The Midwest Philosophy of Education Society strives to enhance and deepen the level of conversation about education in the modern world and to evaluate, in moral terms, the relationship of education to the larger society. The following papers were presented at the 1978 annual meeting of the Society: "Educational Evaluation and Emancipation" (Gary Q. Milcarek); "Can Limitations on Student Freedom be Justified?" (David Tankard); "Latent Hegelianism: Roots of Conservatism in John Dewey" (Marianne S. Glazek); "Socialization and Personal Freedom: The Debate Between Bode and Russell" (Philip L. Smith); "Teachers as Agents of Equal Opportunity" (David Bricker); "Evaluating Synthesizing Skills: A Logical Analysis" (Marcia S. Brown); "President's Address: Institutional Democracy: Problems and Prospects" (Arthur Brown); "Response to the President's Address" (Van Cleve Morris); "Kohlberg's Justification of Stage Theory: A Critique" (Robert P. Craig); "Objectivity in History: A Comment Concerning Historical Methodology" (Charles E. Litz); and "Can Children Have a Right to Education?" (David C. Hoffman). (DB)
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1978

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James Merritt
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Wilma Miranda
Northern Illinois University
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OF EDUCATION
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NOVEMBER 10-11, 1978

College of Education
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, Michigan
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Adrian Dupuis, Marquette University President, Midwest Philosophy of Education Society
Friday, November 10, 1978

Whitney Auditorium

College of Education Building

1:00 Welcome

Fred Bertolaet, Assoc. Dean
College of Education
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, MI 48104

Session I

Presiding: Marc Briod,
Oakland University

1:15 "Educational Evaluation and Emancipation"

Gary J. Milczarek
Ohio State University

2:00 "Can Limitations on Student Freedom be Justified?"

David Tankard
Wayne State University

2:45 "Latent Hegelianism: Roots of Conservatism in
John Dewey"

Marianne S. Glazek
Wayne State University

3:30 Intermission

Session II

Presiding: Joe Burnett,
University of Illinois

3:45 "Socialization and Personal Freedom--The Debate
Between Boyd H. Bode and Bertrand Russell"

Philip L. Smith
Ohio State University
Concurrent Sessions

4:30 "Teachers' as Agents of Equal Opportunity"

David C. Bricker
Oakland University

4:30 Dean's Conference Room
Education Building

"Philosophical Analysis and Its Relevance for Educational Evaluation"

Marcia S. Brown
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville

5:15 Cocktail Hour

Session III

7:00 Dinner at Campus Inn

8:00 Presiding: Frederick C. Neff

President's Address: "Institutional Democracy: Problems and Prospects"

Arthur Brown

Respondent: Van Cleve Morris
University of Illinois
Chicago Circle

Saturday, November 11, 1978

Session IV

Presiding: Robert Ennis,
University of Illinois

9:00 "Kohlberg's Justification of Stage Theory: A Critique"

Robert P. Craig
St. Mary's College
9:45 "Objectivity in History: A Comment Concerning Historical Methodology"

Charles E. Litz
Kansas State University

10:30 "Can Children Have a Right to Education?"

David C. Hoffman
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville

11:15 Business Meeting

12:00 Adjournment
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In recent years many writers have acknowledged the role of practical interests in evaluation inquiry. Yet, the logic of inquiry in both the theory and practice of evaluation still suffers from the lack of a systematic theoretical perspective on the place of practical interests and power relations in the inquiry process. This is partly due to the predominant positivistic conception of inquiry, specifically its reduction of objectivity to measurable facts and their correlations and its separation of knowledge from values. From this perspective, practical interests are systematically excluded from the logic of inquiry and treated instead as the unproblematic context which guides the process from without. Thus, despite the large number of evaluation theories and models that exist in the literature, evaluation in education is seriously lacking an adequate theoretical foundation. The relatively unexamined implicit assumptions about knowledge and value inherent in prevailing evaluation theory provide significant clues toward uncovering the problems that beset educational evaluation today.

Jurgen Habermas' social theory of knowledge provides a useful framework for this task which must begin by liberating educational evaluation from its confining positivistic basis. This paper is a presentation and exploration of some of Habermas' theory. I will briefly describe his social theory of knowledge which identifies three basic forms of inquiry: empirical, hermeneutic and critical. Following will be a brief review of eight evaluation models and their relation to the forms of inquiry—particularly the critical. Finally, I will discuss the places of practical interests in evaluation inquiry and the contribution of Habermas' concept of critical inquiry to practical deliberations.

I

Habermas' Social Theory of Knowledge

Habermas distinguishes three fundamental human interests, or human needs, that define the conditions for human evolution. These interests also designate three frames of reference from which we apprehend reality, three classes of human action, three categories of knowledge, and three corresponding forms
of inquiry. The three interests include the technical, the practical and the emancipatory. Habermas calls them cognitive interests because they guide the development of perceptual and cognitive processes. They each characterize a particular frame of reference from which we apprehend reality and they guide the generation of three corresponding categories of knowledge; thus they are interests that determine what we know. In Habermas's terms, they are knowledge constitutive interests. Each cognitive interest unites a particular configuration of experience, action, knowledge, language use, cognitive development, species evolution, social organization and specialized form of inquiry. While I cannot give a comprehensive account of each configuration on this occasion I will try to outline them briefly.

It will be advantageous to begin our description of the cognitive interests by considering three domains of experience. Intuitively, we can distinguish the experience of an objective external nature, a normative social reality and our own subjective internal reality. These modes of experience represent frames of reference, or points of view, from which reality is apprehended. While we can focus on our experience from any of these three points of view, experience is not completely reducible to any of the three. I believe Habermas would say that experience in each domain is mediated or constituted by a particular cognitive interest.

Technical Control

The technical cognitive interest designates the need to function successfully in nature. We must secure control of natural processes if we are to survive and achieve our purposes. As a species we have evolved physical forms and cognitive processes that facilitate our interaction with nature. With Marx we can say that the formation of the five senses is the work of all of previous history. At the same time, it is easy to see that our experience of the world is a function of our perceptual and cognitive apparatus. Our grasp of reality is determined by cognitive processes which themselves evolved to further our control over nature.

Not only has the interest in control guided the development of our means for knowing the world, it has also guided the production of knowledge itself. Through cumulative learning processes we have acquired knowledge and skills that expand our power to control and act successfully in nature. This knowledge and skill has become organized into the social institutions of labor and work, and has evolved into the various trades, crafts, industries and technologies of our modern world. Habermas suggests that the empirical sciences are an extension of these institutions; they disclose reality from the same point of view, namely, instrumental control over objective processes. From this frame of reference, knowledge is con-
ceived functionally; it is an instrument for furthering human adaptation and survival, and the attainment of human values. Empirical inquiry merely formalizes and lends methodical rigor to the cumulative learning processes that occur in everyday life. It generates empirical knowledge.

Practical Orientation

As the cognitive interest in technical control concerned successful transactions between social beings and nature, so the practical cognitive interest concerns successful transactions among social beings themselves. The practical cognitive interest designates the need for securing a shared social reality that can orient the action of individuals in a community. Habermas calls this kind of shared orientation an intersubjectivity of mutual understanding. Intersubjectivity refers to the communality between individuals who mutually acknowledge the validity of certain norms of conduct and who use and understand the meaning of certain symbols, as in language or traffic signs. As a species we have evolved physical and cognitive capacities in the form of ordinary language that facilitate interaction among individuals in a community. In turn, we recognize the influence that language has in shaping our experience of reality.

Not only has the practical cognitive interest governed the development of the means of social interaction, it has also guided the accumulation of the kind of knowledge that successfully orients individuals in a community. The common realm of language and social norms reflects the accumulated practical wisdom of the culture—the generalized, pooled and stored learnings from successful social interactions. This accumulated conventional wisdom comprises the category of practical knowledge. Through ordinary language we establish and regulate interpersonal relationships with respect to these mutually acknowledged norms and the practical knowledge they reflect. Habermas would say that ordinary language is the medium through which the practical interest finds expression. Ordinary language reflects our norms and practical wisdom, and is the medium of social exchange. It is the medium through which we orient ourselves with respect to each other.

Ordinary language also enables a social being to apprehend the uniqueness of its own experience and still express that experience in universal terms that can be understood by another. Yet, this expression will always imperfectly represent a person's unique experience. There will always be the necessity of interpreting verbal expressions both in relation to correlative conduct and nonverbal expressions, and in the context of a mutually shared social reality. We can understand another's life expressions
only to the extent that we participate in the same intersubjectivity. Hermeneutic inquiry is a specialized form of inquiry that interprets an inadequately understood life expression. The object of inquiry can be any kind of human activity. The investigator expands our horizon of understanding, thereby bringing the subject and ourselves into the same cultural reality or intersubjectivity. Hermeneutic inquiry formalizes and gives methodical rigor to the kind of interpretive understanding that always takes place in ordinary language and social interaction.

Individuated Autonomy

The cognitive processes by which we apprehend reality are shaped not only by the cognitive interests in technical control and social orientation, they are the product of an emancipatory interest in autonomy as well. Cognitive processes in the form of self-reflection evolved to establish and continuously maintain an autonomous ego. The emancipatory cognitive interest defines the self-formative process of individuation in which individuals must reconcile their own interests with those of the community. Individuals must construct their identity in the conflict between individual and common interests, between their own conscious experience and the intersubjectivity of the community.

Common interests are mediated in a normative structure which is created and maintained by community members. However, there is generally an imbalance in the influence that individual members have in the establishment and maintenance of social norms. This imbalance is reflected in the system of power relations in the community and the authority structure that enforces norms. The process of individuation toward autonomy and responsibility takes place in this system of power relations. Autonomy and responsibility mean that the individual is able to freely participate in and influence the norms of the group and is not unnecessarily restricted by these norms in the expression of individual interests.

But the institution of power relations in a community always restricts communication among its members. Since norms are created and maintained in communicative interaction some individuals will be prevented free expression of their interests in the formation of group norms. To the extent that communication is not free to systematic constraints imposed by power relations, the normative structure will contain an element of repression and will not represent the true needs and interests of the community. Systematic constraints bring about a distortion in communication that prevents formation of what Habermas calls a rational will of the group. Yet, to escape negative social sanctions, individuals will generally attempt to maintain the appearance of an open intersubjectivity. This leads individu-
uals to internalize the limits of communication and repress their own interests. Repression means that motives become cut off from public symbols and norms of language and action, and their expression is limited to unintentional and nonverbal forms. For example, there are times when we conceal our true motives even from ourselves by constructing alternative explanations that serve in lieu of the real ones. This process of rationalization occurs on a social level in the form of ideology. In neither case can we act with autonomy and responsibility. Instead we are subject to the false consciousness of societal patterns that appear to have the necessity of natural law but in reality are forms of social dependence and domination.

The emancipatory cognitive interest is embedded in and arises out of this social medium of power relations. Cognitive processes serve us in both the natural and the social world; but in self-reflection reason also turns back on itself to free the subject from what it has become as a result of individual and social self-formative processes. Reason has emancipatory power; through critical reflection a subject can free itself from false consciousness, whether the veil of rationalization or ideologically frozen social traditions.

Critical reflection is directed to the self-formative process itself so that the subject becomes aware of its own development. By analytically reconstructing its own genesis the subject gains insight into unconscious interaction patterns and repressed motives. As long as these patterns and motives remain cut off from awareness they retain their power over the subject. Insight is the experience of release from false consciousness as the subject moves toward autonomy and responsibility.

Habermas gives psychoanalysis as the only methodically formal example of critical reflection in an inquiry process. Critical social theory would be another example although it is not systematically developed as a method.

For our purposes a detailed outline of the logic of critical inquiry is required. The logic of critical inquiry can be illustrated with the logic of psychanalytic interpretations. The structure of ordinary language governs the interconnections among linguistic expressions, patterns of action and nonverbal expressions, so that they normally cohere and reinforce each other to express the intentions of the speaker. Under ideal conditions of open communication, our underlying motives would be expressible in the public symbols of language so that motives of action and linguistic expression would coincide. But in all cultures social norms restrict the expression of some motives. When our need dispositions are repressed, they remain severed from public linguistic symbols and find expression through private incomprehensible symbols. They cannot be understood because they do not follow the culturally learned patterns of expression and socially
approved norms of language and action. We take care to maintain the intersubjectivity of mutual understanding, to escape negative social sanction. When we internalize these social constraints some need dispositions remain inaccessible to ourselves. We cannot pursue unconscious motives in functional ways. Successful transactions in the natural and social worlds are inhibited by rationalizations and unconscious and nonfunctional patterns of action.

The starting point for critical inquiry is the experience of resistance against free expression of our interests and intentions. Critical inquiry aims at dissolving this resistance by reversing the process in which motives are cut off from linguistic symbols. Through critical self-reflection we reconstruct our problematic interactions to uncover the repressed motives and conflicts. With this insight into ourselves we gain the freedom to resolve on a conscious level the conflicts between public and private interests and to pursue our interests in functional and rational ways.

The price of community will always be a measure of repression. Collective self-preservation, for example, requires some degree of repression of individual interests. Critical inquiry aims at limiting such repression to what is necessary. The suffering that we experience under the suppression of our interests is the occasion for reflection on the sources of our discomfort, and provides the impetus for emancipation from such suppression. The forces of socialization, reflecting the practical cognitive interest, are countered by the forces of individuation, reflecting the emancipatory cognitive interest.

II
Predominant Evaluation Models

In this section, I want to briefly review eight predominant evaluation models and then consider their relation to critical inquiry.2

Systems Analysis Models

In this approach evaluation is generally initiated by high level administrators and managers in order to improve and justify large scale social action programs. Value judgments are made by specialists and top level administrators on the basis of efficiency in the production of social services, quality control and accountability. These judgments are justified by empirical evidence of the attainment of expected results.
The logic of inquiry consists in the reduction of the 
evaluatum to a causal relationship between program inputs and 
output variables. Agreement is presupposed on the choice of 
a few output measures which must meet classical measurement 
criteria. Program alternatives are treated as planned vari-
tions and must meet classical criteria of the internal and 
external validity of experiments. Through homogeneous scaling, 
all variables are reduced into a quantitative model such as 
regression analysis. Program alternatives are systematically 
compared through cost benefit analysis and the most efficient 
alternative is judged most valuable.

Goal Attainment Models

Evaluation is generally initiated by administrators charged 
with responsibility for the success of educational programs, 
sometimes at the request of funding agencies or public offic-
ials. Evaluation focuses on the achievement of prespecified 
instructional goals in order to facilitate effective curriculum 
design and instruction, as well as to hold educators accountable 
for student learning. Value judgments are based on empirical 
evidence of student performance meeting prespecified standards.

The subject of goal based evaluation is the effectiveness 
of instructional activities. The logic of inquiry treats the 
evaluatum as a cause whose effect is the students performance. 
The desired post instructional status of the learner is describ-
ed and, for evaluation purposes, reduced to indices meeting the 
standards of criterion referenced measurement. Since instruction 
is judged against these measures, it must be demonstrated that 
the instruction itself and not something else produced the re-
results obtained. In other words a causal relationship should be 
shown to exist between instruction and student performance. 
Therefore evaluation designs should approximate as closely as 
possible the criteria of classical experimental designs for 
external and internal validity. Value judgements are based on 
the extent to which educational programs lead to (in a causal 
sense) learner behavior which meets stipulated performance 
standards.

Both the systems analysis and goal attainment models are 
consistent with the empirical form of inquiry. Both are guided 
by the cognitive interest in technical control. Both assume 
the problematic situation to be a lack of technically tested 
rules for behavior that would produce desired effects. Finally, 
both take place in the behavioral system of instrumental action 
in which the evaluatum is conceived as a means which should 
take advantage of natural empirical regularities and thereby 
lead to a subjective end which has, in turn, been objectified 
into quantitative indices. They therefore aim at the discovery 
of the pertinent empirical laws of relations. Knowledge claims
in each case are justified by appeal to the appropriate standards of empirical research which in turn depend on the success of operations.

**Decision Making Models**

Evaluations are conducted to provide administrators with useful information for judging decision alternatives including accountability decisions. An evaluation generally addresses a complete educational program and can focus on the program's goals, its development, process or results. The formal theoretical foundation for these models is based on synoptic decision alternatives, complete delineation of criteria on which the alternatives are to be judged, and complete assessment of each alternative on each criterion. In practice, however, the evaluations tend to be less formal.

The evaluation consists in clarifying decision alternatives, delineating the information needed, obtaining this information and applying it to the decision tasks. The information required will generally be different for each stage or aspect of the program being evaluated. Some frequent examples are needs assessments, questionnaires, interviews and criterion referenced tests. Panel visits, advocate teams and PERT analysis are also sometimes used. The important consideration is to obtain that information which is both feasible and useful in making the required decisions. Information is considered to represent a factual claim and is expected to meet scientific criteria of internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity. However, traditional causal comparative experimental designs are considered to have limited applicability. Value judgements are based on empirical evidence of anticipated results or of conditions that support a particular course of action.

**Goal Free Models**

Goal free evaluations usually address particular products or programs which are sponsored by private or public funding agencies and then developed by an intermediate group of institution for public consumption. Evaluations are initiated by sponsors strictly for the benefit of consumers of these programs. Goal free evaluations, whether formative or summative, focus exclusively on results or effects with no consideration given to the program goals or intentions so as to escape co-option and other difficulties usually encountered in goal statements such as grandiose overstatement or vagueness and incompleteness. This model is analogous to the approach used by the Consumer's Union or Ralph Nader.

The evaluation task is to discover the positive and negative effects of the program and compare these with competitors against a profile of demonstrated needs. Needs assessments can
provide the positive standard for judging the program. The information gained for this comparison is usually quantitative and must meet criteria of scientific validity and reliability. The identified needs are then treated as ends which the program should lead to more efficiently than its competitors to receive a favorable judgment. An instrumental model is assumed by the inquiry which seeks to relate the intervention and a set of desirable effects discerned by the evaluator. Through experimental or "modus operandi" methods a causal relationship is sought. The modus operandi procedure, used by detectives, historians and anthropologists, establishes a configuration or "MO" of events from the "trail" left by the object that can be pieced together to build a "case" connecting a cause with an effect.

This model cannot be completely reduced to the empirical form. Qualitative analysis and description are also important in the search for positive and negative effects. Since objectivity is not defined as intersubjective reliability in this framework, "it is possible for a single observer, unaided by any psychometric instrument, to be more objective than a battalion of observers loaded with reliable instruments,"4 provided there is sufficient control of bias. The most important considerations are that the evaluation be guided by consumer interests and that irrelevant interests and other sources of error and bias be adequately controlled. Empirical evidence and rational argument are combined to build a case linking a program to its effects. The merit of the program is expressed in an overall summative judgment that ranks it against its competitors in terms of consumer needs.

Art Criticism Models

Drawing on the traditions of art and literary criticism, Elliot Eisner has proposed a "connoisseurship" model of evaluation. This approach aims at helping "teachers and others in education learn to see and think about what they do."5 Connoisseurship is the art of perception that makes it possible to appreciate complex qualities and their relationships and to judge them against highly developed and sensitive standards. Such judgment requires a profound understanding and familiarity with the phenomena involved and with the standards of the tradition it represents. "If connoisseurship is the art of appreciation" says Eisner, "then criticism is the art of disclosure . . . . the critic aims at providing a rendering in linguistic terms of what it is that he or she has encountered in such a way that others not possessing his level of connoisseurship can also enter into the work."6

In the classroom, criticism is the art of capturing what it is that is happening, the meaning and significance of actions in their cultural matrix. Criticism is itself judged on the
basis of its referential adequacy. The critic's audience should be able to see in the event what it is the critic has discovered and described. Another criterion is coherence: the critic's portrayal should organize the events in question into a unified configuration that is clearly significant relative to the purposes for the critique. The audience should have a kind of "ah ha" experience as insight develops and a pattern falls into place. Disputes are settled through argument in reference to traditional standards.

**Professional Judgment Models**

Many professions have developed procedures to insure the quality of their own programs and individual members. Qualified experts are called to make judgments about a particular activity or even an entire college. Examples include site visits to review federally funded programs, doctoral oral examinations, and accreditation agencies such as the North Central Association. Some explicit standards of judgement are developed through collective interaction of highly qualified and experienced professionals. The evaluation usually centers around these standards but in order to capitalize on the reviewers' expertise, much room is left to the tacit standards involved in making a wholistic qualitative assessment against the tradition of the profession. Quality control is addressed by using multiple reviewers, traditionally established standards and employing professionals of recognized competence. The evaluation process is carried out in direct interaction with those under review permitting judgements to be corrected through two-way communication. Procedures for appeal are made explicit. Professional judgment models of evaluation exemplify a general process of practical deliberation in which no form of specialized inquiry tends to predominate.

**Adversary Models**

This approach uses quasi-legal procedures to present the pros and cons of a proposed course of action, or to compare alternative courses of action. Modeled on the form of an administrative hearing, advocates for opposing points of view present evidence, testimony and arguments to develop the best possible case from the perspective they represent. Bias is assumed and controlled by the adversary process where each side emphasizes the strengths of its own position and carefully notes and exploits weaknesses in the opponents position. The audience or decision makers are then left to choose or judge for themselves.

Adversary evaluation represents a form of practical deliberation in which participants are partitioned into separate interest groups of equal power in relation to the issue being considered.
A decision is made through negotiation. The rationale of the model is not committed to any particular form of inquiry.

**Transaction Models**

What distinguishes these evaluation models is that they tend to be more responsive to the actual concerns and issues of all groups legitimately involved in the activity considered. Neither preconceived standards of science or tradition are used in the evaluation. Instead only those standards, values and interests actually held by the participants are represented. Evaluation compares the entire constellation of values actually perceived in the program with the whole complex of expectations and standards actually held by all groups legitimately involved. The methods of investigation are chosen by their usefulness in obtaining information about these perceptions and expectations for the program and to facilitate their comparison. There is much interaction between the various groups and between them and the evaluator. The evaluator depends heavily on informal case studies, observation and negotiation to arrive at an overall assessment.

Transactional models of evaluation tend to downplay formal inquiry processes of any kind. In principle however, any form of inquiry may be found to be appropriate in a particular context. The overall process is one of practical deliberation in which validity claims are justified in many different ways according to the context.

In summary, two of the three forms of inquiry identified by Habermas find some utilization in prevailing evaluation models. By far the most pervasive in actual use has been the empirical-analytic form of inquiry. Two models, systems analysis and goal-based approaches, are strictly modeled on the logic of empirical inquiry. A case could probably be made that for a time it was considered the only form of scientific inquiry.

While it has not found widespread use in evaluation, hermeneutic inquiry has come to be recognized as a viable method in the social sciences. The art criticism model of evaluation comes closest to a form of hermeneutic inquiry. Perhaps it should not, as Eisner suggests, be regarded as scientific inquiry. But there are analogs to his proposal which though similar are still considered to be methods of scientific inquiry. Take, for example, naturalistic inquiry and ethnomethodology.

