A discussion of language policy and planning in developing nations with diverse student populations focuses on the role of language in education. Through review of the literature, history, and case studies, the relationship between language policy and the integration of ethnolinguistic minorities is examined. The first chapter surveys language-related issues in developing countries, including the instrumental and sentimental dimensions of language use, bilingualism and multilingualism, and three approaches to language: as problem, as resource, and as a right. Chapter 2 examines nation-building strategies often used by political authorities in developing countries and their potential effects on policy formation. The third chapter looks at defining characteristics of bilingual education and the unique qualities of language policies for education in different countries. A subsequent chapter examines the relationship between language and ethnicity, particularly as they relate to individual and ethnic identity. Chapter 5 presents case studies of the situations in Peru, Yugoslavia, and Malaysia. The final chapter outlines a framework for language planning to facilitate economic modernization and sociopolitical development while allowing for preservation of ethnic identity. A 251-item bibliography is included. (MSE)
TOWARD A CONTEXT-SPECIFIC LANGUAGE POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH AN EMPHASIS ON LANGUAGE-IN-EDUCATION

A Thesis
Presented to
the Faculty of the School of Intercultural Studies
Department of TESOL and Applied Linguistics
Biola University

in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts in Applied Linguistics

by
Martin Trent Chandler
May 1992
ABSTRACT

TOWARD A CONTEXT-SPECIFIC LANGUAGE POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WITH AN EMPHASIS ON LANGUAGE-IN-EDUCATION

Martin Trent Chandler

The question of what language(s) to use for instructional purposes in schools with a linguistically diverse student population has long been a focal point of debate among those who have an interest in language-in-education policy decisions. Dissension over this and other language-related issues has led to what many scholars perceive to be an insoluble dilemma for linguistically diverse developing countries: Should language policies be legislated by central governing authorities, or decided upon by the individual language communities which make up the society in question?

This thesis will investigate the relationship between language policy and the integration of ethnolinguistic minorities in developing countries, with emphasis upon language-in-education planning. Language planning which combines elements of all three main language planning orientations will be proposed as a means to facilitate the integration of ethnolinguistic minorities.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

ABSTRACT ................................................................. iii

LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................... ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ................................................... xi

INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 1

- Sociolinguistics and Language Planning ......................... 3
- Nation-Building, Modernization, and Development ............... 6
- Language-in-Education .............................................. 7
- Language and Ethnicity ............................................ 8
  - Theories of Ethnicity ........................................... 8
    - Culturally Derived Theories ................................. 8
    - Socially Derived Theories ................................. 9
- Case Studies ..................................................... 9
- Toward a Context-Specific Language Policy ..................... 10

CHAPTER 1: LANGUAGE ISSUES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES .... 11

- The Instrumental and Sentimental Dimensions of Language Use ... 11
  - Language and Society ......................................... 11
  - Language and Culture ........................................ 12
  - The Dialectics of Instrumental and Sentimental
    Attachments to Language ................................... 13
- Planning Language ................................................. 15
- Bilingualism and Multilingualism ................................ 16
  - The Origins of Societal Multilingualism ..................... 17
    - Migration .................................................. 18
    - Imperialism ............................................... 18
    - Federation ............................................... 19
    - Border Areas ............................................. 21
    - Caveats ................................................... 21
  - Multilingualism and Conflict ................................ 21
- Language Planning ............................................... 23
  - Language-as-Problem ......................................... 23
  - Language-as-Resource ....................................... 24
  - Language-as-Right .......................................... 26
  - The Dialectics of Language Planning ........................ 28
### CHAPTER 2: LANGUAGE AND NATION-BUILDING

- **Nation-Building** ................................................................. 30
- **Nation and State** ............................................................... 32
- **Nationism and Nationalism** .................................................. 32
- **Nation-Building and Identity Formation** .................................. 34
- **Progress** .................................................................................. 35
  - **Modernization and Development** .......................................... 37
    - **Western notions** ............................................................... 37
    - **The Relativity of Modernization and Development** ............... 38
    - **Differences Between Modernization and Development** .......... 38
  - **The Dialectics of Progress** ................................................... 40
- **Modernization, Development, and Language Planning** ............... 42
- **Linguistic Diversity and Development** ..................................... 42
  - **Evidence for a Negative Correlation** .................................... 42
  - **Criticism of Negative Correlation Studies** ............................. 43
  - **The Challenge to Formulate Language Policies** ........................ 44
    - **Which Can Foster Modernization and Development** .............. 44
- **The Social Psychology of Language** ........................................ 45
  - **Speech Accommodation Theory** ......................................... 46
    - **Similarity Attraction Theory** ......................................... 47
    - **Social Exchange Theory** ................................................. 47
    - **Causal Attribution Theory** ............................................. 47
    - **Intergroup Distinctiveness Theory** .................................. 47
  - **Language and SAT** ............................................................. 48

### CHAPTER 3: LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION

- **Education** ................................................................................. 50
- **Language, Education, and Society** .......................................... 50
- **Bilingual Education** ............................................................... 52
  - **The Problem of Definition** .................................................. 52
  - **Purposes of Bilingual Education** .......................................... 53
  - **Classification of Bilingual Education** .................................... 53
  - **Types of Bilingual Education** .............................................. 54
    - **Enrichment** .................................................................. 54
    - **Transitional and Maintenance** .......................................... 55
  - **Bilingualism** ....................................................................... 57
    - **Arguments for Transition** ................................................ 58
    - **Arguments for Maintenance** .............................................. 59
    - **Additive and Subtractive Bilingualism** ................................. 59
  - **Comparative Bilingual Education** ......................................... 60
  - **Bilingual Education Research** .............................................. 62
CHAPTER 4: LANGUAGE AND ETHNICITY

The Ethnic Phenomenon ........................................ 81
The Growth of Ethnic Conflict ................................ 81
Ethnicity Defined .................................................. 82
  Classic Primordialism ........................................ 84
  Circumstantialist Views of Ethnicity ...................... 85
  The Purpose of Ethnic Attachments ....................... 87
  The Dialectics of Ethnicity .................................. 87
Issues in Identity Formation .................................. 90
  Individual Identity .......................................... 91
  Social and Ethnic Identity ................................ 92
Related Ethnic Phenomena ..................................... 93
  Ethnic Mobilization ........................................ 93
  Ethnic Boundaries ........................................... 94
Ethnicity and Language ....................................... 95
  The Relationship Between Ethnic Identity and Language ........................................ 95
  Language Shift and Stable vs. Unstable Bilingualism .... 97
  The Intergroup Model .................................... 99
    Social Identity Theory .................................. 99
    Ethnolinguistic Vitality ................................ 100
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter 5: Case Studies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White and Mestizo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerindians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical Antecedents to Linguistic Diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Inca Empire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Colonial Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Independence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Current Situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Yugoslavia              | 118 |
| Ethnic Groups           | 118 |
| Historical Antecedents to Linguistic Diversity | 119 |
| Formation of the Nation | 119 |
| The Rise of Communism   | 121 |
| The Current Situation   | 124 |
| Conclusion              | 128 |

| Malaysia                | 131 |
| Ethnic Groups           | 131 |
| Historical Antecedents of Linguistic Diversity | 132 |
| Colonialism             | 132 |
| Post-Independence       | 134 |
| The Current Situation   | 137 |
| Conclusion              | 137 |

<p>| Chapter 6: Toward a Context-Specific Language Policy | 139 |
| Definitions                                           | 139 |
| Integration                                           | 139 |
| Pluralism                                             | 140 |
| Assimilation                                          | 142 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LIST OF FIGURES</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1    Instrumental and sentimental poles of</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>language use</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2    The dialectics of language use</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3    The three major orientations to language</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>planning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4    The dialectics of language planning</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5    Nation/nationalism and state/nationism</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poles of nation-building strategy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6    The dialectics of nation-building strategy</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7    The modernization and development poles</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of progress</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8    The dialectics of progress</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9    The transitional and maintenance poles</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of bilingual education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10   The dialectics of bilingual education</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11   The common underlying proficiency (CUP)</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and separate underlying proficiency (SUP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>models of bilingual cognitive functioning</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12   The primordialism and circumstantialism</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>poles of ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13   The dialectics of ethnicity</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14   Peru, position in South America</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15   Yugoslavia, position in Eastern Europe</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16   Language policy formulation and</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>implementation in Yugoslavia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17   The language planning process and</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>political structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18   Malaysia, position in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
19  The pluralism and assimilation poles of integration ............... 143

20  The dialectics of integration ............................................. 148

21  Congruent and incongruent orientations toward centripetal and centrifugal trends of subordinates as viewed by themselves and superordinates ............................................ 152

22  Essential components of language policy formulation in linguistically diverse populations ............................. 155
I wish to thank all of the people in the office who have shown grace to me as I've worked on this thesis. I am especially grateful to Paul & Jeannie M. for allowing me the freedom to pursue further education, to Mike C. for his computer wizardry in helping me with the graphics, to Jim W. for his helpful hints on how to get the most out of a computer, and to my wife and Holly S. for keeping me company while I worked nights adding the finishing touches.
To my wife, best friend, and fellow-pilgrim
INTRODUCTION

What language(s) to use in education in linguistically diverse populations has long been a concern of government officials, applied linguists, educators, parents of school age children, and others who have a legitimate interest in language-in-education decision-making (Ingram 1990). Unfortunately, disagreement among these various constituents is the norm rather than the exception. This thrusts language-related issues from being mere academic concerns into the realms of social science, economics, and politics.

The language factor is especially salient in multilingual societies, i.e., societies in which two or more languages are used to perform communicative functions (Fasold 1984; Nida & Wonderly 1971). Although multilingual societies are found throughout the world, the problems which accompany linguistic diversity tend to be greater in number and severity in developing countries than those in more developed countries (Connor 1972; Fishman, Ferguson, & Das Gupta 1968; Gonzales 1977; Kennedy 1984b; Mackey 1984). Many scholars argue that the profound degree of linguistic heterogeneity found in most developing countries poses a great threat to their economic modernization and socio-political development (Connor 1972; Lieberson 1981b; McRae 1983; Pool 1972).
Throughout history developing states have been obliged to respond to the questions invoked by the multilingualism within their borders. These questions include:

1. Will the progress of the state be best served by tolerating (or even supporting) a certain degree of linguistic diversity, or by planning for linguistic homogeneity?

2. What effect does linguistic diversity have on social and economic stability?

3. In planning for linguistic homogeneity or diversity, what are the factors which should be considered?

4. Is it best to ask all people to conform to the language of dominant groups or to impose a language other than the one spoken by members of the dominant group on all groups?

How a particular country responds to these questions can help determine the pace of modernization and development and the quality of relations between subordinate language and dominant language groups.

From the perspective of dominant language groups, the increase in language-related problems has been due largely to the growing strain placed upon language, the primary vehicle of communication, as linguistically heterogeneous peoples of the world have become more involved with one another (Deutch & Foltz 1963). Some people believe that so-called "primitive" languages are not able to handle the complexities of modern communication.

However, most modern theories of language argue that all languages are able to withstand any demand its speakers can possibly make of it, i.e., all languages have the inherent potential of meeting any and all communication
needs (Hill 1964; Hymes 1964). According to these theories, the problem would appear to be with the users of language and not with language itself. In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the role of language in the modern world, therefore, it may be necessary to account for the tension infused into the linguistic equation by humans (Edwards 1981; Fishman 1977; Haarman 1986).

This thesis will examine the relationship between a particular country's language policy (especially language-in-education policy) and the integration of its ethnolinguistic minorities, with particular emphasis on developing countries. One of the major premises of this thesis is that the nature of the relationship between language and integration demands that the latter be addressed simultaneous to the pursuit of the former, rather than preceding or following it. The skillful handling of language-related issues is requisite to building social harmony, without which the pace of modernization and development may be significantly retarded.

Sociolinguistics and Language Planning

The practice of planning language is not new. Early recorded history reveals that political authorities in ancient civilizations implemented some form of language policy to ease the burden of governing populations of people that spoke more than one language. *Language planning* refers to "deliberate language change . . . in the systems of a language code or speaking or both that
are planned by organizations" (Rubin 1984, 4). Problem-solving has been the main activity of language planners throughout its history (Ruiz 1988). Sociolinguistics, the study of correlations between languages and societies (Hudson 1980; Hymes 1974), has helped language planners in multilingual societies develop a greater appreciation for the value of creating a language policy which is congruent with social reality (Edwards 1981; Trueba 1979).

However, it is still common for a country's language policy to be formulated with apparently little or no regard for prevailing social patterns or the interests of all its individuals and groups. The result can be the implementation of language policies that exacerbate rather than reduce tension between various ethnocultural groups.

The formulation of an adequate and effective language policy is a slippery thing. Some scholars may overestimate the importance of language in interpreting or predicting economic, societal, and political outcomes (Apter 1987; Eastman 1984; C. B. Paulston 1975). Certain scholars maintain that language is the most salient factor in defining an individual's social identity (Smolicz 1984; Szepe 1984). Schermerhorn (1970) believes that this perception leads a society to attempt to realign itself around cultural features in order to integrate its ethnic minorities. However, he goes on to argue, only structural realignment can lead to true integration (see Chapter 6). In the words of McClain (1959), "the danger of oversimplification has been given impetus by that natural bent of the
human mind, best exemplified in the systematic philosophers, which impels men to search for a single principle or idea that will explain everything else" (3).

On the other hand, some scholars may underestimate the significance of language in the social milieu. They argue that language is essentially pragmatic and economic; therefore, society should adopt whatever language is most efficient and effective in achieving societal goals (Brass 1985; Malinowski 1956).

There is a third band of scholars, however, who suggest that language is only one of the more important determinants of an ethnic group's identity (Fishman 1989; Haarman 1986; Lambert 1990). While admitting that the knot between language and ethnicity can be untied, Fishman (1989) quickly adds that "[this untying] does not change the phenomenological truth that the link [between language and ethnicity] is indissoluble" (180).

In order to avoid the errors associated with either over- or underestimating the role of language in society, some scholars advise against attempting to disentangle language issues from the social fabric in which they function (Wagner, Spratt, & Ezzaki 1989). However, in view of the prodigious escalation in inter-group tensions around the world in recent years--many with language issues as their source--such counsel implies that sociolinguistics can play little role in helping to redeem a society fractured by inter-ethnic conflict. This thesis will argue otherwise.

Chapter 1 will provide a survey of language-related issues in developing countries. Following Ruiz (1988), the specific language planning orientations of
(1) language-as-problem, (2) language-as-resource, and (3) language-as-right will be examined.

Nation-Building, Modernization, and Development

It can be argued that developing countries are more concerned with how to build strong states (characterized by political, economic, and social stability) than they are with how to solve their countries’ language problems. The corresponding nation-building strategies adopted by developing countries often employ language planning that precludes dialogue between dominant and subordinate language groups. Instead, such strategies tend to emphasize "the use of a common language, the practice of a common faith, and the obedience to a common law as the glory of the modern nation-state" (Francisse 1971, 15).

It is commonly acknowledged that the pace of modernization and development is usually impeded by civil or ethnic conflict (Choy 1977). Though scholars tend to disagree as to whether or not uniformity/unity (as opposed to diversity) should be the final goal of modernization and development, few would argue that harmony between people, at least, is a goal worth aiming for. The question that must be asked, then, is why the last 25 years has produced more ethnic and civil strife than any quarter century on record.

Chapter 2 examines some nation-building strategies frequently employed by political authorities in developing countries and their potential effects on the formulation of language policies. It will then explore several key concepts
that language planners in developing countries should be aware of in order to create language policies which are congruent with goals of both economic modernization and socio-political development, i.e., policies which can accommodate the desires of all people(s) whom they affect (Weinreich 1988).

Language-in-Education

An analysis of the juxtaposition of language and nation-building will also include discussion of a third variable: education. It has been noted that education is inextricably tied to the language issue (Cummins 1981; Cziko & Troike 1984; Fishman 1980; Hartford, Valdman, & Foster 1981; Siguan & Mackey 1987).

Whereas language-in-education planning for settings in both developed and developing countries can benefit from research which is specific to one, it may be deleterious to a developing country's economic and socio-political stability to saddle itself with a language policy which is based on socio-cultural conditions of a more developed society (Zhangtai & Jianmin 1990). Unfortunately, this is what frequently happens when developing countries adopt either voluntarily or through economic coercion the language policies of more developed countries. Chapter 3 will look at some of the defining characteristics of bilingual education and the unique complexion of language-in-education policies in developing countries.
Language and Ethnicity

There is generally more to linguistic heterogeneity than meets the eye. A diversity of languages inevitably means a diversity of ethnic groups, a term used to describe a group of people who share (or perceive that they share) a common history, language, religion, identity, or any combination thereof (Barth 1969; Keyes 1981; Royce 1982; Schermerhorn 1970).

Theories of Ethnicity

Theories of ethnicity can be divided into two categories: (1) culturally determined theories and (2) socially determined theories (C. Williams 1982).

Culturally Derived Theories

Individuals who view ethnic identity as a derivative of culture perceive ethnic tendencies to be primordial in nature, i.e., determined at birth by the givens of social existence (Geertz 1963). These givens would include such things as sex, locality and time of birth, physiological features that are marks of biological inheritance, and social descent or links with forbears (e.g., language or religion) (Geertz 1963; Keyes 1981).

Scholars holding to cultural interpretations of ethnicity contend that members of an ethnic group are spurred on to create, protect, revise, and retain their ethnic identity in the face of what they perceive to be assaults on their traditional ways of life coming from forces outside of the ethnic group (Geertz 1963; Shils 1957).
Socially Derived Theories

Contrastingly, socially derived theories of ethnicity (sometimes called circumstantial) view ethnic tendencies as malleable in the face of inevitable societal and cultural change (Brass 1976; Nordlinger 1972; R. Paulston 1976a). According to proponents of this view, ethnic groups agree to change when they believe their best interests are being served, but are resistant to change when they perceive they are being treated unfairly by another group or other groups.

Socially derived theories of ethnicity imply that ethnicity is a variable open to the manipulation of an individual or group of individuals. Ethnicity, they say, can be manipulated either from within the ethnic group for the purpose of ethnic mobilization, (i.e., the voluntary movement of an ethnic group towards the achievement of some desired goal), or from outside the group for the purpose of forced (or unforced) assimilation or segregation (De Vos 1975; Nagel & Olzak 1986).

Chapter 4 will investigate the relationship between language and ethnicity. Stress will be given to the contrasting nature of culturally and socially derived theories of ethnicity. A theory of language that takes into account the salience of this relationship will be suggested.

Case Studies

Chapter 5 will present case studies focusing on the unique socio-historical contexts which have given rise to ethnic and linguistic diversity in the countries
of Peru, Yugoslavia, and Malaysia. Consideration will be given to the way in which language policies, particularly language-in-education policies, have affected the pursuit of modernization and development and the quality of inter-group relations produced by such policies.

Toward a Context-Specific Language Policy

Among social scientists in developed Western countries, it is currently in vogue to promote linguistic and cultural pluralism. Pluralism is a doctrine or theory of ethnic relations that affirms as morally good the freedom of members of ethnic groups to exercise their ethnicity (Haugen 1987). Accordingly, some scholars argue that cultural and linguistic heterogeneity is cause for "celebration," and that the expression of one's ethnicity should be considered an inalienable right (Fishman 1985).

It may be unfortunate that many developing countries have adopted Western models of pluralism without sharing Western countries' history of development. This does not imply that pluralist models of integration should be altogether rejected by developing countries, only that Western models may prove grossly inadequate for them. Such models may have unanticipated and revolutionary implications for the creation of language policies, as well as undesirable political side-effects. Chapter 6 will propose a framework for language planning which can facilitate economic modernization and socio-political development while allowing for the preservation of ethnic identity.
CHAPTER 1
LANGUAGE ISSUES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The Instrumental and Sentimental Dimensions of Language Use

Language and Society

Among sociolinguists language is thought to be an important vehicle of social order (Penalosa 1981; Fasold 1984). Malinowski (1956) suggests that the function of language is essentially pragmatic, i.e., to direct, control, and correlate human activity. He de-emphasizes the symbolic role of language believing it to be relatively insignificant. Malinowski is representative of people who hold to what Kelman (1972) calls an instrumental view of language. According to this view, language is merely an instrument used by individuals to advance their economic, social, and/or political standing.

