Corporate television suffers from at least two "identity crises": departmental isolation, and the lack of a legitimate identity for the corporate video product itself. Video departments are not usually viewed and accepted by the organizational whole as natural evolutions of a historically defined and behaviorally integrated system. The essential component in the survival process is the establishment and maintenance of interlocked behavioral cycles with client departments. The Kansas City, Missouri School District's Television Production Department evolved through three distinct configurations: from 1974 to 1984, the department was dependent and isolated; from 1984 to 1988, the department was dependent and interlocked; and from 1988 to 1991, the department was dependent and isolated. In corporate television, working with existing video solutions means using broadcast and instructional television as models for production methods, equipment configurations, program design, and the conceptualization of audience attitudes and communication processes. In maintaining a restricted collection of product models copied from broadcast television, instructional film, and other corporate media examples, the video department itself resembles a "garbage can" model as used in organizational psychology. To fully perceive, evaluate, and take a hand in all of the factors which can determine survival requires looking beyond the immediacy of the hardware, software, and the people contained within the walls of the media department. (RS)
Random Acts of Senseless Video: An Organizational Psychology perspective on the "identity crises" of Corporate Television
Random Acts of Senseless Video: An Organizational Psychology perspective on the "identity crises" of Corporate Television

Gregory Gutenko

Corporate television is lost and in need of help. It suffers from at least two "identity crises" which require definition and remedial action. The first crisis is that of departmental isolation resulting from a lack of day-to-day functional interactions with other departments comprising the organization. The other crisis resides within the corporate video product itself, which often has no legitimate identity of its own because it is essentially an inappropriate imitation of noncorporate television models, particularly those of broadcasting, which have been construed to be the standards to which all video applications should aspire.

Institutionally owned and operated media departments suffer a precarious existence. Few enjoy a complacently stable existence within their host organizations. Most are continually engaged in self-justification and the documenting of their significant support of the institution at large. Several factors can be suggested which can contribute to this insecure state:

1. Internally owned and operated media production services are relatively recent additions to most organizations when considered against personnel, payroll, maintenance, and other operational functions that are deemed essential, fundamental, and around in some form since the dawn of organized human enterprise. In comparison, media departments are perceived as recent add-ons (Luxury items? Image accessories?) that can and should be dispensed with if the health and best interests of the institution require "right-sizing". That which is recognized as basic and indispensable will remain. Fat will be trimmed.
2. Media production departments often appear to bestow their attention and services in support of only certain selected organizational activities; they are not widely integrated into the full spectrum of the corporate routine. This also contributes to a generally held impression that media production is a largely peripheral and non-essential activity.

3. Media production personnel are often perceived to be outsiders. They are not in the same business as the rest of the organization. They are media creatures, with their own foreign professional and academic backgrounds, processes, and language. Again, this fosters isolation from the corporate body.

Certainly, there are other destabilizing factors that can be mentioned, such as the difficulty of justifying expenditures that do not clearly and directly show revenue generation or recovery. (Documentation and arguments that track and explain actual income or savings realized by media implementations are not always satisfyingly obvious and easy to follow...not a "quick read".) However, the factors listed above relate directly to a number of basic precepts derived from organizational psychology studies.

The Organization as a System of Interlocked Behaviors

Organizational psychology does not deal with the crises of individuals; there is no examination of subconscious ills or neurotic behavior. It deals instead with the crises and disorganizational behavior of human organizations. Instead of neuroses, there are structural dynamics, interpersonal transactions, and bounded rationalities under examination.

The organization might be viewed as an entity composed of subentities (divisions) which are in turn composed of subentities (departments) which are in turn composed of further subentities (individuals), the hierarchies of which can be metaphorically represented by an organism/organ/cell/molecule/atom physical construction. This perspective, however, misses the crucial aspect of interacting
dynamics--the patterns of functional relations among entities—that "empowers" these organizational components and positions them within the context of the whole.

The view that "organizations are grounded in interlocked behaviors rather than interlocked people" is fundamental in organizational psychology (Weick, 1979, p. 79). If interlocked behaviors are fundamental to the organizational structure, the restricted behavior patterns of most corporate video departments do indeed resemble "random acts", and are misanthropic to say the least.

A lack of consistently reinforced and widely distributed interlocked behaviors will isolate these video departments, leaving them ill-defined, outside the stability of the organization's routine behavioral system patterns, and vulnerable to disruption and termination. Just how many other adjacent departments will have their ongoing and critical interlocked behavior patterns disturbed by a transferred or eliminated video department? The dismal reality is that many video departments have been, are now, or soon will be displaced or eliminated with hardly a ripple felt throughout the rest of the organization.

