By 1978, those associated with the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) knew that serious internal and external problems existed. This paper describes the redesign of NCATE and is presented as a case study of political, organizational, and professional complexity. Data were gathered from four sources: (1) published material pertaining to redesign and its antecedents; (2) all pertinent records of the NCATE Council and Coordinating Board; (3) 35 one-hour telephone interviews conducted between the end of November 1989 and the beginning of March 1990; and (4) interviewee responses to the draft of the present paper. The benefit of a decade's perspective reveals a profession responding to its own perceived needs to change. Findings suggest that on the strength of the evidence in this case, teacher educators have acquired a broader and deeper reality principle and public mindedness; proponents of reform can take useful lessons from the NCATE story. Three appendices list names and professional affiliation of case study interviewees, November 1989 to March 1990; NCATE case interview questions; and an abbreviated NCATE Redesign Chronology. (Contains 38 selected references.) (LL)

THE REDESIGN OF NCATE 1980-1986

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By 1978, those associated with the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE) knew that serious internal and external problems existed. NCATE, the national voluntary mechanism for the peer regulation of professional preparation programs for education, was then governed by a Coordinating Board composed one-third of representatives of the National Education Association (NEA), one-third from the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education (AACTE), and the remaining third from the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO), the National School Boards Association (NSBA), and a revolving group of six other specialty organizations in education.¹ The actual work of accrediting programs and defining standards was done by the NCATE Council, a twenty-five member body, one third from the NEA, one-third from the AACTE, one-third from the CCSSO, NSBA and specialty organizations,

¹For example, in 1981 those specialty organizations included the Council for Exceptional Children (CEC), the American Association of School Administrators (AASA), the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics (NCTM), the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP), the Student National Education Association (SNEA), and the Association for Educational Communications and Technology (AECT).
plus one public member. At that time NCATE accredited programs in over 500 institutions responsible for preparing over 80% of the national production of educational personnel each year.

The problems were apparent. In February, 1978, the Association of Colleges and School of Education in State Universities and Land Grant Colleges and Affiliated Private Universities (ACSESULGC/APU) had, in effect, placed NCATE on notice that either productive change would be needed within five years or ACSESULGC/APU would consider developing an alternative accreditation system\(^2\); the widespread awareness of the unhappiness of this prestigious group of institutions weighed heavily on NCATE (GC\(^3\), DG, JG, RK, WM, HO, JS, RW). In 1980 the

\(^2\)Unfortunately, the actual document is fugitive. Extensive efforts were unsuccessful in locating a copy of the report of the Task Force chaired by Don McCarty, the former dean of the University of Wisconsin College of Education, but the collective memory is consistent on its message. Equal effort was expended attempting to locate a report of the TECSCU Accreditation Task Force of spring, 1982. Also alive in interviewee's memories, it remained fugitive after more than 30 phone contacts systematically following leads developed during the calls. The document was finally acquired by accident; it was embedded in a sheaf of materials sent by one of the interviewees a couple of weeks later on the off chance I might be interested! Document retrieval problems like these arise because of the changing cadre and institutional location of association officers which, together with the combined effects of career moves, sometimes leads to less than exacting storage or retention of materials.

\(^3\)To save valuable space in citing sources the following conventions are applied. For in-text citations underlined capital letters indicate NCATE Council (NC), NCATE Coordinating Board (CB), or AACTE Board of Directors (ABD) minutes followed by the date. Executive Committee minutes for a body are designated (EC). All other two-letter couplets (e.g., DI or CF or HB) indicate the initials of one of the thirty-five interviewees.
Institute for Research on Teaching had, at NCATE's request, completed a study of NCATE'S accreditation processes that noted some strengths but a number of major weaknesses (Wheeler, 1980; LG). Individual institutions (for example, five in the state of Wisconsin alone) had either withdrawn from the NCATE fold or indicated a desire to "place themselves on hold" in the accreditation timetable. Some of the most prestigious universities nationally were not accredited by NCATE. NCATE's governance was proving increasingly confusing, and participation of the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) and the National Association of State Directors of Teacher Education and Certification (NASDTEC) had become a matter of serious concern by the NCATE Council and its Coordinating Board (DG, WM).

Constituent elements within the teacher education community were suspicious of each other; the smaller, liberal arts, often church-affiliated programs of teacher education felt the flagship research universities were calling the shots, but many of the latter, in their turn, felt NCATE's standards and procedures were biased against them. The institutions organized in the Teacher Education Council of State Colleges and Universities (TECSCU), especially given the fact of their dominant role in the actual production of teachers year after year, chafed under the larger role they saw being accorded the so-called "big" deans in

listed in Appendix A; where more than one is cited, they are listed alphabetically.
accreditation and other teacher education policy activities (JG, WGr, EH, JL, WM, HO, JW).

The increasing vigor and interest of the specialty groups (organizations like the Council for Exceptional Children [CEC], the National Association of School Psychologists [NASP], the International Reading Association [IRA], and the Association of Educational Communication and Technology [AECT]) led them to assert themselves in governance and standards matters, challenging the relatively-recently-established parity created between the National Education Association (NEA) and the American Association of Colleges of Teacher Education (AACTE) (JE, WGr, HO, SR). (In earlier days, AACTE had held a dominant position on both NCATE's Council and its Coordinating Board.)

On July 1, 1986, eight years after the ACSESULGC/APU action, NCATE began the implementation of a thoroughgoing redesign fashioned over the preceding twenty-eight months. NCATE's focus shifted from program to unit accreditation. Its governance structures were completely reformulated. The aim was to underscore the importance of the entire educational family participating in its responsibilities, but to do so in ways which assured that the involvement was appropriate to the roles each sector should play in contributing to the definition and

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4 In part a function of the fact that, unlike the teacher and teacher education constituencies, specialty group representatives tended to continue in their NCATE roles for long periods of time (WGr, SR).
maintenance of quality in professional preparation. In particular, the relationship to CCSSO and the states was re-established and strengthened. Furthermore, the groundwork was laid for the eventual inclusion of the American Federation of Teachers as a participant in NCATE along with the NEA.

Curricular concerns, already present in the old standards, were refocused in terms of knowledge bases underpinning teaching and teacher education. Relationships to the world of practice were highlighted. An ambitious set of expectations had been identified to carefully select, orient, and more efficiently utilize a substantially smaller set of much more highly trained examiners to conduct the on-site visits. Accreditation criteria that could be assessed on a presence/absence basis became preconditions for on-site visitation. Much greater reliance was placed on the professional judgment of examiners (and other NCATE accreditation officials) in assessing the relative worth of what units offered as evidence that standards were met. The promise of greater financial stability for NCATE, even in the face of substantial start-up costs for redesign, was defined. Finally, through the adoption of what came to be called its "developmental posture," NCATE self-consciously set about implementing redesign in ways aimed at capitalizing still further on what it anticipated learning as the new structure began to work.

These accomplishments are substantial, noteworthy, and full of promise for the future. The benchmarks established during
those eight years of ferment and then redesign are important to record and vital for succeeding generations of education professionals and those who will play accreditation roles therein to know and understand.

Methodology for the Study

Four main information sources were tapped. First, the relatively small amount of published material pertaining to redesign and its antecedents was located and reviewed. Second, all the pertinent records of the NCATE Council and Coordinating Board were read. Successive and final drafts of important antecedent and redesign documents were acquired and reviewed.

The third major source of input took the form of thirty-five one hour plus telephone interviews conducted between the end of November, 1989, and the beginning of March, 1990. Virtually every one of the principal protagonists of redesign or its antecedents was contacted and interviewed (see Appendix A for the list of interviewees and their relationship to the case). All interviews followed the same question outline (see Appendix B), although for any given interview not all of the items proved appropriate or pertinent. Interviews were not taped, but extensive notes were taken. Interviews were informed that their responses were solicited for attribution, but each was

5Copies of the notes and other fugitive materials have been archived at the University of Cincinnati for possible future examination by interested scholars.
afforded the opportunity, if needed, to identify specified material as "off-the-record" and, therefore, inadmissible for the purposes of this analysis. (As it turned out, interviewees went off the record only a half dozen times, in each case to express personal reactions or conjectures.) The fourth and final source of input was interviewee responses to the draft of the paper. All interviewees were sent a copy of the paper, asked to read it, and respond in any way they chose. All of the recipients responded. Identified concerns and corrections were addressed as raised and appropriate corrections and emendations made. Ultimately, responsibility for the chapter, however, remains with its author.