More significantly, the evaluation models we considered make little use of anything like critical inquiry in Habermas' sense of the term. Those models that set evaluation in the
context of practical deliberation are not inconsistent however, with critical inquiry. I would argue that the very possibility of practical deliberations presupposes that certain conditions obtain and that only critical inquiry can address these conditions. We return now to the role of critical inquiry in practical deliberations.

IV
Evaluation and Practical Deliberation

Evaluation in education can take place on many levels, from the classroom to national programs. It can formally and informally serve many different purposes in a wide variety of contexts. But in all cases it is a social process which affects the values, norms and standards that orient people's lives. The term "evaluation" frequently refers to a technical process of ascertaining the value of an activity, by assessing its goals, process and effects against a standard. But even such formal studies can only support a particular decision or course of action. The decision must still be made through argumentation and deliberation by those involved or responsible. We can distinguish such technical evaluations from the process of practical deliberation. More specialized and technical studies can aid practical deliberations in various ways. In the second part of this section, I want to consider what empirical, hermeneutic and critical inquiry can each contribute to practical deliberations. We will be able to grasp their contribution more easily however, if we better understand the process of practical deliberation itself.

Practical Deliberation

To recapitulate, I suggest that evaluation is a normative social process which contributes to the establishment and regulation of community norms. Norms and standards are created and maintained, and particular courses of action are chosen through a process of practical deliberation among the individuals involved or responsible. In practical deliberations, conflicting perspectives are brought together as participants attempt to form their individual concerns and interests into a common orientation that they believe will reflect the interests of their group or the larger community. But in order for the outcome of practical deliberation to reflect the interests of the community, and not some systematic distortion of these interests, certain conditions of open communication must be met. In his theory of communicative competence, Habermas derives these conditions from the structure of ordinary language. From this theory I think we can give a more formal characterization of practical deliberation. Let us now turn to that theory.
Ordinary language has a structure which allows us to form expressions that focus on any of the three experiential domains we identified in section one. These include an objective external nature, a normative social reality and our own subjective internal reality. When we want to focus on external nature, we emphasize the propositional content of expressions. For example, we make statements about objects or states of affairs in the world. This defines the cognitive or descriptive use of language. Besides the propositional component of language expressions, there is also an illocutionary or performative component by means of which we accomplish things in relation to each other. We establish and regulate interpersonal relationships through the performative component, as when we make promises, give orders or make assertions. When we want to focus on our normative social reality we emphasize the performative component of expressions. This defines the interactive, or prescriptive use of language. When we want to focus on our own subjective experience we emphasize neither the propositional content nor interpersonal relationships, but instead we emphasize our own intentions. This defines the expressive use of language.

These three modes of communication are always at least tacitly involved in any expression. Their importance is not so much in serving as a classification scheme for expressions. Rather, they delineate three classes of speech acts in terms of which a speaker can unambiguously focus on a particular experiential domain. That is, the speaker can state a propositional content, stress an interpersonal relationship or express an intention. Each class of expressions presupposes a specific kind of validity claim. A proposition expresses a truth claim. A performative expression implies a normative claim, that is, the rightness or legitimacy of the interpersonal relationship established with respect to mutually acknowledged norms. Finally, self-representative expressions make a claim to the veracity of the speaker. These validity claims are simultaneously presupposed in ordinary language interaction. Otherwise there would be no basis for attempting communication. But, on occasion, a given validity claim may become problematic, requiring a special kind of discourse.

Habermas suggests three stages in the development to communicative competence which culminate in the speakers ability to separate speech from its normal action and experiential context. This separation allows the speaker to engage in discourse marginally free from the constraints of action and experience so that validity claims can be considered hypothetically. When truth or normative claims are questioned there is a break in the normal context of communication and a transition to argumentative discourse. For Habermas discursive justification of validity claims is a normative concept which implicitly refers to conditions which must be met if validity claims are to be
settled in a rationally justified consensus.

Initiating a process of discourse assumes that genuine agreement is possible. In discourse the questionable validity claim is bracketed and becomes the sole topic of discussion. All motives are excluded except for the cooperative resolution of the problematic claim. The outcome of deliberation must be the result solely of the force of the better argument and not the result of any distortions from systematic constraints on communication. The absence of systematic constraint can be formally characterized in terms of the structure of ordinary language that permits expressions of the three experiential domains. That is, in discourse there must be a symmetrical distribution among participants of opportunities to represent their experience in any domain. Specifically, they first must have equal chances to assert and dispute propositions and to argue for or against their validity with explanations, interpretations and justifications. Second, they must have equal opportunity to prescribe norms, and to conform to or resist them or question their legitimacy. Finally, they must be equally free to express their own intentions, attitudes and feelings, and to question the veracity of others self-representative expressions. As long as these symmetries exist we have the conditions for a pure intersubjectivity and communication will not be distorted by any systematic constraints arising from its own structure.

The Role of Specialized Inquiry in Practical Deliberations

Within the larger framework of practical deliberation the specialized forms of inquiry; empirical, hermeneutic and critical, can each make a particular contribution. With respect to logic of inquiry, each form of inquiry centers around a particular validity claim. That is, empirical inquiry is directed at problematic truth claims, while hermeneutic inquiry addresses problematic normative claims. Normative validity claims are generally the major issue in educational evaluation. Finally, critical inquiry addresses veracity claims, that is, the authenticity of self-representations of intentions, motives, and interests. Critical inquiry would generally focus on the conditions for the possibility of authentic self expression.

Critical Inquiry

Practical deliberation concerning normative validity claims, assumes that the linguistically expressed intentions of speakers can, in principle at least, correspond to their true motives and interests. When the true needs and interests cannot be expressed because they have been psychologically or ideologically
repressed under the influence of an imbalance in power relations, then deliberations will depart from the ideal speech situation with a corresponding deformity in intersubjectivity. This means that the interests, motives and goals in some members of the educational community can not be adequately reflected in the deliberation process and in the formation of community standards and norms. The importance of this can hardly be over estimated. Several of the evaluation models we considered presuppose and depend on the possibility that the needs and values of people in the community can be known and represented in the evaluation process. But when the possibility for symmetrical self-expression is inhibited as described above, then attempts at clarification of value perspectives may only serve to further supress the interests of less powerful constituencies. There is a certain protection that comes from remaining vague and operating so to speak in the shadows, either consciously or unconsciously. To the extent that there is distortion due to systematic constraints in the communication, to the extent self-representation is inhibited and decisions cannot reflect the rational will of the community.

Critical inquiry focuses on the identification of distorted communication and its sources and on its transformation into open communication. It is a self-healing process that aims at freeing interaction from unconscious domination of selective interests in the form of rationalization and ideology. It aims at establishing the conditions that allow for the formation of a community of autonomous and responsible beings, of individuals who can create and freely participate in norms to guide their conduct. It aims at enlightened action, action animated with shared purpose and the ethical significance of mutually created and mutually maintained norms that can truly address the welfare of the community.

Empirical inquiry also claims a critical function by releas- ing us from normative claims based on theories that can be shown to have no basis in fact. But while this is a valuable critical function, it is also a very limited one. For we have seen that empirical inquiry discloses reality from the point of view of the technical control of natural processes. When empirical criteria are used in the normative selection of courses of action then the implicit standard is the facilitation of instrumental action. This standard is implicit because efficiency and economy in the selection of means to valued ends seem almost a defining characteristic of rationality itself. But then, practical ques- tions that cannot be framed in terms of technical problems cannot be taken seriously. With its strict separation of descriptive and normative domains, empirical inquiry can neither acknowledge its standard of instrumental efficiency nor reach into the practical arena to guide the selection of ends or values that guide and orient action. Action orientation is provided through traditional interpretations formed through practical deliberation.
When empirical inquiry refutes the claim of a traditional interpretation, it cannot itself fill the orienting role of the refuted idea because the logic of its method does not aim at the generation of normative or action orienting knowledge. The relation of empirical knowledge to practice must necessarily come from outside the inquiry process itself. Emotivism, non-cognitivism and other systems of ethics consist with positivistic conceptions of inquiry reduce norms to decisions which cannot be rationally justified. Empirical inquiry serves only to limit the domain of possible decisions: when technological rationality is brought to bear, then rational consideration is limited to the domain of empirical knowledge. We are limited to goals for which inquiry can provide appropriate technologies. However, even where appropriate technology exists there are frequently many routes to a given end. The logic of empirical inquiry can only analyze alternative means in terms of their instrumental efficiency. If standards have not been identified, or are found to be in conflict, then a technological rationality resorts to needs assessments and other methods for identifying values and resolving conflicts through summation and averaging. The values themselves are considered to be fundamentally and irrationally given, to be measured and pooled and used as a basis for decision making.

A case in point was the process recently used by our own faculty to choose a name for itself. This process consisted of use of the Delphi technique in which individuals rated a list of proposed names and added comments and additional names. The results were tallied and recirculated through several cycles. The process finally yielded a rank ordered list of names that supposedly reflected the preferences of the members of the faculty. Presented with the name at the top, one member observed, "Now that just isn't the kind of name I thought we would have come up with to name our faculty," and a process of deliberation was initiated which resulted in the choice of a different name. Such practical deliberation allows those involved to form rationally their individual and sometimes conflicting interests into a common interest that expresses the will of the group. Norms are reinforced and built in this process. Individuals linked together through such norms have created a mutual understanding that guides their conduct in relation to each other across a variety of situations. More is gained than just the name of the faculty. An intersubjectivity is created that transforms individuals with conflicting perspectives into community. Their actions acquire coherence, purpose and ethical significance in relation to each other.

Conclusion

I believe that Habermas' social theory of knowledge and his theory of communicative competence can provide an important
framework for expanding evaluation beyond its narrow preoccupation with empirical inquiry. It provides a way to fit specialized inquiry processes within a larger framework of practical deliberation. Empirical inquiry can provide us with knowledge of patterns in the natural world that we can use to achieve human purposes. But over-reliance on empirical understanding tends to substitute technology for enlightened action. Hermeneutic inquiry can provide us with interpretations that enlarge our frame of reference, orient our actions with respect to each other and bind us into community. But over-reliance on hermeneutic understanding tends to substitute tradition for enlightened action. Only critical inquiry can free us from ideologically frozen relations of dependance so that the dialog of autonomous and responsible human beings can take place.
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CAN LIMITATIONS ON STUDENT FREEDOM BE JUSTIFIED

David Tankard
Wayne State University

Recent years have seen the growth of several freedom and liberation movements both in and beyond the United States. In harmony with this trend there has been much agitation for increased freedom for students. Indeed, so pervasive and popular has been the bias of our culture in recent years in favor of freedom that such books as John Holt's Freedom and Beyond and Carl Rogers's Freedom to Learn occupy prominent places on the shelves of commercial bookstores, while books urging restriction of the freedom of students and youth are much less in evidence. If one of the functions of philosophy is to examine prevailing assumptions, then this is an opportune time to ask what sorts of limitations on student freedom can be justified.

Examination of this question must be preceded by agreement on the meaning of freedom. It will come as no surprise to an assembly of philosophers that this agreement is hard to come by. It seems that freedom has one meaning in ordinary language and various other meanings when used by philosophers.

If anyone were to inform us baldly that he is free, we would sense his communication to be incomplete. In this respect the statement "Jones is free" is quite different from the statement "Jones is six feet tall," for whereas the latter statement is complete and meaningful, the former is elliptical and obscure. In order to understand "Jones is free," we would want to know the context, for instance, whether he had been dragged out of a quagmire or interred in his tomb. In general, if anyone claims that he is free, we cannot fully understand him until we know what he is free from and what he wants his freedom for. Claims of freedom in full dress are of the form "X is free from Y for Z." That is, they presuppose a subject (X) with a desire (Z) which is obstructed by a constraint (Y). Interpreted in accordance with this analysis, the question under investigation is whether educators can be justified in preventing students from doing what they want to do.
Some philosophers have objected to this conception of freedom, not because they consider it to be an inaccurate analysis of the meaning of the word 'freedom' as it is ordinarily used, but because they believe that philosophic discussions of freedom are more enlightening if 'freedom' is understood in a different sense. As distinct from a concept of "ordinary" freedom they prefer a concept of "real" or "rational" or "true" freedom. At the risk of oversimplification it may be said that they object to the notion that a student is free when he is not constrained from doing what he wants; instead they contend that he is free when he is not constrained from doing what he ought to do. In support of their conception they point out—quite correctly—that the word 'freedom' has a commendatory force. How can the freedom of students be something commendable, they then ask, if their freedom is nothing more than their being permitted to do what they want, which may be anything but commendable?

The fallacies in this argument stem from two mistaken assumptions. First, it assumes that freedom is commendable under all conditions. To assume this, however, is to beg the question at issue. Moreover, it does not follow from the fact that the word 'freedom' has a prescriptive force that people are free only when they are acting as they ought to act. For it may be that the prescriptive force of 'freedom' indicates only a prima facie warrant for not interfering with people's freedom. Second, the argument assumes that what people want has little or no relation to what is good for them. While it may be readily acknowledged, however, that people sometimes do not know, and sometimes do not think they want, what is good for them, it is surely a mistake to try to sever the connection between people's wants and their best interests. Whatever is good for man is not to be found among the things that men feel indifferent or hostile towards. The satisfactory must be sifted from what is satisfying, and the desirable must be winnowed from what is desired.

Since it appears that there are not tenable grounds for defining 'freedom' as being unconstrained from doing what one ought to do, this definition will not be adopted. 'Freedom' will then be used in its ordinary sense of being unconstrained from doing what one wants to do.

On this interpretation of freedom, our question is whether educators are ever justified in preventing students from doing what they want to do. Notice that this way of putting the question presumes that the onus of justification lies with those who would limit rather than extend freedom. In view of the laudatory bias of the meaning of 'freedom' mentioned previously, a bias prevalent in our culture and no doubt shared by this group, it is natural that a presumption should be made in favor of freedom. However, the presumption is not just a concession
to the weight of opinion, for there are powerful reasons supporting it. If little space is devoted to them here, that is not because there is little to be said on freedom's behalf, but because its value has been so widely accepted that to argue for it at length would be redundant. Suffice it to say that freedom is necessary for the full development of the individual and society, since this development can occur only if there is the opportunity for people to make and be responsible for significant and authentic choices. Further, it can be persuasively argued that both moral action and rational deliberation presuppose freedom, and that there are good reasons for valuing both of these.

Assuming it is agreed that there should be a presumption in its favor, is it possible to justify limits upon or exceptions to freedom? One approach to this problem has been to make much of a distinction between liberty and license. Warranted freedom is referred to as liberty, unwarranted freedom as license. An educator who has relied heavily on this distinction is A. S. Neill, the late founder and headmaster of Summerhill. Unfortunately, however, the distinction is of no help in enabling one to decide whether or not to interfere with a person's freedom of action, for labelling uses of freedom as acceptable or unacceptable is no substitute for presenting and defending criteria by which they can be distinguished. To rely on the designations 'liberty' and 'license' to guide one in deciding whether to permit freedom is analogous to depending on the designations 'white lie' and 'black lie' to guide one in deciding whether to tell a lie, and it is equally irrelevant.

A second approach paradoxically seeks to justify constraint by appealing to freedom. As a criterion for determining whether a specific freedom is justifiable it offers the principle that any freedom is permissible provided that it does not limit another freedom. One objection to this principle is that it is too restrictive, since every freedom limits some other freedom. For example, if Smith is free to talk to Jones or shake his hand, then Jones is not free to refuse to be talked to or have his hand shaken by Smith. This objection, however, overlooks the fact that the freedom of both persons can be preserved on condition that one of them voluntarily accedes to the other's wishes.

Although the objection does not invalidate the principle—that any freedom is permissible provided that it does not limit another freedom—it does raise the problem of determining which of two conflicting freedoms should have priority, and the principle provides no criteria for solving this inescapable problem. The principle's fundamental defect is that it implies the rejection of all values other than freedom. No matter how evil the consequences that may result from unrestricted freedom, those evils are regarded as counting for nothing when weighted against a diminution of freedom, no matter how slight. It implicitly condemns those who subscribe to it to live in a world devoid of all
values except one. Furthermore, it even undermines the very value it appears to support, for freedom lacks any point if there is nothing of value anyone would wish to be free to do or to become. Moreover, in the absence of any values other than freedom it would be impossible to exercise the freedom to choose, since any choice must be based on some value. Also it implicitly denies that there is only a presumption in favor of freedom, for any presumption in favor of one value presupposes the existence of at least one other value. For these reasons it appears that any attempt to live by this principle would be mired in anomalies and paradoxes that would defy resolution.

If the two approaches discussed so far do not justify limits on freedom, are any other approaches more promising? The basic weakness of the last approach is the latent assumption that freedom is the only value. Far from being the only value, freedom acquires its value through its relationship to other values, for the worth of freedom consists in its being a condition of or opportunity for the creation of value. Rather than being a value sufficient unto itself, it is a gateway to value. And as its value stems from its instrumental relationship to other values, so it may be justifiably curtailed if it impedes their realization. An acceptable approach to the justification of limits on freedom should then proceed by a careful weighing of the advantages and disadvantages expected to result from any specific authorization or restriction of freedom.

If this strategy is acceptable, the next step is to apply it to student freedom. What are some of the principal advantages and disadvantages of permitting students to be free? In addition to advantages specific to particular freedoms, the general advantages of freedom for students are the same as those already identified as supporting a presumption in its favor. Stated with the utmost brevity, these are the dignity of being treated as moral and rational beings and the opportunity for growth through making responsible choices.

Before we inquire into the disadvantages of student freedom, it is necessary to define what we mean by 'student freedom.' A student is, of course, a person, a citizen, a member of various social groups, and in all of these capacities he has certain obligations and is entitled to certain freedoms. With a single exception, none of these obligations or freedoms will be discussed here. The exception is the freedom to which he is entitled in his capacity as a student, that is, a learner in a school whose function is to educate him. It is recognized that schools have functions other than education and that a student has purposes and roles besides that of being a learner whom the school proposes to educate. Nevertheless, it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to explore the disadvantages of student freedom in the context of these functions, purposes, and roles.
Although this study must focus on the disadvantages of student freedom in relation to education alone, it should be recognized that there is a wide range of values other than education with which the value of student freedom may conflict and for the sake of which it may be justifiable to restrict such freedom. For example, compulsory schooling can be defended on the grounds that it promotes equality of opportunity and a more cohesive society as well as that it produces a more educated populace. Likewise, attempts to exclude weapons, dangerous drugs, and unauthorized persons from school premises serve other purposes besides that of education. Although such purposes and the values implicit in them cannot be extensively exemplified or categorized here, the multiplicity of schools' responsibilities for the safety and welfare of their student bodies indicate that the range of values involved is wide indeed.

To concentrate on the benefits of education instead of other values as reasons for restricting student freedom may seem to be a device for admitting some of these other values through the back door. This view, however, seems plausible because education is so often viewed as potentially useful for increasing the productivity of our economic system, raising the ethical standards of our public officials, promoting social mobility, and so on, that it is easy to conclude that its sole function is to serve a broad range of social goals. Such an instrumental view of education is especially tenacious because, even if the conception of education as being merely an instrument of public policy is dropped, education may still be viewed as a means of acquiring a desirable fund of knowledge, skills, dispositions, and so on. Both of these conceptions of education are, however, incomplete. Knowledge, skill, and the dispositions to use them well, are not only means to be used in the service of ends other than education, they are also valuable in that they enhance the person possessing them. The educated man is not just the licensed or certificate man—though education may qualify him for a license or certificate. Essentially, he is a man whose living is illumined by certain prized and learned qualities. In short, education is an intrinsic value, to be ranked with other values important enough to override the presumption in favor of freedom.

The need to limit the freedom of students for the sake of their education may arise either in the course of establishing conditions favorable to education or in the process of education itself. Among the conditions most necessary for effective education in schools is order. It is not usually necessary or desirable for the classroom to be as solemn or decorous as a funeral service, but purposefulness and organization are equally necessary in both. The most successful teacher leads his students to a voluntary commitment to the goals and methods of education, so that his students learn to "order" themselves
instead of being the reluctant objects of externally imposed order. Nevertheless, whether order is generated voluntarily or compulsorily, the freedom to be disorderly cannot be sanctioned if education is to proceed.

The process of education, as distinct from the conditions that facilitate it, may also require that the freedom of students be controlled. Schools should make provision for electives so that students can fashion their curricula according to their goals, aptitudes, and interests; and teachers should provide opportunity for students to assist in planning their educations. Nevertheless, the final authority and responsibility for selecting a curriculum, objectives, and methods of education should remain with professional educators and the elected representatives of the public. Hence, the right to limit the freedom of students in these matters should be vested with these authorities.

In the space remaining I cannot attempt to offer a comprehensive defense of the claims just made, but I can respond to one important objection. This objection is based on the doctrine that students should not be required to study any subject matter that does not interest them. If this premise were accepted, and if it were assumed that students want to study what interests them, then it would follow that students should be free to study whatever they want. Probably none of us would deny that teachers are well advised to capitalize on the interests of students. Not only would a teacher who ignores this precept in today's classrooms probably experience more than the usual difficulty in obtaining student cooperation, but we would consider him misguided even to try. For there are good reasons for teachers to pay attention to students' interests. In the first place, a student gains satisfaction from following his interests, and this in itself is worthy of respect. Secondly, a student's satisfaction encourages him to pursue his interests, and thus motivates him to learn more. Finally, a skillful teacher can work to broaden and deepen a student's interests so that his learning is enriched in quality as well as quantity.

Granted that a teacher should make good use of students' interests, there are nonetheless some questionable assumptions in the previously-stated premises—that purportedly entail the conclusion that students should be free to study whatever they want. To begin with, the premise that students want to study what interests them is not as obviously true as it appears. Some students want to do only what is immediately and continuously gratifying. To be interested in a discipline, however, is to seek to acquire certain competencies and dispositions, and the process of acquiring them cannot be guaranteed to be immediately and continuously gratifying. Indeed, a passionate interest in reaching a goal is compatible with experiencing frustration and boredom at certain stages on the way to that goal. A weak and faltering interest by comparison is even more likely to be side-
tracked by periodic distractions. Therefore, a teacher who helps a student get through the deadspots of learning by requiring him to apply himself may be acting in accord with the student's perceived interests but contrary to his temporary desires.

There are flaws too in the premise that students should not be required to study any subject matter that does not interest them. For some students interested in learning is so lacking in intensity, narrow in scope, and sporadic, that teachers have to focus more on "catching" and "sparking" their interest than on exploiting whatever interest is already operative. Even when working with "eager beavers" teachers need to be on the alert for opportunities to arouse fresh interests and rekindle earlier enthusiasms. In such cases teachers should be free to introduce or re-introduce subject matter that their students have never been or are not currently interested in; and this constitutes an important exception to the premise under consideration.

