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Congress of the U.S., Washington, D.C. House Committee on Armed Services.


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Congress 102nd

This document reports the oral and written statements of persons who testified at congressional hearings on the subject of professional military education. Witnesses included members of Congress, active and reserve military officers from various branches of the armed services, and supervisors of the services' military colleges. Testimony, presented by Paul L. Jones, Director of Defense Force Issues at the U.S. General Accounting Office, indicated that the military's professional schools had responded favorably in implementing previously made recommendations of a Congressional panel concerning phase 1 of joint professional military education. Other witnesses addressed questions about lines of promotions for officers, the need for more officers, student qualifications for admittance to the schools and for promotion, curriculum reform, and school requirements. (KC)
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARINGS HELD
FEBRUARY 5, APRIL 17, 24, SEPTEMBER 18, NOVEMBER 1, 5, AND
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GAO BRIEFING ON PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Military Education Panel, Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 5, 1991.

The panel met, pursuant to call, at 9:10 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the panel) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL

Mr. SKELTON. Good morning.

This morning we will receive a briefing from the General Accounting Office on the interim results of its examination of professional military education. This session is structured as a briefing because the committee panels have not been officially appointed as of this moment. As soon as the panel has been appointed, I will ask unanimous consent that today's briefing be considered a hearing of the panel. This last step is a formality, inasmuch as we will adhere to.

I welcome you to this briefing. Desert Storm underscores the operational importance of joint education for our military officers. I am heartened by the obvious examples of jointness displayed by our forces in the Persian Gulf, which I feel is directly, in many instances, attributable to the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.

This morning the panel will hear testimony from Mr. Paul Jones. Mr. Jones, we welcome you and we thank you.

Mr. JONES. Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Jones is the Director of Defense Force Management Issues in the National Security and International Affairs Division of the General Accounting Office—I bet you can't repeat that.

[Laughter.]

Mr. JONES. Not very fast.

Mr. SKELTON. He will brief us on the results of the GAO work at the services' intermediate and senior professional military education schools. As you know, there are five intermediate schools and five senior schools. We thank you for your assistance. This is, we feel, monumental work. It is not all that newsworthy but in the long result it will have telling effects for the national security of our Nation. We thank you.

Would you care to introduce the gentlemen there with you, sir?
STATEMENT OF PAUL L. JONES, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT ISSUES, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEORGE E. BREEN AND FRANK BOWERS

Mr. JONES. Thank you. I will, sir.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the panel this morning to discuss the results of our review of intermediate and senior service schools on the implementation of the panel’s recommendations concerning phase I of joint professional military education.

Accompanying me today are Mr. George Breen, or “Chip” Breen as we call him. He is the assistant director who is responsible for this area of work, and Mr. Frank Bowers who is the evaluator-in-charge of this particular review.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize my statement and request that my full statement be entered in the record.

Mr. SKELTON. Without objection, your entire statement will be put forth into the record.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In responding to your request, Mr. Chairman, we are preparing, under separate covers, four reports that detail actions taken by each service to implement recommendations made by the panel concerning phase I joint professional military education at intermediate and senior service schools.

The seven service schools have responded very favorably to the panel’s recommendations, each school has implemented or partially implemented, at least 90 percent of the panel’s recommendations.

Mr. SKELTON. Did you say each school?

Mr. JONES. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. JONES. Each school.

Today, Mr. Chairman, I would like to just summarize some of the concerns that were raised by the schools. Again, the gist and detail of our review will be reported in separate reports. I want to just mention this morning the concerns that the schools have raised about certain recommendations.

Specifically, concerns have arisen in the areas of the in-residence phase I education as a prerequisite for phase II; the distinction between the intermediate school and the senior school curricula at the Naval War College; the prescribed levels of non-host faculty and student mixes and student/faculty ratios; and there are some concerns about letter grades at the Army senior school and at both Air Force schools.

Mr. SKELTON. On that last point, some concerns about what, sir?

Mr. JONES. Some concerns about the letter grades requirement.

Mr. SKELTON. The letter grades.

Mr. JONES. Yes.

Mr. SKELTON. That’s my phobia.

Mr. JONES. Yes. There were some concerns about letter grades at the Army senior school and at both Air Force schools.

I would like to briefly discuss each area of concern.
Regarding the in-residence requirement, or recommendation, the schools have some concerns because the recommendation requires in-residence phase I education as a prerequisite for phase II education. School officials recognized and agreed that the phase I requirement must be met before attending phase II at the Armed Forces Staff College.

For example, Army and Air Force officials said that completing intermediate in-residence or equivalent education is a prerequisite for selection for promotion. However, they expressed concern that, if implemented, the requirement for in-residence phase I education as a prerequisite to phase II might send unintended signals to officers who don't attend in-residence education for phase I. Also, it might give the impression of preselection for choice duty assignments and for subsequent promotions. Again, this would send a negative message to officers who are not selected for in-residence phase I education.

To counter this, the services have established non-resident and correspondence programs. They are in the process of trying to get these programs certified by JCS. As you know, once the correspondence or non-resident courses are certified by JCS, they meet the requirement for phase I and the officer can attend phase II.

Regarding distinctness in the curricula at Naval intermediate and senior schools, as you know, the panel recommended operational art as the focus of the intermediate schools and military strategy as the focus of senior schools. The Naval War College has not established this distinctness among its schools. The Navy schools have comparable curricula and the focus of both schools is primarily on national military strategy. This similarity is intentional, because the Navy, in the past, didn't intend to send its officers to both schools. Hence, it has a curriculum focusing on national military strategy for both schools.

Mr. Skelton. Let me interrupt you right there.

Do you see any change since the initial report came out? Is the Navy sending them in proportion to both schools more now than they used to?

Mr. Jones. Although the Navy still has the same focus, they intend to separate the schools by establishing more distinct curricula. They haven't gotten there yet, but the plans are to establish separate and distinct curricula. But it is my understanding that they still plan to send their officers to only one school, one of the two schools. That's our understanding to date.

Regarding the faculty mix, only the Navy schools meet the panel's recommended level for non-host faculty mix. But, for the most part, the service schools do meet the Military Education Policy Document, or the MEPD, goal for non-host faculty mix.

The panel recommended that the senior level service schools should have military faculty mixes of about 10 percent from each of the two non-host military departments by academic year 1989-1990, and that intermediate level schools should attain the same mix by 1990-1991. The MEPD, on the other hand, has a set goal of 5 percent from each non-host department at the intermediate schools and 10 percent at the senior schools. So there is a bit of a difference between the panel's recommendation and what the MEPD now states.
Mr. SKELTON. What was the date of that document?

Mr. JONES. The MEPD is a recent document revision, I believe in mid-1990 it was revised. It was May of 1990.

There was concern also as to the student body mix. The Marine Corps and Navy schools are currently meeting the student mix recommended by the panel. Air Force and Army officials told us, on the other hand, that they have met or intend to meet MEPD goals. Again, there's a difference between MEPD goals and the panel's recommended goals.

MEPD calls for at least one officer from each of the non-host services per seminar at both intermediate and senior level schools. The panel recommended that the senior level schools have student body mixes of about 10 percent from each of the two non-host departments by academic year 1989-1990, and that intermediate schools should have one officer from each of the two non-host military departments per student seminar by academic year 1990-1991. School officials did not address the panel's additional outyear mixes.

On the recommended student/faculty ratio, none of the intermediate schools is fulfilling the panel's recommended student/faculty ratio of 4 to 1, although the Army and Air Force schools are close. They are 4.1 and 4.4 to 1, respectively. The ratio at the Marine Corps school is more than 6 to 1. Officials there expect this figure to improve with the addition of new civilian faculty on their staff. Also, due to the relatively small size of the Marine Corps school, they should be able to meet this goal of the panel. It is difficult to compute a similar figure for the Navy schools because, as I said before, the same faculty serves both schools. Collectively, the ratio at the Navy school is higher than the 4 to 1. It's about 4.6 to 1.

The panel recommended a student/faculty ratio of 3 to 1 at the senior level. Only the Army senior school meets this standard, about 2.6 to 1. The Air Force ratio is 3.9 to 1. Again, it is difficult to compute separate ratios for the Navy schools because of the combined faculty for both schools.

The final area of concern I would like to discuss is the area of letter grades. All schools state that they have rigorous student evaluation standards. However, letter grades are not administered at the Army senior school or at either Air Force school. Basically, the Army said that letter grades foster competition and discourage cooperation. They further said that since Army senior school students are recruited from the top 6 percent of all eligible Army officers, they have already competed against each other. Army officials told us that their emphasis at the War College should be on achieving academic objectives in a joint strategic environment where cooperation, not competition, is encouraged.

Air Force officials explained that it is more important for their students to be able to demonstrate operational competency rather than academic excellence.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I would just like to stress that I have highlighted the areas of concern. Please keep in mind that there has been considerable receptiveness to the panel's recommendations and that each school has had about a 90-percent success rate in either implementing or partially implemented the panel's recommendations.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my oral statement. I will be pleased to respond to any questions you might have at this time.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Panel,

I am pleased to be here today to discuss issues relating to our review of Phase I joint professional military education at the 4 intermediate and 3 senior service schools. Overall, the 7 service schools have responded very favorably to the Panel's recommendations. Each school has taken some form of positive action on at least 90 percent of the recommendations. Conversely, the schools have concerns with 10 percent or fewer recommendations.

In responding to your request, Mr. Chairman, we are preparing, under separate covers, 4 reports that detail actions taken by each service to implement recommendations made by the Panel concerning Phase I joint professional military education at intermediate and senior service schools.

Although the schools have taken many positive steps to improve the quality of joint professional military education, concerns exist in curriculum, faculty, and student evaluation areas which warrant the Panel's continuing attention. Specifically, these areas include

-- in-residence Phase I education,

-- the distinction between the intermediate school and the senior school curricula (at the Naval War College),
-- prescribed levels of non-host faculty and student mixes and
student/faculty ratios, and

-- letter grades (at the Army senior school and at both Air Force
schools).

Let me discuss each of these areas in more detail.

CURRICULUM

In-Residence Requirement

Officials of the service intermediate schools support the intent
but do not believe that it is desirable to implement the Panel's
recommendation requiring in-residence phase I education as a
prerequisite to attending phase II at the Armed Forces Staff
College (AFSC).

School officials expressed concern about what they perceive as an
unintended result of this recommendation. They stated the
recommendation would give the appearance that those officers who
were selected for in-residence education were also being pre-
selected for subsequent choice duty assignments and promotions.
Conversely, this would send an unintended negative message to those
officers not selected.
Army and Air Force officials also explained that completing intermediate in-residence or equivalent professional military education is a prerequisite for selection for promotion to the rank of lieutenant colonel. In the Marine Corps, in-resident intermediate education is not currently a requirement for promotion. However, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has instituted a requirement that all officers in the future will complete intermediate in-resident or non-resident education.

The services have established non-resident and correspondence course programs to serve the professional military education requirements and are attempting to certify these programs to ensure that phase I joint intermediate education requirements are met as well. School officials recognize the shortcomings of non-resident and correspondence programs compared to resident programs, such as limited student-teacher and student-student interaction. However, they also expressed concern that it is impractical to send all of their officers to resident education programs.

School officials recognize and agree that phase I requirements must be met before attending phase II at AFSC.
Distinctness in Navy Intermediate and Senior Schools

A second curriculum area of concern is that the Navy War College has not established the distinct curricula recommended for its intermediate and senior schools.

The Panel recommends that operational art be the focus at intermediate schools. Operational art is defined as the use of military forces to attain strategic goals in a theater of war or theater of operations. The focus at senior schools should be national military strategy, defined as the art and science of using the armed forces to secure the objectives of national policy by applying force or the threat of force.

The curricula at the Navy intermediate and senior schools are comparable. The focus at both schools is on national military strategy. Despite some recent changes, extensive similarities exist in curricula, learning objectives, readings, and case studies. In addition, both schools share the same physical facilities, administration, and faculty. School officials said that the similarity is intentional since Naval officers do not have to attend both schools. Attendance at either school is not a requirement in promotion decisions.
The curricula at both schools in the Army and Air Force are distinct in terms of their focus on operational art and military strategy. The Marine Corps has recently established a senior school at Quantico which is co-located with, but distinct from, its intermediate school. Plans for this school are to offer a senior-level national military strategy curriculum which meets the Panel's guidelines.

Before leaving the area of curriculum, I would like to add that all the service schools have revised their curricula to strengthen their focus on joint matters. For example, they have incorporated Panel guidance on the contents of a joint curriculum to include joint and combined operations, joint processes and systems, and joint planning.

I shift my attention now to the second issue—faculty.

FACULTY AND STUDENT BODY

Faculty

Only the Naval War College schools meet the Panel's recommended level of non-host, or sister service, faculty mix.

For the service intermediate schools, the Panel recommended 10 percent from each non-host military department for academic year 1990-91 with an increase to 15 percent by academic year 1995-96.
For the senior schools, the panel recommended 10 percent from each non-host school for academic year 1989-90 with an increase to 25 percent by academic year 1995-96.

The Army, Air Force and Marine Corps intermediate schools do not meet the Panel non-host faculty percentage goals. However, the Air Force school meets the MEPD goal of 5 percent while the other two schools fall slightly short of the MEPD goal. The Army and Air Force senior schools fall slightly short of the MEPD goal of 10 percent. The two senior schools say they can meet the MEPD level.

Officials at all of the schools have not yet addressed additional Panel faculty mix goals for 1995-96. The Army, for example, said it is unable to determine the impact of projected force reductions on staffing.

**Student Body**

Service schools plan to implement MEPD, but not the Panel, standards for student mix.

For intermediate schools, the Panel recommends 1 student per seminar from each of the non-host military departments counting the Navy and Marine Corps as one department, 2 students per seminar by 1995-96, and eventually 3 students per seminar thereafter. By contrast, the MEPD specifies a minimum of 1 non-host student per
seminar with no directive to increase this number by academic year 1995-96. The Navy and the Marine Corps meet the current student mix goals recommended by the Panel.

In the case of the senior schools, the Panel recommends 10 percent from each of the two non-host military departments and 25 percent in the outyears. Again, the MEPD only prescribes at least 1 student from each non-host service. Only the Naval War College has met the 10 percent goal. None of the senior schools has plans to implement the Panel's outyear goals at this time.

Student/Faculty Ratios

Computation of student/faculty ratios was complicated by the fact that there is no standard definition for faculty. The faculty composition is unique to each service school, and consequently, the methods for counting faculty vary from school to school.

None of the intermediate schools is fulfilling the Panel's recommended student/faculty ratio of 4 to 1, although the Army and Air Force school ratios are close (4.1 and 4.4 to 1, respectively). The ratio at the Marine Corps school is more than 6 to 1. Officials there expect this figure to improve with the addition of new civilian faculty on their staff. Due to the relatively small size of the Marine Corps intermediate school, officials there should be able to attain the Panel goal. It is
difficult to compute a similar figure at the Navy schools because the same faculty serves both schools. Collectively, the ratio there is higher (worse) than 4 to 1.

