Composition teachers today are aware of the practice of differentiating between written and spoken language. The "basic writing" student often views written language as a nearly new language altogether. Therefore, it is increasingly important to recognize and codify not merely the disparity between speech and writing but also the profound connection between the two. Thought is simultaneously formulated and articulated in verbal utterances, and there is no way to know the thought in its full implication until it can be heard by the inner ear. The appropriation of speech and hearing terminology to the discussion of literary texts—or of writing—is supported by psychological research on the relationship of thought to language. When David Olson suggests that formal education is the process that fosters the ability to "speak a written language" he is exceedingly accurate. The problem for the writing teacher is the promulgation of appropriate conventions through the media of speech and hearing—or of conversation in its broadest sense—which in turn creates and coexists with writing. (Contains 18 references.) (SAM)
Speculations on the Presence of Ear in Writing

by

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Once upon a time, the teacher told a tale of two languages, the written and the spoken. The teacher made a great and conscientious show of being objective (or, in somewhat more current parlance, non-judgmental), regarding the relative merits of the two. Thus, the students were told something on the order of:

"Spoken language in informal; written language is formal."

Or:

"The written language and the spoken are both important: Each has its place."

Or perhaps:

"Spoken language (with its auxiliary arsenal of tone, nuance, facial expression, etc.) does not require the logical, formal, consistent formal and grammatical structures required by written language (which is somehow purer, more precise, and certainly more intellectually weighted.)"

The difference between the two languages, the written and the spoken, was presented to the student (consciously, at least) not as the difference between good and bad, but as the difference between appropriate and inappropriate expression¹. That the teacher then proceeded to act in such a way as to treat formal, written and language as good--and

¹An opinion that is, to say the least, highly divergent form that of such rhetoricians as Richard Murphy, who cites Aristotle and Quintilian as exemplars of the pedagogical tradition of linking the spoken and written in the student's experience.
informal, spoken language as bad (or at least of lesser value) was a subtlety that went largely unnoticed, as did the short shrift given to genuinely informal oral utterance. Grammatical correctness, the hallmark of written language, became within the classroom a requisite of all verbal discourse. And so generations of children learned to say "It is I," instead of the more comfortable "It's me."

Alas, the teacher of this little tale may (all unwitting) have promulgated a grievous misapprehension which today's students and teachers have jointly inherited. Mina Shaughnessy, in *Errors and Expectations*, has pointed out that basic writers (those who lack the requisite grasp of formal structural, grammatical, orthographic conventions) are perceived by many "as native speakers who for some reason use 'bad' English," (92) despite the fact that their English has served many of their needs appropriately enough for a number of years. Unfortunate as this situation is, the most damaging part of the pedagogical heritage that splits written and spoken language may not be the subtle and almost certainly unintentional confusion over good/bad, formal/informal, and spoken/written distinctions, but the unvoiced and virtually unrecognized premise that there are, in practice, two languages--a "fact" it is perhaps impolitic to acknowledge.

There is, I believe, necessarily a concern for level of discourse and the conventions of genre that have their home in the classroom. David Olson, as far back as 1977, in "From Utterance to Text; the Bias of Language in Speech and Writing," stated unequivocally that "oral language can be less conventional and formalized," that its written counterpart. Further, there may be as Nancy Comley and Robert Scholes have suggested, "something inescapably academic about all writing." (103) Without academic concern, widely intelligible written work might, in fact, be an impossibility. If these apparently sensible
notions have any weight at all, then the implications of the tale which began this essay are more complicated than at first seems obvious.

The most problematic aspect of the pedagogical and academic inheritance for today’s teachers and students of composition may in fact be the implicit belief that speech and writing constitute two modes of language so distinct--so disparate--as to constitute two separate languages.

