Centimeter

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 mm

Inches

1.0
1.1
1.25

Manufactured to AIIM Standards
by Applied Image, Inc.
The Midwest Philosophy of Education Society strives to enhance and deepen the level of conversation about education in the modern world and to evaluate, in moral terms, the relationship of education to the larger society. The following papers were presented at the 1985 annual meeting of the society: "A Plea for Philosophical Reflections" (George Dalin); "The Recitation: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow" (Amy Raths McAninch); "The Elastic Circle: A Scheme of John Dewey's Social Philosophy" (Dwight C. Rinke); "Wieman's Creative Event as an Educational Phenomenon" (George W. Stickel); and "The Myths and Realities of Social Reform or Why People Would Rather Kill Than Drive Slowly" (Alton Harrison, Jr.; Diann Musial). The following papers were presented at the 1986 annual meeting of the society: "The Moral Development of the Developmentally Disabled" (Walter P. Hrolickowski); "On Why Self-Government Failed at Bronson Alcott's Temple School" (Ronald Swartz); "Philosophy of Education in an Era of Reform" (George A. Kizer); "Philosophy of Education and Partnership in Reform" (George W. Stickel); "Performance Versus Results: A Critique of Excellence in Modern Sport" (John H. Gibson); "The Habit of Inquiry and the Content of Inquiry: Implications for Curriculum" (Vincent Macri); "Did Dewey Dance? An Artistic Assay I: The Critic as Teacher" (Lawrence J. Dennis); "Philosophy and the Artistic Quest: Are There Objects of Art? Response to the Presidential Address" (Phillip L. Smith); "Liberal and Conservative Creeds in Education" (Robert B. Nordberg); and "Moral Principles and Moral Education" (Glynn Phillips). (DB)
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE
MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1985-1986

Edited by

Philip L. Smith
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preface</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program (1985)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Plea for Philosophical Reflection</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by George D. Dalin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago Board of Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Recitation: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Amy Raths McAninch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Illinois</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Elastic Circle: A Scheme of John Dewey's Social Philosophy</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Dwight C. Rinkle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wayne State University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wieman's Creative Event as an Educational Phenomenon</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by George W. Stickel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Myths and Realities of Social Reform or</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why People Would Rather Kill Than Drive Slowly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Alton Harrison, Jr. &amp; Diann Musial</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Illinois University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program (1986)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Moral Development of the Developmentally Disabled</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Walter P. Krolikowski</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyola University of Chicago</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On Why Self-Government Failed at Bronson Alcott's Temple School</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Ronald Swartz</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of Education in an Era of Reform</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by George A. Kizer</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iowa State University</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy of Education and Partnership in Reform</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by George W. Stickel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northwestern College</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Performance Versus Results:  
A Critique of Excellence in Modern Sport  
by John H. Gibson ........................................... 129  
The Ohio State University

The Habit of Inquiry and the Content of Inquiry:  
Implications for Curriculum  
by Vincent Macri ............................................. 141  
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Did Dewey Dance? An Artistic Assay I: The Critic as Teacher  
by Lawrence J. Dennis ........................................... 155  
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Philosophy and the Artistic Quest: Are There Objects of Art? Response to the Presidential Address  
by Phillip L. Smith ........................................... 169

Liberal and Conservative Creeds in Education  
by Robert B. Nordberg ...................................... 177  
Marquette University

Moral Principles and Moral Education  
by Glynn Phillips ........................................... 191
PREFACE

The Midwest Philosophy of Education Society strives to enhance and deepen the level of conversation about education in the modern world and to evaluate, in moral terms, the relationship of education to the larger society. These Proceedings are a record of the presentations at our annual meetings in 1985 and 1986 that we believe deserve the attention of a wider audience.

Our group has convened regularly for nearly thirty years. We have published our Proceedings since 1977. Many people have worked to make the Society a lively forum for intellectual exchange and, at the same time, a structure that supports individual and professional growth. The challenge of those who follow us is to maintain this tradition in an atmosphere where philosophical understanding and human community are viewed increasingly as needless encumberments.

Philip L. Smith
November 1987
1985 Annual Meeting

November 15-19

Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 15 -- 12:00 noon to 5:00 p.m.
12:00 - 1:00 Registration
1:00 - 1:10 Welcome

Session I: Papers
1:10 - 1:40 "Is the Personal Political?" Mary Leach
University of Illinois
1:40 - 1:50 Commentator Sopie Haroutunian
University of Chicago
1:50 - 2:00 General Discussion Walter Krolikowski, Chair
Loyola University

Session II: Panel Discussion
2:00 - 3:00 "Has Philosophy of Education a Future?"
Chair George D. Dalin, Chicago Board of Education
Arthur Brown, Wayne State University
Philip Jackson, University of Chicago

Break
3:00 - 3:50 Coffee and Juice

Session III: Papers
3:30 - 3:50 "The Recitation: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow" Amy McAnich
University of Illinois
3:50 - 4:10 "The Elastic Circle: A Schema of" Dwight C. Rinke
John Dewey's Social Philosophy Wayne State University
4:10 - 4:20 Commentator Ronald Schwartz
Oakland University
4:20 - 4:30 General Discussion Carl Beck, Chair
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Business
4:30 - 5:00 Business Meeting

Social
5:00 Cocktails

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16 (coffee and rolls) -- 9:00 a.m. to noon

Session IV: Working Papers
9:00 - 9:20 "Wiernan's Creative Event as an... George W. Stickel
Educational Phenomenon" Northwestern University
9:20 - 9:30 General Discussion
9:30 - 9:50 "The Myths and Realities of Social Reform or Why People Would Rather Kill than Drive Slowly".

9:50 - 10:00 General Discussion.................Peter Collins, Chair
Northern Illinois University

Session V: Publishing
10:00 - 10:40 Publishing.............................Ralph Page, Editor
Educational Theory

Break
10:40 - 11:00 Coffee and Juice

Session VI: Working Papers
11:00 - 11:20 "On Teaching Thinking: Three Perspectives"....Francis Strong
University of Wisconsin, Madison

11:20 - 11:50 "Herman Horne's Critique of Pragmatism and Progressive Education
Ohio State University

11:50 - 12:00 General Discussion...............Robert Nordberg
Marquette University

ADJOURNMENT
12:00
MIDWEST PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Officers:
President: Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Vice-President: Sophie Haroutunian
The University of Chicago

Secretary-Treasurer: George W. Stickel
Northwestern College

Executive Committee:
Philip L. Smith (ex officio) The Ohio State University
Robert Nordberg Marquette University
F. Craig Schley Wayne State University

Program Committee:
David Annix, Chair Ball State University
Robert Craig St. Patrick's College
Jack Williams University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee

Arrangements Committee:
Robert Nordberg
Peter Collins
Lori Ashley
Yvonne Murnane
Marquette University
I should like to think that Anglo/American philosophers of education have encouraged educators to reflect on the information and knowledge they have produced or accumulated in the never-ending quest for excellence in public school education. The reflective process, an integral part of philosophy, suggests the struggle to acquire perspective on what we are doing as individuals and as educators. Educators ought to be reminded from time to time that they should ask the following simple and direct question, "Do we know what we are doing?" This candid question requires reflection on how to educate people. I contend that this question is rarely raised by today's educators.

Perhaps it is unfair to say that reflection or philosophical reflection has not been part of many educators' methods or a part of their lexicon. From a vast number of empirical studies and commentaries on contemporary educators, there has been little evidence to support the claim that philosophical reflection is practiced by public school educators. This is not to say that we expect educators to be philosophers, but we can expect educators to attempt to use their training, especially in philosophy of education, to train their students to grasp the assumptions and arguments of the various disciplines that they are required to study.

Today, what seems to have emerged from public school educators is the tendency to think about issues and problems instrumentally. It is as Habermas puts it, "action oriented to success," i.e., instrumental. This "action
oriented to success" is what many educators seem to use when action is understood as following technical rules and can be evaluated in terms of efficiency in influencing the decisions of others. The outcome of this type of action is force or coercion on others to accept policies. Needless to say, this type of action bears little resemblance to philosophical reflection. To many educators this does not matter when they can muster up the tools and methodologies of educational research to provide evidence that intractable educational problems can be solved or dissolved. For example, the U.S. Department of Education publication, What Works, supported by citations from educational research, provides us with "sound" solutions to our problems in educating our youth. Moreover, in this publication there is a flagrant lack of research and reflection done by philosophers of education.

Educators who rely on tools and methodologies of educational research are ill-equipped to educate anyone. Instead, there must be a serious attempt on the part of educators to undertake the arduous yet rewarding task of philosophical reflection on the many problems that confront them. To partially support this belief or mine, I am reminded of J. Glenn Gray's claim that the greatest gift of philosophical reflection is likely to be the measure of equanimity of spirit. The equanimity of spirit provides us with the strength we need to meet the uncertainties of life with all its tragedy, suffering and occasional joy. This evenness of mind is a way to rise above pettiness, mournfulness, and coercion without being an unhappy consciousness.

What is needed is the continued study of the contributions of philosophy of education which can move educators to engage in reflection on the very issues that stretch their minds to solve. Rather than relying on dim recollections of contributions of the many thinkers who grappled with issues on education or the complex philosophical systems that some philosophies of
education label with an "ism," educators must be guided in their efforts to reflect on what it is to educate. Philosophers of education can direct their efforts toward guiding educators on what it is to reflect philosophically on the disciplines that contribute to the educational process. Put in another way, philosophers of education must seriously consider how to argue that there is a connection between philosophy and educational issues, problems, and policies.

Now many contemporary philosophers of education will argue that they have undertaken to show in various ways this connection or linchpin. But these efforts have had little impact on educators who are generally sceptical about anything philosophy has to offer in solving practical educational problems. Partly, this scepticism may have come about by the training in philosophy of education that a majority of educators received in their university courses. Another factor is that this training may have had an exiguous role in questioning and reflecting on the grounding of the educational process. Moreover, the training may have been adequate in introducing what one needs to do in philosophy of education, but this training may have failed to have educators engage in the struggle and risks that are involved in reflecting philosophically.

My plea for philosophical reflection may not persuade many educators because it lacks specificity. But I must remind them that whatever questions they may ask about what it is to educate, their answers, replies or arguments will depend on their own reflections. And I must add that philosophical thought "will participate in all the different forms of human rational creativity, not with the despotic superiority of a system of concepts which integrates everything in its framework, but with the thoughtfulness of someone who never knows totally and definitely what he knows." 顶部
Notes


The Recitation: Here Today, Gone Tomorrow? by Amy Raths McAninch
University of Illinois

Introduction

John, a student observer in a teacher education program, recently described how his cooperating teacher, a high school history instructor, conducted class. According to John, the cooperating teacher would, "ask if there were any questions on last night's reading assignment, lecture and occasionally ask the class questions, then, at the end of the hour, assign new reading from the text." When questioned about this teacher's method, John commented that he would probably teach in the same manner because that is the way his high school history teacher taught "...and besides that, what else is there?"

This vignette speaks directly to the topic of this paper: the stability of teacher-centered instruction—despite reform efforts of the 20th century which specifically sought to implement a child-centered pedagogy. The first portion of this paper briefly presents some findings on the stability of teacher-centered instruction. The second part of this paper criticizes an implication of this research advanced by N.L. Gage; namely, that teacher education should focus on improving and refining teacher-centered instructional skills.
Cuban's 1983 study, How Teachers Taught, is the most recent, and perhaps most thorough, piece of research to document the predominance and stability of teacher-centered classroom practices. Cuban describes this mode of instruction in the following way:

...teacher-centered instruction tries to capture a common form of instruction where teachers generally teach to the whole group of students in a class, show high concern for whether students are listening, concentrate mostly on subject-matter and academic skills, and, in general, control what is taught, when, and under what conditions.

Thus, in a teacher-centered classroom, one would expect to see far more teacher-talk than student-talk, whole group instruction a high percentage of the time, teacher control of time, and the students' desks arranged in rows facing the front of the classroom.

Specifically, Cuban reports that classroom practice in secondary schools changed very little during or after the reform movements of this century, remaining highly teacher-centered. At the elementary level, the evidence suggests to him that only a small minority of teachers, perhaps 5-10%, adopted child-centered practices. Cuban states that a larger number of elementary school teachers, approximately 25%, very selectively incorporated one or more child-centered practices into their classroom in such a way that the existing teacher-dominated mode of instruction would not be upset or interrupted. This careful selection created a "hybrid" of student- and teacher-centered classrooms. He writes,
The modification of teacher practices that produced hybrid forms of teacher-centeredness occurred in substantial numbers of elementary schools during the interwar years and since the late 1960s. By the 1980s, classrooms were far less formal places for children than a century earlier. Varied grouping procedures, learning centers, student mobility, and certain kinds of noise were acceptable. But far fewer teachers had incorporated teacher-student planning of activities, determination of content, and allocation of class time into their lesson plan.6

Cuban likens the drive for progressive education or open classrooms to a hurricane moving along the top of the ocean: yes, water splashed and surged at the surface, a flurry of activity could be observed, but down on the ocean floor of the classroom, the scene was extraordinarily calm. His research corroborates the earlier work of Dreeben, Westbury, and Hoetker and Ahlbrand, among others.7

In "The Persistence of the Recitation", the latter two authors offer the following puzzlement regarding the stability of this mode of instruction:

What is there about the recitation, for instance, that makes it so singularly successful in the evolutionary struggle with other, more highly recommended, methods? That is, what survival needs of teachers are met uniquely by the recitation?9

They also ask, "If the recitation is a poor pedagogical method, as most teacher educators long have believed, why have they not been able to deter teachers from using it?"9 Similarly, one might ask why teacher educators have not been able themselves to refrain from using it.

What accounts for popularity of the recitation? Cuban and Dreeben, two sociologists, attribute its stability to classroom and school organizational structures. These structures, they argue, create the boundaries within which teachers must perform
the tasks of instruction, including classroom management. Teacher-centered techniques, they suggest, are more adaptive to these structures than child-centered ones. Cuban also cites the occupational culture of teaching as a source of conservatism. Many individuals, he suggests, are attracted to the profession because they like something about schools as they exist. Socialized by the institution through 12 years of schooling, a large majority of prospective teachers learn "how it is done" through years of direct observation of teacher-centered methods.10

Cuban's primary explanation for the shift to child-centered practices in that very small minority of classrooms lies with the beliefs of individual teachers regarding teaching, learning, and the purposes of education. Thus, highly influenced by the ideas of progressive education, these teachers altered their instructional practices through sheer perseverance against organizational constraints.11

In sum, this research indicates that teacher-centered practices are remarkably stable, and have been, despite the highly reform-minded progressive and open classroom eras.

Some Implications of these Findings for Teaching Education

At this point, it might be argued that if the recitation is the overwhelmingly stable and persistent form of instruction, then the task for colleges of education should be to teach prospective teachers how to lead better recitations. This position is forwarded by Gage in his Hard Gains in the Soft
Sciences: The Case of Pedagogy. Gage suggests that trying to reform teacher-centered instruction is like "trying to change the basic art form that constitutes classroom teaching." In fact, drives for open education and progressive pedagogy "are tantamount to trying to persuade poets to stop writing sonnets and start writing sonatas." Therefore, according to Gage:

If we cannot replace the art form, we can perhaps change the quality of what is done in that form. Within the sonnet form there are poor sonnets and good sonnets... Within the art form called classroom teaching there is also great variation in quality. What I see as promising is research that accepts the basic parameters of classroom teaching: teacher-centeredness, whole-class organization, subject-matter orientation, and much recitation, interspersed with short lectures, discussions, tutoring, and seatwork.

In short, the task for research in pedagogy, Gage maintains, is to find out how to conduct teacher-centered techniques well.

One reason why Gage's proposition is objectionable, if not simply disheartening, is that recitations and other forms of teacher-centered instruction do not, by and large, constitute educative, worthwhile activities for the classroom. A quotation from Dewey's Democracy and Education is highly appropriate here. Dewey, commenting on the direct-instruction, subject-matter oriented pedagogy of Herbart, writes, "It takes, in brief, everything educational into account save its essence..." In other words, providing a student with a steady diet of recitations, lectures, and worksheets cannot generally be considered providing him/her with experiences that are educative.

In a chapter of Ethics and Education, R. S. Peters sets out criteria for worthwhile activities. He argues that the term "activity" suggests individuals who are not passive. In
addition, an activity involves a span of time, particular rules and mores, and involves skill and effort on the part of the participants. Peters also points out that activities usually have some purpose or meaning.

By these criteria, it may be quite possible to argue that for many children, a large percentage of the school day is not devoted to activities of any kind, since listening to the teacher talk requires a high degree of passivity. And, further, young children do not normally engage in the kind of critical or analytical thought which would make listening "active." Listening of this quality requires a complex of knowledge, interests, skills, and dispositions that grade school children are unlikely to possess. At higher levels of education, as students are better able to participate in lectures through thought and reflection, the lecture format may more frequently meet the criteria set out above.

For the purpose of discussion, however, let us assume that the lecture and other teacher-centered techniques qualify as activities. The question remains: are they intrinsically valuable or worthwhile? Are they the types of activities one would choose to participate in for their own sake? According to Peters, such an activity must be capable of capturing and maintaining a person's attention, provide unending pleasure, and offer "rich" opportunities to practice skills, among other criteria.

Clearly, teacher-centered practices fall far short of meeting these requirements. One only has to imagine the
absurdity of a child expressing a desire to participate in a recitation for the sheer joy of it to grasp just how deficient such methods are by these criteria.

Broudy's criticism of didactics, which he defines as "a type of teaching that tries to convey skills, knowledge, and attitudes that can be formulated with respect to outcomes and means," is particularly appropriate to the methods of lecture and recitation:

The weakness of didactics is its remoteness from the immediate concerns of the pupil. Not only is the content of standard school subjects highly abstract, but the very orderliness of didactics is out of kilter with the adventitiousness of ordinary life. Accordingly, for all who do not enjoy acquiring knowledge for its own sake, didactics is synonymous with the drudgery that has made school the legendary burden of the young. The history of pedagogy is replete with schemes that promise to make didactics pleasant and easy. The persistent search for such schemes is melancholy evidence that a successful one has yet to be found.

Thus, even if Gage is successful in finding out how to train teachers to conduct these methodologies well, it is still unlikely that Peters's criteria can be satisfied because of the very nature of the instruction.

In *Experience and Education*, Dewey writes that worthwhile experiences are measured according to two principles: continuity and interaction. By the principle of continuity, Dewey means "that every experience both takes up something from those which have gone before and modifies in some way the quality of those which come after." Specifically, Dewey sees as valuable those experiences which promote growth which lead to more growth.
emphasis be placed on the objective and internal conditions of a given situation. The student's impulses, purposes, capacities, and interests should be given as much emphasis in planning experiences as the external environment. Dewey states that particular activities or subject matter only become valuable when they fulfill the needs of students at a particular time. It is clear that teacher-centered instruction sacrifices much of what Dewey and the progressives held dear: concern for the development of the whole child, school that is as "life-like" as possible, organization of the curriculum to fit the needs of the students, and so on.

Conclusion

Gage, on the basis of Cuban's research, suggests that teacher-centered instruction is here to stay for at least the next 20 to 30 years and that research should now aim at equipping teachers with sharply tuned lecture and recitation skills. I am suggesting that Gage's proposed research agenda lacks promise because these methods, even if done well, do not, by and large, constitute worthwhile or valuable experiences. Further, the notions of what constitutes a worthwhile experience advanced by R.S. Peters and John Dewey come closer to approximating the kinds of experiences we would call "educational" in the best sense of the word than do the teacher-centered activities advocated by Gage. This is not to say that teacher-centered instruction is never appropriate or that the realities of classroom life should be ignored or trivialized. I am suggesting, however, that every
school day should offer students the opportunity to engage in experiences that are valuable by these or similar criteria.

If I am correct, then the research on the stability of teacher-centered classroom practice holds some promise for instructional reform and suggests an alternate research agenda to Gage's which might focus on the following questions, among others: what are the necessary qualities an instructional strategy or innovation must possess to be adopted readily by teachers? How can we educate teachers to have problem-solving skills and dispositions? What are the relationships between the teacher's use of worthwhile activities and various student outcomes? Finally, how can we change the structure of schools to make them more hospitable to child-centered pedagogy?

Notes

1. I wish to thank Ralph Page and James Raths for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.


4. Cuban, How Teachers Taught, p. 3.

5. Ibid., p. 254.

6. Ibid., p. 238-239.

8. Hoetker and Ahlbrand, Jr., p. 163.
9. Ibid.
10. Cuban, How Teachers Taught, pp. 243-244.
11. Ibid., pp. 250-251.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
17. Ibid., pp. 280-285.
19. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 27.
Let us admit the case of the conservative. Once we begin thinking, no one can guarantee where we will come out, except that many ends, objects, and institutions are doomed. Every thinker puts some portion of an apparently stable world in peril, and no one can wholly predict what will emerge in its place.

--John Dewey (1939)

Not only to philosophers and educators, but to social, political, and economic thinkers as well, one of the great puzzlements of the twentieth century has been the birth and premature death of liberalism, and within that movement one of the greatest puzzlers has been one of its chief exponents, John Dewey. Long a conundrum to the lay community he so profoundly affected with his many works on progressive education, he proved equally as problematic to his colleagues in the philosophical community who have continually interpreted, debated, and criticized his philosophy since he first published in 1882. To wit, a 705-page book entitled Dewey and His Critics was issued in 1977 which reprinted articles written by and in response to Dewey that were originally published in The Journal of Philosophy between its founding in 1904 and 1959. Logical empiricism notwithstanding, that Dewey's theories are still discussed in philosophical circles and philosophy departments and taught in colleges of education across the nation today bears witness to the irrepressive vitality of liberalism to stimulate our thinking even during periods of conservative control like the one our nation is currently experiencing. To be sure, Dewey's ideas are liberal. In 1944 he wrote an article titled "Antinaturalism in Extremis" in which he identified himself with the naturalists, a philosophical school whose reliance on the scientific method equates it with humanism. In fact, he had
earlier defined himself as a humanist by signing the original 1939 Commit-

tee for Cultural Freedom Manifesto. His enemies would point a finger and

pejoratively call him a "sectarian humanist," and as such he was--and is--
anathema to the conservative religionists and absolutist ideologues who are

in a desperate struggle today to control not only our government and its

ecosystem but also to legislate our morals and bring their God to the airways of

television and radio, not to mention our public school classrooms. To under-

stand their fear and apprehension of "many ends, objects, and institutions

[being] doomed" is to gain an insight into the relativism of Dewey's ever-

changing, developing, and growing Weltanschauung.

For many people reading Dewey is difficult. His writing is dense, obscure,

and abstract, even "involved and tortuous" said his editor, and some would

add ironically as still and unexciting as his university classroom. Thus in

the absence of the clarity that Dewey could have provided through visual meta-

phor, the present paper proposes the drawing of a "map" of his social space and

theory. That schema I shall call "The Elastic Circle" and suggest it is a para-

digm for the understanding of Dewey's philosophy.

It is interesting that The American Heritage Dictionary not only defines

a circle as "a plane curve everywhere equidistant from a given fixed point, the

center," but also describes it as "a group of people sharing an interest, activity,
or achievement." Dewey would undoubtedly have appreciated both definitions.
The first is a simple and elegant geometric definition. The second, however,
makes a different kind of statement. By use of the word "sharing" it implies

community which is a concept central to understanding Dewey. Unlike Platonic

idealism which focuses on an abstract, absolute ideal, considering the realism

of things in our world only reflections of perfect reality; and unlike exis-
tentialism which isolates human beings in the pleasure and pain of their exis-
tences and essences; Dewey's pragmatic instrumentalism is a social philosophy
that emphasizes our connectedness to other human beings within the fabric of a society. Thus the circle (see fig. 1) represents society as a discrete unit with boundaries. But Dewey would not be happy with something so static and delimited. Thus, the concept of the circle as elastic is needed. It can expand and contract representing societies of smaller numbers of people, such as a classroom of students or a family, or larger numbers, such as a university, federal state, nation, or even a cultural population. A further and more important aspect of that elasticity will be discussed below.

However, before proceeding with that explanation, it should be noted that the members of Dewey's social system are represented by smaller circles within the larger confines of the society. They are of varying sizes depending upon their maturity or growth, and it should be pointed out that the largest are located nearer the center, while the smaller ones are newer, younger members of the society, more recently having entered it, and are not yet as mature or as socialized as the others. Further it should be stated that all the individuals are ideally free to float around the circle as they wish, this being metaphoric of the freedom of a democratic society upon which Dewey bases his philosophic method. It should be pointed out, too, that these circles are not isolated and unconnected. They touch one another and overlap to show the influence every individual in society has upon all others. In a very important sense they form a network, a term which in recent years has enjoyed a rather trendy vogue, but which was of real import to Dewey and integral to his social structure decades ago.

It is important to emphasize another element of the drawing in figure 1. The circles are defined by broken lines to indicate their elasticity. The significance here is not only to indicate the possibilities of larger and smaller social groups as already mentioned, but more importantly to illustrate the potential for growth which is another key concept for an understanding of Dewey.
Fig. 1: Dewey's Elastic Circle
The object, as it were, is to become a larger individual circle within the infinitely growing circle of a society which is realizing a higher and higher collective consciousness. Thus the boundaries although discrete are not fixed in size. The object, too, is to move nearer and nearer to the center of the circle of society as one's size grows. The metaphor of the power of growth suggested here is of a stone dropped into a pool of water: if one is at the center, concentric ripples of influence radiate to the edges touching all as they move outward. While other stones if dropped elsewhere in the pool have lesser influence because the ripples of their power are only bisecting arcs of lesser size whose current of influence often must fight against the prevailing ripple-current of the society.

At the risk of adding confusion to this paradigm, I should like, nonetheless, to observe that two imaginable extensions of this model come to mind, both of which would require different and impractical media to communicate their full meanings, so I shall only suggest their possibilities. The first is the idea that this elastic circle may really be a sphere, possessing a third dimension, moving through space and time as our earth moves through the solar system. This is an obvious and almost literal image of our world, and undoubtedly Dewey would appreciate its directness.

The second possibility I should like to suggest is that the experience of this elastic circle may go beyond such a sphere in a solar system. If one thinks of the center infinitely expanding to hold the ever-growing number of ever-growing individual spheres, the analogy by further extension could compare it to a black hole, highly concentrated in mass and energy. This last comparison with its emphasis on energy then raises the question of the dynamic of Dewey's system. Through what energy does one get to be a larger individual circle and thus move nearer the center to greater and greater positions of influence? In other words, how does one grow since that is the mechanism of mobility, the cur-
rency of power, which for Dewey is simultaneously the means and the ends of his society?

For Dewey the answer to that question lies in the understanding of his philosophic method, sometimes called the experimental method, which in its greatest refinement is the scientific method. In another context, as articulated in *Art as Experience*, it is criticism—practiced socially—embodied in a discussion one might have about art, literature, or other issues in a classroom or other forum. In all cases the end or purpose is the same—growth.

In his essay, "Dewey's Philosophy and Philosophic Method," Lewis E. Hahn enumerates five steps to that method. They are the following:

1. [In what some people would call a "felt difficulty"] the first step in a complete act of reflective thinking or inquiry is the appearance of the problem or the indeterminate situation.

2. The second step or phase is clarification of the problem, or what Dewey referred to in *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* as the institution of the problem.

3. [The] appearance of suggested solutions or hypotheses as to how to solve the problem.

4. The fourth stage is that of deductive elaboration. On the basis of a survey of the various proposed solutions as elaborated we decide which to test in action.

5. The fifth step is that of verification or disconfirmation.

Another important connection must be made at this point. Bertram Morris in his essay, "Dewey's Theory of Art," states it well when he essentially equates the art process with the education or growth process. Interspersing Dewey's words from *Art as Experience* and *Democracy and Education* into his own text, he describes that equation thus:

The art-process easily becomes the paradigm of the educational process. And indeed Dewey defines them both in the same way. "This cumulative movement of action toward a later result is what is meant by growth." The only
difference is that whereas art has an end, a finality, education has none, since "there is nothing to which education is subordinate save more education." In art the funding of meaning has an end as its product. The product of the process is form; that is, subject-matter come to its fulfillment. Matter and form are, Aristotelian-like, two ways of looking at the same thing; hence, matter is not to be confused with the subject with which a statue or painting or poem is concerned. Form is defined as the "operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral fulfillment." Thus everything contained in the art-process must lead on to such fulfillment.

Elsewhere—in Experience and Nature—Dewey reinforces the connection.

There he says:

For all intelligent activities of men, no matter whether expressed in science, fine arts, or social relationships, have for their task the conversion of causal bonds, relations of succession, into a connection of means-consequences, into meanings. When the task is achieved the result is art: and in art everything is common between means and ends.  

Morris further develops the concept when he says in the same article that "... clarity of aesthetic experience is achieved because it is critical experience. Dewey believes that intelligence is at work in every step of art-creation ... Critical judgment is thus of the essence of the creative process."10

For teachers, nay for any learner, Lawrence Dennis seems best to articulate the steps of growth as he reinterprets Dewey's idea of the role of the teacher in conjunction with his philosophic method. Dennis says the following:

The steps a teacher must take in extending the potential of his students to secure aesthetic appreciation of the arts are (1) to put his educational procedures into the context of his aesthetic beliefs, (2) to present material of worth, (3) to discuss this and review it in terms of its internal relations and to bring it into focus by a synthetic interpretation of the work, and (4) to refer again to the art object. This is a circular process; the experience looks back to another while it also projects to the next. Thus there is a constant growth and reconstruction on the part of the students as their fund of artistic experiences mutually reenforce and enrich one another. The final goal of the teacher is that these
students continue this growth pattern unaided and that each becomes his own critic.