The Hired Gun

In many respects, video departments are associated with their organization as though they were a hired gunslinger retained by a community of ranchers or farmers in the mythological Old West. A gulf separates the day-to-day routines of the two. The hired gun has a greater affinity, and so a correspondingly higher potential for interlocked behaviors, with other hired guns rather than with the community. In the typical mythic scenario, the rancher/farmers utilize the expertise of the hired gun for an atypical (usually crisis) situation, and once normality is reestablished, the gunslinger is eventually shunned and cut adrift. This is similar to the ostracization faced by soldiers once peace has returned to the homeland. A viable video professional is well aware of this tendency for
estrangement, and conscientiously works towards maximum integration with the goals, shared views, and business concerns of the greater corporate body.

Dependency or Autonomy?

Yet, despite such efforts, video departments are not usually viewed and accepted by the organizational whole as natural evolutions of a historically defined and behaviorally integrated system. They appear to be (and usually are) sprouted like mushrooms out of nowhere, or they may have been nurtured by a more conventionally defined department, such as training or marketing, as an adjunct service activity or an evolution of existing services. The wide diversity of umbrella departments within which many media operations are contained suggests the sort of identity crisis faced by the incorporated operation (Passaro, 1982). It must interact with the larger organization from within the interlocked behaviors of the sponsoring department. Even if an incorporated media department tries to work directly with a wide range of institutional clientele, they will still be identified by others with the narrower goals and functions of its sponsor.

This is a bit like being a teenager living at home. Having necessities like shelter and food provided by one's parents can be convenient and comfortable, but this dependency has its risks. The ills and misfortunes that might befall the parents will also have their way with the dependent child. An incorporated media department may enjoy relief from budget battles and internal politicking when these matters are handled by the management of the host department, but should the host's performance, role, or ideological positions fall into disfavor, the media operation will very likely share in any dire consequences.

Autonomy is certainly more work, both for teenagers out on their own and for media departments who must lobby for their own budgetary needs and justify and document their contributions to the organization. But independence from a
founding department also realizes a freedom to disengage from the limits of the founder's purview and engage with all other constituents of the organization on a more equitable basis.

Even if a video department actualizes an autonomous identity within the organization, it can still be isolated by the lack of established habit-meshing, the routinized and frequent fixed interlocked behaviors that makes one entity part of the environment of others (Weick, 1979, p. 178). A gunslinger who is habit-meshed with his farm clientele would be participating daily in the fundamental tasks of crop planting, growing, and harvesting. It's not enough to be sociable. To overcome the randomness of most media communications activities requires the establishment of frequent and routine interlocked behaviors with other organizational operations. This may necessitate the development of serial programming and services with a weekly or daily schedule, and the choosing of ongoing "permanent" projects, rather than isolated, one-time-only products.

This is often an unappealing choice for creative people to make, since it is usually the "special" projects that will be endowed with the larger budgets, will be the most well-executed, and will earn the applause and recognition of fellow media professionals. Routine services, in comparison, are usually simpler, no frills offerings that can seem tedious and positively unenthralling to work on. It's not very "showbiz". The important thing, for the sake of survival, is that it is habit-meshing.

The essential component in this process is the establishment and maintenance of interlocked behavioral cycles with client departments. In terms of defining a secure position for any department within an organization, it is the extent and multiplicity of operational interactions, not of product output, that is paramount (Weick, 1979, p. 179). It does little good to generate great quantities of serialized, routine programming if it is produced in isolation from the client
department. In this case, the media service would have a productive, but not interactive, presence in its surrounding environment.

**A Strategy for Security**

To build these interlocked behavioral cycles means acting, not independently in isolation, but dependently through functional patterns with client systems and staff. It may be necessary for the video manager to discard some autonomous efficiency and contrive aspects of project development or management to transfer into the client department. Opportunities for project research, expertise input, evaluation, distribution, phase approvals, and brainstorming can be devised as interactive activities.

Initially, it will cost the department in terms of time, persuasive effort (the client is being asked to adopt transactional work loads), and scheduling. Client departments may resist rather than welcome involvement in their own project requests. Video personnel will have to become more adept and efficient at interpersonal communications; it won't be enough to be a creative artist only with videotape and computers.

