Introducing enduring innovations into a higher education organization requires commitment and support from colleagues. Organizational change involves three steps: (1) mobilization; (2) implementation; and (3) institutionalization. Without institutionalization, the innovation is likely to be terminated despite how well it may be communicated and implemented. The level of influence within the organization directly attributable to the innovation can be construed as being the extent of its institutionalization. Factors influencing longevity of innovations include the intensity of direction and support from organizational leaders, decision making and communication concerning the innovation's essential features, and incorporation of the dissident voice. Learning organizations, such as universities, can become innovative communities, where such innovation results in productive behavior, if organizational members have valid information upon which to base their actions and are thus more able to control what happens to them as community members. An organization's leaders and members must be flexible in developing innovations and setting levels at which these changes will achieve institutionalization. Contains 75 references and an index. (GLR)
INSTITUTING ENDURING INNOVATIONS

ACHIEVING CONTINUITY OF CHANGE IN HIGHER EDUCATION

BARBARA K. CURRY

REPORT SERIES: HE-ERIC HIGHER EDUCATION REPORTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

It is not unusual for members of an organization to find themselves puzzling over the designs of their innovations and the best approach to gathering support and commitment from among their colleagues for putting those innovations in place. Knowing what it takes to put an innovation in place and what it takes to garner the support that will ensure the innovation’s permanence is, in most instances, a benefit of hindsight. Hindsight is a broader view than the somewhat narrow and immediate views of an organization’s members in the midst of creation or innovation. Each party comes to the process of creation or innovation with a vision of his or her own and influences change accordingly. As a result, a process that often sounds simple is much more complex and requires high levels of skill and collaboration to be successful.

What Is Permanence in Organizational Change?

Organizational change is a process that has been described extensively over the years, often as a model outlining the stages of change. One less complex typology includes three stages: (1) mobilization, whereby the system is prepared for change; (2) implementation, whereby change is introduced into the system; and (3) institutionalization, whereby the system is stabilized in its changed state (Curry 1991). Studies of the way change occurs in organizations focus on each stage and attempt to find causes for outcomes that are often much less than the members of those communities had hoped for. In the studies, it is often difficult to determine where one phase stops and another begins, because mobilization, implementation, and institutionalization are interwoven throughout the life of an innovation.

If an innovation is not institutionalized, it is likely to be terminated. Those who attempt to distinguish one process from another should observe whether the innovation is sustained over time (Miles and Louis 1986). Accordingly, “models predict[ing] whether an innovation will be mastered and whether it will change the organization are very similar to those predicting the likelihood that it will be continued” (p. 36), which might occur because a basic, underlying set of processes exists common to both the mastery and the continuation of an innovation, or because good innovation is a necessary precursor to institutionalization.

Still another interpretation is possible: A successful innovation is one that has achieved its goals—whatever those goals
might be. As a project achieves success, it can serve as a catalyst for subsequent innovations, and members of an organization are able to create and put in place other kinds of innovations that further change their community. Often those changes are dramatic as a result of an accumulation of influences. Although the original project is no longer distinguishable, it continues to influence innovation in particular and life within the organization in general. That continued influence can be construed as a measure of the extent to which change has been institutionalized.

Although organizational change is discussed as a terminal event or as having a clearly distinguishable beginning and end, complex interrelated events represent continuity in the process. The culmination of change, in addition to characterization as institutionalization or termination, might also be characterized as points of emergence or points where new or different states in the life cycles of organizations emerge (Cameron and Whetten 1984). In most instances, however, the focus of an organization's members is on the endurance of the innovations they create rather than on the emergence of new or subsequent programs.

What Factors Influence the Development and Longevity of Innovations?

A number of factors integral to the process of change support institutionalization or the extent to which an innovation becomes enduring. Innovations cannot become lasting without a rather significant role from leaders. The direction and support of leaders are required for change to take place. And the term “leader” is not limited to the chief executive officer. The role and the function of leadership are different. The role is a formal designation vested in contractual arrangements; the function is an informal designation in which responsibilities or activities associated with leadership are shared among members of the organization. Consequently, “leader” might refer to a number of individuals participating in the change process.

Other factors influence change, including communication and decision making. These factors are interrelated, dynamic, and central to the prosocial nature of organizations in general and to the construction of change that finds support among the majority of the members of organizational communities in particular. Decision making and communication can facil
itate discovery of an innovation’s essential features. Change is a negotiated process, requiring that standards of reasonableness be met. To help meet those standards, the dissident voice must be heard; it must be part of communication networks and decision-making processes associated with the development and implementation of innovation. The dissident voice offers a test of the premises upon which innovations are based, challenging standards implicit in beliefs about the kind of change necessary to improve an organization.

The dissident voice, also the target of political activity during change, helps to create a balance between vision and the realities inside and outside the organization. The dissident voice is an important factor in the iterative and transactional processes that are the distinguishing features of the innovative organization. In an innovative organization, this voice is not stilled; rather, it is heard, serving to improve the innovative design. And this treatment of the dissident voice is characteristic of learning organizations.

How Can Learning Organizations Become Innovative Communities?

Much of the current thinking about organizational change and innovative organizations includes the concept of innovative organizations as learning organizations (Argyris 1982b; Beckhard and Pritchard 1992; Senge 1990). Accordingly, learning that takes place in organizations, if it is to be the kind that results in productive behavior, is based on providing members of the organization with valid information they can base their actions on and control what happens to them as members of the community. It allows members of the organization to govern their actions through “free and informed choice,” and to support “internal commitment to choice” and “bilateral protection of others” (Argyris 1982b, p. 103).

As a result, members of the organization experience each other as “minimally defensive” in interpersonal relationships and group dynamics, “learning-oriented norms” emerge, and “high freedom of choice, internal commitment, and risk taking” are evident (p. 102). And, to the extent that its leaders and members can commit themselves to its evolution, an organization is in a position to become flexible in developing innovations and setting levels at which it will achieve institutionalization. In a learning organization, discovery and construction or creativity take place simultaneously.
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## CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreword</td>
<td>xv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovation in Higher Education Organizations:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Familiar Story</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change and Its Institutionalization</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Change as Process</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization as Process</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Significance of Culture in Change and Institutionalization</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change and Institutionalization as Social Processes</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizations as Social Structures</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership, Change, and Institutionalization</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision Making as Part of the Social Nature of Organizational Change</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication and Organizational Beliefs about Change</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization as a Goal of Change</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Organizations</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approaches to Change at Amherst and Boston</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieving Desirable Outcomes</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative Organizations as Learning Organizations</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting Standards of Reasonableness</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change as a Negotiated Process</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Becoming a Learning Organization</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOREWORD

All higher education institutions need, at one time or another, to establish something different from the status quo. It might be a new course, a new grading practice, a new curriculum, or a new administrative procedure. It might be considered a routine matter or highly innovative; it might involve only a few members of the institution or affect the entire system. In any case, when something new is initiated or a change instituted, the initiators usually want to make that change permanent. Often, however, it does not happen. Should this lack concern the members of that education community? The answer is, "it depends."

For initiatives with a fixed purpose, it is appropriate that the initiative end once that purpose has been achieved. If, however, as part of the original mission an initiative was intended to become a permanent part of the organization, then concern with permanency should be a primary concern from the start. On the surface, it seems that any change that has a positive effect should automatically become permanent. But, as Creating Distinctiveness: Lessons from Uncommon Colleges and Universities (by Barbara K. Townsend, L. Jackson Newell, and Michael D. Wiese, Higher Education Report No. 6, 1992) clearly details, even highly innovative and respected change often is short-lived.

Therefore, understanding what contributes to making innovation and change an integral and lasting part of a process or organization can become central to its success. The first step in ensuring that change endures is to understand that, at first, like a body receiving a transplanted organ, the first spontaneous reaction of most individuals is to reject change. Change challenges the status quo; change creates discomfort as it causes individuals to do or accept something different. And it is during this initial resistance to change that leaders often make their first mistakes. The normal reaction to the discontent that almost always accompanies change is to minimize the conflict rather than analyze the reasonableness of the disharmony. A second reaction is to reject the discontent outright and believe that, given enough time, the change will take hold and flourish. Both reactions in the short run might be successful, but with a greater understanding of the process of change and making change permanent, more options become evident.

This report by Barbara K. Curry, assistant professor of education at the University of Delaware, reviews in depth the pro-
cess of making change enduring, or institutionalizing change, and examines the importance of understanding the influence of organizational culture on the process of change. Dr. Curry reviews various aspects influencing the process, such as an organization's social nature and beliefs, that leaders can anticipate and directly influence. Finally, the report concludes with strategies organizations can use to achieve their desired outcomes.

Deciding that change is necessary is the first step in improving a process or an organization. But it is by no means the final step. Understanding the process of change and what needs to be considered to institutionalize change, to make it an enduring part of the organization, is necessary if the desired outcomes of that change are ever to be achieved.

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INNOVATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION ORGANIZATIONS: A Familiar Story

Recently an administrator at a state university interrupted a colleague in the middle of packing a project to move it from the campus where it had been housed for more than 12 years. A student helping with the move approached the administrator, saying, "What do you do when you have a program that does what it is supposed to do: brings in large grants and provides valuable services to the community?" The student was describing what sounded like a successful program, the kind of innovation that organizations want to implement and often want to institutionalize. Before the administrator could venture an answer, however, he responded, "You move it off campus!" Her curiosity piqued, the administrator looked to her colleague, who confirmed the program's imminent separation from the university. She added that she also was surprised by the university's decision, in effect, to terminate the program. What she had hoped would be a valued, lasting part of the organization was being discontinued.

Like the colleague, managers who have invested a fair amount of time and energy in developing proposals and programs are often dismayed by an organization's responses to their innovations. They implement projects with every intention of achieving successful outcomes, but few, if any, of the results they had hoped for actually happen. Not only must they work through their own frustrations as innovators, but they also must face the disheartened community members who supported the project as well as those who did not support it and now see another failed attempt at change. Individuals and groups supporting the innovation wonder whether they have misplaced their trust, while those who did not support it find their skeptical and sometimes antagonistic approach toward attempts at change justified.

The need for innovative responses when crises occur is often necessary. When change arises from such circumstances, the conflict and disappointment resulting from a failed innovation can sometimes cause even more problems. Members of an organization in crisis more acutely feel the need for relief through a successful and long lasting effort to change the status quo.

Also troubling is the case when innovations implemented under what appears to be optimum conditions succeed in achieving their goals but are abruptly discontinued. Such terminations are puzzling and unsettling to individuals who

Instituting Enduring Innovations

They implement projects with every intention of achieving successful outcomes, but few, if any, of the results they had hoped for actually happen.
expect innovations to be continued when they appear to be doing well. Speculation about the reasons for termination tend to focus on power, politics, and administration rather than on the innovation's utility or pragmatism. In the absence of a reasonable explanation, members of an organization attempt to make sense out of what seems to them to be a nonsensical event. They might attach meanings that are not helpful to puzzling events, making faculty suspicious of managers who seem to act with their own interests in mind, treating other members' interests as unimportant or incidental. Such constructions of reality, treated as truths, could support a perceived schism between administration and faculty.

Even when innovations arise from the best of circumstances, it is helpful to know why they do not last. Innovations, whether or not achieving their goals, are not automatically institutionalized; organizations are not naturally prepared to accommodate and incorporate them. Change involves the inevitable struggle of the old and familiar versus the new and unknown.

In another instance, a moderately successful innovation might remain in organizational limbo, retaining its status as an add-on, not an integral part of the organization's structure. Success for such an innovation is defined in its meeting its goals and by its ability to last in the absence of becoming legitimate. Such innovations manage to survive in sometimes indifferent and often hostile climates. Under these circumstances, much of the energy that might otherwise be spent to achieve the program's goals is invested in forestalling termination. For survival, the program and its related activities are modified to be perceived as less intrusive to the organization. As a result of that modification, however, the organization might view the program as less effective in meeting its goals. A paradox is created: A program seeks acceptance from its organization to survive and, to be effective, modifies its approach to achieving its goals. When it modifies its approach, however, the organization no longer sees the program as an appropriate response to the very issues supporting its development.

It is important to keep in mind that organizations are complex social structures in which individuals and groups are engaged in dynamic interactions influenced by interrelated events. The story of OBEW (Opportunities in Business and Education for Women), the program that had been moved...
off campus, is far more complex than a simple move off campus.