To summarize, thus in Dewey's world growth is the key to empowerment, and the instrument through which growth is effected is "criticism"—not the criticism of nay-saying, or the literary or social criticism used in traditional or journalistic senses, but a criticism founded on the democratic process which provides a method of inquiry that ends in problem solving. It is a method that (1) recognizes the existence of a problem; (2) clarifies the problem; (3) examines the hypotheses of various solutions; (4) tests the best of those solutions in action; and (5) verifies the results. This method or process is seen in its most elegant refinement in aesthetic education which can be viewed as a paradigm for all education and growth.

Generalizing the aesthetic experience to all experience has profound lessons: Remembering that for Dewey experience is education, aesthetics teaches the learner to focus through the experimental method on the qualities that make any situation unique and to use that understanding in intelligent action. The aesthetic act, whether of creation or of understanding that which has been created, to use Dewey's terms, vivifies, clarifies, and intensifies life. Thus one of Dewey's great contributions to philosophy, as he tried to combat atomism and dualism, is that he removed art from the elitist realm of the museum, concert hall, and library, and gave it a context in the mainstream of life. In doing that, he has shattered the delimiting restrictions of absolutism and provided us with a way of viewing and experiencing beauty and the world, which in itself is full of beauty.

Dewey deals little in the works cited above directly with the economics, sociology, or politics of power, and for that some people might criticize him. He does not offer a comprehensive economics or a sociological power paradigm. Indeed, in some ways the suggestion by this paper that the power core of Dewey's
society is the individual and collective intelligence at the center of the elastic circle is slightly elusive. This may be true because what Dewey provides is not the map or schema of a world observed, but the inner workings of a method of social reform, a way of changing the world into a better place. Thus, Dewey's elastic circle is a hopeful ideal. In that sense one can hear, even in his strongest and most mature works, i.e., Art as Experience and A Common Faith, certain echoes of his earlier Hegelian idealism.

Dewey frightens the conservative precisely because of this hopefulness, because he can envision the world being a different place—growing and changing to meet the myriad demands of progress, dooming institutions that have outlived their usefulness and creating new ones. Since his death in 1952, greater and greater "portion[s] of [the] apparently stable world" he points to have changed at a velocity few could have imagined in pre-Sputnik days. Therein one finds the value of the application of Dewey's elastic circle to our post-space-age world of information. Who could have predicted today's technology? And who can predict what wonders await us in the next decade? Dewey assuages rather than creates fear because he provides a method for dealing with, rather than running from, change. We know the present world, but none of us knows what "will emerge in its place." Because of Dewey, however, liberal thinkers are better equipped to face new worlds, but more than that, they have the instrumental power to create them.
REFERENCES


5 Ibid., p. 180.


10 Morris, p. 172.

Bernard Meland suggests that:

Henry Nelson Wieman was a theologian of the American experience in much the same sense that John Dewey has been described as a philosopher of the American experience. Toward the end of his life, . . . Wieman remarked that, in retrospect, he could see that he had had more in common with Dewey than with any other thinker of modern times. In saying this Wieman had in mind not only their common empirical orientation, but their common concern in focusing upon value and motivation within human experience, and the range of issues they brought to such inquiry: a format peculiarly adapted to reflecting upon the American experience. [1]

Since Wieman's death on June 19, 1975, there has been a great deal of interest in American philosophical circles in the study of Wieman's empirical orientation and his theological studies within the scope of human experiences. In the summer of 1984 there was a centenary conference on Wieman in Carbondale, Illinois. In the last three years there have been three books published or republished about Wieman.

To understand Wieman, one must examine his life's problem. We will examine that life problem as an educational phenomenon. In other words, we will address the problem, how does Wieman's theology define religion as a growth experience. Wieman's problem is to empirically examine theology and psychology beginning with the Calvinistic mystery of Grace that transforms a believer's life.
He described his life's problem as:

What operates in human life with such character and power that it will transform man as he cannot transform himself, saving him from evil and leading him to the best that human life can ever reach, provided he meet the required conditions? [2]

Wieman chose to study religion from this perspective because he believed that if a religious system was supported with empirical evidence then positive growth would ensue. Otherwise religion becomes nothing more than a system of beliefs which can result in evil. [3] As a result of his approach to the problem, Wieman strips his theology of much of the traditional baggage the mainline religions employ, including certain terms and definitions. For example, when asked in a faculty lecture "Is there a God?" he replied:

I am convinced that [that] way of putting the question can lead us nowhere except to reaffirm or deny a traditional belief or philosophical speculation. Therefore we put the question this way: What actually operates to create the human level of existence along with its distinctive kind of good, doing this progressively when we commit ourselves to it and meet other required conditions; also operating to sustain and save us from self-destruction and degradation when required conditions are met?

The answer to this question can now be stated: A kind of interchange occurring between individuals, when conditions are favorable, which creates progressively the range and coherence of symbolized meaning available to those who engage in this interchange. [4]

Wieman is seeking to understand human growth, but growth on a deeper, more far reaching level than is implied by Dewey's educative experience or Mead's emergence. And yet there are similarities as Wieman employs empiricism. There is a
problematic situation and reflection that leads to a hypothesis and a systematic testing of that hypothesis to correct the problem. Wieman seeks to understand this deeper transformation of an individual in this manner so that a truly liberating religion could be available to people. He would call this liberating religion creative freedom for reasons that will become obvious as we discuss his theology.

The Process of Renewal: Creativity

Wieman's purpose for the positive growth must be understood in the whole of Wieman's problem, namely the problem of transforming people to the "best that human life can ever reach." As we look at the process, then, we must see it as a process to, and a process from.

The process is similar to the pragmatic or empirically observable growth or emergence. In fact, Walter M. Horton writes: "Ever since reading Bergson, Dewey and Whitehead, Wieman has been fascinated by the concept of Process and has seen it in the clue to the active working of God, empirically observable; . . ."[5] (Emphasis is Horton's).

The process is first empirically observable. Unless one can observe the religious process, in an empirical way, one is bound by a system of beliefs that enslave rather than free. Wieman writes:

Transformation can occur only in the form of events. The empirical method is the only possible way to distinguish events and to know what transformation results from them. Therefore, if the religious problem be as stated, theology must be empirical.[6]
Elsewhere Wieman writes of mistaken ideas of freedom, suggesting that people construct moral and religious beliefs to suit themselves, in search for that freedom.[7]

Second, the process is experiential. To be empirical requires that Wieman's process must use observations within the realm of human experience. One cannot refer to God apart from what is seen in the human experience. Peden and Axel describe Wieman's "Doctrine of God:"

Wieman limits knowledge about God to the context of human experiences and the following of a proper rational method in examining these experiences. His line of reasoning is roughly as follows: All experiences are of objects. One has an experience that . . . one [can] call religious. By definition, God must be the object of this experience; therefore, God is an object that exists.[8]

Wieman writes in Religious Experience and Scientific Method:

We believe nothing is more important at the present stage of human thought than to define God in terms of concrete experience. Failure to do this has led some of the finest scientific thinkers of our time to regard religion as superstition and nothing else.[9]

Finally, the growth process is social in nature. The growth is reminiscent of George Herbert Mead's social self relationship with the social other. The organism comes to know itself as a social self only because of interaction with the social other.

There are several facets to the social relationship. One is that the society perpetuates itself in growth (in a reconstructive sense) by its interaction with its young. The individual, on the other hand, thus comes to understand his or her role from society. Wieman uses the social nature of the process in the same two ways. First, the individual is enabled
in the process by the proper social setting. Second, the proper social climate is positive if the individual's response is toward the freedom Wieman seeks. He writes:

Thus there is a circle in which personality, commitment and social institutions all depend on one another. But the creative center of this circle is a religion which leads people to give themselves most fully to the work of shaping the institutions and interacting with one another in ways mentioned. [10]

He argues for a unified effort in this cyclical process:

Not only in the relation between parent and child but in every interpersonal relation throughout society at all ages the primary social condition of freedom is readiness to engage in the kind of interchange which produces appreciative understanding depends in turn upon all major institutions such as the family, the school, industry and business, government and the religion of the churches. [11]

If this so happens, then Wieman suggests we will have the greatest freedom.

The process between individuals becomes crucial to the greater good, and has been argued accordingly by earlier pragmatists. Wieman echoes this social nature of learning within his own transformation process.

Learning in depth means learning with the whole self so far as the self has attained wholeness. It also means learning from the whole self of the other so far as the other is able to express an undivided self. This kind of learning results in a creative transformation of the whole mind and not merely a bit of added skill or information. [12]

To summarize the above points, the transformation that saves one from evil and leads to the best, including the greatest freedom, must be understood empirically, which means that it is experiential, but experiential in the social, human sense. The
process results from an interaction of humans within a society, providing and interpreting experiences in an empirical fashion. The transformation affects the "whole mind" of the individual.

The creative transformation that we see in Wieman's process is something beyond the educative process of Dewey, or beyond Mead's social interaction. The process of Wieman incorporates another social dimension. The dimension is God, and interaction with this dimension is always social. Additionally, the interaction must meet the criteria discussed above, namely be a concrete experience which is empirically observable.

Wieman thus argues, according to Peden and Axel:

"The nature of everything that exists is to interact with other things. Because God is an object that exists, God must interact with other objects. When God interacts within human experience, humans are able to know God through this interaction. Wieman is saying that God can be known only as God functions in relation to humans." [13]

God is, then, another social other with whom people can have a relationship, but more importantly, God is that being that can transform people as they themselves cannot. The process of concern to Wieman, then, is an empirically understood social and psychological experience in which God transforms the individual. The process is a rebirth that transforms and renews an individual. The rebirth is, for Wieman and the traditional theologian, a turning away of the old and a simultaneous seeking of a greater good. Wieman's concept is not strictly the rebirth experience, but what theologians may call the justification and sanctification experiences. Wieman's transformation is a continual growing, a continual rebirth, if you will.
Wieman continues after describing his life's problem:

Religious faith is giving oneself in the wholeness of his being, so far as he is able, to what he believes has the character and power just mentioned. This self-giving requires the purging of oneself by every means at his command of everything he can discover in himself which resists the transforming power to which he commits himself. In theological terms, this purging is called repentence and confession of sin.[14]

The Result of Renewal

Creighton Peden and Larry Axel, in the "Preface" to Creative Freedom: Vocation of Liberal Religion state that Wieman's purpose for the book is to present an argument for a "mature religion," that is a religion that "offers a renewed vision of the life of freedom—not only 'freedom from,' but also 'freedom to'—and a more fulfilling life of creative transformation."[15]

The mature religion practised by a mature society seeks to transform or recreate the individuals of society as they can not transform themselves. The transformation requires a something outside of the individual. To free himself of traditional baggage, Wieman calls this something, or God that transforms, creative interchange.

By creative interchange I mean the creativity which creates the human mind and personality after the first days of infancy, creates human culture and history, creates the universe as known to the human mind.

In summary, creative interchange is (1) getting the perspective of the other; (2) integrating of this perspective with one's own; (3) consequent expanding of perspective; (4) consequent widening and deepening of community with others.[16]

While referring specifically to his concept of God, Wieman herein defines some events that immerse us in his process.
theology in a rather confusing way. First there appears to be a spectrum of ideas that are implied in the event of an individual's life, again similar to an educative experience. Then there is the complexity of the development of a civilization. The two ideas are more closely related than first reading would indicate. They both imply a maturity beyond the shallowness of mere evolutionary growth.

A question immediately arises as one views this definition of creative interchange in relation to what was said about rebirth and God as a part of the creative interchange process. Surely Wieman means more than just the progression of civilization on one level, and the growth of an individual on the other? The response must be a resounding, "Yes, he does mean more."

But in defining the creative event, one can not remove it from the human experience, both the individual experience and the larger experience of human history. Within both, as well as within what we view as a religious experience, one finds some commonalities which become confusing at first. Because of this relationship, Wieman can write: "Creative interchange creates the very existence of the language-using animal, which is human existence. . . . The process of education, when rightly conducted, is [an expression of] creative interchange."[17] In short the creative event is both an individual experience, and a part of a greater social context, both in the present community and historically. These passages, then, imply what has been, but also suggests a greater opportunity for commitment to creative
interchange by going beyond self and even social others toward a
goal that promotes creative interchange in the whole community.
The following serves to define this idea.

No individual can expand the range of goal-seeking
activities without absorbing into his own existence
the goal-seeking activities of his associates and
his culture and transforming them to fit the demands
of his own unique individuality.

This absorbing of the goal-seeking activities of
others and transforming them to meet the demands
of the unique individuality of each participant,
I call creative interchange. It does three things
all at the same time. It expands the valuing
consciousness of each. It widens and deepens
mutual support between individuals and peoples.
It develops the unique individuality of each
person.[18]

Within the need for a commitment to this process Wieman logically
continues:

Therefore the central problem of human existence
is to find and provide these conditions under
which this creative interchange can operate most
effectively.[19]

The reasons that finding and providing the conditions best
for creative interchange are so crucial lie in its notion of evil
permeating the human culture apart from the commitment to
creative interchange and in his philosophy that hopes for a
greater good for the community as well as the individual.

The question now becomes what does creative interchange look
like when it happens. Wieman answers that in The Source of Human
Good:

The creative event in the life of an artist is
sometimes an ecstasy. So also the emergence of
new transformative ideas in the mind of the
creative thinker, the moment of vision for the
prophet, the "rebirth" of the religious convert,
or the communion of friends may stand forth as a
peak of qualitative meaning. However, in the
ordinary run of life, for the most part, the 
creative event reorganizes the mind and transforms 
its appreciable world without the qualities of 
the creative event being themselves discriminated 
and distinguished from the newly emergent meaning. 
Rather it is the newly created good that is 
qualitatively appreciated and not the creative 
event producing it.[20]

The creative event is then similar to a religious 
experience, in the traditional sense, but it also allows for 
other life changing occurrences. Additionally, an individual may 
understand or not understand the process of the event, but the 
individual does recognize a new "good" in life which has resulted 
from something. Wieman needs this latitude of including a 
variety of experiences in his theory if it is to be studied 
scientifically. That is, he must examine the details of all 
kinds of life changing events and draw conclusions. His 
observations are, again, for a greater purpose than just 
observation. What separates his study from other psycho-social 
experiences that transforms an individual is Wieman's desire to 
understand the process for the purpose of perpetuating these 
experiences in order to mature or reach some greater good, both 
individually and collectively. In other words, Wieman is 
attempting objectively to examine transforming experiences so 
that he can theorize how one can perpetuate these experiences for 
the good of individuals, and also for the good of society.

As Wieman continues from one of the above quotes which 
defines creative interchange, he suggests what is beyond.

Creative interchange means getting the view- 
point of the other person and integrating it 
into your own personality so that you under- 
stand him sympathetically even when you do
not agree with him. It is a subconscious process ordinarily. Jesus is the supreme example.[21]

Elsewhere, Wieman discusses four steps or "subevents" which, when unified as a whole, produce the creative event and explain the "viewpoint of the other person..." Those subevents are

- emerging awareness of qualitative meaning derived from other persons through communication;
- integrating these new meanings with others previously acquired;
- expanding the richness of quality in the appreciable world by enlarging its meaning;
- deepening the community among those who participate in this total creative event of intercommunication.[22]

The first subevent is growing awareness of the meaning of qualities as understood from other people. The interaction, socially, is the key. It is not interaction with the environment as a lower organism might exhibit, but rather an intellectual interaction derived from human social interaction. The awareness is a growing ability to walk in the experience of others, thus communicating on an even deeper level than language might suggest.

The second subevent builds upon the first. It is the event or moment(s) in life when we process those deeper experiences with social others (to borrow Mead's concept) and categorize them relative to our other past events. Wieman agrees that often this is subconscious, but it is not a mere passing through the mind of an idea.[23] He hastens to add, though, that often for the truly creative event, this step must take place in "solitude." He writes "A period of loneliness and quiet provides for incubation and creative transformation by novel unification"; he lists as
examples, Jesus, both in the wilderness during the temptation, and in Gethsemane, and Buddha, beneath the Bo tree, alone. [24]

The third stage is an enlargement of the first two stages. That is, it provides for a better understanding of the new relations or new structures as applies to the surroundings, and as obtained from the previous two subevents. Here again Jesus is mentioned, but with a caution. Jesus apparently better understands the "blessedness of all-encompassing love and yet [is] living in a world so barren of love that he must have been heartbreakingly lonely through all the days of his life." [25] Wieman's caution is that if all that was felt was Jesus' loneliness, then a creative event would not have been fulfilled. Jesus must expand his understanding to a greater context. This means Jesus must also appreciate the capacity for greater good, yet unfulfilled plus, it seems, also move to the fourth subevent.

The fourth subevent is a widening and a deepening of the community as a result of the first three subevents. Concerning the fourth stage, Wieman writes that: Taken in context, there is interaction between people, or specifically, there is an action on the part of individuals as they test these ideas, or experiment with them. If we apply that idea to those who sat in judgment of Jesus before his crucifixion, then one can assume that not only was the community of followers widened and deepened, but likewise the same happened for those antagonists because of the interchange between Jesus and his crucifiers.
That is, the action of the crucifixion changed the world. The second comment of interest is, speaking of Jesus:

Perhaps such loneliness, born of such craving for love between men, would drive a man to that desperate madness in which he dreamed that by dying on a cross he could somehow bring this kingdom of love into existence.[26]

Later, Wieman suggests that increase in an individual's sense of community is not necessarily pleasant.[27] Wieman's point is that Jesus is this supreme example of one who understands others even though he disagrees with them. Wieman implies he understands because of the first three subevents, then through an action there is a broadening of the community. Jesus then, in his experience is the model for the creative event.

A key idea in this process is the unification of the personality. As the above subevents must be unified for the creative event, so must the creative event result in a unified personality. This is "the chief value of such profound religious experience," Wieman writes.[28] He continues that he is referring to the idea employed by Christians of a person becoming "whole."[29]

The wholeness of a mature person is paradoxically a less than whole person who understands an emptiness in the whole of human experience, as defined in the subevents previously mentioned, and as a result sees the wholeness, or greater good beyond the immediate "wilderness" experience. The wilderness experience provides an anxiety that moves the individual through the creative event like Dewey's problematic situation or Mead's impulse. In the pragmatic sense, the person is maladjusted to
the surroundings. This maladjustment provokes thinking, resulting in hypotheses to correct the maladjustments. Likewise, for Wieman, the instability moves the individual to the rebirth experience and beyond.

He writes:

This brings us to the problem of maturity in religion. Since maturity of the individual is measured by capacity to undergo creative transformation of the mind, a person's religion is more mature to the measure that it leads one to give oneself most completely to the creativity which produces a sequence of periods of uncertainty and anxiety, alternating with periods of newly attained assumptions sustaining a more ample organization of the mind better fitted to deal with the complexities and changes of human existence. This alteration may continue indefinitely. [30]
Conclusions

From the above discussion of Wieman's life problem and mature religion we see evidence of growth on the part of an individual and on the part of society. Both become changed in a positive sense, when the individual is receptive to the creative interchange. That openness transforms the individual and deepens the community avoiding evil and promoting good. The growth is similar to Dewey's educative experiences, but beyond the mere social or psychological growth of the individual. A new mind is formed, a new vision revealed, a new creation manifested. Thus the individual and the community participating are recreated; they have grown beyond their previous state. Wieman's mature religion is then an educational phenomenon in the greater sense of the word.
ENDNOTES


[3] Ibid.


[12] Ibid., p. 10.


ENDNOTES—2


[17] Ibid., p. 446.
[19] Ibid., p. 455.
[23] Ibid., p. 59.
[24] Ibid., p. 60.
[26] Ibid., p. 63.
[27] Ibid., p. 65.
[29] Ibid.
Americans, it seems, are never satisfied. We are always trying to change things. Perhaps it is our heritage; after all, ours is a nation birthed by revolution. And to some extent we have been revolting ever since. We are constantly seeking political reform, economic reform, educational reform, and so on and on and on. And not without reason. Despite the many freedoms and opportunities we enjoy as Americans, we do not live in the best of all possible worlds. Our society continues to have many examples of waste, corruption, inefficiency, and injustice. There is no doubt that we need social reform; the question is why does it keep eluding us -- year after year, decade after decade? The primary though certainly not the only reason for this is that we do in fact prefer society as it is (unreformed) to society as we say it should be (reformed). In reality, reformers are the greatest obstacle to social reform. At first glance this statement seems quite false, and it is this apparent falsity plus the psychic denial of our true personal needs and preferences which keeps us blinded to the major cause for social reform failure. Why, you may ask, would people defeat the very changes or reforms they are trying to implement? If they do not want to change, why not simply say so and support the status quo? The answer is that they do desire the change but they have an even stronger desire for the status quo. Desires or needs are satisfied by both activities -- working for change and maintaining the status quo. The condition that meets the greatest need will prevail.

Take education, for example. The major school reforms related to humanism that were espoused by Emerson in 1850, are in essence the same as those called for by every succeeding generation of critics up to the present.
time. Like waves, their voices swell and recede — like beaches, the ubiquitous schools remain relatively unchanged. Despite sporadic flirtations with humanism, schools, for the most part, have been and continue to be similar to assembly line factories. In some instances, they provide custodial care with a dash of utilitarianism. But the majority of children are mass processed to fit into a limited number of molds bearing the U.S. stamp of approval. Most often, individuality is either ignored or openly discouraged and conformity is richly awarded.

If the critics alone wanted humanistic reforms, the failure of those reforms would not be particularly surprising. That, however, is not the case. If one were to conduct a survey, as we have done, one would find that an impressive majority of the parents, teachers, students, and administrators (yes, even principals and superintendents!) profess to believe that schools should be more responsive to individual needs and interests. Why, then, does education continue to be predominantly rigid and traditional? The answer is starkly simple — that is the kind of educational system we want. Or to put it another way, we are not willing to make the sacrifices necessary to achieve the ideals we profess.

We have been eager, receptive readers of most of the critics of traditional education. Our thinking has been especially influenced by the humanist movement. Writers like Rousseau, Emerson, Neill, Goodman, and Rogers, to name a few, have had a significant impact on our instructional methods and teaching style. The dissatisfaction we had with our own experiences as traditional students and later as traditional teachers provided a favorable climate for the growth and development of many of their ideas.

We believed that each person was born with a unique potential and that education should not only respect that individuality, but create programs
conducive to its growth. We believed that learning was natural for man; that every individual was motivated by natural curiosity and a desire for inner peace or happiness. Like Emerson, we were convinced that learning could and should be an enjoyable experience. While recognizing the importance of cognitive development in education, we regarded affective development to be of equal importance.

As this basically individualized-humanistic philosophy of education grew and shaped itself in our thinking, we compared it to what was actually happening in public schools and particularly in our own classes -- both were found lacking. For the most part, schools appeared to be repressive factories whose main purpose at the elementary level was custodial and at the upper levels utilitarian. Learning did not seem to be especially joyful; in fact, it appeared to be a grim business.

As the comparative discrepancies grew, so did our disenchantment. Since we taught at the university level, we enjoyed a considerable amount of freedom in terms of our own personal approach to teaching. We began to make changes designed to give the students more choices and, thus, hopefully, increased involvement in formulating course requirements related to their own individual needs and interests. We were determined to develop a course based on principles that were educationally sound rather than principles that were economically efficient. And our model was to be humanistic rather than industrial. We emphasized the freedom students would have to pursue topics, issues, and projects related to their own individual needs and interests. In the role of the teacher, we emphasized nonauthoritarianism and stressed the dimensions of advising, facilitating, participating, guiding, and consulting. The course was designed as a cooperative learning endeavor -- not just for the students but also for us as teachers. Each person had a significant contribution to make and a responsibility for making it. In
order to free students from the threat and control of evaluation, they were permitted to assign their own grades at the end of the semester.

Without going into more detail, the experiment was simply a dismal failure. It was disappointing and frustrating for both us and the students. But it was very revealing in this respect: Authoritarian, structured education creates a classroom environment that provides much greater security and ease of job performance for both teachers and students -- this is not to say that teachers and students do not value humanism and freedom in education; they do. But there is something they value even more — security and job ease.

Consider another example. We operated schools for more than a half century on principles of expediency because we said (and validly so) there was a shortage of qualified teachers. Then, around 1975, we abruptly announced that America had a teacher surplus, this is a ludicrous assertion; we don't have too many teachers, but rather we have enough teachers now to enable us to switch the operation of the schools from principles that are expedient to principles that are educationally sound. But that, of course, would require a significant increase in educational expenditures. And, when the chips are down, we prefer cheaper, expedient schools to better schools that are more expensive.

The point here is not that humanistic education reforms have failed because they would cost more money, but that achieving our ideals, educational, political or otherwise, inevitably results in the loss of something else which we may think we value less than the ideal, but in reality we value it more. Take the students who profess a desire for more freedom in school. They genuinely believe they want more freedom until they get it. Then they are confronted with the tasks of thinking for themselves, assuming the initiative and responsibility, making their own decisions, and
accepting the consequences of those decisions. Despite their verbalizations to the contrary, most students, and adults too, for that matter, will exchange their freedom for the comfort and security of imposed authority. In his book, *Escape From Freedom*, Fromm contends that while nations make passionate speeches and wage deadly wars in the name of freedom, in reality, they prefer autocracy to democracy. He dramatically asserts that Hitler's nazi regime was not forced upon the German people but that they openly embraced it. The Germans, he believed, wanted a strong totalitarian form of government because of a long tradition of paternalism and the order and security it provided.

In our university classes (both graduate and undergraduate), we have shown a film that presents a graphic portrayal of education in a private boarding school in England called Summerhill. It is probably the best example of a school operated on truly democratic principles. And yet, more than 93 percent of our students (who are either teachers or about to become teachers) express negative opinions about the school and indicate that they would not want to study or teach there; nor would they want their children to attend Summerhill as students. This is a very telling statistic when viewed within the context of a democratic society. In a followup study of former Summerhillian students, Emmanuel Bernstein found many who did not like Summerhill and were negative about their experience there. Essentially, he found these people to be rather passive, shy, introverted, dependent individuals who wanted or needed a good deal of structure, supervision, and direction which was not provided at Summerhill. In other words, they were unhappy at Summerhill because there was no alternative to freedom. As Maslow and other psychologists have pointed out, human behavior is a response to felt needs and that behavior varies according to the strength of those needs.

In using clinical hypnosis for weight control, we encountered an extremely obese young lady who expressed a strong desire to lose weight. She
stated that her greatest interest in life was to get married and have a family, but that she could not fulfill this dream until she reduced her weight to the point where men would find her attractive. Her goal was to lose 130 pounds. Before coming to us, she had entered numerous weight control programs and had remained in each one of them until she had lost thirty to forty pounds at which point she would drop out of the program. Then, after regaining the weight, she would join another program and the cycle would be repeated. Not surprisingly, she followed the same pattern with us. After losing thirty-four pounds, she quit and we never heard from her again. Why? She had repeatedly demonstrated the ability to lose weight. Despite what she said, did she actually prefer to be fat? Perhaps. What if she had lost 130 pounds, and men still did not find her attractive; what if they did not ask her for dates; they did not propose marriage? How could she explain this? What would be her excuse? On the other hand, as long as she remained obese, male disinterest would be easy to understand and explain -- behind a fortress of fat, she would feel safe and secure. And she would have an explanation for male disinterest that was logical and acceptable to her and the rest of society. Apparently, her need for this explanation was greater than her need to be slender.

The recent oil embargo can provide us with even more sobering data. Our society prides itself on being a democracy, and has championed the cause of human life and dignity around the globe, albeit somewhat inconsistently at times. While professing our opposition to human misery and suffering, we annually maimed and killed thousands of people with our cars. And this slaughter continued long after research revealed that it could be significantly reduced if we drove our cars at a slower speed. Not until the Arab oil embargo did we reduce the speed limit. And we lowered it not to save lives, but to save gasoline. The conservation of lives was, one might say, a secondary benefit or bonus. We do not want to injure and kill people with our
cars; nor do we do it intentionally or derive any sadistic pleasure from it, but the inescapable conclusion is that we prefer the increased odds of accidental injuries or deaths to driving slowly. And until we value human lives as much as we do high speed and gasoline, highway fatalities are likely to remain high.

It is, of course, difficult to believe that a highly advanced culture would place the conservation of oil above the conservation of human lives. Nevertheless, it is, as the Arab oil embargo confirmed, a fact of life. Another fact of life which many of us also find very hard to believe is that, given a choice, some people in our society will choose to live in poverty. We have always thought of the poor as victims of circumstance, and, unfortunately, there are enough people in that category to perpetuate the myth. In truth, there is enough work in America to provide jobs for ever ablebodied adult who wants one. In Chicago where unemployment is among the highest in the nation, we have a friend who lost a high paying position in advertising. After searching unsuccessfully for a comparable job, he spent five dollars to place an ad in The Reader for house cleaning services. At ten dollars an hour, he turns clients away. Another unemployed Chicagoan with a Ph.D., removed the seats from his 1972 passenger van and started a one man moving and delivery service. At twenty-five dollars an hour, he also turns customers away. In our country there are presently millions of job opportunities available -- jobs that pay well, require no special training or skills, and require little, if any, capital. The only requirement is a desire for employment and herein lies the explanation for the vast majority of our poor. Unemployment is a lifestyle they have chosen, and poverty or economic deprivation is a price they are willing to pay in order to escape the burden of employment.

