This paper examines ways in which the magnitude and critical import of the Thirteenth World Festival of Youth and Students (a week-long festival held approximately every four years, where tens of thousands of young people gather in the name of peace and friendship) was "distorted, diminished and suppressed" by coverage in the mainstream United States press. The paper first examines the history of the festival movement and how it has come to exist in its present form, and then considers the concept of historiography and the extent of its relevancy. An account of what actually took place at the festival is offered next, followed by a contrasting account of the festival as it was depicted in the mainstream press. This critique examines several national United States newspapers and periodicals, and shows how the festival was discussed in terms of peripheral elements (the North Korean political regime) and how its multifarious dimensions were transformed into homogenous and oversimplified categories. Lastly, the paper explicates the critical aspects of ideology and how ideology functions as a determinate factor in producing perspectives, particularly the perspectives of the mainstream press. A list of 36 references is attached. (SR)
The Rhetorical Reduction of the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students

On July 1, 1989, the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students opened in Pyongyang, the capital of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and continued through July 8. Participants in this week-long festival included 15,000 delegates from 180 countries ("Delegations"), ninety of which were from the United States, myself included. The 12 previous festivals, held approximately every four years since the first in Prague, Czechoslovakia in 1947, have been hosted in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, Finland and Cuba. The festivals have been described as "global town meetings" where tens of thousands of young people could gather in the name of peace and friendship. During the eight days of a festival, not only do cultural events and sports contests take place, but youth and students unite to discuss issues of peace and disarmament, learn of each other's cultures, and celebrate the belief that "friendship among young generations can bring peace among nations" (USNPC letter).
The 13th festival, however, is particularly significant for several other reasons. The first reason is that the 13th festival is the first festival to be hosted in Asia. The second is that young people from China were in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for the first time in 30 years. Lastly, and quite remarkably, this festival marked the first time that a U.S. group has been able to obtain a Treasury Department license for travel to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since the U.S. imposed a ban on travel after the Korean War (Doran).

Even so, and in spite of the fact that approximately 20 journalists from the United States attended the festival (Kristoff, "North Korea Bids), the magnitude and critical import of the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students was distorted, diminished and suppressed by the coverage in the mainstream press. To this I can attest; my position as a festival delegate enabled my position in terms of this assessment. Upon my return, I was able to negotiate the discrepancies between the festival functions I experienced and the meager, disproportionate testimonials of the reporting journalists. My recognition of these discrepancies, no doubt supported earnestly by my festival associates, are not unfounded claims, tossed in feeble reaction to dissimilar renderings. First of all, the 90 delegates who where chosen to attend the festival in Pyongyang were selected from nearly 300 applicants (Doran) by the United States National Preparatory Committee of the 13th World Festival of Youth and
Students; hence, a selection process opting for active and deliberating participants. Secondly, my stance in considering the event from a rhetorical purview is not without substantiated evaluations and criticisms. In what follows I will explicate my position that announces, quite frankly, that the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students was rhetorically reduced. As Burke writes:

Any word or concept considered from the point of view of any other word or concept is a reduction in this sense. One reduces this to that by discussing this in terms of that. In this sense, such expressions as "reduced to...," "in terms of...," and "with reference to...," are synonymous. (96)

Additionally, any generalization is necessarily a reduction in that it selects a group of things and gives them a property which makes it possible to consider them as a single entity (Burke 96). In this regard, the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students was rhetorically reduced by the mainstream press journalists in that they: (1) discussed the festival in terms of peripheral and tangential elements; and (2) generalized the multifarious dimensions of the festival occurrences into homogenous and oversimplified categories.

Thus, in assessing the ways in which the festival in Pyongyang was rhetorically reduced in the past, and by subsequently rendering a broader and expanded account of the event, I can provide a perspective through which similar underlying mechanisms in the present can be acknowledged and
confronted. As Haydn White has pointed out, the contemporary historian has to establish the value of the study of the past, not as an end in itself, but as a way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the solution of problems peculiar to our time ("Burden" 41).

In what follows, I will develop my notion of the rhetorical reduction of the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students by first examining the history of the festival movement and how it has come to exist in its present form. I will then attend to the concept of historiography and the extent of its relevancy, followed by an examination of what actually took place at the festival. By contrast, I will then address the festival as it was depicted in the mainstream press. This critique will include the rhetorical elements pointed out earlier: (1) the festival discussed in terms of peripheral elements; and (2) the multifarious dimensions of the festival occurrences transformed into homogenous and oversimplified categories. In attending to these rhetorical elements, I will examine the Christian Science Monitor, the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Los Angeles Times, the National Review, Newsweek, the New York Times, the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. Lastly, I will explicate the critical aspects of ideology and how ideology functions as a determinate factor in producing perspectives, particularly the perspectives of the mainstream press. In closing, I will address the far reaching potential that is incorporated in
positioning the festival in history with the full degree of its magnitude and critical import.