The Panel recommended a student/faculty ratio of 3 to 1 at the senior level. Only the Army senior school meets this standard (2.6 to 1), although the Air Force is close (3.7 to 1). Again, it is difficult to compute separate ratios at the Navy schools, because one faculty serves two schools.

Cadre of Career Educators

The Panel recommended the establishment of a cadre of career educators. While the schools recognize that quality faculty is fundamental to quality education, they prefer military faculty with operational experience. The Navy and Marine Corps schools have no cadre of career military educators. School officials stated that current operational experience is necessary to insure the credibility and validity of the material being taught. In general, the service schools use civilians and adjunct faculty as a cadre to provide subject matter expertise and continuity to complement the military faculty. A special group of military career educators exists only in the Army and Air Force schools which offer tenured or specially designated positions.
Faculty Exchange Program

Although the Panel recommended a faculty exchange program between service schools and service academies, no school has established an exchange program. Furthermore, the degree of exchange that does exist varies across service schools. For example, the Air Force Academy has sent two members in a one-way exchange to the Air Force intermediate school. The Navy's exchange program entails one faculty member from West Point.

By contrast, the Army and Marine Corps do not find the exchange beneficial given differences in the missions and purposes of the two institutions. They see the academies as undergraduate schools emphasizing academics targeted toward pre-commissioned officers. The service intermediate and senior schools, on the other hand, are graduate schools emphasizing operations and strategy targeting instruction to senior officers. While no formal exchange program exists, they do bring in academy faculty as guest speakers when a particular topic necessitates such an exchange.

Students Retained as Faculty

Although the Panel opposes the widespread retention of graduating students as faculty, the practice continues. This is especially apparent at the Air Force intermediate school, where 41 percent of
The current faculty are members of the 1989-90 graduating class, and also at the Naval War College, where 28 percent of the current faculty are graduates from the past 3 academic years. The other service intermediate and senior schools also retain graduates, although to a lesser extent.

The third issue I would like to discuss concerns student evaluation.

STUDENT EVALUATION
Letter grades

While all service schools state they have rigorous student evaluation standards, letter grades are not administered at the Army senior school or at either Air Force school. Army senior school officials said that letter grades foster competition and discourage cooperation. Since Army senior students are recruited from the top 6 percent of all senior school eligible Army officers, they have already competed against each other to reach the senior school. Army officials told us that their emphasis should now be on achieving academic objectives in a joint strategic environment where cooperation, and not competition, is encouraged.

The Air Force, on the other hand, is examining the senior school's evaluation system. Air Force officials explained that it is more
important for their students to be able to demonstrate operational competency rather than academic excellence.

The Marine Corps recently adopted a letter grading system in academic year 1990-91. Only grades of "A" and "B" represent acceptable levels of performance as is the practice in most graduate programs. The Navy's letter grading system is further refined by attaching pluses and minuses to each letter grade.

Distinguished Graduates

Of the 7 schools we visited, 5 have implemented a distinguished graduate programs in one form or another, while 2 have not implemented any such program. For instance, the Army intermediate school designates a distinguished graduate but does not use a system of class rankings. A ranking list does not help the school identify students for special assignments since most students are assigned to their next position before the academic year ends. The Army senior school has no distinguished graduate program. Army officials said that since the top 6 percent of all senior school eligible Army officers are selected to attend the school, to further rank these officers against each other is neither desirable nor necessary. Two-thirds of the Army officers at the school are assigned to service joint or national command structure assignments, thereby already fulfilling the objective of a distinguished graduate program.
At present, the Air Force senior school has no distinguished graduate program. It is examining its evaluation system to attain the level of objectivity which could form the basis of a credible distinguished graduate program. The other service schools all have distinguished graduate programs varying in the percentage cutoffs.

As a final point, the Panel recommends that evaluations of a student's performance be captured in officer efficiency reports. Only the Navy and Marine Corps are using officer efficiency reports. School officials in the Army state that they reflect the spirit of the Panel recommendation by using academic reports. These reports are reviewed by promotion and selection boards and become part of an officer's permanent performance record. The Air Force uses training reports which, it states, are equally effective and better suited to an academic environment.

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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Jones, thank you so much.

This is really the result of a lot of effort. You may recall, Mr. Jones, we had some 28 hearings and 48 witnesses and interviewed over 100 people during the initial phase of the panel's investigation. We have been riding shotgun somewhat since then. But now we're asking for a definitive grade, and that's really what you're doing. You give them a 90 percent which, frankly, is pretty good. On the other hand, in some of those areas that you call "concerns"—I would probably be less kind—they are glaring, and I will address them with you in just a moment.

I would introduce Mr. Machtley at this point.

Mr. MACHTLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to welcome you. I'm sorry I wasn't here for all of your testimony, but I look forward to hearing some of your responses to questions and I will review your written testimony.

Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Jones, let's go back to the in-residence requirement for phase I. Our recommendation was that this come to pass, that they be in-residence for this phase I.

It is understandable that everybody is not going to be able to do that.

Mr. JONES. Right.

Mr. SKELTON. We know that. But through this nonresidence course or this correspondence course do you see a concerted effort to skirt around the spirit of what we were trying to do?

Mr. JONES. I don't know if it's trying to skirt around the intent of the panel's recommendations. The panel recommendations are geared to a jointness—

Mr. SKELTON. That's correct.

Mr. JONES. I think the schools recognize that in-residence phase I education does offer the maximum amount of jointness in terms of the faculty/student relationships or interactions, student-to-student interactions and so forth. These attributes are lacking in a non-residence or correspondence program. But the services try to make that up through a rigorous curriculum in the non-residence program or correspondence course through papers, seminars, bringing in professors from the services, and also high-level officials from the services. So they recognize that the in-residence program is a preferred method and it is the best method in terms of getting joint professional military education. But they are trying to make provisions to include those officers who don't attend in-residence education programs. There might be some cases where there's an officer who did not attend in-residence, by the luck of where his assignments were. If he were at sea, making provisions for that bright officer who might be a good candidate for joint service to also get in a joint service program would be desirable.

I don't think the intent is to bypass the requirements of the panel. We don't see that.

Mr. SKELTON. The Navy War College continues to be a concern. What you may not know, sir, is that in yesteryear, it was not absolutely necessary for someone going through the ranks to go to a war college in the service. I think it was important for them to have been chosen, but they might have gone on to a cruiser assignment, a battleship assignment, an aircraft carrier captainship or
something like that. I think that has changed and I commend the Navy for that.

But the counterparts in the Air Force, Marines and Army, just by rote, will go through the intermediate school and the senior school. As you pointed out, the intermediate school is aimed at operational art. For those of us who are laymen, we call that "feeder art."

Let me ask you more about the Navy system. There are two distinct schools up there; is that not correct?

Mr. JONES. There are two distinct schools. But they both have similar curricula.

Mr. SKELTON. This may be a difficult question, but can you compare the emphasis. Obviously, the more senior one will have, or should have, more strategy than the junior one. Is that the case, or do both of them give an equal amount of strategic thought? What happens to operational thought if you're in the Navy?

Mr. JONES. Well, the focus at the Naval War College is on military strategy.

Mr. SKELTON. In other words, when you go to their intermediate school, the lower school, you're going to get the same amount of strategic challenge that you would get if you went to the senior one; is that correct?

Mr. JONES. That's true. But the percent of military strategy is lower in the intermediate school curriculum than in the senior school. That was intentional, by the way. As I said before, the intention was to have the curricula at the two schools similar, because the intent was to send officers to just one school. So that lack of distinction is not by chance. It's intentional.

Let me stress, though, that I think the Navy recognizes that there are shortfalls in the distinction, and they are working to establish separate curricula and distinctness. They just haven't gotten there yet.

Mr. SKELTON. What would the difference be between the intermediate school and senior school? Would it be just the rank, the rank on the shoulders?

Mr. JONES. Right now?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. JONES. Well, it's basically the rank.

Mr. SKELTON. So they basically get the same dose?

Mr. JONES. They do not get the same education.

Mr. SKELTON. Let's talk about the faculty mix. Do you mind if we go through each of the schools—the ten schools—on the faculty student mix? Let's do the faculty mix first and then the ratios next of each of the ten schools. Let's look at each of the intermediate schools first. Would you go through the faculty mix on each one of those, sir, please?

Mr. JONES. OK. The faculty mix?

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, please.

Mr. JONES. At the Navy school, the Navy seems to be the only school right now that is meeting the panel goal of 10 percent. That's at both Navy schools. The other schools really haven't gotten there yet. I think the concern here is the distinction between the panel goal of 10 percent and the MEPD goal which they are trying to adhere to, which is 5 percent. It doesn't say they're
prohibited by the MEPD from reaching the 10 percent. It is just that the goal of MEPD for intermediate schools is 5 percent and—

Mr. Skelton. Let me interrupt you right there.

That is basically the status quo. They're not climbing the ladder there at all if it stays at 5 percent. Is that not correct?

Mr. Jones. That's correct. Again, that's what is in the MEPD.

Mr. Skelton. But those are not our recommendations.

Mr. Jones. Those are not your recommendations.

Mr. Skelton. We're measuring this as our recommendations against theirs.

Mr. Jones. Right.

Mr. Skelton. We will have those folks over in due time.

OK. In other words, all of the schools except the Navy schools are going by the 5-percent figure?

Mr. Jones. That's right.

Mr. Skelton. Now, let's look at the senior schools, please.

The Navy, again, is meeting the goal of 10 percent. The other two schools, the Army and Air Force, again are not there yet. They're again following the MEPD.

Mr. Skelton. Did you raise this question with these various schools and did they give you reasons why they're not doing it, or do they just say they're meeting the—

Mr. Jones. Well, again they offer the idea that the MEPD goal for intermediate schools is 5 percent. I guess I would have some concern with that, because the MEPD is a goal; it's not an upper limit. So it doesn't preclude the Army and Air Force from going to 10 percent, if I can make that clear. So the goal is 5 percent, but it doesn't say they can't go above that in terms of reaching your recommendation of 10 percent. But that's what they offer.

Mr. Skelton. So the story is the same for the senior schools?

Mr. Jones. That's right.

Mr. Skelton. Let's look at each of the two sets of five schools on the student ratio once again. Let's talk about intermediate schools and the student/faculty ratio.

Mr. Jones. Well, the intermediate school—Again, it's kind of difficult to compute the ratio for the Navy school, because as I say, there is one faculty there.

Mr. Skelton. That's right.

Mr. Jones. But in terms of the other services, only the Marine Corps seems to be meeting the panel's recommended level, and that's because of the size of the school.

Mr. Skelton. What's their ratio?

Mr. Jones. Their ratio is—OK. The intermediate school in the Marine Corps is not meeting the goal. I'm sorry. It's more than 6 to 1.

Mr. Skelton. OK. So it's at the other end.

Mr. Jones. Right.

Mr. Skelton. Which of the intermediate schools is the closest to meeting that goal?

Mr. Jones. The Army is close, about 4.1 to 1.

Mr. Skelton. The recommendation is—

Mr. Jones. Is 4 to 1.
Mr. SKELTON. Right.
How about your senior schools?
Mr. JONES. As far as the senior schools, the Army is close at 2.6 to 1.
Mr. SKELTON. The others, where do they fall in?
Mr. JONES. They're a little off, 4.6 being the high, and 3.9 for the Air Force.
Mr. SKELTON. Letter grades. This is a deep, philosophic gulf between this panel and some of the schools. It seems to me that officers who compete for everything should not lose that competitive edge during the school year, but that doesn't seem to be the case in some instances. However, I have been told that some of the schools will academically categorize the students into one, two, three, four and five even though they don't give letter grades.
Did you find that to be the case?
Mr. JONES. That's correct. Some do categorize but they don't give the letter grade.
Mr. SKELTON. Could you explain that for the record, please? First, which ones give the letter grades in both the intermediate and senior schools?
Mr. JONES. OK. The Army senior school doesn't give grades.
Mr. SKELTON. Does not?
Mr. JONES. Right. Neither Air Force school gives grades.
Mr. SKELTON. Right. Neither Air Force school gives a letter grade.
Mr. JONES. That's right. They do not give letter grades.
Mr. SKELTON. Right. The other schools do give a letter type grade?
Mr. JONES. That's right.
Mr. SKELTON. Now, looking at the Army Senior War College and the two Air Force schools. Do they categorize their students in some sort of order ranking though they don't give them an A, B, C or D?
Mr. JONES. The Air Force intermediate school does evaluate students, but they don't give letter grades. I guess the question would come up, how do you do that? So I guess the answer is they are probably close to having a letter grade, but they don't really assign letter grades. They do evaluate.
Mr. SKELTON. How about the Air Force senior school?
Mr. JONES. The other two don't rank.
Mr. SKELTON. Pass/fail?
Mr. JONES. No.
Mr. SKELTON. Do they just give a pass/fail for the——
Mr. JONES. No, there is no pass/fail. The idea of the two schools is that——
Mr. SKELTON. Can you flunk out of the Army senior war college? Can you flunk out of the Air Force senior war college?
Mr. JONES. Yes, you can flunk out. We don't know of any cases, but I guess, theoretically, you could.
Let me explain again why they don't give letter grades at senior schools, the Army particularly. They consider that to get to the Army senior school, they go through a rigorous process of selecting the top officers for that school. So they feel they already have the top officers. To assign them letter grades and to rank them again is not needed. Plus they say they don't see a need for that because
most of the assignments are made before they complete the course, or they have their assignment before they enter the school. So the grade would really serve no purpose in terms of assignments or in terms of their next assignment, for example.

Mr. Machtley.

Mr. Machtley. Thank you.

In the area of career educators and civilian faculty members—and I would preface this by saying there’s a Naval War College in my district, so I have a particular interest, and I’m a naval person myself—where the Navy does not have a cadre of professional educated officers.

Do they have a system of ensuring that the officers who are assigned to the faculty have advanced graduate degrees and previous teaching experience? What is the selection criteria?

Mr. Jones. They do use selection criteria. They try to pick officers who do have advanced degrees.

I guess it’s key to look at the intermediate schools first. They don’t use a cadre of professionals, as the panel envisioned, in that area because the theory is, in the intermediate school, you’re concerned with operational art. The schools, in general, feel that operational art is best taught by the line officers who are the experts. They bring those officers in to teach the officers in that skill.

Where the civilian expert would come in would be in the senior schools, where they would tend to want more than operational experts to come in to teach. They do this, in part, through getting some retired generals as guest lecturers and so forth. But they don’t have a real cadre of educators in the intermediate school.

Mr. Machtley. Is there any criteria used to select who teaches other than—

Mr. Jones. There is criteria to select.

Mr. Bowers. Let me just take a crack at that.