Is the premise sound when qualified by the exception just introduced? Should no person be required to study any subject matter that still does not interest him after a skillful teacher has had sufficient opportunity to initiate him into its mysteries and delights? It is noteworthy that many people do not impose such restrictions on themselves. Many a parent has believed it to be his duty to learn to play children's games so that he can play with his children even though he may find the games themselves rather tedious. It is not uncommon for a teacher to study a subject that has no appeal for him because there are openings to teach that subject but no openings to teach a subject he prefers. In these and countless similar examples one could cite, people do not shrink from "requiring themselves" to study subjects that do not interest them. Admittedly, some fail to achieve a desired level of competence. Moreover, those who do succeed encounter greater internal resistance to learning than do those who have a natural affinity for the subject. Nevertheless, many do experience success and suffer no continuing handicap as a result of having faced and overcome resistance. Indeed, there are likely to be as many whose resolve is strengthened by success as are discouraged by failure in the face of natural disinclination. Such considerations as these point to the conclusion that there are no compelling reasons why a normal person should not study in an uncongenial field if he has good reasons for wanting to become competent in it.

Up to this point it has been assumed that the decision to study an uninteresting subject is a voluntary one. Now we must ask whether compulsory study of uninteresting subject matter can be justified. Because individual differences among learners probably have a significant bearing on this question, there is reason to be more than usually hesitant about making sweeping
pronouncements about it. Beyond such individual variations, however, there are certain general considerations which may justify compulsory learning. Learning that does not interest a student may nonetheless contribute to that student's welfare. This is possible because interest is a function of subjective conditions whereas welfare is a function of both subjective and objective conditions. The truth of this point is most obvious in the case of a student who is interested in a harmful or trivial activity. However, it is also true in the case of a student who is drawn to an activity that would be objectively worthwhile in another place or at another time but has only subjective value under existing conditions. For example, while there is nothing inherently harmful or trivial about an interest in learning to construct log cabins, such a study may lack objective value for an Eskimo child. In such cases the difference between merely subjective value on the one hand and value based on both subjective and objective conditions on the other may be expressed by the distinction between what is interesting to a person and what is in his best interest. If it is in a student's best interest to study subject matter that does not interest him, then it may be justifiable to compel him to do so.

While there are dangers in such compulsion, these dangers may be minimized so that little or no harm to the student results. One of these dangers is that he will develop a displaced antipathy for the required subject. Another is that he will develop an irrational distrust of authority. Yet another—especially for an older student—is that he will lose confidence in his own judgment and sense of autonomy. Notice, however, that these are dangers rather than unavoidable effects, for the risk of harm to a student may be averted by school authorities who succeed in winning his consent to learn. Now it may be objected that learning which is consented to is not compulsory. Much learning is done, however, not because a learner chooses to do it on his own initiative but because he accepts the authority of a teacher who insists that he learn it. In the latter case the learner may quite cheerfully say something like "I'll learn it only if I have to." If a student accepts his teacher's authority, and if his teacher uses his authority in his student's best interest, then compulsion need result in no harm to the student. If a teacher demands that a student learn what is in his best interest but the student refuses to accept the teacher's authority, then the risk of harm to the student resulting from compulsion may or may not outweigh the benefit to be gained from the learning. The solution of this dilemma requires the assessment of numerous variables, such as the student's maturity and his interests, aptitudes, and aspirations, the nature of the subject matter to be learned, and the needs of the society; and although the philosopher of education may have something to say about the relative importance of these variables, he can offer no pronouncements to obviate the need for careful assessment.
The foregoing examination of the thesis that students should be free to study whatever they want reveals that it cannot be defended by reference to the doctrine of teaching students in accordance with their interests. Unless other more cogent objections are forthcoming, we may reiterate the conclusion that a presumption in favor of student freedom may be justifiably superseded whenever the benefits of student freedom are outweighed by benefits stemming from other values, notably including education, with which student freedom conflicts.
LATENT HEGELIANISM: THE ROOTS OF CONSERVATISM

IN JOHN DEWEY

Marianne Seemann Glazek
Wayne State University

In a previous study* I have argued that Hegelianism, which once dominated educational philosophy in this country, is inherently autocratic and therefore at odds with the democratic ideals which we expect our schools to institutionalize and so perpetuate through the education of our youth. Hegel's metaphysics, which is his dialectic, conceals the conservative and reactionary character of his philosophy of law and state.

In this paper I examine Dewey's Hegelian roots and point out that because of this background he is a tempting target for revisionist criticism. I also examine his concept of holism and suggest that Dewey's search for organic relationships which embrace all partial activities, place him among the pioneers of today's social scientists with their emphasis on the "system model."

There is great confusion in the world of Hegelian scholarship. Eminent scholars clash over Hegel's political roots, some arguing his conservatism, others his liberalism, without bothering to define these ambiguous labels. Similarly, contrasting views about Dewey's place in the political spectrum arise periodically among educational theorists. On one hand, Dewey is viewed as a radical who believes in socialism and whose efforts towards greater equality of education are "somehow loose, sloppy and dangerous without moral fibre." On the other hand, he is accused of being totalitarian, an instrument of irreligion. I submit that these opposing views issue from the ambivalence in Dewey's thought that derives from the contradiction between his subscription to the more or less rigid system of Hegelian idealism on one hand and his faith in the democratic ideal of the liberation of the individual through growth on the other hand. As a result of his ambivalence,

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*This paper is a summary of sections of my dissertation with the title "Hegel's Influence on the Social and Educational Theory of John Dewey", Wayne State University, 1978. It is by no means complete in itself. Some of my apparently unsupported points are developed in the various chapters of the dissertation.
Dewey's theories have been blamed for the sorry state of the educational system in our country by the progressives as well as by the so-called educational fundamentalists.\(^2\)

Revisionist historiography points an accusing finger at Dewey and the other pragmatic liberals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, accusing them of contributing to the maintenance of the capitalist system in this country by using the schools as a vehicle for economic and political control. The revisionist position which maintains that the pragmatist liberals helped to perpetuate the status quo and thereby strengthened and capitalist corporate state, is based on the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. History is meaningful only in terms of the values and the structure of the present, and according to Clarence J. Karier, the historian is "ultimately judged by the meaning achieved in the present."\(^3\)

But this argument which makes the liberal humanitarians responsible for the fact that American society has basically not changed since 1898 is just as absurd as if one would blame Aristotle because Galileo was forced to recant in seventeenth century Italy.

Dewey's view of history is a variation on the Hegelian theme that all history is a history of thought: Empirical events constitute the outward expression of those thoughts which form a logically connected chain of concepts. History, as life itself is a kind of experiment, is an experiment which reveals how something "came to be what it is."\(^4\) Dewey would agree with the revisionists that "the true starting point of history is always some present situation with its problems," but he past and present form one integral whole whereby the "past is a key to understanding the present."\(^5\) This does not mean that we can ignore the change in context and social situations and apply today's standards to events long past.

The oft-raised accusation that Dewey had no respect for history is based on ignorance of his most basic category—that of "continuity." It includes his concept of holism as applied to the present and the past. He himself points out the importance of his concept for his philosophy when he insists that anybody with a "sane mind" would have to admit that ". . . upon the hypothesis of continuity the . . . social . . . furnishes philosophically the inclusive category." Continuity thus replaces in Dewey's philosophy the Absolute of Hegel, as he himself states that continuity "cannot be denied without self-contradiction."\(^6\) Continuity implies movement or process and is at the core of all of Dewey's teachings. Similarly, unity in Hegel's thought is not "immediate," not ready-made, but involves a process by which differences are overcome and oppositions are transformed into agreement. This applies to thought, as well as to the stages of philosophy, whose history is its own process. For Hegel, as later for Dewey,
the sequence of events not only must be temporal, but logical
and, moreover, the logical explanation of historical events
is identical with their moral justification. The realm of
the rational is also the realm of the moral in world history.
Dewey applies to the changing world of science an historical
thinking which does not constitute a mere chronological succe-
sion but displays the characteristics of growth or development.
A science not only has a history, but it is its own continuous
self-expanding, self-correcting history. In order to make
history intelligible, man has to make it an object of his ex-
perience, a part of his practical activity. Experience is an
experience of the environment, which is an existential whole
in Dewey's philosophy, and is the basis of his theory of reality.
Experience, according to Herbert Marcuse, "saturates even Hegel's
most abstract and metaphysical concepts." For Dewey, as well
as for Hegel, reality is neither timeless nor universal but is
derived from contemporary experience, the result of the process
of existence. In order to make history intelligible, man has
to make it an object of his experience, a part of his practical
activity. Dewey's vision of history is the basis of his new
and unorthodox logic and is diagonally opposed to the revision-
ist approach of historical scholarship. Dewey's logic, re-
volutionary as Hegel's was in his time, is a means of effective
inquiry. That means intelligent inquiry into the interaction
of antecedent conditions with anticipated events which produce
new results and thus makes choices possible. The history of
science, which is science itself, thus establishes the continuum
between the "is" and the "ought," between science and value.

Dewey's Hegelian past thus accounts for his aversion to
disruption and disorder. His basic category of continuity
could not justify any wild leaps or abrupt changes. As the
revisionists so rightly observe, Dewey was no advocate of
violence or revolution. Democracy was for him a result of an
evolutionary process, a product of the past and a past in re-
lation to the future. Insistence on wholeness became almost
a fetish in Dewey's thought, a virtual religious system which
rendered holism holy. He is blamed for making the holistic
category into an abstract metaphysical concept and applying it
to the totality of experience. Thus, this category becomes
Hegel's objective Spirit, void of any single individual and
no human agency to sustain it.

Dewey, like Hegel, was a child of his time and his theories
reflect the intellectual landscape of his time. A strain of
idealism has been vital to American consciousness since the
time of the first settlers and is as discernible in Lockean sensationalism and Scottish common-sense philosophy as in
twentieth century pragmatism. Though largely forgotten and
ignored today, the St. Louis movement (1868-1885) in philoso-
phy, psychology, literature, art and education became an
important component of the intellectual history of pluralistic,
cosmopolitan America. It gave rise to several scholarly groups, educational ventures, literary schools and circles, the Kindergarten Movement and other organizations, many of which, in altered forms or under different names, are still active today. The St. Louis movement was thoroughly American in everything but inspiration, since it drew from some very undemocratic sources: Plato and Hegel. This intellectual movement saw in Hegel's philosophy the only effective weapon against encroaching agnosticism, narrow provincialism, and atomistic individualism. The Hegelian mode of thinking, the first to locate contradictions inherent in any situation and then try to resolve them, came naturally to Americans who had to learn the art of compromise beginning with the drafting of the Constitution. After the tragic confrontation of the Civil War, it was the Hegelian dialectic which showed the way for the evolution of the pragmatic or "American" philosophy.

John Dewey was in a better position to gain insight into the great German systems than most other American idealists. He received private tutoring in philosophy and instruction in philosophic German from his professor of mental and moral philosophy at the University of Vermont, H.S.P. Torrey. The young Dewey owed Torrey a double debt for encouraging him to study philosophy while leaving him free to follow his own conscience. These circumstances led Dewey from his original "tender-minded" position of the philosophical belief in transcendent spiritual realities toward the long road of emancipation which would terminate in his mature, naturalistic theories.

The evolution of Dewey's theory of truth is a good example of how long this road really was. For Dewey, as for Hegel before him, the object and goal of philosophy is truth. Both philosophers deny that there is a separation between epistemology and ethics, between theory and practice, between knowing and doing. Thus, the goal of philosophy becomes the goal of human activity, and the ways of seeking truth are not only ways of knowing but also ways of behaving. Josiah Royce goes so far as to assert that in Hegel's Phenomenology, "theoretical problems always appear as also life problems." These "life problems" are the problems of the linear progression of the forms of consciousness, with all the forms engaged in the endeavor of seeking truth, but with varying success. Only the most mature and highest form of consciousness becomes identical with the absolute knowledge of philosophy. While the other forms are the particular truths which have to find their assigned place in this preordained system of reality, the whole truth is that of the whole reality. Dewey adopted Hegel's view of reality as an absolute organic unity with uninhibited enthusiasm and wrote in 1887 in his first book, Psychology:
Truth is but another name for intelligence.

\[ \text{It is not only harmony with all intelligences but harmony with the universal working of one's own intelligence.} \]

In 1889 he revised this passage in the following manner:

The mind always tests the truth of any supposed fact by comparing it to the acquired system of truth. If there is irreconcilable conflict, one or the other must be false. The worth of the criterion will evidently depend upon the degree in which the intelligence has been realized and knowledge acquired.

In Dewey's mature philosophy truth becomes the property of ideas, which are true only if they lead successfully to the desired goal. But he always retained his fondness for the whole in opposition to the part. Pragmatism holds that knowledge is the prerequisite to the formulation of truth. "It is what emerges from the critical employment of the best methods that we can develop." The best method is determined by "the universal assent of those who understand" and not by a priori "ideas or fixed truths already in existence." Ideas which have the capacity to guide us truly are true, and they cannot be attained without knowledge. Thus, education for Dewey, as for Plato and Hegel before him, becomes an important tool in the pursuit of truth. It represents the "laboratory" in which philosophical theories are tested and chosen for their role of becoming an "organ" for dealing with the social and moral conflicts of their own time. Philosophy "may even be defined as the general theory of education," and due to its dynamic nature has the capacity to point the way towards what ought to be in terms of educational ends. In contrast, Hegel believes that philosophy always arrives on the scene too late, too late to lead or educate. Philosophy shows up in history after a culture has passed its zenith and is in decline. When the "world has grown old" there is nothing left for philosophy but to describe "what is." "The owl of Minerva begins its flight at the arrival of dusk."

While American philosophy is often embarrassed by its Hegelian parentage, Dewey openly admits that it left "a permanent deposit" in his thinking, and in 1913 he still considered Hegel the richest and most varied of the great systematic philosophers, with the exception of Plato. The two converging strains of thought of his time, idealism and experimental psychology, based on the theory of Darwinian evolution, became dominant in his thinking. He was convinced that it is possible to integrate the two disciplines, Hegelian philosophy and the then now psy-
ology. Thus, during his first period as an instructor at The University of Michigan, 1884-1888, Dewey's efforts were directed toward bringing together the new psychology of Wilhelm Wundt and G. Stanley Hall and idealism, without violating either. But he started drifting away from Hegelianism and proceeded to do so at an accelerated pace during his second period at Michigan, 1889-1894. These were the years in which he started to realize the impossibility of trying to accommodate his growing naturalism to an idealist interpretation of nature. According to a dissertation written by Willinda Hortense Savage also at Michigan in 1950,

The available evidence appears to indicate that the beginnings of Dewey's experimentalism may be traced to the Ann Arbor period of his career.

In 1894 he gave his view the name "experimental idealism" and during his Chicago years, 1894-1904, he worked out the main outlines of his instrumentalism. Thus, one of the key elements in his mature philosophy, contunity versus dualism, has its roots in his Hegelian period.

Dewey called idealism in 1914, "philosophical absolutism," and I tend to agree with him on the aptness of this label. But we cannot dismiss Hegel because, as Walter Kaufmann said in the Introduction of a book of collected essays, Hegel's Political Philosophy, "a recent intellectual history cannot be understood apart from him." One of these recent new intellectual orientations with faint Hegelian metaphysical overtones is the general trend in the social sciences as well as psychology and medicine to view the individual in his significant social context. Thus, transactions among people become the psychological unit; the individual's behavior is both caused and causative. Slowly but surely, the study of man removed from his circumstances--man as a heroic individual--is being replaced by a view of man as influenced by his context. This "systems model" observes the transactions in the family or social milieu which governs each family member's range of behavior. Similarly, Dewey searched for organic relationships which embrace all partial activities; the truth can be determined only within the subject-object totality. The "good" is the same for both Hegel and Dewey, it resides in social interaction. This interaction is a process of activity which is continuous with the environment and leads to Dewey's model of "social organism." Democracy is a truly organic society in which the exchange among members or as Dewey calls it, the "interaction," later "transaction" furnishes the continuity in the community in which everybody is a "sustained and sustaining member" of the "social whole." It is these interactions which constitute the whole of society. Similarly, today's system therapist includes in his formulation the interdependence of parts in a social context. He deals with
transactions among people, and his psychological unit is holistic: not the individual alone but the individual in the web of significant relationships in which people interact.

In their book, The Anti-Man Culture, Tesconi, and Morris blame Dewey and the "latter-day progressives" with the "a-responsible" attitude forced upon our children in the name of the "doctrine of sociality."

... in our passion for the /doctrine of sociality/ we have allowed the school to become the arena where we demonstrate the great superiority of the group mind over the individual mind.13

I am not so sure that the theory of the development of personhood as put forth by Tesconi and Morris is as far removed from what Dewey advocated as they claim it to be.
NOTES


6 Ibid.


SOCIALIZATION AND PERSONAL FREEDOM

The Debate Between Boyd H. Bode and Bertrand Russell

Philip L. Smith
The Ohio State University

In 1944 The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell appeared as the fifth volume in the Library of Living Philosophers. Included among the twenty-one essays written by other prominent philosophers on Russell's work was a devastating critique of his views of education authored by Boyd H. Bode, one of progressive education's most respected champions.

Bode was highly critical of what he regarded as Russell's naive and dangerous doctrine of individualism. On the other hand, Russell accused Bode of supporting a position that ignored the individual altogether. As he said in his reply,

Mr. Bode... is the only one of the contributors to this volume whom I recognize as (in an impersonal sense) an enemy. I feel that he and I desire very different kinds of society, and that therefore all agreement between us, except on minor points, is impossible.1

Russell suggested, rather sarcastically, that perhaps there would have been some basis for discussion had Bode read his chief works on education. As it was the situation was made impossible by what Russell described as the spiteful, dogmatic and thoroughly wrongheaded tenor of Bode's remarks.

He dislikes me for being English, for being an aristocrat, for not being a pragmatist, and for agreeing with Christianity (which he does not mention) in attaching importance to the individual.2

"I did not choose to be an English aristocrat," he insisted; "... there is something Hitlerite in objecting to people on account of accidents of birth." As for pragmatism, Russell maintained that it was an absurd doctrine. But the issue of individuality was, "the real crux of the matter" and he acknowledged that it called
for "serious discussion." To begin with, he writes,

I get the impression--though in this I may be guilty of misrepresentation--that Mr. Bode sees no conflict [between the individual and society] because he cares only for citizenship, and sees no point in individual culture except insofar as it produces better citizens.3

As Russell went on to point out, whether or not education should foster acceptance of the prevailing social order depends on the nature of the particular society, and that while it may be only our misfortune, those societies that seem to value citizenship the most are the ones that are most oppressive of the individual.

. . . if you are fit for world citizenship your freedom from the prejudices of your neighbors will cause you to be thought wicked and anti-social, important persons will fight shy of you, and you will have difficulty in making a living. At any rate this will be true in Germany and Japan, which have adopted Mr. Bode's emphasis on citizenship more whole-heartedly than it has yet been adopted in America or England.4

As if this were not enough to discredit Bode's criticism, Russell went on to say, an exclusive emphasis on citizenship would destroy the possibility of communication between groups, undermine international justice, encourage vanity, promote militarism, prejudice science and limit religion to mere church-going. "All this," he said, "is already being brought about, in a greater or less degree, by the educational administrators who agree with Mr. Bode."5

The only thing Russell could find " . . . to set against this powerful trend towards the enslavement of the human spirit" was " . . . the old religious emphasis upon the individual."6 For Russell this meant a license to promote the gospel of individualism. He said of the Good Samaritan, for example, that he was good because his actions were his own, the result of a free-thinking and responsible moral agent, not because he was a loyal and faithful follower of prevailing social norms. Even Christ was portrayed as an individualist, superior to others only because he practiced what he preached. Recoiling on Bode, Russell concluded,

I do not think Mr. Bode would like Christ if he were a younger member of the Faculty of Ohio State University [where Bode taught]; I fear he would find him subversive, anarchistic, and unpatriotic. Moreover, he would criticize the existing religious institutions.7
Russell was never one to take kindly to criticisms and, obviously, he proved true to form in this clash with Bode.

While Russell's response was predictably reviling, we must remember that Bode was not one to pull punches either, particularly when so much was at stake. Russell had said that the problem centered on the relation of the individual to the surrounding group culture. He believed that we meet this problem everywhere—in politics, in ethics, in metaphysics—but that it was especially difficult to deal with in education. In his own words,

...there is one great temperamental cleavage which goes deeper than any of the other controversies, and that is the cleavage between those who consider education primarily in relation to the individual psyche and those who consider it in relation to the community.8

With this Bode could agree, but he considered it a serious mistake to conclude, as Russell did, that the question is, "...whether education should train good individuals or good citizens."9 Consistent with his pragmatism he rejected any question formed on the basis of an either-or logic. He believed there must be internal cohesion within the state, which is only to say that there must be education for citizenship. But he also believed that education must produce good individuals. The problem as he saw it was to reconcile these two demands.

Bode recognized more clearly than Russell that there is a perennial tension in education between its adjustment function and its liberating function. On the one hand, education should help the learner to adapt to the world, to "fit in," so to speak. On the other hand, education should work to free the learner from environmental constraints (social and psychological as well as merely physical), to develop an inquisitive and critical intelligence that will generate an aptitude for change. However, in recognizing this tension Bode was also able to see that an education that could not fulfill both of these functions was hardly worthy of the name.

By contrast, Russell viewed these functions as logically contradictory and philosophically irreconcilable. To satisfy one would be to neglect the other and, thus, a genuine synthesis is impossible. While making some concessions to the demands of group life his sympathies were with the individual, as over against the physical and social environment. As Bode put it,

When the question of the relation of the individual to the State is under consideration, he (Russell) is disposed to be uncompromising. The emphasis then is all to the effect that the State must interpose no
obstacles to growth or individual development. The possibility that the State should have any function or obligation to cultivate "a sense of citizenship, of social co-operation," is slurred over or ignored altogether. As far as the State is concerned, the reconciliation of individuality and citizenship is to be achieved by methods that are essentially negative. They center on the elimination of "the harm that is done to education by politics."10

Bode considered this view to be disastrously mistaken. It was mistaken, first, because it ignored the practical character and social nature of the self, and, second, because it denied that cooperation is essential for individual development; at least, scolded Bode, Russell's occasional contemptuous references to the "herd" do not indicate any yearning for co-operation. It was disastrous, however, because of its consequences. To put it briefly, "If unfriendly critics see in all this a hang-over of an aristocratic tradition, the reason is presumably that the latter likewise has its roots in the antithesis between the individual and the community."11

What complicates matters is that Russell would sometimes argue for what appears as the opposite point of view. He was especially hostile to that "lunatic fringe" in education that regarded any form of compulsion as an infringement on the sacred rights of childhood. When it came to practical, in contrast to ideal, considerations, the demands of a just and stable social order were given precedence over the needs of individual development. "Considered sub specie aeternitatis," Russell writes, "the education of the individual is to my mind a finer thing than the education of the citizen; but considered politically, in relation to the needs of the time, the education of the citizen must, I fear, take the first place."12 More specifically this means that,

\[
\text{... individualism, although it is important not to forget its just claims, needs, in a densely populated industrial world, to be more controlled, even in individual psychology, than in former times...} \\
\text{A sense of citizenship, of social co-operation, is therefore more necessary than it used to be; but it remains important that this should be secured without too great a diminution of individual judgment and individual initiative.13}
\]

While Russell may have exhibited more common sense in these matters than those he considered at the "lunatic fringe" in education, the latter can be credited with a greater degree of logical consistency. How could he say that, "the education of the individual is... a finer thing than the education of the citizen" and then turn around and argue that, "individualism... needs... to be
more controlled"? Bode suspected that Russell's vacillation were strategic rather than philosophical. Instead of abandoning his commitment to individual development or rejecting the possibility of isolated growth, Russell was merely acknowledging the realities of modern life. Thus, in this "densely populated industrial world" the goal of self-realization is a pipe dream unless we manage to exploit all manner of human relationships.

