This report examines the state of education reform and policymaking over the 10 years following publication of "A Nation at Risk" in 1983. It compares and contrasts 1983 and 1993 across a variety of aspects: (1) the changing constellation of power and authority in school reform; (2) the changes in the capacity of the system to undertake reform; and (3) new directions in the mechanisms of state policies directly targeted on classroom instruction. Major changes that have occurred since 1983 include a policy shift from input-focused education to a focus on results and systemic reform, a rise in the power of local educators and leaders, a closer examination of the capacity of states and local governments to implement reform, and the development of curricular frameworks and assessment instruments (particularly, testing). This report includes an abstract, introduction, overview, and three sections on the players, capacity for reform, and policy instruments. Appendices contain four case studies of educational reform in California, Florida, Georgia, and Minnesota. (Contains 126 references.) (LMI)
Ten Years of State Education Reform, 1983–1993:
Overview with Four Case Studies

Diane Massell and Susan Fuhrman
with Michael Kirst, Allan Odden, Priscilla Wohlstetter, Rebecca Carver, Gary Yee
CONSORTIUM FOR POLICY RESEARCH IN EDUCATION

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Abstract

This report examines the state of education reform and policymaking over the 10 years following publication of the landmark report, A Nation at Risk in 1983. The report provides an excellent starting point because, like the prosaic "shot heard around the world," A Nation at Risk became a defining moment in the public imagination about the potential of education reform, and provided a new platform for federal leadership.

This study is not a chronology of reform developments. Instead, it compares and contrasts 1983 and 1993 across a variety of aspects: the players involved (and the politics they engender); the capacity of the system to undertake reform; and the major instruments of reform. The analysis is published together with case histories of reform in four states studied by CPRE since 1985: California, Florida, Georgia and Minnesota. The analysis also draws upon the education efforts of other states, particularly Kentucky, Connecticut, South Carolina, New Jersey, Texas, Arizona and Pennsylvania.

One of the major changes between 1983 and 1993 is the evolutionary shift that occurred in policy ideas and strategy. The kind of policy reforms promoted by A Nation at Risk focused heavily on the inputs of schooling, from financial and human resources to the number of credit units students must obtain prior to graduation. By the end of the decade, policies were becoming attuned to the quality of the results of education—what students should know and be able to do. Reformers were also calling for a new systemic approach to education policymaking, one that would unite coherent policies around student learning goals. This critical shift is affecting all areas of policy. It affects who is active in reform, court perspectives on finance equity, governance, accountability, and instructional guidance. By 1993, the federal government had once again become a major proponent of reform. But its advocacy was being backed by funding and new institutional arrangements to support its reform ideas. At the same time national organizations were providing strong impetus for systemic reform.

The constellation of power at the state level is changing too. While the early 1980s saw the rising prominence of governors and legislators, the early 1990s are seeing the resurgence of chief state school officers and other educators as facilitators, and often drivers, of content-based reform. Throughout both periods leaders from local districts have been key in devising new reform ideas at the state and local levels.

The new, results-focused reforms demand a high level of developmental work at the policy level and qualitatively different school-level instruction. These are tall orders. But we do see some evidence that steam is gathering behind the capacity issue. In part because of the recissions and in part because of new reform ideas, state education agencies are reorganizing in ways that may facilitate systemic reform. Questions about the ability of local districts, schools and teachers to deliver on the promises of reform were largely ignored at the beginning of the decade; policymakers assumed that people would know
what to do if given incentives and sanctions. Today policymakers are having serious
discussions about the substantive and pedagogic knowledge teachers need to deliver
improved education, and are attempting to engage teachers in the development process not
only to gain new policies but also to provide professional growth. Other forms of teacher
training are beginning to emerge.

Finally, the gravitational pull of new ideas—the shift in focus from inputs to results
and systemic reform—is altering the design of policy instruments used to impact teaching
and learning. To address the quality of the curriculum, curriculum frameworks or similar
documents that specify what students should know and be able to do today have risen in
importance, and are the cornerstones of many states' outcome-focused, systemic
strategies. Testing, a key instrument of reform at the beginning of the decade, remains so;
in fact, some states are leading their reform effort with assessment.

Indeed, the political centrality of testing as a means of accountability will sustain it
on the agenda. But growing recognition of the actual and potential impact of testing on
classroom life has led to some significant attempts to revise the multiple choice, basic
skills tests that have predominated. States, districts and others are struggling now to
develop "authentic" assessments that provide more than a snapshot, that move beyond
basic skills to measure, and encourage, creative, higher order thinking. As a consequence,state assessment systems are in great flux. In the area of teacher policy, the legacy of the
intensification strategies suggested by A Nation at Risk remain strong, although some new
directions based on the alternative visions of learning that undergird curriculum and
assessment reform are beginning to bud.
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Introduction

Since the early 1980s, new recommendations for reforming public education have spread through policy networks at a rapid pace and with great authority. Americans have a long history of generating change in education through broad public discourse and social networks. Today's reform ideas are promoted by an increasingly crowded arena of national and intergovernmental organizations.

After a decade of reform beginning with the 1983 landmark report, A Nation at Risk (NCEE 1983), we examined changes in the ideas driving reform, the political, social and economic environment they inhabit and the policy instruments used to support them. A Nation at Risk is our starting point because it became a defining moment in the public imagination about the potential of education reform, and provided a new platform for federal leadership.

In many ways policymakers and educators did not anticipate the impact that A Nation at Risk would have on public education. Emerging out of an administration which had intended to dismantle the U. S. Department of Education three years prior, this federal report was not expected to assume the high profile necessary to galvanize and reshape the reform dialogue. However, during its first year 70,000 copies of A Nation at Risk were sold, and approximately seven times that number were reproduced and distributed. The new administration seized the rhetorical advantage provided by the report to advance its agenda, marking the federal government's reliance on moral suasion from the bully pulpit as a primary strategy for addressing national education concerns (Jung and Kirst 1986). Unlike the approach taken by the federal government in the 1960s and 1970s, the new report was not accompanied by large new federal programs to accomplish its purposes. But the report did effectively staunch then President Reagan's efforts to do away with the Department, and made it politically difficult to call for drastic cuts to the federal education budget (Bell 1993). While in some cases the report simply confirmed policy initiatives already underway in many states and districts, A Nation at Risk gave

1 As of November 1982, 27 states had adopted or were in the process of adopting tougher standards for admission to college (Education Week 1993b). In 1983, California, Kentucky and South Carolina joined a growing list of states which were strengthening high school graduation requirements, and in the 1970s Florida had already required students to pass tests for promotion and graduation. It is also important to recognize that in some cases the new state standards reconfirmed district practices prior to 1983. This was particularly the case with credit requirements. In May of 1983, the National Center for Education Statistics reported that over half of all school districts increased credit requirements in core subjects between 1980 and 1983, while 38 percent noted that they would also do so. Similarly, Goertz (1989) finds that much of the increase in mathematics and science coursework noted between 1982 and 1987 actually had already occurred by 1984. Finally, the growth in state government capacity, the pressures of political and business elites at the state level, and the work of national policymaker associations explain state action as much as A Nation at Risk (McDonnell and Fuhrman 1985; Fuhrman 1988).
momentum to these policy directions and helped to sustain attention from all quarters for a decade, and not a few years, of reform.

The appeal of the document within state policymaking circles also surprised some observers because it came on the heels of a recession in state government. At the beginning of 1983, the National Governors' Association was predicting that states would face budget deficits of over $2 billion by year's end; raising money for education was the top concern of policy leaders, and the quality of elementary and secondary education ranked ninth (Education Week 1993a). Nevertheless, state governors and legislatures around the country eagerly examined the policy remedies suggested by A Nation at Risk. They launched an extraordinary number of blue-ribbon commissions (one count reported that 240 state-level reform groups had been established by 1984). State legislatures subsequently were flooded with bills patterned after the report's recommendations to raise educational standards and stem "the rising tide of mediocrity." Many of the bills readily passed. For example, between 1983 and 1985, 41 states increased high school graduation requirements, a diffusion rate more than four times the historical rate for state policies without specific federal impetus (McDonnell and Fuhrman 1985).

How has education reform evolved since then? This report addresses that question. However, it is not a chronology of reform developments. Instead, we compare and contrast 1983 and 1993 across a variety of aspects: the players involved (and the politics they engender); the capacity of the system to undertake reform; and the major instruments of reform. We begin our report with an overview of each of these areas. The overview also discusses the most dramatic shift that has occurred in the ideological underpinnings of reform—the shift in emphasis from inputs to results. Our analysis is published here alongside case histories of reform in four states we have followed since 1985: California, Florida, Georgia and Minnesota. In addition to these states, our analysis also draws upon the education efforts of other states, particularly Kentucky, Connecticut, South Carolina, New Jersey, Texas, Arizona and Pennsylvania.
Chapter 1
Overview

From Inputs to Results

Between 1983 and 1993 reform ideas and strategy evolved substantially. By 1990, policymakers at the state and federal level have begun to turn their attention to the results rather than the inputs of education (see Finn 1990). For most of recent history, government officials attempted to govern education by regulating the amount and type of fiscal, human, and other resources that flowed into schools. A Nation at Risk was no different. Its policy logic drew upon many familiar efforts to solve educational problems, but asked for more: more required credits in the academic “core” of schooling; more testing used for a wider range of purposes, including grade-to-grade promotion and graduation from high school; longer school days and year; higher teacher salaries accompanied by tougher certification and entry requirements as well as differentiated career paths; an emphasis on upgrading the technology of schooling; and heightened state monitoring which included school performance reports, staff evaluations, state-centered student testing programs, and improvement incentives and rewards. These intensification strategies were embraced by state politicians, and came largely in the form of mandates about inputs.

How successful were these input strategies? By 1993 there was mixed news of educational progress. On the one hand, although the course work requirements of most states still fell short of the National Commission on Excellence in Education’s recommendations,\(^2\) the increases that states and districts did make frequently had their intended effect. In Connecticut, for example, the state’s 20-credit requirement for the graduating class of 1988 increased by more than a third the proportion of students in social studies and mathematics classes between 1984 and 1988 (Connecticut State Board of Education 1990). The gains were not just for the college-bound: course-taking patterns over the decade showed that all students took more academic courses. Furthermore, curriculum studies revealed that courses were not necessarily watered down to accommodate students with different academic backgrounds. Clune and his colleagues conducted a study of student transcripts in four states (California, Missouri, Florida and Pennsylvania) and found that, between 1982 and 1988, enrollments in science grew significantly over this period. Remedial math was replaced with courses like pre-algebra and algebra, and more students took advanced levels of English (Clune et al. 1991). A study of 18 schools in six states found that there was no significant difference between algebra courses expanded to include the non-college bound and traditional offerings, suggesting that the increased coursework was, in fact, more challenging (Porter et al. 1993).

\(^2\)By 1990 only 10 states required the recommended three years of mathematics, and only 4 states required three years of science (Coley and Goertz 1990).
At the same time that students were taking more academic courses for graduation, their ambitions for postsecondary schooling grew. The proportion of high school graduates who entered college in the fall following their graduation rose from 49 percent in 1980 to more than 60 percent in 1990, a record high (Congressional Budget Office 1993). The increase in the number of high school graduates who took the SAT (up from 33 percent in 1980 to 41 percent in 1991) included a higher proportion of minority students, who did increasingly well. Between 1981 and 1991 the number of students taking Advanced Placement examinations more than trebled; the number of minority test takers doubled (Pitsch 1991) and now comprise about one-fifth of the AP population.

However, while significant progress was made in improving the exposure of all students to core academic content and in helping all students to attain more education, there were continuing signs suggesting problems in the nature of the core coursework that students received.

On one hand, National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) scores showed significant improvement for all students in mathematics and science between 1982 and 1990. But the data also shows that 17-year-olds did not perform well at high levels in either mathematics or science (NCES 1992a). Another study found that few students in grades 4, 8 and 12 were able to perform at high levels of proficiency in science (Rothman 1992). In other areas, scores remained flat. International comparisons showed that while 9- and 14-year-olds in the U. S. compared favorably with their cohorts in other industrialized nations on basic reading, our students fell behind on comprehending complex passages. Our students also appeared relatively weak in mathematics and science, likely because the curricula did not expose students to much problem solving, statistical inference, chemistry or physics (Elley 1992; OECD 1992; Kirst 1993).

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3 Black students gained 10 points on the SAT verbal and 19 points on SAT mathematics scores between 1982 and 1991 (NCES 1992a).

4 These tests are given at age 9, 13 and 17. The gains made between 1982 and 1990 were significant at all ages except for age 13 in mathematics.

5 At age 17, the average mathematics score was 305 for all students. Level 300 on the NAEP scale is “understands measurement and geometry and solves more complex problems.” The top level is 350, where a student “understands and applies more advanced mathematical concepts.” At age 17, the average science score was 290 for all students in 1990. Level 250 on the NAEP scale is “uses scientific procedures and analyzes scientific data” and is the midpoint on a 5-level scale. Level 300 is “understands and applies scientific principles” and at the top level of 350 a student “integrates scientific information and experimental evidence.”

6 Scores remained flat for all students on average reading and writing proficiencies between 1984 and 1990, and the writing scores were poor at the start (At grade 11, the average writing score was 212; a score of 200 is a minimal level of proficiency, where students recognized “the elements needed to complete the task, but were not managed well enough to insure the intended purpose” (NCES 1992a).) The one exception was on average writing proficiency scores for grade 8, which showed a statistically significant improvement between 1984 and 1990.
Finally, although the traditional gap between whites and minorities narrowed on most NAEP measures, recent data suggests that some of the early gains for African American students were being lost. Certainly complicating continued progress are the extraordinary social problems and pressures confronting all children and youth, but particular minorities. In 1993 more than 23 percent of American children were living below the poverty line, one of the highest rates among the industrialized nations. The rates of children living in poverty were significantly higher for blacks and Hispanics than for whites; in 1990, about 15 percent of white children were living in poverty, compared to about 44 percent of black and 40 percent of Hispanic children. Among other things, disadvantaged children are less likely to receive preschool instruction and regular health care. Further, while self-reports suggest that drug use declined during the 1980s, 44 percent of high school seniors surveyed acknowledge using illegal drugs, and 88 percent acknowledge drinking alcohol (Congressional Budget Office 1993).

Thus all in all, while substantial progress was made between 1983 and 1993, the existing measures of educational health show that many problems persist. For most students, the system has failed to provide the kinds of challenging curriculum that yields complex, higher order thinking. For many minority students, progress made early on is slipping, and is further endangered by encroaching poverty.

Over the course of the decade, as these problems became apparent, policymakers began to rethink the strategies employed by the first wave of reform embodied in A Nation at Risk. One of the striking differences in the reform ideas circulating today is their strong emphasis on results as the proper and critical focal point of policy. While there is an intellectual continuity with A Nation at Risk—both emphasize high academic standards (“excellence”), and both strive to move the system away from the minimum competency focus of the 1970s—today’s reformers approach their task quite differently. Results-focused reform builds on three pointed criticisms of the early 1980s strategy. First, the kind of standard-setting launched by A Nation at Risk did not directly address the academic content of schooling. It required more seat time in courses labelled science and mathematics, for example, but did not insure the quality of the science and mathematics courses that students would receive; and, further, the testing data showed that even the best courses did not meet “world class” standards. It required more testing, but the new state tests tended to reinforce the kind of focus on basic-skills and rote instruction which predated the 1980s reforms (Smith and O’Day 1991; NCES 1992b).

Second, the top-down mandates and regulatory approach used in early 1980s reforms narrows the zone of professional discretion that is so important to effective teaching.

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7For instance, the difference in average reading proficiency scores between black and white 17-year-olds went from 50 points in 1980 to 21 points in 1988, but between 1988 and 1990 the gap increased again to 30 points. Similarly, the average writing proficiency of grade 11 students showed no progress between 1984 and 1990 for white or black students, and while blacks made progress vis-a-vis whites between 1984 and 1988, the gap widened again over the next two years (Hodgkinson 1993).
Restructuring, the “second wave” of reform that captured the attention of state, and especially district, policymakers after *A Nation at Risk*, relies on the redistribution of power as the major mechanism for change (Murphy 1990). The idea, resonant with the American philosophy of local control, is that improvements will be made by redistributing decision-making authority to the “street-level bureaucrats”—teachers, principals and other local administrators—closest to the student and the classroom. Perhaps the biggest imprint of restructuring reforms at the state level is the growing attempt to move away from detailed input and process regulation, and the reorganizations in state departments of education to focus staff on technical assistance rather than control. (Fuhrman and Elmore 1992; Lusi 1993). At the local level a variety of site-based management efforts have emerged.

Third, the early focus on intensification and the input side of schooling did nothing to address long standing concerns about fragmentation in education policy. In fact, a focus on inputs exacerbated the problem; the 1980s reforms focused on “fixing” this problem or that, with this policy mechanism or that, without considering the way they interacted and affected the whole system. Thus in the realm of teacher policy, for example, one would find within a state an effort to tighten up certification and add more requirements to respond to concerns about the low quality of the teacher workforce, and at the same time relaxed emergency credential laws to respond to teacher shortages.

Systemic reforms built around results for student learning attempt to address these criticisms. While many versions of these new ideas are emerging, the initial concept explicitly aims to combine the strengths of top-down standards reform and restructured governance while avoiding the problems caused when these approaches are used in isolation (Smith and O’Day 1991). The current reform efforts attend to the quality of the academic core of schooling by explicitly, and publicly, defining what it is that students should know and be able to do. Following the lead of the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics and states like California, several national professional associations and nearly all states are moving to establish curriculum frameworks or other kinds of documents that spell out more rigorous content standards and expected student outcomes. Standards that express desired content and performance play a central role in current reforms, so much so that many refer to prevailing efforts as *standards-based* reform.

But the term “standards reform” does not capture another central purpose of many reform activities. At the same time that they advocate standards, these reforms envision providing districts, schools and teachers with the flexibility to determine their own paths to meet the standards, to decentralize authority over the means while maintaining centralized authority over the ends of public education. By coupling restructured governance with standards in this way, these reforms address one of the central criticisms of restructuring—that many “restructuring” efforts focused too much on form and process, and too little on not goals and content. So, many states that are developing standards for student learning are also providing regulatory waivers to schools and districts and striving for broader deregulation. (Fuhrman and Elmore 1992). In fact, many view the standards policies as mechanisms for making the policy system more supportive
of school-level reform, not as instruments to achieve school-level improvement on their own.

Finally, it is argued that by setting explicit outcomes, policy mechanisms like curriculum frameworks, instructional materials, testing, and staff development can be keyed to the standards, thus fashioning coherence out of the fragmentation that plagues education.

Today the effort to achieve systemic reform focused on expectations for student learning is affecting all areas of education, from finance, to governance, judicial definitions of equity, accountability and instructional guidance.

Players

A second key difference between 1983 and 1993 concerns the players driving and developing education policy reform. Throughout the decade the federal government remained a key leader promoting various policy ideas, although until more recently those ideas did not have as comprehensive a reach as they did with A Nation at Risk. The federal government is now becoming more assertive, bolstering its calls for action with funding and new institutional arrangements to support systemic reform. An intriguing development, however, has been the rise of non-federal, national organizations as partners in reform during the decade. These national players provide impetus for reforms around the country by providing a forum where ideas are expressed and sanctioned, but also by providing technical and fiscal support. In fact these national organizations are becoming strong proponents, developers and facilitators of systemic reform.

In 1983, state politicians were the primary conduit for reform ideas, seizing the leadership that had long been held at this level by educators and traditional interest groups. State legislators and governors championed the initiatives spelled out in A Nation at Risk. Teachers did not develop state policy alternatives but rather responded to proposed policies. Indeed many of the early 1983 reforms treated educators as part of the problem. This was perhaps most true in Southern states which were in general more mandate oriented and regulatory than many others. In addition to state politicians, the business community became a prime mover of new education reform policy.

Today, state politicians remain active but have in many cases diminished policy initiation efforts in favor of the kind of bully pulpit, change advocate role ascribed to the federal government after A Nation at Risk. Educators have once again gained policymaking prominence. While legislators and governors still may point out the direction of change, chief state school officers are as likely now to seize the reins of reform. The nature of the current dialogue—particularly its emphasis on revising the substantive content of schooling—has given professional educators new, alternative routes of access and an enlarged role in the policymaking process. Teachers, state education agency staff, and other educators have become central partners in the standard-setting
process, and in many states have been actively involved in the development of new ways to assess student knowledge.

Local policymakers were not, and are not, silent recipients of reform. On the one hand, state law and regulation proliferated in the decade following *A Nation at Risk*, continuing the expansion of state authority that has characterized American education since the 1960s (Murphy 1974; Garms et al. 1978; Fuhrman and Elmore 1990). Local control over schooling is a basic tenet of our system, and at the outset of the reform decade many feared that the growth of state activity would erode local autonomy (Anderson and Pipho 1984; Cuban 1984; Killian 1984). But in many ways, local governments asserted authority through their own initiatives, demonstrating that educational policymaking over the 1980s was not a zero-sum game (Fuhrman and Elmore 1990). Just as the states stretched the bounds of their policy activities during this period, so did local entities. Local players not only acted to adapt state polices to their needs, but also experimented with innovations that later filtered up to guide state policy direction. Today we find local educators shaping and participating in state reform efforts and embarking on their own versions of current reform trends.

**Capacity for Reform**

Unfortunately, one element that has not changed, and may have even worsened in some respects, is the capacity of all levels of the system to act upon the pledges of reform. Although on average, monies for education have nearly doubled in real terms over the decade (NCES 1992a), the increases in any one year were quite small (Odden 1993). The recessions which hit both at the beginning and the end of this period left most state agencies blighted by cutbacks in staff and other resources from which they have not recovered. Agencies’ ability to evaluate changes in the system is suffering. In states like Florida and California, burgeoning student populations have eroded financial gains, just as the overall increases in poverty and consequent need for expanded services have affected the education budget in most states. Local districts also saw cuts in technical assistance, analytic and support staff.

The new results-focused reforms demand a high level of developmental work at the policy level and qualitatively different school-level instruction. These are tall orders. But we do see some evidence that steam is gathering behind the capacity issue. In part because of the recessions and in part because of new reform ideas, state education agencies are reorganizing in ways that may facilitate systemic reform. Questions about the ability of local districts, schools and teachers to deliver on the promises of reform were largely ignored at the beginning of the decade; policymakers assumed that people would know what to do if given incentives and sanctions. Today policymakers are having serious

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8The percentage change was 48.3. To calculate this figure, the National Center for Education Statistics looked at changes in average daily attendance (ADA) expenditures per pupil using constant 1989-90 dollars.
discussions about the substantive and pedagogic knowledge teachers need to deliver improved education, and are attempting to engage teachers in the development process not only to gain new policies but also to provide professional growth. Other forms of teacher development are beginning to emerge.

Policy Instruments

Over the decade policymakers have given considerable thought to the design of policy instruments used to affect teaching and learning. The primary components of the instructional guidance system (Cohen and Spillane 1993) used by states and districts are familiar—instructional frameworks, instructional materials, assessment of student performance, requirements for teacher pre- and in-service education and licensure, and evaluation. But the content and structure of these instruments, as well as the way they relate to one another and to schools, have changed significantly.

Once again, the gravitational pull of new ideas—the shift in focus from inputs to results and systemic reform—is key to each of these changes. Influential, too, is the growing embrace of cognitive psychology, with its emphasis on active, student-directed and context-specific teaching and learning. At least at the policy level, new beliefs about learning are issuing a significant challenge to the behavioralist paradigm that has structured policy and practice for many years.

As a result, curriculum frameworks or similar documents that specify what students should know and be able to do today have risen in importance and are the cornerstones of many states’ results-focused, systemic strategies. Testing, a key instrument of reform at the beginning of the decade, remains important; in fact, some states are leading their reform effort with assessment. Indeed, the political centrality of testing as a means of accountability will sustain it on the agenda. But growing recognition of the actual and potential impact of testing on classroom life has led to some significant attempts to revise the multiple choice, basic skills tests that have predominated. States, districts and others are struggling now to develop “authentic” assessments that provide more than a snapshot, that move beyond basic skills to measure, and encourage, creative, higher order thinking. As a consequence state assessment systems are in great flux. In the area of teacher policy, the legacy of the intensification strategies suggested by A Nation at Risk remain strong, although there are some new directions based on the alternative visions of learning that undergird curriculum and assessment reform.

In the following sections we explore in greater depth: (1) the changing constellation of power and authority in school reform; (2) the changes in the capacity for reform; and (3) new directions in the mechanisms of state policies directly targeted on classroom instruction.
Chapter 2
The Players

Federal and National Players

The terms "federal" and "national" often are used interchangeably, in part because federal initiatives usually have national impact. Recently people have been distinguishing the two. National-level organizations, such as the Education Commission of the States or The College Board, operate independently of the federal government, although they may at times receive federal funding for particular projects or activities. Federal agencies do not have primary authority over the organization's agenda, staffing or governance. Here we use the term federal to refer, by contrast, to agencies authorized and funded by Congress, the U. S. Department of Education or other federal branch or organization.

Federal Government. While A Nation at Risk established the federal government as a persuasive leader of school reform around the country, its fiscal, programmatic and regulatory presence in the states diminished during most of the 1980s. The Reagan years saw a reversal of many decades of growth in federal expenditures and programs to aid education. The largest cuts were made by fiscal year 1983, before A Nation at Risk. While the proportion of public elementary and secondary dollars averaged 9.8 percent federal in 1979-80, by 1987 that figure was 6.2 percent. This occurred under the banner of New Federalism, which aimed to return to the states the authority lost under previous decades of federal activism. In this spirit federal categorical aid programs were consolidated under block grants and deregulated. Combined with the rhetoric of A Nation at Risk, the states were promoted as the major player in education reform.

After President Bush took office in 1988 on a promise to be "the education president," the federal share stopped its decline and by 1990 had even risen slightly to 6.3 percent (NCES 1989-90). In 1990 federal on-budget program funds for elementary and secondary education grew from $23.7 billion dollars to $28.3 billion in 1992 in constant FY 92 dollars (NCES 1993). While the federal share has not yet been restored to 1980 levels, the federal government is backing its "bully pulpit" leadership with more and more fiscal and programmatic resources.

A critical turning point occurred in 1989, when President Bush and the nation's governors met together for an historic Education Summit that led to a new, bipartisan set

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*Between 1959-60 and 1979-80, federal aid to public elementary and secondary schools rose 1,400 percent. In 1959-60 federal aid constituted 4.4 percent of total revenues for public elementary and secondary education; by 1979-80, they contributed 9.8 percent (Rossmiller 1990).*
of national education goals. The new goals provided the first broad and comprehensive package of federal ideas to emerge since A Nation at Risk, but unlike the latter they were equipped with an organizational infrastructure—the National Education Goals Panel—and supported by federally funded projects to develop and promote the achievement of them.

Although the federal government is once again exerting strong leadership its approach stands in strong contrast to the heyday of federal categorical programs in the 1960s and 1970s. While federal policy was characterized by an array of isolated problems and projects, program funding decisions today are more likely to be guided by the overarching framework of systemic, results-focused reform. The U.S. Department of Education let contracts to various subject-matter associations and groups to develop content standards in their fields. The Department now is promoting a bill in Congress (H.R. 1804, Goals 2000: the Educate America Act) which would empower the National Education Goals Panel to approve a set of national content standards as well as state content standards and assessments. Also included in the proposed bill is a provision that would use systemic reform as a framework to which subsequent federal programs and grants would conform. Efforts to rethink the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) are moving in the same direction. Various commissions and the Clinton Administration have recommended that ESEA be reframed to coincide with the movement toward standards: that all children, including those served by Chapter 1, be expected to meet challenging expectations about learning; that funds provided by ESEA be used as flexibly as possible to enable that result, and that federally supported efforts be judged by their success toward that end (Independent Commission 1993).

The National Science Foundation has provided funding for State Systemic Initiatives (SSI) grants to support systemic mathematics and science reforms in 26 states. Like the federal support for the subject-matter projects, these SSI initiatives were begun under the Bush administration. These efforts have been continued and are receiving significant support from the new Democratic administration of Bill Clinton. Clinton was in fact a key leader in systemic reform in Arkansas, and played an integral role in the Charlottesville summit. Thus the general vision of standards-based, systemic reform has garnered bipartisan support.

10These six goals are:
- All children in America will start school ready to learn.
- The high school graduation rate will increase to at least 90 percent.
- American students will leave grades four, eight, and twelve having demonstrated competency in challenging subject matter, including English, mathematics, science, history, and geography; and every school in America will ensure that all students learn to use their minds well, so they may be prepared for responsible citizenship, further learning, and productive employment in our modern economy.
- U.S. students will be first in the world in science and mathematics achievement.
- Every adult American will be literate and will possess the knowledge and skills necessary to compete in a global economy and exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.
- Every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and will offer a disciplined environment conducive to learning.
However, partisan differences reminiscent of those of the early Reagan years have resurfaced. In the 1979 election the Republican platform called for a more hands-off approach to educational regulation and federal support; the Democratic platform reflected its historically strong concern with equity and the reduction of fiscal disparities (see Rossmiller 1990). While today there is much more agreement between the parties over the importance of deregulation and flexibility, equity concerns have become the central sticking point over current Congressional action on H.R. 1804. Most Republicans view the federal role as limited to keeping track of progress made towards the national goals and providing research and development. On the other hand, many Democrats are concerned about developing "opportunity to learn" standards. They contend that it would be inappropriate for the government to measure progress in meeting expectations for learning without a role in providing—schools, teachers and students with the capacity to meet them (Kirst forthcoming, citing Sroufe 1993).

At this writing it appears such differences can be overcome. If they are, and particularly if H.R. 1804 passes and the ESEA reauthorization follows current recommendations, the federal role will have shifted significantly in two respects. First, much more than in the past there will be an effort to develop and maintain an integrated framework for fulfilling historic federal responsibilities. Content and performance standards could serve as a guide for all K-12 federal programs addressing special needs children, by providing performance goals, by placing emphasis on improving teaching and learning for all students, and by setting high expectations for all children. The standards could also undergird federally funded professional development through the Higher Education Act and various programs like Eisenhower and Chapter 2. They would guide the identification and dissemination of promising practices to teachers and school administrators and therefore provide a framework for research and development. In this manner, a common set of objectives could forge new integration among previously discrete categorical programs. The standards also would make performance the primary emphasis of these programs and direct the provision of support toward the realization of these objectives. At the moment, as states like California try to promote learning beyond the minimum competency efforts of the past, Chapter 1 teachers are hamstrung by federal testing requirements that emphasize these lower level skills.

A second change of the decade is the more explicit federal recognition that states are now the major players in education reform. Chapter 1 reauthorization recommendations propose that states adopt standards to serve as performance goals for Chapter 1 and that they take responsibility for holding schools accountable to the standards. Goals 2000 would provide federal support for state and local policy design and development. This is quite a departure from the 1960s and 70s, when the federal government provided funds for programs delivered by local education agencies and administered by state education agencies but designed in Washington. Certainly the fact that the President as well as the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Education are former governors provides a partial explanation for this change. But more fundamentally, the state leadership role—in policy and well as finance—is indisputable, given the last decade of reform. The feds can no longer expect to bypass the states, as they did in the early days of ESEA and P.L. 94-142.
when states were judged as neglectful of special needs children. Given the web of state policy surrounding core areas of schooling, it would be counterproductive, if not impossible, to circumvent them. Direct federal-local efforts have to at least complement state initiatives or they will be swamped by the much greater tide of state policy. Much more likely to succeed are those federal actions which harness and provide further leverage to the efforts of the states; in such cases the relatively small federal contribution can be magnified instead of thwarted by state funds and related policies. Furthermore, some argue that there is little need to bypass the states, because states and districts now have their own programs to help students with special needs and are much less likely to resist federal equity-related efforts. The political environment has changed so that extra help for children with special problems is an established aspect of the state and local role.

**National Groups.** National-level organizations and temporarily convened national committees have always played an important role in American education. In the late nineteenth century, for example, the National Education Association's Committee of Ten produced a report that had a profound effect on the core content of the secondary curriculum. National organizations like The College Board or accreditation bodies have established examination systems, programs or rules of membership which significantly impact school policy and content.

During the 1980s, the role of national organizations in school reform intensified and took on great prominence. Indeed it was the work of one national professional association—the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM)—that provided the groundbreaking leadership for the development of subject-matter content standards. The organization decided that in order to encourage textbook publishers and test developers to produce more rigorous, challenging material, they would have to develop and establish curriculum standards. When NCTM started its work, the idea of standards was an anathema in government and foundation circles, particularly at the federal level. In the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government sponsored a series of curriculum projects which politically backfired and led to serious problems for the agencies involved. No one was eager to repeat this history. But NCTM set about its work without substantial financial support; it has since received wide acclaim for producing ambitious curriculum and teaching standards that have achieved broad professional backing (see NCTM 1989, 1991; Massell et al. 1993).

In part because of NCTM's success, and in part because of the rise of systemic reform ideas on the public issue-attention cycle, the energy that has been mobilized to create content standards at both state and federal levels, and among professional associations, is nothing short of remarkable. In February 1987 the leaders of five major subject-matter organizations met to discuss ways to influence the direction of reform. Seven groups were funded by the U. S. Department of Education to develop standards in their fields, and several others are moving ahead independently. Other national forums are spinning off from these efforts; for example in August 1990 leaders of 20 subject-area groups met together to initiate a process to forge consensus across the different standard-setting groups. The efforts of these national groups of professional subject-matter
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specialists have provided teachers and other professionals, many of whom felt overlooked in the early 1980s reform period, with access to influence both at the national and at the state levels.

Other national associations are providing platforms for ideas which have had the effect of increasing the role and authority of their members in education reform. They do so in part because of the high visibility of the national format, but also because the organizations provide resources, strategies, and support for mobilizing members’ activities. Two examples during the decade were the work of the National Governors’ Association (NGA) and The Business Roundtable (BRT). During the 1980s education became the NGA’s top priority, and over this period it has promoted and disseminated many reform ideas. As a result, governors have become important players at the federal and national levels. The BRT has been very active as well. In the last few years, for example, it developed a list of nine Essential Components specifying that schools should be outcome or performance based and that professional staff be rewarded for success, helped to improve, or penalized for failure. It has been conducting “gap analyses” in different states to help business leaders determine the steps to take to move their states towards meeting the Essential Components; it publishes newsletters, provides resources, develops strategies, and uses other means to help members become policy influential in their states. BRT affiliates in states like California have already played key roles in promoting school reform.

Other organizations also promote aspects of standards reform. The National Board for Professional Teaching Standards was organized in the latter 1980s to develop certification for experienced teachers based on their mastery of high professional standards. The Board is working with the different content standard-setting groups to build model challenging academic standards into the range of expected teacher competencies. Similarly, the New Standards Project is developing a voluntary, national examination system that would accommodate many exams all set to the same high standards. Comprised of an association of states and big city school districts, the New Standards Project aims to generate systemic reform via authentic assessments that would yield improved instruction, better staff development, and greater clarity on goals and outcomes, among other things.