OBEW was developed in 1978 with the support of a grant for counseling in the higher education community. At the time it opened its doors, it was the only program in the state for women returning to the work force, providing students with 120 hours of job training. In 1980, funding for the program changed to successive grants awarded under the Perkins Vocational Education Act. In 1984, IBM funded the development of its first child-care program through OBEW—a program that continues in 19 businesses and industries nationwide and provides information on similar services available regionally. OBEW had brought more than $2 million to the university since its inception, engaging graduate students in community psychology as interns and undergraduate students to teach the job readiness classes. Its two offices had served more than 200 women a year, and the number of women applying for participation in the project had been steadily increasing. Approximately 80 percent of the women who participated in the project entered the work force. The state university received the first national continuing education award given to an institution of higher education for OBEW. In 1989, the project director, a professor of sociology, was invited to Russia as part of a panel of scholars to study the state of professional women in that country. The U.S. Department of Education has distributed two of her publications nationally.

OBEW also succeeded in changing the kind of training women receive in preparation for returning to the work force. In 1980, it created a blue-collar guild that trained women for higher-paying jobs often held by men and helped to build a support network for women entering the job market and competing with men for those positions. The guild changed the impressions of policy makers in the state and in the Department of Education; DOE made counseling women and encouraging them to train for nontraditional jobs a requirement for programs similar to OBEW. OBEW also conducted research on the way women approach prospective employers, finding that women whose personal lives had been upset were likely to discuss their problems with the interviewer. As a result, those women were considered unattractive candidates and were not offered jobs.

Despite its record of impressive accomplishments, OBEW was moved off campus. An explanation for the move might
be found in the university’s changed mission, which is now significantly different from OBEW’s mission. When OBEW began in 1978, its mission and the university’s mission, which was closely tied to research and development in continuing education initiated and funded by various regional and national industries, seemed to supplement each other comfortably. For example, in one of its research projects, the university was responsible for developing a new way to process coal that would be used in the mining industry throughout the state. At that time, a place on campus was available for a project designed to offer remedial and vocational instruction. Recently, however, the university has restructured its continuing education program so that few, if any, distinctions exist between it and residential programs. The university’s academic programs continue to emphasize research in industry and continuing education, but continuing education has become synonymous with academic preparation. The new definition for academic study does not include vocational training as such.*

The university ranks among the top 10 academic institutions in the country in the amount of funds it receives for research and first among academic institutions in its own state’s system of higher education. The university’s restructuring to emphasize research and academic studies means that the two missions are no longer compatible. Thus, OBEW has been relocated to two regional vocational schools that are planning to expand and are adding services to the project’s menu.

After 12 years in residence at the university, OBEW had not been institutionalized, and separation was complete in a matter of days. This case ended on a positive note, but certain important issues influence the institutionalization of a program and its longevity within the structure of its parent organization. Those issues stem from the organization’s dynamic features; for example, although the project was well known regionally and nationally, it had few allies on campus.

University and college faculty define scholarly research and related activity within the parameters of their own organizations and others. Research and scholarship are promoted through collegiality, including support and interest from peers. Support from faculty—by aligning themselves with women’s studies, for example—might have increased the proj

*Director of OBEW 1991, personal communication.
ect’s chances for survival. And the faculty’s support for the project might have been persuasive evidence of the two missions’ compatibility.

The life of an innovation depends on other organizational features as well. To understand why some innovations fail and others succeed, or why some successful programs are discontinued while other, unsuccessful ones survive, it is helpful to look at the influences on the process of institutionalization.

The discussion in the remainder of this volume focuses on the way change takes shape in organizations and the way resulting innovations are institutionalized. It is organized into four sections that help to clarify change: (1) change as it takes place in organizations; (2) processes that influence the form and purpose of innovations as they are developed; (3) factors that facilitate or inhibit institutionalization; and (4) change as the necessarily social nature of an enterprise.

Specifically, the first section, “Change and Its Institutionalization,” reviews the theory of innovation and change, providing a context in which to consider organizational change. This part of the discussion focuses on foundational theories (see, e.g., Goodman and Associates 1982; Kanter 1983; Levine 1980) and reviews definitions of institutionalization and the ways in which culture and an organization’s design influence the process. It also covers criteria for determining whether and to what extent an innovation has been institutionalized.

The following section, “Change and Institutionalization as Social Processes,” looks at interpersonal and group dynamics in changing organizations, particularly higher education organizations. It also considers leadership as a formally defined role and as a function that is shared among members of innovative organizations. This section acknowledges the distinctive circumstances of individual organizations and poses two questions: What are the desirable outcomes of institutionalization? How might institutionalization fit the special circumstances facing some organizations? No pat answers fit all organizations, and each organization attempting change must answer these questions itself.

If “theories simplify” (Perrow 1986, p. 219), then the balance to be struck here is between theory and real life. The third section, “Institutionalization as a Goal of Change,” reaches for that balance in an exploration of the way two schools, the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and the University of Massachusetts at Boston, set about to become
multicultural, an enormous task that each is working to complete. Consequently, the examples offered here show real organizations experiencing real-world struggles as they innovate and work toward their goals. Other examples of innovative schools (the University of Wisconsin and the University of Michigan) help to put cultural restructuring in higher education organizations in context.

The final section, "Achieving Desirable Outcomes," synthesizes theory and practice, such as the experiences of the two University of Massachusetts campuses, and reconsiders the roles of members of organizations involved in change. It then suggests ways to accommodate change and ultimately to institutionalize it. Because organizations are distinctive, more detailed designs for addressing their needs should come from their members.

Organizations that want to be innovative must first become learning organizations (Argyris 1982b; Senge 1990). As such, organizations must engage in self-study or a kind of reflective practice where learning and innovation are nearly synonymous and where innovation and change form an iterative process.

Two closing notes must be added to this introduction. The first has to do with the nature of change and its institutionalization. To describe the process so it can be understood, a discussion of change and its institutionalization necessarily proceeds in an orderly fashion. Order imposed on the telling of a story, however, does not always mirror what actually took place. Many change agents, members of organizations undergoing change, and visionaries responsible for designing change have complained about the chaos that can result. In short, change in most cases is a messy, disorderly enterprise when it occurs in people-oriented organizations. Orderliness, ease, and comfort are gifts that sometimes come with the process.

The second point also has to do with institutionalization as a subject. It is not possible to discuss change without incorporating that discussion into a text about change in general. Organizational change and its institutionalization are inexorably linked. Change is difference; institutionalization is making that difference last. Whether or not an organization is successful in making the difference last has much to do with the way change proceeds.
The disillusionment that comes with the termination of an innovation that has taken large investments of time and energy is understandable, eliciting sympathy from supporters and nonsupporters alike. When projects fail to meet their goals and when they meet their goals but are short-lived, their fate should be of interest to members of their respective organizations as well as to theorists. This discussion thus begins with a review of the theory of innovation and change, providing the context for the consideration of organizational change and institutionalization. It begins with a look at the long-standing conceptualization of the change process and then moves to more recent attempts to explore the field. This consideration of the way organizations accommodate change offers definitions of institutionalization and looks at the ways in which culture and organizational design influence the process. It also includes criteria for determining whether, and to what extent, an innovation has been institutionalized.

Notwithstanding the differences between entrepreneurial and educational organizations, certain concepts can be applied across organizational types. As the body of work on the management of educational organizations grows and educational organizations view their needs as different from those of entrepreneurial organizations, however, some of the material borrowed from entrepreneurial organizations will likely be less helpful.

Organizational Change as Process
Organizational change comes about through a process that has been described and modeled extensively over the years. One model, for example, offers a two-part process with stages in each (Rogers 1983): The first part includes initiating change, setting an agenda, and matching the problem with the solution, while the second part, implementation, includes redefining or restructuring the innovation, clarifying expectations about change, and making the change routine. Although the stages in this model are sequential, innovative activity could return to an earlier developmental stage before progressing. Another model, based on a study of innovation and change at the State University of New York, is structured around a four-stage process: (1) recognizing the need for change; (2) planning and formulating solutions; (3) initiating and implementing the resulting plans; and (4) institutionalizing or terminating the results (Levine 1980, p. 266).
This discussion is based on a simpler typology, with only three stages: (1) mobilization, in which the system is prepared for change; (2) implementation, in which change is introduced in the system; and (3) institutionalization, in which the system is stabilized in its changed state (Curry 1991; Miles and Louis 1986). If an innovation is not institutionalized, either in its original form or in a modified form, it is terminated. Stage three implies the possibility of an innovation's termination.

It is often difficult to determine where one phase ends and another begins, because mobilization, implementation, and institutionalization are interwoven throughout the life of an innovation (Berman 1981). Those who attempt to distinguish one process from another should observe whether the innovation is sustained over time (Miles and Louis 1986), as "models predict[ing] whether an innovation will be mastered and whether it will change the organization are very similar to those predicting the likelihood that it will be continued" (p. 36). Further, this phenomenon could be because a basic, underlying set of processes is common to both the mastery and the continuation of an innovation, or because good innovation is a necessary precursor to institutionalization (p. 36). Still another interpretation of theory is possible: A successful innovation has achieved its goals—whatever those goals are. As a project succeeds, it could serve as a catalyst for subsequent innovations. Members of an organization are able to create and put in place other kinds of innovations that further change their community. Often those changes are dramatic as a result of an accumulation of influences. Although the original project can no longer be distinguished, it continues to influence innovative activity in particular and life within the organization in general. That continued influence can be construed as a measure of the extent to which change has been institutionalized.

**Institutionalization as Process**
The concept of institutionalization has only recently gained the attention of contemporary organizational theorists. Essential to understanding institutionalization is knowing more about the way it takes shape within organizations (Curry 1991). It is with this final phase of the change process that an innovation or program is fully integrated into an organization's structure. With this phase, an innovation receives its staying power.
When managers describe a project or innovation that has been put in place, they are stating the implicit beliefs held by members of the organization about the nature and the extent of change. Similarly, when they describe an innovation as having been institutionalized, they are providing another lens for viewing the way the organization’s structures and life have been changed by a program or a project. The influence of innovations on an organization can be far-reaching. Within an organization that has been changed, the word “institutionalization” implies something more than the acquisition of a set of behaviors, going beyond definitions in which institutionalization is simply the process of making the change routine, or routinization (Yin 1984). The word “routinization” works for organizations concerned solely with production, but it is not descriptive enough to draw a clear picture of what happens in service organizations like colleges and universities.

Some studies of the sociology of organizations focus much attention on the process of change and its influence on organizational structures and on the people who function within those structures (see, e.g., Kanter 1983). Kanter’s work provides comprehensive studies in the contemporary humanist approach to managing organizational change, contributing to an understanding of change as well as to an understanding of the role of the change agent. This perspective is particularly useful in the present context. Organizations must be careful to avoid extremes as they attempt to consolidate their identities and standing when compared with their competitors (Kanter 1983). As they design and implement innovations, they are in danger of embracing fads or panaceas that promise to cure organizational ills but make little real progress in doing so. An organization could move to the opposite extreme, seeking only what is familiar with little promise other than supporting old, comfortable ways of functioning. In either case, what was intended to be a productive course of action ends up as wasted effort. When an innovation or change is thoughtfully designed and implemented:

... [it must also be] reflected in multiple concrete [ways] throughout the organization. ... It is when the structures surrounding a change also change to support it that ... a change is “institutionalized”— that it is ... part of legitimate and ongoing practice, infused with value and supported by other aspects of the system. ... “Institutionaliza-
tion" requires other changes to support the central inno-
vation, and thus it must touch, must be integrated with other
aspects of the organization (Kanter 1983, p. 299).

Institutionalization has several key features. Changes or pro-
grams must actually be implemented so as to establish a
causal relationship, so that when an innovation is put in place,
it has results. Organizational structures are subject to change
once they come under the influence of the innovation, and
they are no longer the same as they were before the inno-
vation was introduced. Because of the authority that many
of the old structures hold within the organization, the inno-
vation and its subtle features, such as the values it embodies,
become legitimate (Kanter 1983). Valuation takes place as
part of the final phase of institutionalization (Curry 1991).
One might find evidence of institutionalization in organiza-
tional structures like mission, goal, and policy statements,
administrative or management hierarchies, and financial or
budget documents (Kanter 1983, pp. 180-299). For example,
a look at an organization’s management hierarchy could pro-
vide insight into the power vested in individuals charged with
implementing an innovation or organizational change.

Institutionalization has not taken place when the innovation
does not show results; thus, the innovation has no far-reaching
and lasting influence on the organization. It fits the typology
of an innovation that might be quickly conceived and imple-
mented but is isolated and eventually discontinued (Kanter
1983). Some members of the organization are likely to view
such innovations as reactionary responses to symptoms of
problems rather than as innovations that could significantly
change the organization. Historically, such innovations have
been described as "piecemeal."