The construction of interlocked cycles will be resisted by a very powerful inertia, this being the existing structure of the total system of all other interlocked behaviors that are in place at any given time. Any addition of cycles to the system is necessarily a disruption of the system. Once the desired interlocked behaviors are established, however, it will be this very same structural inertia that will provide a new form of security for the now "unrandomized" and interdependent video department.

**Interlocked Behaviors, Autonomy, and a School District Media Department**

In applying the preceding organizational precepts to a real-world example, it must of course be acknowledged that the real world is messy, filled with confounding variables, and many other elements of success and failure aside from
interlocked behaviors and autonomy had their part in the life and death of the Kansas City, Missouri School District's Television Production Department. This analysis is also dependent on participants' and observers' subjective interpretations as to when this department was most secure and most at risk. The department evolved through three distinct configurations, with each demonstrating a relationship between the organizational principles discussed and the security and prosperity of the department.

**Dependent and Isolated, 1974-1984**

The Television Production Department was established in 1974 by the Division of Career and Continuing Education and mandated to create instructional video materials in support of vocational training at the secondary and adult level. It was directly administered by this division, was funded entirely by federal grants dedicated to career education, and its production facilities were located at the Kansas City Technical Education Center. Staffed by two producer/directors, who also performed all technical work, the department's activities were restricted to vocational instruction applications. On rare occasions, the staff were granted dispensation to work on non-vocational programs, but these projects (such as broadcast Public Service Announcements) required a transfer of funds from the "outside" school district client department to the grant funded account, a process which required approval and action at the assistant superintendent level. This was a daunting process which effectively discouraged the use of the video department for applications other than those within the career education division.

In this configuration, which remained essentially unchanged for ten years, the television production department was dependent on and interlocked with only its parent division. With assured continuity and support, the staff were free to develop high-quality (often award-winning) video and multi-image instructional, career counseling, and student recruitment programming. While the media
production personnel recognized that there were many contributions that could and should have been made to the district at large (and many requests for services were ventured), the security blanket of dedicated federal program funding made any kind of proactive service development for justification and survival unnecessary. This was a time of comfortable childhood for the video department. Dependent and Interlocked, 1984-1988

It often requires cutting the purse-strings to get the child out of the house, and so it was with the television production department. By 1982, the gradual and predictable cutback in federal funding alerted the department to the inevitable; by 1985 there would be cuts reaching into the department itself. The department then proposed that it be surrendered by the Division of Career and Continuing Education (and the dependency on the diminishing but predictable federal "formula" funding) and adopted by the Office of Public Information (OPI) and a dependency, through it, on annually reviewed district operating funds. This was a move towards greater interactions and interlocked behaviors with the district at large through the widening services of the OPI, which was soon to become the District Communications Office (DCO). This adoption fit in with the new DCO's expansion into internal communications, public relations, publicity, instructional support of schools, and government relations.

Concurrent with this new parent department's general expansion was the implementation of the Kansas City, Missouri School District's Magnet School based desegregation plan. Video, photography, and print production were built up principally to handle the publicity and parent/student recruitment for the new Magnet School system. However, there was also a commitment by the DCO at this time to support a wide variety of district communications needs. There was an upgrade of the production facilities, a move to a more visible location in the central administration building, and the addition of a producer/writer in 1985 and
a videographer in 1988. (However, the videographer was added in support of Magnet School promotional production only, and this presaged a fatal change of focus in departmental priorities.)

Between 1984 and 1988, the media production sub-department developed its most comprehensive range of service and support. In the area of publicity and public information, it recorded bimonthly school board meetings for cablecast and produced a weekly news program, also cablecast, called District Directions. This latter program followed a television newscast format and featured a video tour of a different school each week, profiles of district administrators, teachers, and outstanding students, coverage of current issues in an talk show segment, and the presentation of shorter items using an in-studio anchor.

In the area of staff support, the department conducted video production workshops for teachers and counselors, who would shoot material with school-owned camcorders, and provided both editing access and assistance for these independently produced projects. Staff training and information videos were created for the personnel department, including recruitment programs and orientations for new employees. The District Datascreen, a video bulletin board system, displayed announcements (meeting and athletic schedules, birthdays, lunch menus, etc.) in the administration building's lobby and cafeteria. Inservice workshops, meetings, and receptions were recorded, edited, and distributed. Broadcast PSAs continued in production, along with instructional and promotional videos, for vocational, Magnet, and traditional curriculum support.

