While not attempting to review and criticize the whole body of research of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, this paper explores the applicability of his theory of culture to one of the critical theories of mass communication, namely cultural studies. The paper discusses political economy and Bourdieu's economic rationality and presents an overview of Bourdieu's sociology of culture. The paper compares the two theories within four concepts which are regarded as the central notions of cultural studies: culture, class, ideology, and intertextuality. The paper concludes that Bourdieu's sociology, especially the analysis of the relations between economic capital and cultural capital, would be a way of resolving the lack of political economic aspect of cultural studies. One hundred thirty-three references are attached. (RS)
Can Political Economy of Communication be incorporated with Cultural Studies in Postmodern Era?

Eung-Jun Min
Assistant Professor
600 Mt. Pleasant Ave.
Department of Communications
Rhode Island College
Providence, Rhode Island 02908
401-456-8270
Abstract

The development of any strategies for transforming cultural studies has always been grounded on an interdisciplinary approach which integrates and synthesizes a whole range of perspectives of social reality and its meaning. Cultural studies has been very open to postmodernism. Grossberg once argued that the distance between cultural studies and postmodernism is "not as great it appears." On the other hand, cultural studies has tended to ignore the political economic aspects of cultural practices. It is absurd to believe that there is no relation between ideological and political forms and economic classes: work on institutions, power and state policies (production-based studies). By incorporating postmodernism and political economy with cultural studies, these new directions and inner connections are described in relation to their applicability to media, especially television, practices and strategies. These are offered, not as a finished theory of culture or popular culture in cultural studies, but as indications of how to work towards more adequate accounts.
An Overview

Several articles have exclusively analyzed and criticized cultural studies. Lembo and Tucker (1990) argued that cultural studies tends to overemphasize ideology and class. O'Connor (1989b) and Budd, et al. (1990) criticized American cultural studies, mostly Larry Grossberg's and Fiske's. As discussed earlier, Grossberg (1989) defended his position and explained the utility of his effort to link cultural studies with postmodernism. He also complained of the lack of specificity in cultural studies and of the tendency to take the British body of work as the standard model or universal paradigm. I would agree with Grossberg's claim that cultural studies in the U. S. should be practiced within an American context, although it should be understood as practice, institution, and cultural form regardless of national origins. Megan Morris (1988), a cultural critic from Australia, warned of cultural studies being institutionalized and fixed. She resented the fact that cultural studies is beginning to commodify an appropriate theoretical "style" for analyzing everyday life. For Morris, this is banality in cultural studies. Even more importantly Graham Murdock (1989), a British political economist, in his essay "Cultural Studies: Missing Links," offered a rather sympathetic critique of cultural studies from the viewpoint of the political economy. Along with Murdock, Nicholas Garnham (1986) and Peter Golding (1977) have been also critical of cultural studies for not seriously considering economic aspect of cultural processes. The debate between political economy and cultural studies has lasted for over a decade now. I think it is time to find innerconnections between two approaches. The political economists have a legitimate point over the criticism of cultural studies. As the first pointer, this paper begins with exploring the political economic aspect of production-based studies and showing how Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of culture may address the apparent incompatibility between cultural studies and political economy in the field of communication.

The influence of Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, has been largely ignored in the field of communication. Bourdieu's work is considered as the most comprehensive and elegant system since Talcott Parsons (Dimaggio, p. 1460). Garnham (1986) tried to revalue the significance of Bourdieu's sociology of culture to critical theories:

Neglect of this aspect of Bourdieu's work (comprehensiveness) is not only damaging in its own right in the study of culture, but the fragmentary and partial absorption of what is a rich and unified body of theory and related empirical work across a range of fields from the ethnography of Algeria to art, science, religion, language, political science and education to the epistemology and methodology of the social sciences in general can lead to a danger of seriously misreading the theory (1986, p. 116).
The purpose of this paper is not to attempt to review and criticize the whole body of his theory. Instead it will explore the applicability of Bourdieu's theory of culture to one of the critical theories of mass communication, namely cultural studies. Secondly, it will compare the two schools within four concepts which are regarded as the central notions of cultural studies: culture, class, ideology, and intertextuality. Pierre Bourdieu attempts to theorize the role of structural determinations with detailed empirical work on cultural consumption. I would argue that to analyze the media adequately, for example, one must analyze the linkages between political-economic power structure, the ideological functions of the mass media, and the media related forms of popular culture. Therefore, there cannot be one single appropriate starting point or key to understand such complex phenomenon. Bourdieu's may be the work that has provoked the most interest in developing concepts which overcome the gap between analyses of culture and of socio-economic processes. For example, Bourdieu constructs a general model whereby symbolic goods have "economies" in which transactions take place in order to accumulate symbolic capital or prestige, while insisting that these operations also contain forms of economic rationality (Murdock, 1989, p. 240).

The political economy approach, as a branch of classical Marxism, has also been treated as mere conspiracy theory and economic reductionism, rather than as a starting point for empirical and theoretical inquiry. As far as the media are concerned, political economy focuses on the economic structure, the role of the state, and processes of media production (Wasko, 1989, p. 475). To understand contemporary cultural formations accurately, it argues, one must first analyze monopoly capitalist structures of ownership and control. It certainly wants to preserve the base/superstructure metaphor. It is true that it has an element of economic determinism. However, this approach is not simply a temporal extension of orthodox Marxism or even a revival of it. Rather, the political economy arises as a reaction against other Marxist and neo-Marxist positions (Wolff, 1984, p. 30). In particular, it criticizes Structuralist Marxism for overemphasizing the ideological elements of media and ignoring the question of the determination of the media. Thus, Garnham, Murdock, Golding, and Mattelart call for a return to "a political economy of culture" (Ibid). They argue that the key to understanding contemporary cultural formations lies in analyzing monopoly capitalist structures of ownership and control. But not everyone agrees. Critics from the other side ask how economic determination can explain properly how meanings are created and how cultural forms develop. Although economic logic can explain the origin of the ubiquity of cultural domination in mass culture, it cannot account for their autonomy. According to Williams' definition of "materialistic culture," beyond capital's conditions of reproduction, mass culture reproduces itself on the basis of its own logic and other social activities. Certainly,
economic factors may partially penetrate cultural life by mechanization, transforming art into entertainment, and expanding mass communications on a global scale. At the same time, however, economic logic is unable to explain the counterlogic of reception. In other words, the proletarian public sphere and the popular culture that is rooted in resistance cannot be explained by the capital logic. I think that any theory loses its interpretive power if it tries to seek to specify the conditions of transcendence. The conflict between two positions over how to understand economic determination is far from resolved. However, there is recognition that a more complex model is needed which takes account of institutional, legal and political pressures, and which analyses the gender and racial, as well as the class nature of the divisions of labor and exercise of power within the industry.

