This paper questions the applicability of current moral development theories to the Chicano population. The stage theories of Piaget and Kohlberg that emphasize the "universality" of psychological aspects of moral development may be culturally biased. Research indicates that the rate and terminus of moral development is highly variable among cultural settings. Cultural differentiation in moral judgment might not exist if stage definitions were reconstructed to be culture and content-free. Although Chicanos are influenced by the technological and cultural context variables common to the United States, they retain the core values of Mexican folk culture and reject basic aspects of the dominant value system. This is evidenced through Chicano socialization and child-rearing practices. Group morality is based on the premise that the individual learns and internalizes morality enforced by the community. Research on group morality indicates that Chicano children proceed toward a different goal (i.e., cooperation) or final stage of morality rather than progressing at a slower rate of universal moral development. Further cross-cultural research is needed to evaluate the relationship between social structure and psychological structure in relation to moral development. (Contains 81 references.) (LP)
CHICANO SOCIALIZATION AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT

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Moral development remains one of the least understood aspects of comparative human development. This deficiency is the result of difficulties in conceptualizing and measuring developmental processes in moral judgment. The purpose of this paper is to question the applicability of current moral-development theories to Chicano populations.

The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Judgment

Piaget (1926, 1952) proposed that children move through four stages of increasingly abstract reasoning, developing through an invariant sequence despite individual experiences, families, or cultures, and that progression to a higher stage of cognitive development is necessary for moving to a higher stage of moral development.

Piaget's assumptions about stages imply distinct, qualitative differences in structures that form an invariant and universal sequence in individual development. Each stage forms a "structured whole" (Colby et al., 1980:8-9) and represents a differentiation of the basic elements in the preceding stage and their reintegration into a new, more logically powerful structure (cf. Edwards, 1980).

Piaget also established the presence of two qualitatively distinct stages of moral development. He concluded that younger children are objective in moral judgment; that is, they judge an act to be right or wrong solely in terms of the relation of the act to the rule. Older children are subjective; that is, they take the intentions of a person into account when judging moral right or wrong.

Kohlberg (1976), in agreement with Piaget, proposes a stage theory of moral reasoning that is essentially concerned with the development of aspects of cognition. He further proposes six possible stages of moral development, forming a universally invariant sequence in full accord with all the requirements of stage theories (Kohlberg, 1969:348-349, 352-353; Piaget, 1960).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>Individual responsive to cultural rules and labels of good/bad, right/wrong, but interprets in terms of physical or hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favors) or in terms of physical power of those enunciating rules and labels.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>Punishment-and-obedience orientation. Physical consequences of action determine goodness, regardless of human meaning or value of consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power valued in their own right, not in terms of respect for underlying moral order supported by punishment and authority.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>[Hedonist] instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action is that which satisfies one's own needs and occasionally those of others. Elements of fairness, or reciprocity, and of equal sharing present, but interpreted in physical, pragmatic way.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONVENTIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td>Maintaining expectations of family, group, or nation perceived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and obvious consequences. Conformity to personal expectations and social order; loyalty to, maintenance, support, and justification of the order, and identification with the persons or group involved in it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>Interpersonal concordance orientation (&quot;good boy, nice girl&quot;). Good behavior is that which pleases or helps [significant] others and is approved by them. Conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority of &quot;natural behavior.&quot; Behavior frequently judged by intent; &quot;he/she means well&quot; important for first time. One earns approval by being &quot;nice.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4</td>
<td>&quot;Law and order&quot; orientation. Orientation toward authority, fixed rules, maintenance of social order. Right behavior consists of doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the social order for its own sake.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
POSTCONVENTIONAL

PRINCIPLED LEVEL

A clear effort to define moral values and principles that have validity and application apart from the individual's own identification with these groups.

Stage 5

Social-contract, legalistic orientation, with utilitarian overtones. Right action defined in terms of individual rights and standards that have been examined and agreed upon by the whole society. Clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching consensus. Aside from that constitutionally and democratically agreed upon, right is a matter of personal opinion and values.