Although it has been universally acknowledged that human speech serves a function similar to that of animal cries in that it helps to organize social behavior, many social scientists contend that language is also an important symbol of personal and group identity (Gudykunst 1987; Penalosa 1981). They emphasize what Kelman (1972) calls the sentimental dimensions of language use (Fishman 1977; 1989; Pattanayak 1986; Smolicz 1984). Sentimental attachment to one’s mother tongue refers to the emotional ties an individual feels toward his
or her own language. The reason most often given for the strength of this attachment is that an individual's "inherit" their mother tongue from their ancestors (Fishman 1977).

**Language and Culture**

The origin of the notion that language and culture are intimately related is usually attributed to the American linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf. The *Sapir-Whorf hypothesis* postulates that the structure of the particular language(s) people speak determines the way one perceives the world around them. Based on this theory, Sapir (1929) says, "human beings . . . are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression of their society" (207). In other words, the linguistic expression of phenomena in a given culture is circumscribed and delimited by the language it uses.

The difference between the instrumental and sentimental views of language use becomes more discernable when one considers the cultural aspects of language. Language is not only a vehicle of social order, but it is also a conveyor and repository of culture (Jacobs & Beer 1985; Fishman 1977). To those who perceive language to be principally instrumental, the relationship between language and culture is arbitrary. The particular language used to encode cultural information, they would say, is irrelevant.
On the other hand, to a person who sees language as an important
dimension of personal and group identity the relationship between language and
culture is highly significant. It is the conviction of some scholars that the
continuation of a given culture is directly tied to the continuation of that
culture's language (Fishman 1980; 1989; Szepe 1984).

The Dialectics of Instrumental and Sentimental Attachments to Language

In the past, sentimental and instrumental attachments to language have
been perceived as opposite poles of the continuum of language use (see Fig. 1).
Thus, theories of language often emphasized one set of attachments while
denying the legitimacy and authenticity of the other.

Fig. 1 Instrumental and sentimental poles of language use
Among some contemporary sociolinguists there is a growing conviction that language is animate, possessing a life of its own. It should not, they argue, be treated as a mere tool or an instrument which can be wielded apart from sentimental considerations (Haugen 1971). At the same time, however, many of these same researchers recognize that language is often used for economic, social, and political purposes which are pragmatic in nature (Fasold 1984). This dual nature of an individual’s use of language has led many scholars to incorporate elements of both sentimental and instrumental attachments into their theories of language (though the weight given to each tends to vary). In fact, argues Kelman (1972), sentimental and instrumental attachments actually "feed" off of one another, possessing a dialectical relationship (see Fig. 2).

Fig. 2 The dialectics of language use
Planning Language

Unfortunately, many of the people responsible for creating a given country’s national language policies do not base their decisions on modern theories of language. This is especially true in developing countries. Instead of attending to the notion that sentimental and instrumental dimensions of language use support each other, language policies in developing countries are frequently generated almost entirely by extra-linguistic considerations, such as economics or political ideology (C. B. Paulston 1974; 1975). This usually results in exaggerating the aforementioned dichotomy between sentimental and instrumental dimensions of language use. When language planners view instrumental and sentimental attachments as dichotomous, language policies are usually skewed toward the instrumental pole of language use.

In countries that use few languages to conduct verbal negotiations between people or groups of people this pattern may not be readily apparent to the untrained eye. But in countries that utilize several different languages to perform verbal transactions, the instrumental bias of language policy becomes conspicuous even to the layman.

In order to better predict, evaluate, and treat the problems that can arise in societies marked by extreme linguistic diversity, it may be beneficial to understand the relationship between instrumental and sentimental dimensions of language use. The salience of this relationship, however, cannot be fully
appreciated until one examines the historical antecedents of a particular society’s linguistic diversity (Lewis 1985).

**Bilingualism and Multilingualism**

It is estimated that there are around 4000 living languages in the world (McRae 1983), but some estimates go as high as 6000 (Hudson 1980; Connor 1972). Assuming that there are 140 or more fully autonomous political units (i.e., countries) in the world today (Connor 1977), the average country has approximately 40 different languages spoken within its borders. In developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and eastern Europe, this number may be substantially higher.

The vast number of languages spoken around the world and within countries has prompted scholars to recognize the phenomenon known as bilingualism or multilingualism, i.e., a person’s ability to speak two or more languages (Fasold 1984). Few bi/multilingual individuals, however, can speak more than one language with equal fluency. Most restrict each language spoken to specific domains, with one language tending to predominate over the other(s).

*Diglossia⁴* is the term used to describe situations where an entire society recognizes the exclusive use of certain languages in certain domains of speaking (Ferguson 1972). In many parts of Africa, for example, people live under what is called a *three-language structure*. An individual uses one language when speaking with members of the in-group (i.e., relatives and friends), a second,
commonly called a trade language, when speaking with members of the out-
group (i.e., those people outside of one’s community), and a third in higher
education (Nida & Wonderly 1971). Ferguson (1972) says that this specializa-
tion of function is one of the important features of diglossia. Whereas the use
of one language may be appropriate only in certain situations, another language
may be appropriate only in other situations, with a small overlap where it would
be appropriate to use either language.

Southern Asia is an area of the world characterized by extreme multilin-
gualism. In India, for example, it is common to come across schools where
classmates communicate with each other in one language, teaching is conducted
in another, school materials are written in a third language, and homework is
done in a fourth (Hamers & Blanc 1989). India has over 14 official languages
(i.e., languages given special recognition by the government), with the total
number of languages estimated to be over 16,000 (Johnstone 1986). For this
reason, some have called India a "linguistic madhouse" (Khubchandani 1983).

The Origins of Societal Multilingualism

Fasold (1984) identifies four predominant patterns which historically have
engendered multilingual societies:

(1) migration
(2) imperialism
(3) federation (voluntary or forced)
(4) the mingling of peoples living around borders

Migration. Migration can be of two types. The first type involves a large group expanding into a contiguous area, taking control of smaller sociocultural groups in the process. Subordinate group(s) can either assimilate into the majority culture or seek to maintain their own group identity, thereby creating a potential problem for the newly arrived dominant group. An example of this first process was illustrated in the westward migration of descendants of British colonists in America. Some of the Native Americans that were overrun by these early American settlers assimilated into the new culture, whereas a large segment of the population has remained unassimilated to this day (Leap 1981).

A second kind of migration occurs when relatively small numbers of the members of an ethnic group move into a territory already under the control of another group. Immigrants arrive speaking the language of their own group. But because they usually come to the new territory voluntarily they are often quick to assimilate (linguistically and otherwise). The United States with its many immigrants from Europe, Asia, Latin America, and other parts of the world serves as a prime example of this second kind of migration.

Imperialism. Imperialism is used by Fasold to refer to several different phenomena: colonization, annexation, and economic imperialism. In all imperialistic processes control of a geographical area, and consequently control over the people who inhabit the area, is accomplished by relatively few members
of an outside group. Colonization occurs when a foreign power seeking to expand its dominion travels a relatively long distance to exercise authority over an area, whereas annexation takes place when a foreign power merely absorbs neighboring territory and the people in the path of its border expansion. The former is exemplified by early Spanish, British, Portuguese, or Dutch settlements in Africa, Asia, and South America. The latter is well-illustrated by the Soviet Union’s absorption of the Baltic Republics after World War II.

Finally, economic imperialism occurs when a foreign language gains influence in a country strictly by merit of that country’s economic dependence on the country from which the language originated. Although a foreign country never takes military action in achieving linguistic hegemony in cases of economic imperialism, it nonetheless ends up exercising considerable political authority in economically dominated countries (Altbach 1987; Santiago 1982). The use of English in many developing countries such as Nigeria, the Philippines, and China, provides an example of the link between language and what is sometimes labelled economic imperialism. The terms economic imperialism and neo-colonialism refer to the practice of using economic aid as a type of leverage in order to pressure developing countries into implementing policies favorable to the donor country (Altbach & Selvaratnam 1989; Santiago 1982; Watson 1982).

Federation. Federation is the union of diverse ethnic groups or nationalities under the political control of one state. This can be either voluntary, as in
the case of Switzerland, or involuntary, as in many parts of Africa. In Nigeria, for example, the binding together of many ethnolinguistic groups into a single political unit was a creation of British colonialism rather than being an indigenous development. Since Nigerian independence in 1960, this amalgamation of peoples which the British built lives on in the form of an uneasy federation (Affolayan & Bamgose 1979).

It is common for language policy-makers in developing countries to cite Switzerland's achievements as an example of the merits of federation in the midst of linguistic and ethnic diversity. But they often fail to mention that it took the Swiss several centuries of conflict before they were able to achieve a relatively harmonious situation (McCrae 1983). Perhaps more significantly, however, the Swiss government did not try to force a federation on an unwilling people. Involuntary federation is far more common than voluntary federation in today's developing world. As in Nigeria, the prevalence of this situation tends to be seen as fall-out from the colonial experience (Royce 1982). During their experience under colonialism, many multilingual populations were held together by the external force of the colonial government. When these linguistically diverse populations gained their independence after the Second World War and suddenly found themselves needing to cooperate as a single political entity, they often concluded that force was the only way to maintain any semblance of national unity (Lieberson 1981b).
Border Areas. The fourth historical pattern that has given rise to societal multilingualism concerns border areas. Oftentimes, political boundaries do not correspond well with the distribution of ethnic and linguistic groups (Fishman 1968a). This is especially the case in many countries that have emerged from a colonial background. But it is also true of Canada, Germany, France, and many other Western countries that have established arbitrary borders for such purposes as national security and tax collection. Members of ethno-linguistic groups which straddle borders usually learn the tongue of the country in which they reside, as well as their own.

Caveats. Fasold (1984) cautions that these four patterns not be taken as hard and fast categories, such that every multilingual society be an example of one pattern and not the others. Rather, he says, they are historical strands that may overlap or be imperceptible from each other at various times.

Although this may leave room for interpretation, Fasold warns that failure to identify the historical source(s) of multilingualism in a given region could lead to the establishment of language policies which are counterproductive to the achievement of other societal goals. Similar warnings are given by Edwards (1990), Heath (1985), Mannheim (1984), and C. B. Paulston (1974; 1975; 1980).

Multilingualism and Conflict

Many scholars believe that a certain amount of conflict can be expected when trying to resolve language issues in any multilingual society (Das Gupta
1970; Esman 1973; Fishman 1968b; Horowitz 1985). However, they are usually quick to add that its intensity and duration will differ from society to society. For example, in multilingual societies subjected to colonialism, annexation, or forced federation where language policy was often imposed by force, conflict is often longer and of greater severity. On the other hand, societies characterized by patterns of immigration and voluntary federation or those where national boundaries conform well with cultural boundaries are frequently accompanied by less conflict (Lieberson 1981b). A possible reason for these phenomena, according to Fishman (1968a), is that, whereas the former situation is characteristic of an artificial division of language groups, the latter is typified by natural and indigenous cleavages.

Whereas some scholars see linguistic diversity as a hindrance to personal and national improvement, a curse which developing countries should diligently seek to eliminate (Bull 1964; Rustow 1967; Sibayan & Segovia 1979), others see multilingualism as a blessing that should be maintained, even at high cost (Fishman 1985; Haugen 1987; Saville-Troike & Troikey 1970; Pattanayak 1986). Their conviction is that whatever is natural must be preserved. A third group of scholars, however, feel that linguistic diversity is an exciting challenge, i.e., a naturally occurring phenomenon that man must and will overcome (Lewis 1985; Lieberson 1981a). Whether linguistic diversity is seen as a curse, a blessing, or a challenge, its existence has led to the widespread belief that language issues should be the subject of government planning.
Language Planning

Because linguists and other language scholars do not unanimously agree on a theory of language, language planning can best be thought of as an art rather than a science. Language planning, depending on one's orientation to language issues, can be defined in a variety of ways. An orientation refers to a complex of dispositions toward language and its role in society (Ruiz 1988).

Das Gupta (1972) calls language planning a "set of deliberate activities systematically designed to organize and develop the language resources of the community in an ordered schedule of time" (157). Fishman (1974) delimits language planning as "the organized pursuit of solutions to language problems, typically at the national level" (79). Ruiz (1988) identifies the three most prevalent orientations in language planning as: (1) language-as-problem, (2) language-as-resource, and (3) language-as-right see (see Fig. 3).

Language-as-Problem

Linguistic diversity has been blamed for such things as slowing down the implementation of a country's social and political reforms and hindering the pace of economic modernization (Kennedy 1984b). This indictment against a plurality of languages has served to make policy-makers in developing countries more aware of the importance of language planning in the overall development of their country.
In light of the potential threat that linguistic diversity poses to other governmental goals, many developing countries have adopted a language-as-problem orientation to language planning. Such orientations toward language planning are frequently carried out under the guise of nation-building strategies. Chapter 2 will examine the relationship between nation-building and language policies.

**Language-as-Resource**

The economic value of efficient communication is undeniable (Mannheim 1984; Phadnis 1989; Snider 1973). Some scholars reduce language to a mere economic commodity which, when used to one's advantage, can provide access to
a society's goods and services (Deutch & Foltz 1963; Jernudd & Sung-Hwan Jo 1985; Rustow 1967). They make the assumption that being understood by the speakers of a dominant language is the first step to social mobility for speakers of subordinate languages. Some language-as-resource proponents contend that an ability to speak the dominant language is the key to obtaining economic advancement (Ngu 1983; Sibayan & Segovia 1979).

Recently, however, the language-as-resource orientation has been applied to all languages, regardless of the status of its speakers. In the United States, for example, allegations of linguistic discrimination have risen dramatically in the last decade. In arguing that language is a slighted resource in the U.S., Fishman (1985) says, "A country that can afford to invest in outer space as a potential resource for mankind can also afford to invest a little in its own inner space and in the cultural resources that go unrecognized there" (4). He maintains that language is an important key to global understanding.

Treating language as a resource has also led to its being compared to other natural resources such as oil, water, timber, and the like. The recent thrust for natural resource conservation has been used as a rationale for the protection and promotion of minority languages.

A goal of the language preservation movement is to make language planners around the world more conscious of the sentimental dimensions of language use while not underestimating its instrumental value (Nadkarni 1977). Ruiz (1988), for example, lists some of the possible benefits of a society's
linguistic diversity as increased national security, better diplomatic relations, increased international trading, and social and educational gains. He claims that in the U.S., "meaningful language planning may not be possible without [a language-as-resource orientation to language planning]" (18). Language-as-resource orientations to language planning usually emphasize the value of language education in personal and national development. Chapter 3 will probe the relationship between language education and the language-as-resource orientation.

**Language-as-Right**

The language-as-right orientation to language planning implies that language use is a personal and ethnolinguistic group right. Macias suggests two kinds of language rights: (1) "the right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of language," and (2) "the right to use your language(s) in the activities of communal life" (quoted in Ruiz 1988, 11).

The word *right*, when used as a noun, can be defined as "power, privilege, etc., that belongs to a person by law, tradition, or nature." The same word, in its adjectival form, means "conforming with or conformable to justice, law, or morality" (Webster's New World Dictionary 1964, s.v.). Therefore, when someone claims that an individual has a right to something, he or she is invoking the idea that this entity is both lawful and moral.
Some individuals speak of the self-evident truth of linguistic self-determination (Szepe 1984). But, as Connor (1973) points out, people did not recognize self-determination of any kind to be a self-evident truth prior to the late 18th and early 19th centuries, and then only in Western countries. In light of Connor's observation it may be erroneous to interpret linguistic self-determination as having legal validity on a universal plane.

A thorough discussion of the supposed universal nature of human rights is beyond the scope of this thesis. It should be noted, however, that the word right has been understood in different ways both historically and geographically. Right and/or rights have always been a matter of cultural interpretation (Bull 1964; Triandis 1988; Donnelly 1989). An illustration of this is provided by Asmarom Lesesse when he writes:

[A] critical difference between African and western traditions concerns the importance of the human individual. In the liberal democracies of the western world the ultimate repository of rights is the human person. The individual is held in a virtually sacralized position. There is a perpetual, and in our view obsessive, concern with the dignity of the individual, his worth, personal autonomy and property . . .

If Africans were the sole authors of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they might have ranked the rights of communities above those of individuals, and they might have used a cultural idiom fundamentally different from the language in which the ideas are now formulated (quoted in Donnelly 1989, 58).

The previous statement implies that a language-as-right orientation to language planning may only receive partial acceptance in non-Western cultures. However, the escalation of inter-ethnic violence indicates that language may be
an important dimension of personal and group identity. Therefore, failure to allow for the linguistic expression of language minority peoples can adversely affected a country's pursuit of economic modernization and socio-political development. Chapter 4 will investigate the impact of ethnicity on the formulation of language policies and language-as-right orientations to language planning.

The Dialectics of Language Planning

Many scholars imply that the most effective way to preserve the tension between instrumental and sentimental dimensions of language use without denying the legitimacy of either is to adopt a dialectical approach to language planning, i.e., an approach that incorporates elements of language-as-problem, language-as-resource, and language-as-right orientations (Barndt 1980; Fishman 1971; C. B. Paulston 1974; 1984; Ruiz 1988). Fig. 4 illustrates the dialectics of language planning.

Jacobs & Beer (1985) claim that "language policy becomes the social glue through which . . . governments seek to bond these human fissures into a stable political and social whole" (1). Language has the potential to be a powerful tool for the integration of a linguistically diverse population. But if mishandled, it can become a major source of disintegration (Choy 1977; Cooper 1989; Kelman 1972). Chapter 6 will propose a way to combine elements of all three language planning orientations that can foster the integration of ethnolinguistic minorities.
Fig. 4  The dialectics of language planning
CHAPTER 2
LANGUAGE AND NATION-BUILDING

Perhaps the most dominant concern of policy-makers in developing countries is the formation of a strong, modern state, a state that can facilitate the economic modernization and socio-political development of the country. In order for language issues to receive the attention they warrant, therefore, they must be interrelated with contemporary conceptions of nation-building.

Nation-Building

Nation-building can be defined as "both the establishment and formation of the new state itself as a political entity, and the process creating viable degrees of unity, adaptation, achievement, and a sense of national identity among the people" (Bell & Freeman 1974). Nation-building in its classical sense involves the attempt to move a country from Gesellschaft (functional society) to Gemeinschaft (homogeneous community) (W. Bloom 1990).

The notion of nation-building dates back to 19th century Europe, when large empires were carved up into smaller geo-political units. The ideas and practices associated with European nation-building were resurrected after many developing countries gained their independence following World War II (Francisse 1971).
Popular opinion at the conclusion of the War following the dissolution of many of the European empires was that new nations could only achieve economic modernization and socio-political development if they pursued the same course that European countries had trod in their formation (W. Bloom 1990). Consequently, many new nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America began following in the footsteps of their former colonial masters.

However, most of them have experienced far less success than their European mentors. According to many researchers, the reason why many developing countries have had difficulty creating a single national identity is because the geo-political boundaries which they inherited from their colonial masters seldom corresponded to natural and pre-existing ethno-cultural cleavages (Fasold 1984; Fishman 1968b; Royce 1982).

Connor (1972) claims that the problems associated with these artificial boundaries are unique to post-colonial developing countries. Therefore, he says, it is unprofitable to compare the Western experience of nation-building with the post-colonial experience and can only confuse the issue. This confusion, he says, stems from misunderstanding the concepts of nation and state (see Connor 1972; 1973; 1977; Phadnis 1989).
Nation and State

Plano & Olton (1969) define nation as "a social group which shares a common ideology, common institutions and customs, and a sense of homogeneity." A state, they say, is "a legal concept describing a social group that occupies a defined territory and is organized under common political institutions and an effective government." Connor (1972) claims that a nation can be thought of as a group of people whose existence is not determined by anything external to the group; the cohesiveness of the group is a given by virtue of common descent. A state, on the other hand, is a conglomeration of people (often from different nations) whose existence can only be explained by appealing to forces outside the nation/group. A nation-state, says Connor, should therefore be a term reserved only for those polities where the nation is coterminous with the state (in 1972, he estimated this to be roughly 4% of the world's countries).

Because of the contradictions that exist between nation and state, Connor concludes that nation-building would better be called "nation-destroying." This, he argues, would be a more accurate term because building loyalty to the state often requires destroying loyalty to the nation.