A low standard of living is not repugnant to everyone, and employment is a condition which, in a different way, can constitute greater deprivation than
poverty. The Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines poverty as, "the state of one who lacks a usual or socially acceptable amount of money or material possessions." Poor or impoverished people in our society are not starving or freezing; for the most part, they have adequate food and shelter -- plain and basic but adequate. Poverty in our culture is not a condition of physical suffering but one of social stigma or, as Webster puts it, poverty is socially unacceptable. There was a time in the history of humankind when everyone lived in poverty and it was an acceptable way of life. Today, however, the majority of people have chosen an employed lifestyle and their resulting affluence creates an unfavorable contrast for the minority who have opted for the unemployed way of life. The poor minority would like to have the material comforts enjoyed by the employed majority, but do not want to adopt their lifestyle of employment. However, the selection of an unemployed lifestyle in our society is socially and economically unacceptable; therefore, the poor are compelled to pretend that they are willing to work if only they could find a job. It is a little publicized fact that many of the poor ridicule the lifestyle of the employed and laugh all the way to the supermarket with their food stamps and public welfare checks. They envy the material acquisitions of their benefactors, but they want no part of the tiring and restrictive employment lifestyle necessary to gain them.

Public welfare is based on the false premise that recipients are poor people who want to be employed and need temporary economic assistance until they are able to find a job and become self-supporting. In reality, most (not all) of the poor are impoverished because they are unemployed and they are unemployed because they do not want to work and public welfare is a means of supporting themselves without employment. It is for this reason that success in social welfare reform continually eludes us.

The gap between goals and practice or ideals and reality is, of course, not a startling revelation. What makes this familiar paradox intriguing, however, is
our blindness to the primary cause for its existence. There is a very strong cultural and psychological pressure to believe that we want the changes we are attempting to implement, but simply do not comprehend that the greatest obstacle is ourselves. And, thus, the failure of moral reform may be blamed on the devil or unfavorable environmental influences. We are prone to blame unethical officials or voter apathy for political injustice, and insufficient money is the most commonly cited enemy of educational reform. To be sure, these are not just rationalizations for our failures; they are indeed obstacles to reform, but they are relatively inconsequential in comparison to our own psychic resistance. We delude ourselves into believing that the false commitment we have to ideals is genuine. And it is this self-deception that constitutes the greatest impediment to social reformation.

The battle for racial integration was not lost in our courts, but in our minds. It is safe to say that some of the most eloquent spokespersons for integration were also among the most racially biased. It is also safe to say that the majority of them were not consciously aware of their racial prejudice. People of every race have a distinct variety of preferences (race is only one of many) about the kinds of people with whom they associate. And racial segregation as well as integration in our society is a reflection of that preference. Racial segregation is only one of innumerable forms of segregation based on personal preference or bias. Most wealthy people prefer to associate with others who also have lots of money. There are gay ghettos in our large cities, not because the gays are refused housing in straight neighborhoods, but because most gays prefer to live among and associate with other gays.

Each time we walk across campus to the student center for coffee, we survey the diverse population of the large Pow Wow Room and are always struck by the homogeneous social clustering that occurs. There are no designated
areas labeled: "PROFESSORS ONLY," or "INDIANS ONLY," or "FRATERNITY STUDENTS ONLY." And yet the ebb and flow of people voluntarily form into these readily identifiable groups. Actually we should not be suprised by this social phenomenon, since it is a very natural, logical occurrence. Probably, our amazement or surprise is related to the myth that segregation is always the result of oppression and bigotry. On our campus, like every other campus, there is pervasive social segregation; among professors, students, secretaries, blacks, Arabs, and so on. It is not malicious; it is a matter of choice based on personal preference. Professors relate to each other better, have more in common with one another, and feel more comfortable and secure with each other. And the other groups are segregated for similar reasons.

At the conscious level, we feel compelled to believe that we actually desire the ideals we profess. We want to believe them; we almost have to believe them. To do otherwise would be a shattering experience psychologically, morally, culturally. It would mean stripping away protective layers of consciousness that have been culturally nurtured since childhood. We would be forced to confront not just our individual hypocrisy but the hypocrisy of an entire society. The resulting burdens of guilt and shame would be very painful and yet in unguarded moments and in our hearts, we suspect that individually and collectively our commitment to reform ideals is less than genuine if not downright false.
1986 Annual Meeting
November 14-15
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 14 -- 12:00 NOON TO 8:30 PM
12:00 - 1:00 Registration
12:55 - 1:00 Welcome: Lawrence Dennis, President MPES

Session I: Papers
1:00 - 1:30 "The Moral Development of the Developmentally Disabled" Loyola University of Chicago
     Walter Krolikowski
1:30 - 1:50 General Discussion University of Illinois
     Amy Raths McAnich, Chair

Session II: Papers
     Ronald Schwartz
2:20 - 2:40 General Discussion Loyola University
     Walter Krolikowski

Break
2:40 - 3:00 Coffee and Juice

Session III: Panel Discussion
3:00 - 4:00 "Philosophy of Education in An Era of Reform" Iowa State University
     George Kizer
"Philosophy of Education and Partnership in Reform" Northwestern College
     George Stichel

Session IV: Paper
4:00 - 4:20 "Performance Versus Results: A Critique of Excellence In Modern Sport" Ohio State University
     John Gibson
4:20 - 4:30 General Discussion Ohio State University
     Steve Estes

Graduate Student Competition Paper
"The Habit of Inquiry and the Content of Inquiry: Implications for Curriculum" (Undelivered) Southern Illinois University
     Vincent Macri at Carbondale
Business
4:30 - 5:00  Business Meeting

Social
6:00 - 7:15  Dinner
Quadrangle Club, 1155 East 57th Street

7:15 - 8:30  "Did Dewey Dance? An Artistic Assay"  .... Lawrence Dennis
Presidential Address
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

"Philosophy in the Artistic Quest"  Phillip Smith
Response
Ohio State University

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 15 -- 9:00 TO 11:50 A.M.

Session I: Papers
9:00 - 9:30  "Liberal and Conservative Creeds in Education"  .... Robert Nordberg
Marquette University

9:30 - 9:50  General Discussion  ...................... Arthur Brown, Chair
Wayne State University

Session II: Papers
9:50 - 10:20  "Moral Principles and Moral Education"  .... Glynn Phillips
Westminister College
Oxford, England
Secretary of the Philosophy of Education Society
of Great Britain

10:20 - 10:40  General Discussion  ....................... Robert Craig
SCH Corporate Offices

Break
10:40 - 11:00  Coffee and Juice

Session III: Papers
11:00 - 11:30  "Plato's Republic and Dialectical Testing"  .... David Owen
Iowa State University

11:30 - 11:50  General Discussion  ...................... Alex Makedon, Chair
Loyola University

Adjournment
11:50
OFFICERS
President: .................................................. Lawrence J. Dennis
Southern Illinois at Carbondale

Vice President: .............................. Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon
The University of Chicago

Secretary-Treasurer: .................................. George W. Stickel
Northwestern College

PROGRAM COMMITTEE
  David Annis, Chair................................. Ball State University
  Robert Craig......................................... SCH Corporate Offices
  Jack Williams....................................... University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
  Philip L. Smith (ex officio)..................... The Ohio State University
  Robert Nordberg.................................. Marquette University
  F. Craig Schley..................................... Wayne State University

ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE
  Sophie Haroutunian-Gordon with the assistance of Gladys Powell
THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED

Walter F. Krolikowski
Loyola University of Chicago
Midwest Philosophy of Education Society
November 14, 1986

About four years ago, Nancy Hablutzel and I began teaching a course, entitled "The Moral Development of the Developmentally Disabled." The students in special education wanted such a course in place of the usual and required course in philosophy of education. Philosophy of education always sounds terribly remote to the practical-minded and care-oriented persons who want to work with the handicapped. More positively, the exposure these students had had with the disabled made them aware of the need of the disabled for moral training. Where could future special education teachers look for help? Kindly appearing laissez-faire and benign neglect seem to characterize the recommendations of too many of the textbook discussions of the topic. Nor has research been very helpful. It is not fair to say that all such research compares the disabled to the juvenile delinquent, but material of this type, which is indeed quite common, is not what the prospective teacher is looking for. On the other hand, good practitioners seem to be working in isolation, trying out their own ways of helping the child morally but without any assurance that what they are doing is all that can be done or that what they are doing is theoretically well grounded.

Nancy, who is a specialist in special education, wanted the course to help complete the training of future teachers and administrators. I wanted the course because the practical results being achieved in the field—
developmentally disabled persons do indeed become moral persons-- suggested that regnant moral theories ought to be re-examined. What follows, then, is my analysis of the situation and a few suggestions toward a theoretical basis for any program of moral development of the developmentally disabled.

Why do present-day moral theories seem inadequate? Bluntly stated, these theories not only have nothing or little to say about the handicapped, but they positively exclude them from the moral universe. This strong assertion needs some evidence to support it. Let me give some. First, for most ethicists, the moral life begins with the "age of reason" or the "age of discretion." And that time, arbitrarily but not unreasonably, is six or seven years. For instance, Piaget, to some extent, and Kohlberg, to a much greater extent, do not consider children under the age of five fit subjects for moral inquiry. Yet it is clearly the case that a large number of developmentally disabled, although their chronological age is over six or seven, attain a mental age of six or seven only much later, if at all. Second, the requirement of universality in R.M. Hare's theory would exclude the greater part of the handicapped; for such a conceptualization requires an awareness of more persons than those with whom one is in cognitive contact; it requires awareness of the potentially but not actually known other. Third, the utilitarian requirements of a comprehensive and rapid calculus of consequences by which alternatives are imaginatively represented and weighed is much too stringent. Fourth, the Aristotelian requirements of practical reason involve a maturity which enables one to grasp one or more generalizations forming part of the practical syllogism and an ability to perceive instances as belonging under some generalization. Fifth, the existentialist requires the arbitrary but free positing of one's own essence in the face of a pre-existing world intent upon determining what is to...
follow in a non-free way. This battle for a genuine future in a determined world asks for heroics beyond what can be expected of almost everyone except the chosen few. Seemingly, only emotivism remains, and most educators find it a most shaky basis for any moral instruction that a school dedicated to rational discourse can provide. As I have already intimated, there are similar problems with the literature of psychological research.

Yet, the fact remains: There are developmentally disabled children who, although excluded by all these theories of morality, are manifestly moral creatures, kind, dependable, sensitive to the need of others, generous, loving. And there are practitioners who are helping these children become moral. It is true that in cases of necessity, we all descend to the ad-hoc, but in a continuing situation some understanding and some theoretical basis for action are called for. With these philosophical positions as background, I have been searching for some theoretical grounding for the moral development of the developmentally disabled, and I would like in tentative fashion to share what I have found with you.

By way of a preliminary remark, Avishai Margalit3 in his article on "second best" proposes many counter-examples to the idea that when we can't have exactly what we want we ought to be satisfied with an approximation. A silly but striking example is being satisfied with missing a plane by five minutes if we can't catch the plane, rather than travelling by a train which we can catch although it is manifestly a less attractive way of travelling for some. Perhaps we ought to abandon the plan to catch (almost) the plane and take a train we can catch instead. Second best may indeed be better than an approximation to the best. Or, to formulate the principle less generally and more to our purpose, rather than try to approximate "normal moral theory," perhaps we ought to draft another theory.
I have been fortunate to have read in this past year the John Dewey lecture of Tom Green. That lecture, "The Formation of Conscience in an Age of Technology", opens up several vistas traditionally closed to moral theorists. Green shifts the moral question from "What ought I to do?" to "What kind of life ought I to live?".

Within this broadened perspective, he posits a plurality of consciences responding to a variety of calls instead of a unitary conscience possibly responding to and only responding to the call of duty.

First, conscience as craft is the product of performing innumerable tasks innumerable times. Emerging is a sense of work attuned to some norm. The agent comes to know when a tool is being used well. The agent comes to know when the work has been completed and that it is has been completed well. To fail to meet these norms in any one instance is not to have sinned but to have missed the mark, and one's recourse is to further practice.

Efforts with the developmentally disabled begin in this ambience and remain focussed on skill-acquisition which always includes norm acquisition. And just as the skill is the agent's, so too must be the norms. The hope of the teacher interested in moral development is that these experiences will form a practical inductive base leading to generalizations about a norm-regulated life. Watching the teaching-learning interactions with the disabled offers concrete evidence of the feasibility of such an approach.

Second, conscience as membership is the product of forming a conscience on the basis of experiences in public life, in Hannah Arendt's sense of the active life. Experiencing oneself as a part of a community is not consequent upon forming a private conscience. For, simultaneous with experiencing the purely personal, individuals experience external limits and orderings that prescriptively structure their environment, in addition, the
interests of others become factors in decision-making that must be weighed in. Granting the difficulties that arise when a person's membership in various groups leads to severe conflicts, developmentally disabled children find themselves, perhaps more than other children, inextricably bound to and profoundly dependent on their membership in a group. The experiences of limits and ordering and the discipline that they impose are more formative than the actions themselves. Affects, emotions, especially that of loyalty, deeply influence how the child will act.

Third, conscience as sacrifice highlights those acts that are free, non-duty bound responses to the needs of others. Such risk-taking is almost counter-intuitive. If conscience as sacrifice exists at all, it ought to be a very late development. For the "supererogatory" logically depends on the concept of the "obligatory." And yet the supererogatory may be one of the earliest of moral experiences and absolutely necessary, as Green suggests, if certain other actions are to be experienced as morally binding. Green is very perceptive in noting that that prudence which regulates self-regarding behavior need not be taught and is, in fact, anterior to any moral instruction. Who, after all, has to be taught to be self-regarding? But how does one become other-regarding? Green suggests that children become other-regarding through experiences of the non-obligatory. Children are invited to volunteer. Children freely enmesh their lives with those of others. And they directly experience the joy of helping another even if it is at some cost to themselves. Only on the basis of these experiences will children be willing at a later date to pay the price exacted by obligations arising out of promising and truth-telling. Anyone seeing what goes on in the cottages of the disabled encounters innumerable examples of supererogation and comes to see them not as the
culminating moments in moral life (the supererogation said to be characteristic of the saints) but as foundation stones for the construction of a moral life.

Fourth, conscience as memory describes a sense of obligation arising out of the particularities not of the moment (the synchronicity of membership) but out of those of the past (the diachronicity of rootedness). One is faithful to one’s past by maintaining a continuity with it. Rousseau’s Emile as a member of humankind, even Emile as a citizen, does not adequately conceptualize the complexities of human existence. Leibniz’s charge du passé and gros de l’avenir are much better. Many of our obligations are, as Roger Scruton says, “not a matter of contract but of piety.” “Historical attachments... with all the arbitrariness and all the contingency of human life” are as binding as any abstract principles of justice.

Such a conscience is not beyond the ken of the developmentally disabled. Their roots may be narrow; for they may be largely unaware of the world in which all of us live. But their roots are as deep as anyone s. Their world, which may be limited to a few acres with occasional week-end forays to the homes of their parents, is a world already existing when they entered it, a world with its pieties—celebrations, rhythms, work and play periods. And the disabled respond to them and flourish because of them.

Fifth and last of Green’s typology, conscience as critical imagination arises whenever someone deeply committed to a community finds a discrepancy between norm and practice and is able to imagine at least one alternative way of acting better fitted to the norm. We most easily associate this kind of conscience and behavior with the Hebrew prophets, but it can be a response to something as simple as seeing another child being harassed and
demanding justice for that child. For some time I was of the opinion that such a conscience was beyond the abilities of the developmentally disabled. Watching children protect other children has caused me to change my mind.

Let me pause, then, and summarize. We have left behind the concern for the application of high cognitive skills in determining what is next to be done and shifted our focus to what kind of a life a person is living. In so doing, more than a fierce concentration on duty or utility is needed and something quite other than them. Life revolves around skills; social relationships; unexpected, uncalled for, and costly generosity; maintaining continuity with one's past; and attempting in loyalty to these consciences to change the future. All of these are not beyond the developmentally disabled, and I would hope that all of you, as you are thinking along with me, are sensing the opening of doors too long closed.

Now, as enormously suggestive as Tom Green's ideas are, they add up to a classificatory schema and not to a theory, though they clearly suggest that some alternative ways of viewing the moral life are probable. I am sure that Tom has not stopped thinking on this subject, but while we wait for further reports I would like to make a suggestion or two on my own.

I begin by looking at a key formulation of George Herbert Mead and then at a little known thesis of Thomas Aquinas. I am indebted to Anthony J. Blasi, who teaches at the University of Toronto, for the material on Mead. Let me quote Blasi:

Mead made attitude a scientific term, giving social psychology the major matter of investigation. As Mead formulated it, an attitude is an earlier phase of an act. An act is not simple behavior of heart beats, eye blinks, or even the conditioned responses of laboratory animals, but rather a complex of physical adjustments...
co-ordinated with a preconceived, imagined outcome in mind. In a environment dominated by behaviorists, Mead stressed the evidence for attitudes: people setting the hand before picking things up, people acting not at signs but at what the signs signify, etc. But what is significant for the present discussion in his processual view of intelligent action is that an act includes an "attitude" which is oriented toward an anticipated but as yet unrealized outcome, prior to the physical adjustments required to achieve the outcome, and prior to the outcome itself.

Before an act is observable, it is already formed inchoatively in attitude. For my purposes, the moral life begins then before the observable act, before perhaps the physical act can be performed. In a traditional formulation, we frequently praise children because their hearts were in the right place; it was circumstances beyond their control that prevented the appropriate act and its outcomes.

Now this concept of attitude can be further specified by considering a point Thomas Aquinas makes in a wonderful and typical scholastic discussion of an old school topic: Whether venial sin can exist in a person with original sin alone. His answer, surprisingly, is that it is impossible for a person in original sin to commit only venial sins. In the midst of this discussion, Thomas limns a line of thought that I have found extremely helpful.

Like a true scholastic, Thomas is not interested in psychological states but rather in causes and causal nexuses. Modern discussions, if they do not limit themselves to the psychological, usually restrict themselves even when they speak causally to discussions of material and efficient causes. Aristotelians like Thomas fill out the discussion with the formal
and final (or telic) causes. Need I add that we are obviously in a controversial area? But clearly enough teleology has not been banished once and for all from philosophical consideration.

In any event, Thomas is concerned with the teleology of the first human act historically unrecoverable for any individual but obviously necessary to posit for every individual. Such an act does not depend on a consistent level of human activity such that one can say the person is now habitually acting as a full human being. But it does suppose that the person can at least intend something, choose some means to bring it about, and do it. Now to choose a means one must intend an end. As Thomas says, "For, the end being first in intention, the first thing that faces a person possessed of moral discretion is to think about himself in order to direct other things to himself as end." Or, as Aristotle might say, the last in execution, namely the end to be achieved, is the first in intention. For the intention of end starts off the entire complex causal process.

The foundation for all human activity is the natural love of a human for the human good. To put this statement as baldly as possible: Every being is what it is and not what it is not; every being thus wants to be what it is, rests in its own perfection, and resists what is opposed to this. Thus in whatever the human person loves, whatever it seeks, the reason for willing is the value of the human good as such. In regard, then, to the handicapped child, as well as to every child, as soon as it begins to act humanly, it has to intend some end if the complex machinery of human action is to get started.

Let me summarize what I think Thomas would say:

1) There can be no moral life that does not involve the willing of the end.
2) It is "deliberation about self" that is the precise crisis that inaugurates moral life.

3) The initial moral act can be concerned with a good that is "concretely incomplete," but sets for the self an ideal to be reached, however vaguely that ideal may be defined.

4) A new point which I include to simply point out how Thomas rounds off his discussion: Either one orders something right or does not do so; that one will choose well is not automatic nor predictable. The fundamental issue is between the self as ultimate and the self as ordered to a further good, a distinction Rousseau also makes when he speaks of amour propre and amour de soi-même.

Not only is such an ordering necessary—Thomas's point—but it is possible at a very early age—my point. There is every reason in the world for saying that a child must have reached a significant level of maturity if it is to be able to choose intelligently between alternative means toward an already loved and desired end. There is much less reason for saying that a child must have reached a significant level of maturity to love what is good for it. Thomas's point is that we're built to desire what makes us happy. And that initial acts of love places us squarely in the moral life even though concrete acts to bring about such a happy state of affairs may be impossible to implement on account of any one of a number of adventitious circumstances: lack of physical prowess, lack of materials, lack of powers of discerning what would indeed be apt means. Children can be in the moral world through that initial act, just as we can take possession of a house even though the electricity is not connected and the water not turned on.

But what kind of world has the child entered? Here I plug in the third and last part of my present speculations on the moral life of the
developmentally disabled. This part comes from John Macmurray's 1954 Gifford Lectures, *Persons in Relation.* What house has the child taken possession of? It is the world presented to the child by the community in which the child is embedded. Macmurray speaks of three possible apperceptions. That is, there are three possible ways in which the child selects from what is presented to it and organizes these materials in terms of their relevance to its own interests. And these apperceptions define for the child what is expected of it as a moral agent by the community.

In the first, the child sees itself and others as mutually repelling particles, each egocentric and compelled by the nature of the resulting aggressive society to use its reason to realize its own will. One limits oneself to maintain a society in order to realize as best one can one's own will. Such a child enters basically a Hobbesian universe.

The second child retreats from its contact with the perceived artificiality of the society that it encounters. It cannot resist the other and therefore participates as much as it must in that unreality. But it escapes as best it can into an ideal world of fantasy, and it uses its reason to hinder what hinders its vision of the good life. Reality is to be a spectator, an isolate which finds sociality in pseudo-identification with that totality called by Rousseau the general will.

Both of these worlds are constituted, according to Macmurray, by an impersonal unity of persons. The third is characterized by a personal unity of persons. It is also heterocentric: "The centre of interest and attention is in the other." "Self-consciousness is not primary but secondary." And this interest is mutual. The other, nevertheless, must not be an exclusive another. The world is seen as constituted by a community of persons who simply care for each other. For those who find Macmurray's language
difficult here, I would suggest an easy transposition. What Macmurray is saying is to all intents and purposes exactly what John Dewey is saying in the first chapter of Democracy and Education. If the child is to apprehend the world in this third way, its first experiences with significant others are obviously of the utmost importance.

By way of conclusion: Thomas offers us an argument for the crucial importance of that first moment in which a child acts humanly. Mead helps us to focus on the centrality of attitude in that complexus called the human act. Macmurray helps explain why all children, even the developmentally disabled, act differently on the basis of the kind of world they personally encounter. And Macmurray offers the most salutary of warnings: Don't assume that we become rational in the process of growing up, and that the more rational we become the more we grow out of our childish phantasies. By neglecting the first moments of a child's cognitive and affective contact with its world, we have made this assumption one all too easy to make. And then a truly moral life becomes the exclusive domain of the adult.

Once these pieces are all in place, once the child enters the moral life, in differing time frames according to the aptitude of the child, the five consciences Tom Green speaks of begin to be formed. And my own observations confirm what practitioners tell me. It is simply amazing how disabled children respond and grow. They may never be able to apply rules of universalizability to their solutions of dilemmas; they may never begin to approach an adequate consideration of the multiplicity of consequences that utilitarian moral theory calls for. They will continue to be dependent on the expertise that others in their community possess, but so do we all, even if in lesser degree. I have talked to workers who have labored five and six years to get a child to make eye-contact. When they finally
succeed, they realize that that child has at long last entered on its own, terms the human community and has begun to live the moral life. Who is to set limits to that child's growth? Who is to say what heights that child will in the course of time attain? Second-best may indeed have turned out not to be so bad after all.

Footnotes:
1. See, for example, Rosalyn Kramer Monat, Sexuality and the Mentally Retarded (San Diego: College-Hill Press, 1982.)
5. This move parallels the one made by Bernard Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985). See especially pp. 1-21
ON WHY SELF-GOVERNMENT
FAILED AT BRONSON ALCOTT'S
TEMPLE SCHOOL

by
Ronald Swartz
Associate Professor of Education
Oakland University
Rochester, Michigan

...Often heresy has nothing to do with being right or wrong in literal - mathematical or scientific - senses of these terms. Instead, it has to do with not believing what everyone else believes or what one ought to believe; with proclaiming disbelief when the right thing to do is to profess belief or at least remain silent.¹

I. Preliminary Remarks on Bronson Alcott as an Advocate of a Self-Governing Educational Philosophy

If one wishes to learn about a nineteenth century American Transcendentalist other than Ralph Waldo Emerson or Henry David Thoreau, then Amos Bronson Alcott is usually chosen as the prime candidate for study; during his life of nearly nine decades, Alcott wrote incessantly and his journals, essays, poems, letters, and books now make up over "fifty manuscript volumes containing descriptions of what he did, and his ideas, formulated not once, but many times."²

Besides the mammoth accumulation of his own writings, commentary on Alcott's life, work, and ideas has been somewhat continuous since the opening of the Temple School on September 22, 1834. Alcott's experimental educational program originally had only eighteen students whose ages varied between five and ten years old; in the short five years that his school existed Alcott attempted to have co-educational classes that allowed his students to discuss matters related to human reproduction. Alcott's efforts to incorporate sex education into the school curriculum were described in his book Conversations with Children on the Gospel; this book appeared

85
in print in January 1837 and it "was the occasion of a fierce attack in the Boston newspapers in the following March. Their hostile criticism both of Mr. Alcott and his book was singularly varied in its nature." But the publication of Alcott's controversial book did not lead to the immediate demise of the Temple School. It would take Alcott a couple of more years to finally go beyond the limits of what most nineteenth century adults viewed as socially acceptable behavior for children who attended elementary schools; by the summer of 1839 Alcott's school was in a shambles and he was operating out of his own home when he allowed a young black girl to enroll in his educational experiment. This final act of insensitivity to the established social norms of a progressive nineteenth century New England community left Alcott with no students other than the black girl and his own daughters. And with his debts far exceeding his assets, Alcott had to end his innovative educational experiment as the fall of 1839 approached.

Alcott lived when sex education and racially integrated schools were an anathema in enlightened antebellum cities such as Boston. And throughout his lifetime Alcott would find that many of his innovative educational views would contradict the ideas of influential American educators such as Horace Mann and Henry Barnard. An account of Alcott's differences with his contemporaries was beautifully summarized in The Social Ideas of American Educators when Merle Curti observed that in the nineteenth century

an important part of moral training was the inculcation in the schoolroom of respect for authority in order to prevent the anarchistic dissolution of republican society. Some teachers, like George Emerson and A. Bronson Alcott of Boston, did indeed try to train children for their responsibilities in a republic by encouraging them to learn in the schoolroom the art
of self-government, but they were exceptional. Far more representative was Jacob Abbott, father of Lyman Abbott and writer of inumerable highly moral stories for boys. It was his conviction that the maintenance of rigid discipline and authority in the schoolroom was by far the best means of inculcating respect for law and order.

II. Statement of Problem and Overview of the Argument

In this essay I would like to help begin the reappraisal of Alcott's work by offering a discussion of the question, "Why did Alcott's views on self-government for young children fail to become the basis for an educational philosophy that could sustain experimental learning situations such as the Temple School?"

The above question significantly narrows the range of discourse about Alcott's educational views; throughout this paper I will primarily be concerned with what Curti has referred to as Alcott's attempt to have children "learn in the schoolroom the art of self-government." In addition, I will suggest that a self-governing educational philosophy failed at the Temple School for at least the following two reasons: 1) It will be argued that Alcott had a romantic and unrealisitic estimation of the ability that children have to govern themselves. As we will see, Alcott thought that children who functioned in a self-governing manner would naturally discover the truth about themselves and the world in which they lived. And when Alcott's students discovered ideas that were different from the "truths" which children were expected to learn in the more conventional schools of the early nineteenth century, it then became possible to claim that a self-governing approach to learning leads children to believe and accept ideas which most conventional educational theorists viewed as false, socially unacceptable, and degenerative. 2) A second reason I will suggest for the failure of self-government at the Temple School is that Alcott had
unreasonable expectations about how his contemporaries would view his educational theories and experiment. Specifically, Alcott failed to create a meaningful dialogue about his educational philosophy partly because he was a romantic thinker who thought that his self-governing educational philosophy would be seen as self-evidently true by all people who came in contact with his views. However, contrary to Alcott's naive expectations, people such as Horace Mann and Henry Barnard had their own views about the true way to educate children.

Briefly stated, this essay will attempt to offer a preliminary explanation about why Alcott failed in his efforts to begin a self-governing educational reform movement; my major reason for discussing Alcott's failure is that I wish to use this paper as a vehicle for providing some of the necessary groundwork for having a reasonable dialogue about some of the central aspects of a self-governing educational philosophy.

III. On Alcott's Endorsement of the Doctrine that Truth Manifests Itself to Children

My critique of Alcott's unsuccessful attempt to begin a self-governing educational reform movement will rely upon the notion that he endorsed what Karl Popper has referred to as the doctrine of manifest truth. In a lecture read before the British Academy in 1960 Popper had the following to say about this doctrine:

The great movement of liberation which started in the Renaissance and led through the many vicissitudes of the reformation and the religious and revolutionary wars to the free societies in which the English-speaking peoples are privileged to live, this movement was inspired throughout by an unparalleled epistemological optimism; by a most optimistic view of man's power to discern truth and to acquire knowledge.