I turn now to a discussion of the history of the festival and how it has come to exist in its present form. The idea of World Festivals was initiated during the Second World War when young people were striving to fight against the terror and poverty caused by facism and its militarist ideology. In late October and early November of 1945, a conference in London brought together 437 delegates and 148 observers from more than two hundred youth and students' movements and organizations in 63 countries. The conference discussed and endorsed the goals of a new international organization called the World Federation of Democratic Youth; its purpose was to bring young people together to discuss peace and democratic changes. This London conference also decided to organize world festivals of youth and students. It called for:

a struggle for the unity of young people all over the world, young people of all races, colors, nationalities and religions ... for a profound, sincere friendship of nations, for an equitable, lasting peace, for the eradication of poverty and unemployment. (Neubauer 9)

Subsequently, the International Union of Students was founded at a world congress in Prague in 1946 and in the early summer of 1947, Friendship Relays started their journey to Prague from many places of Western Europe, Scandinavia, the Balkans and other regions. These relays were a symbol of
the plight of millions of young people who perished in Nazi torture chambers and concentration camps. Thus, on July 25, 1947, at Prague's Strahov Stadium, the opening ceremony of the First World Festival of Youth and Students was held. An estimated 17,000 delegates from 71 countries attended (Neubauer 10-11). On August 17, in an address to the delegations, Czechoslovakian Premier Klement Gottwald told the delegates:

Democracy today means the ruthless eradication of ... facism. Democracy is the implementation of the will of the common people.... [it] is the freedom of nations, their free, independent development, their equality and friendly cooperation ...

(Neubauer 13)

Hence, from the time of that first festival, over a quarter of a million delegates have participated in the 13 festivals that have been held (Thirteenth). Briefly, the festivals are thus:

1st - July 25-August 17 in Prague
   17,000 delegates from 71 countries

2nd - August 14-28, 1949 in Budapest
   10,371 delegates from 82 countries

3rd - August 5-19, 1951 in Berlin
   26,000 delegates from 104 countries

4th - August 2-18, 1953 in Bucharest
   30,000 delegates from 111 countries
In terms of organization, the festivals are initiated by an International Preparatory Committee (the IPC) which consists of a wide range of national and international youth and student organizations, such as the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Continental Organization of Latin American Students, the Council of European National Youth Committees, YMCA International, the All-African Student Union, the
International Youth federation for Environmental Studies and Conservation, the International Union of Socialist Youth, the International Youth and Student Movement of the United Nations and the World Student Christian Federation. The IPC sets the direction of the Festival and elects a standing body, the Permanent Commission (the PC), which carries on the day to day preparatory work of the Festival on an international level. A National Preparatory Committee (NPC), under the guidance of the PC is also set up to organize and locally popularize a festival's upcoming activities (Thirteenth).

In February of 1988, the Permanent Commission of the International Preparatory Committee began to organize and coordinate its activities in regard to the festival in Pyongyang. Elected to the commission were representatives from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Soviet Union, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Finland, Algeria, Palestine, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary and Australia (Information 6). In the latter part of 1988 and the beginning of 1989, the International Union of Students commenced Festival Tours to different countries in order to promote the preparations at all levels for the 13th Festival, particularly to develop activities being started by the National Preparatory Committees. Meetings were subsequently held in the regions of North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, the Indian Ocean Islands, Central America, South
America, the Middle East, India, the South Pacific islands and the Caribbean islands (Information 8).

In November of 1988, the United States National Preparatory Committee was established. The coordinating youth and student organizations included the United States Student Association, the Georgia Black Students, the Student Section of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Young Communist League and affiliates of the Student Action Union (USNPC letter). By April of 1989, the USNPC had established a considerable number of endorsers, among which were the Honorable George W. Crockett, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives, Michigan; the Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.; the Honorable Kwesi Mfume, U.S. House of Representative, Maryland; the Honorable Edolphus Towns, U.S. House of Representatives, New York; the Honorable Ronald V. Dellums, U.S. House of Representatives, California; the Honorable David Patterson, New York State Senate; and the Honorable Roger Green, New York State Assembly (Endorsers). Thus, with the financial assistance of these and other endorsers, the USNPC was able to select 90 delegates for the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students.

Thus far, I have examined the history of the festival movement and how it has come to exist in its present form. In so doing, I have demonstrated the magnitude of what the festival movement actually is. I submit that this contextualization in an historical light is of critical
import in terms of understanding what actually took place at the 13th festival in Pyongyang. In the same regard, an historical examination of what actually took place at the 13th festival in Pyongyang is of critical import in determining the extent to which the mainstream press has managed to rhetorically reduce it. Clearly, perspectives on the past are indispensable in regard to perspectives in the present. In this regard, and before I examine what actually took place at the 13th festival, I will explicate the concept of historiography from which I establish my point of view. In so doing, I will make the point clear that exhuming the symbolic artifacts of an event that now rests between pages of text is paramount to any responsible consideration of the future. History is an organon of our self knowledge, an indispensable instrument for building up our human universe (Cassirer 206).