Stage 6

Universal-ethical-principle orientation. Right defined by decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. Principles abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule), not concrete moral rules (the Ten Commandments). At heart, these are universal principles of justice, the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and respect for the dignity of humans as individuals.


Cultural Universality

Using cross-cultural and longitudinal data, Kohlberg (1969) maintains that in every culture all children can be expected to display the same fixed order of stages as they grow older. Other studies (Gorsuch and Barnes, 1973; C. B. White, 1975; Turiel, Kohlberg, and Edwards, 1978; Edwards, 1975; Batt, 1974; Parikh, 1975; Kohlberg, 1969; and Simpson and Graham, 1971) suggest that although the sequence of stages may be invariant from culture to culture, the presence of higher stages appears to be culture-specific, which implies that only the first several stages constitute universal modes of moral reasoning. This further suggests that the rate and terminus of moral development is highly variable from one cultural setting to another. Edwards (1975) suggests that cultural complexity is an important variable since greater societal complexity is associated with higher stages of moral development. However, the assumption
that a principle-oriented morality is higher than a law-oriented one is a value-laden judgment, and both Piaget and Kohlberg have been sharply criticized for cultural bias.

**Multidimensionality of Moral Judgment**

Cultural differentiation represents a distortion and oversimplification of reality. Stage sequences have no proper place in the examination of cultural variation in normative thought (Simpson, 1974).

Fundamental social and cultural influences are likely to be at work in cross-cultural studies that find a slower rate of progression in moral development for Chicano children (e.g., Cortese, 1981). Gilligan (in press) raises the issue that some people do not define morality in terms of justice, universality, fairness, or logical comprehensiveness as in the works of Kant, Rawls, and Kohlberg. Rather, she posits, moral reasoning includes a dimension often overlooked by standard moral-reasoning-interview scoring procedures. Such protocols tend to reflect the areas of responsibility, concern for others, and practicality, and are based on the correct assumption that moral judgments do not occur in a temporary or social void. Rather, moral inferences and choices are made in the context of everyday life circumstances that confront individuals. While the principled orientation of Stage 6 reasoning is objective, responsibility perspectives are action-oriented and subjective. That is, Kohlberg's highest stage centers on logical comprehensiveness that promotes autonomy and sets up moral problems as mathematical equations. Conversely, Gilligan maintains that such logic is not relevant to the individual in real life dilemmas. Instead, moral solutions emphasize the interdependence of people's lives.

**Sociocultural Psychology**

Chicano psychologists (e.g., Martínez, 1977) have been gathering information on the behavior of Chicanos on the assumption that such behavior can be understood only if viewed within the cultural content in which it occurs. Such approaches take into account psychological formulations that adequately explain that the behavior of Anglos within the Anglo culture may not necessarily explain the behavior of Chicanos within the Chicano culture. Thus, a situation exists in which improperly applied explanations of the behavior of Chicanos may harm them by creating or enhancing existing stereotypical images. For example, Mercer (1977) demonstrates that the "IQ gap" between
Chicanos and Anglos can be accounted for by the acculturation level of the Chicano. Therefore, a large number of Chicanos who are classified as "unintelligent" and are so labeled for the rest of their lives, may not be unintelligent at all. Yet, standardized IQ tests are used daily in schools to assess the intellectual functioning of Chicano children. Olmedo (1977) indicates that the American Psychological Association is insensitive to this issue.

The data on IQ parallel a certain bias in the area of moral development. That is, just as the "IQ (cognitive) gap" between Chicanos and Anglos can be accounted for by sociocultural differences, the "moral gap" between the same groups also results from sociocultural differentiation. Accordingly, the need and justification of a Chicano psychology was born out of the moral vacuum of the science and profession of psychology. Moreover, a sociological psychology is more scientific, parsimonious, and universal than traditional American (e.g., Kohlberg) and European (e.g., Piaget) systems of psychology, which have labored under the assumption that behavior is best explained by variables within individuals (Díaz-Guerrero, 1977:17).