At the heart of this new optimistic view of the possibility of knowledge, lies the doctrine that truth is manifest.
Popper's views on the doctrine of manifest truth are a crucial part of his critique of the epistemological perspectives of Francis Bacon, Rene Descartes, John Milton, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and other famous Western philosophical thinkers. Popper has not argued that famous Western educational theorists have endorsed the doctrine of manifest truth. Nevertheless, it can be argued that Western educational theorists such as Jean Jacques Rousseau did indeed suggest that truths would manifest themselves to children who were allowed to experience the world without the corrupting influence of society or its formal educational systems; in a sense Rousseau's *Emile* is a long essay explaining how truths will eventually be revealed to the mind of a child who has learned his lessons by experiencing nature in all her glory, rather than by being taught with books and other socially corrupting influences. Moreover, Rousseau's *Emile* was destined to have a huge impact on Western educational theorists such as Heinrich Pestalozzi; in his final book the *Swan Song* Pestalozzi explains how Rousseau's "dream book" inspired him to become an educational reformer.

Alcott was exposed to Pestalozzi's ideas before he was thirty years old; in the 1820's when he was a teacher in Connecticut at the District Schools in Bristol and Cheshire, Alcott was slowly beginning the development of his novel self-governing educational philosophy. However, Alcott would not clearly argue for the idea that children had the ability to discover truths until after he had founded the Temple School; in his *Conversations with Children on the Gospels* Alcott stated that

*Childhood utters sage things, worthy of all note; and he who scoffs at i.s improvisations, or perverts i.s simple sayings, proves the corruption of his own being, and his want of reference for the Good, the Beautiful, the True, and the Holy. He beholds not the Face of the Heavenly Father.*

89
Alcott assumed that children were able to govern their own learning because he thought that all human beings were born with the god given gift to know and discover truths. And Alcott was not alone in this belief; after a visit to the Temple School Emerson claimed that Alcott was indeed successful in his "experiment of engaging young children upon questions of taste and truths."\(^\text{10}\)

Emerson and Alcott thought that a child's mind had the ability to discover and understand the abstract and dubious truths which formed the bases of their Transcendentalist philosophy and these men endorsed the radical idea "that to truth is no age or season."\(^\text{11}\) To be sure, Alcott was not naive enough to think that children would discover truths the first time they asked a question about some matter of importance. As it turns out, Alcott recognized that children were likely to make some errors on their way to discovering truths; for Alcott, truths about nature and the world were to be revealed to children in dialogues with adults. Alcott's method of instruction was labeled "entirely Socratic"\(^\text{12}\) by his disciple Elizabeth Palmer Peabody. Specifically, Alcott's method of teaching truths was described when Peabody recalled the following discussion between Alcott and one of his students:

Mr. Alcott said, there are two sorts of truth, the truth of what is in the mind, and the truth of what is out of the mind...

The world existed as a thought in God's mind before a single particle of it existed in such a way as to be seen, or heard, or felt. Do you believe that? He then addressed one boy eight years old; tell me, when you do anything outside of you, any thing which others see you do, does it not exist first within your mind; do you not feel it first really existing within your mind? Yes. Well can any of you tell me of a single thing that you see with your eyes, that did not first exist, really, within some spirit?
One boy said—did that bust of Shakespeare exist really in a mind before it existed out of a mind? He was soon convinced that the form of it did exist in the mind of the moulder.13

We do not need the research results of a Piaget to know that Alcott attempted to teach metaphysical ideas that were far beyond the mental capabilities of most eight year olds; the use of mere common sense should tell us that children between the ages of five and ten are not usually interested in sophisticated metaphysical discussions about truth. But if one is interested in a philosophy of education which includes much common sense, it is best to look some place other than Alcott's work. Furthermore, not only does Alcott's work usually lack common sense, it also fails to provide any kind of serious discussion about the historical roots of his teaching method. Whereas Alcott did indeed use dialogue as the basis for learning, his interpretation of the method used by Socrates leaves much room for debate. If we recall that Plato's Socrates in the Apology claimed that his wisdom was worth little or nothing at all, then it seems odd to view Alcott as a follower of the Socrates of the Apology. Of course, Socrates as he is portrayed in Plato's Republic is more akin to Alcott's image of the ancient philosopher; by the time Plato wrote his Republic the Socrates of the Apology had been transformed from a humble pursuer of truth to a wise philosopher who knew many truths. And Alcott seems to have taken the Platonic Socrates of the Republic as his ideal teacher.

IV. Self-Governing Schools as Part of the Western Quest for More Liberal Social Institutions

The dialogues Alcott had with children attempted to lead his students to the truths he had discovered. And Alcott was a patient listener who did not
criticize a student

for thinking at Temple School - even when his thoughts ran
counter to those of the schoolmaster. But this school
master had such an overpowering personality that rarely
happened. Inevitably, the thoughts that Bronson drew out of
his pupils were his own. In his sublime and innocent
arrogance, he remained totally unaware of the manner in which
he molded his students' minds; he thought that their Platonic
utterances merely confirmed the divine rightness of his own
ideas.

For over fifty years Alcott was a devout vegetarian who followed a
"Pythagorean diet" that did not allow a person to eat meat, butter, cheese or eggs. And Alcott felt that human beings had no right to kill even the smallest living creatures such as mosquitos. "Self-defense might extend to waving a mosquito aside, but never to slaughter." But, ironically, this gentle romantic mystic who would not kill a fly, inadvertently endorsed educational theories that allowed for teaching methods which bullied young children to accept the dubious truths of their benevolent schoolmaster. Of course, Alcott's teaching methods did make discussion possible and mandatory at the Temple School; the range of ideas that children were exposed to in Alcott's classrooms were far greater than the more traditional classrooms that existed during the early nineteenth century. It will be remembered that Alcott did not use "rigid discipline and authority in the schoolroom;" the children who came in contact with Alcott in his Temple School experiment did not have their thoughts censored by their teacher or other educational authorities such as school administrators, religious leaders, or politicians. Thus, in a very real sense Alcott organized classrooms which granted freedom of thought and freedom of speech to his students; this radical idea of
having educational programs which act in accord with such laws as the First Amendment to the United States Constitution did indeed prove to be far too novel for most conventional nineteenth century American educational theorists.

Whereas Alcott usually found that he could often control the outcome of the dialogues he had with children, this unconventional schoolmaster did not make an effort to control the content of the discussions he had with the students at the Temple School; on their way to discovering Alcott's wonderful truths students were allowed to entertain a vast variety of ideas that most traditional teachers and religious leaders considered to be outrageous. And when word of Alcott's unconventional teaching methods reached the public, most people came to the conclusion that what was going on in the Temple School was far too dangerous because children were being exposed to heretical ideas; for those who believe in the censorship of ideas, contact with heretical views might lead innocent or even mature minds to accept false and pernicious ideas. However, Alcott did not see the need for censorship in his classrooms because he thought that the power of truthful ideas was so great that children would easily reject falsehoods for truths.

Alcott endorsed the extremely optimistic doctrine that truth manifests itself not only to mature minds, but also to young and innocent minds. And Alcott's blind and dogmatic acceptance of this optimistic doctrine made it impossible for him to understand that honest disagreements between people is indeed possible, likely, and perhaps even desirable in social institutions that allow for freedom of speech. But diversity of thinking as a constant way of living was not viewed by Alcott as reasonable. On the contrary, this unreasonable man expected his students to follow his example of seeing clearly that people should neither destroy mosquitos nor eat eggs.
Some of Alcott's more rebellious students might have found it desirable and reasonable to kill a few mosquitos in their lifetime. And some of Alcott's students who became heretics to the mystic religion followed by their teacher may have even decided that a person could enjoy eating an egg or two. Of course, Alcott's students may have had much difficulty in overcoming the domineering presence of their "intellectually seductive" schoolmaster, but some of his rebellious students probably did use their own minds to come to conclusions which were at odds with their loving teacher. Unfortunately, those students who ended up disagreeing with Alcott and his dubious truths might have felt guilty every time they killed a mosquito or ate an egg. However, some of Alcott's students may have been lucky enough to outgrow the guilt that Alcott's instilled in those youngsters who found that they had to disagree with the truths of their teacher.

For Alcott open-ended debates were impossible because he assumed that all right thinking people would come to the same conclusions about what is the truth. And what Alcott and many other nineteenth century thinkers never realized is that the simple truth is that truth is often hard to come by and that once found it may be easily lost again. Moreover, once, a person endorses Popper's criticism of the doctrine of manifest truth, it then becomes impossible to argue along with Alcott that a self-governing educational philosophy has the potential to help children discover and learn the truth; the modern criticism of the doctrine of manifest truth suggests that even teachers and other educational authorities should not be expected to know truths. Following Socrates as he is portrayed in Plato's Apology, Popper has revived the ancient idea that no human beings, even the wisest among us, can know that they possess the truth.
V. On the Debate that Never Materialized Between Alcott and Horace Mann

A dialogue about issues associated with having experimental self-governing educational programs did not materialize during Alcott's lifetime partly because Alcott and his critics both thought that knew the truth about what children should learn in school. Specifically, Alcott's educational proposals were critically evaluated by a person such as Horace Mann who assumed that he knew the truth about how learning should be organized in a school. In his famous Twelfth Annual Report of 1848 Mann argued that

...indispensable to our ultimate success, will be the appointment of a teacher of the true faith...those articles in the creed of republicanism, which are accepted by all, believed in by all, and which form the common basis of our political faith, shall be taught to all...20

Mann thought that the "light of truth"21 would be readily seen by all human beings who had learned to form their opinions correctly. And in an oration delivered at Providence in 1825 Mann suggested that the task of education was not so much "to inclucate opinions and beliefs, as to impart the means of their correct formulation."22 Thus, for Mann, schools were to teach students how to find the truth and he often argued against using the schools for the indoctrination of partisan views. However, when all was said and done, Mann was "far from consistent in adhering"23 to his opposition to indoctrination. As with Alcott, Mann thought that schools could and should teach those truths which had been discovered by wise human beings; although Mann admitted that perhaps there were some unsettled questions, he nevertheless thought that when it came to political truths the "controverted points, compared with those about which there is no dispute, do not bear the proportion of one to a hundred."24 And it appears that the large body of truths which were not in dispute were to become the basis of the "true faith"25 of the Common Schools.
The truths which Mann saw as necessary to teach to children were not the same as the ones Alcott wished to teach. As it turns out, "Mann had neither the taste nor the time for Alcott's pedagogy." 26 When Mann was given the opportunity to invite Alcott to a teacher training institute in the 1840's he rejected Alcott's offer to speak to the teachers in Massachusetts because he considered "ronson's "ideas on teaching far too subversive to be safely presented to teachers." 27 It appears that Mann did not consider Alcott to be a teacher of the "true faith;" in order to make sure that the teachers in the Common Schools did not teach or come in contact with the "false faith" Mann did everything in his power to prevent teachers from even hearing Alcott's heretical ideas. Thus, although truth had manifested itself to both Alcott and Mann, these men saw a different truth and they differed significantly on how to make a school a social institution for teaching truths.

Briefly stated, neither Alcott nor Mann could admit that the ideas they viewed as truths may have been nothing more than opinions or falsehoods. And both of these men found no need to explain or discuss their disagreements with one another. Of course, Mann and others like him had political power, social respectability, and the psychological temperament that is usually required to have a significant impact on the educational institutions in a society; when it came to implementing a theory of education for the American public schools, Mann's ideas would be embraced by his society while Alcott's unconventional views on self-governing schools would be ignored.

VI. An Update on the Disagreements Between Alcott and Mann

The generations of educational theorists and practitioners that followed Alcott and Mann did not choose to debate some of the central issues and problems poorly articulated in Alcott's feeble attempt to develop a self-governing educational philosophy at the Temple School. Whereas John Dewey would go on to
praise both Mann and Emerson as significant American thinkers, it appears that Dewey never discussed the differences between Mann's and Alcott's views on schooling; when Dewey was confronted with a model of a self-governing educational program that was similar to Summerhill, he would find it very difficult to be serious about this kind school. Unfortunately, Dewey never came in contact with Homer Lane's attempts to develop a self-governing educational philosophy. Ironically, Dewey and Lane both created experimental educational programs in the United States during the first decade of this century, but these two American educational reformers never compared their radically different models for a school; this should not surprise us because Lane did not do much writing during his short life of only fifty years. As it turns out, Lane's contribution to a self-governing educational philosophy centered around his experimental schools and his lectures which influenced people such as A.S. Neill.

In the generation following Dewey and Lane the idea of a self-governing educational philosophy was argued for in the work of Paul Goodman; in essays such as Compulsory Miseducation Goodman would argue that the self-governing educational philosophy used at Summerhill was both "relevant and practical" for people living in the 1960's and 1970's. Moreover, in his attempt to argue for a self-governing educational philosophy, Goodman made an effort to strike up a debate with educational theorists such as Jerome Bruner; for Goodman, the ideas outlined in Bruner's The Process of Education were highly unsatisfactory and incompatible with the Summerhill model of schooling that Goodman wished to promote. However, Bruner did not find it necessary to answer Goodman's criticism and to this day there has yet to be a serious public dialogue about the central issues associated with a self-governing educational philosophy.
As we enter the last decade and a half of the twentieth century it does not appear to me that American educational thinkers are now getting ready to deal with questions such as the following: Is it reasonable for liberal-democratic societies to have some experimental educational programs that follow in the tradition of Alcott's Temple School, Homer Lane's Ford Republic, and A.S. Neill's Summerhill?" This question, which we can refer to as the educational problem of experimental self-governing schools, is not of central concern today as American educators debate the conventional ideas articulated in works such as Mortimer Adler's *The Paideia Proposal*. Whereas self-governing educational theorists have offered novel ideas about the kind of learning that should take place in schools, I doubt very much if we will hear much these days from those who follow in the tradition of Alcott, Lane, and Goodman.

VII. A Concluding Remark

In thinking about the overwhelming odds against having meaningful educational reform in our society, I was reminded that Thoreau, although he was often pessimistic about living to see the social reforms he dreamed about, nevertheless found it desirable to conclude *Walden* with the reminder that

> The life in us is like the water in the river. It may rise this year higher than man has ever known it, and flood the parched uplands; even this may be the eventful year, which will drown out all our muskrats. It was not always dry land where we dwell...The light which puts out our eyes in darkness to us. Only that day dawns to which we are awake. There is more day to dawn. The sun is but a morning-star."
Thoreau was indeed an optimistic pessimist. And as long as we have "more day to dawn" the self-governing philosophy of education hinted at in Alcott's work may eventually evolve into a cogent system of ideas that will be taken seriously by modern American educational theorists. No one can really say for sure where the political and intellectual winds will blow in the future; with more luck than it is reasonable to expect we may yet be able to create schools which are worthy of people living in liberal-democratic societies.

FOOTNOTES

5. Ibid.
9. A. Bronson Alcott, Conversations with Children on the Gospels, quoted in F. B. Sanborn and William T. Harris, A. Bronson Alcott: His Life and Philosophy, p. 213.
10. Ralph Waldo Emerson quoted in F. B. Sanborn and William T. Harris, A. Bronson Alcott: His Life and Philosophy, p. 213.
11. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 59.


16. Ibid., p. 415.


21. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


27. Ibid.


34. Ibid.
Calls for reform are again dominating the educational landscape. Not since the Post-Sputnik era of a quarter century ago has the turbulence of reform been so widespread. The implications for teacher education and educational foundations, including the philosophy of education, are profound, and it behooves those of us with vital interests in these fields to be aware of these developments and to assess their possible consequences.

The Rhetoric of Reform

The Report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education focused national attention on education in 1983. This report, with its spectacular "act of war" rhetoric, cited alleged deficiencies, particularly at the secondary school level, and called for reforms such as a longer school day and year, greater emphasis on cognitive knowledge and college preparatory courses, and on mathematics, languages, and the sciences. In many respects the recommendations were reminiscent of those offered by Conant and others in the Post-Sputnik era. A major difference, however, is that education was then considered to be a national problem, and federal funds were generously available. The Nation at Risk report clearly indicates that education is a state and local problem, and clearly places financial responsibility at state and local levels.
Following in quick succession, several states, perhaps most notably Texas, passed legislation aimed at implementing educational reform. The Texas legislation provided for a wide range of reforms including greater emphasis on academic performance (and lesser emphasis on extracurricular activities and athletics -- no pass/no play rules etc.), strict limits on the size of lower elementary school class enrollments, improved salary schedules and opportunities for professional advancement for teachers (career ladder, etc.), and competence testing for teachers and administrators.

Competence tests for teachers, certification and recertification of teachers, and teacher preparation programs in colleges and universities have received widespread national attention. All of these movements have been fueled by calls for reform, apparent widespread discontent with education, and a growing shortage of teachers nationwide, and all give evidence of reductionist tendencies and a decided emphasis of practice over theory.

The American Federation of Teachers has generally favored competence testing for teachers in recent years, while the National Education Association has generally opposed such tests. Both groups, however, have been united in favor of more involvement of practicing professional teachers in the certification and recertification of teachers. As early as 1982 the National Education Association was expressing dissatisfaction with traditional certification programs in colleges of education and calling for more involvement of practicing teachers in the preparation of teachers:

The NEA plan sets forth the best thinking of practicing teachers-most of them dissatisfied with their own preparation.

It calls for rigorous admission standards for colleges of education, based on firm evidence of potential success as a classroom teacher; teacher preparation programs based on skills and experiences that
practitioners say are necessary for effective practice; ample opportunities for education students to apply their new knowledge and skills to the 'real world' of teaching while they're still in school; teaching credentials based on multiple measures of a graduate's ability to teach; and autonomous state agencies, governed by practicing teachers, to approve teacher education programs and certify new teachers. By the summer of 1985, 34 states were reported to have passed legislation requiring specific tests for teacher certification.

The growing shortage of teachers has stimulated numerous alternatives to traditional teacher certification. Officials in the state of Maine, facing the problem of a shortage of teachers, developed in 1983 a plan to grant teacher certification to mid-career college graduates who complete a six months experimental teacher training program. A similar program was developed in New Jersey providing for provisional certification for college graduates who did not have the traditional formal teacher preparation program. Students with strong liberal arts background and good credentials in subject matter to be taught could be provisionally certified to teach "without having to extend their college education for 30 or so credits in such courses as history of American education, careers in education, and educational philosophy, or for 12 weeks of practice teaching." The program also provided for permanent certification by passing a national teacher examination in subject area, completing 200 contact hours of instruction in general education and the behavioral sciences at one of seven regional centers, and teaching under supervision of a practicing teacher for one year.

While criticism of the preparation of teachers is not new, a new wave of criticism has emerged. The most prestigious of these are the Holmes Group and the Carnegie Forum.
The chair of the Holmes Group is Judith E. Lanier, Dean of the College of Education at Michigan State University. A steering committee composed of Lanier and Deans of Education at 13 other research universities has provided leadership for the entire group, which has a potential membership of 123 deans of education who have been invited to membership. As of April, 1986, 38 education deans have been involved in activities. Long range goals of the group include reformation of teacher certification standards at member universities and the improvement of training, rewards, and working conditions of teachers prepared at those institutions. Member schools would be expected to phase out education majors and teacher certification programs at the undergraduate level and replace them with a reformed liberal arts education at the baccalaureate level. Teacher certification would be tied to a professional master's degree in education which would include a year of academic and clinical study and a year of internship under career professional teachers. The emphasis appears to be primarily on disciplinary study, apprenticeship experiences, and application of research. There is apparently little or no provision made for the study of educational foundations.

The Carnegie Report is based on a presumption of economic necessity, and recommendations for rebuilding (rather than repairing) the structure of teacher preparation are central to the report. Principal provisions include more control by teachers, more accountability, a national certification board for teachers, creating a hierarchial order of teachers, improved salaries and career opportunities for teachers, requiring a baccalaureate degree in arts and sciences prior to professional preparation, teacher certification programs at the graduate level culminating in a master's degree, and incentives to increase the pool of minority teachers. Particularly significant is the fact that the Carnegie Report, as does the Holmes Group, recommends a liberal arts
degree as prerequisite to graduate teacher education programs. The latter report emphasizes a common core of history, government, science, literature, and the arts, which is presumed to develop essential skills of computation, writing, speaking, and clear thinking.

One suggested model of a two year graduate program would begin with a summer session devoted to instruction in teaching, followed by a year internship in a school with a diverse population. The second summer would be devoted to courses designed to build on internship teaching experiences. The final year would consist of residency (similar to a teaching hospital residency) in a school, with considerable teaching responsibility under the supervision of "Lead Teachers" who would hold some sort of faculty appointment in the graduate school where the fledgling teacher is enrolled. "What is essential is a strong element of field-based preparation, emphasizing opportunities for careful reflection on teaching, integrated with a demanding program of academic coursework."11

Of course all of these reforms will never happen -- the obstacles of economics, vested interests, and inertia are simply too formidable. The Holmes group chair is already developing a defensive posture, stating that recommendations have been misunderstood and they are "actually more flexible than they appear..."12 This is not to say, however, that there will be no significant changes in teacher education in the years ahead.13 It is abundantly clear that many undergraduate teacher education programs are in jeopardy and many may disappear. It is also a good bet that teacher preparation will be much more heavily weighted toward apprenticeship and practice, probably at the expense of theory and philosophy. Both the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA) have long supported a greater role for practicing teachers in the preparation of
future teachers. Significantly, both Mary Hatwood Futrell and Albert Shanker, presidents of the NEA and the AFT, are members of the Carnegie Forum Task Force on Teaching as a Profession, and both have expressed at least some support for Forum recommendations:

Initial reactions to the report by Mary Hatwood Futrell, president of the National Education Association, provided mixed signals. The union leader, . . . said she supported it "generally" but had serious reservations about several points, including how the national certification standards would be developed and applied, and what she called a "potential for abuse" in the idea of paying top teachers more than others.14

The American Federation of Teachers supported resolutions bearing more resemblance to the Forum recommendations at a recent meeting in Chicago:

It called for more power and self-regulation by teachers, abolishing undergraduate degrees in education and shifting professional preparation to graduate school. It would also open an alternate route into the profession through internships for liberal arts majors.15

It is an open question as to whether or not changes based on such reforms would result in better teachers, for there is a woefully insufficient body of research to support such change. It is also possible that some of what happens presently in undergraduate teacher education will be shifted to graduate school simply by changing course numbers, and in the process, eliminating much of the content of a four year baccalaureate teacher education program, including courses in the philosophy of education.

What is likely to occur if such reforms are implemented is a stratification of teachers characterized by "Super Teachers" prepared in the new mode at a handful of prestigious research universities, and paid and rewarded much more handsomely than the majority of teachers who will probably still be prepared at the undergraduate level, and who will serve in the trenches of education at lower pay and less rewards much as most teachers are doing today. The application of simple arithmetic to the projected mass
shortage of teachers for the rest of the century would make clear that a drastic reordering of national economic priorities would be necessary to pay for such reforms applied to all schools and all teachers.\textsuperscript{16} Such reordering of priorities is not likely to occur.

The Contemporary Status of the Field

The conventional wisdom among philosophers of education is that we are an endangered species. The Philosophy of Education Society has a standing committee (Committee on Professional Activities) whose purpose includes assisting philosophers of education in finding employment, and indeed there appears to be good reason for this concern. A study of membership records of the Philosophy of Education Society reveals that United States membership declined from 804 in 1975 to 410 in 1984, a decrease of 49\%. (During this same time period foreign membership increased from 50 in 1975 to 81 in 1984, an increase of 62\%).\textsuperscript{17} While it is not argued that such membership decline proves austerity for employment in the philosophy of education, it is certainly indicative of such. Other studies provide confirmation of a pessimistic outlook for the future.\textsuperscript{18}

The field of philosophy of education has also been subjected to evolution and reforms in the recent past, and these reforms may have contributed in a number of ways to our present ills. Some evidence indicates that we may have defined our role too narrowly to contribute significantly to the preparation of teachers, and we may have become preoccupied with philosophical respectability as an end in itself. In his Presidential Address to the Philosophy of Education Society more than a decade ago, Jonas Soltis cited the demise of the Department of Social and Philosophic Foundations of Education at
Teachers College and praised the increased specialization of individual philosophers, historians, anthropologists, etc. who were now doing:

... serious and scholarly studies in their corner of the field of education. In almost an inhumane and certainly insensitive way we were saying that in effect Teachers College had done away with the field we had invented, disseminated across the country, and trained people in; and now we were reporting to those whom we had granted our benevolence either directly or indirectly that they were obsolete. Though I publicly chastized my colleagues, I'm afraid there was little I could do to help those who stood there in need of justification for amateurism in the pursuit of educational wisdom and the training of teachers. The way of the future seems not to be the way of the generalist.19

A scant five years later, however, in the introduction to the 80th Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Soltis recognized that there is a serious mismatch between expectation and delivery, i.e., between what educational practitioners expect to be done by philosophers of education and what philosophers of education actually do. He recognized that much of the blame for this phenomenon should be placed on the increasing professional specialization of philosophers. The main purpose of the 1981 volume, according to Soltis, was to redefine the philosophy of education in terms of its contemporary practice and to illustrate the many ways in which philosophy and education can be connected. Another objective of the volume was to:

reflect the new state of affairs in the field in a way that could meaningfully restructure the expectations of educators with regard to the relation of philosophy to education, and vice-versa, if philosophy of education was to have any value for educators in the decades ahead.20

The yearbook consisted of articles by contemporary philosophers of education and is a classic example of what we do best, i.e. communicate with each other, but it will have little effect in reducing a mismatch between expectation and delivery, simply because it will not reach significant numbers of educational practitioners. Of the approximately 4,000 members of the National Society for the Study of Education, only about 5% (or 200) are
educational practitioners such as public and private school teachers and administrators. Furthermore, if the rhetoric of the NEA expresses the perspective of educational practitioners relative to educational theory and philosophy, it is unlikely that many practicing educators would be challenged to read this volume even if it were readily available to them, for teachers have always tended to favor practice over theory. Performance based criteria for certification, teacher and student competence examinations, internship, and other practice oriented developments further illustrate the erosion of theory and philosophy in the pre-service preparation of educational practitioners, and present a gloomy forecast for the future of our field.

Several references were made in the NSSE publication to the increased respectability that has come as a result of the philosophy of education following more closely the increasingly specialized model of general philosophy. Doubtless we all gain because of the brilliance of those of our guild who have developed to a superlative degree those finely honed skills of general philosophy. We should remember, however, to examine our motives for the exhibition of this brilliance. Such respectability is not legitimately an end in itself -- it is a means to the end of accomplishing our total objective which includes for many of us participating in the education of teachers. Smith commented on the subject as follows:

If we had been reflecting the changing styles and modes of general philosophy because we found them genuinely useful and productive in our field, then I would join . . . in approving this trend. But after a quarter of a century I have grown weary of this pathetic compulsion to attain academic respectability by imitating recent trends in general philosophy. I'm afraid that respectability, like happiness (and in spite of our Declaration of Independence) turns out to be a will-o'-the-wisp when pursued directly. It is correct that we ought to have feeling of being at home in both philosophy and education. But even one who is a frequent house guest is generally more respected when it is clear that he has a home of his own that is in good repair.
The point that brilliance is vain as an end in itself was perhaps made most pointedly by Harris:

It is not on the statue books, but there is such a crime as indecent exposure of the mind. There is something obscene in the sight of a man who must be brilliant at all costs, who is under a compelling need to prove his intellectual superiority on every page and in every paragraph.

There is fear behind all this - fear that if, for a moment, the brilliance dims, then everything is lost, the audience leaves, and the author is left alone, a small and frightened man on an empty stage. It takes a long time for a brilliant man to learn that nobody is loved for his mind - but only for the human way in which he uses it.24

The specialization and fragmentation of foundations in general and philosophy of education in particular, and our preoccupation with professional respectability, combined with the wave of reforms in teacher education, which certainly appear to be a threat to the philosophical foundations of education, may indeed render our profession obsolete. I argue neither cause nor effect among all these phenomena, but coincidence is obvious. I merely suggest that we speculate on the potential of that coincidence.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


5. "Radical Teacher Certification Program in Maine" Education Week May 18, 1983, p. 4.


7. The writings of numerous critics provide scathing critiques of the Post-Sputnik educational scene. James D. Koerner provided not only a criticism but a prophetic model for much of what is happening in contemporary American education. As Executive Director and President of the Council for Basic Education, he edited a monograph entitled The Case for Basic Education (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1959) in which 18 authors bemoaned the loss of influence in education of the liberal arts scholar, professor, and scientist. In The Miseducation of American Teachers (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963) Koerner argued that the education conspiracy of professional educators that control teacher education and certification must be broken, and that teaching degrees should be relieved of much of the burden of professional education and weighted much more heavily in liberal arts and general education. He was highly critical, incidentally, of courses in the history, philosophy, and psychology of education, which he viewed as illegitimate derivatives of the parent disciplines of history, philosophy, and psychology. In Who Controls American Education (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968) he argued for private schools and for greater control of education by teachers and lay persons. A model for implementing such control is included in the appendix.


13. "A survey by the American Council on Education released in July, 1986, reports that faculty members at most of the nation's colleges are at least discussing recent reports, and that reform movements have spurred changes in academic programs in more than one third of them (See "National Reports on Undergraduate Education Spur Changes at 1 in 3 Colleges, Survey Finds." The Chronicle of Higher Education July 30, 1986, pp. 1 & 20-21.


15. "Teachers Call for End to Education Degrees." The Des Moines Register July 7, 1986, p. 5A.