Consider, for example, Henry David Thoreau's contention that the government which governs best governs least. We would not normally view this as sound advice, for as usually understood, as a form of positivism, it assumes that individual development can take place independently of community involvement. However plausible this might be in theory, we know that in practice our world makes it impossible. The counsel of Thomas Hobbes is much more realistic. He tells us that in a state of nature, "... the life of man (is) solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." But we need to understand that while, perhaps, more realistic this advice need not be seen as qualitatively different from that which was offered by Thoreau. Historically, this is precisely what has happened. Hobbes has been seen to represent a different point of view only in the sense that he recognized more fully the realities of our "densely populated world." The same could be said about Russell's position on citizenship, or so Bode believed.

By moving back and forth between the welfare of the individual and the demands of group life Russell failed to develop a position that was internally consistent. His method of reconciling conflicts was to hold fast to the principle of individual development as an abstraction while surrendering it when required in specific, concrete situations. The only criterion he advanced for the right system of education was that it consider the adjustment function and the liberating function in "due proportion." What is needed, Bode insisted, is a genuine synthesis.

... instead of laying down a clear-cut principle for educational and social theory, Mr. Russell bypasses the whole issue. This is all the more regrettable since it is at just this point that educational guidance is most needed in these troubled times. In political parlance, Mr. Russell "passes the buck" to the classroom teacher, in the form of a recommendation that "due proportion" be observed. He neither surrenders the view that the good of the individual is to be determined by considering the individual "in isolation," nor does he move on to a theory of the good in terms of a synthesis which he concedes to be necessary. As a result "individuality" and "citizenship" remain antithetical in Mr. Russell's mind.

Bode referred to this predicament as, "... the noxious skeleton in Mr. Russell's philosophical closet" and the reason his edu-
cational philosophy was "... becoming increasingly remote from the requirements of associated living in our modern society."18 Individuality is conceivable only in a social context. If we start with Russell's assumption that it is inherently antithetical to community welfare, then the problem of its "reconciliation" with citizenship becomes insoluble. But what reason is there for accepting this assumption? None that Bode could see. He characterized Russell's understanding of the issue as, "... a product of the philosopher's perverted ingenuity"19 and proceeded to offer his own formulation.

Following the lead of John Dewey, Bode adopted a process orientation to philosophical problems, rather than Russell's atomistic orientation. Not that distinctions can never be made, but in a world constantly subject to change they cannot be made absolutely, once and for all, without losing their ontological significance. Whether or not universal differences exist outside of nature they certainly do not exist within the empirical world. When we assume they do we create what Dewey called "untenable dualisms," that is, in this case, unwarranted ontologized distinctions.

Dewey opted for a transactional theory of reality. Things become what they are in virtue of behaving as they do in particular situations where they must undergo the consequences. This is not mere interaction. Interaction means only that things come into contact and influence each other; there is no assumption of changing nature. With transaction, however, things are not only influenced but trans-formed. Trans-action is action which trans-forms, which alters the character, or nature, of those things involved in the process. This is precisely the message in Bode's conception of the individual.

The individual psyche which figures in Mr. Russell's scheme of things becomes an abstraction, since the individual achieves status as a human being only by becoming a "function" of the larger life of the community. To use a term that once was popular in philosophical circles, the relation of the individual to his environment is "organic." This term has much the same meaning as the "field" concept in physics, if we are careful to bear in mind that it never occurs to the physicist to provide a transcendental or extra-experiential basis for the unity of the field. Such distinctions as individual and environment, subjective and objective, truth and error, arise as distinctions within the field; they are not as distinctions based on a blanket contrast between the individual psyche and the world at large. They arise in connection with focal points within the field which have become disturbed and consequently
require attention. It is the specific difficulty which sets the conditions both for the content of these various distinctions and for the reinterpretation or reconstruction that is required.20

Thus, it is no accident that Bode would refer to the individual as an abstraction, for he regarded the individual, like the community, as the result of a transactional process, that is, as a consequence of interacting natural events, or to use Dewey's expression, as an "eventual function."21

Considered on this level the question is not whether there are real conflicts between the individual and the community, but how these conflicts are to be interpreted. In contrast to Russell who saw them as representing the opposing interests of persons and groups, Bode viewed them as a breakdown in the unity of culture. He argued that the individual should not be, "... identified with a 'psyche' which is set over against the community in wholesale fashion or with some element or constituent in an inclusive experimental situation."22 What Russell conceives, "... in terms of individual psyche versus community are in fact splits or cleavages within the culture."23 Given this perspective, the aim of social and educational theory is radically different from what Russell assumed. If the cleavage is within culture itself, the problem is not to reconcile individual and societal interests, but to eliminate the structural contradictions within group life that make genuine community impossible.

Bode acknowledged that this was easier said than done for basically two reasons. First, because culture is always in transition: as part of nature it changes constantly, upsetting balance and generating contradictions. The discrepancies and inadequacies that result constitute a challenge for philosophers to show how culture should be reinterpreted or reconstructed. Second, when culture breaks down, the conflicts that result center on values not merely on facts. Now, as we all know, resolving conflicts of value is, at least conceptually, often more problematic than resolving conflicts of fact, especially within a democracy. We may value both freedom and equality; but what do we do if, as frequently happens, these two values stand in opposition, at least insofar as we can see?

One procedure for handling this sort of problem is to give preferred status to a particular value, or set of values, and declare that it must be protected at all cost. According to Bode,

This is the procedure on which Mr. Russell and his dearest enemies--the State and the Church--seem to be agreed; the trouble is that they do not agree on the values that are to be thus protected. The State identifies the central value with loyalty to the
group, and therefore sees to it that nationalism and patriotism in the conventional sense are taught in the schools. The Church insists that the belief in a supernatural origin and basis for mundane things is a sine qua non, and organizes education accordingly. Mr. Russell, after surveying the situation, selects those values which are revealed to him sub specie aeternitatis. Those values are essential which man would have if man were God; even though Mr. Russell objects to having this taken seriously in the schools.

Bode's objection to the simple prioritizing of values as a means of eliminating conflict can be readily understood in the light of his commitment to democracy as a way of life. Democracy as a way of life implies full recognition of democratic values. If, for example, freedom and equality are actually in opposition at some point, we cannot choose one over the other, holding it up as superior, and still retain our democracy. Instead we must reconceive what freedom and equality consist in, and do so in a manner which makes prioritizing unnecessary. If we rely on the process of free decision, that is enough to have a democracy—even if we live to regret the choice that emerges from the democratic process.

In suggesting an alternative procedure for dealing with this matter Bode took it for granted that where there is no conflict it is,

... not because the individual finds himself undisturbed in the exercise of his god-like faculties "in isolation," but because participation in the common purposes of the community is the medium through which he achieves moral and spiritual stature.

But, of course, life on this earth must be lived in a physical and social environment that will not stay put.

No form of social organization can be adequate for all time; which is just another way of saying that conflicts are bound to appear. Something must then be done by way of changing the tradition or culture so as to make it fit the new conditions. No culture can escape entirely from the necessity of reinterpreting itself.

Starting from these assumptions and the proposition that the alleged conflict between the individual and the community was actually a conflict within tradition itself, Bode proposed as a remedy that we must,
... try to restore the identification of the individual or of minority groups with an inclusive common purpose by enlarging or reconstructing this common purpose... This is a process of constantly revising this common life in the light of changing conditions, on the basis of no other principle than to overcome conflicts by constantly widening the area of common interests among men.27

To say this does not say nearly enough. Much remains unspecified about the mechanisms of this process. But seeing this as a deficiency should not blind us to the tremendous significance of Bode's remarks, especially about the establishing of common interests as a basis for increasing agreement. They not only represent a rejection of the contention that socialization unavoidably inhibits personal freedom, but they suggest that both socialization and personal freedom are essential for democratic living. Where they are in opposition it is not because of logical necessity, but because changing circumstances demand their reconceptualization and sometimes reapplication to human affairs. The cleavages in culture which are products of a modified environment, generate conflicts of values that can only be resolved intelligently if these values are appropriately transformed through a process of experimental inquiry: a process, by the way, which preserves their original humanistic and practical functions.

Bode stressed the importance of deliberate education precisely because it can serve this function. "The schools are the agency upon which democracy must chiefly rely for the constant re-examination of its own meaning," we are told, and without them there is virtually no rational hope that it can survive.28 Bode considered the relation of the individual and the community to be a serious problem because it calls for constant and sometimes radical revision, not only in the interests of education, but, "... in the interest of the entire future of our civilization."29 Individuals can hardly be regarded as god-like, in Russell's terms, if, as Russell himself would admit, they require improvement at the hands of pedagogues.30 But then we must face the matter of imposition. Unlike Russell, Bode faced this challenge foursquarely.

If coercion is to have even prima facie justification, it is necessary to shift from the will of the individual to the will of the citizen, i.e., the will which results from the effort to secure a common program through voluntary co-operation. It is only through such a shift that coercion can change from rank imposition to a means of grace. It is a shift which implies that the good of the individual and the good of the citizen are basically identical.31
NOTES


2Ibid., 731.

3Ibid., 732.

4Ibid., 732–33.

5Ibid., 733.

6Ibid., 733.

7Ibid., 734.


9Ibid., 9.


11Ibid., 629.

12Russell, op. cit., 27.

13Ibid., 236f.


15Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme (sic) and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall (sic) and Civil (Oxford: Basic Blackwell, 1957), Part 1, Chapter 13, p. 82. (Originally published in 1651)

16Bode, "Russell's Educational Philosophy," 633.
17 Ibid., 641.
18 Ibid., 642.
19 Ibid., 631.
20 Ibid., 639.
22 Bode, "Russell's Educational Philosophy," 639.
23 Ibid., 639.
24 Ibid., 635-46.
25 Ibid., 637.
26 Ibid., 637.
27 Ibid., 637-38.
28 Ibid., 638.
29 Ibid., 642.
30 Ibid., 630.
31 Ibid., 630.
Perhaps the reader shares with me the impression that our author has left us in a cliff-hanging state. What does "it all mean" now that Smith has painstakingly detailed this historic debate? Is there a winner in this trans-Atlantic contest? What significance is there (and I believe there is much) for philosophy of education? The debate portends a profound difference between British and American philosophy—at least such at one historic juncture. Hopefully, Phil Smith shall address such questions in future writings.

JM
Teachers As Agents of Equal Opportunity

David C. Bricker
Oakland University

During the last decade equal educational opportunity typically has been viewed as a large scale social policy issue involving the freeing of educational attainment from the influence of racial and social class characteristics. Small scale innovations within classrooms such as the creation of more "open" and informal organization have also been tried during the same period, but little attention has been given to the relationship between classroom innovations and broader issues of equal opportunity. In this paper I shall demonstrate a way of relating the issue of classroom organization to broader issues of equal opportunity and social justice.

In the course of my presentation I shall make a number of generalizations about the way teachers view their work. Of course they do not all think alike in every detail about their work; in fact, I shall examine one of the polarities within which each teacher must judge his personal priorities. However, studies of teachers' perspectives such as Dan Lortie's School Teacher and my own exposure to the thinking of many teachers over many years impress me by the conventionality in teacher perspectives. The conventionality consists of more than a shared jargon of terms like "child-centered learning" and "learning by discovery"; it consists also of normative assumptions about the rights and responsibilities of student and teacher. I am especially interested in the way acting on these assumptions involves the making of trade-offs within classrooms that are congruent with trade-offs in other social arenas--welfare administration, for example--where the attempt to recognize both human equality and individual productivity evidences polarities in the ideology of democratic, capitalistic citizenship.

Persons and Their Performances

Teachers often say to a student, "I am criticizing your performance, not you as a person." The normative assumptions behind this statement are intimately related to equal educational opportunity, although many teachers would have difficulty in articulating the relationship. In the statement a distinction is made between persons and their performances, and behind the distinction is an assumption about the way the worth of persons and performances should be understood. It is assumed
that all persons are the same in their worth as persons; thus, as persons student and teacher have the same worth, and the teacher recognizes the similarity by not subordinating his student as a person to him. However, it is also assumed that the worth of performances varies, and the teacher as the more expert of the two performers implies that his superior expertise justifies his criticism of the student's performance. Many teachers believe that the similar worth of persons obligates them to respect students as persons similarly and that the varying worth of performances obligates them to admire performances perceived as incompetent to receive little admiration although the performer, as a person, receives respect. Unconditional respect and proportional admiration are what a teacher is trying to communicate to a student when he says, "I am criticizing your performance, not you as a person."

Generally, teachers believe that it would be wrong to intentionally ignore a student by permitting his/her uninvolved in learning. Since all students are similar in worth as persons, to deliberately ignore a student would constitute an act of disrespect. The principle of granting respect to every student as a person underlies teachers' interest in finding ways to involve students in learning. Students do not have to accomplish anything in order to deserve teacher efforts at motivation. Teachers believe that students have a right to motivation, and this right seems to be derived from the belief in students' worth as persons.

The belief that the unmotivated deserve to be motivated is part of the teachers' common sense view of equal opportunity in classrooms. They believe that the different amounts of admiration students receive for their performances must be "fair", and they see fairness requiring that a student's performance be a product of his or her natural endowments. The performance through which students earn their positions in a class must be earned by the students as persons through use of their natural endowments rather than by the product of abilities the students have developed by virtue of their birth into a particular position within society. Concerned about fairness, teachers worry about the equalization of motivation between students who enter their classrooms inspired to learn the curriculum and students who have no inspiration because of environmental disadvantages.

Classroom Organization as Evidence of a Teacher's Morality

The commitment to motivating all students in recognition of their similar worth as persons is egalitarian in the sense that its goal is to get all students to develop their natural
endowments. However, endowments vary, leading some students to accomplish more than others. The admiration and other rewards used by teachers to recognize competent performances have several purposes. Sometimes performers do not realize that they have done well, that their lesson is over, and a teacher’s admiration is one way of letting them know. Also, competent performers are admired and rewarded in order that they will be inspired to continue with their achievements. Thus, teachers view themselves as involved in promoting both social integration and differentiation among their students. They try to integrate all students into participation in learning, and this is egalitarian. Also, they try to distribute admiration and other rewards to students in proportion to the competency in their performances, and often from the distributions students discover how they compare with one another in terms of their competence. This, I have learned, is the way many teachers believe equal opportunity is to be pursued in classrooms. They believe that they must be both egalitarian and meritocratic: all students must become involved in learning by using their natural endowments, and the differences in competency which come from involvement must be acknowledged by admiration and other rewards that make the development of endowments worthwhile.

Although many teachers believe that they cannot completely ignore either their egalitarian or their meritarian duties, they individually feel differently about the comparative importance of the duties, and they give some evidence of their personal priorities by the degree of bureaucratization in their personal classrooms. According to Weber, bureaucracies are characterized by the assignment of persons to positions as a function of their "expertise", by conceptualization of positions in terms of "official duties", by a vertical distribution of authority through which office supervisors reward their compliant and productive subordinates with better positions, and by the expectation that productivity will be measured "impartially". In a highly bureaucratized classroom, a teacher is conspicuously the supervisor of learning. Students are obligated to demonstrate specific types of expertise for the earning of "promotions". A distinction between students as persons and as performers of classroom assignments--"official duties"--is enforced, and performances are evaluated impersonally in behalf of "fairness". Teachers generally view such a classroom as more "subject centered" than "child centered". "Traditional" and "formal" are labels they use when discussing a highly bureaucratized classroom and they see as one of the favorable features of formality the focusing of the students' attention upon specific areas of expertise--the "basics"--which are thought to be valuable for everyone. Moreover, standardization of official duties and impersonal evaluations facilitate identification of competent performances and calculation of each student's earned position within the classroom. A hierarchy among the students readily evolves, making
it easy for each student to see his or her position in comparison with others. There is little ambiguity over how "well" a student is doing.

Teachers report that one of the unfavorable effects of "formal" classrooms is that the students at the bottom of a rank order become demoralized by their unfavorable position. For teachers such demoralization would not be a serious matter were it not for their belief that equal opportunity obliges them to sustain every student's involvement in learning. Thus, they experience an antithesis in their pursuit of equal opportunity through formal teaching: straight-forward recognition of competent performances makes it more difficult for a teacher to maintain the involvement of less competent students.

Distress over demoralization arising from status inequalities has led some teachers to seek types of learning which students find intrinsically satisfying. They hope that intrinsic satisfactions will reduce the need for overt rewards and that a reduction in rewards will make more obscure the students' comparative positions in the classroom. For example, in the mid 1960's dismay over the effects of status inequality caused some American teachers to try a strategy of de-bureaucratization exemplified by English "open" or "informal" classrooms. When a classroom is de-bureaucratized, the "official duties" associated with a student's role become less specific, more open to individual interpretation and control. Less precision in prescriptions of "official duties" helps reduce conflict between personal interests and role obligations, making it easier to act upon personal interests and hence to obtain intrinsic satisfactions during the course of role performance. De-bureaucratization also changes the relationship between teacher and students: a teacher's expertise based superordinancy becomes transformed into a facilitative role in which to some degree the teacher subordinates himself to a student's interests. Interaction between teacher and students becomes more egalitarian in the sense that the interaction is less affected by qualitative differences between performances than it is by the fact that performances are seen as evidence of personal interests of the performer which deserve respect because of the performer's worth as a person.

Unfortunately, informal organization raises equal opportunity dilemmas which are just as perplexing for teachers as the dilemmas accompanying the use of formal organization. When a teacher adopts a facilitative role, he becomes dependent upon the motivations students bring with them into his classroom, and there is no reason why these motivations must be socially congenial and conducive to individual development. Informal classrooms make it easy for students to act on inherited motivations which inhibit development of their natural endowments, and development of endowments is viewed by many teachers as the primary goal of
equal educational opportunity. Thus, both informal and formal classrooms give teachers equal opportunity based dilemmas which center on the problem of motivating students to utilize their natural endowments in ways that are both personally satisfying and admirable to others. The informal classroom reduces demoralization arising from status inequalities but risks the weakening of teacher effectiveness in inspiring students to use their natural endowments. In the formal classroom some students utilize their endowments to earn admired positions, but their positions cause less endowed students to be alienated toward learning. As a result of their appreciation of these dilemmas, many teachers wish to create classrooms which combine the best features of formality and informality. They realize that criticisms based on claims for equal opportunity can easily be leveled at extreme positions. They search for mediative arrangements such as "guided discovery", "facilitative leadership" and "personalized, competency based instruction".

Equity Within Classrooms and Democratic Capitalism

The view of equal educational opportunity held by many teachers is compatible with the ideology of democratic capitalism. According to the ideology, all adults are responsible for providing for themselves to the extent that they are able by using their endowments in ways for which there is a demand. The unable have a right to "welfare benefits" which are to be transferred to them from the productions of the able. The productivity of the able, and thus the benefits pool for the unable, is maximized by competition for material and social advantages. Government is understood as an instrument by which the unable receive the respect due them by virtue of their worth as persons through distribution of "necessities of life", but government also functions as an instrument for maintaining competition among the able.

Just as teachers worry that the advantages earned by the competent in their classroom will dissuade the less endowed from trying further, so chiefs of the government agencies which regulate competition worry that competition may demoralize the losers so much that they will decide to drop out of production and become welfare recipients. Teachers worry that their solicitous concern for the less able student may cause the more able to lower his/her productivity because competency does not count clearly enough in the distribution of classroom goods. In the same manner, transfer administrators in government worry that the level of welfare benefits may be high enough to make the costs of continued competition exceed its potential benefits to the competitively productive.
Conclusion

In this paper I have shown how the views of teachers involve assumptions about equal educational opportunity and how these assumptions comply with the ideology of equality in a capitalistic democracy. I recognize that the argument is just as much sociological as it is philosophical, but I believe that the thinking of teachers is complex and evidences fundamental antinomies in civic ideology which deserve interdisciplinary investigation. For philosophers who teach teachers one of the benefits of participating in the line of inquiry demonstrated above is that fundamental social justice issues can be related to the issue of stratification within classrooms. Teachers already appreciate that student stratification is an issue, and by developing the connections suggested above philosophers can broaden the teachers' concern from the issue of student stratification to the issues of social justice. For teachers one of the benefits of participating in this line of inquiry is the discovery that trade-offs between competing modes of classroom organization need no longer be viewed as evidence of personal incompetence but as evidence of personal sensitivity to underlying antinomies in civic ideology which persistently affect everyone, in schools and outside of schools alike.
FOOTNOTES


3 Lortie, p. 115.

4 For a structural-functional analysis of the integrating and differentiating obligations of teachers see Talcott Parsons, "The School Class as a Social System: Some of Its Functions in American Society," Harvard Educational Review, (Fall, 1959). I believe that Parsons' analysis is much more revealing of the normative assumptions behind teaching than it is of the effects of teaching and involving your occupational attainment.

5 The priorities of a teacher are not the only factor determining the organization of a classroom. Architecture, a consensus in a staff on teaching style and the socialization of students through earlier confrontations with classroom life are also reflected by organization. Organization is evidence of a teacher's adaptation to material and social constraints in light of his personal priorities.


8 At the time, many educational journalists eulogized the informal classroom as a major breakthrough toward more effective schooling. See, for instance, Charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom. (New York: Vintage Books, 1971).

9 There is some evidence that English informal classrooms were not as egalitarian as their advocates implied they were, with inequalities between students evolving in proportion to the students' competency at keeping "busy". See, Rachel Sharp and Anthony Green, Educational and Social Control: A Study in Progressive Primary Education. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975).

Lortie finds many teachers burdened by feelings of self-accusation because they believe their classroom troubles are evidence of incompetence. Lortie, Chapter 6--"Endemic Uncertainties."
Evaluating Synthesizing Skills:

A Logical Analysis

Marcia S. Brown
Southern Illinois University, Edwardsville

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INTRODUCTION

Questions of valuing have been of continual concern to philosophers of education, but more recently value questions have assumed an increasing importance for educators and evaluators in the field as they attempt to meet the current demands for accountability in the schooling process. Both the procedures and products of schooling are being subjected to scrutiny, and there are conflicting proposals for their proper measurement and evaluation. Educators who are under fire for both financial and academic accountability seek methods of evaluation that will reveal the relative merit of instructional programs in achieving the various aims proposed as desirable by those responsible for such decisions. Within this concern for the proper forms for evaluation, philosophical analysis assumes a valuable role for determining the direction and form evaluation evidences in a wide variety of educational situations. Such inquiry has as its goal the development of a structure for the evaluation process, that it may adequately provide the most relevant data for informed decision making.