The notion that a principled morality (Stage 6) is higher than those based on system maintenance (Stage 4) or utilitarianism (Stage 5) is based on the Rawlsian concept of justice (Rawls, 1971), parochial rather than universal, wedded historically to the liberal conceptions of natural law at the time of the French Revolution, and developed to maturity in the writings of Kant (Sullivan, 1977). Kohlberg's framework has existed in a recent past era that made any developmental theory a very attractive option in North America (Ausbuel and Sullivan, 1970). Since the concept of development implies progress, one can understand why a culture that demands progress should draw from theoretical perspectives that build this notion into their very ontology; and the decade of the sixties demanded theories that dealt with both intellectual and moral progress. Accordingly, Kohlberg's theory entered the scene as a knight in shining armor and filled a vacuum prevalent in the social sciences dealing with the whole topic area of values. In a country deeply involved in moral problems related to race, poverty, and war, the theory offered a concept of justice which promised to deal with the quagmire of relativity (Sullivan, 1977:353).

Sullivan notes that within a social context, psychological theories are tied to the infrastructure of a society. He concludes that Kohlberg's position is conservative in nature and masks an unreflective liberal ideology. Consequently, Kohlberg's theory suffers from ahistoricism. Nevertheless, all scientific theories are cultural as well as historical products and hence do not exist in a temporary or social vacuum. Rather, scientific theories emerge and
are supported or refuted in a unique social setting at a particular time. Thus, these theories reflect the nature of the scientific community from which they emerge (Kuhn, 1970).

Simpson (1974) also analyzes the claims put forth for the cross-cultural universality of cognitive-developmental theory. She opines that the definition of stage and the assumptions underlying them, including the view that the scheme is universally applicable, are ethnocentric and culturally biased. She argues that concept development is not equivalent from one class or culture to another. In large part, it does not entail learning the same body of particular knowledge, so that the relational bases for the generalizing that builds the broad abstractions are fragile. For example:

In the United States ... the concept of equality has a wide range of specific meanings which is affected by class membership. Working class Americans define equality as economic but not social; upper middle-class Americans tend to conceptualize it as social, not economic (Simpson, 1974:96).

Simpson also attacks Kohlberg's reliance on language and problem-solving abilities, which are particular only to educated Western societies and not universal. The language used in the protocols of Stage 5 and Stage 6 subjects seems to depend on the capacity to refer to hierarchies and justice, equality, and reciprocity at a high level of abstraction. Simpson (1974:94-95) argues that "requirements for the highly trained use of analytic and theoretical modes of thought and language would automatically disqualify most of the world population (including Americans) at any age." Thus, as might be expected, there is a strong correlation between moral development stage and IQ since the latter is essentially a measure of the ability to succeed in doing those tasks that require, among other capabilities, considerable verbal facility.

**Stage Bias**

Kohlberg's stages of moral development are transformations in the form or structure of thought, rather than a set of beliefs absorbed or internalized from the environment. Hence, individual differences in moral development are expected to occur only in the rate at which individuals progress and in their final point of development. Kohlberg (1969) exhibits cross-cultural evidence in support of the universal assumption concerning the first four stages, although people in more simple societies do not attain the higher levels of judgment displayed by some people in advanced societies.
The deficiency in the less complex cultures is not due to biological inferiority, but rather to a lack of specific role-taking experience resulting from social dilemmas that stimulate reasoning at the higher stages of moral development. However, cross-cultural evidence is not yet adequate to establish the universality of the entire developmental sequence. Thus, a question remains as to whether the remaining stages (5 and 6) are more than representations of cultural specializations under determinable conditions. Perhaps the criteria in the principled or postconventional level of morality is characteristic only of the intense individualism of Western European culture in the last two centuries (Edel, 1968). If so, this entire body of research is more an exercise in the celebration of a given social formation--that of the researcher--than a work of pure science.

