists throughout the CIO, but especially the UAW, were caught between contending viewpoints. Hodges Mason, central figure of the black caucus in the UAW during the mid-1940s, argued that African American did not want special favors. What they did want was the opportunity for qualified black unionists to occupy a regular office—not a special "Negro position." Yet according to Mason, Walter Reuther told him at the convention that there was "not a Negro in the entire UAW qualified to sit on the executive board."93

Black members of the National Committee such as director George Weavar sided with white unionists who viewed black rank and file concerns over union office holding as "as dangerous racism—an evil that no one has ever been able to control and direct constructively." The debate over black representation at the executive level of the CIO carried over into most of the postwar decade. Of the four major affiliates under examination, the issue was most troublesome in the UAW, and especially effected the state and local CIO councils in Michigan.94 Moving from union office holding to seniority and job security was perhaps even more complex and could not be simply reduced to a "communist proposition" as some CARD members alleged. Committee chairman Carey concluded that seniority clauses as they stood at war's end were not "sufficient protection for minority groups." Economic development in the post-WW II decade revealed the weaknesses of CIO affiliates, the National Committee to Abolish Discrimination as well as organized labor in general to solve minority job insecurity.95

The CIO Committee and Political Factions

The anti-Communist struggle which characterized much of the CIO's political development form the organization's birth, reach its high point in the post-war years (1946-1952). The National Committee to Abolish Discrimination and its members were not immune. Several additions to the Committee's membership in 1946-47 determined that the Committee would be an important tool in the CIO leadership's campaign to purge all Communist Party unions and unionists, black or white. The three new members were Philip Weightman, a vice-president of the Packinghouse workers, Richard Carter, Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers, and George Crockett of the UAW. Weightman was the first black international vice-president of the UPWA having been elected when the CIO chartered the union in October of 1943. As noted earlier, Carter joined the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilders in 1941 and was elected a full member of the executive board in 1943. He had also been president of Local 49 IUMSWA and a member of the United Mine Workers. The IUMSWA has been described as one of the more progressive affiliates on racial matters during the CIO era because of its willingness to hire black organizers. Yet, IUMSWA like the UAW, USWA and UPWA, who also employed black organizers, was far from a utopia of tension-free integrated unionism.96
In early 1945, George Crockett replaced Walter Hardin as the UAW's representative on the National Committee to Abolish Discrimination. A University of Michigan Law School graduate, Crockett had been hired by the UAW as a consultant on minority problems in July of 1944 after having served in the regional office of the FEPC. Crockett's appearance on the UAW staff coincided with the growing friction between white regional directors and Walter Hardin, chairman of the UAW's first Inter-Racial Committee. Hardin probably did as much as any one toward securing the success of the UAW among blacks in the late 1930s and 1940s. Yet by late 1944, Hardin and three other black international representatives were dismissed from the union staff in what UAW Secretary Treasurer George Addes called an "economy move."

Crockett was by far the most militant member of the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination when it came to improving the status of black unionists. In addition to pushing for anti-discrimination clauses in contracts, he advocated CIO policy and urged UAW officials to call for the creation of fair practices committees in all UAW locals. Moreover, Crockett with the support of UAW president R. J. Thomas, urged union officials to follow through on the Minority Rights Resolution adopted at the 1943 UAW convention calling for all regional directors and department heads to add a black to their staff. His efforts created a great deal of conflict and led to a special hearing in Toledo, Ohio in April 1945 regarding discrimination against black UAW members. He took partial encouragement when Regional Director Richard Gosser, "one of the most vociferous objectors to the employment of more Negroes," appointed a black staff person in September.

Crockett brought to the National Committee the same dedication and activism toward minority problems that he advocated in the UAW. His outspoken and direct approach did not go over well with other Committee members especially Weaver and Townsend. At the quarterly meeting of the Committee at the 1946 CIO Convention, Crockett proposed the Committee be restructured and enlarged with a "renewed emphasis upon the need for adequate anti-discrimination machinery" in every CIO union. Above all, he stressed that the Committee's staff needed to be free from "factional alignments" and that the director be selected by the Committee, subject to the approval of the president of the CIO.

Committee Director Weaver, the main target of Crockett's barbs, informed the latter that these suggestions could not be carried out unless more staff and finances were provided and the enforcement machinery of the Committee strengthened. While all of this was indeed true, Crockett blamed CIO factional politics as the cause of the National Committee's weakness. If the Committee were ever to attack discrimination more diligently, it would have to rid itself of "a leadership which in the past had used the Committee as a means of fomenting and capitalizing upon factional disputes among minority members in almost every CIO union."
As a member of the UAW's black caucus—a group aligned with that union's left wing—Crockett was at a disadvantage in attempting to redirect the energies of the Committee. Any support he might have received from fellow leftist Ferdinand Smith of the NMU was nil since he never actively participated in CARD although he was a charter member. Smith and the NMU, like other Communist Party-leftist unions preferred to deal with minority problems in their own way. Morris Muster, leftist President of the UFWA during the war, was able to get the Committee to acknowledge anti-Semitism in the CIO, but little else beyond that.\textsuperscript{101}

In other leftist CIO unions like the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers and the United Public Workers, which had active and successful anti-discrimination committees, there was constant tension with the National Committee. James Leary, Secretary-Treasurer of Mine, Mill and a member of his union's anti-Communist faction, was accused of discrimination by the left-wing during the course of interviewing several black women for a secretarial position in 1946. Leary charged that the entire affair was a plot "made at character assassination" and in light of his position on the CIO Anti-Discrimination Committee (Leary was also a charter member), he seemed to be correct.\textsuperscript{102}

The United Public Workers never had a representative appointed to the CIO Committee, and because of the union's political leanings, its efforts in the civil rights field were undermined by the Committee. In fact, UPW Vice President, Thomas Richardson, in a letter to CIO President Murray in 1946 accused Director Weaver of "unthinking and irresponsible behavior that detracted from the good work of the Committee" and created "doubt in the minds of black workers about the racial policy of the CIO."\textsuperscript{103}

It seems that in late 1946 the UPW began recruiting faculty members at black colleges in the Atlanta, Georgia area (Atlanta University, Spellman, Morehouse and Morris Brown). Heading into 1947 Richardson assumed the majority of faculty would be in the union. Yet this did not materialize because Weaver visited Atlanta University and "consistently attacked the national leadership of the UPW and its integrity" claiming it was Communist dominated. Moreover, he emphasized to the new union members that "a determined move would be made to throw out the entire present leadership of the UPW."\textsuperscript{104}

Although National Committee chairman James Carey told Philip Murray he thought Weaver should be asked to resign if the charges were fact, Murray, Carey and other CIO officials who had taken a stand against the Communists and their sympathizers in the CIO, predetermined Weaver's "guiltlessness." According to a former member of the National Committee, both Weaver and Townsend were in a "strategic position to help the "socialist or right-wing element" in the CIO "pool their efforts in opposing all programs" proposed by the so-called Communist or left-wing group "regardless of the worthwhileness of such proposals."\textsuperscript{105}
The repercussions of the Communist issue in the CIO were such that several black Committee members found themselves facing unemployment regardless of factional affiliation. In an attempt to get a friend a job on the CIO staff, Richard Carter of the Industrial Union of Marine and Shipbuilding Workers reminded Director George Weaver of the discussion he and Willard Townsend had had with Philip Murray at the 1948 CIO convention about “taking care of the capable, loyal Negro representatives in the CIO.” Shortly thereafter, Carter himself was sending out job feelers because the political situation in his union had become “somewhat brutal,” and as the only black on the staff, he “expected to get the axe any day.”

Although Philip Weightman had formerly gone along with the left-wing-Communist faction after his election as vice president of the UPWA in 1943, the relationship was always strained, and he finally broke ranks in the summer of 1947. When Communist Herb March, director of District 1 of the union, declined to support Weightman for the office of vice president of the Illinois State CIO Council, Weightman became one of the main opponents of the Communists in the UPWA. Both he and Willard Townsend blamed the Communists and UPWA president Ralph Helstein for “engineering” the disastrous UPWA strike against the Big Four meat companies in 1948. Even though the Communists were a minority in the union, they held enough leverage to oust Weightman as vice president at the 1948 UPWA Convention. Soon after his defeat, Weightman became a personal assistant to CIO Director of Organization, Alan Haywood. Over the next several years, he attempted to regain the leadership of UPWA Local 28 in Chicago where he was once president, but to no avail. His staunch anti-Communism however, allowed him to maintain a position on the National Committee to Abolish Discrimination until 1952.

George Crockett and other black UAW staff members like William Lattimore, the union’s first black legislative representative in Washington, who sided with the UAW’s left-wing against Walter Reuther were “removed” from their positions once Reuther was elected to the union’s presidency in 1946. Reuther’s new appointee to the UAW’s Fair Practices Department was William Oliver, a staff member under Ford Department head Richard Leonard. Upon his appointment to the CIO National Committee to Abolish Discrimination, Oliver confided to Director Weaver, “Long live Crockett. Crockett has now resigned. We shall now progress in this union with pro-democratic thinking.”

Even before Crockett’s departure, Reuther was pressured into a meeting with concerned black union members over the state of race relations in the UAW. According to Reuther’s staff aide William Kennedy, Reuther admitted that “the Negro question had gotten a great deal of lip service from him before,” but promised the future would see him “translate lip service into action.” This would not be an easy task since he would have to “break down certain prejudices” among several regional directors who refused to accept UAW Fair Practices Committee recommendations to place blacks on their staff.
Reuther led the way, however, among white CIO racial liberals in holding an optimistic view on the future of race relations in the UAW and the United States toward the end of World War II. While it is not clear whether he, Murray, Carey, and other white union leaders read the prognosis of American race relations stated by sociologist Gunnar Myrdal in his famous study entitled *An American Dilemma*, the similarities in solutions says a great deal about liberal racial ideology.

Myrdal had concluded that race conflict was grounded in the ignorance of whites, who by the latter 1940s were allegedly becoming aware of the "tremendous social costs of keeping up the present irrational and illegal caste system." Reuther concurred and envisioned the UAW's Fair Practices Department as leading the way in demonstrating to the nation that "money and effort spent in teaching people to live as good neighbors and equal citizens could lead to greater dividends." In short, the CIO's bureaucratic challenge to racial discrimination could "stamp out racism as effectively as other engineered tools stamped out machine parts."

Within the larger National Committee, Weaver, Townsend, Oliver, and to a lesser extent Weightman, continued their involvement in the CIO's internal cold war. They were the men most responsible for attempting to draw black CIO unionists away from left-wing factions and unions. Their most important, yet most difficult task, was separating the sincere and legitimate CIO policy of race discrimination and civil rights from the allegedly "insincere and illegitimate" racial policies of the left-wingers. Whenever the left-wing unions sent their representatives to CIO sponsored civil rights conferences, the triumvirate kept top CIO officials informed when the "commies were out in full force."