In other words, I advocate the notion of "radical history" proposed by Howard Zinn. This notion of history starts with idea that writing history can extend human sensibilities: (1) it can expand our perceptions of human oppression; (2) it can expose the pretensions of government; (3) it can expose the ideology that pervades our culture; (4) it can demonstrate that change is possible; and (5) it can demonstrate how to be critical participants in social change (35-52). This notion of history advocates the position that recapitulation of the past can help us focus on questions that are important today (Zinn 364). Clearly, in
regard to the 13th festival, I can posit the notion that the rhetorical reduction of this event has disabled the capabilities of the youth as they ponder their future. One does not need to look far to see the patterns and effects of pessimism, negativity and nihilism in youth. Likewise, I can posit the notion that the exposure of this rhetorical reduction, and in turn, the exposure of what actually happened at the festival, can set into action the capabilities of the youth as they ponder their future. What the present generation does not need is a specious continuity between the present and the past. What it needs is an historical consciousness that can challenge the world anew and mediate between what is and what men think ought to be (White, "Burden" 50). As Nietzsche so clearly stated, "Lack of a historical sense is the original error of all philosophers ... " (51)

So, with this historical sense, I turn now to an examination of what actually took place at the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang. As explicated above, this historical stance can expand perceptions, expose pretensions, expose ideologies, demonstrate change and promote responsible criticism.

First of all, however, I preface with the following clarification. Even though I attended the festival as a delegate and experienced the event first hand, I could see only through the lenses of myself, through the knowledge, theories, and methodologies that I have assimilated. Personal
choice and personal responses were involved (Segal 80). As an historian, I must "interpret" my data by excluding certain facts as irrelevant and filling in the gaps on speculative grounds (White, "Interpretation" 51). As Cassirer notes, "Facts themselves are not immediately observable by the historian. They are not observable like physical or chemical facts; they must be reconstructed" (195-196).

Now, the festival. As mentioned earlier, not only do cultural events and sports contests take place, but youth and students unite to discuss political issues. At the 13th Festival, well over 1,000 events took place, from round-table political discussions, solidarity rallies, and plenary sessions, to sports matches, artistic performances, film showings and visits to the city and beyond (Jayko 13). There were also frequent bilateral meetings arranged for two countries at a time to talk over issues of economic and political concern. As a delegate from the United States, I participated in the Korean, Soviet Union and Czechoslovakian bilaterals.

The main headings for the events were: (1) political; (2) cultural and artistic; (3) sports; and (4) national clubs. I will describe each of these separately. In terms of the organization of political activities, eight thematic centers were set up throughout the city; each focused on a particular area of concentration and conducted sessions daily. These centers were as follows: (1) Peace, Disarmament, a Nuclear Weapon-Free World, Security; (2) Anti-Imperialist
Solidarity, National Liberation, Independence, Sovereignty and National Self-Determination, Social Progress, Democracy and Human Dignity; (3) Non-Alignment; (4) Socio-Economic Development, A New International Economic Order, Foreign Debt, Disarmament for Development; (5) Protection of Nature and the Environment, A New International Information and Communication Order and Solution of Other Global Problems; (6) Youth, Students and Children's Rights as Inalienable Part of Human Rights; (7) Women's Rights; and (8) Education, the Sciences, New Technologies (Program 3-8) Also incorporated under the political theme were meetings of special interest groups such as Young Members of Parliament, Trade Union Activists, Young Workers and Rural Youth. Solidarity rallies and mass activities such as the Torchlight Procession of Youth and Students supplemented the program (Guide). In the Torchlight Procession, Korean young people and youth and student delegates of other countries, 50,000 in all, lined up in Kim Il Sung Square and on nearby streets with torchlights in their hands, each inscribed with the words, "A new world free from nuclear weapons" ("Torchlight" 3).

The cultural and artistic program featured political songs, classical and modern music, dance and pantomime, pop music, folk and traditional music, circus and magic art, a film festival, exhibitions of fine art and an international workshop of literature and art. The sports program featured football, basketball, volleyball, table-tennis, Taekwon-do, rhythmic gymnastics and figure skating. This program was
interspersed with both performances and the opportunity for delegates to participate (Guide). In regard to the national clubs, each country was given a designated location from which to conduct business, socialize and organize their individual interests.

In addition to the above organization of the political, cultural, sports and national concerns, each day of the festival was devoted to a specific theme: (1) Opening ceremonies; (2) Peace, disarmament and the creation of nuclear free zones; (3) Independence and national liberation struggles; (4) The environmental crisis; (5) Friendship, cooperation and international solidarity; (6) The rights of youth and students; (7) The day of the host country, i.e., visits to various locations in the city and meetings with Korean elected officials; and (8) Closing ceremonies (USNPC letter).

As the above points out, the 13th festival was replete with discussion, activities and a vastness of cooperation, considering the fact that there were 15,000 delegates from 180 different countries in addition to the resident Korean youth. The relevance of this magnitude and the critical import of the activities of the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students can be captured in the following excerpt from Kim Il Sung's address at the Opening Ceremony on July 1, 1989:
Mankind is now entering a magnificent, historic age of creating a new world of independence, peace and friendship by breaking with the old world of aggression and war, domination and subjugation which have caused untold miseries and sufferings for ages.... Man's social nature is not based on antagonism, enmity and bellicosity, but on the desire to lead an independent life as the master of the world, as the master of one's own destiny, through mutual cooperation. An independent world which is free from aggression and war, domination and subjugation, and in which the people of all lands equally develop and prosper, is the world which accords with man's reason and with his nature. (Sung 2)

Kim Il Sung's message, however, never reached the United States through the mainstream media, neither did the message conveying the expansive and dynamic nature of the festival itself. What did reach the United States was a message that conveyed only a meager resemblance of the festival; one that was distorted, diminished and suppressed; to use a more precise term, rhetorically reduced.