It is the recollection of the people who were involved with the video production operation (M. E. Justus, personal communication, May 4, 1993) and the larger DCO (V. N. Cummiskey, personal communication, May 6, 1993) that this was their finest hour. Certainly, this period of time saw the greatest level of interaction with other district programs and offices. It saw the greatest diversity
of programming forms, ranging from complex promotional videos, where outside production facilities were retained for postproduction finishing, to the simple, day-to-day updating of announcements on the *Datascreen* service. There was a conscientious effort made on the part of the staff to be as widely involved, to nurture as many interlocked behaviors, as was within their capacity to serve. Members of the staff also volunteered (and later would be invited) to serve on committees, such as Transportation and School-based Computing), and in workshops dealing with issues and processes that often did not have a direct bearing on DCO activities.

While these engagements were elective and carried no obligations, they did provide occasions to become acquainted with and known to the wider district community. Indirectly, this sought-after awareness did indeed "pay off" quickly in facilitating both interpersonal communications and the design of media productions. The subsequent design and execution of media products evidenced an authenticity of organizational culture, language, symbolism, and institutional memory (message attributes so often missing or misconstrued in communications products developed by outside consultants). From the organizational psychology standpoint, this also established the *habit-meshing*, the routines of interlocked behaviors, that brought the DCO and its media department into the supportive inertia of the total system's behavioral cycles. What went wrong?

**Autonomous and Interlocked?**

Beginning in 1986, the media department, being intuitively and professionally aware of the need for an independence that would assure a diversified district clientele, developed a management proposal (Gutenko, 1985) that recommended ultimately putting media production services out in the cold, with no one to blame for its failure... but itself...autonomy.
This was not, however, a good time to suggest changes in district structure. District-wide attention and planning concerns were being directed towards the implementation of a nationally scrutinized Magnet School Plan, and propositions that were not directly relevant to this plan's facilitation, or obstruction, were of very low priority. The strategic focus of the district was becoming singular, and this narrowing view was to percolate through every strata of the organization.

Dependent and Isolated, 1988-1991

It must be noted here, once again, that other factors can come into play that will affect the viability of a media department. In this case, the directorship of the DCO changed hands, and where the director of the DCO from 1984 until 1988 had been interested in a diversified support service in video and print, the new director was concerned with a clear and undiffused dedication to the promotion of the Magnet School Plan. Other production priorities were cut back or abandoned to "clear the slate" for Magnet marketing activity. However, Magnet promotional activities, subject as they were to considerable review and debate throughout the district hierarchy and the community, were often delayed and rethought, which left the previously well occupied and challenged media staff frequently idle and unchallenged. Morale suffered. Within two years (by 1990), half of the production staff had been lured away by other institutions.

By 1990, only the coverage of school board meetings and the District Datascreen were in regular production. The acquisition of footage to be used in promoting the Magnet Schools was the balance of video production activity and this, due to the exhaustive, multi-committee review and recasting of marketing themes and concepts, yeilded very little finished product. More significantly the media department, along with the DCO, had withdrawn itself from the rest of the district. It was no longer in habitual contact with the teachers, students, parents, or administrators it once interacted with. It was no longer visible. Survival of
the department was now dependent entirely on the survival of the DCO and in turn its performance in developing and executing a successful Magnet School marketing effort. Success in this effort was essentially to be measured entirely by enrollment statistics. Everyone's eggs were in one basket.

By 1991, with Magnet School enrollment figures falling embarrassingly short of the desired numbers and ratios, the District decided that the resources dedicated to Magnet School marketing would be better entrusted to outside agency design and production. At this point, the DCO and its video production facility were fulfilling no other significant purpose or service, and both were taken off life support. They had not been well for some time.

As of 1993, the DistrictDatascreen is the only communications service in operation within the Kansas City, Missouri School District. It is maintained and programmed by the central computing services department. There are no video or other media production services available. Enrollment in the Magnet School system still falls far short of expectations.

**Senseless Video**

What is video? Video is what it is expected to be. What is video expected to be? It is expected to be what it already is. A dilemma faced by anyone who tries to use video for a purpose that is truly *new* is that "what video already is" tends to serve as the complete set of potential techniques and product designs that will be used in the *new* application. This "new"video application will be constructed by rearranging existing video solutions rather than by devising a truly *new* video form.

Working with existing video solutions is extremely efficient. In corporate television, it means using broadcast and instructional television as a models for production methods, equipment configurations, program design, and the conceptualization of audience attitudes and communication processes. Using old
models that are commonplace aids previsualization, script treatment, and the task of explaining to others what is being done and why.

