This paper highlights and applies past inventional theory to current critical thinking and writing practices. The paper provides a contextual background to capture the tension between opposed sides in the college composition discipline regarding the usefulness of elements of the classical rhetorical tradition. Next, the paper reviews one well-known ancient technique from Quintilian (a three-question heuristic for creative and critical thought). The paper then presents a speculative exploration of Chaim Perelman's theory of "presence" as a critical topos, which concerns the rhetorical strategies of concreteness, repetition, illustration, evocative imagery, and dramatic devices such as "hypotyposis," "sermocinatio," dialogism, analogy, and metaphor. The paper concludes that Perelman's theory of presence could be taught to students both as a heuristic for writing and a critical tool for studying how argumentation is built along strongly emotional lines. (Contains 51 references.) (RS)
Insights from Past Inventional Theory for Present Critical Thinking and Writing

presented by
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"This book is not the usual hogwash about writing."
Lil Brannon, et al. in Writers Writing.

"Is this all just antiquarian hogwash?"
James J. Murphy, in The Rhetorical Tradition and Modern Writing.

**Insights from Past Inventional Theory**
for
**Present Critical Thinking and Writing**

Almost twenty years ago, Janice Lauer described the 4C's (The Conference on College Composition and Communication) as a "discipline vibrating with the tension of opposites . . . . fighting to channel its exploding energy and to balance its extremes" (341). What Lauer said then still describes the disparate approaches to teaching writing and critical thinking in America's colleges. Brannon's "explosive" label for the classical model of rhetoric, "hogwash," captures one extreme attitude in the profession toward the use of past insights for contemporary writing instruction. Murphy could symbolize another pole. In a multicultural world one would expect to find diverse pedagogies. However, in a day when the paradigmatic approach to teaching has shifted to cooperation, collaborative "sparks" seem more sensible than competitive ones.

Lauer proposed a cooperative use of these "competing" academic energies, where "we, as the fuses of the explosion, meet, share, and ignite each other" (343). The major purpose of this paper is to highlight and apply past inventional theory to present critical thinking and writing. I begin with a contextual background in order to capture the tension between opposed sides in the discipline. Next, I review one well-known ancient technique from Quintilian and one newer strategy by Perelman which may not be so familiar. Since these "past" inational strategies seem perpetually modern and capable of being used in critical thinking and writing instruction in today's classroom I will also offer some suggestions for incorporating them into our daily teaching.
OPPOSITION IN WRITING AND CRITICAL THINKING PEDAGOGY

In more recent history, critics in both Speech/Communication and English have condemned classical theory, particularly Aristotelian insight, because of its psychological, linguistic, anthropological, epistemic, ontologic and judicial inadequacy. In 1936, I.A. Richards rejected the theories of Aristotle in his *The Philosophy of Rhetoric* because they were "largely irrelevant for the study of how rhetoric functions in the twentieth century" (Foss, Foss and Trapp 20). In 1949 Rudolph Flesch argued that it was time for writers to "free [themselves] from Aristotle" (18). Alfred Korzybski, father of the General Semantics movement, traced modern day insanity back to Aristotle in his *Science and Sanity* (1958) and appropriately published his work through a press called The International Non-Aristotelian Library. Edwin Black's 1965 publication of *Rhetorical Criticism* was a powerful argument against "Neo-Aristotelianism." Like an echo of Korzybski, Black claimed that "current Aristotelianism is wrongly founded philosophically, outdated, too limited, or otherwise inadequate" (10). Young, Becker and Pike's influential *Rhetoric: Discovery and Change* (1970), questioned the Aristotelian "image of man as a rational animal," and announced "the need for a new rhetoric" reflecting Pavlovian, Freudian and Rogerian psychological insights (6-8).

Halloran's "On the End of Rhetoric, Classical and Modern" (1975) implied that Aristotle's views on knowledge (epistemology) and "external reality" (ontology) were no longer adequate (624). James Berlin, in 1982, debunked Aristotle's view of reality and his "rationalistic view of language, a view no longer considered defensible" ("Contemporary" 767-68). The wave-making indictment of Aristotelianism and classicism came in 1984 with Knoblauch and Brannon's *Rhetorical Traditions and the Teaching of Writing*. Knoblauch and Brannon, writing teachers, virtually outlawed the use of classicism in the freshman writing course because of its deficient understanding of mental processes and the nature of knowledge and reality. Four years later, in an article in *College English* (1988) Knoblauch, sounding strikingly like Korzybski, implied that contemporary social and intellectual "inequities," such as injustice, are the fault of Aristotelian thought and "the rationalization of neo-Aristotelianism" ("Rhetorical Constructions" (128-9).
From this select look at some literature one can see that a steady trail of anti-Aristotelianism and anti-classicism has wound its way through the field of rhetorical and English studies in the past 50 years.

Aristotle, and of course other classical writers, have their defenders, those who believe that a revivification of "ancient" tenets can be successfully carried out in the contemporary classroom. In this century, since the 1920's, and particularly in the last thirty years, following a revivival of classical rhetoric at such institutions as the University of Texas-Arlington, Carnegie--Mellon, Purdue, Ohio State University, the University of Iowa, the field of rhetorical studies spawned movements and communication theorists who reframed classical thought into versions conversant with the contemporary world, an Aristotle, Hermagoras, Cicero, Quintilian of fresh insight (Enos 283; Kneupper 112; Connors, Ede and Lunsford 1-12). What one contemporary philosopher said of Aristotle, could symbolize the spirit of the rhetoric revivial in its approach to Greek, Roman and later rhetoricians influenced by classical insight. In this view Aristotle should not be viewed as a "hulking museum piece" but "as if he were a contemporary philosopher [rhetorical?, writing?, critical thinking? theorist], like, say, a Wittengenstein, or a Russell, or a Heidegger, or maybe even a Marx, Marcuse, or Sartre" (Veatch 3). Corbett's early landmark article, "The Usefulness of Classical Rhetoric" (1963), qualified the degree to which such theorists were willing to view the tenets of the classical world as a panacea for contemporary problems.