Certainly anyone who teaches composition today is aware of the practice of differentiating between written and spoken language. To the "basic writing" student, rather more often than is comfortable for me as teacher, the written language becomes very nearly a new language altogether--a language to be assimilated with diligence and great discomfort. In her introduction to Errors and Expectations, Shaughnessy offers the following insight:

. . .the spoken language, looping back and forth between speakers, offering chances for groping and backing up and even hiding, leaving room for the language of hands and faces, of pitch and pauses, is generous and inviting. Next to this rich orchestration, writing is but a line that moves haltingly across the page, exposing as it does all that the writer doesn't know, then passing into the hands of a stranger who reads it with a lawyer’s eyes, searching for flaws. (7)

Perhaps ironically, in a passage that distinguishes carefully between the written and the spoken, there is considerable evidence of oral expression in the language of the text itself, in such repetitive and sonorous phrases as "hands and face. . .pitch and pauses," an orality suggesting that as Shaughnessy finds places to hide in spoken language, the spoken language itself has found places to hide in her text. The view of writing championed in Errors and Expectations presents composition in terms consistent with the linear models of compositions criticized by such theorists as Nancy Sommers, whose "Revision Strategies" describes composition as an ongoing and recursive process which never produces a completed, finished artifact. Curiously, Shaughnessy’s text presents speech as such an
ongoing process in which revision (by hearer and speaker in dialogue) is a constant activity, while the written word, having made its way "haltingly across the page," can be made, in some sense to sit still, to be the artifact on which the writer consciously operates. It strikes me that this is a curious distinction, since in Sommers' view, it the writing that is seen as a process; always capable of revision, perhaps never completed, and always ready to be altered by the perception of a reader.

Viewed in this light, writing becomes less a production of static artifact than simply another aspect of speech; part of Oakeshott's "human conversation" as the term was understood by Kenneth Bruffee (Bruffee, 638), who saw textual artifact as part of an ongoing dialogue for all of mankind--past, present, and future. Thus there is at least an implication not that writing is separate from speech, but that writing is the inevitable extension of speech.

In spite of what Walter Ong has called "a large and growing literature on the differences between oral and written verbalization" (9), there is much to provoke an examination not of the differentiations between speech and writing, but of the relationship between them, and to prompt the belief that it will become ever more important to recognize and codify not merely the disparity between speech and writing (this is fairly obvious and already well catalogued) but also the profound connection between the two. The academic impetus to separate speech from writing may actually impose an unnecessary handicap on student and teacher alike, simply because such classification imposes artificial restrictions on the consideration of language--a topic that might more properly be viewed as a continuum. This is particularly important in view of the evidence which implies that writing--speech made visible--is less a visual artifact for the reader to look at than a cue (in the form of visualized speech) for the "inner (or imaginative) ear" of the reader.
A brief look at some of the literature of speech pathology and learning disability is helpful in establishing the importance of the ear in language acquisition and use. It is, of course, self-evident that the majority of human beings are able to learn language by means of heard speech, which can then be emulated. Education of the deaf presents unique problems because a deaf child, lacking language, must be taught it by some means other than the auditory (DiCarlo, 79) and because the intelligence of the deaf (which presumably has some bearing on the speed and ease of language acquisition in the case of hearing children) cannot be properly tested with a language-based intelligence test (DiCarlo, 21). Further, children who suffer from prelingual deafness (deafness occurring before acquisition of language) cannot reasonably be expected to acquire normal speech.

Similarly, the learning disability categorized as dyslexia seems in some manner to be associated with the "linguistic" left hemisphere of the brain ("Insight," 54), which depends on aural stimulation for optimum development. It has been established that dyslexia "is a problem with language, not with visual perception" ("Insight," 54) and that dyslexics perform poorly on tests of "reading, writing, spelling, naming things..." ("Insight," 54). Certainly, this does not establish a firm connection between the ear and reading, which is generally thought of as an act of visual perception. Yet the fact remains that dyslexics demonstrate, by means of their spelling, a substandard grasp of phonetics. ("Insight," 54) Dyslexic deficiencies are the same kinds of deficiencies experienced by hearing impaired students (i.e. weak grasp of phonetics, reading and writing difficulties, weak word retrieval capacity which makes it hard to name a well-known object. This in turn suggests that there may be a concrete physical grounding for the belief that thought (as we know it) is, to a large extent, language.

If language acquisition in normal student is dependent on aural stimulation--on the
function of the human ear, then thought and language together owe their existence in large measure to auditory stimulation, and it will be reasonable to look for this connection in auditory responses to language in a variety of modes.