This use of "recipes" and models defines the boundaries of concept and action, and fences out all other concepts or actions that could be recognized (Weick, 132). As mentioned above, this selection process permits great efficiency of performance and does so by reducing equivocality and ambivalence in task definition and production approach. Unfortunately, the appropriateness to an application area of a restricted view of possibilities (which may have been initially established by trial-and-error, research and testing, or other "objective" development) can diminish as reality evolves while the restricted view doesn't. A even more troublesome situation exists when a restricted view of possibilities is transferred from an application area that justified that view into an application area that does not.

This is the situation that plagues corporate video to a mild degree in most cases, and with severe virulence in not too few others. In a sense, despite the billions of dollars of dedicated hardware and salaries and million of hours of programming generated to date, corporate video doesn't exist yet. It is yet to be invented. The use of broadcast television as a model for methods, audience characteristics, and possible solutions to communication objectives not only carries within this act of imitation many assumptions that are inappropriate to the true nature of organizational communications, it also effectively precludes the development of appropriate assumptions. A question which has been provided with an answer is no longer in need of further asking. As long as that answer doesn't fall apart, the question is off the agenda. Regarding the adoption of film and television technology by Third World nations, Elihu Katz (1977) has remarked "There is a sameness in the style of television and radio presentations which has come packaged with the technology, almost as if the microphones and
cameras came wrapped together with instructions for presenting a news program or variety show."

Corporate television all too frequently solves its communications questions with answers from broadcast television. Those answers should be considered suspect, for they relate to questions concerning mass audience appeal, impulse buying stimulation, impression formation through repetition, and inducing the noncritical state of mind in broadcast audiences that is most conducive to the reception of unrelated, thirty second messages...the prime communications objective of commercial television. To confuse that objective with those of a corporate organization, one in need of informed, intelligent behaviors on the part of process and task oriented individuals focused on complex organizational goals, is naive and irresponsible.

And yet both right and wrong answers adopted from broadcast television through model imitation are conventionally applied to the requirements of an organization. Audience passivity is assumed. Corporate goals are displayed like hamburgers. Organizational rationalities are trivialized as sitcoms, soaps, and happy news. These methods are senseless in terms of the actual environment and the immediate audience characteristics. Where it may be sensible for broadcast programming or advertising executives to address their audience as a narcotized, drifting attention span looking for sheer escapism, it is senseless for corporate television producers to address their organizational audience in the same fashion.

Situational and environmental cues direct individuals towards the behaviors and attitudes appropriate for a given time, place, and activity. A person walking through a door and confronting a dozen professionals in business attire arranged around a conference table will be cued towards a certain set of behaviors and mental states; a pre-existing *script construct* will be provoked and engaged. When that same person walks through the door to their recreation room at home
to find a six-pack and a bowl of popcorn ready and waiting, a different set of situational and environmental cues will prompt the accessing of a very different script construct.

What is encountered on a video screen can also deliver unique cues, which are the constituents of a different form of address. The same individuals can be members of both a causal broadcast television audience and a task-oriented professional video audience, but these will be at different times and in different situations. One of those situations is work, and the other is leisure. These environments are not the same, and neither are the audiences. A single person can be many people.

If an organizational audience is presented with a video product that imitates a familiar broadcast model, there will be sufficient numbers of cues available to induce in the viewers an appropriate response to this manner of address. Those appropriate responses might include the desire to open a can of beer, slump down in an arm chair, channel hop, fall asleep...just about anything but the maintenance of a professional state of mind. What makes sense for the leisure time audience is senseless for the workplace audience. Corporate video is senseless video when it is modeled after broadcast television merely for the sake of convenience or out of ignorance of an appropriate product form.

Exacerbating the consequences of misaddress is the strong probability, suggested by various studies in cognition and brain response, that induced changes in behavior are rarely instantaneous. While we are essentially electronic beings, our "switching" is not mechanical and immediate but biochemical and gradual. Changes in brain activity in response to stimuli and task performance take place over a period of time. Leaving work for lunch or home, many people find that it takes time to "unwind". Conversely, arrival at work in the morning or from a lunch break appears to incur a certain adaptive period of time in which
conversations with coworkers, visits to the coffee machine, and other unfocused and non-task activities seem to keep hold of people's minds. If this is the case, then even a conscientiously designed and intentionally frivolous manner of address that interrupts a state of concentrated work effort will very likely fail to elicit the intended response within a practical span of time.