Thus far, I have discussed the history of the festival movement and how it has come to exist in its present form. I also explained my position in terms of historiography and accordingly examined what actually took place at the festival. What I turn to now is an explication of the
festival as it was depicted in the mainstream press, and thus, rhetorically reduced. This critique, as previously noted, will confront the following methods of rhetorical reduction employed by the various journalists: 1) discussing the festival in terms of peripheral elements; and (2) transforming the multifarious dimensions of the festival occurrences into homogenous and oversimplified categories.

In attending to these rhetorical elements, I will examine the Christian Science Monitor, the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Los Angeles Times, the National Review, Newsweek, the New York Times, the Pittsburgh Post Gazette, the Wall Street Journal, and the Washington Post. As Foucault writes:

> One must consider discursive formations in the density of accumulation in which they are caught up (125) and question them as to their existence and what it means for them to have come into existence and what it means for them to have appeared when and where they did. (109).

In this regard and in what follows, I will examine the media items that demonstrate discussions of the festival in terms of peripheral and tangential elements. Accordingly, I will address how they reduce the festival rhetorically.

The news media, in regard to addressing the festival in terms of the peripheral and tangential, employed basically three devices: (1) shifting the agenda to the North Korea/South Korea issue; (2) shifting the agenda to the South Korean student, Lim Su Kyong, who came to the festival
despite her government's ban on travel to the north; and
(3) shifting the agenda to the "regime" of North Korea. I
will first discuss how the media shifted the agenda to the
North Korea/South Korea issue.

The headline of the July 3, 1989 Christian Science
Monitor article (Sneider) reads, "North Korea Turns on the
Charm: As Part of its PR War Against South Korea, Pyongyang
Hosts a Rare Influx of Foreign Visitors." This headline sets
the tone for the entire article. Sneider writes that "this
unusual access," i.e., the festival, is a product of North
Korea's ongoing competition with its "bitter foe." Also,
Sneider writes that North Korea seeks to bolster its image by
inviting South Korean student organizations to attend the
festival. Likewise, he mentions that South Korean analysts
say a successful festival will encourage the North to pursue
a more flexible policy. Clearly, Sneider has shifted the
agenda of the festival to the North Korea/South Korea issue.
He reduces the festival to a mere charming device for North
Korea to manipulate South Korea. Incidentally, the only
photograph in the article is of the demarcation line.

Peter Maass in the July 10, 1989 Washington Post, also
brought in the issue with South Korea. He writes, "The
festival was staged to counteract the prestige and publicity
South Korea gained from the Seoul Olympics."

The Los Angeles Times, on June 29, 1989 produced an
article which devoted half of its space to the North
Korea/South Korea issue. For example:
North Korea has consistently demanded withdrawal of the approximately 43,000 U.S. service personnel in South Korea as a step toward ultimate reunification. ... the propaganda notwithstanding, North Korea seems to be working hard to make it a success.

(Holley)

Also, the July 10, 1989 Los Angeles Times addressed the North/South Korea issue. The caption stated, "Deep Inferiority Complex Seen: N. Korea Puts on Best Face to Vie with South." Again, the festival is pushed into the background by this shifting agenda.

David Zweig in the July 15, 1989 New York Times offers a similar account in terms of shifting the agenda to the North Korea/South Korea issue. He writes that while North Korea admits to having 550,000 troops, credible reports put its actual troop strength at 842,000 soldiers, 25 percent more than South Korea's. Such a large force, he writes, makes U.S. military withdrawal from the South difficult; yet when North Koreans look south, they see 40,000 U.S. troops, hundreds of nuclear weapons and the yearly Team Spirit military exercise and feel threatened.

Following in this pattern is the Wall Street Journal. In an article dated July 3, 1989, Urban C. Lehner writes that even though the North-South dialogue has been on hold in recent weeks, there are signs it may resume soon. Accordingly, he adds that the North Koreans have made
"tremendous propaganda hay" out of South Korea's refusal to let its students attend the festival.

Clearly, the above demonstrates how the agenda was shifted away from festival occurrences. I will now address how the media shifted the agenda to the South Korean student, Lim Su Kyong, who came to the festival despite her government's ban on travel to the north.

Shim Jae Hoon, in the July 20, 1989 Far Eastern Economic Review, made mention of the festival only in passing:

> The arrival in Pyongyang on 30 June of Lim Su Kyong, a 22-year-old student representing the radical student organization Chondaehyop, to take part in the leftist World Youth Festival, has provided the government with new leverage to deal with the campus agitation for reunification. (27)

In a similar fashion, the July 17, 1989 Newsweek featured not only article space, but a captioned color photograph of Lim Soo Kyong. In this regard, Bradley writes that the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students paid an immediate dividend to Pyongyang when a South Korean radical, 21-year old Lim Soo Kyong, defied the Seoul government's ban on travel to the north and showed up in Pyongyang just before the festival began.