If innovations are isolated in segments and not permitted
to touch other parts of the [organization], they are likely
to never take hold, they are bound to fade into disuse, or
they will produce a lower level of benefit than they poten-
tially could (Kanter 1983, p. 299).

Another definition of institutionalization is similar to Kan-
ter’s. “Institutionalization is the point at which an innovative
practice, having been implemented, loses its ‘special project’
status and becomes part of a routinized behavior of the insti-
tutional system” (Berman and McLaughlin 1974, p. 16). An earlier organizational theorist defines institutionalization as complete when members of an organization are required to complete a series of behaviors to produce a desired result (Littner 1965). This analysis of causal relationships does not include culture or less concrete systems of rewards and punishment and was influenced primarily by theories of scientific management that were popular during the early part of the 20th century.

Not only is the outcome of having implemented change desirable: Members of the organization must also embrace the norms and values associated with the innovation. Culture plays an important role in institutionalization; to determine whether institutionalization has taken place, “one must look at concrete practices that embody the values” of an organization’s community. An organization is inextricably linked to its culture:

Organizational culture is the body of solutions to problems that has worked consistently for a group and that is therefore taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think about, and feel in relation to those problems. Over time, organizational culture takes on meaning so deep that it defines assumptions, values, beliefs, norms, and even the perceptions of participants in the organization. Though culture tends to drop from the conscious thoughts of participants over time, it continues to powerfully create meaning for them in their work and becomes “the rules of the game” (Owens 1987, p. 197).

The Significance of Culture in Change And Institutionalization

Values and attitudes held by members of an organization are shaped by its culture (James, James, and Ashe 1990). “As the essence of a company’s philosophy for achieving success, values provide a sense of common direction for all employees and guidelines for their day-to-day behavior. . . . Organizations succeed because their employees can identify, embrace, and act on the values of the organization” (Deal and Kennedy 1982, p. 21). Unless an innovation becomes valued, it will lack a constituency capable of lobbying for its continuation.

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and ensuring that it becomes long lasting. Organizations are comprised of individuals who interact with each other and whose culture binds them together. An organization is constructed by the participants interacting within the confines of a social setting. Such social settings and organizational communities are “constructed environments” (Tierney 1987; see also Bates 1989; Beckhard and Pritchard 1992; Codd 1989; James, James, and Ashe 1990; Kouzes and Posner 1991; Maxcy 1991; Mirnis and Sales 1990; Pfeffer 1992; Rae lin 1986).

It is not unusual to find that the program an organization starts out to implement is different from the one that is institutionalized. Sometimes the differences are relatively minor, other times more dramatic. A study of the Meyerson Plan at the State University of New York provides an analysis of failed or failing attempts at significant change (Levine 1980). The Meyerson Plan was an enormous undertaking intended to change the nature of campus life and higher education. In 1966, Martin Meyerson, then president of SUNY, set out to create an outstanding and distinctive academic community. To do so, he brought to the SUNY campus some of the great scholars of the day to help establish a campus college system. Each academic discipline guided by scholars was to create a college built around curricula that drew upon the strengths of its faculty. In those colleges, students and faculty would come together as members of learning communities. While Meyerson was only partially successful in bringing his vision to fruition, his approach provides visionaries today with many insights into the change process and the development of innovative organizations.

Norms, values, and goals have an important role in an organization’s culture (Levine 1980). They are significant features of culture that influence institutionalization, and they result in innovations that are more or less desirable. Accordingly, institutionalization takes place in forms that reflect the degree to which a project fits into an organization’s life. Conflict resolution and boundary convergence, further, are functions of institutionalization, or the termination stage. Based on the four stages of change presented earlier, “two mechanisms for accomplishing these ends” (p. 14) are boundary expansion and boundary contraction. Boundary expansion takes place when the innovation is adopted in its entirety, although an innovation is rarely adopted to this extent.
Boundary expansion is the adoption of the innovation's traits by the host, or more simply an acceptance by the host of some or all of the innovation's differences. In boundary expansion, the convergence of organization innovation boundaries and conflict resolution takes place when the organization legitimizes some or all of the innovation's differences and agrees to live with or absorb those differences. Acceptance or absorption can involve establishing the innovation as an enclave or diffusing it throughout the organization (Levine 1980, p. 14).

Innovations are accepted in some modified form through negotiation with members of the organization.

Boundary contraction occurs in such a manner as to exclude innovation differences. The innovation, which is then outside organizational boundaries, is viewed as illegitimate and labeled "deviant." The deviant label serves to define and highlight the organization's boundaries by singling out previously not accepted norms, values, and goals as now clearly inappropriate for the organization. Having identified the presence of a deviant subpart, the organization has two available sanctions. The two sanctions of boundary contraction are resocialization or termination of the innovation (Levine 1980, p. 15).

The separate boundaries of innovations and organizations converge during institutionalization (p. 16). That convergence results in one of four forms: (1) diffusion, in which the innovation's characteristics are allowed to spread through the host organization; (2) enclaving, in which the innovation assumes an isolated position within the organization; (3) boundary contraction, in which the organization's boundaries constrict to exclude different innovations; and (4) resocialization, in which the innovative unit is made to renounce its past deviance and institute the acceptable norms, values, and goals it failed to incorporate previously. A fifth form, termination, would see the innovation eliminated (p. 15). The example of OBEW discussed earlier describes enclaving: That project existed for more than 12 years on the precarious edge of the campus community. As a result of that isolation, the program was easily separated from the campus, suggesting that, during
its earlier years on campus, enclaving was less desirable than diffusion but perhaps more desirable than failure resulting from another form of convergence, such as boundary contraction.

In universities and colleges, like business organizations, compatibility and profitability are factors in the institutionalization or termination of innovations. Compatibility is "the degree to which the norms, values, and goals of an innovation are congruent with those of the host" (Levine 1980, p. 17). OBEW's mission, however, diverged from that of the university (although the two entities might not have been compatible from the start of the relationship).

Defining profitability for nonprofit education organizations is difficult, as colleges and universities have approached the idea of consumerism with trepidation. Intellectual pursuits are treated as if they are or ought to be inherently rewarding. The word "profitability" in education organizations might be taken to imply that higher orders of intellectual achievement are driven by a profit motive and can be purchased rather than pursued by individuals driven by curiosity and the longing to learn for its own sake and provided by those similarly motivated. The idealistic picture, the pursuit of intellectual achievement as driven by the intellect, persists even though schools are sensitive to a job market that supports credentialing. Profitability takes two forms: self-interest profitability and general profitability (Levine 1980, p. 18), thus modifying the concept so that it becomes useful in considering management on campus. Self-interest profitability motivates units and individual staff within the organization to adopt an innovation, while general profitability motivates the organization to select "or maintain" an innovation (p. 19). The two kinds of profitability interact with Levine's element of compatibility. When elements are highly compatible, then participants complain little about the innovation; when they are compatible and profitable as well, then the organization will seek to maintain the innovation (p. 19).

Another definition of institutionalization focuses on adaptation to change and its continuance as measured by "the persistence" of behaviors associated with an innovation or program (Goodman and Associates 1982). This definition emphasizes the central role of individuals and groups in organizational structures (Baldridge and Deal 1983, p. 11). When behaviors associated with a program are no longer practiced,
the program has been discontinued. Accordingly, "the defining characteristics of an institutionalized act are performance by multiple actors, persistence, and its existence as a social fact" (Goodman and Associates 1982, p. 229).

The process of institutionalization is temporal and incremental, meaning that institutionalization involves levels that can be achieved over time (Goodman and Associates 1982). The degrees or "variations" in institutionalization are represented as five facets:

1. Knowledge of the behavior, the extent to which an individual knows about and is able to perform a particular behavior.
2. Performance of the behavior, an attempt to provide a measurable indication of the extent to which participants in the social system perform each behavior.
3. Preferences for the behavior, a reference to whether the participants like (or dislike) performing the behavior.
4. Normative consensus, the extent to which the organization's participants are aware of others performing the requisite behaviors and agree about the appropriateness of the behavior.
5. Values, the social consensus about value relevant to specific behaviors. Values are concepts of the desirable, statements about how one ought or ought not behave (Goodman and Associates 1982, pp. 230-33).

Another author suggests that organizations can achieve three levels of institutionalization:

1. The structural level, in which an innovation is represented in multiple, concrete ways throughout the organization (comparable to numbers 1 and 2 in the preceding list);
2. The procedural level, in which policy and behaviors associated with the innovation have become standard operating procedures (similar to number 3 above); and
3. Incorporation, in which the host organization accepts the values and norms associated with the innovation and incorporates them into its culture (similar to numbers 4 and 5 above (Curry 1991).

It would be misleading to suggest that any one of these theories more accurately reflects institutionalization than
another. Rather, each adds to an understanding of what takes place when innovations are institutionalized. In the case of OBEW, for example, it is possible to conclude that enclaving prevented it from being integrated into the organization or from being diffused throughout the host organization.

Under ideal circumstances, OBEW would have been implemented with the support of faculty and management at the university, which would have prepared the host organization for institutionalization. Members of the organization would have knowledge of the project's mission and goals and to some extent monitor them for greater compatibility. Depending upon their interests and affiliation, faculty would have some input into the project's focus on service and research. The project might have been aligned with an academic department so that its research and subject matter could be incorporated into the curriculum. Eventually, the project might have been expanded or restructured or incorporated into an existing program on campus. With that kind of change, OBEW would have been able to continue its work to effect policy regarding women, education, and employment within the state and nation. It would be difficult to implement OBEW under ideal circumstances, but the circumstances in which programs are implemented and eventually institutionalized are seldom ideal. On the contrary, most organizations, which are oriented toward people, are dynamic social systems whose outcomes are often unpredictable.

The definitions and models offered by theorists are more useful when they are placed in a context that includes a variety of factors influencing organizational change: organizational leadership, communication, and decision making, among others. The factors influencing the way change takes place and innovations are institutionalized are the subject of the following section.

Summary

"Institutionalization" implies more than simply making a change routine; rather, it indicates that change that is institutionalized takes place to varying degrees, depending upon circumstances within an organization. Organizations respond to change by expanding or contracting their boundaries. Boundary expansion can take one of two forms (change can become an enclave or be diffused), while boundary contraction involves two types of sanctions (resocialization or ter-
mination). As a response to pressures within organizations, resourceful projects also change to increase their chances for survival. In universities and colleges, like business organizations, compatibility (the degree to which an innovation's norms, values, and goals agree with those of the host) and profitability (self-interest profitability and general profitability) influence whether innovations are institutionalized or terminated.

Institutionalization is achieved to varying degrees over time and involves several levels of implementation, generally categorized as structural, procedural, and cultural.
CHANGE AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION AS SOCIAL PROCESSES

The following discussion focuses on interpersonal and group dynamics within changing organizations, in particular as they relate to higher education organizations. It also focuses on leadership as a role that is formally defined and on leadership as a function that is shared among members of innovative organizations. The discussion acknowledges the distinct circumstances of individual organizations and considers two questions: What are the desirable outcomes of institutionalization? How might institutionalization fit the special circumstances facing some organizations?

No patent answers to these questions fit all organizations. Rather, each organization attempting change constructs the answers to these questions. Consequently, the levels of institutionalization become conceptual approaches to assessing the extent to which change takes place in an organization.

Organizations as Social Structures
Organizations are social structures reflecting the characteristics of people who make up their membership. Thus, change or attempts to change could be perceived as subtle and unthreatening, mildly to extremely disruptive, or intrusive and threatening. More to the point, an organization's members might differ in their perceptions of change. The organization's response to change is governed by individuals who shape or define its social context. That context represents complex social arrangements that are worth exploring, as they often serve as catalysts or support for change and are crucial to its institutionalization.

Organizational structures and processes can be grouped in several ways to facilitate discussion of factors influencing institutionalization. For example, certain “key processes” are important to an organization's functioning (Kotter 1976): gathering information, communicating, making decisions, transporting matter/energy, and converting matter/energy (p. 11). (These labels change according to the kinds of activities in which an organization is engaged. In educational organizations, for example, those relevant processes might include communication, decision making, leadership, teaching and curriculum management, delivery and management of student services, personnel management, and facilities management.)

These processes can be aligned with organizational structures, such as formal organizational arrangements and oper-
ating systems, organizational culture, dominant coalitions and other personnel structures, organizational goals and strategies, and external environments, to assess their influence on innovation and change (Kotter 1978). For example, an interaction occurs between decision making and an organization’s formal arrangements, between decision making and dominant coalitions, and so forth.

