The Politics of Education.

In Marie E. Wirsing's "Academic Freedom and Teaching Foundations of Education: A Personal Memoir," the history of academic freedom, including the constant struggles to preserve it and examples of significant infringement, are discussed. In "Education and Community-Building in the European Community: The Impact of 1992," D. G. Mulcahy examines how the European Community has shaped and begun to implement educational policy. Bruce S. Cooper and Grace Dondero describe the complexities and changes in schooling, religious life, and parental expectations in the United States over the past 25 years in "Survival, Change, and Demands on America's Private Schools: Trends and Policies." Paul Farber asks what part teachers play in the politics of education in "The Politics of Teacher Authority." In "Towards a Postmodern Politics: Knowledge and Teachers," William J. Bain and Mustafa Umit Kiziltan suggest that the modern politics of education has evolved out of concerns with access to knowledge (credentials) and that as a result the modern school is seen to hold the promise of preparation for material well-being and the development of a more fully human being. (DB)
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Freedom and Teaching Foundations of Education: A Personal Memoir</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie E. Wirsing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education and Community-Building in the European Community: The Impact of 1992</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. G. Mulcahy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Survival, Change, and Demands on America's Private Schools: Trends and Policies</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce S. Cooper and Grace Dondero</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Politics of Teacher Authority</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Farber</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toward a Postmodern Politics: Knowledges and Teachers</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William J. Bain and Mustafa Umit Kiziltan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Editorial Overview

*Educational Foundations* seeks to help fulfill the stated mission of the American Educational Studies Association to enhance scholarship in and among the educational foundations disciplines by providing a vehicle for publication of articles and essays which feature analysis of the foundations, of foundations methodology, of applications of such methodology to key issues of the day, and of significant research which evolves from and unifies the foundations disciplines, all focusing on the interdisciplinary nature of the educational foundations fields.

*Educational Foundations* seeks articles and essays in four primary areas:

1. Exposition on the nature of the educational foundations--essays exploring the foundations, highlighting definition, interrelationships, strengths, difficulties, and other aspects of the combined fields.

2. Application of the foundations disciplines to an issue of significance--collections of articles around a specified theme, bringing to bear the nature of the various foundations disciplines on such themes. Information concerning themes for future issues of the journal may be obtained from the co-editors.

3. Methodology--articles exploring methodological issues of the foundations fields, stressing similarities and differences among the disciplines.

4. Research--articles describing or reporting on new research in the foundations fields, with emphasis on interdisciplinary aspects of such research.

Contributions to *Educational Foundations* are solicited from members of the American Educational Studies Association as well as from all other scholars in the foundations of education and related fields of study. While the journal is open to submissions from all interested scholars, the standards for review and acceptance of articles and essays are stringent. Submissions should follow the *Chicago Manual of Style*, with a suggested length of 25-30 doubled-spaced pages, and be sent in triplicate to: Kathryn M. Borman, Co-Editor, *Educational Foundations*, College of Education, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, Ohio 45221. When an article is accepted, authors are asked to submit the final version of their article on computer disk, preferably 5-1/4 inch, IBM-compatible computer disk in either WordPerfect format or as an ascii textfile, with as few formatting commands as possible.
Introduction

This Winter, 1991, issue of Educational Foundations is the first one of the new year and our first with the theme “The Politics of Education.” There is no better way to introduce this theme than Marie E. Wirsing’s keynote address to the American Educational Studies Association annual meeting held in Orlando, Florida, in October, 1990.

Wirsing’s “Academic Freedom and Teaching Foundations of Education: A Personal Memoir” discusses the history of academic freedom, including the constant struggles to preserve it and examples of significant infringement. She further describes her own ongoing efforts to have the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado reconsider their position on the standardization of faculty course evaluations and her steadfast refusal, “on grounds of conscience, to administer the standardized form.” She makes four recommendations for academics and AESA and closes with a warning, “unless the academic profession assumes a proactive stance and organizes collectively to protect the individual rights of all its members, the status and autonomy of each of us is in jeopardy.”
D. G. Mulcahy, in the article “Education and Community-Building in the European Community: The Impact of 1992,” examines how the European community has shaped and begun to implement educational policy. This policy emphasizes student mobility, language learning, and cooperation between education and industry. The author reports that the “persistent problem of unemployment has generated a range of programs which also have the dual objective of vocational training and a broadening of geographic, linguistic, and cultural horizons.” Mulcahy believes that the European Community’s endeavors in education, which have included a high degree of cooperation among member states and the promotion of a sense of community through teaching the European dimension, will have significant economic and social benefit for the entire Community.

Bruce S. Cooper and Grace Dondero, in their work “Survival, Change, and Demands on America’s Private Schools: Trends and Policies,” describe the complexities and changes in schooling, religious life, and parental expectations in the United States over the past twenty-five years. They examine the broad spectrum of private schooling available and show how the distribution and function of private schools have changed in this country in the past quarter of a century. The authors conclude that their data shows the incredible diversity, adaptability, and resiliency of private schools. Cooper and Dondero suggest that “as models of education, nonpublic schools continue to be responsive, changing, and dynamic, though always fragile, in striving to meet the changing needs of America’s families.”

Paul Farber asks what part teachers play in the politics of education. In his article, “The Politics of Teacher Authority,” he examines what the authority of teachers involves and how teachers represent diverse realms of social life and values. Farber further suggests that it is time to examine “the relationship between educational authority and educational values and begin to explore more fully the social-political dimensions of current educational practice and the authority relations embedded in them.”

“Towards a Postmodern Politics: Knowledges and Teachers” by William J. Bain and Mustafa Umit Kiziltan suggests that the modern politics of education has evolved “out of concerns with access to knowledge (credentials)” and that as a result the modern school is seen to hold the promise of preparation for material well-being and the development of a more “fully human being.” The threat, then, being that non-access to school knowledge will result in “material deprivation, marginalization, and dehumanization,” through which the authors indicate that modern politics of education becomes a struggle for survival. They suggest that there are at least four primary modalities which are “best conceived as discursive spaces which order educational practice, present
knowledge, and formulate idiosyncratic backgrounds for the naming of problems and outlining of their solutions."

We are interested in hearing from our readers about your reactions to this "The Politics of Education" issue.

—Patricia O’Reilly
Co-Editor
Evaluation Form

1. How many of the articles in this issue did you read?
   All_____ Many_____ Some_____ None_____ 

2. Which articles did you find particularly interesting, and why?
   __________________________________________
   __________________________________________

3. What topics, themes or authors would you like to see in future issues?
   __________________________________________
   __________________________________________

4. What comments or suggestions do you have related to style, format, and presentation of articles in the journal?
   __________________________________________
   __________________________________________

5. What is your overall reaction to *Educational Foundations*?
   Excellent_____ Good_____ Adequate_____ Poor_____ 

6. Do you feel there is a need for such a journal in the field?
   Yes_____ Uncertain_____ No_____ 

Please send completed evaluation form to:
   Alan H. Jones, Publisher
   Caddo Gap Press
   1411 West Covell Boulevard, Suite 106-305
   Davis, California 95616
Academic Freedom and Teaching Foundations of Education: A Personal Memoir

Marie E. Wirsing is a professor of educational foundations at the School of Education, University of Colorado at Denver. This article is the text of her Keynote Address delivered at the American Educational Studies Association annual meeting, October 31, 1990, in Orlando, Florida.

By Marie E. Wirsing

Thank you for the honor of inviting me to deliver your Keynote Address. I am glad that you have not forgotten me despite my lengthy absence from American Educational Studies Association affairs. It was ten years ago this month that I was last able to meet with you. Thus, I am feeling more than a little nostalgic at this moment.

I have followed AESA activities with continuing interest, and have been impressed with the quality and direction of your splendid leadership over the years. I am especially pleased to be able to participate in this 1990 convention which has been organized by two old and valued friends, Glorianne Leck and Rob Sherman. Although I must note in passing that I have wondered about the possible symbolism of a Keynoter speaking from the middle of Disney World on Halloween!
As background preparation for my remarks today, I reread my 1980 AESA Presidential Address. The main thrust of my remarks, a decade ago, was to urge the membership of this Association to consider a more activist role in addressing the growing authoritarian climate of American education. Suggesting that there were countless opportunities for political activism, I singled out a number of tasks which called for direct expression of foundational ideas. The first task which I identified in 1980 was the "need to assume an instructional role with respect to the nation's legal profession and the courts." As I stated then:

The job of providing sophisticated rationale so that the professional beliefs of individual classroom teachers will be respected under the law appears to me to be our special obligation. The Foundations of Education profession, through its overriding purpose of developing interpretive, normative, and critical perspectives on education, presumably seeks to ensure that a classroom teacher will be able to function from some clearly perceived theoretical frame of reference. Unless we assume an active role beyond academia in explaining and defending the legitimacy of theoretical frames of reference and the relationship between teaching theory and action, our students--particularly those who teach in the public schools--will have no reason whatsoever to take their foundational studies very seriously.¹

I find it more than a little ironic that I am in the position of speaking to you today about essentially the same task. The major difference from my earlier speech is the focus of attention. In 1980, I was preoccupied--along with many of you--with what was happening in the nation's elementary and secondary classrooms. This still concerns me deeply. The ideological regulations which now govern American public schools have become overwhelming in scope and absurdly counterproductive. But since 1980, the Educational Excellence movement has redirected reform efforts to encompass higher education. Today, faculty in all branches of The Academy are being subjected to the same kinds of accountability policies and controls that for so long have dominated and decimated the lives of elementary and secondary teachers. Therefore, I would like to use this occasion to examine the implications of accountability and assessment policies as applied to higher education. Very specifically, I want to address the issue of academic freedom.
The Development of Academic Freedom

The idea and practice of academic freedom was not an American invention. The concept of the university as a place devoted to the advancement of learning, and the belief that truth was more likely to emerge through the interplay and conflict of ideas rather than through the imposition of uniform and standardized opinions by authority first emerged in seventeenth-century Europe. Prior to the seventeenth century intellectual activities in Western universities tended to be circumscribed by theological considerations. It was primarily the work of the English thinkers, John Locke, Thomas Hobbs, Francis Bacon, and John Milton that first illuminated the idea of the modern university. Their writings had the effect of forwarding the notion of learning unimpeded by preconceptions of any kind. However, it took two centuries before such ideas were actually applied to English universities.

Academic freedom had its actual birth in Germany, notably in the universities of Halle (1694), Gottingen (1734), and Berlin (1809). It was the University of Berlin that introduced the doctrine of Lehr- und Lernfreiheit ("freedom to teach and learn"), thereby promoting German leadership in academic freedom in the nineteenth century.

The early American colleges, founded by religious groups, all were subject to sectarian controls. In force through much of the nineteenth century, these sectarian restrictions ultimately were abolished in most of the country's older and most respected institutions. The earliest state university, founded by Thomas Jefferson in Virginia in 1819, was non-sectarian. However, as Arthur Lovejoy pointed out:

there was no express enunciation of the principle of academic freedom in the act of creating [the University of Virginia]; and the first appointee to its faculty, Thomas Cooper, though chosen by Jefferson himself, was removed under pressure from certain religious leaders. In later times interference with freedom of teaching in the United States has usually taken the same form: it has consisted in attempts by sectarian, political, economic or other groups to impose limitations not prescribed by statute or by the charters of the institutions concerned, usually through the dismissal of teachers whose opinions or utterances were obnoxious to these groups.²

During the first half of the twentieth century, academic freedom came to be recognized broadly in most Western nations, including the United States.
The American Association of University Professors, founded in 1915, was very instrumental in advocating freedom as the basis for a modern American university. It was in 1915 that the AAUP developed its first formal expression of academic freedom in its Declaration of Principles. This document established a code of scholarly behavior and procedures for ensuring that the enforcement of that code would be in scholarly hands. Ten years later, the AAUP formulated a revised code, and in 1940, its Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure.

These documents, endorsed by other learned societies and educational associations, gained wide acceptance in American colleges and universities and over the years had a clear impact on the courts, particularly in connection with the First Amendment. The Supreme Court decisions in Sweezy v. New Hampshire (1957) and Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the University of New York (1967) were landmarks in legally upholding the principle of academic freedom.

In the Sweezy decision, which invalidated punishment directed at a noted Marxist economist for failure to answer legislative inquiries about the content of his lectures, the Court broadly proclaimed that:

To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolute. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate.

Justice Felix Frankfurter, concurring in the Sweezy case, powerfully captured an understanding of academic freedom:

In a university knowledge is its own end, not merely a means to an end. A university ceases to be true to its own nature if it becomes the tool of Church or State or any sectional interest. A university is characterized by the spirit of free inquiry, its idea being the ideal of Socrates--"to follow the argument where it leads."

In the Keyishian decision, the Supreme Court overturned New York's Feinberg law, under which membership in any organization held by the state to be "subversive" constituted prima facie evidence for disqualification of a teacher. In a memorable passage, the Court declared:

The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers
truth "out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."6

The work of the philosopher-educator Alexander Meiklejohn cannot be ignored in linking academic freedom with Constitutional protection under the First Amendment. In a long life, Meiklejohn educated many lawyers—even Supreme Court justices—in bringing academic freedom under the First Amendment. Although a philosopher, with no legal training, Meiklejohn's articles were published in many law journals. In one such 1961 law review, he wrote:

Education, in all its phases, is the attempt to so inform and cultivate the mind and will of a citizen that he shall have the wisdom, the independence, and, therefore, the dignity of a governing citizen. Freedom of education is, thus, as we all recognize, a basic postulate in the planning of a free society.7

Thirty years earlier, Meiklejohn had written what still stands, in my judgment, as the most eloquent argument for preserving academic freedom:

it is obvious that the teacher must be free to do what he is trying to get his students to do. No one can teach an art which he is forbidden to practice. Slaves cannot not freedom. If the members of our faculties are forbidden to make up their own minds and to express their own thoughts they cannot lead their pupils into the making up of their minds and the expressing of their thoughts. They can only teach what they do. To require our teachers to say to their pupils, "I want you to learn from me how to do what I am forbidden to do," is to make of education the most utter nonsense.8

By 1930, Lovejoy, a distinguished philosopher who had been a primary force in the development of the AAUP, wrote an authoritative essay defining academic freedom as

the freedom of the teacher or research worker in higher institutions of learning to investigate and discuss the problems of his science and to express his conclusions, whether through publication or in the instruction of students, without interference from political or ecclesiastical authority, or from the administrative officials of the institution in which he is employed, unless his methods are found by qualified bodies of his own profession to be clearly incompetent or contrary to professional ethics.9 [emphasis mine]

Lovejoy went on to point out that although the teacher is in his economic status "a salaried employee," the principle of academic freedom "implies a denial of the right of those who provide or administer the funds from which he is paid, to control the content of his teaching.10 It is important to recognize that in the
American context, as in Europe, the traditional view of academic freedom has applied to teachers and researchers, not to administrators.

Despite the widespread acceptance of such principles, significant infringements of academic freedom did occur in the United States in the first half of this century. Among the most notable examples was Scott Wearing, who was fired from the University of Pennsylvania in 1915 because of his outspoken criticism of child labor conditions in the coal mines. Nearing subsequently lost his position at the University of Toledo in 1918 because of his unpopular views about America's role in the First World War. Even the AAUP, it should be noted, did nothing about Nearing and the other academic casualties of the First World War. Instead, the Association redefined academic freedom in such a way that wartime violations of that freedom were condoned. In 1918, the AAUP, reflecting the national phobias of the day, advised professors of German or Austrian descent not to talk about the war in public or to criticize it in private.

One of the most famous lapses in academic freedom, of course, occurred in 1925 in the community of Dayton, Tennessee. There the state successfully pitted its authority against the views on evolution held by a young high school biology teacher, John Scopes. Although the setting in that instance was a public high school, the decision had a broader chilling effect on educators—even within the university, where academic freedom always had been considered in more expansive terms.

There are those of us here today who surely recall how even members of the yielded to the prevailing national Zeitgeist during the anti-Communist purges under Presidents Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower. The National Education Association declared in 1949 that members of the Communist Party had surrendered the right to think for themselves and, therefore, the right to teach. In 1952, the American Federation of Teachers resolved not to defend teachers declared to be Communists. Sidney Hook, the noted professor of philosophy, wrote a series of influential articles arguing for the removal of teachers who held to Communist and conspiratorial ideas. During that period, only the AAUP attempted to combat the political purges directed against members of The Academy, usually arguing that such institutional behavior was contrary to the principles of academic freedom.

By 1968, these lapses notwithstanding, Jacques Barzun could write in his study, *The American University: How It Runs, Where It Is Going*:

The practice of giving tenure to university professors is justified on the same grounds as the tenure of judges in federal courts: to make them independent of thought control. A guarantee of academic freedom—the right to speak freely in the classroom on the subject of the class—would not be worth much if it were subject to anybody's challenge and the holder
had to defend it, even before a fair tribunal. The scholar’s role, it is felt, does not go well with litigation or worry. What generates the true scholarly atmosphere is a property right in the post itself, voided only by mental incapacity or moral turpitude. Therefore uncensored speech and tenure. On these unusual and inseparable supports academic man walks in freedom.\textsuperscript{13}

Barzun, writing from the vantage point of the American Counter Culture, recognized new threats to academic freedom originating from student demands for participatory government, an unbridled libertarian spirit among many faculty, the growing bureaucratic structure of the university, and conflicting demands on the school’s performance. Still, he concluded in 1968 that the two traditional academic freedoms of Lehrfreiheit and Lernfreiheit--teaching and learning--were solidly in place and, indeed, had been expanded.\textsuperscript{14}

Fifteen years later, scholars were reflecting growing concern. Frances Fox Piven, in a collection of essays published in 1983, \emph{Regulating the Intellectuals: Perspectives on Academic Freedom in the 1980s}, wrote that

> What universities teach, how they teach it, and what passes for scholarship in the universities are all necessarily influenced by the exigencies of institutional preservation and expansion --in other words, by money...

Piven went on to point out that

> The expansion of academic freedom that occurred in response to the political movements in the 1960s and 1970s is under assault today. We should not overstate what is happening. There has been no full-scale purge. A good part of the narrowing of outlook, of the contracting of the intellectual space achieved over the last decade, is the result of economies made necessary by declining enrollments and government cutbacks; just as the liberalization of the 1960s and 1970s was facilitated by the extraordinary institutional expansion that was then occurring. Still, the cuts made necessary by contraction are not likely to be neutral or evenhanded. Inevitably, those who are more controversial, more difficult, more deviant (and perhaps for such reasons better and not worse scholars) are inevitably more likely to be the ones who are terminated.\textsuperscript{15}

Piven’s astute analysis followed, in point of time, an unsuccessful attempt by one of America’s most prestigious private institutions to fundamentally change the meaning of academic freedom as it had been understood for three centuries.
The Princeton Case

In 1978, two members of the U. S. Labor Party attempted to distribute leaflets on the campus of Princeton University. They were arrested and charged with trespass. The New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the trespass conviction, basing its decision on a New Jersey constitutional provision which imposed a duty on the government to protect "fundamental individual rights." Nicholas Katzenbach, attorney general under President Lyndon B. Johnson, and then general counsel for IBM--as well as a member of the Princeton Board of Trustees--served as chief counsel in behalf of the University administration. It was Katzenbach who articulated before the New Jersey Supreme Court--and subsequently, under appeal, before the U. S. Supreme Court--a radical redefinition of academic freedom. Through Katzenbach, the Princeton Board of Trustees argued that academic freedom "did not so much apply to faculty and students as it did to institutions, that the university is best conceived as property whose owners [trustees] hire employees [administrators and faculty] to inculcate specific views into the minds of the consumers [students]."

As noted by Sanford Levinson, who served as attorney for the leafleteers, Princeton tried to "transform academic freedom into a guardian of the right of university administrators and boards of trustees to be absolute masters of the ideas that entered university grounds." Succinctly stated, Katzenbach shifted the focus of academic freedom from individual faculty and students to the rulers of the university as a corporate whole. Under the view, Princeton University was presented not as a community of distinguished scholars and their students devoted to unfettered critical inquiry. Instead, Princeton was depicted as "a nonprofit corporation organized for educational purposes and under the legal control of its Board of Trustees, who hire a broad range of employees, including professors, to carry out their wishes."

In the brief submitted by Princeton University to the U. S. Supreme Court, the argument was made that private universities had a First Amendment right to exercise "unconstrained philosophical and curricular choices," even if such choices meant limiting the free inquiry of faculty or students. "Thus," wrote Katzenbach, "a private university may choose an educational philosophy which seeks to expose students to widely differing viewpoints, as does Princeton, or, it may choose to indoctrinate students to a particular ideology or set of beliefs." Under this view, academic freedom thus becomes a protection of a corporate entity to promote its preferred view of the world. Expressed another way, the traditional defense of individual autonomy was reshaped for the protection of corporate autonomy. As observed by the political scientist, Amy
Gutmann, the Princeton argument is an example of "corporate pluralist" theory, wherein diversity is entertained as between but not within institutions. Significantly, at no time during the course of this case was the Princeton faculty or its student body consulted by the Board of Trustees or its chief counsel.

In a friend-of-the-court brief, the AAUP described the extraordinary Princeton arguments as "pernicious."

The U. S. Supreme Court, in 1980, dismissed this case as moot because Princeton had modified its policies permitting freer campus access to leafleters. Thus, Katzenbach's attempt to redefine academic freedom was not addressed by the court.

It is my contention that the Katzenbach thesis, in more recent years, has become operational on a de facto basis in American institutions of higher education, particularly institutions within the public sector. I believe that academic freedom has been radically and dangerously transformed. I believe that this has been accomplished incrementally and covertly chiefly through mandated accountability and assessment policies, and the subsequent yielding of The Academy to those policies.

Accountability and Assessment in Higher Education

The Society of Professors of Education, in a 1988 publication, *Accountability and Assessment in Higher Education*, reported that assessment procedures were "being discussed on three-fourths of the nation's campuses," that "approximately half" were in the process of developing assessment procedures, and that eighty percent "expected to introduce some form of assessment in the next few years."