Federal and national efforts interact in a synergistic way. The professional and membership-driven efforts of national associations undergird and give leverage to the policy activities undertaken by the federal government; the policies give the national groups fiscal support and significant developmental and technical assistance responsibilities in carrying out the reforms. The linkage provides some insight into the staying power of the current reforms. It might be predicted that the budget deficit and competition for attention and resources from other serious societal needs would drive education off the radar screen at the federal level. It is certainly true that education has been a lower profile activity for the first year of the Clinton administration than the budget deficit, health care reform and crime. But the sizeable and numerous non-governmental activities surrounding federal efforts magnify federal policy activities and
reinforce their direction, suggesting that the reforms have a continuing momentum. Just as professional activities, particularly those of NCTM, gave important impetus to the shift to a results-focus, such activities are likely to be the key variable influencing the persistence of reform.

The States

The increasingly busy policy arena serves as both an explanation for and problem for state leadership in education. As Finn and Rebarber (1992) note, education policy at the state level was once a fairly sedate sport played in a small arena with relatively few participants. Interest groups representing teachers, administrators and other school employees dominated the scene and negotiated agreements behind closed doors with a few key legislators, the state education superintendent, and perhaps the governor or his representative. Few people outside of this small circle participated in these discussions. As the state’s administrative and policymaking duties expanded over the years, in part through the federal categorical programs noted above and in part because of their growing financial obligations, public involvement grew. So did the number of special interests. We now turn to the individual players, those with formal powers and those without official portfolio, and look at the roles of these institutions and groups at various points in the reform decade.

Governors. Governors’ attention to education has remained strong through the 1980s and into the current decade. We began the reform decade with many examples of exemplary gubernatorial leadership.11 As in the case of the school finance reforms of the 1970s, some governors such as Richard Riley of South Carolina, Joe Frank Harris of Georgia, Robert Graham of Florida and Lamar Alexander of Tennessee established commissions or blue-ribbon committees to recommend comprehensive reform approaches, placed the full prestige of their office behind the resulting packages, and took the lead in generating public and legislative support. Georgia’s Harris took pride in the fact that there were no amendments to his initial proposal and that it was passed unanimously by the legislature. Others, such as Florida’s Graham, skillfully merged their own programs with recommendations arising from within the legislature. Still other governors, such as Thomas Kean of New Jersey and Bill Clinton of Arkansas, made education a consistent focus throughout their multiple terms, relying on successive reform bills. Whatever approach governors took, their influence was apparent in the fact that several specific reform ideas became known throughout the nation by the name of the governor who initially sponsored them. Hence, “Alexander’s Career Ladder Program,” a merit pay plan for teachers; “Kean’s Alternate Route,” a certification program for prospective teachers without a teacher education background; and Booth Gardner’s “Schools for the Twenty-
First Century Program” in Washington, a grant program for school restructuring, all emerged as major reform initiatives.

In these roles, governors typically relied more on policy leadership than on managerial influence. For a governor to be “active” in education has meant focusing on new policy initiatives rather than managing existing policy—in part because education is, like any other state policy area, too complex and sprawling for governors to actually manage directly (Rosenthal 1990, 170), and, in part, because education is, with its separate boards and strong local control conditions, formally insulated from the governor’s direct control.

As the decade wore on, it appeared that governors were less active in developing new state education initiatives. However, this relative quietude is not, in our opinion, a sign of lack of interest or of diminishing gubernatorial leadership. For one thing, a number of governors, such as Chiles of Florida, Miller of Georgia and Florio of New Jersey, have been notable for protecting education from budget cuts during the recent recession. Instead, there are indications that the focus of governors has moved away from individual education initiatives and toward broader efforts. The broadening is noticeable in two respects: (1) many governors are now as active collectively in national efforts as individually within their states, and (2) education leadership has widened to include social services beyond education with governors becoming more active in efforts to integrate social services on behalf of children.

A landmark in the emergence of collective gubernatorial action was the National Governors’ Association (NGA)’s 1986 report, A Time for Results. The report marked a turning point in education reform. It called upon NGA members to move away from the policy preoccupation with increasing standards for students and teachers toward a “second wave of reform in American public education,” one focused less on regulation and more on school-based change. NGA was certainly not the sole source of these ideas. Other major reports issued in 1986 contained similar language about school change and shifts in state policy to support restructuring (Carnegie 1986; Holmes Group 1986). However, the NGA report gave particular impetus and political legitimacy to these new reform ideas. A Time for Results found a way to urge a new wave of reform without denigrating the mandates and regulation that had characterized reform to date. It provided language and a set of ideas about building on what had already been accomplished and moving beyond existing reforms without making it seem as if embracing the new agenda meant scrapping the old. This was important for reform governors who had invested considerable energy and reform capital in the old agenda. Because NGA took on the education issue in A Time for Results, ideas which were already circulating through other influential forums became the property and responsibility of the governors.

In 1989 and 1990, the NGA joined President Bush in calling for, establishing and promoting a set of national education goals. The idea had antecedents in NGA publications that called for states to establish goals, following up on the emphasis in A Time for Results on educational outcomes. If outcomes were to form the basis of
accountability systems, then leaders needed to determine which outcomes were desirable. The discussion around goal setting laid the groundwork for national goals, making them an appropriate topic for the Education Summit of 1989. The National Education Goals Panel, comprised of six governors, four representatives of the administration, and three ex officio members of Congress, was then established to report on progress toward the goals. The Panels' efforts to define what steps would be necessary to achieve the goals drew the nation's attention to high performance in key subject areas and to challenging conceptions of content in those areas (National Education Goals Panel 1992).

NGA and Goals Panel leadership in education may have lasting influence on the manner in which state policy innovation occurs. These bodies serve as consensus-building mechanisms for the highest state policymakers, policymakers who are not only state officials but national political figures. NGA's positions carry high visibility: they draw authority not only from their own validity but from the political power they represent. NGA can take ideas in good currency among policy specialists and professionals and grant them widespread political legitimacy. National action can be used as potential leverage for change within states. The association thus becomes a new structure for policy entrepreneurship among the governors. Through NGA a governor can make a name for himself within a policy area that extends far beyond what he achieves within his own state. In fact, it can be argued that President Clinton's bid for the presidency was enhanced by his leadership of NGA and of the National Goals effort.

The second aspect of broadening focus is the growing role of governors in using their authority to link education to other children's policy issues. For example, Governor Wilson in California created a cabinet position for education and children's issues. In Florida, Governor Chiles is continuing to provide leadership in this area, building upon the work he had done in the U. S. Senate in the areas of infant mortality and the coordination of health and human services. In May 1991, Governor Miller of Georgia launched a pilot program called "Family Connection" to link education and human service agencies to provide comprehensive medical screening and follow-up services. Since then, Governor Miller created a Policy Team for Children and Families to plan an initiative to establish family centers statewide in or near elementary schools. These initiatives attempt to respond to the worsening social and health conditions of children and youth, and recognize these problems as integral to continuing educational progress.

Legislatures. The extent to which legislatures took the initiative in the reforms of the 1980s is extremely impressive. A study showed that in Georgia, California, Arizona, Minnesota and Florida, legislative chairmen and leaders shaped and shepherded reform packages, and in Pennsylvania legislators pressured the state board to assure that their

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12Later the composition of the Goals Panel changed. It now includes eight governors, two administration representatives, and four members of Congress (the latter are no longer ex officio).

reform goals were met. There were other key players in each of these states, including governors and business leaders, but legislators were active pilots at each stage of the education reform process. Even before reform bill introduction, legislators often served as members of gubernatorial task-forces and commissions and/or convened their own studies (Fuhrman, Clune and Elmore 1988).

Legislative leadership is in part a reflection of outside forces, such as the pressure of business interests and the urging of the federal government. But it also reflects the strengthened capacity of legislatures as institutions. The increase in staff resources, including staff who specialize in education, the more professional stance of legislatures, and the increased time devoted to legislative duties all prepared legislatures to assume leadership over a function that commanded the largest share of state budgets (Rosenthal and Fuhrman 1981). The activity of legislatures in the school finance reforms of the 1970s in some senses made their leadership in the substantive reforms of the 1980s inevitable; as the state share of the education dollar grew so did the need for accountability and the interest of legislatures in promoting and assessing school performance.

As we approach the mid-1990s, legislatures appear to be more selective in exerting their leadership than they were during the 1980s. Although this relatively low profile is not universal and there are exceptions, a change is noticeable in a number of previously very active states. For example, in South Carolina, the legislature has not initiated any major education reform measures since 1989; in New Jersey, the legislature has been consumed with school finance issues. Other previously active legislatures, like California and Georgia, have produced a steady but relatively small stream of education bills in recent years.

Legislators are playing a role through participation on advisory committees, or through the adoption of broad goal statements (which frequently mirror the national education goals) and some enabling legislation, but certainly the range and scope of legislative enactments is much smaller in scale than it was during the flurry of omnibus legislation at the beginning of the 1980s. With exceptions, Kentucky being the most obvious, the omnibus education reform packages of the early eighties are not as much in evidence today.

Why this more selective legislative stance? There are several possible explanations. The most obvious is the fiscal stress experienced by states in the first years of this decade. With little money, and much local furor about mandates without funding, legislatures are wary of making a great deal of new and directive policy. Fiscal conditions have resulted in more organized campaigns to stop mandates without money. In Pennsylvania, for example, lawmakers are considering a constitutional amendment that would prohibit demands on local jurisdictions, including school districts, unless it were backed by state funding. In Texas a similar proposition, if approved by voters, would exempt districts from complying with state mandates that are not fully funded. In New Hampshire the Board of Education voted to eliminate all minimum education standards—
the state only provides seven percent of all school funding—although this initiative was later modified and narrowed by the legislature.

In Georgia, originally very directive mandates have been modified and softened in response to opposition. Other states have passed new bills which eliminate or allow districts to apply for waivers from many regulations, including Florida, Minnesota, and Texas. A skeptic might view the recent efforts of a number of legislatures to repeal education mandates as a way to justify their failure to increase funding. Many local educators in Florida view the “horse-trade”—freedom from regulation in return for results—as just that.

A second explanation for the legislative quiet rests on changes in education leadership in state legislatures. Many of the long-time, well known legislative education leaders retired by the end of the 1980s. In Minnesota, where the legislature has initiated or been supportive of nearly all new education reform proposals over the decade, all education committee chairs, including prominent advocates like Senator Ken Nelson, have left. In South Carolina, the F.B.I. sting of the legislature led to a loss of roughly a dozen legislators in addition to those who retired. As a result, only one education committee chair who was involved in the 1983 forms remains. One can chronicle similar changes in education leadership in the New Jersey and Florida legislature, as well as other states. It is not immediately apparent that new leaders are emerging to take the place of many of those no longer in power. The cautious stance of legislatures may reflect a power vacuum in the field of education. If that is so, one can only imagine that the term limits movement will result in further retreats from policy leadership. On the other hand, it may be that new chairs and committee members are being groomed, but because they are taking time to grow into a more activist education policy role, their impact is hard to trace and the time lag creates the appearance of a fairly quiet legislative time.

A third explanation has to do with the nature of the current reform movement. The emphasis on standards and coordinated policies linked to standards (mechanisms like assessment, teacher professional development and materials) has implications for the current stance of legislatures. First of all, much work can be done on these reforms without new legislative action. In many states, development of curriculum frameworks, assessments, and the like lie within the existing authority of state agencies. Agencies may determine to undertake or set up structures for standards-based reform without explicit statutory charge. California’s reinvigorated curriculum frameworks resulted from Commissioner Bill Honig’s own vision and initiatives from the staff that emerged over time. Eventually this included the reworking of a pre-existing set of policy instruments to coordinate with the frameworks, and new legislation was not needed to take these directions. Similarly, Delaware’s New Directions reforms are guided by a partnership of the state agency, the university, business leaders and local districts. While legislators appear supportive, in many cases they have not been asked for nor have they offered statutory action. In New Jersey, the development of curriculum frameworks are spelled out in State Board regulations about accountability that respond to an earlier statute calling in a rather general fashion for outcome standards.
In addition, this reform approach is technically complex. It focuses on the development of a set of very innovative, sophisticated policy approaches that coordinate with one another. From a legislative point of view, the need for continued, careful orchestration may suggest delegation, either to existing agencies or to new structures established specifically to bridge all the intricacies and varied constituencies. Since in 1993 most states are still in the development stage of standards-based reforms, the legislative role in giving these reforms teeth (e.g., providing rewards and sanctions) is still yet to come. Further, the current reform approach specifically calls for legislatures to refrain from initiating new policies that would contradict the standards. Since reform emphasizes coherent policy, it anticipates that once a policy framework is developed, policymakers will support it over time and protect the reform thrust from new initiatives that might diverge in nature (Fuhrman 1993). Also, the notion of focusing policy and accountability around expected results suggests a corresponding effort to remove a number of process regulations so that schools have maximum flexibility in reaching the outcomes. Therefore, a premium is put on removing existing policy rather than on creating new policy.

In some cases the legislature’s role in systemic reform may be more easily traced through the budget than through code. For example, membership in the multi-partner New Standards Project for standards and assessment development might show up in the budget, as might assessment development contracts. In addition, some of the states’ current development work is being supported by federal funds, through the National Science Foundation’s State Systemic Initiatives Program, the U. S. Department of Education’s Eisenhower and FIRST programs. Certainly the federal stimulus provided to professional associations to create content standards will provide many states with a “leg up” on developing their own content documents (Massell forthcoming.) Given hard times, some states participating in these efforts may even be using foundation and private funds to supplement federal dollars, and the standards work would be hard to find in state budgets.

State Agencies. State education departments have for some years been mistrusted by legislators (Rosenthal and Fuhrman 1981). State agencies have been seen as self-interested bureaucracies, representing the “education establishment” rather than students, parents or the public. This distrust, as well as the fact that political benefit comes from placing scarce dollars in local schools rather than in state agencies, has led to a vicious cycle of underfunding and failure to keep up with reform demands.

As in the early 1980s, the recession of the early 1990s has meant significant downsizing for state departments of education. In both periods budget cutbacks led to reductions-in-force of approximately 25 percent in many of the states we followed.\textsuperscript{14} In

\textsuperscript{14}Like their state counterparts, the U.S. Department of Education lost 30 percent of its staff positions between fiscal year 1981 and 1991. On the other hand, the number of programs it manages increased 47 percent, and its budget increased 85 percent (House Government Operations Committee 1993).
Minnesota the budget was cut by 20 percent in 1991 and 1 percent more the following year. Pennsylvania’s staff was reduced from 1,600 at its peak to little over 600 employees by 1987 because of hiring freezes (Moloney 1993). In New Jersey, the department lost 363 positions between 1989 and 1992, or 25 percent of its total staff. The department reports that of the remaining 1,036 positions, about half (453) are non-state-funded, and 256 of the state-funded positions are in special institutions (like the state library). Thus, only 326 state-funded positions remain for the core mission of the department, the fewest since 1966. In Georgia the department lost 89 out of 450 positions in 1992. In those states where agency staffing levels remained stable or even expanded, it was frequently as a result of federal programs which at this point are not coordinated around the central missions of agencies. This is not an unfamiliar story.

Reorganizations have followed from these cuts. In recent years the departments have attempted to move away from regulatory functions towards providing local districts with more technical assistance and helping to build local capacity. In addition, state agencies are instrumental in leading state efforts to achieve coordinated, in-depth reform of school content, assessment, and other areas. It is probably not coincidental that this reorganization comes at a time when mandates and top-down regulation have been increasingly questioned. More and more states are actively encouraging districts to employ waivers, charter schools, and the like. The Minnesota State Board of Education, for example, approved an unprecedented waiver freeing an entire school district from nearly all state rules. Minnesota also permitted up to eight schools to operate free of state and local regulations, provided they meet outcome goals agreed to with the local board. In Minnesota they fulfill the regulatory mission by identifying areas where standards are not being met and assisting districts to better their performance. Districts are encouraged to come to the SDE to ask for support.

Towards these ends, the state departments in Minnesota, Texas, Georgia, South Carolina and elsewhere are organizing into cross-role, multi-skill teams to serve local districts. As states attempt to move towards coordinated, systemic reform, this cross-role teaming may help turn policy specialists into generalists, foster communication, and promote policy integration keyed to common goals (Fuhrman and Massell 1992). An in-depth study of the transitions within the Kentucky Department of Education found, for example, that curriculum and assessment people worked together to design curriculum frameworks and assessments, and that divisions are working together to provide professional development (Lusi 1993).

However, a critical question is whether state departments will have the time, resources, or capacity to upgrade their own knowledge, let alone provide such services to districts and schools. In the words of one agency staff person:

When you move from...a monitoring and supervisory kind of...role to a technical assistance role, it’s a big change. And we did not provide the necessary staff development for our people to make that change. They say, “Today...you monitor, you govern, you make regulations...” And tomorrow you say, “Oh,
today you’re going to be a buddy.” …[It’s] a different job…and…we never have done professional development to prepare our people to do this new job. (Lusi 1993)

Furthermore, with revisions in the federal categorical programs looming ahead, a question is whether states will lose even more of the staffing capacity that was bolstered strongly by these programs. Another question which needs to be explored is the extent to which reductions-in-force actually result in cost-savings. In Georgia, despite large reductions in 1992, the amount of money saved to the state was minimal (see Georgia case study, appended). And finally, without the capacity somewhere in the educational system to provide support and guidance to local districts and schools, it will be difficult to bring about the kind of meaningful changes to schools that is the hope and promise of systemic reform.

**New State Structures.** In the 1980s and at present, states sometimes find it necessary to bypass traditional governmental structures to build coalitions for reform. In the post-*A Nation at Risk* period, many states, as noted previously, used special commissions or blue-ribbon task forces to set the agenda, develop reform recommendations, forge compromises to smooth the way for legislative deliberation, and build public support (especially for tax increases needed to finance reform). Today, states are resorting to similar broad-based mechanisms, but with an interesting difference. The new entities are likely to be standing, not ad hoc as most of the earlier commission efforts were. They are intended to be continuing, to maintain membership across key agencies and actors and authority across electoral cycles as a means of enhancing political stability. Such bodies could recommend necessary refinements and protect reform momentum and coherence over time.

The model for many such efforts is the South Carolina Business-Education Subcommittee. Established in 1984, it included 20 members—10 from the business community, 6 from education, and 4 from the legislature—prominent in shaping and selling the Education Improvement Act of that year. The Subcommittee’s charge was to monitor the reform and suggest recommendations, including modifications to EIA over time. The annual reports and the deliberations of the committee kept public attention focused on reform. Citizens were regularly informed of implementation progress and effects and were continually reminded that the reforms would take time to bear full fruit. As a consequence, EIA was given time to work and its direction was maintained. South Carolina did not experience the shifts in emphasis and proliferation of projects that occurred in other states during the 1980s (Fuhrman 1993).

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15 In 1970, the federal government contributed about 40 percent of all SEA expenditures (Ross-miller 1990 citing Millstein 1976). The proportion of the federal budget distributed to state education agencies has, in fact, increased since 1980. Then, the proportion of the budget going to SEAs was 3.5 percent, at a level of $2.4 billion (in constant FY92 dollars). In 1992, the proportion of the federal budget provided to SEAs was estimated at 5.3 percent, at $4.0 billion (NCES 1993).
Kentucky’s Prichard Committee is another interesting example of a structure that bridges constituencies. The Committee is composed of 95 volunteer members, including former governors, business leaders, and parents. Since 1991, it has undertaken a six-year project designed at maintaining commitment to the Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) and facilitating implementation. For example, it conducts public education through the media, public forums and information channels such as a touring KERA bus and an 800-number phone service. It organizes local support through citizen committee and trains parents in the school based management aspect of the reforms. It also monitors and reports to the public on reform progress. The Prichard Committee was structured as a citizen effort and does not include educator representatives. To reach out to those key constituencies, the Committee created a coalition of educational associations to work with.

Another example is the Florida Commission on Education Reform and Accountability. Created as part of the 1991 reform bill, FCERA is authorized to oversee the development and implementation of the School Improvement Program, state goals for local implementation, and make many other important policy decisions. Several states receiving SSI grants from NSF have established governing bodies that serve similar purposes in facilitating cross-role and agency interaction and protecting reform direction. For example, the Connecticut Academy for Education in Mathematics, Science and Technology has a broad-based governing board, aimed at building support for reform as well as undertaking teacher enhancement and working with schools. The board represents business, urban interests, educators from elementary and secondary and postsecondary education and political actors.

In some cases, the alternative structures are created within the education agency, but have unique composition or reporting requirements designed to foster interbranch coordination. For example, in Minnesota, the legislature created an Educational Leadership Office in the Department of Education to implement its new reform and selected its own point-person within the agency to report to it directly. Kentucky’s Office of Accountability resides within the legislature, so that investigative activities regarding school district management can be separated from the SDE’s education leadership role. In 1992 the Georgia legislature transferred authority to regulate training and licensure from the Board of Education to an autonomous Professional Standards Commission to allow the Department of Education to function more fully as a service rather than regulatory agency.

Courts. While many issues—personnel, health and safety, and others—bring the courts into the realm of education, finance is the primary conduit of court involvement in schooling. From 1971, when the Supreme Court of California ruled the state school finance system unconstitutional in Serrano v. Priest\(^\text{16}\) to 1992, lawsuits were instituted in 26 other states (Odden and Picus 1992). Barton, Coley and Goertz (1991) distinguish between two different waves of activity based upon the nature of the challenge and the court decision. The first wave, following Serrano, focused primarily on disparities in

\(^{16}\text{Serrano v. Priest, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P. 2d 1241, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971).}\)
educational expenditures across districts in a state and on the relationship between the
revenue and wealth of school districts (Barton et al. 1991). In response to court litigation
or as a measure to prevent lawsuits, 35 states enacted new or revised funding programs
between 1971 and 1985. Directly, then, or indirectly these cases had the effect of
expanding states' share in school funding so that by 1990 states on average were
supplying about half of all school expenditures (Odden and Picus 1992). In addition to
targeting spending disparities, these first wave finance cases also led states to provide
better services to at-risk students, such as special education, direct aid for compensatory
education programs, and bilingual programs.

However, school finance activity during the 1980s was slow; new court cases were
filed in only 8 states during the entire period. At the end of the decade, court activity
began to pick up and significant rulings were issued. In 1989 courts in 3 states—Montana,
Kentucky and Texas—ruled in favor of the plaintiffs. In 1990, litigants in New Jersey
succeeded in having their finance system ruled unconstitutional, as did plaintiffs in
Minnesota and Tennessee the following year. The latest count shows new school finance
litigation in 25 states (Congressional Budget Office 1993).

Barton and others (1991) refer to these and later cases as the “second wave.” Many
of the decisions differ from the first wave not in their focus on disparities in expenditures
across districts, but in the way “unequal educational opportunities” are measured and
defined. As in other realms of education, courts are looking more and more at educational
outcomes rather than just inputs. As Barton and others (1991) write:

The [second wave cases] focused on disparities in actual programs offered as
well as wealth and expenditure disparities; expanded definitions of what state
constitutions require of education systems; moved toward requiring the equaliza-
tion of expenditures, and away from an equalization of the ability to raise educa-
tion revenues; emphasized the needs of educationally disadvantaged children;
and, in Kentucky, called for a total restructuring of the educational governance,
as well as finance, system. (p. 19)

In some respects these new directions build upon a strand of challenges based on clauses
in state constitutions calling for a “thorough and efficient” education. Because these
clauses are broadly stated and subject to interpretation, plaintiffs are more free to assert
particular definitions of “thorough and efficient” based upon prevailing perspectives of

17A number of older court cases, however, were heard on appeal. See the chart compiled by

18The clauses vary across states: some state constitutions call for “thorough and uniform” or
“general and uniform” school systems, for example. Others merely call for the creation of an
good schooling. And in fact court cases in this arena generally have raised issues about the substance and quality of the educational program that districts must provide (Odden and Picus 1992; Wise 1983), and have led courts to deal more directly with the core of the educational enterprise. In Robinson v. Cahill (1973) the New Jersey court argued that the "thorough and efficient" clause required an education system that allowed all students equal opportunity to compete in the labor market—a clear outcome focus. A West Virginia case in this era required the state to provide equal programs and services across all school districts, and the court even went so far as to determine the specific content standards in art, mathematics, science and other areas that the state must meet (Odden and Picus 1992).

The 1989 Kentucky case, Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. (Ky., No. 88-SC-804-TG), took this precedent and further expanded the meaning of "thorough and efficient." The court overturned the entire system of public education in Kentucky, including funding but extending to governance and school programs as well. The court wrote into its decision the minimal characteristics of an efficient system, including that the state should meet such specific goals as "sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage" and "sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization." It specified that the system be focused on outcomes, student performance, and not just dollar inputs. We see once again the forceful pull of outcome-focused ideas on shaping another arena of educational activity.

Interests

Teachers. During the reform decade teacher unions frequently endorsed reform proposals, but have not played a strong role in initiating change at the state level. In a six-state study of teacher unions during the first half of the reform decade, McDonnell and Pascal (1988) write:

Unlike the national-level organizations, which have actively worked to shape some bold approaches to teacher professionalism, the state organizations in each of the six states in our sample moved from initially opposing some key reform proposals to accommodating new policy directions... At the same time, state teacher organizations were not active shapers of new approaches to teacher policy between 1983 and 1986. They were reactors and accommodators, rather than innovators....With only a few exceptions, local teacher organizations in the six sample states responded to reform initiatives in an accommodating manner. However, unlike the state affiliates, their accommodation resulted not from a calculation that opposition was unlikely to produce a significant payoff, but from

\[19\] In Pauley v. Kelley (162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E. 2d 859; 1979), the West Virginia Supreme court required the trial court to determine what a "thorough and efficient" education system was and to determine the extent to which the system met that test (Odden and Picus 1992).
a belief that reform policies were quite peripheral to their mission and interests.
(p.vii-viii)

These findings are largely confirmed by the reactions in the states we followed over the 10 year period, with some exceptions. For example, unions in Florida were very effective in abolishing first the merit pay program and later the merit schools program, which had never built a strong base of support among local districts.

Unions were more active on the local level with many of the restructuring reforms of the latter part of the 1980s; for instance, unions worked with local administrators to restructure districts like Pittsburgh, Rochester, Dade County and Cincinnati and alter or enlarge teachers’ roles and responsibilities (Koppich and Kerchner 1993). Most of these activities were unrelated to state political developments, running on a track of their own and influenced more by state budget cuts than policies. In some cases, like Jefferson County, Kentucky, local efforts provided a model for later statewide reforms. For the most part state policies were not where reformist unions (professional unions, in Koppich and Kerchner’s terms) focused their efforts in the last half of the decade and in the early 1990s.

While traditional unions did not play a highly proactive role in state reforms during this period, teachers have begun to exert their influence in other ways and through other organizational means. Specifically, as noted earlier, professional subject-matter associations are playing a big part in current state reforms, as are individual teachers who have been engaged in new state reform activities. One estimate is that 41 states around the country are revising their mathematics guidelines to conform to NCTM content standards. This marks a significant change from the beginning of the reform decade, when professional educators were excluded from the policymaking process because policymakers did not believe the profession could reform itself (Darling-Hammond and Berry 1988). The 1991 Accountability Act in Florida is seen as a “bottom-up” state approach which has been shaped more by professional educators than any statewide reform since the 1960s (Kirst and Carver, appendix, this volume.) In California, Kentucky, New Jersey and South Carolina, professional educators dominate learning goals and standards committees as well as curriculum framework writing teams. In Vermont, teachers are primarily responsible for the design and implementation of the new portfolio assessments that will be used statewide.

Business. One surprise to many observers is the persistent presence of the business community in the politics of school reform. While business has periodically played a high profile role in education, during the 1980s many business people at the state level
undertook an organized advocacy role. The California Business Roundtable, for example, was instrumental in passing the omnibus Senate Bill 813 in 1983, and remains a potent force today. Georgia’s Quality Basic Education Act grew out of the work of the Educational Review Commission which was chaired by and comprised of many business leaders; business communities were also active in lobbying the General Assembly for passage of the bill. In Kentucky, the business community (the Kentucky Business Roundtable) and the Prichard Committee created a partnership of business, political, education and civic representatives to maintain visibility and develop public support for the 1990 Kentucky Education Reform Act. In the last years of the 1980s, public school policies were among the top legislative priorities of the Florida Chamber of Commerce, “a virtually unprecedented level of interest” (Herrington et al. 1992). The Connecticut Business and Industry Association established an education foundation in 1983, and by 1991 had invested over $3 million in Connecticut public schools. The business community in South Carolina has played a more unusual, direct role in the state reform process with continuing participation in the Business-Education Subcommittee described previously.

To be sure, it is a challenge to maintain the participation of the business community beyond the blue-ribbon stage where reform proposals are launched. Business involvement typically occurs at the front end of reform (Siegal and Smoley 1989). Volunteerism wears thin for business leaders just as for anyone else. For example although one purpose of establishing the South Carolina Curriculum Congresses was to provide a vehicle for business involvement, their participation has tended to dwindle over time (Massell forthcoming). Some have suggested that business leaders are particularly prone to burnout on education politics, perhaps because they are impatient for change. Others have complained that business leaders say they are pro-reform and get involved in individual school improvement efforts, yet resist overall increases in taxing and spending for education, and we still see evidence of mistrust between business leaders and educators in several of the states we have followed.

However, overall business interest in education reform shows no signs of dissipating. Organizations such as the Business Roundtable, National Alliance for Business, and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association continue to place education issues high on their agenda. Business leaders appear more willing than parents or educators to admit that the problems with American education require systemic reform, rather than tinkering with individual schools or problems (Farkas 1992). Therefore we should expect to see business leaders remain active in standards-based and systemic reform efforts for some time to come.

20 At the national level, several business organizations have been involved in supporting school reform. The Business Roundtable, for example, has made a ten year commitment to supporting systemic reform. It developed an outline of nine essential components of successful systems, and conducts “gap analyses” on individual states for local business leaders. Based on these analyses, they will help those business leaders develop a policy agenda and strategy. Many other activities can be cited, such as the influential report by the Committee for Economic Development called “Investing in Our Children” (1985).
The Public. In both the 1980s and the current reform period, reform leaders worried about public support. In the early reforms, they cited polls about public concern as justification for reform legislation and conducted surveys to demonstrate that the public would support additional taxation in behalf of school improvement (McDonnell and Fuhrman 1985). Now, despite continuing worries about not reaching enough people to generate widespread and sustained support, a number of state leaders are undertaking innovative efforts to directly enlist citizens in standards-based reform. The new strategies go beyond traditional information efforts, such as public hearings, or blue-ribbon committees that meet for a delimited period of time. Many states are trying to set up continuing mechanisms for citizen input and feedback. For example, South Carolina’s Curriculum Congresses that advise on the state’s new curriculum efforts welcome citizen members. The state launched a massive campaign to advertise draft curriculum frameworks and generate public involvement. Initially, the department distributed over 4,500 copies of three draft frameworks; subsequently, distribution was increased tenfold. Drafts were circulated to beauty salons, barber shops, public libraries, and radio and television media; the department even produced a movie trailer about the frameworks. In Vermont, the state department of education facilitates community-based “focus forums”; the first set of forums, which as of December 1992 involved 2,000 citizens, have focused on what students should know and be able to do (Massell, forthcoming). In Kentucky the Prichard Committee for Academic Excellence is helping to organize a citizens’ committee in every school district, hosting conferences for the public, and producing public radio announcements about the reform efforts.

New strategies to enlist the public reflect the desire of reform leaders to differentiate current reforms from past, failed efforts. Many reformers are aware that earlier curricular reforms (e.g. new math and science) did not take root because the public was not informed and did not understand content goals (Massell et al. 1993; Sykes and Plasterik 1992). In addition, these reforms rest on the notion of societal determination of content and skill objectives; at least some public participation seems integral to the current reform strategy.

However, the challenges of involving the public in a meaningful way cannot be underestimated. Getting and sustaining public attention is very difficult; despite a $1.5 million public relations campaign in Kentucky, a Bluegrass State Poll found that 55 percent of Kentuckians had not heard of the Kentucky Education Reform Act since 1990 when the bill was passed. As noted, public participation in the South Carolina Curriculum Congresses has dwindled over time, despite the state’s efforts to publicize its activities. Finally, there can be a tension between public involvement and the need for standards to reflect the kind of expert professional judgment that garners support and respect from teachers. Public scrutiny of textbooks, for example, has had the unfortunate effect of intimidating publishers and watering down curriculum content. In California, for example, it was not until recently that textbooks discussed the important effect of religion as a factor in world history. The state of California had to maneuver through turbulent political waters to maintain that content, but the battle continues at the local level. The important lesson is that while demanding standards may be achieved at the state and
national levels, it will take concerted effort to get public approval and support on a
district-by-district basis (Massell et al. 1993).

Some groups of citizens have been particularly active in the new reform movement,
without any attempt by policymakers to energize them. In some states the movement to
set standards has led to firestorms over the question of whether states can expect and
schools can teach values. State proposals for outcomes-based education are receiving
sharp attacks from groups who view both the content of the outcomes and a shift away
from inputs like credit hours as a way of imposing certain values. Many states’ standards
have identified affective outcomes, such as Pennsylvania’s goal that students shall
"understand and appreciate others." The outcry from particular constituencies over this
and other statements was vociferous, and Pennsylvania subsequently abandoned some of
these learner goals. Certain groups have also identified outcomes-based education as a
primary state battleground in Kansas, Iowa, Washington State, Kentucky, and elsewhere.
In Kentucky the Eagle Forum has organized a project called HEROES ("Help Everybody
Rescue Our Educational System") to mobilize against the outcomes-based Kentucky
Education Reform Act (Thomas 1993). Iowa recently halted its plans because of charges
that the outcomes were vague, did not emphasize the basics, and were an attempt to
impose "politically correct" values on the curriculum (Education Week 1993c).

Local Educators and Policymakers

However "top-down" early 1980s state policy initiatives in student standards, teacher
policy, and testing appeared, they were often created with the participation and influence
of district-level actors (Fuhrman and Elmore 1990; Odden and Marsh 1987; Verstegen
1988). There is a tendency to think that because local-based groups no longer hold
complete sway over state education policy like they did through the 1950s that their
influence has disintegrated. However, throughout the 1980s, district superintendents,
school boards, local union officials, principals and teachers all played a significant role in
the development of innovative reform programs that would later be incorporated into state
policy. Local actors were also successful in modifying state policies they found trouble-
some. Local districts often used state policies as a catalyst to achieve district objectives
(Fuhrman and Elmore 1990).