Leadership, Change, and Institutionalization
To say that change in organizations requires leadership is to state the obvious. It is not possible to discuss the way innovations are institutionalized without including the rather significant role that leadership plays in change in general. It is not possible for change to take place without the direction and support of a leader. “Leader” is not limited to a chief executive officer; it refers to individuals responsible for managing the innovation and for guiding the support of interest groups, as well as to individual members of the organization. “Leaders... are those persons or groups who can mobilize human, material, and symbolic resources toward specific ends. ... Mobilizing resources in any social system depends upon the ability of leaders to direct the behavior of others” (Rosen 1984, p. 42). Further, that ability depends on the power invested in or assumed to follow the position, and it depends on the ability to influence or persuade members of the organization that the innovation has merit.

The responsibilities of leaders involve four competencies:

1. The management of attention through a set of intentions or a vision, not in a mystical or religious sense but in the sense of outcome, [ends], or direction.
2. The management of meaning. To make dreams apparent to others and to align people with them, leaders must communicate their vision.
3. The management of trust. Trust is essential to all organizations. The main determinant of trust is reliability or constancy.
4. The management of self, (that is,) knowing one’s skills and deploying them effectively (Bennis 1989, pp. 20-21).

This description of the significant strengths of leaders includes management, although some distinction remains between those who manage and those who lead in organizations.
Leadership . . . is generally not the same as what [is called] "management," although the two are certainly not incompatible (indeed, more and more these days, both are needed in managerial jobs). At its core, management is the process of planning, budgeting, organizing, and controlling some activity through the use of (more or less) scientific techniques and formal authority (Kotter 1988, p. 26).

This distinction is helpful, but whether managing in fact involves the use of scientific techniques is still being debated. It is generally accepted that leaders also manage and managers are at times leaders. If the distinction between leadership and management is often blurry in organizations, it is probably more so in the academy. The roles and status of leaders and managers often are not clearly defined (Brubacher 1982), but individuals appointed or assuming such roles must manage a complex set of lateral relationships (Kotter 1988). Those relationships are important: "Effective leadership in a job that includes a complicated set of lateral relationships requires, first, a keen sense of where those relationships are" (p. 60).

Colleges and universities are professional organizations, "where [individuals] can act as if [they] are self-employed yet regularly receive a paycheck. [They are seemingly] upside-down organization[s], where the workers sometimes appear to manage their bosses" (Mintzberg 1989, p. 173). In professional organizations, leaders might not directly control professionals. Rather, they negotiate to "settle disturbances in the structures." Mobilizing resources in such organizations takes place within a network of complex relationships referred to as "collegiality." Bringing about change and institutionalizing innovations require leaders to be political or to be able to discern the interests individuals and groups have in supporting or resisting change. To a large extent, the governance structures of four-year colleges and universities influence those interests. Typically, such organizations have three areas of governance—administration and finance, student services, and academic services—each of which enjoys varying amounts of autonomy. As a result, each is likely to be influenced differently by an innovation. Individuals or groups within each are also likely to respond with varying degrees of support for or resistance...
to change. Academic services, for example, has a provost, vice chancellor for academic affairs, or academic dean who coordinates activities. Faculty in most cases are expected to play a significant role in designing and managing the curriculum as well as in hiring and making decisions about promotion and tenure. Thus, it is reasonable for faculty to expect to be included in any assessment of needs or innovation.

Members of the academy do not expect change to come as dicta from inaccessible individuals. When members of an organization enjoy a fair amount of autonomy, such as that enjoyed by faculty, decisions related to implementing and institutionalizing innovations cannot be made unilaterally and be expected to go uncontested. Competition and politics, manifested in the academy as issues of alliances, identities, control, and power, function in ways similar to those in corporations.

As recent as the beginning of this century, members of educational organizations were likely to describe themselves and their organizations as apolitical. It does not follow, however, that an organization designed to create good citizens through education could have been or can be apolitical in a nation where to be political is a birthright. Nor does it follow that the membership of such organizations would be apolitical, espousing a neutral role in the affairs of its external communities: “The idea that there is a ‘university party’ is inconsistent with the pluralism of higher learning, with the possible exception of opposing the suppression of academic freedom” (Brubacher 1982, p. 59, citing Johnson 1968). Given the extent of campuses’ involvement in their external communities, few would argue that the political diversity found off campus is not reflected on campus. While a university political party does not exist, university political parties do. Moreover, “in the last hundred years colleges and universities have become integral parts of the society they serve” (Brubacher 1982, p. 19). Developing and institutionalizing innovations within the academy has not just recently become bound up in the body politic.

Whether they are developing innovations within less complex organization or working within a system of lateral relationships, whether they are addressing the political agendas of both external and internal communities or unencumbered by such considerations, skillful leaders know their limitations and do not work in isolation. Skillful leaders involve other
members of their organization in designing, implementing, and institutionalizing change.

Change of the magnitude attempted by the schools considered later in this discussion must meet standards of reasonableness set by members of the organization. Determining whether those standards have been met is a continuous task that is in part accomplished through decision-making processes.

**Decision Making as Part of the Social Nature of Organizational Change**

Although it is possible to gain compliance or participation in the change process within professional organizations, it is not possible to legislate commitment and the support needed to institutionalize an innovation. Individuals or groups who perceive themselves or their membership as autonomous are not likely to view coercive power or the power to legislate change and compliance as friendly (Kotter 1988; Kouzes and Posner 1991; Pfeffer 1992; Yukl 1989). Important distinctions exist in the decision-making process, however, between two-year vocational and technical postsecondary organizations, where faculty enjoy less autonomy in curriculum management, and four-year colleges and universities, where faculty have considerable autonomy. The genuine desire to be part of the process and to consolidate changes comes when individuals agree that change is necessary, beneficial, or, at the very least, not harmful to the organization or to what they perceive as their domain and interest.

Accordingly, an accurate reading of organization members' willingness to embrace new issues and to support change is often the hinge that allows change to swing in the direction favored by its initiators (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992). Organizational leaders play an important role in preparing the organization for change and for its institutionalization by creating a climate in which change can take place or by influencing the perceptions and attitudes of the organization's members (Peterson and Spencer 1990). When an organization's leaders develop that climate, they in effect are beginning the process of change.

Leaders help to define and shape issues giving rise to innovations, identifying the organization as an environment where innovation and change can take place, facilitating discussion among the organization's members, and promoting fuller par-
ticipation in innovative activities. They bring participating members into the decision-making process. Leaders draw a distinction between their formal role, defined in the organization’s documents, and the function of leadership, allowing others from within the organization’s ranks to help lead the effort toward change. The distinction also allows participants to emerge from their areas of competence. Leaders help to build communitywide coalitions in support of change and monitor many of the key processes. Funding and other incentives for participation in the process of change are also important considerations.

Leaders are sponsors of change (Goodman and Dean 1982, pp. 262-64), working toward the synergy that develops when the power of such leadership is shared, that is, the power to propel the community forward to bring about change (Bass 1985; Gardner 1990; Green 1988; Kanter 1989; Koestenbaum 1991; Rizni 1989). Rather than viewing power as a fixed sum, leaders must view power as “an expandable pie” (Kouzes and Posner 1991, p. 162). Under Meyerson’s sponsorship, for example, his plan might have been announced with the invitation to all who were interested in participating to “come help design and implement a college structure at SUNY.” And Meyerson would have assumed responsibility for marshaling all resources necessary to bring the task to fruition.

The role of leadership in the process of change and ultimately in institutionalizing innovations has been well documented by numerous theorists, who describe facilitative aspects of the work of leaders, such as gathering information, communicating with other members of the organization, developing new coalitions, and identifying existing coalitions that perceive their members as stakeholders in the process (see, e.g., Kanter 1983; Kotter 1988; Levine 1980; Mintzberg 1983; Rogers 1983; Schein 1985). The debate continues, however, about the direction from which change is initiated and proceeds—whether from the bottom up or the top down—and leads to institutionalization. Two factors distinguish one from the other: communication and decision making.

Top-down change tends to be initiated and directed by an organization’s executive management. Communication is typically one way, with little, if any, input solicited from individuals or groups charged with implementing change or effecting institutionalization. When the innovation is in trouble, a great deal of scrambling occurs to involve the implementors in
diagnosing problems. Ironically, the cause of those problems is typically the one-directional communication and the non-participation of groups expected to serve as implementors during the early stages of the process. Disputes that often arise from one-directional efforts to change make institutionalization more difficult—and impossible at times. Although leaders must be visionary in initiating change, communications and decision making in professional organizations must be two directional or the culture emerging from the change will not be shared (James, James, and Ashe 1990). Through these processes, the vision is imparted, modified, and ultimately shared. Therefore, valuation begins in the establishment of intended or desired outcomes (James, James, and Ashe 1990). Faculty must share a high degree of input: moreover, the faculty’s input or participation should blur distinctions that can be labeled as top down or bottom up, emphasizing the need to mesh or blend the roles assumed by faculty, management, and leadership when they collaborate in the process of change. Their mutual goals then include diagnosing or determining the need for change through open discussion, designing a solution and the way it will be implemented, and determining the level that change will achieve and the form it will take as it is institutionalized (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992). “Participation is an attribute of a relationship between persons and decisions and can vary in amount and degree” (Vroom and Jago 1988, p. 30) —a statement about the extent to which an organization’s leadership involves its members in making decisions. The measure of organization members’ commitment to change is related directly to the extent of their participation in decisions governing the process.

Some individuals and groups who are members of the organization perceive their interests in innovative activities as distinguishable from those of other individuals or groups. Such differences in perception are not unusual. Some of those individuals and groups, however, are in positions to bring considerable influence to bear on the process of change and on the extent to which innovations are institutionalized. People inside or outside the organization can be put into several groups: coalitions that support the innovation in its proposed form, coalitions that support the innovation in a modified form, coalitions that do not support innovation and change, and potential coalitions. An innovation must receive the support of enough people within the organization (a "critical
mass” to be institutionalized (Goodman and Dean 1982). That group of people who support the innovation and its valuation in effect create a presence on the campus that heightens awareness or sensitivity to some feature or part of the innovation, putting a value on the innovation or its related activity (James, James, and Ashe 1990).

Communication and Organizational Beliefs about Change

Yet another consideration is important not only in determining whether an innovation is institutionalized, but also in most every aspect of change. All of the work that goes into moving an innovation from one point to the next must be applied in situations that vary, in part, as a result of the interaction of individuals who bring their own agendas to the process for consideration. What makes a potentially tumultuous gathering of people work as a purposeful, cohesive group? Certainly a meeting of the minds—or an agreement even tenuously arrived at—might serve to move the immovable force from point A to point B.

Leaders and managers who have successfully guided organizations through the process of change have been able to piece together many of the parts of their organization’s beliefs about change (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992). Those beliefs, taken together, serve as a magnet that pulls even the most divergent view into a building block capable of supporting change, with the potential for institutionalization. Discerning those beliefs is difficult because of their many sources—for example, faculty, administrators, staff, governing boards, and associations. The task can be likened to the parable of the blind men attempting to describe an elephant. Part of that elephant is what becomes the shared organizational vision for change and the strategies for progressing toward organizational goals (Mirmis and Sales 1990). Individuals managing the process of change use those beliefs as a guide to the extent to which change is possible and institutionalized.

Discerning beliefs influencing the process of change is not simply a matter of reconciling differences about the form of innovation. Rather, it includes constructing an organization’s history, discerning current perceptions of organizational structure and function, and understanding the many visions of organizational structure and function among its members (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992; James, James, and Ashe 1990;
Mirnis and Sales 1990). Each applies to both individuals and groups, and each contributes part of a body of beliefs as it relates to the roles of individuals and members. For example, the contributions of general managers are likely to relate to their role as well as to individuals or groups under their supervision. Similarly, contributions from faculty relate to the curriculum and to their role as designers and managers of the curriculum. Those contributions include, either explicitly or implicitly, indications as to the extent to which an innovation should be institutionalized (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992; James, James, and Ashe 1990; Mirnis and Sales 1990). Institutionalization of the innovation might not be a goal; rather, it might be the intention of designers and managers of a project to bring about institutionalization of associated norms and values.

For example, SUNY President Meyerson expected to put his plan for colleges in place. During his attempt to implement the plan, however, he encountered difficulty in several areas, each of which indicated to some extent beliefs about change on campus. Meyerson envisioned a grand plan for change that included bringing great minds together as participants in collaboration. He had hoped to create a new campus based on his beliefs, which were likely to include:

1. The campus community wanted change and was ready for it to happen.
2. Key community members could be persuaded to change.
3. Resources to support change would be available.
4. The community needed a visionary leader who would design a plan for change or support the development of a design for new schools.
5. The best minds that could be applied to the task should be brought to the campus.
6. The process of change would be self-sustaining.
7. Such change was timely.