The CIO's post-war attempt to unionize the South known as "Operation Dixie" should have presented the National Committee with an opportunity to make its greatest contribution in the field of race relations. However, top CIO leadership chose to use members of the Committee as instruments of its anti-Communist purge rather than as constructive elements of social activism and unionization among blacks. Given the reluctant response that the National Committee received from Southern CIO officials concerning the creation of anti-discrimination committees, there was no established institutional mechanism (i.e. strong local union Fair Practices Committees) through which the committee could work in the South as it had in the North.

Even before Operation Dixie began, the National Committee was constantly reminded of the continuing difficulty the CIO faced promoting its integrated racial policies. Inquiring about separate water fountains in the meeting hall of the Atlanta IUC, CIO Director of Organization Alan Haywood was informed in early 1945 that they would continue to remain that way since they were owned by the "Atlanta IUC and not the CIO." When Haywood inquired about the possibility of organizing the Pullman Car Company in Atlanta under the UTSE-CIO, the assistant Southern Regional director allegedly confided to his local superior that the CIO could not "expect us to organize white workers in
a organization whose president is a nigger." Once UTSE president Willard Townsend heard this, there was a great deal of animosity and denials that the statement had been made, leading Haywood to call a meeting of Southern regional directors with Weaver and Townsend of the National Committee in attendance to ease tensions.112

Operation Dixie was in reality an experiment in the practical application of the CIO's racial creed for the purposes of industrial unionism. Yet the ten year old organization faced a formidable task in challenging an entire culture molded around racial and class conflicts as well as Christian fundamentalism. Indeed it was a task the CIO was not institutionally nor ideologically mature enough to succeed in at the time. As one historian of the organizing drive put it:

The CIO was not dealing merely with a "public relations" problem, rather, the fundamental difficulty was the simple fact that Southern workers participated fully in the region's hegemonic racial philosophy. That "race mixing" translated as communism in the view of southern political and business leaders was a problem. That it translated precisely the same way for vast numbers of southern workers was more than a problem: It threatened the CIO's entire undertaking.113

Aside from Weaver's actions against the UPW In Atlanta, Townsend was actively involved in the affairs of the Food, Tobacco, and Agricultural Workers (FTA) and the Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers two leftist unions that had done a great deal to raise the quality of life for their black members as well as to promote interracial cooperation. Since the early CIO organizing drives of the late 1930s, black tobacco workers in North Carolina had achieved a great deal in their struggles against the tobacco company barons. By 1943, under the auspices of the United Cannery and Agricultural Workers, NLRB elections were held and several tobacco companies were unionized. Local 22 of the R. J. Reynolds Company in Winston-Salem distinguished itself as a center of social, political and educational development that gave both African American men and women an aspiring self-confidence and respect previously denied by their racially hostile surroundings. The Communist Party played a central role in the affairs of Local 22 as well as FTA and by early 1947 Reynolds, the rival Tobacco Workers International Union (TWIU)-AFL, and the national leadership of the CIO began a red-baiting campaign with three distinctly different goals.114

Reynolds, of course, would have preferred no union at all. The rival TWIU-AFL had a poor track record of bargaining in the best interests of its black members. Moreover, throughout the previous ten years, the leadership of the TWIU unions struggled with the race prejudices of its white members and "their as yet, inability to cope intelligently with the fact that fully sixty-five percent of TWIU potential membership was Negro." The CIO, on the other hand, searched for a solution that would have maintained its growing success in the unionization of the tobacco industry without the assistance of the communist led FTA.115
In February of 1947, two months before the Reynolds contract came up for renewal, the Communist Party of North Carolina began a publicity campaign attacking the "Jim Crow system which forced the Negro people to serve as a source of cheap labor." Furthermore, it called for a defeat of all anti-labor bills, the repeal of all segregation laws, a state FEPC, and the "prosecution of the illegal action of registrars who prevented thousands of blacks from voting." North Carolina CIO Director of Organizing, William Smith, deplored such actions claiming that the CP was "interfering with the function of free democratic labor unions through public advertisement." Expressing opposition to the state's racial, political and anti-labor standards only served to make the white leaders of North Carolina more determined in maintaining their way of life at the expense of working-class blacks and whites.

Under the leadership of black female Moranda Smith, Local 22 not only conducted a successful strike against Reynolds for a pay increase, but mobilized the black community to elect Kenneth Williams as the first black city councilman in the South in the twentieth century. When the leadership of the FTA refused to sign Taft-Hartley affidavits pledging they were not members of the Communist Party of affiliated with it in anyway, red-baiting from the Company and CIO continued. In 1949 CIO officials sent Townsend to North Carolina to organize Local 22 and all other predominantly black FTA members under the banner of his United Transport and Service Employees' Union. Townsend attacked Smith and other Local 22 leaders as Communists void of any interests in the improvement of working conditions for black tobacco workers. The rival TWIU-AFL attempted to capitalize on CIO ideological warfare by beginning its own organizing campaign in the plant and calling for a NLRB election. Regardless of the fact that the FTA Local 22 leadership signed Taft-Hartley affidavits which allowed them on the NLRB ballot against the AFL's TWIU and the CIO's UTSE, the final outcome resulted in there being no unionization whatsoever at Reynolds.

Over the next two years Townsend and the UTSE-CIO were able to organize several smaller tobacco and leaf houses in North Carolina with the intention of moving to organize Reynolds "in due course." This never happened. By 1951, CIO Director of Organization Allan Haywood, contemplated allowing the International Union of United Brewery, Flour, Cereal, Soft Drink and Distillery workers to begin an organizational campaign in North Carolina that would include tobacco workers and especially the R. J. Reynolds plant in Winston, Salem. Upon hearing of such a possible move, Townsend explained to CIO officials that there was a distinct "racial aspect" to such an endeavor by the Brewery Workers which would do nothing less than "muddy the waters." Townsend admitted that he Communist Party had "sensitized the Negro workers in the South to the extent that they were unduly suspicious" of so-called right-wing labor unions. But for the CIO to allow another affiliate that needed assistance from the National office "physically in the form of Negro organizers" to enter the field, created a "ready-made issue to defeat the CIO once again."
Thus on the eve of the AFL-CIO merger, CIO influence in the area of organizing black tobacco workers was marginal, giving way to the meager efforts of the TWIU-AFL of which most blacks refused to join. For its part the UTSE was only a shadow of the dynamism that the FTA had created for black tobacco workers throughout most of the 1940s.119

Townsend also interjected himself in the factional struggles between the Steelworkers and the International Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers in Alabama in 1949. Alleged Communist Party influence in Mine Mill had grown throughout the decade and prompted the CIO to conduct an investigation in early 1947. Mine Mill, like FTA had created a greater recognition of the humanity of black iron ore miners in Alabama as well as among Mexican and black workers in California. The recommendations and measures the CIO took against Mine Mill only served to exacerbate the situation. By 1949 the union was threatened by the mass secession of various locals, who detersed the Communist Party influenced leadership, which had refused to sign Taft-Hartley. The situation was particularly intense among iron-ore miners in Bessemer, Alabama.120

National CIO officials had sent representatives to Bessemer to persuade the iron ore miners to leave Mine Mill, become independent and later affiliate with the Steelworkers-CIO. Unfortunately, “the most conservative and reactionary men in the district” led a movement to leave Mine Mill and create an all-white industrial union excluding the blacks who were Mine Mill members. Despite the pleadings of the National CIO representative that they had to include blacks, the CIO sent in another representative that led the miners into believing that they would have a white union. These secessionist locals were chartered by the CIO.121

In the course of events the Mine Mill leadership castigated National CIO officials for catering to the leaders of the secessionist movement who allegedly opposed both Mine Mill and CIO policy of equal treatment regardless of race. The Mine Mill leadership asserted in The Union, official publication of the organization, that CIO representatives in Alabama allowed racial discrimination to be practiced in steel and other CIO unions and did not “lift a finger to stop it or to enforce what you so often boast of as CIO policy of non-discrimination.” It was also alleged that several black Mine Mill unionists were offered $300 apiece to be photographed holding a charter implying that blacks had not been excluded.122

Violence soon erupted between the two sides in an episode which saw Mine Mill president Maurice Travis lose an eye in a fight with a representative of the Steelworkers. Willard Townsend was sent to investigate, but made no contact with representatives from Mine Mill. As a result of his report, the CIO Executive Board (of which Townsend was a member) met on May 17, 1949 to discuss the altercation at Bessemer. Its conclusions condemned Mine Mill and blamed them for using every “tactic possible to split the white and Negro workers using the Communist weapon of fear, intolerance, racial hatred and other methods that have no place in the decent ranks of trade unionism.”123
Shortly after the CIO Executive Board's pronouncement, two black members of Mine Mill testified in hearings on Fair Employment Practice Legislation in Washington. These men along with former Mine Mill President Reid Robinson went into detail on how the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company, in alleged collusion with the Steelworkers union had "hired all white workers in order to defeat this election." Robinson pointed out that in the "new" Steelworkers locals (former Mine Mill locals) only one of 31 elected union officers was black. This was in stark contrast to the traditional Mine Mill method of having a white president and financial secretary and black vice president and recording secretary. Townsend reiterated the CIO Executive Board's resolution against the International Mine Mill and denied discrimination against blacks, thereby expiating the CIO of any wrong doing.124

Several months after these events at a quarterly meeting of the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination, Townsend and the other committee members realized that they had come to a crossroads. In spite of all their efforts there was still too much racial discrimination and segregation among CIO affiliates across the country. The situation with Mine Mill only magnified this. Black workers were hesitant to abandon the union because it was as Townsend paternalistically put it, "better than nothing for these Negroes." Moreover, Townsend lamented that "we (CIO-Steelworkers) have nothing to establish a precedent because we're not doing anything in the South where you have this vice-president, secretary etc., Negro and white." He also confessed that the CIO could not "tell Negroes to stay out of the Communist Party when we are not doing anything to attract them out of it."125

Despite such observations that were all too true, the National Committee maintained a vehement opposition to anyone or any organization that exhibited left-wing tendencies. Townsend especially "got a thrill" from being criticized in the Daily Worker and pointing out what he considered to be the inconsistency of the Communist Party line in regards to blacks and civil rights in the post World War II era. He even went as far as to relish himself and Weaver as the "Uncle Toms of the CIO" when the National Committee was criticized by the Communist Party and certain elements of the black press. By late 1949 however, Townsend, Weaver, Oliver and the rest of the Committee were concerned that much of this type of criticism was "justified" and that they had "failed to eliminate discrimination in the CIO."126