I do not claim that classical rhetoric will solve, once and for all, the manifold problems of the composition course, and I will not be trapped into the non-sequitur that because classical rhetoric had a long and honorable tradition it must be the best system ever devised for teaching students how to compose a discourse. But perhaps it deserves a chance to prove what it can do for our students. (164)

Numerous theoreticians have arisen since Corbett's 1963 article to continue the argument for the continuing use of classical insights. Two of Corbett's students, Andrea Lunsford and Lisa Ede, in their "Classical Rhetoric, Modern Rhetoric, and Contemporary Discourse Studies" (1984) articulated what were in their view perpetually modern insights from the classical world. They
derived three characteristics listed, below, which classical discourse shares with contemporary discourse and which establish a touchstone for choosing rhetorical strategies which could be used in today's classroom.

- Both classical and modern rhetoric view people as language-using animals who unite reason and emotion in discourse with one another.
- Both classical and modern rhetoric provide a method by which rhetor and audience together create knowledge, most often by building on shared understanding or prior knowledge.
- As interdisciplinary enterprises, classical and modern rhetoric ideally unite theory and practice in the communicative arts of reading, speaking, writing, and listening. (92)

Interestingly, when Robert Connors, another student of Edward Corbett, joined with Lunsford and Ede to edit Essays on Classical Rhetoric and Modern Discourse (1984) the powerful case made there caused Knoblauch—one of the fiercest opponents of classical theory in the writing classroom—to comment that the authors had argued "the compatibility of classical and modern perspectives as forcefully as I would argue their disjunction" ("Modern Rhetorical" 34). It is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper to list all of the recent works which argue for the continuing use of ancient rhetoric. Two of the most recent are Brian Vickers's In Defense of Rhetoric (1988) and Kathleen Welch's The Contemporary Reception of Classical Rhetoric: Appropriations of Ancient Discourse (1990). Welch's work is most significant because it differentiates between those who uncritically draw upon insights out of the past—the "Heritage School"—and those dialectical critics like James Kinneavy, James Murphy, Kenneth Burke and Walter Ong, etc. who "rewrite and reread classical rhetoric with the emerging critical sensibilities that have so enlivened and politicized discourse studies in the last generation" (165). Welch's plea is to "electrify" classical rhetoric by finding "newness" in the old—in ancient rhetoricians like Plato, Gorgias, Aristotle, Isocrates, Cicero and Quintilian.
Ideological politics have kept some textbook writers from incorporating classical insights into their texts. Consider Ann and Charlene Tibbett's frustration at some writing teachers who criticized the use of classical theory in their writing text:

In an earlier edition we included a chapter on classical rhetoric. This was inspired by the splendid research on the ancients by Ed Corbett and others. Away with the chapter, said the teachers, and a pox on unfamiliar terms like ethical proof and exordium. Our chapter on classical rhetoric disappeared. (857)

Other writers have met with some success in attempting to incorporate classical tenets into their textbooks. Probably the most triumphal examples are Corbett's Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student (3rd Edition 1990) and Winifred Bryan Homer's Kinetic in the Classical Tradition (1988). Typically, those texts that have used classical insights have done so on a smaller scale. When William Irmscher turned Kenneth Burke's Pentadic analysis into an inventional tool for writers, incorporating it into his The Holt Guide to English he was essentially importing classical insights into his textbook from a contemporary rhetorician who, in Marie Hochmuth Nichol's words was, "essentially a classicist in his theory of rhetoric" (323).

As is apparent from the discussion above, classical rhetoric continues to have its critics and its defenders. Even among proponents of the so-called "critical thinking movement," pedagogy based upon classical precepts is sometimes openly condemned, or otherwise completely ignored. That became apparent to me several years ago when I was selected to write a grant proposal to the Bush Foundation which would detail a program in critical thinking pedagogy for my college. In order to write the proposal, I read widely in critical thinking literature and attended several critical thinking conferences around the country. They included the University of Chicago's Institute on Issues in Teaching and Learning: Teaching Critical Thinking and Writing, Bard College's Workshop on Teaching Writing and Thinking and Sonoma State University's International Conference on Critical Thinking. Both at Chicago and Bard College Richard Trimbur's view of collaborative learning spoke out strongly against the use of Socratic Questioning. Following Dewey's notion of democracy in education, Trimbur disparages the authority of the teacher being
used to direct student thought. The authority of the college professor should, apparently, only function in the creation of the collaborative project itself.

Meanwhile, at Sonoma State University’s Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique, Richard Paul openly advocates the use of Socratic questioning, where the teacher directs discussion through a non-authoritarian role where the purpose is, in Paul’s view, to facilitate critical thinking not promote an authoritarian view of the teacher. While a host of books on the market which promote critical thinking seem to draw heavily upon the insights of the classical world, for example Aristotle’s logical and rhetorical works, some seem to take their cue from other figures. Lipman’s Thinking in Education (1991) seems deeply indebted to classical thought. Ira Shor’s Critical Teaching & Everyday Life (1980) and Empowering Education (1992) ignore classical thought taking their inspiration from Dewey and especially Paulo Freire. Critical Thinking & Everyday Life disparages the classical technique of Socratic discussion as an irrelevant mode which produces static knowledge and alienation in students. While this brief cameo look at critical thinking pedagogy is, no doubt, unrepresentative, it demonstrates to a degree how some pedagogy in the so-called "critical thinking movement" favors or disparages elements of the classical tradition.