16. The Carnegie Forum report predicts that 1,300,000 new teachers must be hired between 1986 and 1992. If each of these new teachers cost $20,000 more than their present day counterparts, the cost would be a staggering 26 billion dollars added to the costs of education as it presently exists.


18. See Christopher J. Lucas and Irvin W. Cockriel "The Foundations of Education in Teacher Preparation: A National Assessment." Educational Studies Vol. 11, No. 4 (Winter, 1981) pp. 337-363, in which the authors conclude that foundations faculty are concerned about declining student enrollments, that almost 20% of all schools, colleges, and departments of education surveyed had experienced a net decline of full time faculty equivalents within the past three to five years, that foundations faculty have a suspicion that society in general and schools, colleges, and departments of education in particular, do not adequately appreciate or understand the contributions of educational foundations to teacher preparation, and that most of them expect that their primary institutional role will continue to be tied to teacher education programs.


21. Data supplied in a telephone conversation with Sally S. Levitt, Membership Secretary, National Society for the Study of Education, 5835 Kimbark Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.


I have never taught a philosophy of education class but that I have wondered what I am doing and why. The answers are never easy in coming because they are at the very heart of teaching and learning and our role in society. When asked by the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society, 1986 program committee to respond to the question of what is the impact of the various educational reports on philosophy of education, it not only renewed that consternation of what I'm doing and why, but it intensifies it.

At the 1985 Midwest Philosophy of Education Society meeting, my students were amused with the "Did Dewey Dance?" question which was asked during the course of the meeting. It sparked much discussion during the twelve hour return trip home to our campus. One of those students took my philosophy of education course the following spring. She struggled with some of the same struggles I struggled as I approached the course anew. Her bottom line quickly became: "How is this course going to help my teaching?" She was strong willed, she balked at the heavy reading load, and came into my office to advise me on how I could improve my teaching technique.

For several years I have had a standing offer that instead of a paper the students could dance out a philosophy of education. This student saw this offer as a way to reduce her study load, so she asked if I was serious. I affirmed the offer and she set a time when she could give her presentation on "the learner."

She chose to play Debussy's "Syrinx" on her flute and then to develop a dialogue with me concerning the music she played and its meaning in relation
to the learner. She then discussed the relationship of Pan with Syrinx and Pan with Apollo. (Pan is seen as the shepherd or hunter while Apollo represents culture and sophistication. Syrinx was the river nymph chased by Pan. As he was about to catch her she was changed to reeds, which Pan took and made into the syrinx or panpipes.) Her theme was that the learner is found within a classic tension of the bestial and the sophisticated, the application and the theory. Sometimes that is resolved and sometimes not.

Her presentation was incorporated into a larger presentation, she and another girl later gave to the whole class, that addressed philosophy of education. Her model sparked all others, in the course, to wrestle with the concepts of teacher, learner, and curriculum in some very unique ways. One student even wrote some music and performed her own compositions for the first time in her life, even though she had been writing for years. The quality of art form, the quality of teaching methodology employed, and the depth of theoretical understanding I had not seen equaled by students before.

The presentations reinforced in my mind several things. First, the most painful times in teaching often spawn the most fruitful learning situations. Second, when learning begins with and utilizes the student's past experiences and talents, and when the student is forced to go beyond those past levels, great strides in learning occur. Third, dialogue between students and teacher and among students strengthens learning.

What impact does that course have on the current discussion about educational reform? The above experiences epitomize current discussions in many ways.

First, there is a tension between theory and practice in education that is not new to the field. Reformers argue that teachers should have a liberal arts degree because of the breadth offered by such a degree and because of
the depth it offers in a particular discipline. Practicing teachers still shy away from in-service seminars, workshops and courses in the content and choose further training in techniques.

We saw in Mortimer J. Adler's paidera proposals the strong liberal education component. The Holmes report Tomorrow's Teacher (April, 1986) states:

The curriculum for prospective career teachers does not permit a major in education during the baccalaureate years—instead, undergraduates pursue more serious general/liberal study and a standard academic subject normally taught in schools.

The Carnegie Forum's Task Force on Teaching as a Profession published their report one month later (May, 1986) suggesting that a new plan for education should:

—Require a bachelor's degree in the arts and sciences as a prerequisite for the professional study of teaching.

—Develop a new professional curriculum in graduate schools of education leading to a Master in Teaching degree, based on systematic knowledge of teaching and including internships and residencies in the schools.

The Governor's Report, "Section on Teaching" published in late August 1986, addresses these concerns:

Should we move toward graduate-level training of teachers? Several recent studies present a strong case for doing so. Others point to the high cost, the impracticality of doing so until teacher salaries justify it, and the time that it will take to overcome the historic antipathy of graduate schools for teacher education. A Governor can encourage competition among various teacher education approaches. If nationally accepted professional standards are in place and tested, the market place will decide which training programs is superior. Press for an open debate on this subject.

The task is to build alliances with the teacher educators who are willing to assert leadership and set ambitious goals. Hold them publicly accountable, but do what you can to support promising ideas, financially and otherwise.

Again, asking the right questions matters.
For example, does the state university endorse the principles asserted by the Holmes Group of education deans? It is for the university community to decide, but a Governor can encourage the faculty to debate this question.¹

The State of Colorado, prior to the Governor’s report has abolished and will mandate abolishment of many baccalaureate teacher education programs, as it responds to the debate.⁵ In the State of Iowa, on the other hand, the Department of Education is meeting with teacher education units to explain newly published rules. At a recent meeting it was explained that Iowa would utilize the baccalaureate teacher education program to train teachers.⁶

It remains to be seen whether there will be a fruitful outcome from all the debates, but from the plethora of reports and the discussions generated over the last four years we can at least acknowledge a tension. The tension addresses theory versus practice, the liberal training versus professional, the undergraduate versus graduate preparation, the local versus national standards, and various approaches toward teacher preparation and teacher evaluation. Perhaps it is the continued Pan versus Apollo tension that is perennially present. As the Governor’s report suggested that the debate should be continued, perhaps we would suggest it will continue.⁷

Second, utilization of past experiences and talents lead to greater strides in learning. In the current wave of reports, the first to address education in a significant way was Winning Technologies by the California Commission on Industrial Innovation (1982). In a general concern for economic development and a concern for training good economic problem solvers, the report encourages private industry to:

- provide employees to train teachers in math, science, and computer studies, and provide industry sites for hands-on computer education . . . . Private industry could also hire high school math and science teachers during the summer session, as a way to supplement their income and to gain upgrade training in new technologies.⁸
Here we see a group of educators (Richard Atkinson, Chancellor, University of California, San Diego; Ira Michael Heyman, Chancellor, University of California, Berkeley; and Rene McPherson, Dean, Stanford Business School), business and industrial leaders, labor leaders, and government leaders calling on specific segments of the community to offer their talents and their experience for the education of the teaching profession and in turn the secondary students.  

We certainly see the past experiences as being important for the learner, particularly in John Dewey's writings and those of the other pragmatists. John Milton Gregory, the founding president of the University of Illinois, writes in his *The Seven Laws of Teaching*, that the teacher must

> Begin with what is already well known to the pupil upon the subject and with what he has himself experienced—and proceed to the new material by single, easy, natural steps, letting the known explain the unknown.

The California report escalates the concept of experience to the level of institution. If society is to grow (out of the economic slump) it must build upon its strengths or learn from its talent base. The experience of industry in science, mathematics, computers, and technology is an experience that can be brought into the schools to build society, in easy, natural steps. The report implies that an attempt to build a similar level of sophistication for teachers with little or no background in science and technology by sending them for more college or university training may be less productive. The personal experience gained on the job would be more valuable in areas of technology and the science theory would become more obvious. Thus the individual will gain experientially as the institution with experience shares with the institution that has need.

The idea of the strength of an institution from its experiences being helpful to other institutions is also reflected in the Carnegie Foundation
report School and College Partnerships in Education. Both schools and colleges have their individual experiences, but when brought together and forced to go beyond their individual bureaucratic motions, can offer new and needed growth - the training of young people. Gene Maeroff writes in the report

Perhaps it took the shock treatment of remediation—having to offer college courses built around high school level content—to hasten the change in mood. Perhaps it was the loss in public confidence in education at all levels. Or the downturn in enrollments may have been what finally jolted higher education into a state of receptiveness. In any event, college and school educators are showing more interest in each other. Conferences, conversations, and collaborative projects are cropping up from coast to coast.

The experiences of individuals and institutions are being jolted to go beyond their past levels of competence to use those talents to create a brighter tomorrow. And a brighter tomorrow is what we expect with such report titles as Tomorrow's Teachers (Holmes report), Educating Americans for the 21st Century (National Science Board report), A Nation Prepared: Teachers for the 21st Century (Carnegie Forum), and "Time for Results: The Governors' 1991 Report on Education" (see endnote 3).

Additionally, we see the idea of learning experientially reinforced with each of the reports emphasizing the pre-service teaching component as essential in teacher preparation. The Carnegie Forum's report shows the emphasis on the graduate level:

One possible model for developing these skills involves a two-year program of studies. The first year begins with a summer session in which the student takes a full load of courses designed to provide basic instruction in teaching. During the following nine months, the candidate serves as an intern in a school that has a diverse student population and concurrently takes several graduate courses. The following summer, the candidate again carries a full load of graduate courses designed to build on the student's initial teaching experience.

The second year of the program would consist of residency
in a school with the candidate assuming substantial teaching responsibilities under the supervision of Lead Teachers. 

Experience in the school is important for professional preparation. The Holmes report hierarchy of instructor, professional teacher, and career professional also emphasizes the importance of building upon experience to produce the highest quality of teacher. Experience plays a complex role as the reports seek to use it and move beyond it.

The third point is that a dialogue between parties strengthens learning. That is, each can learn from the other. We saw above how that can be done in part. If there is a word that describes this decade, we might call it the decade of partnerships. Each of the reports has the concept of partnership integrated into its message in one way or another. The Governor's report calls upon the governors to "build alliances with the teacher educators."

The Governor's report calls upon the governors to "build alliances with the teacher educators."

For the improvement and professionalization of teaching,

The Holmes Group will commit themselves to establish Professional Development Schools, and working partnerships among university faculty, practicing teachers, and administrators that are designed around the systematic improvement of practice.

This particular partnership is to accomplish the research reminiscent of Dewey's arguments for a laboratory school. The National Science Board argues for government, business and industry and education to work together to improve science, mathematics, and technical training. The Carnegie report on School and College is subtitled Partnership in Education. The most recent report to address education is "College: The Undergraduate Experience in America," issued by the Carnegie Foundation the week of November 3, 1986 also address the partnership idea. Its first major recommendation is concerned with the transition from school to college. "The quality of the undergraduate college is measured first by its alliance with the schools, by its willingness to smooth the transition between school and higher
This alliance requires several things, among them blue ribbon panels of people from both school and college. Partnership is a prevalent notion in the 1980's, and the partnership is to strengthen both education and the greater society. Partnerships are broadly seen as existing between educational institution, government, business, industry, and labor.

The reports, then, suggest at least three things: 1) that there is a tension; 2) that we can and should build upon experience and current strengths; and 3) that we should dialogue to the point of developing relationships, even partnerships. The question becomes, how does this affect philosophy of education and foundational studies in education? Again, let us examine the three themes in the reports which were also found in my philosophy of education course.

First concerning tension, it was suggested that with tension can come fruitful learning situations. Foundational studies, if they do their job, exist where there is tension. Our profession is a fault-line profession. That fault-line activity has been described by the Council of Learned Societies in Education in a set of Standards published earlier this year. In that document, they suggest that studies in foundations of education could be "characterized" as providing interpretive, normative, and critical perspectives.

1. The interpretive perspectives, using theories and resources developed within the humanities and the social and behavioral sciences, assist students in examining and explaining education within differing contexts. Foundational studies promote analyses of the meaning, intent, and effects of educational institutions, including schools. A major task of foundational studies is to provide the resources, incentives, and skills students require in education."
performing the interpretive functions.

2. The normative perspectives assist students in examining and explaining education in light of value orientations. Foundational studies promote understanding of normative and ethical behavior in educational development and recognition of the inevitable presence of normative influences in educational thought and practice . . . . They encourage students to develop their own value positions regarding education on the basis of critical study and their own reflections.

3. The critical perspectives assist students in examining and explaining education in light of its origins, major influences, and consequences. Foundational studies promote critical understanding of educational thought and practice, and of the decisions and events which have shaped them, in their various contexts . . . . Finally, foundational studies encourage the development of policymaking perspectives and skills in searching for resolutions to educational problems and issues.23

To provide interpretive, normative, and critical perspectives requires that foundation studies be where the tension is. Because it is there that students and society see the different contexts, see the questions of values and policy, see, if you will, the geotectonic strata of society's foundational concerns. If they miss seeing the questions and concerns, it is the duty, according to the Council of Learned Societies in Education, to ask the questions and seek the solutions. We are then a fault-line profession.
Second, it is useful to draw on experience. The Report on Standards reaffirms briefly the fifty years of experience since the origin of Foundations of Education in the 1930s. While fifty years is a brief period in academe, it is none-the-less a strong beginning experience for foundations. Some of the tensions that exist among foundation approaches, according to the Standards, are also our experiential strengths in diversity. These tensions are some of the experiences that we bring to our studies. They include our interdisciplinary concerns, our linkages with both the professional schools and the liberal arts studies. They include involvement in religious studies, and parochial education, administrative studies, pedagogy and androgogy, the humanities and the sciences. The standards also suggest that the foundations have experience with the community, providing linkages between education and society as a whole, thus further strengthening education.

Third, dialogue is helpful. Dialogue is at the very heart of the interpretive, normative and critical perspectives offered by the Council. It is through dialogue that problems and tensions are resolved. Perhaps it is dialogue that enables experiences to be useful amid the tension. Perhaps it is the dialogue that will allow us to become. So with Buber we affirm:

The basic word I-You can be spoken only with one's whole being. The concentration and fusion into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be accomplished without me. I require a You to become; becoming I, I say you.

With the tension and dialogue the individual, foundation studies, and society can become.

Beyond the mere act of dialogue, however, perhaps we need to insure a specified dialogue with a specified purpose. First we must continue with our strength of dialoguing with other disciplines and with the larger community. For, it is in such dialogue that we understand the issues and can best serve
our students. But we can also serve other disciplines and the community by working toward the interpretive, normative and critical within our dialogue. Dialogue in partnership can unite us with other groups concerned with similar problems during these times of educational tension.

Finally we must dialogue with each other. For it is in our strength as a professional, scholarly organization that we insure our purpose toward the interpretive, normative and the critical. Dialoguing has been the very purpose in publishing the Midwest Philosophy of Education Proceedings biennially. Our problem in foundations is that we are a minority on most campuses often with a small voice. Perhaps we need to strengthen our ties with one another through dialogue beyond this meeting. By strengthening our dialogue with one another we affirm for foundation studies what George S. Counts wrote for the teacher:

In the last analysis the power of organized education rests with the teacher. Consequently, the most crucial question raised by the suggestion that the school should boldly enter the world of the living, pertains to the role of the teacher in society. First of all, if the profession is to be a factor in the process of social reconstruction, its members must prepare to struggle cooperatively and valiantly for their rights and ideas. They must fight for tenure, for adequate compensation, for a voice in the formulation of educational policies; they must uphold the ancient doctrine of academic freedom and maintain all of their rights as human beings and American citizens. Also they must insist on the public recognition of their professional competence in the field of education: they must oppose every effort on the part of publishing houses, business interests, privileged classes, and patriotic societies to prescribe the content of the curriculum. And in the performance of their own special functions they should always keep in closest possible touch with the great masses of the people, conscious of their struggles and sensitive to their aspirations. Then to the extent that they succeed in winning a position of genuine leadership in the councils and cultural life of the nation, they can expect to attract to their ranks increasing numbers of young men and women of courage and ability who will always desire to participate in the decision of great issues. Let them fail in these things, and the appeal to education can only end in disillusionment.

Perhaps then we can dare to build a better foundational study and society.
ENDNOTES
Philosophy of Education and Partnership in Reform


6 Meeting with David Schuer with Department of Education faculty, Northwestern College, Orange City, Iowa, 14 October 1986.


9 Ibid., p. ii.


12 Ibid., p. 2.


16 "Governor's Report" p. 89.


23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., p. 3.

25 Ibid.

As the 1984 edition of the Summer Olympics fade into the pages of the record books, the most vivid images that linger in my memory are not what one might expect. Not the undeniably wonderous achievements of Carl Lewis or Edwin Moses, nor the feats of the man some call 'the greatest athlete in the World', the irrepressable and eminantly likable Daley Thompson. The scenes that have stayed with me came from the gymnastics centre. With the mark of the 'perfect ten' becoming almost common place in the competitions the crowds were becoming almost derisive about any score that fell more than a tenth of a point below that. The crowd were witnessing incredible feats of human movement, yet their response was to the scoreboard. They were reacting to the result instead of the performance. Here it seems that we have carried our modern games to their final absurd, but logical, state.

When the modern Olympics were initiated in 1896, Allan Guttmann points out that gymnastics were not very popular because they were not really athletic contests with clear winners and losers. It was easy to objectify races, jumping, and throwing contests with the use of carefull measurement and or timing. But how could an aesthetic movement become competitive? The answer is obvious to us now, set up a panel of judges to give their subjective scores, exclude the highest and lowest, then find the mean of the remainder, and there you have it.¹

Guttmann believes that this obsession with

¹
quantification combined with the drive to win resulted in the concept of the record. The Ancient Greeks had no such concept. They could not even express the idea of setting or breaking records. They did not have the word. Nor did they keep scores in athletics. They honored the winners of every contest as just that, not something to be compared with the performance of other athletes in other places at other times. Man was the measure of all things, not the subject of infinite measure.

The modern idea is not limited to gymnastics, although due to its aesthetic nature, the example is just more apparent. The same situation exists in all modern sports. In fact the whole of modern Western scientific thought is based on rational, mathematical reason. This grew from the explosion of rationality central to the Enlightenment. Under the tutelage of Descartes all existing knowledge was questioned. The ruined cloisters of scholasticism were demolished to make way for the towering edifice of rational absolute knowledge, which was of course attainable to all through Descartes method. However, a logical and rational problem followed this approach. As science was value blind, how was the post enlightenment man to know what was right or wrong? One of the great failings of the Enlightenment philosophers, including Kant and Hegel, was their inability to provide a rational, that is scientifically verifiable, basis for values and ethical behaviour. Post enlightenment man was like Oscar Wildes cynic, someone who knows the price
of everything and the value of nothing.

Today we have inherited this legacy and we still subscribe to the spirit of scientific optimism. This is manifest explicitly in our belief in reason, numbers, quantification and formalism. When the world of sport is assessed mathematically the scoreboard is the test of value and worth. The result is more important than the way in which it is achieved.

In Ancient Greece the early Athenians stressed the form in the performance, the grace and skill, rather than just the results. Although they did honour the winners of contests they did so because the athletes were excellent, exhibited arete, they were not excellent because they won prizes.

James Keating is typical of those who have equated winning with excellence in athletics. He seems to hold this as axiomatic, in rather the same way that Plato equated the good and the beautiful. Keating's position is rooted in the distinction between sport and athletics. He claims that athletes are trying to win, whereas sportsmen are merely concerned with recreation and participation. This may be true. But Keating then proceeds to state that as a result of this differing emphasis that athletes are questing for excellence but sportsmen are not. Keating analyses the roots of the words "sports" and "athletics" to further his argument. He emphasizes the recreational nature of the root of sport, "disport" and "desporter", which mean to "carry
away". He then pounces on the origin of the words "athletics" and athlete in the Greek "athlos" and "athlon", which mean "contest" and "prize". He then states, "The very essence of the athletic endeavour lies in the pursuit of excellence through victory in the contest." 

Keating fails to analyse the origins of the words "contest" and "competition". Competition means, "to quest together". Contest means, "to test together". Clearly there is a conflict here between Keating's view of athletic excellence and the meaning of the words contest and competition. The contest drives all competitors towards excellence, it is not the possession of the winner alone, as the prize might be. As such, excellence must be expressable without necessarily winning a contest.

The culture of the Ancient Greeks is characterized by William Sadler as a "Becoming culture". In such a culture the present is viewed as having the greatest reality. Man co-operates with nature and tries to develop to his potential. Competition is seen as being of limited use, and intense competition is scorned as destructive. The value of competition is restricted to a stimulus to Becoming. Competitors drive each other to greater heights, and thus greater self-actualization. However, the Delphic Oracles command to 'know thyself' was a warning to know your limits in a Becoming culture.

By Sadler's definitions modern America is between a "Doing" and "Having" type of culture. A Doing culture sees
the present as part of the road to a brighter tomorrow.
Nature is not master or partner in life, but a wealth of raw
materials for men to use. In Becoming cultures the limits of
the individual are stressed, but in the Doing culture the
fear is not of over reaching your limits, but of never
reaching them. Competition plays a highly significant role
in Doing cultures. The struggle to achieve is so intense
that manners, customs, rules and feelings can be
legitimately ignored if they interfere with getting the job
done.

The Having culture is built around the accumulation of
material wealth. In the Doing culture what you do, or
achieve, is of primary importance, here it is what you have.
The emphasis passes from production to consumption. There is
a strong desire for immediate gratification, and a dominance
of subjective personal values.

Thus we are faced with a situation where the ends
justify the means. The pressure is on throughout society to
win. The dominance of results over performance is found in
politics, business, and even in the student chasing grades
instead of questing after knowledge. Quality is secondary to
the outward appearance. Whether sport is a reflection or
cause of this moral situation it is disturbing to think that
this might be "...the end result of American Pragmatism."
If society is such a dog fight for power, then training the
young on the athletic field to win at all costs is great
preparation for a successful life.
This, in the view of MacIntyre\textsuperscript{3}, is the birth place of the monstrous characters of the emotivist society, the rich aesthete, the therapist, and the bureaucratic manager. In the absence of demonstrable morals we are reduced to subjective judgements of value which we disguise as fact. "This is good," is reduced to, "I think this is good, you should too." With no authority to fall back on one assertion is no more valid than any other. Thus individuals are abandoned, left in isolation to try and work out their own values. Free from the fetters of the organic past they slip easily into the chains of the manager, sustained by the therapist, while chasing the dream of the rich aesthete's lifestyle. In an emotivist society, where good and bad, right and wrong, are matters of taste at bottom, the ordinary individual can easily become victim of the manipulations of others. We must work out our own salvation with diligence, while the characters of modernity, the brokers of power, race after their own interests running roughshod over all others.

MacIntyre\textsuperscript{9} makes an important observation on society. He asserts the existence of what he describes as 'practices' in society. A practice is a social unit that creates internal good. The internal good is not internal to the individuals involved, but to the practice, which in turn benefits society. For example throwing a football is not a practice, but the game of football is. Similarly football teams are not practices, they are institutions. Institutions
are concerned with what MacIntyre calls external good, power, money, material goods etc. The institution, however, sustains the practice and makes its continuation possible. As such the two may appear inseparable, but such is the nature of the institution, blind to internal good, that it threatens the creativity, ideals, and co-operative care of the practice with its aquisitiveness and competativeness. In this situation it is the function of morality to protect the practice from the institution, for without virtues the "... practices could not resist the corupting power of institutions."¹⁰

Put into a sporting context this suggests that unless the players are able to uphold the sport as a practice and see themselves as a community centered on that practice, the practice will be lost, and become just another institution. This change would be undetectable to the institution. The loss of internal good would not even show up in their data, but a fall in revenue or status would horrify them. The monsters of the emotive society, the manager, the therapist, and the rich aesthete, are easily identified in modern sport. The business office, the doctor, and the team owner. These are the brokers of power, as Phil Elliot finds out in the book North Dallas Forty, they are the team while the players are just the equipement. To the practitioner the practice is a source of good, to MacIntyres characters the institution that supports the practice is a source of power.

Perhaps we can use Habermas's¹¹ post modern analysis
and identify the athlete with the avant-garde artist, the new bohemian, living a new lifestyle. If so by Habermas's analysis they will suffer the same neo-conservative backlash. This is a reaction born out of an acceptance of modern society but a rejection of modern culture. The neo-conservative is a liberal who lost his nerve when faced with the cultural results of modernity, and who tries to return to the culture of the past. However, the neo-conservative treats the symptoms not the cause when he attacks the avant-garde artist, or athlete in our case. It is the dehumanizing and commodifying of social relationships and their administration, that is the root of his problem, and not, "...the spectre of a subversive culture."  

While our concepts of the world remain those of the rationalist, the scientist, the positivist, they will control our society through their institutions, and the humanistic view will be suppressed. There have been attempts to unify these positions. But any attempt is played out within the existing framework of modernity. We need a way out of the framework, out of all frameworks Rorty might say, into edifying philosophy. An extension of the positions of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey. For now we must work at our practices remembering that we are in the shadow of institutions. And at a personal level we must live our commitment to our tasks, and our appreciation of excellence and value. If we do not these values will be gone; and the behaviourists' automaton will replace the artist in sport and
the World.

Given our social setting is it then a surprise that even in the ostensibly aesthetic realm of the gymnastic arena, performance is not valued for its subjective beauty, power, grace, control, and exhilarating visual effect, but for the numbers it puts on the scoreboard. This is a sad statement about us as human beings. The implication is that we are constantly in competition, either actually or vicariously, unable to appreciate the experiences of life as themselves, but only in terms of results, of numbers on the scoreboard. If winning is the only standard then we must all fail. No one can go through life unbeaten, untied, and unscored on. One may be a constant winner in sport, business, or any venture. But if this is achieved at the expense of your basic humanity, compassion, and virtue, then the victory is false, hollow, and inauthentic. It does matter whether you win or loose, but it also matters how you play the game. We are becoming blind to quality in our society, so we look for the easy answers, the winners, the top scorers, the fastest times.

We might regard Warren Susman's identification of a change in emphasis in modern culture as a logical follow on from the developments of MacIntyre's theories. Susman suggests that we are no longer a culture of character, but one of personality. We no longer look to the good, honest, just or trustworthy. We look instead to the attractive, magnetic, powerful, and dominant. Emphasis has gone from the
'essential' to the superfiscial. Kant might say we no longer look for the neumena, but are more than happy with phenomena. When image is more important than quality, questions of right and wrong are no longer central issues. Power is its own justification. Appearance and aura are more important than method and intent. Who better to persuade, someone who is good or someone who looks good? There is then no demand on the perceiver to make an intellectual assessment, no need to question, only judge appearances and identify power. In a culture of personality it is more important to look good than to be good.
NOTES


2. ibid. p50.


9. ibid. p190.

10. ibid. p194.


12. ibid. p

Dewey's extensive discussions of habit, of inquiry and of qualitative thought clearly suggest that there can be a habit of inquiry which is intimately involved with the potential of qualitative thought. The habit of inquiry yields meanings helpful in providing general but useful guidance for educational practice. But inquiry, whether habitual or not, must be inquiry about some matter. The question to be addressed in this paper is: To what extent does Dewey provide useful guidance concerning the content of inquiry? However, before I address the main question of content, it is necessary to review Dewey's development of the habit of inquiry.†

There are no concrete entities of habit and thought, for both habit and thought are ways of acting. The term habit is used to help understand functions of transaction between the organism and the environment. If the methods of inquiry are intertwined with experience (do not exist independently of actual activity), then it seems reasonable to see the possibility and value of acting and reflecting habitually.

There is a quality continuum of habit dependent on the inquiry involved. As we develop habits of action it seems that one of the habits of action is the habit of inquiry. There is nothing in experience that precludes making inquiry an integral aspect of our habits.‡ It is a habit not in the sense that we stop thinking about what we are doing, but in the sense that we inquire less "awkwardly". Like the aviator's impulsiveness to fly there is an impulsiveness to inquire. And like any habit, the ease and joy enhance
the potentiality for inquiry. We can so interweave our reflection and action that we produce an impulse to change and growth. Problematic conditions are embraced rather than shunned because habits are not "rutted". In a sense, inquiry has immediate as well as instrumental qualities.

Perhaps the key here should be on how we develop habits. The emphasis must be on the assistance provided by the human environment in providing situations that have the type of pervasive qualities that will suggest associations. Through, and within, inquiry we can discover modes of experiences (situations) that will open up possibilities and provide growth, especially in the teaching-learning situation.

An example may elucidate my point. It is not sufficient to focus on a need for a class of students to know the states of the United States because they may some day have to analyze an article on a state. Such an emphasis violates the need for each student to develop a propensity for inquiry into the problems of our states and country. We must bridge the gap between each student's experience and experiences removed in time and place, in order for the student to wish to inquire. This can only be done as we become cognizant of each student's present habits. It may be difficult at best to completely individualize, but we can find common habits within the class which may be useful for expanding each student's horizon. These common habits may suggest experiences that will provoke inquiry. The original concern, knowing the states, has become a by-product of a more pervasive concern. We have focussed on affecting the student's habits and particularly their habit of inquiry.

The phrase "habit of inquiry" suggests then that we constantly attend to us as a vital part of the total situation. It also suggests providing continuity and direction of experiences. We should focus on the quality of experiences not precise outcomes—the desired outcomes serving simply as
guides to develop experiences.