In 1950, Mine Mill and 10 other Communist influenced international unions were expelled from the CIO. This did not eliminate the problem of racial discrimination against black workers who slowly gravitated toward the Steelworkers union in Alabama. By May of 1953, the USWA, CIO and NAACP were working to convert the last vestiges of the black Mine Mill workers. Some improvements had been made to the extent that the black rank and file members of the USWA felt the staff representatives and local union officers "had done an excellent job on behalf of black workers... and vigorously defended the job rights of Negro workers." In addition there were two black members of
the Steelworkers District Staff as well as a black vice president of the Alabama State CIO Council. Nonetheless, according to NAACP Labor Relations Assistant Herbert Hill, many rank and file black workers still had a "deep sense of frustration that the CIO unions in the Bessemer-Birmingham area had not fulfilled national commitments of the CIO."\(^{127}\)

Black steelworkers in Pennsylvania had the same mixed opinions as their co-unionists in the South. Despite the fact that Boyd Wilson was a USWA and CIO President Philip Murray's personal race relations liaison and a charter member of CARD, the Steelworkers were slow in establishing its own internal civil rights machinery. Only after the protests of black steelworkers did Murray move to create a civil rights department in 1948. Ironically, Wilson was not appointed to this department until 1958! Wilson experienced a great deal of intransigence on the part of the steel company management and white local union officials in attempting to see that black steelworkers were upgraded. According to one source, Murray and his successor David J. McDonald limited Wilson's authority and decided what complaints were to be investigated.\(^{128}\)

The UPWA prided itself on its racial record and accomplishments dating back to the CIO's initial thrust phase of organizing when it was under the direction of the PWOC. The combination of a progressive leadership that was influenced by Communists, as well as a strong following of black and white workers who saw the importance of minimizing racial friction, led to a significant number of locals with integrated administrations. In Chicago, which was home to the international union once the UPWA affiliated with the CIO in 1943, black workers and leftists built a significant base within Locals 25 and 28. Other UPWA locals in such Midwestern and Southern cities as Kansas City, Omaha, Waterloo, Iowa and Fort Worth, Texas likewise cultivated interracial solidarity throughout the 1940s and early 1950s. Nonetheless, the Packinghouse workers faced pockets of resistance to minority equality inside the union and among the management of the Big Four Meat corporations (Swift, Armour, Cudahy and Wilson).\(^{129}\)

Of the four major CIO affiliates under examination, the UPWA was the most racially progressive in the post war period because it relied upon a renewed commitment toward improving race relations and anti-discrimination policies within the union, by management, and within the community. The Big Four meat corporations experienced sporadic success in their attempts to divide the union along racial lines during the 1948 strike, and UPWA officials moved to revamp the entire anti-discrimination program in the aftermath of the strike defeat, as a way to reinvigorate the morale of its membership. Furthermore, despite past success against racial discrimination, the leadership realized that in a number of circumstances, minority workers were still being denied equal opportunities. Therefore, the union set out to "close the gap" between policy and practice.\(^{130}\)

Union officials deliberated throughout the latter half of 1948 and into 1949 about the specific approach to correct the deficiencies in their anti-
discrimination program. At the same time various locals in the Midwest set up anti-discrimination committees and became involved in local civil rights affairs. By the spring the international union decided to conduct a “self survey.” An independent research team under the auspices of the Fisk University Race Relations Institute and Professor John Hope II carried out two separate studies. The “Local Union Study” was based upon the responses to questionnaires sent to all the UPWA locals in the country. Approximately 35% of all local executive boards, representing 58% of the union’s total membership replied. The “Rank and File Survey” was based upon personal interviews with some 1400 unionists in 40 local unions in Kansas City, Omaha, Fort Worth, Atlanta, and New Orleans.  

The results of the survey indicated that there were indeed continuing racial problems on the part of the union and management, but did not allow for union officials to locate specifically where weaknesses were in the anti-discrimination program that existed at the time the surveys were administered. In May of 1950 the UPWA Constitutional Convention passed a resolution creating a new Anti-Discrimination Department under the direction of a vice-president and with a small full-time staff to replace the former “A-D” Committee. Over the next five years the “New Program” led to “tangible, demonstrable, and far reaching results”, in eliminating discriminatory practices through the strengthening of previous non-discrimination clauses in union-management contracts. 

By February of 1951 male and female African American and Mexican workers began to integrate previously all-white mechanical gangs, sliced bacon departments, canning, meat packing and other specialized manufacturing departments at the Amour Company in Kansas City, Kansas, East St. Louis, Fort Worth, St. Joseph, Missouri and Sioux City, Iowa, and at the Swift Plants in Chicago. Reports from all UPWA districts across the country indicated that the greatest success had been achieved in the hiring of black women, the integration of lily-white departments, and the elimination of segregated plant facilities. More importantly, there were no regional exceptions to the application of these policies, with the desegregation of plants in Atlanta and Birmingham.  

Success, however, was not instantaneous nor free from white workers’ resistance. In some locals, particularly at the Armour plant in Fort Worth, the introduction of the “New Program” led to a racist backlash. Alleging that the “New Program” was a “plot from the Communist In the Chicago office,” a white opposition group appealed to the national office of the CIO to intervene. Over the next two years, the UPWA engaged in a struggle that, while resolving the disputes and neutralizing this opposition in Fort Worth, led to a regional revolt and disaffiliation of several locals.  

The success and difficulty of implementing the UPWA “New Program” of anti-discrimination was indeed partially tied to the involvement of a left-wing coalition of black and white unionists centered in Chicago. Unlike any other affiliate that was not purged for CP ties by the CIO in 1950, the UPWA
maintained a small but influential leftist block because its constitution barred
discrimination against members based on "race, color, national origin, religion,
sex, and political beliefs." The CIO leadership under Walter Reuther Interjected
itself in the internal affairs of the UPWA, in response to the political accusations
of white union racial demagogues. The results of such a misguided policy led
to serious breakdown in race relations in a number of Southern UPWA
locals.138

Nonetheless, the UPWA stood above most other CIO affiliates in the
application of its anti-discrimination policies. Moreover, no other affiliate had as
many high ranking elected black officials at the time of the AFL-CIO merger in
1955. Russell Lasley, who was elected a vice president in 1948, was head of
the AD department while Charles Hayes and George Thomas were both district
directors and Leon Beverly was president of the largest local in the union
(Chicago Armour Local 347). Only the United Electrical Workers (UE), a union
expelled by the CIO in 1950, for its ties to the CP, could claim greater
representation of minorities (three African Americans and two women) on its
executive board.137

The URW had done a great deal to promote the interest of black rubber
workers since the union's inception in 1935. Nonetheless, racial problems did
exist, especially in the South. Following the mandate of the 1948 CIO
convention calling on each CIO affiliate to create a civil rights committee or
Department of Fair Practices, URW president Leland Buckmaster appointed a
four man committee. In less than a year however, the committee informed the
Rubberworkers executive board that it was "ineffective." Thereafter a
department was established and headed by James Turner, an executive board
member of Local 7 and member of the Akron NAACP. Although Turner devoted
most of his energies toward setting up local union Fair Practices committees, a
lack of funds and personnel prevented him from carrying out what he
considered to be the main priority of the Department - securing non-
discrimination clauses and occupational upgrading of black rubberworkers. By
1953, Local 222 in Buffalo reported that there was "no discrimination
whatsoever" in terms of layoffs and upgrading. The picture was quite different at
the Springfield plant in Cumberland, Maryland. There were only 21 blacks out
of a total work force of some 1800 and nine of these were janitors. The Fair
Practices Chairman of Local 26 regretfully informed Turner that he realized
"how slow progress is being made on black advancement rights." Seemingly
defending the company he continued by saying that Springfield had no
immediate plans to "further opportunity for blacks" because they did not want a
repetition of white protest when blacks were upgraded during WWII.138

It was most unfortunate for many blacks in the UAW that factionalism kept
the Fair Practices Department from attempting to redress their grievances. In
October 1950 black members of UAW Local 893 in Dallas, Texas, complained
to union President Walter Reuther about their employment problems. But
because of alleged "communist association," the members were forced to wait
nearly five years before any action was considered. Fair Practices co-Director
Oliver lamented that "the Negroes in Dallas may possibly have a legitimate complaint... our failure to act in a matter of this kind because of the reason stated (communism) certainly does us irreparable harm."\[139\]

In some cases black workers in the UAW chose to bypass the bureaucratic process by taking matters into their own hands. In late 1952 members of Briggs Local 742 led by black "militant" Layman Walker staged a wildcat at the Connor Avenue plant in Detroit. According to Walker, who was the local's recording secretary, 359 of the 4,000 workers at the plant were black. Only one black man was in the skilled trades department, and of the 200 female employees, only three were black. The company union contract stated that persons previously employed by Briggs would be hired before new employees were to be considered. According to Walker, hundreds of black women worked at the plant during World War II. The fact that only three were employed at the time of the protest appeared to be "more than coincidence." As a result of the protest, 11 black women were hired. The Briggs company eventually hired another 500 black women along with the Cadillac and General Motors Ternstedt Plant which employed 65 and 25 women respectively.\[140\]

Fair Practices co-Director Oliver labeled the walkout by Local 742 as a "political strike led by one of the left-wingers." The officers of Local 742 in conjunction with the local's FEPC continued to monitor discrimination in the plant and especially focused on the "peculiar absence" of black apprentices to the skilled trades and the "biased tests" given to production employees for maintenance welding jobs. Oliver disapproved of the manner in which Local 742 chose to solve its discrimination problems, complaining that the Fair Practices Department "was not advised of any problem." While he did not doubt that there were a number of cases of discrimination, the main reason they were not being resolved was because Regional Directors were failing to follow through on the Fair Practices programs that had been initiated.\[141\]

Factionalism aside, the events of the post-war period led to a greater awareness that in a number of instances CIO racial policy was not being followed. The National Committee constantly considered its effectiveness and all too often realized its shortcomings. As far as some members were concerned, "too much was wrong and too little was being done" to remedy discrimination against blacks and Jews in the CIO. The committee was not "sufficiently aggressive" in indicting international unions which had not implemented CIO policy and expulsion was suggested to "arouse the public." Chairman Carey, while arguing that "the important instrument to abolish discrimination in this country was the progressive labor movement," adamantly refused to seek expulsion of local unions who violated CIO policy.\[142\]

Despite admitting that many black workers had lost confidence in the Committee's function because its procedures were "vacillatory," most members realized that the Committee itself was limited beyond persuasion and education. If certain CIO councils and officials evaded and violated union racial policy, the National Committee contemplated sending a report to the CIO.
Executive Board with recommendations for censoring and sanctioning. In the end it was felt that President Murray would have to be the remedial force to give the offenders a "liberal education" on how far CIO policy went. By the spring of 1950, CIO General Counsel Arthur Goldberg, a member of the National Committee, sent out a memorandum to all CIO regional directors and IUC's taking the firm position that:

Any state regulation or ordinance which compels the practicing of segregation is in violation of the constitution of the U.S. Therefore, no segregation in the use of facilities in buildings or office space under the control of CIO-IUC should be permitted and there should be no signs indicating such segregation on any CIO property.