The Los Angeles Times went a few steps further in its July 1, 1989 article when it made the caption, "Student Flies to North Korea to Attend Event: South Korea Dissident Defies Festival Ban." David Holley writes in this piece that "a
young Korean woman from Seoul flew into Pyongyang ... to attend a sports and cultural festival as a representative of radical students in the south." He said little much else about the festival, except that it was a "sort of leftist quasi-Olympic and cultural event." The rest of the article addresses the North Korea/South Korea issue of reunification. "American and South Korean supporters of the U.S. troop presence," Holley writes, "argue that it is necessary to ensure stability on the peninsula and deter any possible attack on the south by the north."

Similarly, the July 1, 1989 New York Times provided coverage on Lim Soo Kyong. Nicholas Kristof writes that President Kim scored a minor propaganda victory with the arrival of a South Korean student who will represent the South in the festival. He continues in observing that "Thousands of Koreans and hundred of journalists were at the airport today to greet Lim, who was nearly trampled by crowds waving flowers and shouting 'reunification of the homeland.'"

Not surprisingly, then, the July 2, 1989 Washington Post ran a front page photograph of Lim Soo Kyong in the festival parade on the opening day. Peter Maass writes, "A stir was created on the eve of the festival when a young woman claiming to be a South Korean student arrived in Pyongyang on an Aeroflot [Soviet] flight and received a hero's welcome as the sole representative of South Korea."
I will now discuss how the media shifted the agenda from the festival by focusing attention on the "regime" of Kim Il Sung.

The April 27, 1989 issue of the *Far Eastern Economic Review* devoted considerable space to the "regime." Louise do Rosario, in writing of the upcoming festival, notes that as long as President Kim Il Sung lives, North Korea is unlikely to undergo radical change. She continues:

Ideological slogans, huge revolutionary monuments and statues and posters of Kim still dominate Pyongyang. The oppressive mood of secrecy, suspicion, apathy and heavy propaganda is unmistakable.... Pyongyang's economy is still cast in the classic Stalinist central planning mould ... (32-33)

David Holley, in the June 29, 1989 *Los Angeles Times* continues on a similar note. He writes that the oppressive rhetoric and distortions of Pyongyang's propaganda apparatus continue unabated. Such fascination with Kim Il Sung's "regime" is also demonstrated in Holley's July 10, 1989 article in the *Los Angeles Times* where the feature photograph is of a North Korean policewoman directing traffic in front of a billboard glorifying Kim Il Sung. Holley writes in this edition that North Korea remains an intensely secretive society; its stability depends on vast distortions of the history of President Kim's life and the general history of the past 45 years. Mention of the festival is merely thus:
The eight-day Festival of Youth and Students ... has been Pyongyang's greatest effort yet to show off its accomplishments. About 20,000 delegates and tourists from various countries attended the festival, which featured sports competitions, various types of cultural performances and leftist political gatherings with titles such as "Anti-Imperialist Tribunal."

Anthony Daniels in the September 1, 1989 issue of the National Review takes a more cynical approach. Daniels writes that Kim Il Sung has been playing hilarious practical jokes on the people of North Korea for four and a half decades. One of these jokes, attests Daniels, is that the state he founded is anti-fascist in almost pure form; one enormous poster shows a giant Kim with his arm out-stretched, Hitler-like. Mention of the festival, however, was only a passing commentary that read, "During the recent World Festival of Youth and Students, a Soviet-funded jamboree ..." (19)

Newsweek even devoted more time to the "regime." In the August 7, 1989 issue, Bradley Martin's article was captioned, "Kim Il Sung's Socialist Paradise: North Korea is an Unapologetic Preserve of Marxist Faith and the Cult of Personality" (38). Martin writes that Kim Il Sung is the center of a personality cult exceeding those of Stalin and Mao Zedong, using his cult to consolidate and preserve control; Kim is not just a despot from a bygone era, he has
presided over North Korea's resurrection from the Korean War, which claimed over a million Korean lives.

Sheryl WuDunn, in the July 2, 1989 New York Times also considerably shifted the agenda from the festival to the regime. She mentions the presence of Americans at the festival, but does not clarify their number or their activities. What she did spend considerable space on is the precision with which the opening ceremonies were conducted, the spotless streets and the subway, all of which she remarked are examples of glory and excess. Also, in her July 9, 1989 article in the New York Times, she focuses on the North Korean economy, its industrial production, and finances. She mentions the festival only in the context of these themes:

The Government's new state General Bureau of Tourism expects to spend billions of dollars to add 25,000 rooms, nearly half of which already have been built to house the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students... [The Government] spent $8.7 billion on the festival instead of repaying its loans.

In a similar fashion, Nicholas D. Kristof in the July 5, 1989 New York Times, wrote exclusively on the dam at Nampo and the leadership of Kim Il Sung. This article is captioned, "In North Korea, Dam Reflects 'Great Leader's' State of Mind." Kristoff subsequently expanded the views of Kim Il Sung's regime in the July 19, 1989 New York Times captioned, "Ever
So Reluctantly, North Korea is Showing Some Signs of Change.