One of the big things that the Navy War College has is the right to refuse a military instructor or civilian instructor. They lay out different types of criteria used in selection, such as the academic background, whether the person has published papers or research. They pretty much need to be a person that is almost a household word in the Navy. But the big advantage is that they are able to decide ultimately who is going to be on the faculty.

Mr. Machtley. Now, regarding civilians, I have been told that the pay scale for civilians in our service schools is about $10-12,000 less than they can get in civilian schools for the equivalent position.

Second, I have been told that our new ethics package precludes them from writing about anything which is the subject matter of their job, which means, if they’re academics, that would just about take in anything.

Have you seen any evidence that the salary limitations and the writing prohibition are going to have an impact on our ability to get good quality, first-rate civilians into our senior service schools?

Mr. Jones. Yes, we have. Let me point out one thing, that they do have the authority to use title 10, where they can almost go out to the private sector to hire professors just like colleges and universities do. They use this in the senior schools where they need the kind of experts to teach military strategy. They also use, in the
Army intermediate school, title 5, which is really the Government-
excepted service plan. This is used mainly to hire the intermediate
school professor. They don't see a need for title 10 in the intermedia-
te school because they are mostly looking for experts in operation-
al art.

But getting back to your question, they had seen some problems
with hiring of civilians because of the pay scale. But title 10 helps
them because they can go to the private sector and offer competi-
tive salaries to facilitate hiring civilian faculty.

Mr. Machtley. The second part of that question dealt with the
ability to publish.

Mr. Jones. The Ethics Reform Act gives them some problem in
that area, because as you know, to be an expert in the field, there
is a requirement of publishing and so forth. But with the Ethics
Reform Act, they are prohibited from getting paid for those kinds
of writings, speeches and so forth. So that is sort of a hindrance
to getting a civilian on the faculty of the service schools.

Mr. Machtley. Were you able to draw any conclusions, based
upon the civilian faculty that you saw, and were you able to relate
that to what you might have from other experiences known as
available. Were these factors of economic considerations prohib-
iting our schools from getting the very best civilian strategic think-
ers or educators that this country has to offer?

Mr. Jones. I don't know if we did that level of work to make a
comparison between some of the private schools and what they
offer. I think that the service schools are satisfied with the people
they get to teach at the schools. As I say, I think they have some
relief under title 10 to get the kind of instructor they need. I think
most of the schools are using that except the Army intermediate
school. This school hasn't used that yet. The other schools do have
some relief through title 10, which can help them hire the type of
civilian needed.

Mr. Machtley. Then let's proceed to the Army and Air Force
which does have the academic cadre officers. Would those officers
who are selected for their service school be given tenure normally
at their senior service schools after a certain period as they would
in any other civilian institution, or do their orders rotate so that
they might go to West Point or the Air Force Academy or some
other service school? How does that work? Did you check on that,
the tenure, how many are staying at one school?

Mr. Jones. The Army and Air Force have some tenured faculty.
They usually tenure at about the colonel level. What we found is
that most of these officers who were tenured at the colonel level
are pretty much staying there until retirement, which is not to say
they have an education track. But some officers do, at the Army
and Air Force schools, elect to stay on and achieve tenure at the
schools through retirement. So in that sense, they do have tenure.

Mr. Machtley. Finally, as I read the beginning of your report,
you said the schools have responded very favorably to the panel's
recommendation. Each school has taken some form of positive
action on at least 90 percent of the recommendations.

Does that mean you would give the schools a 90 percent, or does
that mean that the 10 percent which they haven't done are the big
issues that they choose not to do and that the total compliance
would be less than a minus grade?

Mr. Jones. Your question is one of whether we weigh the recom-
mendations. Our 90 percent does not weigh the recommendations. But as you can see from the statement, some of the recommendations that they're having concerns with are some of your key rec-
ommendations. I guess, if I were to weigh all the recommendations equally, I would say 90 percent. If I were to weigh them according to the panel's designation of key recommendations, that grade
might be lower.

Mr. Skelton. I should have asked you a moment ago, Mr. Jones, about the student body mix at the various institutions. Could you
run over that for me, please? I was going to ask you about title 10,
but I think the gentleman has touched on that. Tell us about the
student body mix, please.

Mr. Jones. OK. Well, the student body mix, it seems that the
Navy, if you—again, you have to look at just having comparable
curriculum, the Navy and Marine Corps, in the intermediate
school, seem to be meeting the panel's recommended mix. At the
senior school, again, the Navy seems to be meeting it. The Army
and the Air Force are close; they're close to the MEPD goal again,
the difference being the requirement of the panel—

Mr. Skelton. The difference being 5 percent.

Mr. Jones. That's right.

Mr. Skelton. They cut our recommendations in half.

Mr. Jones. Again, without making a recommendation, I think
there is some concern out there about what do you follow, the
panel recommendation or the Military Education Policy Document.

Mr. Skelton. In many respects, I am really proud of what
they've done. In your testimony you say they've complied 90 per-
cent. All of this is without legislation. The only legislation we had
to enact was the creation and the format of the school down at
Norfolk and the title 10, which gave the various schools authority
to pay civilian instructors. That is not much in the way of legisla-
tion. To their credit, they have complied with 90 percent without
the legislative hammer.

But it does seem that we might be getting down to the crunch. If
they insist on going off in that direction and we say the standards
should be higher, we might have to look at legislation for this.
That, of course, is our job, and we will address that undoubtedly
this year.

Mr. Jones. Well, you might consider a couple of interim sugges-
tions in the mean time. There is a Military Education Coordina-
Conference that looks at issues such as the panel recommenda-
tions. They might want to look at whether the schools can address
the student body mix.

This really involves all seven schools. For example, if the Army
needs to get students from the Navy and the Air Force, they in
turn will also be looking for those schools to reciprocate because
they're going to be losing some slots. So the conference might see
to it that these schools are set up to address this by working out
some kind of arrangements on how they will provide students and
the school receiving the student will reciprocate so that they can
resolve that issue.
Also you might want to look at whether the Joint Chiefs of Staff might not want to intervene here and say—because it involves changes by all seven schools, there has to be some higher level that will sort of mediate this change. It involves one school giving up—

Mr. Skelton. Try Congress.

Mr. Jones. Well, as a last resort, I guess Congress could legislate.

Mr. Skelton. The Navy, rightfully so, explained that they were short of officers, and we have increased their officer corps so that they would have more officers to send to school. That is reflected in what you find, is that not correct?

Mr. Jones. That's right.

Mr. Skelton. So they are doing a better job—

Mr. Jones. That's correct.

Mr. Skelton. —than in Navy past.

Mr. Jones. I would say that's true.

Mr. Barrett.

Mr. Barrett. Mr. Jones, I would just say that, from a staff point of view, I really appreciate the GAO's work. I think the work you're doing is exactly what the panel asked you to do and it gives us a tremendous amount of information and will give the members a lot of information on how to act from here on out. They will have a good idea on what their panel report said and then how it's being carried out. I want to congratulate you from a staff point of view.

Mr. Jones. Thank you.

Mr. Barrett. You talked about the phase I joint education, and you indicated that the services don't want to send an unintended, negative message to those officers not selected. What kind of message do you think officers receive when they don't get selected for the Army Command and General Staff School to go in-residence?

Mr. Jones. In-residence?

Mr. Barrett. Right.

Mr. Jones. I think they see in-residence, if the requirement is to have in-residence phase I as a prerequisite for phase II, and jointness, again, joint service as a prerequisite to, say, general/flag officer rank, I think the officer that doesn't attend, that doesn't get selected for in-residence, may feel that the officers who do get picked for in-residence might have a leg up, so to speak, or they are preselected for better assignments and maybe higher rank.

Mr. Barrett. That's sort of a negative message—

Mr. Jones. It's sort of a negative message.

Mr. Barrett. That they've already received.

Mr. Jones. That's right.

Mr. Barrett. Are people who do not go to the intermediate schools, in the Army and the Air Force particularly, less likely to be promoted than people who do go to those schools?

Mr. Jones. I don't know if we looked at that in detail. We really haven't examined that. But there are other lines of promotion other than joint. So I don't know if we looked at that question, to be quite frank.

Mr. Barrett. I would like to have you include that in your inquiry because of the claims of negative messages you have included. I think you really need to get to the bottom of these negative messages.
Is it not true that if you take the services way of doing this, there are some officers who will be going to the intermediate joint school, the Armed Forces Staff School, who would not meet the qualifications to go to the Army Command and Staff for the other two intermediate schools because they weren’t selected for them. In other words, they enter by correspondence.

Mr. Jones. Right. That’s true.

Mr. Barrett. So they weren’t selected for the service intermediate school. The joint intermediate school will be lesser qualified than the student body going to the service intermediate school.

Mr. Jones. I don’t think that’s the case, if I understand your question. Is it they would be—

Mr. Barrett. How are officers chosen to go to the service intermediate school?

Mr. Jones. OK. I don’t know if we looked at—

Mr. Bowers. For the intermediate school—let’s take the Army—the top 50 percent of eligible majors, I believe, are from that group selected, 1,280 that are in the program.

Mr. Barrett. The top—

Mr. Bowers. The top 50 percent of eligible Army officers.

Mr. Barrett. OK. But your testimony indicates that not just that top 50 percent would be from the selection pool for the Armed Forces Staff College, but from that group, plus officers who were not selected for the Army intermediate school, right?

Mr. Bowers. Right. The big difference, we need to point out, is that the services have basically told us—and we have verified this—the big difference is the interaction between the students and students, and students and faculty. But the objectives, the teaching objectives in the joint professional military education curriculum, are instilled in both correspondence and non-resident—

Mr. Barrett. Mr. Bowers, you’re missing the point. I’m not asking about the school experience itself. I’m asking about the selection of officers. The selection of officers for the Army command and staff, for example. You just said it is in the top half of Army officers. But the Army and the services are arguing that the selection for the Armed Forces Staff College could not just be in the top half of O-4s but also people who were in the bottom half who took the Army course by correspondence. The qualifications of officers going to the Armed Forces Staff College, the student body as a whole, would be lesser qualified, lesser standards, lesser talent, however you want to characterize it, than the officer student body going to the service intermediate schools, if I understand your testimony.

Mr. Jones. I don’t know if we looked at that in detail in terms of the officers who go to these schools who didn’t go through in-residence. We probably need to do a little more work in that area in terms of looking at how they get to the Armed Forces Staff College without being selected for in-residence education.

Mr. Skelton. Let me rephrase it, if I may.

How many did you say you had, Mr. Bowers, 1,200?

Mr. Bowers. It’s 1,280, for example, in the Army.

Mr. Skelton. All right. So if 1,283 go to Fort Leavenworth, right—

Mr. Bowers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Skelton. The 1,284th major didn't make the cut, right?

Mr. Bowers. Yes.

Mr. Skelton. Objectively, he is a lesser major in his OERs and in his record than the fellow that did make the cut. But he does this Fort Leavenworth intermediate school by correspondence; a hard-working guy. He gets credit by correspondence. He says I want to go to phase II down at Norfolk and he applies and they accept him. So you are taking this major who didn't make the cut, along with others from other services who didn't make the cut, along with others who did make the cut. So Mr. Barrett is saying the qualifications of the overall student body down at Norfolk in the Armed Services Staff College might be slightly lower; is that correct?

Mr. Jones. I see what you're saying.

Well, I guess you could make that argument. The point is that what he has missed in the correspondence school is, as Frank was trying to explain, the faculty/student interaction, he has missed the student-to-student interaction. So to that extent, if the joint school is where you get this kind of interaction, if that is a measure of the qualifications of the student, I guess it's fair to conclude that yes, he does have sort of two strikes against him. He doesn't have the student/faculty interactions and he doesn't have the student-to-student interactions. So in those instances of jointness, where he can get joint experience, he does miss those two elements.

I think the schools have recognized that correspondence courses and non-resident courses do not offer these two items, or they offer them to a lesser extent, I should say.

Mr. Skelton. As I understand it, at least in one service—and maybe all the services—you can tell whether they went in-residence or by correspondence by looking at an officer's efficiency report. Do you know whether that's true or not?

Mr. Jones. I don't know about that.

Mr. Bowers. If you look at an officer's efficiency report, the amount of education they had received and where they received that education from would be noted.

Mr. Skelton. So you could tell if he did it by correspondence or otherwise?

Mr. Jones. But it's really not that easy to tell, because right now—except for a few—all the officers who have gone to phase II have gone through in-residence.

Mr. Skelton. OK.

Mr. Jones. So there is not a lot of—

Mr. Skelton. Maybe the question is moot, then, as of this moment.

Mr. Jones. Right.

Mr. Barrett. I think Mr. Bowers was making a very good point, which you had already made very well, about the mix. The fact is that correspondence courses just do not have the same quality as in-residence courses, and never can.

Mr. Jones. They're not full time.

Mr. Barrett. That's right.

Mr. Jones. The students attending an in-residence program are full time. I guess there is some benefit to going full time, where all your concentration is on the course curriculum—

Mr. Barrett. You do have the mix.
Mr. Jones. You have the mix. Of course, with correspondence it goes without saying that you don't have it full time, and you don't have the interaction of the students and the faculty.

Mr. Barrett. Mr. Jones, you mentioned in your testimony that the Navy's goal is to change the intermediate course so that it focuses on operational art and leaves the senior course focusing on national strategy. But your testimony says that school officials said that the similarity in those two courses is intentional, since naval officers do not have to attend both schools. So the testimony doesn't mention this change in goal.

Mr. Jones. That's right.

Mr. Barrett. Could you expand on that, then?

Mr. Jones. What they are doing right now is—the distinction they have right now is through the case studies, readings, and war games. Some of the case studies for the intermediate school and the senior school at the Naval War College are different right now—to that extent they're different now. As far as what they're planning for the future, they tell us that they plan to make the schools distinct and with a distinct curriculum, but they haven't gotten there yet. That's what they tell us.

Mr. Barrett. Do they give you a timeframe, a horizon?

Mr. Jones. No, no timeframe.

Mr. Barrett. Or milestones or goals that we could—

Mr. Jones. No. Just that they're working on it.

Mr. Barrett. You talked a bit about title 10 hiring authority with Mr. Machtley. Why isn't the Army using this new title 10 authority at the intermediate and the senior?

Mr. Jones. Well, the Army is not using title 10 at the intermediate school.

Mr. Barrett. What about at the senior school?

Mr. Bowers. The senior school is using it.

Mr. Jones. They are using it—

Mr. Barrett. Could you explain to what degree and why is it not being used for intermediate?

Mr. Jones. The reason they don't use it for intermediate school—again, the intermediate school is focused on operational art. Those instructors, they think, are best represented by the line officers, or the experts in operations. So they rely more on the military to provide those instructors.

They are using title 10 in the senior school because the senior school is more focused on national military strategy, where it tends to lend itself more to the expert thinking in the strategy and policy area. So they see it more applicable to recruiting civilians as senior school instructors based on its curriculum focus on military strategy than applicable to intermediate school where the focus is on operational art.