To appreciate how little distinction usually exists between corporate and leisure video, it is worthwhile to compare the differences in style, cues, and address to be found between corporate and leisure print. Print has been around a long time, and has evolved along with various human endeavors to be diversified and appropriate in its specific applications. Annual reports, memos, and benefits brochures are easily distinguished apart from newspapers, comic books, or People magazine. The same cannot be said for the video medium.

"We Are What We Are Not"

Discomfort with the term nonbroadcast television led the International Television Association (ITVA) to drop all such references to corporate video in their organizational literature. As intimated in the phrase "we are what we are not", it was an undesirably negative identity. Unfortunately, a negative identity may have been preferable to a misidentity. At least the term nonbroadcast television acknowledged and maintained a conceptual boundary between whatever corporate television was supposed to be and what it was recognized not to be.

The confusion of identity between corporate television and various images of broadcast television is widespread. In some cases, video managers make little distinction between the communications goals of their corporation and those of a TV spot, or between the audience for The Tonight Show and an audience for organizational policy. This utter confusion of objectives, environment, and audience is the net result of an uncritical adoption of media models.
Broadcast television continues to be a pervasive influence on corporate video. Not only does it display the most obvious models for imitation, but this industry has also determined the fundamental parameters and shape of the technology, and has established the precedents for how that technology is to be employed. Broadcasting determined both the tools and the manner of using those tools that were passed in turn to corporate video. Also, the emphasis handed down from broadcasting to corporate video has been in the process rather than the product, directing the attention of video communicators towards hardware and special effects instead of program design (Whittaker, 1982).

The Garbage Can Model

Video technology, with the attendant prescribed techniques for use, possesses inherent implications for appropriate content. The implications for appropriate content are that of broadcasting simply because broadcasting was the first to establish examples of fit uses. Once the precedent is set that a piece of hardware is used in a certain fashion within a certain program format, the die is cast. After that point, the most obvious route is to imitate the process and, in turn, the product. In maintaining a restricted collection of product models copied or adapted from broadcast television, instructional film, and from other corporate media examples, the video department itself resembles a model, one used in organizational psychology to describe a certain approach to problem-solving. It is called "the garbage-can model":

...a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work (Weick, 1979, p. 21)
Carrying around appropriate solution models can facilitate the efficiency with which they can be applied to communications needs (with at least some adaptation, since no premade solution will fit an immediate reality perfectly). But an inappropriate model can also be applied, especially when there are no appropriate ones around. And it will make perfect sense...somewhere.

The trick to making solutions sensible in the corporate environment is to dig critically through the garbage-can of models and methods and "formula answers". Discarding some of the garbage is necessary not only to lighten the load of inappropriate matter, but also to make room for the placement of innovative models and methods. It is worth noting that the videodisk (a model and method that didn't drop in from broadcasting) was a difficult medium to comprehend fully at the outset in terms of its potential and design. It didn't work like the TV set at home. It didn't run with a script from broadcast TV. Broadcast TV provided no clues as to how to design a videodisk program. Existing models derived from broadcast TV were virtually worthless in comprehending videodisk applications and design.

The videodisk was that new video previously alluded to. The videodisk's highly-touted and heavily marketed successor, multimedia, also poses the same challenge to corporate media designers. Unencumbered by a dominant precedent for applications, (except for that of multi-image,) multimedia may suggest design strategies that can be applied back to the video medium, freeing it from the prison of broadcast television. Establishing the corporate video department securely within the organizational whole through interlocking behaviors would be only a partial achievement in terms of identity and security. The balance of success lies in developing video and media communications that are relevant to their unique environment.
Conclusion

Media professionals derive their assessments of work situations and their perceptions of relative success or failure from many sources and levels. They compile their assessments from direct experiences of interpersonal cooperation and conflict, from insights shared with other professionals at other institutions, and on the bases of professional standards, product quality, testable achievement of instructional objectives, and aesthetic sensibilities. These are vivid, ever-present, and immediate indicators of what's right and what's wrong. A media department's behavioral relationship with the institutional body, by comparison, is abstract and invisible.

To fully perceive, evaluate, and take a hand in all the factors which can determine survival requires looking beyond the immediacy of the hardware, software, and the people contained within the walls of the media department. A heart does not survive for long outside the support of the body, regardless of how excellent a heart it may be. What is needed is virtually an ecological view of survival.
References


