Contributions of Habermas and Bakhtin to the Assimilation of Modernity and Postmodernity within Cultural Studies.

While not attempting to unify the various theories in cultural studies, this paper proposes pointers or directions to further transformations of cultural studies. The paper identifies and analyzes the works of two theorists, who have largely been ignored in cultural studies, to suggest a resolution of the theoretical conflicts surrounding cultural studies by tracing inner connections. As a substitution for structuralism, the paper suggests the work of German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, whose theory of communication is valuable to cultural studies because it emphasizes social conditions affecting the legitimacy of various cultural forms. The paper also suggests that Mikhail Bakhtin's concept of dialogism and of language oppose the individualist assumptions and romantic interpretations of cultural forms, providing specific ways in which those producers orchestrate diverse social voices. The paper notes that Bakhtin's notion of carnival also helps to maintain a balance between the importance of the counter-hegemonic subversion of established power and the obvious fact of pleasure, desire, and ambiguity—restoring the notion of collective pleasure to its rightful place within cultural studies. Finally, based in the description, critique, and new possible interconnections with the broader discourse of Habermas and Bakhtin, the paper points to the development of an alternative direction for its primary problematic. Four figures representing various aspects of Habermas' or Bakhtin's work are included; 369 references are attached. (Author/RS)
Contributions of Habermas and Bakhtin to the assimilation of Modernity and Postmodernity within Cultural Studies

Eung-Jun Min
Assistant Professor
600 Mt. Pleasant Ave.
Department of Communications
Rhode Island College
Providence, Rhode Island 02908
401-456-8270

PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Eung-Jun Min

TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.

Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE
ABSTRACT

This paper does not attempt to unify the various theories in cultural studies. Instead it proposes pointers or directions to further transformations of cultural studies. It identifies and analyzes two theorists, who have been largely ignored in cultural studies, to suggest a resolution of the theoretical conflicts surrounding cultural studies by tracing inner connections. As a substitution for structuralism, the paper suggests the work of German philosopher Habermas, who has been virtually dismissed by both British and American cultural studies. His theory of communication is valuable to cultural studies because it emphasizes social conditions affecting the legitimacy of various cultural forms. Habermas's perspective on the relations between culture and social structure is a reformulation of the Marxist theory of historical materialism, but with greater emphasis on communication and culture. Bakhtin favors a more open, reciprocal, decentered negotiation of specificity and difference. His concept of dialogism and of language oppose the individualist assumptions and romantic interpretations of cultural forms, providing us rather with specific ways in which those producers orchestrate diverse social voices. His emphasis on the situated utterance and the interpersonal generation of meaning avoids the static ahistoricism of an apolitical value-free postmodernism. Bakhtin's notion of carnival also helps to maintain a balance between the importance of the counter-hegemonic subversion of established power and the obvious fact of pleasure, desire, and ambiguity. Thus, Bakhtin's theory would restore the notion of collective pleasure to its rightful place within cultural studies. Finally, based on this description, critique, and new possible interconnections with the broader discourse of those two writers, this paper points to the development of an alternative direction for its primary problematic.
Just as Bourdieu's sociology of culture has been overlooked in cultural studies, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has been dismissively treated by both British and American writers in cultural studies. Perry Anderson's 1976 book *Considerations on Western Marxism*, which was one of the seminal books in cultural studies, for example, did not even mention Habermas's name. Despite the dismissal of Habermas, I think his approach provides an attractive solution to many of the concerns that have troubled the analysis of culture in cultural studies. I would even argue that his theory of communication is a better model for cultural studies than Althusserian structuralism.

**Habermas's Communicative Theory: Toward a Defense of Modernism**

Habermas attempts to revise his Frankfurt School predecessors' pessimistic view and recast a more viable method for analyzing contemporary society and culture. Habermas argues that although the first generation has exposed some of the major flaws of certain traditional and conventional approaches to philosophy and social investigation, they have not demonstrated its own adequate theoretical status. In other words, they have not resolved a whole series of epistemological and methodological issues they intended to settle. In addition to the central focuses of the first generation, they emphasize more on the private sphere. They, especially Habermas, attempt to develop a theory of society by focusing on the self-emancipation of people from domination with a practical sense. Habermas' version of critical theory aims to further the self-understanding of social groups capable of transforming society.

His insistence on communication is not much different from the emphasis on language use in structuralism and deconstruction, except that communication brings the question of politics to the fore: language for what? In other words, communication is also a quite different starting point from the abstractions of language that appear in linguistically oriented theories from structuralism to deconstruction. For the Saussurean tradition, language is the final cause, at least in relation to culture. But for Habermas and Williams, "language is the articulation of this active and changing experience: a dynamic and articulated social presence in the world" (Williams, 1977, p. 37-38).

The advantage of viewing culture in close connection with social structure, I believe, is that culture ceases to be reified as a purely abstract set of norms and values. For Habermas, the problem of legitimation is never solved through values and norms alone; it involves the dynamic interaction of social classes, class factions, prophetic and messianic movements, and state agencies. The values and norms espoused by these various actors must be seen in conjunction with the institutions that articulate them and translate them into collective behavior. He avoids the danger of explaining culture or of perceiving it as a mere reflection of social activity. Instead he treats culture as a phenomenon of importance in its own right.

This framework is articulated clearly in his essay on "Universal Pragmatics" (1979, p. 1-68). In this essay, he poses the question of what conditions influence the likelihood that any attempted act of communication will actually communicate effectively. This question is similar to the more specific issue concerning ideology that has been addressed in the Marxist tradition. The question of what produces ideology, in Marx's formulation, is answered primarily with reference to the class struggle. Ideology is produced by the ruling class in its struggle for domination, masking the interests of the ruling class and promoting false consciousness among both rulers and ruled. The understanding of ideology must concentrate on the structure of class conflict. Habermas's treatment of effective communication, however, is more complex in that he distinguishes four types of conditions influencing the effectiveness of communication, each of which represents a distinct domain of reality.

The first of these, the world of external nature, is a world of objects that can be manipulated. Any act of communication will be affected by its symbolic relation to this domain. Speakers and actors accordingly make claims about the truth of their assertions in relation to this domain. Other things
being equal, the closer the level of correspondence between these claims and facts observable in the external world, the more likely it is that a specific act of communication involving these claims will be regarded as meaningful (1984, p. 69; 75-76).