Political Economy and Bourdieu’s Economic Rationality

Adam Smith in The Wealth of nations defined political economy as the science of wealth. This definition was also inherent in Ricardo. Basically, they were concerned with the distribution and the creation of surplus value, problems of determination of three forms of monetary return (rent, wages, profit), and political factors to promote accumulation in agriculture and manufacture (Smith, 1970, p. 43-81; Bottomore, 1984, p. 375). Smith believed in a natural economic order that was responsible for progress and continuously increasing productivity. The natural laws governing the market were those of individual, enlightened self-interest, and competition would be harmonized by an "invisible hand" for the ultimate good of society. He opposed any artificial controls or restrictions on the free working of the market (Ibid, 1970).

It is commonly recognized that in Capital Marx went beyond the achievements of the classical political economy. He recognized that it had provided the analysis which was the necessary basis for critical understanding to begin. He called it "the necessary prerequisite of genetical presentation," that is, of a dialectical presentation of the finished critical science (Tucker, 1972, p. 191-198). What it lacked was an understanding of the categories it had abstracted from its study of the system of market economy, according to Marx. Classical political economy proceeded to analyze the forms of human life along "a course directly opposite to their real development." It does this because it begins with the results of historical development already in hand, and proceeds uncritically taking "the forms which stamp products as commodities for granted as natural and seeks to give an account, not of their historical character ...... but of their content and meaning" (Ibid). Where classical political economy attempts an explanation of its categories, the result is inadequate. For example, Smith considers exchange as a natural propensity to truck and barter, which is inferior to Marx's account.
There has been a view that Marx's advance over classical political economy is seen as consisting in his being historical where classical political economy had been ahistorical (Schiller, 1989; Sweezy, 1968; Wasko, 1989). This view is certainly correct since Marx says that a historical approach to social science leads to a critical approach (Sweezy, 1968, p.21). Marx's criticisms, however, go further. Marx (1971) believes that shortcomings of classical political economy come from what he calls the "analytical method" of it.

Classical political economy seeks to reduce the fixed and mutually alien forms of wealth to their inner unity by means of analysis and to strip away the form in which they exist independently alongside one another .... it is not interested in elaborating how the various forms came into being, but seeks to reduce them to their unity by means of analysis, because it starts with them as given premises (p. 500).

Marx's point here is that classical political economy with its "analytical method" could not recognize the contradictions as real, and so was not seeking to explain that the incompatibilities were made compatible in reality by their interweaving, by changes of form, and sometimes by forcible and violent readjustments, within the continuing movement. So the target of Marx's criticism of classical political economy is not simply its lack of historicity. He is saying that ahistoricity is a bad thing because it leads to errors that prevent thought from succeeding in its objective of understanding. The historical process itself, for Marx, is thus comprehended not merely as a process of undifferentiated change, but as a process of development of an essence through its essential transformations. The historical method is incomplete unless it is coupled with a search for the relevant real essence and its forms, which is what gives the historical enquiry its point (Ibid, p. 501).

In the field of communication, the political economy emphasizes the direct relations between cultural texts and socio/economic realities. Of all positions within the critical tradition, it most closely preserves the base/superstructure metaphor. Within this orientation, the economy is seen as the primary reality that explains second order processes within media practice - audience perception, the production of texts, etc. The issue of who controls media and owns media institutions has been central to Marxist concerns since Marx wrote The German Ideology. This has been a point of reference for all subsequent debates about economic determination.

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. In so far, therefore, as they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age; thus, their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch. (Marx, 1970, p.64)
As a result, for many early political economists, the fact that capitalist relations of production limit and define the production and distribution of images, values, visions, etc., leads easily to the claim that such images naturally disseminate the dominant ideology and are naturally accepted by consumers of these cultural commodities as true. Obviously this view fails to demonstrate the assumed direct effects of corporate structure on consciousness, and does not account for innovation either in production or reception. This reflection hypothesis had become difficult to maintain in the light of historical events during the 60s and 70s. The paradigm was getting shaky.