PAST INSIGHTS FROM INVENTIONAL THEORY

Any teacher knows from the beginning of her teaching career the importance of questions for thinking and learning. It does not take long to discover a myriad of pedagogical variations on questioning available for use in the classroom. Kipling’s well known ditty recalls one of the more basic schema, the so-called journalistic questions:

1 had six honest serving men,
(They taught me all I knew);
Their names are What and Why and When
And How and Where and Who.
Questions have been formulated according to hierarchical systems such as Bloom's Taxonomy, Perry's Scheme, or following a dramatic model—Burke's Pentad or Young, Becker and Pike's particle, wave, field model. Richard Larson's "Discovery Through Questioning: A Plan for Teaching Rhetorical Invention" suggests a schema in which the student is given about 125 questions under seven sub-categories of topics which may be used to think about a subject. While all of these systems may be effectively used to teach critical thinking and to help students invent something about which to write, I will first review an old, well known (but I believe little-used) approach to questioning drawn from Roman rhetorical status (or stasis) theory, valuable because of its easy memorability and ability to engender critical thinking through three basic questions. Secondly, I will explore a new approach to critical questioning based up Chaim Perelman's theories of "presence."

Martin Marty, of the University of Chicago, once observed that it is the nature of genius to be able to boil the complex down into the profoundly simple. When Cicero, and his commentator Quintilian—following a four question heuristic generated by Aristotle in his Posterior Analytics (89b20-26)—theorized about the area of forensic dispute, the area of issues, they suggested that matters could be interrogated according to three fundamental questions: An sit? Quid sit? Quale sit? (Quintilian III.v.-viii.). "An sit?" the first, was a question of fact, and asked whether or not something was, is or will be? The "quid sit" question was a matter of definition, and asked what is the proper definition of a thing, what is its essence, characteristics and relationship to a class of objects. The "quale sit" question asks the quality question—is something to be regarded as good, harmful, expedient, just unjust, valuable, beautiful, etc.?³

- An sit?—(fact) whether something was, is or will be.
- Quid sit?—(definition) what it is.
- Quale sit?—(quality) what its quality is (good, bad, etc.).

With the "an sit" question Quintilian asks us to consider about any fact, incident, claim, observation whether or not the thing really is. Did it happen? Does something thought to exist really exist? This is a profoundly important question and one which is easily overlooked. It leads
easily to what I will call the "piano syndrome," after a photo exercise in Mayfield's text on critical thinking and writing. The photo appears to be taken sometime during the last century and presents a prairie home and barn yard scene complete with cows, donkeys and other livestock. In the front center of the photo are a group of people--what appears to be a family--gathered around a "piano." Actually on a closer look one notices knobs running parallel to and above the piano keys and a wide foot pedal underneath in the front. The piano is really a portable organ. When showed the picture and asked to identify the facts they observe in the picture, most students identify the organ as a piano. Our first impressions often lead to false conclusions because we didn't "see" all the details. The "an sit" question becomes a critically important lesson in critical thinking. During the Persian Gulf crisis a field grade commander piloting a Blackhawk Helicopter destroyed a friendly APC (Armored Personnel Carrier). Without details we often put things in categories where they don't belong. The "an sit" question challenges us to get the facts straight. It reminds us that we can fall into a host of other syndromes like the colored-lens syndrome where our observation is distorted by our own bias, prejudice or consciousness.

One day in Vietnam, while I was flying as mission commander of an Air Cavalry helicopter troop on a reconnaissance mission, several people jumped up out of the underbrush. The LOH scout helicopter pilots wanted immediately to take them under fire. They were enemy, obviously. But were they? From my vantage point it was the "an sit" question that needed to be dwelt upon. Whether or not they were VC was in question. From where I was flying, about 300 feet above the ground, the fact was not certain. They had no weapons. They were not firing upon anyone. They could very well be a couple of lone villagers, caught out in the paddies by surprise. And that's what they proved to be. The Scouts had been briefed that there should be no civilians in this area. But they had the details wrong this time. It was the piano syndrome.

A woman walks into the personnel manager's office and she is the most qualified for the job. The resume looks perfect. The letters of recommendation are impeccable, except that when the personnel director looks up he immediately disqualifies her. How can she be a good PR person? She is "fat," about 190 pounds. Well dressed? Yes. Qualified? Yes. Pleasant
personality? Yes. Those colored lenses--take them off, Quintilian whispers. The "an sit" question says "take them off." Is it the case that an overweight person is incapable of being a good Public Relations person? Who says so? The "an sit" question makes us sort through those untested assumptions. It is the question which makes a critical thinker question first impressions and differentiate between appearance and reality.

The wife/husband/significant other, whom you love dearly, comes home after hearing a charismatic speaker and wants to sell everything and move to a commune in another state where everybody shares everything and where you will hear dynamic Bible teaching like you've never heard before. You already know a state college professor who is moving there. You move. And the preacher is charismatic and everybody shares everything, sort of, and he is a dynamic Bible preacher. And there you are with your boyfriend sitting in the corner, surrounded outside by the police, National Guard and other law enforcement officials as the commune erupts in flame. Whether or not Koresh was for real or a charismatic con man was a question that some forgot to ask.