Mr. Barrett. But can you tell us a little bit more about the senior schools? How much are they using the title 10 authority at the senior school? How many faculty members have they hired under title 10?

Mr. Jones. I don't know if we have those numbers, but I can definitely provide that for you. We don't have those handy.

Mr. Barrett. All right.

Mr. Bowers. I'm sorry, Mr. Barrett. They plan to hire five.
Mr. Barrett. They plan to hire five—So they haven't hired any yet?
Mr. Bowers. They have some civilian educators already on board.
Mr. Barrett. I know that. They had that before the panel report.
Mr. Bowers. Right.
Mr. Barrett. But they don't have any under title 10 yet, but they plan to hire five?
Mr. Bowers. Yes.
Mr. Barrett. When? This year or——
Mr. Bowers. It will probably be later on this fiscal year.
Mr. Barrett. Mr. Chairman, I just have one last comment. Going back about 20 years, there was a blue ribbon report in the Department of Defense chartered by the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Clements. When it was all done, there was a recommendation to completely change DOD acquisition and to change the Joint Chiefs of Staff with things that you finally accomplished in the 1980s. It was a massive blue ribbon report. All of these recommendations were taken under consideration and then DOD, a couple of years later, did a report on the report and indicated that it accomplished 85 percent of the recommendations. Yet nothing was really done.

When I hear the 90 percent, I'm sure that some positive things have been done. But I think you're right. You need to weight these recommendations, and when they're weighted, it doesn't come up that much.

Mr. Machty. Mr. Chairman, I had just one additional general question.

While you were trying to balance the compliance with the mandates as have been set out in the panel's report, did you, as observers, come to some conclusion that here is an area that we ought to focus on, in addition to what we've already stated, to enhance and improve the quality of education and the goals of the panel?

Mr. Jones. As I say, I think the key areas I have outlined are the areas of distinct curricula, student evaluation, and so forth. There might be some other area that might require or might warrant a revisit by the panel. That might be in the area, again, concerning the difference between the panel goals and how they mesh with the MEPD goals.

Also, there might be some definitional questions, too, in terms of what's active and passive learning, that the panel might want to look at. We have some concern, too, about how the schools define faculty. In some cases they use adjunct faculty or temporary faculty in their count and some schools don't. So those are the kinds of things that we're trying to crystallize and bring to closure in our final reports to you. Those will be highlighted.

Mr. Barrett. In your reports would you highlight additional recommendations outside of the text so that we could turn to one page, maybe the——

Mr. Jones. Yes, we will.
Mr. Barrett. Reference back to the——
Mr. Jones. Yes, that we'll do.
Mr. Barrett. Thank you.
Mr. Skelton. If you do that particularly on the items you just mentioned, I think that would be very helpful.
Mr. Jones. Yes.

What we plan to do, let me reiterate, we plan to issue separate reports on each of the service schools, and there will be other reports that will tie it all together with the recommendations and concerns.

Mr. Skelton. That would be very good, and we look forward to that.

Do you have any time reference as to when we could expect those reports?

Mr. Jones. Well, the reports on individual services are going to be coming out staggered. We hope to have one on the Marine Corps to you by a couple of weeks, and then the others would be coming out right afterwards.

Mr. Skelton. Fine.

Then, of course, the catch all would be the final—

Mr. Jones. It would be last, yes.

Mr. Machtle. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield, please.

Mr. Skelton. Yes.

Mr. Machtle. In your reports, could you give us some collation of all the schools on one document so that we could compare without having to look at four simple graphs?

Mr. Jones. I think we can do that. We have been playing with that so far now and I think we're going to get it fine-tuned. There will be a lot of data on one sheet, but I think we can do that.

Mr. Machtle. That would be helpful.

Mr. Bowers. The summary reports will give you a summary which will preclude you from having to look at each individual report on each service.

Mr. Skelton. I know that there are others in the room who have worked long and hard on this. I was out in Fort Leavenworth, KS, not too long ago and they said you had just left. So I know you're doing your job.

From what I see and from your testimony and your analysis, Mr. Jones, this is as good a job as I have seen GAO do. I congratulate you and congratulate Mr. Breen, Mr. Bowers, and the other ladies and gentlemen who have been part of this. If we were to give you a grade—it's an interim one, you understand, until we get the reports—you would have to get an "A."

Mr. Jones. Thank you.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much. The hearing is concluded. [Whereupon, at 10:03 a.m., the panel recessed.]
IMPLEMENTATION OF PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 17, 1991.

The panel met, pursuant to notice, at 9:10 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL

Mr. Skelton. Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you this morning. We will open our hearing. The traffic in Washington has slowed down everybody, both at the witness table and up here at the bench. This is the Military Education Panel. This is a second in a series of hearings planned to follow up on the implementation of the panel's recommendations for improving joint professional military education.

Today, we will hear from the commandants of the Army and Naval War and Staff Colleges, and next week we will hear from the commandants from the Air War and Staff Colleges and the Marine Staff College.

The panel is pleased by many of the actions taken to date by the schools in response to our report. However, we are convinced that there are still some areas that need to be addressed in order to ensure that our professional military education system remains the best. The force drawdowns that we are facing make it doubly important that our professional military schools provide the joint commanders and planners that our country will need in the future.

This morning, the panel will hear testimony from Maj. Gen. Paul Cerjan, Commandant of the Army War College; Rear Adm. Joe Strasser, President of the Naval War College; and new, brand new, Maj. Gen. John Miller, Deputy Commandant of the Army Command and General Staff College. Gentlemen, we thank you for coming, Mr. Machtley.

Mr. Machtley. I look forward to hearing the testimony. In view of the time, I will welcome the panelists and look forward to seeing how we are moving forward.

Mr. Skelton. We will start from our left to right. Admiral Strasser, we welcome your testimony, sir.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOSEPH C. STRASSER, USN, PRESIDENT, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

Admiral Strasser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Members of the panel, it is a pleasure to be here to represent the Naval War College today. You have a copy of my written testimony so with your permission, I will just briefly summarize my remarks.

The hearing that your panel conducted several years ago resulted in a number of recommendations with the goal of improving professional military education in general, and joint professional military education at our service colleges in particular.

We feel that the Naval War College currently has a high quality educational program that incorporates either wholly, or in part, your panel's recommendations. The Chairman's Military Education Policy Document provides guidance that is achievable into today's climate of reduced dollars, people and resources, and supports the panel's overall goals. I am confident the college and the Navy will continue to work on these issues. We are committed to quality education.

Sir, the General Accounting Office spent almost 6 months at Newport looking into our compliance with 38 selected panel recommendations. According to the GAO report, the Naval War College had totally satisfied 30 recommendations, was in partial compliance with 7, and had not progressed with 1. Of the eight recommendations that had not been totally satisfied, four deal with faculty makeup and faculty degree requirements. The others treat primarily differentiation between, and the focus of, our naval warfare and command and staff courses.

By way of summary, the mix of our military faculty members from sister services meets the goals set by both the MEPD and panel. Likewise, the mix of non-host students satisfies the goals of the MEPD and the panel with one exception, the number of Air Force students in the College of Naval Warfare, and we are hopeful that we will reach that guideline by the beginning of the next academic year.

Our student/faculty ratio for each college is less than 2.5 to 1, well within MEPD and panel goals. We believe that the size of our seminars, which range from 10 to 16 students, provides yet another indication that we have sufficient teaching faculty to meet both the MEPD and panel guidelines.

Despite our best efforts, we have not been successful in attracting retired flag and general officers to full-time teaching positions because of the dual compensation laws. I am told that our sister colleges have experienced similar difficulties. We do, however, make good use of both active and retired three- and four-star officers as guest lecturers. The panel recommended that faculty members have advanced degrees, preferably a Ph.D. We are blessed with an impressive civilian faculty, with 24 of 30 having doctorate degrees or their equivalent. With regard to the military faculty, 49 of 57 have advanced degrees and are service college alumni.

To clarify a possible misunderstanding, we do not retain graduates of the intermediate course on the faculty. However, we do carefully select a limited number of senior course graduates to join our faculty. Over the last 3 years, we have invited a total of 16 offi-
cers to remain in teaching assignments and they have made valuable contributions to our educational excellence. While the Navy does not have a cadre of career educators, we do have on our faculty an Army and an Air Force officer who are educators in their services.

As recommended by this panel, we have made substantial efforts to increase the differentiation between the intermediate and senior courses, including varying the length of the Operations and Strategy and Policy courses for senior and intermediate students. Naval warfare students receive 2 additional weeks of strategy, while command and staff students experience a similar increase in operational art. We disagree with the General Accounting Office testimony, which stated that the focus at both schools is on national military strategy. The College of Naval Warfare spends about 40 percent of its time on national military strategy. By the same token, the Naval Command and Staff students spend an equally large portion of their time on operational art.

We have discussed in the past the Navy's operational deployment requirements and their impact on an officer's opportunity to attend a service college twice. Likewise, the relatively small size of our officer corps in comparison to our sister services militates against the Navy being able to send officers to resident service college more than once.

With the predicted downsizing of our officer end strength, I do not see this changing in the future. There are certain enduring principles and subject matter that we feel every officer attending PME must be exposed to, and we want that to occur regardless of which course, at the Naval War College, he or she attends.

Both our intermediate and senior courses have been certified as meeting all phase I PME learning objectives set out in the MEPD. I have verified with the leadership of the Armed Forces Staff College that our intermediate school graduates are as well prepared for phase II as are those from any other command and staff college.

We feel that the degree of differentiation between our courses that we currently have is about right. However, we will continue to look for areas where greater distinction might be prudent. We will, of course, also continue to expend great energy on curriculum development to make sure our material is current and relevant.

Mr. Chairman, we at the Naval War College agree completely with the sentiments that you have expressed regarding the contributions of all of our war colleges to the brilliant success of Operation Desert Storm. This was in many respects a course examination, and I would submit that all of our services passed with flying colors. It is evident to me that a tremendous amount of quality education is being provided by all of our PME institutions. That concludes my summary remarks, Mr. Chairman, I will be pleased to answer your questions.
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JOSEPH C. STRASSER

Good morning Mr. Chairman, members of the Panel, ladies and gentlemen. It is a pleasure to be here today to update you on the progress the Naval War College has made since your last visit in 1988.

The report of the hearings held by your Panel in 1987-1988 made some 94 recommendations pertaining to the joint and service war colleges and schools to which our uniformed officers and selected civilian federal employees are sent for professional military education. Of those 94 items, 38 were examined in detail by the General Accounting Office (GAO) during its recent review of action taken by the Naval War College to comply with the Panel's recommendations.

Prior to commenting specifically on our compliance with those recommendations, I would like to assure you that we have maintained and where necessary reinforced our efforts to provide our students the best education possible. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, your Panel's visit and a continuing emphasis on the part of the Navy leadership, the Naval War College has been actively involved in maintaining educational excellence, improving our ability to teach officers to think strategically, and increasing our students' understanding of joint matters and joint perspectives. Your Panel report, Navy study efforts addressing the report recommendations, the codification of the specific joint learning objectives followed by certification of the schools as meeting the Professional Joint Education (PJE) phase I requirements, and finally, the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD) issued by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff are but a few of the many steps which have been taken to get us where we are today. There has been an active and positive dialogue involving all of the colleges as well as the joint and service staffs. I believe, as a result of the interest you and others have shown in this area, we
have accomplished quite a bit in the past three years.

The MEPD, signed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff last June provides guidelines and requirements for the Service and Joint colleges. It sets standards in many of the areas the Panel examined, particularly with regard to faculty and student mix. The Naval War College exceeds the faculty mix established by the MEPD. Since our faculty teaches both intermediate and senior students, I will compare us only with the more stringent criteria, that is the faculty mix for senior service colleges. The MEPD states that each sister service (that is non-host) should comprise at least 10% of the faculty. We have exceeded this target. Our non-Navy faculty makeup is: 9 Army members (14%); 7 Air Force (13%); 7 Marine Corps (13%); 1 Royal Navy officer and 1 Coast Guard officer; the remaining 32 faculty members (56%), are Navy. This faculty mix also meets the Panel’s recommended goals for the early 1990’s timeframe.

The MEPD guidelines for student mix have also been met by the Naval War College, with one exception. These call for at least one officer from each of the two non-host military departments in every seminar. The College of Naval Command and Staff adheres to this standard completely. There are 31 Army officers and 30 Air Force officers in this class. Since the maximum number of seminars we have is 20 (Strategy and Policy), there are at least one and frequently two officers from each of the other services in each of the seminars. We also have 23 Marine Corps officers, 5 Coast Guard officers, 5 civilians and 102 Navy officers in this class. We were able to work a student personnel swap with the Air Force last year, trading 15 officers between our two schools, thus enabling us to meet both MEPD and Skelton Panel student mix requirements for

In the College of Naval Warfare we are in almost as good shape. We presently have 35 Army students, 27 Marines, 15 Air Force, 2 Coast Guard, 37 international officers and 101 Navy officers. The growth in student loading last year, however, required us to increase the numbers of students per seminar as well as the number of seminars. With 20 seminars in Strategy and Policy, we need 5 additional Air Force officers to meet the one per seminar requirement. I have discussed this issue with General Link at the Air War College and our respective personnel commands in Washington are addressing this issue. We hope to have it solved in this coming academic year. We have asked for an assignment of six additional Air Force students in AY 91-92, with still more in the following years. We understand that these are difficult requests for the Air Force because it, like the services, is facing major cuts in officer personnel. With this exception, the Naval War College meets all MIPD and Panel student mix guidelines for this time period.

In the area of faculty-student ratios, we are doing well. Including the international students, our ratio is about 1 to 2.5 in the College of Naval Warfare, and about 1 to 2.1 for the intermediate students. This ratio allows us to have seminars which range in size from 10-15 students and, as was noted in the Panel's report, each of our Strategy seminars has both a civilian and a military faculty member present. Despite the fact the faculty teaches both the senior and the intermediate courses, they do not do so simultaneously. Since each faculty member teaches during only two of the three trimesters, there is also time between trimesters for the faculty to conduct research and curriculum development; however, with the student increases and the dramatic changes in the
world environment, they are finding their workload quite heavy. Our support from the Chief of Naval Operations in this area has been superb. In light of the student increases we have experienced in the last 15 months, the CNO has provided the resources to hire three more civilian faculty members. We are currently recruiting to fill those positions.

Before moving on to the GAO report, let me sum up our view of the Chairman's MEPD. We find the requirements for faculty mix, student mix and faculty-student ratios give us ample talent to develop and deliver a joint curriculum, while permitting balanced discussions among the students in the seminars. Also, the mandated mix of students and faculty and faculty-student ratios are achievable in today's environment of reduced budgets, reduced manpower and constrained resources. This is one of the issues we as College Presidents/Commandants discussed at our recent Military Education Coordinating Conference.