The success of CIO racial policies in the very early 1950s was tied as much to a direct and forceful method of enforcement as it was a legalistic rhetoric that decried racism and segregation in the organization. Soon after World War II, other forces committed to civil rights and the elimination of racial and ethnic discrimination in the labor movement called the CIO to task for its seemingly lethargic position on these issues. The political climate of the cold war again determined the path the CIO and the National Committee to Abolish Discrimination would take.

Killing Two Birds With One Stone: The CIO's Attack upon Black Labor Interest Groups Under the Guise of Anti-Communism

The post-war period also found the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination forging alliances or engaged in conflict with other ethnic-racial organizations concerned with discrimination and civil rights. The four most important of these were the Jewish Labor committee, the Negro Labor Committee, the NAACP, and the leftist combination of the National Negro Congress and National Negro Labor Council. The Jewish Labor Committee (JLC) was founded in early 1934 by several prominent Jewish trade unionist and socialists. It evolved as an outgrowth of predominantly Jewish unions affiliated with the AFL (International Ladies Garment Workers Union, Amalgamated Clothing Workers, United Hebrew Trades, etc.) in response to the rising tide of fascism and anti-semitism sweeping Germany. Led by Sidney Hillman, David Dubinsky, and Baruch Charney Vladek, the JLC represented nearly 500,000 Jewish unionists in new York City and other large industrial centers, like Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia. Throughout World War II, both the AFL and CIO supported the activities of the JLC which resulted in saving over 1,8000 European labor leaders.

Toward the latter part of the war, the JLC began joining forces with other national organizations committed to challenging discrimination and improving race relations. In large industrial cities like Detroit "Labor Committees to Combat Intolerance" were created in an effort to secure local trade union
support for their educational program against prejudice and discrimination. The JLC's involvement in the post war civil rights struggle was based upon three principles. First, as a Jewish organization it fought for equal rights for Jewish employment, education, and to a certain extent public housing accommodation. This led the JLC directly into the struggle for civil rights under the influence of both practical considerations and political liberalism within its ranks. Secondly, as a democratic socialist organization, the JLC supported civil rights on principal. As a labor organization it knew that a powerful and unified labor movement had to be nondiscriminatory. And finally, because JLC was a labor group, it was considered as integral part of the labor movement and therefore "able to establish contacts and develop programs that outside organizations could not."148

The Negro Labor Committee (NLC), first known as the Harlem Labor Committee (1933) was created in 1935 from a small cadre of black trade unionists led by the black socialist Frank Crosswaith the. Its major goal was to educate black workers in Harlem on the value and benefit of joining labor unions. Initially an all-black organization, it soon moved to become interracial in character. The vast majority of whites that became involved were Jewish unionists whose organizations were integrating their ranks with black workers. Foremost was the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) of which Crosswaith was a general organizer. The NLC was never a national or even state-wide organization, but it always held the potential to become the kind of black labor interest group Horace Cayton called for in the late 1930s. It was in the shadows of the cold war that the NLC and its supporters attempted to plant the seed for a broader and more active black labor interest organization.147

The NAACP began to take a greater interest in organized labor in the late 1930s with the formation and organizing of the CIO. In heavily unionized cities like Detroit and Chicago branch "Labor Committees" were created to focus on civil rights issues directly related to minority workers.148 By 1944 national officers of the Association gave serious consideration toward creating a formal labor department with an experienced head who would coordinate activities between the NAACP and organized labor. In late 1946 such a department was formed and headed by Clarence M. Mitchell who was to work with the Secretary of Labor, and representatives from both the AFL and CIO.149

As noted earlier, the National Negro Congress was originally conceived as an umbrella organization of existing groups that were concerned with discrimination and civil rights, but especially the improvement and advancement of the black worker within organized labor. One student of the NNC contends that there was no difference between the NNC and the NAACP in terms of goals, but that the former might never have evolved if the NAACP had taken a more vigorous stance toward black workers in organized labor in the late 1930s.150 Like the NAACP, the NNC also formed local labor committees, but the telling difference between the two organizations was the latters connection with the Communist Party.151 With the resignation of A. Philip
Randolph as head of the NNC in 1940, because of its increasing ties to the Communist Party, the NNC began to lose credibility and membership. By late 1945, Revels Cayton, a leading figure in the CIO Marine Cooks and Stewards on the West coast was chosen as executive secretary and attempted a greater alignment of the NNC with the left and the labor movement. Its main objective was to see an increase in black office holders in unions and to "confront the labor movement with something more potent and effective than committees set up to beat discrimination." Thus the early post-war period saw the NNC become a black labor interest group composed of black unionists from CIO-leftist unions.

The CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination expressed an initial reluctance to work with any of these groups. It advised CIO Director of Industrial Union Council's John Brophy to write directives urging CIO industrial union councils not to support the NNC because of its ties to the Communists. As for the JLC and NAACP, the early post-war period (1946-1948) was a time of constructive competition and criticism. The JLC took offense at being omitted from the National CIO's list of acceptable agencies with which state and local IUC's were to work in the civil rights field. Jewish Labor Committee leaders and their members in the CIO-Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union criticized the Committee for "doing nothing in the face of serious racial tensions within and without the ranks of organized labor." Moreover, these critics claimed no other group "be it the Urban League or the NAACP" had the ability or experience to administer a labor educational program on race relations. Such claims by the JLC and its allies were no doubt exaggerated, but recent CIO Committee discussions concerning a greater awareness of anti-Semitism played no small part in the JLC quickly being included among CIO civil rights allies.

Members of the CIO Committee were especially disturbed at the creation of the NAACP's Labor Department in late 1948. Willard Townsend informed James Carey that the Association's approach to specific employment problems was "unoriginal and ineffective. As an officer of the National Urban League, Townsend was troubled by the NAACP's initiation of a program which allegedly intruded upon a field occupied by the Urban League for some 36 years. Furthermore, he felt that he Association did not seem to care that its activities might have been "duplicitive and otherwise impeding." By 1947 the CIO Committee and the NAACP had worked out their differences. Speaking at a meeting of the NAACP's Labor Department in June, George Weaver emphasized in a subtly paternalistic manner the "close kinship to the officers and members of the Association because the policy and program of the two organizations were so parallel." Weaver admonished the Labor Department to be the CIO Committee's "eyes and ears" by referring labor complaints to the CIO for settlement to "minimize friction."

Despite the activities of the CIO committee, Jewish Labor Committee, the NAACP and the left, a number of black unionists still felt the need for a "centre of
instrumentality to render united leadership tackling the basic problems affecting Negro labor." The most vocal proponent of such an approach was Noah Walter. Born and raised in Brooklyn, New York, Walter was a graduate of both Bluefield State Teachers College (West Virginia) and the Rand School of Social Science. By the early 1930s, he, Frank Crosswath and a handful of other African American activists comprised the core of the Socialist Party's efforts among blacks in New York City. Walter began his labor activism as an organizer for the Negro Labor Committee and was most successful in helping to organize the United Laundry Workers into the CIO in 1937. Throughout the 1940s he remained tied to the NLC and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers and was one of the fifteen black delegates at the 1942 CIO Convention that formalized the Committee to Abolish Discrimination.158

Voicing the same concerns about black labor as Horace Cayton had in the late 1930s, Walter tried to convince Willard Townsend in 1948 of the need to broaden the base of the Negro Labor Committee to the assumed level of the JLC, Italian Labor Council and the Women's Trade Union League. He argued that neither the AFL or CIO could be expected to "competently understand nor even if interested as a matter of policy fully appreciate the never ending problem of Negro labor." Thus Walter held the opinion of many blacks in the CIO that much of the committee to Abolish Discrimination's efforts had fallen far short of its expressed goal to improve their overall status.158

As usual, Townsend's response was defensive to say the least. As a founder of the CIO Committee it was unlikely that he would have openly lent his support to an organization that perhaps held the potential of overshadowing and upstaging the CIO. Moreover, as a firm believer in complete integration in American society (and staunchly believing the CIO to be the vanguard integrationist organization from which society could pattern itself after), Townsend questioned the value of such racial, religious and ethnic labor interest groups. Somehow, Walter's ideas had the "ugly inference that they were attempting a Negro wing within the CIO."180

Townsend attempted to justify his position with a perplexing dose of contradiction and double standard. In comparing black, Jewish and Catholic unionists, he felt that because the latter two were not "confronted with a complete barrier" in all aspects of their existence like African Americans, their concentration in the form of a particular caucus did not create an unfavorable reaction. Yet, because of the overwhelming discrimination against blacks, the approach had to be "nothing short of full and complete integration."181

It is difficult to understand how Townsend reached this position. On one hand, his argument can be reduced to purely racial terms since all other interest groups regardless of ethnic or religious emphasis were "white" organizations. A separate black labor interest group suggested the kind of de jure and de facto segregation that existed throughout the country at the time. The small cadre of black CIO officials closest to the white leadership (Townsend, Weaver, Oliver and Carter) agreed with it in the belief that all a
black labor interest group allegedly hoped to achieve was greater black representation in union political offices based on their race. Yet this was a legitimate concern since in most cases when blacks or other minorities (e.g., Hispanics) were elected it was from locals with a high proportion of blacks or other ethnic members. When this did occur, minority union leaders held dual allegiances to both the union and their racial-ethnic group.12

Was Townsend blind to the fact that white CIO unionists used their race, religion, and ethnicity for similar political advantage? Catholic unionists in particular through the workings of the Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU) were able to control a number of key positions in the National CIO and in various large affiliates (e.g., Steelworkers, UAW, IUE, and the Transport Workers Union). Both CIO president Philip Murray and Secretary-Treasurer James Carey were Catholic. It has been argued that the ACTU was the key anti-Communist faction within the CIO. Yet to deny that they used religion the same way black unionists or racist white unionists used race is misleading. For example, during the height of the anti-Communist struggle in the CIO, the Detroit chapter of the ACTU forcefully asked Murray whose support the CIO's Political Action Committee wanted, "the confidence of about 300,000 working-class Catholics in the area or, would it rather have the doubtful services of a couple of thousand Reds?"183

Regardless of ethnicity or religion, liberal white unionists in the CIO pledged a firm commitment against racism and communism in the post-war period. It was the latter, however, that brought out the most diligent and far-reaching bureaucratic responses from the leadership. In fact, the leadership went as far as sanctioning black labor interest groups for the sole purpose of heading off Communist Party Intrusions. Anti-Communist black unionists naively speculated that CIO support against the Communist Party would serve as a springboard for greater action against racial discrimination and an improvement of race relations. Such hopes were short lived.