It was Golding and Murdock who rejected the charge of the reflection hypothesis and the conspiracy theory, and relaunched discussion of the political economy of mass communication. They criticized the prevailing tendency among Marxists working on the media to ignore economic determination. Thus, Golding and Murdock (1979) argue that "the media are first and foremost industrial and commercial organizations which produce commodities" (1979, p. 210). They seem to accept the "autonomy of certain cultural practices," but at a macro level, the economy was predominant. Thus, according to Golding and Murdock, the theoretical debates in structuralism, psychoanalysis, etc. missed the point and in a sense were useless since the most important determinations took place in the institutional structures of the media. Smythe (1981) reiterates this position in claiming that the first question that historical materialism should ask about mass communication systems is "what economic function for capital do they serve?" Smythe goes on from this to propose his famous "audience as commodity" proposition, which again calls for a shift of attention from the ideology of texts to the "effectivity" of the mode of production (1981, p. 117). However, these proponents of political economy seem to be careful to note that analyses need to take account of the specific nature of production activities in order to go beyond generalities and crude instrumentalism. But they argue that while production studies provide evidence for the specificity and relative autonomy of professional practices and ideologies, conceptions of news values, for example, are not fundamentally at odds with the dominant forces in society. This is why Golding and Murdock maintain that it is imperative to understand the workings of economic determinations, which are said to "penetrate and frame the forms of particular productions" (Golding & Murdock, 1979, p. 198-204). In his recent article, Murdock (1989) takes up some of Marx's tenets - productionism and the separation of practices. He still stresses the economic dynamics:

Economic dynamics are crucial to critical inquiry because they establish some of the key contexts within which consumption takes place, but they do not negate the need for a full and separate analysis of symbolic determinations. My position is that economic dynamics play a crucial role in structuring the social spaces within which communicative activity takes place, but that within these spaces the symbolic sphere operates...
To Golding, Murdock, and other political economists, Bourdieu's masterpiece *Distinction* has been the shield from criticisms of being called mere economic determinists. In fact the book shows how cultural forms are expressions of the structure of domination in society. It is a systematic study of the cultural forms in which this domination is revealed in the way of life of different classes and class fractions. Here, Bourdieu tries to demonstrate that patterns of cultural production and consumption are not just determined by the socio-economic structure. Bourdieu tends to concentrate more on the analysis of symbolic violence and symbolic capital than the analysis of the economy. Where Bourdieu attracts political economists most, however, is in his argument on symbolic capital which serves essentially economic interests. The following paragraphs will discuss how his notion of economic rationality may agree with the school of political economy and cultural studies.

**Bourdieu's Sociology of Culture: An Overview**

In his book, *Distinction*, Bourdieu shows how cultural forms are expressions of the structure of domination in society. It is a systematic study of the cultural forms in which this domination is revealed in the way of life of different classes and class fractions. Here, Bourdieu tries to demonstrate that patterns of cultural production and consumption are not just determined by the socio-economic structure.

In my view, Bourdieu is certainly not a crude economic determinist, although some scholars point out that he uses economic language, such as capital and market, which evokes the economic mode of reasoning (e.g. Frow 1987; Shirley 1986). He believes that the general theory of the economy of fields which emerges from generalization to generalization enables us to describe the specific forms taken by the most general mechanisms and concepts such as capital, investment, and thus to avoid all kinds of reductionisms including economism which, he argues, recognizes nothing but material interest and the search for the maximization of monetary profit. There may be many reasons why Bourdieu has had both appraisals and criticisms, and has not been received fully into the discourse of Anglo-American social science. Most of all, I believe, there is difficulty of his style and prose. The words he has created break with the common-sense understandings embedded in common language. In other words, the nested configuration of his sentences-designed to convey the relational and recursive character of social processes and the density of his argumentation-have prevented American social scientists from fully grasping the originality and essence of Bourdieu's sociology.
For example, Bourdieu uses a model of society which can be seen as a simple formal analogy of the Marxian concept of capital (1979, p. 109-144). Everyday life is a combination of "fields" such as leisure, family patterns, consumption, work, artistic practices, etc. There are two forms of assets in each of those fields: money and cultural competence. Bourdieu conceptualizes these as economic and cultural capital which are accumulated through competition. For the orthodox Marxists, this analogy may be too liberal use of the concept. As mentioned above, some actually called it a crude economism applying a concept of capital by analogy to any area of social interaction. His theory is far more complex than that. Bourdieu's writing is particularly dense and wide-ranging in subject matter an cannot be summarized within the space available, if at all. Consequently, I will only concentrate on the central notions of (symbolic, economic, cultural, social) capital and habitus in social science.

The basic notion in Bourdieu's methodological position is his conception of the *habitus*. He defines it as "a system of durable, transposable dispositions which functions as the generative basis of structured, objectively unified practices" (1979, p. vii). The basic unit of *habitus* is the individual actor as a member of a social group or class. What is the exact meaning of habitus? The habitus is a generative principle that mediates and harmonizes the objective spaces of economic and social conditions with the more subjective space of group and class-specific lifestyles on the level of the individual actor in his/her quality as member of a class. Here, he strongly rejects Marx's unilateral transposition of an economic "base" into a cultural "superstructure" (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 101-102). As mentioned above, he contends that the combinations of any concrete social formation are held to be refracted through relatively autonomous mediating institutions and forces.

Habitus is not a simple, direct function of living conditions. Cultural forms have an inertia that survives, often through several generations, the material basis that may change very rapidly (Bourdieu, 1979, P. 195). This point can be seen in his work on Algeria (1964). He shows how the precapitalist way of life determined by the agricultural cycle survives along with the linear conception of time imposed by the colonial transformation of the economy. Thus, the habitus of a group or a class defines a symbolic order within which it conducts its practices. It provides a common framework, like universal formula, to understand actions of the members of the group. But it is not a deterministic formula or a set of norms to which individuals are expected to conform. Lower middle class people do not prefer Rafaello to Picasso because there is a norm saying they should. What this preference means and how it has been generated is a matter of the habitus. But this preference is an active choice. There is a cultural code that defines a symbolic value to cultural practices and the habitus of each group or class is formed in the practical choice of utilizing these values.
So Bourdieu (1977) summarizes the contribution of the concept of the habitus to the links between individual and collective practices and to our understanding of transformations of society and culture.

In short, the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history. The system of dispositions ...... is the principle of the continuity and regularity which objectivism discerns in the social world without being able to give them a rational basis. And it is at the same time the principle of the transformations and regulated revolutions which neither the extrinsic and instantaneous determinisms of a mechanistic sociologism nor the purely internal but equally punctual determination of voluntarist or spontaneist subjectivism are capable of according for (P. 82).