Precisely this connection, as it happens, is hinted at in the terms with which we commonly discuss the production and understanding of text. Recently, a teaching colleague discussing the characteristic verbalizations of one student, said "I hear it in his speech and I hear it in his writing." Quite obviously, there is a crossover of terminology here. Properly speaking (at least in the eyes of those who accept a dichotomy between spoken and written language), one does not "hear" writing, save perhaps in a figurative or imaginative sense. While the statement may represent nothing more than a slip of the tongue, it is the sort of "slip" one encounters all the time--and such frequency is itself suggestive. Students and teacher alike, for instance, commonly discuss literary texts in terms of "what the writer is trying to say" and what kind of "ear" an individual writer possesses even when the language in question is "trapped" on paper and cannot logically be expected to be heard at all--unless it is read aloud, at which time the "voice" should logically belong to the reader rather than to the writer. A teacher may ask a student to trace a "voice" in a literary text, or to establish his/her own "voice" in a piece of writing, and the student may respond to a particular grammatical structure (or grammatical vagary) in a text by saying "It doesn't sound right." (a response cited in Errors and Expectations, 26)

Given the prolific use of crossover terminology in speech and in the conversations of literary and composition theory, perhaps it is time for the composition teacher to stop and look carefully at what the language is telling us so clearly, that writing is not so distant and disconnected from speech as we might like, for the sake of pedagogical or organizational models, to believe. Given the connections between language acquisition and auditory
experience, and between auditory experience and verbal performance, this should not be a startling proposition. To say that the use of such speech-related expressions as "voice" and "ear," as "what the author has to say," and Shaughnessy’s "pace and pause," or that to speak (and write) of "tone" and "sound" is merely to use readily accessible metaphor in the attempt to discuss written verbalization seems a rather facile side-stepping of an important issue.

The rather well-known old saw, "How do I know what I think until I see what I say?" indicates, I think, not a confusion of sense, nor a reliance on tired metaphor, but an instance of the speaker using language to express directly something central to the working of language and thought; i.e. that the thought is simultaneously formulated and articulated in the verbal utterance, and that there is no way to know the thought in its full implication until it can be heard or read (seen—heard with the "inner" ear) just what that formulation has turned out to be. Merleau-Ponty, for instance, has theorized that language accomplishes thought rather than that it clothes a formulation previously apprehended by thought alone, as it would exist prior to language (cited in Bolton, 207). This same idea, coincidentally, seems to have intrigued Ludwig Wittgenstein, who determined that "the meaning of a word lies in its future use, yet the meaning must already be present as we grasp it in a flash as the fulfillment of internal meaning" (113). Thus each utterance, spoken or written, which creates the thought it voices, has not only the intended meaning of the intention of the speaker or writer, but the inherently changing meaning of future use and future perception both by the utterer and his audience. This notion both complicates and enriches the implications of what I have called crossover terminology.

Within the field of composition theory, the use of crossover terminology reminiscent of the "see what I say" approach to language is extremely common—though rarely
acknowledged. David Bartholomae writing as instructor and theorist, maintains that the student must "learn to speak our language," (139) which is the formal written language of academic discourse, and that when a student reaches the point where, in the growth of his writing, "he, too, must speak. . . the writing falls to pieces." (160) Walker Gibson, in distinguishing between author and speaker, writes of "that voice or disguise through which someone (the poet) communicates with us," (1) as if the poet's language cannot possibly be part of his real identity—as if, by extension, the inscribed poem is necessarily false. Nancy Comley and Robert Scholes, in writing of student reactions to the poetry of Gwendolyn Brooks, cite "failure of response to voice" (24) (and they are referring to voice in the written poem) as evidence of poor reading by the students and, in turn, poor writing as well. Mina Shaughnessy suggests that punctuation implies "pace and intonation," (18) although the connection between inscribed language and these auditory characteristics of spoken utterance is never completely articulated. Maria Salvatori, of her own students' responses to Margaret Mead's writing, insists that the student "knows what Margaret Mead is trying to say" (605). How is it possible that the phenomenon is simultaneously so widespread and so unrecognized? Although any one of these statements can be attributed to imprecise use of language ("say" for "communicate" or "voice" for "syntactical characteristics of certain characters within a poem"), or (as a last ditch effort) to metaphorical use of language, but the education and expertise of the writers argues against such a view.