Highlighting Dewey's views on the habit of inquiry implies an expected connection with his views on the content of inquiry. This leads us back to our main concern. To what extent does Dewey, himself, provide us with some rationale and specification concerning the content of inquiry? Before I address that question head-on, I would like to suggest some needed perspectives concerning the content of inquiry. The most critical problem to me, is not the lack of direction for content, but the lack of consensus on the need to work together on problems. The spirit of collaboration may suggest and produce content. We need to create an integrative framework. This seems to be close to Dewey's emphasis on becoming social problem-solvers. Until we begin to see that the ultimate end of social democratization is vital to direction and content we will continue to be at loggerheads among ourselves. One time we will shift to technology, another time to social science study, and another time to math and science. The swings are symptomatic of the present state of our communal experience.

The same thing is to be said, mutatis mutandis, of the pursuit of art or science or politics or religion. Each has become specialized not merely in its appliances and its demands upon time, but in its aim and animating spirit. Unconsciously, our course of studies and our theories of the educational values of studies reflect this division of interests.

The point at issue in a theory of educational value is then the unity or integrity of experience.

Dewey, I believe, saw clearly that we can break the inability to use each other's talents if we will keep a focus on our ultimate need—the unity and integrity of experience. How we go about reaching answers may, in the long run, be more conducive to useful content than a focus on what is the right content.

Content does not provide meaning in and of itself. If we think about content carefully we see that it is only a means to an end. The end is the
capacity to find the meanings that are possible in our present experience and to expand those meanings by relating those meanings to the community of meanings. We do not know facts; we know the relations that exist between objects. Here again the focus is not on knowing an entity, but on understanding the meanings behind our experiences. We sense qualities but we do not know those qualities till we test them by acting (the action of thought is included here). We look for means-consequences relations.

It is easy to see that many different contents can help us with the attempt to relate means and consequences. The question about content now radically shifts, it seems to me. What should be the content in given contexts? The contexts available are time and space. We can only exist in the present and in a particular culture. We do not exist in some world of universals. For all practical purposes we then experience differently, depending on culture and the combinations of impulse, habit and the inquiry. All we can say is, given our present state of experience, we will choose the present content. The idea that content derives from context prohibits us from denoting content as the end result to be achieved, or the once-and-for-all content.

This leads to my next major suggestion. The only legitimate criterion for determining content in a democracy is consensus. The only restraint on consensus is the format. We cannot commit democratic suicide. Democracy implies two related factors. First, we must trust in the majority to decide, and the majority must concede that all, including the minority, have the freedom to question and attempt to change consensus. Second, integration as a mode of solving problems must be assured. If the minority is excluded from the format of reasonable input then the best means of determining means-consequence relations are assumed to be only discernible by the majority. In the latter case, revolutionary action or civil disobedience may
be valuable.

And yet, we cannot go on forever disagreeing. Decision-making requires agreement; however, it also requires a habit of inquiry, i.e. we must solve problems cooperatively. The focus must be on those methods that have been shown to yield the best possibilities for determining mean-consequences.

What I have said sounds simple but it puts a demand on how we develop habits.

For every act, by the principle of habit, modifies disposition—it sets up a certain kind of inclination and desire. And it is possible to tell when the habit thus strengthened may have a direct and perceptible influence on our association with others. If our habits are narrowly focussed, no amount of cognition will yield the most sensible action (again, the most sensible action can be further thought-type action). Social problem-solving, if it is to actually lead to action, must be thought of in the larger context. We must create a desire to inquire, and the ability to follow the directions of inquiry. The important point is that often action is difficult because of the types of habits we have formed in the early stages of life. It is absolutely essential that we emphasize both the capacity and the ability to inquire, and act accordingly.

No content is to be revered for itself. It must take its place as a part of the school, based on its potential to help students find meanings in their present experience and to expand those meanings based on the experiences of the culture. "It is the business of educators to supply an environment so that this reaching out of an experience may be fruitfully rewarded and kept continuously active." Given the basic perspective above, are there some guidelines we can provide for the direction and character of content or subject matter? Dewey provided what he thought was reasonable guidance and direction. It is up to us to decide how adequately he helps to provide necessary direction for content.
This content, that is used to assist a student to come to know, is separable from the method only in terms of control and through reflection. Apart from effort to control the course which the process takes, there is no distinction of subject matter and method. . . . Such reflection upon experience gives rise to a distinction of what we experience (the experienced) and the experiencing—the how. When we give names to this distinction we have subject matter and method as our terms. We can examine an experience and judge how it proceeds. This provides possibilities for guiding future similar experiences. However, the method is always a part of the concrete subject matter.  

Given this important qualifying statement, subject matter must and can be determined in particular schooling contexts. The reasons for this assertion also point to the role of subject matter. The environment must be controlled in order to produce knowledge efficiently. Subject matter supplies this environment in a schooling context. The subject matter represents the experiences of the culture and therefore embodies possibilities for meaningful experiences. Outcomes or aims of the experienced specify activities which may guide the student. The subject matter is a necessary guide yet it is not an absolute determiner: It does not represent perfection or infallible wisdom; but it is the best at command to further new experiences which may, in some respects at least, surpass the achievements embodied in existing knowledge and works of art. . . .

Dewey felt that education had come to be the transmission of finished subject matter from the experienced to the inexperienced. In context, he argued that education's main purpose is "...development of intelligence as a method of action." This intelligent action can only be developed through activity that provides opportunity to solve problems purposefully. Inquiry must be learned by doing inquiry, intentionally.

This encapsulated representation of Dewey's thought has implications for subject matter and Dewey attempts to bring them out in Democracy and
Education, and here I would like simply to emphasize a few points. Subject matter must include, in the early years of a child's education, concrete experiences which are closely related to the level of experience of the child. At no time should the subject matter be completely divorced from the student's awareness—from the experienced world. (The illustration concerning the United States, at the end of the section on the habit of inquiry, indicates that subject matter cannot be isolated facts waiting for meaning.)

The body of knowledge that we have guides the arrangement of activity. This arrangement (method) must include activities which will expedite the coming-to-know of the student. We cannot assume that the body of knowledge of the experienced can be stored in the inexperienced as a bunch of isolated facts and ideas—waiting for connections to happen through some mental gymnastics.

. . . no thought, or idea, can possibly be conveyed as an idea from one person to another. When it is told, it is, to the one to whom it is told, another given fact, not an idea. . . . But what one directly gets cannot be an idea. Only by wrestling with the conditions of the problem at first hand, seeking and finding his own way, does he think.\(^\text{14}\)

I don't think Dewey adequately tells us how the body of knowledge will become the body of knowledge of the student (inexperienced). He does provide some suggestions. Surely the body of knowledge serves other than a directional purpose. Not all facts can be experienced directly (Dewey affirms this). Second-hand knowledge must be organized into the existing experience of the learner in order to have meaning for the student—otherwise it represents pure verbalism. This body of knowledge is an invaluable tool for solving problems effectively. It also serves to enhance knowing: The fact that Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation is used to enhance the meaning of new experiences. The "ability" of this "fact" to enhance
knowledge is dependent upon the student's "...response to what is communicated." Dewey does not elaborate at this point but he does suggest that responses are part and parcel of the total situation—the experiential level of students. They will respond in a meaningful way only if they can relate the meanings of the statement to meanings of their experienced worlds. An equatorial native, because he has no experiences to provide situational meanings, would find it hard to understand the concept of ice. It is the context of our experiences that makes verbal meanings possible.

In the initial stages of coming-to-know, concrete experiences must play the largest role. The subject matter must not be bookish, abstract, or primarily secondary in nature, except as the interest of the child shows readiness for building upon the direct experiences. Dewey carries the point a step further. Anytime we approach unfamiliar objects whether scientist or child we must manipulate materials and note results. "Hence the first approach therefore to any subject in school, if thought is to be aroused and not words acquired, should be as unscholastic as possible." What is done should naturally suggest problems and be "sufficiently connected with existing habits to call out an effective response." Dewey, although he is not as direct as I would like, is saying that in the earlier years of schooling the school should be as close to the real world as possible. In Experience and Education he uses the word "interaction" to carry this idea.

Where schools are equipped with laboratories, shops, and gardens, where dramatizations, plays and games are freely used, opportunities exist for reproducing situations of life, and for acquiring and applying information and ideas in the carrying forward of progressive [my underlining] experiences.

What should be done in these labs, shops, gardens and on these "stages"? Dewey does not give, in this context, direct suggestions. The content, or body of knowledge, is not preordained.

The central question has been addressed partially. We know that the
content of inquiry must include concrete and second-hand experiences. It must be related to the experiences of the child. It must be of such texture that it prompts knowing and not repetition of verbal symbols. What has not been elaborated is Dewey's central concern--students must be given the opportunity to solve social problems and therefore to become democratic problem-solvers. He saw the school as primarily a means to enable us to help each other to grow in our humanity.

A society which makes provision for participation in its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind [my underlining] which secure social changes without introducing disorder. . . . A curriculum which acknowledges the social responsibilities of education must present situations where problems are relevant to the problem of living together, and where observation and interest are calculated to develop social insight and interest.

This emphasis is seen throughout Democracy and Education.

Does Dewey attempt to specify the nature of the content? What subject matter, if any, is most conducive to the primary social purpose of learning? What will enable students to acquire meanings and thus enhance their powers of observation, attention and recollection--will enable transference?

I sense a reluctance in Dewey to specify--to deal with his narrow sense of subject matter (Note 6). Just when he gets down to making applications he qualifies them. His primary qualifications, in this regard, concerns the need for change and the possibilities inherent in different content.

Since the curriculum is always getting loaded down with purely inherited traditional matter and with subjects which represent mainly the energy of some influential person or group of persons in behalf of something dear to them, it requires constant inspection, criticism, and revision to make sure it is accomplishing its purpose. . . . The proof of good is found in the fact that the pupil responds; his response is use. . . . We cannot establish a hierarchy of values among studies.

The more we apprehend future possible achievements the less we will be tied
to specific activities. One could then start almost anywhere and have continuous and useful activities. A plurality of aims and alternatives will guard against omissions and provide flexibility.\textsuperscript{22}

Just when it seems that Dewey is going to provide some possible ideas for content, he does not. I am left with the impression that he leaves it to us to decide what to do in particular contexts. I will get back to the idea in my conclusionary remarks. Before giving up, I would like, at least, to point out what I consider the nearest he comes to laying down specific guidelines for content. His most comprehensive statement follows:

We may say that the kind of experience to which the work of schools should contribute is one marked by executive competency in the management of resources and obstacles encountered (efficiency); by sociability, or interest in the direct companionship of others; by aesthetic taste or capacity to appreciate artistic excellence in at least some of its classic forms; by trained intellectual methods, or interest in some mode of scientific achievement; and by sensitiveness to the rights and claims of others—conscientiousness. And while these considerations are not standards of value, they are useful criteria for survey, criticism, and better organization of existing methods and subject matter of instruction.\textsuperscript{23}

History classes should emphasize primitive, economic (especially industrial) history. History and geography should be integrated. Geography should begin with the local but must extend into the world. History and geography should be related to existing human life.\textsuperscript{24} In the beginning, science should use familiar occupations and things to develop observation and experiment. Fundamental principles will be known by seeing the relationships and habituation in familiar practical operations.\textsuperscript{25} Specialization in science should be available, but this should not be its primary focus or format.\textsuperscript{26} Science is inextricably bound up with the human world and is meaningful and significant as it is related to the human world.\textsuperscript{27} All education should be permeated with doing. There should not be a dichotomy of intellectual and practical studies or of vocational and cultural. Studies must be integrated,
e.g. literature and history must be closely related. I am not sure he is advocating a core curriculum.

Perhaps you share with me a degree of interest, and a degree of frustration. Dewey's ideas concerning the habit of inquiry provide insights which will help to make learning useful and "novel". His attempt, to discuss the content of inquiry in his principal book devoted to the subject, Democracy and Education, is carefully constrained. I believe it makes him consistent; but it also leaves one frustrated. Perhaps the frustration is essential. Content is intimately involved with context. In a democracy the very act of deciding on content must be democratic. Dewey, I feel, wants us to decide on the content. Who is us? If the act is important, it must be all of us. But this creates a precarious situation. This is also consistent with Dewey's ideas. Precariousness presents problems as well as opportunities. If all were finished, the new would be either predetermined or impossible. Individuals can grow because the future is not foreordained. The novel becomes possible. Democracy is the best method for determination of needed content even though it may not guarantee the "best" content.

But Dewey does imply that subject matter assists inquiry. It provides a body of knowledge, and direction for tailoring the environment. His aversion to stating what particular math or science is the necessary content leads me to conclude that he prefers not to suggest specific content. He seems to suggest some social content based on conditions that existed at his time (and may still exist). He also suggests that the social context must be the ultimate concern of schooling. Science and math would flow from it. I am not sure how he feels about the content of the arts, except for his one point that we can develop appreciation of form. Whatever the content, Dewey argues that we should not make a body of facts our central concern. He advocates fewer facts and more observation.
I am not even sure that Dewey's concerns for developing social problem-solving and a habit of inquiry can be realized without a complete alteration of our present systems. The accepted norms of the classroom and school seem to make it difficult to achieve. Can it be accomplished with 30-to-1, desk-like classes? Do teachers have the habit of inquiry? Who gets the ball rolling? I would like to suggest that we begin with the risky enterprise of turning the school back to those involved directly with its concerns--the teachers, parents and students--and not be subject to remote dictations of self-appointed or government appointed "experts" or even more to political policies. We cannot expect to move out of the existing ruts if those involved are not given the freedom and responsibility to decide. This seems to be Dewey's position--content is contextual and must be decided by those most intimately involved in the process of inquiry.
FOOTNOTES

1 A previous paper, *The Habit of Inquiry: Its Meaning and Implications*, by Vincent F. Macri, analyzes the concepts of habit, inquiry and qualitative thought and provides a more thorough rationale for the synopsis presented in this paper concerning the meaning of a habit of inquiry.


4 Ibid., p. 415.

5 Ibid., p. 245.

6 Ibid., p. 226. "Content" and "subject matter" are used interchangeably. Dewey uses the word "content" sparingly. On page 226 he implies that they are used synonymously. One more note is important. In some instances Dewey uses the phrase "subject matter" in a narrow sense—a body of knowledge which includes the facts and ideas of the experienced. In other places he uses a more expansive meaning—the activities engaged in by the student which may include the body of knowledge and methods of inquiry.

7 Ibid., pp. 195-196.

8 Ibid., pp. 193-198 (especially 194).

9 I have assumed that the general form of present formal schooling is essential to the growth of individuals and society.


11 Ibid., p. 214.


13 The body of knowledge is synonymous with the narrow sense of subject matter. Dewey uses this emphasis as a tool to help develop the relationship between the certainty of the experienced and the need of the inexperienced.

14 Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 188.

15 Ibid., pp. 221, 185.

16 Ibid., p. 181.

17 Ibid., pp. 181-182.

18 Ibid., p. 190.
19 Ibid., pp. 115, 226.
20 Ibid., pp. 75-79.
21 Ibid., pp. 281-283.
22 Ibid., p. 129.
23 Ibid., pp. 285-286.
24 Ibid., pp. 248-254.
25 Ibid., p. 336.
26 Ibid., p. 334.
27 Ibid., pp. 335-337.
INTRODUCTION

I think it was Jack Williams who last year asked us if Dewey ever danced. The question provoked me to go back to some work I had done almost twenty years ago to see if there might be in it some answer to it. I'm going to leave that for you to decide as I attempt to present an artistic assay along Deweyan lines. To that end, I'm going to do a number on you. Dewey talks about art and the critic, or, as I can easily show, art and the teacher, as the critic's role, for Dewey, is essentially an educative one. Therefore, I'm going to assay a critical examination, a la Dewey, of an undoubted musical masterpiece. You will have to accept my assertions as I progress, but I hope that I succeed in doing justice both to Dewey and also to Mozart, the composer of the piece I have selected for this assay.

THE CRITIC

Dewey stated explicitly that the critic should possess a consuming and informed interest in his or her specialty. This is not either consuming or informed, but both in equal measure. Without the former, there is no chance of the critic penetrating the heart of the art object; without the latter the judgment will not rise above sentimentalism ("I adore Mozart," sort of stuff). The critic must have a knowledge of and sensitivity to the traditions of the medium. The critic should also have a thorough knowledge of the development of the individual artist because "[p]ossession of this understanding broadens and refines the background without which judgment is blind and arbitrary." The critic must have insight, for the task is to "do away with the scales that
keep the eye from seeing, tear away the veils due to wont and custom, perfect the power to perceive." 2 The critic must "direct the perception of others to a fuller and more ordered appreciation of the objective content of works of art," and to do this the critic must "have the experience." 3

So what are my credentials as critic? I think some of you know that I was trained as a musician—a pianist—and that I had, mainly in Canada, a career as a performer. I still play occasionally. While in Canada I did a lot of radio work for the CBC, and for the last six years have resurrected that activity. I am currently in the middle of presenting a series of 52 one-hour programs on Mozart for National Public Radio, which have been picked up by about 60 stations across the country—Boston, Tucson, Columbus, Miami, Anchorage, Ann Arbor, Provo, etc. etc. I tell you this to establish my authority as a critic, particularly of the music of Mozart. I think I meet Dewey's requirements, by possessing both a consuming and an informed interest in Mozart, a knowledge of and sensitivity to music, a thorough knowledge of Mozart's development as an artist, I hope I have insight, and Mozart's music has certainly occasioned for me the highest of peak experiences.

THE ART OBJECT

So much for introduction. Dewey tells me first of all to present to you the work of art—no the art object. Let me briefly expand on this point. In some places Dewey calls the art object the work of art, in other places he clearly differentiates between the two, calling the work of art the transaction or interaction between the perceiver and the art object itself. The work of art is not the art object but "what the product does with and in experience." 4 I wish Dewey had been consistent, and I'm going to be—that is, I will differentiate between the art object, the thing itself, and the work of art, which is that that goes on between the perceiver and the thing perceived.
For this assay I've chosen the piece known as the Masonic Funeral Music, which was written by Mozart in Vienna in November 1785—that is, six years before his death.

PLAY MUSIC [THE MASONIC FUNERAL MUSIC, K. 477 BY W.A. MOZART]

If Mozart works his magic on you, unaided by the critic, for me, as for Dewey, so much the better, for the first stage in esthetic approbation is "[t]he total overwhelming impression," which is direct and unreasoned. This is the esthetic experience Dewey talks about, and it is (and I've demonstrated this elsewhere) something akin to Maslow's peak experience. The usefulness of the critic is "merely" (1) to underline aspects of the music that point to esthetic approbation should it be needed, and (2) to increase discrimination, which will confirm or deny the validity of that initial impression, that taking in, or undergoing. It is simply not enough to respond "I like it," or "I don't like it." Even the esthetic experience alone is not sufficient unto itself, for esthetic growth must be inevitably accompanied by growth in discrimination. But growth in discrimination, or taste, is as possible (and desirable) as growth in intelligence and judgment—so we are back to the educative function of the critic—not as spoiler but as helper, as teacher.

JUDGMENT

Anyway, now that I have established my credentials and have presented the art object to you, I have now, as critic, to perform the dual function, which Dewey summarizes as judgment. In Experience and Nature he writes, "Criticism is discriminating judgment, careful appraisal." He elaborates in Art as Experience: "Criticism is judgment... Judgment has to evoke a clearer consciousness of constituent parts and to discover how consistently these
parts are related to form a whole. Theory gives the names of analysis and synthesis to the execution of these functions." The dual task is that of analysis/synthesis, and in its conduct it is clear that Dewey sees the critic's role as essentially an educative one. He writes, "criticisms are the means by which one is enabled to take, at least in imagination, a new point of view, and then to re-see, literally to review and revise, what fell within one's earlier perspective." Even more plainly Dewey states that "[t]he function of criticism is the re-education of perception of works of art." This is clearly, to use a better-known Dewey phrase, "the reconstruction of experience." Let me repeat, "Criticism is judgment." "Through judging, confused data are cleared up, and seemingly incoherent and disconnected facts are brought together. The clearing up is analysis. The bringing together, or unifying, is synthesis." I'll deal with these two phases of judgment separately, but keep in mind Dewey's abhorrence of dualisms.

Analysis does not, and let me emphasize NOT, mean what is usually meant by musical analysis—that is, breaking the music into parts and then examining them. Rather, the act of analysis is for Dewey the fastening upon and singling out of "those features of one experience that are logically best." "Every judgment is analytic in so far as it involves discernment, discrimination, marking off the trivial from the important, the irrelevant from what points to a conclusion." To perform analysis the critic needs to be knowledgeable of and sensitive to (1) form and (2) the traditions in which the object stands. You will have to take my word here for to substantiate this assertion would lead to a lengthy digression; suffice it to say that analysis itself has dual components—form and tradition, and I'll deal fairly briefly with both.
Form. Dewey provides for me a most useful if not original notion of form. In music, at least as I was taught it, form was discussed abstractly. Sonata form, for example, obeyed certain rules; one then used the rules to examine the structure of a movement in sonata-form, noting if and when deviations occurred. For Dewey, form exists only in conjunction with matter: "Form in the concrete can be discussed only with respect to actual works of art." An object takes on form when "the material is so arranged and adapted that it serves immediately the enrichment of the immediate experience." But Dewey is vague about form from this point on, save that he rather haphazardly and intermittently lists characteristics of esthetic form—continuity, culmination, conservation, resistance, conflict, tension, etc., etc.—but this leaves one a bit at sea.

Tradition. The value of the knowledge of tradition is that it increases the sensitivity of the critic's response to the art object. "Knowledge of a wide range of traditions is a condition of exact and severe discrimination. For only by means of such a knowledge can the critic detect the intent of an artist and the adequacy of his execution of intent. The history of criticism is filled with charges of carelessness and willfulness that would never have been brought if an adequate knowledge of traditions had been present, just as it is filled with praise for works that have no merit beyond a skillful use of materials." Dewey adds that the critic must also have knowledge of the development of the artist himself. In this present case, my knowledge of Mozart's development would be vital, "because understanding of the logic of the development of an artist is necessary to discrimination of his intent in any single work." [I won't here debate the accuracy of this or other of Dewey's assertions.]
Let me recap Dewey's views on form and tradition: form consists in the internal relations of an art product, its stresses and strains, its resistances and releases, its overall integrity, that are necessary components of a work of art. Dewey calls form "dynamic organization." A discussion of form is not a mechanical or routine operation, for critics will perceive art objects differently, according to their temperaments and dispositions. They have to select those aspects of the object that they consider important, discarding what is subsidiary, and demonstrating how the internal elements reinforce each other and point of a consummation or conclusion. Analysis thus "performed with reference to a more definite apprehension of form" bids fair to enrich further direct experience. Knowledge of traditions in a particular art is important for the critic-teacher because it increases sensitivity and powers of discrimination. However, such knowledge and love should not be allowed to develop into fixed standards of taste and appraisal. A particular art object may be distorted if compared to such standards and not considered for its own intrinsic worth.

It was my original intention at this point to attempt an analysis of the Mozart, but on further thought I decided that this was not the moment, for, you'll remember, that the critic's is a dual task, and that analysis and synthesis are really two parts of the same act, of one act--the act of judging. So let me move now to a brief examination of the synthesis phase of judging. (Is Dewey dancing?)

**Synthesis.** Synthesis, for Dewey, is "a function of the creative response of the individual who judges. It is insight." Well, that seems simple enough, but wait, for Dewey writes, "[t]here are no rules that can be laid down for its performance. It is at this point that criticism becomes itself an art." However difficult a challenge this presents, we cannot shirk it if
we are to be true to Dewey. Those of you who are familiar with *Art as Experience* may recall that Dewey does provide us with one example--it is Goethe's synthetic criticism of *Hamlet*. Alas, few of us are Goethes. But Dewey tells us that "[w]hat is meant is that the critic shall seize upon some strain or strand that is actually there, and bring it forth with such clearness that the reader [here read "listener"] has a new clue and guide in his own experience." The basis from which the critic selects these strains or strands is his or her interest, which is derived from the cumulation of past experiences. Thus my synthetic view of Mozart's music will be different from that of others even though we do have to conjoin them with the elements that exist in the object itself. Dewey is certainly not calling for eccentricity. It occurs to me that the synthetic view Dewey advocates is much like that of a stage director--one sees Shakespeare's plays performed from a variety of concepts (including, I hasten to add, eccentric ones), but the great director sees something in the play, some strand or strain, and then presents the play drawing that out. Performers do the same in music, too, but music is abstract thus it is not possible to bring out the strain in verbal or visual terms at any rate. And it is interesting that Dewey himself uses few, very few examples from the non-representational arts.

It might be helpful at this point to say what synthesis is not. It is not pronouncing sentence or passing a verdict on an art object [let me once again remind you of the almost synonymous meaning of "critic" and "teacher"]. If critics must make pronouncements of good or bad, of great or small, they must lay emphasis upon the objective characteristics that support their judgment. They must also avoid being guided by personal predilections, although, as I said earlier, critics must have a love for the thing under review. There must be a balance between learning and loving. Anyone may
attempt synthesis, but without a consuming and informed interest in the field the criticism is likely to be grotesque or banal ("isn't it beautiful?"). As Dewey said, "Learning must be the fuel of warmth of interest."²² Parenthetically, he's coming close, isn't he, to the notion that the expert is the only one who can make expert judgment. This assumption is reinforced by a passage from Experience and Nature where Dewey writes, "All criticism worthy of the title is but another name for that revealing discovery of conditions and consequences which enables liking, bias, interest to express themselves in responsible and informed ways instead of ignorantly and fatalistically."²³

Now I am ready to take you through the Mozart piece again, and probably again--this time I am to judge or to perform the dual functions of analysis and synthesis. This is what Dewey requires of the critic. You have (1) to accept that what I have said about what Dewey says is accurate (I think it is); (2) to allow me to execute the critic's role; (3) to decide whether I have done so according to Dewey's precepts, and (4) to conclude whether or not it works. Now to Part 2

CRITICISM IN ACTION

There is every indication that Mozart's interests in freemasonry antedate his induction into the Viennese Lodge Zur Wohltätigkeit (Beneficence) in December 1784. He writes little about masonry but it is understandable that the theme of brotherhood and love would appeal to the young man, still not thirty years old. We might call Mozart an outsider today. I suppose on account of his youthful travels and also perhaps a little by disposition, he never felt he belonged, even in his home town of Salzburg. Although he loved England and Italy, he was obviously an outsider there, as he was in Vienna, where he lived for the last ten years of his life. Maybe in Prague alone did he feel "at home" but stays there were fairly short. Did the association with
the Brethren give him a feeling of belonging? I think so. And yet, what was a devout Catholic doing among freemasons. He wasn't alone, of course, there were even clerics in the lodge, but it is true that he formed these associations in a very brief period of toleration for masons. But even a year after his joined Beneficence, the Emperor, Joseph II, must have thought the Viennese lodges were assuming too much power, and reduced their number from eight to three. Mozart's own lodge, one of the smaller ones, then linked up with the Lodge of New Crowned Hope. The Craft was banned in Austria from 1795 right until 1918!

This piece, known as the Masonic Funeral Music or, in German, Maurerische Trauermusik, is one of those extraordinary creations that pop up frequently throughout Mozart's career. It was written expressly for a memorial, as we might say, for two aristocratic masons--Georg August, Duke of Mecklenburg-Strelitz, who died on November 6, 1785, and Franz, Count Esterhazy, the original "Quinquin", who died the following day. They couldn't have meant much if anything to Mozart personally, yet the work is intensely personal. The Lodge of Sorrows was held on November 17. Mozart wrote the piece on November 10 (even though the manuscript oddly bears the date, in Mozart's own hand, of July 1785). Now, masonic music, even by Mozart's day, followed certain conventions--dotted rhythms, suspensions, slurred notes, series of parallel 3rds and 6ths, for example, all of which appear in the 69 measures of this short piece. The masonic key was E flat (the key, incidentally of the Magic Flute, whose masonic connections are very well known). This piece is not in E flat, however, but in the relative minor key of C minor--it couldn't be closer. The basset-horn, a slightly larger and hence lower first cousin of the clarinet, figures in many masonic compositions. It does here, although the orchestration was probably dependent
upon the musicians who were available for the performance, and there were two
basset horn playing Brethren—the brothers Springer. But there is another
ingredient in this piece which makes it extremely special—it is the presence
of a chorale melody in the middle which is said to be derived from an old
Jewish melody, which had been transformed to a plainchant tune for the
Christian church—the Lamentations of the Prophet Jeremiah. Haydn had used a
version of it almost 20 years earlier in his "Lamentation" Symphony. That
only underlines the point—this is an ecumenical tune that at once conveys
universality—the brotherhood of all mankind. What better means to hang
brotherhood on than a theme used by Jews and Christians alike—and did Mozart
know that his friend and fellow mason, Joseph Haydn, had already used the same
melody? My guess is that he did.

Incidentally, Mozart used this melody, or very like it, again in two
great masterpieces of his last year—the Requiem, standing for death, and the
Magic Flute standing for love and life. Let me take you through the piece
now, pointing out those features I have referred to as the music goes along.

PLAY MUSIC WITH EXPLANATION

Mozart's views on death are well-known at least if we take the words of a
letter he wrote to his father in 1787 at their face value:

As death, when we come to consider it closely, is the true goal of our
existence, I have formed during the last few years such close
relations with this best and truest friend of mankind, that his image
is not only no longer terrifying to me, but is indeed very soothing
and consoling! And I thank my God for graciously granting me the
opportunity (you know what I mean) of learning that death is the key
which unlocks the door to our true happiness. I never lie down at
night without reflecting that—young as I am—I may not live to see
another day.
The reconciliation that shines in this letter (Mozart's father was to die a few weeks after it was written) is realized in the final measures of the Masonic Funeral Music, when the fist-shaking, the turbulence, the dissonances come to an end, and the clouds roll away and reveal finally the sunshine chord of C major, and not, after all, C minor. It has also been suggested that the urgency of the strings (the fist-shaking I've just referred to) represents the struggle of mankind against the inevitability of death, while the constancy of the wind instruments, playing that Jewish-Christian chant, represents that inexorability. The struggle for life and the acceptance of the inevitability of that movement of time that takes life away from us.