"Bottom-up" restructuring was an example of district-led reform. Long before states
embarked on decentralization initiatives in the late 1980s, a number of districts across the
country were implementing ambitious restructuring programs (e.g. site-based manage-
ment, or SBM) that shifted both academic and financial responsibilities to the school site.
Between 1986 and 1990, major school-based governance initiatives were launched in
Miami/Dade County, Louisville/Jefferson County, New Orleans and Cincinnati (Fire-
stone, et al. 1992). Other districts, such as Chicago, adopted restructuring strategies that
called for the establishment of school improvement councils comprised of parents,
teachers, and community members.
During the eighties, local districts also initiated a series of reforms in curriculum and assessment. Case studies of 21 districts in six states revealed that many local education officials implemented interdisciplinary curricula, higher-order thinking skills instruction and graduation exit exams in their districts prior to state legislation in these areas (Firestone et al. 1991). District reform policies not only informed state policy, but in many cases went beyond it. For instance, when Georgia established course unit requirements for graduation at 19 units, several districts “upped the ante” and set unit requirements at 20 or 21. Similarly, in Florida, many districts responded to new state graduation requirements by adding additional credit requirements in areas such as drug education, health and nutrition education and sex and family life education. Typically, these additional credit requirements were mandated in urban districts with large at-risk student populations.

As we approach the mid-1990s, we find that many school and district personnel continue to play a leadership role in reform initiatives. The Philadelphia school district has been pivotal in the state’s recent adoption of results-focused reform. In this case, district capacity outweighs the state’s, and district staff have been involved in a number of externally funded projects which provided them with the expertise needed to develop these policies. Similarly, staff from San Antonio have exerted strong influence over recent state-level reform discussions in Texas.

When district reform policies came in response to, as opposed to in advance of, state initiatives, there was generally little tension between state and local actors. Contrary to the popular myth of local resistance to state reform action, many district personnel welcomed state intervention in local education matters. State intervention could provide the political leverage districts needed to overcome opposition to change at the local level. It could also provide districts with access to sorely needed resources (Fuhrman et al. 1988). A small rural district in Georgia, for example, found that the Quality Basic Education Act served both functions well (Firestone et al. 1991).

A number of policies that engendered local opposition were subsequently modified and softened in response. For example, in Georgia, a state with a long tradition of local control, district protest against “overburdensome” reporting requirements forced the state to change its accreditation regulations in 1991. In New Jersey, a 1990 state law requiring districts to assume teacher pension expenditures was rescinded two years later in response to complaints made by the state teacher union and a number of suburban districts. And, in some instances state policies were modified or subverted by local action. For example, many schools and districts calculated ways to give state-mandated skills tests on days or at times when poor test performers would not show up (see Pechman and Hammond 1991).

Local school boards are in a process of self-reflection about their role and purpose within the context of current governance arrangements. The site-based management movement is in many cases bypassing local boards and central district offices. Advocates are pressing districts and states to give schools more budgetary authority and control. In
Minnesota, interest groups are asking the state court to move to a school-based rather than district-based funding structure (see Minnesota case study, appended).

The governance and authority questions raised by site-based management on the one hand and the state standards movement on the other are well-illustrated in the case of Kentucky. The Kentucky Education Reform Act (KERA) of 1990 required that all schools participate in school-based decision-making by July of 1996, and determined that each school-site council adopt policies regarding instructional materials, personnel, curriculum, extracurricular programs, and other aspects of school management. While the law required local school boards to allocate funding to the school level, considerable confusion reigns over the issue of responsibility. The law holds schools accountable for student performance, and attaches high stakes (cash rewards, or, if performance drops, students may be transferred to other schools) to the results. At the same time, subsequent regulation required the councils’ plans to be consistent with local school board policy. Site councils argue that they must have full operational control over instructional programs if they are held accountable, but they do not now have that authority because their plans must be approved by the district and the state. Districts counter that they are legally responsible and thus must maintain basic control over programs. The confusion led the teacher association in one district to take the school board to court to determine who is responsible for school programs. At the same time, contrary to KERA’s intent, state regulations over local agencies and schools are growing,\(^1\) thus adding to the confusion and constraint.

\(^{1}\)The Kentucky court decision meant that all state regulations had to be suspended, to necessitate a comprehensive review.
Chapter 3
Capacity for Reform

While the players taking leading roles shifted somewhat over the reform decade, one factor that has remained relatively stable is the fairly low capacity for meaningful reform at various levels of governance and practice. If we wish results-focused reform to lead to serious change, we will have to attend to the learning required at all levels of the system.

Economic Climate

The reform decade was preceded and concluded by hard fiscal times. In 1981 and 1982, state budgets for education were weak (Mueller and McKeown 1986) because of the recession in the late seventies. The fiscal distress led to cutbacks in educational spending, particularly to state departments of education. But by 1983, when A Nation at Risk arrived, state budgets had begun to recuperate, and by 1985 15 states passed or considered increases in state sales or income taxes to help fund education. Eventually, expenditures per pupil in public schools grew by 35 percent between 1981-82 and 1990-91, after adjusting for inflation, and the lion's share of these new resources came from states and local districts. Between 1980 and 1990, state support rose by 33 percent and local support increased 40 percent (Congressional Budget Office 1993).

However, in 1990 the percentage increase in revenues per pupil dropped to its lowest point of the decade, .9 percent (Firestone et al. 1991). And now, health care spending is spiralling out of control, and Medicaid can comprise as much as 20 percent of some state budgets. In Florida, it is projected that in 1993-94, the Medicaid budget will exceed the public school budget for the first time ever (Kirst and Carver, appended). Many governors strongly committed to education reform have concluded that they must place health care reform at the top of their agenda if school reform is to continue. Connecticut’s state education budget decreased $23 million between 1991-92 and 1992-93, which led to massive cutbacks in the state and local education agencies. In Minnesota, per pupil revenues have not kept pace with inflation the last two years, a trend that will likely continue given projected revenue shortfalls.

At the same time, states like California and Florida are challenged not only by a weakened economy but by a burgeoning school population. So while these states made gains over the decade in terms of real expenditures, these gains were eroded by population growth. Students from non- or limited-English speaking backgrounds and with other special needs placed an additional burden on the school dollar. Thus while California’s education budget did expand modestly in FY92-93 by about $200 million for a total of $27.8 billion, the state’s national ranking on per pupil expenditures will drop from the 31st to roughly the 39th place. Florida confronts similar difficulties.
One consequence of this is a continued willingness to propose reforms without a concomitant plan for or resources for implementation. Georgia education bills have passed through the legislature for years without funding or funding only for pilot projects, and provisions of the early reform initiative (Quality Basic Education) still remain underfunded today. Florida's new major reform initiative requires school sites to reallocate existing aid for planning and renewal, and no new money has been provided for implementation. As a result, the knowledge base and capacity for reform is not being built, an issue we take up next.

**State Capacity**

As alluded to in the section on state agencies, at no point over the reform decade did governors and legislatures pay attention to assuring sufficient capacity for reform at the state level. Failure to enhance capacity at the state level has serious consequences for the implementation and effects of education policy, especially for the sophisticated and integrated policy approaches now being pursued. The first function that suffers is development. Most states lack the capacity for serious research and development in areas where technical advances are required (Kaagan 1988). We know as a nation that we must place priority on developing assessment mechanisms that go beyond basic skills and adequately tap the ability of students to understand the structure of a discipline, to solve problems, and to conceptualize. However, only a handful of states have sufficient funds to seriously invest in development of more sophisticated assessment.

Second, technical assistance suffers. State agencies are increasingly finding that they must target technical assistance to the neediest districts. This is a worthy and appropriate goal, but it means that states can not offer widespread assistance on new policy initiatives, such as new curricular frameworks, where even the most capable districts might benefit from help and substantive understanding of state intentions. Furthermore, even the targeted assistance falls short. It is generally insufficient for the most troubled districts, and the squeeze on agency capacity means that agencies are having difficulty separating their compliance and assistance functions in such districts. For example, in states with academic bankruptcy programs, the individuals who are charged with assisting troubled districts to avoid takeover may well be the very same people who have consistently failed the district in monitoring visits over the years. (Fuhrman and Elmore 1992) These monitors are not likely to have developed a high degree of trust among educators.

Furthermore, not much progress is apparent on various measures of educational well-being. States lack fully developed indicator systems that relate educational inputs, process and outcomes (Kaagan and Coley 1989). Hence, we are hindered in our efforts to describe the educational system (to assess the quality of teachers, for example), to mea-

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22This section excerpts portions of “Legislatures and Education Policy,” by Susan Fuhrman, to be published in Governing Curriculum, edited by Richard Elmore and Susan Fuhrman, forthcoming from Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development.
Capacity for Reform

sure progress toward policy objectives (to tell how much and what kind of math students are taking in response to curriculum frameworks), and to examine interrelationships between policy and results (to tell if increased course-taking is associated with student achievement, for example).

Many states collect volumes of data, but many fail to integrate it in a meaningful way. For example, states may have data on graduates of teacher education programs and on teachers who are certified that are not integrated in ways that permit examination of the steps between graduation and certification and comparison of teachers from out of state or from non-traditional routes. Few extend their data collection to permit determination of the characteristics of certified teachers that then seek employment and the characteristics of those who are actually hired out of the pool seeking to teach.

The need for indicators takes on new urgency with respect to recent concerns about opportunity to learn. Many educators and citizens worry about the fairness of holding all students to and assessing their performance on new, ambitious standards without assuring equal educational opportunities. Goals 2000 referred to earlier, calls for states to create "opportunity to learn standards" that would be certified nationally and authorizes an effort to develop such measures. Included in the issues covered by new standards would be the quality and availability of curricula and materials; teacher capacity in each content area; teacher access to professional development; and alignment of curricula and instruction to standards. Most available measures, like the numbers of credits in a subject or even the course titles of courses students are taking, tell little about the content and quality issues raised above. It's likely that new measures will be needed, particularly indicators of the enacted curriculum (Smithson and Porter 1993; Porter 1993).

While indicator research and development is sorely needed to create better measures of educational quality, even if we had much better and complete indicator sets, we would not be able to determine the effects of policy sufficiently to inform future policy. That purpose is best served by policy research and evaluation, a fourth function that suffers from inadequate state-level capacity. Indicator systems can raise questions about the relationship of policy to student achievement; for example, if a state had appropriate measures of the implementation of a new math framework, policymakers could track the relationship between implementation and student achievement. They could learn that students do better in math where the curriculum is implemented. However, without learning why it was implemented better in some places than others, the kind of barriers to implementation that exist, or how other state and local policies or school conditions support or hinder implementation, policymakers will not know how to encourage wider implementation. They will not learn whether the math framework is most appropriately mandated, offered to districts voluntarily, best supported by a certain kind of technical assistance or staff development, etc. They will not learn from an indicator system alone how to best design policy to support learning. Those questions require in-depth studies in a well-constructed sample of schools and districts (Goertz et al. 1989); few states have such analytic capacity available or are willing to purchase sufficient amounts of it.
The lack of attention to development, assistance, indicator systems and policy analysis may suggest that states are increasingly focusing on a function that is becoming more and more central to state policymaker concerns: accountability. It is true that state agencies are directing more efforts toward accountability (see below)—continuing to monitor for compliance, developing increasingly elaborate reports of performance measures for policymakers and the public, and implementing programs that attach rewards and sanctions to various levels of performance (OERI 1988; Fuhrman 1989). However, without really good measures of performance, quality efforts to assist those who are not performing well or analysis of how policy exerts its influence on performance, true accountability is illusive. Furthermore, some states, such as California and New York, are beginning or planning sophisticated quality review procedures to assess teaching and learning, as complements to performance measurement. Such “soft accountability” approaches in the tradition of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate (see O’Day and Smith 1993; and Fuhrman and Elmore forthcoming) seemingly require much more capacity than traditional checklist, paper-trail monitoring.

A final point related to capacity is that all the capacity the state needs to implement and understand education policy need not be housed in the state education agency. Some functions, such as evaluation, might remain separate to assure objectivity. Other functions, like development, assistance and research, might be conducted by a number of organizations. Among the institutions that can provide necessary state-level functions are regional service units, consortia of states, districts and/or schools, and networks of educators. About half the states now have university-based education policy research centers that conduct research on indicator development and study the implementation and effects of state policies.

Local Capacity

The ability of school districts to meet the challenges of new state curriculum standards and statewide tests that measure complex thinking skills remains a serious issue for policymakers. Rural school districts typically have limited capacity and resources. On the other hand, urban districts have frequently seen state reforms as irrelevant to their own problems of fiscal shortfalls, labor relations, large numbers of drop outs and many students at-risk. Systemic reform strategies that call for greater district- and school-level accountability in meeting higher teaching and learning goals could face resistance from teacher unions, superintendents, and other urban education officials who may see such reforms as unresponsive to the needs of their students. While some urban districts (e.g., San Diego) have been successful in implementing innovative teaching and learning policies (GAO 1993), many still lack the necessary knowledge, resources, and motivation to restructure their educational programs. The General Accounting Office (1993, 5) finds that “Districts implementing systemwide reform may need substantial support” in the way of technical assistance, professional development and resources. In fact, districts judged successful in initial systemic reform efforts were receiving outside funding for reform that enabled them to hire consultants and conduct training. However, at least one source of
outside support—the federal government—has provided less funding overall to districts since 1980. In 1980, federal funds flowing directly to districts was $18.7 billion (in constant FY92 dollars); by 1990, this figure had been reduced to $15.0 billion. Estimated 1992 amounts show some gains ($17.7 billion) but not at the level that had been reached by 1980 (NCES 1993b).

Most of the recent results-based initiatives assume that local educators and school districts will flesh out state or national standards by creating curricula that will best meet their particular needs. In Kentucky, for example, the state department of education's curriculum framework is designed at a fairly high level of generality to allow local curriculum supervisors to craft more specific curriculum guidelines based on local needs. In Pennsylvania, too, the state's reform effort intentionally does not presume to make these more detailed curricular decisions. Minnesota's outcome-based plan anticipates that schools, not school districts, will develop their own curriculum. But the fact is that the ability of many local schools and districts to create or assemble their own curriculum has declined steadily over the years (Walker 1990), and districts have had to rely more and more on publishers and other external agents for not only curricular materials but also staff development activities that will support the teaching of those curricula. Furthermore, local districts often do not have the resources to purchase new materials; in New Orleans, for example, the district has a paltry $32 per pupil for texts and materials. State fiscal crises have only exacerbated the problem of capacity. In San Diego, the school district has downsized 21 percent and lost more than $9 million dollars. In recent years San Francisco has had to cut back sharply on its teaching staff due to budget constraints. Many districts are turning to non-certificated staff to plug the holes punctured by funding cuts. State support for staff development is poor (see Staff Development section below), and indeed the question of capacity is the most critical problem facing current reform efforts.
We concentrate in this section on policy instruments directly targeted to teaching and learning. However, we recognize that these instruments are used in, and shaped by, a host of other elements in the broader policy environment. As important as what is being created with the new instruments, for example, is what state policymakers are disassembling and making more flexible. Waivers and broader forms of deregulation, charter schools, school choice, and decentralized budgeting authority are increasingly popular components of school reform. Most of these reforms are in keeping with the general shift in policymakers' gaze away from regulating inputs towards concentrating on results, and each is part of an effort to decentralize authority. The charter schools idea, first enacted in Minnesota in 1991, allows licensed teachers to create their own schools with waivers on state rules. In return, they must meet the goals agreed to in its charter. The charter schools idea has spread rapidly since 1991. California provided for charter schools in 1992, and by 1993 it was introduced in some form in about 16 states (Kolderie 1993).

Charter schools decentralize authority to teachers and other school-level professionals. Choice options attempt to decentralize decision-making to parents by allowing them to "vote with their feet" and aim to generate school improvement through market incentives. States and districts have experimented with a number of different school choice strategies since the mid-1980s: interdistrict transfer laws allowing students to attend public schools outside their residential district; interdistrict transfer laws allowing students to attend public schools within their residential district; post-secondary enrollment option laws that allow secondary students to take college or university courses; residential and special high schools for academically talented students; educational clinics for high school dropouts; and laws allowing private schools or special contractors to provide education to general school populations (Fossey 1992). While choice is a popular reform strategy used in more than half the states, it has been tried only on a limited scale in most locales. The experiment has not broadened for a number of reasons. One is that while the public is generally supportive of allowing their children to attend the school of their own choosing, they are opposed to allowing students and parents to choose private schools at public expense (see 1992 Gallup Poll for the National Catholic Education Association and 1993 Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll reported in Richardson 1993). Another is the added fiscal burden of choice plans; to provide choice equitably, substantial amounts of transportation have to be added to the system. The recent voucher initiative in California lost the support of the Republican governor because of the fiscal implications for public schools and the state, even though he is philosophically inclined towards choice (Education Week 1993c). A third constraint is that choice proposals often threaten powerful education lobbies—teachers' unions, school boards, and administrators. Finally, equity plans such as desegregation bump up against school choice proposals. In Indianapolis, for example, the
district's "Select Schools" plan has reportedly increased racial segregation in schools (Schmidt 1993).

So as we review here changes in instructional guidance policies, readers should be aware that they are taking place amidst other decentralized, deregulated governance and control efforts. In fact, many view the guidance policies as mechanisms for making the policy system more supportive of school-level reform, not as instruments to achieve school-level improvement on their own.

**Curriculum Policy**

Over the years states and districts have used a variety of measures to influence the content of the school curriculum, not the least of which is testing (discussed in the subsequent section). But most previous policy that has relied primarily on the regulation of inputs and practice such as courses or credits and minutes of instruction.

Before the 1980s, when states had credit requirements (and many states like California had backed away from them during the 1960s) they were often minimal. When states did require particular courses to be taught, that policy was usually driven by legislative response to constituency pressures. Like many other states, for example, New Jersey used to specify only those courses, like physical education, that were backed by strong lobbies. By responding to pressure groups, rather than developing a more holistic vision of what the school curriculum should be, policymakers constructed a fragmented, and often chaotic curriculum.

So when *A Nation at Risk* called on states to establish or raise credit requirements in the core academic subjects of schooling, it was seeking to redress this problem. However, like minutes of instruction, credit requirements provide little substantive guidance as to the content or purpose of the courses students should take. While evidence (discussed above) shows that graduation requirements did improve students' exposure to academic subjects over the decade, those courses nevertheless failed to provide students with a high level of academic content and critical thinking skills.

In their policy repertoire states and districts have two other mechanisms with the potential to more directly influence the substance of schooling—curriculum frameworks or guidelines, and textbook selection. California has relied upon curriculum frameworks since 1972, using them as vehicles for setting the criteria for the adoption of K-8 textbooks. Approximately 22 states adopt textbooks and materials, but they vary widely in the extent to which they require local districts to use these materials. In some states, the adoption lists are merely suggested, in others, like California, districts must use all or most of state-appropriated instructional dollars on these materials. In recent years, some state policymakers have broached the possibility of moving away from textbook adoption altogether. One argument against adoption is that it narrows the range of materials that teachers can use. Others argue that textbooks are a mile wide and an inch deep; the
market, and publishers concerns not to offend, leads to watered down material that is neither probing nor challenging. To respond to some of these criticisms, states have taken two paths. One is to broaden the kinds of materials that may be included in adoption; a few state lists now include science kits and computer software. Secondly, some states are attempting to push the textbook industry to meet higher standards of quality. Over the last decade, for example, California was not shy in rejecting textbooks which did not meet its more rigorous standards of quality. Textbook adoption policies will likely remain on the books as systemic reform becomes a priority because it has the potential to leverage the publishing industry to meet certain standards or to fill certain market niches (like second-language materials) that they would otherwise neglect because the profit margin is relatively small. However much the potential, though, pushing the industry to develop materials that contains controversial elements, like the discussion of religion, remains a difficult challenge. One promising development is the effort of some states like California and Texas to work in concert to extend their leverage and overcome these obstacles.

As we turn to a more results focus for policy, the instrument most on the ascent at the state level is curriculum frameworks. For many years states, and districts too, have devised curriculum frameworks or guidelines periodically, but in general these materials did little more than gather dust on the shelves of curriculum supervisors. Their lack of salience to districts, schools and teachers lies in the fact that the frameworks were not strongly linked into other policies, particularly assessment; no one monitored their use (Archbald forthcoming); and at least in the opinion of many experts, the design of these materials hampered their readability and usefulness.

California was one of the first states to recognize the traditional weaknesses, and the potential power, of curriculum frameworks. Bill Honig, who had denounced the frameworks as little more than “good doorstops,” was elected as Superintendent of Public Instruction in the early 1980s. During his term the frameworks became not only the foundation for textbook adoption, but also the intellectual core of the state’s student assessment program, staff development, accountability, and teacher certification. And whereas the older frameworks offered lengthy lists of the facts and behavioral objectives that should be covered, and inputs like number of hours in class, the newer initiatives

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23However, some states also require software publishers to submit hardware as part of the review process, a rule which prevents many companies, particularly small ones, from competing. The politics of adoption is also difficult for small companies, which do not have a lobbyist.

24Note that California recently lengthened its adoption cycle from seven to eight years in part because of the difficulty of getting publishers to readily respond within the time-frame. In addition, the shorter cycle poses a burden on local districts and teachers. Once materials are selected and matching assessments created local educators often have only a few years to learn and implement the new curriculum before revisions are required. These rapid changes are particularly difficult for elementary teachers and district curriculum supervisors who must deal with changes in one area of the curriculum every year (Marsh and Odden 1991). Another motivation for lengthening the adoption cycle is cost; fiscal crises in both California and Georgia contributed to the decision to lengthen adoption cycles.
provide conceptual roadmaps which highlight the "big ideas" of the field, written in a more literary, narrative style to convey the information in a more compelling and understandable way for teachers as well as for district curriculum supervisors. While this is not the only approach to state curriculum frameworks currently in use, it is one gaining rapid acceptance among state and national groups (see, for example, Curry and Temple 1992).

Now, teams of teachers, academics and other educators in over 30 states have embarked on the development of new curriculum frameworks in various subject areas, joining 15 other states which are already in the process of implementing them (Pechman and Laguarda 1993). Even traditionally strong local control states like New Jersey, Vermont, Massachusetts and Minnesota have taken up the banner of curriculum frameworks. In 1987 New Jersey, for example, began its foray into policies that would more precisely specify content, by identifying core course proficiencies in subjects required for graduation recently the State Board of Education demanded the development of discipline-based content standards. Frameworks based on those content standards will soon follow.

This kind of layering of content policies, with each step more detailed, is not atypical. Kentucky, for example, adopted six broad education goals, then developed 75 learner outcomes, and finally a comprehensive curriculum framework which interweaves the goals and outcomes into different subject-matter areas. This single framework does not use the kind of literary, narrative style of the documents developed in California and South Carolina, nor does it develop a separate framework for each subject area. A study of state curriculum frameworks and guidelines in the 1980s showed that state curriculum frameworks varied greatly in their level of prescriptiveness and rationale (Archbald forthcoming), and it is likely that this kind of variation will continue as states and districts wrestle with the question of providing sufficient guidance to districts, schools and teachers, and at the same time giving them adequate flexibility to design their own program to best fit the needs of students and the local community.

Some states, particularly those with strong traditions of local control and weak state intervention, have attempted to provide a less specific, more goal oriented form of curricular guidance. States like Pennsylvania, Vermont, and Minnesota pursued what some refer to as "outcomes-based education," reform efforts which at least initially were distinct from the kinds of subject-matter specific frameworks produced in South Carolina and California. The philosophy of reform in these states was to posit only the goals—what students should know and be able to do—in broad, nondisciplinary-based terms without reference to sequencing or pedagogy or similar kinds of details.

By point of comparison, the state's 1990 science framework identifies 40 major ideas. The document it replaced identified 600 separate science objectives.

It must be noted that the term "outcome-based education" is being very broadly used by the states, and lacks conceptual clarity. Here we are providing a distinction that some may protest, but we think it useful to begin a discussion that more carefully defines terms.
However, many states pursuing this kind of approach have run into difficulties, one technical and the other political. The technical difficulties have arisen over the states’ effort to use these outcomes statements as a foundation for coordinating reform in other policy spheres, i.e. systemic reform. Minnesota and Vermont, for example, found that their outcomes alone were not specific enough to guide the development of assessments. In Vermont, the problem was complicated by the fact that the first draft of its Common Core of Learning, which identifies what students should know and be able to do, was not organized by subject-matter area. In the meantime, teachers around the state were in the process of developing new performance assessments rooted in the distinct disciplines. After critical comment from the state board of education and teachers, Vermont revised its plans. The Common Core of Learning is now organized by subject area clusters, and the department plans to construct curriculum frameworks at a more specific level of detail. For similar reasons, Minnesota is now developing curriculum frameworks.

The specificity issue arising around this topic raises many questions about state versus local control, the flexibility of the standards versus their ability to lead, and the ability of the standards to provide substantive guidance to other policy components. On the one hand, people argue that the standards should be broad enough to allow for many different curriculum designs and teaching approaches. On the other hand, broad standards may lose their potential to promote high quality or to anchor other policy instruments (Koretz et al. 1992a). While some states like Wisconsin are planning to create curriculum frameworks which local districts can use directly as a curriculum guide (“they will be able to rip the cover off and call it their own guide” said a state official), other states like Kentucky intend for local districts to use the framework as a starting point for curriculum planning. The balance between specificity and flexibility can be a difficult one to achieve, but state policymakers need not see them as either/or alternatives. For example, states can provide flexibility for school and teacher choice by designing different strands of relatively precise standards.

As states become more active and involved in curriculum, they are also coming face to face with a range of angry values debates from all sides of the political spectrum. These debates, once occurring primarily at the local level or in a more limited realm of policy, have moved up the ladder to the state. Because of the wide reach of the new policy initiatives, and the fact that many of them are being developed in partnership with the public (see Massell, forthcoming), they have captured greater attention. In the past, Massachusetts had curriculum guidelines which were used by committees to develop testing items; today, like other states, it will develop frameworks in a much more high profile way, with the expectation of garnering broad public and professional support. Outcomes-based education, perhaps because of its more explicit denotation of expected attitudes and competencies, has come under sharp attack (see earlier discussion in Section II, the public). Whether states pursue outcome statements like those generated in Pennsylv-
vania, and/or subject-matter based curriculum frameworks, the mechanisms they establish to develop documents and respond to feedback will be critical to their ability to generate meaningful change accompanied by broad consensus (Massell forthcoming).

At least as important in this process are the mechanisms established at the local level for debate and consensus on the expectations for student learning. A recent study of citizen challenges to instructional programs and materials in Indiana showed local school boards played a pivotal role in these issues. When school boards initially supported challenged programs and materials, less than one-fifth of the challenges made were successful28 (McCarthy and Langdon 1993).

Districts, like states, have moved from inputs to results over the reform decade. Curriculum guidelines were certainly not new to districts, but much more emphasis was placed on them in the 1980s (Cohen and Spillane 1993). In fact perhaps one of the clearest manifestations of local activism during the decade occurred in curriculum alignment and standardization; a study of 24 districts noted that 10 of them had strong forms of curriculum centralization in progress (Clune 1989). Many large urban districts like Philadelphia and San Jose moved to centralize and articulate the K-12 curriculum through districtwide guides and textbook adoptions. In part this effort was undertaken to cope with an increasingly mobile and diverse population, but it was also aimed at helping teachers respond to high-stakes minimum competency tests. Now some of these same districts are beginning to decentralize authority over curriculum, and some are looking at results-based approaches to provide conceptual continuity across school sites. Philadelphia is one of these districts, and as mentioned earlier its move towards a results focus is providing strong leadership for the state’s newest reforms.

Assessment

Over the course of the 1980s policymakers seized on testing as a part of their effort to overhaul teaching and learning to conform to A Nation at Risk. Certainly the use of testing as a mechanism for change has been a persistent feature of the state policy landscape since the late 1970s, and the national report simply added fuel to this accountability fire. In fact, only five states initiated testing programs for the first time between 1984-85 and 1989-90; others already had them in place as a result of the minimum competency testing movement of the late 1970s. By 1990 23 states were using tests to evaluate students for promotion to the next grade or graduation from high school, 38 used tests to monitor student, school and/or district performance, and 20 used them to identify students in need of remediation (Coley and Goertz 1990). In addition, over the decade state assess-

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28The authors of the study note that one-fourth of the complaints lodged against instructional programs and materials and library holdings centered on religious concerns.
Policy Instruments

Policy Instruments were expanded to cover more subject areas and more grade-levels. At the beginning of the decade the California Assessment Program (CAP) only covered reading and mathematics, but history, science and writing were added over time. Georgia added writing, science and social studies to its high school exit examination.

While statewide testing is here to stay, by the end of the decade policymakers began to reevaluate the nature of tests and their effects on the system, particularly on classroom instruction. Basic skills tests were designed to insure a minimum level of learning, but research indicates that such tests promote a minimum approach to level of instruction. Considerable work indicates that multiple choice, basic skills testing, and the high stakes use of tests for evaluation and promotion lead to a narrowing of the curriculum and to drill-and-practice methods of instruction (Haertel 1989; Haladyna, Nolan and Haas 1991, in Pechman and Hammond 1991). Emphasis is placed on the rote memorization of discrete facts, on absolute “right” answers and not critical thinking skills. Basic skills tests are criticized for decontextualizing knowledge. In addition, the kinds of norm-referenced tests that many states use do not connect to the actual content of what students learn in the classroom. An Arizona State University study, for example, revealed that norm-referenced instruments only measured 26 percent of the delivered curriculum. As such the tests do not provide students or teachers with useful feedback for improvement. Thus it is no surprise that the Arizona study also found that teachers did not use the tests to guide their instruction (reported in Bedford 1992).

In light of such criticisms, many states in the late 1980s and early 1990s began modifying their testing programs, in some instances (Florida, Georgia, South Carolina) reducing the number of tests they required or suspending programs until different assessments are developed. But the more common reaction has been to move to criterion-referenced tests, or use interim, off-the-shelf tests with some open-ended components like essay writing to capture more complex, higher order thinking. In addition, states have begun to develop some form of alternative assessment. Alternative assessments range from portfolios, performance of tasks (including writing, essays, and the like), enhanced multiple choice (multiple choice with some open-ended questions), all open-ended questions or problems, extended performance (including presentations), to projects.

Arizona, for example, moved away from norm to criterion-referenced examinations in all state-required subjects, and incorporated more open-ended items that require more complex thinking. Maine expanded the number of open-response questions from 20 percent in 1990-91 to 50 percent of the exams in 1991-92 (Maine Department of Education 1992-93). Georgia supplemented its basic skills tests with some higher order thinking components. Vermont teachers are designing portfolio assessments which will eventually be used statewide. A survey during the 1991-92 school year found that 28 states were implementing and 6 more were in the process of designing or piloting some form of

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29While mathematics and language arts (reading, writing and language) still remain the most commonly tested areas, as of 1991-92, 27 states were assessing students in other subjects, with social studies and science as the most common (Pechman 1992).
alternative assessment. Of the 16 that reported no activity, one (Indiana) is in the process of developing frameworks which will later guide the development of alternative assessments. In other states (Iowa, Utah), the department of education is assisting local education agencies to develop alternative assessments (Pechman 1992).

The alternative assessments that states are developing are premised on very different assumptions than basic skills tests. The new assessments attempt to directly connect to what a student actually learns in the classroom, and to inspire more risk-taking pedagogy that will encourage students to synthesize information, problem-solve and in other ways engage in higher order thinking. They are rooted in assumptions of a branch of research known as cognitive psychology, and seek to replace the behavioralist paradigms that have underlined policy and practice for many years. Alternative assessments promise to be more useful both to the student and the teacher.

At this juncture, the technical issues are still being worked out. California has been piloting performance-based science assessments for a few years, and the cost and administrative time is burdensome; similarly, after the first year of trial many Vermont educators felt that portfolio assessments were burdensome (Koretz et al. 1992b). Another study of Vermont’s portfolio assessments points to problems with interrater reliability, that is, the extent of agreement between raters about the quality of student’s work in mathematics and writing (Koretz et al. 1992c). Test validity, that is, what may be properly inferred from a test score, is also an issue in some instances. Since alternative tests often cover broad areas, it can be difficult to determine what is actually being assessed. In addition, there is concern that alternative assessment data may be appropriate for instructional purposes but not for broader accountability. An unanswered question is whether alternative assessment data can be aggregated in meaningful way so as to make judgments about overall programs, schools, or school districts (Bedford 1992).

But despite these early concerns, many are enthusiastic about the potential of alternative assessments to transform the business of education and accountability. Vermont educators involved in the portfolio assessments reported that the system was a powerful lever for instructional change, and that it had altered their own evaluations of students and increased their enthusiasm for teaching. In about half of the schools that Koretz and his colleagues investigated, local staff had already expanded the portfolio beyond the two grades targeted by the state, and many more were ready to sign on (Koretz et al. 1992a). Anecdotal evidence from teachers participating in projects like New Standards support the enthusiastic response of Vermont teachers.

Teaching

One of the areas to receive the most reform attention over the last decade is teacher policy, which broadly consists of five domains: fiscal (salaries and incentives), preservice education, inservice training, certification, and evaluation.
Salaries and Incentives. Prior to the mid-1980s, most states left teacher salary decisions to districts. In the early 1980s many states set out to raise teacher salaries, and by 1986 at least 30 states had set minimum salaries (Darling-Hammond and Berry 1988). South Carolina’s 1984 legislation, for example, required annual adjustments in the state’s minimum salary schedule to within the regional average teacher salary, and provided adjustments to districts to keep salaries competitive with surrounding locales. Many states such as California, New Jersey and Georgia set new or higher minimum salaries for beginning teachers. Georgia established a market sensitive mechanism to establish beginning pay levels; its Quality Basic Education act specified that the minimum salary of a new teacher with a bachelors degree and no experience must be comparable to the beginning salary of recent university graduates entering jobs with similar requirements. Teacher salaries did in fact increase sharply in the early part of the decade (Darling-Hammond and Berry 1988), and by 1990-91, they were at their highest level ever, about $33,000 (Congressional Budget Office 1993). Between fiscal years 1986 and 1990, minimum salaries rose 13 percent (see Georgia case study appended).

We see signs that at least in some states the gains teachers made may be threatened by current fiscal problems. For the first time ever, Georgia teachers were not paid across-the-board raises in fiscal year 1991. After gains earlier in the decade, average teacher salaries in South Carolina recently slipped to just below the regional average. While teacher salaries have grown in Florida 75 percent since 1980-81, the state average still lags behind other states in the nation, a gap that is growing.

In addition to upgrading salaries to make the teaching profession more competitive with other professions, state policymakers experimented with a number of incentive systems to reward teachers for more, or better, performance. While a number of merit pay programs, career ladders, and similar initiatives have continued, the majority fell by the wayside or were transformed into less controversial school based incentive programs. In Georgia, for example, continued opposition to the career ladder program prevented the item from being funded save for one year (1989). The Florida merit teacher initiative was doomed from the beginning because funding would allow only a small proportion (five to six percent) of teachers to receive it. The subsequent merit schools program was eventually abolished over time because it was not strongly linked to student achievement and it became perceived as a hand-out to districts. Similarly Texas policymakers decided to dismantle career ladder pay. Career ladder programs become easy targets in times of fiscal distress, because they are not part of the regular funding formula and they are very expensive. Texas, for example, never had been able to pay teachers at the upper levels of the pay scale.