As you know, the GAO spent almost six months at Newport looking into our compliance with the 38 selected recommendations. According to its report, the Naval War College had totally satisfied 30, was in partial compliance with 7, and had not progressed with 1. We at the Naval War College are generally satisfied with the overall results of the GAO report. Many of the recommendations which the report indicates we have not adopted cannot in fact be implemented by unilateral Naval War College actions.

Of the 8 recommendations which have not been totally satisfied, 4 deal with faculty makeup and faculty degree requirements. In its report, this Panel on Military Education specifically commented at least 5 times on the prestigious

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and high quality civilian and military faculty at the Naval War College. I totally agree with your evaluation; the faculty is the principal pillar on which the excellence of this College rests. One of the Panel’s recommendations deals with the desirability of having retired senior flag and general officers as faculty members. As you know, the dual compensation law precludes retired three and four star officers from joining the faculty without accepting reductions in their retirement pay. As a result, we have not been successful in attracting such officers to Newport on a permanent basis; however, we do have both active and retired three and four star officers, including Service Chiefs and Unified Commanders, frequently lecture at the College throughout the year.

The Panel has also suggested that the Services develop a cadre of career educators. The Navy does not have career educators as do the Air Force and Army, but we do have faculty members from the Army and Air Force career education cadre currently on our faculty. We believe that our superb civilian faculty, several of whom are retired Captains/Colonels, provide the same continuity and overall excellence that a cadre of career military educators would contribute.

The Panel recommended that faculty should hold an advanced degree, preferably a Ph.D. In principle we support this view. Our civilian faculty have impressive academic credentials; 24 of 30 have Ph.Ds and 2 are working on their doctorates at this time. Military faculty members, particularly Naval officers, have difficulty meeting the advanced degree requirement due to their professional career paths. Because of the nature of the operations curriculum, having officers who are skilled and current in their warfare specialties is absolutely imperative. Finding someone who is operationally skilled and has a
good educator is a difficult task, but one at which we have had considerable success. This year, 49 of 57 military faculty members have at least a masters degree and all of our military faculty teaching outside the Operations Department have advanced degrees.

The final faculty recommendation with which we do not fully comply deals with programs to qualify military faculty members. All provisions of this recommendation have been satisfied with the single exception of our retaining a limited number of senior officers following graduation for service on the faculty. In all cases those remaining are identified by the faculty as having unique qualifications. They are interviewed by the department chairman, and if found to be fully qualified, their nominations are forwarded to me for approval. Those so selected remain for an additional two to three years and are among our finest military faculty members.

The remainder of the recommendations that are only partially implemented have to do with the distinctness between the intermediate and senior service Colleges’ curricula, the amount of time spent on operational art and/or national military strategy, and the requirement for in-residence service education prior to attendance at Armed Forces Staff College. These issues are discussed in detail below.

As you recommended in your 1989 Panel report, we have made substantial efforts to increase the differentiation between the intermediate and senior courses at the Naval War College. By way of background, for the intermediate students the Joint Maritime Operations course is now 14 weeks long, while their Strategy and Policy course is 12 weeks long. The reverse is true for the
seniors in the College of Naval Warfare: they have 14 weeks of Strategy and Policy and 12 weeks of Joint Operations. In addition to the different lengths of the courses, we have recently changed large portions of the curricula in the Operations courses along the lines you suggested.

For example, four weeks of the Joint Operations course for both Colleges is devoted to student war games wherein course learnings are applied during a practical exercise. During Caribbean area games with similar scenarios, the intermediate students take on the role of a Joint Task Force Commander and his staff with the responsibility for the exercise of operational art within the theater, while the senior students assume the position of the Unified Commander and staff, responsible for the distribution of forces within the entire command. The Unified Commander also becomes heavily involved in Political Military Affairs and the deterrence of other nations from becoming involved in the crisis. The second war game employs entirely different scenarios with the Command and Staff students operating as a JTF Commander during a Northern European crisis, and the Naval Warfare class dealing with a theater problem in the Western Pacific.

We disagree with the General Accounting Office testimony before this Panel which stated that the "focus at both schools is on national military strategy." The seniors spend a large portion of their time (40%) on national military strategy. The students in the College of Naval Command and Staff, on the other hand, spend an equally large percentage of their time on operational art. Our two Operations courses do have different foci and that will continue. Although not to the same degree, greater differentiation has also been accomplished in the Strategy and Policy curriculum by using greater numbers of
different case studies. The National Security Decision Making (NSDM) course, with its high current strategy and operational content, has also increased its differentiation between the intermediate and senior classes. The senior course emphasizes planning specific forces from a strategic or top-down point of view while the intermediate course stresses planning joint/combined forces with application at the component level. Force planning for the seniors is 62 sessions in length as compared to 31 seminars for the intermediate course. In other parts of the NSDM curriculum, distinct cases and divergent approaches to the material are used whenever appropriate.

Mr. Chairman, the Navy currently has an officer to enlisted ratio that permits very few naval officers to attend a war college twice. While I look forward to the day when the Navy can provide resident PME to every officer at least once and preferably twice, I do not anticipate this happening in the foreseeable future, particularly as we draw down in size. We have recommended to the CNO that those few Navy officers afforded an opportunity to attend a PME school a second time, do so once in Newport and once at another location. This will broaden the experience of those officers. None of the services has enough space to educate all its officers in residence. We all rely on nonresident seminars and correspondence programs for a significant percentage of our officers who receive service college education. In the case of the Navy, I do not see our operational deployment tempo changing much in the future. Our officers will still face repeated sea tours and extended deployments worldwide. Accepting that very few naval officers will attend a war college twice, I think the degree of differentiation between the intermediate and senior curricula that we currently have is about right. There are certain enduring principles and subject matter that we feel every officer attending PME must be exposed to and
we want that to occur regardless of which college he or she attends. We will, of course, continue to look for logical places to implement differentiation and, as always, expend great effort and energy on our curriculum development programs to make sure our material is current and rigorous. For example, we are already developing case studies and readings that build upon Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

The Panel's report expressed some concern that because of the similarities between the curriculum at our two colleges and the perceived lack of emphasis on operational art at the Intermediate course, students were not receiving the same type of information as their counterparts at the other Service Staff colleges. In talking with General Kwiatkowski at the Armed Forces Staff College, he confirmed that in the entrance examination administered to all Phase II JPE students, he could identify no distinction between Naval War College graduates and the alumni of any of the other Service Colleges. This leads me to conclude that we cover every bit as well as the other schools the information required to be mastered during Phase I.

The recommendation that in-residence service education be a prerequisite to attendance at Armed Forces Staff College is not within my ability to implement. I can state that fleet operating tempo makes this difficult for the Navy to comply with and some waivers have been, and will continue to be, required for our critical occupation specialists.

In early March, the Naval War College received word from the New England Association of Schools and Colleges that we have been initially accredited by that organization for five years. We will award our first master's degrees.
in June of this year to those students who achieve graduate level work in all core courses. This has been a long and difficult process, but one which was worth every ounce of effort, because it not only rewards the educational effort of our students, but it also recognizes the contribution of our fine faculty. I think it noteworthy that this accreditation was gained without any necessity or suggestion of modifying our curriculum or methodology. We very much appreciate the support of this Panel in our authorization and accreditation efforts.

I know that in the past, there has been some concern with respect to the quality of our students, particularly those attending the Command and Staff College. In 1989 the Chief of Naval Operations reissued his service college education policy statement which, among other things, stressed the value of service college education and emphasized the fact that the Naval War College plays the primary role in the development of our future leaders. My predecessor testified in 1988 that graduates of both the intermediate and senior course were promoted at a rate higher than the overall Navy average. This is still true and indicates that we are getting the right officers and providing those with a quality education. I have personally reviewed the orders of reporting and detaching students and find that they are coming from and going to challenging CO/XO/Department Head positions at sea, on battle group and squadron staffs, and tough joint and service staff billets. This further confirms that we are getting high quality inputs to our program.

As a separate issue, we are concerned about the recent Ethics legislation and its impact on our faculty and staff. We have already experienced some difficulty in hiring civilians who are astounded when we tell them they cannot
accept an honorarium to write an article or give a speech. We also are very concerned about our military faculty members, as well as students, who are no longer permitted to be paid by such prestigious publications as the Naval Institute PROCEEDINGS or the STRATEGIC REVIEW, the latter being edited by one of our own civilian faculty members. We strongly support any legislative proposals that will allow our faculty to accept an honorarium for the hours of tedious work that goes into the preparation of an article or speech.

In summing up, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I think we are doing well. Your Panel made a number of recommendations with the goal of improving professional military education in general as well as joint professional military education in particular. We have at the Naval War College a quality educational program with a high degree of jointness which incorporates either wholly or in part the great majority of your recommendations. The MEPD provides guidance that achieves the overall goals of your Panel and can be implemented in today's climate of reduced dollars, people and resources. I am confident the College and the Navy will continue to work on these issues; we are committed to quality education.

I appreciate the opportunity to address you today and I will be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, General Cerjan.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. PAUL G. CERJAN, COMMANDANT, U.S. ARMY COLLEGE

General Cerjan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the panel. Thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before the panel this morning. I look forward to this opportunity because it gives us a chance to interface directly with the panel on the progress that we think we have made over the last year.

I would request my statement be included for the record and I will make some amplifying remarks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Without objection, all three statements will be placed in the record as submitted.

General Cerjan. This has been an interesting year since our last testimony. In fact the interesting part of it has been that our curriculum has unfolded almost concurrently with the events in the Gulf. When our class entered last August, the invasion of Kuwait took place and during the ensuing months of September and October, we looked very, very deeply into strategy, strategic leadership and the strategy for the Gulf operation.

We spent the fall timeframe looking at the definition of military strategy, the translation of that into theater strategy and at campaigning which we feel is central to the curriculum that we present at the Army War College.

Interestingly enough, the campaigning sessions ended on the 15th of January and, of course, on the 16th the war kicked off. At that time, we moved into our advanced courses and we had an opportunity to take our students more deeply into other functional areas, such as intelligence, command and control and logistics and we used as much of the Gulf specifics as we could pull into the classroom to demonstrate the process in which we were involved.

We are about to head into the application phase, the last 7 weeks, in which we will look at scenarios in low-, mid- and high-intensity conflict and we have a unique opportunity to be able to start introducing into our curriculum the lessons learned from the Gulf War.

TRADOC is charged with the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). The Army has moved Maj. Gen. Tom Tait into a position for—

Mr. SKELTON. Tom who?

General Cerjan. Tom Tait, T-A-I-T, for a period of time to oversee the entire collection of lessons learned from the Gulf experience. The Army War College will participate in that particular exercise in terms of being the institution that will analyze the operational and strategic lessons learned.

In fact, we are about to kick that off this coming week when we will interview Lieutenant General Waller, the Deputy of CENTCOM and Major General Schwartz, who is the Deputy of the ARCENT. He, in fact, was totally involved in the coalition aspects of the Gulf War for the 8 months that he was over there.

We will interview these people from the lessons learned aspect and then we will put them in front of the students so the students can pick at them and they will also meet with the faculty. So we
think we have a unique opportunity in the next few months to bring in the senior leadership of the Gulf, not only of the Army, but other services as well and prepare ourselves to put those lessons learned into the curriculum as time goes on.

This has been a tough year from the standpoint that I had to sit on 200-plus students whose hearts were in the Gulf while their minds were in the seminar rooms. But we felt that it was very, very important to keep their focus, because if we did not, we would not give them the type of instruction that they were going to need 5 to 10 years from now.

We have made the subject of strategic leadership and strategic vision central to all discussion and debate in the seminar room. Our themes for next year are alliances, coalitions, and combined command and control, and we will bring the lessons from the Gulf into play in that particular arena. We will look at the New World order which is an elusive topic by any stretch of the imagination and then we will look at national military strategy in transition.

Of import, we are not revising the curriculum because of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We are augmenting the curriculum with the lessons learned out of that particular operation. We maintain our focus on the process and we are dedicated to ensuring that our strategic and operational success in the future will be the result of our instruction at the senior leadership development college in the Army. I would tell you that our class is an exceptional class. In fact, fully 35 percent of eligible Active Army students have already been selected for colonel command when they leave the Army War College.

So indeed we have the top of the line Army officer as we move into the future. The last 2 years of my tenure have been very, very exciting, from the take down of the Berlin Wall, to the completion of the Desert Storm, and it has provided us that opportunity to use world events as a laboratory to point up the process that we are trying to teach in the Army War College. Sir, that concludes my remarks and I am prepared to take your questions.
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE PANEL. THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO UPDATE YOU ON PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE.

I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN BY PROVIDING THE PANEL A FEW COMMENTS ON THE LATEST GAO REPORT. I WILL FOLLOW WITH A BRIEF UPDATE ON SOME OF THE INITIATIVES WE HAVE TAKEN SINCE MY TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS PANEL A YEAR AGO. THEN I WOULD BE PLEASED TO RESPOND TO YOUR QUESTIONS ON SENIOR OFFICER EDUCATION IN GENERAL, AND THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE IN PARTICULAR.

MR. CHAIRMAN, IN THE GAO’S TESTIMONY BEFORE THIS PANEL ON FEBRUARY 5, 1991, THEY CREDIT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE WITH IMPLEMENTING OR PARTIALLY IMPLEMENTING 90 PERCENT OF APPLICABLE PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS. I CONSIDER THIS AN ACCURATE ASSESSMENT OF THE NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WE HAVE ADOPTED. CONCERNING THAT TESTIMONY, HOWEVER, I WOULD OFFER FOR THE PANEL’S CONSIDERATION TWO POINTS OF CLARIFICATION.

FIRST, CONCERNING STUDENT AND FACULTY MIX; THESE ARE COMPLEX ISSUES REQUIRING EXTENSIVE COORDINATION AMONG THE SERVICE STAFFS. THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR MILITARY EDUCATION ON THE JOINT STAFF HAS MOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO HELP THE SCHOOLS MEET RESPECTIVE GOALS IN BOTH CATEGORIES. WE ARE PREPARED TO ADD 18 AIR FORCE STUDENTS AND 18 SEA SERVICE STUDENTS--OR ONE MORE OF EACH SERVICE PER SEMINAR. IN THE AREA OF FACULTY MIX, WE HAVE IDENTIFIED TEN ARMY TEACHING POSITIONS FOR CONVERSION TO COMPARABLY QUALIFIED
MARINE, NAVY OR AIR FORCE POSITIONS. THIS INFORMATION HAS BEEN
FORWARDED THROUGH THE ARMY STAFF TO THE JOINT STAFF FOR ACTION.
ADDITIONALLY, THIS ISSUE WAS A MAJOR AGENDA ITEM AT LAST WEEK'S
MILITARY EDUCATION COORDINATION CONFERENCE.