The world of society, as the second domain, includes the usual array of interpersonal relations, institutions, traditions, and values that social scientists commonly associate with the idea of society. These can be recognized by the actor as external objects or simply taken for granted as features of life incorporated into the actor's perspective (Ibid, p. 235). In either case, they consist of pre-existing norms or symbolic patterns - objects created through processes of social identification and interaction (e.g., the concept of a nation, the value of freedom, the feeling of love). The fact that any act of communication takes place in relation to this domain, in addition to the domain of external nature, means that its effectiveness or meaningfulness is influenced by its relation to social norms. Communication can be judged as legitimate or illegitimate in relation to these pre-existing norms, and for this reason, speakers build clues into the content of their speech acts that make claims about the "rightness" or legitimacy" of their assertions (Ibid, p. 237-238).

The third domain is the internal world of the person communicating - the realm of subjectivity. It includes feelings, wishes, and intentions. Only this person only has access to this realm, but it influences the effectiveness of communication. Assumptions tend to be made in judging communication about the relation between what has been uttered and what the speaker really thought or felt internally. Communication will be more effective if it is judged to have accurately expressed the speaker's intentions. The speaker, therefore, is likely to shape communication in such a way that it can be judged to have contained "truthful" statements (Ibid, p. 90-94).

Finally, communication takes place within the domain of language. Consequently, its effectiveness depends in part on the linguistic medium in which it is framed. To the extent that an act of communication conforms to the grammatical, semantic, and syntactical rules of the language in which it is expressed, it may be said to be "comprehensible" and, therefore, more likely to achieve its intended results (Ibid, p. 98). Chomsky inspired Habermas for this concept of the universal rules and Habermas expands this concept further. He believes linguistic competence of the kind Chomsky studies is fundamental but that a second level of competence exists as well. This is knowledge of the rules for how to use speech acts - how we adapt sentences for use in various contexts. A speaker, in Habermas's scheme, must do more than master linguistic rules to be considered a competent communicator: "By communicative competence I understand the ability of a speaker oriented to mutual understanding to embed a well-formed sentence in relations to reality" (1979, p.29). More specifically, this level of competence involves the ability to communicate in such a way that: (1) the truth claim of an utterance is shared by both speaker and hearer; (2) the hearer is led to understand and accept the speaker's intention; and (3) the speaker adapts to the hearer's world view.

This ideal speech situation is conceptualized both as a means of analyzing the nature of a society and as an imaginative model or end in itself of autonomous human activity. Habermas warns that the ideal speech situation should not be taken as anything but an ideal (Smith, 1981, p.74). He acknowledges that discourse rarely achieves this level of purity, but for him, this is not the issue. Its value lies in its function as an assumption that is made whenever we enter into conversation, thus supplying communication with a rational base. When both participants in an interaction operate as if free to speak their minds and to listen to reason without fear of constraints, the possibility for a rationally motivated consensus exists (Habermas, 1984, p. 307). As such, it is a consensus based not on the arbitrary norms of one interest group or another, but on norms inherent in language itself.

According to Habermas, he has uncovered, in the ideal speech situation, a universal principle of rationality that is true because it taps a necessary structure of our world (Ibid, p. 136-138). By suggesting that the attainment of a rationally motivated consensus requires the acknowledgment,
understanding, and acceptance of norms that embody the universal ideals of truth, freedom, and justice, Habermas presupposes rationality as a basic structure of human life. The ideal speech situation, then, is not simply a set of principles by which actual social arrangements are to be evaluated (Ibid). Rather, as Thomas McCarthy argues, it expresses the ideals of truth, freedom, and justice, thus providing non-arbitrary norms for a contemporary theory of society (1978, p. 305).

Habermas concludes that "... the appropriate model is rather the communication community [Kommunikationsgemeinschaft] of those affected, who as participants in a practical discourse test the validity claims of norms and, to the extent that they accept them with reasons, arrive at the conviction that in the given circumstances the proposed norms are 'right'" (Habermas, 1973, p. 105). Finally, Habermas observes cynical suspicions of truth. System theorists see political dialogue as useless bickering which hinders rational preference selection by technocrats and administrators. Habermas seems to believe in his "partiality for reason" and a determination to fight the stabilization of a nature-like social system over its citizens (Habermas, 1975, p. 2-8). All of these domains must be taken into account to fully assess the conditions influencing communication.

![Diagram of speech acts]

**Figure 1: The dimensions of speech acts**

This work is valuable to cultural studies because it emphasizes social conditions affecting the legitimacy of various cultural forms. Habermas's perspective on the relations between culture and social structure is a reformulation of the Marxist theory of historical materialism (1979, p. 130-177), a reformulation which gives more weight to communication and culture. The basis of Marx's theory is the observation that humankind engages in productive labor to earn its subsistence. Habermas characterizes production as an action concerned with the manipulation of the material (physical, objective) world (1984, p.368).
Habermas's reformulation of Marx suggests that the social relations of production are regarded as a distinct type of behavior, as communicative action. Habermas accords communication theory the tasks of defining, critiquing, and determining the bases for legitimacy in advanced social systems. He establishes the importance of a theory of communicative competence by asserting that communication must be accounted for in human communication. He also complicates the Marxist argument by suggesting that the social base need not be the economy in all stages of societal development. The economy did in fact serve as the basic determinant of society during the transition to capitalism.

This view is strikingly similar to Williams's cultural materialism. Like Williams, Habermas's underlying hope for the theory is to show that the means for actualizing reason or the emancipatory interest in a society are already embedded in language. Habermas's theory aims to further the self-understanding of social groups capable of transforming society. Considering Johnson's assertion that "our project is to abstract, describe and reconstitute in concrete studies the social forms through which human beings "live", become conscious, sustain themselves subjectively" (1987, p. 45), Habermas's critical theory not only fits well into cultural studies, but also could sharpen the project of transforming society.