Were one to treat fully the large volume of written materials available, the intricate details of the NCATE redesign, and the rich anecdotal material generated by the interviews, a very substantial monograph might have been the result. For the purposes of a chapter such as this, therefore, it is important to concentrate on a limited number of central themes.

Antecedents to Redesign

NCATE's redesign did not, like Athena, spring full-blown from the head of Zeus. It had antecedents.

By the early 80's, concern over the substance and application of NCATE's standards, its review processes, governance, costs (financial as well as professional and institutional time), and duplication with state-level program
reviews had been building (DI, RK, HO, DS, CW; Tom, 1980; Tom, 1981). As already noted, in February, 1978, ACSESULGC/APU had given NCATE notice of its concern. In 1977 NCATE had called for an examination of its own procedures (LG), and ultimately had arranged for such a study with the Institute for Research on Teaching at Michigan State University with support from the National Institute of Education and the Ford Foundation. That study was completed in November, 1980 (Wheeler, 1980). It found both strengths and weaknesses. On the plus side, NCATE generally uncovered serious quality problems where they existed. Denial of accreditation, therefore, was a clear signal of inferiority. NCATE's processes were carried out professionally and with concern for objectivity. The process was generally beneficial for the institutions participating. Finally, denial of accreditation had led to some modifications in program (Wheeler, 1980b).

On the negative, the study found a vagueness in NCATE's standards and their organization and an absence of definitions of terms or specification of evidence sufficient to meet standards. Site visitor training respecting standards was judged cursory. A variety of constraints in working conditions impeded the ability of site visitors and NCATE Council members to evaluate programs completely and thoroughly. Institutional influences over team composition were judged inappropriate. The report noted the presence of some in-depth examination of program but, far more
often, reliance on the presence/absence approach (that is, if there were any evidence presented against a standard, it tended to be deemed met). Wheeler raised the question "whether NCATE's stamp of accreditation (was) a meaningful indicator of quality." His study "showed that NCATE's effect on program quality (was) very limited" (1980b, p. 6). The Wheeler report was received by NCATE at its October, 1980, meeting but, for a variety of reasons, the NCATE Council was not overly responsive, if not actually a bit defensive (NC, 10/20/80; DG, LG, WG, DI, MP, DS, CW, RW).

Even before completion of the IRT study NCATE staff had attempted to redraft the standards, but the effort went nowhere (GC, LG, DP).

In the spring of 1981 NCATE staff undertook discussions (for example, one took place between William Gardner, Edell Hearn, Lyn Gubser, and David Poisson) on the implications of the IRT study for possible major changes in NCATE. Those discussions ultimately led in October, 1981, to a staff report to NCATE's Council (NCATE staff, 1981). The document proposed creating a single Board of Directors for NCATE and two accrediting commissions (one for basic professional preparation and one for

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"Among those reasons were NCATE staff and others' beliefs that the report was not entirely reliable, that a number of members of Council did not really believe major change was necessary, or that the changes brought about barely five years before should be given more time to mature before another wholesale effort should be undertaken."
advanced) which would directly elect the Board of Directors. The financial base of the Council would have been broadened, the number of accreditation meetings reduced, and the period of accreditation set at seven years. The size of visiting teams would have been sharply reduced, the focus of accreditation shifted from programs to institutions, and the amount and availability of information about accredited institutions expanded in the annual list. The Executive Committee received the report, scheduled an hour for Council discussion as committee of the whole, and while the Council minutes for the session in question make no reference thereafter to any kind of deliberation over the document (NC, 2/3-5/81), participants in that dialogue agree that the conversation signaled little movement.

One last pre-redesign activity was a 1981-82 TECSCU examination of NCATE accreditation. TECSCU endorsed a two-level system of accreditation. States should assume responsibility for institutional accreditation. The states, in turn, would be accredited by a national accreditation body (TECSCU, 1982). While the document was circulated within AACTE and delivered to NCATE, it was not acted upon (NC-EC, 6/17/82).

Immediate Stimuli and Chronicling Redesign

The immediate stimuli for redesign were the absence of action by Council to the IRT report and the perception of those who attended the October, 1981, meeting of Council at which the staff's redesign document was discussed that needed reform would
not be forthcoming from within NCATE (DI, DS, RW). A shared sense of frustration over the lack of movement culminated in a message that if something was going to happen, AACTE would have to take the initiative. Dale Scannell (Dean of Education, University of Kansas) and three colleagues, William Gardner (Dean of Education, University of Minnesota), Hans Olsen (Dean of Education, University of Houston-Clear Lake City), and Richard Wisniewski (Dean of Education, University of Oklahoma), posed the idea of preparing an alternative accreditation process to David Imig, AACTE's Executive Director, who shared it with the AACTE Executive Committee at its meeting October 5, 1981. AACTE President Dean Corrigan (Dean of Education, Texas A&M) created what would become known as the Committee on Accreditation Alternatives (CAA) (D. C. Corrigan, personal communication, October 23, 1981). Corrigan charged Scannell and his colleagues with the task they had proposed, and more specifically, to develop a rationale for the effort, a design for a new system, a discussion of governance and participation, and a timeline and process for adoption and implementation. His charge left it open whether the alternative should replace NCATE or "be seen as an organization/process model that would significantly modify but not replace the existing Council." (After an initial meeting of the CAA a fifth member, Catherine Sullivan, a long-term, deeply-committed, and well-respected NEA member of the NCATE Council was added to the initial appointees.)
The CAA worked for a little more than a year, maintaining continuing contact with AACTE's Board of Directors (ABD-EC, 1/5/82; ABD, 2/15-16/82, 6/13-16/82; ABD-EC, 8/31-1/82; ABD, 11/18-20/82), with constituent elements of AACTE (TECSCU, the Association of Independent Liberal Arts Colleges of Teacher Education [AILACTE], and ACSESULGC/APU) (HO, DS; Norene Daly, personal communication, 10/11/82), and with NEA leadership via Catherine Sullivan (WM).

The final version of the CAA report, completed in January, 1983, proposed six principles to guide reformulation of national accreditation:

1. Accredit teacher education units, not programs.
2. Replace re-accreditation with continuing accreditation.
3. Articulate national accreditation with state approval.
4. Create a Board of Examiners, highly skilled in NCATE standards, processes, and evaluation skills, from which visiting teams would be drawn.
5. Replace six families of standards applied to programs with five unit-focused standards.
6. Expand the Annual List to describe the unit and indicate the support level for its programs.

Copies of the CAA report were made widely available at the AACTE Annual Meeting (February, 1983), but a resolution endorsing the principles was tabled before much discussion could occur. In a courageous statement immediately at the point of tabling, then AACTE President, Jack Gant spoke to the meaning of the tabling; in the presence of the silence from the membership created by the
tabling, he told the Assembly, the matter would revert to the Board of Directors. His implication was clear; the Board would continue the leadership course on which it had embarked. No one in the audience objected to that conversation (A. Flowers, personal communication, March 9, 1983). Anne Flowers, Gant's successor as AACTE President, in a March 9, 1983 memo to AACTE's Chief Institutional Representatives, communicated her decision, after extensive consultation, to advise the AACTE staff "to move forward with the introduction of an appropriate motion at the March 4-7 NCATE Council Meeting. During the Philadelphia Meeting of the NCATE Council a motion was made to accept the Proposal of the AACTE Committee on Accreditation Alternatives. That motion was unanimously adopted by the Council...." The process of redesigning NCATE had begun.

The formal announcement suggested little of the behind-the-scenes work prior to the NCATE Council meeting. Careful work had been done, beginning with Sullivan's appointment to the CAA, to assure that the NEA delegates were on board (DI, HO, BM). The community of interest worked out over the years, moving safely past periods of strife in the early 1970's between NEA and AACTE over perceived lack parity on NCATE's governing bodies and relative responsibility for financial support, was reflected in the vote to set up an ad hoc committee of six to review the CAA
report and recommend to the Council how it should proceed.\textsuperscript{7}

The Ad Hoc Committee undertook its work that spring and brought a recommendation before the Council at its June, 1983, meeting to adopt the six CAA principles, define a process for undertaking redesign, and address the role of specialty guidelines. An attempt by specialty group representatives to consider the statements associated with specialty guidelines as principles equal to the CAA six was defeated (again a manifestation of the understandings forged between NEA and AACTE representatives in advance of the meeting), and the entire package was approved 21-3,\textsuperscript{(NC, 6/17-20/83)} the only negative votes being cast by representatives of specialty organizations (JE, WGr).