You may think my interpretation too fanciful, too romantic perhaps for such a strict classicist as Mozart. Mozart didn't write program music. But there has to be some way to examine this music, to explain, however weakly, how it makes the appeal that it does.

Brotherhood, universal love, life, death, an occasion, greatness, art, genius, Mozart. I didn't pick the Masonic Funeral Music because I knew all the details ahead of that selection, but I did know that here was a piece, as I said, of undoubted genius, that might be more patently revealed if I could, in a feeble way, for all such attempts are ultimately feeble, perform "on" it the role of the critic so that I could tear away some of those scales that keep the eye from seeing or, in this case, the ear from hearing. Now I ask you, as I did at the beginning, simply, in Dewey's words, "to have the experience," or, if you like to perform "the work of art."

CONCLUSION

There is a sense in which my task is complete. What I haven't addressed is the role of the perceiver in esthetic experience. As a critic I have performed my role to the best of my ability. You must decide whether I have
done so accurately, and also whether it works. Remember I asserted earlier that the role of the critic and that of the teacher are, in this context, virtually synonymous. We are intermediaries between the art object and the perceiver. The experience or the work of art itself is the interaction between them. The work of art is what the perceiver does— it is his or her transaction with the environing conditions, or explicitly here, the art object—Mozart's Masonic Funeral Music. As I've written elsewhere, "I can't learn you," and neither can I have your esthetic experience. To this extent I am the midwife. But there is, for you, the subjective response (or even non-response), and Dewey had a lot to say about this. For me to get into the topic here would be to detain you longer than even the most egocentric speaker would wish. That is a topic for another paper. Suffice it here that I have made an artistic assay along Deweyan lines, not, I hasten to add, altogether on the lines I would have chosen had I assayed, on my own terms, to stand as my own critic with respect to the Mozart masterpiece. Did Dewey dance? Or has this assay only reinforced, in the face of Mozart's evident greatness, Goethe's dictum "Dull, dear friend, is all theory; but green is life's golden tree." Thank you.
FOOTNOTES

2. Ibid., 325.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 3.
5. Ibid., 145.
11. Ibid., 129.
12. Ibid., 129-30.
15. Ibid., 312.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 55.
18. Ibid., 132.
19. Ibid., 313.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., 314.
22. Ibid., 310.
Recently I took my son for his drivers test. He passed but not with flying colors. He had trouble with the obstacle course. Half seriously, half jokingly I lectured him about not practicing more, and not being better prepared to deal with the pressures of the examination. I said he was like that with everything, especially his school work. Somehow he always makes it. But he never does as well as he could. I worry that someday his luck will run out. I told him that he had an attitude problem, that it ran deeper than adolescence, and that he was probably born that way. I confessed to being somewhat like that myself, but insisted this genetic entanglement only made it more imperative for him to begin now developing the discipline and determination to overcome this handicap.

He looked at me half seriously, half jokingly and said, "Do you know what your problem is? You examine life too much. You're as bad as Diana Chambers." (She is the overly romantic, pseudo-intellectual girlfriend of Sam Malone on the TV program, "Cheers.")

I think he was telling me that I don't dance. If he was sufficiently trained, I expect he would also say that philosophy has no place in the artistic quest, and that Dewey has nothing
useful to say about Mozart. He might be right about me. About
the rest, however, I think he would be wrong. Not because he has
no feeling for the artistic quest, or for people like Mozart, but
because I expect that my son, like so many others, would have a
misguided notion of philosophy and a false impression of Dewey.
Philosophy is not a purely rational medium for getting at truth,
goodness, and beauty, as if these things were objects to be
discovered and appreciated like so many nuggets of gold. Nor was
Dewey someone with a special talent to achieve at philosophy
so defined. Dewey worked to undermine what he called the
spectator theory of knowledge, just as Richard Rorty works to
undermine the notion of philosophy with a big "P." Rorty makes
philosophy more like art (as defined in modern culture), and
Dewey more like Mozart, assuming, of course, that Mozart danced.
And who could deny that Mozart danced. After all, he has
recently been portrayed as a rock star, complete with his own
movie and music video. How is this possible?

In its classical form art worshiped the sacred. Like
religion, it spoke in symbols about the invisible meaning of the
visible, which explains the original association of the two. Art
lost this function when it was no longer assumed by our culture
that God spoke excathedra, but spoke instead to and through the
individual. In classical terms this is no God at all. It
implies the voice of subjective perception, rather than that of
objectivity and tradition.

The liberation of art from objective and cultural limitation
is part of that incredible and massive transformation that
produced modernity. To quote Michael Harrington, "the most scientific and technological culture the world has ever known has created the most intense subjectivity in human history." The artist has turned inward. Whereas before the artist revealed and celebrated sacred objects, now the world is created by the artist's eye.

In *The Voices of Silence* Andre Malraux describes modern society as living in "the twilight of the absolute." Consciousness is now relativized. Religion has been rudely shouldered out of its traditional domains. But art has broken through to a new inner space. Malraux writes that, "In civilizations whose unity was based on a supreme Truth, art nourished the best in man by the loftiest type of fiction. But once a collective faith was shattered, fiction had for its province not an ideal world but a world of untrammeled imagination." The new subject matter of the artist was the artist's own subjectivity.

Agents of practicality who dominate modern society tried to make art "pander to a social order which was rapidly losing its awareness of ... (supreme) values. The bourgeois, now in the saddle, wanted a world made to his measure, devoid of intimations and owing allegiance to nothing that transcended it; but such a world was abhorrent to the artist, whose conception of the scheme of things involved a transcendent value - his art." The artist found it unacceptable to be an individual, alone as a sovereign self, in a disenchanted, purely practical, world. So there came that radical separation between the artist and society. Quoting
Max Weber: "The outcast artist had taken his place in history; haunted henceforth by visions of his own absolute, while confronted by a culture growing ever less sure of itself, the artist came to find in his very ostracism the source of an amazing fertility." In the absence of civilization being under the sway of the gods art was seen as a world existing in its own right. For the artist at least it acquired ... "the power of refashioning the scheme of things and setting up its transient eternity against man's more transient life." Harrington says that this "transient eternity" was a kind of religious conception and modern art was, in a metaphorical sense, a religious movement. But the sacred objects of the old art were gone forever. The artist's only real act of religious conviction was art itself.

Participation in the construction of a transient eternity is precisely what it means to dance. Did Dewey dance? By his life and work he certainly tried. His entire philosophy is rooted in the attitude of modern art. Yet he was bothered by the easy acceptance in modern art of the subjective/objective dualism. To this extent he was out of step with Enlightenment individualism and more in line with the anthropomorphism of the premodern world. Dewey thought that giving up on absolutes did not require us to jettison the idea of organic wholes. Like modern art, Dewey's philosophy is focused on the welfare of the human subject. Objective factors never take precedence. The difficulty here is that focusing on the welfare of the human subject is like saying that God speaks to and through the
individual, instead of ex cathedra. If once the individual has priority, can the subjective/objective dualism be far behind? In short, was Dewey, like modern art, flirting with solipsism?

Lawrence Dennis tells us how Dewey danced without falling victim to this suicidal trap. By equating the teacher with the critic, Dewey was saying that the teacher is not merely a conduit. The teacher creates what is taught in the same manner that the literary critic creates the text. Mozart needs Lawrence as much as we do. Similarly, the Civil War needs the history teacher as much as the students.

This makes the object of study dependent on the teacher who functions as critic as well as mediator. This is definitely a step in the right direction if the aim is to dance. But notice who is dancing, the teacher, not the student. A more dramatic question is, can the student, the one who is learning, ever operate simultaneously as a teacher, as the one who doing the assay? Lawrence equivocates about this, but I think he is more reluctant than Dewey to say, "yes." If the teacher operates exclusively as a "midwife," then philosophy, even Dewey's philosophy, will have a limited role in the artistic quest, understood in modern terms, because philosophy will not literally or directly apply to the artist or, in our case, the student who wants or needs to dance. From Dewey's perspective Lawrence is correct to say, "I can't learn you, and neither can I have your esthetic experience." But how does it follow that, as a teacher, this makes him (Lawrence) a "midwife." Perhaps Lawrence and I understand the role of midwife differently. But I suspect we are
Horace Kallen writes that, "the power of art is that of passionate and alternative communication." This would seem to suggest that art had something real and important to communicate. However, it is precisely this that modern art denies. There are no objects of art, if that means they exist apart from their artistic expression. Reality is internal to the process that creates it, in art as in the rest of life. Irving Howe tells us that faith in the modern world, a world with this kind of openness, a "transient eternity," as we have called it, "...was short-lived, precarious and, above all, subject to assimilation by the voraciousness of contemporary society." The pervasiveness of war, totalitarianism, an sheer meanness in the human spirit has shattered much of Western optimism. This shows itself in modern art through an emphasis on the diabolical and savage side of man, the dark side. Still, what choice is there?

Dewey, for one, was stubbornly hopeful. He was not naive, so much as a man of deep secular faith. He accepted a transient eternity and then tried to show how this might work to our advantage. To be our own teacher we must dance, Dewey would say. But to dance well we cannot dance alone. We need many partners. This was Dewey's special insight and it separates him from the many who are cynical about modern life.

Rorty does not fully appreciate this fact about Dewey. He is correct in saying that Dewey, unlike Charles Peirce, was an anti-realist, but wrong to label Dewey a nominalist. Dewey opposed nominalism as much as Peirce did, at least crude
nominalism. Realism-vs-nominalism assumes the very dualism of subjective/objective that Dewey found so distasteful in the Enlightenment. What is it that was "out-there" for Dewey, albeit transient, beyond concrete, particular things? It was community, culture, experience, conversation -- in short, "the social" (maybe Rorty got it right after all). Whatever the precise word or phrase, it involved a total environment. It was something like an ecological system constantly being threatened, yet able to reconstruct itself for the better. It was a system where people must work hard to improve themselves, but not merely as individuals, or in ways that degrade other things, or in a manner that jeopardizes the integrity of the elements taken together. With all this said, it is still a system where everyone dances to their own tune. Is this the sort of pie-in-the-sky aspiration that Lawrence is talking about? I expect it is. The challenge now is for him to admit it and to live with the consequences.
FOOTNOTES


"What is conservativism?" Abraham Lincoln asked in a speech at Cooper Union. "Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new and untried?" This, to be sure, is the conventional view. Similarly, the widely held view of liberalism is that it consists in the ready acceptance of change. Neither of these formulations gets close to the essence.

This paper purports to offer more analytical definitions of these two isms and makes brief applications of a conservative viewpoint to some practical and theoretical concerns of education. We shall also take a special look at one philosopher, John Dewey, in that light. There is a perennial importance to such an effort. As W. S. Gilbert said in an operetta lyric,

I often think it's comical
How nature always does contrive
That every boy and every gal
That's born into the world alive
Is either a little liberal
Or else a Conservative!

There is also a timeliness, as such movements as Back to Basics vie for our loyalty with the heterodox outpourings of writers such as Jonathan Kozol, John Holt, and James Herndon.

Our methodology will entail respect to the logicians' rule to define by proximate genus and ultimate difference. When the genus of each key term is offered, it will be seen that the two outlooks in question are not so much philosophies as attitudes or persuasions. It is surely significant that proponents of both continue to offer "scientific evidence." For every Stephen Jay Gould on the left, there is an Edward O. Wilson on the right.

Conservativism

Conservativism is the belief that there is a fixed and flawed human nature. One may ascribe the flaws to genes, Original Sin, or something else. In any case, they are such that the perfect social order must remain...
always a dream. To snatch at Utopia, therefore, is to risk ending up worse than before.

Of course, there can be an unreflective, habitual conservativism, stemming from nothing deeper than habitual attachment to what is established, just as there can be a knee-jerk liberalism which goes no deeper than an automatic desire to be to the left of everybody else on all subjects.

Around the essence of conservativism cluster corollaries. Six of these have been noted by Russell Kirk:  

1. Belief that political problems are at bottom moral problems and that a divine intent rules society.  
2. Respect for tradition.  
3. Belief that society requires orders and classes.  
4. Persuasion that freedom and the right of private property are connected.  
5. Recognition of the need for rules to control human wills and appetites.  
6. Recognition that change and reform are not identical.

The more conventional and superficial concept of the conservative mind is simply that it is disposed against change and towards tradition. This view is generally correct so far as it goes; but, in some circumstances, a conservative would desire change.

Liberalism

Liberalism is the belief that human nature is infinitely perfectible on the natural plane. All human problems can in principle be solved by some form of environmental manipulation: education, redistribution of the wealth, psychotherapy, one or another political system, abolition of private property, or some combination of such things. This viewpoint, too, has its corollaries:  

1. A tendency to equate change with progress.  
2. Contempt for tradition and authority.  
3. An instinct for social and economic leveling, reducing or eliminating inequalities among human beings.  
4. A tendency to look to government to accomplish man's betterment.
The more conventional and superficial view of the liberal mind is simply that it welcomes change and dislikes rules.

While liberalism and conservativism are more stances or Weltanschaungen than systemic philosophical positions, the first tends to be allied with philosophies of pure becoming, as in Heraclitus and Dewey, while the second is at least loosely tied to systems that see being as prior to becoming as in Aristotle and Aquinas. In epistemology, there is a proclivity for thinkers in the nominalist/empiricist pattern to be liberals and for rationalists and moderate intellectualists to be conservatives. Such statements must be taken with caution, however. Plato, Spinoza, and Hegel are among the philosophers who can be called conservative in spirit. Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Mill, and Spencer are among their left-wing counterparts.

Conservativism and Education

There is, loosely speaking, a conservative viewpoint on education. It has to do with the nature of the learner; the nature, sources, and limits of knowledge; academic freedom; purposes of education; and the nature of good teaching. We are here concerned with these things as conceived philosophically. Man, of course, can be described at many levels and in many frameworks. Further, we must not rest content with cliches such as "Man is good" or "Man is evil," both of which are meaningless unless we have some other morally accountable species with which to compare him. Similarly, our concern with knowledge is not with a psychological account of how we learn, but of what, in the last analysis, we know when we know, and upon what foundations knowledge rests. We are not addressing ourselves to "how to teach well," but to the essence (if we can find it) of good teaching.

One caution: Not everybody sits consistently on the left or the right side of the aisle. Robert Hutchins, for example, was an educational conservative and a political liberal. Even within the field of education, one's
attitudes may be inconsistent. There are also quantitative differences, one theorist being more conservative or more liberal than another.

Hence, we are talking not so much about persons as about positions. The most essential of these addresses the question: Is there a fixed, flawed human nature? Those who answer affirmatively are usually dualists, absolute or moderate. True education, they usually hold, is concerned with the higher part of that duality: the intellect. Where the intellect is seen as a faculty of a spiritual, immortal soul, the salvation of that soul and its union with God in the present life become the ultimate goals. This goal appears in such pre-Christian philosophers as Plato and Aristotle.

Let us not forget that second adjective. Human nature is fixed and flawed. It follows that students cannot be allowed to chart their own course completely, since they will choose evil a goodly proportion of the time. It does not follow that harshness and cruelty towards students are necessary or justified, but regulations and reasonable means of enforcing them are.

The first adjective is also important: Human nature is fixed. It is always and everywhere the same. What specifies humanity through variations in sex, race, interests, and so on, is rationality. This does not mean that people always—or even usually—think particularly well. It simply means that they are able to think at all. A horse can be non-rational; indeed, it cannot be anything else; only a human being (on this planet, at least) can be irrational.

If such is man, what is human knowledge? Conservatism has been allied to rationalism of one degree or another. Even though knowledge begins in the senses, it does not reach its highest level there. Our power to abstract and reason is the epistemological mark of our humanity. The mark of a true statement is not merely that it has some organismic utility or some coherence with the rest of one's knowledge, but that it corresponds in its formal structure to some reality.

Traditional educators have usually placed much emphasis upon facts. This
is not because the facts are compellingly important in themselves, but because they are fuel for the intellect. As the student progresses to higher levels of education, it becomes increasingly important that he/she transcend particulars and deal with ideas. Traditionalists also see truth as changeless. Many things are worth knowing aside from their practical value. Thus, no matter what vocation someone is preparing for, liberal education is a first requisite.

John Henry Newman was a prime example of the conservative educator. Liberal education, he stressed, brings order into an active intellect:

This process of training, by which the intellect, instead of being formed or sacrificed to some particular or accidental purpose, some specific trade or profession, or study or science, is disciplined for its own sake, for the perception of its own proper object, and for its own highest culture, is called Liberal Education; and though there is no one in whom it is carried as far as is conceivable, or whose intellect would be a pattern of what intellects should be made, yet there is scarcely any one but may gain an idea of what real training is, and at least look towards it, and make its true scope and result, not something else, his standard of excellence.

We hear much about academic freedom. We encounter few attempts to define it or to say whence this freedom springs. In the liberal view this is an absolute right of scholars and teachers, an end in itself. It is a univocal notion, taken identically as applied to physics, history, theology, literature, or any other subject. To the conservative, it is an analogical notion, to be applied to each subject within the methodology of the subject and with due regard to sources and varieties of knowledge. It is a limited freedom, a means to truth, and to be balanced by academic responsibility. It is the right of the scholar to search for truth in appropriate ways, not an unrestricted license for any and all kinds of mental exercise.

Conservatives posit a variety of ultimate purposes for education, but they tend to agree that the proximate purpose is to reach and shape the intellect. If Plato recommended physical culture as part of the curriculum, it was not because he considered that an essential business of the school, but
because a good mind is unlikely to develop—or so he thought—in a weak or ailing body.

Questions of how to teach are partly empirical. Yet, conservativism has implications here too. One of them is that the teacher should know a great deal more than the students about the subject at hand and should help the students to move from the known to the unknown. One way to do this that is often effective despite the bad press it gets is the lecture supplemented by discussion. The great rule is, teach for meaning.

Criticisms and Answers

Having presented this overview of a conservative viewpoint on education, I would like to note and comment upon some criticisms of it that are commonly made.

1. Liberals often find fault with the idea of a curriculum grounded in unchanging truth. A typical text complains that the first principles by which such figures as Robert M. Hutchins have wanted the curriculum to be shaped are "prior to and independent of human experience." Such a statement must be examined most carefully. Philosophy is dependent upon experience. It differs from science in not depending upon particular experiences. In an experiment in which Wechsler I.Q.'s are the dependent variable, only specified procedures of giving and scoring the Wechsler test will do. By contrast, almost any experience proves relevant for considering whether existence and essence are distinct in finite things, whether substance is always accompanied by accidents, and the like. Of course experience alone will not suffice to resolve these questions, which require the play of reason upon experience.

2. The same text complains that such an exercise is "sharply opposed to the spirit and method of modern science." Such a claim argues an ignorance of the matter discussed. Every science is master in its own sphere, but philosophy has its own methods, its own questions, its own level of abstraction,
no more opposed to those of empirical science than Tuesday is opposed to Wednesday. Indeed, the whole scientific enterprise depends for its validity upon philosophical tenets, such as that there is a real world and that there is order in this real world.

3. It is said that the idea of unchanging and objective truth is "undemocratic." The implied major premise is that whatever is undemocratic is bad. Both the major and minor premises here are faulty. Truth is not established by counting noses, even in the "scientific method" lauded by these same authors. It is a homely fact of life that some persons, on some subjects, can reason better than others. Any complaints on this score should be lodged with God, who seems to have made the world that way. Reason, in any case, has its own canons and criteria, democratic or not!

4. It is said that a traditional approach leads to "a sharp separation between the ideal and the practical, and between knowledge and experience." As for this latter dichotomy, those who make the charge also make the separation. As for exalting the "practical" in isolation from any rational context, beware of doing that! We are led, for the most part, by people with a problem-solving orientation. For awhile, the problem was how to get into Vietnam. Then, the problem was how to get out of Vietnam. Those who want us to judge principles by their consequences have it backwards. How, then, shall we judge the consequences? Heaven deliver us from people who like to "solve problems"!

5. Finally, it is sometimes claimed that steering by unchanging truths is "a poor guide in a time of change." I suggest, contrariwise, that the more change is in the air, the more we need fixed principles to guide us through it.

John Dewey

To illustrate the conservative and liberal viewpoints as applied to a particular philosopher, let us take John Dewey, the American Pragmatist or
Instrumentalist who lived from 1859 to 1952 and is still a major voice in American educational theory.

Here is Dewey, speaking for himself.

(1) On the nature of philosophy:

If we are willing to conceive education as the process of forming fundamental dispositions, intellectual and emotional, toward nature and fellow men, philosophy may even be defined as the general theory of education. Unless a philosophy is to remain symbolic—or verbal—or sentimental indulgence for a few, or else mere arbitrary dogma, its auditing of past experience and its program of values must take effect in conduct.9

(2) On mind-body relations:

It would be impossible to state adequately the evil results which have flowed from . . . dualism of mind and body much less to exaggerate them . . . In part bodily activity becomes an intruder. Having nothing, so it is thought, to do with mental activity, it becomes a distraction, an evil to be contended with.10

(3) On the nature of mind:

Mind is not a name for something complete by itself; it is a name for a course of action in so far as that is intelligently directed; in so far, that is to say, as aims, ends, enter into it, with selection of means to further the attainment of aims. Intelligence is not a peculiar possession which a person owns; but a person is intelligent in so far as the activities in which he plays a part have the qualities mentioned.11

(4) On how we get knowledge:

There is no such thing as genuine knowledge and fruitful understanding except as the offspring of doing. The analysis and rearrangement of facts which is indispensable to the growth of knowledge and power of explanation and right classification cannot be attained purely mentally—just inside the head. Men have to do something; they have to alter conditions. This is the lesson of the laboratory method, and the lesson which all education has to learn.12

(5) On the nature of education:

Education is that reconstruction or reorganization of experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases ability to direct the course of subsequent experience. (1) The increment of meaning corresponds to the increased perception of the connections and continuities of the activities in which we are engaged . . . (2) The other side of an educative experience is an added power of subsequent direction and control.
On values among studies:

We cannot establish a hierarchy of values among studies. It is futile to attempt to arrange them in an order beginning with one having least worth and going on to that of maximum value. In so far as any study has a unique or irreplaceable function in experience, in so far as it marks a characteristic enrichment of life, its worth is intrinsic or incomparable. Since education is not a means to living, but is identical with the operation of living a life which is fruitful and inherently significant, the only ultimate value which can be set up is just the process of living in itself.\(^\text{14}\)

That is probably sufficient sampling for our purpose. At the most basic level, Dewey's is a philosophy of pure becoming in the spirit of Heraclitus. Man is a natural product of evolution, as is everything else. Thinking is a natural, adaptive function. Judgments of right and wrong, like other judgments, should be scientific. Education has no goal beyond itself. Growth has no goal beyond itself. A question the Instrumentalist can never answer is: Growth towards what? We learn by doing. The curriculum consists of all of the experiences the child has under the conscious guidance of the school.

To all of this, the conservative is apt to reply that being is prior to becoming, that man is more than an organism, that thinking is more than an adaptive function, that science can shed no light on questions of right and wrong, and that we learn in various ways according to what we are learning. To reduce knowing to problem-solving is to produce an oversimplified epistemology in which the role of reason is neglected. Truth is more than utility.

One writer, Russell Kirk, took Dewey to task rather severely from a conservative standpoint. Wrote he:

The belligerent expansive and naturalistic tendencies of the era found their philosophical apologist in John Dewey. No philosopher's style is more turgid; but Dewey's postulates, for all that, are simple and quite comprehensible. He commenced with a thoroughgoing naturalism, like Diderot's and Holbach's, denying the whole realm of spiritual values: nothing exists but physical sensation, and life has no aims but physical satisfaction. He proceeded to utilitarianism which carried Benthamite ideas to their logical culmination, making material production the goal and standard of human endeavor; the past is trash, the future unknowable, and present gratification the only concern of the moralist. He propounded
a theory of education derived from Rousseau, declaring that the child is born with "a natural desire to do, to give out, to serve," and should be encouraged to follow his own bent, teaching being simply the opening of paths. He advocated a sentimental equalitarian collectivism with social dead-level its ideal; and he capped this structure with Marxist economics, looking forward to proletarian ascendency and a future devoted to material production for the satisfaction of the masses, a planner's state. Every radicalism since 1789 found its place in John Dewey's system; and this destructive intellectual compound became prodigiously popular, in short order, among that distraught crowd of the semi-educated and among people of more serious pretensions who found themselves lost in a withered world that Darwin and Faraday had served from its roots. Intensely flattering to the presumptuousness of the modern mind, thoroughly contemptuous of authority, Dewey's books were a mirror of twentieth-century discontent; and the gray haze of the Utilitarian future toward which Dewey led the rising generation was not immediately repellent to a people who had submitted themselves to the lordship of sensation. Veneration was dead in Dewey's universe, indiscriminative emancipation was cock of the walk. Thus was the imperialistic craving of America and the twentieth century given a philosophic mask.15

Let us now take a closer look both at the quotations from Dewey and at Kirk's evaluation of him.

Dewey often defines extrinsically or incidentally. That is, he does not get at the essence. In speaking of education as "the process of forming fundamental dispositions," for example, he does not distinguish between the guided learning which is usually called education and unguided learning. Similarly, in calling philosophy "the general theory of education," he picks one of philosophy's roles but does not point to what it could not lack and still be itself.

Dewey also throws many rocks at many straw men. In the citation about dualism, what he says applies at most only to the sort of absolute dualism found in Leibniz and Descartes. A moderate or qualified dualist would certainly not say that the body has nothing to do with mental activity. There is the further question of whether this is an intrinsic or extrinsic dependence.

His cited definition for mind is nominal ("a name for") and operational. It tells what mind does but not what it is. There is some straw man in the reference to intelligence as "a peculiar possession which a person owns"
(as distinct, presumably, from a possession which a person does not own).
The treatment of intelligence, in Dewey, likewise, is framed by what it does,
not by what it is. A thing must have some mode of existence before it can do
anything.

Dewey's statement on how we get knowledge is, I submit, just plain wrong.
Sometimes it is necessary for one to do something to learn, depending on what
one is learning. We also learn by imagining and thinking, however. Such
imagination and thought, to be sure, draw upon previous experiences, but it
remains that some of our most important insights need not be the product of
doing anything in particular.

Dewey's definition of education is correct but extrinsic. Education
entails the reconstruction of experience, but that is not the characteristic
it cannot lack and still be education. Neither is control essential to educa-
tion, although activists tend to believe so.

It is difficult to agree or disagree with Dewey on his statement about
values among studies, because he seems to come down on both sides of the
fence. He denies that a hierarchy of values among disciplines can be estab-
lished, then cites a basis for establishing one.

Now, what of Kirk's evaluation of the man? To his comment on Dewey's
style, one can only say "Amen!" He is quite correct that Dewey was a thorough-
going naturalist, but it is clearly unfair to say that, for him, life has
no aims but physical satisfaction. Likewise, Dewey would not say that pres-
ent gratification is the only concern of the moralist. Dewey's love affair
with Marxism is clear enough. ("I have seen the future, and it works.")
That veneration was dead in Dewey's universe--true. William James, also a
pragmatist, had a sense of the numinous, a capacity for religious awe. Dewey
seems to have had none.

Thus, Kirk hits the mark sometimes and misses it sometimes on this
philosopher. Dewey has been indiscriminately eulogized so often, however, that it is permissible to let a trenchant critic have his paragraph.

It is time for the present defendant to come out from behind the whiskers and declare a position. I am a philosophical and theological conservative who has supported such political figures as Eugene McCarthy, Walter Mondale, Adlai Stevenson, and George McGovern. (I did vote for Thomas E. Dewey once, which I attribute to combat fatigue.) I mention these political leanings only to make the point that they are compatible with the kind of conservatism we have been examining, which sees human nature as fixed and flawed.

While neither conservatism nor liberalism in itself is, strictly, a philosophy, there is a continuum of positions in this respect which is perennially pertinent. Let us ponder the merits of educational conservatism now and then. Some of us think it is the way to go.

---

1Abraham Lincoln, Address, Cooper Union, New York (Feb. 27, 1860).
2W. S. Gilbert, Iolanthe, Act. I.
6Ibid., p. 141.
7Ibid., p. 142.
8Ibid., p. 144.
10Ibid., p. 165.
11Ibid., p. 155.
12 Ibid., p. 321
13 Ibid., p. 89-90
14 Ibid., p. 281.
15 Kirk, op. cit., pp. 365-366
Introduction

Increasingly, attention is being focussed on the importance, in the moral development of the young, of the formation of their moral character. Work in this area consists of examining such questions as the nature of specific virtues (and vices), attempts to produce a classification system by which to understand the virtues better, the roles of feelings and reason in character development. But this cannot be the whole story of moral development, and there are reasons for this which are instructive. Even if we are, say, temperate, or sympathetic to the plight of others, or courageous in sticking to our convictions, this in itself does not provide a guarantee that we will do the morally correct thing. It is consistent with being virtuous that the wrong thing is done. In addition, there may well be occasions when the various virtues which go to make up a certain part of one's character, pull in opposite directions: thus, wanting to be charitable may conflict with a feeling that a society which relies substantially on charitable acts to sustain the less fortunate, is dealing with its problems in a way which is unfair, both to the receivers of and givers of charity. Wanting to be charitable is at odds with wanting to be fair.