**The Relevancy of Bakhtin's Theories in Cultural Studies**

Habermas, like Williams, is closer to the position of a Russian linguist, Mikhail Bakhtin, for whom language is "a dynamic and articulated social presence in the world" (Williams, 1977, p. 38). Bakhtin's theory has been studied in literary criticism for a long time. Within cultural studies, however, Bakhtin's theory has been largely ignored. In fact, since Horace Newcomb's (1984) essay "On the Dialogic Aspects of Mass Communication," no one has explored the relevancy of Bakhtin's theory for left cultural analysis in the field of communication. What Newcomb suggested was Bakhtin's dialogical approach for cultural studies in the study of relations between mediated texts and social practice as an alternative to structuralism. As in the case of Habermas, my reading of Bakhtin here will be quite partial and will propose a partial appropriation of certain features of his thought for cultural studies.

Bakhtin offers cultural analysis, as Todorov (1984) points out, a unitary, transdisciplinary view of the human sciences and of cultural life based on the common textual nature of their materials (1984, p. ix). His broad view of the text as referring to all cultural production rooted in language has the salutary effect of breaking down the walls not only between popular and elite culture, but also between text and context. The barrier between text and context, between inside and outside, for Bakhtin, is an artificial one, for in fact there is an easy flow of permeability between the two. His critique of all structuralisms and formalism—which at the same time avoids the trap of vulgar Marxism, I believe, is the advantage Bakhtin offers to cultural studies.

Unlike the Saussurean tradition that regards speech as individual and the language system as social, Bakhtin sees the two as constantly imbricated. Speech produces utterances, which are social by definition, since they are inter-individual, requiring a socially constituted speaker and addressee. For Bakhtin, the individual is permeated by the social; indeed, one develops individuality not against but through the social. The process of constructing the self, for Bakhtin, involves the hearing and assimilating of the words and discourses of others (mother, father, relatives, friends, representative of religious, educational and political institutions, the mass media and so forth), all processed dialogically so that the words in a sense become half one's own words (Bakhtin, 1981, p. xvii). With maturity, theses words transform themselves into what Bakhtin called "internally persuasive discourse".
Such discourse is of decisive significance in the evolution of an individual consciousness: consciousness awakens to independent ideological life precisely in the world of alien discourses surrounding it, and from which it cannot initially separate itself. The process of distinguishing between one's own and another's discourse, between one's own and another's thought, is activated rather late in development. When thought begins to work in an independent, experimenting and discriminating way, what first occurs is a separation between internally persuasive discourse and authoritarian enforced discourse, along with a rejection of those congeries of discourses that do not matter to us, that do not touch us (1981, p. 345).

A self is constituted by acquiring the ambient languages and discourses of its world. The self, in this sense, is a kind of hybrid sum of institutional and discursive practices bearing on family, class, gender, race, generation and locale. Ideological development is generated by an intense and open struggle within us for hegemony among the various available verbal and ideological points of view, directions and values.

Thus, the location of meanings, for Bakhtin, is not in linguistic form but rather is the use of language in action and communication (the utterance). These meanings are generated and heard as social voices anticipating and answering one another (dialogism). And he recognizes that these voices represent distinct socio-ideological positionings whose conflictual relation exists at the very heart of language change (heteroglossia). These three concepts can provide very important tools for the analysis of the praxis of mass media in cultural studies. While structuralists are successful in calling attention to the specifically literary and the specifically cinematic, they are less successful in linking the specific and the non-specific, the social and the cinematic, the textual and the contextual. But for Bakhtin, all utterances, including artistic utterances, are determined not by system of codes but by the continuous changing circumstances of the communication (1981, p. xix).

Utterance is the topic of analysis when language is conceived as dialogue, the fundamental unit of investigation for anyone studying communication as opposed to language alone. Since Bakhtin's idea of the utterance is active, there is always a danger that it will be confused with the Saussurian concept of speech (parole) in which apparently willed action is a key aspect (Ibid, p. xvii). For Bakhtin, utterance is not the completely free act of choice Saussure posited. It is dialogic precisely in the degree to which every aspect of it is a give-and-take between the local need of a particular speaker to communicate a specific meaning, and the global requirements of language as a generalizing system (Ibid, p. 433; 263).

We are not wired into the brain. But the norms controlling the utterance are similar to other social norms, such as those found in judicial or ethical systems. They may vary in their details, but the nature of their existence remains the same: they exist only in the individual minds of particular people in particular groups. In dialogism, of course, the "I" of such individual minds is always assumed to be a function of the "we" that is their particular group. According to Bakhtin, it takes place between speakers, and is therefore entrenched in social factors (Ibid, p. 433-434). This means that the utterance is also on the border between what is said and what is not said, since, as a social phenomenon par excellence, the utterance is shaped by speakers who assume that the values of their particular community are shared, and thus do not need to be spelled out in what they say.

First, Bakhtin's concept of utterance is, in my view, at the very heart of cultural studies's audience analysis. Unlike the uses and gratifications model, which is an essentially psychologistic problematic, relying on individual's mental states, needs and processes, and thus less sociological,
Bakhtin would argue that utterances are to be examined not as totally individual, idiosyncratic expressions of a psychological kind, but as sociologically regulated both by the immediate social situation and by the surrounding socio-historical context. Audience must be conceived of as composed of clusters of socially situated individual readers, whose individual readings will be framed by shared cultural formations and practices already existed to the individual.

The second concept, dialogism, is the source of the contemporary discussion of both intertextuality (Julia Kristeva) (Todorov, 1984, p. 60) and inter-textuality (Tony Bennett). Todorov mentions only Kristeva as the contemporary theorist who introduced Bakhtin's dialogism for her own concept of intertextuality. But I think that Kristeva's reading of Bakhtin's dialogism is narrower than Bennett's inter-textuality. As discussed earlier, Kristeva's intertextuality refers to the system of references to other texts which can be discerned within the internal composition of a specific individual text. Bennett intends the concept of inter-textuality to refer to the social organization of the relations between texts within specific conditions of reading.

Dialogism - a term which Holquist (1990) said Bakhtin never used - refers to the open-ended possibilities generated by all the discursive practices of a culture, the entire matrix of communicative utterances within which the artistic text is situated, and which reach the text not only through recognizable influences but also through a subtle process of dissemination (1990, p. 15; 40-41). Dialogism is central not only to the canonical texts of the literary and philosophical tradition of the West, but equally to non-canonical texts. It is just as relevant to those cultural utterances not conventionally thought of as texts, such as extra-commercial products of Bond films, the publicity surrounding film stars in Bennett and Wollacott's analysis of the Bond phenomenon. Since dialogism is concerned with all the series that enter into a text (verbal or non-verbal, erudite or popular), it can be a perfect approach to the analysis of popular culture, which is the central concern of cultural studies.