It is likely that others held beliefs that might have been equally influential in the formulation of the innovation as well as in the formulation of strategies for its implementation. Some faculty did support the idea of change (Levine 1980); in fact, several factions believed dramatic change was necessary to create a progressive campus, some factions believed modest change was enough, and some factions did not want

Instituting Enduring Innovations
change but believed minor change would not be harmful to
the structure and function of the campus. Leaders, managers,
and interest groups often—at times mistakenly—assume that
the most clearly articulated beliefs represent the entire com-
community. Unfortunately, it is often the case that other beliefs,
which might be beneficial to the organization, are not heard
until change meets resistance.

It is possible, for example, to construct a scenario about
the influence of a dissident group under Meyerson’s plan. As
part of that scenario, Meyerson would proceed with his plan,
assuming that, for the most part, he had the support of faculty.
That assumption would not be entirely grounded in the reality
of his organization, however, as a group of faculty on campus
believed that money, contrary to Meyerson’s approach, should
have been taken into consideration. Rather than designing
a new college structure, the group advocated improving and
bolstering the old structure. Further, the group convinced fac-
culty, management, and state government representatives to
support its position. While budget cuts and other kinds of
problems with funding caused Meyerson’s plan to fail (Levine
1980), one might still wonder whether the dissident group
had a sound basis for its beliefs and whether it might have
been persuaded to support some part of Meyerson’s plan
before its activity escalated to lobbying against the project.

Interest groups, managers, and leaders of change are likely
to describe the elephant differently. Different members of
the organization describe another part of the elephant—the
extent to which change is possible and the levels of institu-
tionalization it can expect to achieve (Mimis and Sales 1990).
Those beliefs help agents of change to identify conflicting
or competing goals and to measure the organization’s flex-
ibility in reconciling differences. They also describe partic-
ipants, their role in changing the organization, and the details
that apply to other processes, such as decision making. Beliefs
about the nature and extent of change appropriate for an or-
ganization are among the most influential factors in change,
for they impede or allow agents of change to move toward
institutionalization.

**Summary**

Thus far, the discussion has focused on ways organizations
initiate and eventually move through the process of change.
A number of factors influence an organization’s ability to
achieve its goals, among them interpersonal and group processes like building a coalition, communicating, making decisions, and assuming the role of leader. Other equally important considerations affect change: beliefs about the desirability and appropriateness of change and beliefs about an organization’s ability to change. Those beliefs, held by members of the organization, represent parameters within which change can occur.
INSTITUTIONALIZATION AS A GOAL OF CHANGE

Innovative individuals have an intuitive ability to bring about change. Intuition in this case is sensitivity to signals that say "stop," "go," or "proceed with caution." With such sensitivity, it is possible to anticipate support from inside and outside the organization. Innovativeness and sensitivity are not enough to ensure institutionalization, however. Innovators must be able to see a range of possibilities within the process of change as well as a beginning and an end that is desirable to other members of the organization. Innovators must be both leaders and followers. Innovators who declare that they are "ideas people" must be aware that the declaration is no more than an opportunity to gain distance from the often enormous tasks of implementation and institutionalization.

The need for change is often obvious to visionaries, but a clearly articulated set of goals and a menu of innovations for achieving those goals do not exist at the same time in most organizations. Moreover, even change that is in keeping with an organization's goals often unfolds gradually, in an environment that works to minimize disruptions to its daily functioning. A considerable amount of energy goes into maintaining an organization's community in a steady state. Change most often moves slowly, with caution and tradition driving the process, and practitioners have often complained about the slow pace of change and about innovations that do not take hold.

The plodding pace of change in the academy has been compared to change in business organizations, where it seems to take place dramatically and overnight. The focus in such comparisons seems to be on whether the organization is innovative rather than on causal factors. When factors both internal (the three areas of management where change must be approved and coordinated) and external (private, state, and regional boards or associations, each with its own agenda) to the management of the academy are taken into consideration, then plodding becomes a moderate pace. Education organizations inevitably turn to business for models of change, even though they have in their own rich history as service industries examples of innovative organizations.

Business is only now beginning to explore progressive practices, such as participatory management, which have been the rule rather than the exception in the management of colleges and universities. Moreover, such management practices...
support the development of individuals and groups who are essential to change and institutionalization.

Visionaries are key to changing the organization, but they are not only presidents, chancellors, or deans. Faculty and staff are also visionaries and leaders of the process of change. This part of the discussion focuses on innovative organizations where visionaries reside. Innovative organizations have what might be called “home-grown” visionaries, leaders, and managers of change and institutionalization. Such individuals have been cultivated and nurtured through the organization’s experiences with success—as well as failure—in change. They are individuals who have been encouraged to become the reflective practitioners that they are. Thus, such innovative communities are also learning organizations where self-study, reflection, and creative activity are valued (Argyris 1982b).

The University of Massachusetts at Amherst and the University of Massachusetts at Boston provide examples of innovative educational organizations that incorporate much of what has been presented thus far on change and institutionalization. Each campus has been attempting to restructure its culture to become multicultural, an example of “fundamental change in organizations” (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992). Changing the culture of an organization is an undertaking that requires extensive commitments of energy, time, and resources. The examples offered here are intended to show real organizations experiencing real struggles as they become innovative and work to achieve their goals. The other innovative schools mentioned, the University of Wisconsin and the University of Michigan, help to place cultural restructuring in context as higher education organizations seek to become innovative.

Innovative Organizations

Changing and making that change stick are difficult at best. Innovative organizations have visionaries who can see a range of possibilities for change and the beginning and end points desirable to other members of the organization. How does the process of change unfold in innovative organizations? More specifically, how does an innovative organization bring about change in ways so basic as to influence its culture, wherein resides the basis upon which its members construct their identities as part of that community? Cultural restructuring, both as an approach and as an expected outcome,
is one such attempt at change. The University of Michigan and the University of Wisconsin are nationally known innovative higher education organizations engaged in cultural restructuring.

The University of Michigan, for example, has in place the Michigan Mandate, and the University of Wisconsin has its Madison Plan. These projects influence the elements that help in the construction of culture in the academy, such as its mission, its structure of governance, its leadership and administration, and its curriculum (Austin 1990; see also Deal and Kennedy 1982 and Kanter 1983). While theorists' definitions of culture acknowledge that they influence the process of change, they do not address directly its symbolic nature.

Innovators' beliefs are represented in their organization's cultural artifacts, including its physical and social environments (Schein 1985). Later in the life of the innovation, those artifacts represent higher levels of consciousness regarding the value of individuals who are part of a multicultural campus (Schein 1985). The basic assumptions upon which change is based are to become part of an organizational preconsciousness. With the development of that state, construction of the new culture is complete (Schein 1985). Cultural restructuring is not intended to represent total destruction of the old culture; rather, the old culture becomes new in that it is infused with new values and norms. Organizational memory or history crystallizes around critical incidents (Schein 1985). Saying that “this will be remembered as an important event” labels what has taken place a critical incident. Whether it is planned or occurs spontaneously, the result is the same: The event creates or causes an environment in which change can take place. An environment amenable to change is said to result from one or several critical incidents (Schein 1985), and the role of the change agent is to influence responses to those events.

During his inaugural address, President Duderstadt (1988) described his vision of Michigan as one of the distinguished academies in the country, noting the need for change and the organization's future course. Accordingly, the necessary action was based on “three themes of the 21st century”: (1) the changing nature of the country's population, (2) the country's “growing dependence on the global community,” and (3) the country's shift from “a resource-intensive to a knowledge-intensive society” (p. 5). The president's plan for
change embraced diversity and pluralism, and he described shifts in the composition of college communities, including more older people in the population and fewer college-bound young adults. Duderstadt shared his vision with the campus, as well as what he believed to be a beneficial course of action.

The president's plan for change included educating a diverse population and attracting a supportive, diverse faculty to the campus. His vision for change became the Michigan Mandate, developed as a strategic process driven by the university's mission and goals. The mandate was to be comprehensive and long term, a strategic process that invited communitywide participation. The list of participants included regents, legislators, students, faculty, university officers, and staff. This enormous undertaking would continue to develop, evolving from the input of all who expressed an interest in bringing it to fruition. The president described the approach as "bottom-up initiatives... coupled with top-down incentives."

At the same time the Michigan Mandate was being framed, a plan intended for a similar purpose was approaching its third year at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. The objectives of the Madison Plan included increasing the number of women and minorities on the faculty and increasing diversity in the student population. The plan invited participation from residents of the city of Madison and other parts of Dane County as well as from the university. Together, the participants worked to create a campus environment " conducive to diversity and equal access to educational excellence" (University of Wisconsin 1991, p. 1).

The task each of these innovative schools had undertaken was a difficult one, attempting to change the very hearts of their organizations. The task involved "the major features of culture," emphasizing an organization's deeply embedded and enduring character, from which its members derive meaning (Peterson and Spencer 1990, p. 6). While culture is changed through "cataclysmic events" or through slower, sustained efforts (Peterson and Spencer 1990), leaders can be proactive and orchestrate fundamental change that produces desirable outcomes (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992). It was clearly the intent of Michigan and Wisconsin to change their organizations dramatically.

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*Official from Office of Affirmative Action 1991, personal communication*
The University of Massachusetts at Amherst and at Boston provide two more detailed examples of innovative organizations. The Amherst campus was founded in 1863 and is considered the state’s flagship school. The Boston campus was founded in 1964 in response to the needs of a growing college-bound urban population. Each campus acted independently to develop plans that would restructure the culture of its respective organization. Plans for changing the schools included increasing the number of women and other people from historically underrepresented groups on campus and creating a climate on campus where differences are accepted. Although restructuring culture sounds somewhat straightforward, the means for achieving that goal have met with varying degrees of success.

The University of Massachusetts at Amherst is located in the northwestern part of the state amid rolling green hills and quaint New England towns. Beginning in the early 1950s, the campus changed from a small college with a student population of 4,000 to a research university with more than 1,254 full-time faculty, 17,271 undergraduate students, and 6,073 graduate students. The university “develop[ed] its commitment to addressing issues of differences during the late 1960s” (Ingle 1991, p. 132). In 1972, the campus put in place its first affirmative action plan. Several events led to the development of innovations to meet the needs of the campus community.

*With the arrival of a significant number of African American students came the rude confirmation that racism was a problem on campus and in the surrounding community. There were repeated incidents, demonstrations, occupations, and the creation of a Department of Afro-American Studies. In a parallel fashion, women raised the issue of sexism, [reported instances of sexual assault] and established the first women’s center on the campus (Ingle 1991, p. 132).*

In 1980, the Chancellor’s Commission on Civility in Human Relations, comprised of faculty, students, and staff, was established. The commission recommended two other innovations that were to help it change its culture and value differences. In 1981, the commission prescribed curricular reforms to address issues of racism, sexism, and anti-Semitism on the campus, and it recommended establishing the Office of Human Relations to “enhance the capacity of the campus to
anticipate and then respond effectively to the full range of human relations concerns" (Ingle 1991, p. 134).

This goal is based on certain standards: “One of the traditional values of a university campus centers on the notion that it is a special place of work and study, where high standards of civil conduct exceed those required by law, the open exchange of ideas is promoted, and individuals can pursue their work and education without fear of harassment or intimidation” (Ingle 1991, p. 130). In 1989, Amherst amended its mission statement to reflect what it hoped to accomplish through innovations it had put in place.

Our goal is to achieve a multicultural campus where men and women of diverse racial, social, and economic groups play major roles and, in a spirit of mutual respect, come to understand and appreciate the variety of perspectives that diversity makes possible (p. 3).

As an urban campus, the University of Massachusetts at Boston has always served a more diverse student population than the Amherst campus. Although the student body was diverse, it was not until 1970 that several faculty and administrative positions were filled with minorities and women. In 1973, following the organization of a faculty and staff group that supported the concept of racial and cultural diversity, the Boston campus hired its first director of the Office of Affirmative Action. Between 1975 and 1978, the work of that office was to formalize the university’s personnel policies and procedures for recruiting faculty, staff, and students, hiring Vietnam veterans, providing access for the physically disabled, and hearing students’ and employees’ grievances regarding sexual harassment. A document was adopted in 1982.