THE OTHER POINT CONCERNS CONVERSION OF OUR CIVILIAN FACULTY
POSITIONS TO TITLE 10. WE ARE INDEBTED TO THE PANEL FOR YOUR
STRONG SUPPORT OF THIS INITIATIVE. WE THINK THE TITLE 10 SYSTEM
IS A MUCH MORE RESPONSIVE SYSTEM WHICH WILL SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE
OUR ABILITY TO HIRE AND RETAIN TOP QUALITY CIVILIANS ON OUR
RESEARCH AND TEACHING FACULTY. WE ARE CURRENTLY CONVERTING 16
INCUMBENTS WHO HAD BEEN HIRED UNDER TITLE 5 AND ARE IN THE
PROCESS OF HIRING A NEW FACULTY MEMBER UNDER THE NEW AUTHORITY.
WE HAVE ALSO REQUESTED AUTHORITY TO CONVERT FOUR MILITARY
TEACHING POSITIONS TO CIVILIAN TEACHING POSITIONS. THIS
INITIATIVE WILL ACCOMPLISH OUR GOAL OF HAVING A CIVILIAN
PROFESSOR ON EACH OF OUR SEMINAR TEACHING TEAMS. AS YOU CAN SEE,
WE ARE DELIGHTED WITH THE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WE HAVE MADE IN
THIS AREA. THIS IS A DYNAMIC PROCESS WHICH WILL ONLY BE
CONSTRAINED BY AVAILABLE RESOURCES.

MR. CHAIRMAN, SINCE I TESTIFIED BEFORE THIS PANEL A YEAR
AGO, THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE HAS CONTINUED TO ENSURE THAT THE
QUALITY AND RIGOR OF THE ACADEMIC ENVIRONMENT ARE MAINTAINED AT A
HIGH LEVEL. GAINING KNOWLEDGE IS FUNDAMENTAL, BUT THE PRIMARY
AND ULTIMATE GOAL OF EDUCATION AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE IS TO
PRODUCE GRADUATES WHO CAN THINK STRATEGICALLY; UNDERSTAND THE
CONTEXT AND PROCESSES OF PLANNING, RESOURCING AND EXECUTING
NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY; AND WHOSE LEADERSHIP, JUDGMENT,
WISDOM AND ETHICS MAKE THEM AND THEIR ADVICE OF HIGH VALUE TO OUR
CIVILIAN LEADERS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WE AGREE WITH YOUR COMMENT DURING LAST YEAR'S
TESTIMONY THAT THE PROOF OF RIGOR AT A SCHOOL IS NOT HOW MANY
GRADUATES BECOME GENERALS, BUT WHETHER THEY MAKE THE RIGHT
DECISIONS WHEN THE TIME COMES. NOWHERE WAS THIS MORE APTLY
PROVEN THAN DURING THE RECENT GULF WAR. THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
(CINC), CENTRAL COMMAND, HIS DEPUTY, THE XVIII AIRBORNE CORPS
COMMANDER, AND EVERY ARMY DIVISION COMMANDER ARE AMONG 44 ACTIVE
ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS SERVING IN THE GULF WAR WHO GRADUATED FROM
THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE. THE OTHER 17 ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS WHO
SERVED IN THE GULF WAR ARE GRADUATES FROM THE OTHER SENIOR
SERVICE COLLEGES.

JUST AS IMPORTANTLY, 50% OF THE ARMY'S COLONEL AND
LIEUTENANT COLONELS IN KEY COMMAND AND JOINT STAFF POSITIONS IN
THE GULF AND MANY OF THOSE ON THE STAFFS OF THE SUPPORTING CINCS
AND ARMY COMMANDS WERE ARMY WAR COLLEGE OR OTHER SENIOR SERVICE
COLLEGE GRADUATES. INITIAL FEEDBACK FROM SENIOR OFFICERS
INVOLVED WITH DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM INDICATE THAT OUR
EFFORTS TO PRODUCE GRADUATES WHO ARE COMPETENT STRATEGISTS AND
THEATER-LEVEL WARFIGHTERS ARE DEFINITELY ON THE MARK.
WE HAVE LAUNCHED A MAJOR INITIATIVE TO CAPTURE OTHER KEY LESSONS FROM DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM. OUR FACULTY IS FOCUSING ON THE STRATEGIC- AND OPERATIONAL-LEVEL LESSONS LEARNED AND WILL INTEGRATE THESE INTO OUR INSTRUCTION. PARALLELS WILL BE DRAWN BETWEEN THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND CAMPAIGN PLANNING PROCESSES WE TEACH AND THE ACTUAL FLOW OF DECISIONMAKING AND EVENTS AS THEY OCCURRED IN THE GULF. IN FACT, WE WILL USE EMERGING LESSONS LEARNED IN OUR FINAL COURSE OF THE YEAR THAT APPLIES THE THEORIES AND PROCESSES TAUGHT EARLIER.

WE ARE WELL INTO OUR PLANNING FOR AY92. ACTIVE LEARNING METHODOLOGIES CONTINUE TO BE EMPHASIZED. WE WILL MEET OR EXCEED ALL MILITARY EDUCATION POLICY DOCUMENT STANDARDS FOR STUDENT-FACULTY RATIO, STUDENT MIX, AND FACULTY MIX.

THE CENTERPIECE OF THAT CURRICULUM WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE U.S. NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE FACTORS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED IN REFINING AND IMPLEMENTING THAT STRATEGY IN AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX AND INTERDEPENDENT WORLD. OUR SPECIAL THEMES NEXT YEAR INCLUDE: THE NEW WORLD ORDER; NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY IN TRANSITION; ALLIANCES, COALITIONS AND COMBINED COMMAND AND CONTROL; STRATEGY FOR THE WAR ON DRUGS; AND TOTAL FORCE OF THE FUTURE. ADDITIONALLY, WE ANTICIPATE HOSTING THE PROCESS FOR ACCREDITATION OF JOINT EDUCATION (PAJE) IN ORDER TO ACCREDIT OUR RESIDENT PROFESSIONAL JOINT EDUCATION (PJE) PHASE I PROGRAM DURING THE THIRD QUARTER OF AY92.
FACULTY RECRUITMENT CONTINUES TO BE A TOP PRIORITY AND OUR EFFORTS ARE PERSONALLY SUPPORTED BY THE ARMY'S SENIOR LEADERS. I PERSONALLY PERFORM A QUALITY SCREEN ON EVERY NOMINEE EARLY IN THE PROCESS. WE CONTINUE TO STRIVE FOR A BALANCE BETWEEN EDUCATORS, EXPERIENCED OPERATORS, AND SPECIALISTS. TEN PERCENT OF OUR UNIFORMED FACULTY IS NOW TENURED. OUR FACULTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM HAS BEEN REDEFINED TO FOLLOW A MULTI-TIERED MODEL RANGING FROM GENERAL DEVELOPMENT TO INDIVIDUAL FACULTY AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT. OUR GOAL IS TO PROVIDE MULTIPLE AVENUES THROUGH WHICH OUR VERY TALENTED FACULTY CAN REMAIN CURRENT AND ENHANCE THEIR INDIVIDUAL EXPERTISE AND SKILLS. EVERY FACULTY MEMBER PARTICIPATES.

CONTRIBUTIONS THEY CONTINUE TO MAKE TO THE COLLEGE.

THE BRADLEY LECTURE SERIES HAS ALSO BEEN INSTITUTED THIS YEAR. THIS PROGRAM PROVIDES A FORUM FOR RETIRED SENIOR LEADERS TO SHARE THEIR PERSONAL AND PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EXPERIENCES AND PERSPECTIVES. GENERAL WILLIAM WESTMORELAND INAUGURATED THE SERIES BY ADDRESSING MAJOR LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE THREE WARS IN WHICH HE PARTICIPATED. LIEUTENANT GENERAL HARRY W.O. KINNARD, WHO ORGANIZED THE ARMY'S FIRST AIR ASSAULT DIVISION AND DEPLOYED IT TO VIETNAM, DISCUSSED THE FORMATIVE STAGES OF AIRMOBILITY IN THE ARMY AND THE IMPACT IT HAD ON OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

TEACHING.


IN CONCLUSION, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT WE AT THE ARMY WAR COLLEGE FULLY SHARE IN YOUR BELIEF THAT WE MUST
PRODUCE GRADUATES WHO ARE PREPARED TO HANDLE THE AWESOME RESPONSIBILITIES THAT THEY WILL FACE IN THE UNCERTAIN WORLD THAT LIES AHEAD. I ALSO WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT OUR CURRICULUM, EDUCATION METHODOLOGIES, AND LEARNING ENVIRONMENT RECEIVE CONSTANT SCRUTINY AND REVIEW TO ENSURE THAT TODAY’S STUDENTS WILL BE PREPARED TO BECOME TOMORROW’S SCHWARZKOPFS.

MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS CONCLUDES MY PREPARED STATEMENT. I LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR QUESTIONS AND THOSE OF THE PANEL MEMBERS.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you. General Miller.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN E. MILLER, USA, DEPUTY COM-
MANDANT, U.S. ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COL-
LEGE

General MILLER. Sir, I am pleased to appear before you today with the other panel members. I bring with me Col. Jim McDonough, who is the Director of our School for Advanced Military Studies, and Bob Kupiszewski, who is a staff member and the Director of Academic Operations.

I plan to confine my opening remarks primarily to the areas the General Accounting Office addressed in its report to the panel. But I would like to make a couple of general comments about the overall well-being of the college.

I highlight in my opening remarks that this year we have the greatest subscription to and involvement in our student body in the Master of Military Art and Science program. We have 90 candidates at this time in the CGSOC course, the majors course and of course, all 52 members in our second year course are required to participate in the masters course.

Mr. SKELTON. That is your SAMS course?

General MILLER. Yes, sir—are required to participate. Since appearing before the panel last September, we have undergone two comprehensive audits. One by the GAO, of course, which you commissioned and then a second by the Army Audit Agency. I would report that the Army Audit Agency found no major shortcomings and of course the results of the GAO report are being made known to you.

This coming academic year, the Command and General Staff College will introduce a totally new curriculum, which you were briefed on at our college the last Thanksgiving period. We are excited about that curriculum.

As a result of nearly 2 years of planning, we will have a major shift in focus from the primarily mid- to high-intensity orientation in Central Europe to a much more worldwide orientation looking at regions around the world to include Central America, Honduras, the Philippines, Southwest Asia, as well as Central Europe. We will also be broadening our view to look at peacetime engagement kinds of operations, as well as warfighting kinds of operations.

We are ensuring that the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm are fully integrated. As General Cerven has mentioned, Maj. Gen. Tom Tait will head up a lessons learned team which will be headquartered at Fort Leavenworth. Supplying information to that team from the historical side will be Col. Richard Swain, who has been my Director of the Combat Studies Institute, my department of history, if you will, who was tasked by the Department of Army to go to Southwest Asia and be the historian of record to capture the lessons from that experience.

He will return and draft the first volume of the Army's official History of Operation Desert Storm. He will do that on location at Fort Leavenworth.

For your information, I have enclosed a packet that summarizes the next year's curriculum. It is identical to the one that I briefed
you on, sir, at Fort Leavenworth. I will just call to your attention that in block VI, the students will be given 96 hours of instruction specifically devoted to joint operations set in the Persian Gulf scenario. We will then follow that block of instruction with a major college-wide Capstone computer assisted exercise in Southwest Asia focusing on tactical and operational planning and execution of combat operations at the division, corps, and joint task force levels.

I am confident that our curriculum changes will reinforce CGSC’s traditional strong emphasis on producing well-qualified commanders and staff officers for the future Army.

I would like to talk to a couple of items in the GAO report, if I may. I believe the information in the report supports CGSC’s complete commitment to fulfilling the spirit and intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, as well as your panel’s recommendations published in April 1989.

Since your field hearing at CGSC, the college has strived to enrich all aspects of joint education to include the curriculum, the student body, and the faculty. As we move into the 1990s, we will continue to use the panel’s report and the Military Education Planning Document provided by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, as valuable resources in guiding our decisions for the future.

I believe the GAO report is a fair and accurate representation of our status. As the report states, CGSC has implemented or partially implemented 29 of this panel’s 31 recommendations. Although the report explains our rationale for not implementing two of the recommendations, I would like to make some additional comments in that regard.

First, as regards the faculty exchange with the U.S. Military Academy. I have reviewed this recommendation very carefully before deciding not to recommend its implementation. The key factor is the clear difference between the missions of the two schools. Because of CGSC’s operational and doctrinal focus, unlike the Military Academy’s undergraduate academic focus, I believe it is best to draw our instructors from and return them to the Army in the field, in the main, where their recent experience in operational units can be brought to bear in the classroom and vice versa.

Nevertheless, we do seek out former Military Academy faculty with the skills and experiences which we need, such as in the communicative skills and the military history areas. This year, for example, seven former Academy instructors are assigned to our Combat Studies Institute, our history department, eight to our Center for Army Leadership where we conduct our communicative skills instruction for all of our officers, and 20 in other areas of the college.

Also, despite not having a formal exchange program, I am pleased to report a related initiative we are developing with General Palmer, the West Point Superintendent. He is proposing that the Academy offer a major in military science for cadets taught by CGSC graduates who have completed the Master of Military Art and Science program for their graduate education.

Mr. Skelton. Run that by me again.

General Miller. The faculty at the Military Academy——

Mr. Skelton. Right.
General Miller. Which would teach the major of Military Art and Science to the cadets.

Mr. Skelton. Right, as a major?

General Miller. As a major, would be educated at the Command and General Staff College. The faculty will be master of Military Art and Science degree holders, in an accredited degree program. That would be their principal educational background to qualify them to teach Military Art and Science at the Academy.

This proposal is in the planning stage. It has the potential of linking the two institutions in a manner similar to a faculty exchange program. That is, the West Point faculty, for this curriculum would receive their graduate education at the Command and General Staff College. Then in later years, some of them as former West Point faculty would become instructors at the Command and General Staff College. Even though we lack a formal exchange program, considerable exchange, deliberate as well as incidental, does occur. We are planning more.

The second item that I would like to expand on is the Officer Efficiency Report—rather than to use the words of the GAO report, Training Reports. The college currently prepares an Academic Evaluation Report on its graduates. The Department of Army has designed this evaluation report form to be better suited for academic reporting than the efficiency report used in operational assignments.

Of importance is that the Academic Evaluation Report, like any other officer efficiency report, becomes a permanent part of each officer’s official overall performance file maintained by the Department of Army. In the report, the college provides important performance- and course-related information to be used by selection boards and personnel managers in making key decisions regarding an officer’s career.

Within the college, I have established a review procedure by senior leaders, myself included, to ensure that each report meets the highest standards. It is my judgment, and the judgment of others, that this academic report is best suited for student evaluation.

Beyond these two recommendations, which we have not implemented, the GAO report describes 10 other recommendations as partially implemented. Most of these address matters related either to faculty or students. I would like to make some brief remarks concerning these two areas.