The third concept, heteroglossia, is very close to Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Both concepts provide a theoretical frame for analysis of the discursive relationships that can be found in cultural forms. According to Bakhtin (1981), language is a zone of conflict, stratified and fractioned among different dialects, classes, ethnic minorities, etc., each creating a discourse that embodies its own particular set of reasons, rules and contradictions.

At any given moment...a language is stratified not only into dialects in the strict sense of the word (i.e., dialects that are set off according to formal linguistic markers, but is... stratified as well into languages that are socio-ideological: languages belonging to professions, to genres, languages peculiar to particular generations, etc. (1981, p. 271-272).

Heteroglossia is central to Bakhtin's concept of language as a totality. Verbal-ideological belief systems, points of view on the world, forms for conceptualizing social experience, which are marked by their own tonalities, meanings and values, are represented by languages composing heteroglossia (Ibid, p. 428). The role of a television show, for example, is not to represent real life existence, but rather to stage the conflicts inherent in heteroglossia, the coincidences and competitions of languages and discourses.

The notion of heteroglossia also brings a discursive dimension to the premise in cultural studies that everything is political. Patriarchal oppression, for example, passes through language, as does feminist resistance to oppression. Bakhtin spoke little of the specific oppression of women, yet his work can be seen as intrinsically open to feminist inflection. A female professor at Stanford medical school recently resigned because of her male colleagues' "gender insensitivity" (Time, July 8, 1991, p. 52-53). She simply was tired of being called "honey" by male surgeons. She claimed that the word "honey" made her lose control as a surgeon in operating room. Another example she provided was that if she had a disagreement with her male counterparts, she was simply treated as
a sufferer of PMS syndrome. This incident sounds trivial, but it is, I believe, a real problem (sexism as patriarchal oppression) which exists in all societies. Issues of race also intersect questions of language, power and social stratification. I often hear that Black English in the U. S. is bad English. But is it? I hadn’t disagreed with that claim until recently. I begin to think that this is not a matter of good/bad language, but a matter of differences. We probably fail to take into account the specific African historical roots and the immanent logical structure of black speech.

A good deal of oppressive politics are also taking place in everyday language exchange - the welfare officer’s rude treatment of the welfare recipient, the INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) officer’s patronizing of immigrants, the male doctor’s condescending tone and language toward his hysterical female patient. Resistance, similarly, takes the discursive forms of whispered words of solidarity or loud collective proclamations of protest. Language, for Bakhtin, is an arena for struggle. Political issues also take place on the terrain of language. The issue of abortion, for example, is permeated by ideological conflicts fought in churches, Congress, Supreme Court, the media, and the streets. If either side (pro-choice and anti-abortion) is trapped in the language of its opposition, either pro-choice or anti-abortion has already lost half of the battle.

Bakhtin notion of heteroglossia is also useful in understanding the different levels of discourse articulated by non-mainstream cultural producers (films in Sundance Film Festival, Third Cinema, alternative press, etc.) through textual production. Using this model it is possible to conceptualize the characteristic modes of productive practice as signifying codes that establish those cultural products as discourses of resistance. In the case of Third Cinema, Teshome H. Gabriel (1982), who pioneered theoretical framework for Third Cinema, analyzed Third Cinema from some of Third World nations such as Chile and Peru exclusively based on Althusserian ideological criticism. But I think both the concept of hegemony and of heteroglossia can provide a more comprehensive theoretical frame for analysis of discursive relationships that can be found in Third Cinema.

Their relevance can be seen in several different contexts: (1) the context of the dominant cinema of Hollywood, which constitutes a cultural hegemony throughout much of the world, and of the local mainstream film industry which is not much different from Hollywood in terms of modes of production; (2) the context of local folk culture and nationalism to which Third Cinema is closely related; and (3) the international context, within which Third Cinema can be seen in relation to European counter-cinema, American regional film (Sundance Institute), and other national non-mainstream cinema. Again, Bakhtin’s heteroglossia can provide a better model for cultural studies’ textual analysis than the structuralist tradition.

Bakhtinian method celebrates difference; rather than expand the center to include the margins, it interrogates and shifts the center from the perspective of the margins. It calls attention to all oppressive hierarchies of power, not only those derived from class but also those of gender, race and age. A Bakhtinian textual politics favors a more open, reciprocal, decentered negotiation of specificity and difference. His concept of dialogism, and of language oppose the individualist assumptions with romantic interpretations of cultural forms. They rather provide us the specific ways in which those producers orchestrate diverse social voices. His emphasis on a boundless context that constantly interacts with and modifies the text, helps us avoid formalist insistence on the autonomous art object. His emphasis on the situated utterance and the interpersonal generation of meaning avoids the static ahistoricism of an apolitical value-free semiotics.

The notion of heteroglossia, finally, proposes a fundamentally non-unitary, continuously changing cultural field in which most varied discourses exist in a state of flux. Heteroglossia can be seen as another name for the social and psychic contradictions that constitute the subject as the site of conflicting discourses and competing voices. Like Gramsci, Bakhtin rejects the idea of a unitary political subject: the bourgeois, the proletarian. One can hear the voice of the proletarian in the
bourgeois and the voice of the bourgeois in the proletarian, without denying that social class is a meaningful category. A Bakhtinian view deconstructs the rigidities of the base/superstructure and the paranoia of the dominant ideology school of Althusserian Marxism.

My readings of Bourdieu, Habermas, and Bakhtin have been quite partial, and have led to propose a partial appropriation of certain features of their thoughts for the strategic purposes of cultural studies. There are some real theoretical incompatibilities between them, like the three approaches (production, text, audience). What I have traced are the inner connections and real identities between them which in turn could improve the interdisciplinary tradition of cultural studies. The following paragraphs of this chapter will be devoted to the presence of postmodernism in cultural studies and how it accommodates postmodernism and how these two writers, Habermas and Bakhtin, can show the way to bridge or to extend the gap between the two intellectual formations.