Emphasizing that the time was "ripe," Walter continued to press both Townsend and Weaver on the idea of building the Negro Labor Committee into more than a localized forum where black unionists discussed their concerns but had little hope of remediation. By early 1950 plans were well underway for a "Negro Labor Conference" to "offset some of the destructive activities and influences which subversive groups are conducting among American Negro trade unionists." Caught up in its own internal purges, CIO leaders did not respond until late 1951 when Carey and other leaders spoke at the Frank R. Crosswaith testimonial dinner. By this time it was very clear to the CIO leadership that some kind of offsetting action was indeed necessary.154

The main spark that motivated CIO leaders to support the Negro Labor Committee was the challenge posed by the Communist supported National Negro Labor Council (NNLC). The brainchild of prominent black CIO unionists like Ewart Guiniar and Ferdinand Smith the NNLC brought together those African American unionists who had been connected with the Communist Party...
influenced National Negro Congress and Negro Labor Victory Committee during the war. By 1949, both of these organizations were defunct, and a number of their former members led by Smith and Guinier formed the Harlem Trade Union Council. This group in turn sponsored the "National Trade Union Conference for Negro Rights" in Chicago in June of 1950. A gathering of some 900 unionists including white labor leaders Harry Bridges and Maurice Travis, focussed on the upgrading of black workers, apprentice training, and the need for state FEPC legislation. From this meeting plans were laid for the creation of a permanent organization under the leadership of William Hood, recording secretary of UAW Local 600 in Detroit, Coleman Young, former director of organization of the Wayne County CIO-IUC, and Ernest Thompson, business agent of UE Local 427 and the most prominent black in that union.165

Although the National Negro Labor Council did not come into being until its founding convention in October of 1951 in Cincinnati, Ohio, some 20 or so local councils began active and militant campaigns against discrimination in the CIO and the hiring practices of businesses throughout the United States. To the discredit of the CIO and its Committee to Abolish Discrimination, the NNLC was able to partially achieve the kind of economic and racial advances the CIO envisioned for the future. Various labor councils engaged in direct action boycotts and protest to challenge the barriers to equality. On the West Coast some 90 black workers were hired by the Key System Railroad after negotiations with local leaders of the NNLC. In Detroit both Hood and Young met with Ford Motor company director of labor relations Manton Cummins and admonished him to live up to the company claim of non-discrimination in the hiring of office workers. The Greater Detroit Labor Council then made it a point to send "dozens of qualified" black women for job interviews. In Louisville, Kentucky the local NNLC negotiated a "precedent-shattering" agreement with the city's board of education to offer special courses for black workers in anticipation of the opening of a General Electric Plant in 1954.166

Thus the NNLC was much more than a "paper organization," even if it was allegedly a "Communist Party front group." Realizing that NNLC was making inroads where it had grown lethargic, the CIO attempted to respond through the Negro Labor Committee. Such an alliance had to be conceived with great care since the CIO had no intentions of supporting a "Jim Crow outfit." Moreover, the CIO took great care in seeing that the "reconstitution" of the Negro Labor Committee was along strict trade union lines with representation from both the CIO and AFL and not simple "adjuncts of the ILGWU or the Liberal Party."167

Addressing the conference of March 1, 1952 in New York, CIO Secretary-Treasurer James Carey told the audience of some 350 that the CIO welcomed the opportunity to be involved in organizing "colored fellow Americans into labor unions of every sort and description." Short of these brief remarks, the gist of his speech had nothing at all to do with organizing black workers or addressing their concerns, but rather it denounced the white supremacists of the far right and the Communist "stooges for the Politburo" on the extreme left.168
The remainder of Carey's talk was a nostalgic description of what the CIO had done in the civil rights field and to improve the status of all workers, not just blacks. He stressed that the CIO had not relied upon its mere constitutional declarations of non-discrimination, but put "flesh, muscle, and skin, heart and brain" into action by creating the Committee to Abolish Discrimination. Yet Carey admitted that the CIO had a long way to go to realize its goals and was willing to work with any "free and voluntary American groups in attaining the principles on which we are agreed."[169]

In conclusion, Carey went to great lengths to point out that the CIO sought no special interest of blacks or any other worker considered as a class. The conference was a meeting of organized labor -- "not a religious meeting; not a biracial meeting as such; definitely not a political meeting...and not a front for any special interest." Instead it looked for the creation of a vehicle through which "all of us (CIO, AFL, other union organizations) could join together to bring the first and most important step of all within the grasp of our fellow Negro Americans-organization."

Labeled as an "Anti-Red Negro Group" by the official publication of the CIO, the Negro Labor Committee hardly lived up to such a billing. For one thing, the combination of the federal government and the CIO red-baited and repressed the National Negro Labor Council into organizational impotence. Its achievement on behalf of thousands of black rank and file members in the CIO in the face of such political repression should not be underestimated or overlooked. The creation and activities of the Negro Labor Committee however, played little if any role in the demise of the NNLC.

The greatest irony of all was that in less than a year after its "reconstitution" the CIO decided against continuing active cooperation with the Negro Labor Committee. In January of 1953 the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination met and recommended to the CIO Executive Board that since the activities and procedures of the Negro Labor Committee were "in conflict and duplicated" the work of the CIO Committee, all formal ties be severed.[170] Why had the CIO reversed its position? Unfortunately, the leadership of the Negro Labor Committee made it quite easy for the CIO to rely on any number of "misdeeds" that took place throughout 1952. Foremost was the internal struggle between Frank Crosswaith and Benjamin McLaurin as to who was in charge of the organization. The intensity of their disagreements made it "easily recognized that a group that was supposed to reduce Communist Party influence among Negro workers, was obviously racing rapidly away from its objective."[171]

Among the other reasons given for the withdrawal of the CIO were the reckless use of funds, and the attempt to establish local chapters across the country which "was not the CIO's initial understanding." Moreover, these local chapters took it upon themselves to intervene in situations involving the integration of black workers into certain CIO locals and alleged acts of
discrimination by other locals without notifying national CIO officials. Thus the local labor committees were viewed by the CIO as "vehicles for disgruntled and malcontent local officers." Finally, representatives of the CIO Committee boldly stated that there was nothing the Negro Labor Committee could do for the CIO that the CIO could not do for itself.\footnote{This was just as apparent on March 1, 1952 when Carey and Townsend paid lip service to the idea of a Negro Labor Committee for the sake of anti-Communist unity within the CIO. Despite such disclaimers, the Negro Labor Committee was more of a CIO anti-communist "front group," and a "paper organization" than its ideological counterpart the NNLC.}

Once the "distraction" of the NNLC was removed, the CIO forged ahead with a much more legalistic approach to solving racial matters. Upon the death of CIO President Philip Murray in 1952, Walter Reuther took over as President of the organization. In March of 1953, the Committee's name was changed to "CIO Civil Rights" reflective of the growing public relations character the Committee had assumed. The direct concern the Committee had had during the war years on the position and potential advancement of black unionists waned considerably as it focused more on a broader legislative civil rights agenda.

Between 1950 and 1955, the Committee's membership composition expanded as did its relationship with national civil rights organizations and programs like the NAACP, Jewish Labor Committee, NUL and American Jewish Committee. The Committee's most important civil rights endeavor was its role in pushing for national FEPC legislation. Yet by 1952, it was an accepted fact that no gains would be made in this area unless the rules of cloture in the U.S. Congress were altered. Therefore the Civil Rights Committee directed its State IUC affiliates to push for local and statewide FEPC legislation. In many states like Michigan the CIO provided the majority of financial backing for such campaigns.\footnote{Between 1950 and 1955, the Committee's membership composition expanded as did its relationship with national civil rights organizations and programs like the NAACP, Jewish Labor Committee, NUL and American Jewish Committee. The Committee's most important civil rights endeavor was its role in pushing for national FEPC legislation. Yet by 1952, it was an accepted fact that no gains would be made in this area unless the rules of cloture in the U.S. Congress were altered. Therefore the Civil Rights Committee directed its State IUC affiliates to push for local and statewide FEPC legislation. In many states like Michigan the CIO provided the majority of financial backing for such campaigns.}

In terms of internal regulation the Civil Rights Committee had the 1950 directive of President Murray with which to pressure those international affiliates or state IUC's that refused to follow union racial policy. For the most part the vast majority of CIO facilities North and South were integrated. However racial problems still persisted throughout the deep South, especially in Alabama. This was highlighted during one of President Philip Murray's last speeches before his death in 1952. While addressing a congregation of Steelworkers in Birmingham, local union officers asked the police to maintain segregation among the black and white unionists assembled outside the meeting.\footnote{Most of the success the CIO achieved in persuading various employers to hire black workers in the early 1950s was with the support of governmental intervention. Both the Korean War and continuing pressure from civil rights organizations pushed president Harry Truman to issue several executive orders reminiscent of Roosevelt's pioneering executive order 8802. The two most helpful for the CIO were executive orders 10210 and 10308. The former, issued...}

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In February of 1951 stated that there was to be no employment discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color or national origin by those industries handling defense contracts. Yet like its predecessor (8802), 10210 lacked an enforcement clause. Subsequently Truman issued 10308 creating a Government Contract Compliance Committee which was to “study the rules, procedures, and practices of the contracting agencies of the government as they related to compliance with provisions prohibiting discrimination.”

While this certainly was not the ultimate measure of force Civil Rights Committee members had been looking for, it was a persuasive tool that brought about some measure of advancement. Along with a memo from UAW President Reuther reminding his union’s regional directors of the nondiscrimination clause in certain union contracts, black female auto workers made incremental gains. Throughout 1952 and 1953 the Fair Practices Department of the UAW relied upon the threat of invoking the sanction of the Governmental Contract Committee to see an additional 300 black women hired on at several Detroit auto plants.

In reality the Governmental Committee had no real power other than to recommend to the President “the best way” to bring about compliance. Although the Committee continued under the Eisenhower administration, CIO Civil Rights Director Weaver concluded in 1953 that it was a “dead duck.” Moreover the Civil Rights Committee pondered how they could impress the administration of the importance of the Governmental Committee. According to Weaver, the authority for handling violations was in the hands of people who were “actually not in sympathy with the program.” It was felt that without extreme forms of pressure, the government was not dedicated to enforcing the law of the executive order.