Most commonly the form of evaluation used to assess the efforts of schooling is instrumental, where some causal relationship is sought between a desired end product of schooling and the means used to attain it, i.e., a determination of how well I affects or produces D, where D the dependent variable, is the desired outcome. Such assessment offers information to the evaluator that he might make an informed decision concerning the relative worth of the instructional program in question. The activity of this evaluative form is predominantly the collection of relevant data to provide the information required for decision making.

Because use of instrumental evaluation or any other specific form requires a rationale for its selection, it is at this point in the evaluation process that the methods of inquiry best performed by philosophical analysis enter the picture as requisite a priori deliberation to the entire plan for evaluation. Critical questions must be posed as prelude to evaluating, including those regarding the purpose of the evaluation and the form of evaluation best suited to that purpose. This paper seeks to expand the common regard for evaluative effort from the rather restricted instrumental view to consideration of alternative forms derived from purpose, and which are indeed necessary when a cause-effect relationship is not possible to establish or even desired as an outcome of a proposed evaluation.

As an example of the need for considering alternative forms for evaluation, the problem of evaluating synthesizing skill will
be described and analyzed, and a form for its possible assessment will be proposed. In order to relate instances of implementation of evaluation to its theoretical consideration, the situation proposed for evaluating will be that of developing a means for determining whether synthesizing skills are being developed in an undergraduate university program, and the extent to which these skills are being developed in undergraduate students. Selection of this instance is not arbitrary, nor is it of minor importance, for the National Task Force on Educational Credit and Credentials has recommended that the undergraduate degree should attest to the accomplishment of competence in synthesizing skill. Evaluation of synthesizing was a further concern of the Resource Center for Planned Change of the American Association of State Colleges and Universities, when participants met in a seminar this past summer to discuss university undergraduate program evaluation. The emphasis of the seminar was program improvement, i.e. increasing educational quality. The necessity of selecting or developing adequate forms for evaluating the presence and quality of synthesizing activity becomes apparent at this point. One must know, prior to instructional improvement, what indicators reveal synthesizing activity, and the extent to which opportunity for such activity is present or absent in the university instructional program.

Determining a "best" method for such assessment requires an examination of the possible alternative forms for evaluation and this investigation will utilize the analysis of three types of evaluation described by P.G. Smith in a paper presented to the Philosophy of Education Society in the Spring of 1978. These three include the forms of instrumental, exemplified, and contributory evaluation. It will be proposed that the rationale of contributory evaluation is best suited to indicating the presence of opportunity to develop a skill as measurement-elusive as synthesizing. In the following sections the paper will address these questions of philosophical concern:

(1) How do the forms of evaluation derive from the purposes of evaluation?

(2) What is synthesis, and what constitutes synthesizing activity in the instructional process?

(3) How can an educational effort best be measured that is goal-specified, but product-free?

It has been suggested in this introduction that measurement of synthesizing is elusive and requires an alternative evaluation form. Such an alternative and its rationale for consideration will begin the discussion in the following section of this paper.
PURPOSE AND EVALUATION FORM

The direction of instrumental evaluation toward causal discovery and the limitations of such information collecting has been previously mentioned. Exemplified evaluation similarly requires observation to determine the degree to which an instructional program meets certain criteria for effectiveness when compared with a standard. The question posed that is most adequately dealt with in this evaluation form is "To what extent or degree does Y meet the criterial standards of X?" or "How many characteristics of X can be found in observing Y?"

In contrast to the goals of instrumental and exemplified forms, contributory evaluation attempts to determine a part-whole relationship in which an element of instruction is evaluated on the basis of its contribution to the targeted goal. Such elements are not seen to be causal or indicative of the total effectiveness of a program as in instrumental evaluation, but rather, contributory evaluation efforts are directed at observing how the part participates within the whole. This form of evaluation is based on the assumption that goal activities are composed of contributory part activities, and the logical effort of evaluating becomes one of discovering what parts constitute the whole.

Evaluation of synthesizing in an educational program could effectively utilize both the method of contributory evaluation to establish criteria, and exemplified evaluation, in which the criteria so obtained is used to evaluate a particular instructional program. It has been proposed that both the methodology and intent of evaluation are characterized by what they seek to discover. R.S. Peters has frequently inquired about the logical relationship between means and ends in education, but the problem itself remains to be explored, especially in the area of educational evaluation.

How does purpose for evaluating affect the form selected? If one is concerned with finding information about an outcome of instruction, i.e. a product or behavior, instrumental evaluation of the effectiveness of the means for such attainment may become an appropriate choice for evaluation form. On the other hand, if one seeks to discover how well a product or behavior measures up to a specified standard, the proper selection of evaluative form may be that of the exemplified type. In contrast to both these forms, contributory evaluation makes inquiry about the constituents of a process, foregoing the assumption of instrumental evaluation that it is possible for instructional effect to have single causation. The contributory evaluative form seeks to discover those elements of instructional activity that can logically be determined to describe the specified goal of instruction. Using the example of synthesizing activity, which is the specified desired competence
or goal behavior for undergraduate students, analysis would begin with a determination of what is meant by synthesis and what can be said to constitute synthesizing activity. These constituent elements of instruction may then be said to logically contribute to attainment of the specified goal, i.e. synthesizing skill. As such, however, no product is involved, for observation and assessment is directed toward indicators of doing synthesis rather than having done synthesizing, as might be indicated in a finished product. If certain instructional activities contribute to this "doing" then more precisely the observation for purposes of evaluation is directed toward discovering opportunity to engage in synthesizing activity. The assumption is made here that doing synthesizing is being able to do synthesizing: the skill and activity are the same - a means-ends identity.

Contributory evaluation in this instance will seek to observe the opportunities present or absent for such activity to occur with the assumption being made that it contributes to the development of synthesizing skill. One may effectively join the modes of contributory and exemplified evaluation at this point, for the goal, i.e. synthesizing skill, has been described by analysis of what logically constitutes synthesizing activity. Whether and the extent to which opportunity is present to exercise or develop this skill, i.e. opportunity to do synthesizing, effectively joins the prior analysis to observation of the contributory parts determined by analysis. If one were to assign a descriptor to such an evaluation using the contributory rationale it might well be designated as goal-specified, product-free evaluation. The goal, synthesizing skill, can be observed in the instructional activities which support or encourage its development. These activities are derived from an analysis of what it means to synthesize, for the means, i.e. synthesizing skill. The specification of a goal however, does not in this case logically imply a product by which the effectiveness of instruction can be measured. What is sought is not evidence of having done synthesizing in the form of student products such as papers and projects, for these creations may well emerge from individual talent and ability not affected one way or the other by the instructional process. If what is sought is evidence of instructional influence then the activity itself must be observed in the form of opportunities made available in instruction itself for synthesizing activity to occur. In this sense, the evaluation form here developed is product-free. Opportunity to do synthesizing is believed to contribute significantly to the ability to synthesize, but a cause-effect relationship indicated by evaluation of a finished product is not sought.

It would perhaps be helpful at this point to analyze the specified goal activity to demonstrate the usefulness of the form thus developed to measure this somewhat elusive but desired skill of synthesizing. The following section analyzes the concept of synthesis and identifies its logically constituent parts.
WHAT IS SYNTHESIS?

When one is considering the ability to do synthesis as an aim for education, there is a very real concern to justify its conclusion in the instructional process. By itself, such justification poses an interesting and complex problem, but it will not be the purpose of this paper to attempt such justification. For purposes of this investigation it will be assumed that the determination of worth has already occurred and the problem at hand is one of developing a means for its detection and measurement. It is proposed that this evaluation must ideally be suited to the purpose for evaluating. Ascertainment of this purpose is not always readily apparent, and analysis of evaluating purpose becomes an all important first step in selection of an evaluation form. If we wish to measure synthesizing, it is necessary to know what synthesizing is, which brings us to the analysis of the concept of synthesis. Such analysis can be conducted by identifying a necessary condition of synthesis happening or synthesizing being present in a situation. What questions present themselves for consideration at this point? At least three points of inquiry emerge: When can it be said that synthesizing occurs in an instructional context? What characteristic pedagogical moves will be present? What opportunities will be available for synthesizing behavior on the part of students?

Synthesis, as it is commonly described, refers to an activity of "putting together," a cognitive exercise that can, but does not need to, follow the activity of analysis. Analysis, as distinguished from synthesis, involves intellectual activity directed toward "taking apart" for the purpose of examining concepts, relationships, or arguments within a discipline. Opportunity to synthesize would be directed toward a creative putting together of these parts, discovering and building new concepts, relationships, or arguments. Such creation need not be novel to all experience, although it might be, but will represent discovery and construction new to the student as he builds from his understanding of previous analysis.

The parts of synthesis that could be observed in an educational setting would consist of the opportunities present to (1) build definitions, (2) build questions and claims, and (3) build arguments to support theory. Observation of this activity in instructional behavior would consist of measuring the degree to which these conditions are present in the conduct of an individual course.

If one applies the evaluation form developed in the previous section to evaluating synthesizing, two distinct activities are indicated: that of assembling information relative to synthesizing activity, and the assessment of the degree to which these criteria are observed to be present in instruction. Categories of the evaluation would consist of a three-fold assessment directed at observing that synthesizing is:
(1) Not present in the conduct of the course

(2) Present, but not integral to the conduct of the course

(3) Present and integral to the conduct of the course

The distinction between the first and other categories would be that of the theoretical distinction between didactic and heuristic instruction. A clearly didactic pedagogical situation would be one characterized by: (1) clearly defined, measureable objectives, (2) formal presentation of structured content, (3) a prescribed text and specified assignments, (4) objective testing procedures. Although one could experience the activity of analysis in an instructional setting so described, it is unlikely that synthesizing activity would be present in a course conducted exclusively by methods of direct teaching. Absence of opportunity to do synthesizing as part of the instructional process disallows instructional influence on its development, i.e. synthesizing could occur and be present in students but not as a result of instructional activity.

In contrast, the conduct of instruction according to the heuristic approach would more likely provide opportunity for synthesizing to occur, for there is present in heuristic teaching style the open-endedness and emphasis of process necessary to permit and encourage synthesizing activity. Exact content of courses conducted in this manner would not be precisely established, and there would at least exist the opportunity to follow the direction of questions raised, with additional possibilities for the construction of arguments relative to the following of an inquiry. This didactic-heuristic distinction is not sufficient however to distinguish category two from category three. It would be possible to have synthesizing activity that is irrelevant to the discipline under consideration, i.e. to be related to, but not integral to the course of study itself. For example, questions that deal with psychological motives of the participants of a philosophical debate are interesting and even intriguing, but they are tangential to the methods of inquiry appropriate to the discipline of philosophical study. This evidence of synthesizing activity would characterize category two. If, however, the synthesizing bears directly upon the type of inquiry relevant and integral to the field of study, it can be said to characterize category three, and at this point in the observation it becomes germane to analyze the means by which this integration is achieved. These criterial standards which must be present in the instructional activity derive from the analysis of the concept of synthesis, and their application moves evaluation from contributory form to exemplified evaluation using the standards so developed.
SUMMARY

It has been proposed in this investigation that the philosophical analysis of evaluation form is a necessary a priori consideration to the activity of evaluating itself. The form of evaluation must logically derive from the purpose for evaluating, and non-reflective application of a form is unlikely to produce an informed result. An example of the means-ends relationship extant in the problem of evaluating synthesizing activity was developed, for such evaluation eludes the common application of instrumental, cause-effect measurement. Evaluation of the presence of synthesizing requires development of a form unique to the concerns of the evaluation, a means congruent with the aim, i.e. synthesizing skill, whose logical characteristics are also those of the activity to be measured. Such a form would not be concerned with evaluation of a product, but rather with the opportunity present for the practice of an activity, i.e. synthesizing. The form would provide for observation of the actual activity, but to identify it as a goal or end of instruction is irrelevant, for the ends and means in this instance are the same; to be able to synthesize is to engage in synthesizing, and to engage in synthesizing is to be able to synthesize.

Because an evaluative form is product-free, does not logically require it to be also goal-free. Indeed the goal is specified. Synthesizing is deemed a worthwhile competency, and evaluative efforts are directed at assessing the extent to which activity is present that will afford opportunity to develop this competency. The evaluation form so constructed in this paper has been designated as goal-specified, product-free, and derives from the conjunctive use of both contributory and exemplified evaluation.
INSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: PROBLEMS
AND PROSPECTS

Arthur Brown
Wayne State University

In speaking to the matter of institutional democracy, I am expanding on a theme which has been in one way or another addressed in the Friday evening sessions of the last three conferences of the Midwest Philosophy of Education Society. That theme is how to make compatible, if not even mutually supportive, a pair of potentially conflicting and interrelated values: the public good and the private good; freedom and equality.

Last year Gerald Gutek made a case for a renewal of democratic education.1 Aligning himself with the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill, Gutek took the position that the public good would be served through appropriate social, political, and educational policies supported by a consensus as to the "value of individual freedom of thought and expression." And the school would have a role in the development of such a consensus by engaging students "in the process of reflective, disinterested inquiry," and by acting "as a critic of society, of other institutions, of politics, and of the quality of human experience."

In his Presidential Address two years ago Laszlo Hetenyi considered the problem of collective bargaining, particularly in education.2 He contended that collective bargaining often eventuates in the sacrifice of the public good for the private goods of the negotiating parties. To resolve the conflict between the public and the private good, Hetenyi proposed arbitration by a group comprised of various elements of the political community.

Three years ago Freeman Butts laid out the larger dimensions of the problem.3 He noted that in the early years of this nation, education was conceived of as a means for supporting the public good, as a means for the development and the sustenance of a "political community." However, Butts observed,
the new conservatives--the Nisbets, Nozicks, Friedmans--disenchanced as they are with the bureaucracies created by leviathan institutions are recommending a form of pluralism so radical that it would seriously weaken the larger political community. As Butts put it:

We must give wide scope to religion and to pluralistic communities and the variety of ethnic heritages, but I do not believe that they can become primarily the basis for community in education. I believe rather that a renewed and revitalized political community for all its weaknesses should become the basis for cohesion and obligation in American education.

And he added:

... I think the highest priority for improvement on all levels of education for the next quarter of a century lies in our intensified search for education's role in achieving freedom, equality, and community... I believe the very highest priority should be given to the search for a viable, inclusive and just political community.4

In essence, Butts raised the following questions: How can we make democracy as a form of political, associational, and perhaps ideological, pluralism compatible with democracy as an ethical system which informs, infuses, and ties together separate group and private interests? And what will this mean for education? It is on this challenge of Butts that I should like to spend some time this evening. By focusing on institutional democracy, and the related matters of access and control, I shall try to add what I can to suggestions, such as those made by Gutek, Hetenyi, and Butts, as to how to harmonize the public good and the private good, and freedom and equality.

II

I use the term institutional democracy rather than industrial democracy because I wish not to confine myself merely to business and industrial organizations. And I prefer not to use the term economic democracy because it may imply, simply, economic equality, a leveling in income for the various members of an institution, which is not an essential feature of institutional democracy, at least as I conceive it. (I do happen to believe, however, that economic democracy may well occur in institutions which are democratically controlled.) Perhaps the term 'co-determination' or the term 'participatory management' would have served the purpose, but these terms omit the word democracy with its long history and powerful moral impact.
In any case, what I mean, generally speaking, by institutional democracy is a system which allows for broad participation in decision-making about vital institutional matters by all persons who work within a more or less discrete social institution, such as a school, a university, a business firm, a government agency.

In considering institutional democracy, I shall examine two problems: (1) the philosophic problem, of which there are two aspects, human rights and the means-ends relationship; (2) the practical problem, of which there are also two aspects, merit and efficiency. Making a distinction between the philosophic problem and the practical problem may not be justified, but for purposes of analysis it may be helpful.

With respect to human rights, I am concerned principally with two rights: (1) the right to the fullest possible development of one's understanding, that is, the fullest possible development of one's intellectual powers and moral sensibilities; and (2) the right to control, the right to participate in decisions which affect one's life. These rights are not independent of each other. Understanding provides a basis for action; the consequences of action modify one's understanding. If they are not rights by virtue of some natural or moral law, at least they are entitlements of citizens of a democratic society and should constitute the basis for democratic education wherever it may take place, in the school or elsewhere. I appreciate the fact that the problem of human rights is extremely complex; but I wish to limit myself to the two rights I have mentioned because they are general enough to provide a basis for some consensus and particular enough to have a direct bearing on the problem of institutional democracy.

I should like to pause for a moment to explain why I am not including among human rights certain rights such as the right to a guaranteed income, medical care, pensions, sick pay, etc. It is preferable, I think, to call such rights, welfare rights. This is not to say that they are unimportant. In fact, in agreement with Maslow and Marx, I believe that they may well be preconditions for the realization of human rights. But most welfare rights are contingent; social conditions will determine their character. With rare exceptions, this is not the case with human rights.

Insofar as institutional democracy is concerned, the distinction between welfare rights and human rights is of some significance. Much that is labelled participatory management consists of either a variety of paternalism, such as job security in exchange for company loyalty, or a mechanism for control by employees of certain limited conditions of work, like flex-time or job rotation. Such programs are better described as forms of "job enrichment" or "playing at participation"; they
may be regarded as welfare programs or welfare rights but are not to be confused with participation as a human right, that is, participation in making decisions about vital institutional matters. What is important in this connection is that a failure to make a distinction too often leads to the Faustian sacrifice, the sacrifice of human rights for welfare rights.

We are all familiar with the more blatant instances of such sacrifices in human organizations. But sometimes they occur over a period of time and so subtly that by the time they become noticeable, there is almost no turning back. What has happened to the university as a result of increasing dependence on the government for research funds is a case in point. More graphically illustrative, for our purposes, are the reasons for the change in Russia's attitude over the years toward the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from one of hostility to a certain degree of sympathy and even enthusiasm. As Maurice Cranston explains:

Why then did they change their posture: The political answer is plainly that the United Nations changed its field of interest [from human rights to welfare rights]. The concept of economic and social rights was as congenial to the Communists as the idea of political and civil rights was alien to them. And the more the economic and social rights were stressed, the more reconciled the Soviet Union became to the idea of human rights as a United Nations activity.

Returning to the matter of institutional democracy, why democracy in this country should be regarded by so many as merely a political system distinctive only by virtue of the franchise—the power to elect and control government officials—is difficult to comprehend. That the higher quality of life democracy promises and the philosophic justification for it are not commonly apprehended as applicable to institutional life is, I think, responsible, in part at least, for the fractionizing of society, for the excessive pluralism that militates against the construction of a cohesive political community.

If there is any validity to the idea that only in a democratic society can the rights I have indicated—understanding and control—be realized, and if there is any merit to the idea that having these rights is essential for personal growth and satisfaction, are we not forced to conclude that institutions within the larger society should also be democratic? And since institutional life is educative, and surely it is, is it not likely that the common understandings and commitments acquired through active institutional citizenship may somehow provide cohesiveness for the larger political community?
What I am saying is, of course, not original. It is as old as philosophy and as new as yesterday's research results. However they may differ in other respects, philosophers as unlike as Plato and Dewey, and behavioral scientists as dissimilar as Skinner and sociobiologist Edward Wilson, have understood the interactive relationship between the individual and society. Why, then, it may be asked, is the idea of institutional democracy alien to so many who are committed to the ideal of political democracy? Why is it not more widely recognized that just as the values of the political community will be reflected in the values of primary institutions and their members, so the primary institutions of social life—the family, the school, the work place, the university—responsible as they are for the development of personal habits, dispositions, attitudes, skills, and understandings, inevitably have an impact on the character of the larger political community? What I am alluding to seems to me so obvious that I hesitate to call on support. But I can't resist at least one look at Dewey on the subject, particularly since, on one hand, many who accept his views on political democracy often ignore his position on institutional democracy, and since, on the other hand, he has been of late accused of supporting conservative, if not reactionary, political and economic policies. The following passage is from Freedom and Culture, but any number of similar comments may be found elsewhere in Dewey:

The conflict of the moral Old and New Worlds as it concerns the democracy to which our history commits us is within our own institutions and attitudes. It can be won only by extending the application of democratic methods, methods of consultation, persuasion, negotiation, communication, co-operative intelligence, in the task of making our own politics, industry, education, our culture generally, a servant and an evolving manifestation of democratic ideas.

If there is one conclusion to which human experience unmistakably points it is that democratic ends demand democratic methods for their realization. Our first defense is to realize that democracy can be served only by the slow day by day adoption and contagious diffusion in every phase of our common life of methods that are identical with the ends to be reached.

III

Objections to institutional democracy are usually based on two practical considerations. One is that authority and access to positions of power should be based on merit. The other, not unrelated, is that considerations of efficiency militate against its implementation. First the problem of merit.
Ordinarily merit refers to some combination of ability and effort which provides the basis for social selection and, in a meritocratic society, for differentiated responsibilities and rewards hierarchically arranged. That only a relatively few in a given population are sufficiently meritorious to exercise legitimate authority in society or its institutions, that an aristocracy of some sort is part of the natural order is, as we all know, an idea deeply embedded in history. Furthermore, according to the elitist, not facing up to this natural order, to believe, as Edmund Burke said, in the "monstrous fiction" of human equality is to "inspire false ideas and vain expectations into men destined to travel in the obscure walks of laborious life" and to "aggravate and embitter that real inequality which it can never remove."8

I don't believe I would be overstating the case if I were to say that the idea that the "common man" is capable of leadership or judicious use of power has never received much credence, even among common men themselves. If the Federalist Papers are any indication, certainly the antipathy of our founding fathers to a system of inherited privilege and power was not paralleled with a rejection of a system based on the existence of an intellectual elite. And as the world becomes increasingly complex and difficult to understand and to manage, and as competition for limited status positions and resources becomes exceedingly acute, Platonic ideas of leadership and the application of meritocratic principles for access and control take on considerable attractiveness.9 But how to justify a management elite to be selected on the basis of natural superiority without violating the democratic principles of popular approval and equal opportunity--let alone satisfying demands for equality of condition--is no mean task. Enter intelligence testing and with it the nature-nurture problem.

Like old soldiers, the nature-nurture problem never dies; but unlike old soldiers, it never fades away. And I have no intention of trying to put it to rest. I leave that to the gods. In fact, I would avoid it like a plague if I could, and would heed the good sense of Constance Holden, who wrote in a recent Science article: "Anyone who decides to get embroiled in the I.Q. debate soon finds himself or herself in a bottomless morass in which the only way to get a toehold is to fall back on personal convictions."10 But the problem of biological differences is so basic to the question of merit and the justification of a meritocracy that it must be dealt with. I am by no means an expert on the matter, but since apparently no one is, I'll take the plunge without fear, knowing that my convictions, if nothing else, will sustain me. I shall try, however, to make our stay in the morass as painless as possible.