Recruiting and training of a quality faculty are my top priorities at the college. We have in place a systematic process whereby senior college leaders select or reject faculty based on an established set of criteria, foremost of which is a completion of an appropriate Military Education Level-Four school, coupled with operational skills and experience developed in unit assignments.

Once selected, new faculty participate in a 2-week faculty development course for all faculty, followed by a more focused 4-week program within their academic department. As the GAO reveals, this process has given CGSC an outstanding military and civilian faculty that has the qualifications and skills the college seeks.

As a related matter, and as the report states, we have not elected to use title 10 for civilian faculty hire at this time. We believe the
37 civilian faculty hired under title 5 and assigned at CGSC with career status are the right kind and number for CGSC at this time, particularly with the school's operational and tactical focus.

We plan, however, to review this issue periodically to determine whether title 10 hiring would later benefit the college in selected areas. Similarly, the issues of faculty and student mix are areas of major concern to me and the Army leadership.

I am happy to say that the college has now developed and forwarded plans that will enable us to reach standards established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The student mix issue is especially important to us because of the teaching methods we use in our staff groups of 16 officers. During tactics instruction, for example, we need a good balance of Army combat, combat support, and combat service support officers to work practical warfighting exercises and tactical scenarios in substaff group teams of five to eight students.

If we include too many sister service or international officers in each group, we lose the critical Army mix that we need to ensure our ability to teach combined arms warfighting and the Army's role in Joint Operations, which is my mission. Therefore, I believe that one sea and one air student in each staff group makes the optimal mix for the Command and General Staff College. We will achieve that mix in academic year 1992-1993, if the other services are able to provide the number of officer students we have requested of them.

Before closing, I would like to address the final issue related to the report. That is resourcing. We are currently maintaining a 4.1, 4.2 to 1 student to faculty ratio for Command and General Staff College. However, like other schools, we are facing budget cuts that will affect the size of our faculty.

These cuts will make it increasingly difficult to maintain the desired ratio. We, therefore, may have to use different teaching methodologies and educational technology to offset the reduction in faculty. In any event, our outstanding faculty will continue to provide a challenging and quality learning experience for our students.

In conclusion, I would say that the Command and General Staff College remains one of the premier military educational institutions in the world. College leaders since General Sullivan have used your panel's report to sharpen our focus on joint education, while maintaining our unique position as the Army senior tactical school. Command and General Staff College will continue its tradition of academic excellence with emphasis on educating officers who understand the importance of the Army's role in joint operations. Gentlemen, thank you.
Mr. Chairman and members of the Panel,

I am pleased to appear before you today to testify concerning the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and its role in professional military education. In my view, there are few issues more important than the training and education of officers.

I plan to confine my opening remarks primarily to the areas the General Accounting Office addressed in its report to the Panel. However, first I would like to make some general comments concerning the college and its overall well-being.

The Army Command and General Staff College was re-accredited in 1985 by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools for 10 years—the maximum time possible. As a college authorized by Congress to grant a master's degree, this accreditation is vital and fundamental. We are proud of the success of our program and will continue to build on those areas cited for excellence in the NCA report. For example, this academic year we have nearly 90 students enrolled in our Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) degree program. This is the highest enrollment ever. Also, we require the 52 students in our Advanced Military Studies Program to complete the MMAS during their second year study program.

Since I testified before the panel last September, CGSC has undergone two comprehensive audits: the GAO's review of joint professional military education and a detailed four-month audit...
by the Army Audit Agency on the ways we execute our educational missions. I believe both reviews confirmed that CGSC continues to excel as an intermediate-level institution. I am particularly pleased that the AAA will issue a no-finding report. They were unable to find any major shortcoming in the way we execute our mission.

This coming academic year the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) will introduce a new curriculum. After nearly two years of planning, the curriculum will undergo a major shift from focusing primarily on mid- to high-intensity operations in Central Europe to a more global balance featuring joint and combined operations in such areas as Honduras, the Philippines, and Southwest Asia, as well as Central Europe. As we continue to refine this new curriculum, we are ensuring that the lessons learned from Operation Desert Storm are fully integrated. In this regard, the Army has established a task force at Fort Leavenworth under Major General Thomas Tart to document the lessons learned. Colonel Richard Swain, the command historian for Desert Storm (and Director of the CSOD Combat Studies Institute) will work with the task force and serve as the catalyst for integrating the lessons into the several CGSC curricula.

For your information, I have enclosed a packet that summarizes next year's course. Please note that in Block VI, students will be given 96 hours of instruction specifically devoted to joint operations set in the Persian Gulf area. We then will
follow that block with a major, college-wide CAPSTONE computer-driven exercise in Southwest Asia focusing on tactical and operational planning and execution of combat operations at the division, corps, and joint task force levels. I am confident that our curriculum changes will reinforce CGSC's traditional strong emphasis on producing well-qualified commanders and staff officers and producing a substantial joint perspective to student learning.

Now I would like to address the GAO Report. I believe the information in the report supports CGSC's complete commitment to fulfilling the spirit and intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act, as well as your Panel's recommendations published in April 1989. Since your field hearings at CGSC, the college has strived to enrich all aspects of joint education to include the curriculum, the student body, and the faculty. As the college moves into the 1990's, we will continue to use your Panel's report and the Military Education Planning Document from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as valuable resources in guiding important decisions related to the education of officers at Fort Leavenworth.

I believe the GAO report is a fair and accurate representation of our status. As the report states, CGSC has implemented or partially implemented 29 of its applicable 31 recommendations. Although the report explains our rationale for not
implementing two of the recommendations, I would like to make several additional comments to further reinforce our rationale in each of the two cases.

First as regards Faculty Exchange with the United States Military Academy:

I reviewed this recommendation very carefully before deciding not to recommend its implementation. The key factor in my decision was the clear difference between the missions of the two schools. Because of CGSC's operational and doctrinal focus, unlike USMA's undergraduate academic focus, I believe it's best to draw our instructors from, and return them to, the Army in the field where their recent experience in operational units can be brought to bear in the classroom and vice versa.

Nevertheless, we do seek out former USMA faculty with the skills and experience we need, such as in the communicative skills and military history areas. This year, for example, seven former Academy instructors are assigned to our Combat Studies Institute, eight to our Center for Army Leadership, and twenty in other areas in the college.

Also, despite not having an exchange program, I am pleased to report a related initiative we are developing with LTG Palmer, West Point Superintendent. He is proposing that the Academy offer a major in military science for cadets taught by CGSC graduates who have completed our Master of Military Art and Science Degree. Although still in the planning stage, this
The proposal has the potential of linking the two institutions in a manner similar to a faculty exchange program; that is, the West Point faculty for this curriculum would receive their graduate education at CGSC. Then, in later years, some of them as former West Point faculty, would become instructors at CGSC.

Thus, even though we lack a formal exchange program, considerable exchange, deliberate as well as incidental, does occur. And we are planning for more.

Second, as concerns the use of Officer Efficiency Reports Rather than Training Reports:

The college currently prepares an Academic Evaluation Report for its graduates. The Department of Army has designed this evaluation report form to be better suited for academic reporting than the efficiency report used in operational assignments.

Of importance is that the Academic Evaluation Report, like any other officer efficiency report, becomes a permanent part of each officer's official overall performance file maintained by the Department of the Army. In the report, the college provides important performance- and course-related information to be used by selection boards and personnel managers in making key decisions regarding an officer's career. Within the college, I have established a review procedure by senior leaders, myself included, to ensure that each report meets high standards. It is my judgment, and the judgment of others, that this academic report is best suited for student evaluation.

- 5 -
Beyond these two recommendations not implemented, the GAO report describes 10 other recommendations as partially implemented. Most of these address matters related to either faculty or students. I would like to make some brief remarks concerning these two areas.

Recruiting and training a quality faculty are my top priorities at the college. We have in place a systematic process whereby senior college leaders select or reject faculty based on an established set of criteria—foremost of which are completion of an appropriate Military Level Four (MEL-4) school, coupled with operational skills and experience developed in unit assignments. Once selected, new faculty participate in a college two-week faculty development course, followed by a more focused four-week program run by each academic department. As the GAO review revealed, this process has given CGSC an outstanding military and civilian faculty that has the qualifications and skills the college seeks.

As a related matter and as the report states, we have not elected to use Title 10 for civilian faculty hire at this time. We believe the 37 civilian faculty hired under Title 5 and assigned at CGSC with career status are the right kind and number for CGSC at this time, particularly with the school's operational and tactical focus. We plan, however, to review this issue periodically to determine whether Title 10 hiring would later benefit the college in selected disciplines.
Similarly, the issues of faculty and student mix are areas of major concern to me and the Army leadership. I am happy to say that the college has now developed and forwarded plans that will enable us to reach standards established by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The student mix issue is especially important to CGSOC because of the teaching methods we use in our staff groups of 16 officers. During tactics instruction, for example, we need a good balance of Army combat, combat support, and combat service support officers to work practical warfighting exercises and tactical scenarios in teams of five to eight students. If we include too many other service or international officers in each staff group, we lose the critical Army mix needed to ensure our ability to teach combined arms warfighting and the Army's role in Joint Operations, which is my mission. Therefore, I believe that one sea and one air student in each staff group makes the optimal mix for CGSOC. We will achieve that mix in AY 92-93 if the other services are able to provide the numbers of officer students we have requested of them.

Before closing I would like to address a final issue related to the report—resourcing. The college is currently able to maintain a 4.1 to 1 student to faculty ratio for CGSOC. However, like other schools, we are facing budget cuts that will affect the size of our faculty. These cuts will make it increasingly difficult to maintain the desired ratio. We may, therefore,
have to use different teaching methodologies and educational technology to offset the reduction in faculty. In any event, our outstanding faculty will continue to provide a challenging and quality learning experience for our students.

In conclusion, CGSC remains one of the premier military educational institutions in the world. College leaders since General Sullivan have used your Panel’s report to sharpen the focus of joint education, while maintaining our unique position as the Army senior tactical school. CGSC will continue its tradition of academic excellence with emphasis on educating officers who understand the importance of the Army’s role in joint operations.
CGSOC

AY 1991-92

CURRICULUM

"KEEPING PACE WITH THE FUTURE"

CURRICULUM OUTPUT

HIGH QUALITY, COMPETENT, AND CONFIDENT LEADERS WHO CAN MEET THE ARMY’S CHALLENGES OF THE 1990s AND BEYOND
KEY FEATURES

- HIGHLIGHTS THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE
- LINKS TO AIRLAND BATTLE-FUTURE CONCEPTS
- SHIFTS EMPHASIS FROM CENTRAL EUROPE
- ACHIEVES GLOBAL BALANCE
- FOCUSES ON A BROAD RANGE OF LAND-FORCE CAPABILITIES
- INTEGRATES CAPABILITIES OF ARMY UNITS WITH OTHER SERVICES AND ALLIES.

CONTENT ENHANCEMENTS

- APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE
- REINFORCING & FORWARD-DEPLOYED OPERATIONS
- JTF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
- FORCE STRUCTURE--TAILORING & MIX
- MOBILIZATION & STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT
- NATION ASSISTANCE
- HANDS-ON LIC PLANNING
- ENHANCED LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES
EDUCATIONAL ENHANCEMENTS

• FUNDAMENTALS BOOKLETS LINKED TO MQS II
• SEQUENTIAL AND PROGRESSIVE INSTRUCTION
• INSTRUCTOR-LED FUNDAMENTALS UP FRONT
• INCREASED INTEGRATION OF DISCIPLINES
• COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATIONS
• INCREASED APPLICATION/Writing OF OPRN ORDERS
• REINFORCEMENT OF LEARNING—THE CAPSTONE EXERCISE

INITIAL STEPS

• ANALYZED CGSC MISSION AND REVIEWED MISSIONS/GOALS
  -- DOES THE MISSION REFLECT THE REALITIES OF THE CHANGING WORLD?
  - HOW CAN CGSC KEEP PACE WITH THE ARMY OF THE 1990s AND BEYOND?

• CONDUCTED NEEDS ANALYSIS
  -- WHAT DOES A CGSC GRAD NEED?
  -- WHAT IS THE LINKAGE TO LEADER DEVELOPMENT?
  -- HOW CAN CLASSROOM TRAINING AND PERFORMANCE BE ENHANCED?

• CONDUCTED AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
  -- WHERE IS THE ARMY GOING?
  -- HOW DOES THE CURRICULUM RELATE TO EMERGING DOCTRINE?
  -- DOES THE CURRICULUM ADDRESS CHANGING FORCE STRUCTURE?
CGSC MISSION

CURRENT MISSION
THE MISSION OF THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE IS TWO FOLD:

TO DEVELOP LEADERS WHO WILL TRAIN AND FIGHT UNITS AT THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS.

TO DEVELOP COMBINED ARMS DOCTRINE AND ASSIST IN ITS PROMulgATION.

RESTATED MISSION
THE MISSION OF THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE IS TO EDUCATE LEADERS IN THE VALUES AND PRACTICE OF THE PROFESSION OF ARMS; TO DEVELOP DOCTRINE THAT GUIDES THE ARMY AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY; AND TO PROMOTE THE STUDY OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THROUGHOUT THE DEFENSE COMMUNITY.

DIFFERENCES
• RECOGNIZES VALUES OF PROFESSION •
• REQUIREMENT TO TRAIN AND EDUCATE •
• BALANCES ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT •
• RECOGNIZES CGSC’S EXTERNAL MISSION •

CGSC GOALS

CURRENT GOALS
(1) TRAIN AND EDUCATE LEADERS WHO CAN APPLY COMBAT POWER AT THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS.

(2) DEVELOP COMBINED ARMS DOCTRINE, ASSIST IN ITS INTEGRATION THROUGHOUT THE ARMY, AND STAY ON THE LEADING EDGE OF WARFIGHTING IDEAS.

(3) DEVELOP LEADERS COMPETENT IN JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS.

(4) DEVELOP LEADERS WHO EXEMPLIFY THE HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS.

(5) DEVELOP LEADERS WHO WILL ANTICIPATE, MANAGE, AND EXPLOIT CHANGE.

(6) DEVELOP THE FULL POTENTIAL WITHIN THE COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE(CGSC).

RESTATED GOALS
- DEVELOP LEADERS COMPETENT IN THE ART AND SCIENCE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT.

- DEVELOP LEADERS WHO EXEMPLIFY THE HIGHEST PROFESSIONAL AND ETHICAL STANDARDS.

- DEVELOP LEADERS WHO WILL ANTICIPATE, MANAGE, AND EXPLOIT CHANGE.

- DEVELOP AND INTEGRATE SELECTED ARMY, JOINT, AND COMBINED DOCTRINE.

- PROVIDE A FORUM FOR INTELLECTUAL EXCHANGE RELATED TO MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE PROFESSION OF ARMS.

- CONDUCT AND PUBLISH RESEARCH OF THE PROFESSION OF ARMS.