These examples I have just repeated may be a bit homely for academic audiences, but when I used them during a speech to a community group on the importance of using the "an sit" question in our daily lives, I was, frankly, overwhelmed at the positive reaction to my speech. Most of the members of the audience were college-trained professionals and yet the topic of the speech seemed to hit a nerve. The comments both oral and written which I received from that speech convinced me that Quintilian's question is of fundamental importance in our lives and one which should be repeatedly taught in my writing class.

The other two questions of Quintilian can be just as easily applied to life situations in their most basic or expanded form. Winifred Bryan Horner's Rhetoric in the Classical Tradition suggests asking the following questions as variations on the "quid sit" question: What is it? What is it like? What is its purpose? What is its effect? What caused it? What terms are associated with it? What is the meaning of those terms (32)? Of course, defining one's terms is crucial to any intellectual discourse. Is Mohamed Farraah Aidid an international criminal, war-lord, terrorist,
outlaw, Somalian leader? Depending upon how one defines Aidid, one may end up with at least two different policies—one military, one political. If Aidid is a criminal a United Nations military action may be called for. If he is recognized as a political leader, negotiations seem reasonable.

Asking the "quale sit" question raises the issue of values, of right and wrong. Other variations on this question might be: What are the consequences? Is it good for me or bad? Is it good for other people or bad? Is it right or wrong for me? Is it right or wrong for other people (Horner 32)? Since questions of goodness and badness may be defined in terms of expedience, justice, beauty, etc., this question may be framed according to those values. Was it "just" for Yeltsin to disband parliament by dictorial fiat, contrary to the Russian constitution? Is it good for the United States to be acting militarily in Somalia when our mission was allegedly humanitarian and not military? Asking these questions one sees how Quintilian's other questions arise, begging to be answered. Did Yeltsin violate the constitution (an sit--fact)? What does the Russian constitution say? What does it mean to engage in a humanitarian mission (quid sit--definition)? Does a humanitarian mission allow the use of force? Under what conditions? Is military "force" a good way to establish a democracy (quale sit--value)?

Such questions may seem academic, but they bring discussions alive when students begin asking them. That was demonstrated to me the other day in a very real way. As part of our Grant proposal to the Bush Foundation we planned to have regular advisor/advisee dinners with students. Our administration saw the value of faculty/student interaction as an important ingredient for critical thinking and student retention. They approved a plan whereby each faculty member could dine with students at the noon meal, being entitled to eat free from the soup/salad bar. The other day I sat down at a table with a half dozen students, several of which were enrolled in my classes. I had spent several days on Quintilian's three questions and had been testing them out in classroom use. Just that morning I had read the full address of Yeltsin's speech which I had downloaded from the America Online newscast and had asked them to do a ten minute free-write in response to Quintilian's "quale sit" question, "Was it just for Yeltsin to take the actions he had taken?" That was in the morning, but meanwhile I was now sitting at the table and it wasn't long
before one student said of another of my students--his roommate--"Tony is very bright but he is highly unskilled socially." Two others agreed. Another student took Tony's side, disagreeing with the others. It was becoming obvious that eyes were beginning to look at me, while I quietly ate my meal. As the issue seemed to become more embroiled and I became somewhat uncomfortable about the position in which I was being put, I discreetly looked up at two vocal members of the group--who were members of my writing class and who were also vocal in criticizing Tony's social skills--and asked, "Is it the case that Tony is really without social skill?" emphasizing the "an sit" question. "I haven't observed that in Tony at all. What makes you draw that conclusion?" After some tenuous comments were made about Tony's alleged lack of social skills I nonchalantly looked up from my food, paused a moment and asked, "how do you define 'lacking in social skills'? I'm not sure I know what you mean?" Somehow the conversation seemed to shift away from Tony. I know these students and am relatively certain that they were not put off by my questions and I would really like to believe--from the glint of recognition--that the "an sit" and "quid sit" questions did some independent work in bringing civility and perhaps just a bit of critical thinking to that discussion. We never got to the "quale sit" question as I recall, because about then Tony sat down and his critics now became discussion partners.

Whether it is, what it is, what quality it is--while the variations on these questions can expand, as in Horner's adaptation, the genius of Quintilian's questions is that they are easily remembered in their basic form and can be adapted to varying situations. For Cicero and Quintilian these were universal questions, questions which could be asked about any kind of issue. While my adaptation is somewhat reductive their continued use in the contemporary classroom to engender writing and critical thinking seems promising.

A SPECULATIVE EXPLORATION OF PERELMAN'S "PRESENCE" AS CRITICAL TOPOS

While Quintilian's three-question heuristic for creative and critical thought has been widely used in textbooks based on classical rhetoric, I am not aware that anyone has attempted to cultivate
Perelman's theory of "presence" as a systematic critical tool in a textbook. Be that as it may, the reader/audience is now warned that this is a speculative attempt to revivify and develop a concept rooted in classical rhetoric which may have applications in the contemporary world of critical thinking. This puts the issue squarely in the "an sit" category of Quintilian. I am motivated to explore Perelman's theory of "presence" as a possible topos for critical thinking because of a statement made by Lothar Bornscheuer, a German rhetorician. While the thought may seem obvious to some, its profundity struck me the first time I read it. In Bornscheuer's view, "almost any formal or thematic viewpoint, logical or psychological tactic of disputation, objective fact or fictional image, concrete example or symbolic code may attain the rank of a topos" (cited in Dyck 70). In the ancient world a "topos" or "locus" was a "place" for finding arguments. Aristotle's artistic topoi--logos, ethos, pathos--his 28 common topics, e.g., opposites, inflections, correlative terms, more or less, etc. became invention memory jogs to help orators/writers think of something to say. Of course, this creative function of topoi to produce critical thought is one side of the coin. By a metaphorical coin flip the topoi become critical tools and may be used to analyze thought in progress or thought completed as to its reliability and truth factor. Aristotle anticipates this dual function of the topoi by attaching to his logical work on topoi (the Topica) a work called De Sophisticis Elenchis (On Sophistical Refutation). This work--which is rarely read by college writing teachers--is the foundation for all contemporary discussions on the fallacies, the uncritical, erroneous use of the topos.