By contrast, Arizona’s pilot career ladder program started as a small pilot and expanded steadily over time. By 1991-92 the state was investing $21 million in the program. Part of Arizona’s staying power can be attributed to the fact that (unlike Florida’s merit schools reform) student achievement remained an integral part of the program, and to participate districts had to change the teacher salary structure completely (Cornett 1993). But Arizona and a few other states are the exception to the general rule.
If differential pay programs remain, they may be more palatable as school-based, rather than individual, incentives. In South Carolina, the state recently eliminated the option to provide bonus awards to individual teachers based upon state test scores and performance evaluations, but sustained rewards for schools based on aggregated student achievement on state tests. The Kentucky Education Reform Act called for a review of the statewide salary structure, and it provides financial rewards for schools that show gains in student performance based on statewide assessments. The law gives teachers the authority to decide how fiscal rewards from the state are spent, and they may take the money as individual bonuses or use it for other purposes. Texas has a Successful Schools Program which rewards schools based on a composite of indicators (dropout rates, measures of student achievement, and the like).

School-based incentive programs, then, have risen in prominence as differential pay for teachers has declined. As a consequence, teacher compensation structures remain largely as they have been for decades; in most districts, teachers are paid according to a fixed schedule that provides salary increases for education units and degrees, and years of teaching experience (Odden and Conley 1992). However, the issue of differentiated salary structures is once again rising in some policymaker circles, and a few states and districts have taken steps to consider some new alternatives. Mohrman, Mohrman and Odden (1993) advocate skill-based pay, arguing that it is appropriate for educational organizations as they move towards systemic reform and school-based management.

Certification. In 1980 only a few primarily southern states tested prospective teachers, but in 1990, 39 states mandated assessments of basic skills, professional knowledge and/or the teaching specialty prior to entering a teacher education program in addition to or instead of such a test for certification (Coley and Goertz 1990).

States also expanded their role in evaluating beginning teachers. Although local districts have been required to perform these evaluations for many years, during the 1980s states became more aggressive in mandating and specifying the kinds of programs districts must use. In 1984 only four states had a policy to assess new teachers’ performance; in 1992 only four states did not have any policy in this area (Mastain 1988; Sclan and Darling-Hammond 1992). Seventeen states, including South Carolina, Connecticut, Kentucky and Florida, require evaluation before regular certification is granted (Sclan and Darling-Hammond 1992).

Accompanying the move towards testing was the elimination of lifetime licensure. Once permanent credentials were a common staple, but in 1991 New Jersey became the last state in the nation to abolish the practice of granting permanent licenses to first-year teachers. The majority of states, 78 percent, now require teachers to renew their certificates on a regular basis. Recertification is predicated on years of teaching experience, additional formal training, and/or in-service training, but states do not generally specify that training focus on the individual’s teaching area (Blank and Dalkilic 1992).
During the decade states experimented with alternative routes into the teaching profession. In 1984, New Jersey became the first state to do so as an alternative to issuing emergency credentials, which were typically offered to people without bachelor’s degrees or without degrees in appropriate fields, and were offered with virtually no orientation or instructional support save for night classes or summer school. At the time, a teacher shortage was projected and the alternative route was seen as a way of bringing in more qualified people into the teaching pool. The alternative route was intended to attract individuals with degrees, sometimes advanced degrees; the New Jersey program recruited graduates and provided them with a mentor teacher as well as formal instruction while they were teaching in the classroom. Between 1985 and 1990, only about 20,000 people had been certified through alternative route structures, but between 1990 and 1992 that figure doubled and 40 states reported that they had an alternative route into the profession (Feistritzer 1993).

For a variety of reasons most of these teacher policies have not been very effective. One is that while teacher shortages did not reach the high proportions that some observers predicted, they did have an impact in certain regions and in specific fields like science and math. For example, the Georgia’s Teacher Professional Assessment Instrument (TPAI), a series of classroom observations over a three-year period, was initially for all teachers, both beginning and veteran. But low pass rates generated strong opposition which was exacerbated by teacher shortages. These issues led the state first to scale back the exam to only prospective and out-of-state teachers, and later to replace the evaluation with a less rigorous one not linked to certification. The upshot is that states which raised standards for entry into teaching through tests or other requirements have in general also had more permissive emergency credentialling policies (Scannell 1988). According to the National Center for Education Information, very few alternative route programs are specifically designed to tap the market of adults with at least a bachelor’s degree who wanted to become licensed, and concern has grown that states simply use this mechanism as a de facto emergency credential.

Another reason is that evaluation programs typically rely on generic teaching competencies; for example, Minnesota’s Educational Effectiveness Program created in 1983 builds on 15 “effective schools” characteristics that tend to narrow the focus of evaluation and assistance (Sclan and Darling-Hammond 1992). Research demonstrates the importance of understanding the context of the teaching situation as well as the content of what is being taught and the particular instructional goals in order to define just what effectiveness is (Sclan and Darling-Hammond 1992).

Finally, teacher testing has had little impact on the teacher education curriculum, in part because the tests are basic skills.

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30The pool did not diminish so rapidly in part because older, nontraditional students entered teacher training programs, see Feistritzer 1992.
As in other areas of education policy, we see the influence of the more general trend towards results beginning to move into the teacher certification and credentialing arena. Although it is difficult to reform the content of higher education from outside the walls of those institutions, when high numbers of students have not passed state credential requirements they have tended to adjust their curriculum. The National Board for Professional Teaching Standards (NBPTS) is using rigorous standards to certify high performing, experienced teachers. The promise of this new approach is that it may stimulate institutions of higher education to adjust their curriculum towards demanding, rather than traditional, subject-matter and pedagogy (Goertz 1993). In fact Oklahoma has already decided to tie teacher certification to NBPTS standards. This kind of goal may be speeded along as states like Vermont and Kentucky require teacher training institutions, as well as elementary and secondary schools, to move to outcomes-based models of performance for graduation.

A handful of states now have autonomous professional boards with authority for establishing teacher education standards and monitoring teacher practices. As of 1989 the Association of Colleges and Schools of Education in State Universities and Land Grant Colleges and Affiliated Private Universities reported that three states did so: California, Minnesota and Oregon. But interest is growing, thanks in part to the credibility offered by the NBPTS (Scannell 1990). As mentioned earlier, the Georgia legislature created an autonomous Professional Standards Commission in 1991.

**Staff Development.** What did not seem to change significantly over the decade was the ability of state or local education agencies to deliver the resources or support for comprehensive and effective staff development. Some state education agencies do not even have a staff development office, and most do not allocate any aid specifically for the purposes of staff development. In 1990, only eight states reported funding district inservice programs or teacher professional development activities (Coley and Goertz 1990). More commonly states require teachers to have continuing education as a precondition for recertification, or require districts to offer inservices, but they do not specify content. Florida’s 1991 accountability legislation, for example, requires in-service offerings to be linked to district needs assessment documents.

Part of the resource problem is that staff development lacks political legs; state lawmakers and parents often view it as a special bonus for teachers rather than a real means of improving instruction. Staff development programs are very expensive on a large scale, and one very vulnerable at times of fiscal crisis. (Fuhrman and Massell 1992). Although Kentucky, for example, now provides $17 per pupil for professional development (up from $1 in 1990-91) it does not pay for the kind of extended, long term staff development that the literature shows to be most effective (Little 1993). One superintendent noted that the level of funding provided by the state would not pay for even one full day of funding for his 935 teachers. Under its new reform bill the Florida legislature required districts to reallocate aid for staff development purposes, and even then it was a small amount. The Wisconsin Department of Education has no staff development office and earmarks no monies specifically for staff development. In
Pennsylvania educators are concerned that the state has not offered any extra funding for staff development; current in-service dollars are a minimal part of a district’s annual budget (Langland 1992). While California provides a small amount of funding within the general aid formula for staff development, the fiscal crisis has led many districts to allocate the monies to teacher salaries. There staff development has moved from being a state/district responsibility to university/school networks which feature summer workshop training and other activities (e.g. the California Writing Project and the California Math Project). The state department’s own funding for staff development has been decimated by budget problems and political turmoil.

Currently educators must scramble for staff development time. We found that even in one very cutting-edge, entrepreneurial district which participates in many special projects and programs that provide resources for this purpose, elementary teachers are allotted no planning time during the school day. Elementary teachers at one school in this district “banked” time by juggling the start and end of each day, and thereby saving 10 minutes of instructional time. To avoid losing Average Daily Attendance monies from the state, they would pool these extra 10 minutes until they had collected enough time for an afternoon of staff development (Massell 1993).

Many districts must rely on external funding sources for staff development and, even with that support, find it difficult to produce the kind of long-term staff development that research shows to be most effective. The resources required for staff development involve not only the money for the activity itself (i.e. preparation, materials, meeting site, and the like), but also potentially for substitute teachers, compensation for participating teachers (which may be required in the union contract or may be necessary to encourage broader interest), or foregone funding from the state if teachers are released during the school day. Because of these problems, one large urban district formally takes advantage of only three of eight state allotted staff development days. Furthermore, school administrators around the country receive strong local community pressure to reduce the time teachers spend out of the classroom. Poor communication with parents about the staff development initiatives, as well as family work schedules, contribute to this problem.

Because of the twin pressures of politics and resources, the most typical approach to staff development is the “one shot workshop”—a day or two with an external expert “giving” teachers particular ideas for practice and materials—or a special course. Studies show these to be of little value of improving teaching practice (Little 1993). In these modes, teachers become passive consumers of fragmented knowledge. (Moore and Hyde 1981; Little 1989). More effective approaches are the kind of subject-specific teacher collaboratives we see springing up around the country. In these collaboratives, teachers gain entry to a broader realm of professional networks and are empowered by their participation in systemwide efforts (Lord 1991; Lieberman and McLaughlin 1992). Their success may arise in part because they draw upon a constructivist conception of learning that undergirds most recent efforts to improve education. In this model, learning is active and dynamic and builds on the knowledge and backgrounds of the learner. In evaluation, too, some of the more promising recent initiatives move away from generic teaching
competencies to more context-specific conceptions of teaching and learning that build on constructivist approaches toward knowledge and understanding. California’s pilot mentor program is developing complex, situational evaluations, where colleagues provide support and continuous feedback on teachers’ judgment and behavior. A study of the pilot found that the proportion of new teachers involved in this program that remained in teaching between 1988-90 was 7.5 percent greater than those not involved (Slan and Darling-Hammond 1992). Minnesota is proposing an internship program for teachers based on similar conceptions of teaching evaluation.
Summary

In the early 1980s, in response to the concerns and recommendations laid out in *A Nation at Risk*, states and local districts stepped up their efforts to improve schooling, and relied on a familiar repertoire of policy strategies and tools. As we look back over the decade of reform we should take some pride in the accomplishments that were achieved by these changes: downward trends in test scores of the 1970s were reversed, students attained more schooling and more academic courses of study, more students had access to more computers, along with other positive improvements.

But to accomplish the more ambitious goals that underlay *A Nation at Risk* deeper, more meaningful reforms will be required. The kind of complex thinking and problem-solving behavior that we want all students to achieve demands a different way of teaching and learning, one not premised largely on rote memorization and teacher-centered classrooms. We now see some significant revisions in policy instruments and strategies that hold promise for encouraging this kind of change: challenging curriculum frameworks that attempt to provide strong leadership, higher standards of student learning and performance, alternative assessments, efforts to increase school flexibility, and budding forms of professional development, support and evaluation. Older state guidelines enabled publishers to submit watered-down textbooks and materials that avoided controversies; some newer efforts have been successful in moving beyond the status quo. Alternative forms of assessment may prove to be powerful tools not only for providing better measures of student ability but for encouraging more dynamic, open-ended learning situations, and again early signs suggest they are having the intended, positive impacts. Perhaps the biggest challenge confronting reform is the age-old issue of capacity. We will need teachers who can provide this environment, who have themselves the ability to attain the knowledge and skills necessary to teach in new but highly demanding ways. This will require not only changes in the way teachers themselves are taught—alone a challenging undertaking—but in the way we provide inservice training for teachers in the field. We must rethink the way we as a nation customarily approach the issue of staff development for teachers. States must think carefully about the kind of help that they can reasonably provide to schools and districts given their own fiscal difficulties and staff capabilities, but also about what kind of support districts and teachers really need both now and over the long run. Understanding, and providing, the kinds of support districts and teachers need to accomplish current reforms is perhaps the foremost task of research and policy today.
Bibliography


Appendix A
An Examination of the Evolution of California State Educational Reform, 1983-1993

Michael W. Kirst and Gary Yee

1993 marks the tenth anniversary of the educational “ca"l to arms,” A Nation At Risk (The National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983). It also marks the tenth anniversary of education under California State Superintendent of Schools Bill Honig and the passage of Senate Bill 813 (SB 813), California’s far-reaching omnibus educational reform act. While the passage of SB 813 occurred independent of, not in response to, the recommendations outlined in A Nation At Risk, it reflected a concurrent statewide concern over the state of public education in California, and expressed the public’s willingness to significantly change the direction and leadership for public education. What was the policy environment in California during this decade, what was the nature of the subsequent reforms, what influences affected their implementation, to what extent did they contribute to structural reform of education in California, and what were their long-term effects on pupils? This paper will review the past decade of state educational reform, identify policy trends, and seek to develop some explanatory factors which may have contributed to those trends.

Key Aspects of Reforms

The Decade Preceding 1983. What Led to SB 813?

In the decade preceding 1983, several significant events set the political and fiscal context for an increased state role in education. Serrano v. Priest (1976) required the state to reduce wealth-related expenditure differences, and Proposition 13 (1978) placed severe limits on local school districts’ ability to raise funds through property tax levies. This resulted in a greater dependence on state funding by school districts, and more state involvement in local district education policy. School decisions were governed not only by

31Since the draft of this paper, several events which are referenced actually took place: Supt. Honig was convicted on conflict-of-interest charges in January 1993 and removed from office; his permanent successor has yet to be appointed. Proposition 174, the voucher initiative, was defeated in November 1993, by a 70-30 percent vote. The new statewide student assessment program, CLAS, was administered; school-wide results will be available in the fall 1993- individual student results will be reported starting in 1994. The first 37 Charter Schools opened for students in September. And legislation was passed allowing one district in default of its state loan to put up school property as repayment of that loan.
district policy, but by statewide initiatives, court decisions, and a thick, five-volume state education code. Collective bargaining by district employees was legalized in 1976. The California Business Roundtable began its study of school reform in 1980. State and Federal categorical funding, early childhood, gifted, and special education funds, formerly designated for target populations, could be consolidated into a single school-wide plan (AB 777; 1981), controlled by a School Site Council (SSC). And a test, the California Basic Educational Skills Test (CBEST), was administered for the first time in 1982-83 to screen potential teacher-training enrollees, and to evaluate those seeking an emergency teaching credential.

During the 1973-1982 era, California schools had experienced dramatic declines in some aspects of student academic performance, pupil enrollment, and financial resources (Guthrie et al. 1985). Policies in the seventies had focused on minimum standards, disadvantaged minorities, and the lower third of the achievement band, but despite significant increases in funding for categorical programs, high school achievement dropped below the national average (Kirst 1984). After a decade of declines in both student enrollment and general per-pupil expenditures (which had fallen below the national average), the 1982-83 year brought an increase in the student enrollment and a budget for education of $12.7 billion. Bill Honig was elected state superintendent of schools in 1982 on a reform platform emphasizing a return to high academic standards, a comprehensive, statewide reform strategy, and active public support for public education (Honig 1986).

SB 813 and the Influence of Bill Honig (1982-1993)

Superintendent Honig’s education platform was embedded in the California Reform Act of 1983, also known as Senate Bill 813 (SB 813); it included 65 components which addressed a myriad of issues from graduation requirements to mentor teacher programs. SB 813 was supported by both the California Business Roundtable, the California Teachers Association (CTA) and California Federation of Teachers (CFT). Many of the reforms reflected meetings the Roundtable held in the early eighties on ways to improve public education. However, SB 813 was not passed without modification and without a fight; Governor Deukmejian protested that not enough was being exacted from teachers, and he pushed for additional reforms, including more explicit rules for teacher dismissal and layoff and a longer school year, in exchange for the extra state monies. The multiple components reflected the interests of various constituencies whose support was necessary to pass the $800 million package. A summary of the major reforms (Odden and Marsh 1987) are as follows:

- Increased high school graduation requirements to reflect California State University and University of California entrance requirements
- Model Curriculum Standards for grades nine through twelve
- Textbook selection criteria
- Improved and expanded California Assessment Program (CAP)
Appendix A: California

- Mentor Teacher Program
- Certification of teacher evaluators, alternative certification, and new teacher evaluation systems
- Local staff development for teachers and administrators
- School Improvement Program (SIP)
- Increases in homework and writing
- Tenth grade counseling
- Longer school day and longer school year
- Establishment of quality indicators
- A regents-type Golden State Examination
- Increased accountability

The California educational reform program was cited as a model reform package; it committed significant new monies, provided incentives for adoption, worked to upgrade the caliber of the teaching profession, established a school improvement agenda, and upgraded the accountability system. The major components of school reform, curriculum and instruction, assessment and accountability, and capacity building, were first brought together in SB 813. While the reforms of the 1970s attempted to humanize education and target services to specific students with categorical programs, SB 813 stressed tightening standards and intensifying efforts along a broad array of policy levers. Influenced by the effective schools research (Mesa 1984), the attention was directed towards establishing a rigorous core program for all students.

Reforms which required relatively minor structural changes, such as increased graduation requirements, and those for which the state had provided additional funding, such as an extended school year, increased counseling, and the addition of class periods, were quickly adopted by local districts. Proposed quality indicators included improved SAT scores, reduced dropout rates, higher attendance and graduation rates, and increased enrollment in academic courses (California State Department of Education 1985).

The main incentive for districts to adopt various components of the reform were the additional resources they would receive, for example, for extending the school day and school year, for designating teachers as mentors, and for increasing the student participation in the assessment program (Cash for CAP). Of the over 1100 school districts, only 14 declined to participate in both longer day and longer year funding; much of the funding went to increase teacher salaries, which had become significantly lower than the national average by 1983. Geographic regions shared Teacher Education and Computer Centers (TECC) centers, districts hired additional counselors, teachers applied for CTIIP (California Teacher Instructional Improvement Program) mini-grants (up to $2000), and schools applied for AB 803 innovation grants, all paid for by the state. Mentor Teacher salary supplements put an additional $45 million into the hands of 3.75 percent of the state's teachers in 1986-87 for specific projects that they had designed. AB 803 provided an additional $3 million for local school staff development.
The initial efforts at implementation often simply supported district-level improvement strategies with additional resources. For example, most mentor teachers were employed initially to write curriculum for their districts. Because they were usually self-selecting, the notion of a career ladder for teacher-coaches never really materialized.

Despite the intention to upgrade the content of instruction, much of the initial staff development provided for in SB 813 ended up focusing on “clinical teaching and clinical supervision” (Guthrie 1987, p. 16). Rather than participating in professional development in the content areas, teachers were trained in generic lesson planning and administrators in generic teacher supervision. Teacher training programs, under the authority of a different state agency than the State Department of Education, were not obligated to coordinate their courses with any of the reform policies, such as upgraded curriculum or ongoing staff development. An alternative teacher certification program, The Teacher Trainee program, was little used except in Los Angeles.

Assessment and accountability were main features of the SB 813 reforms. Student outcome accountability included the mandatory California Assessment Program (CAP), (introduced by the state in 1972 as a way to assess school effectiveness rather than individual progress) and an annual Performance Report for high schools. In the beginning, CAP was little different from standardized, norm-referenced achievement tests such as CTBS; there was little relationship between the curriculum suggested in the new frameworks and the multiple choice test items. The Performance Report included data on each high school, including three new performance indicators: the percentage of students who obtained high scores on the SAT, the number of students who completed requirements for UC admission, and the percentage of students who obtained passing scores on Advanced Placement (AP) examinations.

Individual student assessment was not a significant component of SB 813. The Golden State examination was introduced to give individual honors recognition to students in mathematics (and now other academic areas). Student participation was strictly voluntary, and this assessment has had little apparent policy effect. A conceptual framework (Carter 1989) that describes most of the components of SB 813 and the linkages between the major components is listed in figure 1.

While policymakers hoped for a fundamental shift in educational direction, the reforms most readily adopted were those that “tweaked” the system (Kaplan 1985). They required little significant change in district structure or culture, or minimal negotiation with teacher unions. These incremental changes, called “first order” reforms by Cuban (1988), serve to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the established system without requiring substantial structural change. A need for structural reform and changes in school governance—second order changes—were not clearly articulated in SB 813, but emerged later in state support for school restructuring, as reformers found that organizational structures and norms impeded efforts to implement the instructional shifts outlined in the legislation (Timar and Kirp 1988).
The School Improvement Program (SB 65), developed as an early childhood supplemental program in 1975, became a potential resource for structural reform at the site level. The school self-study, the program quality review process which utilized quality indicators based on the curriculum frameworks, and the local governance aspects, all were re-designed from their initial emphasis on compliance to encourage “bottom up” flexibility and integration of various categorical programs. Under Honig, the Program Quality Review (PQR) process evolved from a compliance-driven assessment of categorical program outcomes at the school sites by state-trained teams, to a self-study review of school-wide alignment of curriculum and instruction to the frameworks conducted by the staffs themselves, with local support (Odden and Marsh 1987). Categorical monies could now be used school-wide, provided a representative School Site Council (SSC) was established to manage the program. The SI program goal became to create a self-renewing system that would be locally driven, that would secure high community and teacher commitment, and that could be fine-tuned as local conditions warranted (Guthrie et al. 1986). However, in the 1980s, School Improvement funds included planning money of only $30 per pupil per year; for an “average” school of 500 pupils, that amounts to only $15,000.

The Latter Half of the 1980s

Funding

In order to fully implement the reform program outlined in SB 813, a major effort was undertaken to mobilize public support and resources. State funding for education increased during this state economic growth period in the state to the extent that per-pupil spending was restored to the 1979-80 state level by 1986-87 (in constant dollars). However, the student population growth during this period overtook the funding growth to the extent that by 1989-90, funding per average daily attendance (ADA) began to decline once again. By 1991-92, funding per ADA declined to the 1985-86 level (figure 2), despite the continued growth in the numbers of limited English speaking students who often required additional services (figure 3).

SCA 55, adopted in 1986, provided a potential new source of locally-generated revenue for construction; local governing boards, with the approval of two-thirds of district voters, could incur bonded indebtedness for site acquisition and capital outlay, and then retire those bonds by temporarily increasing property tax rates. Passage of the Lottery in 1987 signalled that the public was becoming weary of the additional tax burden of supporting schools, and was looking for a non-tax alternative. The Lottery gave schools an initial shot in the arm, although this funding source has subsequently provided

32However, since 1986, less than half of the 247 local tax initiatives have met the requisite two-thirds majority required for approval.
less and less, in a pattern of declining public participation. In addition, Boards of Education, with a simple majority vote, could impose developer fees for site acquisition and new school construction (Guthrie et al. 1986).

An important feature of state school support is the extensive use of “categorical” funds for specific educational programs and target populations. These funds, about one-third of the total state budget, provide monies for legislatively designated programs such as Adult and Special Education, technology, Bilingual Education, and Child Development programs. As a result of a battle between Honig and the Governor over school funding, several categorical programs, such as bilingual education, Educational Impact Aid (EIA), and School Improvement Program (SIP), “sunsetted,” meaning that the detailed specifications for the programs, but not the programs themselves, ceased to be valid. Despite this, funding has continued for these programs. While categorical funds are usually targeted to needy student populations, supplemental grants were authorized in 1988 for middle-class suburban districts that did not qualify for much categorical support; the grants were justified as a way of providing a “fair share” of the state’s revenue to such districts without disturbing the basic aid funding formula (Picus 1993).

The need for new schools for the booming student population, the need for additional services for a poorer, more needy student population, and the recognition that the relative fiscal prosperity in California was ending, created a battle for control of the public education budget. While Honig continued to push for increases in the state’s contribution to education, Governor Deukmejian consistently opposed new funding. With the Gann Initiative limits to state spending drawing near, and the recession kicking in, Honig and the educational establishment searched for a way to insure a stable, “non-politicized” level of funding for public education. The local property tax was capped by Proposition 13 in 1977, and few districts were able to muster the necessary two-thirds vote to enact a supplemental parcel tax.

Finally, in 1988, Proposition 98 and its companion SCA 1 (1989) was narrowly approved; it mandated that a fixed percentage of the state’s budget be set aside for public education, thus in theory guaranteeing that the budget would not be the battlefield it had been in the past. However, instead of depoliticizing state funding of education, when the economy declined as it did in the late 1980s, Prop. 98 pitted education against other social services such as medical, welfare, and other public agencies for scarce state funds (Shimsaki 1992). It appeared as if education was not willing to share the budgetary cuts required by lower than anticipated revenues as a result of the severe recession which California experienced, and the state’s inability to increase taxes. In a final irony, the supplemental grants reflected a shift away from support for poor, urban districts toward greater per-pupil equity in the total funds available to a school district, regardless of the extent of need in the school and community.

33It currently provides less than 3 percent of the total state education revenues, down from an initial 7 percent.
Frameworks

State curriculum frameworks were developed by teachers and subject area specialists to embody the new academic standards, to serve as the standard against which textbooks could be evaluated for adoption, and to provide a guideline for what is taught.

Each year, a framework for one of seven subject areas was submitted for adoption to the State Board of Education. Local districts were not required to adopt the frameworks, but since the frameworks are linked to statewide staff development, to the state-funded textbook adoption process, and to the content of CAP, districts generally supported their content. Teachers became more familiar with their content through the textbooks they used, staff development projects and professional teacher networks (such as Bay Area Writing Project and the California Science Instruction Network), and content areas tested by the CAP test. Moreover, many districts believed the state frameworks embodied improved curricular and instructional concepts. Common themes such as an emphasis on complex thinking skills, depth rather than breadth of content, and a multidisciplinary, multicultural perspective, promoted a more coherent and better aligned curriculum, both within and among subject areas.

The frameworks provided a way to standardize curriculum in each subject area, by providing content continuity and articulation through the grades and identifying appropriate instructional strategies. Frameworks were developed, one discipline per year, by a combination of classroom teachers and administrators, district curriculum developers, and disciplinary experts. The influence of professional discipline-based organizations such as the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM) and the National Science Teachers Association (NSTA), and others, cannot be understated: their reports, and leaders from their ranks, as well as university researchers, formed a substantive base for most of the framework development.

The frameworks outlined what should be taught, but not how (Brandt 1989). One factor that led to the frameworks' emergence as a primary policy instrument was their link with textbook adoption. Frameworks provided a way to update and influence the content of textbooks, beyond simply checking the readability level and ethnic balance in the illustrations. For grades kindergarten through eight, textbook monies from the state could be spent only on state-adopted textbooks, and the adoption process required state-adopted textbook content to reflect the state frameworks. Publishers struggled to find ways to incorporate the content, philosophy and strategies into the traditional textbook; each purchase of their materials was accompanied by offers of extensive staff development. The new round of textbooks clearly reflect the publishers' attempts to align their materials with framework guidelines. However, since the frameworks advocated team teaching, integrated curricula, heterogeneous grouping, and, ironically, less reliance on textbooks, schools and districts began to see that fundamental structural and pedagogical changes might be necessary in order to implement content changes called for in the frameworks.
Assessment

CAP testing expanded from reading and math tests to history/social science, science, and writing. Significant numbers of teachers statewide were invited to participate in refinements and pilot testing; through this process teachers became more knowledgeable about both the content of the test and new assessment processes. As each CAP test was periodically revised to be more aligned with framework objectives, it reinforced the frameworks' prominence as a policy lever (Odden and Marsh 1987). Through steady refinement, CAP became widely acknowledged as a state-of-the-art assessment tool. Publication of test scores school by school, and district by district, in local newspapers and through real estate agents' multiple listings, made the test "high-stakes." The test's importance as a comparative measure of student achievement undoubtedly resulted in some distortions attributed to the desire of schools to improve their relative state ranking.

In 1990, a dispute between the Governor and the State Superintendent resulted in a loss of funding for the CAP program. In 1991, funding was reinstated for a "new" test designed to provide individual, performance-based assessment of student performance. This reflected a shift in test objectives from an analysis of what's taught to one of what's learned. The first of the new generation of tests, the California Learning Assessment System (CLAS), was field-tested in 1992. Tests will be administered at different grade levels than before; different disciplines will be tested at different grade levels to reduce the load at any one grade level. Beginning in 1994, individual student results will be reported.

Another component of assessment, the School Accountability Report Card (SARC), was part of the "Prop. 98" school finance package. Updated annually, the purpose of the SARC is to provide more detailed site-specific information to the local school community about conditions and progress being made at the school site level. While each district determines the format for the reports throughout its schools, they generally contain a school description and philosophy, data regarding student ethnicity, attendance, and achievement, information about teacher salaries, staff development and educational level, a description of teaching strategies and materials used, and a description of opportunities for community involvement. While still in the early stages, this self-assessment has been perceived as a "low-stakes" compliance requirement in most cases, and its effect as an accountability tool is minimal.

Capacity Building

In 1988, through the passage of SB 1882, California intensified and reorganized some innovative and effective staff development approaches, including six-week summer institutes and regional and local teacher networks. These are not yet widespread and involve relatively few teachers; their statewide effect has yet to be evaluated. It became apparent that more attention would have to be directed toward reform issues involving the quality of teachers and the quality of the teaching environment, the so-called "second wave" of reform (Guthrie et al. 1988). SB 1882 re-designed the whole area of staff development, and funded a three-tiered staff development strategy, which shifted funding away from centrally-directed categorical support for local district staff development (for
example, the Mentor Teacher Support Program, and the mini-grant project program, CTIIP) toward university-supported teacher networks, such as California Science Information Network (CSIN), the California History Project (CHP), the California Math Project (CMP), the New Teacher Support Network, etc. Some county offices of education became the regional hubs for staff development, especially for smaller school districts. These networks focused on training site-based teams of teachers, and in some cases administrators, who became curriculum experts; they would then return to their sites with both curriculum and school change skills. This strategy by-passes district staff development departments and district-mandated training and encouraged site-based collegiality and self-study. However, it also depended on the dissemination of skills and information by a small percentage of trained teachers, and it is not yet clear whether this will occur to the degree necessary to sustain system-wide school change.

SB 813 was seen by some critics as primarily a centrally driven, curriculum-focused reform effort (Brandt 1989), but it did envision that structural, school-based change would occur as a result. The School Improvement program was seen as a way for teachers and the community to have a greater say in the way school decisions were made. Reports from the State Department of Education, such as “Caught in the Middle: Educational Reform for Young Adolescents in the California Public Schools” (1985), emphasized themes of greater teacher collaboration, more interdisciplinary instruction, and greater community involvement. Yet, changes in school site governance did not come automatically as a result of the School Improvement program, nor was it initially seen as necessary condition for school improvement. By the end of the 1980s, there was a general awareness that more substantive, second order reforms (Cuban 1988) were necessary if the high standards were to be achieved; merely tinkering with the current class schedules or the course outlines, or intensifying efforts in various areas, or even providing substantial financial incentives, was insufficient to generate the momentum for significant structural reform. Scattered efforts to change high schools crystallized around movements such as the State Department of Education’s middle schools initiative, which linked newly-structured middle schools together, and the Coalition of Essential Schools, which networked “restructuring” high schools to others across the nation. The Business Roundtable suggested a reform agenda for schools, this time focusing not only on standards but on a fundamental restructuring of school-site governance relationships.

The result was SB 1274, which recognized the importance of local school site restructuring, and offered some grants for planning and implementing restructured governance at the site level; the director of this program was formerly on the staff of the Coalition of Essential Schools. But SB 1274 received only $6 million for planning grants in the 1992 budget. With such a limited budget, it is questionable whether schools without the initial capacity to plan and develop locally will be given the necessary opportunity and/or pressure to learn from the model schools.

Within the reform agenda of SB 813, changes in the pre-service training of new teachers seemed to be the least-addressed area. In addition to the annual need to replace an estimated 20,000 teachers due to attrition, there is a requirement for an additional 4000
new teachers due to enrollment increases. The State Department of Education did not have authority to closely couple teacher preparation programs within the California State University system, where 9 percent of new teachers are trained, or the private colleges to the reform agenda (Guthrie et al. 1991). In addition, the CBEST test, implemented to ensure minimum competency of new teachers, is being challenged in the courts for screening out minority teacher candidates at a significantly higher rate than white candidates (figure 4). Beyond issues of ethnic representation, this has added to the problem of recruiting sufficient numbers of bilingual teachers to staff bilingual classrooms throughout the state.

School Reform at the Crossroads: The 1990s

The California reform agenda had evolved during the eighties from a push to improve education by raising academic standards to a more coordinated “systemic” reform. The state’s coordination of curriculum frameworks, CAP assessment, textbook revisions, tiered staff development, and restructured governance has been touted as a model of systemic reform.

Systemic Reform

By the 1990s, in California, the curriculum, textbook adoption, and assessment aspects of the reform package had become fairly well integrated. Initially, the S3 813 reforms of 1983 had a comprehensive, but non-integrated feel; this was because the frameworks, the CAP test, and the textbooks were as yet uncoordinated; each was on its own planning and implementation schedule. After five years, the frameworks became the primary document to which the other policy instruments were linked. To be eligible for state adoption, textbooks up to the eighth grade must conform to standards outlined in the frameworks. The CAP program has evolved into a sophisticated, performance-based, authentic assessment program which reflects the curriculum standards outlined in the frameworks. The state-specified Program Quality Review school assessment uses quality indicators based on the frameworks.

One difficulty in maintaining integration among the various instruments is the relative time lag which occurs from the time the frameworks are developed (that itself is a two to three year process), to the time that teachers are trained, to the time the textbooks are received by teachers (usually three or more years after the frameworks), to the time that the CAP test is revised and employed (another three years). The technology of framework production generally exceeds the ability of the state to follow up with staff development and implementation. Textbook production, review and adoption generally lag framework adoption by at least two years. The CAP tests were not initially aligned with the new curriculum outlined by either the frameworks, the curriculum standards, or the texts. Multiple choice examinations precluded performance-based authentic assessment, although the
latter has been planned and piloted for use in the new set of tests. Because a framework for a new subject area is developed each year, schools must prepare for a new subject area before the materials and assessment process has been developed for the subject area introduced in previous years. For example, the English-Language Arts Framework was adopted in 1987; textbooks were received by districts in 1990, and the integrated language arts examination was field-tested in 1992. A new language arts framework is scheduled for completion in 1993. In the meantime, Frameworks have been adopted for Mathematics, Science, History-Social Science, Foreign Language, and Health.