In the SPE study, Christopher J. Lucas, describing Governor John Ashcroft's political move, by 1986, to impose a student learning outcomes-based assessment program at the University of Missouri, called attention to the fact that such efforts actually dated back a decade. It was in the early 1970s that Missouri authorities put in place an elaborate student outcomes assessment plan at Northeast Missouri State University. Thus, historically, it should be pointed out that accountability policies in higher education parallel the introduction of such policies in the nation's public schools. Nonetheless, there is no question that a wholesale movement toward postsecondary accountability dates from the mid-1980s.
The Holmes Group Report and the Carnegie Task Force Report on Teaching, both released in spring 1986, took the position that improvement of America's elementary and secondary teaching force necessitated reforms at the college and university level. Both Holmes and Carnegie endorsed top-down controls not only of the country's teacher education faculties, but also of faculties in the liberal arts and sciences. Embedded in both influential reports was the desirability of externally-imposed norms and directives, and the assumption that these would be passively accepted by all American educators. Among the recommended controls advocated by Holmes and Carnegie was the codification and centralization of a national knowledge base.

On January 18, 1987, The New York Times reported that American colleges and universities, which had operated for more than three hundred years on the premise that the fruits of higher education were self evident, were facing mounting pressure to prove that their students were being educated:

Public institutions in at least a dozen states have begun testing students, first as freshmen and then as seniors, to measure how much they have learned. Assessment of seniors' mastery of their major fields, in some cases by outside professional groups, is also on the increase.

Cheered on by the National Governors' Association, a few states have begun linking university budgets to proof of teaching efficiency. Tennessee has already distributed $50 million on this basis.

The New York Times article further reported that in December 1986, Governor Ashcroft of Missouri had announced a plan to do likewise. Citing Ashcroft that "Most colleges and universities simply do not know what their students are learning," the Times article concluded: "With tuition at many institutions rising at double the inflation rate, legislators and families are seeking assurances that the institutions take their teaching responsibilities seriously."

On September 8, 1987, the Federal Register carried an announcement by William Bennett's Department of Education of a proposal that would fundamentally alter the criteria and procedures for the Secretary's recognition of accrediting agencies. Calling attention to the recent emphasis with the postsecondary education community on "the effective assessment of student achievement as the principal measure of educational quality," Secretary Bennett stated that he was "in full accord with this trend" and wished to encourage it. Accordingly, his revised regulations proposed that accrediting agencies would be directed to require institutions participating in federal loan and grant programs "to measure, assess and document student progress toward specific goals." Bennett emphasized that without accreditation, institutions would be
ineligible to participate in student aid and other federal education programs. What is important to grasp about these postsecondary accountability policies--whether announced by the Department of Education, or those implemented at the University of Missouri, Wayne State University, Tennessee institutions of higher education, or at the University of Colorado where I teach--is that all have been characterized by top-down governance in academic matters.

There has been some evidence of faculty opposition to these assessment policies. For example, Kerby Miller, as University of Missouri professor of history, delivered a stinging attack before the faculty at the Columbia campus, and his comments were published in a local newspaper. Miller pointed out that assessment is fundamentally a teaching issue, one "cutting to the very heart of the educational enterprise." As Lucas reported, Miller assailed the prospect of faculty compliance with the new procedure as a "political sell out." Arthur Brown similarly reported faculty-registered objections at Wayne State, including the concern that this type of activity is anti-intellectual, and that faculty diminish themselves "by engaging in such a project." Nonetheless, such opposition has been voiced in relative isolation and unsuccessfully. At the University of Missouri, Wayne State, and elsewhere, the new policies of assessment have become operational, and it is apparent that The Academy has largely complied.

In 1985, the Colorado General Assembly passed House Bill 1187, Concerning the Reorganization of Higher Education. Its provisions undoubtedly are illustrative of the extent to which the state has assumed decision-making authority over matters long deemed the responsibility of The Academy. Under its provisions the state granted sweeping new powers to the Colorado Commission on Higher Education to eliminate "needless duplication of facilities and programs" and "to effect the best utilization of available resources [in order] to achieve an adequate level of higher education in the most economic manner." House Bill 1187 also enacted a "higher education accountability program," which stipulated:

--that institutions of higher education be held accountable for demonstrable improvements in student knowledge, capacities, and skills between entrance and graduation.

--that the higher education accountability program ... be designed to measure objectively both qualitative and quantitative achievement. The program shall first develop broad goals and specific performance objectives of institutions of higher education which can advance students toward these goals and objectives. The program shall then develop a means for evaluating the achievement and performance of students.
By statute, the Colorado Commission on Higher Education—a politically appointed body—has authority over all the governing boards and institutions of higher education in the state. Commencing July 1, 1990, the CCHE was authorized, under House Bill 1187, to impose a 2 percent funding penalty on any state college or university found to be in noncompliance with the accountability law.

The Board of Regents of the University of Colorado responded to House Bill 1187 in three successive stages. In 1985, it adopted a slash and burn policy with respect to academic and professional programs, leaving faculty reeling from program termination or threatened termination.

By spring 1986, the Regents followed up with a resolution regarding faculty-course evaluation:

Faculty-Course Evaluation shall be implemented at the University of Colorado for all courses and their sections offered by any of the University of Colorado campuses. Each campus shall design an evaluation form that meets that individual campus' specific needs so long as such forms are uniform for that campus, include evaluation of individual faculty, and are adaptable to either the individual campus' research and testing services or such services that exist at the Boulder campus. The evaluation system shall be designed to provide published information to students, faculty, departmental administration, and the University's administration.

The faculty evaluation mandate was accompanied by a Regent policy that placed all faculty under a 100 percent merit pay system. This meant that factors like earned professorial rank and inflation no longer were considered in the annual faculty assessment process or in salary determination. The new faculty evaluation system replaced the 1976 Regents' ruling under which faculty had to provide students with the opportunity to assess courses on a regular basis. Importantly, the 1976 ruling did not compel faculty to use an institutionally-sponsored assessment instrument. Thus the 1986 Regents' mandate represented a fundamental relocation of academic decision-making—a usurpation of individual faculty judgement in determining the connections between philosophic orientation, instructional style, and evaluation procedures.

The third stage of the Regents' response to House Bill 1187 occurred in February 1988, wherein the entire University of Colorado system was ordered to place all undergraduate programs on a student outcome-based mode of operation. This third mandate was implemented throughout academic year 1989-1990. At a departmental level, a student outcomes curriculum typically meant the adoption of standardized pre- and post-program testing instruments, with results to be reported to the Colorado Commission on Higher Education.
The underlying assumption was that all University professors within an academic department could and would agree on educational purposes, curriculum substance, and learning results.

The School of Education on the Denver Campus is a graduate department. Therefore, it was directly impacted only by the first two stages of the Regents' actions, that is, by external directives to economically redesign curriculum, and the adoption of a standardized faculty evaluation form. The "Procedures for Administering the Faculty Course Evaluations at CU-Denver" stipulated that the standardized form, known as the Faculty Course Questionnaire, or "FCQ," had to include twelve questions common to all the campuses, and provided an option of developing another eight questions that would uniformly apply to all Denver Campus faculty. The purpose of this, according to the official "Procedures," was to ensure "continuity as individual teaching performance is tracked over time." Each faculty member had the option (virtually unused) of identifying up to five additional questions that would apply to individual courses. The FCQ also allotted limited space and limited time for open-ended comments by students. Students, it should be noted, rarely took the time to add comments! The Faculty Course Questionnaire was to be administered sometime during the last three weeks of the semester by having students take the first fifteen minutes of a class to fill out the evaluation and return to a designated student who, in turn, was to deliver the completed forms in a sealed envelope to the Dean's office.

The policy was in sharp conflict with the assessment procedure I had used since 1966, namely, a take-home form with four open-ended questions, accompanied by an invitation from me for a thoughtful, anonymous, and critical response from students. Over the years, many of my students spent a great deal of time and effort in completing the form, often turning in additional pages typed with their thoughts about the course and my teaching methods. School of Education Faculty Evaluation Committees never expressed any difficulty in interpreting my student evaluations nor in discerning the quality of my teaching. It was always my custom, and remains so, to advise students that all my assessment procedures—including the open-ended course questionnaire—were a carefully considered aspect of my entire teaching philosophy.

The newly-mandated Faculty Course Questionnaire not only had the effect of undermining my authority in determining the priorities of instructional practices, but also conveyed ideas that reflected the assumptions of positivist-realist philosophy and behaviorist psychology. The physical aspects of the FCQ form, itself, were ideologically biased. The FCQ items were presented as generic, observable, and measurable instructional behaviors. The substance of the questions was similarly biased. For example, students were asked to score such items as the following three—after each item I offer comment on key ways
that such an evaluation question is in contrast to my teaching philosophy:

**Item 1.** "Presentation of course material was: [six alternative responses offered]."

This item presumes the universalized desirability of didactic teaching methods—ignoring heuristic, philetic, facilitative, or other methods.

**Item 2.** "Explanation of complex material was: [six alternative responses offered]."

This item presumes the universalized desirability of viewing the teaching role as one of authority over a given body of knowledge with respect to the student, ignoring problem-solving, provocation, or other instructional roles.

**Item 3.** "Instructor’s motivation of students to explore subject further was: [six alternative responses offered]."

This item presumes that the universal task of the teacher is the extrinsic motivation of students, in contrast with those educational philosophies and learning theories that view motivation as an intrinsic phenomenon.

In short, the FCQ is an excellent illustration of the positivist-realist-behaviorist tendency to operationalize and mechanize the whole of the educational process, and all of human experience.

By 1986, I was the only Foundations of Education professor remaining on the Denver Campus, and one of three within the entire University of Colorado system. I realized that I would have to assume personal responsibility for mounting a foundational critique of the accountability policies.

---

**Wirsing v. The Board of Regents of the University of Colorado, et al**

On November 1, 1986, I wrote a letter to the Board of Regents urging that they reconsider their resolution calling for a standardization of faculty course evaluation. I took an educative approach and tried to illuminate the ideological implications of the policy. I called attention to Article X of the Regents' own Laws, which is a magnificent statement of academic freedom. It emphasizes that faculty have an obligation to practice "with integrity and in accordance with the highest standards of their profession," and that "while they fulfill this responsibility, their efforts should not be subjected to direct or indirect
pressures or interference from within the University, and the University will resist to the utmost such pressures or interference when exerted from without.35

I also cited from the Standards for Academic and Professional Instruction in Foundations of Education, Educational Studies, and Educational Policy Studies which serve as the scholarly guidelines for our own field of expertise. The Standards are explicit with respect to mandated competency-based education—the approach reflected in the FCQ:

Such a policy automatically establishes a given normative attitude of educational practitioners; it universalizes a single standard of presumed correctness. The imposition of any single intellectual outlook and associated behavior raises grave questions relative to education in a democratic society.39

The Standards are clear, too, in terms of sustaining academic authority in assessment procedures:

the formulation of program objectives for Foundations of Education, Educational Studies, and Educational Policy Studies, and the means of assessing them [are] matters that are properly reserved to the professional and scholarly judgments of qualified faculty members operating within the settings of their respective colleges and universities, utilizing the Standards.40

The Regents did not respond to my letter. However, I had sent a copy to the leadership of the Colorado Commission on Higher Education. I did receive a reply from the Executive Director, who informed me that the CCHE did not intend to trivialize postsecondary education; instead, they hoped to encourage "quite creative, institutionally-designed assessment procedures."41 The CCHE response, of course, entirely missed the point of my critique.

I had also sent copies of my letter to the Regents to various faculty leaders and selected administrators. The president of CU's chapter of the American Federation of Teachers replied by inviting me to speak on the main campus in Boulder in February 1987.42 My speech received considerable publicity in the University newspaper, and this in turn provoked written communication from CU President Gordon Gee. He expressed interest in my remarks, conveyed his own deep reservations about student evaluations, and advised me that the Regents had approved the policy over the objections of his administration. "I spoke strongly against it," Gee wrote to me in April 1987, "alas, to no avail."

That communication was the first and last official acknowledgment by the University administration that serious issues surrounded the Regents' faculty accountability policy.43 By that time I was deeply involved in a personal grievance effort.
Eighteen months earlier, in fall 1985, William Grady had become the dean of the CU-Denver School of Education. For reasons of his own, Dean Grady determined on an *ex post facto* basis that teaching merit for 1985 and subsequently for 1986 would be considered only if he possessed a "common data base" from a standardized assessment instrument. He took this position two years before the Regents' mandate was to be effective on the Denver Campus. I had continued to use my open-ended forms, and my Faculty Evaluation Committee peers continued to respect these student responses in the annual assessment process. The Dean, however, arbitrarily lowered my teaching rating to zero—an action he was to take in all ensuing years. The Dean's punitive zero rating for my refusal to use the F-XQ also obliterated my performance in the areas of research and service.

By fall 1986, I had filed a grievance with the University of Colorado Faculty Senate Committee on Privilege and Tenure. Following a lengthy two-year review and then a hearing in fall 1988, the Privilege and Tenure Committee ruled in my behalf and recommended that salary adjustments be made for 1985, 1986, and, by that time, 1987. After still another year of maneuvering and delay by the central administration, salary adjustments finally were made, on my terms, for two years only—1985 and 1986. Because the Regents' mandate was in force by 1987, the Regents and central administration refused to alter the Dean's assessment for that year. Of no small irony was my selection in 1987 by faculty peers to receive the Colorado State Board of Education's award for "excellence and dedication to teaching." My salary has been frozen since that year.

After unsuccessful appeals within the University, my attorneys and I determined to bring legal action against the Board of Regents and the University administration. In January 1990, we filed a lawsuit in the Federal District Court of Colorado. We chose the federal over the state court system despite the fact that it was now possible in federal courts to seek prospective relief only. As a test case, we felt that a federal court ruling on the principle of academic freedom would be more significant and carry much more weight on a national basis. Also, we speculated that a member of the federal bench would give a more thoughtful reading to our case documents than the crowded state courts.

In the Brief submitted to Judge Lewis Babcock, who presided over the Federal District Court of Colorado, my attorneys pointed out that my objections to the standardized student evaluation form were based on scholarly judgments as a tenured Professor of Foundations of Education. First, that as an educational historian, I regularly taught my students that there is no historical evidence that supports any one particular set of good teaching characteristics. Second, that Foundations of Education also concerns a study of different philosophic approaches to teaching, which in turn have different pedagogical implications,
including different approaches to student and instructor evaluations. Our Brief explained the positivist-realist premises implicit in the Faculty Course Questionnaire, pointed up that it conveyed ideas directly contrary to what I teach, and that for me to comply with its usage would undermine my professional integrity and credibility with students. Our Brief highlighted that my position was fully justified under both the assessment clause of the Council of Learned Societies in Education’s Standards which govern the Foundation of Education profession, and the academic freedom statement of the University of Colorado’s Laws of the Regents.

The heart of our argument was that the University’s standardized faculty evaluation policy interfered with my academic freedom. And we brought to bear solid legal precedents from a long series of academic freedom cases. Our citations included the January 1990 U. S. Supreme Court ruling in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, which upheld the landmark academic freedom cases halting attempts “to control or direct the content of the speech engaged in by the University or those affiliated with it.”

We also provided the Court with considerable evidence which pointed up that the standardized evaluation form was applied unfairly in administrative salary decisions and that the policy was, indeed, a smokescreen for an arbitrary and retaliatory deanship use of power.

The University attorney, in her Brief on behalf of the CU Board of Regents and administration, argued that the guarantee of academic freedom arising from rights enunciated in the First Amendment “does not encompass the right to refuse to follow University regulations,” and that academic freedom is “a protection provided to teaching institutions” as well as to teaching faculty. Relying on several lower court decisions concerning public school teachers and untenured faculty, the University attorney further argued that the First Amendment does not require that a teacher be made “a sovereign to himself,” and that the University—not the individual faculty member—had the right to set policy on such matters as course content, teaching techniques, homework load, and grading policy.

The Board of Regents’ case also rested on Dean Grady’s offer to me that had been presented as a means of “alleviating” my philosophical disagreement with the standardized evaluation instrument. That it, I was free to openly criticize the form before my students, and free to administer an additional form of my own choice. But neither academic freedom nor any First Amendment right provided me with immunity from complying with the “responsible rules” of the University to accomplish its evaluation of teaching.

Since I was declared to be insubordinate in my refusal to provide the required evaluation data, the University attorney argued that the institution, through its Board of Regents, was fully justified in imposing salary sanctions.
It is important to grasp that the issue before the Court was narrow and concise. The continuing excellence of my teaching over a twenty-four-year period was not challenged. The Regents and administrators acknowledged in their Brief and in oral testimony before the Court that I am a superior teacher. The University attorney also testified, on behalf of the Board of Regents, that I continue to be a valued member of the faculty. The single issue was my steadfast refusal, on grounds of conscience, to administer the standardized form.

The Federal District Court entered its judgement in favor of the University Board of Regents on June 28, 1990, denying trial. In a terse Opinion, Judge Babcock completely ignored the academic freedom statement of the Laws of the Regents and the professional Standards which guide Foundations of Education faculty. He saw the case as one in which the academic freedom rights of the University, as an academy, were in conflict with the rights of an individual professor. As a result, the Court viewed the dispute as one wherein the Court, itself, was the government potentially interfering with the University's own academic freedom—and he refused to interfere.

In Judge Babcock's reading of the situation, I was not denied merit salary increases because of my teaching methods or presentation of opinions "contrary to those of the University." Instead, I was denied merit increments, he stated, because of my refusal to comply with the University's reasonable teacher evaluation requirements. Babcock cited the Stastny case:

Academic freedom is not a license for activity at variance with job related procedures and requirements, nor does it encompass activities which are internally destructive of the proper function of the University or disruptive of the education process.

It should be borne in mind that the Board of Regents at no time placed evidence before the Court that my behavior was "internally destructive" or "disruptive to the education process." Quite the contrary!

In a strange piece of reasoning, Judge Babcock ruled that the standardized form represents a University policy and procedure "unrelated to course content that in no way interferes with Dr. Wirsing's academic freedom." He based his judgment on the fact that I was free to openly criticize the form and the University policy, and that the forms were not distributed until the course had been "completed substantially." The fact that I was required to leave my classroom during the fifteen minutes when students completed the forms meant, to him, that I thereby was "not communicating an idea" to students. The Court held, moreover, that the evaluation forms per se are not expressive of content-based regulation, since each form "involves written comments and has a choice selection 'not applicable' that...students may select;" and that, in any event,
the Regents' policy was "a condition of employment.""

My attorneys, Larry Hobbs and Rita Kittle, filed before the U. S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals on September 11, 1990.52 Our appeal is based on three major arguments: First, the trial court was in error in characterizing this dispute as between the professor and The Academy. The courts have recognized that the right to pursue academic ends without government interference extends not only to the teacher as an individual but to the university as an academy. However, First Amendment issues become more complicated when there is government regulation which implicates academic freedom in a public educational institution, because the government is both regulator and speaker. This distinction was made by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 1990 decision, University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC.53 In my case, the trial court failed to recognize the distinction between the University as regulator (the Regents and administrators), and the University as a speaker (that is, The Academy) which is endowed with rights of academic freedom. We are arguing that the Regents and administrators represent not the University but rather the state interfering with the University's academic freedom as well as mine. In short, it is I who represent The Academy, not the Board of Regents.

Second, the trial court was in error in holding that the Regents' mandate does not interfere with my academic freedom—that the conduct required of me is not compelled speech, and that my refusal to administer the form is not Constitutionally-protected expressive conduct. Conduct of similar kinds in schools and universities has long been a subject for First Amendment protection. Moreover, the burden of proof was on the Regents to show that conduct which their mandate requires is not expressive of any idea.4 This the Regents did not do. Instead, they simply argued that I was free to rebut any implicit communication by criticizing the form or by administering it in conjunction with my own. The fallacy of the Court ruling is apparent when applied to the facts in any of the compelled speech cases. For example, in Keyishian, the loyalty oath could lawfully be a precondition to public employment if individuals required to take the oath are allowed to criticize it or give additional sworn statements. In Barnette, students could be compelled to recite the pledge of allegiance in school if they are also allowed to criticize the pledge or recite additional pledges. Very clearly, "the opportunity to criticize or supplement the compelled speech does not avoid the chilling effect on First Amendment rights caused by the government compelling citizens to express a certain idea."55

Since I had been a tenured professor for many years when the Regents adopted the evaluation policy in 1986, and since there never has been any such policy stipulated in the CU Faculty Handbook, there is no basis for the trial court to have concluded that the mandate was "a condition of employment" that legally should sustain penalties for non-compliance. I am challenging the
Constitutionality of the mandate itself.

Third, the trial court was also in error in concluding that the Regents' mandate does not regulate the content of my classes. The U. S. Supreme Court ruled in the 1984 Clark case that the court must look carefully to determine whether a regulation touches even incidentally on academic freedom rights. Significantly, because my students directly engage in the study of evaluation in terms of philosophical premises and historical factors, the evidence is clear that the Regents' mandate has, in fact, an inhibiting effect on the content of foundational ideas expressed in my classroom. Furthermore, it is axiomatic that a teacher instructs by precept and example. That I am compelled to perform certain acts, including leaving my classroom, constitutes instructional affirmation of certain specific ideas that undermine my curriculum content.

Fundamentally, what we are testing in the courts is whether the statutory powers of supervision by the CU Board of Regents—and, by implication, the authority of the state, itself—can preempt a First Amendment claim to academic freedom by a member of The Academy.

The Board of Regents responded to our Appellant Brief on October 15, 1990. Their arguments and citations were essentially the same as those that had been upheld by the Federal District Court. The University attorney again declared that the Faculty Course Questionnaire regulation is content-neutral, not content-based as we are claiming, and therefore does not rise to a First Amendment issue. Not surprisingly, the University attorney scoffed at our traditional view of The Academy as excluding the University dean, chancellor, president, and Board of Regents, asserting instead that:

There is absolutely no question that the University administration is equally entitled to academic freedom in determining whether and how the student body shall participate in evaluation of teaching.

To the letter, the University of Colorado Board of Regents has adopted the pernicious rationale of the Princeton University Board of Trustees—that is, the Katzenbach Doctrine.

Conclusion

This would make a much better speech if I had an ending for you. Nut I don't. I do not know what the outcome of our long legal struggle will be. At the present, we are waiting for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to set a date for oral hearing—a verbal battle between attorneys for both sides. If we prevail at that level, the Tenth Circuit will remand our case back to Federal District
Court for trial before Judge Babcock. Whatever the next outcome, our expectation is that appeals, on either side, will proceed ultimately to the U. S. Supreme Court.

In my judgment, we have a strong and important case. But I am sufficiently a student of American judicial history to recognize that the courts—even the highest in the land—often reflect in their decisions the popular Zeitgeist of the day. The Rehnquist Court has tended to favor institutional privilege over the rights of individuals. For me, however, as for Scott Nearing, the issue is a profoundly ethical one. And I can see myself proceeding in no other way. Whether we are successful or experience failure, it is my earnest hope that other members of The Academy will follow suit.