Nationism and Nationalism

Fishman (1968c; 1972), although defining nation and state somewhat differently than Connor, makes a similar distinction. To elucidate the difference in function between the two notions, he uses the term nationalism for "the
activity engaged in by a nation in order to assert its national, or ethnic, identity," and *nationism* as "the activity engaged in by a state for the purposes of politico-geographical integration" (Fishman 1968c, 29). Fishman points out that the initial questions addressed by nationism are usually not ones of authenticity (identity), but of efficiency (cohesion). By contrast, nationalism is concerned with identity issues. According to Fishman, the processes of nationism and nationalism are inherently antagonistic to each other and often erupt into inter-ethnic conflict. He says that language issues are frequently caught in the middle of such conflicts. The twin concepts of nation/nationalism and state/nationism are often viewed as opposing forces on the continuum of nation-building strategies (see Fig. 5).

**Fig. 5** Nation/nationalism and state/nationism poles of nation-building strategy
Nation-Building and Identity Formation

Making distinctions between nation, state, nationalism, and nationism highlights the importance of a country's language planners distinguishing between short- and long-range goals when formulating language policy (Fishman 1968b; Hawkins, La Belle, & White 1985). Connor (1973) and Kelman (1972) both concede that the immediate operational needs of a new government might necessitate the use of mild coercive tactics in order to ensure cooperation of the masses. Accordingly, language policies may need to be imposed from the top-down in the early stages of a government's existence. However, Connor and Kelman are both quick to add that coercive force should not become the determining factor in the continuation of a state.

Connor (1972) contends that if a state has long-term survival as its goal, it must form a psychological concept of nation (or national identity) among its people. Identity can only be formed after the cessation of external restraints, "in a system of relations which [can] crystallize into a commitment" (Brock & Tulasiewicz 1985). The issues of ethnic conflict and identity formation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.

Certain scholars argue that a second reason why nation-building strategies in developing countries do not correspond to European concepts of nation-building is because European countries' experiences of economic modernization and socio-political development have been so different than those currently being undergone by developing countries. Connor (1972), Das Gupta (1970) and
Enloe (1973) all note that in Western societies the developmental process has been relatively gradual and unplanned, encountering less inter-group conflict than it has in most developing countries. Connor maintains that it is extremely difficult for a society to try to telescope the developmental process into a short period of time through social engineering, because "modernization largely dictates its own timetable" (352).

Das Gupta (1970) asserts that the notion of nation-building as an architectural enterprise may overemphasize the role of deliberate planning, and neglect the contribution of organismic evolution. In other words, when people are subjected to inordinately swift societal transformation (as ethnolinguistic minorities often are) the result may be antagonistic to the formation of a single identity. Das Gupta (1970), Connor (1973), Kelman (1972), and Enloe (1973) all suggest that the relationship between nation/nationalism and state/nationism might best be understood as being a dialectical one (see Fig. 6).

Progress

It can be argued that the paramount objective of people throughout history has been to gain power and control, either over their own destiny or that of others. People on both sides of almost every war that has ever been waged have been motivated by the two incentives of power and control.
When issues of power and control are more or less settled, however, a person's (or group's) chief objective becomes the pursuit of efficiency, i.e., striving to make existential conditions more smooth and productive. *Pursue* means "to try to find; strive for; seek," and *efficiency* can be defined as the "ability to produce the desired effect with a minimum of effort, expense, or waste". The term *progress*, captures the essence of this pursuit of efficiency: "to improve; to advance toward perfection or a higher state" (Webster's New World Dictionary 1964, s.v.).
Modernization and Development

Western notions

The valuing of economic modernization and socio-political development as the embodiment of progress is a uniquely Western concept, appearing during the period of Western colonial expansion (Berry 1980). In the West, and increasingly in developing countries, there tends to be a dichotomizing of what is thought of as traditional and what is seen as modern (Berry 1980).

According to classical Western ideas of progress, those people(s) who seem satisfied to maintain the status quo (i.e., people who cling to tradition while ignoring or even rejecting whatever is modern) appear to be excluded from the ranks of the progress-minded. However, it has been argued that Western definitions are unreasonably narrow in scope (Berry 1980). After all, even the maintenance of a status quo over time can be called a kind of progress.

This elicits the question: Are traditional and modern best thought of as polar opposites, representative of incompatible views, or are divergent views represented by traditional and modern thought actually complimentary? Berry (1980) concludes that some of the side-effects certain non-Western people experience as they become more modernized are increases in such things as feelings of discontentment, aggressive behavior, and feelings of ambivalence toward out-
siders. These negative findings call for a re-evaluation of the presumed benefits of modernization.

The Relativity of Modernization and Development

According to Berry, a particular group's level of modernity is not simply a measure of per capita income, gross domestic product, or government spending but is "the movement of persons or groups along a cultural dimension from what is defined by the cultural norms as traditional toward what is defined by the same culture as modern" (268). In saying this, Berry suggests that progress is a highly subjective construct.

Reitsma & Kleinpenning (1985) say that "development and underdevelopment are time-relative and culture-relative concepts" (37), i.e., a country or society is considered backward and underdeveloped only when compared to another country or society that is more modern and more developed. It would, therefore, appear that progress can only be considered a universal value when viewed psychologically.

Differences Between Modernization and Development

In the literature, the concepts of modernization and development are usually treated as being synonymous (Ronen 1986). Although both concepts are used to refer to "the process of advancing toward a set standard" (World Book Dictionary 1979, s.v.), they can best be thought of as producing different effects: modernization produces the accumulation of information, ideas, institutions, and
the like, whereas development generates the improvement in living conditions perceived by people (Enloe 1973).

According to this view a particular society's level of modernization is relatively easy to assess. The amount of information that a society processes can generate ideas which are often fleshed-out as institutions (i.e., schools, hospitals, churches, labor organizations, etc.). In the final analysis, modernization can be measured in strictly economic terms.

Unlike modernization, however, development is difficult to evaluate. Development can be thought of as a measure of the increase in contentment of the members of a society over time. Enloe (1973) suggests that this can best be measured by assessing the level of voluntary cooperation among and between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups and their respective group members. Here she implies that the notion of development is analogous to Schermerhorn's (1970) idea of integration. According to Schermerhorn, integration can be defined as "a process whereby units or elements of a society are brought into active and coordinated compliance with ongoing activities and objectives of the dominant group in that society" (14).

Enloe believes that the principle vehicle for economic modernization is the state whereas the principle vehicle for socio-political development is the nation. Corresponding to the view that nation and state represent opposing forces, modernization and development are frequently perceived as opposite poles on the continuum of progress (see Fig. 7).
The Dialectics of Progress

Progress may best be thought of as a combination of objectively measured economic modernization and subjectively measured socio-political development. The distinction between these two processes implies that progress may have a somewhat contradictory nature (Esman 1973). The relationship between modernization and development is similar to the relationship between the instrumental and sentimental theories of language use hypothesized by Kelman (1972)—it is not a matter of "either/or" but rather "both/and."

When a polity assumes that modernization and development are synonymous undertakings it may pursue an agenda of economic modernization while
ignoring socio-political development. The long-run results are often economic and socio-political disintegration (Kelman 1972). The present situation in Yugoslavia provides a vivid illustration of what can result from this misappraisal of ends and means (see Chapter 6).

Failure to understand and even legitimate the competition which is natural between economic modernization and socio-political development may lead to an unbalanced view of progress. What is needed is not the exalting of one over the other but a symmetry between the two (Enloe 1973). Fig. 8 shows the dialectical nature of the relationship between modernization and development.

Fig. 8 The dialectics of progress
In the long-run modernization cannot continue without development, and vice versa. The story of progress in developing countries is not just the story of the state; it is the story of many nations doing their best to cope with profound change (Enloe 1973; Fishman 1972).

Modernization, Development, and Language Planning

Linguistic Diversity and Development

Evidence for a Negative Correlation

Articles by Fishman (1968c) and Pool (1972) have been particularly instrumental in drawing attention to the ills associated with linguistic diversity. Both authors show a strong negative correlation between linguistic diversity and economic well being.

After some painstaking research, Pool compares the gross domestic product per capita (i.e., the value of economic output of a country in a given year divided by the population) with the level of linguistic diversity for 133 countries. As a measure of linguistic diversity, he used the size of the largest native-language community in the country divided by the entire population. Therefore, the lower the percentage, the higher the degree of multilingualism.

Based on his data (taken from 1962), Pool says:

A country can have any degree of language uniformity or fragmentation and still be underdeveloped; and a country whose entire population, more or less, speaks the same language can be anywhere from very rich to very poor. But a country that is linguistically highly
heterogeneous is always under-developed or semi-developed, and a country that is highly developed always has considerable language uniformity* [italics added] (213).

After comparing linguistically heterogeneous polities with linguistically homogeneous ones, Fishman was led to "the decided impression that linguistic homogeneity is currently related to many more of the good and desirable characteristics of polities than is linguistic heterogeneity" (60). As defense for his claim, Fishman says that "linguistically homogeneous polities are usually economically more developed, educationally more advanced, politically more modernized, and ideologically/politically more stable" (60).

Rustow (1967) furnishes a good summary statement for the articles by Pool and Fishman when he says that "far from being a shibboleth, linguistic unity can be a modern nation's most precious possession" (47).

Criticism of Negative Correlation Studies

Though Fishman and Pool are both careful to point out that linguistic diversity and economic well-being may not be causally related, they have been criticized for leaving the door open to the likelihood of either a direct or an indirect causality (Apter 1987; Fasold 1984; Hamers & Blanc 1989). The basic problem with this literature, say the critics, is that it concentrates on the importance of the language variable, per se, at the expense of other variables. For example, Apter (1987) queries as to whether or not linguistic diversity might itself be caused by a lack of economic development. Neither Pool nor Fishman
give a rationale for why they chose to treat language as an independent variable and all others as dependent.

A second problem with these studies pointed out by critics is that both Pool and Fishman appear to settle on ways of measuring development and multilingualism, belying the fact that there is widespread disagreement among scholars on how to do either one. Enloe (1973) notes that it is an "attractive notion to arbitrarily narrow the meaning of slippery terms" in order to squeeze more explanatory value from them, but such practices reduces their utility in interpreting related phenomena (23).

The Challenge to Formulate Language Policies Which Can Foster Modernization and Development

Developing countries must respond to two extreme positions in their attempt to build language policies which can reconcile socio-political development with economic modernization. One extreme is to direct all language planning efforts at seeking to pacify ethnic sentiments. The other extreme is to assume that language is merely an economic commodity that can be manipulated at will. Fishman (1972) argues that in order for these two extremes to be reconciled language planners will have to overcome the inertia caused by people who believe such a reconciliation is either impossible or unnecessary.
The Social Psychology of Language

Many scholars have suggested that the social psychology of language can provide significant guidance in the development of language policies for multilingual settings (Beebe 1988; Edwards 1990; Giles 1977a; 1979; Giles & Byrne 1982; Gudykunst & Schmidt 1987; Liebkind 1989). Research from this field can contribute to the reconciliation of the apparently contradictory forces associated with economic modernization and political development.

Phadnis (1989) claims that an individual's or a group's social and linguistic identity are determined by negotiations between members of the group in question and individuals outside the group. Accordingly, the social psychology of language seeks to record both language behavior which is objectively observed by people outside of ethnolinguistic groups being studied and that which is subjectively known by the speakers themselves. In other words, its goal is to explore the phenomenological world of both hearers and speakers. According to Giles, Robinson, & Smith (1980),

The distinctive contributions of the social psychological perspective on language may lie in its ability to integrate the study of the system and resources of language with the study of social behavior more generally, and in the potential for some explicit theory and method to shed light on the alternating roles of language variables as explicit and consciously-manipulated sources of influence on the one hand, and as passive indices of influence on the other (2-3).

Giles et al. argue that language is the legitimate domain of both dominant and subordinate groups. Policy should, therefore, be a product of bilateral negotiations between the two groups. An understanding of social psychological
dimensions of language use can enable policy-makers to better predict ethnic responses to language policies and act as a guide in formulating language policy that can better facilitate the integration of ethnolinguistic minorities (Giles & Byrne 1982).

Although scholars from numerous disciplines, e.g., psychology, anthropology, sociology, and sociolinguistics, have given their attention to the social psychological dimensions of language behavior, the moving force behind much of the recent research has been British social psychologist Howard Giles (Beebe 1988). His Speech Accommodation Theory and Intergroup Model of second language acquisition propose several key concepts which can help explain language processes in multi-ethnic settings (Beebe 1988; Giles & Byrne 1982). The present chapter will explore Speech Accommodation Theory. Chapter 4 will examine the Intergroup Model of second language acquisition.

Speech Accommodation Theory

The objective of Speech Accommodation Theory (SAT) is to investigate why individuals or groups of individuals make adjustments in their language behavior to correspond with the social milieu. SAT asks the questions:

1. Why do people become more similar to others in their speech behavior?
2. Why do people become less similar to others in their speech behavior?
Integrating four established social psychological theories, SAT attempts to answer these and other questions.

**Similarity Attraction Theory.** One theory assimilated by SAT is *similarity attraction theory*. Similarity attraction theory claims that people are attracted to other people whose beliefs, values, and attitudes are similar to their own.

**Social Exchange Theory.** A second theory incorporated into SAT is *social exchange theory*. This theory says that people weigh the costs and rewards of adopting certain behaviors, and subsequently choose the alternatives that will maximize rewards and minimize costs.

**Causal Attribution Theory.** A third theory subsumed under SAT is *causal attribution theory*. This theory hypothesizes that individuals will evaluate the motives and intentions of others before they attribute a cause to other people's behavior.

**Intergroup Distinctiveness Theory.** *Intergroup distinctiveness* is the final theory integrated into SAT. This theory proposes that members of different groups (social, ethnic, or other) make comparisons across groups on particulars valued by their own group (Beebe 1988).
Language and SAT

Applying the four theories subsumed under SAT to language planning implies the following:

(1) From similarity attraction theory--The dominant language group should understand the beliefs, values, and attitudes of minority groups, and efforts should be made to incorporate these values into the society's overall value system.

(2) From social exchange theory--The dominant language group must demonstrate to subordinate groups that the rewards outweigh the costs involved in learning the dominant language.

(3) From causal attribution theory--The dominant language group must operate under the assumption that their motives and intentions will remain suspect in the eyes of subordinate groups until (2) above takes place.

(4) From intergroup distinctiveness theory--The dominant language group should understand that social comparisons are made by subordinate language groups according to what the particular subordinate language group values. Therefore, dominant language groups should seek opportunities to understand the value system of subordinate groups.

How a particular country views modernization and development will contribute to the determination of the language planning orientation adopted by that country. If a country opts to fit social and political development into an agenda which is focused on economic modernization, the language planning orientation will likely be language-as-problem.

On the other hand, if a country is more concerned with social and political development than with economic modernization, language planning will tend toward the sentimental dimensions of language use (i.e., language-as-
resource or language-as-right). If a polity spends a disproportionate amount of its efforts on social and political development issues, the price may well be economic stagnation (Lieberson 1981a). In the United States, some have attributed a part of the massive federal deficit to the government's pursuit of such an agenda (A. Bloom 1987).

Eggington (1992) implies that a bottom-up rather a top-down approach to modernization and development can provide a balance between these two excesses. A top-down approach is one where the dominant group forms policies with little or no input from subordinate groups. In bottom-up approaches, on the other hand, policies and regulations which affect subordinate groups are established only after mutually satisfying dialogue between subordinate and dominant groups. Eggington suggests that language policies should be arrived at using a bottom-up approach to language planning.
CHAPTER 3

LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION

Education

The preferred way to transmit knowledge, be it ideology, culture, or any other type of information, is via language, oral or written, in formal or informal settings. In developed Western countries the transmission of knowledge has long been associated with progress (Ngü 1983). However, it was not until the end of World War II and subsequent independence that many of the newly formed governments of developing countries made this connection (Gonzalez 1977; La Belle & White 1985). Advances in education in developing countries have been tied to such things as decreases in birth rate, increases in food production and per capita income, and improvement in the overall standard of living (Levine & White 1986).

Language, Education, and Society

Recent policy statements from a number of developing countries have reflected a growing emphasis on the role of education in modernization (Levine & White 1986). For example, a resolution adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1986 states that "the development of education, science and culture is a prerequisite not
only for material progress but also for ideological and ethical progress" (China Report 1987, 251). Accordingly, in their seventh five-year plan (1986-1990) China set as a goal to "gradually introduce a system of nine-year compulsory education" (China Report 1986, 532).

Taking a critical look at the various aspects of language in education can provide a check on the level of congruence between a country’s *de jure* and *de facto* language policies and it can act as a kind of mirror which reflects the role and status of language(s) in a society (Edwards 1977; Fasold 1984; Fishman 1976; C. B. Paulston 1980). If the status given to a particular language in language-in-education policy does not coincide with the status attributed to this same language in the broader society, then it is unlikely to produce the desired results (Edwards 1984b). The case surrounding the use of Quechua in bilingual education programs in Quechua-speaking areas of Peru provides a classic example of this kind of mismatch between a language’s status inside and outside of school (see section on Peru in Chapter 6).

The purpose in doing a cross-check between a language’s educational and social status should not be to condemn certain countries as being insensitive to language issues. Unfortunately, much of the literature on language-in-education tends to be so value-laden that it often alienates readers who do not share a particular author’s values (Edwards 1985; 1988). On the contrary, the goal should be to assist people in better understanding how language policy can have a profound effect on the pursuit of other social, political, and economic goals.
Bilingual Education

The Problem of Definition

In its widest sense, bilingual education refers to an educational system that uses two or more languages as the media of instruction, one of which is usually (though not always) the students' first language (Siguan & Mackey 1987). Although this definition is general enough that it is not likely to meet with much opposition, the purpose(s) of bilingual education has been the subject of much debate (Baker 1988; Chamot 1988).

After more than 50 years of theoretical and empirical analysis bilingual education researchers have not reached agreement about what bilingual education is supposed to accomplish, and what form of bilingual education would best meet these objectives. This situation is understandable in light of the fact that there is still widespread disagreement on such fundamental questions as:

(1) What is language?

(2) What is the nature of language interference for people who can speak more than one language?

(3) How do children learn their first language?

(4) In what ways is learning a second language similar to, or different from, learning a first language?

(5) What are the effects of the social environment on learning a second language? (Baetens-Beardsmore 1986; Baker 1988)
Purposes of Bilingual Education

Some of the purposes that different people have articulated for bilingual education include:

1. to facilitate national development
2. to facilitate national integration
3. to provide for improved access to goods and services
4. to maintain segregation of the educational system
5. to develop languages
6. to preserve or revive a language
7. to increase the efficiency of inter-ethnic and international communication
8. to promote cognitive development
9. to facilitate English language development (Cziko & Troike 1984; C. B. Paulston 1980; R. Slimbach, 1992, January, personal communication)

Classification of Bilingual Education

Many researchers feel that it is necessary to further classify bilingual education according to specific and overall language objectives. Edwards (1981), for example, advises that bilingual education should never be considered apart from the specific social context in which it operates. Mackey (1972) articulates a similar notion by devising a detailed typology of bilingual education. He delineates no less than ninety different environments in which bilingual education can operate, depending on different conditions in the home, school, area, or
nation. Through assessing these conditions one can provide "a framework within which measurement of the status and function of languages used and of the distance between them would facilitate planning, research, and comparison" (413).

However, any classification system will necessarily be unacceptable to some people (Siguan & Mackey 1987). Some typologies are criticized on the grounds that they are too simple and fail to account for all of a given society's sociocultural variables (Gerbault 1983). Others, like Mackey's (1972), are criticized because they are too complex to be of any practical value (Baker 1988).

Types of Bilingual Education

For the most part, the many varieties of bilingual education that currently exist fit into three categories: (1) enrichment, (2) transitional, and (3) maintenance (Fishman 1989; C. B. Paulston 1980)

Enrichment

Fishman (1985) promotes what he calls enrichment bilingual education, i.e., bilingual education and second language acquisition for personal benefit or aesthetic reasons. C. B. Paulston (1981) credits Bruce Gaarder with making the crucial distinction between elitist bilingualism and folk bilingualism. Elitist bilingualism, Paulston says, is a matter of choice. It is the hallmark of upper-class, learned individuals from any society, especially those in the West.
Folk bilingualism, on the other hand, is the result of ethnic groups in contact. It is usually involuntary and the second language acquisition associated with this type of bilingualism is often a matter of survival for one or more of the groups. Pattanayak (1981) makes a similar distinction. She differentiates societies which are predominantly monolingual from those which are what she calls *grassroots multilingual*.