In this article he addresses issues such as the absence of the handicapped in Pyongyang; the friendliness of Koreans; the use of Western clothes; dating rituals; political prisoners and the openings of Catholic and Protestant churches. He mentions the festival only to note that the admission of Americans might be a sign of change.

Also fascinated by Kim Il Sung's regime and the economic situation is Urban Lehner as he writes in the July 11, 1989 issue of the Wall Street Journal. For example, he writes, "But all the analyses of the North Korean economy are suspect because so little reliable information is available. Even foreigners who live in the country get a limited view. Most are confined to Pyongyang, the capital, which is something of a Potemkin village." Lehner continues to explain how North Koreans are cut off from knowledge of the outside world other than what their government tells them and how they express little dissatisfaction with their lot. Here again, the 13th Festival is mentioned only in passing. Even so, Lehner's August 15, 1989 article in the Wall Street Journal is by far the most complex in assessing Sung's regime. In this piece, Lehner delves explicitly into the supposed mechanisms of Sung's ideology. He writes that political indoctrination is the country's most important work and he proceeds to explain several mechanisms, including "mass games," factory loudspeakers, slogan signs, ideological movies and books, and educational. Also, in the August 29, 1989 edition of the Wall
Van Mersbergen 25

Street Journal, he remarks that President Kim Il Sung keeps his country so neat that at times it has an eerie, almost unlived-in quality; no laundry hangs from apartment windows and no bicycles clog the streets.

Accordingly, Peter Maas, in the July 18, 1989 Washington Post writes predominantly on Kim Il Sung's "regime." His article is captioned, "North Korea Maintains Orwellian System: Pyongyang Controls Political and Social Life of Isolated Nation." The festival, in this article, was not mentioned at all.

Clearly, the above represents that the festival was discussed by the mainstream press in terms of peripheral and tangential elements. The agenda was shifted by the North Korea/South Korea issue; by the presence of Lim Soo Kyong; and by a concentration of press attention to the "regime" of Kim Il Sung. Consequently, the 13th Festival was rhetorically reduced. The presence of the American delegates was virtually ignored. The activities of the festival, such as the magnitude of round table talks, political bilaterals and other political "talks" were ignored. Also, the organizing mechanisms of the International Preparatory Committee and the United States Preparatory Committee were ignored.

As I have examined how the media addressed the festival in terms of peripheral and tangential elements, I will now focus on how the media succeeded in transforming the multifarious dimensions of the festival occurrences into homogenous and oversimplified categories. The homogenous and
oversimplified categories that the media coverage falls into are as follows: (1) classifying North Korea as Orwellian; (2) blatant name calling classifications; (3) classifying "mass games" as indoctrination; and (4) classifying the "Juche Idea" as self-reliance.

In this regard and in what follows, I will examine the media items that demonstrate discussions of the festival in terms of the above homogenous and oversimplified categories. Accordingly, I will address how they reduce the festival rhetorically.

I will first address how North Korea has been classified as Orwellian, thus oversimplifying the culture, and accordingly, reducing the atmosphere of the festival.

Anthony Daniels, in the September 1, 1989 National Review commented on North Korean shoppers in a department store and how they received a tub of rouge at the end of the day instead of currency. He writes, "This was surely wittier than anything in Orwell." In the first place, Daniels is not considering the cultural context in this regard. He does not really know the specificity of this drama and has taken it upon himself to reduce it into the most simple narrative. Money, wages and the novelty of a simple cosmetic are quite different to Americans than they are to North Koreans. Daniels does not take that into account.

Urban Lehner, in the August 15 issue of the Wall Street Journal, calls the following Orwellian: the loudspeakers on
factory roofs; loudspeakers in the fields of farms; loudspeakers in trucks; loudspeakers in apartments; party slogans on country hillsides; and neon signs with party slogans such as "Socialist Economic Construction." Peter Maass in the July 18, 1989 issue of the Washington Post is similarly troubled by these loudspeakers, slogan signs and the regulation of daily life. He calls it all "Orwellian Propaganda." In sum, these are claims that use American culture as a gauge through which to assess Korean culture. This view unfairly create a negative perception of the Korean culture, a culture that can be explained accordingly:

President Kim Il Sung's Korea lives in the age of "labour." In Korea, people do not spend much time on discussions, reports, documentation, various lengthy lectures or meetings. But they employ their time in teaching farmers to cultivate land in the fields, workers to take care of their equipment and increase productivity, and cadres to live together with their subordinates, speak in their terms and share a life with them in factories.... The Korean people think that some countries fail to take appropriate measures for saving people from the crisis because they have no guiding idea to make people masters of nature and society. Fervent love for the motherland, burning hatred for the class enemy, a high organizational sense, boundless love
for labour, a spirit of mutual aid and strict discipline are for the Korean people indispensible conditions for success... (Fersi 223-224).

Accordingly, this Orwellian perspective reduced the import of the festival because it severely biased the place in which it was held. It reduced it to that which was congenial with an Orwellian disposition.