Meanwhile, changes were in the offing in the composition of NCATE's staff officers. Lyn Gubser's resignation as NCATE's Executive Director became effective July 1, 1983. George Denemark, former dean of education at the University of Kentucky and, before that, at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, was enlisted to serve as Interim Executive Director. He presided over a process wherein members of the NCATE Council chaired Ad

\textsuperscript{7}The Committee was chaired by James Eikeland (National Association of School Psychologists) and included two members of the CAA, Gardner (AACTE and ACSESULGC/APU) and Sullivan (NEA), Donald W. Hight (National Council of Teachers of Mathematics), Marjorie Pike (NEA), and J.T. Sandefur, Dean, College of Education, Western Kentucky University (AACTE and TECSCU). It is hard to imagine how a six-member committee of NCATE could have been more politically well-balanced.
Hoc Committees sponsored by the Council's standing committees, each charged with further investigating various aspects of the principles.

The pressure on NCATE's scarce resources led to two decisions. One was to have Council itself do the work; there was no money to support travel and subsistence for additional committee members at NCATE's expense. The second decision was to seek to augment Council's human resources with volunteers. Toward the end of the summer of 1983 the need for volunteers began to be communicated (ABD, Board Memorandum, Redesign Update, 8/25/83). In December, Denemark proposed a plan for enlisting additional resources in support of redesign. The proposal identified personnel, agencies, redesign stages, redesign purposes, and the kind of assistance needed (G. Denemark, personal communication, December 10, 1983). Subsequent to this proposal, individual letters were dispatched to a variety of organizations and agencies. The responses were favorable; volunteers and "conscripts" alike were enlisted and supported to attend to a variety of redesign tasks.

A March, 1984, meeting in Memphis generated great amounts of material and brought a substantial number of volunteers, at their own or their organization's expense, to participate in the redesign effort. Materials growing from the deliberative session were reproduced and widely circulated for review and comment (Marjorie Pike, personal communication, April 4, 1984).
meantime, AACTE members and staff were very busy, including sponsorship of a number of hearings around the country soliciting input on the principles guiding redesign and on the developing ideas and materials contributory to the effort.⁸

Richard Kunkel, dean of education at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas and chair of ACSESULGC/APU's 1982-83 Task Force on Accreditation, became the new Executive Director of NCATE July 1, 1984, a role for which he had already begun to involve himself beginning with the preparations for and the staging of the March meeting of the Council in Memphis. Joined by Donna Gollnick, AACTE liaison to NCATE, and John Leeke, staff liaison from the NEA, Kunkel and Gloria Chernay, Assistant Executive Director of NCATE immediately set about the task of preparing a unified, comprehensive redesign draft from the disparate pieces then in hand. The draft was completed in August. Two months later it had been critiqued by Denemark and three members of the CAA (Sullivan, Olsen, and Scannell).

At its October meeting, Council reviewed the document and undertook a Likert-scale assessment of a number of issues

⁸AACTE's activities in this regard, as well as continuing direct conversations between AACTE officials and staff with other parties to redesign, produced some friction with Denemark who was concerned that NCATE, itself, should be perceived as the core of the redesign effort and that AACTE should not come to be seen as attempting to dominate an activity that ultimately would have to be broadly acceptable across the many sectors of teaching and teacher education if it were to be successful (ABD-EC, December 18-1, 1983; ABD, January 30-31, 1984).
suggested by the draft or that, as yet, remained unresolved (NC, October 13-15, 1984). The Council judgments fed into a December draft widely distributed to NCATE's many constituencies with requests for feedback (RK).

In February, 1985, an important meeting was held in Atlanta of Coordinating Board and Council representatives that successfully addressed fundamental governance questions for redesign (R. L. Saunders, personal communication, February 15, 1985). In March, at a Council meeting in Cincinnati, testimony on redesign was taken from representatives of ACSESULGC/APU, AILACTE, TECSCU, AACTE, NEA, NASP, and the Council of Learned Societies in Education. Following further discussion straw votes on remaining issues were taken to guide yet a third re-write of the redesign document (NC, March 10-11, 1985).

At its June Meeting, its sense of excitement tempered by the death only days before of George Denemark, the Council considered and acted upon the April draft of redesign. Despite the months of work and negotiation, participants remained nervous until the very end for fear that what was still felt to be a very fragile coalition might come undone (MF). The April draft was accepted as a final draft, the standards section to be ratified the following October after consideration of any written comments of reaction, and necessary directives were given to the Task Forces on Governance and on Finance to work with the Constitution and Bylaws Committee to prepare a new constitution and bylaws for
At the October meeting the requisite approval of the standards was given by Council and extensive consideration was given to the proposed constitution and by-laws (NC, October 10-14, 1985). Four months later, the Council unanimously adopted the proposed changes in governance and structure plus a Transition Document outlining understandings of future policies and practices to effect an orderly transfer from the old NCATE to the new and to authorize staff to draft appropriate implementation documents to assist the small set of institutions who would volunteer to pilot the new standards and to assure that "the learnings from these visits will be systematically reported to the Unit Accreditation Board [which would assume the accreditation responsibilities formerly undertaken by the Council] and the Executive Board [which would assume the governance responsibilities which had formerly been held jointly by Council and the Coordinating Board]..." (NC, March 8-10, 1986, Attachment B). Implementation would formally begin with the July, 1, 1986, advent of the newly configured NCATE.

Major Themes

The kinds of changes brought about and the sequence of events, while important, provide only the thinnest of outlines to explain the significance of what was wrought in the four years plus, from the creation of the CAA through redesign itself to the
formal launching of implementation. Five themes emerge as especially powerful explanatory frames.

**Greater Efficiency and Effectiveness**

Many of the concerns and issues leading to redesign can be grouped under the general heading of improving efficiency and effectiveness. The great burden perceived by institutions and the states of two separate and overlapping kinds of program reviews is one example. Institutions needed state approval in order for their graduates to be licensed to teach; they wanted national accreditation because of the perceived professional value of the peer recognition. The burden, however, of two independent reviews of the same type was substantial.

The IRT study had shown the inadequacies of using NCATE's standards on a purely presence/absence basis—if some evidence is present, the institution would be passed on that standard. But there were some criteria for approval that could be judged in that way. Distinguishing between criteria that can be satisfied on a presence/absence basis and those that require in-depth examination and professional judgment speaks to another dimension of efficiency (Wheeler, 1980).

The size of visitation teams was also a concern because of cost as well as logistical considerations (HB), but one of the problems respecting the recommendations forthcoming from the IRT study had been their programmatic (as contrasted to institutional) focus. The IRT report had left the impression
with readers that the ms even greater in size would be required (DS). The large pool of visitors under the old system, the perceived thinness of their training (especially respecting the standards themselves) and the de novo construction of each of the teams leading to each team having to spend valuable time learning how they might best work together constituted additional drains on the system. Confusion among some site visitors as to what the standards were further complicated the matter.

There was not agreement on where to go with all these concerns. Specialty groups were understandably concerned that the curriculum standards that NCATE had approved be applied; in their view it was program quality that ultimately assured the entry of quality graduates into the profession. On the other hand, deans and directors, especially of the larger teacher education institutions, understandably perceived the cumulative effect of individual approved program curricula as particularly burdensome, in effect, not a single accreditation but multiple ones. Some NASDTEC representatives, however, tended even more strongly in the exact opposite direction, contending that NCATE was not, in its pre-redesign form, evaluating programs but rather categories of programs (for example, not each individual secondary certification area but all such areas in tandem), and they were critical of NCATE for having teams that were too small to evaluate everything rather than too big (HB).

Two key conceptual breakthroughs and some political
compromises were required to resolve the puzzles that existed. Prior to the CAA effort, two formulations of unit (as compared to program) accreditation had been developed. The first was in the NCATE staff document that had been shared with Council in October, 1981, a formulation that had grown out of conversations earlier that spring between Gubser, William Gardner, Edell Hearn, and David Poisson, who, in turn, had been influenced by his knowledge of accreditation procedures in other fields (DP). The second antecedent was the TECSCU proposal for state approval of institutions reserving national accreditation for the review of state evaluation procedures (TECSCU, 1982).