The Boston campus’s approach was somewhat different from the one employed at Amherst, where several programs were put in place. Boston relied heavily on one project to achieve diversity within its faculty and to achieve support for valuing diversity on campus. Since the creation of its Office of Affirmative Action, affirmative action at the Boston campus has gone from a narrowly focused activity, compiling statistics for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, to a broader focus. The office concerns itself with building and sustaining working relationships within the campus community and with guiding the organization through successive levels of institutionalization.
Approaches to Change at Amherst and Boston

Institutionalization at Amherst and Boston can be discerned at several levels:

1. **Structural**, including changes in organizational design that accommodate innovation;
2. **Behavioral**, including knowledge of the behavior, the behavior itself, and preferences for the behavior; and
3. **Cultural**, including normative consensus and values (Curry 1991; Goodman and Associates 1982).

It seems obvious that when a program is implemented within an organization, structural change has occurred. Other, finer changes have also occurred, however, that offer more detail of the picture of change. Both Amherst and Boston, for example, now include in their mission statements their intention to achieve a multicultural and diverse campus. Where once the statements included the schools' commitment to educating members of their respective communities and citizens of the state, they now acknowledge the heterogeneity of those populations they seek to serve. And each school explicitly expresses its intention to accommodate differences without compromising its standards of education.

In addition to changing structures that are integral to the work of the academy, both campuses fund activities designed to meet their goals. Each campus's budget reflects the funded activities the programs that have been put in place to achieve their goals. At Boston, the Office of Affirmative Action has an operating budget and receives additional funds from the Office of the Chancellor to continue its activities. At Amherst, the programs are part of the university's regular budget. Neither campus funds its programs as "special projects." Perhaps of greater importance than changes in documents governing the work of the campus is the extent to which the programs are visible.

Such visibility creates the kind of climate that is necessary for change and gives an innovation presence within an organization. For example, the Office of Affirmative Action at both campuses acts in an advisory capacity to individual members and groups in the campus community and establishes policies and procedures governing personnel hiring and management. The Amherst campus's broader definition of diversity includes policies and procedures that also cover areas like sexual
harassment and intolerance of different life-styles. At Amherst, the task of change is distributed among three programs, each of which plays a part in achieving the campus's goal: the Office of Affirmative Action, the Commission on Civility, and the Office of Human Relations.

When hiring and management practices require behavior that is different from past discriminatory practices, the Office of Affirmative Action prescribes behavioral changes. To a lesser extent, changes in behavior are prescribed in projects sponsored by the Commission on Civility annually, such as the Day of Civility, and by projects designed by the Office of Human Relations. Such campus projects encourage community gatherings where participants instruct each other as to acceptable behaviors and can share symbols that represent work toward or achievement of organizational goals. The activities encourage participation by all members of the campus community and help to raise the consciousness of participants about the benefits associated with the changes in progress. Participants are then able to assign meaning and value to the innovations in ways that permit them to take ownership of them as well.

In another example, the Office of Human Relations was instrumental in developing procedures that ensure students’ rights to gather on campus. As part of the procedure, faculty and administrators serve as impartial observers during such events and, when called upon to do so, provide feedback for participants. This procedure was put in place when members of the campus community received reports of students’ attacks on groups expressing different ideology or groups representing different life-styles, and reports of police brutality in disbanning student groups. With observers present, violent acts are less likely to occur when factions air their disagreement or disapproval. Also as a result of observers’ presence, police are better able to control situations without resorting to force. Projects implemented to support change at both campuses have been based on the conventional wisdom that suggests that changing behaviors leads to changed attitudes. A measure of the extent to which this statement is true can be taken at the third level of institutionalization.

At the third, cultural level of institutionalization, an innovation is said to have become part of the organization in a way that promises it will be long lasting. An organization’s culture is said to embody its ideals, norms, and values—the
basis upon which organizational reality rests. Innovations put in place at Amherst and Boston were to produce such change in both schools' cultures. Those innovations were to change the cultures of those campuses with the introduction of a new norm. Existing cultures were not to be abandoned completely; rather, rules prohibiting acts of discrimination and intolerance were to be replaced by tolerance and an appreciation of differences among individuals and groups. At Boston, for example, the chancellor, the director of affirmative action, and other members of the community attempted to change behaviors and then attitudes. They believed that change in the culture of that organization could be brought about through proactive personnel practices that would create a sufficient number of people who would invest their energies in changing the campus. The new members of the community were to join with older members, serving as agents of change. As a result of that joining, a new culture that included new norms and values would be constructed.

The concept of "numerical equalization" (Kanter 1977) is an example of the kind of change in population that the Boston campus hoped to achieve (figure 1). Numerical equalization pays attention to the effect of population changes on organizational culture.

Uniform groups have only one kind of person, one significant social type. The group may develop its own differentiations . . . but groups called uniform can be considered homogeneous with respect to salient external master statuses [like] sex, race, or ethnicity. Uniform groups have a typological ratio of 100:0. Skewed groups are those in which there is a large preponderance of one type over another, up to a ratio of perhaps 85:15. The numerically dominant types also control the group and its culture in enough ways to be labeled "dominant." The few of another type in a skewed group can appropriately be called "tokens" . . . [and] are often treated as representatives of their category, as symbols rather than individuals . . . Next, tilted groups begin to move toward less extreme distributions and less exaggerated effects. In this situation, with ratios of perhaps 65:35, dominants are just a "majority" and tokens become a "minority." Minority members have potential allies among each other, can form coalitions, and can affect the culture of the group. They become individuals differentiated from
each other as well as type differentiated from the majority. . . . Finally, at 60:40 and down to 50:50, the group becomes balanced (Kanter 1977, pp. 208-9).

The point beyond the “skewed group” that reaches a critical mass of support facilitates the process in that it generates norms consistent with change (Greenwood, Mann and McLaughlin 1975). The new norms will not take hold if they are promoted by only one person or by a few teachers working alone and within the confines of their classrooms.

Although this approach is useful and has had some success in increasing the numbers of individuals belonging to historically underrepresented groups at the Boston campus, it presents some problems as well. The notion of affirmative action has been challenged since its inception, and more recently it has received a considerable amount of negative publicity owing largely to comparisons between its use of

FIGURE 1

GROUP TYPES AS DEFINED BY PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION OF TWO SOCIAL CATEGORIES IN THE MEMBERSHIP
goals and timetables, and quotas. Goals and timetables intended to be helpful measures of the success of opening employment to groups that have historically been excluded have been made synonymous with quotas, which immigration authorities have used to prevent groups from moving into the country. The underpinnings of the strategies are different—one is inclusionary, the other exclusionary—and goals and timetables are self-monitoring strategies that are continuously modified, but the erroneous comparison works because it conjures up memories of groups that were prevented from fleeing oppressive and genocidal governments.

Another difficulty with affirmative action personnel practices is that such practices assume that standards affecting applicants’ qualifications will be color blind and evenly applied. In effect, they depend on an outcome that cannot occur widely within an organization unless its culture is changed. And most of the burdensome responsibility for changing the organization falls on a few veterans and newly hired members of those underrepresented groups as they are made the conscience of their organizations and monitors of employment practices. That responsibility has been perceived as an added source of stress for new faculty coming into a competitive, potentially alienating, and hostile environment.

The approach at Amherst involved a similar joining of old cultures with new ideals to bring about change and thus a new culture. The emphasis, however, was not on achieving a critical mass of support or numerical equalization solely through hiring practices. Rather, supporters of change among the faculty, staff, and students believed that, in general, members of the campus community had to become more tolerant of differences and would thereby create an environment that would be attractive to groups that historically have found it to be hostile.

The differences in the beliefs about change driving the approaches at the two campuses are not likely coincidental. Rather, they reflect some important distinctions in structures between the two campuses. Amherst, for example, is a residential campus with housing for its students and with faculty who have some responsibility for monitoring students’ behavior and activities through its structures of governance and its relationship with student services personnel. The relationships between faculty and students are designed to influence students’ academic lives, which are not easily separated from
their social lives on campus. Faculty advise students, serve on committees with them, eat in the same places, study in the same libraries, collaborate on projects, attend plays or lectures or other social events together, and, more recently, might even be represented by the same union. On some residential campuses, faculty live in dormitories or houses with students. The lives of groups belonging to the campus community intersect and are intertwined in many areas.

On a residential campus, students and faculty are members of a community that enjoys a fair amount of stability despite changes in both populations from year to year as students graduate, new faculty and staff join the community, and other members retire or leave to take new positions. Residency ensures continuity in relationships and influences perceptions of individuals who live and work together. The influence of the campus community has the potential to extend beyond class periods into days, weeks, months, and years. That continuity must certainly make a difference in the kind and extent of change possible. The campus is perceived as more than an organization of individuals who come together; it involves a sense of familiar, long-standing relationships, a sense of responsibility and commitment.

The approaches to change implemented at Amherst look more like a community's response to a growing need to change the quality of its members' interaction than the approach taken at Boston. The design of those innovations is compatible with perceptions of a community that reflects the group's thinking, the need for wide commitment, and participation in the process of change. The responsibility for developing new definitions guiding life in the community, including what it means to be a member of the community, belongs to management, students, staff, and faculty alike. Amherst's attempt to become a multicultural campus in effect is a process of redefining citizenship. That definition first changes the way members of the campus community interact with one another and influences the way graduates negotiate relationships in the world beyond the campus's physical boundaries.

In contrast, the commuter campus at Boston serves a population of students who spend considerably less time on campus than students at Amherst. Undergraduates at Boston are likely to be older and to also have the responsibilities of careers and families, leaving them little time to engage in res-
idential campus life. Time that might be spent on campus life is spent in ways as important, but off campus.

The sense of community that develops out of this experience is not the same as that experienced on a residential campus. Galvanizing students, staff, and faculty around an effort to change is more difficult on a nonresidential campus. The sense of commitment to resolving campus issues is limited and hierarchical. Issues relating to the curriculum and to tuition, fees, and financial arrangements become more crucial than those relating to the social needs of the general population. Commuter students tend to be more transient, finding it necessary to modify their plans and schedules in accordance with responsibilities at home or at work in an effort to complete their studies. And a student taking longer to complete his or her studies does not necessarily become more visible or active on campus.

Notwithstanding the nature of the commuter campus, a sense of community does exist within its structure. Faculty govern the institution's academic affairs and are, in part, responsible for bridging the gap between their culture and that of their students. During the time when they are on campus, students are encouraged to participate in campus activities and organizations. The approach to developing multiculturalism on the Boston campus reflects, to some extent, the naturally occurring limitations on participation within a commuter campus (Astin 1991). Implementing the innovation and ensuring continuity of the effort to change rest with the administrative offices and the faculty, the two groups in the organizational community that are most active and spend longer periods of time on campus. The approach to change at Boston included hiring members of diverse groups; once on campus, they would change the organization's culture.

The standards for achieving institutionalization are theoretical constructs that make it difficult to measure a far more complex reality. The Boston campus provides an example of the momentum gained in the process of change. In 1991, three years after the campus changed its chief executive, the campus continued to vigorously support affirmative action and its related goals. Members of the campus community developed and implemented innovations they believed would continue to build support for multiculturalism on campus. One such effort is a project designed to introduce the requirement for diversity to the curriculum. The project, developed
by the Center for the Improvement of Teaching at the Boston campus, is a grass-roots initiative to build a multicultural curriculum that broadens the definition of diversity and includes, in addition to race and gender, age, social class, culture, sexual orientation, and disability.

What each campus has achieved thus far can be considered part of a history of change. The kind of change each is attempting is not easily accomplished in five-year increments reflected in their affirmative action plans or as it appears in one, two, or even three decades. Both Amherst and Boston have made significant moves toward achieving their goals. Although innovative policies and procedures have been implemented to bring about change and accepted as a matter of course, groups that support change in the culture of the two organizations are still distinguishable from the general populations, and it is possible they will remain so for some time. Perhaps success in achieving institutionalization at the third level should reflect the complexity of the process and, as a result, should be measured by the kinds of activities and size of the groups that support or participate in moving the campuses toward valuing diversity or multiculturalism. Such activities and groups ensure continuity in the event of variables, such as a change in leadership or a fiscal crisis, that might impede or threaten the process of institutionalization.

Summary
Approaches to change vary among organizations, depending largely on goals set by members of those communities. Cultural restructuring is an approach to change that is fundamental to the organization: a number of academies throughout the country, including the University of Massachusetts at Amherst and at Boston, have used that approach to achieve diversity within their communities. Although each campus has moved through the first two levels of institutionalization and although both have made significant progress in doing so, they have not completed the process at level three.