Bourdieu moves beyond the agent defined by class habitus to the relations between habitus in the processes of domination. Bourdieu approaches his analysis of modes of domination through his analysis of symbolic capital. Symbolic capital involves consideration of the mechanisms which disguise the true nature of the economy, "a system governed by the laws of interested calculation, competition, and exploitation, but which are integral to its reproduction" (1977, p. 172). Knowledge of symbolic capital provides the link between the objective economy and the accumulated behavior of agents. It is merely a subjective reflection, acknowledgement and legitimation of a given distribution of economic, cultural and social capital (Ibid, p. 171-173).

Mander (1987) says that symbolic capital only exists in the eyes of others and always fulfills ideological functions, while the other forms of capital have an independent objectifications, such as money, titles, etc.

For Bourdieu, the understanding of symbolic capital and symbolic violence is given further point by the study of non-capitalist society, in his case Kabyla. The Kabyla have no consciousness of economic capital and political institutions. Power is exercised not so much through physical violence, but through symbolic violence. Symbolic capital, symbolic power, and symbolic violence are intertwined as vital elements in the establishment of modes of domination (Bourdieu, 1965b). The significance of symbolic practices in the accumulation and distribution of symbolic capital then provides for him the clue to the non-violent reproduction of classes (Garnham, 1986, p. 428).

In sum, as was mentioned above, the focus of Bourdieu's theory is to disclose the causal relations between the objective structure of social classes and the cultural field of conflicting but social-reproduction guaranteeing lifestyles. How is the power structure of the objective social space transformed into distinctive lifestyles? An answer to this crucial question presupposes, besides the
above mentioned concept of habitus, an adequate theory of the social field. The dynamics of social fields are determined by the interaction of their autonomous internal logic with the external state of the social distribution of capital resources. Social fields, ranging from the educational system, the spheres of high and popular culture, the consumptive complexes of fashion, sport, leisure, etc., supply "objectified possibilities" (goods, services and patterns of action) (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 223). Social fields are characterized by the interplay of their relative autonomy with the efforts of the social agents and classes to occupy and determine their legitimate definition. In this sense the autonomy of social fields is always relative. Social classes try to seize these spheres and use them for displaying of power and social reproduction. This general struggle is ultimately determined by economic struggle in the field of class relations. Even though the founding fathers like E. P. Thompson, Williams, and Hall emphasized the significance of Bourdieu's work, though never elaborating his theory, newcomers are reluctant to agree with the assessment (e.g. Mander 1987; Frow 1987). Since it is composed of several institutions and disciplines, it would be inappropriate to attempt to compare one model of individual scholarship from cultural studies with Bourdieu's work. Therefore, the paper will emphasize the central notions of cultural studies, namely, culture, ideology, class, and intertextuality, and see how Bourdieu's theory of culture may agree with cultural studies.

Bourdieu and Cultural Studies

On the Methodological Point of View

Few seem to accept cultural studies as an academic discipline, although it is growing and has influenced academic disciplines of humanities and social sciences, especially on communication and media studies in North America. Cultural studies is often considered in the field of communication as a form of criticism, or network, or a movement both drawn from and criticizing previous research on communication and media studies, as well as previous work in other disciplines. Much of contemporary American research has been devoted to find a fixed system of understanding that would provide an objective understanding of the empirical world. On the other hand, cultural studies doesn't seem to be interested in a particular set of assumptions or hypothesis. Rather it has focused on the nature of everyday experience, the sense the individual makes the world. For example, where mainstream research has seen mass society, cultural studies has seen cultures, subcultures, classes, and institutions. Thus, it avoids the mechanistic determinism of much sociology, including some forms of Marxism, by looking at the complexity and importance of subjective experience. Cultural studies, however, doesn't simply deny scientific approaches, nor an attempt to synthesize what Lazarsfeld called administrative and critical research. This resistance to reductionism can also be found in the work of Weber, who argued the need for a
cultural science that was interpretive rather than reductionist in the form of causal or functional explanations. Hall seems to prefer cultural studies to cultural science to avoid a possible slide toward more behaviorist scientism. On the philosophy of the subject—Richard Johnson and others having defined cultural studies as the investigation of how our individual subjectivities are socially constructed (1987, P. 45, 62)—then in my view, cultural studies is anti-subjectivist because it locates the sources of meaning not in individual reason or subjectivity, but in social relations, communication, cultural politics. The stress on culture implies the social construction of meanings, but it also implies the existence of forms of political reason transcending individual subjectivity.

Similarly, Bourdieu's methodological point of view is at one and the same time anti-functionalist and anti-subjectivist. To him, the cultural forms of the practices of everyday life cannot be reduced to needs of the individual any more than to the functional imperatives of the collectivity. They take the form of irreducible symbolic expressions, the meanings of which are not directly apparent to the subjects (1977, p 3-9). Yet the subjects are not determined by the collective institutions in their practices. People do not simply reproduce their meaning systems, they also produce and use them. Classes and their members are not just actors in a prefabricated play, but also creative subjects. According to Bourdieu, such actions should not be interpreted in terms of a 'logic' but rather in terms of a 'sense.' This sense is generated by the objective living conditions, but since it is itself able to generate new sense it is by no means reducible to a function of them (Bourdieu, 1984). Bourdieu's complex theoretical dimension around habitus can be expressed in a diagram:

**STRUCTURE**

Meaning<-------->Habitus<-------->Function

Subject

**Figure 3. Dimensions of Habitus**

To Bourdieu, it is necessary to see human practices as structured by meaning systems and as their expressions, but they also serve various functions determined by objective conditions of existence; and while on the other hand they are parts of a structure, on the other they are carried out, produced, reproduced and used by living individuals (1984, p. 485-500). Like cultural studies, Bourdieu's sociology never developed grand theoretical systems and does not lend itself to systematic generation of precise hypotheses which could be rigorously tested by statistical method. Bourdieu's flexible methodological position can best be appreciated in his interpretations of the cultural forms, including media.
On Culture