With Bornscheuer's and Aristotle's principles in mind as a basis for exploring "presence" as a critical topos, we are first faced with Quintilian's "quid sit" question--what is "presence?" In keeping with the thesis of this paper, we might be reminded that Perelman is recognized for his efforts of recovering classical rhetoric and logic and reinterpreting them in the contemporary world. His theory of "presence" vivifies and develops an idea touched upon in rhetorical works by Aristotle, the author of the Ad Herrenniun, Cicero, Quintilian, "Longinus," Francis Bacon and George Campbell and others.
Perelman discusses "presence" in several of his works, especially The New Rhetoric--written with the research assistance of L. Olbrechts-Tyteca--(1969; hereafter NR) and The Realm of Rhetoric (1982; hereafter RR), a 185 page summary of NR. Since Perelman's massive book on argumentation theory is essentially a study of how writers and speakers use data to build cases it is essentially a study of critical thinking and can be read, I believe, as a source book for both creating and critiquing thinking. In NR Perelman argues that "presence" is an important feature in argumentation. Perhaps--framing his words through this paper's terministic screen--that suggests that it could be an important feature in critical thinking:

By the very fact of selecting certain elements and presenting them to the audience, their importance and pertinency to the discussion are implied. Indeed, such a choice endows these elements with a presence, which is an essential factor in argumentation and one that is far too much neglected in rationalistic conceptions of reasoning. (116)

As I have stated, the seed ideas for presence show up throughout the writings of classicists. Aristotle believed that it was the rhetorician's task to make the audience experience fear, shame, pity by creating the "presence" of these ideas before the audience's eyes. In discussing emotion, Aristotle connected fear to "imagination of a future destructive or painful evil." Fear is created only if these destructive or painful evils "do not appear far-off but near, so that they are about to happen; for what is far off is not feared: all know that they will die; but because that is not near at hand they take no thought of it" (1381a1). In Cicero's De Inventione the author writes that the legal counsel for the defense lays the blame on someone else "by magnifying the culpability and audacity" of the crime and "by placing the scene vividly before the eyes of the jury with an intense display of indignation." (II. xxviii.).

The familiar proverb, "Out of sight, out of mind" reminds us that important beliefs, values, ideas do come alive in the minds of hearers when hearers are motivated to attend to them and are conscious of their reality. Present circumstances tend to overwhelm audiences and readers so that they are unable to consider as present realities people, places, ideas or things which are distant in time and space. For Perelman, the words of Francis Bacon--echoing Aristotle, Cicero,
Quintilian—suggested a way to close the gap so that the distant is brought into present consciousness. Bacon expressed the thought in these words:

...The affection beholdeth merely the present; reason beholdeth the future and sum of time. And therefore the present filling the imagination more, reason is commonly vanguished; but after that force of eloquence and persuasion hath made things future and remote appear as present, then upon the revolt of the imagination reason prevaileth. (qtd. in NR 117)

Perelman found it insightful that imaginative discourse, words, may be used to "help reason . . . take into account what is not there" (Golden and Pilotta 9). Imaginative techniques which work toward the creation of presence, he believed, "are essential above all when it is a question of evoking realities that are distant in time and space" (RR 35).

Even when speakers address audiences sympathetic to their premises there is no guarantee that hearers will attend to the message. "It is not enough indeed that a thing should exist for a person to feel its presence" (NR 117). For example, justice and peace are values which most rational people subscribe to, yet how many people necessarily "feel" the meaning of those values at any moment so that they consciously take them into account in their present thinking and actions? Even these may seem to be "distant" realities at any time.

Accordingly, one of the preoccupations of a speaker is to make present, by verbal magic alone, what is actually absent but what he considers important to his argument or, by making them more present, to enhance the value of some of the elements of which one has been actually made conscious. (NR 117)

Perelman's focus on the "verbal magic" of rhetoric to make ideas, concepts, things, values become "present" in the minds of hearers, reveals that his emphasis is not primarily philosophical or psychological but technical. He does not want to explore the ontological nature of presence, nor does he want to dwell upon exactly what is happening cognitively to auditors when things become present to consciousness (NR 119). He can bring the psychologist Piaget's perspective into his
discussion, but only because it contributes to his rhetorical/technical purpose of relating the human senses to argumentative technique:

Presence acts directly on our sensibility. As Piaget shows, it is a psychological datum operative already at the level of perception: when two things are set side by side, say a fixed standard and things of variable dimensions with which it is compared, the thing on which the eye dwells, that which is best or most often seen, is, by that very circumstance, overestimated. The thing that is present to the consciousness assumes thus an importance that the theory and practice of argumentation must take into consideration. (Qtd. in NR 116-17)

Perelman makes clear in RR the implications of this Piagetian insight for argumentation. "The tie which is established between the presence to consciousness of certain elements and the importance we give them has allowed us to see in rhetoric alone the art of creating this presence thanks to the techniques of presentation" (36-37). Echoing Richard Weaver's phrase, Perelman calls rhetoric "an art of emphasis" (37).