Amherst implemented several approaches in its effort to change the quality of its members’ interaction, compatible with perceptions of community that reflect group thinking, the need for wide commitment, and participation in the process of change. Amherst’s attempt to become a multicultural campus is, in effect, a process of redefining citizenship. That definition first changes the way members of the campus com
munity interact with one another. At Boston, the chancellor, the director of affirmative action, and other members of the community attempted to change behaviors and then attitudes through proactive personnel practices that would create a sufficient number of people who would then invest their energies in changing the campus. The new members of the community were to join with older members to serve as agents of change and construct a new culture that includes new values and norms.
ACHIEVING DESIRABLE OUTCOMES

The academy's style of participatory management provides the kind of open forum necessary for change to occur. Within that forum, divergent beliefs about change are reconciled. Amherst implemented several approaches in its efforts to change its culture and the quality of interactions among members. The design of those innovations was compatible with members' perceptions of the nature and extent of change necessary to achieve the organization's goals. Amherst's attempt to become a multicultural campus was a process of redefining citizenship. At the Boston campus, the chancellor, the director of affirmative action, and other members of the community attempted to change behaviors and then attitudes through hiring practices. They also hoped to create a multicultural campus but used a different approach to attain it.

The very independence and individualism that campuses embody make change difficult. Faculty, students, and staff who are often celebrated for their ability to be analytical and critical, for example, set rigorous standards for innovations that would change their community dramatically. Discerning whether an innovation is reasonable is given over to long discussions or debates that can slow the process but are useful when they allow projects to be adapted so they are more suitable to the academy and allow individuals to support change in the organization.

In part, this discussion continues to synthesize theory and real-world experiences, such as those at Amherst and Boston, and to reconsider the roles of members of organizations involved in change. Suggestions for accommodating change and ultimately the institutionalization of change are global, owing to a deliberate attempt to avoid being prescriptive. Organizations have distinctive needs, particularly when their members begin to create and apply designs for change. Questions driving the final phase of the process of change in such organizations might be constructed around a range of desirable outcomes and the optimum level of institutionalization.

The second part of this discussion involves the need for communities that want to be innovative to become learning organizations (Argyris 1982b). Learning organizations engage in self-study or a kind of reflective practice where learning and innovativeness are nearly synonymous. As such, issues contemplated as those organizations design innovations necessarily cover their identity, purpose, structures, processes, and activities. Although they are innovative organizations, nei-
ther Amherst nor Boston claims to be “learning organizations” (per Argyris 1982b or Senge 1990). It might well be, however, that they exhibit some of what it takes to meet the demands of that new paradigm.

The connections between the learning organization and the experiences of Amherst and Boston in developing innovations and institutionalizing them are not always as strong as they might be as the new paradigm governing life in those organizations emerges. One connection is the response of each of the schools to the many and varied views about the nature and extent of change necessary to bring about improvement in their respective communities. That response, one of which was more clearly discernible at Amherst, was to acknowledge the variance and to negotiate change based on the standards of reasonableness held by members of the community.

**Innovative Organizations as Learning Organizations**

Are innovative organizations necessarily learning organizations? Much of the current thinking about organizational change and innovative organizations includes conceptualizing innovative organizations as learning organizations (Argyris 1982b; Argyris and Schön 1978; Beckhard and Pritchard 1992; Senge 1990). Much of what the Amherst and Boston communities did approximates approaches to functioning that found support in the new ways of thinking about organizations presented in the following discussion.

What are the distinguishing features of learning organizations? What are the philosophical approaches that support them as such? The groundwork for conceptualizing organizational behavior as learning and innovative behavior began with a study of interventions in a for-profit organization (Argyris and Schön 1978). The researchers worked with leaders and members of organizational communities and began to apply what they believed to be approaches to double-loop learning in organizations. Learning that takes place in organizations, if it is to be the kind that begets productive behavior, must be based on several “governing variables” (or “governing values”):

1. Members of the organization must be provided valid information upon which they can base their actions and thus be in control of what happens to them as members of the
The organizational community must then “design situations or encounters in which participants can . . . experience high personal causation.”

2. As adults, members of the organization govern their actions through “free and informed choice.” Organizational tasks are “controlled jointly.”

3. The situation involves “internal commitment to choice and constant monitoring of the implementation. . . . Protection of self is a joint enterprise and oriented toward growth.” Further, participants engage in “bilateral protection of others” (Argyris 1982b, p. 103, citing Argyris and Schön 1978).

Participants experience positive interaction as a result of these governing variables: (1) Members of the organization are “minimally defensive” toward others; (2) the group experiences “minimally defensive interpersonal relations and group dynamics”; (3) “learning-oriented norms” emerge; and (4) participants have “high freedom of choice, internal commitment, and risk taking” (Argyris 1982b, p. 102).

Double-loop learning behavior is different from the behavior resulting from prior conditioning that commonly occurs throughout the lives of members of organizations (figure 2) (Argyris 1982b). Prior conditioning is consistent with the variables or values associated with “single-loop learning”: (1) “Achieve the purpose as the actor defines it, (2) win do not lose, (3) suppress negative feelings, (4) emphasize rationality” (p. 86). This list reads much like the single-minded, individualistic, and competitive practices that at one time were valued in private industry but have more recently been criticized. Although the two sets of variables are not opposites, they differ in significant ways (Argyris 1982b). The latter set emphasizes skillful articulation of purposes and goals and simultaneously controls others and the environment to ensure success (p. 101). The former set does not reject skillful articulation and precision regarding one’s purpose, but it does reject “the unilateral control that usually accompanies advocacy because the typical purpose of advocacy is to win” (p. 105).

Double-loop learning is “coupling articulateness and advocacy with an invitation to . . . confront views, even to alter them, in order to produce action that is based on the most complete, valid information possible and to which people can become internally committed” (p. 103). Thus, members,
FIGURE 2
INNOVATIVE PROCESS AS DOUBLE-LOOP LEARNING

Source: Adapted from Argyris, 1982b. Reproduced with permission of the author.
and particularly leaders, of the organization are at once invit-
ing and supporting double-loop learning (p. 103). In this con-
text, the organizational leadership or the visionaries are crucial
to the processes of change and institutionalization, and the
invitation is like those extended from the presidents of Michi-
gan and Wisconsin. The invitation flattens the organizational
hierarchy in ways that support exchanges of information and
collaboration in the design and implementation of inno-
vations.

Double-loop learning requires two-way communication
in which parties to the process encourage and facilitate devel-
opment of heuristics in exploring new meanings that support
new organizational realities. Certain paradoxes associated with
double-loop learning provide useful insights into the nature
of the human experience during the course of change. One
of those paradoxes is that “in the interest of rationality, people
act to produce consequences that [actually] inhibit rational-
ity” (Argyris 1982b, p. 10), but they are unaware that they are
acting as such. Another paradox is that what should be dis-
cussed for learning to take place becomes undiscussible
(p. 10); that is, participants in the process of change theorize
about what is taking place, moving from lower to higher levels
of abstraction, treating them as truths. These paradoxes are
related to the governing variables that inhibit double-loop
learning, but another important paradox is the paradox of
counterproductive control; that is, the “very competencies
that keep [organizational leaders and managers] in control
prevent double-loop learning” (Argyris 1982b, p. 455). By giv-
ing up control and becoming vulnerable or facing the pos-
sibility of failure, one can succeed (p. 455).

Learning and change are aligned: “Learning and change
processes are part of each other. Change is a learning process
and learning is a change process. Ultimately underpinning
these processes are changes in the way individuals think and
act” (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992, p. 14). Similarities in the
two processes appear in their descriptions. Learning involves:

1. “Unfreezing” oneself from currently held beliefs, knowl-
dge, or attitudes;
2. “Absorbing new or alternative attitudes and behavior”;
3. “Refreezing” oneself in the new state.
Change involves:

1. A present or current state;
2. A transition state;
3. A change state (p. 14).

To be a life-long learner and for organizations to be committed to that pursuit as well, however, refreezing must not take place, for refreezing in a learning organization would mark its end as such. Instead, members of the organization understand that change is inevitable and desirable, as it represents the acquisition of new knowledge. “One characteristic of a true learning organization is that [its] norms encourage innovation. Another is that problems are approached in an integrative way” (Beckhard and Pritchard 1992, p. 16). It is the second characteristic that speaks directly to a systems approach to change that takes place in learning organizations.

The systems approach is “the fifth discipline” or “a body of theory and technique that must be studied and mastered to be put into practice. A discipline is a developmental path for acquiring certain skills or competencies” (Senge 1990, p. 10). Further, “as with any discipline, from playing the piano to electrical engineering, some people have an innate ‘gift’ but anyone can develop proficiency through practice. To practice a discipline is to be a lifelong learner” (p. 11). Five disciplines or “component technologies” converge in the learning organization:

1. **Systems thinking.** Events both internal and external to an organization though “distant in time and space . . . are connected within the same pattern.” “Each has an influence on the rest, an influence that is usually hidden from view.” Further, it is possible to understand an event only by contemplating the whole or the pattern within which it is perceived as a constellation.
2. **Personal mastery.** Mastery in this context means “a special level of proficiency.” “Personal mastery is the discipline of continually clarifying and deepening our personal vision, of focusing our energies, of developing patience, and of seeing reality objectively.”
3. **Mental models.** “Mental models” are deeply ingrained assumptions, generalizations, or even pictures or images that influence how we understand the world and how we take action.” This discipline begins with self-study. It is
also the ability to engage "in learningful conversations that balance inquiry and advocacy where people expose their own thinking effectively and make that thinking open to others."

4. **Building shared vision.** The practice of shared vision, rather than a unilaterally developed "vision statement," involves the skill of discerning shared "pictures of the future" that foster genuine commitment and engagement rather than compliance.

5. **Team learning.** This discipline starts with "dialogue," the capacity of members of a team to suspend assumptions and enter into "thinking together." This process also involves learning how to recognize patterns of interaction that undermine learning (Senge 1990, pp. 6-11).

Personal mastery, the second discipline, does not define objectivity. The construct is generally subjectively defined and relevant only to the narrow circumstances wherein it emerges. Therefore, it must be assumed that objectivity in this context relates to standards or definitions set within a particular organization. It is not likely that a universally defined objectivity related to learning organizations is intended in this definition.

The individual also has a role in developing the disciplines. Accordingly, as a member of an organizational community, the individual must understand that mastery is an ideal state and that learning is part of the "process of becoming" that ideal. The art of the discipline requires commitment that is not compartmentalized or applied only "at work." The philosophical approach to "becoming" makes no distinction between "at home" and "at work." Individuals are conceptualized as members of more than one community. Consequently, communities and membership are merged.

This view of the individual as a member of communities is a vastly different paradigm from one that motivated the individual's identity and standards of organizational membership of past decades. One's personal best is now relational. Change and institutionalization as process take place within a social context and, as such, must be guided by the standards of learning organizations or communities of learners.

**Meeting Standards of Reasonableness**

Because of a learning organization's governing paradigms, change is negotiated. Part of that process of negotiation

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"One characteristic of a true learning organization is that [its] norms encourage innovation."
requires that standards of "reasonableness" be met. In a world where change progresses smoothly, without a hitch, both Amherst and Boston might have moved through the process of institutionalization in a timely fashion. For example, on both campuses members of the community and management would have arrived at similar conclusions. They would have concluded that some feature of the organization needed to change. They would also have concluded that the two parts of the community had to work together to bring about change. They would have begun to articulate their beliefs about what was needed and why, and they would have formulated goals. A great deal of activity would have occurred in this beginning phase of change: gathering information about innovations from inside and outside the organization, gaining consensus, and identifying others who might perceive themselves as being affected by the change.

At the same time during the early phase of change, a process of evaluation is developing. As the change takes shape, its effect and quality are being assessed. Members of the community, possibly including its leaders but involving others as well, begin to debate the issues related to the change. While that debate helps evaluate the process, it also feeds the process of change. Other visionaries pick up the slack, guiding the process along and coordinating and directing related innovations that will bring the organization closer to its goals. Some of the organization's members come forward, becoming more active participants, while others recede into the background until their expertise is needed. Problems having to do with resources, constituencies, or stakeholders are resolved. Notwithstanding impediments, the innovation reaches a level of institutionalization. This oversimplification of the way change takes shape—even in an ideal world but especially in a world where the concept of the learning organization is only beginning to take hold and change life in organizational communities—is useful for visualizing change as it takes place in learning organizations.