Another potential obstacle to classroom implementation of systemic reform is the local option to dissent from the framework. This has occurred most prominently around the History-Social Studies Framework, around issues of cultural diversity and perspective; as a result, a few districts, predominantly those with large minority populations, declined to adopt any of the state-approved textbooks, preferring to produce and pay for their own local materials. Consequently, the alignment of materials, frameworks, assessment, and capacity building is dependent on local support and implementation.

Professional development has also been unevenly integrated; few districts mandate that veteran teachers must enroll in extensive inservice re-training to the professional expectations outlined in the frameworks. Most staff development for veteran teachers remains voluntary. Within the last five years, there have been many summer institutes where teachers are paid to attend and/or develop curriculum for their districts; however, participation by veteran teachers is usually voluntary. There is a requirement for new teachers and administrators to participate in ongoing professional development.

University/school networks such as the California Writing Project (CWP), California Math Project (CMP), California Science Project (CSP) have become major staff development providers. This has put teachers into positions as trainers and developers of instructional strategies, and has put university researchers closer to the practitioner. These networks have also generated interest in school site-based decision-making, i.e., restructuring, as teachers have taken greater responsibility for instructional leadership within their schools. This movement has been supported statewide by SB 1274 which funded selected schools interested in restructuring. These networks along with state-sponsored reform networks such as in middle schools, math and science, work experience, etc., that are still operating, deserve field research to assess their overall impact.

Still, this process has been very uneven. It clearly depends on a core of teachers willing and able to undertake long-term training in single disciplines, and their willingness and ability to communicate the changes mandated in the frameworks to their colleagues. To date, that core has been relatively small. In secondary schools, that may mean training department by department; in elementary schools, the training issue is compounded by the fact that each teacher must learn a new set of curriculum and appropriate instructional strategies for that subject area each year. Nevertheless, researchers report that teachers appreciate the direction of the frameworks and try to conform, despite the lack of signifi-
cant inservice or the pressure of CAP or other assessment mechanisms (Cohen and Ball 1990).

Teacher education is also difficult to integrate, because of its different line of authorization (Fuhrman et al. 1992). There is little control over the content of teacher training programs; the pre-service curriculum is not subject to any control or direct influence by the state Department of Education (Kirst 1992), although this has begun, through the Commission on Teacher Certification (CTC).34 As a result, new teachers arriving at school sites seem to have been at least introduced to the subject area content outlined in the frameworks. One issue that does negatively impact on schools is the inability of teacher training programs to develop and graduate significant numbers of minority teachers. Two teacher preparation examinations that new teachers are required to take (the NTE and the CBEST) show substantially lower pass rates for Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics (Guthrie et al. 1991).

The Fiscal Context

California’s fiscal situation has reached crisis proportions; the national recession hit California relatively late, but coupled with military base closures, has meant that funds will continue to be short. In 1990, the state experienced a $3.6 billion shortfall, followed by a $12 billion revenue gap in 1991 (Shultz 1993). California’s per-pupil spending on education dropped from 23rd in the nation in 1978 to 39th in 1992, and the numbers promise to get worse, as the pupil population grows. There is no money for class size reduction. Several districts experienced severe budget shortfalls. Los Angeles laid off teachers and instituted pay cuts as a result of the severe fiscal pressures. Because of their precarious financial status, some districts requested state loans. In approving the loans, the state assigned a “trustee” with at least informal “advice and consent” powers by the state Superintendent of Schools, to oversee the budget process and the cuts necessary to balance the district budgets. Several districts requested, and received, the authorization to offer Certificates of Participation, much like long term bonds. One district defaulted on its state loan and has offered to “trade” surplus district property to repay the loan; approval is dependent upon legislation sponsored by a local state legislator. The independence of local districts was severely limited by their dependence on bail-out help from the state and the difficulty of obtaining the two/thirds majority necessary to pass parcel tax initiatives. The recession has caused various public interests (i.e., health, welfare, law enforcement, and education) to compete with each other for limited monies.

34In an informal survey of four teacher preparation programs in the Bay Area, including one at a state university, I found that each program utilized the appropriate framework as the central focus of their curriculum courses. Directors of these programs stated that their widespread use began at the end of the 1980s. In addition, they stated that at least one member of each of their faculties has been involved in the development of one or more frameworks.
Total state funding for schools increased from $12.6 billion in 1982-83, to $26.9 billion in 1991-92. One-third of the education budget was appropriated for categorically funded programs, special education consuming the largest share. In 1982-83 dollars, per pupil (ADA) funding increased from $3,046 per ADA in 1982-83 to $3,373 per ADA in 1991-92. While the funding per unit of ADA, adjusted for inflation, has increased by 13 percent over the decade, it should be noted that the base year, 1982-83, represented a relative “low water mark” in funding (Legislative Analyst’s Office 1991). The years 1989-1992 showed decreases in per ADA funding, due to increases in enrollment.

The high cost of building new schools in California and the dire need for more classrooms created a significant change in the school system. The emergence of year round scheduling for schools became a potential solution to the problem of overcrowding and the need for more classroom capacity in the elementary schools. More than a million students in 200 school districts now attend year-round schools (California Department of Education 1993). Initially touted as both an important instructional improvement and a cost-effective solution for handling the rapidly expanding student population, year round schools have yet to be demonstrated to have positively affected instruction. In addition, overcrowding will soon affect high schools where the year round solution may be even more difficult to implement.

The Demographic Context

The effects of policy initiatives in California are affected by a rapidly changing student and teacher demographic profile (Guthrie et al. 1992). While the total budget for education continues to increase, the pupil population is predicted to grow at an annual rate in excess of 200,000 students; this is the equivalent of one new school with 23 teachers per day. Per pupil funding has been declining since 1990, and state resources are stretched to the limit, so funding is uncertain for high-cost items such as capital improvements, technology, lower class size, and staff development.

- The number of students has increased each year since 1982, from 4,065,486, to 5,107,145 in 1991 (figure 5). Of the new students, one in four came from a poverty household, and one in six came from a family where English was not the first language.

- Rate of growth in the student enrollment is increasing, from .5 in 1982-83, to 3.7 in 1991 (rate of growth in 1991-92 was 3.2 percent).

- 985,000 students were assessed to be limited English proficient in 1991, twice as many as in 1983.

33For 1992-93, the growth was actually 110,000 students.
- The percentage of white students declined from 75 percent in 1968 to 44 percent in 1992. The percentage of Asian/Pacific Islander students increased from 3 percent to 11 percent, Hispanic from 14 percent to 35 percent; Black from 8 percent to 9 percent. The actual numbers of all ethnic groups, including white students, has increased over the decade.

- There was a persistent teacher shortage, especially minority teachers. The increase in the numbers of students and the restoration of a sixth period in the high school schedule exacerbated the teacher shortage during this period, since more teachers were needed. In addition, since most of the emphasis in classes shifted away from optional and vocational classes towards A-F requirements, since requirements to teach in one’s major or minor became more stringent, and since the numbers of limited English students increased, much of that additional need was for specialized teachers, who, during this period were also being wooed by growing businesses and industries in California. As a result, there is a requirement in 1993 for 12,000 additional bilingual teachers. Yet the percentages of ethnic minorities who passed the CBEST test was significantly lower than the percentage of whites who passed. This, coupled with a significantly lower college-going rate for Black and Hispanic students, resulted in a new teacher pool which included only 23 percent minority teachers, despite a “majority-minority” student population (figure 6).

The Political Context

The nineties brought a series of jolts that have diverted some of the initial energy and influence from the reforms, especially relative to urban school districts. Despite an initial euphoria over the apparent agreement between Superintendent Honig and newly-elected Governor Pete Wilson over the educational agenda, a rift has developed over the direction of that agenda, and the amount of funding that will be attached to it. Honig’s own attention may have been deflected by his battles with the State Board of Education and Governor Wilson for the right to determine the state’s education agenda. Honig’s public trial for conflict of interest drew time and attention away from his reform agenda (Guthrie et al. 1992).

California has long prided itself on possessing and supporting a strong public education system, from kindergarten through university. Nevertheless, by 1982, per pupil education funding had declined to its lowest level since 1976-77. Honig signaled his leadership over the educational agenda with his ability to orchestrate the passage of SB 813 and the infusion of $800 million into the education budget (Kaplan 1985), despite the Governor’s unwillingness to support new programs (Shultz 1993). His comprehensive program for rigorous standards drew support for middle class families and their quest for higher education, and these families have largely been supportive of him in two re-election campaigns, to the extent that he was frequently mentioned for governor in 1990. Some minority groups have been lukewarm to Honig, especially as state support of
categorical programs declined, although he has attempted to maintain communication and support through his ethnic advisory councils.

The legislature, the business community, and the teachers’ unions seem also to have been solidly behind the highly visible and articulate Honig. At the same time, by the end of 1990, his conflicts with the State Board and his open quarrels with the governor made him more vulnerable to his political opponents. Both Governors Deukmejian and Wilson appeared to initially support Honig’s position; Wilson himself campaigned as an “education governor.” But that support eroded as financial pressures forced difficult budget choices to be made. The role of the two governors in educational policy increased as funding shifted to the state in the aftermath of Prop 13. Interest groups supporting social services whose budgets were not guaranteed by Prop 98 have exerted pressure on education’s supporters for a more flexible allocation of Prop 98 funds set aside for education. Schools were forced to compete with health and welfare programs for a share of the “shrinking pie” (Shultz 1993). While he has had opposition from both governors, the religious right, and most recently from his own State Board of Education, he continues to have support from the education infrastructure as a whole despite his upcoming trial.

Honig has faced four major educational challenges: establishing world-class standards to prepare students for highly skilled, technically-oriented jobs, stanching the flow of students from middle class families to private schools, meeting the needs of increasing numbers of diverse, poor and limited-English speaking youth, and maintaining a coherent educational infrastructure for a rapidly expanding student population within a shrinking financial base. His strategy seems to have been to focus on the first, which initially pleased his political base, and to hope that it brings the other three areas along. The numbers of students attending private school has decreased since 1983 in the middle and senior high school grades, but has been increasing in the primary grades. Some question whether the needs of minority students are being met. While improvements have been made in the decade, the gaps still remain between white and minority groups (Guthrie et al. 1992). Minority concerns about the curricular reforms were exemplified in the debate over the history-social studies framework development and subsequent textbook adoption. It was argued that the textbooks under-represented and inaccurately portrayed the history and perspectives of minority peoples, and reflected the values and interests of the white community (Waugh 1990). The reform efforts have produced the high standards but little in the way of capacity for widespread implementation or the elimination of disparities in performance between white and minority students.

Finally, advocates of school choice and some form of voucher system began to surface in earnest in 1991; they reflect an opinion that the state reform agenda has failed large numbers of parents. The threat of a voucher initiative calls into question whether there is a sufficient belief in and a political support for the current reform agenda. The

36 A recent court decision took broad powers from the state superintendent and gave them to the state Board of Education; recent (1993) legislation to return those powers to the superintendent was vetoed by Governor Wilson (Association of California School Administrators 1993).
second decade after *A Nation At Risk* finds the state struggling with the difficult task of maintaining the momentum of school reform within the budgetary constraints of severe recession. Even as the reforms of 1983 were being transformed by the realities of implementation, the reforms themselves are threatened by the lack of continued funding and political consensus. The “iron triangle of shifting demographics, declining economics, and intensifying politics” (Guthrie et al. 1990) further fragments the reform agenda and calls into question whether coordinated, statewide, systemic reform will continue.

As a result, in the 1990s, there has been a shift in emphasis to greater support for local decision-making, integrated children’s services which involved more of the community, and a renewal of interest in some categorical funding. The inability to significantly improve perceptions of the quality of schools, both in the inner-city, and in the suburbs, has increased political pressure by an older, non-minority electorate to support vouchers for parents to spend in either private or public schools. While touted as an opportunity to provide poor minority parents the opportunities to send their children to private schools, opponents argue that it is little more than an effort to channel public resources to support largely white, high-achieving students and their parents who already attend private schools (Haggin 1993). The teachers’ unions and the Democrats in the legislature counter-punched by supporting a Honig-supported Charter Schools program, and introducing legislation increasing school choice within the public school systems. The future of the voucher initiative is uncertain.

A notable omission of local school boards from the decade’s educational reform agenda reflected a lack of confidence in the education leadership of local boards (Guthrie et al. 1990). The state began the reform decade with an expanding economy and a need for a highly trained workforce. SB 813 came at a critical time when enrollments were rising, teacher salaries were low, and the effects of Prop 13 were severely affecting school districts. The resulting reliance on increased state funding for schools increased the influence of the state over local school policy (Guthrie et al. 1990). The recent bankruptcy in Richmond, and its takeover by a state-appointed trustee, demonstrates that the final authority for local school governance now resides with the state. The Performance Improvement Program (PIP) identification process also signals the state’s willingness to step in and direct underachieving schools.\(^\text{37}\)

The state itself continues to be handcuffed by a recession, by Prop 13 and by Gann, from raising sufficient funds to meet the capital and mandated program needs of schools in the coming decade, let alone fund wide-scale reforms. Few districts have been able to muster the 2/3 votes necessary to support a parcel tax which could raise additional funds. And the voucher initiative and the charter school experiment may signal public dissatisfaction with the results of the SB 813 decade, an increased desire for local community

\(^{37}\)Schools identified as low-achieving are given three years to improve. If they do not, the state has the option of installing a trustee.
control over its schools, and an uncertain public commitment to public education as presently constituted.

Summary of Phases of Reform

The 1983 California school reform began with the more manageable components: upgrading of the curriculum, increasing the professional standards for teachers and administrators, extending “seat time,” and increasing the academic graduation requirements. By 1985, 90 percent of the state’s school districts had met the graduation requirements, and extended their school year. These are largely “first order” reforms, designed to intensify effort and improve the efficiency of pre-existing organizational features (Cuban 1984).

The policy instruments themselves evolved over time. The matrix-designed CAP test has given way to individual-performance assessments (CLAS). Curriculum reform itself shifted from curriculum standards towards more emphasis on a thinking curriculum as represented by the disciplinary frameworks, integrating higher order thinking skills into subject area instruction. Instead of simply mandating stricter requirements and assuming that they themselves will improve instruction and student performance, implementation is assumed to reflect the core concepts outlined in the frameworks, but adapted to the local needs and capacity. In some cases, teacher-leaders have led the way to restructured governance at their school sites.

Implementation

There remains a major question regarding the classroom implementation of the curriculum and instruction reforms outlined in the reform agenda. As noted above, the pace of reform is slower than its leadership had hoped for, even for first order changes such as raising academic standards, or improving course content. It is difficult to determine the extent to which classroom instruction has changed over time. Three factors created variable levels of implementation at the district level.

First, implementation remains voluntary. Compliance through threat of sanctions is rarely invoked (Fuhrman and Elmore 1990). The capacity of the state to support or enforce policy at the local level has actually declined: the Department of Education has cut over 200 positions during the decade.

Second, direct coupling of policies to classroom activities rarely occurred; for example, efforts to improve teacher supervision by principals through a more rigorous evaluation process has not been sustained. Instead, the state attempted to influence implementation through: the use of local teachers, administrators, and teacher training colleges to help draft policy documents; the mobilization of public opinion and interest
around certain items, such as test scores; and the linkage of incentives to policy compliance, such as with textbook adoption.

Third, intensification efforts have resulted in implementation overload in many schools. This is partly a result of the requirement to develop each aspect of the reform in sequence: framework, staff development, textbook adoption, local textbook adoption, local inservice, testing revision. This process begins anew each year for one more of the seven curriculum areas. The timing places particularly difficult demands on elementary teachers: it requires them to both sustain the implementation of prior year’s reforms and to learn and incorporate the new year’s changes into the school day. In order to manage simultaneous reforms across multiple initiatives, as well as across multiple subject areas, school site reform requires more than intensification of customary efforts. It also required changes in school organization, governance and the decision-making structure (Timar and Kirp 1988).

**Policy Effects**

As alluded to above, changes in the demographic, fiscal, and political context seem to have contributed to a limited effect of the reforms on student achievement, despite increasing coherence and alignment between the various policy components. Nevertheless, some significant gains are noted in data which show longitudinal improvements in both student achievement and dropout rates. But other data, which compares California’s performance with other states, show strongly that in the aggregate, both educational mediocrity and performance disparities continue to exist in about the same proportion as before the reforms began (Guthrie et al. 1992, 1991, 1990).

- While the average SAT scores in 1992 have declined when compared to 1984, 14,500 more students took the test. 26 percent more seniors scored above 500 in mathematics, and 13 percent more scored above 450 on the verbal portion (figure 7). Explanations of this phenomenon point to improved preparation for students overall, while increases in the numbers of test takers and minority test takers who have traditionally done more poorly on the tests lower the overall average. While California students score above the national mean in mathematics, they score below in the verbal portion.

- The number of high school graduates who have completed the University of California’s A-F course requirements has shown a gradual increase, although the gap between minority students and white students has not decreased (figure 8).

- The performance of California students on the Advanced Placement tests in 1992 remained below the national mean on nearly all tests, but the absolute numbers of students who have scored three or better increased by 188 percent when compared to 1984. Yet in a national test of eighth graders, the National Assessment of Educational Progress, California students still scored below the national norms (figure 9).
Appendix A: California

- At grade levels eight and twelve, California’s CAP student scores were higher in 1990 than they were at the beginning of the test. However, the performance gap between ethnic groups remains (figure 10). The average CAP score increase over this period has been 4.4 percent, although the scores are only roughly comparable over time due to the evolving nature of the test itself. Scores in grade 3 “peaked” in 1987, and have generally declined since then, although the 1990 scores are over 10 percent higher than in 1983.

- The dropout rate declined from 25 percent in 1986 to 18 percent in 1991 (figure 11).

The rationale for a more demanding academic curriculum was that all students would benefit, regardless of whether or not they were intending to go to college. Jobs for high school graduates required a higher level of literacy and computational skills than ever, and job recruiters were complaining that graduates were unprepared for the world of work. In that regard, it appears that all ethnic groups improved. However, what has emerged is that despite growth in many indicators by all ethnic groups, the gap between them remains substantial. As a result, the relative “rank order” in terms of academic performance remains as severe or more so as before: white, Asian, Hispanic, Black. Despite the efforts to intensify the standards, overall student achievement is still below the national average by most measures.

Some Explanations for the Slow Pace of Reform

One would have expected that the “state of the art” reforms embodied in SB 813, coupled with strong public support, additional resources, and stable leadership from Superintendent Honig, would have created a significant revolution in California education, but the performance effects belie that expectation. One must seek some possible explanations. Explanations in California generally take one of three forms: the problems were too great and the funding was insufficient (there is a need to intensify effort); the assessment is flawed (reform occurred but was not likely to be observed by existing tests); and the reforms were the wrong kind (there is a need for a different direction for reform).

Some argue that insufficient funding for the reforms limited their full implementation. California has had a strong tradition of support for public education, but the steady increases in state per pupil expenditures in the eighties ended abruptly with the statewide recession; CAP scores mirror that trend in funding. Serrano v. Priest, Prop 13, and SB 813 have increased districts’ reliance on state funding for local districts and prevented local districts from raising additional funding for their own schools. The data do show some improvement in college-going rates, AP exams taken, etc., but these don’t necessarily indicate significant growth for minorities and underachievers, nor do they indicate that sustainable, structural changes have occurred that would be resistant to revenue variables. Supplemental grants re-distributed funds more evenly across school districts and shifted focus away from targeted student populations to high end achievement goals which
failed to substantially reduce the disparities between high and low achieving student populations.

While to a great extent court decisions have evened out state funding across the state, the resources available for educational improvement still vary: some schools are able to raise funds from supplemental sources—parent assessments and local parcel taxes, for example—and some districts must spend more for non-education related expenses—security and vandalism repair, for example. And the disparities between schools and school districts make it difficult to expect that student performance or district performance will be uniform, simply because standards are. Therefore, one might argue that disparities in funding and student background prevented educational equity from occurring. While funding has grown, due to growths in the student population much of the new monies have gone to maintaining class sizes, and increasing teacher salaries to compensate for real dollar losses in the decade preceding 1983. The expansion of resources is tied directly to trends in the state economy, and the nineties confront public education with the prospects of a tight budget and few resources for expanding programs on a massive statewide scale. Some have argued that it is essential for school districts to be able to raise their own funds, most likely through a reduction in the 2/3 rule for new local assessments such as parcel taxes, but passage of the necessary constitutional amendment seems remote (Kirst 1992).

Second, it is possible to argue that significant and lasting changes have occurred, but that the indicators used to evaluate policy effects are not able to measure them. The ability of standardized tests such as CAP to evaluate educational quality is limited. Multiple choice examinations have been the norm, yet much of the content of curriculum and instruction reforms as outlined in the frameworks is not amenable to that sort of evaluation. The most recent frameworks have consistently recommended a move toward authentic assessment (California Department of Education 1992). In addition, the massive demographic changes that occurred in the state during this decade may also mask changes that have been put into place; this may be one reason that the performance gaps among ethnic groups have not shown any significant decrease. Therefore, it is possible that the revolution has occurred, but is difficult to measure. Some teachers have noted that their practice has changed as a result of changes in the curriculum outlined in the frameworks (Odden and Marsh 1987). As a result, alternative, performance-based "authentic" assessment strategies will be implemented in 1993. At the same time, however, these new tests will provide individual information, with uncertain effects on classroom practice. They will probably raise the stakes for teachers and the public at the local level without equipping teachers with resources or training to address deficiencies in curriculum or instruction.

Third, it is possible that the policy changes instituted at the state level simply do not significantly affect instructional practice in the classroom (Timar and Kirp 1988). It was much easier to change old course offerings than to change the nature of teaching strategies or to initiate a thinking, problem solving, communications-based curriculum. While the initial A Nation At Risk call was for a drastic restructuring of education, the
solutions themselves were somewhat incremental. What began as intensification of current school practice (i.e., more class hours, more course offerings) and improvement of instructional technology (CAP, frameworks, curriculum standards) became touted as a statewide "second order" change, but result in "first order" adaptations of existing structures. Those reforms that did not require structural change were readily adopted, but did not have the kinds of effects that were anticipated. Those that did require substantive change, changed the least, or are still in the process of changing. As a result, attention has shifted to other policy levers, which affect organizational arrangements, local decision-making, and long-term staff development and support. While the Business Roundtable initially moved to articulate uniformly high standards and expectations, a decade later it has become a leader in the movement towards local initiative in the implementation of that policy and the restructuring movement, the "second wave" of reform. The focus on a coordinated effort at the sites to implement curriculum and instructional reform, assessed by new instruments, with attention to collegiality and teacher professionalism, and with local support, represent the third, "systemic" wave.

A fourth perspective is that the kinds of fundamental restructuring of education that were first envisioned require a political and policy consensus that is sustainable over time. What does history tell us about the potential success of such structural reform efforts? That it is indeed difficult to hold together such a consensus in a state with such shifting and competing political constituencies, especially when resources are shrinking yet needs for a broad range of services grows. Kirst and Meister (1985) suggest that reforms which develop powerful political constituencies, are cost-effective, and are easy to monitor are the ones most likely to last. They cite programs such as compensatory education and bilingual education as structural reforms which have persisted. On the other hand, Cuban argues that few efforts to induce fundamental or second order change of education meet with much success. He cites such reforms as student-centered instruction, open-space architecture, non-graded schools, programmed learning, and flexible scheduling as examples which "have seldom found a permanent home in the classrooms and schools of the nation." (Cuban 1988, p. 343). Parts of those reforms have been adapted and incorporated into the organizational norms of schooling, especially if they serve to reinforce or enhance the productivity of those structures, in other words, they became "first order" reforms. He argues that policymakers should not look down on those incremental adaptations, but recognize that they have benefit and value at the teacher and classroom level. "For those who seek fundamental, second-order changes that will sweep away current structures and start anew, as was done in the mid-19th century, basic social and political changes would need to occur outside of schools," Cuban adds.
Appendix A: California

Bibliography


STATE REQUIRED COURSES
Science
  Biological
  Physical
English
Math
Social Studies
  U.S. History
  U.S. Government
  World History
  Economics
Physical Education

STATE CURRICULUM, INSTRUCTION, PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT, AND EVALUATION PROGRAMS
Model Standards (SB 813)
Frameworks and Handbooks
Textbook Specifications
K-8 Textbook Adoptions
Program Evaluation and Improvement
State Quality Indicators
Reviews of State Programs, e.g., SIP
WASC Accreditation Reviews
Teacher Evaluation Guidelines (SB813)
Professional Development Programs
  Administrator Academies
  TEC Centers
  Curriculum Programs and Consultations
State Awards Program

STATE ASSESSMENT PROGRAMS
State Testing Programs
  CAP Tests
  CTBS Tests
  Golden State Examinations
State Competency Proficiency Test Requirement

In 1991–92, California spent $26.9 billion on K–12 education.

Between 1982–83 and 1991–92, spending for K–12 schools more than doubled. However, when corrected for inflation and enrollment growth, actual per-pupil spending increased only 12.7 percent.

(Source: *Conditions of Education in California 1991*. Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE), Berkeley, CA)
Since 1980–81, limited-English-proficient (LEP) enrollments have increased five times as fast as general enrollments.

LEP students now comprise 20 percent of California’s total school population.

One in four students in grades K–6 is limited-English-proficient, as is one in seven students in grades 7–12.

Spanish is the primary language of nearly three of every four LEP students in California.

(Source: Conditions of Education in California 1991. Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE), Berkeley, CA)
In 1990–91, the ninth year of the California Basic Educational Skills Test (CBEST), the passing rate for individuals applying for credentials with bilingual emphasis was significantly lower than for individuals applying for nonbilingual credentials.

- CBEST passing rates remained highest for whites (81%), and lowest (39%) for black credential candidates.

(Source: Conditions of Education in California 1991. Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE), Berkeley, CA)
FIGURE 5: CALIFORNIA STUDENT POPULATION 1982-83 TO 1990-91

(Source: California Department of Education)
Despite California’s increasing ethnic student population, less than one-fourth of the state’s newly credentialed teachers (23.1%) are members of ethnic and racial minority groups.

Hispanic credential candidates comprise the largest single category (11.4%) of new minority teachers.

(Source: Conditions of Education in California 1991. Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE), Berkeley, CA)
### Significant Increase in SAT Verbal and Math Performance Nationally Since 1983-84

Percent Above 450/600 Verbal and 500/600 Math

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>SAT Takers</th>
<th>% of Senior Test Takers</th>
<th>% of Minority Test Takers</th>
<th>Percent of Seniors Passing Performance Levels</th>
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<td>% of Senior</td>
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<td>Math ≥ 500</td>
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*Increase in the number of students a year taking the SAT or reaching these levels, if rates had remained the same since 1983-84. For example, because of the improvement in performance, an additional 49,180 students each year now score above 600 in math.

(Source: Educational Testing Service, Princeton, NJ)
FIGURE 8: GRADUATES COMPLETING U.C. A-F COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Graduates, percent completing U.C. A-F Course Requirements

- a-f total
- a-f white
- a-f hisp

(Source: California Department of Education)
FIGURE 9: AVERAGE MATHEMATICS PROFICIENCY

Average Eighth-grade Public School Mathematics Proficiency

FIGURE 10: CAP SCORES FOR GRADES 8 AND 12

CAP Scores for grades 8 and 12

(Source: California Department of Education)
Dropout figures statewide declined by nearly 20 percent (19.2%) between 1986 and 1990.

During these four years, the dropout rate for white students declined by 28.7 percent, for blacks by 8.1 percent, for Hispanics by 16.8 percent, and for Asians by 33.1 percent.

The state's dropout rate, however, remains high—14.4 percent for whites, 32.8 percent for blacks, 29.1 percent for Hispanics, and 10.9 percent for Asians, for a statewide average of 20.2 percent.

(Source: Conditions of Education in California 1991. Policy Analysis for California Education (PACE), Berkeley, CA)
Appendix B
School Reform in Florida: A Decade of Change From 1983–1993

Michael W. Kirst and Rebecca Carver

Florida has been a leader in state school reform ever since the overhaul of school finance in the 1970's. The state has a recent history of intervention in local affairs and big policy fixes through lengthy and multi-faceted omnibus bills. The creation of the modern Florida legislature built the capacity to create major state legislation. (Fuhrman and Rosenthal 1981). A crop of young aggressive legislators combined with activist Governors in the 1970's and 1980's to launch numerous reforms. Many of these key policymakers continued to play important education reform roles for 20 years until 1992. By 1993 this reform generation of legislators had all moved to new positions or retired.

The impetus for state reform has been a persistent dissatisfaction with the quality of Florida education and a need to expand the system rapidly to meet pupil population growth. For example, Florida enrollment grew from 1,492,000 in 1983 to 2,097,000 in 1992. Traditionally, Florida had compared its education outcomes to other Southern states and its deep South neighbors. The new Florida population from the 1970's onward, however, was not only from the South, and aspired to national education standards. The legislature and governors from 1970 to 1990 lacked confidence in local educators to catapult Florida toward national education quality standards. National comparisons, for example, highlighted Florida at 47th in the nation in school retention.

Consequently, state government was viewed as an appropriate instrument for detailed direction and guidance of the entire system. This state interventionist political culture was enhanced by the 1972 finance reform that equalized funding and created a very high state floor with limited local revenue raising leeway. The state also assumed the major portion of school construction financing in 1972. The assumption was that the elderly and migrants from outside of Florida would not be willing to tax themselves very much for Florida children. A common joke was that the Northerners said, “We paid for education once already up North.”

Local control education organizations such as school boards and teacher organizations were never able to offset this tendency toward state reform. They needed increased state money, and statewide teacher organizations were less powerful than in local control states like New Jersey or New Hampshire. What makes recent Florida policy so interesting is that the Accountability Act of 1991 reversed the entire policy trend of detailed, mandated, top-down reform. This change cannot be attributed primarily to a bottom-up political groundswell. It was led by a former state legislator who was elected CSSO in 1986, and a
Governor who wanted to “reinvent government.” Moreover, this 1993 bottom-up state approach has been shaped more by professional educators than any statewide reform since the 1960’s. The legislative leadership of the 1970’s and 1980’s began retiring in the late 1980’s, and Florida entered a new era of political and policy focus.

In many ways Florida state policy has been a rapid reflection and response of dominant national policy trends. In the 1970’s Florida emphasized state finance equalization, categorical programs and statewide minimum competency testing. The 1972 reform act was comprehensive, but based primarily on state testing and state finance equalization. In the 1980’s the focus was on increasing academic standards, longer school days, and pay for performance. By the 1990’s, the pendulum swung to deregulation, decategorization, and school site improvement plans from bottom-up site councils. Florida abolished major portions of its statewide testing program in 1991, and is proceeding very cautiously in the design of newer, alternative assessment instruments. Currently, Florida’s statewide testing consists solely of a minimum competency test for high school graduation and a writing exam. Consequently, Florida is struggling to define appropriate state outcomes for measuring the progress of school site plans and the new bottom-up accountability approach.

Florida never implemented a systemic approach if one assumes that this relies heavily on a state level instructional guidance system. The curriculum frameworks of the 1983 reform (called FACET) were never specified sufficiently, or followed up by staff development to have much local impact (Porter et al. 1991).

Florida is one of 7 states without an income tax. It has relied on a broad based sales tax and growth in the property tax base. This was sufficient to fund the reforms of 1972 and 1983–84. But it is unclear whether this limited state finance base is sufficient for implementing the 1990’s approach in an era of slower state economic expansion. At any rate, Florida deserves to be watched closely as it tries to reverse 15 years of the mostly top-down state policy. It will tell us a great deal about the current fashionable concepts in public administration featuring bottom up flexibility. The new orientation reflects the “power of new ideas” such as reinventing government. (Osborne and Gaebler 1992; Reich 1991). A state that did not trust local educators to galvanize major education reform for many years has now placed its bets on school site improvement plans and local flexibility.

The Importance of Political Leadership in Florida Education Reform

The 1983 and 1984 comprehensive education reforms depended heavily on the senior legislative policymakers and Governor Graham. The Speaker and Senate President are powerful figures. They appoint all committee chairmen, including the rules chairmen who control bill flow, and refer all bills to committee. Because the majority caucus chooses
future leaders in advance, as 'designates,' leadership can work with their successors to shape future activities. Unlike many other states where party leaders defer entirely to education committee chairmen or other legislative education experts, the Florida presiding officers have played key roles in shaping education policy and in developing consensus that bridges the deep divisions, particularly between urban and rural interests, that characterize state politics (Herrington et al. 1992). In fact, so important is the legislature’s leadership role in education that it functions as an incubator for education leaders throughout Florida government, including former Governor Graham and current Lieutenant Governor McKay. Both the previous and current elected state commissioners of education were legislative education leaders; numerous top department of education positions have gone to legislative staffers (Turnbull 1981).

Florida’s education governance structure is unique because of the composition of its state Board of Education. The Executive Cabinet constitutes the executive arm of the State’s educational system. Acting as a Board of Education, the Executive Cabinet consists of seven independently-elected constitutional officers:

- the Governor (who serves as Chair),
- the Secretary of State,
- the Attorney General,
- the Comptroller,
- the Treasurer,
- the Commissioner of Agriculture, and
- the Commissioner of Education (who serves as Secretary and Executive Officer).

In 1981, Governor Graham established a Commission on Secondary Schools composed of three members appointed by the Governor, three by the Commissioner of Education, three by the Senate President, three by the House. The Commission was extremely critical of Florida’s education quality. The Governor held press conferences to heighten public awareness of education’s plight. Meanwhile, newly elected House Speaker Lee Moffitt established a task force on math, science, and computer education. Senate President Curtis Peterson devised his own bill on math and science as well as longer school days increased graduation requirements, and a longer school day. When the regular 1983 legislature could not agree on a reform bill, the Governor called for an immediate special session. He visited seven cities to mobilize support for an education package. The result was “a classic example of log rolling legislation—an omnibus bill that embodied many of the goals of all three leaders.” (Arthur and Milton 1991). It included a controversial teacher merit pay plan backed by Governor Graham. A corporate income tax was used to finance part of the omnibus bill.
Reform During the 1980's

Accountability has been a major issue in Florida state education policy ever since the late 1960's (Herrington 1992). In 1968, Florida experienced a statewide teachers strike with massive teacher rallies in the Orange Bowl. The failure of this statewide teachers strike fragmented the education political organizations during a period when school finance equalization suits stimulated a new state finance approach. The 1973 omnibus bill established:

1) the individual school as a unit of accountability  
2) annual reports of school site performance  
3) an equalized finance system using pupil weights rather than input specification  
4) allocation of state funds through districts to school sites  
5) statewide pupil assessment.

In 1983, the RAISE bill was designed to increase academic standards primarily at the high school level. RAISE relied on the performance of individual students (such as course completion) as measures of accountability for schools and districts. A major component of the RAISE bill was a set of statewide high school graduation requirements that include the following courses:

- 4 in English (Composition and Literature);  
- 3 in Math and Science (at least 2 in lab sciences);  
- 1 in U.S. History;  
- 1 in World History;  
- 1/2 in the following—Economics, American Government, Vocational Education, Fine Arts, Life Management and Physical Education; and 9 electives.