It seems to me that the major value of Perelman as a critical thinking heuristic is that he goes beyond Aristotle's rationalistic focus to consider the phenomenological, evocative emotive power of language as an argumentative force. For example, Perelman considers at great length what have been traditionally called the "figures of style" not from a "stylistic" or "ornamental" viewpoint but from the viewpoint of how they work rhetorically. While there are literally hundreds of figures of speech, some work more powerfully than others so as to cultivate presence. Among these he includes hypotyposis, various forms of repetition such as anaphora, conduplicatio, adjectio, amplification, aggregation, synomymy (metabole), sermocinatio and dialogism, structure, analogy and metaphor (NR 158-179; Golden and Pilotta 10). Non-figurative techniques of presence include expanded forms of repetition: accumulating stories and accumulating concrete evocative detail, and illustration (NR 142-8; 350-62).

How then does one apply Perelman's theory as a critical thinking tool? Perelman's theory of presence suggests that any attempt at communicating thought to another person involves the
conscious rhetorical choice of certain data in the form of verbal techniques and strategies. If an argument, read or heard, seems convincing, and in fact does persuade, that is, cultivates "presence," the question from a critical standpoint is: what was it technically that the rhetor used to make her thinking effective? What strategies did he use to actualize the idea, object, concept, etc. so that they were real, consciously present, accepted by the reader/hearer?

**Repetitive Figures**

The "simplest figures for increasing the feeling of presence are those depending on repetition." The discourse of scientific reasoning has little use for repetition, generally, Perelman argues, but in rhetorical reasoning repetition, such as "anaphora," can be used to "act directly" upon the mind of the hearer. Perelman offers an example from Vico as an illustration.

Three times I flung my arms around his neck,

Three times the empty image fled away.

Such a figure can be employed to "accentuate the breaking up of a complex event into separate episodes" in order to create "the impression of presence" (NR 174-5). Perelman divides the "repetitive" figures into two categories. The first kind of repetitive figure, such as "anaphora," above, encourages presence through simple repetition. "The other, more complex, uses oratorical repetition. or "amplification." in order to bring about "the feeling of presence" (175).

"Amplification" may be promoted through varying figures, including "aggregation" and "synonymy" (also called "metabole"). In both cases an idea is amplified by repetition in different words. The following examples of "aggregation," from Vico:

Your eyes are made for impudence. your face for effrontery, your tongue for false swearing, your hands for plunder, your belly for gluttony . . . your feet for flight: so you are all malignity (qtd. in NR 176),

and "synonymy," from Corneille, "Go, run, fly and avenge us..." (qtd. in NR 176), illustrate how phrases and words may be rhetorically crafted to create presence. In the first case by enumerating the different parts of the body in terms of their evil purpose, the mind is engrossed by
the idea of malignity. In the illustration from Corneille, "synonymy"--"the repetition of a single idea by means of different words"--is used to "convey presence by using a form that suggests progressive correction" (NR 176). Corneille's progressive choice of words, in Perelman's view, goes beyond simple emphasis, to the point of enlivening the idea. "While the repetition of the same word simply expresses emphasis, 'metabole' reinforces this emphasis and accentuates one or another aspect of it" (RR 38).

Dramatic Figures

The "repetitive figures" can be used in striking fashion to advance the feeling of "presence." Yet other figures, which I shall call the "dramatic," may be artfully crafted to produce even more stunning rhetorical actuality. Through the figures of "hypotyposis," "present tense" and "imaginary direct speech" argumentation can create a "live stage" presence in the psyche of the hearer so that distant ideas and truths are vividly pictured or enacted by a hypostasis of language before the theatrical eye of the mind. If Jerome Bruner is correct, the constitution of each human being is attuned to such dramatic presentation:

There is within each person a cast of characters, his own cast of characters--an ascetic, and perhaps a glutton, a prig, a frightened child, a little man, even an onlooker, sometimes a Renaissance man. The great works of the theater are decompositions of such a cast, the rendering into external drama of the internal one, the conversion of the internal cast into "dramatis personae." (16)

The power of "hypotyposis" ("demonstratio") to convey a sense of live drama before the imaginative eye of the audience is noted in several Latin and Greek rhetorical works. The dramatic description of the murder of Gracchus--here in the Caplan translation of the Rhetorica ad Herennium--illustrates the kind of "presence" created by "hypotyposis":

Then the fickle mob, stricken with sudden fear, take to flight. But this fellow [Verres], frothing crime from his mouth, breathing forth cruelty from the depth of his lungs, swings his arm, and, while Gracchus wonders what it means, but still does not move from the place where he stood, strikes him on the temple. Gracchus does
The assassin, bespattered with the pitiable blood of the bravest of heroes, looks about him as if he had done a most admirable deed, gaily extends his murderous hand to his followers as they congratulate him. . . . (qtd. in NR 407-9)

Perelman cites the Rhetorica ad Herennium's definition of "hypotyposis" as a figure "which sets things out in such a way that the matter seems to unfold, and the thing to happen, under our eyes" (qtd. in NR 167). While Perelman's definition for "hypotyposis" follows the Rhetorica ad Herennium, defining it as a fully detailed depiction of unfolding events, Quintilian allows for a more limited perspective. In his view, "hypotyposis" may be used to refer to "any representation of facts which is made in such vivid language that they appeal to the eye rather than the ear" (397). Since this figure is "a way of describing things which makes them present to our mind," Perelman writes, "can one deny the importance of its role as a persuasive factor?" (167).