The unit focus emerged as a key simplifying assumption. It enabled the clarification of NCATE's domain (units) relative to the states' (programs), and set the stage for further negotiations with specialty groups on exactly how their concerns would be addressed. (The latter's uneasiness with the unit approval assumption was reflected in their failed attempt to have the sentences on specialty groups elevated to the level of "principles" at the June, 1983, Council meeting, as well as the three negative votes cast against entering into the redesign process at that same meeting [JC, JE, WGr].

The decision to opt for unit accreditation dovetailed neatly

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9 Although not with full staff endorsement (DC). Over some staff objections, Gubser had decided to transmit the material on grounds that the decision ought to be Council's based on fully-staffed options (LG).
with a variety of options for addressing concerns respecting the mechanics of evaluation. Presence/absence criteria (e.g., was there a unit, did it have a director, was the institution regionally accredited and approved by the state for teacher education, had evaluation studies of program been conducted, etc.) could be applied independently to a unit as preconditions well before a site visit. Indeed, having a visit would become contingent upon such preconditions having been met. The submission and evaluation of program portfolios against NCATE-approved guidelines could be accomplished at that time.

Furthermore, teams could be considerably smaller because of the unit focus; therefore, NCATE could afford to be more selective of site visitors, could train them more thoroughly, and could establish means whereby, functioning as continuing cohort groups, they could develop experience with one another as examiners, thereby reducing vary substantially on-site socialization functions needed for them to carry out their responsibilities efficiently. Finally, distinguishing and delineating NCATE's orientation from that of the states opened the opportunity for differentiation of function, articulation between the two, the invention of a governance function within NCATE to address state responsibilities (the State Recognition Board), and a further elaboration, beyond their role in defining preconditions for visitation, of the states' use of specialty guidelines as a basis for conducting their program evaluations.
Embracing and Extending the Family

To create a peer evaluation mechanism for professional preparation in education one must first define the profession. Governance, therefore, is central.

Prior to and during redesign one of the most fundamental issues was securing the appropriate involvement of all the constituent elements of the profession in the accreditation function. During the preceding decade a long-standing tension between AACTE and NEA had been resolved by the establishment of parity between the two on the Council and the Coordinating Board (eight seats apiece) (WM, HO). In the intervening years, however, specialty groups had begun to assert and engage themselves (curriculum guidelines had been approved for a number of them), but a reverse phenomenon had begun to develop with CCSSO and NASDTEC, failing to pay their assessments or to send their representatives to attend meetings (CB, October 22-23, 1979; NC-EC, February 29, 1980; CB, May 12-13, 1981). Tensions existed within the teacher education community itself between research-oriented, state college and university, and liberal arts teacher education programs. Finally, NEA's role as the only teacher organization involved in NCATE began to appear increasingly untenable (DI, WM, TS).

As it turned out, the linch-pin to this interlocking set of issues was the rekindling of the involvement of the CCSSO. That
rekindling long antedated redesign itself.

One of the first initiatives Lyn Gubser took on assuming the Executive Directorship in 1978 was to open conversations with William Pierce, CCSSO's then new Executive Director (LG, WP). Those conversations helped inform Pierce about the Chiefs' original aggressive role in founding NCATE. The conversations continued over the years, paralleling—as well as being informed by—the Council's increasing discomfiture at the non-participation of the Chiefs. Gradually, however, Pierce's growing familiarity with the issues and the possibilities of CCSSO's more active involvement in teacher education and certification matters and, therefore, in NCATE, allowed him to support the emergence, within CCSSO, of a new interest in the Chiefs' role in teacher education. This happened despite lingering coolness (if not hostility), in part based on inadequate understanding and in part a reflection of the impact of NASDTEC representative criticisms of the NCATE operation (RB, CF, TS, WP).

Anne Campbell, the second President Pierce had served as Executive Director, expressed an interest, however, in looking at teacher education. She set up an ad hoc committee chaired by Robert Scanlon, the Chief from Pennsylvania, which undertook a study of the states' involvement and perceived needs in teacher education and certification. Campbell herself began to attend NCATE Council meetings. Besides the matter of participation,
there was also a financial issue, arising from the CCSSO prohibition of paying dues to other organizations, and Campbell encountered hostility from the Council because of the Chiefs' nonpayment. Feeling they were not wanted, Campbell recommended the Chiefs not participate and the CCSSO Board approved her recommendation (DI, CF).

The letter announcing the withdrawal was drafted and sent to the new (1980-81) President, Robert Benton (Iowa), who, simply, chose not to act. Despite Pierce's prodding, the letter that would have severed connections never went out (DI, WP), but Benton's interest in teacher education could be seen in his service on the new ad hoc Committee on Teacher Certification, Preparation, and Accreditation.

In the meantime, Scanlon's report came out in draft form, but before it could be acted upon, Scanlon left his Pennsylvania post. By this time, Calvin Frazier (Colorado) had assumed the CCSSO presidency (1983-84). He, too, was interested in teacher education, having been particularly taken, both in his Colorado responsibilities and for teacher education, by the notion of self-correcting systems he associated with a policy essay on the role of inquiry that the Chiefs had all received in late December, 1983 (Gideonse, 1983; CF). Frazier knew that an energetic and committed successor to Scanlon would be needed for the ad hoc committee. In Ted Sanders (Nevada) he found that person.
Sanders, too, had been impacted by the 1983 inquiry essay, in particular a recommendation that chief state school officers had a special obligation to orchestrate connections and relationships among all the elements of the education family (RK). Sanders' role became pivotal in the restoration of the Chiefs connections to NCATE and their full engagement in the redesign process.

A series of rapid-order events followed. Richard Kunkel's selection as NCATE's Executive Director effective July 1, 1984 had been announced in December, 1983. (Kunkel had enjoyed a close working relationship with Sanders as the two had sought to articulate better NCATE accreditation with state-level program approval.) The report of the Chiefs' Ad Hoc Committee (chaired by Sanders), Staffing the Nation's Schools: A National Emergency, was released in January, 1984. Conversations between Kunkel, David Imig, J.T. Sandefur, and Calvin Frazier led to Frazier's request of Sanders that he represent the Chiefs at the Memphis redesign meeting in March, 1984, also attended by Kunkel as Executive Director-elect. Later conversations between representatives of the NEA, AACTE, the Chiefs, and Kunkel resulted in a mutual understanding between the constituent elements that formal re-connection of the CCSSO could be secured if a number of points could be agreed upon:

- forgiveness of past CCSSO debts to NCATE;
- a better mode of collecting and transmitting future...
assessments;
an immediate CCSSO seat on the Council;
continuation of a standing CCSSO committee addressing
teacher education;
acknowledgement of CCSSO goals to place a Chief on NCATE's
Executive Committee, to enlarge CCSSO representation on the
Coordinating Board, voting membership on the Membership and
Finance Committee, and expansion of NCATE to include AFT;
assuring better linkage between CCSSO and its
representatives to NCATE; and
taking steps to facilitate notification to all states of
denials, suspensions, revocation, or surrendering of
certificates.

CCSSO acted on November 13, 1984 (T. Sanders, personal
communication, 11/29/84). At the same time that these events
were taking place within CCSSO, conversations that began the
preceding June between Sanders and Pierce, Marjorie Pike and Beth
Bond (both of the NEA), Imig and Robert Saunders (AACTE
President, 1984-5) and Kunkel had culminated in a AACTE/NEA/CCSSO
discussion paper on the future governance of NCATE (DI, RK, MP,
TS). There for the first time was laid out, not only an early
version of the provisions on which CCSSO would act in November,
but also the delineation of the distinction between national
accreditation of professional preparation units and state
approval of certification program and the outline of a future
structure of NCATE containing four elements—a board of directors
of NCATE, and three subsidiary councils responsible for (1) unit
approval, (2) specialty guidelines, and (3) development of a
program, process and standards to nationally recognize quality
state approval systems--that would ultimately come into being (R. Saunders et al, 1984).