I will now address the blatant name calling classifications. They are as follows: "the hermetic communist nation of North Korea," stated in the July 3, 1989 Christian Science Monitor (Sneider); "Kim raises anti-imperialist bogey for world festival," stated in the April 13, 1989 Far Eastern Economic Review (do Rosario); "Iron fist relaxes," and "oppressive mood of secrecy, suspicion, apathy and heavy propaganda," stated in the April 27, 1989 Far Eastern Economic Review (do Rosario); "the leftist World Youth Festival," stated in the July 20, 1989 Far Eastern Economic Review (Hoon); "abrasive rhetoric and distortions of Pyongyang's propaganda apparatus," and "pervasive personality cult," in the June 29, 1989 Los Angeles Times (Holley); "Deep inferiority complex seen," and "vast distortions of the history of President Kim's life," stated in the July 10, 1989 Los Angeles Times (Holley); "a party in Pyongyang," "the hermit kingdom," "lavish leftist youth festival," " Spartan diet of communism," "propaganda boost," "festival - nothing more than a party," and "skimpily clad foreigners... flirted and drank beer," stated in July 17, 1989 Newsweek (Martin);

The above represents the way in which the blatant name calling classifications of the media oversimplified the issues and slanted understanding toward a particular bias. These generalization are not accurate and ultimately reduce the ways in which the festival can be appreciated and understood.

I will now address how the media classified the "mass games" as indoctrination, and consequently simplified, reduced and biased the import of the festival in Pyongyang.

Urban Lehner writes in the August 15, 1989 Wall Street Journal that "mass games" are an indoctrination. He calls them "rearing a good communist," and notes that they are "propaganda pep rallies." This, I submit is a gross
simplification. The Pyongyang Times describes a "mass game" with a little more detail and a lot less bias:

Performed by 50,000 young people.... [t]he mass game is run through with the changes of formations which move like a machine, the making of beautiful formations, three-dimensional scenes on the background and a high level of skill in gymnastic art. More than 30,000 piece of apparatuses and gadgets of over 20 kinds including banners, hoops and skipping ropes and tens of thousands of beautiful clothes in scores of types sumptuously decorate the mass game.... The background scene which is made by 12,000 young pupils and students plays a special role in giving prominence to the ideological and artistic quality of the mass game. ("Mass")

Clearly, mass games are a reflection of an ideology, but in Lehner's account, the students participating are nothing more than prisoners, held by someone in a likeness of Hitler. Lehner completely obliterates the beauty and cultural significance of these games. In so doing, the festival, which was graced on several occassions by the mass games, is reduced and rendered as something akin to the likeness of Hitler.

At this point, I will address the media classification of the "Juche Idea" as self-reliance. In doing so, the media reduces this concept into a notion that perpetuates the idea
that Korea wants to be interculturally indifferent, isolated and hostile. This refutes the entire theme of the World Festival, which stresses cooperation, friendship and solidarity.

The following address the "Juche Idea" as national self-reliance: the July 15, 1989 New York Times (Zweig); the August 7, 1989 Newsweek (Martin); the August 15, 1989 Wall Street Journal (Lehner); and the July 2, 1989 Washington Post (Maass). As pointed out above, these designations perpetuate a notion that Korea wants to remain hostile, thereby reducing the potential import of the 13th Festival. Fersi explains the "Juche Idea" in the Korean cultural context:

[T]he idea of Juche means that.... one is responsible for one's own destiny and one has also the capacity for hewing out one's own destiny.... Man of a Juche type is a completely independent and creative one. He is also the most precious of all beings in the world. His life is inseparable from society and cannot be independent of his times.... The Juche philosophy shows that man is an independent and creative social being and therefore his life should be valued by what he did for the sake of the world surrounding him and accordingly by the importance of the contribution he made to the progress of society.... man must know how to sacrifice himself to a cause more precious and lofty than himself.... The Korean people's
happiness of today lies not in piling up wealth...
but in devoting themselves to the grand cause of
creating the world... (60-72)

Clearly, the "Juche Idea" is quite a bit more involved than
what the journalists above called "self-reliance." The "Juche
Idea," when understood in the Korean context, explains an
ideology and clarifies the reasons why the many elements in
Korean culture are the way that they are. In sum, the
journalists above, who discussed the festival in terms of
peripheral elements or who transformed the multifarious
dimensions of the festival into homogenous and oversimplified
categories, did not view the festival event in a cultural or
historical manner, and quite inadvertently, reduced the
magnitude and critical import of the festival. It is
important to note, however, that many issues brought up by
the journalists were quite important in their own right, such
as the North Korea/South Korea issue, Lim Soo Kyong, and the
specific ways in which the North Korean society functions;
however, as I cited Foucault earlier, one must consider the
discursive formations in the density of accumulation in which
they are caught up (125) and question them as to their mode
of existence, what it means for them to have come into
existence and what it means for them to have appeared when
and where they did (109). With this notion in mind, I turn
now to explicate the critical aspects of ideology and how
ideology functions as a determinate factor in producing
perpectives, particularly the perspectives of the mainstream
press. In closing, I will address the far reaching potential that is incorporated in positioning the festival in history with the full degree of its magnitude and critical import.