In concluding, I would like to make four recommendations: First, I would urge you to consider the appropriateness of legal action in such matters. Traditionally, litigation has been held to be alien to academic life and to the polite custom of resolving differences on a collegial basis. The hard truth is that it requires a Dr. Pangloss mentality in our day to pretend that The Academy is healthy and that its customary prerogatives are being respected. We simply are not living in the best of all possible academic worlds! The Academy has need for an even playing field in its relationships with university trustees, boards of regents, and administrators. University administrators and boards of overseers currently have at their disposal in-house batteries of attorneys. All their legal costs are absorbed by the university. The Academy is left to its own inadequate resources. To suggest that academics ought not pursue legal remedies is to sustain the present double standard of operation.

Second, I would urge aggressive educational leadership by the American Educational Studies Association. One prominent professional organization that could greatly benefit from foundational insights is the American Association of University Professors. Whereas the AAUP has a long and relatively courageous record as a champion of academic freedom in behalf of The Academy, it appears to be in a vulnerable position with respect to issues growing out of accountability and assessment policies.

In 1975, the AAUP’s Council adopted a “Statement on Teaching Evaluation” which had been developed by the Association’s Committee on University Teaching, Research, and Publication. The “Statement” subsequently was endorsed by the Sixty-First Annual Meeting as AAUP policy.

Consistent with the history of that Association, its “Statement on Teaching Evaluation” spoke to the “primacy of faculty colleague judgments” and the need for a judicious evaluation system that would “recognize the broad dimension of teaching” and “be sensitive to different kinds and styles of instruction.” However, the same document took the following position—a position that strikes me as a glaring inconsistency:
Evaluating teaching on the basis of teaching performance...presents difficulties in measurement, but the large body of research into the reliability and validity of carefully applied performance measures supports the practical usefulness of these data... A common instrument covering a range of teachers, departments, and subject matter areas has the great advantage of affording meaningful comparable data.  

It is obvious that this policy statement could be interpreted as an endorsement of the University of Colorado Board of Regents' mandated Faculty Course Questionnaire, a reality not lost upon an AAUP attorney in his recent conclusion that the Association could not join us in our case.  

It is equally obvious that the AAUP policy statement could be interpreted as an endorsement of student outcomes-based education. The same logic in arguing for a comparable data base is being widely applied by state legislative bodies and university administrators across the country in mandating student outcome-based curricula.  

The AAUP seems to have absorbed the popular belief that researchers have made great progress in the quest for a recipe for effective teaching. But as R. Katters and N. Haigh reported the reality of the situation:  

The fact is...that more than three decades of research on teaching has produced inconclusive, or at best tentative, findings regarding causal links between the conditions of learning that teachers may arrange and student achievement. Research findings simply do not support a single comprehensive theory of teaching, nor do they provide a set of generally accepted criteria for judging teacher effectiveness.  

The American Educational Studies Association--perhaps in a collaborative effort with the Council of Learned Societies in Education--could set for itself the instructional task of broadening the foundational understandings of the AAUP with respect to the implications of its policy statement on teaching. Who better than we can inform others that research is never intellectually neutral, and that among scholars the debate over knowledge, instructional purposes, and teaching continues.  

Third, I would urge that you consider class-action suits. My own case deals with just one dimension of ideological control. My hope, of course, is that it will set a precedent for examining accountability and assessment policies in general. Those of you who are directly involved in mandated outcome-based curriculum, for example, might want to consider the potential advantages of coming together for joint legal action.  

Fourth, I would urge that you consider the desirability of developing a voluntary legal consortium to assist individual members or groups in cases
related to the professional and academic interests of this Association. Again, it might be more effective to consider such a legal consortium under the sponsorship of the Council of Learned Societies in Education. It is not realistic to assume that an academic ought to carry the financial burden of litigation on an individual basis. But action should not be mounted without a commitment to go the full judicial route, as necessary. The cost of taking a case through the courts typically runs between $50,000 and $100,000. This constitutes a calculated business expense for the university. It can be financially disastrous for a single academic.

I am very cognizant of the spirit of independence that has always motivated the membership of this distinguished Association. I greatly value independence in my own professional life, and am eternally wary of organizational appeals for consensus. But unless the academic profession assumes a proactive stance and organizes collectively to protect the individual rights of all its members, the status and autonomy of each of us is in jeopardy. I would leave you by restating my fundamental message of a decade ago: "The job of providing sophisticated rationale so that the professional beliefs of individual classroom teachers will be respected under the law appears to me to be our special obligation."

Notes

5. Ibid.
10. Ibid.


14. Ibid.


18. Ibid., p. 194.

19. Ibid., p. 197.


27. Ibid.

44. The U. S. Supreme Court, in *Will v. Michigan Department of State Police*, ruled in June 1989 that state agencies are not "persons" and, therefore, cannot be sued retroactively for damages. Prospective relief became the only avenue of redress through federal courts, e.g., adjustment in salary from the date of filing the lawsuit.
47. Brief submitted by Defendants to the U. S. District Court of Colorado in the case of *Marie E. Wirsing v. The Board of Regents of the University of Colorado*, et al, No. 90-B-38, March 16, 1990.


Education and Community-Building in the European Community: The Impact of 1992

By D. G. Mulcahy

In European affairs the spotlight since late 1989 has been upon political developments in Eastern Europe. As a consequence, the question of the social and economic integration of the member states of the European Community has received less exposure than before. Yet, with the implementation of the Single European Act, and the impetus to European union which it provides, the year 1992 is set to become a landmark year for the Community, its impact already being considerable. Its impact on education has been, and will continue to be, no less significant than in other spheres. This can be seen from the wide range of innovative educational measures already introduced, especially during the past three years, and others being planned for the future.

An essential feature of the educational initiatives of the European Community is their transnational character; they are directed at addressing Com-
munity-wide issues in education rather than educational problems and issues of purely national dimensions within countries of the European Community. A good deal is written about the latter, and about the manner in which individual systems of education attempt to deal with them; less has been said concerning the emergent and uniquely Community-wide character of education in the European Community, and it is upon this aspect, and its community-building intent, that I shall concentrate here. I shall begin by placing the educational developments within the context of the evolution of the European Community since its beginnings.

The European Community

The immediate post-war years in Europe saw the growth among sovereign nations of a number of associations and groupings such as the Council of Europe in the cultural sphere and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the military sphere. In the economic sphere, three countries, namely, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, agreed in 1948 to integrate their economies to a very large degree, forming what became known as the Benelux countries, and in 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community was formed among six countries of Western Europe. It was these same countries which came together in 1957 to sign the Treaty of Rome, bringing into existence the European Economic Community (EEC), or the Common Market, as it was sometimes called. While founded, in part, to encourage peaceful co-operation among nations of Western Europe following the destruction of World War II, the primary purpose of the EEC was to promote the economic development of the countries involved.

Since its foundation, the European Community has grown from an original membership of six countries to twelve today. The original six were Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined the Community in 1973, Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, a range of important Community policies such as the common agricultural policy, the regional policy, and the European Monetary System were implemented. By the end of the 1970s, however, there was a growing concern that the Community had fallen behind other world economies. It was this awareness, and the idea of moving to an even more free and open market, along with the growth of a European political dimension within the Community, that led to the Single European Act.

With the coming into effect of the Single European Act after 1992, an
entirely new phase in the evolution of post-war Europe as an economic, political, and cultural entity is set to commence, as the Community, like the United States, will become a single market where goods, services, capital, workers, and students may move freely. In so far as the European Community has always been primarily concerned to achieve economic goals, in removing trade and other barriers to harmonization and economic growth the Single European Act is doing no more than bringing about a completion of the so-called internal market. While this cannot be forgotten, however, the Act symbolizes much more besides; in its efforts to develop into a more powerful and efficient economic trading block the European Community has become a more clearly defined social, political, and perhaps cultural entity as well. And in part, the Single European Act represents the recognition of this development.

In the educational sphere, moreover, as in others, 1992 has also been used by the powers that be as a target date for the introduction, clarification, refinement, and general tidying up of a myriad of rules and regulations, aspirations, and plans pertaining, more or less urgently, to the definition and implementation of the idea of the European Community through education.

Towards a European Educational Policy

That the European Community should become as deeply involved in educational affairs as it has is noteworthy in itself, and it probably tells us a good deal about the role of education in the development of any community. There is no direct reference to a European educational policy in the Treaty of Rome. What reference there is to educational matters deals with the issues of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications and the training of workers and farmers. Under the Treaty of Rome, the Commission is also assigned responsibility “to lay down general principles for the implementation of a common training policy.” As early as 1961, however, it was evident to the member states that education was of such fundamental social significance that the possibilities of setting up a Council of Education Ministers and the establishment of a European university were considered. Following delays and discussions, in 1976 a unified European Community approach to educational matters was agreed in the form of an action programme; it was published in 1977 in a little pamphlet entitled Towards a European Education Policy.

As social, political, and economic events have occurred, and as the Community has gained experience in dealing with educational matters, new policies and new priorities have emerged and others have been re-defined. Nonetheless, the overall direction and implementation of educational policy in
the European Community has been profoundly shaped by the action program adopted in 1976. The action program identified six major areas for immediate attention, namely, cultural and vocational training for migrant workers and education for their children, the forging of closer links among the educational systems of the member states, documentation and statistics, co-operation in the field of higher education, teaching of foreign languages, and equality of opportunity and the right to education. Of the six major areas adopted in 1976, three have retained consistent support and have seen the greatest progress. More recently there is an emphasis upon teaching the European dimension, a new recognition and support for advanced technological education and co-operation between education and industry, a broadening of measures to promote mobility throughout the community through educational exchanges, and a renewed and broadened interest in the education of teachers.

Cooperative Programs

Higher Education. Of the six areas identified in the action program of 1976, perhaps the greatest prominence and success has been achieved by the measures taken to promote greater co-operation among universities, leading to the establishment in 1987 of the ERASMUS program, that is, the European Community Action Scheme for the Mobility of University Students. This program has also paved the way for similar programs in the fields of higher technological education and exchange schemes involving schools.

When first dealing with this topic in 1976, the Community was aware that while Community policies touch upon many of the socio-economic aspects of life in member countries, education had remained exclusively a national preserve. It probably accepted that it would be unrealistic to attempt a complete harmonization of European educational systems, but also believed that the ideals of the Community implied some kind of training for students which would give them professional mobility throughout the Community. Concerned to create such mobility, it saw increasing co-operation in higher education as the key to achieving this. Such increased co-operation in higher education was also seen as a way of pooling resources and cutting the costs entailed in research, technology, and higher education, with a view to maintaining Community industry on an equal footing with that of the super-powers.

In 1976, a number of obstacles stood in the way of increasing student mobility of the kind hoped for, and other forms of mobility involving students and teachers. Today many of these obstacles have been overcome and the original objective of promoting student mobility and co-operation in higher
education is being pursued in a variety of ways. Student mobility is being promoted through the recognition of that part of a student’s course completed in a university in another Community member state; through exemption from registration and/or tuition fees at the host university; and through the continuation, during the period spent abroad, of any grant or loan to which they would normally be entitled in their country of origin. Students may also qualify for financial aid to offset costs incurred in travel, taking language courses, and living in a host country. Of the difficulties encountered in promoting exchanges, one of the more persistent has been the issue of credentialing: how does a university in one country assign credit to a student for studies carried out in a university in another country. This has proven to be as difficult an issue to resolve as the question of the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, though a new ray of hope has entered the scene with the establishment of a pilot project known as the European Community Course Credit Transfer System (ECTS) which is looking into the matter. Eighty-four institutions are participating in the program, which is attempting to develop a system similar to that found in American universities, for transferring credit earned for academic work completed in one institution to another.

Encouragement is also provided to entice faculty to participate in the ERASMUS program by developing joint teaching programs in conjunction with colleagues in universities in other member states and by spending at least a month teaching in a university in another member state. Universities are themselves being encouraged to facilitate both student and faculty mobility through enabling them to offer appropriate language courses for students, covering travel and subsistence costs for teaching staff while absent in another country, and by replacement, if necessary, of teaching staff during their stay abroad. The adoption of the Jean Monet Project for 1990-1994, providing financial support for course adaptations to reflect Community developments, is expected to give added impetus to European integration in university studies.

A second program which is having a major impact on university education very clearly reflects the underlying economic character of the Community and its recognition of the role of education in promoting its economic, industrial, and technological objectives is the program known as COMETT, the Community Program in Education and Training for Technology. Concentrating on the areas of business and engineering, the first phase of COMETT ran from 1987 to 1989; the second phase is to run from 1990 to 1994. The specific objectives of this program are to encourage and strengthen co-operation between enterprises and universities with a view to developing initial and continuing training in technology to meet the technological challenge facing Europe’s universities and industries, and to meet industry’s requirements for a qualified workforce. Typical features of this program are its policy of placing students
in industry for training and for the experience of working in another member state, exchanges of training personnel between universities and industry, and the setting up of University-Enterprise Training Partnerships (UETPs) to develop and strengthen university-enterprise cooperation in the field of training for technology, and the advanced technologies in particular.

Both the ERASMUS and COMETT programs have met with general approval, leading to their continuation into a second phase in each case. In the case of ERASMUS, there has been more than a doubling of its budget to over 190 million ECU ($150 million) for the first three years of phase two of its operation. While this suggests a high degree of satisfaction with the programs, they have not been without weaknesses. From the educational standpoint, the most serious deficiency of both programs is the poor linguistic and socio-cultural competence of students participating in these programs. To some extent the language problem has been attended to in phase two of ERASMUS and through adaptations made in the European languages program, LINGUA, which now incorporates specific measures to promote the better linguistic preparation of students in these two programs. It must nonetheless be said that added support in the area of the social skills was not provided for and that the Education Council which approved of phase two of ERASMUS appeared more concerned to improve procedures for the funding and administration of the program than to provide for its linguistic and social content.

A second area in which difficulties have been experienced in the ERASMUS program is in attracting participation of students and faculty in the critical area of teacher education. Sufficient study of this problem had not been undertaken in time for the adoption of new measures for phase two of ERASMUS; now that at least one important study of the particular problems experienced in this area has been completed, it remains to be seen what corrective measures will be taken.

Vocational Training. As is widely known, unemployment and the structure of unemployment, has been a major social and economic problem in the European Community for over a decade now. In 1975, unemployment in the Community stood at 2.9 per cent; by 1986 it had increased to a staggering 11 per cent, and there are no signs of an immediate major improvement. In the past, this has led to a number of Community-sponsored education-related measures, most notably transition from school to work projects. To what extent the problem can be addressed through education is unclear, though it has not deterred the Community from developing several programs in the broad area of vocational education.

Chief among these programs are the Community Action Programme for the Vocational Training of Young People and their Preparation for Adult and
Working Life (PETRA) set up in December 1987 for a five-year period, the Community Action Programme in the Field of Vocational Training and Technological Change (EuroTecneT), and a new program for the development of continuing vocational training—to be known as FORCE—adopted by the Labour and Social Affairs Council in May, 1990, covering the period from January 1991 to December 1994. The objectives set for PETRA are to ensure that all young people who so wish receive one year or, if possible, two or more year's vocational training upon completion of their compulsory education; to raise the standard and quality of initial training and improve the preparation of young people for adult and working life, and continuing training; to diversify training, enhance the capacity of training systems to adapt to economic, social, and technological change, and to develop a European dimension in initial vocational training. EuroTecneT aims at developing vocational training in the new technologies, and proposals for its second phase to run from 1990 to 1994 are currently being examined by the Council.

Another program in the vocational area, the Community Network of Training Programmes for Women (IRIS), was set up at the initiative of the Commission in December 1988. This program aims to create a training method specially adapted to the needs of women and to increase the involvement of employers and trade unions in vocational training programs for women. The Network intends to promote exchange visits between projects participating in the network, hold national seminars to analyze strategies for ensuring women's access to all types and levels of vocational training, and improve the provision of information.

A number of youth programs aimed in part at a younger age range or aimed at non-university youth also exist. The Young Workers Program is yet another work-preparatory program and is open to young people aged between 18 and 28 who are either unemployed or who have received basic vocational training or some form of work experience. Preference is given to those who have not attended university.

Language Training. With many different languages spoken in the European Community, the teaching of modern European languages has become a renewed priority for the Community, both at school level and beyond. Accordingly, in July 1989, the Council adopted LINGUA, the Action Programme to Promote Foreign Language Competence in the European Community. The program is intended to support and complement existing policies of the member states in this field. Specific measures to be taken include in-service education of teachers of foreign languages and their trainers; developing the initial training of foreign language teachers in the universities; the promotion of knowledge of foreign languages used in work relations and in economic life;
the promotion of exchanges between young people who are undergoing professional, vocational and technical education; and a variety of supportive measures such as dissemination of information.

Relations with Eastern Europe. Because of the manner in which the relatively young institutions of the European Community have operated in the past, the European Commission has exercised considerably greater influence than the European Parliament, the only institution of the Community whose members are elected directly by the citizens. This has left some to wonder how democratic an institution the Community is and how responsive it is to the needs and wishes of the citizens. However well founded these feelings may be, there can be little denying the sensitivity of the Community to the political significance of the rapid developments in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The sudden collapse of communism in Eastern Europe during the past twelve months has led in a short time to greatly expanded communications and co-operation between countries of Eastern and Western Europe at both official and unofficial levels. Many unofficial ties and forums for the interchange of ideas had already existed, notably through the auspices of the Council of Europe, and in academic and professional circles such as the Association for Teacher Education in Europe and the Association for Engineering Education in Europe, which have long drawn their memberships from both Western Europe and Eastern Europe. By December of 1989, the European Council promoted the idea of adopting measures to enable the participation of countries of Central and Eastern Europe—and specifically Poland and Hungary at that time—in education and training programs similar to existing Community programs, especially ERASMUS. As a consequence, there was a proposal from the Commission to establish TEMPUS, the Trans-European Mobility Scheme for University Studies.14

In May 1990, the TEMPUS program was adopted by the General Affairs Council to go into operation beginning in the academic year 1990-1991. Funding to the tune of about sixteen million dollars for the first two years, and something approximating one hundred million dollars over the five-year duration of the program, is envisaged.15 The broad goal is to have both a short-term impact and a medium- and longer-term impact on the development of higher education and training systems inside the Central and Eastern European countries and to foster their interaction with the European Community and other Western countries through joint activities and increased staff and student mobility. Primary attention will be given to developing projects that will have a multiplier effect, where there will be an emphasis on links between education and industry, and a training of teachers and trainers in key areas. Of particular interest, in the broader political and economic contexts, are the stipulations
requiring the development of market economies and the promotion of political freedoms in the participating countries.

Consistency of Educational Policy. Aside from the question of their success or failure in meeting their specific objectives, the various Community programs that have been detailed above are of significance in pointing to the values and priorities of the Community in the matter of education. Among the values represented in these programs generally are those of mobility of individuals, economic development of the Community, and linguistic, technological, and vocational training. While this will hardly come as a surprise to anyone, it does raise some questions regarding the value priorities and direction of the educational policy of the Community.

At the meeting of the European Council in May, 1990, the Council adopted a resolution on the integration of young children with handicaps in ordinary systems of education and committed itself to improving equality of opportunity for boys and girls in education; at meetings during the previous year it adopted measures to combat school failure, reduce regional disparities, provide appropriate training for disadvantaged children and equal access to high-quality education; and as far back as the 1976, and on a number of occasions since then, the Community pledged itself to deal with the problem of the education of migrant workers and their children. But where, in reality, does the Community stand on these issues, none of which is served by programs that are counted by Eurydice, the education information network of the Community, among the principal programs of the Community at this time? And where does the Community stand on the issue of the broader cultural education of students, be they early school leavers or university graduates, values that one traditionally associates with education in the European tradition?

A Nation at Risk was committed to the view that education ought to be shaped and measured by what it contributes to advancing the economic objectives of the state. Much the same can be said of the major educational programs of the European Community. Yet this does not faithfully reflect all of the policy stances adopted in the original expression of a Community educational policy by the Community in 1976, or in its many subsequent commitments on broader social issues involving equality and equity. Against this it might be argued that the individual states of the Community continue to retain overall responsibility in both policy and financial terms for education, and that they may be expected to attend to the broader aspects of education, thereby allowing the Community to encourage due attention to education for economic development. This would be a more defensible view if it were not for the fact that the programs that the Community has introduced and funded have a considerable impact on existing programs and state educational systems. Thus,
universities in all member states have reshaped programs to respond to the monies available under the ERASMUS and COMETT programs, and schools have sometimes found their students attracted away from conventional schooling by the financial inducements provided for participation in some Community-sponsored education and training ventures.

In recent times, there are signs that the Community is beginning to reflect more deeply on the issue of the harmonization of educational systems of the different member states, a matter which could not have been broached so readily when the original policy position of the Community was being framed. Independent commentary on the future of education in the Community has also begun to ask if we might see harmonization of effort even in so sensitive an area as curriculum. Any such discussions regarding increased co-operation and harmonization are probably the best place to address the question of balance to be maintained among the various educational objectives to be espoused by the Community and the interactions which inevitably emerge between existing state programs and newly introduced programs of the Community. But such discussions may also be the more fruitful if they were to take place as part of a broader reconsideration and updating of the overall educational policy of the Community.

Teaching the European Dimension

To raise the issues of increased harmonization and sensitivities in curriculum matters leads directly to the question of the promotion of the European dimension in education, an issue attracting more urgent attention of late. The Youth for Europe program, a program which enables young people aged between 15 and 25 to take part in a wide range of activities, thereby giving them opportunity through which it is intended that they will learn from each other about the social and cultural make-up of the Community and discover together the implications of a changing Europe, and ERASMUS itself, are examples of measures taken in this area. There are more specific moves afoot also, however.