"Hypotyposis" is one of the figures which is often found "connected with the grammatical tenses" (NR 176). Among the available tenses, the "present tense" possesses the "property of conveying most readily what we have called the feeling of presence" (NR 160). The account of the murder of Gracchus, above, exemplifies how the present verb tense may work together with the figure of "hypotyposis" to produce vivid effect. Again, this characteristic of the present tense, Perelman points out, has been recognized by ancient and contemporary rhetoricians, from Longinus to the French novelist Mauriac, whose Genatrix switches dramatically to a use of the present tense, creating the perception that the action is going on, as if before our eyes:

After an inner debate, she left her bed, slipped her swollen feet into a pair of old shoes, and wearing a brown dressing gown, went out of the room, candle in hand. She goes down the staircase, follows a corridor, crosses the expanse of the hallway (qtd. in NR 160).

While "hypotyposis" combined with the "present tense" allows a rhetorician to vividly picture scenes with visual verisimilitude, the use of "imaginary direct speech" incorporates human beings into the presentation. Perelman mentions two forms of "imaginary direct speech." In
"sermocinatio" fictionalized words are ascribed to a single character. In "dialogism" people engage in conversation with each other. How does imaginary direct speech serve the argumentation process? Since imaginary direct speech may be employed to "reveal the intentions ascribed to a person, or what is thought to be the opinion of other people regarding those intentions," a host of creative possibilities present themselves to the rhetorician (NR 176). Recalling Richard Weaver's dictum that rhetoric is an "art of emphasis," the speaker may create dramatic monologues and dialogues, spoken or thought, which emphasize the speaker's ideas, making the audience feel their presence. By the dramatic illusion of people actually speaking, "imaginary direct speech" may help the speaker negotiate the space/time factor which often separates the psyche of the audience from the subject of the message.

Other Repetitive Techniques

Perelman in NR mentions other important repetitive strategies of "presence" which he does not group with the figures. Among these he includes "accumulating stories," "evoking details" and "illustrations." NR has little to say about the relationship of stories to "presence." The one general statement by Perelman about stories derives its value from a general discussion of presence immediately preceding. That discussion implies that stories are to be commended because they reflect the "slow style," a style which does not rapidly cover the argumentative reasons, but "spends time" "accentuating a point." This kind of speaking cultivates "presence" by expatiating at length, cultivating emotion and getting through to the hearts of the hearers. Repetition, Perelman writes, is the "simplest way of creating this presence and "[a]ccumulating stories . . . on a given subject" is one of those means of repetition, a way of insisting upon the importance of a subject (NR 144).

The technique of accumulating, of insisting, is often connected with another technique, that of evoking details. These two techniques are often so closely connected as to be indistinguishable. In treating a subject, its overall, synthetic description will be followed by analysis or enumeration of its details. (NR 145)
A rhetorician may evoke details in several ways. The evoking of details might entail giving a "detailed account of the successive stages of a phenomenon." It could include calling forth" all the conditions preceding an act or "all its consequences." Perelman does not make clear how this kind of repetition differs from the repetitive figure of "amplification." Both exhibit similar characteristics, although perhaps the figure of amplification displays an oratorical structure and unified purpose by which details are rhetorically linked together.

In order to describe the last technique of repetition considered in this section, "illustration," attention must be given to its connection with example. In Perelman's theory both are sub-categories of argument by "particular case." What complicates Perelman's discussion is his claim that the very same particular case may be for one audience segment an example, for another segment an "illustration" (NR 351). In yet other situations it may be difficult "to say what is the function of a particular case cited in the course of argumentation" (NR 357). Yet, of the two kinds of particular cases only "illustration" functions rhetorically to increase "presence."

The key to understanding the difference between an example and an "illustration" rests "in the status enjoyed by the rules they support. Whereas an example is designed to establish a rule, the role of illustration is to strengthen adherence to a known and accepted rule, by providing particular instances which clarify the general statement" and thus by doing so "increase its presence to the consciousness" (NR 357). An example "makes generalization possible," while "an illustration . . . provides support for an already established regularity" (350). If an audience does not believe that newspapers incorporate bias in their reporting, a number of examples can be provided to establish that "rule." If an audience believes that newspaper reporting slants the news, particular cases can function as illustrations which reinforce a rule to which they already adhere.

Perelman offers the following excerpt from Aristotle's Rhetoric as an illustration: ". . . one always likes to sight a stopping-place in front of one: it is only at the goal that men in a race faint and collapse; while they see the end of the course before them, they can keep on going" (qtd. in NR 360). In this particular case the general rule being supported is "one always likes to sight a stopping-place in front of one," and the illustration, reinforcing the rule, "while they see the end of
the course before them, they can keep on going." Perelman comments about this "illustration" that it exemplifies another feature of illustrations, that they are "undoubtedly often chosen for their affective impact" (360).

In Perelman's theory, an example must be "beyond question" and "enjoy the status of a fact, at least provisionally," because the audience does not accept the rule and needs powerful evidence in order to be persuaded. "If the example is rejected . . , adherence to the thesis that is being promoted will be considerably weakened" ([NR 353, 357]). However, in the case of illustration, the speaker does not face such demanding strictures since the rule is already accepted by the audience.

An illustration, evidently, may assume several forms, e.g., the form of a brief specific instance, as the excerpt from Aristotle above; it may take the form of a story (362). Perelman leaves open the possibility that a speaker may "manufacture" the illustration "to suit his cause," as long as it is one that "could very easily have occurred" (362). The main requirement is that "[illustration] . . . strike the imagination forcibly so as to win attention" (357). If an illustration is "designed to create presence," the wise strategist may want to insure that it is "developed with a wealth of concrete and vivid detail" (358).

From this discussion, perhaps, one can glimpse Perelman's rationale for listing illustration, but not example, as a technique for creating or increasing "presence." In order to create or increase "presence" the audience must first adhere to the rule under consideration. The rule or value may be suppressed, hidden away in one's psyche, forgotten perhaps, but in order for a particular case to create (recreate?) or increase "presence," the audience must in at least some minimal way adhere to the rule.