I shall examine four positions which relate the question of biological differences to the concepts of equality and meritocracy. I shall describe each position and follow with
a brief critical comment, including in the process reference to pertinent issues in education. Although the four positions I shall look at are somewhat extreme, they represent important segments of the nature-nurture controversy and should serve to put more moderate views in perspective.

The first position is one which denies that there is any evidence to support the contention that genetic differences in intellectual capacity truly exist. Consequently, the claim is made that a meritocratic system is without a theoretical base and equality is part of the natural order. Professors William Boyer and Paul Walsh in a provocative article published in the Saturday Review ten years ago, at the height of sentiment favoring the environmental thesis, took this position. "Current genetic theory," they claimed, "does not provide an adequate basis for deducing a theory of abilities,"11 and "... it is clear that the best supported general genetic or psychological theory does not validate the conclusion that individual intellectual capacity is innately unequal."12 They noted, further:

If it is true that people have inherently unequal capacities to learn, the American educational system is built on theoretical bedrock, and it helps construct a social order based on natural superiority. But if people actually have inherently equal capacities, the system is grounded in quicksand and reinforces a system of arbitrary privilege.13

Though they may err on the side of the angels, when egalitarians like Boyer and Walsh deny innate differences in mental capacities in order to "prove" the arbitrary nature of a meritocratic system, they defeat their own purposes. For if the evidence should indicate—as I believe it does14—that genetic differences do exist, the rationale for elitism would be indisputable. And when egalitarians attempt to justify equality on the presumption of intellectual identity, they commit the same logical error as do elitists. Equality is a human construct; its meaning is to be found in values to which people subscribe, not in the nature of things. If people want to create inequalities out of differences, they will do so, and, as history reveals, they could well select for such a purpose characteristics other than intellectual capacity, such as ancestry, physical strength, beauty, spirituality, charisma, and even lunacy (sometimes prized in both primitive and "advanced" cultures).

Ideologically inspired selective perception, as we know, is not uncommon, but it can prove very embarrassing. I am reminded that for many years and for reasons similar to those of Boyer and Walsh, official Russian science denied the existence of genetic differences. And for ideological reasons also, Russian scientists rejected Einstein's theory of relativity, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, Bohr's principle of complementarity, and Mendelian genetics.15
The second view, also highly egalitarian, accepts the existence of genetic differences but claims that they can be entirely eradicated by social intervention. As David Hawkins states the case in The Science and the Ethics of Equality:

My argument is simply that human beings can, ideally, attain equal levels of educated talent, knowledge, and creativeness in any area of human endeavor (italics mine).16

With regard to the potential power of education in producing equality, Hawkins offers the following illustration:

What I do not in the least doubt is that in a given milieu and subject to similar musical inducements and instructions, we will in fact display talents, and develop them, in a very unequal degree. But so likewise, I urge, different kinds of children—different genetically and in human nature and early choice—become musical along different pathways and yet grow to be equal in merit as musicians.17

Hawkins' radical form of environmentalism is central to the concept of mastery learning and is strongly implied, I believe, in the performance standards movement in education currently sweeping the country. It is a position which hereditarians and meritocrats, like Jensen and Herrnstein, attack with much relish—and perhaps for good reason. Even if we were to accept in principle the position of the radical interventionist, a concerted effort to overcome relevant biological differences in order to ensure social equality would encounter several difficult practical and ethical problems, such as: (1) the social costs entailed in ensuring that each person attain competence in at least some highly valued attribute; (2) employment imbalances even now manifesting themselves in unemployment and underemployment of college graduates and professionals in this and other Western countries; and (3) the violence done to individuals who prefer to march to the sounds of different drummers.

A third group of egalitarians attempts to overcome such objections to the radical interventionist position by invoking the Kantian principle that "each person should be treated as an end in himself." This principle serves as a rationale for the encouragement by society of the full flowering of individual differences without allowing for social distinctions. In his satire, The Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870-2033, Michael Young imagines such a society in England at the start of the 21st century when, with wars no longer a threat, and with occupational achievement to raise the national war potential no longer required, "intelligence" (based on I.Q. tests, naturally) would cease to be a qualification for power. The egalitarian principle is embodied in what Young calls the "Chelsea Manifesto," for reasons which will become obvious.
The classless society would be one which both possessed and acted upon plural values. Were we to evaluate people, not only according to their intelligence and their education, their occupation and their power, but according to their kindliness, their imagination and sensitivity, their sympathy and generosity, there would be no classes. Who would be able to say that the scientist was superior to the porter with admirable qualities as a father, the civil servant with unusual skill at gaining prizes superior to the lorry driver with unusual skill at growing roses? The classless society would also be the tolerant society, in which individual differences were actively encouraged as well as passively tolerated, in which full meaning was at last given to the dignity of man. Every human being would then have equal opportunity not to rise up in the world in light of any mathematical measure, but to develop his own capacities for leading a rich life.18

Now there is nothing that stirs the heart of an egalitarian more than a Chelsea Manifesto. And I have no intention of deprecating such an ideal; it stirs my own egalitarian heart. And it stirs the egalitarian hearts, in educational circles, of devotees of the various human potential movements, of advocates of values clarification, and of exponents of career education (at least those with genuine humanitarian motives) who promise a secular form of salvation through a restoration of the traditional work ethic and an acceptance of the "dignity of all labor." But a Chelsea Manifesto does not speak to the problems of political power or to economic policies or to human rights. And insofar as it does not speak to these matters, it can easily lead to domination and control by those sophisticated in the political process or by those with economic power. Without a just system of access and control, a Chelsea Manifesto could be a Circean song whose seductive qualities would make of society an Animal Farm. And when meritocrats sing the same song—as they do—egalitarians would do well to keep at least one eye open while they listen.

Having enlightened my egalitarian friends by showing them how they must face up to the facts, how they must be more logical, practical, and politically sophisticated, in all fairness I should do no less for those with whom I am not so friendly, the hereditarian-meritocrats. I turn then to one of their representatives, Richard Herrnstein. Herrnstein finds innate differences ineradicable and postulates the inevitability of a meritocratic system to be tempered, I would hope, by some humane ethic:

The measurement of intelligence is one of the yardsticks by which we assess the growing meritocracy, but other tests of human potential and performance supplement the I.Q. in describing a person's talents, interests, skills, and shortcomings. The biological
stratification of society would go on whether we had tests to gauge it or not, but with them a more humane and tolerant grasp of human differences is possible. And at the moment, that seems our best hope.19

Though Herrnstein finds "our best hope" in refinement of the diagnostic procedures used for the selection and sorting necessary to support a meritocratic system, his assumption fails to consider that social intervention, through education and other means, offers an even better hope for a "humane and tolerant" society. As Herrnstein himself admits, the level of intelligence (as measured by I.Q. tests) of the entire population would increase if society were to provide a favorable environment. But, according to Herrnstein, such a social policy would also produce an increase in the heritability of intelligence; that is, the phenotypic or observable differences between individuals would become increasingly a function of genetic differences. As a consequence, Herrnstein says, "the average person would be smarter, but intelligence would run in families," eventuating in a sharper social stratification than is even now the case.20 But the fact is that if we grant that an increase in the level of intelligence in the general population would occur as a result of intervention sufficient to enable most people to perform most social functions adequately, a selection based on so-called intelligence becomes increasingly arbitrary. What would it matter if heritability were 100%? For instance, what would it matter if the difference between A's I.Q. of 120 and B's I.Q. of 130 could be attributed entirely to genetic differences if an I.Q. of 120 represented sufficient potential for becoming a competent lawyer? In fact, this is the dilemma currently facing law schools and other professional schools as they struggle with the problem of selecting from among the tens of thousands of applicants who satisfy current standards of admission. Assuming the standards are reasonable and valid, selection of students with the very best grades and the very best aptitude scores is simply arbitrary. And the meritocratic system, in this case, a fraud. What is accomplished is the preservation of a hierarchical order in the guise of a meritocratic system. The former obviously does not imply the latter.

IV

Moving out of the nature-nurture morass, I should like to summarize my convictions. Biological differences do exist with respect to socially important human attributes. Although innate differences are not fixed, they are also not completely eradicable. And if they could be completely eradicated by powerful forms of intervention, it would entail inordinate social and personal investments, let alone serious ethical problems.
Nevertheless, when a system purports to be meritocratic, it cannot justify access to power and control merely on the basis of the fact that more or less obdurate biological differences exist. The selection process, if it is to be just, must be based on relevant differences. And when mild forms of intervention become increasingly available (as in affluent societies such as ours) to the point where relevant differences begin to diminish significantly (remember the lawyers with 120 and 130 I.Q.'s), selection becomes increasingly arbitrary. Under these circumstances, a just system might call for selection by lot, the method Plato thought would be logical for democracies to use in selecting their leaders. In all candor, after observing the "meritocratic" system in operation in the university as well as in society at large, I am prepared to conclude that for certain positions, selection by lot, at least from among plausible candidates, may not be all that bad. In fact, it is now being seriously suggested as a means for selecting students for medical schools.

Since it is true, I think, that a "natural" superiority with respect to certain valuable human attributes is an inescapable fact of life, some sort of meritocracy is, as a result, desirable, if not inevitable. Some people do make better chemists; some, better salesmen. But whether the native capacity required for making moral decisions, for participating in resolving important institutional matters, or for electing representatives to do so, is limited to so few that we need a management elite is highly questionable. For my part, I am inclined to say about an institution what Clemenceau said about war: it is too important to leave to the generals.

Speculation aside, what are the prospects for institutional democracy? We might agree that it is a philosophical desideratum, that it affords broad opportunity for enjoying certain human rights; we might agree that the normal person possesses the natural endowment for institutional citizenship; we might agree that by participating in institutional decision-making, by taking risks and assuming responsibilities, people are challenged, their intelligence developed, their sensitivities refined; we might agree that the personal growth made possible by institutional citizenship would redound to the political community and also could make for greater cohesiveness; and, finally, we might agree that institutional democracy could do much to minimize the tension between freedom and equality and between the public and the private good. But how do we answer the skeptic who claims that institutional democracy—however just it may be or however desirable in theory—won't work in a complex technological society; or that it is so inefficient that practical considerations must prevail and the traditional hierarchical system must be maintained? How do we answer the skeptics who see institutional democracy as "mobocracy?" What evidence do we have that the effort required for responsible institutional citizenship will be made? Would institutional democracy fail because, as Oscar Wilde once said about socialism, "it requires too many evenings"? I turn then to the question of efficiency.
For more than two decades now, a group of organizational theorists, including such figures as Joseph Scanlon, Douglas McGregor, Frederick Hertzberg, Chris Argyris, and E.F. Schumacher, have been arguing that when it comes to institutional efficiency, the scientific management people and the human relations theorists are wrong. The classic contrast was made by McGregor when he distinguished between two theories of management, Theory X and Theory Y. According to McGregor, Theory X, which features the hierarchical, organizational structure and the carrot and stick approach to motivation, is relatively ineffective in an affluent, educated society. As he put it:

Management by direction and control—whether implemented with the hard, soft, or firm but fair approach—fails under today's conditions to provide effective motivation of human effort toward organizational objectives. It fails because direction and control are useless methods of motivating people whose physiological and safety needs are reasonably satisfied and whose social, egoistic, and self-fulfillment needs are predominant.22

Much more effective, according to McGregor, is Theory Y, the theory of democratic management, which presumes the presence in all people of a capacity for assuming responsibility. It is, as McGregor said, a "process primarily of creating opportunities, releasing potential . . . , encouraging growth . . . " through arranging conditions whereby people can direct "their own efforts toward organizational objectives."23

For evidence to support his contention about the relative efficiency of participatory management, McGregor pointed to the results of experiments conducted during the 1950's in certain British coal mines, in a textile mill in India, and in an electronics firm in the United States.24 When workers were given some responsibility, the results were higher productivity, superior quality of product, less absenteeism, fewer strikes, and fewer discipline problems. My own reading in the field leads me to conclude that recent experiments with institutional democracy, in general, bear out McGregor's contention. Given the right conditions—and in industrialized societies and in societies with well developed educational systems, those conditions now exist—institutional democracy may be a far more efficient management system than a hierarchical system over which workers have little or no control. And despite the frustrations which inevitably occur when large numbers are involved in the decision-making process, people generally are more satisfied with their jobs and grow when challenged by the responsibilities of institutional citizenship.
I could point to the owner-operated plywood firms of the Northwest, which comprise about one-eighth of all the firms in the industry. Although they are run principally by people not trained to operate a modern business, the worker-owned firms exceed the productivity of privately-owned firms by more than 30%. And, I might add, all employer-workers—"floor sweeper, skilled panel-finisher, and accountant"—are paid the same wage.26

I could point to International Group Plans, an insurance company based in Washington, D.C., whose workers own half the business and attempt to run it democratically. According to Zwerdling:

The system does work—better than any other self-managed enterprise in the country, and, I would argue, better than any corporate system in America. Despite the problems and tensions at IGP, 340 rank and file workers and managers are operating a $60 million corporation — and making a profit — with a degree of freedom, democracy, and equality never before achieved by a major corporation in the United States.27

My favorite illustration is that described in a New York Times article a couple of years ago. For one reason or another the three schools in a small school district in Westchester County were left without principals. The district decided to allow the teachers, functioning in teams, to take on supervisory responsibilities. The experiment was so successful that the district formally asked the New York State Department of Education for permission to eliminate the position of principal and for the transfer of the duties of principal to the teachers.28

But this is neither the time nor the place to offer a comprehensive review of the literature on the subject. An excellent source of information has just been published by Daniel Zwerdling. It is entitled, Democracy at Work: A Guide to Workplace Ownership, Participation, and Self-Management Experiments in the United States and Europe.29 I wish to mention, too, that Professor Arthur Wirth, a member of our Society, who has had a long-standing interest in the subject, delivered an insightful and informative paper last month to the World Future Society on workplace democracy, particularly as it is developing in Sweden and Norway.30

Let me conclude with what I envision the future prospects of institutional democracy to be; what it may mean for reducing the tensions between the public good and the private good and between freedom and equality; and what it may imply for education. For a number of reasons, including a more highly educated populace, a heightened sensitivity to principles of justice, and the demands of the marketplace, the movement toward co-determination and toward worker owned and controlled business that we see in the
Scandinavian countries, in Germany, the Netherlands, and to some extent in England and France is, I think, too powerful to turn back. Legally mandated worker representation on the boards of business and industry in most of these countries is, I believe, the beginning of what I have called in this paper institutional citizenship. As a consequence, the lines separating management and worker will become increasingly blurred. If that should occur, freedom and equality will be more widely distributed. And one won't need to be a physician, a Harvard MBA, or a corporate president to enjoy a full measure of human rights and respect. Perhaps we can have our Chelsea Manifesto after all.

The acceptance of institutional democracy on a broad scale will depend, of course, on its being perceived as serving the several private goods as well as the public good. At the moment most labor leaders in this country seem to be ambivalent about, if not hostile toward, a system wherein labor and management become one and the same, or sit together to make policy. But some, like Irving Bluestone, a Vice-President of the UAW, believe it is the logical next stage in labor-management relations. Business leaders are not exactly enraptured by the prospect of workplace democracy. Yet, some industrialists, although not necessarily persuaded by principles of justice, see workplace democracy as the only way to save capitalism. And West German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, has expressed the view that Germany's social, economic, and political stability is in no small part attributable to codetermination.

It may be that I have claimed too much for institutional democracy. Perhaps because I am so strongly committed to it. I know it won't solve all of life's problems. The church will still have something to do; psychiatrists won't go out of business; and there may even be a place for philosophers of education. But I think that democracy in the workplace is a worthy and obtainable goal. And if it should develop in this country beyond the scattered experiments now going on, its implications for education are enormous. The limited vision manifest in so much of education today, with its emphasis on performance objectives, basic skills, and vocationalism, would be transformed—could it be possible?—to embrace an education fit for philosopher-kings.
NOTES


4 For guidance, Butts proposed that we look to John Rawls's two principles of justice: (1) "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal liberties compatible with a similar system for all;" (2) "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged . . . and (b) attached to affairs and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity."


12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
After reviewing the literature covering a 50 year period, Erlenmeyer-Kimling and Jarvik observed "a marked trend . . . toward an increasing degree of intellectual resemblance in direct proportion to an increasing degree of genetic relationship, regardless of environmental communality," and noted:

"... the orderliness of the results is particularly impressive if one considers that the investigators had different backgrounds and contrasting views regarding the importance of heredity. Not all of them used the same measures of intelligence . . . and they derived their data from samples which were unequal in size, age structure, ethnic composition, and socio-economic stratification; the data were collected in eight countries on four continents during a time span covering more than two generations of individuals. Against this profound heterogeneity, which should have clouded the picture, and is reflective by a wide range of correlations, a clearly definitive consistency emerges from the data." L. Erlenmeyer-Kimling and Lissey F. Jarvik, "Genetics and Intelligence: A Review," Science 142 (December 13, 1963): pp. 1477-1478.


Ibid., pp. 73-74.


Ibid., pp. 58, 63.

I hope that I do not give the impression that I think the case for institutional democracy rests on whether it is more efficient, in some quantitative sense, than non-democratic systems. I side with Rawls against the utilitarians in this matter. The reason I am considering the question of efficiency, as I said earlier, is that a major objection to institutional democracy is its supposed inefficiency.


Ibid., p. 15.


26 Ibid., p. 56.


29 Published in 1978 by the Association for Self-Management, 1414 Spring Road, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20010.

30 Arthur Wirth, "Two Futures for Education Work Relations: Technocratic vs. Socio-Technical Design." Wirth is at Washington University.

31 Although capital is controlled by a fairly small number of financial institutions, and their managers, actual ownership of these institutions as well as much of industry and business has over the years come into the hands of large numbers of people. Mortimer Adler has called this state of affairs, "universal capitalism." A new and significant element of universal capitalism is the pension fund. In a recent article entitled, interestingly, "Pension Power: Meet the New Masters of American Industry," Rifkin and Barber point out that pension funds now "constitute the single largest source of capital for the American economy," and "they are expected to provide almost one-half of all the external capital raised by U.S. corporations in the next decade." The potential for fund participants to control the economy of the country is beginning to dawn on unions. Among possible courses of action foreseen by Rifkin and Barber is the use by unions of their shares of stock to elect their own representatives to the boards of banks, thus enabling them to influence investment policies, and to "buy out companies and convert them into union-owned, worker-run firms." See Jeremy Rifkin and Randy Barber, "Pension Power: Meet the New Masters of American Industry," Saturday Review (September 2, 1978): pp. 11-15.

Response to the President's Address
Van Cleve Morris
University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

The concentration on "Democracy" in Professor Brown's paper, it seems to me, requires further elaboration. Specifically, a clear distinction needs to be made between macro-democracy and micro-democracy. These types of democracy must be distinguished in order to test Brown's thesis, namely, that we need more participatory democracy in American social life. Macro-democracy is what we have in the wider society; this kind of democracy has no ultimate goals. The process of participation is itself considered to be the end. There are no ultimate ideological purposes to macro-democracy, there are no final ideals that it is expected to obtain. Instead, the very ideology of not having any ultimate goals is itself considered to be the primary value of such a system.

In contrast, micro-democracy is the type of democracy we see exhibited in American institutional life. Specifically, we expect our organizations, associations, corporations, churches, educational institutions, labor unions, etc. to be democratic in character. What this means is that we would like to think that participation and openness characterize these institutions as much as the wider, macro-form of democracy. However, micro-democracy is characterized by having specific goals. Each institution in American life has a mission, a program, an explicit purpose to fulfill. This characteristic makes it differ sharply from macro-democracy which characterizes the wider society.

Micro-democracies, therefore, cannot be fully open because they do have a preordained ideology which is built around their institutional objectives. Individuals who do not conform to these objectives or who do not conduct their work in such a way as to fulfill the mission of the institution must be separated and cannot be accepted within the group. For example, we have seen in the past ten or fifteen years the American university bedeviled by individuals who do not share academic values. The university, as a micro-institution, cannot afford to embrace the behavior or ideas of people who are fundamentally opposed to academic values, chief of which is the free and open pursuit of truth. If, therefore, an individual who pretends to be a member of a university community announces that he will block the entrance to a building for any speaker who addresses his research to, say, race and IQ, is blatantly thwarting the basic purposes of the institution for which he works. This is the kind of
democracy which the university, as a micro-institution, cannot tolerate. This line of reasoning leads to the ultimate conclusion that at the micro-level, democracy is capable of producing bad and dangerous results. There is a limit, therefore, to the degree to which we can put into place Professor Brown's thesis of ultimate participatory democracy throughout American life.

There is one other point that might be made regarding this and that is that democracy, either micro- or macro-, requires liberty, equality and fraternity. It so happens that the third element, fraternity, has withered away not only in our institutional life but in the wider society as well. We now live in an epoch of me-ism, of looking out for No. 1, of protecting one's own life-space at all costs. In such a situation, the element of fraternity, of looking out for others, loses, and without this element, democracy is endangered.

The same point might be made in a slightly different way. Participation, contrary to our sentimental attitude toward it, does not always produce cohesiveness. Participation is a mode of group living which provides interchange of ideas. However, it also opens the door to interfering with other people and their work. In American universities, we have seen this inter-collegial interference exhibited frequently in the last several years. The university has been politicized, and the scholarly endeavors of well-meaning people have been brutally interrupted in the name of some vague and inarticulate social end.

For this reason, I believe that the university is the last place to start the revolution which Prof. Brown is asking for. Participatory democracy in a university is an invitation to obstruct scholarship as often as it is a medium of collegial communication.

As I have noted, this phenomenon is widespread throughout American higher education. The university is becoming more and more like the macro-society: everybody participates but education suffers because there is no longer any overarching purpose to it. The university in our time, Prof. Brown's and mine, no longer stands for a specific mission in contemporary life. I believe that that is the case because it has been allowed to fall into an unbridled mode of participatory democracy. If the university is to recover from this, it must return to its origins and to its institutional ideology of being the one place in American life in which teaching and learning can be liberated from political hassling. Whether or not American society is prepared to permit the university to resume that role is, to put it mildly, an open question.
There is little consensus in the philosophical community over the meaning of morality. The theories range from teleological and natural law ones which emphasize a kind of authoritative rationality to those of a more extreme existential emphasis which either reject the concept of objective morality and its accompanying notion of rationality, or they reinterpret the meaning of rationality without accepting a natural law morality.