Given the very rapid development of the European Community during its relatively short lifetime, and given in particular the aspiration to even greater integration among the member states in the future, it is hardly surprising that as a matter of urgency the Community has begun to look to the question of the education of Europeans, and in particular schoolgoers, in what it means to be a European in a way that did not hold true before, that is in the sense of being
something akin to a citizen of Europe as distinct from being a citizen of France or Italy. That this is being perceived as a task in civic education is clear from the debates and resolutions of the various official bodies that have considered it, including the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers of Education, and the European Council itself. That there is a determination to promote this objective is also clear, as can be seen from an extract to that effect which is taken from the Resolution of the Council and the Ministers of Education meeting within the Council on the European Dimension in Education adopted on May 24, 1988:

The purpose of this resolution is to strengthen the European dimension in education by launching a series of concerted measures for the period 1988 to 1991; these measures should help to:

-- Strengthen in young people a sense of European identity and make clear to them the value of European civilization and of the foundations on which the European peoples intend to base their development today, that is in particular the safeguarding of the principles of democracy, social justice, and respect for human rights (Copenhagen Declaration, 1978),
-- prepare young people to take part in the economic and social development of the Community and in making concrete progress towards European union, as stipulated in the European Single Act,
-- makes them aware of the advantages which the Community represents, but also of the challenges it involves, in opening up an enlarged economic and social area to them,
-- improve their knowledge of the Community and its Member States in their historical, cultural, economic, and social aspects and bring home to them the significance of the cooperation of the Member States of the European Community with other countries of Europe and the world.

The objectives adopted by the Council of Ministers in this resolution were not the first such objectives set forth or acted upon. Their adoption is part of a tradition promoted by the Council of Europe during the 1950s and 1960s, long before the Community demonstrated an interest in such matters. This interest did not emerge clearly in the Community until, following the appearance of the Janne Report in 1973, the Community’s Action Programme on Education was agreed in February 1976 by the Ministers of Education. Yet this Resolution of May 1988 does go further than was ever the case before: it calls for specific action and program reports at the level of both the member states and the European level in the Commission. The actions called for at the
member states level includes the incorporation of the European dimension in educational systems as well as school programs; the development of suitable teaching materials for this purpose; giving a greater emphasis to the European dimension in the initial and in-service education of teachers; promoting contacts between teachers and pupils from different countries; and arranging for other suitable promotional events such as seminars and international school sporting events. At the Community level the Resolution calls for the exchange of information between states; curriculum research and development projects; further contact among teachers of different countries through the use of existing programs such as the ARION program (a program of study visits for education specialists), the ERASMUS program, and through the institution of a European Summer University for teacher educators; and other appropriate measures.

It might appear from the expressed commitment of the European Commission and other European agencies, such as those from which I have quoted already, that Europe is making strides in civic education. The truth of the matter is otherwise, however, and it is this that was borne out by the broadly based findings of the 1989 Palermo seminar regarding the state of civic education in Europe. It is true that the reports of the member states dealing with the state of the teaching of the European dimension, which were the focus of discussion at the Palermo seminar, were commissioned before the Resolution of 1988; nonetheless, it is upon the existing state of affairs that they were reporting. What is also of interest are the differences to be found between the official statements of the member states of the Community regarding the state of teaching the European dimension in their schools and the statements of selected experts who compared those official statements with their own perceptions of the state of civic education in the different member states.

These points are well brought out by Raymond Ryba, who presented a paper at the seminar which consisted of a comparison of the official statements and the statements of the selected experts regarding the current state of teaching the European dimension in European schools. One of Ryba's conclusions pertains to the curriculum content employed to teach the European dimension. On this point he wrote:

... only a minority of countries refer explicitly to the provision of courses or modules devoted to the institutions of the Community and the manner in which they work. In general terms, the main emphasis in almost all the countries is on the provision of European content within traditional subject areas: learning about Europe rather than learning to be Europeans. How far what is done is different from, or more effective than the kind of European content which existed in national curricula before the foundation of the
European Community is far from clear.
Later he takes up this same point in regard to the provisions made for the education of teachers. Again, I quote:25

For the trainee Geography, History, and Civics teachers, the provision described, like that in the school curricula, appears to tend towards descriptive and traditional aspects. Thus, for example, in programmes of Geography, various aspects of Europe’s climatic zones, rivers and relief, and their relation to European activities, seem to be the kind of material offered. For the rest, there seems to be a touching faith, difficult to verify or justify, that exhortation to take account of the European Dimension in the training courses of all subjects will be sufficient to ensure that all that is necessary is done.

It is clear from his comments on the curricular offerings employed to promote the European dimension in Europe’s schools that Ryba has reservations regarding how effective they are likely to be in achieving their goals. Ryba, however, gives no reasons for these reservations. If we judge these offerings by the same standards some American educators apply to their own case we are readily presented with such reasons. Richard Pratte, for example, identifies three main areas of study which he considers essential to the cultivation of citizenship. One of these is history aimed at the development of historical perspective. Historical perspective he defines as gaining a knowledge of one’s own cultural traditions as well as the contribution of diverse societies over time. But while such understanding is necessary, it is not sufficient for civic education as understood by Pratte. In addition, civic education ought to promote the development of social-action skills and the reduction of ethnocentrism in students. By social-action skills Pratte means “the ability to confer, discuss, debate, argue, plan, negotiate, compromise, and so forth.” The development of such skills, he suggests, calls for a classroom that can offer a “rough epistemological equality,” an atmosphere in which freedom of speech is encouraged. The reduction of ethnocentrism, Pratte believes, permits a contribution from across the curriculum aimed at the promotion in students of a respect for cultural traditions and points of view other than their own.26

Whether one agrees or not with Pratte in his analysis, or with his threefold categorization of the goals of civic education, analyses of this kind do not interfere with official attitudes of the state of civic education in Europe. The existing courses being taught, the methods of teaching and approaches to teacher education, and the provision of materials were all broadly considered to be satisfactory. “In general terms,” Ryba says, “the official view in most member states appears to be that provision for the European Dimension in
Education in the curriculum is generally satisfactory." Having examined closely the official Irish report, I have found nothing there to entice me to disagree with Ryba's assessment.

Turning to Ryba's review of the statements of the selected experts which comment on the official reports, the views that come across are very different on most points from those presented in the official reports, a point that was borne out also in my own study of the Irish report. In general, the expert commentators are not satisfied that in their teaching of the European dimension the individual states have sufficiently grasped, if they have grasped at all, the essential difference between civic education aimed at promoting a sense of national identity—however suitable the methods of so doing may or may not be—and that of promoting a sense of European identity. Related to this point is the view that there has been a failure so far to develop a sufficiently clear and coherent account of what is meant by a European dimension in the first place. In the absence of that, and of a structure for incorporating it within school curricula of the member states, it is difficult to see how such a dimension can be satisfactorily taught in the schools. In the eyes of some the situation is compounded in practice by the difficulty of making space available in existing curricula in the various member states so as to allow more European oriented material into existing courses.

In defense of the efforts underway, it might be argued that the Community has anticipated the generally disappointing findings of the Palermo seminar and for that reason has attempted to step up provision for civic education through the measures adopted in the Resolution of 1988. It might also be added that other Community education projects, and ERASMUS in particular, is a practical way of developing a greater degree of European integration and community awareness.

Beyond 1992

In its relatively short lifetime, the European Community has shaped and begun to implement a responsive and developing educational policy addressing a range of pressing social and economic issues affecting the life of the Community. Up to now the emphasis has been upon promoting economic growth, integration, and community building—objectives which often go hand in hand. This can be seen in the emphasis on student mobility, language learning, and co-operation between education and industry. The persistent problem of unemployment has generated a range of programs which also have the dual objective of vocational training and a broadening of geographic, linguistic, and cultural horizons. The emphasis on teaching the European
dimension is clearly aimed at increased understanding of the Community itself and mutual understanding among fellow Europeans.

Prospects are strong that the more recently adopted areas of educational activity will continue to attract support and that some of the more established areas of activity, notably, the teaching of European languages and the promotion of cooperative links and exchanges between institutions of higher education will remain the focus of attention. Given the renewed attention which they have attracted it can also be anticipated that measures to combat school failure will feature more prominently, as will the use of the new information technologies. The future can also be expected to see increased efforts made to link up with the non-Community countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The strengthening of ties with other non-member states of the European Community, such as the Scandinavian countries, and with international organizations, such as the Council of Europe, are also likely to be high on the agenda of future involvements, as is the continuing concern to achieve final agreement on the mutual recognition of professional diplomas and the intensified measures to provide for the recognition and transfer of academic credit earned by students for academic work carried out in universities in different countries.

Unique features of the European Community's recent endeavors in education are the high degree of cooperation among the member states of the Community upon which they have been built, the emphasis upon promoting a sense of community through the focus upon teaching the European dimension, and the distinctive Community-wide character of the educational measures adopted. No less significant are the prospects for economic and social benefit to the Community that such cooperation and innovation are likely to create, even though it is too early yet to assess their lasting impact. It is not too early to say that, with the advent of 1992, education in Europe, and in the European Community in particular, has entered a new era. It is one that must surely hold interest for comparative scholars, and one that is likely in the economic sphere to lead to increased challenges to other world powers.

Notes

1. An exception to this is Guy Neave, *The EEC and Education* (Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books, 1984).
4. "ERASMUS: European Community Programme for the Development of
Student Mobility in the European Community,” Dossier in *Eurydice Info*, No. 6 (November 1988), pp. i-viii.

5. See “ECTS: European Community Course Credit Transfer System,” in *ATEE News*, No. 25 (September 1989), 14-15; and Fritz Dalichow, “European Community Course Credit Transfer System,” in *ATEE News*, No. 27 (March 1990), 4-5.


Training, and Youth, p. 3.


24. Ibid., p. 31.

25. Ibid., p. 33.


29. *Actes de Palerme*. 

52
Survival, Change, and Demands on America's Private Schools: Trends and Policies

By Bruce S. Cooper and Grace Dondero

Private schools have long served important functions in American education. They offer choice to families with limited options and for students otherwise forced to attend a public, nonsectarian school not to their liking. For inner-city children, the local private, parochial school is often the only alternative that is both accessible and within financial reach; furthermore, some research indicates that parochial high schools work better than public schools for low-income and minority students (Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, 1982; Devins, 1989; and see, arguing to the contrary, Crane and Rossell, 1989; see also Chubb and Moe, 1990, on the organizational effectiveness of private versus public schools).
For families seeking a religious education for their children, too, private schools may be the best singular choice, given the ever-stricter prohibitions against religious teachings and activity in public schools (see Gaffney, 1981). Furthermore, as some public school systems have become overly segregated, the parochial school may be a last opportunity for inner-city children to get an integrated, high-quality education. It was recently proposed that desegregation funds would be better spent paying the tuition of black children to attend integrated, neighborhood parochial schools than to bus these students to far-away public "magnet schools," many being not well integrated (Coons, 1991; Coons and Sugarman, 1981).

From a policy perspective, too, private schools are extremely useful. These schools embody many of the 1980s-style reforms (see Doyle, Cooper, and Trachtman, 1991) being attempted in the public sector: (1) A choice-driven, market-based system, now being introduced in some public systems, has always been the rule in the private sector where schools attract patrons or close their doors. (2) An emphasis on school-site control, now the policy in such public systems as New York City and Dade County-Miami, Florida, have prevailed in virtually all private schools; even the hierarchy of Roman Catholic dioceses grants enormous discretion to parochial school principals, long the envy of urban public school heads who must clear decisions with layers of "higher-ups." And (3) A drive toward a more diverse and responsive system, always the case among the many different types of private schools, is now being tried in public education, including such experiments as "magnet schools," "alternative schools," "education option schools," and even state-run residential schools.

Yet, for all their importance, private schools have until recently been all but ignored by public policymakers and policy analysts alike. Policymakers have, with a few important exceptions (see Vitullo-Martin and Cooper, 1987), excluded private schools from public support altogether, despite the crying need among many nonpublic schools for financial and technical help. While parochial and private schools serving low income students were guaranteed services in the Title I and Chapter 1 compensatory education laws, recent court decisions (see, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 1985) have prevented these programs from operating conveniently on the premises of parochial schools, reducing their accessibility and effectiveness.

Policy analysts, too, have often overlooked the important contribution of the private sector in education, ignoring the 12 percent of children attending private schools. Data as basic as the types, location, and number of nonpublic schools were mostly unknown, though the federal government in the last decade has moved effectively to correct earlier oversights. In the most recent estimates of 1990 school enrollment, for example, the National Center for Education
Statistics (1989) predicted the size of the private school sector, based on "a national probability sample of private school teachers, students, and graduates collected through a survey of state education agencies" (p. 1).

The government estimated that of the approximately 46.0 million students in the nation's elementary and secondary schools in 1989, 5.35 million or 12 percent attended nonpublic schools, up from 10 percent in 1979. While these findings are useful as a starting point, they fail to account for the incredible diversity of nonpublic schools. The government tends to lump private schools into rather broad, overly-inclusive categories, such as "other religious" and "nonsectarian" when considering such interesting private school types as evangelical Christian academies, Talmud-Torahs and Yeshivas, Old Order Mennonite schools, Greek Orthodox day schools, and the newest (but oldest and most original) form of education, the burgeoning "home schooling" movement. Although broad categories of data are useful as a starting point, additional analysis of private schools by type is necessary, if we are to analyze the importance and future of private education in the United States.

The Study

Private schools have become a major avenue of religious preference, academic choice, and a means for signalling dissatisfaction with local public schools, as part of the "exit, voice, and loyalty" calculus that clients undergo (see Hirschman, 1970). As such, the need for accurate, complete, and specific data on private education increases. Private schools, excellent barometers of change in American life, give insight into shifting needs, preferences, and tastes of parents in the nation. Furthermore, private school "values" (choice, diversity, competition, reduced bureaucratic structure and school-site decision-making, and responsiveness to clients) are now embraced by growing numbers of public schools, in the recent waves of reform and restructuring. Thus, private schools are a living laboratory of school reform, with applications to public education organization and management (see Chubb and Moe, 1989; Cooper, 1988).

This study follows two other surveys--one done in 1971 and the other in 1983 (see Nault, Erickson, and Cooper, 1976; Cooper, 1988; Cooper 1984; Cooper, McLaughlin, and Manno, 1983)--which tracked the condition of nonpublic schools from 1965 to 1990, a twenty-five year period. Not only can we analyze the current data on private schools (1989) in comparison to public education, but also benefit from nearly a quarter-century of trends and changes in the composition of the private school sector by type and sponsoring group.
A longitudinal perspective is critical in research on private and parochial schools, since most of these schools are intimately related to religious communitarian concerns, and thus act as bellwethers of changes in Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish life in the United States. We report data for three years, 1965-66, 1980-81, and most recently, 1988-89, for twenty-two different private school types.

This fine-grained analysis allows us to examine the great diversity of schools and the macro- and micro-trends among and within groups: the total private sector in education, Roman Catholic, religious/non-Catholic, non-affiliated, as well as denominational and sectarian differences. Besides the broad categories of Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish; religious and non-religious, we can report four kinds of Lutheran schools (Missouri Synod, American Lutheran Church, Wisconsin Synod, and Evangelical Lutheran); three types of Jewish day schools (Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform), a host of Protestant groups (evangelical, Seventh-day Adventist, Friends, Mennonite/Amish, and Calvinists, Greek Orthodox, etc.), and interesting non-religious schools (military, independent, Montessori, special education, and "home education").

Put together, we get a snapshot of school and community life in the United States, in a way that many scholars and practitioners of education have only recently appreciated. We also include data on public schools, giving trends on all school-age children between 1965 and 1990—a basis of comparison between the public and private school sectors.

We became aware, starting with our 1965 analysis, that American private schools were struggling to hold down costs and keep quality high, raise salaries, maintain facilities, and meet changing needs and demands in a market where public schools were "free" to clients, if not to taxpayers. In the absence of only basic public support (tax-free status, some free textbooks and remedial services, transportation where available), private and parochial schools faced tough sledding. In fact, the nation's largest parochial school group, the Roman Catholic schools, peaked in 1964, the year before our first survey, at 5.66 million pupils, (more student enrollments than in all types of nonpublic schools combined in 1990), and have declined ever since. Other types have grown, in some cases dramatically and remarkably, though almost every private school works hard to make ends meet. It's the old story: if one shop is giving away a service, free, and another is charging the real cost of the product, the one charging a fee must be much better—and work much harder.

Hence, a theme of this paper is survival, the difficulties faced by private, fee-for-service schools, as they struggle to compete with more choice-oriented, competitive (tuition-free) public schools. An irony in this paper is: The more like private schools that our nation's public schools behave, the more competitive the public schools become and the more private schools lose students and
resources. Except for the Roman Catholic schools, the nation's largest nonpublic type, most other private schools are continuing to grow and compete successfully, though the struggle continues.

Methodology

The search for private schools has posed problems for researchers for over thirty years, since many schools were operating without reporting to government authorities or to their own church leaders. Since 1970, furthermore, two new types of nonpublic education—evangelical Christian academies and home schooling—have grown extensively, both of which defy easy tabulation. Thus, research on private education is hampered by the very nature of some types of schools.

Three sources for private schools are used in gathering such data:

1. Local and State Education Agencies: State departments of education and local school districts bear the legal burden of educating all children of compulsory school age, and thus are attentive to private schools. However, the laws vary state to state, and local districts in many cases have little interest in keeping up with children living there who attend a nonpublic school (perhaps in a different district). States are good sources of information as a starting point, though research has shown that a number of students go unaccounted for—and their data are not complete (see Cooper, 1984).

2. National Sampling: The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) has worked hard in the last six years to maintain a data base of nonpublic schools in the United States. Using a sophisticated sampling procedure, the NCES is able to project enrollment trends, as well as other data (teachers, graduates, grade levels etc.) from a sub-sample of schools in sample counties.

In particular, the Center mailed questionnaires to 1,169 schools drawn from the universe of some 27,000 nonpublic schools, of which 986 responded. From this group, a smaller sample of 523 schools, based on area frames set up by the Census Bureau for 75 Primary Sampling Units (which roughly correspond to sample counties), became the basis of a stratified sample for the Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS). A standard error was calculated for non-responding schools, allowing estimates of school enrollment to occur at a 95 percent confidence level, plus or minus 11,830.9 students.

While this method is useful for estimating national enrollment trends, it suffers from the imprecision of any weighted projection model; second, it cannot account for the vast differences among types of schools, lumping them
into very broad categories; third, it lacks the longitudinal perspective necessary to plot changes over decades; and fourth, the survey did not include students in home schooling, the fastest growing type of education in the United States (Moore and Moore, 1989; Ray, 1989, 1988; Mayberry, 1988; Lines, 1991).

3. Direct Sampling of Schools and Organizations: We used a mixed sampling process, appropriate to the group or type of school being measured. In some cases, we had the names of all the schools, and their enrollment (Roman Catholic, Calvinist, Conservative Jewish, Quaker); in other situations, we used the data gathered by the national and regional associations of the groups. And where no national or regional groups existed, we consulted experts in that field of education.

Presenting the greatest challenge are evangelical Christian schools, which belong to a range of organizations or none, and home schools, which are mainly unaffiliated. Here, we consulted experts, as well as other surveys. Most experts agree that almost a million children are enrolled in the nearly 8,000 fundamentalist Christian schools across the nation, while home schooling figures range from 150,000 to over a half-million.

In all, then, we used a mixed approach to gathering the information, appropriate to the type of private school. For the larger denominations, we accessed their national data banks (e.g., the National Catholic Education Association, the National Association of Independent Schools). For smaller groups, we depended on their offices, from which we often received a complete listing of the universe of their schools (Reform Jewish, Greek Orthodox, Military Schools), plus information from the state departments of education. These data were then compared to those from the National Center for Education Statistics, plus our own data bases from 1971 and 1983.

Other sources of data are also possible, including the 1990 census, which could learn where children are attending school. Perhaps with continued effort, the state and federal governments will perfect their data gather procedures.

Macro-Trends

According to our 1989 survey, some 5.31 million children attend the 27,263 private elementary and secondary schools in the United States. When compared to the some 41 million students in public schools, the private sector now comprises about 12 percent of the nation's students.

As shown in Table 1, private school enrollments dropped by 17 percent, from 6.39 million students in 1965 to 5.31 million in 1989. However, when
longitudinal data are considered, as in Figure 1, we see in fact that private school enrollments dipped from 6.36 million to 4.87 million between 1965 and 1980, but by 1989 had returned to 5.3 million, for a nine-year recovery of about 9 percent.

And the number of nonpublic schools dropped during the 24-year period even more dramatically, by 21 percent: from 34,642 to 27,263 schools, as shown in Table 1, row 2. Between 1980 and 1989, however, the number of private schools actually increased, from 23,452 to 27,263, or a 16 percent jump in nine years. This drop, dip, and return contrasts with the public school pattern, which showed an increase from 36 million students in 1965 to 41.6 million in 1980 (+14 percent) with a slight decline to 41.1 million by 1989. See Table 1, row 3. The percent of private school students, of the nation’s total school population, changed significantly: from 15 percent in 1965, to 10.5 percent in 1980, to 13 percent in 1989.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trends in Private and Public Schools, 1965-1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Private School Enrollment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965  6,369,807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980  4,875,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989  5,311,624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change                                  -17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Number of Private Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965  34,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980  23,452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989  27,263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change                                  -21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Public School Enrollment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965  36,076,241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980  41,645,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989  41,123,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change                                  +14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Roman Catholic Enrollment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965  5,574,354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980  3,106,378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989  2,551,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change                                  -54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Religious School Enrollment (Non-Catholic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965  595,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980  1,352,139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989  1,864,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change                                  +213%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Total Enrollment in Religious Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965  6,170,353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980  4,458,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989  4,415,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change                                  -28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Total Enrollment in Private Non-Religious Schools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965  199,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980  417,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989  915,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Change                                  +358%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Center for Education Statistics, 1990
Catholic Schools: These aggregate figures mask, however, a major shift in the composition of private education in the United States. For between 1965 and 1989, Catholic school enrollments dropped by nearly half (-54 percent), while other religious schools grew by +213 percent and non-religiously affiliated schools jumped +358 percent (see Table I, rows 5 and 7).

Figure 1 also shows the trends, with the dotted line indicating steady growth and recent leveling off among non-Catholic private school pupils, while Catholic enrollments (the double line) declined sharply between 1965 and 1975 and less precipitously since then.

Importantly, too, the decline in Catholic school pupils had a direct and parallel effect on overall private school enrollments (the single line), until the mid-1970s when non-Catholic private school pupils began to take effect. Between 1980 and 1985, in fact, overall enrollments pulled up faster than Catholic school enrollments drooped. The late 1980s, however, saw an overall decline of less than 300,000 total, as we shall later discuss.