Williams, one of the most influential figure in cultural studies, attempts to shift the Marxist theory of determination from a base/superstructure model to an organic process model. He sees society as a complex and interrelated process of limits and pressures in political, economic and cultural formations. For example, in explaining the emergence of the mass media, Williams refutes any notion of determinacy by abstract structures of technology or economy. Instead, the technological emergence of television is explainable only in terms of certain purposes and practices that were intentionally acted upon. Thus, television emerges from a socially shared awareness of mobility and change, conditions of a "structure of feeling" that sets the terms for its development. This complex interaction between structure (economic, social determinants) and agency (cultural autonomy) points to the need for an adequate definition of culture. The term culture for Williams is a way of living within an industrial society. Culture is not just ideological production, it is the lived experience of a people in institutions, practices, habits of everyday existence. Since culture is an environment, a process and an hegemony in which individuals and their works are embedded, it has a concrete effectivity.

Bourdieu also takes seriously the notion of culture, though he defines it narrowly: "the summits of achieved civilization" (Hall 1980, p.59). It is true that he places more emphasis on the whole range of social activities-an emphasis which is most evident in specifically cultural activities-than on a whole social order. Leaving culture to such cultural activities only, of course, may prevent him from taking a broader view of culture. Nevertheless, his narrow interpretation of culture has its own value. For example, it helps to illustrate and clarify national histories of styles of art and kinds of intellectual work which manifest, in relation with other institutions and activities, the central interests and values of a people. It is inevitable to combine both the anthropological and sociological senses of culture for a more complete analysis of culture. Thus, I would argue, Bourdieu's definition of culture is relevant for cultural studies of consumption patterns, life-style, social consciousness, and even of the various forms of political practices. He also believes that culture is defined by the dominant classes. In fact, his interest revolves around the question of what determines those practices and how they are expressed and lived among the different sections of the dominating classes and among the dominated popular classes.

On Class and Ideology

In Distinction, by exploring the socio-economic origins of cultural taste, Bourdieu questions the "relative autonomy" of culture and articulates a way of mediating the relation between culture and economic or class status that attempts to resolve dialectically the structuralist-voluntarist tension.
He argues that the tension was caused by Marx's ambiguous conception of class either an objective condition (the relation to the means of production) or a subjective sense of class identity and shared political goals (class consciousness). Instead of abandoning the category of class as reductive and economistic, referring to Weber's distinction between class and estate, Bourdieu refines the categorical determinants to account for the effects of cultural capital (i.e., the status derived from education and modes of consumption) as well as economic capital (i.e., the status derived from material goods and income), and intra-class struggles among class fractions. To Bourdieu, like money or investments, culture has value. The possession (or lack) of cultural capital increases (or decreases) the social worth of the individual. Class fractions are differentiated by whether the origin of their social capital is primarily economic or cultural: thus, junior executives and primary school teachers represent different class fractions of the middle class. Bourdieu attempts to complicate the category of class according to many factors (age, sex, geographical location, trajectory, etc.). Here, Bourdieu tries to describe class in both structural and dynamic terms.

To describe Bourdieu's definition of class, it is helpful to recapitulate briefly the one main sociological traditions, Weberian theory, which has shaped the discussion of class up to the present. However, I will focus on the Weberian tradition which has affected Bourdieu to define the notions of class, class relations and struggle (Parkin, 1979). Weber conceptualizes classes as totalities of individuals who share the same marketable capacities in the sphere of distribution. Classes are occupational groups who share the same amount of socially valued resources and engage in a distributive struggle for their maximization (Weber, 1982, 63-64). Class struggle in this context is an entirely competitive effort by social groups to appropriate and to enclose themselves within the boundaries of respective social classes. They are based on a similar setting within the division of labor and are socially integrated by common lifestyles, intermarriage patterns, etc. Classes as competitive social groups basically acknowledge the institutional rules which set the legal framework for the distributive struggle, the latter being essentially a struggle for power, according to Weber (Ibid).

Similarly, Bourdieu emphasizes the importance of class relations for the constitution of classes. The identity of a particular structure can only be secured by its negation of all other structures, not by its internal qualities. Class relations take the meaning of mostly unconscious group activities to maintain or to break down the objective distances between them, for example by means of the symbolic struggle for distinction. Class relations therefore refer to practices which secure and affirm implicit group identities (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 244-249).

Bourdieu is also concerned with class struggle. But the struggles that concern him are not Marx's antagonistic nature of capital/labor relationship, but conflicts within the dominant class with
economic and cultural capital. Indeed, the notion of capital is the center of his class theory. Cultural capital refers to cultural knowledge as a resource of power used by individuals and social groups to improve their positions within the social class structure (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 89). Economic capital refers to monetary assets which can be accumulated and invested as part of class strategy. Cultural capital is harder to measure than economic capital because there is not clear equivalent to the medium of money in the sphere of culture. For Bourdieu, cultural capital is the incorporation of symbolic, cognitive and aesthetic competences via implicit learning processes mainly within the family socialization. The acquisition of cultural capital in the sense of incorporation is the prerequisite for the possibility of symbolically appropriating that cultural capital as objectified in cultural goods, artifacts, books, pictures, etc (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 53).

The distinction between economic and cultural capital enables Bourdieu to distinguish between 1) the ruling-class fraction with much cultural and little economic capital (free artists, intellectuals, etc.), 2) the fraction with little cultural and much economic capital (free entrepreneurs, managers, etc.), and 3) the free professions which own a high amount both of economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 260-317). Due to their relatively high amount of economic and cultural capital, all three fractions of the ruling class can engage not only in the struggle for the appropriation of economic and cultural goods, but also in the symbolic struggle for the marks of distinction inhering in the socially highest valued cultural goods and practices (Ibid, p. 124).