Cultural differentiation in moral judgment might vanish if the stage definitions were reconstructed to be more culture/content-free. The present stages focus on a core value of fairness defined as reciprocity, equality, and individuality. Moreover, the framework emphasizes the acquisition of rules, laws, and higher principles such as justice and equity. These central concepts may be appropriate for Western respondents but not for other cultural/ethnic groups. Thus, several aspects of Chicano socialization need to be examined in relation to core values and child-rearing.

CHICANO SOCIALIZATION

Chicano socialization and role-taking experience affect cognitive development through family activity, peer group, common literature, formal associations, in-group marriage, and segregation. For the Chicano, the ability to survive in a particular environment has taught him/her subcultural beliefs and value complexes that are not likely to be counteracted by the development process (e.g., the Stage 2 barrio child whose existential beliefs are grounded in a reality of instrumental relativism). Lack of opportunity may delay or preclude the development of various types of social "skills."

Chicano social roles, although they have undergone change, have remained remarkably traditional, especially parental roles (Samora and Lamanna, 1972:236). The Chicano has been influenced by the technological and cultural context variables peculiar to the United States, yet he/she retains the core values of Mexican folk culture and rejects the basic aspects of the dominant value system (Hayden, 1966:19).
The Chicano Family

Status and role definition in family and community is a basic sociocultural premise to understanding how Chicanos think, feel, and act (Ramirez and Castañeda, 1974). A great deal has been written about the Chicano family, but neither empirical data nor an adequate theoretical framework exists for the analysis of the Chicano family structure (Péñalosa, 1968). Acculturation pressures have forced the Chicano family away from the Mexican prototype (Martínez, 1977:30). "Instead there are literally thousands of Mexican-American families, all differing significantly from one another along a variety of dimensions" (Murillo, 1971:97). It is well documented that the Chicano population is not homogeneous. Some Chicanos identify more with the Mexican culture and some with the Anglo culture.

Olmedo, Martínez, and Martínez (1976) developed an acculturation scale for Chicanos and found that the Anglo population is more homogeneous than the Chicano population and that the overlap of the Chicano population into the Anglo distribution is much greater than the converse. At the extreme end of the Chicano distribution, where it might be said that "Chicanoness" is defined, there were no Anglos. Conversely, on the extreme side of the Anglo distribution there are few Chicanos. Perhaps a more important finding was that the mean score of Chicanos in a high school with only 10 percent Chicanos is closer to the Anglo mean than in schools with greater proportions of Chicanos.

Characteristics of the Chicano family that significantly differentiate it from its Anglo counterpart are empirically supported. For example, Derbyshire (1968) administered the semantic differential to adolescents living in East Los Angeles and asked his subjects to rate the concepts of self, mother, and father. He found that girls identified more closely with the Anglo female and mother roles. Girls saw self and mother similarly, except that mother was seen as braver, more beautiful, and wiser than self. Males, on the other hand, identified more closely with "machismo" and husband roles. Males viewed self and father similarly, except they saw father as more active and harder than self. It clearly appears that sex-role differentiation exists among most Chicanos (Staples, 1971), although there is evidence that young Chicanos are beginning to reject these traditional roles (Ramírez, 1969).

In the traditional Chicano family, the father is the undisputed head of the family with the power to make all major decisions (Alvirez and Bean, 1976; Staton, 1972), while the mother is submissive (Padilla and Ruíz, 1973). In relating to his children, the Chicano father frequently serves as the disciplinarian. He assumes responsibility for family members in or outside the home.
Child-rearing practices are described as including both indulgent affection, especially for young children, and harsh punishment (Padilla and Ruiz, 1973). During the period of early childhood, the relationship between Chicano parents and their children is very loving. The father is often permissive, warm, and close to his children during their earlier years. The small child in the Chicano family is regarded as a "little angel" and receives adoring affection from mother and father alike (W. Madsen, 1964:51-52). Moreover, Ramírez (1967) reports that for a Chicano child, the mother should be the dearest person in existence and that there is hardly anyone lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his/her parents.