All was not necessarily well within the ranks of affiliated unions either. In one of the last meetings of the Civil Rights Committee before the AFL-CIO merger, Weaver confided that over the previous 14 months (since August 1953) less than 90 cases had been received of which “30 or 40” were resolved. Yet he was certain that there was not a Committee member “sitting around who could not in a very short period get 10 or 15 cases of discrimination” that they were personally aware of. It was a known fact that a number of local unions were ignoring CIO mandates against discrimination. With the Supreme Court’s Brown vs. Board of Education ruling still fresh, the Committee considered the revoking of charters as proper but felt court orders would be necessary to assist them.

While the picture was somewhat discouraging, the Civil Rights Committee and its outside allies like the NAACP continued to pressure the Eisenhower administration “to seek an overall solution to the discrimination practiced by both the employer and union.” Several national firms with plants in the South like General Electric, Shell Oil, and Chance Vought Aircraft in Houston felt compelled to change their hiring and promotion practices because they were being pushed by the government—their biggest customer. In light of
such overtures, Weaver informed the union representatives involved (UAW, Oilworkers, IUE) to indicate their support to the company in the increased employment of blacks on a basis of merit rather than race.\textsuperscript{179}

Although the CIO Civil Rights Committee admitted that problems continued to exist within its own ranks and that the federal government was less than enthusiastic in resolving cases of discrimination, it could always console itself by engaging in one-upmanship with the AFL. The Committee went to great lengths to publicize findings that CIO unions had a more progressive policy in its dealings with minorities than the AFL. Not only did various studies conclude that the CIO was "much more energetic than the AFL in putting anti-discrimination policies into practice, but "in one way or another" the AFL Executive Council "practiced discrimination."\textsuperscript{180}

Less than two years after such conclusions, the CIO and the Civil Rights Committee had somehow become convinced that the AFL was well on its way toward rectifying past discrimination. How it could have reached such a position when at least 17 unions either excluded blacks or refused to admit them by tacit consent is mystifying. Previous scholarship has rightly pointed out that the civil rights issue was one of the most troublesome and delicately bargained arrangements of the merger convention. Yet it was high ranking officials of the CIO, as well as Civil Rights Committee members that put up the least opposition to the final agreement. Congress of Industrial Organization chief legal counsel or Arthur Goldberg felt that the policies of the two federations on racial discrimination were basically identical by the time of the final discussion of labor unity. Civil Rights Committee Chairman James Carey likewise praised the final statement and concluded that "the language is so clear and forthright on the score that it banished at once any qualms or misgivings that even the most timid could hold." Yet Carey obviously knew that many CIO unionists, and blacks in the CIO and AFL in particular, felt that the civil rights provisions were not that strong. He readily admitted that if the drafting sub-committee had attempted to "devise standards more stringent" than those contained in the final document, "it would have had the effect of trying and finding guilty some organizations particularly in the AFL without their having had a hearing. Without actually mentioning "expulsion," Carey argued that it was impossible to write a self-enforcement constitution unless a compulsory arbitration clause were added to the document--something CIO leaders were "violently opposed" to.\textsuperscript{181}

A number of black unionists in both the CIO and AFL were not as naive. Meeting in Detroit several months before the merger convention, they formed the Negro Trade Union Committee (NTUC) designed to advocate civil rights and union officeholding concerns of black workers. The NTUC presented a specific agenda to the merger convention in December 1955 that called for an organizing campaign of the South and the expulsion of any union failing to eliminate discrimination within a specific time period.
There was no way they should have expected Carey or the entire CIO leadership to reverse their opinion on the question of expulsion. With regards to officeholding, the NTUC was somewhat appeased by the selection of A. Philip Randolph and Willard Townsend to the AFL-CIO Executive Council. The NTUC took full credit for Townsend's election and attributed it to their distribution of handbills calling for the election of a black vice-president at the separate AFL and CIO conventions. Townsend had not expected to be elected but said he was willing to work with the group.182

The most important convention measure that affected African American unionists was the creation of the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Committee. This was viewed as an extension of the CIO Civil Rights Committee. Yet, it was all too apparent that the AFL-CIO Committee was in for hard times if it did not attempt to do more than its CIO predecessor. Three major developments in 1957 foreshadowed the relationship between organized labor and its black membership for the next two decades. First was the reformation of the NTUC into the Trade Union Leadership Council (TULC). This was yet another historic example of black discontent with the inability of organized labor's bureaucratic mechanism to address racial and minority discrimination concerns. Although TULC was largely a Detroit based organization its formation and influence were a major factor that led to the creation of the Negro American Labor Council in 1959. Both TULC and NALC represented the culmination and inevitability of what Abram Harris saw as necessity in 1939 and what Noah Walter argued for in 1948. The lack of black rank file participation and input on CIO racial policies as well as the tendency to label alternative approaches as "Communist inspired" forced blacks to constantly seek ways to prod the white leadership to listen.183

The second matter revolved around the leadership and program of the AFL-CIO Civil Rights Department. Boris Shiskin, former AFL research director was appointed director of the department while George L.P. Weaver, Director of the CIO Committee, was appointed executive secretary. No clear distinction or definition of their job function was established. Clash of interest was avoided when AFL-CIO President George Meany sent Weaver to the Far East on special assignment for most of 1956. Although James Carey continued as chairman of the Committee, he soon found out how mistaken he had been to believe that the merger agreement on civil rights was a panacea. By June of 1957, he and Weaver resigned because of the "inability of the Committee to effectively function."184 The third event that complicated matters even more, was the passing of Willard Townsend after a lengthy illness. A. Philip Randolph stood alone as the only black member of the AFL-CIO Executive Council. The issue of black union leadership which had been so divisive in the CIO during the 1940s, and was repressed and avoided during the early 1950s, re-emerged.

Unlike the 1940s, black unionists in the mid 1950s had a new ally in the form of the NAACP and its labor director, Herbert Hill. The Association had expressed the greatest reserve over the impact of the merger on civil rights and was reluctant to believe the AFL was ready to clean its house. Indeed events
over the next twenty years would prove that racial equality within organized labor was much more than simple integrated unionism.


Labor historians anxiously await Professor Robert Zieger's book on the CIO which will in all likelihood serve as the definitive account of the organization. The pioneering works on African Americans and the CIO (and AFL) are Horace Cayton and George S. Mitchell, *Black Workers and the New Unions* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1939), and Herbert R. Northrup, *Organized Labor and the Negro* (New York: Harper and Brothers Publisher, 1944).


3 The most important of these studies since 1978 are August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, *Black Detroit and the Rise of the UAW* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), which is still the single best history of black participation in a single CIO union. Roderick N. Ryon, "An Ambiguous Legacy: Baltimore Blacks and the CIO, 1936-41," *Journal of Negro History, 85* (Winter, 1980), pp. 18-33, is a brief yet informative essay on the ups and downs of the relationship between Baltimore's black community and the CIO during the Organization's formative period. Martin Halpern, *UAW Politics in the Cold War Era* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), continues Meier's and Rudwick's story, but limits itself to the period 1945-55 and only deals with blacks and race relations within the context of political factionalism in the UAW.


8. Ibid., p. 69.


12. Two examples will suffice. See the October-November, 1945 issue of the *People's Avenger* in which noted black journalist George Schuyler compared the backgrounds of the two black candidates running for the New York City Council-Benjamin F. McLaurin, field organizer for the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, and the incumbent Benjamin J. Davis, Jr., the leading black member of the Communist Party. Schuyler left no stone unturned in depicting Davis and his black and white associates as "agents of the International Communist conspiracy laboring diligently to undermine and destroy the American government and way of life." The other notable instance centered around the 1951-52 CIO struggle against the Communist supported National Negro Labor Council in which the latter's criticism of discrimination in the UAW served as proof for the HUAC of the council's "pro-communist ideology." See October 22, 1951 UAW-CIO, News Release in National Negro Labor Council Vertical File, Archives of Labor and Urban Affairs, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan, (hereafter ALUA), and below pp. 41-43.

14 Cayton and Mitchell, Black Workers and the New Unions, pp. 198-199. Here again it is important to point out that two works which appeared after Cayton and Mitchell's Black Workers and the New Unions, Robert R. R. Brooks, As Steel Goes...Unionism in a Basic Industry (New Haven: Yale University press, 1940) and even the United Steelworkers official history written by Vincent Sweeny, The United Steelworkers of America: Twenty Years Later (Pittsburgh, 1956) completely disregard black workers or make a single paragraph reference. See Brooks, p. 186.

15 John P. Davis, "Let Us Build A National Negro Congress," (Washington, 1935), Box 2, NNC Papers; John P. Davis to John Brophy, 4 February 1935, Box 4, NNC Papers, Schomburg Collection, New York Public Library.

16 "Proposed Plan for Organization of Negro Steelworkers in Youngstown, Ohio." 10 June 1936, Box 16, CIO Central Correspondence Files, Catholic University, Washington, D.C.


19 John P. Davis to Phillip Murray, 27 August 1936, Box 6, NNC Papers; Dickerson, Out of the Crucible, pp. 142-149.

20 John P. Davis to William Mitch, 12 October 1936, Box 6, NNC Papers; Ryon, "Ambiguous Legacy," pp.23-25.

21 John P. Davis to William Mitch, 16 September 1936, John P. Davis to William Mitch and Mitch to Davis both 12 October 1936, Box 6, NNC Papers; Kelly, Hammer and Hoe, pp.142-144. According to the black communist labor leader Hosea Hudson, Howard was indeed a Communist Party member that was recruited along with him and worked on behalf of the CIO until his death in the early 1940s. Hudson asserted that in some cases because of prior Communist Party activities in the South prior to 1936, blacks were more willing to join the CIO than whites who despaired interracial association. One of the worst offenders was said to be the district representative who "constantly insulted Negroes." Hosea Hudson, Black Worker in the Deep South (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 51, 85-86, 79.

22 John P. Davis to Clinton Golden, 12 October; Davis to Philip Murray, 13 October; Golden to Davis, 21 October; Murray to Davis, 10 November, 1936, Box 6, NNC Papers. Murray had agreed to such a meeting with Davis and black SWOC organizers nearly a month before he publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with the rate of black steelworkers' recruitment into the CIO. At the same time he did not make Davis aware that there were problems as far as he and the SWOC leadership was concerned. We are of course left to speculate as to what would have happened if Davis and the black organizers had not been the initiators of such a conference.

23 Negro America Acts to Build Steel Union," Daily Worker, 8 February 1931; "Chance for Negro Worker," United Mine Worker, 15 May 1937; Dickerson, Out of the Crucible, p. 136
24 "Schuyler Visits Steel Centers in Ohio and Pennsylvania; Finds Race Workers Loyal to Companies; Making Big Money," Pittsburgh Courier, 24 July 1937, reprinted in Foner and Lewis, Black Workers from the Founding of the CIO to the AFL-CIO Merger, pp. 51-57.