Both Paulston and Pattanayak note that failure to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary bilingualism has led numerous Western scholars to advocate overly simplistic solutions to problems associated with linguistic diversity in developing countries. School age children and their parents seldom have the luxury to opt out of bilingual programs that they do not like. Because enrichment forms of bilingual education tend to be reserved exclusively for relatively affluent individuals and/or societies (of which the developing world has few), the remainder of this chapter will focus on transition and maintenance types of bilingual education.

**Transitional and Maintenance**

The debate about whether transitional or maintenance bilingual education is more preferable is typically posed in the form of two opposing questions:

1. Should the primary goal of bilingual education be to enable minority-language students to transition to the dominant language as quickly as possible, with little or no regard for helping them to maintain their original tongue?
(2) Should the primary goal of bilingual education be to help students maintain the use of their own language while making a gradual transition to the dominant language?

Those in favor of transitional bilingual education would answer "yes" to question #1 and "no" to question #2. On the other hand, individuals in favor of maintenance bilingual education would answer "no" to question #1 but "yes" to question #2. How individuals answer these questions is dependent, among other things, on how they define the words bilingual and bilingualism. The perceived dichotomy between these two types of bilingual education is illustrated in Fig. 9.

Fig. 9 The transitional and maintenance poles of bilingual education
Bilingualism

As with bilingual education, proposed definitions for bilingualism vary considerably. At one end of the spectrum are scholars who reserve the term bilingual to refer to individuals who demonstrate complete mastery of two different languages without interference between linguistic processes (Bloomfield 1933). On the other end of the spectrum are those who would call a bilingual any person who possesses any degree of mastery of any skill of a second language (Baker 1988). Most definitions fall somewhere between these two extremes.

Baetens-Beardsmore (1986) identifies no less than thirty different kinds of bilingualism including: semi-lingual (partial facility in more than one language), receptive (the ability to understand more than one language while speaking only one), passive (the ability to speak in more than one language but preferring to use only one), functional (the ability to perform at least certain social skills in more than one language), dormant (having spoken more than one language at some time in the past but currently using only one), symmetrical (equal facility in two or more languages), asymmetrical (unequal facility in more than one language), incipient or ascendant (the beginning phases of becoming bilingual), and recessive (bilingualism on its way to becoming dormant or non-existent), to name but a few. Eventually, he settles on a definition from Beziers & Van Overbeke: "Bilingualism is a double means of efficient communication, imposed
or freely chosen, between two or several worlds, using two linguistic systems" (quoted in Baetens-Beardsmore 1986, 36).

Stated more simply, "bilingualism is . . . a person's ability to process two [or more] languages" (Williams & Snipper 1990, 33). Questions regarding advantages and disadvantages of being and becoming bilingual for the individual or the community (or both) are at the heart of the bilingual education debate.

Arguments for Transition

There are a number of arguments used by scholars on both sides of the transitional vs. maintenance debate. Proponents of transitional forms articulate the following about transitional bilingual education:

(1) It will promote a unified cultural identity in a country.

(2) It will promote the national unity of the country.

(3) It will promote the social unity of the country.

(4) It will ensure a positive socio-economic future for minority language children.

(5) The linguistic situation is too complex and there are not enough resources (financial and other) to organize good maintenance bilingual education programs.

(6) Many parents of minority language children are opposed to maintenance bilingual education because of their negative attitudes toward the minority language. (Appel & Muysken 1987)
Arguments for Maintenance

Proponents of maintenance forms of bilingual education make the following arguments in favor of minority language maintenance:

(1) It will ensure the minority child's academic progress.

(2) The minority child's general cognitive development will be hindered if she or he does not receive education in the mother tongue.

(3) It will ensure healthy development of the minority child's personality and self-image.

(4) It will relieve the culture shock that minority language students encounter as they transition from the home to the school.

(5) It is a necessary prerequisite to the acquisition of the dominant language.

(6) It will ensure that linguistic discrimination does not take place. (Appel & Muysken 1987)

Additive and Subtractive Bilingualism

Lambert (1990) implies that more is involved in the maintenance of a minority language than simply which language(s) is used for instructional purposes in schools. He proposes that any time the two or more languages involved in a bilingual education situation both have social value and respect inside and outside of school (though not necessarily to an equal degree) the situation be called additive bilingual education. Additive bilingual education correlates to maintenance of the minority language.
On the other hand, situations where the language being learned necessarily portends the eventual loss of the first (or home language) Lambert refers to as *subtractive* bilingual education. In subtractive bilingual education, the majority language is endowed with status and prestige whereas the minority language(s) is not. In settings such as this maintenance of the minority language is deemed by educational authorities to be unnecessary and possibly even counterproductive for minority-language students.

**Comparative Bilingual Education**

Given the fact that educational systems in different societies have a variety of reasons for implementing (or not implementing) bilingual education programs, many researchers have suggested that a comparative approach to the research would yield the greatest insights (Barndt 1980; C. B. Paulston 1990; Shafer 1987). A comparative approach considers not only the prescriptions made by authors of a particular study, but also the historical, social, economic, and political background of the group(s) being studied (C. B. Paulston 1975; 1980; 1986; 1988b; 1990). Models of bilingual education spawned by a comparison of various educational methodology often demonstrate a dialectic between transitional and maintenance approaches (see Fig. 10).
Even though the bulk of bilingual education literature tends to focus on developed societies and, hence, has only limited application to developing countries, a comparative approach to bilingual education presupposes that it would be helpful to review the world-wide state of the art in bilingual education (Chamot 1988).

After giving a brief overview of some of the issues embedded in the bilingual education debate, factors which have the most relevance for developing countries will be highlighted. Finally, several social, political, and economic factors which are unique to developing countries will be discussed.
Bilingual Education Research

Much of the research in bilingual education attempts to answer the questions:

1. Will children suffer if they become bilingual?
2. Will children suffer from education that uses two (or more) languages?
3. What roles do attitude and motivation play in learning a second language? (Baker 1988)

Will Children Suffer if They Become Bilingual?: Bilingualism and Intelligence

It has long been thought that an irrefutable way to verify the merits of becoming bilingual would be to find concrete evidence linking bilingualism with intelligence. However, such evidence is yet to be presented. Over the past 35 years, contradictory studies have reported both positive and negative associations between bilingualism and intelligence.

Researchers who report a negative correlation argue that bilingual individuals suffer from what has been called a language handicap (Skutnabb-Kangas & Toukomaa 1976). They arrive at this conclusion based on studies where bilingual experimental groups consistently perform more poorly on verbal intelligence tests than monolingual control groups.

Other researchers, however, propose a positive relationship between bilingualism and intelligence based on their own experiments. They contend that bilinguals, among other benefits, have greater linguistic skills, are more intel-
lignant, demonstrate a greater capacity for divergent thinking, are more analytic, and are more sensitive (Cummins 1981).

How is it possible for people who profess to be studying the same relationship to come to such opposite conclusions? Much of the contradictory nature of the findings can be explained by researchers' different underlying assumptions about how bilingual proficiency develops.

Cummins (1981) identifies the two predominant conceptions of a bilingual's linguistic capability as the separate underlying proficiency (SUP) model and the common underlying proficiency (CUP) model (see Fig. 11).

Fig. 11 Common underlying proficiency and separate underlying proficiency models of bilingual cognitive functioning (Adapted from Hoffman, 1991, p. 129)
The SUP model presupposes that proficiency in a first language (L1) and proficiency in a second language (L2) are kept separate in a bilingual's brain. According to this model, it would be a handicap to be bilingual because different languages would have to compete in the bilingual's brain for time in which to be processed. This implies that maximizing the input of L2 and minimizing the input of L1 will lead to faster acquisition of L2 (McGroarty 1988).

In the CUP model, on the other hand, the literacy-related aspects of a bilingual's proficiency in L1 and L2 are seen as common, or interdependent across languages, i.e., all languages are thought to be processed in the same place in a person's brain (Cummins 1979; 1981). A main argument of the CUP model is that experience with any language will facilitate the development of proficiency in other languages.

Apart from the SUP/CUP controversy, studies which claim to show either a negative or a positive correlation between bilingualism and intelligence have been criticized on methodological grounds. According to the critics of the positive association studies, a major flaw in the research is that most of these studies use balanced bilinguals (i.e., someone who speaks two or more languages with more or less equal fluency) as subjects (Appel & Muysken 1987; Baker 1988; Chamot 1988). Thus Baker (1988) points out that balanced bilinguals do not represent the vast majority of bilinguals who, nonetheless, satisfy the Williams & Snipper (1990) definition, i.e., a person who is able to process two or
more languages. When balanced bilinguals are tested for intelligence the results might lead one to conclude that the fact of being bilingual is the reason why bilingual experimental groups routinely outperform unilingual control groups. However, the relationship between bilingualism and intelligence could be the other way around, i.e., higher intelligence may increase the chances of becoming a balanced bilingual.

Cummins (1981) points out that the negative correlation studies have the opposite problem. The subjects chosen for these experiments, he says, are frequently either lower than average on the socio-economic scale or are scholastic underachievers for some other reason.

A second methodological problem in trying to establish a causative correlation between bilingualism and intelligence is that both terms are difficult to quantify. Baker (1988) points out that there are no agreed upon definitions for either bilingualism or intelligence, much less a way to measure them.

The use of I.Q. tests to measure intelligence has been the subject of much debate. Some argue that they tend to favor white, middle-class children. Baker says that definitions of intelligence are notorious for being subjective, value-laden, and culturally relative. Thus, when the semantically unstable terms bilingualism and intelligence are merged, the inevitable result is mere speculation about the nature of their relationship.

According to Baker (1980) and Chamot (1988), some of the other methodological problems with studies linking bilingualism with intelligence
include drawing conclusions from sample sizes that are too small (leading to over-generalization) and utilizing invalid techniques to control for extraneous variables. Even though a majority of the most recent research tends to support a positive relationship between bilingualism and intelligence (Fishman 1985; Harley, Allen, Cummins, & Swain 1990), it would be unwise to recommend bilingual education based on this criteria alone.

**Will Children Suffer From Learning in Two Languages?**

Northover (1988) sets the stage for the debate surrounding the question of whether or not children suffer from learning in two languages when he says, "Rightly or wrongly, there is an emotive conviction which is widely prevalent that those individuals who grow up to speak a language other than their first language or mother tongue are deprived of the full enjoyment of their personal identity" (207). Whereas most researchers agree that many individuals who speak a minority language will have to be educated in a language other than his/her L1 at some point in life, when and how to make the transition from L1 to L2 has become a point of contention (Tosi 1990).

**Mother Tongue Education.** *Mother tongue,* a metaphor coined in the West, "probably derives from the situation where the mother is the main source of guidance in a child’s primary social adaptation and, therefore, carries a positive connotation" (Szepe 1984, 63). *Mother tongue* is variously defined as: (a) the language a person learns first, (b) the language a person knows best,
(c) the language a person uses most, (d) the language a person identifies with most, or (e) the language a person is most often identified with by others (Skutnabb-Kangas 1988). Usually these criteria are satisfied by the same language for any given individual.

As the quote by Northover suggests, the mother tongue is often related to an individual's way of feeling, thinking, and acting even before entering school. Therefore, they claim, it is critical to begin education in the student's mother tongue (Fishman 1980; Pattanayak 1988; Saville & Troike 1970; UNESCO 1953). Engle (1975) notes that the debate over mother tongue education (also called vernacular education) has not abated for over 65 years.¹⁰

James Cummins, a strong advocate for early-age mother tongue education, has received wide acclaim for his threshold hypothesis. He says: "there may be a threshold level of linguistic competency which a bilingual child must attain both in order to avoid cognitive deficits and allow the potentially beneficial aspects of becoming bilingual to influence his cognitive growth" (Cummins 1977, 10). He and other proponents of mother tongue education argue that children will learn to read in an L2 more rapidly and eventually achieve greater general knowledge in an L2 if they are given initial instruction in their L1 (Engle 1975; Pattanayak 1986; Saville & Troike 1970; Szepe 1984; UNESCO 1953). The time period meant by initial instruction usually varies from between one and six years (Engle 1975). Lending their support to the validity of mother tongue education, Harley et al. (1990) claim that the great majority of empirical studies
point to the existence of a common underlying proficiency (CUP) between L1 and L2.

Engle (1975), however, appears to contradict this claim. After surveying twenty-four empirical studies, she compared the Native Language approach (mother tongue education) with the Direct Method (immersion) in nine different areas:

1. how reading skills transfer from one language to another
2. what stage in a child's learning development it appropriate to introduce reading in the second language
3. the effects of pride in culture and language on reading and content-area learning
4. the relative rates of learning content-areas when presented in L1 versus when they are presented in L2
5. the best instructional method for teaching L2
6. the characteristics of teachers and teacher training that lead to success in teaching under the two systems
7. the difference in learning styles between home and school
8. the existence of, and possible effects of, negative stereotyping students by teachers
9. prior decisions regarding the political goals to be accomplished via the educational process. (Engle 1975, 6)

The results, she reports, varied in "every conceivable way," leading her to the conclusion that most mother tongue education studies were failing to account for an undetermined intervening variable(s) (Engle 1975, 26).
More recently, Wagner, Spratt, & Ezzaki (1989) say that in many of the contemporary studies of mother tongue education it is difficult to separate the enhanced performance of experimental groups due to the novelty of the experiment in which they are involved (known as the Hawthorne effect) from the educational and linguistic interventions themselves. Edwards (1990) argues that mother tongue education studies are frequently interpreted to support a researcher’s *a priori* assumptions, rather than to reflect *a posteriori* findings.

Another reason why some scholars are so impassioned in their defense of mother tongue education is their belief that the continuance of a given culture is inextricably linked with the continuance of that culture’s language (Fishman 1980; Smolicz 1984). They contend that when students from a minority-language group are immersed in majority-language instruction, the survival of their group’s culture is seriously endangered. This, they argue, is tantamount to ethnocide, i.e., a dominant culture’s deliberate annihilation of a minority culture (Szepe 1984).

A popular opinion among many proponents of mother tongue education is that it is incumbent upon those who have the power to act on behalf of minority cultures to do so in their defense (i.e., national governments and international relief organizations). This philosophy has been adopted by such international agencies as UNESCO, the United Nations, the World Bank, the Centre for Educational Development and Innovation (CERI), and the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Ingram 1990; Santiago 1982).

A third reason cited by proponents of mother tongue education for its importance is that it supposedly provides children with a strengthened self-concept and the necessary motivation to learn (Cardenas 1984; Carrasquillo 1991). They claim that students are taught to despise their own language (and culture) when it is not given a place of prominence in the education process (Fishman 1980). This teaching may be overt, as it was for many native Americans who, after the first European settlers arrived, found themselves in all-English schools that punished them for using their mother tongue (Leap 1981). But more often the teaching is covert, as when a student's mother tongue is neglected altogether in the educational process (Fishman 1980).

**Immersion Bilingual Education.** Whether overt or covert, the alternative to mother tongue education is instruction which uses the L2 exclusively. An educational setting where L2 is the sole medium of instruction has been called *immersion* (Lambert 1990). Wink (1992) differentiates between the use of immersion *methodology* from what she calls *structured* immersion. Immersion methodology is used in many French Canadian models where there is a two-way immersion between French (for English speaking children) and English (for French speaking children). The use of immersion methodology is based on the notion that bilingualism should be additive. Swain & Lapkin (1982) mention
four characteristics of the Canadian French immersion education which have contributed to its success:

(1) parental involvement in establishing and ensuring the continuation of the immersion program

(2) the fact that the participating students were from majority-language populations

(3) the students' positive attitudes towards French and French Canadians

(4) the optional nature of the program

On the other hand, structured immersion often results in subtractive bilingualism. In structured settings immersion education is mandated by school (or government) authorities, and programs are not optional for minority-language students. The result of structured immersion, according to many researchers, is that minority-language students often develop low self-esteem about who they are both as individuals and as members of minority-language communities (Cummins 1987; Fishman 1980; Wink 1992). Researchers who are opposed this type of education frequently refer to structured immersion bilingual education as *submersion* (Cardenas 1984; Fishman 1980).

One weakness of such an argument, however, is that self-esteem (as well as other psychological variables) is measured in different ways by different cultures (Triandis 1988). The notion that it is necessary to receive initial instruction in one's mother tongue in order to build his or her self-esteem may be an entirely Western notion (Bull 1964; Edwards 1984a; 1984c; Fasold 1984).
In the Peruvian highlands, for example, one finds that native speakers of Quechua associate learning in Spanish with a positive self-concept, and learning in Quechua with a low self-concept (see the case study on Peru in Chapter 6).

Who Should Decide on the Language of Instruction for Linguistic Minorities?

In order to counteract situations like the one that exists in Peru, UNESCO (1953) recommends that educators "carry public opinion with them" and exert efforts to "persuade" groups resistant to the idea of mother tongue education to accept it, "at least for experimental purposes" (54).

Bull (1964), taking issue with UNESCO over mother tongue education, says:

what is best for the child psychologically may not be what is best for the adult socially, economically, or politically and, what is even more significant, what is best for the child and the adult may not be the best or even possible for the society which, through its collective efforts, provides the individual with the advantages he cannot personally attain [italics added] (528).

An important question is whether it should be the parents, the child, the state, or a panel of language experts who should have the deciding vote when it comes to the language of instruction in schools (Edwards 1990; Halstead 1988; Sowell 1990).

The statements by UNESCO and Bull cited above suggest that the mother tongue education debate is more a question of values than sound pedagogy. The heart of the matter, as far as UNESCO and many other mother tongue education proponents is concerned is the deep-seated conviction that
education in one's own language is a fundamental right of the individual (or ethnic group) (Wong 1988). They view language use as a matter of personal choice. On the other hand, Bull speaks for those who believe that language is the property of a collective of individuals (or collective of groups) and, therefore, transcends an individual's discretionary use.

**What Roles Do Attitude and Motivation Play in Learning a Second Language?**

Schermerhorn (1970) implies that bilingual education research should focus on Baker's third question, namely, *What role does attitude and motivation play in learning a second language?* This requires that language planners deal with the issues of attitude and motivation in making language policy. In developing countries, the debate between the maintenance and transition types of bilingual education becomes relevant only when it addresses this question.

It seems clear from the abundance of research on bilingualism and bilingual education that children can become bilingual through a variety of different programs. But whether they will or not is another question (C. B. Paulston 1975). Comparative approaches to bilingual education endorsed by Barndt (1980), C. B. Paulston (1990), and Shafer (1987) can help to ensure that language policies promote the voluntary acquisition of dominant languages by speakers of subordinate languages.
The Uniquenesses of Bilingual Education in Developing Countries

The Inadequacies of Western Models

Language-in-education policy-making in developing countries is currently taking cues from two divergent guideposts. Many developing countries are growing increasingly more dependent on international aid agencies which are dominated by pro-Western sentiment such as UNESCO, CERI, the OECD, and the World Bank (Altbach 1987; Altbach & Seivaratnam 1989; Ingram 1990; Watson 1982). Altbach (1987) says that "donor nations often have several goals in mind for providing assistance, one of them being the perpetuation of educational and political structures that will ensure stability and a generally pro-Western orientation" (49).

However, some scholars are persuaded that the political, social, and economic situation of most developing countries do not necessarily lend themselves to Western solutions to language problems (Gonzales 1977; C. B. Paulston 1980; 1988b). Thompson says that because of "the international networks of constraints", "it [is] almost impossible for developing countries to develop systems of education tailored to their own individual needs" (quoted in Watson 1982, 183).

After comparing one of the many pro-bilingual education works with an anti-bilingual education work by Porter (1990), Ovando (1990) concludes that "research in bilingual education has become much too politicized for its own
good" (352). C. B. Paulston (1984) argues that if bilingual education researchers are going to persuade a potentially suspicious reading audience to embrace their recommendations, they should keep their arguments as apolitical as possible.

This caveat points up a second, related, drawback to the body of bilingual education literature, namely, that the bulk of research on bilingual education has been carried out by Western scholars in developed countries. There is a relative paucity of data with direct application to developing countries.

Government officials from developing countries tend to be skeptical about accepting recommendations proposed by Western scholars as being workable in their countries (Gonzales 1977). According to Triandis (1988), they have good reason to be skeptical. He says that due to differences in socio-historical, cultural, and political contexts which exist between developed and developing countries, sociological comparisons between the two must be attended with great caution. As a result, says Triandis, there needs to be an awareness on the part of Western researchers that many of the assumptions made in their writings are not necessarily held universally. Schlossberg (1983) comments,

It is the assumptions we must question. These are statements presumed to be true but are not proven. No serious thought can be conducted without assumptions, but recognizing them—in our own thinking as well as in others—is vital if we are to avoid falling into serious error. . . . Soundly designed experiments, complete data, airtight controls, scrupulous honesty, and rigorous logic yield wrong conclusions when the original assumptions are wrong. (8)

Bilingual education issues in developing countries are very complex.