As the Chicano child approaches puberty, the father alters his position of indulgent parent and playmate to that of dignified master of the home. He becomes more reserved, authoritarian, demanding of respect, and avoids demonstrations of affection. Respect for the father is engendered by the mother (Woods, 1956:286). Children are expected to be quiet, passive, unobtrusive, and to avoid intimacy with the father. Chicano parents teach their children to have unquestioning loyalty and feel that obedience and respect for parental authority are the most important virtues children should learn (Ramírez, 1967). On one hand, such authoritarian child-rearing attitudes and practices could retard, preclude, or even regress moral development since moral autonomy is not encouraged. But if moral autonomy is a mask for bourgeois notions of the individual restrained by social bonds, this is not regression but rather progression toward responsibility for parents, the aged, tradition, or whatever the parents embody.

Child-rearing researchers (Bartz and Levine, 1978; Alvarez and Bean, 1976; Davis and Havighurst, 1946; Murillo, 1971) have reported that Chicano parents expect relatively early assumption of responsibility by a child and that children will overcome the dependency of infancy as soon as possible. Moreover, Chicano parents have been found to be more protective than black parents (Durrett et al., 1975) and more controlling than Anglo parents (Rusmore and Kirmeyer, 1976). Mothers are posited as warm, supportive, and loving, but offering minimal direction and discipline (Staton, 1972). However, this pattern of sex-role differentiation has been questioned in recent years (Hawkes and Taylor, 1975; Miranda, 1977). Bartz and Levine (1978:715) report that Anglo and Chicano parents scored similarly on emotional support and control of their children, but that both groups scored lower than black parents on these factors. They also indicate that Chicano parents scored highest on "devalue permissiveness," indicating more support for permissiveness, less discipline, and more "giving-in" by parents in parent-child relations.
Chicano parents are significantly less supportive of equalitarian relationships than their black and Anglo counterparts (Bartz and Levine, 1978). This finding is consistent with prevailing descriptions of the authoritarian Chicano family. Bartz and Levine also indicate that differences in education account for most of the variance in intrafamilial equalitarian relationship scores, while ethnicity was nonsignificant. The higher the level of education in Chicano families, the greater the belief in equalitarianism. Thus, it appears that education has a definite influence upon parental attitudes toward equalitarianism within the family. Another possible factor is size of family. As family size increases, parental authoritarianism may increase (Walters and Stinnett, 1971), and Chicanos tend to have larger families than do Anglos.

In sum, according to cognitive-developmental theory, low scores on moral judgment measures by Chicano children indicate that such children generally have not been exposed to the types of moral problems that encourage them to take on the role of the generalized other as they seek to find appropriate solutions to such problems and, concurrently, progress through the stages of development.

Group Morality

In contrast to cognitive-developmental theory, which centers on the moral development of individuals, an alternative research strategy is to measure the moral development of groups. Thus, morality is conceptualized as a group phenomenon, not individual. Accordingly, measures using the individual as the unit of analysis are methodologically inadequate. This view is based on the premise that the individual learns and internalizes the particular sense of morality enforced by his/her community. Moreover, morality is viewed as a social fact.3

The empirical literature supports a broad conclusion about the development of social motives and behaviors among Chicano children (Kagan, 1977:73). Chicano children develop stronger group enhancement and altruism motives than do Anglo children, who develop stronger competitive motives (Madsen, 1971). The greater cooperativeness of Chicano children manifests itself as they (1) more often choose the cooperative alternative in experimental tasks (Madsen and Shapiro, 1970); (2) tend more often to behave spontaneously as group members, in contrast to Anglo children who, faced with the same situation, behave as individuals (Kagan and Madsen, 1972); (3) contradict their mothers less frequently in potential conflict situations (Hoppe et al., 1977); and (4) tend to be higher on the need to achieve for the family (Ramirez and Price-Williams, 1976).
Madsen's cross-cultural study of cooperative and competitive behavior of young children suggests a higher level of cooperation among Chicano children than among Anglos. "Not only was there far more cooperative interaction, but the competitive responses, when they did occur, were far less vigorous" (1971:369-370).