Hence, this period has witnessed a major social change in American education, which the aggregate data disguise. As shown in Table I, row 4, the Catholic schools in 1965 had 5.57 million pupils, more than the combined enrollment of all types of private schools today. In fact, 90 percent of all children in nonpublic schools were attending schools affiliated with the Catholic church. It was no wonder, then, in the 1960s and earlier that when one thought "private" school, one assumed "Catholic!" In 1964 (see Table 2), the high watermark in Catholic school enrollment, these schools had a whopping 5.66 million children in 13,296 different facilities.

Since 1964, however, the number of Catholic schools and students has dropped steadily: between 1965 and 1989, for example, enrollments plummeted 54 percent, from 5.57 million to 2.55 million, and the trend continues into 1990. The number of schools, too, declined, as schools closed or "merged," a slip from 13,292 schools in 1965-66 to 8,867 in 1988-89, or a one-third drop. This is in contrast to decades earlier, when between 1880 (405,234 students; 2,246 schools) and 1950, the growth was steady, except for a slight slip during the Depression years (1930s) as shown in Table 2.

The period of greatest growth was the 1950s, when the Catholic community helped to absorb the "post-war baby boomers," with a jump from 3.06 million students (and 10,778 schools) to 5.28 million pupils, but only 10,892 schools, indicating a use of the "excess capacity" in existing schools that accumulated during the Depression period and World War II.

Reasons for the decline in Catholic schools and students are many, complex, and interesting. In part, the Catholic community's primary need for separate schools--prejudice, hatred, and rejection--has let up, as this group has assimilated (see Buetow, 1970, for a history of Catholic education).
Figure 1

Private School Enrollments by Group, 1965/66-1988/89

ENROLLMENT:

- Total Private School Enrollment
- Catholic School Enrollment
- Non-Catholic School Enrollment
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pupil Enrollment</th>
<th>Elementary Pupils</th>
<th>Secondary Pupils</th>
<th>Change from Previous</th>
<th>Number of Schools</th>
<th>Elementary Schools</th>
<th>Secondary Schools</th>
<th>Change from Previous</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>405,234</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,246</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>+68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>633,238</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+56%</td>
<td>3,931</td>
<td>3,194</td>
<td>1,737</td>
<td>+28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>854,523</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+45%</td>
<td>5,012</td>
<td>3,811</td>
<td>1,201</td>
<td>+48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,237,250</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+35%</td>
<td>7,405</td>
<td>5,856</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>+9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1,925,616</td>
<td>1,795,700</td>
<td>129,916</td>
<td>+56%</td>
<td>10,046</td>
<td>7,923</td>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,464,522</td>
<td>2,222,600</td>
<td>241,921</td>
<td>+28%</td>
<td>10,046</td>
<td>7,923</td>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2,396,329</td>
<td>2,035,200</td>
<td>361,129</td>
<td>-3%</td>
<td>10,046</td>
<td>7,923</td>
<td>2,123</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3,066,419</td>
<td>2,560,819</td>
<td>505,600</td>
<td>+28%</td>
<td>10,778</td>
<td>7,444</td>
<td>3,334</td>
<td>+48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>5,288,705</td>
<td>4,373,403</td>
<td>915,302</td>
<td>+72%</td>
<td>10,892</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>5,662,328*</td>
<td>4,505,620*</td>
<td>1,066,740</td>
<td>+7%</td>
<td>13,296*</td>
<td>10,879*</td>
<td>2,417*</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>5,574,354</td>
<td>4,492,100</td>
<td>1,082,254*</td>
<td>-1%</td>
<td>13,292</td>
<td>10,879</td>
<td>2,414</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,363,600</td>
<td>3,355,500</td>
<td>1,008,100</td>
<td>-22%</td>
<td>11,262</td>
<td>9,307</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3,415,000</td>
<td>2,525,000</td>
<td>890,000</td>
<td>-0.001%</td>
<td>9,993</td>
<td>8,340</td>
<td>1,653</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>3,106,378</td>
<td>2,269,300</td>
<td>837,000</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>9,560</td>
<td>8,043</td>
<td>1,516</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>3,094,521</td>
<td>2,266,432</td>
<td>828,089</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>9,494</td>
<td>7,996</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3,027,312</td>
<td>2,225,289</td>
<td>801,023</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
<td>9,423</td>
<td>7,950</td>
<td>1,464</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,953,210</td>
<td>2,180,160</td>
<td>784,049</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>9,401</td>
<td>7,937</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>2,902,008</td>
<td>2,120,008</td>
<td>782,000</td>
<td>-2.2%</td>
<td>9,340</td>
<td>7,891</td>
<td>1,444</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>2,816,787</td>
<td>2,056,419</td>
<td>760,368</td>
<td>-2.9%</td>
<td>9,219</td>
<td>7,789</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>2,726,004</td>
<td>1,998,584</td>
<td>727,420</td>
<td>-3.2%</td>
<td>9,102</td>
<td>7,693</td>
<td>1,409</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>2,623,031</td>
<td>1,942,148</td>
<td>680,883</td>
<td>-3.8%</td>
<td>8,912</td>
<td>7,601</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>2,551,119</td>
<td>1,911,911</td>
<td>639,208</td>
<td>-2.7%</td>
<td>8,867</td>
<td>7,505</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2,498,870</td>
<td>1,892,913</td>
<td>605,957</td>
<td>-2%</td>
<td>8,719</td>
<td>7,395</td>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Peak amount for enrollment or number of schools.
The "barricade mentality" that spurred the bishops to vow a Catholic school for every Catholic child gave way to a willingness to attend public schools. Relatedly, the structure of the Catholic community changed in the 1960s and 1970s: no longer did Catholics live mainly in urban communities surrounding the parish church and parochial school. With their new-found affluence, they could afford to move to the suburbs, though most of the Catholics schools did not (see Greeley, McCready, and McCourt, 1976). As the number of Catholic children in parochial schools declined, diocesan and parish leaders were divided over their loyalty to the parochial schools (which enrolled only 10 percent of Catholic children) and commitment to more general "parish education."

The rising costs of maintaining these schools, the growing numbers of non-Catholics attending, and the precipitous decline in teaching "religious" (sisters, brothers, and priests) increased pressures to close or merge ailing schools. Some parents even argued that with so few teachers from religious orders, the growing likelihood of a lay principal, an increasingly non-Catholic student body, and the loss of an immediate Catholic community, why spend the money? Why not attend a public school?, some asked. Whatever the reason, the percentage of Catholic school students (as a part of the total enrollment in nonpublic schools generally) declined from 87 percent in 1965 to 48 percent in 1989. And most recently, the general down-turn in the economy has affected urban Catholic schools, as it has all education. Dioceses simply have less money to support parochial schools.

Other Religious Schools: While the total private school enrollment dipped by 17 percent and Catholic school enrollment by 54 percent, other religiously-affiliated schools showed remarkable expansion, from around 0.6 million in 1965 to 1.86 million in 1989, a leap of 213 percent in 24 years. Even more astounding is the number of non-Catholic, religious schools, reaching 14,591 by 1989, in comparison to the 8,867 Catholic schools. It becomes obvious that the non-Catholic religious schools are smaller in size, since over 14 thousand schools enroll only 1.86 million students, while over 8.8 thousand Catholic schools contained 2.55 million pupils in 1989.

These changes signal something important about American private education: its great religious diversity. Non-Catholic religious school categories number some 16 religious denominations, sects, and churches, reflecting the mix of religious choice and opportunity in the country. As shown in Table 4, we see four Lutheran groups, three Jewish sects, and a whole set of Protestant groups: Seventh-day Adventists, Episcopal, Greek Orthodox, Quakers, Mennonite-Amish, Calvinists, Evangelical, and Assembly of God schools.
### Table 3

U. S. Lutheran Schools by Type and Level: 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lutheran Church,</th>
<th>Elementary Schools/Pupils</th>
<th>Secondary Schools/Pupils</th>
<th>Total Schools/Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Missouri Synod</td>
<td>1542 181,666</td>
<td>61 16,493</td>
<td>1603 198,061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Lutheran Church</td>
<td>374 31,284</td>
<td>2 333</td>
<td>376 31,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Church</td>
<td>372 31,126</td>
<td>18 4,414</td>
<td>390 35,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Church in America</td>
<td>40 8,555</td>
<td>6 813</td>
<td>46 9,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association of Evangelical Lutheran Church</td>
<td>21 4,296</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>21 4,296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical Lutheran Synod</td>
<td>16 848</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>16 848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of the Lutheran Confession</td>
<td>19 517</td>
<td>2 28</td>
<td>21 545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of the Lutheran Brethren</td>
<td>3 106</td>
<td>1 113</td>
<td>7 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Protestant Conference (Lutheran) Inc.</td>
<td>3 65</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>3 65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals by Category

2390 181,568
90 22,194
2480 280,529

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Enroll.</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Percentage Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>5,574,354</td>
<td>3,106,378</td>
<td>-54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amer. Lutheran</td>
<td>8,795</td>
<td>5,111</td>
<td>-33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri Synod</td>
<td>171,966</td>
<td>10,546</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evan. Lutheran</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wis. Evan. Luth.</td>
<td>27,448</td>
<td>114,980</td>
<td>+35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutheran Totals</td>
<td>208,209</td>
<td>245,812</td>
<td>+44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox Jewish</td>
<td>68,600</td>
<td>84,201</td>
<td>+45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conserv. Jewish</td>
<td>3,489</td>
<td>3,622</td>
<td>+341%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform Jewish</td>
<td>823</td>
<td>1,431</td>
<td>+22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish Totals</td>
<td>73,112</td>
<td>96,173</td>
<td>+33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Day Advent</td>
<td>64,252</td>
<td>74,615</td>
<td>+29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep. (NAIS)</td>
<td>199,329</td>
<td>197,538</td>
<td>+232%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Episcopal</td>
<td>50,437</td>
<td>4,911</td>
<td>+77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek Orthodox</td>
<td>2,205</td>
<td>13,303</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc. of Friends</td>
<td>10,878</td>
<td>13,864</td>
<td>+208%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mennonite</td>
<td>13,256</td>
<td>9,705</td>
<td>+208%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Educ.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>101,213</td>
<td>+398%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>12,117</td>
<td>+336%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12,117</td>
<td>+256%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calvinist</td>
<td>51,240</td>
<td>87,215</td>
<td>+208%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>110,300</td>
<td>985,431</td>
<td>+238%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly of God</td>
<td>3,110</td>
<td>18,815</td>
<td>+238%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montessori</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>+238%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Schooling</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+238%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>6,369,807</td>
<td>5,330,982</td>
<td>+238%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The American Lutheran Church has merged with the Evangelical Lutheran Church. The data representing the merger are included in the entries for the Evangelical Lutheran Church.*
Among these groups, the Evangelical and Fundamentalist Christian schools have grown by nearly eight-hundred percent (793 percent) in 24 years and Assembly of God school by 1,814 percent, with sizeable increases amongst the Episcopal (232 percent), Conservative Jewish (241 percent), Reform Jewish (340 percent), Mennonite/Amish (170 percent), and Greek Orthodox (112 percent) school enrollments. In fact, except for the Catholic schools, all other groups witnessed increases, from slight (Seventh-day Adventist with 4 percent) to extensive overall rises between 1965 and 1989.

However, data from the decade of the 1980s show a different profile. Catholic declines tended to level off a bit, with only an 18 percent drop in enrollment and 7 percent decline in school closings. Seventh-day Adventist (-11 percent enrollment, -11 percent fewer schools), Greek Orthodox (-2 percent drop in enrollment, 15 percent increase in schools), and Friends (Quaker; -2 percent enrollment, but 20 percent more schools) enrollments dropped but numbers of schools sometimes rose.

Non-religious private schools, while a smaller sector (see Table 1, row 7), increased from 199,454 pupils in 1965 to 915,106 in 1989, a 358 percent increase. Unlike the religious schools, however, this category saw significant increases in the 1980s, from 417,108 to 915,106, or almost 100 percent in nine years, while the non-Catholic religious schools, recall, went from 1.3 to 1.8 million in the same period, a 38 percent climb.

As shown in Table 4, the home schooling category is quite large and new --from a type of "schooling" hardly recognized by government or researcher, to a major form of private education. Alternative schools increased from virtually nothing to about 8,000 students; and the independent schools (preparatory, boarding, etc.) went from 199,329 students in 697 schools to 355,045 students in 893 schools--a 78 percent growth in pupils and 28 percent gain in number of schools. Some 300,000 students attend special private schools for various handicapping conditions, though exact data are not available since 1965.

At least one type of non-religiously affiliated school, the military academy, saw a decline since 1965, though we have limited data. In part, a number of these schools changed categories, becoming "civilian" independent schools, giving up their military characteristics (a commandant, uniforms, ranks), though a number have closed as well.

In all, then, the macro-trends are informative. First, the drop in the nation's largest private school group, the Roman Catholic schools, has a major impact on the nonpublic sector. For example, when we factor the Catholic schools into the overall religious school sector (see Table 1, row 6), the Catholic school decline is so large that it affects not only the total private school curve (-17 percent) but also the religious school statistics (-28 percent). So while...
public school enrollments rose by 14 percent (from 36 million in 1965 to 41 million in 1989), private school membership slid by 17 percent. Remove the Catholic school data, however, and the changes were positive: from some 800,000 to 2.78 million, a total increase of 287 percent in 24 years.

Second, the growth has been in smaller schools associated with various religious communities, including the Evangelical Protestant churches. These schools are located in virtually every community in the nation (see Cooper, 1988, pp. 36-37, for a state-by-state analysis of private schools), shifting private education from the mainly urban, industrial states of the East, Great Lakes, and Far West, to the hinterlands, small towns, and rural states, not usually associated with parochial and private education. The popularization of private education, as we shall discuss at the end of this paper, has important implications for the politics of public as well as private schools.

**Micro-Trends**

Within groups and affiliations, too, private schools have come of age. Examination of some of the specific trends is useful, since the diversity, complexity, and the "privateness" of private schools have changed. This section examines the trends by group and within groups, since the mix of nonpublic education is constantly changing.

In effect, private education prior to the 1960s was mainly Roman Catholic, big city, and affiliated with local dioceses. By the 1980s, a more diverse group of parents, from different religious groups and backgrounds, were seeking nonpublic education for their children--a revolution in the willingness of families to go local, private, and small. Parents relied on the institutions they knew best: their home, community, and church, chapel, or synagogue to meet specific needs of their children. While parents in the 1950s and earlier tended to trust the public schools, or the larger, mainstream diocesan private schools, by the 1970s and into the 1980s, families were just as willing to keep their children home, or put them in a school at church or synagogue. And the demand for academic excellence, particularly among the middle and upper class families, continued to mean demands for independent schools, which grew by 78 percent in the 24 years under study.

Private schools, then, reflected the micro-trends in society: smaller families, more resources, and greater attention to the values and needs of the family--and less reliance on the "given" institutions. Four mini-trends deserve further consideration:

1. Lutheran: Taken together, Lutheran schools comprise the second largest...
religious school group organized by a national church. In fact, the Lutheran synods have operated schools since the 1600s, as immigrants from Sweden, Germany, Holland, Norway, and Austria settled on the continent (see Beck, 1963), a system of private schools that has grown steadily since 1965. (Note: Evangelical Christian schools are more numerous and have more students, but they are diverse, and autonomous, whereas various sects of Lutheran schools are nationally affiliated. Local evangelical/fundamentalist Christian academies, however, have only limited relationship to any national church, though they do join such groups as Association of Christian Schools International.)

In 1965, Lutherans had 208,209 pupils in 1,750 schools; by 1989, enrollments grew 44 percent to 299,502 students, with a 61 percent rise in number of schools (2,825). See Table 3, second row. The diversity of Lutheran school groups is interesting, too, with the newly merged Evangelical Lutheran Church (a union of the American Lutheran Church and the Lutheran Church in America). Smaller groups include the Wisconsin Evangelical Lutherans, Church of the Lutheran Confession, and Church of the Lutheran Brethren, though these groups have only a few schools (see Table 4 for the 1983 data by group). Most active are the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod schools, which have 228,865 students in 1,978 schools, out of a total Lutheran school enrollment of 299,502 students in all types of Lutheran schools (2,925).

2. Jewish Day Schools: American Jews have long been staunch supporters of the public school. Yet, changes in the make-up of the Jewish community and the perception in some places that the public schools are failing have led to both the expansion of types of Jewish day schools and the growth of the sector as a whole. For the first time, Jewish communities from orthodox to liberal are using Jewish day schools, in addition to the “supplemental” schools (meeting in the late afternoons and Sundays) which serve the largest percentage of Jewish children (see Himmelfarb, 1990, 1989; Schiff, 1966, 1974; Dubb and Della Pergola, 1986).

Even the Reform Jewish movement acknowledged the importance of Jewish day schools, which have grown in number from five in 1965 to twelve Reformed day schools in 1989 (+140 percent); and now, officially, the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, their national association, helps congregations to start such schools. See Table 4, row 8. Between 1965 and 1989, enrollment grew by 340 percent in Reform day schools, from 825 pupils to 3,622. Conservative day schools, often named Solomon Schechter Schools after the late president of Jewish Theological Seminary, have also increased in number and enrollment, from 19 schools and 3,489 students in 1965, to 11,918 students in 58 schools in 1989—a jump of 241 percent in students, and 205 percent in schools in 24 years.

The schools of the orthodox Jewish community, by far the largest segment,
have grown, bolstered by the increased interest in Jewish education and values and since the 1950s by the arrival of ultra-orthodox ("chasidic") groups from Europe, which insist that all their children attend single-sex Jewish schools (see Himmelfarb, 1991). Since 1965, the "yeshivot" and Talmud-Torahs increased from 321 schools, with 68,800 pupils, to 515 schools and 99,440 pupils, an increase of 45 percent in enrollment and 60 percent in new schools.

Together, Jewish schools have reached nearly 115,000 students and 585 schools—a steady growth pattern of 57 percent more students and 70 percent more schools in 24 years. The increase in the 1980s has been steady as well, showing 20 percent more students in 8 percent more schools between 1980 and 1989. These trends indicate a growing interest among American Jews in improved religious identity and education, and a commitment amongst Jewish communities to support day schools through local Jewish charities (the United Jewish Appeal or Federation of Jewish Charities).

However, the cost of maintaining these schools has also risen, particularly for the Orthodox schools and their large families (artificial birth control and abortion are forbidden). No Jewish child is turned away from these schools for lack of resources—placing an additional burden on them. A need for funds has brought some Jewish organizations to support various forms of aid to private education (e.g., through lobbying efforts of Agudath Israel of America and others), a change from traditional Jewish opposition to diverting any public money from public schools.

3. Fundamentalist Christian Schools: Perhaps the most remarkable new group of private schools in the United States are those run by local evangelical Christian churches and communities—remarkable because of their vitality and what they tell us about changes in American religious life (see Neuhaus, 1985; Carper and Weston, 1990). As James C. Carper explains,

When evangelicals and fundamentalists establish and support Christian day schools, which emphasize the Bible, moral absolutes, basic subject matter mastery, spiritual growth, and varying degrees of separation from the contemporary culture, they are expressing not only profound dissatisfaction with the official agnosticism of public education, unsatisfactory academic and behavior standards, and education decision-making by agencies not accountable to the public, but also disillusion with the society that sustains the public school enterprise (Carper, 1990, p. 2).

The growth of these schools has surpassed anything this nation has seen of late. For, these Christian families were long the bulwark of the local public schools, and their leaving is an important message. During the 1980s, a Christian school seemed to open every day. From an enrollment of 110,300 in
1965, these schools mushroomed to 985,431 by 1989, in 7,851 schools, in every community of any size in America. Evangelical Christian schools have ideal characteristics for rapid growth and expansion:

1) Parental concerns: The U.S. courts and local public school authorities did much to upset Christian families in virtually every community in America. Prohibiting prayer in schools, teaching evolution, and the general perception of falling morals and academic quality combined to spur families to go it on their own (Pfeffer, 1977).

2) Local control: Each school opened and operated independently, usually sponsored by a church or chapel; hence, schools did not need permission or direction from a central agency, such as diocese, to begin. Since most fundamentalist churches are fiercely autonomous, eschewing contact with government, the founders of the school felt accountable only to their parents and community, giving them enormous freedom to act.

3) Small size: Schools opened with as few as five pupils, often in a church basement; no need to recruit widely or buy a building. Christian schools are still small, by most standards, which allow them to operate economically in small spaces without expensive administration and facilities.

4) Readily available curriculum: Programmed texts, using Christian themes (1 Disciple + 1 Disciple = X ?), were readily available, from groups such as Accelerated Christian Education (ACE), a company specializing in programmed textbooks in academic subjects, with Christian themes, which made a school curriculum and teacher partly unnecessary.

Thus, a small group of parents, a pastor or two, and a few interested helpers could open a Christian school in a church, set up desks, bring in the students, open the boxes from ACE, hold a prayer service, and a school was born. In fact, these schools grew 800 percent in 24 years, though the trend has slowed of late. Between 1980 and 1989, enrollments increased by 30 percent (still a strong show) and the number of schools by 5 percent (though a number of schools closed while new ones opened; the 5 percent is the net increase in the 9 years). The slow down is to be expected, at some point. Evidence shows that a number of evangelical Christian families are doing "home education," believing that the best way to bring up a Christian child is in a Christian home. New, smaller academies tend to open and close; families move on; interests change—though no exact data on the longevity of these schools are readily available. Also, families give up, finding the struggle to keep a new private school alive overwhelming, and return to the public schools (particularly at the upper grades).

In all, however, the rise of the evangelical Christian school has important implications for life in the late 20th century. Perhaps more than any other, these schools signal the popularization and universality of nonpublic education,
since virtually every community all across the nation has these schools. Educators and policy-makers alike must take the parents' concerns seriously, since these families have long been the bedrock of local government and public education.

4. Home Schooling: Perhaps the ultimate in "privatization" of education, educating at home, is now the "school" of choice for an increasing number of parents. Exact data on home schools are not available, though we have estimated, conservatively, 220,000, well below the numbers offered by the National Center for Education Statistics and home school organizations and networks. Some postulate that almost one million students are being educated at home, though this number seems high given earlier statistics. Further, few districts and states even try to account for all home schooled children--since families move in and out of formal schools throughout the child's career in education.

States vary, too, as to the strictures on home schooling. Some require parents to present a plan and prove that the home can handle the task of education as well as the school. Some hardly bother, and parents go undetected, particularly if they never register their children in a public system to start with. Since nationally 22 percent of students change schools every year anyway, withdrawal for home education may be attributed to "moving residence" or changing schools.