When asked their opinion about the value of an innovation, members of an organization articulate their beliefs about the kind and extent of change necessary to address issues. Those beliefs serve as parameters indicating the individuals' ability to commit themselves to moving an innovation through institutionalization. At the very least, exploration of those beliefs is important to the process of change. Although leaders might
be empowered to initiate change, they are not often in a position to dictate commitment. In an ideal organization, people understand the necessity for change and support it accordingly. In real organizations, such as Amherst and Boston, commitment follows discussion and often follows debates that help create the setting for change by facilitating reconciliation of differences and helping to further development of an innovation. The exchange of ideas, often accompanied by much enthusiasm, conviction, and frequently acrimony, makes it more difficult for organizations to return to business as usual. This part of the process of change has been described as chaotic, in part because it is uncomfortable for some people and because it often leads to unpredictable outcomes. It could be, however, that the catharsis that also takes place during debate permits movement forward.

This cathartic effect is described in a school community’s response to a project intended to improve relationships that had become strained and threatened to disrupt the day-to-day operations of the organization (Deal 1986). An instrument designed for gathering information would provide the organization with potentially useful feedback. Initially during evaluation, the researcher held community meetings. Those meetings turned into encounters where individuals expressed their beliefs about what was taking place in the organization and included angry exchanges and shouting matches. Later, however, the community environment improved, even though its members chose not to use the information that had been gathered. Perhaps the community’s open forum and exchanges had a positive effect (Deal 1986).

The debate as part of the process of change involves the application of standards. Leaders of the process are able to provide information that facilitates development of those standards. Such information might include whether the innovation is compatible with the academy’s present mission, whether the innovation can be supported financially, and whether the innovation will influence the way members of the organization function. The heuristics referred to earlier arise out of the need to satisfy the standards described here.

**Change as a Negotiated Process**

Organizational change is sometimes seen as developing out of extreme viewpoints. Innovations that fail are often described as top-down initiatives that impose the will of upper
levels of management on service providers. In the academy, for example, because of its structure of governance and generally collaborative approach to management, its members expect that, at the very least, those who are likely to be affected by change ought to play a role in its design, as exemplified by the Meyerson Plan at SUNY. In that scenario, a group of faculty on campus did not believe that the dramatic change Meyerson envisioned was appropriate for the campus; they believed that money should be an issue factored into the design of the innovation and that the existing structure should not be dismantled. On the contrary, they believed the academy as it existed should be supported and that funds should be spent to do so. Perceiving that their voice was not heard, the group successfully marshaled support in opposition to the college structure.

Profitability takes two forms, self-interest profitability and general profitability (Levine 1980). Self-interest motivates individuals and groups within the organization to adopt the innovation, while general profitability motivates the organization to select a particular innovation and support its continuance. The two interests interact with an element of compatibility. When compatibility is high, members complain little about the innovation, and when both compatibility and profitability are high, then the organization will seek to maintain the innovation. This explanation of profitability and compatibility is another take on the need to discern and integrate organizational beliefs about the nature and extent of change.

Another example is found in the modification of personnel practices as part of the affirmative action plan at the University of Massachusetts at Boston. Although many, if not most, of the faculty at Boston believed in principle that change was necessary and would be beneficial, they did not agree about the best way to achieve desirable outcomes. Some faculty believed the new personnel practices interfered with the collegial process in which faculty evaluate whether a candidate is suitable for joining their ranks. Some faculty believed that too much power was vested in one office, the director of affirmative action, who reported directly to the chancellor. As a result, the director managed the campus academic staff in matters of recruiting personnel and in tenure and promotion—an unwelcome precedent set by the chancellor that faculty construed as a divestment of its traditional responsibilities.
The chancellor’s departure from tradition created a schism within the faculty—those who believed such a radical approach was necessary to move the campus toward achieving goals set some years earlier and those who also wanted change but sought to achieve it using a less radical approach. Further, those seeking a less radical approach probably did not advocate terminating the affirmative action plan or all of the personnel practices it formulated, and they probably would have endorsed an approach that acknowledged their traditional responsibilities without compromising their ability to make decisions accordingly. Although the chancellor’s approach acknowledged the responsibilities of the faculty, the inordinate amount of power invested in the Office of Affirmative Action diverted attention from his having done so. It is likely that other unresolved issues added to the tension around the personnel practices as well. In the paradigm of the learning organization, however, profitability and compatibility become systemic rather than individual concerns.

Bottom-up approaches to change present problems that look much like those experienced at Boston and in the Meyer-son Plan, but from a different perspective. Change at Boston began nearly three decades ago as part of a bottom-up approach initiated by faculty who believed change was important and necessary for improving the quality of students’ and other faculty members’ experiences. At that time, participation in attempts to change the campus culture was limited to a few individuals who divided their time between their responsibilities as faculty and advocacy of a multicultural campus. Thus, those faculty assumed the task of finding applicants they believed were qualified and encouraging them to apply for positions on campus. The change those faculty hoped for was slow to materialize. Staff who initiate change expect that their efforts will be successful because they are responding to what they perceive as real and immediate problems or issues and because they are not engaged in heavy-handed attempts to legislate change like those imposed from the top down. Insofar as they are able, faculty starting bottom-up projects attempt to be apolitical and egalitarian in their approach. Delegation of responsibilities, decision making, and support for change is a matter of observing rules of collegiality.

Each group looks at change from its position within the organization. Although they might be at odds during the
course of the process, those groups are potential contributors to integrative change. Organizational change is necessarily a negotiated process that involves, at some point during its course, many if not all of the interpersonal and group process skills touched on in this discussion. Shared leadership, for example, is an important part of negotiating the agreement for change, open communication among parties in the process is necessary, and prevailing beliefs held by members of the organization regarding the nature and extent of change should be discerned and addressed during the process.

The design for change in a negotiated agreement is by necessity flexible, allowing for intervening factors both internal and external that affect the organization's structure and the way it functions. It is the outcomes or goals that members of the organization agree upon that remain constant. Although its organizational community does not claim to have implemented negotiated agreements, attempts to bring about change at Amherst came close in several ways. First, its innovators openly communicated to members of the community their beliefs about the need for change and the form it should take. Second, that open communication invited further discussion and led to a number of forums in which other points of view could be considered and even debated. Third, it had in place several approaches with the same goal—to create a multicultural campus. As a result of those multiple approaches, the function of leadership in the process of change was shared. And in response to those several approaches, members of the community who might have found it difficult to support one approach had several options rather than resisting change altogether. Fourth, Amherst seemed to support and encourage the development of new projects that would facilitate achievement of its goal.

On Becoming a Learning Organization

How do organizations become learning communities where members' standards are included in the development of innovations, where those standards are compatible with those of its visionaries, and where change is a negotiated process? Communities that would be engaged as such must involve their members in systemic self-study guided by features common to learning organizations (Argyris 1982b; Senge 1990). Those features reflect a systems approach to organizational functioning:
1. The organizational community is committed to systemic self-study.
2. Organizational leaders support systemic self-study and development.
3. The function of leadership is shared among the organization’s members.
4. Organizational functioning is relational.
5. Change and institutionalization are directed and are integral to the life of the organization.
6. The organization supports its members’ personal and career growth.
7. The organization’s standard for its members is their “personal best.”

Although learning organizations are innovative, innovative organizations are not necessarily learning organizations. Systemic study includes focusing on at least three areas:

1. Structures: how they meet the organization’s needs and the needs of its publics and how they work with regard to other internal and external factors.
2. Processes: interpersonal and group processes, decision making, and communication, and how they facilitate learning and innovation.
3. Functions: ways in which the responsibilities and interests of leaders, faculty, and staff interact.

This list is by no means complete, as organizations generate their own lists in these and other categories.

To the extent that its leaders and members can commit themselves to its evolution, an organization is in a position to become flexible in developing innovations and in setting levels where it will achieve institutionalization. A learning organization and the evolving learning community are mindful of the relational nature of a systems approach. Moreover, those who would support the ideology of such organizations must be aware of the constructed nature of objective standards. That is, standards are reached through subjective, interpersonal, and group processes, and members of the organization agree about them. Cool, dispassionate objectivity need not be—and perhaps should not be—an organization’s central aspiration. Learning is a subjective experience, even—or, perhaps, especially—when it takes place within a collective where
others are having similar experiences of discovery. In the learning organization, discovery and construction or creativity take place simultaneously: What is constructed must have relevance for members of the community as well as for those individuals and groups that receive its services.

**Summary**

Change seldom progresses smoothly or without problems in the real world. Moreover, it is sometimes seen as developing out of extreme viewpoints that do not represent a range of perspectives from within the community. As a result, innovations often fail. Failed innovations are sometimes described as top down or bottom up, implying that initiatives by management are pitted against those coming from the grass roots. Each group looks at change from its position within the organization and designs an approach to change accordingly.

Although more of them are being pressed to do so and to do so more frequently, organizations generally experience change as an unsettling, discrete event. Further, organizations do not have the luxury of waiting for the ideal circumstances in which to become innovative. Even in the absence of a perfect set of circumstances, however, change is still possible. Organizational communities are populated with designers and leaders who implement change. Organizations that want to be more innovative—to change to meet the changing needs of its consumers—can reconstruct themselves as learning communities. Change is integral to the way learning organizations function, leadership is shared, and members of the organization openly communicate among themselves regarding the need for change and the form it might take. Change is a negotiated process in which members' beliefs provide standards that serve as parameters indicating the extent to which those communities are able to move an innovation through institutionalization.
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INdEX

A
affirmative action, 35, 36-38, 39, 40, 44, 47, 56-57
African American students, 35
anti-Semitism, 35

B
boundary expansion and contraction, 12-13

C
Center for the Improvement of Teaching, 44
change, 52. See also innovation
agreement negotiated, 58
beliefs about, 26-28
bottom-up, 57
catalyst, 8
intuition as a factor, 31
organization models for change. See organization
process negotiated, 55-58
slow pace in academy, 31
sponsors of, 24
top-down, 24-25
chaos association. See innovation.
collegiality. See lateral relationships
Commission on Civility, 38
commuter campus, 43
compatibility, 14, 56
constructed environments. See organizations.
cultural restructuring, 32-33, 35

D
decision making, 23-26
deviant innovation. See boundary contraction
diffusion, 13
discontent, reactions to, xv
Duderstadt. See University of Michigan

E
enclaving, 13-14
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 36

F
foundation theories. See institutionalization

G
governance areas, 21
groups
skewed, 39-40
types, 39-40

Instituting Enduring Innovations 67
implementation, 8
incorporation, 15
innovation. See also change
add-on success, 2
chaos as an associate of, 6, 55
deviant. See boundary contraction
faculty contribution, 22
governing variables, 48-49
in for-profit organization, 48
local base necessary for survival, 4
permanency concern, xv
piecemeal, 10
prerequisite for. See learning organization
process as double-loop learning, 50
retained but not integral part of structure, 2
significance for educational community, xv
two directional change necessary, 25
visibility, 37
innovative organizations, 32-36, 47
as learning organizations, 48-53
not necessarily learning organizations, 59
innovators requirements, 31
institutionalization, 6, 8, 16-17
behavior, 15
definition, 10-11
foundation theories, 5
key features, 10
lacking, 10
process, 8-11, 15
success measurement, 44
intuition. See change.

L
lateral relationships, 21
leadership, 20-23
sponsors of. See change
visionary, 25
learning, 51-52
communities, 12, 58, 60
double-loop, 48, 49-51. See also innovation process
single-loop, 49
subjective experience, 59-60
learning organizations, 48, 52. See also innovative organizations
becoming, 58-60
component technologies, 52-53
innovative communities, 32
prerequisite for innovation, 6
M
Madison Plan, 33-34
managers, 21
Meyerson Plan, 12, 27-28, 56, 57
Michigan Mandate, 33-34
mobilization, 8

N
normative consensus, 15
numerical equalization, 39

O
OBEW. See Opportunities in Business and Education for Women
Office of Human Relations, 38
Opportunities in Business and Education for Women, 2-4, 13-14, 16
organizations. See also learning and innovative organizations.
constructed environments, 12
cultural artifacts, 33
culture, 11
key processes, 19, 28-29
memory or history, 33
models for change, 7
professional, 21
structure, 10, 19-20
visionaries key to change, 32. See also leadership

P
participatory management, 31, 47
profitability, 14, 56
program implementation, 12

Q
quotas, 41

R
residential campus, 41, 42
resocialization, 13
restructuring eliminates peripheral program, 4
routinization, 9
rules of the game, 11

S
sexism, 35
Standards of Reasonableness, 53 55
State University of New York, 7, 12
systems approach, 52
systemic study, 59
T
termination, 13
of successful programs, 1-2
themes of the 21st century, 33

U
University of Massachusetts
at Amherst, 5, 32, 35-37, 39, 41, 42, 44, 47, 48, 58
at Boston, 5, 32, 35-37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 56-57
University of Michigan, 6, 32-34
Duderstadt, President of, 33-34
University of Wisconsin, 6, 32-34

V
values, 15
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