In addition, the state requires instruction in conservation of natural resources, civil government, consumer education, elementary principles of agriculture, environmental education, flag education, Florida history, gun safety, kindness to animals, substance abuse prevention, traffic education, and U.S. history.

In 1984, an omnibus bill was passed to provide more state policy guidance for the 1983 reforms. It included four major components:

- Florida Accountability in Curriculum, Educational Materials and Testing (FACET);  
- Florida Progress in Middle Childhood Education (PRIME);  
- A Master Plan for Higher Education; and  
- The Merit Schools Program.
Florida Accountability in Curriculum, Educational Materials, and Testing (FACET), requires the Department of Education to develop curriculum frameworks for high school courses in selected subjects. The initial subjects specified were math, science, language arts, and social studies. The frameworks were intended to be aligned with both state-adopted instructional materials and norm-referenced tests that are used throughout the nation.

FACET is still in place but is moribund. Indeed, it never really got off the ground. The complete set of content requirements for all subjects combined comprises a document of only 100 pages. Ten general requirements are stated for each subject. This is too sparse to serve as a local instructional policy framework, and it has never been a precise state policy instrument. There were no accountability measures tied to compliance with FACET. Moreover, FACET was never combined with other policies that were needed to reinforce it (Tyree 1992).

Florida Progress in Middle Childhood Education (PRIME) required the Department of Education to extend the curriculum frameworks to cover middle school grades (6-8) in the same academic areas listed above. PRIME contained many middle school concepts that are now widely advocated but was never adequately funded. Funds were concentrated on elementary and high schools leaving PRIME without sufficient state resources to be widely implemented. For fourth and fifth graders, the bill required the development of pupil progression plans for all students which assure that certain coursework is undertaken and that educational and vision and hearing screening occurs. In particular, the legislation spells out that all students must take some mathematics, science, language arts, reading, art, music, and social studies; physical education is to be taken as determined by the school district; computer literacy is to be taken if resources permit; and critical thinking and other related skills are to be taught in the context of the other subjects. The Legislation was accompanied by special funds available to districts who chose to submit plans. All districts participated. In 1990-91, the last year funding was available, the appropriation level was $43.9 million. In 1991, as part of the overall accountability initiative, the Legislature held in abeyance the sections of the PRIME bill that created the funding program and provided no specific funds for PRIME. Districts may use local funds for PRIME, but do not have to send a PRIME plan to the state.

Master Plan for Higher Education: The postsecondary education component of the Omnibus Act requires state universities and community colleges to report back to high schools the percentages of students who were required to take remedial English and Math courses upon entering. These reports are rarely publicized, but may be used by some local educators.

The Merit Schools Program blended state standardized outcomes with local capacity to establish flexible local objectives. Schools received state incentive payments for progress toward specific state and local school site goals. The program was opposed by the NEA, but the Dade County chapter of the A.F.T. supported it. The Merit Schools Program was eliminated in 1989 in response to opposition from teacher organizations, and
a lack of LEA enthusiasm for the concept of paying for changes in state outcome indicators.

The accountability theme also served as the touchstone for other policy initiatives during this era. Some policies relied on rewards as incentives for compliance, and others assigned penalties for lack of compliance. As an example of the latter, vocational schools were held accountable for the performance of the students who graduated from their programs. This was measured in terms of the percentage of students who, after graduation, became employed in jobs for which the school provided training. If, over a three year period, more than 30 percent of a vocational school’s graduates were not employed in such jobs (within a set amount of time after their graduation), LEA’s were supposed to discontinue the program.

On the other end of the spectrum, the Quality Incentive Program, a merit pay program for teachers, was designed to reward teachers for good performance. It was discontinued shortly after implementation in 1984 because of criticism from teachers and teacher unions. Local unions opposed the manner in which the policy was implemented. The program was criticized for being rushed into practice despite technical problems.

The Middle and Late 1980’s

1985 and ’86 were years during which some changes were made to the 1983–84 reforms, but no landmark pieces of new legislation were introduced. In 1985, the number of remedial credits accepted as part of graduation requirements for high school students was increased from two to nine. In response to budgeting constraints, the new scheduling format of seven-period days became optional, and many high schools cut back to six periods by 1990.

There are several alternative explanations for the lull in legislative activity between 1984 and 1989. One interpretation is that there was “a predictable policy fatigue following the 1983 and 1984 sessions in which massive and hotly contested educational bills were passed,” says one analyst who adds that “educational interest groups argued for some time off from state legislation in order to allow the reforms of the early 1980s to take root.” The same source explains that after 1984, “new ideas were harder to come by,” and that, “the state began to experience the beginnings of its current fiscal stress...It’s hard to make a lot of significant new state policies without any new state money.” This final point is interesting in light of the fact that state fiscal constraints remained throughout the 1990–1993 wave of legislative reform. Another explanation for the lack of activity relating to education is the bi-partisan split that existed in the state political leadership. During this time, the Democratic legislature was confronted with a Republican Governor. However, partisanship as a prime cause is questionable for two reasons. First, the role of the Governor in education policy has not been as significant as
that of other elected officials, (e.g. the legislature and CSSO). Moreover, policy views on education did not always break down according to partisan lines.

The Transition To Outcomes and School-Site Initiative in the 1990’s

The new decade marked the beginning of a new era for education reform in Florida. The federal wall charts caused alarm in Florida because the state remained one of the five worst states for dropouts. In January 1991 a new accountability package was at this time a priority issue for the Governor, Commissioner, and Speaker of the House, but not a priority of either of the legislative chairs. The accountability legislation had several components but stressed a switch to state deregulation and bottom-up school site improvement. The first draft included a list of sanctions that would be invoked if school site plans did not result in improved outcomes. This was deleted as a compromise made during the negotiation process which led to eventual passage of the bill. It was replaced by a statement that merely says the state accountability commission should figure out appropriate incentives.

Near the end of the session, the Senate was asking for a two-year study and needs assessment program, while the House was arguing for an accountability program that involved a school site improvement plan. In the meantime, the Department of Education was ready to go ahead with a version of the school improvement and accountability plan even if the legislature did not pass the bill.

Holding categorical programs in abeyance became a major action of the legislature in order to provide more local spending flexibility. “Holding in abeyance” is not the same as a block grant because each categorical program remains in the statutes. But LEA’s can ignore all the legal restrictions on how to spend the state funds. If the legislature wants to reinstate categorical controls it merely needs to remove the “abeyance” law, and there is no need to reenact the details of the categorical statutes. Localities can spend any categorical program the legislature holds in abeyance in the same manner as unrestricted state aid. Appropriations committees were responsible for deciding which programs would be funded. Interviewees concluded that the budget crisis may have precipitated movement toward decentralization of authority over spending. Increasing local discretion could be a convenient way to take pressure off the state government to improve education under fiscal constraints.

Teacher organizations were mostly in favor of the accountability package but voiced some reservations. There were initial feelings of being left out of the policy process when the DOE introduced an early proposal. This did not prove to be monumental; the teachers groups had supported Chiles when he ran for Governor and was willing to get behind him on this initiative. The unions supported the shift from top-down mandates to greater reliance on site-level program decision-making, and supported the categorical program
deregulation. Primary concerns were about the shortage and uncertainty of funding, and how accountability would be shared between state and local control. In addition, there was some concern that changes in state policy would undermine school site reform in Dade County.

Governor Chiles was in favor of deregulation and decentralization, so the agenda Chief State School Officer Castor put forward in Education was compatible with his overall agenda. The Governor wanted budget flexibility, reporting to the public on the performance of schools, stated consequences for unsatisfactory performance, and he wanted change to take place as soon as possible. Chiles was elected before the bill was drafted, but he made his presence known, especially toward the end of the Legislative session in which the bill was passed. The Florida School Board Association favored the bill, seeing the new legislation as an instrument for giving local school boards more authority in the future, and a way of showing the public that action was being taken to improve the system. Their concern was that state sanctions might lead to state takeover of local schools. The categorical programs that are held in abeyance can be treated by LEA’s as general revenue. These local flexible programs, however, did not involve powerful lobbies like special education, Chapter I, or vocational education. As the list in Table 2 indicates, these are not categorical programs that create well organized lobbies.

By the time the School Improvement and Accountability Act was passed in 1991, members of the SBE, staff at the DOE, representatives of the teachers, administration, school boards and the Governor’s office had all been involved in the negotiations. Given the diversity of interested parties, it is not surprising that the bill which passed is one that includes a lot of ambiguous phrases to guide implementation.

The legislature had mixed reactions to Blueprint 2000. Republican legislators, who were not tied to the mandates of the 1983 RAISE Act, and in several cases believe in smaller roles for government, supported the bill. Democrats in the Legislature were more reluctant to deregulate the categorical programs. The bill passed the Senate by one vote, only after Governor Chiles and the President of the Senate intervened.

The passage of the 1991 act reflected a shift in policymaker attitudes about the locus of Florida educational governance. Phillip D. Lewis, a former State Senate President and a member of the Accountability Commission, says the 1991 legislation was born out of a “total frustration” with the quality of education in Florida. “The legislature came to the conclusion that something dramatic had to be done. This is dramatic. I don’t know if they (the local educators) know how dramatic this is.”38 Charles Fowler, the Sarasota superintendent, claimed “the previous accountability systems didn’t work because they were largely top down... As the population grew and communities grew, the legislature stepped into the breach. If anybody had a problem anywhere in Florida, it ended up on a

legislator's desk... If somebody tells a legislator kids don't write well, then there was a bill to improve writing. Douglas Jameson, Chairman of the House Education Committee stated, 'the legislature has mandated and mandated, ordered and ordered school boards, and it hasn't worked.'

The Statewide Accountability Commission and the New Law

The Accountability Act created the Florida Commission on Education Reform and Accountability (FCERA), but not as a part of the SDE. State policymakers felt that the Department might still be committed to the reform approaches from 1970 to 1990, so an independent body was needed. Commissioner Castor is now reorganizing the department to focus on bottom-up assistance but the process is not yet complete. There might be future tension between the State Department of Education (SDE) and FCERA, but there is nothing significant as of 1993.

FCERA consist of the following 23 members:

- the Commissioner of Education (co-chair),
- the Lt. Governor (co-chair),
- 3 House members,
- 3 Senate members,
- 3 Business persons,
- 3 Parents,
- 1 Dean,
- 3 Teachers,
- 1 School Board member,
- 1 Superintendent,
- 1 Principal,
- 1 Expert in testing & measurement, and
- 1 Vocational educator.

FCERA has a director and only three staff members. It relies on the Department of Education for staff support. A second feature that distinguishes FCERA from other state commissions is the authority to oversee the implementation of a flexible local policy. FCERA has a majority of professional educators which is a significant break with the past because legislators have not trusted education to shape state legislation.

FCERA has used a process to develop standards and implementation guidelines that include public hearings, committee deliberations and draft proposals, and then more public hearings. Draft guidelines have been circulated widely for comment and hearings held in every section of the state. The State Board of Education (e.g. the Cabinet) must
approve all draft documents. After this approval FCERA recommendations become official state policy. The accountability legislation specifies that FCERA shall serve as an advisory body to oversee the development and implementation of SIP and accountability. FCERA has done more than advise—it has devised detailed specifications for the new system and acted like a governing body by being the key state agency for citizen response. It has defined local needs assessment protocols for the major areas school improvement plans must address. It has proposed detailed school site outcomes and a state role to assist localities.

FCERA produced a document in 1992 (Blueprint 2000) to serve as the official plan for local implementation. Goals for Florida identified in Blueprint 2000 are organized into seven categories. The state is still struggling with specific state standards that align with each over-arching state goal presented below.

1. **Readiness to Start School**
Communities and schools are to collaborate in preparing children and their families so that all students can succeed in school.

2. **Graduate Rate and Readiness for Postsecondary Education and Employment**
In addition to increases in the graduation rate, students graduating from high school should be prepared for entrance into the workforce and/or postsecondary education programs.

3. **Student Performance**
Students should be able to perform at levels enabling them to compete successfully within and beyond this nation’s economy. Students are to be prepared so they can make well-reasoned, thoughtful, and healthy lifelong decisions.

4. **Learning Environment**
School boards are to provide learning environments that are conducive to teaching and learning. This should include sequential instruction in mathematics, science, reading, writing, and the social sciences; appropriate educational materials and equipment; and suitable ratios of teachers to students.

5. **School Safety and Environment**
Communities are to provide school environments that are drug-free and where students are protected from risks to their health and safety, and violations of their civil rights.

6. **Teachers and Staff**
Schools, districts and the state are to ensure the presence of professional teachers and staff in each school.
7. Adult Literacy

All adults living in Florida are to be literate. They should each have skills and knowledge needed to compete in a global economy and exercise rights and responsibilities of citizenship.

Faced with the daunting task of operationalizing these goals and setting standards, the accountability commission has based its decisions on the following premises:

1. Results rather than processes are emphasized in the standards and outcomes.
2. Standards are written at the highest level of expectation.
3. High level standards are written in the full knowledge and belief that ALL STUDENTS can learn; and
4. All schools are expected to address all seven goals in writing their school improvement plan.

The 1991 legislation followed the “horse trade” recommended by Governor Lamar Alexander of Tennessee, who headed NGA in 1989. The state will loosen up on state operational mandates and categorical funding but be more specific on high level outcomes for all children (see Table 2).

The commission’s position on incentives for meeting standards and the consequences of doing so are reflected in the following guidelines:

- Financial incentives are not recommended;
- Incentives may be developed and awarded by the state local school boards;
- Incentives must be valued by the appropriate target audiences (school staff, parents, students, and/or school community);
- Certain local goals may be more important than others in triggering incentives and recognition;
- Incentives and recognition should be awarded annually;
- Incentives should be based on the attainment of a specified number of state standards and/or exceptional progress toward meeting state and local goals;
- Progress should be based on a reduction of the distance between the school’s starting point and the standard’s performance level; and
- Awards should use criteria that recognize individual school differences.

1992-93 is the first of four consecutive school years designated in Blueprint 2000 as transition years for the implementation of the School Improvement and Accountability Act. Every school in the state is required to submit a School Improvement Plan (SIP) to their district’s school board during this year. They are required to base SIPs on comprehensive needs assessments. Blueprint 2000 further specifies that school advisory councils, “composed of teachers and staff, students, parents, and community representatives” be involved in this process.
During the second year of transition (1993–94), schools are expected to conduct internal evaluations. By the end of the third year (1994–95), the first round of external evaluations will be started. Then, in 1995–96, the final year of the proposed transition, the state Board of Education will be notified of schools that are not progressing toward state and local standards at a satisfactory pace. Table 1 includes the “Transition system flow chart overview” proposed by FCERA.

Many goals and standards which serve as the backbone of the current reform movement are to be specified by the state. Assessment has become a crucial area of disagreement, because the state abolished most its testing program in 1991, and is at least three years away from developing a new one. FCERA hopes a new state assessment system will be ready by 1997, but there is no specific plan, time schedule, or funding plan for developing it. What will the state use in this long interim as a basis for outcome indicators? In February 1993 the State Board of Education approved a hodge-podge of existing statewide data elements. (See Table 1). Indicators such as attendance, preschool participation, graduation rates, AP classes, and national norm-reference tests are included.

Little state financial or technical support is being provided to enable schools to build site capacity. In 1990, the law stated that an amount between $4.00 and $9.50 per pupil should be spent by each site on the SIP process from existing state aid. The Florida SDE has no large-scale site capacity-building strategy involving staff development of a large percentage of Florida teachers.

LEA’s are uncertain how state recommended workplace skills concepts based on SCANS, can be integrated with an outcome approach based on subject matter curricular frameworks. LEAs are also unclear about how to merge a local central office vision of curriculum standards with school-based management.

The State Department of Education is being reorganized into a technical assistance agency for local SIP improvement. However, because the state has not increased funding to localities for implementation of Blueprint 2000, tensions between local education agencies and the state are running high. Many local educators show little sense of appreciation for the broad sweep of state deregulation. Instead, they express concern that the state might use change in policies as an excuse to cut state funding.

There are some signs that local resistance to state accountability reform is growing. Dade County teachers voted a moratorium on all district and state reform efforts. Pat Tornillo, Executive Vice President of the Union said:

I think the teachers of Dade County feel that a lot of promises have been made by the Florida legislature with regard to funding the accountability law (known as Blueprint 2000) that decentralized every school in Florida with shared decision-making councils of parents and teachers.
As of this hour, this minute, the legislature has failed to put any money into Blueprint 2000—money for training, not just teachers but parents, and to coordinate with businessmen in terms of how everyone will work together. It has failed to provide money for technology, for release time so that people can meet to develop the school improvement plans that have to be done.

That was the purpose of the moratorium—teachers are being asked to do more and more with less and less. (Bradley 1993)

Chief State School Officer Betty Castor is totally committed to the 1991 accountability statute, and embarked on a major public relations campaign to galvanize citizen participation in the local School Improvement Program (SIP) process.

**Specific Florida Policy Areas**

Another lens for analyzing Florida policy evolution is to examine particular policy areas like curriculum/instruction, teacher policy, and other high priority areas of state policy development.

**Instructional Guidance**

In the 1970's, Florida began a system of instructional guidance based on a basic skills orientation in statewide testing and minimum competency for high school graduation. Textbooks were adopted by the state based in part on the basic skills standards in the state curriculum guidelines. State control of local curriculum was influential because local instruction was geared in part to state high school graduation requirements (Tyree 1993). Florida’s curriculum control system seems less powerful than either Texas’s or New York’s but more powerful than California’s. Both sanctions and rewards are common to Florida’s basic skills-oriented curriculum control policies. Students cannot graduate without passing minimum competency tests based directly on state basic skills curriculum guides. Textbooks cannot be adopted if they do not address the basic skills standards in the curriculum. Also, schools receive more state financial help to buy textbooks that match the requirements of the curriculum guidelines.

In the 1983 RAISE bill the state tried to lead through curricular policies that moved beyond the basic skills level. The external evaluations of Florida’s 1983–1984 curriculum frameworks, however, suggest limited impact on local schools and a failure to design the needed policy elements for systemic reform. State curriculum guidance was too brief, and not sufficiently explicit on key concepts. Some quotes from Porter et al. (1991) demonstrate this:
Florida's math curriculum does not have an overreaching rationale statement calling for emphasis on problem solving and math concepts. (p. 24).

Florida's content guidelines do not give examples of what NCTM Standards refer to as mathematical power, and the guidelines are stated with sufficient generality to leave ample room for teachers to claim and believe "we already do a lot of mathematics problem solving." (p. 24).

Florida and Texas guides furnish very few specific facts, concepts, and conclusions to be learned in their social studies courses. Instead they use generally stated active-verb outcomes like analyze, define, and evaluate. (p.27).

Tyree (1993) broadens this perspective in his study by emphasizing that Florida guidelines do not include scope and sequence or subject area rationales. Florida is silent on how teachers should teach curricular components. Tyree also evaluates Florida's 1980s reforms this way:

Though Florida competency standards run through three key policies, there are inconsistencies in the Florida policy system. Inconsistency in Florida policies seems to arise mainly from the minimal articulation between the basic competency and the other parts of the curriculum. Those parts of the curriculum that go beyond basic competency do not speak to or reinforce the competency parts. Testing for each of these parts was mandated in separate legislation. Testing programs in each of these areas has developed independently of the other. Partly as a consequence, testing for courses or subject areas beyond basic skills has lagged well behind the basic skills testing. A similar development has occurred in the unfolding of the instructional materials policy. State selection committees are asked to ensure that materials reflect the basic skills guidelines, but not the guidelines as a whole.

However, Florida's sanctions and rewards seem less powerful than those of New York or Texas. Unlike New York, Florida offers no rewards or sanctions for teachers to teach, or students to learn, the part of the state curriculum that exceeds basic skills. For several years, Florida has required that students pass tests of basic reading, writing, and mathematics content and skills. But only recently (1990) has Florida added state tests for higher level courses. These latter are low stakes tests, administered to a sample of eligible students with no consequences for graduation, school funding, or teacher evaluation. And unlike that of Texas, Florida's school evaluation system does not directly monitor teachers' incorporation of basic skills into their plans and actual teaching. Finally, at the time of this study, Florida had not developed public comparisons of schools for media use. (p.43-44)
Teacher Policy in Florida

As in curriculum policy, Florida developed an effective control system for minimum teacher standards. Florida requires teachers to pass a minimum competency test before entering teaching and another test to gain certification in the subject field. Florida has elaborate and detailed requirements for certification, including specific courses that prospective teachers must pass (Porter et al. 1991, p.30).

The 1983 RAISE bill included a teacher incentive program as a critical part of its political compromises. Arthur and Milton (1991) concluded:

Then Governor Bob Graham also proposed an across-the-board pay increase for Florida public school teachers. Graham proposed a special corporate “unitary tax,” which would have affected corporate profits whether earned in Florida or not, to finance the pay increase. The major corporations were galvanized through the Florida Chamber of Commerce into opposition to the unitary tax, demanding that teacher remuneration be related, instead, to performance. Legislative leaders, on the other hand, proposed an increase in the corporate income tax to reward individual teachers and/or schools that showed improvement. Hence the Florida Teacher Incentives Program: were offered as a key compromise package designed to achieve education excellence in Florida. (p.267)

Both teacher unions in Florida opposed performance-based pay and a series of technical and political objections delayed implementation. Merit pay was transformed by 1984 into a master teacher program. The Florida Meritorious Instructional Personnel Program, also known as the master teacher program, was created “to recognize superior ability among Florida’s instructional personnel and to provide an economic incentive to such personnel to continue in public school instruction” (S.231.533, Florida Statutes). The law required that in order to participate in the program as associate master, a teacher must document the following: 4 years of teaching experience, 2 of which must be in Florida; a professional services or continuing contract with the school system; completion of a master’s degree in field or if holding a master’s degree out of field, 15 semester hours in-field; a superior performance evaluation; and outstanding attendance. Requirements for a master teacher designation included 7 years’ teaching experience (5 in Florida); at least 3 years’ experience as an associate master; and completion of 15 in-field semester hours above the level require for the associate master. Several revisions to these criteria were made in 1984.

This law was never implemented and by 1986 it was repealed. A substitute law was passed in 1986 comprising a three-level career advancement system, but this new design was implemented for only one year and repealed. There was never conceptual agreement or a coalition to support such a bold change in policy. Governor Graham left office and ran for the U.S. Senate so teacher incentives had no state political champion. The unions were never reassured that Florida had the technical competence to run a large scale
evaluation program. In the end, the legislature did not believe the political costs were worth the unknown education benefits.

Integrated Children’s Services

Over the last six years, Florida has provided national leadership in focusing on the needs of young children, establishing a continuum of preventive and early intervention services for children aged 0 to 8, funding pre-school for at-risk three- and four-year olds and piloting full-service school approaches.

Since her election in 1986, the Florida Commissioner of Education, Betty Castor, has made early intervention and pre-school for three- and four-year olds a major priority for the State. Under the leadership of Speaker of the House Tom Gustafson in 1988–90, the Florida Legislature passed out a series of bills focusing on young children, providing mechanisms for coordination of a broad array of services for young children and reforming the state’s juvenile justice system. Governor Chiles, when elected in 1990, continued the leadership he had demonstrated in the U.S. Senate in the areas of reduction of infant mortality and coordination of health and education services.

However, despite progressive and aggressive leadership these advances have stalled over the last two years because of severe financial constraints in the State, resulting in cutbacks in agency budgets and inadequate funding and delayed implementation of new initiatives.

Though the economy appears to be improving, the State is faced with structural budget constraints that are longer-lasting. Though there is growing recognition within the state that better coordination of children’s services and a shifting of focus from provision of high-cost crisis services to lower-cost preventive services offers the promise of improved efficiencies in program delivery, the knowledge, technology and political stratagems to achieve this transition are lacking.

The State of Florida is currently the site of two innovative integrated service delivery projects funded by national foundations. As part of its children’s initiative, the Pew Charitable Trusts has sponsored two community-based service delivery projects in Pinellas County and the City of Pompano Beach while the Annie E. Casey Foundation has sponsored another similar project in East Havana in Miami. If these projects prove successful, the challenge facing the state will be to bring such programs up to a scale at which they can have an impact on a substantial portion of the state’s population living in equally troubled communities and to ensure that any productivity gains realized are recycled back into expanded service delivery.

39 The writers acknowledges the assistance of Carolyn Herrington in this section.
Like other states, Florida is caught in a budget crunch between federal mandates regarding the extension of Medicaid services to all children under the age of 19 and the need to increase funding for the public school system. In 1993–94, it is projected that for the first time, the Medicaid budget in the State of Florida will exceed the public school budget. Strong leadership is needed to develop public understanding and a policy infrastructure that comprehends the inter-related aspects of state policies to meet the health and social services needs of its population and continue funding for a strong public education system.

**Issues In School Finance In Florida:**
**Adequacy More Than Equity**

Education accounts for the largest share of the Florida state budget (31.6 percent), but still lags behind the average in national rankings for expenditures, revenues and tax effort. Florida has no personal income tax and relies heavily on the sales tax. A 1987 attempt to extend the base of the sales tax to a wide range of services was repealed after six months enactment. A subsequent effort to tax services by Governor Chiles was also defeated in 1992. Based on its 1973 school finance reform, Florida has a high degree of equity in spending among its 67 county school districts. Adequacy has been the major issue and the sales tax was quite volatile during the 1991–1993 recession. Florida limits the amount of optional local property tax revenue, and maintains a very high state floor of expenditures. The deregulation of many categoricals in the 1991 Accountability Act increased inter-district equity because so many of the categoricals were not adjusted for low property wealth. Florida uses a district cost differential to even out the cost differences between urban South Florida and rural North Florida.

The adequacy issue is exacerbated by the projected annual pupil growth of between 4 percent and 5 percent from 1993 to 1995. Sales tax accounts for 70 percent of state general revenue collections and depends on tourism for its elasticity. In the 1990’s, state initiatives have focused more on decentralization and organizational reform rather than enhanced resources. By 1993, however, the Florida economy rebounded enough to provide most teachers with a 3 percent increase. Florida ranks 35th in per capita expenditures of state and local governments for public education. It is questionable whether this level of effort can fund growth in the states’ education system, and also spur innovations under the Accountability Act.

**Concluding Comments**

Florida has made a transition from top-down reform of the early 1980’s to bottom-up strategies. Marked by a move away from minimum teacher, student, and school requirements to outcome-based education where the state prescribes broad teaching and learning
goals and allows districts to administer educational programs through school site improvement councils. The state role has changed to monitoring site outcomes and building school level capacity.

This is an accountability strategy that still has not been adequately honed. Some of the problems with it include a lack of state money for technical assistance (an integral part of decentralized reform strategy); overly-vague and sometimes contradictory outcome goals that are not easily translatable to school-level processes; and state-local issues, such as the “fit” between existing local school-based management programs and state-mandated processes in the accountability scheme. But Florida state policymakers seem committed to solving these problems and reorienting their policies from the prior two decades.
Bibliography


Florida Department of Education. 1990. "Proposal to the National Science Foundation for the Systemic Initiatives Program."

Florida Department of Education. Various internal documents from the time period covered.


**TABLE 1: INITIAL TRANSITION ASSESSMENT**

**GOAL 1**

**Readiness to Start School**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY DATA ELEMENTS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR RESULTS REPORTED</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR DATA AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School and/or district agreements with external agencies, such as H.R.S., other governmental agencies, public libraries, or medical practitioners (see &quot;School Board Responsibilities for Agency Agreements,&quot; p.5)</td>
<td>School and district</td>
<td>Schools: Fall 95</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent of free and reduced lunch eligible kindergarten students in the school who participated in pre-school program (e.g. Pre-K Early Intervention, Head Start, Pre-K disabilities, migrant Pre-K, subsidized child care, nonsubsidized child care)</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent of Pre-K (age 3-4) identified vs. served</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent of students who pass kindergarten screening for vision and hearing problems</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent of free and reduced lunch eligible kindergarten students who have been screened, treated, or are under treatment for vision and hearing problems</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent of age 3-4 served in Pre-K, subsidized child care, Chapter 1, Head Start, Pre-K disabilities, migrant Pre-K, and private non-subsidized child care, compared to the number and percent of 3-4 year olds in county</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent of K-3 students in E.S.E. by type of program</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent of children identified through child find systems</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children served in TAP (Birth-3) (3-5)</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children served through First Start compared to estimated prevalence in county</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of children served through Even Start compared to estimated prevalence in county</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy Start infants screening positive for risk factors</td>
<td>HRS</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** All statistical data will be disaggregated and reported by gender and race/ethnic group. The clear communication of data on school reports will be subject to oversight provisions. The first school reports will be released by December 15, 1994, and will include all key data elements available at that time.

Source: Florida Department of Education
**TABLE 1:** INITIAL TRANSITION ASSESSMENT  
GOAL2: Graduation Rate and Readiness for Postsecondary Education and Employment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY DATA ELEMENTS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR RESULTS REPORTED</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR DATA AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Graduation rate by diploma type (include early completers)</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent passing college entry level placement tests (reading, writing, and math)</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 95</td>
<td>Fall 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent high school dropouts not enrolled in retrieval programs (Florida Public Schools and remain in Florida)</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 95</td>
<td>Fall 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School and/or district agreements with appropriate agencies, such as other governmental agencies, public libraries, or volunteer organizations, to identify/match dropouts with programs for students to progress toward graduation (see &quot;School Board Responsibilities for Agency Agreements,&quot; p. 5)</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Schools: Fall 95</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent job preparation vocational program enrollees vs. completers</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment follow-up of job training vocational program completers</td>
<td>FETPIP</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent habitual truants</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Career plans for vocational students</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational student movement from general level to upper level math and science</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** All statistical data will be disaggregated and reported by gender and race/ethnic group. The clear communication of data on school reports will be subject to oversight provisions. The first school reports will be released by December 15, 1994, and will include all key data elements available at that time.

Source: Florida Department of Education
### TABLE 1: INITIAL TRANSITION ASSESSMENT

(continued)

#### GOAL 3

**Student Performance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY DATA ELEMENTS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR RESULTS REPORTED</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR DATA AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent passers of HSCT on their first attempt (grade 11)</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent meeting designated criteria on Florida Writing Assessment in grades 4, 8, &amp; 10</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.T.A.T. results</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School district N.R.T. results</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent passers of upper level courses (math, science, foreign language, art, music, etc., + honors and A.P. divided by enrollment of those courses)</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent passers of level 2 &amp; 3 courses (number passing divided by enrollment, both by level and for levels 2 &amp; 3 combined)</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent passers of A.P., dual enrollment, and I.B. courses divided by number of 9th &amp; 10th grade enrollees and all 11th &amp; 12th graders</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent passers of HSCT by end of senior year</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent middle school advanced course takers</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** All statistical data will be disaggregated and reported by gender and race/ethnic group. The clear communication of data on school reports will be subject to oversight provisions. The first school reports will be released by December 15, 1994, and will include all key data elements available at that time.

Source: Florida Department of Education
### TABLE 1: INITIAL TRANSITION ASSESSMENT

#### GOAL 4

*Learning Environment*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY DATA ELEMENTS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR RESULTS REPORTED</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR DATA AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average daily attendance of students</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate survey results (students, parents, teachers, other staff)</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average daily attendance of staff and teachers</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 95</td>
<td>Fall 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per pupil expenditures</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student-teacher ratio (number of students in all class periods divided by number of teacher periods/classes)</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student mobility rate</td>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** All statistical data will be disaggregated and reported by gender and race/ethnic group. The clear communication of data on school reports will be subject to oversight provisions. The first school reports will be released by December 15, 1994, and will include all key data elements available at that time.

Source: Florida Department of Education
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY DATA ELEMENTS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR RESULTS REPORTED</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR DATA AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School and/or district agreements with external agencies, such as law enforcement, health/social services, public libraries, or environmental protection (see “School Board Responsibilities for Agency Agreements,” p.5)</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Schools: Fall 95</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number/Percent incidents: violence, weapons, vandalism, substance abuse, harassment</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 95</td>
<td>Fall 95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program review by race, gender, and special population</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on hazardous conditions</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student Code of Conduct in place at every school</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number suspension (in-school, out-of-school) and expulsions</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** All statistical data will be disaggregated and reported by gender and race/ethnic group. The clear communication of data on school reports will be subject to oversight provisions. The first school reports will be released by December 15, 1994, and will include all key data elements available at that time.

Source: Florida Department of Education
### TABLE 1: INITIAL transition assessment

#### GOAL 6

**Teachers and Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY DATA ELEMENTS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR RESULTS REPORTED</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR DATA AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent teachers participating in ongoing staff development programs contained within the school's improvement plan addressing standard 1</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Evaluations address skills (yes/no)</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Report staff by racial/ethnic diversity, including disabilities</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent Teachers holding regular teaching certificates</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** All statistical data will be disaggregated and reported by gender and race/ethnic group. The clear communication of data on school reports will be subject to oversight provisions. The first school reports will be released by December 15, 1994, and will include all key data elements available at that time.

The importance of collaboration and articulation between the state, postsecondary institutions, districts, and schools cannot be overemphasized in this goal. See pages 34-35 for the Statement of Cooperation.

### STATE, DISTRICT AND POSTSECONDARY ARTICULATION

<p>| Source: Florida Department of Education | 130 | 132 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY DATA ELEMENTS</th>
<th>DATA SOURCE</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR RESULTS REPORTED</th>
<th>INITIAL YEAR DATA AVAILABLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School and/or district agreements with external agencies, such as H.R.S., other governmental agencies, public libraries, or volunteer organizations (see &quot;School Board Responsibilities for Agency Agreements,&quot; p. 5)</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Schools: Fall 95</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demonstrate that learning opportunities have been marketed with the community</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number completing programs (basic and functional literacy, G.E.D. and high school credit)</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile of adult literacy students served by volunteers</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profile of adult literacy students referred for service</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of literacy volunteers including hours and training</td>
<td>District</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documentation of family literacy activities</td>
<td>School</td>
<td>Fall 94</td>
<td>current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: All statistical data will be disaggregated and reported by gender and race/ethnic group. The clear communication of data on school reports will be subject to oversight provisions. The first school reports will be released by December 15, 1994, and will include all key data elements available at that time.

Source: Florida Department of Education
TABLE 2:

STATE STATUTES OR RULES HELD IN ABEYANCE OR ELIGIBLE FOR WAIVERS

Abeyance and Waiver Statutes
(BASED ON FUNDING)

For 1992-93 Section 229.592, F.S., HB 371H and HB 413H identifies the statutes for abeyance and waiver in one listing with the difference as follows:

ABEYANCE:
Statute and applicable rules are in abeyance if not funded in a line item appropriation or not listed within a line item appropriation in the current year's budget.

WAIVER:
Request for and authority to grant a waiver until July 1, 1994, is authorized if funded in a line item appropriation or listed within a line item appropriation in the current year's budget.