Several key factors contributed to the collective success in getting CCSSO re-established in NCATE in a more vital way and in extending a governance role to AFT. More than a half dozen state chiefs, because of the professional organizational characteristics of their particular jurisdictions, were oriented more to the AFT than the NEA; the exclusive role for NEA in NCATE, therefore, for those chiefs represented a serious shortcoming. More than that, however, several of the chiefs and their Executive Director had participated in the Educational Forum, a leadership group of eleven education organizations. In that context they had witnessed the ability of AFT and NEA through their respective leaders, Mary Hatwood Futrell and Albert Shanker, to work together smoothly (WP). There was a fair amount of history, though, in the rivalry that had existed between the two competitor organizations, and that history was embedded in the minds of a number of some of the continuing NEA figures in NCATE affairs. AACTE representatives, particularly Imig, as well as Kunkel supported the "entire family" concept, too, but, ultimately, agreement that NCATE would favorably entertain an AFT request to become fully involved was facilitated by AACTE's willingness to compromise on an essentially unrelated issue: what role would the Association of Teacher Educators (ATE) play in the new NCATE? Were they a specialty group--as AACTE believed--
because they represented individual faculty (in contrast to the institutional membership character of AACTE), or were they, as the specialty groups maintained, more properly to be counted within the teacher education constituency, and, therefore, a claim against prospective teacher education seats on the governance bodies rather than specialty group seats? AACTE's willingness to work out an accommodation whereby one of the teacher education seats on the Board would go to an individual affiliated with the ATE Board was seen as a significant gesture of a capacity to compromise, a gesture that eased any remaining reluctance of NEA figures to entertain the anticipated forthcoming petition from AFT to participate fully in NCATE affairs (MF, DI, RK, WM, RS, TS).10

The governance proposals worked out in conversations between the Chiefs, NEA, and AACTE officials still had to be tested more broadly. That test came at a meeting widely regarded as among the most satisfying of participants' professional lives (JE, RK, JL, WM, JS, RS). Including representatives of both the Council and the Coordinating Board, the meeting was convened in Atlanta in February, 1985. Participants were divided into two groups, one under the chair of Willard McGuire to deal with finance and one under the chair of J. T. Sandefur to address governance.

10CCSSO invited AFT to apply to NCATE in March of 1986. The petition from AFT arrived in October, 1986, was accepted by NCATE that fall, and the necessary charter amendments making AFT membership possible were adopted in September, 1987.
Participants recall working independently, then wanting to touch base with one another, late Saturday morning. To the delight and surprise of the participants they discovered that they had arrived at the same place, namely, that the existing conceptualization of the governance of NCATE having three parts—teachers, teacher education, and others—should more accurately be understood as a four-fold break embracing teachers, teacher education, specialty groups, and the public policy and related governing elements including the chiefs. The realization that both groups working independently had arrived at the same conclusion, and that it met deep acceptance by those assembled, released participants' energies to flesh out the emerging details of the over-arching governing structure. An Executive Board composed one fourth of each of the four constituencies would govern three operating bodies, one responsible for the Board of Examiners and unit accreditation, one for the approval of specialty guidelines, and one for administering the process for recognizing the quality of state program approval mechanisms. Each of the three operating bodies of NCATE would have a membership composition corresponding to the relative stakes of the constituent members in the activity in question. Following

11Referred to in the parlance of the day as "the third world," meaning specialty groups and others, a terminology recorded here only for purposes of historical accuracy, because the designation understandably rankled those who were covered by it.
the Atlanta meeting it was only necessary to work out the
details.

Knowledge Bases

NCATE's focus on knowledge bases for professional education
is a signature element of the redesigned standards. The shift
from the pre-existing curriculum standard, together with the
closely related set of standards obliging units to relate to the
empirical realities of the world of practice, has spawned "a high
organizational development effort for teacher education" (RK).
How did it come about?

Antecedents lie in a number of places. Great increases in
educational research and development had occurred in the sixties
and seventies accompanied by a cumulative development of a
research and scholarly awareness in some sectors of the
professional education community. A more specific stimulus,
however, very much like the feelings which launched the CAA, was
an immediate sense of frustration arising out of the 1979 annual
meeting of AACTE. Surely, they felt, there were more important
issues that teacher educators ought to be addressing than the
meeting itself had reflected.

Sylvia Tucker, then dean of education at Oregon State
University, persuaded her president to release some developmental
funds and convened a meeting of like-minded colleagues at
Salishan Lodge. Thus was born the so-called Salishan Deans.
Their activities stirred the teacher education community in 1981
by their strong and very public challenge that future professional education be strongly grounded in research, scholarship, and the knowledge bases of the profession (Tucker, 1984).

Jack Gant, one of the participants in the Salishan Deans' two-year traveling seminar (although not ultimately a signatory of the Salishan Dean manifesto), would two years later be responsible for an Annual Meeting of AACTE dedicated wholly to essential knowledge for beginning educators, and the next year would declare the Board of Director's intention to continue with redesign in the face of the unexpected tabling of the matter. Two of the participants, Wisniewski and Gardner, were members of the CAA, and Wisniewski played the key role (HO) in pressing the knowledge bases formulation. Hendrik Gideonse drafted the inquiry monograph that impacted two of the Chiefs and Kunkel in their NCATE redesign roles (CF, RK) and, as President of ACSESULGC/APU, responded to Denemark's call for redesign volunteers. None of these influences, of course, could

12 Gideonse participated himself on behalf of the Executive Committee which also voted Association resources to support the involvement of Jane Stallings and Barak Rosenshine in the redesign standards and knowledge bases subcommittees.

13 A fifth and sixth members, Robert Koff and Myron Atkin, would later become deeply involved in initiating what would become the Holmes Group. The Holmes Group was a development that must be considered exactly parallel to NCATE's redesign. Three of the founding members (Judith Lanier, Robert Koff, and John Palmer) were members of the ACSESULGC/APU Task Force on Accreditation in 1983 following up on the 1978 decision to give
have succeeded by itself or if they, together, had not touched emergent understandings and commitments in the larger professional community. Nor could the impact of re-drafting the standards to focus on knowledge bases have had the kind of developmental effect on the field that it did had not parallel projects (for example, the 1986 publication of the American Educational Research Association's third edition of the Handbook of Research on Teaching [Wittrock, 1986] or AACTE's vigorous pursuit of a variety of seminal efforts including a faculty development knowledge base seminar and sponsorship of the synoptic volume, Knowledge Base for the Beginning Teacher [Reynolds, 1989]) been undertaken.

NCATE five more years before ACSESULGC/APU would decide whether or not to embark on their own independent accreditation enterprise. Carefully appointed by then President Richard Brandt, who wanted the arguments about NCATE and possible alternatives to be thrashed out in committee, not on the floor of the organization, three critics of NCATE were joined by three supporters with Kunkel as chair. The Task Force brought a two-part recommendation before the body. The first part called on ACSESULGC/APU to continue to support NCATE pending its forthcoming redesign. The second part called on the association to "encourage further efforts to develop standards of excellence that institutions producing educational personnel should strive to attain." Holmes became the realization of the "permission" thus granted. The intensity of the conceptual and planning effort associated with Holmes led to very light participation of Holmes participants in NCATE's redesign; William Gardner was the single exception. The non-involvement of some who would have been perceived by many at that time as "unloving critics" was probably something of an enabling factor to achieving the redesign objectives in the 1983-85 timeframe that embraced the period of most intense redesign consideration.
The Developmental Posture

A fourth feature of redesign, what came to be called during implementation of redesign NCATE's "developmental posture," contributed prominently to the success of initial implementation. Although named after the 1980-86 timespan of this case study, its inclusion here is justified because it characterized redesign almost from its inception and was then "ratified" in the March, 1986, Council meeting.

From its inception NCATE's redesign process was an open and evolving one. Redesign began with the six principles advanced by the CAA, but even they were subjected to preliminary examination by an ad hoc committee before being submitted to Council in June, 1983, for endorsement. The combination of financial necessity and the realization that more human talent would be required led Council to solicit volunteer help. That help was used in substantial ways. Draft materials were prepared, reviewed, and sent out for public reaction. Responses to these communications were considered and often reflected in the subsequent versions. Hearings were held, input reported, and then brought to bear on the deliberations.

It soon became apparent that the huge scale of the redesign project and the diverse nature of its many parts dictated an understanding that closure would never be achieved if everyone was expected to agree with everything. Instead, what was needed
was agreement on directions and principles and the development of trust that a continuous process of adjustment would be followed consistent with those directions and principles (MF, RK). One manifestation of this understanding was recognition that it would be of particular importance to have the new standards and processes tested in pilot fashion by institutions which would put themselves forward for this role (MF, SL, RK).