This double aspect of cultural capital, as partly incorporated and partly institutionalized resources of individual actors and social groups used to support their strategic positions in the struggle for wealth, status, and power, is crucial to Bourdieu's overall theory (Mander, 1987, p. 429-430). Despite this emphasis on meaning systems, however, Bourdieu is by no means a subjectivist. Much of his writing is against phenomenological approaches and strict structuralism, such as that of Lévi-Strauss. Since Bourdieu believes that systems of domination persist and reproduce themselves without conscious recognition by a society's members, to him, any social science based on the subjective perceptions of participants, or on commonsense classifications of social groups or social problems, can only reinforce and confirm the very domination he regards as problematic.

The notion of cultural capital is further explored in the empirical analysis of the French school system (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1979). The educational system succeeds in its function as a mechanism of class reproduction allocating individuals to stratified occupational positions insofar as, with the transition from liberal to corporate capitalism, the economic relations between firms and sectors, and the administrative hierarchies within enterprises are rationalized and bureaucratized (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 186-188). With separation between ownership and control,
the acquisition of academic degrees replaces the "inheritance of property titles" as the mechanism of position. In other words, the acquisition of titles itself presupposes that cultural competences be incorporated, which favors individuals from family backgrounds with a large amount of cultural capital (1979, p. 91-92).

Beyond the notions of economic and cultural capital Bourdieu introduces social capital as another autonomous means to maximize power and rewards. Social capital refers to the membership in social groups and the profits that can be appropriated by the strategic use of social relations in order to improve one's position (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 171). For example, membership in exclusive clubs can explain why the same amount of economic and cultural capital often yield unequal returns. Mutual knowledge and acknowledgement among the group members is the condition for the efficiency of social capital, according to Bourdieu (Ibid, p. 179). Therefore Bourdieu states that social capital always functions as "symbolic capital." Symbolic capital cannot be objectified, institutionalized or incorporated, since it is dependent on its activation and affirmation by actual communicative practices. It will be discussed along with symbolic violence.

These three sorts of capital are used for the appropriation of the objective products of social labor. Bourdieu believes that they make it possible to construct a social space which, besides the economic sphere, integrates the spheres of culture and social relations into the structuration of class relations. For Bourdieu, the analysis of class should be under the restriction of the "tendential dominance of the economic field" (1985, p. 11). In other words, class struggle is ultimately determined by economic struggle in the field of class relations. While there is convertibility between economic and cultural capital in both directions, it is the convertibility of cultural into economic capital that defines it as capital and determines not only the overall structure of the social field but also that of subfields (Bourdieu, 1977, P. 183). It does so because economic capital is a more efficient reproductive mechanism. He seems to avoid Marxist essentialism by introducing the structure of capital distribution beyond the volume of capital. In this way, intra-class differences between the cultural and the economic bourgeoisie can be analyzed. How does then a given volume and structure of capital-accumulation among individuals and social groups translate into empirically observable class practices? This question will be discussed later.

The point of this seems to be that culture and class are closely interrelated but the discourse of culture disguises its connection with class. By using words like "taste," and "discrimination," the discourse of culture grounds cultural differences in universal human nature or in universal value systems. It pretends that culture is equally available to all, as democratic capitalism pretends that wealth is equally available to all. The fact that few acquire either culture or wealth is explained by reference to natural differences between individuals, which are expressed as differences in their
natural taste. The argument here is that naturally people who have better conditions of existence appreciate "high" art and therefore the value system that validates high art and denigrates low art is based in nature, and not in the unequal distribution of power in a class-divided society. Bourdieu's account of cultural capital reveals the attempt of the dominant classes to control culture for their own interests as effectively as they control the circulation of wealth. Thus, in Bourdieu's view, culture is neither neutral not morally edifying but constitutive of the semiotics of class struggle.

Bourdieu (1984) takes the charismatic mode as characterizing all high cultural practices. He seems to restrict it to the practices of the dominant fraction of the ruling class - the fraction that possesses economic capital (p.68). The children of the upper classes, for example, are forced to rely on the school for the "credentialled cultural capital" which, supplemented by their social capital of networks and connections, can be reconverted into a high class position. Their parents convert a portion of their economic capital into cultural capital by sending their children to the proper universities and business schools. These children, in turn, reconver their cultural and social capital into economic dominance. Because, according to Bourdieu, remuneration is increasingly provided through salaries rather than profits, this transformation has not only reproduced the previous structure of class relations but fortified it as well, by transforming its basis from inheritance of wealth to possession of cultural and social capital (Bourdieu & Saint Martin, 1973).

Individuals with common material conditions of existence share not only, conditions of existence but a system of dispositions associated with those conditions of existence. There is a "harmonization of agents' experiences" associated with "the production of a commonsense world endowed with ..... objectivity" (1977, p. 80). Thus the context of material and ideology is relatively homogeneous, and is secured through "the orchestrations of the habitus " in its dialectical interaction with lived experience. The concept of habitus thus enables Bourdieu to explain the natural processes of culture and economical social relations.

In Bourdieu's class theory, class boundaries are conceptualized objectively in the class-members relations. Similarly, Hoggart's particular concern is the interrelationship among several existing cultures that made up the culture of the working class. He argues that forms of entertainment were rapidly eroding and commercializing this distinctive culture. Williams, on the other hand, began by refusing to accept the concept of class division and questions some distinct forms of working class cultures. Later, Williams admitted that bourgeois culture was orientated towards the basic individualist idea and working class culture towards the basic collective idea. But he also argues that there is constant interaction between two cultures and calls for the development of a common culture, a subtle interaction between the old forms and a vision of socialist man. Thompson used
the broader definition of culture. He argues that working-class culture was not only produced by and for the people, but that it was the product of their struggles against the dominant order.