25 Daniel Blakely, Oral History, (OH), pp. 8-13, 17, Ohio Historical Society, (OHS), Columbus, Ohio.

26 Ibid., p. 6; "Schuyler Visits Steel Center," in Foner and Lewis, Black Workers from the Founding of the CIO to the AFL-CIO Merger, p. 55.

27 Ibid., p. 54.


29 Schuyler, Pittsburgh Courier, July 1937 in Foner and Lewis, Black Workers from the Founding of the CIO to the AFL-CIO Merger, pp. 50-51. Rye was one of the original black organizers whom National Negro Congress secretary, John P. Davis, had requested CIO leaders hire for the "Youngstown Plan" in 1938.


31 John Dancy to Andrew Sneed, 8 March, 1937, Box 3, Detroit Urban League (DUL) Papers, Michigan Historical Collections, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

32 Lester B. Granger, "The Negro in Labor Unions," 1938 Annual NAACP Conference, Columbus, Ohio, NAACP Papers, Series 1, Reel 10, Box 15.

33 Walter Smethurst to A. M. Wendell Mallich, 21 September 1938; W. Smethhurst to Thomas B. Morton, 26 November 1938, Box 16, CIO Central Correspondence Files, Catholic University, Washington D.C.

34 "Report of Director," 1937, 38, 39, 40, Boxes 5, 6, 7, John Brophy Papers, Catholic University, Washington D.C.


36 Ben Williams to John L. Lewis, 23 March, 8 June, 28 September, 1938, CIO Files of John L. Lewis, Part 2, Reel 2; Van Bittner to John L. Lewis, 18 October 1938, Henry Johnson to J. L. Lewis, 2 November 1938, Box 30, CIO National and International Union (Packinghouse), CIO Archives, Catholic University. Johnson's activities among meatpackers in Fort Worth, Texas was the same as in Omaha, but both blacks and whites were more receptive. See Rick Halpern, "Interracial Unionism in the Southeast: Fort Worth's Packinghouse Workers, 1937-1954," in Robert Zieger, (ed.), Organized Labor in the Twentieth Century South, (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991), pp. 161-162.


40 Ibid.


42 Kelly, *Hammer and Hoe*, passim; but especially chapter seven, "The CIO In Dixie," pp. 138-152.

43 Walter Hardin, "Negroes Stand by Lewis," John L. Lewis to W. Hardin, 15 December 1941, CIO Files of John L. Lewis, Part 1, Reel 17; James Jenkins to Philip Murray, 29 April 1941, Box 16, CIO Central Correspondence Files, Catholic University.


47 John Dancy to Elmer Carter and Eugene Kinckle Jones, 9 April 1941, Box 3, DUL Papers, Michigan Historical Collections; Meler and Rudwick, *Black Detroit and the UAW*, pp. 82-107.

48 "The CIO and the Negro Worker" (Washington, D.C., 1940); Rinaldo Cappellini to Kathryn Lewis, 24 April 1441, Lewis to Cappellini, 25 April 1941, Part 1, Reel 23; John L. Lewis Correspondence with CIO Unions; Meler and Rudwick, *Black Detroit and the UAW*, pp. 53-54, 74-76; Cooper, "Role of the Negro In the CIO," pp. 37-41. A revised edition of the *Negro Worker* came out in February of 1942 but did not mention any increase in the number of black officials within the CIO. However, another revised pamphlet appeared later in 1942 and told of UTSE President Willard Townsend's election to the CIO IEB. See p. 14.

49 John Brophy, "Labor and Wartime Unity," 21 March 1942 speech before the Victory through Unity Conference under the auspices of the Council Against Intolerance in America, Box 9, Brophy Papers, Catholic University.

51 Sweeney, United Steelworkers, pp. 52-56; "Delegates to the USA Convention Condemn Jim Crow," CIO News, 25 May 1942; "First convention of the United Steelworkers of America, 1942 Resolution #5 On Racial Discrimination," Reprinted in Foner and Lewis, Black Workers from the Founding of the CIO to the AFL-CIO Merger, pp. 341-344; Dickerson, Out of the Crucible, p. 169.

52 Daniel Blakely, OH, pp. 20-22, OHS.


54 "Negroes Favor the CIO," Pittsburgh Courier, 14 November 1942; See below pp. 22-24.


56 "This is the Story," (1952), Box 1, UTSE Collection, ALUA; Horace Sheffield to Emil Mazey, 20 December 1955, Box 32, UAW Political Action Collection, ALUA.

57 "Report of Committee on Racial Discrimination appointed by President Murray on 12 August, 1942," Box 196, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

58 Ibid.


60 Wilson learned of his appointment several weeks before the convention by way of rumors and wrote Carey asking if it was true and why he had not been officially informed, Boyd Wilson to James Carey, 30 October 1942, Box 190, CIO Secretary-Treasurers Collection, ALUA. Two labor historians have suggested that the decision to create this committee met with opposition from those in the CIO who felt that it was a Communist inspired initiative to split the organization along racial lines. Neither President Murrays' personal papers, nor CIO Administrative Files and IEB meeting minutes contain dialogue, or debate concerning opposition to the Committee.

61 "Minutes of the CIO Committee to Abolish Discrimination" (hereafter referred to as 'Committee Minutes'), 6 January, 12 March 1943; Box 71; "Statement of Carey," 4 February 1953, Box 154, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, George L.P. Weaver interview with author, 30 November 1986, Detroit, Michigan.

62 Ibid; "Agreement between the CIO Anti-Discrimination Committee of Philadelphia Metropolitan Area and Region III, President's committee on FEP" in memo from R. Parker to George L.P. Weaver, 21 December 1944, Box 201, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection.
55

63 George Weaver to James Carey, 17 January 1943, Box 71, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA.

64 Mervyn Rathborne to James Brophy, establishment of California CIO Council Committee, 29 June 1943; Saul Mills to Brophy on establishment of the New York IUC Committee; Maggie Rambeau to James Carey, creation of Durham (N.C.) IUC Committee, 22 May 1944; George L.P. Weaver, "Article for New York State CIO Yearbook," 1 August 1944, Box 190; Report of Willard S. Townsend, 27 January 1944, Box 190, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection.

65 "Statement by the New York CIO Committee For the Abolition of Racial Discrimination," 4 August, 1943, Box 199 CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

66 Report of the Philadelphia IUC-CIO Committee to Abolish Racial Discrimination, June -August, 1944, Box 201, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

67 Carey Haigler (Alabama IUC) to James Carey, 3 May 1944, Box 97; Clyde Ingram (Texas IUC) to Weaver, 28 February 1944; Al Swim (Tennessee IUC) to Carey, 26 May 1944, Box 201, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection. For more on the racial situation in Tennessee see Michael Honey, "Industrial Unionism and Racial Justice In Memphis," in Robert Zieger, ed. Organized Labor and the 20th Century South, pp. 135-257.

68 "Cops Bar White Speakers at Atlanta CIO Rally," Michigan Chronicle, 29 June 1943.

69 William F. Gerhard to James Carey, 11 June 1944, Box 197, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA.

70 Freeman Cochran (Washington State IUC) to J. Carey, 19 May 1944, Box 201, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA.

71 Walter Frisbee to George Weaver, 2 March 1944, Leo Casey to Weaver, 31 March 1948, Box 192, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA.


74 Ben Allen to John L. Lewis, 8 July 1942, Part, Reel 17, (UAW), John L. Lewis Correspondence with CIO unions.


76 Meier & Rudwick, Black Detroit and the UAW, pp. 120-121.

77 Committee Minutes, 26 April, 7 May, 15 May 1943, Box 192, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.


80 "Anti-Discrimination Clauses," Box 203, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection. In 1945 a URW representative claimed that clauses were in very few contracts (1/3) because the union had not received protests from minority groups claiming company discrimination.

81 John Rackliff to George Weaver, 8 November 1944, Box 203, CIO Secretary Treasurer’s Collection, ALUA.

82 John Fox to Weaver, 30 April 1945, Box 203, CIO Secretary Treasurer’s Collection, ALUA.

83 "Committee Minutes," 16 August 1945, Box 192, CIO Secretary Treasurer’s Collection, ALUA.

84 "On Jew Batting," *Michigan CIO News*, 12 March 1943; Committee Minutes, 2 December 1943, Box 154; 20 March 1944, Box 193, CIO Secretary Treasurer’s Collection, ALUA.


86 Committee Minutes, 12 March 1945, Box 195, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA.

87 Willard Townsend to Philip Murray, 5 May 1948; Townsend to Bessie Hillman, 25 May 1948, Box 188 CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA.


Abstract of Interview with Philip Weightman, United Packinghouse Workers Oral History Project, pp. 1066, 1098, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, Wi. (hereafter cited as UPWA Oral History Abstract). The author wishes to thank Rick Halpern for providing him a copy of this abstract.


1943 UAW Convention Proceedings, p. 374; Hodges Mason, OH, pp. 25, 29-30; Nat Ganley, OH p. 74, ALUA; Painter, Narrative of Hosea Hudson, pp. 334-335, describes how left leaning blacks in the Alabama State CIO gained a temporary and shallow victory within the councils leadership ranks.


George L. P. Weaver, "Pitfalls That Beset Negro Trade Unionists," Opportunity (Winter, 1944), pp. 12-13; "Committee Minutes", 15 November 1944, Box 192, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection; Willard Townsend, Fardinand C. Smith, Sidney Hillman, "Post-War Job Rights of Negro Workers," CIO News 24 January 1944; Philip Murray "Postwar Jobs for Negro Workers," Opportunity, April-June, 1945; p. 18. When committee member Boyd Wilson of the Steelworkers asked CARD Director Weaver what steps were being taken to "protect the working opportunities of minority groups," he was told that the idea of "proportional layoffs" would be impossible because it was "Jim Crow in reverse." Boyd Wilson to George Weaver, 15 June 1945; Weaver to Wilson, 21 June 1945, Box 190, CIO Secretary-Treasurers Collection, ALUA.

Complaints from black unionists like those in the United Railroad Workers Union in New York and New Jersey indicated that the white leadership could not fight for black seniority rights "because the white workers would oppose it." Etroy Sherman and James E. Jones to George Weaver, 8 March 1948, Box 188, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection; Weaver, Negro Labor, pp. 284-302.

Northrup, Organized Labor and the Negro, pp. 219-231.

"UAW Memorandum, 1 July 1944," Box 1, George Crockett Collection, ALUA; "George Addes Clears Firing of Four Workers," Michigan Chronicle, 9 December 1944: "UAW's Discharge of Four Negro Organizers Attacked," Wage Earner, 15 December 1944. Hardin was "off and on the payroll" for the next three years. Meier & Rudwick, Black Detroit and the UAW, pp. 40-41, 213. Also dismissed was William Bowman, another black union pioneer who was later rehired in 1949.