We know little about the long-term home schooling effort, though we do know that "parents do come back." Hence, a number of Christian academies offer to "consult" with evangelical parents, and help them set up their home lessons, knowing that in a few months or years, the children will return to the fold (the evangelical school). A few outstanding, moving cases (see Huebner, 1990) show the impact of withdrawing from the institutional life of school and entering the supportive environment of the home. Research seems to show good results, though much is yet to learned.

Summary

Private education in the United States presents a complex, fascinating picture of changes in schooling, religious life, and parental expectations over the 24 years being studied. Clearly, the private school enterprise is alive, vital, growing, changing, and in some cases declining. Like any communal and market-driven activity, the slightest change in consumer preference can be seen in the data--if enough information is available.

For example, who could have predicted the withdrawal of thousands of
fundamentalist Christian children from local public schools? And, more unlikely, who could foresee withdrawal of many Christian families out of those academies and into home education? Who would have thought American Jews, the ideal case of public school beneficiaries (through “upward mobility” and the “melting pot” using public education as fuel), would now be supporting their own schools (one out of nine Jewish children in America is now in a Jewish day school), from ultra-orthodox to liberal and progressive?

And importantly, the very distribution and function of private schools has changed in the United States in a quarter century. In 1964, “private school” mainly meant Catholic school: 90 percent of the children, 80 percent of the schools, most of the activity, teachers, and recognition. By 1989, however, the Catholic school effort had come on hard times, over half the numbers were no longer attending, and the bishops, priests, and laypeople were struggling to keep these schools going in many communities. But while this sector declined, the other religious and non-religious groups came on strong—with incredible work, energy, and strength.

Figure 1 and Table 5 show the 24-year change in the makeup of American private education. The drop from 1965 to 1975 was most dramatic, as enrollments went from 6.36 million to 4.6 million students. By 1980, the non-Catholic/private enrollments began to rise, as the Catholic school slope leveled off a bit. Between 1980 and 1986, we saw another slight rise, only to decline again slightly by 1989. The most recent trend (1985 to 1989) appears to show a leveling off of the non-Catholic school increase matched by a slight leveling of the Catholic decrease.

The “mix” has clearly changed, with Catholic school children now in the minority among nonpublic school students. Hence, what was once an urban, ethnic, immigrant, and seaport activity (New York, Chicago, Boston, Philadelphia, Detroit, Cleveland) has now become a mainstream, main-street, inland, upland, small town, Protestant effort. Private schools are everywhere!

Private schools are not secure, however. Besides a 17 percent decline in students and 21 percent in schools, we see an interesting trend in the 1980s. Catholic school decline has slowed, to -18 percent in pupils and -7 percent in schools in the last nine years. And other groups, too, appear to be losing ground slowly. Seventh-day Adventists, for example, saw a slight drop (see Table 4, row 9). Greek Orthodox, too, lost pupils (-12 percent enrollments). Quakers, too, though only a tiny bit (-2 percent).

The struggle to keep going for many schools, against escalating costs and growing public school competition, may be taking its toll. Any hope of public assistance has dimmed in the 1980s, despite the Republican Party’s commitment to various forms of public funding for private schools (tax credits, parent grants or vouchers, and Chapter 1 mini-vouchers for low income students).
Table 5
Changing Patterns of U. S. Private School Enrollments, 1965-1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1965-66</th>
<th>1980-81</th>
<th>1988-89</th>
<th>% change</th>
<th>% change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1965-88</td>
<td>1980-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>5,574,354</td>
<td>3,106,378</td>
<td>2,551,119</td>
<td>-54%</td>
<td>-18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Schools (Non-Catholic)</td>
<td>595,999</td>
<td>1,352,139</td>
<td>1,864,757</td>
<td>+213%</td>
<td>+38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Religious Schools</td>
<td>6,170,353</td>
<td>4,458,517</td>
<td>4,415,876</td>
<td>-28%</td>
<td>-1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Religious Affiliation</td>
<td>199,454</td>
<td>417,108</td>
<td>915,106</td>
<td>+358%</td>
<td>+120%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Private School Enrollment</td>
<td>6,369,807</td>
<td>4,875,625</td>
<td>5,330,982</td>
<td>-16%</td>
<td>+9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With growing public debts and deficits in Washington, the states, and local levels, even public schools will be hard pressed to get new funds, much less private and parochial schools. With few exceptions (the Minnesota tax deduction program), no new money is coming and, in fact, private schools will struggle to hold on to federally-guaranteed programs such as Chapter 1, which have now moved “off site.”

It appears, then, that private schools will remain just that, private. They will survive on their own devices, meeting or failing to meet the needs of parents. What our data show, clearly, is the incredible diversity, adaptability, and resiliency of private schools. As models of education, nonpublic schools continue to be responsive, changing, and dynamic, though always fragile, in striving to meet the changing needs of America’s families.
Note

1. Data were readily available for Catholic schools in 1990, but not for other groups. Hence, Table 2 shows the continued decline by -2 percent in students and -1.7 percent in schools in this category between 1989 and 1990, continuing a 26-year trend, a -56 percent decline between 1965 and 1990, according to the National Catholic Education Association (1990).

References


COOPER and DONDERO


The Politics of Teacher Authority

By Paul Farber

What part do teachers play in the politics of education? Historically marginalized in debates about aims and policy in education, some teachers struggle for a voice in these debates. This is surely important, but however that struggle proceeds, teachers do have a voice in what happens in their own classrooms, and therefore it matters how they conceive of and exercise their authority in practice. Social and political consequences follow from where teachers tend to fall as between those who regard teaching to be properly depoliticized as a bureaucratically delimited, technical, or managerial affair, on the one hand, and those who develop some fuller sense of what the authority of teachers involves, on the other. The latter orientation gains support from Hannah Arendt, who urged consideration of the deeply political nature of authority in education this way:

The authority of the educator and the qualifications of the teacher are not the same thing....The teacher’s qualification consists in knowing
the world and being able to instruct others about it, but his authority rests on his assumption of responsibility for that world. Vis-a-vis the child it is as though he were a representative of all adult inhabitants, pointing out the details and saying to the child: This is our world.1

Arendt's vision of authority in education challenges those of us who teach to question the normal boundaries of our role. If we are part of public education in a modern democratic state, we are called upon to represent diverse realms of social life and systems of value. This observation is pivotal to the discussion that follows.

Consider a few instances. One teacher might ask how important, in the cooperative learning groups that she is using, is the quality of cooperation itself as opposed to the advances in specifiable learning that individual students in the groups seem to be making? Another ponders whether it is desirable to encourage a small group of boys who, having the talent and fascination, tend to monopolize the class computer in wondrous ways, or whether to insist upon equal time for all students. Or, a high school science teacher who has consistently supported efforts to reduce tracking wonders how to respond to a request that she identify which of her most talented students should be accorded the opportunity to change schools in order to attend a new city-wide advanced program in science and mathematics.

In instances such as these, the "world" to be represented to students in and by the decisions teachers make is by no means obvious. Teachers are expected both to nourish the culture of democratic values and to maintain stable and productive procedures for the fulfillment of other social and economic needs: needs based on the classification and specialized training of students with socially valued talents and abilities. Teachers are scrutinized, and thoughtful teachers scrutinize themselves, with respect to very different sets of goals and expectations. This fact generates an inherent tension in the role of teachers in the modern democratic state. The educational authority of teachers, considered against Arendt's demanding standard, would seem to be an accomplishment always in doubt.

Observers and practitioners do not all understand this tension in the same way. From one perspective, it is a matter of minimal concern. The exercise of authority in education is justified in view of epistemic considerations, and rightly operates in ways that support forms of learning valued by and consistent with a democratic political order. The educational authority of teachers is thus insulated from the larger political context, and typically not at odds with the values and processes present in that domain. Others, however, less sanguine as to the harmoniousness of educational authority and democratic values, regard educational authority in the institutional context in which it is exercised and
draw attention to the social and political consequences of judgments exercised by authority figures in that context. The tension in the role of teachers, seen from this second perspective, is considered to be deeply problematic, and the exercise of teacher authority is viewed as at least potentially destructive of democratic values in its effects.

This paper explores further the nature of the tension in question, and considers the alternative ways of understanding it. I will present reasons for adopting the second perspective as a framework for further inquiry in the politics of educational practice. Current reforms centered on the notion of teacher empowerment will be critically examined to illustrate the importance of how we think on these matters at this point in time.

Social and Political Interests

Education leads practitioners inevitably to face significant questions of meaning and value. The contestable nature of the concept of education itself, combined with the far-reaching ramifications of how it is defined in practice, sustain this fact of life for teachers. I want to examine one aspect of the role of teacher in a democratic state. Specifically I am interested in the authority of teachers nestled between two realms of powerful social and political interests.

One of these realms has been vividly exemplified in the pace of political change in recent months. But the pace of events enlivening the news belies a significant fact: where dramatic events are unfolding, a groundswell of dissent and commitment to change has been building for years. Popular democratic movements do not arise overnight, even if their coverage on television does. They represent vital responses to forms of domination and are rightly seen as sources of inspiration. Now, with humankind imperilled on many sides by environmental and sociopolitical calamities in the making, the message of these movements is clear: the potential exists for vital, popular responses to common problems leading to significant forms of change.

This hope centers on what John Dewey spoke of as the aim of instilling "the working disposition of mind" necessary to achieve the "fuller, freer, and more fruitful association and intercourse of human beings with one another." Teachers in a democratic society are positioned and sustained, presumably, so as to open up worlds of meaning; they can work to remove barriers to learning and worthwhile forms of human interaction; they can contribute to efforts centered on access to our evolving culture that all young people might find a home in it and flourish. In these kinds of ways, teachers provide a basic condition for an ongoing democratic form of life. Teachers in practice are
called upon to cultivate the virtues and dispositions that make such a life possible.³

Teachers draw upon and represent another realm of ongoing interests as well. In modern, technologically advanced societies, teachers are expected to contribute to the transmission of forms of knowledge, skill, and attitudes that sustain and advance technological resources designed to achieve a variety of social needs and objectives. And while some critics deride this realm of concern as being inimical to fundamental human interests and destructive of educational vision,⁴ such concerns do not negate the significance of how and what we know. Beyond the innovative joys of high-tech toys and CDs, consider the basis of our common trust as we place our lives in the hands of surgeons and pilots. Across a great range of matters, whatever we might wish to say about technological wastelands, we place trust in forms of specialized knowledge and skill; we would be foolish not to.

As Ernest Gellner⁵ points out, there is an important gulf between those domains of belief established on the basis of empirically testable, mechanistic explanations (surgeons know a good deal about how the heart works), on the one hand, and what he calls “ironic cultures” on the other. We value our link to particular forms of the latter category (William Shakespeare or Willie Nelson on broken hearts for example, or democratic values for another), but should not confuse them with the domains of knowledge and skill that get things made and done in the world.

Teachers are held to account for how well they succeed in stimulating the development of the knowledge, skills, and attitudes, and forms of specialized expertise that a technologically advancing society requires. This role evokes controversy. As many commentators have noted, the hidden curriculum that often accompanies this activity emphasizes order, efficiency, hierarchy, and narrow, focused forms of understanding. Serious questions are raised with respect to aims of the enterprise as well as the fairness with which it proceeds. Regardless of these kinds of criticism, the imperatives of advancing expertise and specific forms of excellence in education are a responsibility teachers must surely bear.

My point is not to suggest that teachers must somehow decide between these realms of interest and value. Rather, it is to note that teachers inhabit a role that, in a society such as ours, is infused with a most exquisite and awful tension. In modern democratic society teachers are called upon in practice to reconcile a deep social tension. The problem is unavoidable (except by those who, rejecting Arendt’s insight, refuse to ground their authority in the taking of responsibility). But, it might be objected, have I not inflated the significance of what teachers confront? Is it not the case that the authority of teachers is much more limited than I or Arendt suggest?
The questions express a longstanding view that tends to be dismissive of teachers and teaching. Some clarification of what teacher authority consists of in practice is helpful. The social practice of education involves teachers in exercising judgment on a host of matters rooted in conceptions of subject matter and worthwhile activity, ideals of the educated person, the defining norms and values of the practice, socially constructed interpretations of the purposes of education, and so on. They need to be able to say, as an authority and with some assurance, things like, "this is good writing," "she's an ideal student," "this is what my students need to know and do." Patterns of such judgment over time preserve, extend, or sometimes modify conceptions of subject matter, ideals of educated persons, notions of what the practice of teaching is all about. Teachers are involved not only in judgments of what constitutes knowledge or skill in a discipline, but also with fundamental questions about student conduct and belief. Based upon their position in authority, a kind of social-political authority, teachers are called upon to judge how students should behave and regulate how students interact in relation to one another and to the system of order and authority itself. And based upon what they know, a kind of epistemic authority, teachers seek to establish themselves as an authority for the students with respect to things that they want students to know.

At the very least, teachers wishing to remain employed must use their judgment in deciding how to maintain and encourage desirable forms of order and how to instill and transmit desirable forms of knowledge and skill. But what in either case is desirable? It is important to realize both the scope of this question, and the practical constraints placed upon teachers in answering it. The question opens into inquiry as to how we should live and what we should believe. These are nothing less than the kinds of philosophical questions that stand at the heart of politics itself. Inquiry, debate, and conflict surrounds such questions, and will so long as the conditions for civil discussion persist.

But then teachers do not stand alone in expressing judgments in practice on these questions. Indeed, constrained in a network of social relation, teacher judgment follows well worn paths. The bureaucracy of schooling, and the political culture supporting and regulating schools, limit the possibilities of even those teachers most inclined to address the full scope of the matters in question. As a result, the tension that I have suggested to be inherent in the role of teacher in authority, a crossroads between the realms of democratic values and technological efficiencies, may not be conceptualized as such by teachers.

This may account for the fact that concern about the tension is not expressed in most recent calls for an expansion of the professional autonomy of teachers. Donna Kerr, for example, provides a strong argument supporting a shift in the direction of considerably more site by site authority for teachers.
in practice. Like much of the recent empowerment talk, a subject to which we will return, Kerr expresses the view that teachers with enlarged responsibilities and authority will do better what teachers are meant to do in a society such as ours. We may presume that this includes a place both for the development of democratic values and the advancement of special forms of excellence.

Kerr exemplifies a prominent perspective with regard to this situation. This perspective, sanguine with regard to the internal integrity of teaching as a form of professional practice, maintains the view that, in principle at least, the conflicting demands on teachers can be harmonized in practice. The perspective posits a common ground of purpose and direction, with authoritative teachers tending to the epistemic needs of students within the educational domain, largely divorced from but generally in harmony with social movements and change in the political domain. From this perspective, the tension in teacher authority is regarded as useful and instructive. The tension serves to keep both democratic political movements and professional authorities alert and responsive to important matters of mutual concern, while not producing conflicts that damage either democratic values or the integrity of schools and their distinctive mission. In the American context, this interpretation is captured by the title of Diane Ravitch’s history of post-war public education, *The Troubled Crusade.* Troubled, yes, but a shared enterprise—a crusade—nonetheless.

This interpretation, hopeful with respect to the tension between political movements and teacher authority, is supported by a prominent view within the philosophy of education. The view distinguishes questions about power and social-political affairs from those that concern the authority of educators. Teachers gain their standing on the strength of their exercise of epistemic, not social-political authority. For R. S. Peters, for example, the authority of educators derives from what they know. Individual educators deserve respect, indeed they have a right to proclaim, to the extent that they can be said to be “an authority” with respect to some field of knowledge. Forms of knowledge thus preserved and extended may or may not have significance with regard to matters of social-political concern; but that is another matter, an inevitable relationship to be tended to over time. This view supports Kerr in drawing a sharp distinction between the responsibility of public officials to provide the material conditions necessary for schools to flourish, and the responsibility of educational authority figures within those schools to govern what takes place there on the strength of their special knowledge. The important concern is that professional authority in education should, on this view, be evaluated and justified on epistemic grounds, detached from social movements and political demands.
Existing Patterns of Authority

A second approach to the tension denies the idea that the matter can be treated so neatly, and identifies in the tension the conditions of significant incompatibility and social dilemma. On this second view, the fundamental aims and purposes of socially progressive, democratic movements and existing patterns of professional authority in education are sharply at odds in such a way that in practice painful compromise, at best, is the product of the struggle between them. This version finds its history not in Ravitch’s Crusade, but in works like Joel Spring’s The Sorting Machine and in accounts such as that provided by Martin Carnoy and Henry Levin in their recent study, Schooling and Work in the Democratic State. These works examine the degree to which authority in education is exercised systematically in ways that suit the human resource needs of modern forms of hierarchical, economic organization. Democratic movements for social and political change in and through education are not impossible, on this view, but they are limited and the result of extraordinary efforts over and against established patterns of educational authority.

An important conceptual underpinning to this orientation is supplied by Helen Freeman. She challenges the idea that the exercise of epistemic authority in educational institutions could proceed free of social-political influences, and demonstrates how social-political and epistemic considerations interpenetrate the exercise of authority by educators. Educators have the power to enforce their judgments concerning questions of knowledge and, whatever the content of these judgments happens to be, the lives of students and relations among them are shaped in important ways accordingly.

Freeman’s argument strikes me as compelling. The critical perspective it frames urges us to yield the belief that the exercise of epistemic authority in schools is an apolitical matter to be protected and harmonized with larger social-political concerns largely independent of its exercise. Rather, the view anticipates a serious breach between the values inherent in transformative social movements and the systematic exercise of educational authority in practice.
Recognizing the Tension

Does it matter which view one takes? I believe that it does, and will argue that it is increasingly important to see the tension along the lines of the second perspective. The matter centers on the emerging social-political role that educators are expected to fulfill, given the location of educational practices in the constellation of enterprises that comprise modern economic systems. It is increasingly evident that the global economy features a number of critical, education-based characteristics. A premium is placed on advanced training in mathematics and science, and in preparation for diverse forms of specialized technical expertise. It is similarly evident that workers without special expertise are vulnerable and subject to radical dislocations and fierce international competition as capital investments and available employment shift dramatically. In addition, it is apparent that, for those who do not have special technical expertise, no attributes are as important to have as are such skills in learning how to learn, problem-solving skills, and a high level of communicative competence. The managerial and professional class in the modern global economy must be flexible and well trained in these ways.

The role of education in this emerging scenario is evident. Education is vital as the source of the forms of expertise that are demanded in the international economic order and it provides the route to individual engagement and status in that order. Alvin Gouldner’s discussion of education as proving ground for the “new class” of professional and managerial elites as it comes into being is instructive. Education provides the way that membership in the managerial and professional class of modern societies is achieved, and members gain the knowledge and training that their status and performance depend upon.

Because of this, schools are situated at the center of a number of critical functions affecting both individuals and social groups in the emerging economic order; and teachers (along with other professional educators) are themselves educated for their specialized role in that order. The stability of their status depends upon recognition for how well they can demonstrate the expertise that they have.

In what does the special expertise of professional educators consist? Whatever else it may involve, educators operate in a climate of intense scrutiny with regard to economic results. Schools are called upon to provide the kind of skilled workers that are in demand in the competitive economic order, while deciding who is not fit for the advanced training in the various fields of special (and economically productive) knowledge and skill. To put the matter simply,
teachers are called upon to classify students, and to provide useful skills and knowledge—to sort and to train. That is not all schools are given to do, of course. Continuity of forms of culture does matter. And since all must live together, in some fashion anyway, despite the sorting and specialized training, educators face the task of seeing to it that children learn patterns of interaction that allow a degree of social harmony to remain in the end. This socializing function, the managing of expectations, aspirations, and potential frustrations may be the most sensitive part of the school’s function over time.\textsuperscript{16}

Consider these characteristics in light of the tension in question. The cultural conditions for democratic movements would seem to call for patterns of activity in schools designed to develop both the understanding and dispositions needed to challenge hierarchical structures of domination and oligarchic control. But those who would seek to establish themselves as educational experts are pressured, in the modern economic order, to exercise their authority so as to maximize the school’s effectiveness in terms of the needs of the hierarchical and essentially oligarchic economic order of which they are part.

This adversarial relationship is not a necessary one. For one thing, democratic movements could yield their emancipatory thrust and press for schools to advance economic efficiencies in a hierarchical and inegalitarian order (in order to put bread on the table and to stock the store shelves). For another, educational expertise could be developed that, following Socrates—though he was clearly neither professional nor democratic—promotes the widest dissemination of emancipatory knowledge.

My claim, however, is that while the above are conceivable, they are not likely. What is likely is that, along the lines now evident in the United States, the kin of professional expertise in educational practice that is sought and recognized will center on the ability to make judgments that rationalize and enhance the functioning of schools in response to urgent economic imperatives.

Why is this likely? A number of reasons stand out. First, viewed positively, professional educators are widely encouraged and have much to gain from managing schools well in terms of their economic purposes. One need not go back to Marx, speaking of base and superstructure, to see the influence of business and the longstanding place of economic interests on education and public opinion regarding education. There is an indisputable force to economic arguments about the proper role and nature of education in our time.

In addition, as my own efforts as a teacher educator have made very clear to me, it is important to recognize the location of teachers in the economic order. They represent a most vulnerable group in the emerging professional and managerial middle class. Teachers do belong, in that they have special training and expertise that shields them from the variability and uncertainties of less-skilled forms of work. But, as Barbara Ehrenreich points out, they are almost
unique in the difficulty they face in trying to maintain a grip on vital components of their professional status. Their education is not of exceptional length or status-conferring difficulty. They perform tasks that are publicly perceived to be readily performed by many others—她们 can be replaced. And, in the American context at least, teaching has long been discounted as a kind of work better suited for women and accordingly underpaid and minimized in status. The upshot of these features is that teachers are themselves, as a group, both privileged and marginal. They have an important stake in securing their professional standing.

Still, teachers could seek to strengthen their position by appeals to, and engagement in, democratic movements, as opposed to professional standing. But there are constraints on this possibility. Educators are themselves the product of certain institutional practices and, as Walter Feinberg suggests, there is every reason to believe that structured patterns of action and consciousness will tend to reproduce themselves over time. Disjunctions are conceivable, but teachers are surely embedded to some extent in traditional forms of order and patterns of judgment regarding students and the social role they inhabit. The authority they exercise will reflect norms of judgment they have long since internalized.