To illustrate how diverse the meaning of morality may be, in some ethical theories the actor's intention is emphasized; in others the nature of the act is paramount; and in still other ethical theories the consequences of the act are important. One ethical approach is to equate morality with social conditioning. Berkowitz, for instance, defines morality as "evaluations of action believed by members of a given society to be right."\(^1\) This identification of morality has been made popular by some of the behaviorists who equate morality (although some behaviorists would not use the term 'morality') with conformity to an external stimulus or norm. But this theory of morality implies that the person is a rather passive agent who internalizes various external norms. Using a social conditioning approach, it would be difficult to evaluate persons such as Jesus Christ, Ghandi, Martin Luther King or other individuals who seemed to transcend their environment.

Although the social conditioning approach to morality is inadequate, the above does point out the ambiguity of the term 'moral.' At least Lawrence Kohlberg's position on morality has an advantage in that he gives supporting arguments against the social conditioning approach. Kohlberg distinguishes between a moral principle and a concrete rule of action. By principle he means "... a mode of choosing which is universal, a rule of choosing which we
want all people to adopt always in all situations."² According to Kohlberg, there are exceptions to rules but not to moral principles, and he further asserts:

A moral principle is a principle for resolving competing claims, you versus me, you versus a third person. There is only one principled basis for resolving claims: justice or equality. Treat every man's claim impartially regardless of the man.³

It is at this point that Kohlberg shows his Kantian bias, for he equates respect for persons with Kant's "act so as to treat each person as an end, rather than as a means." The principle of justice (respect for persons) is even higher than the law, or so Kohlberg suggests; for the claims of law are deduced from the principle of justice.

According to Kohlberg, there are more mature and less mature levels of moral reasoning. At the less mature levels, stages one through four, justice has various meanings. Stage one, for instance, incorporates a hedonistic concept of justice; while stage four implies a social contract theory of justice. It is only at stages five and six that the individual can begin to develop self-accepted moral principles; and this is Kohlberg's more mature notion of justice.

Kohlberg argues that it is possible to commit the naturalistic fallacy by moving from his description of what stage development is to a statement of what such development ought to be. This means that the latter stages are "higher" or "better" than the previous ones. Some psychologists, not to mention philosophers, disagree with Kohlberg. Mischel and Mischel insist that a particular moral stage is not necessarily morally superior to its predecessor.⁴ This is true even if a former stage is logically dependent on an earlier stage as the condition of its development. Mischel and Mischel's argument is based on ethical relativism. This relativism seems to be a necessary part of contemporary social science. Yet if social sciences make normative judgments concerning social action or ideology, they must demonstrate criteria by which to judge such states of affair. This seems to mean that moral hierarchies cannot be avoided. Of course, this does not mean that Kohlberg's position is evidence of the moral hierarchy.

Kohlberg argues that a moral hierarchy is demanded because a morality that respects the rights of others is superior to a moral system that does not. And he asserts that "the development of such a higher morality is a necessary condition for the kind of society whose members each have a fair chance at the pursuit of happiness or fulfillment."⁵

Yet there are numerous problems with Kohlberg's theory of moral development. Many critics recognize, for instance, that
Kohlberg does not sufficiently demonstrate the relationship between cognition and affect. Likewise he does not feel that moral development should include the development of positive habits. He de-emphasizes the concept of habit. Some critics point out that he has a rather behavioristic notion of habit in mind; a theory that is fairly easy to attack. I think it could be claimed with some certainty that Kohlberg sets up straw men. The habit example is a case in point.

It is interesting that almost half of Kohlberg's publications are a defense of the philosophical underpinnings of his theory. Yet it is essential to separate his philosophical considerations from his psychological ones. When this is done one finds that his philosophical theory does not justify his psychological one. His philosophical underpinnings are a necessary condition for his psychological claims but not a sufficient condition. This will be evident when we examine his stage theory.

There is much empirical evidence in support of the stage theory of moral development. This is especially striking in relation to the first four stages. Yet Kohlberg and his researchers claim that not only is there a sequence of stages, but that these stages form an invariant sequence. Even though there is research to suggest that there are six stages of moral development, the research only entitles one to assert that there are three levels of moral growth. The existence of six separate stages is not as empirically demonstrated as the existence of three levels--pre-conventional, Conventional and Post-conventional.

For example, Kohlberg divides the conventional level into two separate stages. Stage three is the one in which individuals reason about moral dilemmas by chiefly considering conformity to the wishes of other persons. At stage four the rationale is in relation to conformity to social rules. Norman Williams has suggested that these stages may not be separate ones, but are alternatives rather than sequences.

Kohlberg needs to be clearer on what he means by a stage. In his initial work he viewed a stage as a total gestalt or world view which ordered human experience. By these claims Kohlberg is attempting to refute the associationist or learning theory approach to moral development. But as Hall and Davis insist: "... the more we learn about the transition from one stage of moral thought to another, the closer the cognitive developmental approach is to an association model of social learning." They argue that there are crucial moral dilemmas for which one at a particular level of moral development is adequate to judge; and this would mean that moral development is a matter of social learning, not cognitive growth. Or there is another possibility: each stage may be adequate to judge any moral issue. If this is the case, then "moral issues will not facilitate development because there are no issues to which a given stage is adequate."
There is another problem with Kohlberg's stage theory mentioned by Hall and Davis. They write that "individuals think in different ways about specific moral issues rather than in any consistent pattern about moral questions in general."\(^{12}\) If moral development is situation-specific then Kohlberg's stage scheme needs to be modified or abandoned. If this situation-specific consideration is a proper analysis of Kohlberg's position, it seems that an individual may be at one stage on a particular issue and at another stage on a different issue. This would contradict Kohlberg's notion of irreversibility.

Another problem with Kohlberg's scheme is that it is difficult to know whether the stages are strictly consecutive. If they are consecutive then when one progresses to a new stage of development she or he leaves behind the criteria used at the previous stage of moral reasoning. Or the stages could be cumulative so that the development from one stage to the next demands an entire "reinterpretation of the previous mode of thought."\(^{13}\)

It appears that in Kohlberg's early studies he accepts a consecutive view, for the definition of stage three means that stage two is mutually exclusive, for instance. As was suggested previously, it may be the case that an individual can be at two stages at the same time. At any rate, Kohlberg has not supplied definitive evidence for either the consecutive or the cumulative view of stage development.

Likewise Kohlberg has difficulty in defending the thesis that stage six is the "highest" stage of moral development. He makes a further claim when he insists that stage six incorporates a more comprehensive concept of justice than any of the preceding stages.\(^{14}\) At some points he defines justice in relation to impartiality and universality; a contention he claims he arrived at through his reading of Kant, Hare and Rawls. But Kohlberg's definition of justice is only one among many, and it is a philosophical preference on his part to choose deontological considerations rather than teleological ones. Kohlberg continues to argue that his theory of justice contains formal criteria, such as those used by Kant. Yet it seems to be the case that Kohlberg's theory of justice is based on other normative principles, not only those explicated by Kant. The principle of respect is a case in point. This means that Kohlberg's definition of justice is not as formal as he imagines.

As many critics have pointed out, Kohlberg's definition of justice is quite ambiguous.\(^{15}\) He identifies justice in at least three ways: as the preservation of the rights of individuals, as a universal mode of choosing, and as respect for persons. At times he seems to confuse justice and equality. And although these views of justice are not necessarily mutually exclusive, they do differ. For instance, the principle of respect for persons is a broader concept than that of the preservation of rights. By defining justice in this manner Kohlberg is contradicting him-
self, for these three notions of justice are substantive principles not formal properties.

One wonders why Kohlberg chose the preceding three definitions of justice, for there are other definitions, such as utilitarian ones. Thus there are other principles which are universalizable and which can define the stage six individual. This makes it clear that his definition of justice is a preference on Kohlberg's part and is not derived from his psychological research.

Kohlberg also maintains that the principle(s) of justice is (are) the "highest" moral principle(s). This is confusing when he equivocates on the meaning of the principle of justice. Yet Kohlberg asserts that there is almost universal philosophical agreement that the principle of justice is "higher" than other principles, such as equality or freedom. He even makes the questionable claim that Kant, Rawls and Dewey share a similar concept of justice. This claim is certainly mistaken, for there are many competing notions of justice, and Kant's deontological view differs radically from Dewey's instrumentalism.

Kohlberg's position leads to troublesome consequences. It turns out that stage six is not really the stage of self-accepted moral principles at all, for Kohlberg has definite principles in mind. Likewise Kohlberg insists that the major difference between the fifth and six stages of moral development is that stage six incorporates the notion of civil disobedience. At least this is the example Kohlberg consistently gives when discussing the sixth stage. But if civil disobedience is one principle involved in the stage six individual's moral reasoning, then Kohlberg's analysis is based on substantive principles, not on the existence of cognitive structures, a point that was made earlier. Hall and Davis write:

The question is whether Kohlberg has drawn an adequate distinction between stages five and six or not, that is, a distinction which is truly based on cognitive development rather than on differing moral opinions.

As Israeli Aron points out, Kohlberg's views would not be as problematic if he would stick to empirical claims; but he is not merely content with a description of how individuals make moral judgments. He is also concerned with a philosophically adequate moral theory. This is where Kohlberg enters the den of philosophers, for "... he tries to form a bridge between the descriptive and the prescriptive, between the 'is' and the 'ought' which has long troubled moral philosophers."

Kohlberg gives two types of justification for the adequacy of his stage theory. As we have previously seen, the first type of justification is a philosophical one in which he argues that each stage is philosophically more adequate than the preceding
stage. Aron goes on to suggest that his second defense is a logical one—that of the logical necessity of the hierarchy of stages. But Kohlberg often does not distinguish the philosophical arguments from either the empirical or the logical ones.

This logical defense presupposes that each stage is more adequate than its predecessor because each stage represents a more differentiated and integrated conception of morality. But Kohlberg's use of "differentiation" and "integration" are used so narrowly "that their standing as independent criteria of rationality is questionable."23

"Differentiation" and "integration" refer to biologically given structuring tendencies. This is found also in the work of Piaget. Each moral stage is differentiated because it is contended that it is more adequate (philosophically and logically) than the preceding stage. According to this argument, stage five is less differentiated than stage six, for instance. Each stage is differentiated from the preceding one because each successive stage includes a more fair and impartial notion(s) of human life and worth.

Yet Kohlberg's concept of "differentiation" is problematic because he does not justify why it is more rational to consider the value of human life as a categorical moral principle, as opposed to some other value, property, for example. Until Kohlberg supplies the missing link among various notions of "differentiation," his argument will continue to be problematic.

Secondly we need to examine Kohlberg's concept of "integration." He claims that each stage is a progressive integration of various aspects of morality, justice and obligation, to mention two. But again he does not supply evidence, either empirical or logical, to demonstrate that each stage is a positive integration of various moral concepts, unlike Piaget who supplies such evidence for the logical development of his cognitive stages. Aron writes:

'Integration' has become the correlation of rights and duties and the inclusion of social welfare considerations in moral thinking. Once these terms are given such specialized interpretations, their standing as independent criteria is open to doubt.24

Thus, both Kohlberg's philosophical and logical justifications of his stage theory are problematic. We have questioned his deontological suppositions as well as his justification for the adequacy of his stage theory. But the previous criticism does not mean that Kohlberg's theory of moral development is worthless. This merely indicates that his theory needs to be grounded in more adequate philosophical and logical rationale.
Notes


3. Ibid., p. 72.


5. Ibid., p. 7.


12. Ibid., p. 102.

13. Ibid., p. 103.

15. Hall and Davis, p. 104.


17. Craig, "Form, Content and Justice in Moral Reasoning."


20. Ibid., p. 105.


23. Ibid., p. 205.

24. Ibid., p. 206.
OBJECTIVITY IN HISTORY: A
COMMENT CONCERNING HISTORICAL METHODOLOGY

Charles E. Litz
Kansas State University

PREFACE

During the turbulent 1960's revisionist historians offered an alternative to the traditional laudatory version of American educational history. Much has been made of the substantive differences between the traditional interpretation of our educational heritage that prevailed until the 1950's and the revisionist view of the origins and development of the American educational enterprise. Differences are certainly present. Whereas traditionalists such as Ellwood P. Cubberley, Amory D. Mayo, and James P. Wickersham extolled the public school as the bulwark of democracy, the key to national greatness, and the primary agency for social mobility, revisionist historians Colin Greer, Clarene J. Karier, Michael B. Katz, and Joel Spring are pessimistic about the genesis and purposes of public education. They perceive the school as an engine of pernicious social conformity, an index of national failure, and a tool of a racist society.¹

Despite these clear differences, there are similarities between the two interpretations of American educational history which are significant and disturbing. Both views are whiggish in that they subordinate the past to the present. Traditionalist and revisionist alike make direct connections between events and institutions separated by many decades and thus misunderstand the differences between the past and the present.² Both interpretations are didactic, that is, they attempt to convince educators to adopt a specific attitude toward future developments in public education. They both, therefore, run the risk of distortion which is inherent in any polemical view of history.

The traditionalist and the revisionist also share the misdeed of oversimplification which is endemic to the whig version of history. Both tend to view the educational past as either totally beneficial or a conspiracy against the poor and ethnic minorities. While the traditionalist argues that the schools and their impact were democratic and humanitarian, the revisionist maintains that the schools and schoolmen were involved in an invidious and fundamentally manipulative endeavor.³
Both schools of thought tend to construct rigid categories on intent. They do not appear to recognize any difference between intention and outcome. For example, many revisionist historians ascribe less than noble intent to the actions of nineteenth century reformers. They usually disregard the possibility that the sometimes harmful consequences of reform activity may well have been fashioned by historical accident. There is, after all, a difference between being wrong in the long run and being just plain capricious. In the narrative of both historical views there are good men and bad men but seldom honestly confused ones. This proclivity for identifying historical figures as either saints or sinners distorts not only the narrative, but also oversimplifies what is known about the complexities of human motivation.

The point is that while the attitude of the traditionalist toward the genesis and expansion of public education is one of acceptance and the revisionist one of rejection, both operate in the same whiggish either-or, black-white, good-evil interpretive framework. There is not much complexity in such a historical vision and hence scant recognition of the intricacy of human affairs. Both explanations of our educational heritage fail to perceive adequately the raggedness of human experience, the tension between individual desires and social demands, and the relationship between consensus and conflict in our educational past.

Revisionists have advanced educational historiography from childhood into adolescence, an age of anger, alienation, and rebellion against established institutions. Although the child-like devotional view of the American public school has generally given way to the critical, the interpretive framework remains virtually unchanged. Like the traditional interpretation, the revisionist view is flawed in that it tends to be whiggish and polemical.

The realization of a more mature explanation of our educational heritage will not be easy. The interpretive framework employed in the childhood and adolescent stages of American educational historiography must be discarded. A mature interpretation of the origins and development of public education should seek neither to blindly praise nor bitterly condemn the school but rather to understand it as an institution which often embodies social consensus as well as conflict. It must also incorporate within itself room for suspended judgment, an understanding of the complexities of motive and action, and a willingness to allow for a certain amount of indeterminacy.

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3 See Greer, pp. 3-79.

Over the last twenty-five years a number of historians have grappled with the recurrent problems of methodology in historical studies hoping to advance the idea that history is, in the fullest sense of the word, a genuine science. Among the better known and more philosophically inclined historians the question of the nature of history has taken on added importance in the past few decades because of assertions made by R. G. Collingwood and others that the distinctive feature of intellectual life in this era is that of the rise of history as an autonomous discipline. The question then is: What is the nature of history, science or muse?

Before we can say with any degree of certainty whether or not history is a science we must address ourselves to the "difficulty of whether, and in what sense, historians can hope to attain objective knowledge." Objectivity is requisite in scientific endeavors and without it a body of knowledge becomes mostly inferential. Inference, though an important aspect of science, cannot be the sole foundation upon which a science is constructed.

Before I make any claims either for or against history as a science, I will clarify what science means to a significant number of historians, a view best summarized by R. G. Collingwood: "Whether history is a science... need not be asked; for in the tradition of European speech, going back to the time when Latin speakers translated the Greek ἡ σαπισία by their own word scientia, and continuing unbroken down to the present day, the word, science means any organized body of knowledge." Collingwood, by using the traditional humanistic definition of science, placed history squarely in the scientific camp.

A second definition of science, one that is widely accepted, states that science is concerned with observation, classification, and the establishment of verifiable general laws. In this sense, history is placed outside the realm of the scientific and will remain so unless historians can conjure up (as Toynbee tried) some general laws that are applicable to the study of history. Historians generally "do not regard it part of their aim to establish (general) laws" and it would appear that they have disqualified themselves from inclusion under the second definition given above. However, this does not mean that such "historical laws" do not, in fact exist.

Since most historians do not consider it the business of history to establish general verifiable laws it is my contention that Collingwood's definition must be utilized if we are to give meaning to "scientific" history. History, as most knowledgeable people will agree, is an organized body of knowledge and, like the science of geology, has been constructed in an attempt to create a truthful picture of the past. But how can this truthful rendering be done if the historian brings into the milieu of time past his prejudices and preconceptions? It would seem then that the crucial element in a scientific history would be the objectivity of the historian.
W. H. Walsh, an English philosopher, has defined objectivity as dealing with "a body of propositions . . . that are such as to warrant acceptance by all who seriously investigate them. Thus we describe the result of a particular piece of work in physics as making a contribution to objective knowledge when we think that any competent physicist who repeated the work would reach those results. The point of description is to emphasize the universal character of scientific thinking: the fact that it is impartial and impersonal, and in consequence communicable to others and capable of repetition."6

Historians, like all individuals engaged in research, do not approach their subject in a mental vacuum, nor do they involve themselves in areas of study in which they have little or no personal interest. The foregoing statement is as true of the historian as it is of the physicist, yet history and historians in general, have been constantly confronted with the criticism that preconceptions and prior commitments to "schools of historical thinking" make it nearly, if not outright, impossible for the historian to create an objective historical narrative. What makes the critics think this is so?

In Walsh's definition of objectivity he mentions that a proposition is objective if it warrants "acceptance by all who seriously investigate it . . ." General acceptance then is an important criterion that must be satisfied if objectivity is to be obtained. The critics of history need not look far or deeply to discover the fact that there are few (if any) theories or interpretations in history that are without abundant opposition within historical circles. For example, Toynbee's "comparative method" in which he compared twenty-one societies is opposed by such historians as Collingwood, Taylor and Chester G. Starr to name but a few. There is also no agreement among historians as to which, if any, of the many historical interpretations is true, nor is there any general agreement concerning the methodology that should be utilized in dealing with historical evidence. An example of the latter is Collingwood's idea that historical evidence should be interpreted through a re-enactment of past experiences by the historian himself. The historian must re-enact the past in his own mind and draw what conclusions he will from the process. Everything then depends on the creative imagination of the historian. This empathic idea is scoffed at by many in the historical community.

It appears from these examples that history fails to meet the specifications proposed by Walsh's definition of objectivity. History, though often impartial and impersonal, cannot as a method or set of laws, be "communicable to others and capable of repetition." If Walsh's definition is unattainable then the only scientific claim that can be made for history rests in our first and much weaker assertion: that it is scientific only in that it is an organized body of knowledge. Either Walsh's definition is too restrictive or limited, or history must be considered purely a literary art form.
Walsh has, I suggest, defined objectivity too narrowly and has confused the term, in a vague way, with neutrality.

To write objectively is to present all reliably known facts and arguments that are believed to be relevant to a particular judgment. In history there is no need to pad the subject matter with superfluous or irrelevant facts. As for the creation of propositions that "warrant acceptance by all who seriously investi-gate them" this, it seems, excludes the analyzing and conclusions of the individual historian, the actual creation of an historical work. Those who argue that for the sake of objectivity we must not draw personalized conclusions from materials under study are intellectually tepid and not realistic as this is the central force of interpretive history.

To be totally objective, impartial, and impersonal is not the same as to be neutral. The historian who fails to take a position either for or against a policy, action or statement, or who never pronounces a movement or person right or wrong, guilty or not guilty, is not objective at all, because he has allowed his desire for neutrality, or objectivity in the narrow sense of Walsh, to interfere with the performance of his duty: to state the facts as he sees them, to analyze and interpret those facts and draw what he honestly believes to be appropriate conclusions from the evidence. It is better to create rational dissent than to give the impression that history consists of being on both sides of every question without ever clarifying anything.

History, unlike the natural and social sciences, has no special concepts of its own and also lacks a uniform methodological approach for formulating historical narrative, and although historians use rigorous (though varied) methods to establish conclusions, those conclusions are not deemed "general verifiable laws" but are instead particularistic.

Why is it that historians cannot formulate general laws? An objection has been made that historical phenomena are unique and therefore cannot be studied through a repetitive and empirical process. The counter argument to this claim is that the same event never repeats itself exactly in nature and that all we need for the formulation of general laws are recurrent instances of the same type of event under instances of the same type of conditions. If the relevant variables, and they are not usually all identifiable, could be isolated it might be possible to establish something very akin to broad general laws in history, but as historians deal with a complex of antecedent conditions and events it seems unlikely that they will be able to do so.

History then has no general laws because of the problems involved in variable identification and because when a law is formulated on the basis of historical evidence it is usually classified under one of the social sciences. For example, when economists
study business cycles they use historical descriptions of past business cycles. History then, in this sense, becomes a manner or method of studying subject matter in all of the natural and social sciences.

The historian in the process of constructing a historical narrative employs the general concepts and laws of the social sciences--political, sociological and economic--for if this were not so they would find that historical explanation would be impossible and that the product of their labor would be only annalistic, and annalistic chronology is not history in the modern sense of the term. The crucial methodological problem facing the historian is the use of laws, principles and concepts that are the property of the social sciences. It is at this juncture that the above mentioned disagreements among historians arise.

As an example of how historians utilize laws, concepts and principles of the social sciences in their work let us consider the following statement: "The American Revolution came about because of the 'intolerable' economic conditions suffered by the colonial business sector." (I am not arguing that this statement is historically correct, but it will suffice as an example)

The word 'intolerable', as descriptive of the then prevailing economic conditions means that the conditions were such that the colonials could not tolerate them; thus we can assume that the colonials would in some manner try to alter or change their social and economic conditions. The historian specifies the antecedent conditions which created the need (desire) for change and these conditions will, I argue, show why the word 'intolerable' is correct and may be fitted to a scientific description in genetic form: conditions a, b, c, and d created the need for R (revolution). At this point the historian points out that under conditions a, b, c, and d the social and economic conditions are such as to create a "deliberate" response (revolution) on the part of the people, a psychological explanation for the reasoning behind the revolution is introduced.

The historian has not himself assumed a general law concerning revolutions, he does not state that whenever social and economic conditions a, b, c, and d are evident then the corresponding psychological feeling of oppression will exist and will be followed by a revolution. If he did make this proposition then he would in effect be proposing a general law and this could be done only after an examination of all revolutions throughout the known scope of history and, more importantly, the disclosure of an invariant relationship among certain variables in all revolutions.