Language problems in education are not only linguistic in nature, but are also 72
economic, political, social, psychological, philosophical, historical, etc. (Edwards 1981; Gerbault 1983; C. B. Paulston 1980). In order to create sound language-in-education policy language planners may need to account for these other variables. According to Mackey (1984), the importance of different variables will be context-specific. The result of vacillating between pro-Western and context-specific educational policies in regards to language policy is that many governments in developing countries are in the unenviable position of paying lip-service to linguistic self-determination, while actually practicing linguistic discrimination (Connor 1973).

According to several researchers there are certain unique considerations that need to be taken into account when formulating language policy that is specific to developing societies (Fasold 1984; Gonzales 1977; C. B. Paulston 1986). Whereas most of the bilingual education models which have been developed in the West have been in response to a tremendous influx of immigrants and have tended to focus on the needs of the individual, the two most important factors in developing countries may be: (1) economic constraints and (2) the need to build a sense of national unity (W. Bloom 1990; Fasold 1984; Gonzales 1977; C. B. Paulston 1986). Fasold (1984) asks three questions in regard to the feasibility of a developing country's employing mother tongue education: (1) Is it possible?, (2) Does it work?, and (3) Is it worth it?
Is Mother Tongue Education Possible in Developing Countries?

When the extreme poverty that so characterizes most of the developing world is combined with the fact that the average developing country spends only about 0.2% of its national budget on educational research (Santiago 1982), the implied answer to Fasold's first question would appear to be "no." But, in actuality, this only answers the question: *At the current rate, is it possible?* There are those who would argue that a country's refusal to allocate the necessary funds for mother tongue education is simply bad economics and will ultimately detract from the achievement of other goals (Pattanayak 1986). Therefore, it must be concluded that mother tongue education is possible for any society.

Does Mother Tongue Education Work in Developing Countries?

As mentioned previously, the validity of mother tongue education and, thus, the answer to the question *Does it work?* has been the subject of debate for more than half a century. This question also presupposes agreement upon the more basic issue of the purposes of bilingual education. Therefore, it may not be wise for a developing country to adopt a certain style of bilingual education simply because it seems to work in more developed settings.

Even assuming that policies advocated by Western scholars warrant consideration by language planners in developing countries, it is unlikely that such individuals would be persuaded to utilize mother tongue education simply based on the inconclusive evidence of Western research that it works.
Is Mother Tongue Education Worth It for Developing Countries?

Fasold's third question may warrant the most consideration by policy-makers in developing countries. In order to propose an honest answer to this question, however, one has to deal with a second question which follows naturally from the first: *Worth it for whom?* It has already been mentioned that the emphasis in individualistic cultures is upon the individual, and in collectivistic cultures it is upon the whole community. But this does not necessarily imply that individualistic cultures and collectivist cultures will come up with different answers to the question, *Is mother tongue education worth it?* Arguments for why a certain type of bilingual education should be implemented in developing countries, therefore, need to transcend cultural differences.

In most developing countries, there is also the matter of the tremendous gulf separating the rulers from the ruled (i.e., the masses). A popular assumption among educators is that all education is, in essence, political (Hawkins, La Belle, & White 1985). "Since education functions to both reflect and promote the interests of those in power, [governmental] control of the education system is important . . . especially in developing countries" (Ahmad 1980, 112).

Ellul (1975) says that the palpable domains where the rulers exercise dominion over the ruled are most manifest in nation-building strategies (see Chapter 3). "The state is the ultimate value which gives everything its meaning. It is a providence of which everything is expected, a supreme power which pronounces truth and justice and has the power of life and death over its
members . . . the state is one of the sacred phenomena of this age" (80). This implies that bilingual education will vary as a function of political ideology. Expressing one's opinion about whether the sacredness of the state translates into a just or an unjust situation for ethnolinguistic minorities may not be appropriate for bilingual education researchers (Edwards 1981; 1990). This does not mean that it is untenable to say anything of significance about bilingual education across the political spectrum. However, it does mean that bilingual education researchers should not set their sights too high by questioning the validity of entire political structures with their recommendations. "The main point is not so much whether [their] opinions are right or wrong, but rather that they are out of place . . . appearing, as they all do, in allegedly academic discussions of bilingual education and its ramifications" (Edwards 1981, 29).

C. B. Paulston (1974; 1984) argues that language specialists will either have to accept the limited power they possess to influence language planning decisions made at the political level or forfeit the opportunity to make even small contributions.

Conclusion

The questions *Will children suffer if they become bilingual?* and *Will children suffer from education that uses two or more languages?* are both relatively superfluous in countries characterized by a collectivistic culture and folk bilinguism. A more relevant question for developing countries may be: *What are
the conditions that foster the integration of linguistic minorities to such an extent that political, economic, and social stability can be maintained? (Schermerhorn 1970).

The difficulty in creating models of bilingual education that will be both viable and acceptable across cultures is that there is confusion about which variables should be treated as dependent and which should be treated as independent (Apter 1987; C. B. Paulston 1974). Chapter 4 will focus on a single dependent variable which can provide a solid foundation for language-in-education theory in developing countries.
The Ethnic Phenomenon

The Growth of Ethnic Conflict

In recent years, many regions of the world have experienced a marked increase in inter-ethnic conflict (Glazer & Moynihan 1975). This is especially true in developing areas. Large-scale violence has been witnessed in Myanmar (formerly Burma), Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Guyana, India, Iraq, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Commonwealth of Independent States (formerly the Soviet Union), Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, and Yugoslavia, to mention but a few of the affected states (Connor 1973; Cziko & Troike 1984; Steichen 1991; Stubbs 1990).

What Connor (1973) calls ethno-nationalism, i.e., a subordinate ethnic group's concerted efforts to authenticate its ethnic identity and mobilize its members in order to obtain self-determination from a dominant ethnic group, presents a growing threat to the economic and socio-political stability of many states. He says this threat stems from the fact that loyalties to one's ethnic group are often not compatible with loyalties to the state. If only for this
reason, the ethnic phenomenon demands that it be studied (Glazer & Moynihan 1975).

Ethnicity Defined

There is no longer lack of data on ethnicity as once was the case. However, the rapidly-growing body of literature on the subject of ethnicity presents anything but a clear picture of what it is. Few other terms are subject to such parochial definition as is ethnicity (Enloe 1973; Horowitz 1985). As of yet, no paradigm for understanding the patterns of ethnic conflict that exist throughout the world satisfies all scholars (Horowitz 1985).

The terms *ethnic* and *ethnicity* are derived from the Greek word *ethnos* or, literally, "nation." It is common for people to refer to a bundle of cultural features such as religion, language, color of skin, dress, and other equally tangible signs of group distinctiveness as ethnicity. Even though these visible markers are usually accurate in identifying individuals as belonging to a certain ethnic group, they oversimplify the concept of ethnicity. Following Schermerhorn (1970), a more comprehensive definition of ethnicity might be "a collection within a larger society having real or putative common ancestry, memories of a shared historical past, and a cultural focus on one or more symbolic elements defined as the epitome of their peoplehood" (12).

An ethnic group, therefore, is characterized by either an actual or an assumed common descent (see also Connor 1977; Keyes 1976). This is only
partly a function of externally manifested cultural differences. Ethnic salience is merely the importance an individual attaches to being ethnic (Mackie & Brinkerhoff 1984). In other words, ethnicity has both objective and subjective components (Phadnis 1989; C. Williams 1984).

In the past, the investigation of ethnicity was the exclusive domain of anthropologists immersed in the study of exotic cultures. They were soon followed by sociologists who were seeking better explanations for the diversity of human social behavior. Today, the field is crowded with psychologists, political scientists, sociolinguists, and other researchers hoping that an understanding of ethnic phenomena will shed light on their specific disciplines. Not surprisingly, different theories of ethnicity have been proposed. The various models of ethnicity are too numerous to mention here. However, they tend to fall within two distinct categories: (1) primordialist and (2) circumstantialist (Glazer & Moynihan 1975) (see Fig. 12).

![Fig. 12 The primordialism and circumstantialism poles of ethnicity](image)

Primordialism

Circumstantialism
Classic Primordialism

The earliest paradigms of ethnicity said that affective attachments which exist between a member of a particular ethnic group and the group to which he/she belongs are inborn, or primordial (Shils 1957). Primordial attachments are not only built around such visible things as language, religion, skin color, dress, and other cultural traits, but ties also exist in the realm of the invisible; a person may feel attached to something simply because it possesses subjectively derived value to him/her (Mackie & Brinkerhoff 1984).

According to the classic primordialist position, since the way individuals feel about their own culture is acquired at birth, it is no more subject to change than is a person's skin color. In a now classic article, Shils (1957) writes, "[Society] is held together by an infinity of personal attachments, moral obligations in concrete contexts, professional and creative pride, individual ambition, primordial affinities and a civil sense which is low in many, high in some, and moderate in most persons" (131).

Shils is an example of the myriad of anthropologists who emphasize the irrational nature of ethnic attachments. The essentially unbounded subjectivity that these anthropologists have attributed to the notion of ethnicity has caused many researchers to reject classic primordialism as so mystifying the concept of ethnicity that its study is fruitless (Fishman 1977).

Brass (1985) implies that classic primordialism may also place unrealistic constraints on governing authorities in multi-ethnic societies. In trying to build
social harmony, he says, classic primordialism leaves power-holders in the unenviable position of either indulging ethnic sentiments to their maximum, or appearing insensitive to minority ethnic concerns; they must either let the irrationality of ethnic attachments run amuck (potentially leading to anarchy), or attempt to terminate ethnic attachments by demanding that all minorities conform to the dominant lifestyle.

As if to underscore the reality of this dilemma, Geertz (1963) argues that there is direct conflict between primordial sentiments and what he calls civil sentiments, i.e., feelings of loyalty that are created artificially by civil authorities to bring about social cohesion. The conflict between civil and primordial sentiments, he goes on to say, intensifies when subordinate groups are subjected to the strain of modernization. He concludes that "it is by watching the integrative revolution happen that we shall understand it" (157).

Circumstantialist Views of Ethnicity

Circumstantialist views of ethnicity can be seen as a reaction to the classic primordialist position. Whereas classic primordialists view ethnicity as being highly irrational and open to only limited interpretation, circumstantialists contend that ethnicity is primarily a by-product of economic conditions and is, therefore, both rational and subject to thorough analysis (Brass 1976; Nordlinger 1972). Like the primordialists, circumstantialists have noted that modernization tends to bring with it an increase in inter-ethnic conflict. But this increase, they
say, is due to competition for scarce resources rather than for the sake of defending ethnic traditions (Brass & van den Berghe 1976; Nordlinger 1972). Economic concerns, they say, is the prime motivator for ethnic groups rather than primordial attachments.

According to Hechter (1986) and Birch (1978), hostility between subordinate and dominant ethnic groups is the product of internal colonialism, i.e., a dominant ethnic group's exploitation of subordinate ethnic groups for their own advantage. The notion of internal colonialism is founded upon the theory of relative economic deprivation. This theory states that when one group prospers economically other groups must be deprived of an equal amount in order to compensate for the one group's prosperity (Brass 1976). Beer (1985) says that this kind of zero-sum economic theory implies that inequality between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups will continue until subordinate ethnic groups mobilize themselves to successfully compete with the dominant majority (Beer 1985).

According to circumstantialist views ethnic attachments are merely epiphenomena associated with a given society's economic climate. In other words they function to fill the vacuum created by economic want. Only a few decades ago, as a result of the growing popularity of circumstantialist views of ethnic attachments, a common assumption among sociologists was that ethnicity would wither away as a result of the increased economic equality modern nation-states promised to usher in (Birch 1978). Until the state had fully matured politics
was viewed as the preferred tool to overcome the obstacle to social change posed by ethnicity (Ronen 1986).

**The Purpose of Ethnic Attachments**

Some scholars see ethnic attachments as both defensive and offensive mechanisms used by minority groups to preserve the continuity of their traditions in the face of rapid social change (Ahmad 1980; Connor 1977; Enloe 1973; Fishman 1977; 1989; Haarman 1986; C. Williams 1982). Consequently, it is common for power-holders in developing countries to view ethnicity as an impediment to modernization (Horowitz 1985). Much nation-building strategy suggests that ethnicity should be replaced by the modern nation-state in its roles of providing an individual with emotional support, familiarity, a sense of community and reciprocal help, and a medium for dispute resolution (W. Bloom 1990; Horowitz 1985). Horowitz (1985), however, doubts whether this is desirable or even possible. The focus, he says, should not be on reducing ethnic attachments, but on reducing ethnic conflict. According to Horowitz, the most effective nation-building strategies are the ones that recognize the limitations of the state in totally replacing ethnic attachments and work within these boundaries.

**The Dialectics of Ethnicity**

Whereas the classic primordialist theory of ethnicity has been rejected by many researchers because it fails to offer workable solutions to the problems
faced by multi-ethnic societies, extreme circumstantialist views have likewise been rejected because they, too, are insufficient to fully account for the complexity of ethnic phenomena (Keyes 1981).

The most frequently cited criticism of classic primordialism is that it portrays ethnicity as nothing more than the combined effects of primordial sentiments (Connor 1977). On the other hand, the error most often attributed to circumstantialism is that it fails to recognize that ethnic membership is defined socially, culturally, and morally, as well as economically (Nevitte & Kennedy 1986). Contrary to the notion espoused by rigid circumstantialists, ethnicity has not attenuated with the rise of the modern nation-state, rather it has intensified (Appel & Muysken 1987; Enloe 1973; Glazer & Moynihan 1975).

Connor (1972) says that the theory of relative deprivation is mistaken because it assumes that ethnicity is only the external manifestation of cultural identity. "The essence of a nation," says Connor, "is not tangible" (337). The result of the intangibility of ethnicity is that political and educational action have both been unsuccessful in counteracting the influence ethnic attachments have over people (Rizvi 1986, Van den Berghe 1981).

Many scholars maintain that ethnicity has both an instrumental and a psychic dimension to it (Connor 1972). Whereas it is commonly accepted that ethnic attachments are sometimes utilized for material benefit, Nagel & Olzak (1986) point out that "if ethnicity is always viewed as subservient to material
considerations, then the complexity, resilience, and even irrationality of ethnic bonds will be underestimated" [italics added] (8).

The shortcomings of each type of theory has led a number of researchers to adopt what Glazer & Moynihan (1975) call middle-of-the-road positions in regards to ethnicity (see, for example, Connor 1972; De Vos 1975; Horowitz 1985; Nagel & Olzak 1986; Nevitte & Kennedy 1986; Rizvi 1986; C. Williams 1982). Proponents of middle-of-the-road positions believe that any proposed solution for ethnic conflict which relies exclusively on either circumstantialist or primordialist views of ethnicity may generate undesirable side-effects (e.g., ethnic separatism or martial law). Instead, they contend that there is a dialectical relationship between these two orientations (Keyes 1981; C. Williams 1982). Fig. 13 illustrates the dialectical relationship between primordialism and circumstantialism proposed by most middle-of-the-road positions.

![Diagram of the dialectics of ethnicity]

Fig. 13 The dialectics of ethnicity
Royce (1982) suggests that a functional theory of ethnicity must provide answers to the following three questions:

1. What are the qualities of the ties that bind individuals to an ethnic group and to a state?
2. How are these ties different from one another?
3. How does this difference affect the relationship between subordinate and dominant groups?

Phadnis (1989) argues that ethnicity is self-determined but other-recognized. Accordingly, input from all ethnic groups coexisting in a particular multi-ethnic society may be necessary in order to respond adequately to these questions. The need for such a mutual understanding between ethnic groups is implied by De Vos's (1975) -emic and -etic approaches to ethnicity:

An -emic approach is an attempt on the part of the scientific observer to understand the conceptual system of the observed and to state his observations as best he can within the conceptual framework of the observed. This is opposed to the -etic approach, which analyzes an observed situation in terms of the external system of the observer (17).

In the analysis of an ethnic group's socio-political situation, says Connor (1977), what matters is not what is, but what people believe is.

**Issues in Identity Formation**

The processes of modernization and development in a multi-ethnic society should be viewed as exercises in cross-cultural psychology (Giles, Bourhis, & Taylor 1977). The person(s) responsible for creating social, economic, and political policy must be able to predict how these policies will affect inter-ethnic
relations. In order to formulate policy which will facilitate both modernization and development, a basic understanding of the concepts of *individual identity*, *social identity*, and *ethnic identity* might be beneficial (Edwards 1984c; Giles 1979).

**Individual Identity**

Individual identity refers to people's conceptualization of who they are (Liebkind 1989). Even though theoretical psychology is the field usually associated with identity issues, social psychology seeks to explain the dynamics of identity formation in the context of societal interaction (Brislin 1980). Describing and predicting these processes in multi-ethnic settings have presented social psychologists with a particularly difficult challenge (Liebkind 1989).

Individual identity (also called self-concept) is thought to be the product of highly complex negotiations between the individual and the society to which he/she belongs (Tajfel 1970; 1981). In other words, individuals determine their identity as a function of both what they think of themselves and what they perceive others think of them. According to Tajfel (1981), individual identity cannot be separated from social identity. He contends that if individuals have a positive perception of their social identity, they will likely also have a good self-concept (high self-esteem). On the other hand, if they perceive their social identity negatively, they will probably have a poor self-concept, as well (low self-esteem).
Social and Ethnic Identity

Many social psychologists operate under the assumption that, outside of the family (but very similar to family group membership), the ethnic group is the most salient social group to which one belongs (Giles & Byrne 1982). Thus, it is believed that ethnic group membership provides individuals with one of their primary sources of self-esteem (Isaacs 1975; Driedger 1976). A person’s ethnic identity is formed by such things as ancestry, religion, language, dress, food, and other traditions that are unique to one’s ethnic group. But, more importantly, it is also determined by the value and significance the person in question attaches to these things (Mackie & Brinkerhoff 1984; Tajfel 1981).

Tajfel (1981) implies that the terms social identity and ethnic identity are synonymous. It may be useful, however, to maintain a distinction between the two terms. Whereas social identity is derived from the interaction between the ethnic group and the society of which it is a part, ethnic identity is that part of people’s self-concept derived from their membership in a single ethnic group (Liebkind 1989; Tajfel 1981; Weinreich 1988). In other words, social identity can be thought of as a macro-phenomenon, while ethnic identity can be thought of as a micro-phenomenon.

Also, in the sociological literature ethnic identity and ethnicity are often used interchangeably. According to some scholars this is unfortunate (Liebkind 1989). In social psychological analysis, for example, ethnic identity is seen as being anchored in the identity process (a psychological phenomenon), whereas
ethnicity is part of the structural relationship between ethnic groups (a social phenomenon). A fusing of the two terms has contributed to the primordialist/circumstantialist dichotomy which often leads to a misunderstanding of ethnic issues (Liebkind 1989).

Related Ethnic Phenomena

Ethnic Mobilization

Ethnic mobilization is the united effort of an ethnolinguistic group to achieve a common goal. The purpose of ethnic mobilization can be for either assimilation or separation. Martin Luther King is an example of someone who attempted to use ethnic mobilization to achieve assimilationist ends. His exhortation to African Americans in the 1950's and 1960's was to passively resist efforts of the white majority to segregate them from the latter's world. An example of ethnic mobilization being used for separatist ends was provided by Eldridge Cleaver and the Black Panther movement. He advocated the creation of an all-Black nation that would rival the white majority in its power and influence.

The tendency for ethnic mobilization movements to trigger violence and add to regional instability has caused political authorities in ethnically diverse countries to seek ways to manipulate ethnic sentiments from outside the ethnic group. A popular notion among government officials in developing countries is that the energy people expend on retaining and strengthening ethnic identity
should be harnessed for the purpose of building a strong and unified state (Horowitz 1985).

**Ethnic Boundaries**

Barth (1969), in the introduction to his seminal book *Ethnic Boundaries*, says that both primordialist and circumstantialist views of ethnicity focus too much on cultural features, both observable and unobservable, tending to differentiate people from one another. This, he says, has produced "a world of separate peoples, each with their own culture and each organized in a society which can legitimately be isolated for description as an island unto itself" (11). He says this may serve the purposes of most anthropologists, but it inhibits a clear understanding of ethnic phenomena and their place in human culture.