Toward a Reconciliation of Postmodernism and Modernism in Cultural Studies

The gap is essentially the debate between modernism and postmodernism within cultural studies. Some (Hall, Johnson) hold on to a modernistic view of culture, while some (Grossberg, Chambers, Hebdige, Chen) propose the postmodern cultural studies. This is not to say that Hall and Johnson are ignoring the obvious presence of the postmodern culture and postmodernism's strength on a certain level in the exploration of linkages between social and cultural realms. On the contrary, those postmodernists tend to believe in a total break with modernism. In fact, postmodernism is deeply rooted in modernism and it is probably the continuation of modernism - a radical modernism. Although attempts to link it to an epochal analysis of "post" thinking and concepts (e.g. post-structuralism, post-industrial society, post-empiricism, post-rationalism) are useful and convincing, it seems to me that those working in cultural studies on the basis of postmodernism tend to refuse to speak to issues of transformation and issues of enlightenment. As Habermas argued, those issues of modernity have not been exhausted is surely not identical with the ideology of postmodernism. It is, however, artistic and intellectual formation which is worthy of serious study.

Cultural studies is indeed on a new round of the theoretical debate between modernism and postmodernism: a "war of worlds" between two apparently separate semantic planets (Hebdige, 1985, p. 19). The concept of postmodernism has become one of the most elusive concepts in aesthetic, literary and sociological discussion of the last decade. Before getting into the discussion of postmodernism in relation to modernism, it is necessary to describe a series of practices which condition the postmodern.

Postmodernism is, then, the term which signals the cultural character of new times. The modernist movement, it argues, which dominated the art and architecture, the cultural imagination, of the early decades of the 20th century, and came to represent the look and experience of modernity itself, is at an end (Ibid, p. 79-80). Postmodernism celebrates the penetration of aesthetics into everyday life and the ascendancy of popular culture over the high arts. Jameson (1983, 1984) and Lyotard (1984) agree on many of characteristics of the postmodern condition. They remark on the dominance of image, appearance, surface-effect over depth; the blurring of image and reality; the preference for parody, nostalgia, kitsch and pastiche over more positive modes of artistic representation (like realism or naturalism); a preference for the popular and the decorative over the functional in architecture and design. They also comment on the erasure of a strong sense of history, as seen in Grossberg's case: the end of the narrative of progress, enlightenment, and rationality.

A major change in the political and cultural problematic, postmodernism is in turn related to other changes that have taken place since World War II. The main shifts from the pre-modern to the post-modern world can be seen in a diagram. I think that it is a mistak to conceive of
postmodernism as a periodizing concept, as Jameson (1983) tried to do. This diagram provides nothing more than a convenient comparative chart based on predominant features of each. The postmodernism is not synonymous with the contemporary. As Lyotard (1984) indicates, postmodernism is, in fact, the founding condition of the possibility of modernism, although he insists on the end of modernity (1984, p. 79).

![Diagram of three types of society based on their major forms of production](chart.png)


**FIGURE 2:** Three types of society based on their major forms of production

Let me take an example from differences in production pattern between modern and postmodern. If the modern world is based on the notion of an endless repetition of a few products, then its successor is based on the idea of short-runs and the targeting of many different products. The computerized and totally cybernetic production in some industries has partly allowed this situation to develop. This development also leads to individualization of everything. Surveying postmodernity from the precipice of the "end", Baudrillard describes a culture which is not just
prone to, but actually predicated on, instability and uncertainty. Everything has become short-circuited within the whirligig of reflexivity and paradox. Sober analysis has been displaced by "virulent description" (more descriptive than description: hype) (Morris, 1984).

In the U.S. in 1950, there were seven hundred radio stations; now with only a moderate population increase there are more than ten thousand, and many of them are oriented to specific city cultures (DeFleur and Dennis, 1991, p. 191;197). ABC, CBS, NBC, and FOX still control the large portion of the mass market, but they are being supplemented by five thousand cable systems, more than one hundred television channels with satellite transmission. In Los Angeles, for example, one can watch Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, and Korean networks. This segmentation of tastes leads to another obvious shift: from centralized authority to decentralized pluralism.

"The loss of authority" is the theme of this shift. Lyotard (1984) traced this to the decline in belief systems and the rise of skepticism. The role of marriage and the family has been decreased in a time when many women work and almost as high a percentage are divorced, the place of nations in a world economy dominated by transnational corporations on one side, and city and regional life on the other. Both cultural and political regionalism are growing. There is a growing polarization: between the north and south in Britain; or in America between the East Coast and the West Coast, New England and the Pacific Rim. In the art the New York hegemony is being challenged by other cities, such as London, Toronto, L.A. etc.. One could go on and on.

According to Baudrillard, something has changed. It is a change which is perverse and paradoxical, signalling the end of the very possibility of change. In the place of a world ordered according to monolithic truths, linear grids and representational stability, we are faced with a set of unstable and volatile equations that correspond to a collapsed or imploded representational space. Reality can only repeat itself - the feature film serialized and forced into the quotidian space of the soap opera. Our space of interaction has been replaced with the narcissism of contact, contiguity and feedback:

>We are no longer part of the drama of alienation; we live in the ecstasy of communication. And this ecstasy is obscene. The obscene is what sed away with every mirror, every look, every image. The obscene puts an end to every representation. But it is not only the sexual that becomes obscene in pornography; today it is the whole pornography of information and communication, that is to say of circuits and networks, a pornography of all functions and objects in their readability, in their fluidity, in their availability, in their regulation, in their forced signification, in their performativity, in their branching, in their polyvalence, in their free expression... (1988, p. 220).

This is Baudrillard's analysis of the postmodern condition. It seems to be an analysis that does not make direct claims to argument and substantiation. It does not seem to seek to challenge and repudiate reality. If theory can no longer offer itself as the mirror of the subject, what remains? What can it do? Baudrillard also described a postmodernity predicated on death - the end of history, the social, meaning, politics, etc. - while offering no strategies of resistance, and refusing to posit alternatives.