That the words chosen by professionals in the field to discuss reading and writing are so consistently tied to the experience of speech and hearing may indicate less a fondness for metaphor than the impossibility of finally severing writing from speech and hearing even though, as composition teachers, they may feel that such a distinction facilitates instruction. (As in, "you might say this, but you would not write it in a formal essay.)
The connection between speech and writing, or utterance and text, that is suggested in the language of so many theorists and teachers of composition, is underscored by David Olson’s 1977 essay. Olson freely contrasts text with "oral language statements" (259) or speech by categorizing the levels of contrast possible to the linguistic modes themselves—written language versus oral language: their usual usages—conversation, story telling and so on for the oral mode versus statements, arguments, and summaries for the written mode; their summarizing forms—proverbs and aphorisms for the oral mode versus premises for the written mode: and finally the cultural tradition build around these modes—an oral tradition and a literate tradition." (258)

While Olson makes what seem to be clear and obvious distinctions, however, there is a curious blurring of those distinctions when one recalls that various characteristics of one mode also occur in the other. Stories, after all, are frequently written—not always related orally—and arguments are often constructed extempore in verbal utterances. A more crucial point, however, and more subtle, is that he refers to distinct modes and traditions rather than to two distinct languages. He argues, in short, that "the evolution both culturally and developmentally is from utterance to text," (202) and that

\[ \ldots \text{this transition can be described as one of increasing explicitness, with language increasingly able to stand as unambiguous or autonomous representation of meaning.} (258) \]

Leaving, for the present, Olson’s assertion of "unambiguous" representation, this statement goes a long way toward explaining why, in Barry Kroll’s words, "a traditional way to view the act of writing for a reader is to see it an analogous to oratory,—to a speaker addressing an audience which he or she hopes to persuade." (173) Kroll’s statement clearly locates the common goal of persuasion in both speech and writing. If one then reviews Olson’s
contrasts of modes and considers the necessity for each mode to be rendered accessible to audience, one is led to the notion that while "oral language statements must be poetized to be remembered," (Olson, 265) this poetization is not really so different in kind form the sort of rhetorical organization that is imposed on the written text to make it comprehensible.

The fact that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* were both believed, into the twentieth century, to be the work of a literate Homer, rather than the transcription of centuries of oral tradition (Olson 263) lends additional force to the idea that the rhetoric of written language evolved from and is not entirely distinguishable from the sort of "poetizing" evident in preserved oral work, and to Olson's conclusion that the advent of writing "did not end the oral tradition [and that] some aspects of that tradition coexist with the more dominant literary tradition" (264). My suggestion is that the oral tradition does not merely coexist with the literary, but that it underlies the literary; thus the oral presence of language remains embedded in the literary text. Hence we have the necessity (as distinct from the possibility) of voice, ear, pace, rhythm, etc. in text. Thus, for example, stanzaic and rhythmic repetition characteristic of "poetization" of language can be seen as the underpinning of such grammatical structures as parallel construction, compound predicates, and so on as well being the a foundation for rhetorical structures ranging from enthymeme to syllogism--structures which I would argue have their own rhythmic substructure.

The appropriateness of speech and hearing terminology to the discussion of literary text--or of writing--is further supported by at least some of the psychological research on the relationship between thought and language. Prompted by the need to understand the nature of thought, psychologists have worked from the generally accepted premise that language is the basis for thought. Neil Bolton, in *The Psychology of Thinking*, outlines three major position on thought and language:
1. They are identical.