From Barth’s point of view, the critical focus of investigation should be "the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff that encloses it" (15). Ethnic boundaries, says Barth, are the ethnic group members’ subjectively held beliefs about what features are most salient for distinguishing them from other groups.

Haarman (1986), agreeing with Barth, adds that ethnic boundaries are "not fixed, but deeply dependent on the attitudes and activities of ethnic groups, which may serve to weaken or strengthen them" (39). In other words, changes in ethnic boundaries are in response to a changing environment.
Ethnicity and Language

The Relationship Between Ethnic Identity and Language

The literature on ethnicity frequently cites language as the most salient distinguishing mark of ethnic identity (De Vos 1975; Fishman 1977; 1989; Nadkarni 1977; Schermerhorn 1970). Lambert (1990) says bilingualism, identity, and ethnicity are all inextricably tied together. Fishman (1989) says that ethnicity is linked to language at every stage. However, whereas the nexus between language and ethnicity appears to be undeniable, there is disagreement as to the nature of this relationship.

Fishman (1977) argues that "language is the recorder of paternity, the expressor of patrimony, and the carrier of phenomenology" (25). Paternity, he says, refers to an ethnic group member's understanding of who inherits the group's distinctives (e.g., skin color, language, religion). Patrimony refers to what is inherited, as defined by the group itself. Phenomenology is the externally observable traditions associated with a particular ethnic group. Fishman goes on to say that the relationship between language and ethnicity is one of "sanctity-by-association."

While holding to a view of ethnicity which incorporates both primordialist and circumstantialist elements, Fishman ascribes much significance to primordial attachments, especially the attachment individuals have to their mother tongue.
He is representative of scholars who believe that the continued existence of an ethnic group is dependent upon the existence of the group's language.

Taking a different position, Haarman (1986) rejects the *a priori* assumption that language is the single most salient feature of ethnic identity. It is important to note that he does not thereby make an assumption opposite to the one made by Fishman, that is, he does not say that language is an unimportant aspect of ethnic identity. Instead, he recommends a concrete analysis of ethnic identity as it is manifested in a particular setting and an *a posteriori* evaluation of the role of language in contributing to this identity. Haarman believes that the role assigned to language in a given ethnic group is relative, determined by members of the ethnic group itself. He is representative of individuals who believe that language does not necessarily play a role in ethnic identity maintenance.

According to Haarman, it is correct to say "language is definitely related to ethnicity," but it is incorrect to say "ethnicity is definitely related to language" (261). As an illustration of why this is so, he cites the situation in what was the U.S.S.R. where Jews have adopted the Russian language while maintaining other Jewish cultural patterns. A similar situation exists in Egypt, where the Copts have assimilated to the Arabic language (spoken by the Muslim majority), all the while keeping the traditions of their Christian ancestors. These two examples, Haarman argues, demonstrate that it is possible for a culture to survive even when its language does not.
Based on the wide-spread occurrence throughout history of situations like the ones described above, a number of scholars have concluded that ethnic identity can (and usually will) continue without language (Brock & Tulasciewicz 1985; Eastman 1984; Edwards 1988; Glazer 1983; Haarman 1986; C. B. Paulston 1975; A. Smith 1981). Schermerhorn (1970) says the perception that language is the primary distinguishing mark of ethnic identity has given cultural features rather than structural characteristics the most prominent place in policy making. This is unfortunate, he says, because only structural realignment can alleviate ethnic conflict.

**Language Shift and Stable vs. Unstable Bilingualism**

In order to determine the importance of language in the continuance of a culture, it is helpful to understand the phenomenon known as *language shift* (Lieberson 1981b; C. B. Paulston 1981). Language shift occurs when the speakers of one language voluntarily or involuntarily adopt a new language to meet communication needs in one or more domain(s). In cases of voluntary language shift, a cultural subgroup will be affected only as much as the members of that subgroup allow. On the other hand, when language shift is involuntary, the dissolution of their culture is outside of that subgroup's direct control. Lieberson (1981b) argues that historically language shift has tended to be voluntary, i.e., people have usually adopted a new language due to the benefits they perceive from doing so.
Closely associated with the phenomenon of voluntary language shift is Edwards’ (1988) distinction between what he calls stable and unstable bilingualism. Stable bilingualism, he says, exists in societies where there are viable domains for both a dominant and a subordinate language(s) (as exist in most diglossic societies). On the other hand, unstable bilingualism exists when one language functions adequately to meet the needs of all domains. Stable bilingualism, says Edwards, will not result in voluntary language shift. If bilingualism is imposed on speakers of a subordinate language by speakers of a dominant language, i.e., if language shift is involuntary, the stability of the bilingualism will not be threatened. Language will remain an important dimension of cultural identity in such situations.

On the other hand, according to Edwards, unstable bilingualism will inevitably result in voluntary language shift. If the speakers of a given subordinate language decide among themselves that the dominant language is acceptable for them to use in all domains of communication, they may abandon the use of their mother tongue. When this happens, he argues, it "does not bode well for the continued survival within the group of both languages" (Edwards 1988, 203). Edwards contends that bilingual education for the purpose of helping minority language speakers maintain their cultural identity is misguided and will likely meet with resistance from the minority group itself (Edwards 1984b; 1990). He says this is because when language shift is voluntary on the
part of a subordinate language group, societal bilingualism grows unstable, and language becomes less salient in maintaining one's cultural identity.

The Intergroup Model

Giles and Byrne (1982) note that language has often played a crucial psychological role in inter-ethnic behavior and is frequently the focal point of inter-ethnic conflict. Regardless of whether or not language in the key factor in determining one's ethnic identity, the relationship between language and ethnic conflict is one that warrants much attention.

Central to the intergroup model to second language acquisition espoused by Giles and Byrne is a cognitive definition of ethnic group membership, one that is determined by the individual belonging to a given ethnic group. Their theoretical system includes aspects of social identity theory, the concepts of perceived ethnolinguistic vitality and perceived group boundaries, and the notion that language acquisition can be enhanced by facilitating multiple group membership.

Social Identity Theory. Social identity theory is built around the idea that individuals' social categorization of the world involves knowledge of their membership within certain groups. This knowledge together with the values associated with membership in the group constitute an individual's social identity. The satisfaction and security individuals' receive from their social identity is determined by their group's having achieved differentiation from other groups on
valued dimensions. Failure to achieve positive differentiation can result in a group's developing a negative social identity. According to Giles and Byrne, when a group has a negative social identity its members usually adopt one of three strategies:

1. **Individual mobility**—A strategy whereby individuals attempt to pass out of the group which is causing them discomfort into a more positively-valued one. Often an important aspect in this movement into another group is linguistic accommodation.

2. **Social creativity**—A strategy whereby certain members of the in-group seek to redefine group characteristics that have led to a negative identity. In these situations, a group's language (one that was previously viewed as inferior to other languages) may be destigmatized and proudly heralded as a group's symbol of cultural pride.

3. **Social competition**—This is the most radical of the three strategies. It refers to the attempt to reverse the perceived status of in- and out-groups on valued dimensions. If subordinate group members perceive their social status to be illegitimate or unfair, between-group comparisons will become more active. Hence, symbols which promote group identification (e.g., language) may be used by subordinate in-group members to challenge the superiority of dominant groups. (1982, 20-22)

**Ethnolinguistic Vitality.** *Ethnolinguistic vitality* refers to the overall strength of an ethnolinguistic group to sustain its own culture as determined by its ability to maintain positive social and ethnic identities. The maintenance of a positive social identity is determined by group members' "cognitive representation of the socio-structural forces operating in inter-ethnic context" (Giles & Byrne 1982, 23). The more of these forces a particular group has in its favor, the
more vitality it is said to have. Most of the structural variables influencing ethnolinguistic vitality can be derived from status, demography, and institutional support.

Status factors include economic, political, social, socio-historical, and language status variables. The more a group has control over its own economic and political destiny, a high social status, and a strong tradition of language and culture, the higher its vitality. Demographic factors are those relating to the absolute number and distribution of a group's members. The greater the number and the higher the concentration of a group in its own territory, the higher its vitality. Finally, the institutional support factors include representation of the group in mass-media, education, government, religion, and culture. The more a group is supported in these areas, again, the more the vitality it is said to have.

Giles and Byrne draw an important distinction between objectively-measured vitality (i.e., that measured by an outsider's observation) and the vitality perceived by the members of in-groups themselves. They argue that, whereas objective measurements and subjective perceptions might overlap in some areas, it could be that there is little correspondence between the two.

**Perceived Group Boundaries.** Also affecting the situational strength of ethnic identification, according to Giles and Byrne, is an individual's perception of the nature of ethnic boundaries. These boundaries can be perceived as hard
and impermeable (involving difficulty and/or severe social sanctions from either the in- or out-group if and when they are crossed) or soft and permeable (involving little difficulty and/or social sanctions from either group when crossed). Giles and Byrne emphasize that it is not the actual boundary features that matter, rather an individual's perception of these features.

Multiple Group Membership. Citing the work of social psychologist Henri Tajfel, Giles and Byrne note that individuals are usually members of other social categories beside the ethnic group, with each group contributing to his or her self-concept. The more groups that individuals are a part of, the less likely they are to perceive ethnic boundaries as hard and impermeable. Moreover, the greater the proportion of a group's members who possess a high degree of multiple group membership, the less likely it is to perceive ethnic boundaries as being hard and impermeable, and the less likely it is to mobilize for separation from other ethnic groups.

Conclusions and Implications. Based on the constructs of social identity theory, perceived ethnolinguistic vitality, perceived group boundaries, and multiple group membership, Giles and Byrne propose that individuals are more likely to define themselves in ethnic terms and adopt strategies for linguistic distinctiveness to the extent that they:

(1) identify strongly with an ethnic group which considers language an important dimension of its identity
make insecure inter-ethnic comparisons (i.e., they are unaware of cognitive alternatives to their own group's status position)

(3) perceive their in-group to have high ethnonlinguistic vitality

(4) perceive their in-group boundaries to be hard and impermeable

(5) identify strongly with few other social categories each of which provides them with inadequate group identities and low intra-group statuses.

According to Giles and Byrne, individuals for whom these propositions hold true are not likely to achieve native-like proficiency in the dominant group's language.

On the other hand, when a group's:

(1) in-group identification is weak and language is not considered an important part of ethnic-group identity

(2) quiescent intergroup comparisons exist (i.e., group members are aware of cognitive alternatives to their own group's status)

(3) perceived in-group vitality is low

(4) perceived in-group boundaries are soft and permeable

(5) identify strongly with many other social categories

they propose that subordinate group members are more likely to acquire native-like proficiency in the dominant group's language.

The implications of the intergroup model of second language acquisition can steer language policy-makers in two opposite directions. A serious criticism of the intergroup model is that the five propositions made by Giles and Byrne fit in too easily with the assimilationist mentality of trying to extinguish all ethnic attachments (Husband & Saffulah Khan 1982). Viewed in isolation, the proposi-
tions do suggest that groups which maintain strong ethnolinguistic vitality will not be as cooperative with dominant groups as groups with weak vitality.

However, it is important to note that the model proposed by Giles and Byrne is descriptive rather than prescriptive. They never suggest that a dominant group intentionally try to devitalize subordinate ethnolinguistic groups. A more favorable interpretation of the intergroup model (when incorporated with contemporary middle-of-the-road theories of ethnicity) suggests that one of the keys to facilitating dominant-language acquisition by subordinate group members lies in promoting voluntary multiple group membership. Deliberate attempts by dominant groups to obliterate ethnic boundaries is likely to elicit a strengthening of those same boundaries by subordinate groups (Horowitz 1985).

**Prestige Planning**

Haarman (1986) suggests that the best way for a dominant group to foster the voluntary compliance of subordinate ethnic groups with language policy is to incorporate what he calls *prestige planning* into the language planning process. Prestige planning is "planning with regard to elements of evaluation in the ethnic identity of the speech community" (87). He acknowledges the inevitability of certain languages having more prestige in multilingual settings by virtue of their having official status (e.g., national languages) or of their being the mother tongue of certain types of people.
However, equality of languages is not the goal of prestige planning, rather it is the reduction of inter-ethnic conflict. Thus, according to Haarman, the most effective and efficient language planning for promoting the integration of ethnolinguistic minorities is one that does not officially support either dominant or subordinant languages.

**Identity Planning and Ethnogenesis**

Assuming that language is an important though not essential element of one's ethnic identity, it would appear that nation-building strategies which revolve around the imposition of a common language may not produce the desired results, even if language policy makes use of prestige planning (Haarman 1986). By definition successful nation-building, i.e., nation-building that results in both economic modernization and socio-political development, requires that the mass of individuals in a society make a complete identification with the nation-state (W. Bloom 1990). Psychological analyses of the processes whereby an individual comes to identify with the state indicate that this can only happen when the individual experiences the state in such a way as to evoke voluntary identification (Brock & Tulasiewicz 1985; Sherif 1966).

This realization has led Pool (1979) and Lamy (1979) to suggest that developing countries adopt a more holistic approach to national identity formation instead of relying simply on language planning activities to bind a multi-ethnic society together. Approaches such as this are already under way in a
number of countries in the form of political and ideological indoctrination. But the identity planning they refer to is planning that takes into account the desires and frustrations of minority groups. R. Paulston (1976a) uses the term *ethnogenesis* to refer to a more conscious form of identity planning. He says ethnogenesis is "the conscious, cognitive construction of an identity for the individual and an ideology for the group or new collectivity, out of traditional cultural symbols [leading] to social participation in schools and elsewhere" (271).

Contrary to popular opinion, says Paulston, ethnogenesis is not necessarily a bad thing. It is a neutral description of what takes place in any society that is moving from traditional to modern (Berry 1980). "[When] ethnicity is given a certain level of political and critical awareness, [it can] be strategically employed by groups, or by outsiders" (R. Paulston 1976a, 271). Paulston suggests that the most important question may not be *Can ethnicity be manipulated?*, but *Who will manipulate it, and why?*

Chapter 5 will investigate the relationship between language and ethnicity in Peru, Yugoslavia, and Malaysia. Chapter 6 will then propose a direction for language planning that incorporates the notions of ethnogenesis and identity planning.
CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDIES

Introduction

The following three case studies—Peru, Yugoslavia, and Malaysia—were chosen because they illustrate the dynamic relationship of language and ethnicity in developing countries. It should be understood, however, that specific language plans should only be formulated after making an analysis of the country in question similar to the three analyses which follow.

Peru

Peru (see Fig. 14) is South America’s third largest and fourth most populous country. According to a census taken in 1981, Peru’s population stands at over 17.5 million. Peru can be divided into three geographical regions: (1) coast, (2) mountain (called the sierra), and (3) jungle (called the selva) (Palmer 1980). Because of the natural barrier created by the Andes Mountains, these divisions tend to correspond with historical, cultural, economic, and ethnic differences (Nakamoto, White, & La Belle 1985).
Fig. 14 Peru, positio~ in South America

Note. Adapted from Fasold, 1984, p. 13.
Ethnic Groups

White and Mestizo

Approximately one-third of the population lives in the coastal area, with five out of six of these inhabitants living in the capital city of Lima. The population of Lima has tripled in the last 50 years leading a number of scholars to conclude that Peru is rapidly changing from a basically rural country to an urbanized, modern, and homogeneous land (Escobar 1988). In actuality, whereas the coast (especially Lima) has made great strides in economic modernization in recent years, this trend has had virtually no effect on the inhabitants of the sierra and selva.

Overwhelmingly, the coastal population is white or mestizo, i.e., descendants of Spanish colonialists. Hispanicized mestizos and whites make up approximately 53% of the total population of the country. Spanish is the language spoken along the coast, where indigenous languages are almost unknown. Whites and mestizos are the elite of Peruvian society, reflected not only by their high social standing, but also by their control of the country’s resources and governmental institutions. To say someone is white is to automatically attribute elite status to him/her.

However, there is a great deal more confusion surrounding the term mestizo. To call someone a mestizo is to attribute to him or her middle or lower class status, depending on their position in society. Even though some
mestizos share a common historical background with whites, therefore having their status ascribed to them, other mestizos have gained their status by virtue of abandoning their Indianess in favor of assimilating with the dominant culture (Kluck 1981). This indicates that there is a certain relativity to one’s being mestizo which can best be understood by examining Peru’s Amerindians.

Amerindians:

The Andean highlands are home to Peru’s two largest ethnic minorities, the Quechua and the Aymara Indians. These Indians are the descendants of the Incas who ruled most of western South America before the arrival of the Spaniards in the sixteenth century. Although Spanish is growing as a lingua franca in the sierra, the vast majority of the population speak either Quechua or Aymara as their primary language. Between one-third and one-half of the 3 1/2 million Quechua speakers are monolingual.

The remainder of Peru’s Indians live east of the Andes mountains in the lowlands of the selva. The jungle is the country’s marginal, half-forgotten region, being isolated and sparsely populated. Two-thirds of the total land mass of Peru lies within the selva, but less than ten percent of the population lives here. Of the estimated 85 languages in Peru, almost half of them are spoken only here, sometimes by as few as 200 speakers (Palmer 1980). Even though the natural resource production of the region (predominantly oil) plays a critical role in the Peruvian economy, the people of the selva have no say in the national agenda
because all valuable, exportable resources are controlled by the coastal elites via the national government. By virtue of the extreme isolation of the jungle Indians and their infrequent contact with other groups, discussion will be limited to groups which inhabit the coast and the sierra.

The current language situation in Peru is predominantly a function of white/mestizo-Indian intergroup relations (Nakamoto et al. 1985). These relations, in turn, are a function of historical antecedents. For the sake of convenience, Peruvian history can be divided into three periods: (1) the period of the Inca empire, (2) the colonial period, and (3) the post-independence period.

**Historical Antecedents to Linguistic Diversity**

**The Inca Empire**

The Inca empire originated from its capital, Cusco, at the end of the 15th century. The Inca military machine ruled over a vast Andean region which included present-day Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and parts of Chile and Colombia. The emperor, or Inca, was considered to be the "Divine son of the sun" and sole ruler of the empire. The nobility was made up of either relatives of the emperor and individuals who had distinguished themselves in the service of the empire. By contrast, commoners were organized into communities and relegated to what amounted to serfdom. The economy of the empire rested exclusively on
the agricultural production of the commoners, and any excess production was retained by the state for distribution in times of war or natural catastrophe.

Ethnic groups which were brought into the empire by military conquest were assimilated by coercion. Vanquished foes became part of the serfdom whose labor was intended to ensure economic stability. They were given virtually no chance of ever gaining nobility status.

Formal education was reserved exclusively for the nobility. Informal commoner education was administered solely by the elite, helping them to maintain a monopoly over the socialization process. In this way commoners learned their place in Inca society and were compelled to teach their children the values and norms of the Incaic order. In all regards the rule of the Incas was despotic, authoritarian, and elitist, reflecting only the interests of those in power.

The Colonial Period

Spanish colonial rule in Peru was inaugurated by the arrival of Pizarro in 1531. The ease with which the Spanish were able to rule was due in large part to its similarities with the old Incaic order. Both were highly centralized, ruling from the top down, and depended heavily on the labor of the conquered groups promoted by a process of coercive integration. Both groups also enforced religious assimilation. The Incas demanded that the emperor be worshipped by
the commoners as the Divine son of the sun, and the Spanish forced their Peruvian subjects to convert to Catholicism.

Also like the Incas who had ruled before them, the Spanish kept a firm grip on the education enterprise. In an effort to create a much-needed bridge between colonial rulers and Indians, the Spanish began regional schools to train native elites to govern native populations for the interest of the crown. Education for the Indians was mostly limited to the religious sphere, the primary purpose being for the "extirpation of idolatry" (Nakamoto et al. 1985, 65). The colonialists were willing to share some of their power with the small upper class only to maintain the status quo.

One of the main differences between the Inca empire and colonial rule was with their respective linguistic policies. Whereas the Incas were preoccupied with teaching the Quechua language to its nobility, the Spanish permitted, and even encouraged, the use of local languages. Their reasons for adopting these dissimilar practices, however, were the same: to spread the influence of their culture. A Spaniard's bilingualism in Quechua was inevitably for the purpose of Hispanicizing Indian culture, and not vice versa (Epstein 1985).