One hypothesis to account for the apparent differences in the psychological functioning of the two cultural groups is that Chicano children develop as rational problem solvers in social situations, while Anglo children develop such a high level of competitive motivation that behavior is irrational in conflict-of-interest situations. For Chicano children, the "good thing to do" is also the pleasurable act. In this they are similar to Anglo youngsters (i.e., Stage 2). But in the Chicano protocols there appears another value linked with the good and the pleasurable: "other orientation" or concern for and sensitivity to the feelings and wishes of people who are important to self.

The implication of the above is that Chicano children proceed rapidly toward a different goal (i.e., cooperation) or final stage of morality rather than progressing at a slower rate of "universal" moral development.

Time Dimension

Generally, it has been concluded that a life of poverty creates a sense of fatalism and a present-time perspective (Chilman, 1966; Irelan, 1968). Descriptions of Chicano families are replete with references to a cultural deemphasis upon the importance of time (Mirande, 1977; Queen and Habenstein, 1974), although Bartz and Levine (1978:714) found little support for the idea that Chicano parents take a laissez-faire approach to the use of time. In traditional analysis, there appears to be a common tendency for the Anglo to live in a future- or extended-time orientation, whereas the Chicano is more likely to live and experience life more completely in the present. For example, in the Anglo culture, being responsible is equated with being on time for an appointment. The Chicano, however, is not as likely to be as tied to the clock since the Chicano's concept of responsibility is closely linked to, for example, attending the immediate needs of family or friends.

A more radical perspective, however, takes issue with the traditional notion that Chicanos (or blacks or the poor) are present oriented. Marcuse (1964) maintains that it is the Anglo/capitalist culture that has lost the time dimension (i.e., the sense of change and history). It takes a very clever research protocol to "find" that Anglos are future oriented. The Anglo culture is based on a
"smash and grab" economy with little sense of what is good from the past and what harm to the future is accumulating. Although the Anglo child has internalized a clock-like cognitive map of social relations, this is a mechanical, not a moral, stance.

THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

Success in registering "higher" levels of moral judgment depends on familiarity with methods of analyzing the physical and social realms that are not pan-cultural. Piagian and Kohlbergian moral problem-solving tasks are rooted in current, limited scientific paradigms:

These paradigms constitute cultural conventions integral to Western world views, conventions to which a great many cultures do not yet adhere. The theory of genetic epistemology [i.e., Piaget's stage theory of cognitive development] assumes that the view derived from adherence to such paradigms is correct, and therefore contains an inherent cultural bias (Mangan, 1978:170).

Regarding possible ethnic/cultural differences in moral judgment between Chicanos and Anglos, any of the following positions might be taken (Edwards, 1980):

(1) Cultural differences result from a bias built into the definitions of the [Kohlberg's] stages.

(2) Cultural differences result from variations in social experience that stimulate moral growth by encouraging processes of role-taking. This differentiation can be presented in ways that do not involve invidious comparisons and can be interpreted to rank order cultural groups on a scale of moral adequacy (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969, 1971).

(3) Cultural differences result from an attempt to capture multidimensional cultural variation on a unidimensional scale.

(4) Cultural differences result from culturally biased testing procedures. For example, less mature moral judgments by Chicanos might disappear if the research instruments were sensitized to their best, most advanced reasoning.
Methodological Criteria

Moral judgment research on Chicanos can be judged against four methodological criteria:

(1) Moral dilemmas must raise issues and examine values relevant to Chicanos. This involves either the adaptation of original dilemmas or the creation of new dilemmas appropriate for Chicanos.