Gramsci also rejects the orthodox Marxist tendency to reduce the complexity of culture to the status of a totality. He analyzes critically the nature of state and civil society, the role and formation of intellectuals, popular cultures, class, etc. In doing so, Gramsci brings these ideas together within the concept of hegemony which has played a seminal role in cultural studies. The literal meaning of hegemony is leadership, or domination, or preponderance. But for Gramsci, the concept of hegemony signifies something much more complex. Hegemony describes the general predominance of particular class, political, and ideological interests. Although a society is made up of conflicting class interests, the ruling class exercises hegemony in that its interests are accepted as the prevailing ones. Social and cultural conflict is expressed as a struggle for hegemony, a struggle over which ideas will be recognized as the prevailing, common-sense view. If the orthodox Marxism had stressed the repressive role of the state in class societies, then Gramsci introduces the dimension of civil society to locate the complex ways. He suggests ways in which culture is a strategic field for the establishment of forms of consent. Gramsci would support Bourdieu's argument that there are many features of the working-class lifestyle "which, through the sense of incompetence, failure or cultural unworthiness, imply a form of recognition of the dominant values" (1984, p. 395). Although his analysis is supported by Gramsci, theorists from cultural studies disagree with this pessimistic view on working-class culture, because this dominance of the dominant values thus seems to become something absolute, and the working class to be inevitably entrapped within the cultural limits (Frow 1987, p. 70-71). Also it would reject Bourdieu's notion of dominant class which leads him to neglect the potential for contradiction in the role of intellectuals, for example.

Both certainly reject the notion of homogeneity, although Bourdieu is more deterministic on class division. It is difficult to say which one is more accurate to the analysis of class than the other. Again, cultural studies has always stressed the heterogeneity or complexity of working class culture. Johnson, however, underscores the idea of the heterogeneity of what happens in culture; as both Thompson and Williams often stressed, experience does not conform neatly to theory. Johnson (1980) argues that "it is an error, certainly in modern capitalist conditions, to view working-class culture as all of piece. The degree of homogeneity is undoubtedly historically variable" (1980, p. 235). Culture is plural and messy, and cannot be representable by a single point of view; a too reductively deterministic approach must fail to take account of the multiplicity and contradiction of experience. At the same time, extreme emphasis on heterogeneity, I think, may weaken the possibilities of class solidarity. It also becomes very difficult to think in terms of
class experience or culture at all. Thus, Johnson continues to argue that we should start to analyze the relation between economic classes and cultural forms, as Bourdieu did, by looking for contradictions, taboos, displacements in a culture, as well as unities (Ibid). In a way, Bourdieu's theory can help to break the bad romantic or theoretical side of cultural studies.

- **On Intertextuality**

Textual analysis of cultural products is common in cultural studies. It uses the Althusserian concept of relative autonomy and the ideological level to explore the internal dynamics of signifying practices. On the other hand, the mainstream research on analysis of texts has used an approach called quantitative content analysis. This methodology reduces the text to quantifiable data by noting the incidences of certain features and comparing that frequency with something else. Content analysis is useful to document the ways in which television programs represent constructions of the world rather than reflections of reality. But its preference for the principles of laboratory science limits its ability to account for the complexities of our engagements with those constructed worlds we see on television. We cannot the categorize meanings of sit-coms or soaps as a set of quantifiable and objective categories of data. Simply put, the scientific law tells us little about the various relationships we have with fictional television programs.

Meanwhile, cultural studies attempts to fracture the simplistic approach. For example, Connell from the Center investigated news coverage of the dispute between the Labour party and British trade unions over the wage problem. He found that the routine journalistic practices helped to construct a set of premises about the dispute that favored the government's position. Television reading is a negotiation between the social sense inscribed in the program and the meanings of social experience made by its wide variety of viewers, and thus, the negotiation is discursive one. This inevitability of intertextuality is proposed by Barthes who argues that intertextual relations are so pervasive that our culture consists of a complex web of intertextuality. Bourdieu takes similar position in analyzing the French educational system. For him, texts-as the means of both transmitting privilege from generation to generation and legitimating the resulting perpetuation of class differences by representing it as the consequence of unequally distributed natural aptitudes-are classified and valorised so as to function as tokens of exchange within a game of culture (1984, p. 328-330). In the case of Parisian university students, knowledgeability of all forms of culture, including those classified as popular, serves as a means of distinguishing students of bourgeois origin from those of working-class or even petit-bourgeois origin. In every area of culture, students have richer and more extensive knowledge the higher their social origin. Thus, Bourdieu argues that the forms of cultural stratification that may be produced in relation to textual phenomena are more complex and varied than is usually supposed.
There is no doubt that Bourdieu is an important figure in cultural studies of communication. But while Bourdieu's work has been explicated in the sociology of culture, the political economic aspects of his work have been overlooked. Hall (1978) locates Bourdieu's significance in his synthesis of the Marxist position with structuralism, a dialectical resolution which offers the possibility of the development of "an adequate Marxist theory of ideology" (1978, p. 29). Garnham and Williams (1986) seem to agree with Hall's judgement. At the same time, they stress Bourdieu's commitment to the materialist side of the theoretical dialectic.

While Bourdieu has concentrated his attention upon the mode of domination, upon what he calls the exercise of symbolic power, his theory is cast in resolutely materialist terms and it is not just the terms borrowed from economics such as capital, profit, market and investment, which he uses to describe and analyze cultural practice, that links his theory to a properly economic analysis in the narrow sense of that term, that is to say to the analysis of the mode of production of material life, which for Bourdieu is always ultimately and not so ultimately determinate (p. 118).