Despite the presence of the past as an important guiding concern for postmodernism, it seems to me that there is a simultaneous rejection of modernism and the modernist project. The postmodernists' reality, especially Baudrillard's, is a nice place to visit, but I wouldn't live there. All that we are left with is a nostalgia for an era that existed prior to simulation, for a stability that we cannot find in the text. In the simulated mediascape, Baudrillard (1987) describes how the complexity of the intertextual flotation within media networks always confuses the story with the real events to the point at which images, codes, subjects (the masses) and events flow and intersect independently of the referent. What is described is a hyperspace of neutralization and
indifferentiation, where dialectics has been given over to seduction, rhetoric of demolition, inversion and provocations (1987, p.16-18). Grossberg (1986) seems to conform with Baudrillard's postmodernism.

To Grossberg, television erases the line between image and reality. He argues that TV's indifference to reality can be found in every genre including advertisements (1986, p. 4). The way in which TV deals with the difference between the same and the different is repetition - episodes, character types, narratives, etc. TV's repetitive nature makes it the most predictable set of images. Of course, there are differences between the contents of each episode, although they share a similar narrative structure. Here, the pleasure of the viewing depends on one's ability to renegotiate the difference that difference makes. The popularity of TV programs is not immediately dependent on ideological issues. Rather it relies on TV's various forms of excess of which, the emotional excess is the most important. It is made by TV's "in-difference" to meaning and reality. It is structured by a series of movements between extreme highs and extreme lows. It presents an image of an "affective economy" (1986, p. 30-32). For Baudrillard and Grossberg, there is no reality beyond appearance (image is everything) and therefore no dialectics of inside and outside from which to position a critique.

Postmodernism is becoming the dominant cultural and political form of our epoch with systematic excesses and provocations. But not everyone rejects the modernist project. Most famously, Habermas has called for the completion of the project of modernity, a project whose roots lie in the Enlightenment notion of rationality. In the speech he delivered at New York University titled "Modernity versus Postmodernity" (1981b), one can feel his extreme dislike of postmodernism. The original German version was delivered in 1980 when he received the Adorno-Prize from the city of Frankfurt. In it, Habermas openly attacks the notion that we have reached the age of postmodernism because this assumption would necessarily result in a flawed assessment of our future. Instead, he insists on the continuation of the Enlightenment project, even if this project should not be pursued through the use of instrumental reason or in the mode of traditional subject philosophy (Habermas, 1990, p. 59-60). He also charges that postmodernism is neoconservative and a completed pluralism. All historical styles, along with all imagery, are reduced to the level of exchange-value.

Habermas claims that the privilege attributed to the aesthetic sphere by the neo-Nietzscheans (postmodernists, deconstructionists) tends to undermine theoretical and practical rationality. He contends that such a primacy of the aesthetic entails an absence of social mediation and especially a lack of articulation between cultural modernity/postmodernity and every-day social practices. He notes a certain convergence between postmodernists and neoconservatives (e.g. Daniel Bell), implying that the renunciation of any notion of substantive rationality by the former paves the way for the "decisionism" advocated by some of the latter (1990, p. 65; 1983, p. 89).

The influence of post-structuralism has been a decisive factor in the formation of postmodernism, according to Habermas. Post-structuralism's critique of metanarratives, its productionism, and its general emphasis upon the rhetorical rather than the referential function of language, have met the crisis of the reformist Western left with a celebration of fragmentation and the de-territorialization of disciplines and identities (Hohendahl, 1986, p. 50-51). Lyotard argues that questions of relevance, adequacy and fit, in discussions of politics, science and art, can only lead to "correct narratives" and "correct content" (1984, p. 75). In fact, a correlation is held to exist between the breakdown of modernist historicism and the great emancipatory narratives; we live on the threshold, Lyotard argued, of an age of micro-narratives, of aesthetic and political pluralism. Here, both post-structuralism's and postmodernism's pure systematicity fails, Habermas argues, to acknowledge the most basic of historical materialist premises: that analysis of a given conjuncture must begin from the contradictions internal to it (1990, p. 58-59). Habermas's dislike of the neo-Nietzscheans continues. He also criticized Derrida's emphasis on the end of European history and the decline of traditional European philosophy. Habermas (1987)
described Derrida's project as an anarchistic and subversive struggle that aims at undermining the foundations of Western metaphysics. Habermas argued that:

The critique of the Western emphasis on logos inspired by Nietzsche proceeds in a destructive manner. It demonstrates that the embodied, speaking and acting subject is not master in its own house; it draws from this the conclusion that the subject positing itself in knowledge is in fact dependent upon something prior, anonymous, and transsubjective - be it the dispensation of Being, the accident of structure-formation, or the generative power of some discourse formation. But the hope awakened by such post-Nietzschean analyses has constantly the same quality of expectant indeterminacy. Once the defenses of subject-centered reason are razed, the logos, which for so long had held together an interiority protected by power, hollow within and regressive without, will collapse into itself. It has to be delivered over to its other, whatever that may be (1987, p. 311).

Derrida's approach, Habermas argued, has to be seen against the background of Jewish mysticism and its heretical hermeneutic theory (Handelman, 1983, 98). Hence, Derrida's deconstruction belongs to a tradition that opposes the hegemony of Christian logos and its hermeneutics in Paul's teaching. Deconstruction sounds more radical than Habermas' communicative reason, but it cannot clear away the rubble of metaphysics its analyses pile up in order to open a space for an understanding of the social/political construction of meaning.

Williams (1962) seems to share common ground with Habermas on neo-Nietzscheans, although Williams raises some issues about modernism that seem to be ignored by the epochal analysis of postmodernism. As the Frankfurt School problematic of the dialectic of enlightenment suggests, the fate of modernity is identical to the success or failure of the social embodiments of reason through industrialization and democratization. Most postmodernists, especially Baudrillard, claim the failure of the Enlightenment project of social rationalization, and do so at times even more pessimistically than Habermas's predecessors. This polemic, Williams argues, reduces the ambiguity of modernity by stressing the negative elements without considering the positive side of the account. Habermas also argues that the project of modernity must not be abandoned even if its failure has caused catastrophes. Attacking the potential of the project of modernity, Habermas (1987) responded:

This critique of the essential elements of modernity not only repudiates the dangerous consequences of reified self-reference, but also cancels those connotations which explain subjectivity, connotations in other words that subjectivity once contained as unredeemed promises: the expectation that there will be a self-conscious practice in which self-determined solidarity of all individuals would encourage and support the authentic self-realization of these individuals. This criticism rejects precisely those elements that the age of modernity, when it fully grasped its own project, articulated through the concepts of self-consciousness, self-determination, and self-realization (1987, p. 391).