(2) Research procedures must be designed to elicit the best or most reflective reasoning of Chicanos. Especially pertinent for interviews is the choice of the oral versus written response medium.

(3) Dilemmas and probing questions must be presented in Spanish or from a bilingual orientation. Answers should be scored in Spanish or translated without distortion into English for moral-stage scoring.

(4) A moral judgment scale for Chicanos must respond to a Chicano value orientation that strongly emphasizes interpersonal relations rather than individualism.

These four criteria require thorough knowledge of the Chicano culture and bilingual proficiency.

Research Methodology

Several psychologists (e.g., Piaget, 1955; Isaacs, 1966; Vygotsky, 1935) note that children seem to converse in a more complex and detailed fashion and attain more complicated solutions to intellectual problems or social dilemmas in the course of spontaneous everyday interactions with their social and physical environments than they do when formally questioned by researchers. This is so probably because the contents of these interactions are phenomena that the child knows and cares about (in contrast with the questions used in cognitive and moral assessments, which are arbitrary, hypothetical, and perhaps alien in content as well).

This issue has taken on considerable contemporary importance for both practical and theoretical reasons (Cole et al., 1977). Methodologically, the quest for cognitive assessment devices that would be valid and reliable across various cultural, ethnic, and language groups has led to repeated reassessments of such tests. One such device is the use of video-tape in presenting moral dilemmas to children.
Use of Video Tape

The presentation of video-taped moral dilemmas offers several advantages to research designs (Cortese, 1980):

1. **Standardization of the presentation and administration of moral dilemmas.** Kurtines and Grief (1974) have criticized the moral judgment interview for a lack of standardized administration (in addition to a lack of standardized scoring). Kohlberg's testing techniques require the interviewer to present three dilemmas (one at a time) to a subject who must make a judgment about the situation and then justify his choice. The interviewer encourages the subject to respond freely and asks probing questions to elicit additional responses, all of which are usually recorded. Since these probing questions vary in accordance with the subject's original judgment and with the researcher's biases, each person receives a different set of questions.

2. **Reduction of administration time.** Standard oral interviews require one to two hours of time per subject. With video tape, the sample size can be increased or the costs of the research decreased.

3. **More interesting to view and easier for subjects to understand.** This is especially advantageous in child studies because of limited attention span and restlessness in subjects.

4. **More accurate assessment of moral development in young children.** For example, Chandler et al. (1973) presented two moral dilemmas to eighty seven-year-olds, exposing each subject to one verbal and one video-taped story. Moral judgments made in response to the verbal dilemmas were largely based on consequences, supporting previous studies using similar methods. Responses to the video-taped dilemmas were, however, largely based on intentions, suggesting that the actual age of onset of intentional judgments is considerably earlier than had been previously assumed. Such results suggest that previously published findings indicating that young children are unresponsive to issues of intentionality are methodological artifacts of the verbal assessment procedures employed.

5. **Production for a particular audience.** Dilemmas produced for a specific audience (e.g., Chicanos) have greater validity and utility than standard oral or written dilemmas. Chicano actors have been used in video tapes presented to Chicano subjects (Cortese, 1980). The technique of using lower-middle-class Chicano actors in situations relevant to lower-middle-class Chicano subjects results in a more natural environment and enhances the validity of the tapes as part of the research design.
In many cases, persons were literally picked off the street at the sites of the tapings to serve as actors. Other times, the video tapings occurred in the homes of the actors. Care was taken to choose actual family members in the video taping of family situations. The moral dilemmas were taped without eliminating or disrupting other coexisting situations and occurrences on the locations. For example, a moral dilemma taped at and inside a neighborhood grocery store not only shows a gang of male youths shoplifting (the focal concern of the story), but also depicts actual shoppers, store personnel, and passersby.

The video-taped moral dilemmas were constructed under the premise that problems that depend on familiarity with the environment are more likely to elicit meaningful replies that demonstrate the acquisition of cognitive skills than the standard dilemmas that are possibly inconceivable or foreign to the subject. In-depth individual interviewing immediately following the presentation of video-taped dilemmas can be combined with detailed observation for a valid and reliable assessment of moral judgment.