Bourdieu seems to be accepted favorably in critical studies of communication without depth. Hall, for example, in the paper cited above, devoted only the last page to critical discussion of Bourdieu's thought. Garnham (1986), Garnham and Williams (1986), despite their detailed exposition of the central strands in Bourdieu's work, devote only the last two pages to an actual critique. Murdock (1977, 1989) seems to be more enthusiastic about Bourdieu than any other scholars in our field.

Bourdieu's discussions of the production and reproduction of capital seem to suggest the influence of Marxism, although he avoids that. It may be helpful to consider his relationship to Marxism. When he writes about capital, Bourdieu sounds very Marxist, according to DiMaggio (1978).

... increase in the quantity of cultural capital that is objectified in machines, implements, or instruments ... and hence the quantity of embodied cultural capital necessary to reproduce this objectified capital and to make it productive (p. 27).

Despite his preoccupation with culture, distinctions of infrastructure and superstructure can be discerned. In his discussions of French society, Bourdieu refers to the owners of capital as the dominant fraction of the dominant class: pursuit of cultural capital is seen as a means to economic ends (DiMaggio, 1979). In responding the charge of economism, Bourdieu (1989) argues:

The only thing I share with neo marginalist economists are the words. Take the notion of investment. By investment I mean the propensity to act which is born out of the relation between a field and a system of dispositions adjusted to the game it proposes, a sense of the game
and of its stakes which implies both an inclination and an ability to play game. The general theory of the economy of fields which emerges progressively from generalization to generalization enable us to describe and to specify the specific form taken by the most general mechanisms and concepts such as capital, investment, interest, within each field, and thus to avoid all kinds of reductionisms ................ Thús my theory owes nothing to the transfer of the economic approach (p.42).

Although he does not belong to crude economic determinism, Bourdieu, in my view, takes a deterministic view of social reality and the practice of social agents. If objective reality determines social practice, as he argues, then conformity to the dictates and probabilities of that reality is the only possible outcome. Although he may draw heavily upon Weber as the source of his ideas on symbolic domination, the introduction of a false knowledge seems to ensure the reproduction of determinism in his work. Thus, he ignores that class’s internal differentiation and stratification and underestimates the importance of the possibility of mobility in the legitimation of patterned domination. I think that the reproduction in social practice of class society is complex and less determined.

Bourdieu (1984) defines class in terms of three variables: the volume of capital possessed; the composition of this capital (that is, the relation between economic and cultural capitals); and the change in volume and composition over time. Within the dominant class "the structure of the distribution of economic capital is symmetrical and opposite to that of cultural capital" (1984, p. 120), and this means that the two forms of capital are mutually exclusive. Thus, for example, in an analysis of cultural and social reproduction between fractions rich in cultural capital and those rich in economic capital, he suggests that both kinds of capital are differentially distributed in the dominant class. But I think that they are in some way mutually convertible. Their structural difference is subordinated to their potential equivalence. But of course this argument is incomplete: in the first place because the conversion of capitals can take place only under certain conditions and at certain restricted levels of the market, and in the second place because conversion is not reciprocal (it is possible to convert cultural capital into economic capital, but not vice versa).

His theory of cultural capital explains the social function of culture as the provision of a system of meanings and pleasures that underwrites the social system structured around economic, class, and other forms of social power. Cultural capital underwrites economic capital. But the metaphor of the cultural economy must not be confined to its similarities with the material economy. The circulation of meanings and pleasures in a society is not the same as the circulation of wealth. Meanings and pleasures are much harder to possess exclusively and much harder to control: power is less effectively exerted in the cultural economy than it is in the material. I would extend the metaphor of cultural capital to include that of a popular cultural capital that has no equivalent in the
material economy. Popular cultural capital is an accumulation of meanings and pleasures that serves the interests of the subordinated and powerless. Like any form of capital, either economic capital or the cultural capital of the bourgeoisie, it works through ideology; as Hall (1986) points out, we must not limit our understanding of ideology to an analysis of how it works in the service of the dominant. We need to recognize that there are alternative ideologies that both derive from and maintain those social groups who are not accommodated within the existing power relations.

Finally, the novelty of Bourdieu's analysis of a society is its comprehensiveness, enough to accommodate both cultural studies and political economy. This comes out most clearly in Distinction. He sees the same pattern of contestation for distinction operating everywhere. The value of his work is to uncover the dialectical interrelation between the various practices and social classes as mediated by the habitus. Another value of Bourdieu's work lies in his portrayal of the relations of domination and subordination which structure the internal dynamics of French society. Most importantly, Bourdieu examines his work as relatively autonomous systems which are transformed not only through their internal dynamics with other fields but through their relations as well. It seems to me that Bourdieu tends to concentrate more on the analysis of symbolic violence and symbolic capital than the analysis of the economy, although he argues that symbolic capital serves essentially economic interests. To me, his work is more of a culturalism with the backbone of determinism in response to vulgar materialism. I would argue that Bourdieu's sociology, especially the analysis of the relations between economic capital and cultural capital, would be a way of resolving the resolving the lack of political economic aspect of cultural studies. However, one must also recognize that Bourdieu's analysis is based on the structure of modern French society. He thinks that it is dominated by bourgeois values vested in a vast variety of symbolisms and encoded in a long tradition of legitimized elite culture. In French society, in his view, it is the pursuit for expressions of cultural competence that motivates the style and aesthetic practices of all classes. Finally, I think that those differences in those central notions, especially in the definition of culture, between Bourdieu and cultural studies may not be differences of theoretical orientation but differences in the societies themselves.
REFERENCES


-----.  "The specificity of the scientific field and social conditions of the progress of reason,"  *Social Science Information* 14(6) 1975: 19-47.


------. Television Culture. London: Methuen, 1987


"on postmodernism and articulation: An interview with Stuart Hall," Journal of Communication inquiry 10 (2) 1986b: 45-60.


----------. "Banality in Cultural Studies," Discourse 10(2) 1988: 3-29.