Accordingly, a decision was made to have a one-year moratorium on accreditation visits.\(^{14}\) In the meantime, the first cadre of examiners would be trained. A handful of institutions would be solicited to pilot the new system. On the basis of this decision to approach implementation, essentially, in a learning mode, the standards themselves were carefully edited one more time before fullscale implementation, the examiner training was substantially revised, and Board of Examiner and Unit Accreditation Board evaluative procedures were revised after initial formulation and use. The evaluative, self-corrective stance continues in NCATE to the present.

\(^{14}\)At the time the proposal generated considerable debate. Feeling the tremendous pressure of the public scrutiny of education which by this time had become something of a tidal wave, a number of people felt that appearing to stop evaluations, even to launch implementation of redesign in an orderly way, would bring criticism down on the field. During the deliberations it was demonstrated that if a moratorium were combined with a cessation of interim visits under the old standards, it would actually result in all institutions coming under new standards more quickly (SL). Ultimately, the decision to identify the moratorium year with the launching of the pilot studies satisfied both camps.
use. The evaluative, self-corrective stance continues in NCATE to the present.

Convincing, intellectually, though it might be for educators to adopt a learning posture in respect to implementation, it is still to the credit of the participants that they were willing to tolerate the ambiguity of working toward a moving target in the interest of both modeling sound practice and achieving an ever-higher standard of accreditation and institutional performance.  

The Personality of Reform

The redesign of NCATE had a personality, as is suggested by the preceding sections, but it also had personalities. Its accomplishment could not have occurred absent a rich cast of characters and a variety of modes of carrying the work forward.

Not all the work was done in formal meetings and sessions; much of the absolutely vital work took place in two and three-person conversations and in formal and informal caucuses. Some of the work that turned out to be of crucial long-term significance to the way things happened occurred outside of redesign itself, either preceding or paralleling it.

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Subsequent steps after July 1, 1986, connected with the decision to approach implementation in a learning mode were: another careful editing of the standards after pilot use but before fullscale implementation; the revision of examiner training (and the updating of the initial cadre of examiners to bring them up to the new speed); and the revision of the Board of Examiner and Unit Accreditation Board evaluative procedures after initial formulation and use.
A vigorous caucus system was clearly enabling (JC, JE, MF, RF, WG, HH, DI, SL, MP, WP, SR, TS). Like-minded individuals, or persons representative of the same organization would convene themselves to explore ideas, develop tentative statements, and the like. Such activity was not unknown in NCATE before redesign. NEA representatives to NCATE had long used the technique; in more recent years, especially with the advent of Imig in the Executive Directorship, so had AACTE. Some of the NCATE family were clearly worried by NEA's use of the technique; those who were tended to advocate other's use of the technique as an important defensive strategy against what they perceived (inaccurately, according to several close observers of NEA developments) as monolithic behavior on the part of NEA. But over time it became clear to virtually everyone that caucuses were important, not as attempts to control, but as ways of engaging in unfettered, friendly exploration of ideas and issues in a non-threatening and non-provocative environment, a way of testing conceptualizations and approaches that led to better results overall (MF, DI, BM, SL). The importance of these kinds of discussions actually helped to create an entity, the Coalition of Organizations for the Professional Preparation of Educators (COPPE), when James Eikeland (NASP), Jack Cassidy IRA, and William Grady (AECT) realized that the specialty groups needed a mechanism that would allow them to function effectively in the emergent governance structure of the new NCATE.
Constituent organizations (e.g., NEA, AAC&UE, CCSSO), temporary systems (e.g., the CAA, the ad hoc redesign committees, and the 1984 summer writing group), and the caucus system were all important elements. But there is another way to look at these permanent and temporary systems. They were vehicles for the work of a collection of individuals whose particular contributions are credited with major roles in NCATE's redesign. Many have been identified in the narrative and analysis above, but the overall story would not be complete without special attention. There were scores of such people; here special mention is given to a few.

Three individuals stand in the front rank. Dale Scannell, brimming with professional passion and more than occasionally deeply frustrated over the pace of improvement, played the critical leadership role in the CAA initiative, conceptually and organizationally. He was the catalyst, and sometimes the lightning rod, his strength lying not so much in political finesse as in his steely commitment to improvement of the accreditation function. His contributions were pivotal (JE, DG, WG, HH, DI, RK, SL, SR).

Richard Kunkel, NCATE's Executive Director--beginning formally July 1, 1984, but actually from the time of the announcement of his appointment in December, 1983--was equally important. Kunkel's contributions lay in many areas. He
believed that redesign could be defined and achieved, and he was able to communicate and sustain that belief in others. His friendship and close working relationship with Ted Sanders was crucial to bringing the CCSSO back into the NCATE fold. He resolved issues, facilitated compromises, and even where those compromises were occasionally unpalatable, he was able to persuade people of the importance of needing to accept something in order to be able to continue moving forward. His conceptual contributions came from two sources—an appreciation of the complex political realities of the education profession and his skills in organizational development. He was able to forge the compromises (some of them probably temporary to be sure) because he understood the politics. His skill at small group processes (including the newsprint charts that sometimes drove participants dizzy and his ubiquitous self-admonition to achieve clarity of expression—"Say that again, Richard") helped assure the development of common understanding and, ultimately, consensus (RB, JC, GC, MF, DG, JG, WG, EH, SL, BM, WM, MP, WP, SR, RS, TS, JW, RW).

The third kingpin was Ted Sanders, at the start of redesign chief state school officer in Nevada and, then later, chief in Illinois. Sanders was committed to the improvement of teacher education, to the redesign of NCATE, and to the reinvolvement of a strengthened CCSSO role in NCATE. His willingness to invest his personal time, energy, and talent was crucial, especially in
carrying the message back to and securing the eventual approval of CCSSO, even in the face of initial disinterest if not outright opposition or dismissal of NCATE, even as an idea. His longstanding working relationship with Kunkel in Nevada, in particular their mutual attempt to render more efficient and better articulated NCATE accreditation with state program approval, was a vital foundation—even an issues training ground—for their later collaboration in redesign. His no-nonsense approach and his early blunt assessment of why reforming NCATE was so important (to root out and discontinue inadequate programs) at one point created a small public relations problem for redesign, but though troublesome at the time, it was overcome. Sanders' role, like Kunkel's and Scannell's, was absolutely pivotal to redesign (HB, RB, CF, MF, RF, JG, WG, WGr, HH, DI, RK, JL, SL, WM, MP, SR, RS).

Just behind the "big three" were five individuals whose roles were crucial, two from AACTE and three from the NEA. William Gardner, dean of education at the University of Minnestoaa, was highly influential throughout the process. A

16Although not in all circles and for all time. Despite Sanders' universally regarded contributions to redesign, as recently as the fall of 1989 at least one teacher educator at the TESCSCU meeting in Las Vegas could, in plenary session, publicly condemn Sanders for saying, in perhaps overly colorful language, what many, many teacher educators also believed. Teacher educators would appear to be no more immune to over-sensitivity to legitimate criticism than professionals in any other field.
member of the CAA with Scannell, Gardner employed the skills of diplomacy and persuasiveness to allow deeply committed people of divergent and sometimes conflicting view "to agree and disagree agreeably." He is credited with taking the IRT study seriously and insisting that NCATE do something with it. In his various leadership roles within NCATE and AACTE he shepherded the reform (JE, DG, JG, WGr, DI, SL, BM, DP, SR, CW).

David Imig, AACTE's Executive Director, carried the message of frustration back to AACTE and facilitated the creation of the CAA. He worked intensely to assure Mary Hatwood Futrell's understanding and support within NEA, and equally closely with Ted Sanders and CCSSO. His constant engagement behind the scenes and his effort to assure that the right people from AACTE institutions served in all the capacities required, illustrate further his major contributions to redesign (WG, TS, RF, RK, DG, WG).