While postmodernism argues that people and societies are confined to relationships of power, property, and production, both Williams and Habermas argue that communicative relationships (describing, learning, persuading, exchanging experiences, etc.) are equally fundamental. This is not to say that both assert that communication is an automatically rational activity that will eventually cure history of all ailments. The point is that if we abandon the tools of reason to indict the irrationality of society for the promise of a future, there is no point in critiquing society. Habermas and Williams seem to be sympathetic to the questions and problems which motivated poststructuralists and postmodernists to problematize the Western philosophical tradition, but they
are less sympathetic to their pointless solutions (the end of history, the death of author, and the end of reason).

As mentioned above, in cultural studies, there has been talk of modernity versus postmodernity. It is, however, difficult to say who is sympathetic with postmodernism or with modernism in cultural studies, as in the case of Habermas versus the entire neo-Nietzscheans. In fact, cultural studies overall has been open to postmodernism and to examining it as a tool for rethinking the direction of cultural politics. The importation of postmodernism is closely related with the theoretical force of the feminist critique of narrative.

Feminism's basic argument is that women have been mainly excluded from the selective tradition of modernist art history and criticism (O'Connor, 1988). The issues of gender and sexuality have become central to recent radical American accounts of postmodernism under the influence of writings of British postmodernism theorists (e.g. Mary Kelly, Vigen and Burgin). What postmodern feminist discourses focus on are postmodernism's concept of the end of class struggle as the principal motor of emancipatory transformation and the end of the masculine high arts of painting and sculpture (1988, p. 4). Owens (1987) condemns Marxist cultural studies for "its totalizing ambitions, its claims to account for every form of social experience" (1987, p. 71). Rosalind Coward (1977/8), a leading feminist scholar in the CCCS, explains why feminist theory must not be theorized within the Marxist discourse:

Mao's and Lenin's writings would have been dismissed as being outside their contemporary limit-positions. The contemporary implications of this notion are also clear: members of the women's movement are to crawl back into their corners suitably reproved for attempting to theorize those things which Marx never bothered with. The centrality of the conception of class is very clearly problematic for feminism since it is difficult to accept either the idea of women as a class since economic class divisions cut across women much as men; neither is it helpful to conclude that just because Marxist theorization is inadequate, we should relegate questions of the positions of women to secondary positions of class. Questions such as the organization of sexuality do arise. And Marxism has as yet nothing to say about them (1977/8, p. 122).

Postmodernism stands principally as a theory of photographic intervention within dominant visual ideology. Feminism's critique of the Western fine-art tradition has rested principally upon the historical collusion of the institutionalization of painting with the interests of men, with the male gaze. For feminism, therefore, postmodernism has come to signify the end of painting (Kelly, Burgin, Owens, Foster, and Crimp). In fact an equation is made, particularly in Burgin and Owens, between the end of painting as male-dominated tradition and feminism's critique of a masculinized class politics (Owens, 1987, p. 74). The defense of this theory is focused through patriarchy theory.

Because meaning under patriarchy circulates around the primary signifier of the Phallus then the responsibility of the postmodern artist is to initiate some critical rupture in those forms, traditions and categories that perpetuate such a system of division. And this is why photography takes on a particularly important political significance of these theorists. I believe the problem with such a scenario is not that feminism is not at the center of a new politics of representation, but that such claims are used in highly idealist ways to displace a caricatured historical materialism. Coward and Owens raises a relevant issue in the conflict between Marxism and feminism, but neither of them has provided a solution to the crisis. Instead they reduce Marxism to the monolithic and productivist. Marxist historical materialism is not a stagist roll-call of modes of production but an interlinking set of research programs which place the relations of production as the starting point for the analysis of a given social formation.
Thus it is the institutionalized presence which designates the socialist character of a mode of production and not the nationalized or state-owned form of the mode of production itself. It is therefore one thing to keep in view the autonomy of feminism's critique of representation and class-based politics, of countering that view that woman's oppression can only be explained if it is put forward as mediating another oppression. Then, Marxist historical materialism must provide a way: a new theorization must be found. As Alex Callinicos (1987) from the CCCS has succinctly argued:

Feminists and black nationalists often complain that the concepts of Marxist class theory are gender-blind and race-blind. This is indeed true. Agents' class position derives from their place in production relations, not their gender or supposed race. But of itself this does not prove grounds for rejecting Marxism, since its chief theoretical claim is precisely to explain power-relations and forms of conflict such as those denoted by the terms "nation", "gender", "race" in terms of the forces and relations of production. The mere existence of national, sexual and racial oppression does not refute historical materialism, but rather constitutes its explanandum (1987, p.177).

Can all paintings be reducible to a master narrative of Western male authorship? Is painting merely, as Owens contends, the "simulacra of [male] mystery" (Owens,1987, p. 75)? In his critique of Marxism, Owens simply reduces painting to its inherited and imputed contents. This is not to say that painting is not implicated in the privileges of men, or that painting is more "aesthetic" or "pleasurable" than photography, video or performance. Rather questions of value in art are reduced to essentialist foreclosure.

The methodology for postmodernists is known as "schizoanalysis" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1977; Jameson, 1983). Guattari (1984) argues that schizoanalysis is superior to other approaches because its principle of "semiotic polycentrism" is not limited by what it believes is rational, and thus it can improve the data collection (1984, p. 77). In semiotic polycentrism, postmodernists claim that phenomena may possess a variety of meanings simultaneously. Although this theory is widely practiced within cultural studies, especially textual analysis, I would argue that this is closer to Krestiva's interpretation of intertextuality - narrower than Bennett's inter-textuality. The idea of a final reading of a text must be rejected as uniformed. Postmodernism also undermines the belief that a society's "dominant significations" are synonymous with reality and lead to truth (Ibid, p. 168). Reality is thus recognized to be multivalent. A schizo-analyst, therefore, does not seek "to make subjectification fit in with the dominant significations and social laws" (Ibid, p. 77). The duty of a researcher, according to Derrida, is to subdue the "aggression of reason" indigenous to technological rationality, so that the fragile linguistic basis of facts is not destroyed (Derrida, 1979, p. 31-69). In other words, even if an interpretation of reality appears to be irrational, the reason that is present must be given serious attention.