The statutes listed in Section 229.592, F.S., HB 371H and HB 413H are listed below and are separated into abeyance or waivers statutes based on funding.

WAIVER STATUTES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>228.071</td>
<td>community education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>228.0855</td>
<td>model schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229.605</td>
<td>Office of International Education: duties**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2305</td>
<td>prekindergarten early intervention*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23135</td>
<td>Florida Council on Student Services**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2316(11)</td>
<td>dropout prevention community based education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231.087</td>
<td>management training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231.613</td>
<td>training institutes (Summer Institutes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232.257</td>
<td>school safety trust fund (Safe Schools)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>234.021</td>
<td>hazardous walking conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.02(3)</td>
<td>FEFP, minimum periods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.083</td>
<td>funds for student transportation*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.0873</td>
<td>school volunteers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.122</td>
<td>instructional materials*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.1228</td>
<td>accountability program grants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Entitlement Categoricals
** HB 413H and HB 371H

Source: Florida Department of Education
(BASED ON NO LINE ITEM FUNDING)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>228.041(16)</td>
<td>minimum of 1,050 hours of instruction for grades 9-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2215</td>
<td>professional development for School Board members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2309</td>
<td>district school site restructuring incentives program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2312</td>
<td>PREP*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2313</td>
<td>student services*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2314</td>
<td>teachers as advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2316(12)</td>
<td>mini schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2316(13)</td>
<td>student suspensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2318</td>
<td>school resource officer*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2319(6)</td>
<td>PRIME 4 &amp; 5 enhancements*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2319(7)</td>
<td>PRIME 6 - 8 enhancements*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.2319(8)</td>
<td>PRIME plan submission alternatives*</td>
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<tr>
<td>230.2319(9)</td>
<td>PRIME implementation*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231.532</td>
<td>district quality instruction incentives programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>232.301</td>
<td>model programs for the prevention of student failures and dropouts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.057</td>
<td>reading resource specialists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.0575</td>
<td>mathematics / science mentor teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.0576</td>
<td>pilot projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.0615</td>
<td>law education program</td>
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<tr>
<td>233.067(5)</td>
<td>comprehensive health district program responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.067(6)</td>
<td>comprehensive health technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.067(7)</td>
<td>comprehensive health program review; funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.067(8)</td>
<td>comprehensive health evaluation and monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.067(11)</td>
<td>use of comprehensive health funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.069</td>
<td>vocational improvement fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.65</td>
<td>residential mathematics &amp; science honors high schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.02(2)(a)</td>
<td>minimum of 1,050 hours of instruction for grades 9-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.022</td>
<td>projected study of alternative methods of school finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.081(10)</td>
<td>extended day supplement*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.0835</td>
<td>school bus replacement*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.088</td>
<td>basic skills and functional literacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.089</td>
<td>allocations for student development services*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.091</td>
<td>programs of excellence: mathematics, science, and computer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.092</td>
<td>math, science, and computer labs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.1223</td>
<td>writing skills*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.1224</td>
<td>science lab facilities*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.1227</td>
<td>quality instruction incentive categorical program</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Entitlement Categoricals
** HB 413H and HB 371H

Source: Florida Department of Education
### Statutes In Abeyance

( REGARDLESS OF FUNDING )

Regardless of funding, the following statutes and applicable State Board of Education Rules are in abeyance until July 1, 1994:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>228.088</td>
<td>high schools &amp; secondary schools utilization of security programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229.52</td>
<td>State Board of Education, assistance in economic development*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229.57(4)</td>
<td>Student Assessment, District Testing Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>229.57(5)</td>
<td>Student Assessment, District Testing Programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.232</td>
<td>pupil assignment; powers &amp; duties of school boards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232.08</td>
<td>age certificates authorized for children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.0641</td>
<td>free enterprise &amp; consumer education program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.0643</td>
<td>water safety education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.0645</td>
<td>voting instruction; use of county voting machines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.0677</td>
<td>educational centers for gifted students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.501</td>
<td>consortium on quality instructional materials; participation authorized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.64K-12</td>
<td>mathematics, science &amp; computer education, quality improvement act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.641</td>
<td>legislative intent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.642</td>
<td>advisory council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.643</td>
<td>council powers &amp; duties</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* HB 413H and HB 371H

### Statutes That May Be Waived

( REGARDLESS OF FUNDING )

Regardless of funding, the following statutes and applicable State Board of Education Rules may be waived until July 1, 1994 by the Commissioner upon request by the School Board:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>229.602(6)</td>
<td>partnerships, district coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(3)</td>
<td>school board power, adopt school program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(4)(f)</td>
<td>school board power, uniform date for opening &amp; closing schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(4)(o)</td>
<td>school board power, early childhood and basic skill development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(6)</td>
<td>school board power, child welfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(7)(a)</td>
<td>school board power, course of study, adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(7)(b)</td>
<td>school board power, textbooks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(7)(c)</td>
<td>school board power, other instructional aids</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(11)(c)</td>
<td>school board power, report to parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230.23(17)</td>
<td>school board power, public information program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>231.095</td>
<td>teachers assigned teaching duties outside field in which certified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232.01</td>
<td>school attendance required between age 6 &amp; 16, age 5 exceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232.04</td>
<td>in kindergartens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232.245</td>
<td>student performance standards, instruments, &amp; assessment procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232.2462</td>
<td>attendance requirements for receipt of high school credit; definition of credit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232.426</td>
<td>athletic activities / postsecondary scholarship opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233.011</td>
<td>accountability - curriculum, education, instructional materials, &amp; testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.013(3)</td>
<td>FTE, middle school teacher in home room advisory program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>236.135</td>
<td>equipment purchasing or leasing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Florida Department of Education
RULES AUTHORIZING WAIVERS

s.228.041(13) School Day - Rule 6A-1.0953, FAC
s.228.041(16) School Year - Rule 6A-1.09532, FAC

Areas of the Statutes Generally Not Included in the Waivers or the Abeyance of Statutes Process

- General Duties of the Superintendent
- General Duties of the School Board
- Collective Bargaining
- Contracts with Instructional Staff, Supervisors, and Principals
- Federal Program Requirements
- Certification
- Financial Accountability
- Food Service
- Student School Bus Transportation
- Civil Rights
- Student Safety
- Student Welfare
- General Health Requirements
- School Facility Construction
- Exceptional Child Programs

Source: Florida Department of Education
Appendix C
Georgia: Reform at the Crossroads

Priscilla Wohlstetter

Georgia’s 1985 comprehensive education reform bill, the $2 billion Quality Basic Education Act, represented a major leap forward for a state that traditionally had languished near the bottom of educational effort and quality. Regarded by some as a masterful piece of legislation, QBE was fashioned to address local school districts’ governance and leadership shortcomings as well as the woefully inadequate performance of their students. Prior to QBE, Georgia ranked 37th among states in median family income, 44th in per pupil expenditure and hovered close to 50th in educational achievement by various measures; only 60 percent of the state’s students even graduated from high school. But with the state’s economy booming, a trend fueled in large measure by Atlanta’s emergence as the white-collar capitol of the “New South,” and with the “Nation at Risk” report’s cry of alarm ringing in their ears, Georgians were ready to address those problems.

Governor Joe Frank Harris had made education an issue in his 1982 campaign and the state’s corporate leaders, driven by their need for better trained workers, found it easy to get in line behind him. The fact that the state’s astonishing economic growth allowed Harris to promise a major reform effort while pledging not to raise taxes didn’t hurt (Firestone et al. 1989). In 1983 Harris appointed corporate leaders and others to a Education Review Commission (ERC) that was charged with studying developments in other states, including the Carolinas, Florida and Tennessee, and devising reform strategies. Harris endorsed what they came up with—more funding, more accountability, a tougher curriculum and efforts to improve teaching—and pushed it through the legislature, where it was approved unanimously. The unanimous vote demonstrated both the widespread support that had developed for the aims of QBE and the backroom efforts to assemble a legislative package that the General Assembly could embrace by consensus.

QBE was notable for its comprehensive approach and for its ambitious goals. The goals of the legislation were to:

1. Reduce the number of professional dissatisfied teachers leaving the field.

2. Lower the number of high school dropouts.

3. Eliminate emergency teaching credentials and waivers for teaching outside of one’s specialty.
4. Lower the failure rate on the state’s 10th grade Basic Skills test.

5. Increase SAT scores.

6. Increase the number of students who master essential reading, math and other basic skills.

In some ways, QBE was similar to earlier attempts at education reform. During the 1960s, Governor Carl Sanders got the legislature to back the Minimum Foundation Program to set basic educational standards; in 1974, Governor Jimmy Carter shepherded the Adequate Program for Education in Georgia through the legislature. Each bill tied school finance reform to substantive education change but each failed because of inadequate funding.

QBE, which included many specific mandates and requirements, was funded from the state’s sizable largesse and became effective in July of 1986. The statute provided for the establishment of a statewide basic curriculum spelling out competencies for each grade level; subjected veteran teachers to tests and evaluations that, previously, only beginning teachers had to pass; and increased student testing requirements by adding a school readiness test for kindergartners and “gate tests” for promotion to the third grade and graduation from high school. QBE also called for creation of an information management system to generate reams of data about students, teachers, classrooms and school programs to be reported to the state.

Structural changes sought by QBE, by means of financial incentives, included the creation of middle schools and the consolidation of school districts. To address vast inequities between rich and poor districts the legislation overhauled the state’s finance system.

Some researchers (Firestone et al. 1989) have concluded that the relatively top-down approach in the areas of curriculum, teacher certification and student testing resulted from the state’s attitude of distrust toward the 187 local superintendents, 117 of whom were elected. This attitude, which could be more broadly construed as distrust of educators in general, was further reflected in the ERC/QBE process by the prominence of business managers and governor’s office staff and near absence of K-12 and university educators in drafting the legislation.

Aside from being designed to make Georgia more economically competitive and better able to attract new industry, some policymakers believe QBE also was intended to create pressure for consolidation of smaller local school districts. The theory was that school districts unable to meet the new standards would merge to take advantage of the financial incentives offered by the legislation. Others thought of QBE as a mechanism for reforming school finance and eliminating or at least narrowing the huge financial disparities between the poorest school districts and those that were more affluent. Many of the very poorest districts served largely black student populations. But there also were very
poor districts, such as Georgia's Appalachia, serving wholly white populations, while the well-off Atlanta City District served a predominantly black population.

Although education did enjoy substantial funding increases during this period, the pace of reform slowed later in the 1980s as Georgia began to feel the effects of the national recession. By 1989, the state had a $415 million deficit in its $7.54 billion budget. Governor Zell Miller, a former teacher who served as lieutenant governor under Governor Harris, has tried to protect the schools from these financial straits. But they have not gone unscathed. In recent years, innovations to move the state further down the reform road have been adopted. In almost every case, however, the reforms have either been approved without being funded or else received funding for only limited pilot projects. As a result, some have had to be temporarily or permanently shelved. If the state's economy rebounds, the innovative ideas of the past few years will be ready to be put to the test. Until then, however, progress will be slow.

Key Aspects of Reforms

Curriculum

QBE authorized the development of statewide learning objectives for elementary grades and for secondary subject areas. In 1988 the Georgia board of education adopted the Quality Core Curriculum, which includes 72 basic competencies that all students must master before completing high school. The competencies have been in effect since October of 1990 and every four years the Georgia board of education is required to establish a task force of educators and members of the public to update the competencies and the curriculum. The first such review is to occur in 1994.

QCC was designed as a minimum curriculum to be enriched or expanded at the discretion of local districts. Districts were expected to adopt the state-specified objectives and then to develop detailed curriculum guides. The state department of education has been working on state curriculum resources guides to aid local districts with instructional strategies matched to the learning objectives. Once a curriculum guide is released, textbooks from an approved state list can be adopted by school districts.

Although local school districts were quick to adopt the QCC's objectives, full implementation is moving slowly. Districts were to be given five or six years to fully integrate the competencies into their curricula. But the process is likely to take longer. The state department of education has borne the brunt of the educational budget cuts and has shifted its emphasis to providing technical assistance to school districts. That is slowing the development of curriculum guides. In addition, the state changed the length of its textbook adoption cycle from five to seven years, a move that saves $37 million in FY 1993.
Also undermining the impact of QCC on student learning is the wide variation in local school district capacity. Some high-achieving districts already had a curriculum that was more demanding than the QCC and wound up spending a good deal of effort on circumventing it (Firestone et al. 1991). The smaller, rural districts with many minority students and limited central office staff, however, found QCC helpful.

In addition to establishing competencies and objectives, the QCC specified that teacher teams were to be used in middle schools (grades 4–8) and that the middle school day was to be lengthened to slightly over seven hours in order to better prepare students for high school. Short segments of the school year are to be devoted to “personal learning skills” in areas such as fine arts, vocational education and library skills. In the elementary grades, QCC mandated a full-day kindergarten program for all children.

In the area of graduation requirements, QBE established three types of diplomas: general, vocational and a college preparatory. To receive a general diploma students had to complete an additional year of English, math, science and two additional years of social studies. To receive a college prep diploma students need also to complete two years of a foreign language and an additional year of math, science and social studies. The vocational diploma requirements are the same as for the general diploma with some courses in career exploration and industrial arts added. Beginning with the 1993-94 school year, students seeking general or vocational diplomas will have to complete three years of science and math.

As with the QCC, the academic requirements are, in some cases, irrelevant. Most students in the state who were pursuing an academic course of study already met the requirements for a college prep diploma and so the “reform” had the effect of simply legitimizing local practice. Unhappily, disadvantaged districts also found the requirements irrelevant because so few students were pursuing an academically oriented course of study. In effect, QBE was a “common denominator” whose goals were “achievable by the poverty-stricken, racially isolated districts in the South and acceptable to Atlanta and the fast-growing northern metropolitan suburbs.” (Fuhrman 1988, 71).

More recently, the thrust of curriculum reform in the state has been aimed at broadening the range of subjects available to students. New offerings being developed include values education, environmental education, more varied vocational education courses, foreign language instruction in elementary grades and sex education.

The K-12 values education curriculum was implemented for the first time during the 1991-92 school year. It focuses on citizenship, respect for others, altruism, integrity and respect for self. In the area of vocational education, technology courses were introduced at middle and high schools to expose students to additional course options. More generally, through the Postsecondary Options Program, high school students beginning in the 1993-94 school year will be able to attend and earn dual credit at any two- or four-year public college, university or state-operated postsecondary technical institution at state expense.
The foreign language curriculum in Spanish, German, French and Japanese was piloted in 15 kindergarten classes during the 1991-92 school year and for the 1992-93 school year was extended to 15 first-grade classes. In addition to expanding subject areas, the state has been working to expand the student populations served by Georgia’s educational system. During the 1992-93 school year a pre-K curriculum is being piloted in 20 sites around the state, serving 750 four-year-olds who are at-risk.

Georgia also has been interested in using technology to expand its student population and the services offered through schools. The Georgia Distance Learning and Telemedicine Act of 1992 authorizes the development of a statewide distance learning network to enhance the educational opportunities for all children, especially those in remote sections of the state. This system, which will be administered by the Department of Administrative Services, not the state department of education, also will focus on expanding teacher-training programs and beaming parenting programming into individual homes. The initiative is funded by $53 million of Southern Bell monies that are in a state fund as a result of a ruling in a telephone rate case.

**Student Assessment**

QBE, like the 1980s-era reforms in many states, was designed to deliver more generous financing in return for greater teacher accountability and student assessment. Legislators were adamant that not only should Georgia students be tested on their knowledge of the mandated curriculum but that they be measured against national norms.

QBE also included readiness testing for kindergartners; criterion referenced gate tests for entrance to grades 4 and 9; a high school graduation test; and participation in the National Assessment of Educational Progress. The ambitious testing program was controversial from several perspectives. The kindergarten assessment program, for example, was criticized when it was first administered in 1988 because teachers, parents and other educators believed it was poorly engineered. It relied largely on pencil and paper and failed to take into account teachers' ongoing assessments of their pupils. The test was revised in 1990 to allow districts to develop checklists, against which teachers' evaluations are to be compared. The evaluations indicate various degrees of readiness and if a pupil is determined to be at “high risk” of academic failure he or she is to be placed in a special Instructional Assistance Program for kindergarten and first grade children.

The sheer volume of testing also became the subject of controversy and, after hearing for several years complaints about the burden the assessment program represented, Governor Miller proposed “fewer but tougher tests.” The number of tests each year was reduced from nine to four and students in grades 3, 5, 8 and 11 now will be the only ones required to take major state tests. In grades 3, 5 and 8, students will be tested against the state curriculum and against national norms. In grade 11, students will take a new high school exit exam broadened from basic skills to include questions about science and social studies.

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In 1991, the Georgia General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 328, the intent of which was to reduce the amount of time dedicated to testing while providing an accurate measure of the broad sweep of the curriculum in math, reading, science and social studies. The bill stated that the tests were to go beyond minimum skills and emphasize higher-order thinking skills. But the tests were not designed to produce results for individual students. Rather, they were to be matrix samples that allowed comparisons of schools, districts and the state as a whole. There are those who conclude from this that educational reform in Georgia is over. According to this perspective the changes in the testing program have gutted QBE and that the state department of education no longer has a tool for holding administrators and teachers accountable.

Districts also complained that the comprehensive school evaluations/accreditations required by QBE were too costly and time-consuming. In response, the state board of education twice revised those policies, eliminating annual site visits for all but the most troubled schools. Even more significant, in terms of undermining the accountability safeguards of QBE, have been cuts in the staff of the state department of education. There are simply too few staff for assessing the success of individual schools with QCC or QBE. Consequently, it is impossible to say whether an individual school is complying with the state’s major educational reform mandates.

**Teacher Certification and Assessment**

The elements of QBE related to teacher certification and assessment also became the focus of controversy. The Teacher Certification Test (TCT) covered general knowledge and subject matter specific to the teacher’s area of training. It was designed to screen teacher candidates as well as veteran teachers for basic communication and computation skills as well as for knowledge of their specialty.

In 1986, when the test was first administered, the Georgia Association of Educators, the state’s NEA affiliate, protested that veteran teachers should not be made to pass the test and that the test itself was gender and race biased since many women and minorities failed to pass. As part of a compromise with the teachers union, the state gave veteran teachers unlimited chances to retake and pass the test. Teachers’ credentials were not renewed until they passed the test, however. Those who failed were provided with extensive diagnostic analysis of their test performance, and also were eligible for staff development and support sessions.

QBE also subjected teachers seeking new or renewed teaching certificates to a rigorous series of classroom observations in which evaluators were to rate the candidates on their utilization of 120 teaching behaviors. This test, known as the Teacher Professional Assessment Instrument, produced an extremely low pass rate. For example, the average first-time pass rate for all teachers was only 25 percent; 200 teachers failed six times, the maximum number of tries allowed, and another 13 percent quit before using up all six opportunities. State requirements regarding TPAI were subsequently
revised so that only new teachers, experienced teachers from out of state, and teachers with less than five years experience were required to take it.

Once again, faced with strong opposition, the state legislature voted to discontinue the controversial program. Now, the board allows teachers who graduate from an accredited teacher training program and who pass a written subject matter test to earn a renewable teaching certificate without having to prove classroom proficiency. This change in policy recognized that TPAI was exacerbating the state’s teacher shortage: it discouraged teachers from out of state and increased the number of veteran teachers who left. This drain from the teacher corps was particularly problematic because student enrollment was increasing and the number of teaching degrees being awarded was dropping.

In 1990, the state legislature mandated that the TPAI be replaced with the Georgia Teacher Evaluation Program (GTEP). This evaluation program required principals to conduct yearly on-the-job assessments of all teachers. Less rigorous than the TPAI, the on-the-job evaluations are conducted solely by school principals, who receive eight days of evaluation training. It has been estimated that 99 percent of the teachers who have been subject to GTEP have passed.

In March 1991, the Legislature transferred the power to regulate the training and licensure of teachers in the state from the board of education to an autonomous Professional Standards Commission, half of whose 18 seats are set aside for teachers. On July 1, 1991 the PSC began revising state requirements regarding evaluations, certification, alternative certification routes, the nature of state teacher testing (e.g. whether or not it is tied to content frameworks), and cross-licensing arrangements with teachers from other states.

Under new rules proposed by PSC, teacher preparation institutions will have authority for assessing the individual competence, experience and academic background of prospective teachers and for planning an appropriate program of study for them. The PSC also has been charged with establishing requirements for staff development, including those for in-service training, and is expected to release these for review in 1993. This is an important responsibility, because locally developed courses can be used for teacher-certification purposes and can help upgrade the knowledge and skills of teachers on an ongoing basis. Previously, teacher training was the responsibility of higher education, since in-service education usually meant earning college credits that counted for certification. The department of education/state board role was to accredit college teacher training programs and count credits. Removing these functions from the state department enables the department to function more completely as a service agency rather than as a regulatory body. QBE also undercut the college's role by allowing locally devised programs to count where college credits were formerly required.
Finance

Georgia’s strong economic growth in the 1980s enabled the state to fund QBE without levying significant new taxes until 1989 when a one-cent sales tax increase was passed. For 1985, the year before QBE was passed, new monies for education increased by 71 percent, from $98 million to $168 million. The next year, new education spending increased again, to $209 million. In 1987, however, that figure fell by nearly half and education’s share of the total state budget dropped. A far more important source of substantial new money was local districts. In 1973, APEG (Adequate Program for Education in Georgia) had set $78.5 million as the required level of local effort, which meant that the state had to pay for any funding increases for schools.

In 1987, the state legislature passed an 80-20 formula for determining local effort although districts are allowed to spend more and do. QBE also identified 12 categories of allowable expenditures and gave local districts 10 percent leeway in actual spending. This change in calculation resulted in a 250 percent leap in local support from $78.5 million to $263.3 million in one year. The reformulation brought new monies into the total education budget, but also created hardships for many districts.

QBE introduced a more sophisticated system of FTE-based funding. The new formula was expected to distribute more money to the students and classrooms that need it, and to equalize funding throughout the state. In 1986, the average per pupil expenditure was $2,740. By 1990, the average had risen to $3,730, a 36 percent increase for the five years.

In 1991 the state was facing a $415 million deficit in its $7.54 billion budget. The state’s fiscal troubles were prompted by the same circumstances of many other states—lower-than-expected collections of income and sales taxes resulting from the nation’s sagging economy. Both legislators and educators were painfully aware that Georgia’s dismal fiscal realities meant that education would get little if any new money. Despite major state budget cuts, which forced layoffs of state government workers, local school districts emerged largely unscathed, due mainly to the efforts of Governor Miller. The budget Miller proposed eliminated the jobs of 2,189 state employees, 89 of whom worked for the state education department. Many of the layoffs were accomplished through normal attrition, early retirements, leaving vacancies unfilled, and inter-office personnel shifts. The state-level cuts made it possible for state aid to schools to be reduced by only 2.7 percent. Miller paved the way politically for his budget cuts by making an unprecedented, direct appeal to Georgians for public support through a dramatic televised address. In this address, he explained his plan to reduce the education budget by $77 million, but promised not to make cuts that would affect teacher salaries or the equalization money of property-poor school districts. He also proposed that the $2.8 billion QBE program be cut by $66 million in non-instructional areas, but added that local school boards should have the flexibility to decide what programs and purchases to cut.
As the final budget was approved, some programs that the governor had advocated, such as pre-kindergarten classes for disadvantaged four-year-olds, elementary foreign-language instruction and an expansion of the governor's Honors Program for top students, were scrapped. Also, in contrast to recent practice, teachers did not receive across-the-board pay hikes. Instead, 45,000 of the state's 77,000 teachers eligible to advance on the salary schedule were to receive 3 percent raises. In spite of all these cuts, the governor's appeal worked and the cuts "did not draw many protests" (Bradley 1991, 14).

Currently, there is much discussion around the state about overhauling Georgia's tax system. Researchers at the Policy Research Center at the Georgia State University College of Business Administration argue that Georgia needs a more balanced state tax system that is no longer based on an old manufacturing and agricultural economy. Public schools would be significantly affected by any new tax system that altered the use of property valuation as the measure of the local ability to support schools. Those who favor a new tax system criticize the state legislature for being prone to take piecemeal action. They have focused on taxing pension income (1988) and food (1989) as a way of raising more money. In 1991, a state lottery which is expected to raise $250 million annually for education was established.

Researchers at Georgia State University have recommended a comprehensive reform of the state tax system which includes the following five components: taxing services, replacing the state corporate income tax with a value-added tax, removing preferential tax treatment and tax incentives, subjecting tax breaks for the elderly to a means test, and, finally, determining the proper role for local government in the tax system (Pipho 1991, 656).

During the 1992 legislative session, many bills proposing ways to increase funding for public education brought to the floor for consideration. These ranged from the House speaker's proposal to fund education with a statewide sales tax to a proposal for school districts to share in the proceeds from local option sales taxes.

Finally, the Senate proposed a resolution to establish a Joint Study Commission on Revenue Structure (SR 443), which also was approved by the House. This action froze all bills related to school finance. In July of 1992 the governor, lieutenant governor and speaker appointed members to the commission, which then began a thorough review of the state's tax system. A report was due to the General Assembly in 1993.

The Integration Of Reforms

The Quality Basic Education Act of 1985 is still widely regarded as a groundbreaking piece of legislation and it continues to guide most reform initiatives in the state. However, what QBE neglected, and the state department of education was not prepared to support, was capacity building at the local level. The business-dominated ERC, the governor's
staff, the state legislature and the department of education assumed local districts would be unwilling to do the right thing (distrust) so they focused on mandates. The reality that local districts in many cases were unable to comply was conveniently overlooked. An office of strategic planning was initially created in the state department of education to oversee long-range implementation of QBE, but the office was a tiny operation that did not garner the state superintendent's enthusiastic support. What has resulted, some say, is scatter-shot decision making for education.

During the winter of 1992, Georgia's state superintendent of schools initiated a strategic planning process with a team that included state board of education members, department of education staff and local school district superintendents. The superintendent's premise for convening the team was that meaningful school reform had to occur at the site and district levels, not at the state level. Therefore, the state department of education needed to function as a service agency rather than as a monitoring agency. As long as the state department continued to operate as a regulatory agency, local school districts would continue to find ways to avoid its mandates and regulations.

Working with an outside planning consultant, the participants in the strategic planning process agreed that the department needed to be restructured. As a result, six new service delivery regions were created and each was to be served by a School Service Center staffed by department of education specialists ready to offer instructional assistance. This restructuring represents a significant departure from prior reform efforts: the state knows best, issues mandates for reform and school districts comply. By contrast, because of the state's financial troubles and the long agenda presented to local school districts by QBE, much of the reform activity had shifted away from the state and toward the local level. The state department of education, therefore, was in a position of needing to find a way to remain relevant.

In addition to restructuring the department, there is programmatic evidence that suggests Georgia is moving toward and settling into configurations of shared purpose. Much of the effort is focused on integrating locally based school improvement programs and collaboration has emerged as an important theme. Collaboration, which requires the integration of resources and effort, is becoming a popular reform strategy in Georgia. The League of Professional Schools, which has gained a statewide reputation for inspiring effective collaboration among schools with similar school-based needs, has grown from 23 to 43 to 60 participating schools in the past three years.

Through the Governor's Initiative for Children and Families, the state is in the process of establishing family centers in or near elementary schools to provide families with a single point of entry into a "seamless" system of integrated services. Georgia is one of 11 states being considered by the Pew Charitable Trusts for a competitive 10-year $20 million grant to implement a statewide public school-based integrated service delivery system. Fifteen family service delivery sites, funded under the Family Connection project, have been operating since 1991. One state official commented that the department's
Appendix C: Georgia

reform activities over the past year appeared to be guided by an old African adage: "It takes a whole village to raise one child."

Collaboration also is evident among teachers in Georgia public schools. Mentoring that involves pairing experienced and newer teachers is increasing, indicating a willingness among teachers to develop collaborative behavior. In addition, within middle and junior high schools, teachers are working together in interdisciplinary grade-level teaching teams. Hence, just as the words "decentralization," "school improvement" (rather than school reform), "service agency," "seamless system," "integrated services," and "mentoring" are being used with increasing frequency by policymakers, so too is "collaboration" gaining popularity in Georgia's parlance.

A second dominant theme linking education reform in Georgia is the focus on the school site as the locus of change. Validated projects developed through the state's Innovation Programs are being adopted by local schools at the same time that other school-based projects are being launched. The state department, moreover, made the development of effective site-based management processes the top priority for FY 1993 Innovative Programs.

The Georgia Schools for the Future Program encourages districts to forge ahead with innovative instructional models and to request waivers of local and state rules, regulations and standards that are found to inhibit proposed restructuring activities. Finally, as a result of HB 1356, schools are authorized to schedule programs before and after school hours and during school vacation periods.

Pace Of Reform And Implementation Strategies

Georgians know the eyes of the world will be watching over the next few years and many policymakers proudly proclaim: "During the 1990s, the state of Georgia will have the World Series, the Olympics and educational reform." Inspired, the state legislature and the governor have been particularly active in endorsing some cutting-edge policies—integrated children's services, pay for performance, a Pre-K program for at-risk children, a statewide distance learning network and charter schools.

Although there has been no shortage of ideas and the willingness to experiment, there has been a lack of money to make the new ideas work. Therefore, although the pace of reform (as measured by the number of programs enacted) continues to be relatively fast, the number of programs in place are few. Of those just mentioned, only the distance learning network has received substantial funding and that is because money is available from a court settlement, not through legislative appropriations. Some of the new ideas are simply not funded; others are funded but only at significantly reduced levels sufficient only to run small pilot efforts with the hope of expanding the program in subsequent
years. Unfortunately, some programs have had to be terminated or suspended for economic reasons.

At the same time that implementation of the "big ticket" programs is slowing, momentum has picked up in other areas. The Professional Standards Commission is one year ahead of schedule for recommending rule and policy changes for teacher education and licensure. Approximately 200 curriculum and resource guides are currently being developed as part of the implementation of QCC. One hundred and fifty-four school systems are in compliance with the QBE-recommended organizational pattern for elementary, middle and high schools, whereas only 13 systems were prior to 1985.

The Effects Of Reform Policies

Many provisions of QBE are in place. Georgia has a statewide core curriculum with standardized competencies, a full-day kindergarten program, specialized categorical services, improved professional development programs, improved physical facilities, new postsecondary incentives for high school students, and an equitable statewide formula for financing education. However, at the moment it is difficult to measure the effects of these reform policies for several reasons. First, in preparation for the implementation of a new student information system, the four major data centers in Georgia have been closed down. Furthermore, even if these centers were operational, it is not clear that appropriate evaluation data would be available.

Results from the first curriculum-based test for students offered no comparison to pre-reform performances. The results appear to show profound weaknesses in science and social studies, areas where higher-order skills were to be evaluated. For example, the third graders at only 1 in 5 elementary schools achieved the state goal in science. Third graders in only 1 in 20 school districts achieved the goal. The results were not much better for fifth or eighth graders. In the area of social studies, third graders at 2 out of 3 schools and school districts met the state goals. But the fifth graders at only 1 in 20 and the eighth graders at a shocking 1 in 100 schools met the goals. The results in language arts and math are virtually all at 90 percent or above, indicating the schools do better with basic skills competencies.

The Political Context

Governor Miller, elected to his first term in 1990, at this writing is the leading education reformer in his state. Several factors contribute to his interest and influence. First, as a former teacher and original supporter of the reform package who (as presiding officer) smoothed its move through the state senate, Miller is committed to QBE. Second, Miller campaigned on educational issues. Finally, Miller has considerable tenure in
government and is serving at a time that there has been substantial turnover in the Georgia General Assembly. When the legislature opened for its 1993 legislative session, both education committee chairpersons were new.

Miller has been behind the following recent major reforms: The state lottery that generates funds exclusively for education; a statewide system of elected local school boards and appointed superintendents; an independent Professional Standards Commission to strengthen and streamline teacher education and teacher licensure; a Pre-K program for at-risk four-year-olds; and “fewer but tougher tests” for students (i.e., testing in four rather than nine grades).

The governor also appears to have the public’s confidence with respect to education. In spite of Georgia’s strong traditions of localism and elected superintendents, Miller’s campaign to elect local school board members and appoint district superintendents was resoundingly approved (68 percent) in the November election. This outcome was interpreted by state officials as a demonstration the citizenry’s high degree of confidence in the governor and their willingness to follow his lead on educational matters.

The business community also has been a driving force behind education reform. The corporate elite signed on early, and came to dominate the ERC formed by Governor Harris, out of concern that poor academic performance was impeding the state’s economic progress. More recently, the Partnership for Excellence in Education, a group of business, education and government leaders formed in 1990 has become an increasingly powerful statewide voice for educational reform. The governor listens carefully to the Partnership’s recommendations and often participates in its strategic planning sessions. The Partnership’s members also work assiduously to educate the public about the need to support reform efforts, such as the state lottery for education.

While the governor and the business community have been active, the education community often has been on the sidelines. In his recent campaign for the state lottery, the governor appealed to educators for help. The measure won a bare majority (52 percent) and Miller blasted administrators and teachers for their lack of support.

Other forces for reform include the Georgia Board of Education, which created the Georgia Schools for the Future Program; upgraded high school graduation requirements; and supported alternative teacher certification routes. Reforms related to curriculum, methodology and materials have emanated mostly from the state superintendent’s office, as did the School Service Centers program in the state department of education.

The most remarkable aspect of the political environment related to education in Georgia is the degree of agreement among political actors. Proposed reforms move through the policy process, including both houses of the state legislature, with much greater consensus than dissension.
Analysis

Georgia began its reform cycle in the mid-1980s with comprehensive legislation—QBE—designed to break the grip of local control that state policymakers believed had kept the state far behind the rest of the nation in educational achievement. In their reform efforts, state policymakers adopted a stance of mistrust and superiority toward the districts. As a result, QBE relied heavily on mandates to bring about change and sought to redefine the balance of power with respect to education. Many components of QBE put considerable burdens, both programmatic and financial, on local districts as they struggled to come into compliance. While QBE appeared to be a coherent piece of legislation, in practice it punished high- as well as low-performing districts. In some cases, QBE requirements interfered with sophisticated local district reform agendas. High-performing districts were forced to reorganize their curriculum to adjust to new, but largely unnecessary, demands. In the case of low-capacity districts, QBE was overly ambitious and those districts were incapable of responding.

In sum, back in 1985 Georgia tried to improve its poor educational performance with a rigid instrument that had little flexibility to address local variance. Throughout the 1980s, the state legislature was forced reluctantly to attend to local district complaints about unworkable requirements. Consider, for example, QBE’s provisions for a first grade readiness test that relied heavily on paper and pencil assessments. Rather than discard the entire program, the state has adjusted and modified individual parts and QBE continues to be the driving force behind many reform efforts. Georgia ushered in the new decade by supplementing QBE efforts with a second push for reform. The new initiatives generally put the state in the position of facilitating and encouraging locally driven reform efforts, particularly in the area of restructuring. To accomplish this, the state has relied heavily on incentives to encourage local district reform.