George Crockett, OH, pp. 23-25; Memo from R. J. Thomas to All Executive Board Members, 25 November 1943, Box 9 UAW Research Department; G. Crockett to Victor Reuther, 28 December 1944, Crockett to Jack Zeller, 24 September 1945, Box 21 R. J. Thomas Collection; G. Crockett to Charles Lawrence, Jr., 23 October 1945, Box 89 WPR Collection, ALUA.

P. L. Prattle, "Labor Everywhere" Pittsburgh Courier, June-December 1948 in Box 50, Civil Rights Congress of Michigan Collection, ALUA; Crockett, OH, p. 27.

Ibid; Interview with George L. P. Weaver, 30 November 1986.

Committee Meetings, 4 June 1947, Box 193, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

103 Abe Flaxer to James Carey, 8 September 1947, Box 176; Thomas Richardson to Philip Murray, 7 October 1947, Box 71, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection.

104 Ibid.

105 James Carey to Philip Murray, 13 October 1947, Box 71 CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection; George Crockett, "Labor Looks Ahead," Michigan Chronicle, 12 January 1948.

106 W. Richard Carter to George Weaver, 17 August 1948, Carter to Weaver 24 May 1949, Philip Weightman to Walter Reuther, 20 February 1953, Box 190, Box 188 (CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection). Carter was eventually hired onto the staff of the International Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) (James Carey's union) as the union's fair practices liaison to the CIO National Committee.


108 Shelton Tappas, OH, p. 63; William Lattimore, Personal Interview in Vertical File Biography; William Oliver to George Weaver, 9 January 1947, Box 189, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA; on Oliver's appointment to the National Committee see James Carey to Walter Reuther, 24 May 1948, Box 192, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection. Martin Halpern points out that Reuther allegedly chose Oliver because he was non-partisan, but in reality it was a reward for Oliver's loyal support of Reuther among members of the black caucus. See Halpern, UAW Politics in a Cold War Era, pp. 117-118, and Draft of Reuther's remarks to the black caucus at the 1948 convention in Box 89, WPR Collection; George Crockett, OH, pp. 29-30, ALUA.


111 George Weaver to James Carey, 25 February 1948, Box 79, William Oliver to George Weaver, 28 June 1949, Box 193, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection: Jensen, Nonferrous Metals Unionism, p. 200.


113 Griffith, Crisis of American Labor, p. 77.


118 Willard Townsend to R. J. Thomas, 3 January 1951, Karl Feller to Allan S. Haywood, 4 January 1951, Box 34, CIO National and International Office Files, Catholic University.

119 Ibid; Willard S. Townsend to Allan S. Haywood, 8 January 1951, Box 34, CIO National and International Office Files, Catholic University.

120 Jensen, Non-ferrous Metals Unionism, pp. 49-230; "Report of the Special Committee appointed by the CIO Executive Board on 4 March 1947, to look Into conditions leading to Division Within the Ranks of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers," Box 54, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection; Scott Greer, Last Man In: Racial Access to Union Power, (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 55, 59-64.

121 Jensen, pp. 233-235.

122 Quoted from The Union, 28 March 1949, in Jensen, Non-ferrous Metals Unionism, p. 237.


124 Ibid. pp. 242-243. At the 1950 UPWA Convention, black leftist Sam Parks, president of Local 25, challenged anyone to refute that "Townsend went South and promised separate Negro and white unions." Robert Ballard Papers, OHS.

125 Committee Minutes, 3 September 1949, Box 193, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA.

126 Ibid, Willard Townsend to Professor Simpkins, 3 October, 1949, Box 190 CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection; Willard S. Townsend, "The Tragic Myth of Communism" (n.d.) Robert Ballard Collection, OHS.

128 Dickerson, Out of the Crucible, pp. 190-199.


130 Brody, Butcher Workmen, pp. 236, 243; "The New Human Relations Program of the UPWA-CIO," (1953), Box 343, UPWA Papers, SHSW.

131 Russell Lasley to All Members of the International UPWA-CIO Anti-Discrimination Committee, 18 April 1949, Box 52; "The New Human Relations Program of the UPWA-CIO," pp. 3-6, Box 343, UPWA Papers, SHSW.


133 Anti-Discrimination Department to All Armour Locals, 18 November, 1952, Box 345, UPWA Papers, SHSW; "New Human Relations Program," pp. 16-20.


135 Cooper, "Negro in the CIO," p. 42.

136 Halpern, "Industrial Unionism in the Southwest," p. 175.


139 Rev. P. E. Castle to WPR, 23 October 1950, William Oliver to WPR, 20 March 1951, Oliver to Reuther, 28 April 1955, Box 90 WPR Collection, ALUA.

140 William Oliver to Walter P. Reuther, 19 November 1952, Box 90 WPR Collection, ALUA.

141 Ibid., "FEPC Minutes," Box 11, 2 December 1948, 9 September 1950, 25 February 1953, Box 5, Local 752 Collection ALUA.

142 Committee Meeting Minutes 12 November 1946, 11 February, 16 December 1947, Box 191, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection.

143 Committee Meeting Minutes, 8 September 1949, 14 January 1950, Box 193; Harold Keith editorials in the 9 and 16 July, 1949, Pittsburgh Courier, Weaver to Keith, 1 August, 1949. Box 149, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection.
"Notes on Civil Rights Program-1950" Box 79, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection.

145 Jacob Pat, *The Story of the Jewish Labor Committee* (1948), manuscript in Box 2, Michigan JLC Collection, ALUA.

146 Emanuel Muravchik (former National Field Director of the JLC) to author, 17 November 1986.


148 *Crisis*, February, 1941, p. 56.

149 *Crisis*, August, 1946, p. 251, December, 1946, p. 273; "NAACP Meeting of the National Labor Department, 24 October, 1946," Box 149, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.


151 Meier and Rudwick, *Black Detroit* p. 55; *Michigan Chronicle*, 1 April 1944. Numerous scholars who have dealt with the National Negro Congress have dwelled on the Communist connection and gone as far as to say the NNC was "dominated" by the Communist Party. The two most recent studies of the organization (see footnote 48) do not deny that members of the Communist Party—especially black members like Doxey Wilkerson—were influential in setting the tone of NNC policy. However, they do not necessarily agree that at the time of A. Philip Randolph's resignation as head of the NNC in 1940 that it was indeed "controlled" by the Communists.


154 Ibid., pp. 350-51; *Pries*, *Labor's Giant Step* p. 333.

155 Zane Meckler, Director of the JLC Anti-Discrimination Department to George L.P. Waver, 29 January 1947; Leonard Levy, Vice-President of CIO Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, to Weaver, 7 February, 1947, Box 149 CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA; Correspondence from Emanuel Muravchik, former National Field Director of the JLC, to author 17 November 1986.

156 Willard Townsend to James Carey, 21 January 1947, "NAACP 1947," Box 149, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.


159 Noah C.A. Walter to Willard Townsend, 15 July, 1948, Box 15, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

160 Willard Townsend to Noah C.A. Walter, 26 July 1948, Box 15 CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

161 Ibid.


163 Quoted in Harvey Levenstein, Communism, Anticommunism and the CIO (Westport Conn: Greenwood Press, 1981), pp. 191-193; 236-239; see also Pries, Labor's Giant Step, p. 336 for an especially critical view of the ACTU.

164 Noah Walter to George Weaver, 21 December 1949; Noah Walter, A. Philip Randolph and Frank Crosswalt to Philip Murray, 25 April 1950; Noah Walter to James Carey, 15 January 1952. Box 151, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.


166 Struggle, (n.d.) Vol. 1:1, National Negro Labor Council Vertical File Folder, ALUA.

167 James Carey to Noah C.A. Walter, 23 January 1952; Harry Read to James Carey, January-February, 1952, Box 151 CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

168 James Carey, "A Labor Program for Civil Rights," 1 March 1952, Box 164, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

169 Ibid.

170 "Summary of the Report to the Executive Board," CIO Committee on Civil Rights, 5, 6 February 1953; George L.P. Weaver to Robert Oliver, June 9, 1953, Box 10, CIO Washington Office Collection, ALUA.

171 William Oliver to Walter Reuther, August 25, 1953, Box 10, CIO Washington Collection, ALUA.

172 Ibid.

173 Report of the Director, CIO Committee, 3 November 1951, Box 79, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

174 Committee Meeting Minutes, 12 May 1953, Box 194; Marshall, Negro and Organized Labor, p. 45.


177 Committee Minutes, 12 May 1953, Box 194, Zerman, pp. 192-193; F. Burke, The Eisenhower Administration and Black Civil Rights (University of Tennessee Press, 1984), pp. 93, 95. In March of 1954 alone, 26 companies were under investigation for alleged discrimination against blacks and Jews.

178 Civil Rights Committee Minutes, 5 October 1954, Box 195, CIO Secretary-Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

179 Robert L Carter (NAACP) to Richard Nixon, 19 April 1955; George L.P. Weaver to Walter P. Reuther, 2 June 1955, William E. Rentfro (General Counsel of Shell Oil) to George L.P. Weaver, 28 June 1955, Box 194, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA.

180 Untitled document prepared by the Fair Practices Committee of the IUE, Jan-May 1953, Box 193, CIO Secretary Treasurer's Collection, ALUA. Although focusing on African Americans, the report also cited how in some instances "orientals fared worse than Negroes," and that a prominent AFL union president stated that his organization would not participate in a union educational program if there were too many representatives from Jewish unions.


183 Horace Sheffield to Walter Reuther, 7 February 1956, Box 348, WPR Collection, ALUA; Trade Union Leadership Council, "Do You Have the Time?", (c.a. 1959-60), TULC Vertical File Folder, ALUA; "Trade Union Leadership Council; experiment in community action," New University Thought, September -October 1963; "Call, Urging ALL Negro Trade Union Leaders to Assemble for the Purpose of Dealing with the Grave Problems Affecting the Welfare of the American Negroes and the organized Labor Movement, 1 July 1959," Box 67 Wayne County, Michigan AFL-CIO Collection; Bill Goode, "Report on NALC Convention," 14 June 1960, Box 33 Jewish Labor Committee Collection, ALUA.

184 AFL-CIO Civil Rights Committee Minutes, 1 March 1957, Box 195, CIO Secretary Treasurers Collection, ALUA; Interview with George L.P. Weaver, 30 November 1986. Weaver noted that upon his arrival back to the United States in early 1957 he found the Civil Rights Department in disarray and Carey and Meany at near-violent odds with one another. It was Meany's own plumbers union that was then under investigation and when Carey requested the union be reviewed, Meany persistently hedged the issue.
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