It is, perhaps, in recognition of these points that educational institutions, catering for pupils up to the age of 18 are now putting on courses which cover such topics as divorce, abortion, euthanasia, addiction, our relations with the animal world. Moreover, in such courses there is a strong conception that whilst part of such work will require empirical investigations (What is the divorce rate? Is it on the increase? Is it more
prevalent amongst certain social groups? etc.), schools will be failing in their task if they do not get their public to address such questions as "were I in such and such a situation, what ought I to do?"; or "what is the morally correct thing to do in such and such a case?" There is a recognition, here, that educators ought to be getting their pupils to think about such issues in a practical way, that is, to treat topics such as abortion not only as occasions for factual investigation but as opportunities to recognize that they present us with problems in which action is required. Moreover, these are problems, in which we ought to think about what sort of action is required.

What sort of thinking should we be asking our pupils to engage in over such issues? Different accounts of the nature of morality and moral thought will offer different answers to this question. Intuitionists may list for us a number of moral principles, get us to describe the situation in which a moral difficulty is thought to reside and then ask us to try to grasp what is the correct thing to do: that is, which principle to apply. The thinking done here is presumably that kind which flashes across our minds, given that we have understood what principles are available. Existentialists share something with intuitionists, in that a choice has to be made in a moral situation, and this choice will again somehow appear to us. Existentialist moral educators, though, would eschew any review of available moral principles as the background against which such thought as is present in choosing, will occur. A third approach would be for us to require our pupils to reflect upon their existing beliefs over what is right and wrong, what is of worth and what is not, and then invite them to apply their conclusions over this to the moral problem at hand. This seems to be a species of naturalism, in that it requires a sort of empirical investigation, though with philosophical...
overtones. X's existing beliefs have to be brought to mind, and this is an investigation into the contents of one's mind. It may well be that in the course of this self-directed psychology, the individual may be stimulated (either by himself or with the aid of others) to say more precisely what his initially formulated belief means, and perhaps even to examine whether some of his beliefs are of greater importance, so far as he is concerned, than others. This looks recognizably like the kind of thinking which occurs under the auspices of "the need to clarify." But then there is a further exercise in which we have to fit these beliefs to the moral problem at hand: that is, we have to identify the problem as one in which the clarified beliefs are present, and this will enable us to draw a conclusion about what to do. For example, my belief might be that I think it wrong to kill sentient creatures except in self-defence. I observe or take note that a certain situation—say, a rat has invaded my home—is one in which I think that this belief has an application, for I am defending myself. So, it is not wrong to kill the rat. I leave to one side the further question of whether this is sufficient for me to perform the act of killing the rat.

I have suggested that this latter approach—the clarification and application of one's values—is a species of naturalism: Its requirement is that our thinking is directed towards uncovering certain facts, even if these are facts whose content is given by our own beliefs. It does not suggest that we probe the beliefs themselves, beyond any clarification. A variation of this view would be one which drew a sharp distinction between a belief and a feeling, and recommended that we either get to know, or if that is not necessary, simply reveal our feelings about a situation, this being a precursor to action. Here it would be my distaste, say, for the presence of the rat which would be pivotal. Any thinking done here would be whatever
might be present in such feelings, together with whatever thinking is involved in acknowledging and applying these feelings.

There are some well-known difficulties with these approaches. Thus we may want to know the grounds upon which intuitionists tell us that certain principles are moral principles, and we may puzzle over how to take different people's different intuitions (or non-intuitions). We may query why the existentialist thinks that the absence of principles must be a condition of proper moral choice, rather than a condition which would prevent moral choice. We may wish to dig deeper into our beliefs and feelings rather than just acknowledge their presence, as the above species of naturalism would have us do. It is not the purpose of this paper to explore these possibilities or difficulties any further. These different accounts serve as a reminder both that they may be what is underpinning particular approaches to moral education in schools, and that any other account has to be seen as not possessed of the same difficulties, and as having some clear advantages over its rivals.

Is Morality Like Science?

The problem which is explored in this paper is that of the nature of principled thinking in morality. It should be made clear what sort of principled thinking is being discussed. R. M. Hare's distinction between two tiers of principles is helpful here. There is a clear sense in which when we either meet or notice situations in which we have to do something of a moral sort, we act out of habit. We keep a promise, tell the truth, help the person in distress, or whatever. In so far as acting out of a habit is to be equated with acting in accordance with a rule, perhaps even acting because it is the rule, then we could also be said to be acting in a principled way. Hare variously talks of acting, at this level, intuitively, or in accordance with and because of the prima facie principles we hold. It can be noted that we do
talk of people of principle, and such people, in this sense, do not have to puzzle out what their principles are, nor how they are to apply their principles. Principles are part of their psychological make-up, in that they are deeply embedded. Such people are usually highly reliable and because of that, highly predictable. It is important, indeed, not just that there are such people, but that there are lots of people like this.

It is not this level of principles which is being discussed. It is, rather, an inquiry into certain features which may be found when we are thinking through moral issues, typically when we are trying to puzzle out something for ourselves. When we reach a conclusion about a moral issue, are we left with a particular belief about a particular issue, or can we use our thoughts about particular issues to assist us in thinking about other particular issues? Is there the possibility of getting to see connections and similarities between cases, and so the possibility of framing our thinking in more general beliefs (with perhaps even greater degrees of generality)? Is this what would be essentially involved in securing greater consistency in our thinking about different, particular issues? In examining the case of generality and consistency, does it begin to look as if moral thinking resembles scientific thought in the way we go about trying to reach solutions?

To the educator, these are important questions, for if there are the essential features which occur in the thinking which we do about moral issues, this guides the sort of work to be done in getting pupils to engage in such thinking, e.g. getting pupils to be consistent and to see similarities and connections (and, of course, dissimilarities and the lack of connections). The need to obtain a clear understanding is as correct about moral education as it is about other areas of the curriculum. If, for example, we are science educators and our view of science is that it seeks to amass observations from
which we inductively infer a law or generalization ('what do you observe here...there? What is in common in these examples?'), we are, in holding this view, not only giving the pupils an account of what science is but because of this getting them to do it in a particular way. Contrast this with a falsificationist view of science, where we would be asking pupils to produce bold conjectures which would then be subjected to attempts to falsify them. Rather than conclusions being arrived at from observation-statements, generalizations would be regarded as premises in arguments which, together with initial conditions, produce conclusions which then have to be treated as predictions, to be subjected, then, to testing.

How similar to scientific thinking is ethical thinking? This is not just a question of whether each uses deductive thinking and/or inductive thinking. The important issue is whether in mo-al thinking, we seek to establish a body of theoretical statements. This would be, presumably, to construct law-like generalizations, and lower-level theoretical statements, perhaps buttressed by assumptions of various kinds. From such a system, one could advance hypotheses about what to think and do in possible, or in actual situations. The body of theoretical knowledge would be tested out by certain sorts of observations and/or certain sorts of judgments about particular situations or events. These would provide the data by which to see whether the body of moral theory was confirmed. If the particular judgments did not return the sort of judgment which the body of theory would require, we could examine whether the explanation for this lay in a flaw in one of the buttressing assumptions or lower-level principles. Only when we could be satisfied that we had no problem there would we need to look at the lawlike principles themselves. We could then consider modifications to the generalizations. If, however, problems at this fundamental level began to
crowd in on us, one might consider whether the generalizations themselves needed to be abandoned.

This is the way some philosophers see moral and political thinking. Others, seeing difficulties which will be considered shortly, still hang on to as much as they can salvage. Thus Joel Kupperman argues a case for the construction of ethical theory on the grounds that it is only by so doing, that we can be provided with decision-procedures and canons for judging the moral standing of others. In just the same way as a scientist is provided with a decision procedure (does this data confirm or falsify the theoretical claims? Is the theory a fruitful one for future investigations?), so this model of moral thinking would enable agents to decide what to do and why, both in actual moral problems with which the agent is grappling and other such problems which can be illuminated by the theory. In just the same way as theories in science enable scientists to assess the scientific standing of the work of other scientists, so the body of moral theory enables a moral agent to assess the moral standing of other agents and their actions.

It may be helpful to consider briefly an example where one author's treatment of a case owes something to the above model. In his article "What is so wrong with killing people?", Robert Young considers different formulations of the prohibition against killing. The first move is to consider Michael Tooley's view that killing another human being is morally wrong because it violates the right to life. This raises the question of what sort of being can possess such a right. Tooley claims that for this right to be held, a corresponding desire for life must exist in the right-holder. "Exist" is clarified to mean not necessarily that the desire is occurrent but that it could occur; in other words, the right holder must have the capacity for and disposition to hold such a desire. Young then invites us to consider
an implication of this view, namely that it rests on an unargued and thus arbitrary distinction between on the one hand humans who have had, have or could be expected to resume having the relevant desire, and on the other hand those others who do not yet have but who may reasonably be expected to have the relevant desires. Because arbitrariness is unsatisfactory, Young proposes another principle—that killing a human being is wrong on at least some occasions because it unjustly prevents the realization of an individual’s life-purposes or such life-purposes as the individual may reasonably be expected to resume or to come to have. It is noted that it is consistent with this principle that a being who has no life purpose, actual or potential, can be killed without moral blame being attached to whomsoever has caused the death. Young now suggests that the principle faces a problem in that it entails the principle that we should not do something if this results in the complete destruction of someone’s life purposes. Thus this problem would prevent us from imprisoning certain people for life for certain crimes committed. It is clearly assumed here that this would destroy such people’s life purposes, and that this sort of sentencing is the kind which it would be arbitrary to reject. So, we get a further reformulation of the principle: what is morally wrong with killing is that it is the irrevocable, unjust prevention of the realization of actual or potential life-purposes. A further objection is considered—fat man cases. This produces a final statement of the principle, which is that killing is morally wrong because it is the irrevocable, maximally unjust prevention of the life-purposes whether actual or potential, of the victim.

Young now turns to an examination of how this principle can be used. It is held that the principle permits killing in self-defence when this is the only way of avoiding your own death, presumably because this is not the
maximally unjust act (your own death would have been). Killing is also permitted under the principle, in certain strictly defined cases of active, voluntary euthanasia. On the other hand, killing would be morally wrong in a wide range of abortion cases, e.g., abortion on demand. Here it is deemed that this would prevent the coming into being of life purposes, though Young also suggests that in those cases where the mother's life is in danger as a result of the pregnancy, an abortion would not be a maximally unjust act.

Now it does not seem fanciful to construe Young's treatment of the issue as inspired by a theoretical mode. There are conjectured principles which are tested out by drawing attention to what we would say if the principle were applied in a particular instance, this process leading to modifications and emergence of newly formulated principles. Assumptions buttress the testing out of the principles (rather as, say, assumptions about the theory of optics buttressed the Copernican stance against Aristotle). The principles are used to foretell what we ought to think and do about a range of other cases which were not the immediate object of inquiry (in just the same way as apparently widely different phenomena were gathered together under Newton's laws of motion and gravitation).

SOME PROBLEM:

There are some difficulties with this account of ethics, some of which are well known.

I. Observations in Science and Morality

Firstly, if moral theoretical principles are to be judged by some equivalent in morality of observations, whose observations are they? It is a commonplace that in science, the observation of events in whatever form is not radically subjective in the sense that what is seen is altered by the scientists' political views, the time of day, the height of the laboratory
above sea level and so on. This is not of course to deny that sometimes scientists have allowed themselves to be distracted by such factors. Nor is the point the one which is denied by Thomas Kuhn: even if one accepted Kuhn's theory of paradigm shifts, it would still be consistent with this point to say that within a paradigm, the scientist's observations can be publicly replicated in such a way that it does not matter who made the observations. By contrast, in morality, whose "observations" they are can make a crucial difference. If we observe a small improvement in the standards of living, the question of whether this is good evidence for some principle such as Rawls'—that this has to occur in order that wide social and economic differences be tolerated—may, in practice, be decidable because of one's social and economic standing. The least well off may be far less impressed with the principle than the well off, each noting the same change in social and economic standards.

Secondly, why should the observations or judgments which are one's present stock in trade be decisive? What principles were held by those who supported the slave trade might be said to have been confirmed by particular judgments ('we are doing God's work in looking after such primitives who do not know how to look after themselves: see, how hopeless they are in sorting out the paper work'). This criticism amounts to saying that the theoretical model allows moral conservatism an in-built advantage in judging moral issues.

Thirdly, how closely can we press the parallel with observations in science? There are a number of points here. In making scientific observations, the observations are of phenomena, and the statements in which they are framed, refer to those phenomena. The theoretical concepts as, for example, in 'water molecules adhere together as temperatures fall below freezing point', are reproduced in observation statements, which describe the
behaviour of molecules. There is no point in rehearsing the blind alley up which certain ways of stating non-naturalism went in suggesting that there were discernable moral features of the world: the same mistake, of course, was also made by naturalism. The point here is the well known one that whilst we can describe events—the young man is hitting the old lady—we cannot describe this extra feature of the event "it is not right that...", and this is not because we lack some moral faculty, nor that it is a highly hidden thing to observe, but because it cannot be there.

This point is closely related to but distinguishable from another issue. It is thought to be a difficulty that whilst observation statements in science have to be in some way connected with acts of seeing and looking, we look in vain for some parallel acts, related to a sort of sense experience, in morality. This point, whilst correct (because there is no moral sense organ), can be overplayed if it simply leads to an outright rejection that acts of seeing etc. have a part to play in moral judgments. For there is here an exact parallel with scientific observation. To conceptualize in the act of noticing is what is going on when one observes molecular activity, in just the same way that to judge that it is not right that....in the act of noticing an affray is what is going on when one observes an old lady being mugged. Nor is this point spoilt by the argument that observations in morality do not bring with them automatically a moral view of some sort i.e., one can see something and not be bound by that fact alone to judge in moral terms what one has seen. It is not inconsistent to agree with this latter point but still to maintain that in so far as there are moral judgments of events in the world, these judgments can occur in acts of noticing. Judging that it is not right that the old lady is being mugged is a judgment intertwined with the noticing. This is also not to maintain that all moral judgments necessarily involve
observations. It is only a point about those that do, a reminder that moral judgments can be made in these ways.

This discussion introduces yet a further point, this time about the relations between theory and observation. There is a stock problem in those accounts of science which require there to be a central role for observation in theory falsification or confirmation. For if it is being maintained that observations and observation statements are free from theoretical terms, it is hard to see how the former can constitute evidence for theoretical claims. To claim that water expands under temperatures at or below freezing because of the way the molecules behave under those conditions is to force upon the observations those very concepts. The investigation is into whether these concepts apply. So, observation statements cannot be theory-free. Yet this does not matter, in deciding whether the theory is or is not confirmed, is or is not falsified. How does this point fare in morality? Suppose there is a moral theoretical principle that everyone should have an equal amount of a certain good, X. This principle is supported by claims of what other sorts of features are to be expected in those societies where this is the case, and by further claims of what sort of features are to be expected in those societies when this is not the case. What would it be either to confirm or falsify such a moral theoretical principle? We could no doubt make observations, which would not be theory-free, of what features are to be found in particular sorts of society—this is a society where there are considerable differences in the possession of X and these other features mentioned in the theory are/are not present. Yet is is apparent that this would be still an empirical investigation, and not one which could decisively show whether the principle was correct or not. Someone could quite consistently observe there to be these features in societies when X is not held equally, but refuse to be moved

202
by the existence of these into supporting the moral theoretical principle. They might even be got to agree that there was something undesirable in having societies with these features, but it would still be open to them to prefer to live in a society which had to put up with the presence of these features because they did not agree that a society in which equal amounts of X were to be held by everyone was a desirable society in which to live.

It might be objected that this criticism misses the point, for the issue is not that factual observations are required to support the principle but that the principle is to be supported by the moral judgments immanent in certain observations. The proponent of the close-parallel-with-science thesis, though, is now on the horns of a dilemma. If the principle is said to be confirmed by a moral judgment, how is this anything other than circular? If it is not circular, how does the moral judgment support the principle? This problem is nicely highlighted by the argument drawn from Young (above). Young reformulates his principle into it being wrong to kill because this unjustly prevents the realization of an individual's life purposes actual or potential, and then notes that this would entail that we should not do something if this results in the complete destruction of someone's life purposes. We are then asked to agree that this would prevent us from giving life sentences to certain people for certain crimes they have committed. A moral judgment, in other words, is being used to "support" the principle. The trouble is—the judgment about life sentencing simply reaffirms the basic principle. This is an odd sort of proof. It will also be noticed that it is consistent for someone to agree with the main principle and hold that it is his judgment that capital punishment ought to be given for certain crimes, on the grounds that this would not be unjust. This particular moral
judgment—that it is not unjust—would of course not be a sustaining judgment for the principle.

II. Theory in Science and Morality

It does not look, then, as though the thesis under review will get much sustenance from the "observation" side of things. Does it fare any better on the "theory" side? Are there similarities between the features of theory in science and moral theoretical principles? The following might be suggested as such features:

a) in morality, there are examples of moral views which are constructed by sustained reflection, rather than by a joint activity of empirical investigation and reflection. Utilitarianism is formulated by probing such questions as 'does it tell us to generate the greatest happiness, or the greatest happiness of the greatest number?' 'How does it account for rule-following if in particular cases it would be of greater utility to perform a particular act?' 'Can it give us a clear account of "happiness"?' There is a good deal of this kind of reflective reasoning involved in the construction of theories in science, too. It might have been close to a heresy once to have said this but we are nowadays much more used to the idea that scientists spend at least some of their time thinking out the implications of a view they have come to hold, as for example in how a hypothesis or a theory fits in with other theories and laws.

b) in both scientific theory and in moral views, there exists a power to predict. In science, a theory will tell us what will be the case, given the correctness of the generalization, nor is this point undercut by the fact that in some scientific generalizations, the claims have to be expressed as probabilities. Given the fulfillment of certain conditions, N% of people will suffer from asthma, so since we have a particular example of someone who

\[ \text{1 in 100} \]

204
fulfills these conditions, we must conclude that there is a N% chance that this person will suffer an asthma attack. The predictions of science can be either of the kind "so and so much occur," a "so and so is likely to occur, to this degree of probability." Where is the parallel in morality? It lies in working out, on the basis of the theoretical principles, what one is committed to in thinking about other issues. This is a point known to practitioners of philosophy, for we often argue (or are the recipients of an argument) that if a person thinks this, then he or she must hold such and such a view about that. If, for example, you are a pacifist, then you must object not only to the killing of people in war (which is your prime concern), but also to all forms of euthanasia, to abortion (unless you wish to escape this by questioning whether the fetus is a person), to political assassination, and no doubt to many other positions too. It can readily be seen that this is what Robert Young attempts to do. Having worked out a principle against killing, he suggests that it will lead to the taking of positions on various issues: the maximally unjust prevention of the fulfillment of life purposes etc., then applied, leads us to agree that abortion on demand is morally wrong but abortion to save the threatened life of the mother is not morally wrong. It is worth noting, given the background of a concern for the nature of moral education, that the feature of predictability rests upon the need for consistency in applying, respectively, the empirical law or theory, and the moral theoretical principle.

c) Related to the previous point, though not to be confused with it, is the possibility that, as in science, morality seeks generality: that is, a position is regarded as more satisfying if it can subsume within it apparently diverse phenomena or issues. The point need hardly be laboured so far as science is concerned: Newton's laws of motion and gravity apply to the
attractions of planetary bodies, the behaviour of falling objects, pendulums, the behavior of the tides etc. Does the point equally apply in morality? If it does not, then this we might have to face the possibility that each moral issue is unique, with no bearing on any other issue, and not even on any other example of the same issue, apparently. This is the view taken by the situationist: if you look at each moral dilemma, you will always find sufficiently different features as to make it not possible to get any purchase on what to do by considering other examples, and what was done in them. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a full discussion of the issues raised here. Situation ethics would seem to have us deny the fact of moral learning, for if a person is correctly said to have learnt something, at least part of what is meant by this is that the person can apply his beliefs, skills or whatever, to new situations. It might also be doubted whether situation ethics can be stated intelligibly, for if each situation must be unique and so different from any other, does this not pre-suppose that we have to have an understanding of why each situation was different from another? If this has to be the case, 'different from' could not retain the sense it has now because there could be no instances of 'the same'.

The interesting issue for morality over the point about generality is much more concerned with what this feature commits one to. R. M. Hare's discussion of principles in morality has already been alluded to in its distinction between two tiers, or levels, of thinking. Hare argues that whilst for a good deal of the time we operate at the intuitive level of prima facie principles, when we face moral dilemmas, we can only sort out the issue at hand by engaging in critical thinking. What will critical thinking accomplish? It will enable a person to look at all aspects of the dilemma which are morally relevant (one might add that it ought to help the person
decide which features are and are not relevant), including any factual matters which bear on the issue. When a conclusion is reached about what one ought to do, Hare points out that this commits the thinker to accepting that the same circumstances ought to issue in his holding the same conclusion on other occasions too. This is the bare minimum to which Hare's insistence on the universalizability of moral judgment commits us. We could say, then, that if a critical thinker, P, concludes "in circumstances C, let X be done", this judgment logically presupposes a universal principle "whenever P is in circumstances C, let X be done." Hare insists that this is the correct version of act-utilitarianism.

Most critics of Hare do not dissent from this point. Difficulties arise however in seeing whether anything else follows from this. Suppose P agrees that in those circumstances where someone else, S, is in plain need of help, he, P, ought to help S. P's reason for helping S is, we may suppose, that it is wrong to withhold help from S in these circumstances (it need not be this, of course: P may have some reason of self-interest). Now that it is P's reason is not in itself an argument for it also being S's reason, if exactly similar circumstances arose. P's reason for helping S need have no interest for S whatsoever. So this aspect of generalizing from a particular case does not look very promising. But even worse, it is not at all clear even that P is committed to having to think that S ought to help P in similar circumstances. If P thinks he ought to do something to S, it does not follow that P has to think that S ought to do the same thing to P in like circumstances. If, for example, P thinks he ought to take advantage of S, P can consistently oppose S's taking advantages of P on the grounds that this will hurt P's interests. In other words, the universalizing of a principle
does not constrain our judgments about how others should behave, let alone constrain their judgments about how they are to behave.

Can something of a rescue operation be mounted on this point? The important distinction to bear in mind is the one Hare makes, between universalizability and generality. Moral judgments are universalizable in that they entail identical judgments about all cases identical in their universal properties. Moral judgments can be both universalizable and specific, or universalizable and general. Thus the judgment 'don't cause unnecessary pain to rats in medical experiments' is more specific than the judgment 'don't cause unnecessary pain to animals in medical experiments'. The question at hand now resolves itself into one of whether in holding a moral view, or principle, one is drawn into examining the scope of its application, as well as accepting the requirement of consistency. Thus if a person is a pacifist, is the prohibition against killing one which holds in all circumstances, or are there justifiable exceptions? If someone holds a principle that we ought to reduce those differences between people which materially affect their live-chances, does this mean that all such differences are to be reduced, even if this would involve new and unwelcomed restrictions on the liberties of some people? Perhaps the point is this: whilst we cannot say that all moral principles must be general as opposed to specific, and whilst we can produce principles which refer to what ought to be done with regard to a single sort of act, many of the principles in morality (perhaps the most important ones) are general in the way they are phrased. They are like this in that they pick out a stance towards a collection of matters which are of concern. This range of principles, then, already has a predisposition, as it were, to generality. Critical thinking about them then seeks to tie
down more exactly what the principle means and to which acts it is to be applied.

d) Theories in science have an explanatory function. They do not simply announce consistent regularities but try to explain why this particular set of effects is caused by a particular set of antecedent causes (rather than there being some other effects). Since this sort of questioning is an attempt to uncover causes, there is no reason why one set of causes should not in its turn become the focus of the same sort of inquiry—these caused that, but what caused these? This leads to the construction of edifices of generalizations, theories and laws, tightly knit together.

It is often held that we have here a crucial difference between science and morality. Science explains, morality seeks to produce justifications. They just are two different kinds of enterprise. Whether the differences are quite as sharp as this may be queried. We would not find too much difficulty in locating explanations in morality and justifications in science. If a person is asked "why did you do that?", it is quite open for the reply to be given, as an explanation, in terms of the reasons which were held at the time as a justification for the action. This would not, of course, block a further demand for a fuller or better justification. So here a justification can be that which is offered in an explanation. The opposite can occur in science, where an explanation can be offered as a justification for a position taken in a dispute.

These observations do not touch the point at issue. In science we move from observed regularities to ever more fundamental explanations of them. We observe that metal objects expand when heated, and in seeking to find out why, we are led to examine molecular activity in heating agents and in the objects they heat. Is this sort of enterprise a possible one in morality? Against
its being possible, we may adduce the following. Firstly, if an action is to be justified, it will be because there exists a reason...but how do we know that this is a good reason, unless we have some further reason to back the initial reason...but how do we know (and so on)? Thus someone might think punctuality is to be observed so that the office can run smoothly, and this is important because customers' needs ought to be attended to, and this is important because we shouldn't act in a way which makes other people a mere convenience to us, at which point we are pretty close to Kant. Yet how can we ever know that we have reached the basic, or foundational reason? What would this be like? So might go the case against ultimate principles. Allied to this is a second argument. Even if we can make sense of the idea in science that theories are either true or approximations to the truth, we cannot impart this idea of objectivity into morality, because whilst the scientist is engaged in an activity which attempts to explain the workings of nature, i.e. of entities which exist, there is no existent world of values in the sense in which material objects exist. The search for foundational moral principles, it will be argued, is premised on the idea of a similar sort of objectivity in morality. We may add for good measure that the idea that basic moral principles can settle disputes, and even settle those disputes in which lower-level principles are at odds, is traceable to this same idea that there is a moral answer to dilemmas and if we only dig deep enough, we will find the key to it.  

Do these arguments have to be accepted completely? If so, they severely damage the view that principled thinking in morality has at least some of the features which are contained in scientific thinking. Here, I can only sketch the outlines of a defence that there is something in common between the two. The issue surely turns on the charge that moral theorizing leads us inexorably
in the direction of foundational principles. Now this kind of issue is a familiar enough one in other areas of philosophy. The view that unless we can produce a foundation of certain, indubitably true statements, we cannot properly claim to have knowledge, is one that has had a near stranglehold on the theory of knowledge until well into the 20th century. Whether as basic impressions or as sense-datum experiences or as rationally-produced axioms, however, they too were not immune from doubt, nor did they provide sufficient in their premises to lead to the desired conclusions. Further, it needed to be questioned why observation-statements needed to be free from the possibility of doubt in order to be regarded as statements accorded the status of knowledge. The fact that an observation could be mistaken need not lead us to accept that they always had to be, or that we could never tell whether they were mistaken.

In similar vein, we do not have to think that all our moral actions, judgments, rules and principles cannot be justified unless and until we have met the impossibly high demand of establishing some foundational moral principle which is beyond any shadow of a doubt. It is clear that no one has succeeded in such an enterprise, be they a Utilitarian, a Marxist, a Rawlsian liberal-democrat or whatever. It does not follow from this, however, that we have to jettison the idea that judgments etc. can be made by appeal to carefully worked out principles. This should at least turn our attention towards teasing-out what would be involved in such 'careful working-out'. Moral principles can be critically evaluated, and it should not be surprising to be told that criticism will consist of establishing with clarity what the principle is saying, seeing whether it is free from contradiction, examining whether it rests upon other beliefs which can be subject to tests for truth. A very important question will be that of examining how we are to judge the
principle (test the principle) when it is applied, e.g. if an egalitarian tells us that everyone ought to have an equal right to an equal amount of some good, what sort of test is it of this if it is pointed out that this will face difficulties in its application when the demand for the good outstrips the supply of it. We want to know what the egalitarian would say. Another possibility may be that we can produce some formal principles of a procedural type which will be of assistance in examining principles which are seriously advanced for our consideration.

The critics of foundationalism in morality appear to go from one extreme to another, in rejecting the use of principles in favor of a much looser 'good reasons' analysis of moral thinking. This is often tied into an approach to ethics which owes much to Aristotle and Hume. Ends are givens, the province of what we desire, of our goals. Being beyond reason, reason can only operate at the level of taking appropriate means to goals. This is too hasty a rejection of the conception of morality as principled. It ignores the fact that principles are what some people see themselves as appealing to, taking a stand on, sometimes even dying for. Philosophy should help us to try to understand what these are, and what features they possess. I have suggested that if we think seriously about moral issues, then at least some of the features which we associate with scientific theorizing are to be found in moral thought. It is a reflective intellectual activity, seeking consistency, generality and applications. Its major difference with scientific thinking, over fundamentality, should not cause us to forget these points.
Notes


5. YOUNG, R. (1979) "What is so wrong with killing people?" Philosophy, Volume 54.

6. In fat man cases, we are asked to consider what ought to be done if a party of cavers are trapped below ground in a cave where the waters are rising rapidly. There is only one way out but this is blocked by a fat man who is so firmly wedged in that only dynamite can shift him. Fortunately (for whom?), one of the caves has dynamite and whatever else is needed to set it off.


8. This is the view taken, for example, by HARMAN, N. (1977) The Nature of Morality (New York, O.U.P.).

9. A recent exponent of this line of criticism is WILLIAMS, B. (1985) Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, especially Ch. 6 (London, Fontana).