The foregoing problems involved in the study of history imply that history is not in itself a science in the meaning of our second definition of that term. It would appear then that the historical method of inquiry which is so reliant on the "creative
imagination" of the historian and his ability to piece together a narrative assuming concepts from outside his own discipline is, if the term be not contradictory, "a conjectural science, or, in other words, a subjective science."10

To write off history on the grounds that it is "subjective" cannot be justified unless it is meant that a historian in making a historical statement has allowed his particular feelings and prejudices to lead him into error, or falsehood. In this case his statement should be described, not as subjective, but as plainly untrue. Every statement made by any historian is subjective in the sense that it attempts to express the truth as seen from the standpoint of a limited individual. Of course, this does not mean that one can never arrive at objective truth. Historians are not forever shut up within their own subjectivity; this would follow only if the terms 'subjective' and 'objective' were mutually exclusive and if the fact of seeing the truth from a limited viewpoint meant to say that the historian was seeing no truth at all. Subject and object are complementary terms describing two things in their relationship to each other; they are then complementary.

Because a historian can see only the truth from a limited standpoint does not mean he is incapable of seeing any of the truth. It would be wrong to say that I am not seeing my typewriter at all because I can only see it from one aspect at a time. What I am seeing is a typewriter as a whole but not every detail of it. Similarly, historians may be unable to know the 'whole truth about any particular event, but to say they know nothing about it is not so.

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6Walsh, op. cit., p. 96.

7If this is the case then psychology, sociology and even astronomy fail to meet the criterion put forth in Walsh's definition. There is no one "accepted school" of thought in any of these areas of study.

This argument was forwarded by Stephen Tonsor at the University of Michigan in the winter of 1967.

I propose to examine the question whether it is possible to construe education as a universal right of children. Although I shall not argue the case here, I would contend that whether or not education is viewed as a right of children has a bearing upon the nature and justification of such matters as academic freedom for teachers and/or learners, codes of professional ethics for teachers, required studies, and compulsory schooling.

I shall proceed by examining several positions found in current rights literature which provide grounds for arguing that children do not have a universal right to education. It will be argued that these positions do present certain difficulties which permits one to question their force. And lastly I shall offer a brief sketch of a type of argument that might be used to support the claim that children do have a universal right to education.

Obviously, one position which would obviate any claim that children have an educational right is one which assumes that humans have no rights whatsoever. At this time, except for a passing reference in the last section of the paper, I intend to leave the general problem of rights justification to those with more fortitude than I. The three positions I wish to examine are those which assume the existence of human rights in some sense, but provide grounds for arguing that children do not have a universal right to education. Roughly these three positions are as follows:

1. The having of a right is contingent upon socio/legal recognition or acceptance of a claim to a right (positivistic rights theory).

2. Education is excluded from the class of universal rights.

3. Children are excluded from the class of rights bearers.

Positivistic Theories of Rights

I am viewing Bertram Bandman's position as illustrative of the view that in order for something to exist as a right it must
in fact receive some form of recognition by action of a socio/legal system.

Two recent papers by Bandman seem to advocate this position. For example, he asserts, "Evidence that a claim to a right is a right, comes, for example, with legal incorporation and social and moral recognition . . . ."¹ This, of course, is not a definition of a right but is rather an evidential test deemed sufficient for asserting that a right exists.

The definition which Bandman recently proposed is as follows: "A right is a just (or justified) entitlement for making effective claims and demands."²

There seem to be two necessary defining properties asserted here:

1. A right must function as a justified entitlement for making claims, and

2. The force of asserting these claims must be effective (presumably resulting in the kind of socio/legal recognition mentioned in the evidential test noted above).

This appears to mean that the effectiveness of a rights claim in achieving socio/legal recognition is both a necessary condition (by definition) and a sufficient condition (by evidential test) for establishing the presence of a right.

Now if one depends upon the evidential test of effects for assuring the presence of a right, then a child's right to an education is contingent upon:

1.1 The forwarding of a claim by someone that the child has a right to education, and

2.1 The claiming in fact being successful in effecting socio/legal recognition of the claimed right.

Thus, in order for education to be a universal right of children:

1.2 Someone must claim education to be a right of all children, and

2.2 The claiming must in fact be successful in effecting universal recognition of the claimed right (By all societies? All cultural groups? All nation states?).

It is obvious that condition 1.2 has been met. It is not so obvious that condition 2.2 has. Even if condition 2.2 is met at
one point in time, a given group could withdraw its recognition of the claimed right and education would then no longer be a right for some children and hence no longer a universal right for children.

On this interpretation of Bandman we discover a curious consequence. According to Bandman, 'if I am correct, a right is both a justified entitlement for claim making and also provides the persuasive force for gaining social acceptance when the claim is issued. Since the effective persuasive force of the claimed right is both necessary (by definition) and sufficient (by evidential test) for asserting the existence of a right, then it follows that this effect is a sufficient condition for asserting the presence of the other defining property of a right (i.e., a justified entitlement for making the rights claim). 3 Further, the presence of the justification property turns out to be necessary for the occurrence of the persuasion property. 4

But surely this is strange. In what field of inquiry are we prepared to say that an acceptance of claim by a community is a sufficient condition for asserting its justification or that the claim's justification is necessary for its acceptance? Normally, I think, we would say that justification is not always necessary for community acceptance. Members of the community may be persuaded to accept unjustified claims. Likewise, we would not want to say that community recognition of the claim is a sufficient condition for judging the justification status of the claim. Again, the majority, or the official keepers of truth and goodness, may be mistaken for all sorts of reasons.

Ideally a community of disciplined inquirers comes to give assent to a claim by virtue of its justification. Thus the acceptance status of a claim in such a community may function as a reliable indicator of the current justification status of the claim but hardly a sufficient condition for asserting its justification. 5 However, in communities where disciplined inquiry is not the norm or is actively undermined, community acceptance or rejection of claims does not even function as a reliable indicator of justification status.

However, my major concern with positivistic rights theories is their lack of recognition of the possibility of distinguishing the category of moral rights from the category of socio/legal rights. This distinction is not based upon the content of a purported right (what one is supposedly entitled to) but rather it is based upon the logical status of the purported right. But surely to speak of that to which one is morally entitled requires one to enter a universe of discourse logically distinct from that universe of discourse used to speak of what one is entitled to by law or social norm. A major distinguishing feature here is the sort of grounds one appeals to and the sort of arguments one uses.
in justification attempts. Whether or not one has or will have 
given socio/legal rights depends upon what in fact the social 
group or social authorities have done or will do. What we use 
here is certain empirical evidence that legislative or judicial 
actions or community norms indeed recognize that persons are en-
titled to certain sorts of things or that social and legal trends 
permit prediction that such will be the case. But attempts to 
make the case that one is entitled to something on moral grounds 
(that one has a moral right) requires morel argument which cannot 
be managed solely via sociological and legal research.

Of course, if one could make the emotivist case that moral 
discourse is cognitively meaningless, then it could be asserted 
that one can only make conceptual sense of human rights talk if 
it refers to socio/legal realities. Or one could try to show 
that after all moral discourse can be reduced to descriptive dis-
course. But I am satisfied at this point that neither emotivist 
nor reductionist attempts have fared very well. Thus, if one 
can maintain a logical distinction between the two sorts of rights 
statements, it is not at all impossible to imagine cases wherein 
persons can be said to be morally entitled to something and at 
the same time to observe that the community in fact does not 
recognize that right by socio/legal action of any sort. Hence, 
contrary to Bandman's definition of rights, it would not be a 
contradiction to assert that children had a universal right to 
education (on moral grounds) even though the issuance of the 
claim to that right was not in fact effective in gaining socio/
legal recognition in some cases.

The Attempt to Exclude Welfare Rights

Maurice Cranston has argued that so-called welfare rights, 
which would include the right to education, cannot be regarded 
as universal rights.6 Hence, if in any case a child can be said 
to have a right to education it would be a matter of some sort 
of special right (The Right of the Citizens) rather than a human 
or universal right.

Cranston proposes three tests which necessarily must be met 
by any member of the class of universal rights: 1) Universality, 2) 
Importance, and 3) Practicability. Cranston's strongest at-
tack upon the inclusion of welfare rights in the category of 
universal rights is based upon the test of practicability or 
possibility.

As I understand it, Cranston's argument is:

1. Assume that in a certain situation it is impossible 
for anyone to provide X person or group with that 
which is asserted to be a welfare right (say food 
sufficient for minimal nutrition).
2. Since "ought or obligation implies can" and since ex hypothesi no one can then it follows that no one ought. That is, no one can be said to have the obligation to provide Y for X in this situation.

3. Since all rights imply obligation on the part of someone else, and since no one in this situation has the obligation to provide Y to X, then X cannot be said in this instance to have a right to Y.

4. If any person does not have the right to Y, then having Y cannot be a universal right.

Further, we can note that the possibility of providing any given set of welfare conditions is contingent upon society's capability which varies with time and place. Lack of capability (and hence lack of obligation) is always a possibility for any given set of welfare conditions in given societies at given times. Thus, generalizing from the previous argument, one can conclude that welfare conditions cannot be a matter of universal right.

The "ought implies can" rule of the "obligation implies possibility" rule is a crucial element in this argument. I wish to offer a crude distinction between what I shall call (I) impossibility in principle, and (II) instantial impossibility. Any proposed action which would constitute a logical impossibility or a violation of the laws of nature would be a case of impossibility (I). An action which is not a case of impossibility (I) but which cannot be performed in a given case because of contingent conditions is a case of impossibility (II). It does seem to me that the "obligation implies possibility" rule does properly rule out obligations requiring actions which in principle are impossible. However, it is not the case that occasions of instantial impossibility necessarily void obligations and hence rights.

Obligations call for actions (intentional doings or forbearings) of some sort. Roughly put, the following may be viewed as necessary conditions for the possibility of an agent's performing an act in a given instance.

1. The act must be possible in principle.

2. Local conditions must provide an opportunity for the action's performance.

3. The agent must have an actualized capacity for performing the act given opportunity (know-how).

4. The agent must possess some minimal understanding of the presence of the opportunity, the presence of his/her capacity and the relationship between the two.
Obviously if condition (1) is violated we have a case of impossibility (I). If any of the other conditions (or combinations thereof) is missing then one has a case of impossibility (II) with respect to the action.

Conditions (3) and (4) are knowledge conditions (know-how and know-that). Surely we wouldn't want to say that ignorance entails the absence of responsibility or obligation in every case. The drunken driver who "forgets" his know-how is not suddenly relieved of all obligation for the safety of others and can be held blameworthy if she/he fails to meet these obligations. However, failure to meet an obligation does not in itself necessarily establish blameworthiness.

Absence of the opportunity conditions (2) likewise does not necessarily erase obligation. If I borrow money from Jones and promise to repay the loan on a given day, my debt is not erased if I can't find Jones or if the bank fails without forewarning and I lose all I have. In this case I can't very well be held blameworthy but my debt, my obligation, still stands and Jones still has a right to repayment. What we say here is that I find it impossible to honor my obligation and not that I have no obligation.

Thus it does seem that instantial impossibility due to ignorance or lack of opportunity does not automatically permit the inference that obligations and rights are non-existent although it does mean in such cases that obligations cannot be discharged nor rights fulfilled. Thus to accept that there can be instances under which certain welfare conditions cannot be met does not automatically imply the absence of obligation and hence the absence of a right. And so the fact that for some reason it may be impossible to provide a given child or group of children with adequate education does not by itself imply that they do not have that right or that education is not a universal right of children.

The Attempt to Exclude Children From the Class of Rights Bearers

One would surely hesitate to attribute the possession of rights to turnips. The reason seems to be that turnips evidence no capacity for functioning as rational moral agents. As Crittenden notes:

Some might argue that the reason and condition for recognizing a being as having the moral status that rights involve is that it can act as a moral agent and be held responsible for what it does.9

But what of the human child? One might say that status as a moral agent is a necessary condition for possession of rights, and that in childhood one does not have the capacity to function fully as a moral agent, and that consequently children cannot
be said to have rights (or to have full rights).

The consequence of H. L. A. Hart's position is the same. Hart contends that a necessary condition for having any right whatsoever is the equal right to be free from coercion and restraint and that this extends only to those capable of choice ("any adult human being capable of choice").

One is reminded of J. S. Mill's insistence in the essay On Liberty that the doctrine of liberty was intended "... to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties", and not to children or (and other?) barbarians.

It seems to me that if one considers any right of liberty, whether Hart's basic right of freedom or those that he would consider applications of it (general rights of liberty?), then the question of capacity for choice as a moral agent enters in. One simply can't play the rights of liberty game without minimal understanding of the point of the game or its basic rules. If, as is probably the case with the infant, one can only live reactively in the immediate now, then it is clear that choice making, by hypothesis, is out of the question. Further, if one has no conception of what it means to be a bearer of a right of liberty, then one cannot choose and act in terms of the rights one is said to have or in terms of obligations which the rights of others impose. It seems probable that young children can't play the game in a variety of right of liberty arenas for this reason.

At least one must say that some minimal understanding of what it means to be a bearer of a given right and some minimal capacity for choice making in the arena of the right's focus are necessary conditions for exercising any given right of liberty. A stronger claim is that the above conditions are necessary to the possession of a given right of liberty. I believe the stronger claim about possession, which entails the weaker about exercise, is correct.

There are several positions counter to my view concerning possession. For example, Bandman argues that as long as some members of a class are capable of making choices they can exercise choice in behalf of other members in the class who lack this ability and hence, possession of the right extends to the entire class.

With respect to rights of liberty this seems to be a rather strange view. In principle one could argue that if as a consequence of some disaster all humans, save one, became vegetables the class of humans could still be regarded as bearers of the rights of liberty as long as the one survived. Thus those incapable of exercising choice, regardless of opportunity, still possess the rights of liberty. Surely this is to possess a meaningless freedom.
One could also argue that if a being, e.g. a human infant, has the potential for exercising choice, the possession of the potential is sufficient for asserting the possession of the rights of liberty even though another must temporarily exercise the choice for her/him. Again for the same reasons noted above this is to assert the possession of a meaningless freedom.

But to deny the infant the possession of the rights of liberty does not itself imply that the infant bears no rights whatsoever, for rights of liberty are not the only form of rights. It appears to me that often rights discussions evidence category confusions and a bewildering array of category labels.

Thus I propose that we reserve the labels (1) civil or political rights and (2) welfare rights to refer to the content of rights statements. In addition, I suggest utilizing the terms (A) rights of liberty and (B) rights of recipience to refer to the form of rights statements. Thus in principle it is possible to have the following combinations:

1A - Civil rights of liberty
1B - Civil rights of recipience
2A - Welfare rights of liberty
2B - Welfare rights of recipience

Also we note that the type of direct obligation entailed by a right can be negative (requiring persons to forbear doing something) or positive (requiring persons to do something).

If we consider examples of political or civil rights only, we can identify the following four forms:

I. Negative Rights of Liberty:

The bearer of this right ought be permitted to attempt to do X without interference from others if she/he so chooses and ought not to be coerced to do X by others if he/she chooses not to.

An example of this form is found in Article 16 of the U. N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

1. "Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality, or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family . . ."

2. "Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses."
II. Positive Rights of Liberty:

The bearer of this right ought be permitted to accomplish X (ought have access to means sufficient for accomplishing X) if she/he so chooses and ought not be coerced to do X by others if he/she chooses not to.

An example of this form is found in Article 21(1) of the U. N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives."

III. Negative Rights of Recipience:

The bearer of this right ought not receive certain treatment X or be subject to certain conditions Y.

An example of this form is found in Article 5 of the U. N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment."

IV. Positive Rights of Recipience:

The bearer of this right ought receive certain treatment X or be provided with a certain set of conditions Y.

An example of this form is found in Article 2(1) of the U. N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

"Everyone charged with a penal offense has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defense."

Rights of liberty have to do the agent's doings and the agent's choice of whether to do or forbear doing. The difference between negative and positive rights of liberty center in the fact that the former requires only that the bearer of the right be permitted to attempt to try something without interference from others whereas positive rights of liberty require that the person be permitted to accomplish or achieve something and is entitled to assistance if required from certain others in order to successfully manage this end. Thus the right to marry only requires that other persons do not improperly interfere with one's attempt to find a marriage partner and enter wedlock. It does not require others to ensure or guarantee that one will succeed. But the right of franchise requires that one be per-
mitted to succeed in casting a vote if he/she chooses and does not just say one can try to cast a vote. Thus certain positive assistance is required in the establishment of the conditions which permit persons to succeed in casting their vote if they so choose (e.g. polling places, election officials).

The rights of recipience have to do with what happens to the agent at the hands of others or with treatment received. The examples considered for both negative rights of recipience (forbidding cruel punishment and torture) and positive rights of recipience (rights of accused) are not matters of the agent's choice. I am not to be tortured even if I request cruel punishment of this sort. Likewise, I should not be permitted to surrender my due process rights as a defendant even if I request that they not be honored by the legal system. In these cases I am entitled to protection not only from others but from myself.

Welfare Rights

The problem now arises as to how we should regard certain so-called welfare rights. The following is found in the U. N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Article 25 (1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

This is a statement of a positive right but is it a positive right of recipience or a positive right of liberty or perhaps yet another form altogether?

Notice that Article 25 seems to assert that the social conditions ought to be structured such that persons can achieve an adequate standard of living and that such conditions include any assistance which is necessary as a supplement or substitute for one's own effort to this end. When considering the adult in full possession of her/his faculties this seems to be the same form of right as is the right of franchise. In the latter case we also provide needed special assistance to handicapped persons for example, in order to ensure that they are able to cast their ballot. In both cases persons are said to be entitled to a set of conditions which are sufficient for accomplishing the end involved. Also, in both cases when considering the "rational" adult the matter of choice seems to occur. Presumably the rational adult can refuse to avail him/herself of medical treatment just as he/she can refuse to vote. Thus,
for adults in full possession of their faculties this welfare right seems to take the form of a positive right of liberty.

However, when we consider the child or the adult who for some reason is judged not to be competent to rationally choose, the situation is altered. We would probably insist that this right means that the child should receive adequate medical care whether he/she desires it or not. Thus, in cases of persons not competent to understand the alternatives and hence not competent to choose this welfare right functions as a positive right of recipience much like the rights of the accused do for all persons.

The Right to Education

Article 26 (1) of the U. N.'s Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts:

Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

This rights statement is also regarded as a statement of a "welfare" right. It has much in common with the "standard of living" right statement discussed previously. This statement seems to explicitly recognize the shift in form of right from childhood to adulthood. The right to education seems clearly to function as a positive right of recipience for children. They are required to receive educational "treatment", just as we wish to require them to receive needed medical treatment whether they desire to or not.

However, when adults are considered, the right to education shifts form. It is no longer a right of recipience but becomes a right of liberty. In addition, the right to advanced education for adults seems to be a special right of merit rather than a universal right. Hence, advanced education for adults seems to be a special right of merit in the form of a positive right of liberty. Thus, those of "merit", if they choose are entitled to whatever assistance is required in order to participate in these programs.

Also, it should be remembered that the right to education does not use "education" in the achievement sense of the term, but rather in the "process" sense of the term. Becoming educated in the achievement sense of the term cannot be guaranteed for anyone. However, entry and participation in the process can be
provided. "Education" as process (or treatment) in many ways stands to "education" as accomplishment as medical service stands to good health. In each case, the former can be provided, but the latter cannot be guaranteed.

Given the foregoing I would say that although infants do not bear rights of liberty and children do not possess them fully one could still assert that they are bearers of the rights of recipience because choice making capability is not at issue in possession of the latter form of right.

Of course this does not fully address Hart's contention that a basic right of liberty is a necessary condition for having any right whatsoever including, I presume, rights of recipience. It seems to me that we should distinguish between that which is necessary to justify the contention that certain beings have rights or that a particular claimed right is indeed a right for a class of beings (a justified entitlement) and that which is necessary for certain beings to come into the possession and exercise of rights.

I think it likely that the assumption of some basic right of liberty such as Dewey's conception of freedom of mind or intelligence is necessary in any justification attempt. I think that "freedom of inquiry" assumes this important position because it seems to be necessary from both an instrumental and a contributory perspective to any pursuit of the worthwhile human life. However, the possession and exercise of such a right of liberty by humans seems to require certain conditions which are addressed by properly framed statements of recipient rights.

Suppose that one could establish that beings capable of inquiry are entitled to the "rights of inquiry" and other derivative rights of liberty. Further, suppose that one could show that, as far as humans are concerned, educational development is a prior condition for the occurrence of inquiry capability and hence possession of the rights of inquiry. Thus, to ascribe the recipient right to education to children is in effect to assert that beings with potential but unrealized inquiry capabilities are morally entitled to the realization of those capabilities in order to come into full possession of the rights of liberty. But why assume that the class of beings with potential capabilities for "freedom of mind" are entitled to the development of that potential and possession of the associated rights of liberty? Because if one assumes the essential value (both instrumental and contributory) of this basic right of liberty to pursuit of a worthy mode of human existence, then from a moral point of view what grounds could one use to argue that any potential participant ought be prohibited from engaging in the pursuit of the good? And as Kant might say, "He who wills the end must will the necessary means". Smith might add, "And he who wills the whole must will the necessary parts".


Let P stand for the persuasion property of a claimed right. Let J stand for the justification property of a claimed right. Let R stand for an actual right.

By hypothesis Bandman assumes:

1) P R (by evidential test)
2) P R (by definition)
3) J R (by definition)

Thus:

P R (1 above)
R J (the equivalent of 3 above)
P J or

The presence of the persuasion property is sufficient for asserting the presence of the justification property.

Since P J (above) then J P (the equivalent). The expression says that the presence of the justification property is necessary for asserting the presence of the persuasion property.


... community of persuasion is at best an indication, not part of the essence. The history of science will not support the hope that actual agreement at any time will be an actual criterion (of truth) ... .


Maurice Cranston, "A Reply to Professor Raphael," Ibid., pp. 95-100.
When we assert that all rights imply the existence of obligations on the part of someone else we ignore the Hobbesian view of the rights of the natural man. Hobbes's view that everyone has a right to do anything eliminates obligation as a companion of rights. The right of competitors to all try to win the game seems similar.


I have emphasized in what precedes the importance of the effective release of intelligence in connection with personal experience in the democratic way of living. I have done so purposely because democracy is so often and so naturally associated in our minds with freedom of action, forgetting the importance of freed intelligence which is necessary to direct and to warrant freedom of action. Unless freedom of individual action has intelligence and informed conviction back of it, its manifestation is almost sure to result in confusion and disorder. The democratic idea of freedom is not the right to each individual to do as he pleases, even if it be qualified by adding "provided he does not interfere with the same freedom on the part of others". While the idea is not always, not often enough, expressed in words, the basic freedom is that of freedom of mind and of whatever degree of freedom of action and experience is necessary to produce freedom of intelligence. The modes of freedom guaranteed in the Bill of Rights are all of this nature: Freedom of belief and conscience, of expression of opinion, of assembly for discussion and conference, of the press as an organ of communication. They are guaranteed because without them individuals are not free to develop and society is deprived of what they might contribute.