Willard McGuire, a former President of the NEA and a longtime, multiple-role NCATE person, "knew the territory" but is widely credited with a willingness to see a totally new situation and respond to it in new ways. He was a conciliator in redesign, willing to work on the smallest detail, and instrumental in getting Futrell deeply involved in NCATE. He was effective behind the scenes within NEA and in the numerous informal inter-organizational caucuses, especially because of the trust he had in Ted Sanders (MF, WG, HH, DI, JK, RK, MP, JS, RS, JW).
Marjorie Pike, also long experienced in NCATE affairs, was an informed leader in the NEA caucuses, knowledgeable of the "parity wars" with AACTE in earlier years, but a person who enjoyed good relations with AACTE. Like McGuire, she was a conciliating and integrating force throughout redesign (DC, JC, RF, DG, EH, JL, SL, BM, RS, JW).

Finally, Mary Hatwood Futrell, President of NEA beginning in 1983, was critical to the larger public acceptance of the redesign effort. She was responsible for seeing that redesign happened in the NEA context and that the conversation within NCATE itself was brought to a higher level. Her willingness to work toward an accommodation of the Chiefs regarding the participation of AFT in NCATE, despite strong lingering feelings within the NEA itself, was crucial. Her skill behind the scenes was evident to those who were there; so was her strength of commitment before the public at large (JC, GC, RF, WG, WGr, DI, JL, MP).

Four people, all with AACTE backgrounds, played important political roles in legitimizing and sanctioning redesign within the teacher education community, the one that would be most directly affected by revised standards and their application. George Denemark's willingness to serve as Interim Executive Director of NCATE in 1983-84 was critical to teacher educator's acceptance of the redesign effort. He is credited with a "white knight" role, keeping NCATE alive during a very difficult time.
His skill at begging volunteer resources, in healing wounds, in focusing energies, in getting about the start of redesign, and in serving as a kind of political umbrella enjoying the respect of all the sometimes contentious elements within teacher education was important (DC, RF, GC, RF, JG, WGr, HH, MP, RS).

J.T. Sandefur's role was similar, but with a bit more intensity. He "educated all the new people," was powerful in maintaining the linkages with both AILACTE and TECSCU, and did not shrink from taking a leadership role when some of his colleagues were more inclined to raise problems than to seize opportunities. Like Denemark, he brought people together, skillfully, forcefully, but always diplomatically; he made major contributions toward insuring the integrity of the process (EH, DG, JG, WGr, HH, RK, MP, SR, RS).

Edell Hearn played a role early, in the conversation with NCATE staff and Gardner that helped lay groundwork for the unit accreditation concept, and then later as well. While some judged him opposed to redesign because of his motion to table at the February, 1983, AACTE meeting, others saw him as pleading for time to understand the implications of the sweeping change that were being proposed, and he was a strong advocate for the exercise of professional judgment. His access to the process and his willingness to continue working on it even after moving to table, also helped legitimize the effort with his peers (EH, DP, JW).
Finally, Robert Saunders' role was also important. As a participant in the Atlanta meeting and because of his trust in McGuire, it was possible to work out the compromise on governance that ultimately would lead to the full involvement of, first, the CCSSO and, then, AFT (DI).

From the specialty groups three individuals emerged. James Eikeland (NASP) was savvy and possessed of good process skills. He often "took it on the chin" from dean and director types feeling overwhelmed by the demands of program accreditation, but he did not take it personally. He performed his contact role with the specialty groups well and was critical to pulling them together as part of redesign (RF, DG, JL, DP, JS, RS, JW).

William Grady (AECT) was always vocal, persuasive ("He could always sell you a nickel for a dollar, you know?") , but critical to pulling the specialty groups together, even after he, too, voted against redesign at the June, 1983, meeting. He lost, but he "shut up and went to work" (RC, EH, HH, JL, DP).

Jack Cassidy was the third leader of specialty interests, another who voted against redesign at the outset but then contributed heavily to the effort (GC, JE, RF, JS).

Five others merit mention. Alan Tom, chair of the department of education at Washington University, St. Louis, is credited with leading by criticizing (WG, RK). Richard Wisniewski used his low key intensity to promote the need for redesign and press hard the role of knowledge bases in the
revised standards (DG, HH, RK, HO, JW). Hendrik Gideonse, dean of education at the University of Cincinnati and President and Past-President of ACSESULGC/APU, 1983-85, pressed the knowledge base claim, too, assured ACSESULGC/APU involvement in redesign, and, through the 1983 inquiry essay, influenced key chiefs and Kunkel (CF, DG, RK, SR, DS, TS, RW). Steve Lilly is credited with being a thoughtful, reasonable advocate whose combined perspective as, first, a specialty group representative and, then, a unit head was instrumental in achieving important compromises as redesign shifted NCATE from program to unit accreditation (HH, BM). Finally, Cathy Sullivan's longterm role with NCATE and her participation on the CAA were crucial. Well-respected within both the NEA and the higher education community, she kept the NEA deeply involved at the initial conceptual stages and was instrumental in the important launching decision in June, 1983 (JL, BM, MP, DS).

Finally, four association staff officers played key roles. William Pierce, Executive Director for CCSSO, by being responsive, informed, and engaged, materially aided in the important groundwork for reinvigorating the CCSSO role (RB, CF, LG, TS). Bernie McKenna, longterm staff liaison from NEA to NCATE, orchestrated the NEA involvement and in his exacting and demanding styles assured meticulous consideration of all the elements of redesign (DC, DG, RK, MP). Marilyn Sheahan (now Scannell) as AACTE staff liaison to the CAA was an essential
catalyst for the emerging document, taking the often disparate contributions of the members and, conforming to classic rapporteurial expectations, helped assure the development of product that "reported work that was even better than its authors knew" (RK, BM, DS). Donna Gollnick, first, staff liaison to NCATE from AACTE, and, then after July, 1986, Deputy Director of NCATE to Kunkel, gave maximum effort to the initial and subsequent drafting of the redesign document, integrating, identifying holes and potential and actual conflicts. Thoughtful and well-organized, her colleagues in redesign acknowledge the substantial role she played (JG, DI, RK, JL, BM).

One last comment under this section on the personality of redesign. The progress of reform was, as it turns out, not completely free of interpersonal strife as might otherwise be implied by the positive nature of the above material. During the course of the extensive interviews, from time to time, an occasional strong reaction of one individual respecting another was revealed. The stuff of major organizational and professional change could hardly be absent such feelings and reactions; they are a part of life.

The judgment to ignore the specifics of such interactions where they emerged is a function of three considerations. First, the processes of triangulation to test the validity of such judgments led to the conclusion, in almost all instances, that the reactions revealed in the interviews were either highly
personalized, wholly explainable by differences in context and vantage point, or a function of commitments to move that were so deep that sometimes actions that appeared to impede generated over-reactive criticisms. Second, at the time of this writing, redesign is an evolving success story, and, should it in the future founder, it will not be because of any of the handful of sharply critical assessments held by one or more of the participants in redesign itself. Third, these comments are made here because there is an important message about such interpersonal strife in an activity as far-reaching and essentially unsettling as this. The experience of this case in the main suggests the wisdom of reserving judgment when tempted to draw harsh conclusions about the motives or roles of active participants.

Conclusion

NCATE's redesign is a case study of great political, organizational, and professional complexity. It is a story of organizational commitment and personal initiative, imagination, and steadfastness of purpose.

The benefit of a decade's perspective reveals a profession responding to its own perceived needs to change, to be sure, not always as fast as some of its members would like. In the context of a different perception—that it took public notice to stimulate reform beginning in April, 1983, with the Nation at Risk—it is important to note that America's teacher education
leadership's inexorable internal moves culminated in a decision to launch redesign well before the explosion of public interest in things educational. In sum, on the strength of the evidence in this case, teacher educators possess a broader and deeper reality principle and public mindedness than they have recently been credited with.

The large number of individuals involved and the depth of their engagement in the process of redesign speaks well of the teaching profession writ large. The complexity of the issues, however--evaluating programs and units, accommodating both professional and public interests in standards development and application (especially in the context of an emerging professional sense of the importance of specialized knowledge that may not necessarily be shared by public authorities), addressing issues of cost and efficiency in evaluating teacher education, the organizational and functional complexity of a multi-faceted profession like education--clearly suggests the importance of being prepared to challenge overly simple solutions that may be proffered respecting the improvement of teaching and teacher education. On the other hand, the very complexity of the task probably contributed to its successful completion. With so many variables at work, the likelihood was increased that creative, committed people could find a broad array of compromises that would allow the task to go forward.

Finally, proponents of reform can take several useful
lessons from the NCATE story. Reform takes large numbers of individuals orchestrating themselves in more or less coordinated ways, prepared to compromise on specific matters, in order to achieve shared ends on which they are not prepared to compromise.