2. They are independent.

3. They share a reciprocal relationship. (200)

These positions add up to fairly distinct possibilities--either thought and language are one and the same thing--occurring simultaneously--or they have completely separate identities. If neither of these premises satisfies, then the two may act upon each other, either one prompting the other into being (or vice versa) in a continuous dialogue. In response to the theses outlined by Bolton, Revesz argued in 1954 that:

thinking and speech cannot be identical because their ontogenesis is different and because words are often inadequate expressions of thoughts and emotions, . . . nor can they be distinct and independent processes because there are many congruities between them and because disturbances of speech and thought often go together." (Bolton, 206)

This conclusion, taken together with the findings of the speech pathologists who noted the effects on verbal development of hearing impairment, strongly suggests the connection of speech with thought as verbal process. Russian psychologist Lev Vygotsky developed the premise that speech (sound production) and language join at a certain point in human development, and that it is at this point that "thought becomes verbal and speech becomes rational." (cited in Bolton 221) Vygotsky's work established that speech and language share a relationship like that described by Revesz--that they do not "bear one another a sequential relationship, but are simultaneous and correlative," (cited in Berthoff 76). When Carol Feldman posited the existence of "inner speech" as a phenomenon which allowed an individual to establish "a kind of verbal orientation to our surroundings" (Luria, cited in Feldman, 289), she also cited Vygotsky's work as evidence that inner speech develops from social speech. (290)
Although no one has yet established the precise connection between thought and subvocal or covert speech (the inner speech posited by Feldman, and the inner speech engaged in by many readers), much has been done to ascertain its presence and to measure its activity. The work of G.H. Rounds and A.T. Poffenberger has measured breathing activity as an indication of subvocal speech. Anna Wyczoikowska, and L.A. Novikova, working independently, have measured muscular activity in the tongue in covert or subvocal speech, and H.S. Curtis, by means of measuring laryngeal activity, has ascertained that there is definite non-vocalized speech in subjects engaged in the processes of adding three digit columns of figures and of reading, which is not at all the same as the covert speech activity in the same subjects at rest.

K. Faaborg Anderson and A.W. Edfeldt have established by measurement of laryngeal activity that silent reading occurred simultaneously with silent speech, as did F.J. McGuigan, Barbara Keller, and Eleanor Stanton, whose attempts to determine whether subvocal reading was detrimental to the process of learning established clearly that the subvocal speech (and, one suspects, "inner" hearing) was present during reading. It remained for Robert Lepley to establish that people rely on speech when learning to write:

1. Some if not all [writers] execute acts of implicit speech as accompaniments to the overt act of cursive writing.

2. This interferes in some individuals with "execution of "integrated patterns of whole words and phrases."

3. This makes their writing [its physical appearance] lack smoothness, organization, harmony, and rhythm. \(^{(100)}\)

Taken together, the body of evidence in the work of psychologists, speech pathologists, composition theorists like Olson et.al., suggests that people possess not just

\(^{Note \ the \ presence, \ once \ again, \ of \ crossover \ terminology, \ in \ the \ ambiguous \ "smoothness,\ " \ harmonic," \ and \ "rhythm."}
inner speech, but an inner ear. Given that Language is a social phenomenon, as Bruffee, Vygotsky, Oakeshoff et al., argue, it is clear that language is most commonly learned by means of being heard, as is argued by the findings of DiCarlo, Burgener, and Mouw. In those cases where language is not thus learned, as already cited by Burgener, Mouw, and DiCarlo, the linguistic and reasoning ability of the subjects suffers. It is therefore not unreasonable to conclude that people need to hear language in order to learn it, and that they continue to need to hear language as they use it, (or, if you will, to speak it as they write it) and—finally—that if this hearing does not take place actually it must take place imaginatively or intellectually; hence the covert or subvocal speech activity that accompanies reading and writing. The existence of this speech activity strongly suggests the presence of speech in the text, a presence assumed by Olson’s "utterance to text" argument, and further suggests that the real purpose of covert speech is to provide a stimulus for the imaginative, or inner, ear—which must hear the language if the language is to be real to the reader or writer.