The three major caste/class groups that came into existence during the colonial period were based on racial differences. The upper class, most of whom lived in the new capital city of Lima, were made up of the Criollos (whites who were descendants of Spanish colonists). The mestizos, because of their mixed blood, were middle class and usually served the Criollos or worked
in the lesser bureaucracy. The lower class was made up of Indians from the Andean highlands. They were exploited by both the Criollos and the mestizos, clearly holding to the bottom rung of society's ladder.

Post-Independence

Independence for Peru came in 1821 after a series of revolutions led by the Criollos. It has been pointed out that the revolution was both instigated by a relatively small group and, hence, benefited only a small segment of the population (Mannheim 1984). Independence did little to alter the overall social hierarchy originated by the Spaniards; the Criollos merely took over the privileged positions that were formerly held by the Spanish, while mestizos and Indians remained socially inferior. Because Spanish had been the language of the elite since the 16th century, its role as the official language of Peru continued. Also, all forms of education remained in the hands of the church.

Along with independence, however, came a new policy of the ruling elite toward the Indians. The urgent need of the moment was for national unity, therefore, the focus shifted from the economic to the political realm. An effort was made to integrate the Indians into Peruvian society without upsetting the Criollo's base of power. Even though being an Indian and being a peasant were still almost synonymous, class distinctions were no longer drawn rigidly along ethnic lines. Whereas Indians could never hope to become a part of the upper class (reserved exclusively for the white Criollos), they could escape their
Indianess and become mestizo simply by abandoning their own language and culture, adopting the language and culture of more dominant groups. This effectively blurred the distinction between the two lower classes while perpetuating the elite status of the Criollos.

The Current Situation

Though there have been nine civil wars and fourteen presidential coups in Peru since independence, all of the fighting has been spearheaded by the upper class and has, therefore, left the social structure virtually unaffected (Palmer 1980). Up until the early 1970s, the Criollos considered their culture to be "the true" national culture of Peru. Not until the Education Reform of 1972 was any attempt made to redefine the national consciousness to include all ethnic groups.

As part of the reform, the National Bilingual Education Policy had three stated goals: (1) consciousness raising to promote more community involvement of vernacular language groups, (2) the creation of a national culture, including the endorsement of pluralism, and (3) the use of Spanish as a common language in Peru while maintaining respect for linguistic diversity.

In 1977, a bilingual education project began in rural areas near Puno, Peru as a direct result of the 1972 educational reform. The project staff reported that whereas the choice to teach only in Spanish implied a policy of assimilation, their choice of maintenance bilingual education implied a policy of national integration based on respect for all ethnic groups. They proceeded to
outline a number of long-range beneficial effects that they hoped would be ushered in by the implementation of a program of maintenance bilingual education, including: (1) the development of vernacular languages, (2) the production of written materials in the vernacular language, (3) cultural integration, (4) the overcoming of social discrimination, (6) the reduction of illiteracy, and (7) better use of educational opportunities (Hornberger 1987).

The project called for the use of Quechua as a medium of instruction by all subjects in the classroom throughout all six years of primary school. It developed appropriate texts and materials to ensure that Quechua would be adequate as the sole medium of instruction. Teachers were trained by project staff members from the Peruvian Ministry of Education. It is interesting to note that none of these teacher trainers were native speakers of Quechua.

Hornberger (1987) reports that while the project produced striking results in the classroom (e.g., pupils were more verbally interactive, creative in their use of language, and well-behaved), there was no corresponding change in the community. Despite the success of the project in increasing the use of Quechua in the classroom and improving teacher-student relations, Hornberger says that it is still an example of policy failure. The two predominant reasons for this, she says, are obstacles to its full implementation and because the goals specified by the policies surrounding the project were incongruent with social reality.

Hornberger notes that much community resistance to the program stemmed from factors unrelated to bilingual education. For example, sometimes
an individual hoping to attain political office would use bilingual education issues to polarize the community into separate camps in order to promote him or herself. Also, migratory patterns in and out of the Puno area exposed people to prejudice against the use of vernacular languages.

Hornberger argues that the affirmation of cultural pluralism necessarily clashes with the call for integration into a single national culture. Because Peruvian society is structured around the achievement of the latter goal and not the former, native Quechua speakers both want and expect Spanish to be the medium of instruction when they send their children to school. One community member was quoted as saying,

I don’t want any Quechua, I want to learn English, French, Aymara, those are good; but our children are brought up with Quechua from the cradle, so to speak. When they get to school, they are just starting to open their mouths with Spanish. Why revert to Quechua? (quoted in Hornberger 1987, 220).

Even project members from more developed countries could not convince Quechua-speakers that their children would eventually learn Spanish better if they were in the the program.

Conclusion

The conclusion that can be drawn from the Peruvian experience is that schooling is only one of the factors involved in both the maintenance of a minority language and the integration of linguistic minorities into national culture (Trueba 1979). Hornberger argues that the Puno project of 1977 failed to
achieve its goal of ethnic integration because the low status of Quechua speakers and the low prestige of the Quechua language both militated against the maintenance of Quechua. She says that "what is needed for successful language maintenance planning and effective use of schools as agents for language maintenance is autonomy of the speech community in deciding about use of language in their schools and a societal context in which primary incentives exist for the use of one, two, or multiple languages in that and every other domain" (224). As C. B. Paulston (1975) points out, language learning is not salient without rewards. In Peruvian society, the rewards—economically, politically, and socially—clearly lie with Spanish.

Yugoslavia

Ethnic Groups

Yugoslavia (see Fig. 15) provides a particularly rich setting for studying the interaction of language and ethnicity. Of Yugoslavia’s 22.5 million inhabitants (comprised of 24 different ethnic groups), there is no ethnic majority. The largest groups are the Serbs (36%), the Croats (20%), the Moslems (9%), the Slovenes (8%), the Albanians (8%), the Macedonians (6%), the Montenegrins (3%), and the Hungarians (2%). The history of the problem of economic nationalism, its effects on nationality relations, and the policies
developed by the government to deal with the problems, are all closely related to the current language situation. Twentieth-century Yugoslavia is, to a large extent, a function of its attempts throughout history to deal with the massive political, economic, cultural, historical, and linguistic gulfs that often separate nationalities (Tollefson 1981).

**Historical Antecedents to Linguistic Diversity**

**Formation of the Nation**

Prior to 1918, the diverse peoples that inhabited the region now called Yugoslavia lived under a number of foreign masters. The two most powerful empires to encroach upon the territory were the European Habsburgs in the west, and the Asian Ottomans in the east. Lesser empires included the Magyar, the Dalmatian, the Byzantine, and the Venetian. Independent powers, such as the Serbian and Bulgarian Empires, or the Croatian and Bosnian Kingdoms, ruled for only short periods of time, and then only as buffer states between rival empires (Rusinow 1977).
Fig. 15 Yugoslavia, position in Eastern Europe

Note. Adapted from Shoemaker, 1992, p. 196.
It was not until the collapse of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires in 1918 that Yugoslavia was first united as a single state. However, different experiences sustained by Yugoslavia's nationalities during the period of foreign domination made for an uneasy marriage. From the very start, there existed an acute maldistribution of political and economic power among the ethnic groups that occupied various geographic regions. By virtue of the Serbian Kingdom's numerical superiority and their critical role in founding the new state, the Serbians succeeded in imposing their own political system on the entire nation. People of all nationalities suddenly found themselves living under a Serbian king, with a Serbian capital, and a Serbian prime minister.

The people of ex-Habsburg lands in the north and west (present-day Slovenia, Croatia, and Vojvodnia) due to the industrial prowess of the Europeans, enjoyed an appreciably higher standard of living than their neighbors. The economic and political inequalities that came to characterize the nation were only two of the more salient features that kept old Yugoslavia in a state of fragility.

The Rise of Communism

The coming of World War II, and the subsequent invasion by the Axis powers in 1941, precipitated a total dissolution of a ruling system from which many predicted the Yugoslav state would never recover (Rusinow 1977). Italy,
Germany, Albania, Bulgaria, and Hungary all benefited from the spoils of the War by occupying the part of Yugoslavia nearest its own border.

But only 3½ months after its total disintegration, in November of 1943, a new Yugoslavia emerged from the midst of a holocaust of resistance and a fierce inter-ethnic civil war, this time wearing the red badge of Communism. However, the questions that had so vexed the first attempt at national unity remained:

(1) How does a sensitively located small country achieve effective independence?

(2) How can that same country achieve rapid development and modernization?

(3) How can unity be achieved in a state comprised of a wide diversity of languages and ethnic origins?

The Communists believed that the unity of diverse but related nationalities was the only viable answer to the problems encountered by a small nation living in a region where great powers of imperialism intersected (Rusinow 1977).

Consolidating and governing the multi-ethnic state proved to be a formidable task. But the Communists rose to the occasion. During World War II approximately 11% of the population of Yugoslavia died, a large portion of whom were from the more skilled and educated segments of society. In spite of the void this created in the area of qualified leadership Yugoslavia experienced remarkable development in the two decades immediately following the War.

The government was responsible for helping the nation to restructure its physical
resources, restore a degree of economic stability, rebuild its educational system, and create a relatively independent socio-political system (Kintzer 1978).

To ease the ethnic tensions which had been the cause of so much calamity between the World Wars, six republics (Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia) and two autonomous political provinces (Vojvodnia and Kosovo) were designated as homelands for the largest nationalities. Constitutionally, the republics were given only residual powers, while the real formal powers were vested in the federal government.

Rust (1985) argues that a strong, centralized government was necessary in the early postwar stages. Integration by coercion, she says, was to be desired over the disintegration that probably would have occurred had the government taken a more laissez faire approach to governing. Under Josip Broz Tito, Communist rhetoric often spoke of the evolution of a common Yugoslav consciousness and brotherhood and independence as reason for enduring what was predicted to be a short period of forced federation (Rust 1985).

After the Tito-Stalin break in 1948 and the implementation of the self-management system, it appeared that Yugoslavia was well on its way to fulfilling Tito’s dream. The notion of self-management, i.e., "all those who work in an enterprise ... share as equals in the power and running of it" (from OECD’s Review of National Policies for Education: Yugoslavia, quoted in Rust 1985, 18), was best exemplified in the practice of what was called mutual veto. Mutual veto was incorporated into the new constitution so that no single republic or
coalition of republics could impose its will on all the others. The current language policy emerged out of this context.

The Current Situation

Language policy in Yugoslavia is formulated hierarchically on three levels: federal, republic, and communal (Fig. 16). Language rights have become a central concern, as demonstrated by the prominent place given language in the federal Constitution.

In the Constitution republics are referred to as nations and all other minority groups are called nationalities. The Yugoslav Constitution states that:

(1) everyone has the right to express adherence to a nation, nationality, or ethnic group, to promote and express his own culture, and to use his native language and script (article 171).

(2) members of nations and nationalities have a right to school instruction conducted in their own languages (article 171).

(3) all languages shall be equal in "international communication" (article 271).

(4) all languages of the nations and nationalities shall be equal in the armed forces (article 243). (Tollefson 1980)

Although article 171 of the federal Constitution has been interpreted as a commitment to provide the necessary funds for bilingual education, its implementation in communes is the stated responsibility of separate communal statutes. In other words, no federal money is available for bilingual education programs. Fig. 15 illustrates language policy formulation and implementation in Yugoslavia.
Fig. 16 Language policy formulation and implementation in Yugoslavia

Note. From Tollefson, 1980, p. 152.
Yugoslavia's ambivalence regarding bilingual education is only a symptom of its policy of separating language rights from the larger issue of nationality rights (Tollefson 1980). According to much of the literature on ethnicity, a more accepted view is that language is a subset of nationality, and, therefore, the two are not subject to separation (Fishman 1977). Attempts to separate the two inevitably lead to ambiguity of policy toward ethnic rights (C. B. Paulston 1986).

Yugoslavia's basic inconsistency in pursuing a policy of self-management which is centered around the equality of languages is that Serbo-Croatian, spoken by 67% of the population, is, in Magner's (1985) words, "more equal" than the others. Serbo-Croatian has become an obligatory second language for all Slovenes, Macedonians, Albanians, etc. who aspire to professional employment. Though all educated members of the nationalities whose first language is not Serbo-Croatian must learn it, the native speakers of Serbo-Croatian seldom learn a second Yugoslav tongue (Magner 1985). According to Magner, this situation has created a high level of frustration among native-speakers of languages other than Serbo-Croatian who are caught between feeling either chauvinistic in speaking their own language, or unpatriotic to their nationality by yielding to the pressure to learn Serbo-Croatian.

While Yugoslavia is no longer trying to put an end to nationality differences (as Stalin said a successful revolution should) they are trying to limit the conflict and violence frequently associated with fervent nationalism. However, recent events in Yugoslavia have seriously jeopardized this aim. The months
leading up to this writing have proven to be the "most harrowing for Yugoslavia since the end of World War II" (Graff 1991). Ever since the founding of the new Yugoslavia both political and military power have remained in the hands of the Serbs, the largest ethnic group at 40% of the population. Many republics, especially the more economically prosperous republics of Slovenia and Croatia, have claimed that federal policies are more blatantly becoming an instrument for Serbian hegemony (Birnbaum 1991). This has led to an almost unanimous call among the citizens of the two disgruntled republics for secession from a Serbia-dominated Yugoslavia.

Neither the Croats nor the Slovenes seem concerned about how Yugoslavia would pay its foreign debt of $16.7 million. However, with Slovenia producing 30% of Yugoslavia's exports to the West (though accounting for only 9% of the population), and Croatia earning 90% of the Yugoslavia's tourism income, Serbia is very concerned that it (and the remaining republics) would have a difficult time surviving as separate entities (Birnbaum 1991). Serbian officials in the capital city of Belgrade have already noted that wary Western investors have been scared off by the threat of civil war in Yugoslavia. Foreign loans are necessary to keep the beleaguered and near-bankrupt communist economy on a path toward market-oriented reforms (Steichen 1991).
Conclusion

Whereas it would be naive to attribute the current unrest in Yugoslavia entirely to a faulty language policy, it appears that ethnic discontent has at least been aggravated by the separation of language rights from other nationality rights. Even though the intent of such a separation has been to unite the country and prevent the assertion of potentially destructive minority rights, the effect has been the opposite: language has become a more salient marker of ethnic identity and a rallying point for nationalism that threatens to tear the nation apart.

Assuming that language issues can be treated apart from other factors of ethnic identity, as the Yugoslav government apparently does, Yugoslav language policy is still ambiguous. It is contradictory for authorities at the federal level to proclaim that all languages are equal, but then leave it up to authorities at the communal level to implement and fund equitable language policies. Tollefson (1980) suggests that feedback from the implementation of language policies at both the republic and communal levels should influence federal policy decisions (Fig. 17). This, he says, can ensure that language policies serve to reduce rather than foment ethnic tensions.
Political Level

Federal

Regional

Local

Language Planning Process

Formulation

Implementation

Fig. 17 The language planning process and political structure

Note: From Tollefson, 1980, p. 152.
Fig. 18 Malaysia, position in Southeast Asia

Malaysia

The phenomenal development of the official Malaysian language (Bahasa Malaysia) over the last 35 years well illustrates the potential inherent in all languages to adequately function across any and all societal domains (Safiah Karim 1987). However, the reality of Malaysian society suggests that this fact, alone, provides insufficient reason for imposing a single official language on a multilingual populace.

Ethnic Groups

The central theme of Malaysian politics has been communal survival in a society marked by divergent and often clashing group interests. Language issues, especially in regards to the language of education, has proven to be at the heart of the debate (Hon-Chan 1978).

Malaysia (see Fig. 18) currently has a population of almost 16 million people, living in a federation of 13 states. The indigenous population (referring to themselves as Bumiputra, or "sons of the soil") represent a slight majority (53%). A significant proportion of Chinese (36%), and a lesser number of Indians (11%) may also be found. None of these groups, however, are homogeneous. Among indigenous Malays, there are up to 50 different linguistic groups. The Chinese include Hokkien, Hakka, Cantonese, Teochew, Hockchew, Hainanese, Kwongsai, Henghua, and others. The Indian population is a mixture of
Tamil, Nadu, Kerala, Bengali, Gujarati, Parsi, and other ethnic Indians (Omar 1982; Ward & Hewstone 1985).

As in Yugoslavia, among the major ethnic groups in Malaysia, there is no single group which manifests historical, demographic, political, and economic dominance. Overall, however, it is generally understood that the major ethnic division in Malaysia is between the Malays and the non-Malays. Inter-ethnic relations are predominantly a function of the ethnic groups' respective experiences under British colonialism (Stubbs 1990; Thomas 1986).

**Historical Antecedents of Linguistic Diversity**

**Colonialism**

From the mid-19th century until its full independence in 1957, parts of Malaysia, at various times, were under the colonial rule of the Dutch, the Portuguese, and the British. British colonialism had by far the greatest impact on socio-political development. The British practice of shipping in mass numbers of Chinese and Indians to perform cheap labor drastically altered the ethnic make-up of the commonwealth and greatly facilitated the British policy of divide and rule (Ward & Hewstone 1985). Ethnic and linguistic boundaries were augmented by educational separatism and economic inequalities. Colonial rule
prevented intermarriage and other assimilatory processes from taking place (Heidhues 1986).

Apart from maintaining an iron grip on the reigns of political power, the British held to a policy of non-intervention in the Malay way of life. Consequently, schools established by the British for the Malays focused on teaching people how to read and write in the Malay language, and how to be better farmers and fishermen. Simultaneous to this, and to prevent what the British saw as growing nationalism, Chinese and Indian children were educated in schools that used English as the medium of instruction (Heidhues 1986). This helped create an English-speaking elite that effectively excluded Malays. The question of whether or not the British intentionally kept the Malays monolingual in their own language for political reasons (Gaudart 1987) or merely wanted to be benevolent rulers remains unanswered (Hon-Chan 1978).

Whatever the reason, their policies have had lasting physical and psychological effects on Malaysian society. Today, of the three major ethnic groups, the Malays have the lowest per capita income. They tend to be involved in agriculture and fishing and live in the suburbs. The Chinese, by contrast, enjoy a relatively high standard of living and are dominant in commerce and manufacturing, dwelling mostly in cities. The Indians occupy an intermediate place along the economic stratum. Because the English language had been so important under British rule, the Chinese and Indian populations tend to be more educated than the Malays.
More than ten years prior to their granting Malaya full independence, the British proposed formation of a Malayan union that would ensure equal rights for Malays, Chinese, and Indians. Since this idea seemed foreign to most Malays, it only served to mobilize them to resist such a scheme. This led to the formation of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) in 1946, whose Constitution guaranteed special rights to Malays by restricting the rights of non-Malays to claim citizenship (Hon-Chan 1978). Non-Malays had to prove their loyalty to the "country" (i.e., the Malay population) before they could become citizens. In order to counteract the Malayan nationalistic fervor that was sweeping the commonwealth, the British aided in the formation of the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).

Post-Independence

In 1957, after more than a century of British rule, the Malayan and Borneo territories were granted full independence, taking the new name of Federation of Malaya. Despite the fact that democratic processes were alien to the people of the new federation, independence was formed around a compromise reached by the Alliance, a newly formed entity consisting of English-educated leaders from UMNO, the MCA, and the MIC. However, this compromise was neither understood, nor accepted by the vast majority of Malays who were not English-educated. By virtue of their being Bumiputras, and because of the numerical preponderance of Malays, UMNO became the domin-
ant member of the Alliance party. The Malays were determined not to let the economically dominant Chinese also gain political control of their nation. It was at this point that language emerged as the most divisive issue in the newly formed republic (Hon-Chan 1978).

In the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya (authored mainly by members of UMNO), a Malay is defined as someone who speaks Malay as a mother tongue, habitually lives the Malay way of life, and professes the religion of Islam (Omar 1982). Because the belief was strong that linguistic diversity nurtured racial and group prejudice Malay was declared to be the new national language. All post-independence administrations have unanimously "concentrated their efforts on the introduction of national policies which have highlighted national culture as issues and have generally aimed at broad social and structural changes, including the redress of socio-economic imbalances in the Malaysian society" (Ward & Hewstone 1985, 274).

Since UMNO's stated intention was to create a society that was more amenable to Malays, their first order of business was to integrate the system which they felt had done them so much wrong during the colonial period—the education system (Hon-Chan 1978). They believed that "a national ideology that aims for a just society [and] which provides equal opportunity for everybody cannot hope to succeed in education if the national language is allowed to have competition from education in other languages" (Omar 1982, 28).
At the time of independence, schools were taught in one of four languages, namely Malay, Chinese, Tamil, or English, with only a few private schools allowing for bilingual instruction. As Malay became the sole medium of instruction, most Chinese and Tamil schools were closed. The non-Malays began to voice their belief that national identity did not have to hinge on what they believed was the destruction of their cultures. But the Malay government insisted that the continued existence of Chinese and Tamil education was inimical to efforts aimed at national integration (Thomas 1986).