While cultural studies have displayed a greater degree of openness in establishing new grounds for theoretical debate, Stuart Hall has rejected postmodernism's epochal sense of itself in claiming to embody a "final rupture or break with the modern era" (1986, p. 47). Again, like Williams, Hall also seems to agree with some postmodern phenomena and the problems postmodernism raises in the Western philosophical tradition, but he disagrees with its solutions. Hall argues that the grouping together of a series of problems arising out of the collapse of modernist certainties under the singular sign of postmodernism is, in itself, a form of ideological closure:

What it says is: this is the end of the world. History stops with us and there is no place to go astride this. But whenever it is said that this is the last thing that will ever happen in history, that is the
Perhaps using esoteric terminology, such as schizoanalysis, makes it difficult for postmodernism to clarify its position. The postmodernist tendency to weave together often disconnected problems produces a generalized discourse of crisis under the name of intertextuality. Also it tends to turn its discourses of crisis back on itself in arguing that what such discourses register as crises are more appropriately viewed as positively enabling of new forms of thought and political action. Hebdige's (1986) characterization of postmodernism in terms of three oppositions is also familiar: an opposition to totalizing forms of social and historical theory; an opposition to teleological modes of reasoning; and an opposition to utopian representations of the future. I do not see how a postmodern science is possible with its abandonment of any transcendental theoretical guarantees or fixed finality of political purpose. The following diagram shows some similarities and differences between cultural studies and postmodernism.
Figure 3. Theoretical comparison between postmodernism and cultural studies
To me, nothing is striking or enlightening about postmodernism, except from a theoretical, philosophical, intellectual or moral perspective. And I still believe that modernism has offered a much more favorable arena in which to wage cultural studies's cultural struggle. Yet, I must admit that the cultural terrain on which we now all live, work, love, and struggle is pervaded by postmodernism. Thus, it is unwise to ignore it. The following paragraphs will argue that Bakhtin's dialogism, especially the notion of carnival can provide some theoretical connections to bridge the gap between cultural studies and postmodernism.

The ability to connect two intellectual formations in Bakhtin's work lies in his theory of dialogism, especially the notion of carnival, which absorbs both intertextuality and inter-textuality. Novels, for example, are overwhelmingly intertextual, constantly referring within themselves to other works outside them. In other words, novels quote other specific works in one form or another. In doing so, they manifest the most complex possibilities of quasi-direct speech. In addition, they simultaneously manifest inter-textuality in their display of the enormous variety of discourses used in different historical periods and by disparate social classes, and in the peculiarly charged effect such a display has on reading in specific social and historical situations. Among the more powerful inter-textual effects novels have is the extra-literary influence they exercise on claims to singularity and authority made by other texts and discourses. Thus both Fiske's (1987) analysis of Madonna and Grossberg's analysis of Miami Vice, for example, have little theoretical value unless they consider the variety of discourses used in different historical periods by disparate social classes and specific social and historical situations in reading.

For Bakhtin, carnival is a means for displaying otherness: carnival makes familiar relations strange. Like the novel, carnival is both the name of a specific kind of historically instanced thing and an immaterial force which such particular instances characteristically embody. Embodiment is precisely what carnival gives to relations, as it draws attention to their variety, as well as highlighting the fact that social roles determined by class relations are made and not given, culturally produced rather than naturally mandated. Among many forms of popular culture, Bakhtin has a special appreciation for carnival, because it concentrates and reveals all the features of comic popular culture. "Carnival, with its whole complex system of images, was the purest and fullest expression of comic popular culture" (Bakhtin, 1968, p. 90).

Bakhtin describes the carnival as actually being "consecrated by tradition," both social and ecclesiastical (Ibid, p. 5). Therefore, although this popular festival and its manifest forms exist apart from "serious official, ecclesiastical, feudal, and political cult forms and ceremonials" (Ibid), in so existing, they in fact also posit those very norms. The recognition of the inverted world still requires a knowledge of the order of the world which it inverts and, in a sense, incorporates. The motivation and the form of the carnival are both derived from authority: the people's second life of the carnival has meaning only in relation to the official first life (Clark and Holquist, 1984, p. 299-302). Carnival shatters, on a symbolic plane, all oppressive hierarchies, redistributing social roles according to the logic of the world upside down. Brazilian carnival may be a good example of Bakhtin's notion of carnival. It is a collective celebration, at once sacred and profane, in which the socially marginalized - the poor, black, homosexuals, etc. - take over the symbolic center of social life. It offers a trans-individual taste of freedom.

I would argue that Bakhtin's notion of carnival could appeal to both cultural studies and postmodernism and reconcile the differences with a number of inter-related ideas.
Figure 4. Bakhtin's notion of Carnival

Carnival for Bakhtin is more than a party or a festival. It is rather the oppositional culture of the oppressed, the official world seen from below. It is not a mere disruption of etiquette but the symbolic, anticipatory overthrow of oppressive social structures. It is also ecstatic collectivity, the joyful affirmation of change, a dress rehearsal for utopia. The current students' anti-government protest in Korea, for example, shows a kind of carnivalized politics. Demonstrations are, except for the violent confrontation with riot police, often incorporated with colorful elements of music, folk dance (often expressing the painful hope for democracy), costume, and guerrilla theater. The line between performer and spectator is often blurred. Those elements not only celebrate the traditional culture, but suggest metaphorically a progressive change towards social and political justice. Bakhtin maintains a balance between the importance of the counter-hegemonic subversion of established power, including the collective power of social formations (class hierarchy, sexual repression, patriarchy, dogmatism, etc.) and the obvious fact of pleasure, desire, and ambiguity. Thus, Bakhtin's theory would restore the notion of collective pleasure to its rightful place within Marxist thought, especially cultural studies.
REFERENCES


Coward, R. "Class, culture and the social formation," Screen 18 (1) 1977b: 75-105.


BEST COPY AVAILABLE


------. Television Culture. London: Methuen, 1987


Foucault, M. "Film and popular memory," Radical Philosophy 11 (Summer 1975): 24-29.


Gerbner, G. (Ed). Ferment in the Field (Special issue of JOC), 198?


McLennan, G. "History and theory: contemporary debates and directions," *Literature and History* 10(2) 1984: 139-64.