As I mentioned above, the journalists, in shifting the agenda and oversimplifying categories, quite inadvertently reduced the magnitude and critical import of the festival. This phenomenon can be addressed through an understanding of ideology.

Michael Parenti writes that the media exert a persistent influence, channeling public attention in directions that are essentially supportive of the existing politico-economic system (ix). This is clearly evident in both the agenda shifting of the journalists and the oversimplifications. These mechanisms tended towards supporting the existing system and renouncing the very different, but distinctive government of North Korea. Accordingly, these major distortions are not only of deliberative manipulation but of the ideological and economic conditions under which the media operate (Parenti ix). Likewise, even though I have addressed several different mainstream presses, common themes are evident throughout. As Parenti writes, "While having an abundance of numbers and giving an appearance of diversity, the mass media actually are highly centralized outlets that proffer a remarkably homogenized fare (30). The diversity of publications should not be mistaken for a plurality of ideas and ideologies, nor a wealth of information (32)."
What is ironic here is that in these terms, the journalists are guilty of the very same constraints for which they criticized the North Koreans. The difference is that Kim Il Sung's government admits to and professes political indoctrination and is overt in enacting it, while the government in the United States renounces political indoctrination and is covert in enacting it. Kim Jong Il's book, for example, *On Further Improving Party Ideological Work*, includes chapters such as "On Intensifying Ideological Education for Training People of a Communist Type," and "On Intensifying Propaganda and Agitation for the Construction of the Socialist Economy." Likewise, Kim Il Jong's book, *The Cinema and Directing*, states that the important thing in teaching the actor is that the director leads him to have a high degree of political awareness as an artistic creator; the director has to guide the actor in such a way that he will increase his sense of responsibility and initiative throughout the creative activity, deeply conscious of the mission assigned him by the Party and the revolution (39).

In this regard, whether or not one is overt or covert in terms of ideological indoctrination, it works to support the status quo. Ideology is a force that enters into the very constitution of the individual (Ellis 187). So, then, it ultimately does not matter if a press is controlled by the State, as in North Korea, or controlled by private corporations, in the United States; the press is still a mechanism and facilitator of a dominant ideology. As
Althusser writes, "No class can hold State power over a long period of time without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses (146), i.e., the news media.

In contrast to Kim Il Jong's position, however, Althusser argues in *For Marx*, that ideology has very little to do with consciousness. It is profoundly unconscious (qtd. in Heck 122). But whether or not ideology is consciously or uncounsciously put into place, it needs to come into place through legitimacy and consent. As Gramsci writes, it is through legitimacy and consent that the dominant system comes to win a certain acceptance from the dominated classes (qtd. in Hall "Culture"). In sum, it does not matter if the press is controlled by the State, and hence, conscious, or controlled by private corporations, and hence, unconscious. What is achieved in either case is legitimacy and consent for the hegemonic ideology; concurrently, the hegemonic ideology is what is supportive of the status quo. Likewise, in the cases of the mainstream media covering the festival, most accounts were in alignment with the status quo. The status quo, that which rendered Kim Il Sung (and the festival) as subversive, is in alignment with the dominant ideology. That the journalists were reductive is beside the point. The point is that they, nonetheless, perpetuated a hegemonic position.

What, then, can be done in order to reestablish the festival in history with the full realm of its magnitude and critical import if the rhetorical dimensions that reduced it
are part of a hegemonic ideology? There is always room for change, writes Paul Smith (40). Dominated "subjects" do not maintain the kind of control which the word "individual" might suggest, but neither do they remain consistent or coherent in the passage of time: both they and the discourses they inhabit have histories and memories which alter in constitution over time (xxxiii-xxxv). Likewise, there is no such thing as a pre-existing meaning. Things and events in the real world do not contain or propose their own integral and intrinsic meaning. Meaning is a social production, and the world has to be made to mean (Hall "Rediscovery").

What this discussion suggests is that although the festival was rhetorically reduced within a prevailing ideology, there is still the possibility of change and rectification. But why change? Why exhume what has long since past? As pointed out earlier, the study of the past is a way of providing perspectives on the present that contribute to the solution of problems peculiar to our time ("Burden"). Accordingly, I maintain that the rhetorical reduction of the festival has disabled the capacity of the youth. Since the mainstream press diverted the agenda to other areas and oversimplified, the youth did not get an opportunity to see that language can be an alternative to violence; that talking can work; that diversity does not have to be an obstacle when trying to negotiate conflicts. The youth did not get an opportunity to see that in the midst of war, prejudice and environmental collapse, there are tens of thousands of young
people struggling for solutions; struggling for solutions with dialogue after dialogue after dialogue. Therefore, by reversing the reduction of the 13th festival and exposing what actually happened, the small vision of possibility that the youth now have can be expanded ad infinitum. With words and through words. Perhaps.

As Hermann Hesse so insightfully wrote:

We must not begin at the end with reforms of government and political methods, but rather we must start at the beginning, with the construction of the personality. If we want once again to have minds and men who will guarantee a future for us, we must plunge our roots more deeply and not merely shake the branches.
Works Cited


Maass, Peter. "North Koreans are Festive in Unison."