English-language schools, besides being the only multi-racial ones, had been the main channel through which all racial groups had attained high occupational and social status. But since English could not be claimed as a mother tongue by any group, it was an easy target for attack. The Malays saw the English language as a threat to the supremacy of Malay as the principle tool of integration. With the resignation of the last English-educated prime minister in 1969, the English-dominated era came to a close. Starting in 1970, the required credential for admission to pre-university and government sponsored schools was changed from the Cambridge (Overseas) School Certificate (requiring passage of an English language exam) to the Malay Certificate of Education (requiring passage of a Malay language exam). The full significance of this change was demonstrated the following year when 16,000 out of 29,000 candidates failed the Malay exam. Hon-Chan (1978) notes that it seems ironic that
so many non-Malays were frustrated by a process that was intended to foster integration.

**The Current Situation**

Presently, there are no Chinese-medium schools of higher education in Malaysia. This has meant that unless Chinese pupils learn Malaysian or receive schooling outside the country, secondary school terminates their education. Ethnic Chinese pupils are reported to feel pessimistic about their future prospects since the public sector favors Malays so heavily. However, a recent study indicates that pupils in Chinese-language schools felt a greater sense of national identity as Malaysians than did pupils at ethnically mixed schools (Heidhues 1986).

**Conclusion**

Rather than promoting a Malaysian national identity, the imposition of Malay as the sole medium of instruction in schools has been concurrent with a recession in national unity (Ward & Hewstone 1985; Snider 1973). This serves to reinforce the notion that language policy as the singular basis of national unity is not likely to succeed (Gaudart 1987; Heidhues 1986; Hon-Chan 1978). Thomas (1986) identifies the five most prevalent principles of policy-making in Malaysia as: (1) defining who qualifies as a Malay, (2) achieving economic parity for Malays, (3) promoting cultural unity, (4) fostering morality, and
(5) maintaining the peace. The express rationale behind these policies, he says, derive from two principle convictions:

(1) Malays deserve compensation for the disadvantages they suffered under colonial rule, and

(2) the most reasonable source for a unified national identity is the dominant indigenous ethnic group.

Taken together, these rationales imply an ontological approach to policy-making and, thus, explain the reluctance of non-Malays to implement policy decisions.

According to Stubbs (1990), the Malay government has done a remarkable job at maintaining the peace, given the deep ethnic divisions that permeate Malaysian society. This has been the result mainly of a precarious balance of power between political and economic domains rather than deliberate planning. Stubbs concludes that there can be no assurance that the lack of serious ethnic conflict will continue.

Snider (1973) says that the potential for outbursts of ethnic violence will remain high, as long as "more attention is not given to the problems of promoting inter-ethnic understanding, rather than to the implementation of policies which increase pressures for socio-political integration and/or assimilation into a Malaysian nation-state" (88). The current language policy in Malaysia would appear to attend to the latter.
Definitions

Throughout this thesis the importance of definitional precision has been stressed. Because the terms integration, pluralism, and assimilation have become so ambiguous that they have little explanatory value, this chapter will begin by looking at these three terms and seek to show how they are related.

Integration

According to Schermerhorn (1970) integration is a process, rather than an end state. He says integration is: "a process whereby units or elements of a society are brought into active and coordinated compliance with ongoing activities and objectives of the dominant group in that society" (14).

Political, social, and economic integration is one of the primary stated goals of a majority of the world's countries (Horowitz 1985). Political authorities in developing countries often view integration as a way to ensure mass participation in the pursuit of the country's goals thereby hastening the process of economic modernization. Others hope to merit international economic aid by demonstrating that they value the equality of all people (whether they actually do or not). In still other developing countries, it is imperative to a government's...
political survival to espouse the integration and equal treatment of all the
country's ethnolinguistic groups. Because a given country's motives in pursuing
integration are often not open to verification, it may be unwise for researchers
to voice what they judge a particular motivation to be.

As evidenced by the persistence of ethnic violence throughout the
developing world, effective mechanisms of integration have been hard to find
(R. Paulston 1976b). Ethnic minority groups are often afraid that integration is
just another word for (forced) assimilation. On the other hand, dominant
groups may be afraid to unleash the friction thought to be associated with
unbridled forms of ethnic pluralism. A proper understanding of the two terms
may serve to alleviate some of these fears.

**Pluralism**

*Pluralism* can be defined as a doctrine or theory of ethnic relations that
affirms as morally good the freedom of members of ethnic groups to exercise
their ethnicity (Haugen 1987). Schlossberg and Olasky (1987) argue that use of
the suffix *-ism* implies that pluralism is not a descriptive word rather it is
prescriptive. Since the concept of pluralism is frequently associated with
Western-style democracies, it would be helpful to examine the evolution of the
term in America. This will also shed light on the meaning of assimilation as it
has been understood historically.
The originator of the term *cultural pluralism* was Horace Kallen, a German-born Jew and self-proclaimed Zionist. In a 1915 article entitled "Democracy Versus the Melting Pot," Kallen spoke out against what he called the "Americanizer assimilationists" of his day. The negative connotation he ascribed to assimilation belied the fact that he himself was in favor of a certain amount of assimilation. His theory of intergroup relations provided for a "degree of consensus adequate to assure cooperation and harmony among all elements" in a society (quoted in Gleason 1984, 230).

By the mid-fifties, the phrase *cultural democracy* was added to pluralist terminology. However, the goal of the movement was clearly assimilationist: "to improve intergroup relations, achieve social harmony, and national unity; not heightened consciousness of the differences between peoples" (Gleason 1984, 231). Gleason (1984) says that the early concepts of pluralism were all "predicated on consensus around the American value system, despite the fact that verbally each seemed to place a premium on diversity" (235). He then concludes that the ideas of pluralism and assimilation, as they have been used historically, overlap and relate to each other in a dialectical manner.

However, the perception of cultural pluralism as it is currently understood by a number of scholars in the U.S. is different from these earlier views. Whereas at one time proponents of pluralism were interested in seeing the multiplicity of group interests cancel each other out, resulting in the pursuit of the common good, now the main idea is to protect all minorities, even
at the expense of endangering whatever consensus may exist. Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union are renowned for defending the rights of the individual against what they perceive to be the tyranny of majority sentiment (A. Bloom 1987).

**Assimilation**

Assimilation is the process by which two or more different entities become more similar, harmonized, or incorporated (Webster's New World Dictionary 1964, s.v.; Gleason 1984). Though it is frequently associated with a dominant group's goal of compelling subordinate minority groups to conform to them (assimilationism), assimilation is merely a descriptive term.

**Pluralism vs. Assimilation?**

Lamenting the new paradigm of pluralism that establishes individual rights as having primacy over communal rights, A. Bloom (1987) says, "The very idea of majority—now understood to be selfish interest—is done away with in order to protect minorities. This breaks the delicate balance" (32). All too often, pluralism is associated with everything good in social policy and assimilation with everything bad (Gleason 1984). This tends to set up a theoretical as well as a moral dichotomy between the notions of pluralism and assimilation (see Fig. 19).

Some authors maintain that there is a crucial balance between the forces invoked by pluralism and assimilation (Bullivant 1981; 1984; Edwards 1984b; Schermerhorn 1970). These scholars argue that without a certain measure of
agreement between the various ethnic groups coexisting in a plural society there is likely to be social breakdown (Bullivant 1984; Craft 1984; Edwards 1981; Young 1976).

Fig. 19 The pluralism and assimilation poles of integration

However, others contend that when such theoretical views are translated into practice they inevitably lead to a policy of one-way assimilation from the dominated minority culture to the dominant majority culture (Pattanayak 1988). Denying the expression or even the existence of ethnic attachments, they say, is a major cause of ethnic and social upheaval. The recent revolts in many of the former Soviet republics provide evidence for their arguments.

Because of the extreme poverty and political instability endemic to most developing countries, power-brokers in these countries may be more interested in promoting ways to ensure political, economic, and social stability than they
are in extolling the virtues of diversity. At the same time, however, they are often dependent upon Western aid in order to meet their economic goals (Altbach 1987). The result is that they often pay lip-service to pluralist policies all the while pursuing policies of assimilationism.

The Difference Between *Plural* and *Pluralism*

In order to understand principles of integration in a multilingual setting, it may be important to make a distinction between the terms *plural* and *pluralism*. Whereas plural is purely descriptive, pluralism is prescriptive. A society characterized by diversity, be it in the area of language, religion, culture, socio-economics, or almost anything else, is said to be plural. Furnivall (1956), in his observations of Burmese society under British colonial rule, noted that Burma's medley of peoples "mix but do not combine . . . As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society with different sections of the community living side-by-side, but separately, within the same political unit" (304).

Plural societies that sprang up under colonialism, where people "mix but do not combine," were held together by the external force of colonial rule. With a country's independence came the removal of the external force and, for many plural societies, the end of peaceful inter-ethnic relations. The governments in many developing countries resorted to coercion in order to maintain a semblance
of law and order. This coercion has often taken the form of forced assimilation, as in the case of Malaysia (described in Chapter 6).

However, pluralism goes beyond mere description. Halstead (1988) echoes a popular sentiment when he asserts that it is in the best interests of the state (be it developing or developed) to show respect toward its minorities and to avoid any appearance of domination by a majority. He maintains that the absence of majoritarian domination is the essence of pluralism.

But through the exercise of so-called pluralistic policy, it is possible for a country to show the outside world that it respects its minorities while in reality giving them little that will enhance their life chances (Bullivant 1981). For example, a society may publicize its commitment to utilize vernacular languages in the classroom for maintenance purposes, but its actual purpose may be to better prepare minority youth for transitioning to the dominant language (La Belle & White 1980). Pluralism, therefore, may be best thought of as an attitude, and not just an action.

Pluralism in Cultural Perspective

Burtonwood (1986) says that culture is a group's expression to a changing situation. It may not be possible or even desirable to totally insulate minority ethnolinguistic groups from the psychological stress of living in an ever-changing environment. Consequently, any plausible theory of integration must incorporate adaptation to change as a central element (Young 1976).
Strong forms of cultural pluralism, i.e., the advocacy of government involvement in the preservation of minority culture, may work against the best interests of minority ethnic group members by preventing them from adapting to societal change (Burtonwood 1986; Edwards 1984). For example, cultural drift, a term coined by Goodenough (1981) to describe what happens when a group willingly assimilates to the dominant culture, may be mistaken for ethnocide, Szepe's (1984) term denoting an ethnic group's loss of its culture due to forced assimilation.

Language, Pluralism, and Integration

Perhaps nowhere are the adverse effects of misinterpreting the notions of pluralism and assimilation more apparent than in the formation of language policy. Policies which push for the maintenance of a minority tongue against the wishes of that language's own speakers are often perceived by minority group members as hegemonistic on the part of the majority-language group, as in Peru (Chapter 6). The upward mobility of minority-language group members can be thwarted just as easily through pluralistic policy as through assimilationist policy. In the face of inevitable change, say Eastman (1984) and Edwards (1984), there are strong doubts as to whether language is the best vehicle for maintaining ethnic identity.
The question that must be answered is whether pluralism and assimilation represent:

(1) diametrically opposed methods of achieving integration (Cardenas 1984; Cummins 1986; Fishman 1989; Halstead 1988; Skutnabb-Kangas 1988),

or


The Dialectics of Pluralism and Assimilation: Pluralistic Integration

Reflection on the shortcomings of both the assimilationist and the pluralist models have led a number of scholars to synthesize elements of both concepts in a dialectical manner (see Fig. 20). Lessow-Hurley (1990) argues that strict adherence to a view which perceives pluralism and assimilation as polar opposites will inevitably result in the formulation of social policy that is oversimplified and misleading.

According to theories of integration that combine elements of both pluralism and assimilation, the most salient question for planners in developing countries might be, *What is the minimum level of acculturation necessary for full participation in society, and the maximum extent to which diversity might be encouraged?* (Craft 1984). In Higham's words, "What nexus can be forged
between individual rights and group solidarity, between universalistic principles and particularistic needs?" (Higham 1984, 241).

The name which Higham (1984) gives to such schemes is *pluralistic integration*. Unlike purely assimilationist models, pluralistic integration models do not seek to eliminate all ethnic boundaries. But neither do they endeavor to maintain them unchanged, as many forms of pluralism seem to advocate. Instead, they seek to "uphold the validity of a common culture, while sustaining the efforts of minorities to preserve and enhance their own integrity" (242). Under these terms, says Higham, no ethnic group warrants the support of the general community in strengthening its ethnic separateness. Sowell (1990) asserts that preferential policies, i.e., policies which tend to favor members of
certain minority groups, can only provide a "quick fix" at relatively little expense, but are ineffective at integrating plural societies over the long-run.

Centripetality and Centrifugality

In order to implement a pluralistic integration-type policy, a polity should understand the relationship between what Schermerhorn (1970) calls centripetal and centrifugal tendencies which he says exist within all plural societies. Centripetal tendencies, says Schermerhorn, are those tendencies produced by things which draw the members of a society toward the acceptance of common goals. This could include the acceptance by all ethnic groups of one or more common cultural symbols such as language, religion, or style of life. It may also include the solidarity built between groups as a result of participating in common institutions (e.g., schools and churches) and/or social groups (e.g., jobs and clubs). Conversely, centrifugal tendencies are produced by circumstances which tend to move the members of a society away from the acceptance of common goals. Like centripetal trends, these can be in the areas of culture and/or social structure.

Schermerhorn emphasizes that centripetal tendencies do not necessarily relate to integration and centrifugal tendencies to disintegration and conflict. "On the contrary, integration involves satisfaction of the ethnic group's modal tendency, whether it be centripetal or centrifugal" (82). What this means is that some ethnic groups may prefer a measure of assimilation to the dominant group.
to cultural pluralism. On the other hand, some groups will desire autonomy over assimilation. Neither response, however, should be assumed.

Schermerhorn says it is important that dominant (or superordinate) and subordinate groups agree on which cultural and societal trends are centripetal and which are centrifugal in order to maintain a minimum of intergroup conflict. Like De Vos’s (1975) -emic and -etic scheme of ethnicity, this implies frequent and effectual dialogue between dominant and subordinate group members.

Centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, says Schermerhorn, are part of the warp and woof of all plural societies. Whereas integration is possible in a society characterized by many centrifugal tendencies, efforts to integrate around any one of them may meet with resistance from ethnolinguistic minorities. This often occurs when the members of an ethnic group think their language, religion, or some other symbol of ethnicity is being unfairly treated by the dominant group. The result is that a dominant group’s efforts to integrate their country’s citizenry may be scorned by the country’s minority groups.

Careless tampering with structures that are potentially centripetal and integrative (e.g., schools, jobs, and political institutions) can potentially transform them into centrifugal forces, hindering efforts aimed at integration. This can occur when structural inequalities block certain ethnic groups’ access to political, social, vocational, or educational advancement. Fig. 21 summarizes Schermerhorn’s conception of the way in which centripetal and centrifugal tendencies can lead to either integration or conflict in multi-ethnic societies.
Reducing Ethnic Conflict

There may be times when a dominant group unilaterally determines that a subordinate group's efforts to separate itself are unreasonably hindering the pursuit of other societal goals. But such situations should be addressed in a sensitive manner in order to avoid exacerbating the problem (Young 1976; Warwicke 1980). Banton (1986) suggests that polities would do well to keep Glazer's Law in mind at the moment of potential ethnic conflict: "A small group for which one issue is everything will overcome a large group for which the issue is only one among many" (11).
Fig. 21 Congruent and incongruent orientations toward centripetal (Cp) and centrifugal (Cf) trends of subordinates as viewed by themselves and superordinates (Schermerhorn, 1970, p. 83)
Conclusion

This thesis has examined six sets of notions which have each traditionally been viewed in a linear, dichotomous fashion. Chapter 1 looked at the instrumental and sentimental dimensions of language use and the three most prevalent language planning orientations, namely language-as-problem, language-as-resource, and language-as-right. Chapter 2 presented the nation/nationalism and state/nationism dichotomy of nation-building strategy, and the modernization and development poles of progress. Chapter 3 investigated the supposedly contradictory goals of transitional and maintenance varieties of bilingual education. Chapter 4 focused on the antithetical interpretations of ethnicity made by classic primordialists and strict circumstantialists. Finally, Chapter 6 has explored the supposedly opposite impact that policies of pluralism and assimilation have upon integration in a multi-ethnic society. In each case, it has been suggested that dialectical paradigms may better account for the apparently contradictory nature of the data.

A survey of the current situation in most developing countries reveals that social, economic, and political stability are rare commodities. Even though language-related problems are seldom cited as a major contributory factor to socio-political or economic instability, it has been argued that the implementation of a context-specific language policy can potentially reduce the amount of inter-ethnic conflict which often precipitates this instability. Fig. 22 shows the essen-
tial components of a context-specific language policy for linguistically diverse populations.

In the final analysis, the formulation of a context-specific language policy for a particular country is "directly related to the extent to which governments are prepared to challenge historical dogmas ... and to address those that relate to administrative realities, psychological assumptions, and political prejudices" (Santiago 1982, 114).
Fig. 22 Essential components of language policy formulation in linguistically diverse populations
NOTES

1. Reitsma and Kleinpenning (1985) define an underdeveloped country as "a country with a weak economic structure and with extreme poverty among the masses of the generally rapid-growing population who have become increasingly aware of their poverty" (30) and say that "a country or people considers itself developed when material and immaterial needs are reasonably satisfied" (23). They add that "[underdeveloped countries] are considered underdeveloped simply because [developed countries] are considered developed" (25). Following Reitsma and Kleinpenning, these two designations have meaning only when considered relative to one another.

2. The dynamics of cross-cultural communication discourage an ontological approach to making cross-cultural comparisons. Implicit in an ontological approach is a researcher's attitude that "I am right, and anyone possessing a different opinion is wrong." By contrast, a phenomenological approach to cross-cultural research will probably be less objectionable to the human subjects under investigation. In a phenomenological approach, researchers attempts to learn as much as they can about the subjects who will potentially be affected by their research before making any prescriptions for change. The researcher's attitude is one of "I know some things you need to know, and you know some things I need to know; let's learn from each other" (P. Hiebert 1990 July, personal communication).
3. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has now been rejected, at least in its strong form. Modern sociolinguists hold that language and culture mutually affect each other, but that there is no determinism in either direction (H. Purnell 1992 April, personal communication).

4. Although the term diglossia was originally applied by Ferguson to situations involving the complimentary use of two languages, its meaning has been expanded to include more than two languages, i.e., multiglossic situations (H. Purnell 1992 April, personal communication).

5. Ironically, Fishman's definition clearly illustrates the first orientation even though he is one of the main proponents of the language-as-resource orientation.

6. For some people it is never settled (e.g., as it is for the people of El Salvador, Nigeria, Lebanon and other nations that have experienced civil war for much if not all of their existence). However, the vast majority of people delegate the state to be the bearer of ultimate control and power (Ellul 1975).

7. Even though many Western social scientists once assumed that all developing countries would grow to eventually look like the more developed Western countries politically, socially, and economically time has proven this to be a naive and ethnocentric assumption (Rizvi 1986, Royce 1982).

8. Pool's opinion of what constitutes "considerable language uniformity" is questionable. He would, no doubt, include Los Angeles, CA as a region that is highly developed. R. Slimbach (1992 January, personal communication) notes that L.A. has more wealth concentrated in a 60 mile radius than most countries
of the world. Slimbach adds that there are approximately 150 languages spoken in the L.A. area. This appears to run counter to Pool's hypothesis.

9. When a mother tongue is a language that is not an official language of some other country, it is sometimes called a vernacular. According to UNESCO (1953), a vernacular is "a language which is the mother tongue of a group which is socially or politically dominated by another group speaking a different language" (53).

10. Developing countries spend an average of 4% of their GNP on education, but only .2% on education research (Epstein 1985).

11. The political situation in Yugoslavia has worsened considerably since this was written.
REFERENCES


Fishman, J. A. 1968a. Sociolinguistics and the language problems of developing countries. In J. Fishman, C. Ferguson, & J. Das Gupta (Eds.), Language problems of developing nations (pp. 3-16). New York: John Wiley and Sons.