In the event that active consideration of a shift to more politically active, transformative approaches to practice did emerge, further constraints apply. These center on the risks involved. For one thing, it would be risky, in that such activity would demand some withdrawal from the kinds of distancing behavior, social trappings, and special, even unintelligible (to the uninitiated) discourse that support and mark the members of all professions. Furthermore, while the payoffs of professionalization are clear enough, greater participation in grassroots politics is a matter of real uncertainty. How well formed are the politics of discontent? Is there a public movement for transformative social change in and through education, above and beyond the public concern for economic efficiency and growth? It is not clear, in this country at least, that this is so.

For these reasons, it strikes me as unlikely that educators will cede their specialized standing and status for the sake of greater embeddedness in and commitment to democratic movements. But this leaves the profession isolated, and called upon to justify its standing in the context of harsh economic imperatives. It is in this context that recent, seemingly progressive strides have been taken in the United States under the rubric of teacher empowerment. The trends will illustrate, finally, the intensifying grip of the dilemma in question, and why it is important to see it well.
Problematic Status

The notion of teacher empowerment, especially as it arises in connection to the professionalization of teaching, illustrates the problematic status of teacher authority in relation to democratic and emancipatory values. The promise of empowerment is seductively evident. Teacher empowerment is in large part a question of voice; it centers on the idea that the grassroots initiatives and efforts of teachers will revitalize educational institutions. Proponents of the movement seek to free teachers from the suffocating constraints of bureaucratic and hierarchical systems of authority relations and allow teachers to demonstrate what they know and are capable of doing. School by school, practitioners will explore in their increased domain of professional autonomy the possibilities of improving the quality of their practice. The rhetoric appeals on two fronts. Educational systems can flourish while teachers make for themselves a less vulnerable, more deeply connected and valued niche of professional standing.

These promised goods come together in the hope that, as "institutions think," as they, and those who animate them, are minded in certain ways, so they can be re-minded, and called to new tasks and purposes. It is a vision that fits well with the times, a vision of ferment and change driven by people at the grassroots level. Ultimately, the promise is for genuine progress along the lines suggested by the optimistic interpretation of the tension between educational authority and democratic politics: as teacher empowerment proceeds, schools become both more responsive to those in them and supportive of the best forms of educational authority.

We must recognize, however, that this optimistic interpretation must make assumptions about the point of empowerment. Such a view assumes that teacher empowerment connects with vital and significant democratic and emancipatory movements, questions the systematic exercise of judgments which sort talent and channel students into narrow forms of training, and seeks to institute alternatives to this development rooted in democratic values. But these assumptions are dubious, for with the promise of empowerment comes a problem. The rhetoric of empowerment is a constrained rhetoric; it rarely deals in matters of substance such as those mentioned above. Little is said as to what change might actually mean. The promise of empowerment talk is carried forward by a language of process. Such talk seeks to engage practitioners, or at least hold out the hope of doing so, in the process of change without addressing the point of it.
The problem is plain. While teacher empowerment could promote change of a socially and politically transformative kind, this scenario would surely also inspire the wrath of entrenched economic and political elites, and that of the general public to the extent that its views are subject to those powerful sources of influence set against democratic initiatives. As a profession, empowered educators are in the grip of a vise. The reasons suggested above to doubt the likelihood of transformative change apply here with particular force. For teachers, having gained some new power and sensing the increased scrutiny as to how they use that power, a most reasonable course of action must be to search for ways to increase the effectiveness of educational systems along currently established lines.

The professional culture certainly supports ideas that would provide for a more responsive, more culturally diverse and enriched system of sorting and training than large scale economic imperatives demand. But the structure of hierarchical classification and specialization would continue. In this way, empowerment represents what Carnoy and Levin call a micro-political reform, a managerial adjustment in a non-democratic, even anti-democratic institution. Such reform would be warmly endorsed by powerful social and political agents, and would stabilize for the time being both the position and status of professional educators in the lower reaches of the professional middle class.

Conclusion

Let me conclude by saying that nothing I have said denies the possibility that the more profound forms of empowerment for the restructuring and reorienting of education can be achieved. But the conditions for this development are not well understood. At the very least, it seems to me that we must disenthrall ourselves from idealistic and naively optimistic ways of thinking about the relationship between educational authority and democratic values. This would allow us to explore more fully the social-political dimensions of current forms of educational practice and the power and authority relations embedded in them. Such inquiry is but one piece, albeit an important one, of wider emancipatory movements which are battling forms of domination across the range of ongoing economic, technological, and political structures, and which are promoting public deliberation of new forms of order.

In short, the situation is more open than it has been, with the emergence of dramatic and inspiring movements of a democratic and emancipatory kind. But for the promise of this time to be fully realized, the further step of examining subtler forms of domination in hierarchies of power and control will need to be taken. And, the delicate, ambiguous, vulnerable, and highly
scrutinized place of teachers at the center of this should be seen as pivotal. The ethical and political questions that attend the ways in which the authority of teachers evolves at this point in time are intriguing—and profound.

Notes

3. An important recent examination of the relationship of education to a democratic polity, centered on the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination, is provided by Amy Gutmann in her Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

16. For an analysis of this role seen as a kind of “con game,” see, e.g., W. Parker, “The Urban Curriculum and the Allocating Function of Schools,” *The Educational Forum*, 49, No. 4 (Summer 1985), pp. 445-450.


Toward a Postmodern Politics: Knowledges and Teachers

By William J. Bain and Mustafa Umit Kiziltan

Beginnings

To theorize education is to think of education through a metaphor or to place it in a relation of homology with relatively familiar concepts and/or objects. To rethink education, its meaning and its possibilities, then, is contingent upon a novel framework or an innovative imagery. One such thought provoking and promising way to conceive of education is to view it as a discourse which operates alongside and is subject to other discourses.

Discourse is a socially constructed "systematic set of relations" within which ideas, statements, practices, and their corollary institutions achieve their meanings and their everyday reality. A discourse can be understood as providing the background against which words and things make sense.
This background, which is woven together by a coordinated interplay and tension between the elements the discourse contains, also functions as a grid. This grid is the framework through which a reality is made to appear. In this respect, discourse functions to stabilize and fix an otherwise incessant flood of phenomena, perceptions, and sensations into selectively recognizable forms. In effect, discourse orders a world, and in so doing, presents us with a "ready-made synthesis."

As a "ready-made synthesis," then, education qua universal (common/public) schooling locates and designates us all in our subject positions as teachers, students, administrators, and parents. Through this discourse we are continually (re)positioned within the same educational order; an order which, through the "self-evident" reality of schools, textbooks, tax dollars, etc., simultaneously reaches back into the early 19th century and tenuously contains us today. Our reasoning in this essay starts with a proposition about the nature of this order: that the received educational order has been conditioned by and predicated on a puissant and preponderant discourse, that of modernity.

We begin, therefore, with the thought that the current discourse of education has historically been circumscribed by and subject to modernity. In other words, we suggest that practices, positions, and concepts central to education have been constituted and have received their legitimacy against the contextual background of modernity. It appears, however, and this is the second step in our reasoning, that the background is shifting; i.e., the discourse of modernity is losing its cohesion, command, and enchantment. As a result, and this is the educational issue of immediate interest to us, the meanings of conventionally unproblematical terms such as student, teacher, and knowledge, and the consistency of received educational relations and practices long sustained by modernity are being unequivocally challenged.

The end of modernity in question here, and the ensuing social, cultural, and educational (dis)order have been (relatively recently) characterized within the scope of a multi- and trans-disciplinary debate on the postmodern condition. The resulting arguments on, for, or against postmodernity have been multifarious and consequential in theoretical and political/practical terms. A comprehensive analysis of this debate, however, is not only impractical given the limits of this essay, but also not pertinent to our present project. Here, we are particularly interested in the educational significance of the epistemic alterations accompanied by the disintegration of the modern order of things. Our focal point is that the modern conception of a foundational, objective, unifying, and transcendental knowledge is now seriously being challenged by a postmodern understanding of knowledge as relative, gender-, race-, and ethnicity-specific, power-laden, local, and perspectival.

On this account, a principle outgrowth of postmodernity seems to be its
Origination of a new politics (in education), a "politics of truth." The educator in us all is inescapably faced with the challenge of generating an educational and cultural politics (in the absence of modernity's time-honored sustenance.) Our present project is precisely to identify and evaluate the major subject positions which have recently opened up for educators/teachers. More specifically, we attempt to differentiate between competing positions on and assessments of the postmodern condition of knowledge. We show how such assessments prompt different conceptions of education and of what it means to be a teacher. With our essay we intend to participate in and activate a collective reflection on the contemporary conditions of teachers' work. As educators, we have a pressing need to rethink our subjectivity and to come to terms with the shifting epistemic foundations of our authority and identity. If we fail to do so, not only will we be guilty of, to paraphrase Douglas Glover, "a wilful lack of intelligence" and an unwillingness to examine who we are, but also we will miss the opportunity to find out who and what we can be and do.

**Conditions of Knowledge and Politics of Education**

The postmodern has emerged as a periodizing concept, which correlates recent cultural forms with the contemporary economic and social order most often characterized as postindustrial and consumer society, the society of the media or of the spectacle. Postmodernity entail dramatic alterations both in our cultural representations and the forms of material production, which point to new forms of socio-cultural relationships and understandings. It is this apparently systemic transformation of contemporary Western society that necessitates a new theoretical approach to educational phenomena.

Of the alterations that have given us the postmodern, one of the most important for education is the shifting grounds of knowledge. Modernity locates knowledge in a utopian project of ultimate individual and social progress. Knowledge, particularly scientific-technical knowledge, has been the fuel of this project. In the modern episteme, knowledge is "out there" somewhere beyond human action. The goal is to discover this self-contained knowledge and to discover it with a minimum of human interference. Those who master this knowledge occupy a superior position in the hierarchies of modernity: a superiority which has long been underwritten by the development and everyday applications of technology. Furthermore, the modern understanding of knowledge is supported by the metanarrative of enlightenment. That is, modernity sees itself as the current pinnacle of an historical continuum that is
incessantly progressing toward both the enlightenment and emancipation of human beings. Hence, modern knowledge represents itself under the banners of enlightenment, moral elevation, social refinement and manners, ultimate human fulfillment, and self-realization. In this regard, it establishes itself both practically, because it "works," and metaphysically, as it "civilizes." But as the limits of the project of modernity have been reached—in the inability of the economic system to deliver, the manifest disjuncture between science and "progress," and the increasing cleavages in contemporary politics—the modern grounds of (scientific) knowledge are being challenged from within and without.

Before we discuss the nature of this challenge and the educational-political significance of the shifting grounds of knowledge, we will first draw the contours of the modern frame of educational politics. Modern politics in education, played out on a field of distributions, has evolved out of concerns with access to knowledge (credentials). As schooling has assumed an increasingly central role in the functioning of society, schools have become the pillars of a "meritocratic" system of allocating offices, and economic and cultural rewards.

From within modernity, school knowledge and curriculum are mainly conceived as technical issues strictly subject to the dictates of scientific-instrumental rationality. This view of knowledge objectifies and renders school knowledge politically neutral. As a result, modern schooling presents itself as a universal "public good" to be converted into "human capital" by a (generic) student with no specific gender, racial, or ethnic identity. Accordingly, not only are the organization and the presentation of knowledge reified and naturalized, but (school) knowledge itself is prescribed as something that exists transhistorically and outside of human praxis. In this regard, modern politics of education is reduced to issues concerning the distribution and the administration of a "rationalized" educational commodity.

Embodied in the promise of the modern school to prepare the way for material well-being and to do the spadework for the growth of a more "fully human being," is also the threat that non-access to school knowledge is bound to result in material deprivation, marginalization, and dehumanization. Hence, modern politics of education unavoidably takes the form of a peculiar struggle for survival. As modernity recognizes no outside to its totality, no life beyond its own characterizations and systems of discipline, its politics of education is centered around the issue of inclusion into (or exclusion from) the "civilization."

The role of the teacher and the image of the public operative in the modern frame of educational politics are particularly significant. Teachers are positioned in a stable alignment vis-a-vis knowledge and a generalizable public. The proximity of the teacher to knowledge, and how the public
BAIN and KIZILTAN

understands this relationship, characterizes the modern teacher-knowledge-public relationship. In this relationship, teachers stand as advocates for enlightenment and as gatekeepers to a knowledge that is represented as the embodiment of wisdom, morality, order, and discipline. This proximity of the teacher to a secularized and oracular knowledge also serves as the basis of her intellectual and moral authority.

The public is projected by the discourse of modernity as a single, homogenous, and stable whole. Beyond the modern multitude of (culturally distinct) voices hums modernity’s discourse of homogenization: through a totalizing vision, modernity domesticates difference. Potentially disruptive demands for distinct identities and multivocal realities of the subalterns are effectively subverted and diffused by the hierarchical structure of modern knowledge. Hence, what appears contextually as a plural society is abstracted and decontextualized. The knowledges of different groups constitutive of the public are positioned as “immature” and are judged as “primitive” and “crude” against modern standards of rationality.

The challenge of postmodernity to the modern frame of educational politics lies precisely in its power to dramatically upset the form, content, and cultural representation of knowledge. The resulting alteration effects the teacher-public-knowledge relationship and disrupts the epistemic and social bases of teacher authority, and traditional meanings and practices of discipline, professionalism, public good, etc. It is our position that the recent denigration of teachers coupled at the same time with flurries of advocacies are best understood against the background of teachers’ received positions within the modern frame of educational politics. Most criticisms and applause directed at teachers are misleading in that critics and fans alike fail to recognize the indebtedness of their educational paradigms to the modern order of things.

A major aspect of the postmodern transformation has been described as “an incredulity toward [the] metanarratives” of modernity. This incredulity marks the loss of the grounds of legitimation of modernity’s order. The eschatological and epistemological presumptions of modernity are no longer valid. Such a rupture serves to disassemble the modern world and disorient the well-disciplined trajectory of knowledge. Unlike the staid, well-grounded, and unilinear knowledge of modernity, postmodern knowledge darts and flits, flirts and threatens, twirls and spirals, and burrows and bursts.

As the metanarratives which helped form modern knowledge into its univocal and unidirectional form collapse, modernity loses its disciplinary, universalistic, and homogenizing “spell” over difference. Knowledge loses its aura of totality. It becomes a “local” creation of historically specific moments. It can no longer claim to reveal a reality aloof from human action or a reality that can be represented independent of human interpretation. There is thus no
longer any isomorphic match between knowledge and "reality." The demise of the metanarratives, coupled with the concomitant inability of the economic system to deliver, threatens to bring down the whole modern ensemble of hierarchies. Scientific enterprise itself falls victim. Knowledge can no longer be understood as either neutral or objective. Instead, postmodern knowledge is characterized foremost by its inextricable linkage with power.

Michel Foucault has been at the forefront of contemporary appropriations of Nietzsche's formulation of the will to power and how the will to power continually informs the will to truth. In this understanding, the concept of objectivity is relativized as meaning is shown to be the outcome of power struggles. The postmodern intertwining of power/knowledge does not imply that all knowledge is false or that what is created out of power/knowledge is mere illusion. Power/knowledge, in its perspectival and multidimensional (multirational) understanding of "truth" and "reality," does not deny the validity of meaning. What it denies and refuses is the hegemony of one universal meaning.

Postmodern power/knowledge understands itself as an extension of historically specific cultural practices that generate legitimate meanings of the world. Power/knowledge postulates a human agency not just in the interpretation of the world, for in the act of interpretation, the human subject also creates the world. In its moment of creation, postmodern knowledge celebrates its intertwining with power and locality. As such, postmodern knowledges target the seemingly objective representations of modern epistemologies. The result is a multivocal, though unconcerted, assault against modernity's interpellations and the asseveration of nascent postmodern local identities previously absorbed and contained in modernity. Hence, within the discourse of postmodernity the unitary public vanishes, replaced by a criss-crossing seriality of localities.

The dispersal of an amorphous public has its corollary in the dispersal of modernity's singular knowledge. This dispersion results in a "politics of truth" focused on a knowledge that is "humanized" and made contestatory. This politics of truth manifests itself at the cultural level in new social movements, such as those organized around gender, race, ethnicity, ecology, disability, and aboriginal rights, which posit new rationalities and new understandings of being in the world. It is also reflected in the rise of neoconservatism. Furthermore, the "politics of truth" materializes as an aspect of the legitimation of mass culture, as postmodernism—in the aesthetic realm—signifies the collapse of the hierarchical distinction between mass and high culture.

In the field of education, the postmodern transformation has meant that the "politics of truth" supersedes the modern politics of distribution. Education becomes an issue of representation; that is, the assertions of marginalized groups to interpret, experience, and act on the world in their own right. The
parties to this politics of truth understand that "truth" has been dislodged from its Platonic throne and now belongs to history, or rather, to their histories. These groups do not want their histories merely included in the curriculum, they want to be in charge of their own representations. The shift from a politics of distribution to politics of representation thus involves further issues of who will do the presenting, in whose voice and language this presentation will occur, and how the local will be defined. In essence, schools are no longer facing a generalizable public whose idiosyncrasies can be covered over by the blanket of modern knowledge. Schools are now faced with a growing number of different and distinct publics asserting their knowledges and engaged in an agonistics of power/knowledge.

We believe that the contemporary educational reform movements reflect attempts to rediscipline and reorder a disintegrating modern school order. As the cause of this disintegration is the drifting grounds of knowledge, the teacher becomes guilty by association. Teachers are portrayed as having let go the reins of knowledge, thereby failing their students, themselves, and their nation. Often critics indicate a perceptible waning of teachers' knowledge and skills, and a lack of rigor in teacher education. They highlight the need to improve teacher competency, particularly in light of the drive toward "professionalization." Reformers also call for teacher autonomy in the schools and the reinstitution of teachers as intellectual and moral authorities. This interpretation misrepresents the conditions of teachers' work and their relation to new publics generated by a dispersal of a unified, modern knowledge. The drift into postmodernism reveals that authority and autonomy are not natural properties of teachers. Instead, they were the "natural" virtues of modern knowledge, which claimed universal representation, transcendental moral virtue, and intellectual integrity. The problematic nature of the teacher's position, therefore, erupts as a result of the dissipation of this singular, self-contained knowledge.

Politics of Truth

We suggest that the advent of postmodernity opens up at least four primary modalities or subject positions, each with a distinct cultural conceit of knowledge: the nostalgic modernist, the performative pragmatist, the conversational pragmatist, and the positive sceptic. These modalities are best conceived as discursive spaces which order educational practice, present knowledge, and formulate idiosyncratic backgrounds for the naming of problems and the outlining of their solutions. The following three sections briefly sketch the first
three modalities and show how they actually work to reinforce teacher constraint. In the positive sceptic, we suggest an alternative approach to the new epistemological and pedagogical dilemmas confronting teachers.

Nostalgic Modernist: The nostalgic modernist is essentially a defensive and reactionary space that acknowledges postmodernism primarily as the Nietzschean laugh of a hedonistic Western civilization in the twilight of collapse. The nostalgic modernist approach to knowledge adheres to the Enlightenment traditions of material and metaphysical progress. For the nostalgic modernist, possession of the “right” knowledge ensures correct moral-practical action; i.e., cognitive and moral-practical knowledge are mutually inclusive. In education, the nostalgic modernist problematique consists of the loss of the moral and intellectual authority of the teachers; bureaucratization; the physical, curricular, and social disorder in schools; the lack of faith in the propriety of knowledge; and the slipping grip of tradition. Within this space, some “solutions” have emerged in terms of calls for a “strong academic core,” discipline in schools and classrooms, cultural literacy, and the restitution of community.° In seeking to preserve the central arrangements of modern school order, the nostalgic modernist aims to reestablish teachers’ secure and authoritative relation to knowledge and to a mass general public. The project of the professionalization of teaching, embraced by a variety of groups, is a prominent example of an effort to reconstitute teacher authority and autonomy by reclaiming the teacher’s proximity to knowledge. Central to this proposal for professionalization is the hearty cry of nostalgia to get “teachers’ feet firmly planted in the rich soil of education research.” Yet in the postmodern world, scientific knowledge no longer guarantees any stability to the teacher-knowledge relationship. Indeed, the “rich soil” may have already turned into quicksand.

Performative Pragmatist: The performative pragmatist approach to knowledge rejects the metanarratives of modernity. Knowledge in this space has no theoretically emancipatory role. It is an accommodation to a hyperrational modernization which determines the function of knowledge as both the rationalization of social organization and the technicization of culture.° Knowledge is understood as technique, which is merely instrumental and amoral in its relation to the social and natural worlds. Such knowledge is divorced from human action in a triple manner. First, it can be properly apprehended only from an objective distance, that is, through the application of methodology. Second, this knowledge is generated in the drive to develop a better technological capacity, not necessarily better human beings. Third, this knowledge therefore applies itself to the problems of machines and concerns itself only indirectly with human problems. Once generated, this knowledge constantly seeks its own fulfillment in the refinement of technical performance based on input-output ratios.²
For the performative pragmatist, the educational problematic concerns, fundamentally, the congruence of student technical skills with the increasingly specialized (vocational) roles generated by postmodern information technologies. That is, as a teacher, the performative pragmatist translates the needs of self-fulfilling knowledge into a discourse of methodology, for it is only through methodology (as a "prosthetic aid") that one can grasp this knowledge.23

As performative knowledge alleges no interpretation, only possession and application, the teachers' role is that of a technical trainer whose interpretive capacities are minimized, if not effaced. The teacher, in this moment, secures his/her authority by transferring "necessary" skills which are simultaneously and systematically refined and then devalued.26 The performative pragmatist space arrests the autonomy and authority of the teacher on the level of "intermediary functionary."27 Unlike the knowledge of the nostalgic modernist, performative knowledge is temporally specific and rather quickly disposable. In an age of obsolescence, the teacher-as-technician is simultaneously subjugated as a laborer and valorized as an integral conduit in a cybernetic system. The position of the teacher is secured in the fact that the discursive practices of the performative pragmatist space transform economic crises into school crises, and generate calls to solve the crises by enlisting the teacher-as-technician.

Conversational Pragmatist: Like the performative pragmatist, the conversational pragmatist approach to knowledge is built upon a rejection of the metanarratives of modernity. However, the conversational pragmatist approach refuses the reduction of knowledge to technical instrumentality. Here, knowledges are understood as emerging local interpretations of life-worlds which are temporally and spatially specific. As a consequence, knowledge is denied objectivity, aloofness, and the capacity to represent an independent reality. Postmodern knowledges are not seen as the "immature" knowledges of modernity, but as the distinct and "mature" expressions and understandings of diverse localities. In this sense, for the conversational pragmatist, there is no one transcendental knowledge unifying or ordering the plurality of local knowledges.