**Addenda to Techniques of Presence**

Perhaps the most maddening features of Perelman's theory of presence are the addenda. While NR spends much time discussing metaphor and analogy, about forty pages, and at one point calls analogy "an unstable means of argument" (393), no where in NR or RR does Perelman indicate that they work presence. Yet, Golden and Pilotta record a comment of Perelman at a 1982
forum at Ohio State University in which he suggests that both metaphor and analogy can be viewed as techniques of presence (10). It may be that in asking the "quale sit" question about Perelman—is the theory of presence good or bad?—we are left with an ambivalent answer. For the time being I shall overlook the bad elements and attempt to suggest how Perelman's theory of presence may be used as a tool for cultivating critical thinking.

Using Perelman's Theory of Presence as a Tool for Writing and Critical Thinking

In Richard Rorty's view, "It is pictures rather than propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical convictions" (12). When one considers the extent to which Perelman's theory of presence in argumentation is concerned with imagination, with concreteness, repetition, illustration, with evocative imagery, with dramatic devices such as hypotyposis, sermocinatio, dialogism, with analogy and metaphor, Rorty's words suggest that Perelman's presence could be profitably used to create and critique thinking. If Aristotle's enthymeme and Toulmin's Data/Warrant/Claim favor a rational critique and formulation of argument, Perelman's theory of presence offers a supplementary means for engaging in critical thinking which appeals strongly to the emotions, the affective domain, what Winterowd calls the "lyric component of argument" (153). Evocative imagery, concrete image, metaphor, hypotyposis, skillful repetition create aesthetic reality. As Casey suggests, following F. R. Leavis, "an emotion gains reality—a relationship to the world that is complex and rich—when through language an object is presented which justifies, limits and at the same time develops the emotion. For the emotion to be 'realised' is at the same time for it to present a real world... (9).

These observations suggest that Perelman's theory of presence could be taught to students both as a heuristic for writing and a critical tool for studying how argumentation is built along strongly emotional lines. Here one could consider the fine line between appropriate emotional appeal and those arguments which build themselves only by a kind of contrived "presence." When is an attempt to cultivate presence through such techniques uncritical? unethical? Foss, Foss and
Trapp suggest three professional groups whose use of presence could provide excellent material for studying both good and bad examples—lawyers, legislators, and ministers.

Through the use of argumentation, a lawyer can cause a jury to "live" a situation that occurred in the past, a legislator can assist an audience in imagining how much better the world would be if a bill were enacted, and a minister can bring audience members to distant places and times that existed before their birth or will exist after their death. (115-16).

This list could easily be expanded to include heads of state, sales personnel, city planners, etc., any group whose work involves them in issues of time and distance where an "issue" is out of immediate presence. One could easily shift the study of presence to other areas. Wayne Anderson has used Perelman's theory of presence to study argumentation in Coleridge, Carlyle and Emerson's writing. In "Parataxis in Arabic," Johnstone studies how Arabic writers use presence for persuasive purposes. Alan G. Gross applied presence to Sir Isaac Newton's Opticks (1704) arguing that Bacon used repetitive experiment to cultivate argumentative presence. Don Kraemer Jr. studied appeals to pathos in Shakespeare's Julius Caesar using Perelman's presence. Both suggest literary applications of Perelman's presence. Johannesen used presence to engage in rhetorical criticism of political speeches of Jenkin Lloyd Jones. In "Rhetoric and Rational Enterprises" LaRoche and Pearson studied "strength of impression" in organizational communication using presence. Celeste Michelle Condit by using presence to critique television "codings" shows how coding may disenfranchise certain groups:

... television "makes present" particular codings in the public space (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971). Once such codings gain legitimacy they can be employed in forming public law, policy, and behavior. Even if they are not universally accepted, their presence gives them presumption (the right to participate...). Crucially, the up-scale audience courted by television advertisers is also the group most likely to constitute the politically active public... Hence, television, or any mass medium, can do oppressive work solely by addressing the dominant audience... It is
because television "makes present in public" a vocabulary that prefers the dominant audience's interests that the dominant audience gets the most pleasure from television and that television actively promotes its interests. (112).

While I have quoted Condit at some length, her comments are suggestive of possibilities for critical thinking and writing using Perelman's theory of presence in the area of television, and particularly media advertising.

CONCLUSION

This paper began by surveying some of the polarities in our discipline between those who use insights drawn from classical rhetoric and those who avoid it. Quintilian's familiar "an sit?" "quid sit?" and "quale sit?" questions still seem adaptable to contemporary critical thinking and writing and capable of being used inside and outside of the classroom. Tin, orief, speculative exploration of Perelman's presence, while preliminary, seems to suggest that presence may be used both as a creative and critical tool for writing and thinking pedagogy. My recent reading of Ira Shor's work suggests, further, that even though Shor ignores the insights of classical rhetoric, both Quintilian's and Perelman's methods could be easily adapted to his Freirean and Deweyan model, both the ancient and new sparking fresh, critical pedagogy.
Notes

1 The author acknowledges with great appreciation the National Endowment for the Humanities for research funding and especially Lloyd Bitzer and members of his 1993 NEH "Summer Seminar for College Teachers" for conversation which helped generate this article.

2 Ira Shor was the keynote speaker at this 1993 Midwest Regional Conference On English in the Two Year College. Several oblique references to his work remain unexplored due to the scope of this project.

3 This discussion on status (or stasis) is indebted to Lloyd Bitzer, who over the years has developed a successful approach for teaching critical thinking to his classes using stasis theory.
Works Cited