Toby Fulweiler’s contention that we do not know "the predictable routes of faithful translation from thought to language, from pen to paper" (114) seems to be something of an oversimplification in the light of work done in other fields, since we are now aware that language is a social phenomenon and that it exists "simultaneously and correlatively" with thought. Mina Shaughnessy’s lengthy discussion of handwriting, in which she states that simple physical practice in management of the pen is essential to the development of writer, might help to resolve the uncertainty inherent in Fulweiler’s statement. It seems probable, and would be worth documenting with experimental research, that the Lepley subjects with awkward handwriting might, like Shaughnessy’s basic writers, be those for whom management of the pen has not yet assumed the reflex readiness of speech. If this is so, then J.Hillis Miller’s statement that "writing well is learned gradually as an acquired habit, like
speech itself" (401) acquires a new dimension as it must now be seen to encompass physical as well as intellectual habit, since the two are inseparable because of the role of hearing and speech in language production and use. If, as Kenneth Bruffee asserts, thought is internalized public and social talk, then writing of all kinds is internalized social talk made public and social again. If thought is internalized conversation, then writing is internalized conversation re-externalized. (64)

then it becomes crucial that the teaching of writing take this into account--and that the composition teacher recognize the necessity for the written language to be (on some level) mouthed and heard by the student.

If we agree with Maria Salvatori that "the artificial separation between the activities of reading and writing. . .can be dangerous if it seems to suggest that the processes of one activity are harmful to the teaching of the other," (664) we must also now recognize that the activity of speech/hearing must be given at least equal (and very possibly greater) consideration than the activity of reading/writing which is Salvatori's chief concern, simply because the whole structure of writing and written language (audible language made visible) rests ultimately on hearing and speech. Perhaps the single most startling implication of this is the light it casts on the locus of textual meaning. It cannot reside solely in the text, Plato's insistence on the unalterable nature of the written word (Plato's Seventh Letter, cited in Olson, 268) and Martin Luther's certainty that text held on incontrovertible meaning (cited Olson, 263) to the contrary.³ That it should do so would deny the social nature of speech and internalized conversation. Nor can meaning rest solely in the mind of the reader, who is only one aspect of the dialogue or conversation, the ongoing process, that is language. The

³Plato's motives were, after all, political, and Luther's theological. Plato needed to establish fixed meaning in order to promulgate his own design for society, and Luther as a priest/theologian needed to deal with text as intrinsically static revelation of divine intention.
meaning resides, finally, in the conversation and dialogic process of which the writer is a part, and by means of which the utterance/text is modified by each perception and repetition. There is, thus, no unalterable text, and no irretrievably fixed meaning—although there are certainly consensual interpretive conventions and agreements.

This proposition raises some serious problems from linguistic theory, which according to Noam Chomsky is "concerned primarily with an ideal speaker/listener, in a homogeneous speech community who knows its language perfectly and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant conditions as memory limitations, distractions, shifts in attention and interest, and errors . . ." (3) Chomsky’s position effectively isolates linguistic theory from the consideration of much normal social interchange as language. By extension, it denies writing the essential character of speech and writing as practiced by individuals—posing some template of language which exists beyond the realm of language usage as it is in fact practiced, as a dialogic process and not a static or sterile grammatical ideal. By this I mean not that writing is identical to speech (which depends hearing) but that it contains speech, and that this contained speech is a necessary cue to the ear of the reader and writer alike. This approach has important implications for education as practiced by the writing teacher whose job it is to bring the new writer into the human conversation envisioned by Oakeshott and Bruffee, and then to enable that writer to "recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasion of utterance and . . . [to] acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation." (Bruffee 638)

In line with Bruffee’s vision of the teacher’s role, Crews’ contention that the "strongest component in producing fluency [is] . . . early and continuous habituation to educated speech in the home" (168). Speech, of course, is that which we perceive by hearing; the ear trains the tongue and both together produce utterance. When Olson suggests
that formal education is the process that foster the ability to "speak a written language" (Greenfield, 72 cited in Olson, 271) he is exceedingly accurate. Bruffee's belief that thought is related causally to conversation is perhaps questionable, since the two are probably simultaneous one the initial learning of language has been accomplished, but his contention that "the first steps in learning to think better are learning to converse better. . ." (640) is one worth serious attention in the teaching of writing. The problem for the teacher of writing is not, as Chomsky suggests, "to determine form the data of performance the underlying system of rules" (4) that can be discerned in the language use of the speaker/hearer, but the promulgation of appropriate conventions through the media of speech and hearing--of conversation in its broadest sense--which in turn creates and co-exists with writing.
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