The state also has reoriented the role of the department of education towards a service-orientation and away from a compliance and monitoring function.

As implementation of QBE and restructuring reforms progress, the state’s financial condition continues to be an obstacle, as it was in the late 1980s. The state legislature has cut costs by reducing or eliminating appropriations for authorized programs. In spite of Miller’s efforts to both generate revenues and reduce costs, education reform continues to be short funded and only partially implemented.
Appendix C: Georgia

References


Appendix D
A Shift Toward Outcomes:
The Evolution of Education Reform in Minnesota

Allan Odden

Minnesota's education reform efforts have, until recently, marched to a different beat than those of other states. When most states first ventured down the education reform path in the early 1980s to improve education systems that had declined in quality, Minnesota hung back and understandably so. The state consistently ranked among the top on the ACT and other standardized tests and had one of the nation's highest student attendance and lowest dropout rates (see Table 1). It accomplished these results by spending just above the national average, but more than virtually all states except those in the Northeast from Delaware and Pennsylvania up through New England. Perhaps as a result, the state imprisons fewer of its citizens than any other and ranks 37th in crime.

Table 1
Minnesota Educational Outcomes

| Score on 1990 NAEP Eighth Grade Mathematics Test (national rank) | 276 (tied for 4th place) |
| ACT Scores (1988) | 3rd in Nation |
| Status Dropout Rate for Individuals Aged 16-19, 1991 | 6.1 percent (2nd) |
| Expenditures Per Pupil, 1990-91 | $5082 (15th) |


Later in the decade, however, partly at the urging of business interests and the Minnesota Education Association, and also because of then-Governor Rudy Perpich's high visibility as chairman of the Education Commission of the States, the Legislature and the Governor's office began working on reforms designed to push the state's already effective schools to a higher level of achievement. Some of those initiatives once again departed from the patterns followed in most states and now Minnesota has the most comprehensive sets of school choice programs in the nation, is embarked on developing one of the nation's first outcome-based set of graduation requirements, and is supporting the creation of a small number of outcome-based "charter schools" free of most state education rules. Other reforms parallel the activity in other states; Minnesota educators are now writing ambitious student outcome goals, developing new thinking- and problem-solving focused
curricula standards, designing teacher preparation regimens that require candidates for licensing to demonstrate proficiencies targeted to those goals, and attempting to create new student assessment instruments aligned with the new curricula and outcome goals.

Similarly, in terms of school finance, Minnesota was considerably more sanguine early in the decade than it was toward the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. During the 1980s the state streamlined its finance formula, substantially increased its base funding despite some rocky economic periods and augmented its per-pupil spending by 108 percent in nominal terms and 31 percent after adjusting for inflation. Still, in late 1991, the state's school finance system was declared unconstitutional (Sheridan and Dianna Skeen v. State of Minnesota and Virginia Independent School District #706), although that decision was overturned in Fall 1993. Nevertheless, the state is reviewing its options for redesigning its school finance system and some groups would like to link the redesign of school finance to the state's innovative programs, including moving to a school-based rather than district-based education funding structure (Odden 1993). Even so, the key education fiscal issue now, as in most states, is the drop in revenues as a result of the national recession.

Minnesota has approximately 789,500 students enrolled in 413 districts. The largest 10 percent of those districts account for 56 percent of the state's students while the 350 smallest districts enrolled only 24 percent of the state's students. The small rural districts, as well as the medium-size districts ringing Minneapolis-St. Paul, have fought hard against regionalization and consolidation. To counter that independent streak, the state has recently developed various incentives to encourage smaller districts to cooperate with other districts or even join them. In addition, the growing emphasis on outcome-based education in the state may be presaging a centralization of policy activity and a greater role for the Minnesota Department of Education (MDE) in the state school system.

One constant is that education always is given a high priority by the state's policymakers. Funding levels might change slightly or new programs might take center stage but education always enjoys a high degree of attention. One respondent made the point this way: "Education is the only animal in the zoo to get fed twice a day."

With that steadiness of gaze, it is possible for programs in Minnesota to develop slowly over several years, without being required to provide an immediate return to retain the interest and the indulgence of policymakers. With that in mind, it can be said that the state's pace of reform is deliberate and the record of achievement so far modest. The current reform strategies have evolved steadily since the early 1980s, but because the vast majority of Minnesota's school districts are small, rural and fiercely independent the gradual nature of policy change appears to be appropriate. The result is that reform proposals are modified and adapted by local districts before being etched into law but generally win strong local support once they become formal state policy. Sometimes, however, the path that reforms take before they are implemented makes it seem like the state education policy mechanism is a balky one that starts and stops unpredictably.
The Evolution of Reform

In the early 1980s, when the nation awoke to the inadequacies of its educational system with the release of the *A Nation at Risk* (National Commission on Excellence in Education 1983) report, most Minnesotans believed that the state's traditionally good report card on national tests meant that its schools were more than adequate. Subsequent reform efforts have been guided by that perspective, as well as by the wide range of voices and perspectives resulting from the state's highly decentralized system of mostly small, rural districts. Therefore, Minnesota's education reform efforts have started with the confidence that teachers and administrators are competent, assumed that education is primarily a local responsibility and been infused with the idea that reform is the process of making already good schools better. The result is that the state has emphasized improved student outcomes, encouraged local experimentation, allowed students and parents and districts to make educational choices, and imposed minimal state requirements.

**Minnesota Educational Effectiveness Program (MEEP)**

Among the first post-*A Nation at Risk* reforms in Minnesota was the Legislature's creation in 1983 of the Minnesota Educational Effectiveness Program (MEEP), which is an ongoing staff development program built around 15 characteristics of effective schools. Through this program, the Minnesota Department of Education provided training and technical assistance to leadership teams that then conducted week-long school site seminars. Ongoing assistance was provided by regional facilitators. The initiative struck a responsive chord among the state's educators and has resulted in the creation of a local reform infrastructure. The program began at 26 sites in 1983 and in 1992 was operating at 800 schools, more than half of the 1,511 K-12 schools in the state.

Participants say the program encouraged collegiality, teamwork, empowerment and professional renewal. They also say they valued the problem solving process institutionalized at effectiveness program schools and appreciated the opportunity to experiment with instructional innovations and to explore change. Many state educators believed that this reform program created the capacity or at least the inclination for schools to participate in subsequent reform efforts which, it is turning out, are much more complicated than these effective schools initiatives.

**School Choice**

Another element of the state's reform effort has been a growing emphasis on school choice. The first move in that direction came in 1985 when the legislature enacted the Post-Secondary Enrollment Option (PEO) Act which allowed high school juniors and seniors to accrue high school credit by attending classes at private or public colleges or
universities. This program not only provided more challenging and diverse courses to participating students, but also like other choice programs restructured authority and control of program and funding from the education system to students and parents (Archbald 1990). The post-secondary enrollment program involved almost 3,000 students by 1989 with school districts doing a relatively good job of notifying juniors and seniors of the available opportunities.

Beginning in 1987, the state instituted the High School Graduation Incentive (HSGI) program in an attempt to lure some dropouts and non-graduates, some who are older than 21, to return for their diploma at public expense. The program helped create numerous alternative schools in urban districts, and Area Learning Centers (ALCs) in suburban and rural areas; ALCs also were opened in Minneapolis and St. Paul in 1990-91. The general objective of these programs was to foster development of new alternative education programs or to assist in making the state’s existing menu of alternative programs more readily accessible to students who had dropped out of high school. In some cases returning students were given individual educational plans and, in the case of teen parents, granted transportation funds to get their children to day care while they go to school. About 1,400 students, half of them returning dropouts, participated in the program in its first year, the bulk of them either low income or minority. Research (Adelman 1992a) shows that participants are highly satisfied with these new options, tend to increase their academic expectations of themselves, and plan in large numbers to continue with postsecondary education.

Also in 1987 the state created an open enrollment, public school choice program which allows students to attend any public school in the state as long as there is seat space. The program was voluntary in the initial years, but made mandatory for all districts and was fully implemented by the end of the 1990-91 school year. The open enrollment program mushroomed after becoming mandatory and almost 8,000 students were participating by 1992. About half the districts have experienced either students entering or leaving the district through this program, but fewer than 10 percent of districts have had a change in enrollment that exceeded 5 percent. Participation hovers around 1 percent of the total number of students, with low-income students relatively well represented among participants (Urahn 1990; Adelman 1992b). Adelman’s research also showed that there has been a slight migration from urban to suburban districts, and from lower-income to higher-income districts.

This far reaching choice option is now familiar to parents and is ever-present in the media. While there is a perception among some that participation in the program results from high school students seeking greater athletic opportunities, the MDE indicates that parents choose schools for academic opportunities, such as a school’s computer lab facilities or advanced course offerings. This perception was supported by Adelman’s (1992b) research which showed academic reputation is the single most important reasons parents and students decide to attend a school other than the neighborhood school.
Appendix D: Minnesota

Charter schools. The most recent "choice" initiative is the state's sponsorship of outcome-based "charter" schools, which give parents an additional option for where to enroll their children. These innovative schools, which were created in a 1991 omnibus education bill, are to focus on specific student learning outcomes and are exempted from rules and statutes applicable to districts themselves. A school board may sponsor or authorize one or more teachers to form such a school with the approval of the state board. Teachers form the majority of each school's board of directors and all members must be elected by the school's staff and the students' parents. A written contract for a maximum of three years describes the program and its operations.

As of February 1993, six charter schools were approved by the state board. Six proposed schools failed to get a local board to sponsor them to the state board. Three groups are preparing proposals publicly and others are working privately. The sponsor of the program's enabling legislation, state Senator Ember Reichgott, said she hopes to increase the number of such schools to 20 or 25 statewide to serve a wider variety of students, including those who are handicapped or at-risk of dropping out. The original law was limited to eight charter schools, but the number authorized was more than doubled during the 1993 legislative session. Nevertheless, one of the interesting aspects of the charter schools that have been approved so far is their specialized nature: one Montessori, one for deaf students, one vocationally oriented, two focused on at-risk students, and one with an environmental theme.

Outcome Based Education

Although outcome-based charter schools were not part of state policy until 1991, they represent the integration and culmination of another trend in the state's reform efforts that also goes back to the early 1980s. In 1982, the Legislature enacted modest graduation requirements that did little to alter course offerings or course-taking. But in 1989, the Legislature sought to change the focus of education from inputs, such as required courses or seat time, to student outcomes. In an outcome-based system, what a pupil is to learn is clearly identified, each pupil progresses based on demonstrating mastery of that material, multiple instructional strategies and assessment methods are used to give each pupil the opportunity to succeed and each pupil is provided the time and assistance necessary for achieving his or her potential.

In the past, time has been the constant in the learning equation and learning has been the variable. Schools that are outcome-based recognize that learning should be the constant and the amount of time and the instructional methods varied to meet students' needs. No particular grading methodology, scheduling procedure or delivery system is mandated. The outcome-based curriculum rules define the learning opportunities that must be available to all Minnesota residents but the districts are left to decide specifically how to present them.
In 1989, the chairpersons of the four education committees in the Legislature opened an Educational Leadership Office in the state department of education and directed it to implement outcome-based education. The committee leadership also named an assistant education commissioner to direct the office and fulfill its mission. Ten districts were given research and development grants and by 1991, a quarter of the state’s districts were interpreting and beginning to implement the policy. The special office was eliminated by 1991 legislation, which returned responsibility for OBE to the Commissioner. Now the Department of Education is nearing completion of a plan for how it will assist districts in their future efforts.\footnote{In the late 1980s, the Legislature became unhappy with the then chief state school officer. The opening of an office within the Department of Education headed by an individual who reported to the legislature reflected this breach. Subsequently, however, that chief state school officer resigned and a state legislator became chief. When the current governor was elected in 1990, he appointed as chief an individual who had been the lobbyist for the state teacher’s organization and was well known to the legislature. That new chief appointed as one of his assistant commissioners a woman who had been the chief staff person in the Senate on school finance issues, which helped to strengthen the relationship between the Department and the legislature. However, in Fall 1993, the Governor replaced the chief state school officer with a suburban Minneapolis superintendent, claiming he wanted someone more committed to outcomes-based education. The Assistant Commissioner also likely will be replaced. How the Department/Legislature relationship evolves will be further complicated because in 1993 all the education committee chairs in the legislature changed hands.}

**Curriculum Frameworks**

Paralleling the move toward outcome-based education was the development between 1988 and 1991 of Model Learner Outcomes for mathematics, science, language arts, and social studies. These documents began by stating the primary purpose of becoming educated and how public education is to fulfill that purpose. The documents then described the knowledge, skills, processes, values, and attitudes that a learner can expect to acquire through active participation in K-12 education. But, initially, the model outcome documents were not intended to serve as curriculum frameworks or to set curriculum standards. Therefore, they could not be used as the basis for a comprehensive approach to outcomes-based education or as the starting point for creating assessment tools that would measure the degree of achievement of those outcomes. To make the model outcome documents more useful for these purposes, in 1992 the MDE appointed a “Learner Outcome Framework Team” to develop a “second-generation” of documents that could function as curriculum frameworks.

**A New Outcome-Based High School Graduation Rule**

The need for more focused state curriculum frameworks emerged, in part, from work on an outcome-based graduation rule, development of which was conducted by the State Board of Education for several years and then became mandated for the State Board of
Education by 1991 reform legislation. Currently, students must take a certain number of courses to qualify for graduation from high school. The new state graduation rule proposed to shift the basis for matriculation from seat time in courses to demonstrated achievement of certain learning outcomes. If ultimately adopted, Minnesota would be the first state in the nation with such requirements. With involvement of over 200 teachers, administrators, and others throughout Minnesota, the Department of Education responded to the legislative mandate in 1991 by identifying seven graduation outcomes with a total of 63 competencies that would be the student achievement basis for high school graduation. The seven proposed graduation outcomes required the graduate to demonstrate the knowledge, skills, and attitudes that are essential to:

1. Communicate with words, numbers, visuals, symbols, and sounds
2. Think and solve problems to meet personal, social, and academic needs
3. Contribute as a citizen in local, state, national, and global communities
4. Understand diversity and the interdependence of people
5. Work cooperatively in groups and independently
6. Develop physical and emotional well-being
7. Contribute to the economic well-being of society.

During 1991-92 public meetings were held around the state regarding the proposed rule and local concerns were identified. Leading the concerns was the proposal to require development of a personal learning plan for each student and the setting and maintenance of standards. The Legislature debated the issues and removed the personal learning plan element of the proposal.

What eventually emerged was a commitment to a results-based graduation rule, but not to a single form of instruction, such as basing teaching on personal learning plans or, interestingly, a single state test of student achievement. The Legislature requested the State Board to provide them progress reports on this endeavor in 1993 and 1994. The State Board can not adopt a final outcome-based high school graduation rule before July 1, 1994, and likely will not do so unless the rule has garnered legislative support.

If the rule is eventually adopted it would clearly entail a dramatic social and cultural change. The task of redrafting the rule is to conceptualize what students in Minnesota need to know and be able to do in order to graduate from high school. Currently, a draft of the revised rule requires the learner to demonstrate each of the following:

- comprehensive outcomes at or above the state performance standards
- content outcomes at or above the state performance standards
- elective content outcomes that equate to at least twenty-five percent of the content outcomes at or above the local performance standards.

Comprehensive outcomes are still quite broad: think purposefully, direct own learning, communicate effectively, work productively with others and act responsibly as a citizen.
But the content outcomes are more similar to those included in such curriculum reports as those prepared by the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics and the state of California.

As work on both the second generation curriculum frameworks and the high school graduation rule has progressed, the state also has begun work to revise its statewide student assessment program. Currently, the notion is for the state to suggest guidelines for student testing, but to have local districts develop the tests that will be used. But already the state has run into difficulty in implementing this ideal in a way that provides comparable achievement data across school districts, especially since passing such a test will be required for high school graduation. There is only the beginning of conversations about how to resolve the student testing issue, but among some leaders, the need to have clear linkages among the high school graduation rule, curriculum standards and comparable student assessment instruments is becoming increasingly clear. The Governor included in his proposed 1994 and 1995 budgets a Department of Education proposal to support local development of performance testing items; the fate of such a new testing system hinges on legislative response to this proposal.

**Teacher Training**

The training of Minnesota’s teachers is undergoing a similar rethinking that, if implemented, will shift the concentration from inputs to outcomes. The 1991 reform legislation directed the state’s teacher-dominated Board of Teaching to redesign teacher education programs to make them consistent with a research-based, results-oriented curriculum, a clear conceptual link to outcome-based education. The revisions must be in place by 1996-97.

On February 1, 1992, the Minnesota Board of Teaching issued *A Report on Teacher Preparation and Licensing* which proposed a thoroughgoing revamp of the requirements for obtaining a license to teach.

The proposed process includes a year-long supervised internship in a school specially designated for the purpose and would require candidates to pass a test of teaching knowledge and skills. The internship is to be formal and structured and provide a common, rigorous educational experience that would include the opportunity to apply teaching knowledge learned in the classroom, to gain knowledge that can only be learned on-the-job and to practice these skills under the watchful eye of a veteran teacher. The internship would differ from student teaching in that it would be multi-dimensional, combining theory and practice. It would differ from mentor programs in that it would be carefully designed to be comprehensive and to expose interns to a wide range of teaching experiences. Not all districts would operate internships and the number of internships available is to be determined by the demand for beginning teachers, making admission to intern programs selective. In addition to passing the test of teaching knowledge and completing
an internship, beginning teachers would have to pass another test of teaching skills prior to receiving a credential.

In 1992 the Legislature authorized the Board of Teaching to move ahead with the proposal by establishing pilot projects that would help evaluate a full-year internship as a requirement of teacher licensure. But money has not been authorized for implementing internships in designated professional development schools, assisting colleges and universities in making the transition to the new teacher preparation process or for evaluating the changes. Modest funding to begin this process has been proposed by the Governor for the 1994 and 1995 school years.

Other Policy Areas

The state is also moving on other policy fronts, including early childhood education and addressing the needs of at-risk students. Guiding reforms in these areas is a commitment to prevention and early intervention. Minnesota established one of the first statewide programs for assisting pre-school children and its $25.5 million (1991-1993 biennium) Early Childhood and Family Education program is considered a national model.

In 1988 Minnesota expanded its definition of at-risk children to include those still too young to attend school so that their potential for problems could be identified early. The program emphasizes parent involvement and family education and offers all day kindergarten as well as programs for children two years and older if they fall within this definition. The program now serves an estimated 87,500 children and an equal number of parents.

The 1991 reform legislation included mandatory health and developmental screening for children entering kindergarten or first grade and also allocated $100 per children for at-risk 4-year-olds to ensure their readiness for learning. The components of the learning readiness program include social services, health and nutrition services, a plan for addressing development and learning issues and fostering parent involvement.

The state's prevention philosophy also provided the orientation for part of a 1992 anti-crime bill. That bill funded early childhood family education home visits and related staff development and the development of school-district-based violence prevention programs.

The Shape of Reform

Minnesota's reform vision is shaped by outcome-based education, which shifted the focus of education from program inputs to student outcomes. Part of the foundation of this vision is the belief that all students learn if given time, appropriate instruction and
support. Two other fundamental beliefs are that success leads to more success and that schools control the conditions for student success. An additional element of the state’s educational strategy is a focus on prevention which leads to programs to assist children before they reach school age and to meet the needs of students who are at-risk of failure.

The focus on student outcomes is also evident in the state’s various school choice initiatives. The state first offered students the opportunity to attend college classes for high school credit and then adopted a policy of open enrollment, both of which are driven by students and their parents choosing where to attend classes based on the outcomes they desire. Most recently the state has fostered the development of outcome-based charter schools.

Two other policy initiatives helping define the reform vision are an emerging revamp of the teacher licensure system and a new graduation rule. The new teacher licensure system will deregulate the teacher education curricula at colleges and universities and will more directly assess candidates’ knowledge and skills in teaching. The outcome-based graduation rule will make Minnesota the first in the nation to require high school graduates to demonstrate their mastery of a body of knowledge and skills rather than merely completing a set number of courses for a set number of credits. The Minnesota School for the Arts, a state funded specialty school, already has implemented an outcome-based graduation rule.

The Evolution of Policy Coordination

But the state’s various policy initiatives were not organized under the outcome-based education umbrella from the beginning. Rather, most of the reforms emerged separately, with each focused on fine-tuning an already good educational system. Changes in one area were designed to complement or promote revisions in others but there was no massive, unified overhaul of the educational system. Now, however, it is becoming clear—at least to some—that the various reforms need to be integrated and coordinated to achieve their desired results.

For example, the work on developing an outcomes-based graduation rule is tied in to development of curriculum frameworks, student assessment and teacher training/licensing. Even the state’s programs for enabling students and parents to make educational choices are related to outcome-based education, in the sense that the choices made result from the anticipated outcomes touted by various schools or programs.

The result is that formerly separate policy realms are becoming interdependent. For example, to develop assessment models for local school districts the state had to first write measurable outcome competencies. To produce the outcome-based graduation rule, learner outcomes frameworks, performance standards and assessment strategies needed to fit together. The coordination of these various reform strands is now occurring through separate but increasingly coordinated committee processes. Two critical components that still must be incorporated with the other reforms are teacher training and allocating...
funding for the complex assessment system that will be needed to make an outcomes-based system function. The state’s 1991-92 allocation for administering and developing state assessment mechanisms was only about $125,000 plus salaries and no work is contracted out. However, as noted earlier, there is a several million dollar request for support for the 1994 and 1995 fiscal years.

In 1992, the state began to address the interconnectedness of these programs. Learner outcomes are being modified at the state level to be more specific and curriculum-based. Appropriate curriculum frameworks are being developed. Modifications of the state and local student assessment instruments are being explored in the context of the proposed outcomes-based graduation rule.

As mentioned, staff development for these new initiatives, which reach far beyond the effective schools program of the early 1980s, has not received the policy attention it deserves, given the change in teacher behavior that will be required once the shift to outcomes-based education is complete.

In short, Minnesota’s emerging strategy is for the state to set specific learner outcomes, create state curriculum frameworks and develop mechanisms for student assessment (with substantial input from teachers and other local educators). The school districts are to develop the specific programs and instructional strategies to produce the desired outcomes. Colleges and universities are to design programs to produce teachers who can meet the state Board of Teaching’s standards for licensure. And the parents are given the opportunity to enroll their children in the public schools or, in the case of high school juniors and seniors, post-secondary programs they desire.

The overall design is outcomes driven and site-based managed with the students and their parents given choices of programs and approaches. Equal educational opportunity is at the heart of this focus on outcomes, because its single most important aim is “to ensure success of every learner.” It remains to be seen, however, whether all students will be given the tools and opportunities necessary to achieve this ideal.

The Process of Reform

The Governor and the Legislature typically provide leadership on educational issues. Minnesota governors usually promote a single broad plan for dealing with issues raised during their election campaigns. The Legislature and the State Board of Education are responsible for the relatively few mandates that exist. But until recently, the Legislature also was engaged in protecting local school districts from pressures for centralization. In the past few years, the Legislature has assumed a new role, that of pressing to make schools accountable for achieving specific student outcomes. Obviously, the Legislature cannot do both at once and the result has been a tension between pushing for accountability and protecting local districts from onerous demands.
Leading Policy Instrument

The state’s primary policy instrument for achieving accountability is outcome-based education. This is, in effect, the state’s philosophy of education and its mission statement. Outcome based curricula will define the knowledge, skills, processes, values and attitudes that a learner can expect to achieve by actively participating in school. Ultimately, the purpose of 12 years of schooling is to be embodied in the specifics of the graduation rule that is being developed.

But the graduation rule, which represents a bold departure from past practice, also presents a complex problem as to how to rationalize the state’s interest in implementing such a rule with the local districts’ interests in operating more or less independently. The strategy for balancing these two opposing interests is for the state to define the results to be produced while leaving it up to the local districts or, in the case of the teacher licensing standards, the colleges or universities, to decide how to achieve the mandated results.

However, the strategy is complicated when applied to the new graduation rule. The problem is that defining specifically what outcome-based education means, in the form of the desired end result of 12 years of schooling, involves a great deal of centralized work. For example, as discussed earlier, learner outcome frameworks are needed to develop performance standards and an assessment model is needed to measure competencies. As these policies are written and subjected to public hearings, objections are likely. This has already been seen in the reaction that occurred when the state sought to link staff development funding to an emphasis on outcomes-based education. Local districts’ complaints caused this linkage to be eliminated in 1992 legislation and now staff development is a separate, local function.

State Department of Education Capacity

Further complicating the relationship between the state and the districts is the fact that the policy work necessary for shifting the focus of the state’s schools to outcomes has put the MDE in a more critical position than ever before. Meanwhile, however, the MDE’s budget was cut by 20 percent in 1991 and more in 1992. Even though this resulted in the elimination of 60 to 70 positions within the department, there was no corresponding reduction in the services the department was expected to provide. Economic trends make it likely that the MDE will continue to shrink.

The MDE has reorganized in response to the cutbacks as well as to the interdependent nature of the work that needs to be done. The MDE now expects to exercise leadership by setting standards for performance rather than describing how a program must be implemented. The MDE will fulfill its enforcement function by identifying areas in which standards are not being met and assisting “customers” to better their performance. The MDE’s service function is to be met by, again, asking its “customers” where they need help. To accomplish this reorientation, team decision making is being promoted
within the department and staff members are being organized in multi-skilled teams that include the functions of curriculum, instruction, assessment, finance and management.

Perhaps another result of the MDE's downsizing is that the state is now turning to national sources of curriculum standards, such as the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics, or to other states, such as California, for help in designing a performance assessment system. This outreach represents a departure from the state's insular practices of the past.

In addition to fiscal stress and downsizing, there is also turmoil in the Department caused by rapid change in chief state school officers. The chief who assumed office two and a half years ago was suddenly replaced by the governor in September 1993. The new chief, who is the fourth person to hold the office in the past four or so years, likely will appoint new assistant commissioners and change at least moderately the Department's direction and organization. The assistant commissioner heading up the outcomes based education activities, including curriculum framework and assessment development, however, will retain her position, thus giving some continuity to those key activities.

The Role of Broadly Representative Committees

The specific process used to develop policy proposals or implementation rules in the state is committee-based. These committees are typically large because all groups with vested interests are included. Policy proposals are then the focus of public hearings. Pilot studies of a proposed policy are conducted. Finally, the information gathered is used to refine policies to achieve consensus.

The result of this broad-based involvement is that bold, new proposals are typically modified significantly as they move through the policy formulation mechanisms. If they are found to work well and they gain widespread support, steps are taken to develop the policy further. For example, public school choice began in 1985 when high school juniors and seniors were given the option of attending post-secondary classes for high school credit. Building on the program's success, the realm of choices was expanded to include statewide open enrollment by 1988. The development of outcome-based charter schools is following a similar path of expansion as it is tried out.

The path toward a statewide graduation rule is likely to be more complicated, as indicated above. For example, even after the graduation rule is developed it is unclear whether local districts will have the capacity to carry it out or to assess their students' performance. There is no state test and strong resistance to developing one. There also is little funding for such an effort. Rather, multiple state assessment models are being considered to allow the local level to determine which one to follow. Developing the capacity to measure local performance is now being addressed by school districts as they work on curriculum standards.
So far, there is no formal process that insures that all of Minnesota's policy initiatives will evolve into a coherent whole. While one can glean the flickers of an evolving systemic reform strategy, that includes conscious coordination among student outcomes, curriculum standards, instructional materials, performance assessment, teacher training and retraining and school-based management, these connections are not yet formalized as the state's strategy. Awareness of the need to make these connections is growing, however, and increasingly includes overlapping membership on the committees addressing these different issues. It remains to be seen whether Minnesota will formally sanction a conscious systemic reform strategy, whether it will continue to evolve more informally as all the processes unfold, or whether the glimmers of strong connections that appear today will erode over time.

The Financing of Reform

In the mid- to late-1980s, the financial picture for education in the state looked good. Enrollment was declining and revenues were rising faster than inflation. The Twin Cities were experiencing population and economic growth. Toward the end of the decade, however, concern mounted over an economic slowdown in the rural and northeastern Iron Range areas. The narrowness of the economic base made it fragile. And the national recession began to have a widespread impact in the state.

Between 1980 and 1990 the percentage of the state budget devoted to education dropped from 33 percent in 1980 to about 26 percent in 1990, even though in real dollars the amount going for education rose. The Minnesota Education Association used this decline in its 1989 lobbying campaign, charging that education was losing importance in the state.

During the 1989 legislative session the Minnesota House tried to be generous, recognizing that it was an election year. The state Senate, however, not up for reelection, took the position that new funding would be contingent on results. The 1989 session was more acrimonious than usual, with the Governor, the MDE and the Legislature all jockeying for influence over finance and program issues. The disagreements and high-visibility negotiations indicated that education was attracting more, and more critical, attention, and has had a sustained effect on the policy making environment in the state.

The 1991 session was mainly concerned with the economic downturn and resulted in a 20 percent drop in MDE funding. The overall education budget, however, was modest and kept the foundation revenue per pupil at the same level for both the 1991-92 and 1992-93 academic years. As a result, revenues per pupil have not kept pace with inflation the last two years, and likely will continue on that trend for the next two years (Table 2).
Table 2
Revenue Per Pupil, 1988 To 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Operating Revenue per Weighted ADM</th>
<th>Percent Increase from Previous Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>$3607</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>3754</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>3953</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>4208</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992 est.</td>
<td>4347</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 est.</td>
<td>4398</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994 Gov. Recommendation</td>
<td>4492</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995 Gov. Recommendation</td>
<td>4667</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Minnesota Department of Education

In late 1992, the financial picture was grim and represented a potential obstacle to further progress on reforms, such as the development of the new assessment system needed to implement an outcomes-based graduation rule. The state biennial budget began with a $315 million surplus. Projections, however, indicated that expenditures would exceed revenues by $313 million, leaving a balance of only $2 million for the start of the 1994-95 biennium. Expenditures during 1994-95 are projected to exceed revenues by $839 million, leaving an $837 million shortfall. While early 1993 projections show revenues rising above the late 1992 projections, the improvements are modest and mean the fiscal outlook is not as bleak but still not very good.

The school finance equalization lawsuit (Sheridan and Dianna Skeen v. State of Minnesota and Virginia Independent School District #706) further complicates the situation. The state said the lawsuit was more concerned with tax relief than with educational equity. But the plaintiffs contended that relative funding disparities among school districts resulted in students receiving unequal educational opportunities. They also argued that, just because all districts in the state may be providing programs of "adequate" educational quality, some districts provided higher quality programs and caused relative harm to be done to students with less property wealth. On that basis, they claimed that property wealth was an irrational and illegitimate mechanism for determining school funding.

The court case, and the lower court decision that went against the state, however, attacked only the local enrichment portion of school funding. This portion is what is raised by local districts through referendum levies that are applied to property values.
While referendum levies increased consistently over the past five years, the result is that ten percent of students in the wealthiest have only an additional ten percent spent on their education, a fiscal advantage significantly smaller than in all other states that have weathered a school finance court case. In 1991, the Legislature enacted a small guaranteed tax base for this portion of the school finance structure, but the lower court ruled that it was inadequate. During the 1993 legislative session, the legislature further strengthened the guaranteed tax base portion of the formula. In Fall 1993, moreover, the Minnesota Supreme Court fund that the school finance system did not violate the Minnesota constitution and relieved the state from court pressure to change school finance.

During the 1993 legislative session, however, the legislature did not raise the $3050 foundation expenditure level, for about the third year in a row. Further, they required each school district to set aside 2 percent of that expenditure level for ongoing professional development; while the emphasis on professional development probably could add to the impact of Minnesota's reforms, structuring it as a set aside from an unchanged foundation expenditure level created controversy and some dissatisfaction.

The Results of Reform

The state's reform efforts have undeniably permeated the entire educational structure, from the decisions available to parents to the work being done by the MDE. Families are now considered consumers and, like consumers, they have numerous choices to make based on their own resources, goals and values. Districts are grappling with how to respond to the state movement toward outcome-based education, while being true to the values and needs of their own students. In addition, districts are responding to the effects of the state's choice and open enrollment policies, meaning that they have to compete for students. Now, smaller districts regularly cross district boundaries to cooperate with their neighbors. Even the Legislature itself, once engaged almost entirely in protecting the interests of local districts, is now applying its own forms of pressure to improve student achievement.

With respect to achievement, test scores have increased. Scores on the SAT Verbal and Mathematics tests are not only above the national average, but have increased 20 points on the verbal portion and 30 points on the mathematics portion during the last five years. While the score on the ACT test has remained about the same, a larger portion of students now take that test because it is required for admission into the University of Minnesota system. Further, Minnesota students continues to score above both national and Central State regional averages on the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) which Minnesota augments to obtain valid state level comparative data.

Meanwhile, the state is increasing its achievement expectations. Some believe that these expectations will, increasingly, come into conflict with the state's affinity for local
school district control. While in other states district-by-district comparisons of achievement on a state mandated test are considered valid levers to improve schools, this would be considered virtual heresy in Minnesota. The need to assess progress is at odds with the widespread anxiety that unlike districts will be ranked using a state test.

Although they may not result in higher test scores, some gains for children are apparently resulting from the state’s High School Graduation Incentives, Area Learning Centers and Post secondary Enrollment Options programs. Observers say that these programs are pulling students back from the brink of dropping out and giving students and parents more options, resulting in higher attendance rates for at-risk students.

Six high-profile areas of reform include outcome-based education, school choice, restructuring, district consolidation, early childhood programs and programs for at-risk students. Shifting to outcome-based education, however, with its complementary work on curriculum standards, student assessment and teacher training is clearly the top priority, with the entire state school system in some way seemingly working towards this policy shift.

Two reform programs that are widely seen as having a positive impact are the Minnesota Educational Effectiveness Program and school choice, especially the elements of the latter policy that pertain to at-risk students.

The monopoly status of local districts is being challenged by the expanding open enrollment or choice program. Some small districts that are losing more students than they are gaining are suffering as a result of this policy. There is some tension between the state and local districts as the state pushes for more consolidation and restructuring.

Deciding how to specify what students should be learning and creating ways to measure their performance, without prescribing how school districts should achieve those results, remains a major challenge in the state. The topic is a hot one in many local and state-level planning sessions.

Partly because of the strong local focus of education in the state, little statewide data exists to show how the state’s schools were performing at the beginning of the decade. In addition, no systematic evaluation of the effects of a decade’s worth of reform efforts has been done. As a result, it’s hard to see how far the state has come because no one is sure where it was back at the starting point.

Poll results indicate that, on the whole, people are satisfied with their schools. They also say they are willing to pay higher taxes to advance reform efforts. One observer said that one-third of the people say they liked the 1980s reforms before they were implemented, while two-thirds approved of them after they were in place for a while. However, the perception is linked closely to whether those polled had children in school. Those who had children attending public schools rated them more highly than those who did not.
References