The conversational pragmatist problematic in schools concerns the creation of a community of voices each of which, while retaining its own particularity, contributes to the continuity of the whole.28 A recurrent manifestation of this cultural "openness" is the project of multicultural education. Contemporary formulations of multicultural education (or education for multiculturalism) intend to acknowledge the legitimacy of difference.30 Its purpose is to develop in students an appreciation for different cultural traditions and a respect for "the Other." The project, however (for reasons we will discuss below) often devolves into a descriptive examination of various cultures and their artifacts.31

For the conversational pragmatist, schools are communities of story-tellers
speak in self-conscious continuity with their traditions. The teacher is a facilitator in the form of a discussion host or a participant observer. His/her role is to facilitate the emergence of knowledges, to get the publics to reveal how they make meanings in their lives, and to allow them to speak in their own voices. Such involvement with the relegitimation of subjugated knowledges renders the conversational pragmatist space virtually immune to calls for professionalization. Such reforms necessitate a formal distancing of the teacher from the publics, a distancing which is antithetical to the presuppositions of the conversationalist space.

The conversational pragmatist recognizes and appreciates the strength and validity of tradition, as it is tradition that informs a locality's interpretation of itself. Yet the egalitarian attempt at providing for and legitimizing self-expression fails to problematize tradition itself, and ultimately ends up reifying and displacing the cultural legacies expressed by the publics. The reliance on tradition as the foundation of the conversational pragmatist self-understanding prompts not a critical, but a benign pluralism. Thus, within this educational space, the stories form themselves into pieces of exotica which, while paradoxically emanating from lived experience, serve to (re)locate that experience in the distant past. At the same time, the stories remain isolated not only from the dominant culture, but also from each other. They are rendered immune to mutual critique and, paradoxically, they produce a disengagement from present substantive human conditions. Descriptive-level story telling ultimately misdirects attention from the power relations which historically have structured the relationships among the groups in the conversation.

Positive Sceptic: So far, we have argued that the nostalgic modernist, performative pragmatist, and conversational pragmatist approaches to knowledge effectively limit the empowerment of teachers within the postmodern frame. The nostalgic modernist space responds to the postmodern politics of truth with calls for teacher professionalization. In promoting the teacher as a knowledge expert, however, the nostalgic modernist fails to address the instability of the teacher-knowledge relationship, and its implications for the failure of teacher authority and autonomy. The performative pragmatist space acknowledges the shifting grounds of knowledge, but sees this change mainly in technicist terms. The performative pragmatist solution—to remake the teacher as a technician—does not give the profession a new respect. Finally, the conversational pragmatist addresses postmodernism by accepting and encouraging the plurality of local knowledges. The teacher-as-facilitator role created in the conversational pragmatist space does not, however, permit a place in teachers' work for critical responses to plural knowledges.

Is there another response which teachers can give to postmodernism? We believe that, in effect, teacher empowerment within the postmodern frame
currently necessitates a form of positive scepticism. In what follows, we outline the positive sceptic space, and contrast its understanding of and responses to postmodernism with those of the spaces we have already discussed. We then conclude by suggesting the "limit-attitude" as the defining principle, or rather, the ethos, of this position.

Conceived from within the positive sceptic space, the Janus-face of postmodernity represents the potentialities (not hardened policies) of the era. While the first face challenges the rigidity, control, and exclusionary effects of modernity, the second face refines and remystifies modernity's effects. On the one hand, postmodernism in its anti-exclusionary aspect signifies the end of hierarchies through the deconstruction of the Eurocentric discourses of modernity. The positive aspects of this deconstruction include a new-found awareness and respect for the tremendous diversity that makes up North American culture, and a stress on aesthetic sensibilities operating co-naturally with reason. Postmodernism thus seems to invite a more expansive understanding of what it means to be human. On the other hand, the second face of postmodernism reveals the absorption of political activity within a benign pluralism, the hegemony of the performative principle in all areas of life, and a quiet elaboration of an aesthetics of discipline, control and subjection. The human imagination from this aspect seems to be tamed, producing a poverty of the image (the subtle, linguistic homogenization of human experience), and the constant displacement of desire and satisfaction.

In contrast to the nostalgic modernist, the positive sceptic operates within a recognition of the power/knowledge link. She rejects the privileged universalizing narratives of modernity, viewing the modern claims to the "secrets" of emancipatory knowledge as hiding a logic of domination and control. This emancipatory knowledge can only access the world by trying to negate it, that is, by excluding everything that doesn't fit the image of its self-understanding. Yet, in rejecting modern metanarratives, the positive sceptic still maintains a commitment to the "spirit" of enlightenment and to the desire for human freedom. The outlines for such a commitment, however, must be sought in the possibilities of transgressing the limits of the modern frame.

In the practices of the performative pragmatist, the positive sceptic recognizes the continuation of modern dominations: racism, sexism, Eurocentricism, and class-based domination as these are simultaneously domesticated and concealed. The positive sceptic sees the performative pragmatist as working within the systemic imperatives of an information-technology-based economy which orders postmodern society by imposing a reduced sphere of interpretations on an expanding field of technologically mediated experiences. Interpretation is regulated through the circulation of a delimited supply of images, signs, and meanings which packages the heterogeneity of the world into recognizable
commodity forms. These forms are themselves presented as multiplicities; yet, their effect is to shrink the fields of human experience precisely to the immediately recognizable, thereby absorbing potential reconstructions.

For the positive sceptic, the alarming degree of totalization and homogenization is contested, but not overthrown within the conversational pragmatist space. Although the conversation privileges difference and a plurality of knowledges and voices, it arranges this plurality in such a way as to "traditionalize" the present. It grants authority to the many voices only as they locate themselves in the grand tradition. The conversation, thereby, deflects attention from the immediate power relations in which cultures find themselves.

The positive sceptic space evokes not only the descriptive and historical knowledges of cultures, but also the substantive and present-day knowledges of groups bound in a web of power relations. Histories are understood as compositional discourses, the components of which are to be revealed through genealogical analyses. For the positive sceptic, the configuration of power/knowledge generates a "politics of truth." Knowledge is the effect of power relations played out through human interactions. It can no longer be viewed as universal and detached, delimited to what is technologically effective, or reduced to an exercise of presence.

Postmodern power/knowledge creates publics out of the unified public of modernity, at the same time "publicizing" the teacher. Teachers can no longer successfully claim any special distance from the publics in terms of their cognitive or moral knowledge. Education, as a space caught in the politics of truth, necessarily installs teachers not as spectators (performative pragmatist and conversational pragmatist), or ultimate judges (nostalgic modernist), but as active participants in this politics.

The positive sceptic discourse positions the teacher in the midst of a multiplicity of groups, localities, and publics which bring to the school distinct interpretations of the world. These diverse interpretations are not the results of originary, internal, organic group processes that serve as the foundations of group identity. Rather, they are the contingent effects of power/knowledge relations. In the positive sceptic space, interpretations meet each other as interrogations which operate on the level of representations. The purpose of the positive sceptic interrogation is not to confirm a transparent intersubjectivity, but to deconstruct the representations, bringing out the conditions of their intelligibility. Both teachers and localities interrogate and act upon those limits which pose as natural and necessary conditions of power, knowledge, and ethics: identity.
Conclusion
The Limit-Attitude

The idea that identity, or the subject, is constituted along the axes of power, knowledge, and ethics had been the primary focus of Foucault's genealogies of the modern subject. Granted that, for the most part, Foucault's inquiries have stressed the mechanisms whereby the subject is subjugated in relation to his/her identity, he did not abandon all possibility for self-constitution. This is most dramatically revealed in Foucault's reexamination of the question of enlightenment.

Through his reflections on Kant's essay, "Was Ist Aufklarung?," Foucault brings a novel interpretation to Kant's conception of enlightenment. He distinguishes between a theory of enlightenment as an outline of a transcendental, quasi-divine project and an enlightenment "attitude" towards the world and the self. Just as his reformulations of enlightenment attitude enable Foucault to reinterpret the significance of enlightenment, they also open for us the possibility to reinterpret our own educational thought and practice.

Though Foucault by no means shares Kant's belief in a transcendental logic or his search for the unsurpassable boundaries of reason, he does identify in Kant's conception of enlightenment an original formulation of the idea of critical reflection on the formation of ourselves as autonomous beings. Foucault embraces the "critical" moment in Kant's thought by integrating the latter's "critical interrogation on the present and on ourselves" into a "philosophical ethos," he in turn calls "the critical ontology of ourselves." This philosophical ethos, which also embodies a Baudelairean transfigurative relation with the world and ourselves, amounts to the constant problematization of "man's relation to the present, man's historical mode of being, and the constitution of the self as an autonomous subject." The "limit-attitude" is the term Foucault uses to characterize the particular reflexive and transgressive mode of thought and of being in the world implicated by this ethos.

The limit-attitude rejects the Kantian mode of critique and the project of identifying the "universal structures of all knowledge" and of deducing "from the form of what we are what it is impossible for us to do and to know." Rather, the limit-attitude signifies the interest and the determination in transgressing the limits which contain us as individual human beings and which in turn help us to "constitute ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking and saying." To this end, the limit-attitude can be fully realized in the form of historical investigations of the world around us. According to Foucault, the object of these "historico-practical" investigations is to separate out "from
the contingency that made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think."

From within the limit-attitude, education becomes more of a poetic and artistic action. This is in contrast to education as the application of "scientific" rules for the regulation or "improvement" of intellectual and moral behavior; education as vocational preparation; or education as the mere affirmation or "mastery" of an identity.

What curricular issues are at stake in the limit-attitude? Most immediately, knowledge cannot be understood in relation to some final reality. The limit-attitude evolves out of a discursive theory of ourselves, knowledge, and the world. For example, the limits that discourse places to fix reality and meaning are clearly evident in the constitution of academic disciplines. Academic disciplines establish themselves through rules of inclusion and exclusion, thereby delimiting their own "proper" range, constructing the correct objects of inquiry, and regulating the attendant interpretations and meanings. In effect, disciplines establish themselves as "natural" forms (domains) of knowledge. The limit-attitude, however, rejects the finality of forms, acknowledging limits only in so far as they solicit their own transgression. From this perspective, curricular organization is not based on discrete subject areas. Rather, as the limit-attitude proceeds through effacing the self-evidence that representations (of knowledge, identity, and the world) enjoy through their everyday recognizability, it promotes new forms (and not merely content) of understanding and self-understanding. One consequence to this is that curricular organization becomes transdisciplinary.42

In approaching "man's historical mode of being" as the effect of the play between limit and transgression, the limit-attitude takes a political-historical and poetic stance toward knowledge. It posits the act of knowing as "an interplay between the truth of what is real and the exercise of freedom." This contains a number of implications. First, language is conceived not according to systematic rules of logic (themselves imaginative projections), nor according to the idea of representation, but according to the paralogical association of metaphor. Language as metaphor undermines and transgresses what Jean-Francois Lyotard calls "the solace of good forms." As David B. Allison states, "...the metaphor is homeless, a wanderer. It gathers its strength in a continual process of displacement and transference...." Metaphor is "perpetually active, incomplete, manifold and alive."44 What emerges here is a new, more central role of imagination in curricular theory, planning, and evaluation, which redefines the relationship between teacher, public, and knowledge and gives "new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom."45
Notes

1. This paper has no senior author. Each contributed equally. Also, we want to thank Jennifer Milliken, Anita Canizares Molina, Emily Robertson, and the two anonymous critics for their helpful comments and suggestions on previous drafts of this paper.


7. The word “postmodern” incorporates the terms postmodernity and postmodernism. While these terms have their distinct associations, for our purposes here we use them interchangeably. For a discussion of the distinction between these terms, see Jochen Schulte-Sasse, “Modernity and Modernism, Postmodernity and Postmodernism: Framing the Issue,” Cultural Critique, 5 (1986): 5-22.

8. The history and the current structure of the university is inseparable from the logic of modernity. Heidegger points at this relationship by suggesting that modernization of the society is founded upon a form of science qua research which has constituted the heart of the (modern) university. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1977).

9. Thomas F. Green, Predicting the Behavior of the Educational System (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980). Also see Randall Collins, The
104 POSTMODERN POLITICS


12. In this article, “teacher” does not refer to specific individuals, nor necessarily to specific levels of teaching, e.g., elementary, high school. Rather, it is the “figure” of the teacher that we address. For more on figure see Jean Francois Lyotard, *Driftworks* (New York: Semiotexte), 1984; and Lyotard, “Rules and Paradoxes and Svelte Appendix,” *Cultural Critique*, 5 (1986): 209-19.


15. Foucault states, “…that power and knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.” M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, trans. by Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 27.


17. See Janice Hale-Benson, *Black Children, Their Roots, Culture, and Learning Styles* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). In the words of the president of Gallaudet University, Dr. I. King Jordan, “Now we are saying we will manage things, not just have access…. We’ve moved from entitlement to empowerment.” In Catherine Foster, “The Deaf Will Be Heard,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 29, 1988, p.19-20. Also, Marie Baker, a member of the Regina Aboriginal Writer’s Group, suggests that, “Indians want to share their stories, but they don’t need anyone to write for them.” M. Baker, “Stealing Native Stories,” *Briarpatch*, (March 1990).

19. This is not the same as interest group politics. This cultural agonistics is not strictly electoral politics, but also a politics of identity. Also see Victor Burgin, The End of Art Theory: Criticism and Postmodernity (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1986), especially pp. 39-42.

20. Often critics do not argue from within a postmodern framework. Yet, they are often highly sensitive to effects of postmodern transformations in educational discourse. Thomas Fleming, for example, (co-author of A Legacy for Learners, the report published by the British Columbia Royal Commission in 1988), suggests that "the political and social manifesto that has guided policy decisions during the past century has become intellectually tattered and no longer commands public support" and that school and government leaders "appear to be without any body of educational or social orthodoxy, upon which they can base policies or program decisions." T. Fleming, "From the Common School Triumphant to the School of the Millennium," paper presented to Langley School Administrators' Conference, Vancouver, February 23, 1990.


24. What is actually being promoted here is the continuous creation and circulation of "bits of information" that must be transmitted (through teachers or fibre optic wires) and received (by students or computer banks) and quickly disposed of (in action or updating). A corollary to this feature of the information society is the control of access to information. See J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition; and Stacy Palmer, "Reagan's Push to Limit Access to Information Assailed in New Report," Chronicle of Higher Education, March 30, 1988.

25. John W. Murphy, "Computerization, Postmodern Epistemology, and


35. This term refers to the organizing structure which permits the conversation. See also Nancy Hartsock, "Rethinking Modernism: Minority vs. Majority

36. Foucault writes, "There are two meanings to the word subject: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to." M. Foucault, "The Subject and Power," in Herbert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, 2nd Edition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 212.


38. The Foucault Reader, p. 38.


40. The Foucault Reader, p. 46.

41. The Foucault Reader, p. 46.

42. See for example Mas'ud Zavarzadeh and Donald Morton, "(Post)modern Critical Theory and the Articulations of Critical Pedagogies," College Literature (forthcoming).

43. The Foucault Reader, p. 41.


45. The Foucault Reader, p. 46 (emphasis added).

☐ ONE Year $30.00  
☐ TWO Years $55.00  
☐ Check enclosed (payable to Caddo Gap Press)  
☐ Bill me with the first issue.

Name: ____________________________
Institution: _______________________
Address: __________________________
City: __________________ State: _______ Zip: _______

Mail to: CADDOP PRESS
1411 W. Covell Blvd., Suite 106-305
Davis, California 95616
The following scholars have served as reviewers of manuscripts for Educational Foundations during 1990. The editors and publisher thank them for their service in this capacity:

Philip Altbach, State University of New York, Buffalo
Richard Altenbaugh, Northern Illinois University
Michael Apple, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Rebecca Barr, National Louis University
Anne Bauer, University of Cincinnati
Jeff Beaudry, St. John’s University
Bruce Beezer, North Carolina State University
Kathleen Bennett, University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Ann Berlak, New College of California
Marvin Berlowitz, University of Cincinnati
Edward Berman, University of Louisville
Sari Biklen, Syracuse University
Janet Bobango, University of Cincinnati
Janet Bohren, University of Cincinnati
Eric Bredo, University of Virginia
Deborah Britzman, State University of New York, Binghamton
Joan Burstyn, Syracuse University
Lantham Camblin, University of Cincinnati
Malcolm B. Campbell, Bowling Green State University
James Carper, University of South Carolina
Patricia Carter, University of Connecticut
Louis Castenell, University of Cincinnati
Shirley Clark, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis-St. Paul
James Coleman, University of Chicago
Roger Collins, University of Cincinnati
Catherine Cornbleth, State University of New York, Buffalo
James Covert, Memorial University of Newfoundland
Concha Delgado-Gaitan, University of California, Davis
Joseph DeVitis, State University of New York, Binghamton
Alan DeYoung, University of Kentucky
Erskin Dottin, University of West Florida
Max Eckstein, Queens College
Margaret Eisenhart, University of Colorado, Boulder
REVIEWERS

Chris Eisele, Illinois State University
Fenwick English, University of Cincinnati
Joyce Epstein, Johns Hopkins University
Frederick Erickson, University of Pennsylvania
Mark Felter, Department of Education, State of California
Walter Farrell, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee
Karen Gallagher, University of Cincinnati
James Garrison, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Jane Gaskell, University of British Columbia
James Giarelli, Rutgers University
Hendrik Gideonse, University of Cincinnati
Mark B. Ginsburg, University of Pittsburgh
Judith Goetz, University of Georgia
Beth Goldstein, University of Kentucky
Carl Grant, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Maxine Greene, Teachers College, Columbia University
Nancy Greenman, University of South Florida
Dwight Hare, Mississippi State University
G. A. Hess, Chicago Public Schools
Dave Hill, West Sussex Institute of Higher Education
Thomas Hoffer, Northern Illinois University
Robert Houston, University of Houston
Judith James, University of Cincinnati
Erwin V. Johanningmeier, University of South Florida
Howard Johnston, University of South Florida
William Johnston, University of North Carolina
Alan H. Jones, Caddo Gap Press
Calvin Jones, ABT Associates
Sheila Jones, University of Cincinnati
Faustine C. Jones-Wilson, Howard University
Lilian Katz, University of Illinois
Gail Kelly, State University of New York, Buffalo
Ken Kempner, University of Oregon
Sally Kilgore, Emory University
Nancy King, Towson State University
Wendy Kohli, State University of New York, Binghamton
Patti Lather, Ohio State University
Mary Leach, Ohio State University
Glorianne M. Leck, Youngstown State University
Patric Leedom, University of Cincinnati
Robert Leight, Northern Illinois University
Yvonna Lincoln, Vanderbilt University
Dan Liston, Thayer High School
Christopher J. Lucas, University of Missouri, Columbia
Bruce Luskie, University of Rochester
Aleta You Mastny, Rutgers University
Jane Roland Martin, University of Massachusetts, Boston
Edward McClellan, Indiana University
Maureen McCormack, Eastern Michigan University
Peter McLaren, Miami University
Mary Metz, University of Wisconsin, Madison
George Noblit, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Nel Noddings, Stanford University
John Ogbu, University of California, Berkeley
Evelina Orteza y Miranda, University of Calgary
Ralph Page, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana
Caroline Persell, New York University
Hugh Petrie, State University of New York, Buffalo
Denis Philliips, Stanford University
Shirley Piazza, Union College
Judy Pickle, Northern Illinois University
Jeanne Pietig, Eastern Michigan University
William T. Pink, National Louis University
Richard Pratt, Ohio State University
David Purpel, University of North Carolina, Greensboro
Richard Quantz, Miami University
John Ralph, Department of Education, Washington
John Martin Rich, University of Texas, Austin
Gerald Reagan, Ohio State University
Thomas Romberg, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Anthony Rud, North Carolina Center for the Advancement of Teaching
Mara Sapon-Shevin, North Dakota State University
Rita S. Saslaw, University of Akron
Guy Senese, Northern Illinois University
Svi Shapiro, University of North Carolina
Christine Shea, West Virginia University
Robert R. Sherman, University of Florida
Lee Shulman, Stanford University
Olga Skorapa, Miami University
Robert Slavin, Johns Hopkins University
Peter Sola, Howard University
Jonas Soltis, Teachers College, Columbia University
Dolores Stegelin, University of Cincinnati
Alan Tom, University of Arizona
Steven Tozer, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana
Herbet Walberg, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana
Cynthia Wallat, Florida State University
Michael Washington, Northern Kentucky University
John Weidman, University of Pittsburgh
Kathleen Weiler, Harvard University
Randall Wells, University of Louisville
Philip Wexler, University of Rochester
George Wood, Ohio University
Julia Wrigley, University of California, Los Angeles
Bob Yinger, University of Cincinnati
George Yonge, University of California, Davis
Ken Zeichner, University of Wisconsin, Madison
Nancy Zimpher, Ohio State University
American Educational Studies Association

Officers
Robert R. Sherman, President (University of Florida)
Glorianne M. Leek, Past President (Youngstown State University)
Lois Weis, President-Elect (SUNY-Buffalo)
Jeannie Pietig, Vice President (Eastern Michigan University)
Eric Ebeling, Secretary (University of Maryland)
Rao H. Lindsay, Treasurer (University of Maryland)

Executive Council
Terms Ending in 1991:
   Susan Douglas Franzosa (University of New Hampshire)
   Mark B. Ginsburg (University of Pittsburgh)
   Christine M. Shea (West Virginia University)
Terms Ending in 1992:
   Margaret Gillett (McGill University)
   Corinne Glesne (University of Vermont)
   Michael S. Katz (San Jose State University)
Terms Ending in 1993:
   Eric Brede (University of Virginia)
   William T. Pink (National College of Education)
   Rita S. Saslaw (University of Akron)

Staff
Richard LaBreque, Editor of Educational Studies (University of Kentucky)
Harvey Neufeldt, Managing Editor of Educational Studies (Tennessee Technical University)
Kathryn M. Borman, Co-Editor of Educational Foundations (University of Cincinnati)
Patricia O'Reilly, Co-Editor of Educational Foundations (University of Cincinnati)
Harvey Neufeldt, Editor of AESA News and Comment (Tennessee Tech University)
Patrick Socoski, Program Coordinator (West Virginia University)
Bryan Deever, Book Exhibit Coordinator (Georgia Southern University)
Chris Eisele, Historian (Illinois State University)