CONCLUSION

The key question for moral-judgment research on Chicanos is: Are ethnic or cross-cultural differences in moral development the consequence of social experience, as stage theory proposes, or are they an artifact of bias in concepts, theory, or research methodology? Or, less neutrally, is scientific research on moral judgment doing the dirty work for a racist society? Further cross-cultural research is needed to evaluate the relationship between social structure and psychological structure. The noted absence of postconventional reasoning (Stages 5 and 6) in traditional and non-Western societies implies that the former seems to be a unique characteristic of postindustrial societies. Comparative research is important for assessing the validity of the central premises of cognitive-developmental theory and is also crucial as a contribution concerning the antecedent factors in moral development.

Implications of moral-judgment research on Chicanos point to the importance of social experience as indicated by the norms, values, and related moral stances of the Chicano culture. In light of the heterogeneity of the Chicano population, more attention for future research should be given to variation among Chicano children's backgrounds. The literature indicates that generation removed from Mexico, geographical location, area of residence (i.e., within a Hispanic community vis-a-vis an Anglo suburb), socioeconomic status, variation in family structure, and sibling order are related to
acculturation and socialization, which in turn might affect moral development differentially. At this point, the relationship of socialization and child-rearing practices to the development of moral reasoning in the Chicano child has not yet been established; the suggested relations remain speculative, awaiting confirmation or refutation by empirical studies.
NOTES*

*The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of T. R. Young in editing earlier manuscripts.

1 In this article the term "Chicano" is used to refer to all people descended in part from Mexico and living in the United States. In this sense the term is synonymous to "Mexican American," as in forms requesting specification of racial/ethnic background where the terms appear as interchangeable. However, some persons make a distinction between the terms and refer to Chicanos as those who support a particular political ideology or movement in relation to their ethnic heritage. Hence, an individual may refer to himself/herself as "Chicano" but not "Mexican American" and vice versa. These terms can be distinguished from the more general term "Hispanic," which refers to a broad group of Spanish-speaking people including, for example, Latin Americans and South Americans.

2 Current research results (e.g., DeAvila et al., 1976) comparing Chicano and Anglo children on Neo-Piagian measures of cognitive development indicate no differentiation between the groups. This implies that Chicano children develop cognitively the same as, and at basically the same rate as, Anglo children. These results are contrary to the controversial positions of Jensen (1971) and Schockley who suggest that minority children are biologically inferior, i.e., they cannot perform certain cognitive activities that their Anglo counterparts can because of genetic endowment.

3 This notion refers to Emile Durkheim's realist position in sociological matters. In view of his wholism, Durkheim posited a trans-individual psychology to go beyond a simply monadic view of social beings. Certainly, this was a reaction to Gabriel Tarde and his collective psychology. But, considering the preface to the second edition to The Rules of the Sociological Method, Durkheim clearly disavowed a simplistic conception of a "collective mind." A parallel to his position in the literature is that of Wilhelm Dilthey--objectivizations of the human mind. Given Durkheim's concern with an empirical basis for sociology (rather than a reflective sociology), the point of mediation always had to refer to a collective product, such as law, which he used methodologically in most of his works (e.g., The Division of Labor in Society, Suicide, his research on the family). Accordingly, the concept does not refer to an epistemological position, but rather to a methodological one.

In any case, for Durkheim, the initial problem was a function of stability of social life; correspondingly, we find in him (as in Parsons later) an emphasis on the normative character of social life. This classical position should in no way be taken as the only
theoretical alternative, to wit, the contrasting position of Marx, among others. Thus, although appealing to Durkheim, we are in no way assuming his position here.

4To be sure, I have left the world of social science and have made a value judgment about American society. Nevertheless, I do not pretend to be neutral; the point of this research is to make visible the political bias of "neutral" science.
REFERENCES


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