A second lesson is that all reforms have roots in what has gone before. Ideas can be found in earlier position statements which at the time appeared to go nowhere. Past working relationships may suggest affinities and experiences that can be called upon to fuel the new work, and because the homework of building trust and familiarity in working styles has been done, otherwise draining "overhead" costs of starting up can, in some measure, be bypassed.

Third, as important as the formal settings for work of this kind are, informal interactions and "safe environments" like those the caucuses provided are essential for the non-provocative and non-threatening testing of ideas. Any inclination to see such gatherings and colloquies as "controlling" or "organizing behind the scenes to gain unfair advantage" ought to be discounted, unless, of course, there is solid evidence to the contrary. Assuming the ultimate aim is in fact shared, the best defense is for all elements to use such processes in the interests of undertaking the most systematic analysis of options, interests, and consequences of reform alternatives to the end of contributing to the dialogue.

NCATE's redesign was a major undertaking. It is still
unfolding, a testimony to clear intentions, hard work, the ability to compromise, and the construction of a system capable of learning from its own processes.
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Education. 10(2), 73-86.


APPENDIX A -- CASE STUDY INTERVIEWEES, NOVEMBER, 1989-MARCH, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Redesign or Related Role</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Herman Behling</td>
<td>Pres., NASDTEC, 1984-5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Benton</td>
<td>Supt., Iowa; Pres., CCSSO 1979-80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Cassidy</td>
<td>NCATE Council (Spec. Group - IRA) 1983-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gloria Chernay</td>
<td>Assistant Director NCATE 1982-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doran Christensen</td>
<td>Deputy Director, NCATE 1972-1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>James Eikeland</td>
<td>NCATE Council (Spec. Group - NASP), 1980-6 (Chair, 1986)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Fisher</td>
<td>NCATE Council (Spec. Group - NSTA) 1982-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Calvin Frazier</td>
<td>Colorado Commissioner of Education, 1973-87; Pres., CCSSO, 1983-4</td>
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<td>Mary Hatwood Futrell</td>
<td>Pres., NEA, 1983-9; NCATE Council 1983-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Gardner</td>
<td>NCATE Council (AACTE) 1980-3 (Ch., 1982); Pres.-Elect. AACTE, 86-7; CAA Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Godfrey</td>
<td>NCATE Council (AACTE) (1978-81); Board of Directors, AACTE (1981-4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donna Gollnick</td>
<td>Staff NCATE Liaison AACTE until 1984; Deputy Director NCATE 1984-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Grady</td>
<td>NCATE Council (Spec. Group - AECT) 1976-83 (Ch., 1982-3); Coordinating Board 1983-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyn Gubser</td>
<td>Executive Director, NCATE 1978-83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Imig</td>
<td>Exec. Director, AACTE, 1980-present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Kunkel</td>
<td>Executive Director, NCATE 1984-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Leeke</td>
<td>NEA Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Lilly</td>
<td>NCATE Council (Spec. Group - CEC, then AACTE) 1981-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bernard McKenna</td>
<td>NEA Staff Liaison, 1975-84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willard McGuire</td>
<td>Pres. NEA (1979-83); NCATE Coordinating Board (NEA) 1974-86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hans Olsen</td>
<td>Member, CAA; NCATE Council 1975-81; Coordinating Board 1981-4</td>
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<tr>
<td>William Pierce</td>
<td>Executive Director, CCSSO, 1978-1987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marjorie Pike</td>
<td>NCATE Council (NEA) 1981-6</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Poisson</td>
<td>Assoc. Director, NCATE, 1979-81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shirley Richner</td>
<td>NCATE Council (AACTE) 1983-6; Chair, Knowledge Base Subcommittee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.T. Sandefur</td>
<td>NCATE Council (AACTE) 1982-6, Chair, 1985-6; NCATE Coord. Board (AACTE) 1978-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ted Sanders</td>
<td>Supt., Nev. (to 1985), Ill. (1985-9); Chair, CCSSO Tchr. Ed. Comm.; NCATE C'cl 1985-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Saunders</td>
<td>Pres. AACTE, 1985-6; NCATE Coordinating Board (AACTE) 1984-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dale Scannell</td>
<td>Coordinating P'ard, 1981; Chair, CAA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Tom</td>
<td>NCATE &quot;critic&quot;; AILACTE Board 1980-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher Wheeler</td>
<td>Principal Investigator, IRT Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joanne Whitmore</td>
<td>NCATE Council (AACTE) 1981-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Wisniewski</td>
<td>NCATE Council (AACTE) 1980-2; Member CAA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B -- NCATE CASE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

At the onset of the interview, I identified myself and described the project. I reviewed the general thrust of the questions and informed the interviewees that their answers were for attribution unless on certain points they specifically requested that they be off-the-record. In such cases, confidentiality in the interview process and in the write-up was guaranteed. Any direct quotes drawn from the interviews have been reviewed by respondents prior to publication.

Below are the questions as asked:

1. What was your involvement in NCATE Redesign?

2. Some questions about the start of the process. From your point of view what were the antecedents to Redesign? Second, given the continuous discussion within NCATE the decade before redesign concerning NCATE's organization, governance, effectiveness, etc. what was it that made the redesign of 1983-85 happen?

3. Who were among the most significant actors? What were their contributions? Why were they so important? Did decisions by some potential participants not to participate or, simply, to do other things help clear the field?

4. Most difficult projects succeed because somewhere along the way major "breaks" (e.g., conceptualizations, strategies, compromises, etc.) were achieved on a critical number of the tough "nuts" which together comprised the overall difficulty. Was that true for the NCATE redesign? If so, what were the "nuts" and what were those breakthroughs?

5. Were any nuts, as it were, "left in the bowl with their shells intact"? In short, what was left unresolved? Was it finessed? Postponed?

6. Was there opposition to Redesign? From where and why?

7. Do you think what was achieved through Redesign was different from what its proponents originally intended?

8. Given that I am doing this case study of NCATE's redesign, are there questions I should have asked and haven't?
APPENDIX C -- Abbreviated NCATE Redesign Chronology

January, 1977  NCATE call for comprehensive accreditation evaluation
February, 1978  ACSESULGC/APU starts five-year oversight
October, 1980  NCATE Council reviews and responds to the IRT (Wheeler) study
March, 1981  Recommendation that CCSSO be removed from NCATE Council unless its dues are paid
October, 1981  NCATE Council considers staff redesign paper
December, 1981  AACTE launches Committee on Accreditation Alternatives (AAC)
June, 1982  TECSCU statement on the interface between NCATE accreditation and NASDTEC evaluations
October, 1982  Draft CAA report completed
October, 1982  NCATE Council calls for review of all NCATE restructuring proposals
January, 1983  Final report of CAA
February, 1983  AACTE Board adopts CAA proposals
February, 1983  AACTE Annual Meeting tables endorsement of CAA proposal; Board of Directors calls for initiation of process within NCATE to consider and make recommendations concerning the CAA principles
March, 1983  NCATE initiates exploration of redesign with creation of six member ad hoc committee
April, 1983  Gubser resigns as Executive Director
June, 1983  NCATE formally launches redesign
July, 1983  Denemark starts as Interim Director of NCATE
August, 1983  Need for redesign volunteers identified
Sept., 1983  Land Grant Deans vote to continue to support NCATE pending outcome of redesign
October, 1983  NCATE Council seeks CCSSO and NASDTEC cooperation with redesign
March, 1984  NCATE redesign committee meetings, Memphis
July, 1984  Kunkel assumes Executive Directorship
August, 1984  Completion of draft of standards and structure
October, 1984  Likert-scale technique used at NCATE Council meeting on key issues to guide a re-write
November, 1984  CCSSO reactivates NCATE affiliation
December, 1984  Second draft of redesign
February, 1985  Discussion on governance of NCATE at Atlanta meeting of Council and Coord. Board members
March, 1985  Testimony from TECSCU, AILACTE, ACSESULGC/APU, and other entities on December draft
April, 1985  Third draft of redesign
June, 1985  Council votes to accept redesign as a final draft with standards to be voted on at the October, 1985 meeting of the Council
October, 1985  Standards adopted
March, 1986  Council adopts what would later come to be known as the "developmental posture" toward implementation of redesign
July, 1986  New NCATE structure initiated