- DEVELOP, IMPLEMENT, AND SUPPORT OTHER DA AND TRADOC DIRECTED PROGRAMS.

- SUSTAIN CGSC AS AN INSTITUTION OF EXCELLENCE.
CGSOC MISSION

CURRENT MISSION

CGSOC PREPARES OFFICERS TO THINK, DECIDE, COMMUNICATE, PLAN AND ACT AS GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS AND FIELD GRADE COMMANDERS.

RESTATED MISSION

EDUCATE SELECTED OFFICERS TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN PEACE, CONFLICT AND WAR IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE AND WITH EMPHASIS AT CORPS AND DIVISION LEVEL.

DIFFERENCES

- ORIENTATED TO MILITARY OPERATIONS
- CORPS AND DIVISION LEVEL
- DEMONSTRATED PERFORMANCE
- MILITARY LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES

CGSOC GOALS

CURRENT GOALS

PRODUCT: OFFICERS WHO CAN:
(1) APPLY PRINCIPLES, DOCTRINE, AND TECHNIQUES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AT THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR. THE CENTER OF MASS FOR SUCH APPLICATION IN CGSOC IS AT THE CORPS LEVEL.
(2) APPLY THE PRINCIPLES OF LEADERSHIP IN PROFESSIONAL LIFE.
(3) APPLY THE PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN MILITARY OPERATIONS.
(4) FUNCTION AS STAFF OFFICERS IN JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS.
(5) RELATE THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE AS A COMPONENT OF NATIONAL POLICY DECISION MAKING.
(6) APPLY PRINCIPLES, DOCTRINE AND TECHNIQUES OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN LOW INTENSITY CONFLICTS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS SHORT OF WAR.
(7) APPLY AN UNDERSTANDING OF MILITARY HISTORY TO CONTEMPORARY MILITARY PROBLEMS

RESTATED GOALS

TO DEVELOP OFFICERS WHO:
- DISPLAY TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL COMBINED ARMS PROFICIENCY.
- UNDERSTAND JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS.
- CAN PREPARE, FIGHT, AND SUSTAIN FORCES ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT.
- CAN APPLY THE PERSPECTIVES OF MILITARY HISTORY.
- EMBODY THE PRINCIPLES, ATTITUDES, AND VALUES OF MILITARY LEADERSHIP.
- CAN SOLVE COMPLEX PROBLEMS SYSTEMATICALLY AND UNDER PRESSURE.
- UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN A FREE SOCIETY.
- COMMUNICATE EFFECTIVELY IN WRITING, ORALLY, AND ELECTRONICALLY.
- CONFIDENTLY ACCEPT HIGHER LEVELS OF RESPONSIBILITY.
GOAL
DEVELOP CONFIDENT, COMPETENT LEADERS WHO POSSESS THE SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES NEEDED TO EFFECTIVELY STUDY THE DEVELOPMENT, PROJECTION, EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT OF COMBAT POWER.

SCOPE
- SENIOR LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN PEACE AND WAR
- THE ARMED FORCES' VITAL ROLES IN NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
- MILITARY THEORY'S ROLES, USES AND LIMITATIONS
- ARMY WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE'S DISCIPLINED EVOLUTION
- COMBAT OPERATIONS' COMPLEXITY AT THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR
# BLOCK I

## THE PURPOSE AND MEANS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBCOURSE</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C300- FUNDAMENTALS OF COMBAT OPERATIONS</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>DEVELOPS AN APPRECIATION FOR THE DISCIPLINED EVOLUTION OF THE US ARMY WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE FROM THE CLOSE OF WWII TO THE ARLAND BATTLE DOCTRINE OF TODAY AND TOMORROW, AND REFRESSES THE RUDIMENTARY SKILLS OF VISUALIZATION, ANALYSIS AND DECISION MAKING NECESSARY FOR ACHIEVING INITIATIVE, AGILITY, DEPTH AND SYNCHRONIZATION OF COMBAT OPERATIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C500- JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>EXPLAINS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN US NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES, STRATEGY, AND THE FORMULATION OF OPERATIONAL PLANS; INTRODUCES THE AIR FORCE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS SERVICE CAPABILITIES; AND DESCRIBES THE JOINT COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WHICH EXTENDS FROM THE STRATEGIC TO THE TACTICAL LEVEL OF WAR IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C600 - THEORY OF WAR</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>DEVELOPS AN APPRECIATION FOR THE ROLE, USE AND LIMITS OF MILITARY THEORY AND DOCTRINE AND THE WILLINGNESS TO CRITICALLY EXAMINE THEORETICAL AND DOCTRINAL INSIGHTS BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE OF EXPERIENCE.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C710 - SENIOR LEVEL LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>PROVIDES AN OVERVIEW OF US ARMY SENIOR LEVEL LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE, ILLUSTRATES THE CHALLENGES WHICH SENIOR LEADERS FACE DURING PEACE AND WAR THROUGH CASE STUDY, AND PREPARES THE STUDENT TO BUILD HIS OR HER OWN PHILOSOPHY OF COMMAND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C720 - COMMUNICATION SKILLS FOR SENIOR LEADERS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PREPARES OFFICERS TO MENTOR THEIR SUBORDINATES WRITING AND SPEAKING ABILITIES THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNICATION SKILLS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C740 - MILITARY LAW</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>PREPARES OFFICERS TO ADDRESS PRACTICAL ISSUES OF FACT AND LAW IN THE FOUR MAIN AREAS OF CONCERN AT THE SUMMARY AND SPECIAL COURTMARTIAL LEVEL: OPERATIONAL LAW (LAW OF WAR), THE MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM, NONJUDICIAL PUNISHMENT, AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL HOURS 173**
GOAL
DEVELOP LEADERS WHO ARE CONFIDENT AND COMPETENT IN THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF (1) JOINT OPERATIONS PLANNING SYSTEMS; (2) TRAINING; (3) MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT OF FORCES; AND (4) LOGISTICAL REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN THOSE FORCES AT ANY LEVEL OF CONFLICT.

SCOPE
- JOINT PLANNING AND EXECUTION PROCESSES FOR CONTINGENCY AND CRISIS RESPONSE
- ARMY TRAINING SYSTEM APPLIED TO MAINTAIN COMBAT-READY BATTALIONS
- MOBILIZATION, STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT, AND SUSTAINMENT OF LAND COMBAT POWER
# BLOCK II
## DEVELOP, PROJECT AND SUSTAIN COMBAT POWER

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBCOURSE</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C730 - TRAINING THE FORCE</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>DEVELOP COMPETENCE IN THE US ARMY'S DOCTRINE, TECHNIQUES, TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR TRAINING UNITS IN PEACETIME TO THEIR WARTIME MISSION REQUIREMENTS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C400 - DEVELOP, PROJECT, AND SUSTAIN COMBAT POWER</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>PRODUCE AN UNDERSTANDING OF HOW FORCES ARE MOBILIZED, DEPLOYED AND SUSTAINED BY NATIONAL- AND THEATER-LEVEL AGENCIES AND COMMANDS TO SUPPORT THE CINC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C510 - JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>DEVELOP AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE DELIBERATE AND TIME-SENSITIVE PROCESS WHICH JOINT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS USE FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C520 - MILITARY USE OF SPACE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>DEVELOP AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE military applications of space, the US ARMY'S ROLE IN SPACE, AND THE CONTRIBUTION WHICH MIlitary SPACE SYSTEMS MAKE TO deterrence and WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C750 - PUBLIC AFFAIRS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>PRODUCE AN AWARENESS OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLANNING REQUIREMENTS FOR COMBAT OPERATIONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C610 - EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>PRODUCE AN APPRECIATION FOR THE EVOLUTION OF WARFARE, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL CONCEPTS THROUGH TIME, SINCE THE 18TH CENTURY</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL HOURS:** 65
DEVELOP COMPETENT, CONFIDENT LEADERS WHO POSSESS THE SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES TO ANALYZE AND PLAN REINFORCING AND FORWARD-DEPLOYED COMBAT OPERATIONS.

SCOPE:
- POST-CFE COALITION WARFARE'S DEMANDS ON THE ARMY'S COMBAT FORCES
- CONUS-BASED REINFORCEMENTS MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOYMENT TO EUROPE
- HEAVY FORCES NONLINEAR COMBAT OPERATIONS IN THE CENTRAL REGION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBCOURSE</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C3000- REINFORCEMENT AND FORWARD DEPLOYED OPERATIONS</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>This integrated subcourse examines US interests in Europe; NATO organization and missions and USN, USAF, and USMC roles in NATO. It focuses on the mobilization, deployment, reception, and employment in Europe of a CONUS-based division with a round-out brigade. Emphasis is placed on the deployment and production of an operations plan. Soviet operational doctrine is also considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C610- EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>This is a continuation of the military history subcourse. Napoleonic warfare is covered during this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C710 - SENIOR LEVEL LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>This is a continuation of the leadership subcourse. A case study is used to illustrate leadership problems at the division level of command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C720 - COMMUNICATION SKILLS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>This is a continuation of the communication skills subcourse. Students are critiquing each other's training briefing rehearsals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C730 - TRAINING THE FORCE</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>This is a continuation of the training the force subcourse. Students give a battalion quarterly training briefing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C740 - MILITARY LAW</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>This is a continuation of the military law subcourse. Students consider the legal aspects of operations in Europe and CONUS, and administrative law.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## BLOCK IV

### GOAL

Develop competent, confident leaders who can apply doctrine when planning and executing indirect and direct military operations in an immature theater.

### SCOPE

- Corps Commander integrates the Army's heavy, light and SOF forces and, when acting as the JTF Commander, conducts joint and combined operations.
- Deployment, employment, and redeployment of a corps as the Army Force of a JTF.
- Fundamentals of LIC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BLOCK 1</th>
<th>BLOCK II</th>
<th>BLOCK III</th>
<th>BLOCK IV</th>
<th>BLOCK V</th>
<th>BLOCK VI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE MEANS MIL OPNS</td>
<td>DEVELOP PROJECT MIL POWER</td>
<td>REINF OPNS</td>
<td>CONT OPNS</td>
<td>LIC PACOM</td>
<td>JOINT OPNS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>ELECTIVES</td>
<td>ELECTIVES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**THEORY OF WAR**

**EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE**
# BLOCK IV

## CONTINGENCY FORCE OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBCOURSE</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C4000 - CONTINGENCY FORCE OPERATIONS</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>Students apply doctrine in planning the use of military force to achieve political objectives within US CINCSOUTH'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. Students address a wide range of low intensity conflict issues and are exposed to campaign planning and joint task force planning procedures. The course includes a staff planning exercise requiring students to prepare a JTF contingency operations plan in Honduras.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C610 - EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Students continue their military history instruction. The period covered during Block IV is 1864-1914.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C710 - SENIOR LEVEL LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Students address senior level leadership issues associated with contingency operations by examining contingency operations in the Dominican Republic, 1965.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C740 - MILITARY LAW</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Students address unique legal aspects and rules of engagement associated with contingency operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL 68
**BLOCK V**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FOUNDATIONS</th>
<th>APPLICATIONS</th>
<th>APPLICATIONS / ADV APPLICATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>BLOCK I</strong></td>
<td><strong>BLOCK II</strong></td>
<td><strong>BLOCK III</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREP PROGRAM</td>
<td>PURPOSE MEANS MIL OPNS</td>
<td>DEVELOP PROJECT MIL POWER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THEORY OF WAR</td>
<td>HISTORY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GOALS**

Develop confident, competent leaders who possess the skills and knowledge to:

1. Analyze ongoing insurgences and plan appropriate strategies, and
2. Apply analytical tools to decision making.

**SCOPE**

- Examine LIC environment: focusing on insurgency
- Analyze ongoing insurgences to plan appropriate strategies for:
  - Internal defense and development measures
  - Foreign internal defense actions
- Apply principles and techniques of resource management
- Apply quantitative techniques to solve and to staff problems
# BLOCK V
## LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBCOURSE</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C530 - LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>THE STUDENT EXAMINES LIC ENVIRONMENT FOCUSING ON INSURGENCY BY: ANALYZING ONGOING INSURGENCIES, AND PLANNING APPROPRIATE STRATEGIES FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE AND DEVELOPMENT MEASURES, AND FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE ACTIONS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C410 - RESOURCE PLANNING AND ALLOCATION</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>STUDENTS LEARN PRINCIPLES OF RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR PROBLEM SOLVING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C710 - SENIOR LEVEL LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>LEADERSHIP CHALLENGES IN LIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C740 - MILITARY LAW</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>STUDENTS REVIEW STANDARDS OF CONDUCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C610 - EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>STUDENTS CONTINUE THEIR MILITARY HISTORY INSTRUCTION. THE PERIOD COVERED DURING BLOCK V IS 1914-1942.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL HOURS**: 90
GOAL

- Develop competent, confident leaders who can function at the operational level of war as commanders or staff officers in a joint and/or combined operation or a component of same

SCOPE

- Deployment from CONUS for employment and sustainment in an immature theater
- Light-heavy-SOF mix of ground forces
- Integration of capabilities of Army units with those of other services
- Coalition strategy and combined or coordinated operations with friends and allies
- Fully equipped sophisticated, lethal threat from the developing world
# BLOCK VI
## JOINT OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBCOURSE</th>
<th>HOURS</th>
<th>SCOPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C6000- APPLICATION OF JOINT OPERATIONS</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>STUDENTS APPLY DOCTRINE, AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL, IN PLANNING THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE WITHIN USCINCCEN'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. STUDENTS PREPARE STRATEGIC ASSESSMENTS, DISCUSS THEATER OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS, AND PLAN COMPONENTS OF A THEATER CAMPAIGN PLAN AND A SUBORDINATE UNIFIED/OMP OPERATIONAL PLAN, AND SUBORDINATE CORPS AND DIVISION PLANS.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C610- EVOLUTION OF MODERN WARFARE</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>STUDENTS CONTINUE THEIR MILITARY HISTORY INSTRUCTION. THE PERIOD COVERED DURING BLOCK VI IS 1942 TO PRESENT.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| CAPSTONE EXERCISE                  | 36    | STUDENTS CONDUCT OPERATIONAL PLANNING, TAILOR FORCES TO EXECUTE OPERATIONS, ENGAGE IN TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL TRAINING, AND ENHANCE LEADER DEVELOPMENT THROUGH LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES DURING A BCTP WAR FIGHTER EXERCISE. |

V-15-3-91
CAPSTONE PROGRAM

GOAL:
DEVELOP COMPETENT, CONFIDENT LEADERS WHO EMBODY THE PRINCIPLES, ATTITUDES, AND VALUES NECESSARY TO PERFORM COMPLEX COMMAND AND STAFF FUNCTIONS DEMONSTRATING THEIR ABILITY TO PREPARE, FIGHT, SUSTAIN, AND LEAD LAND MILITARY FORCES.

SCOPE:
- CONDUCT OPERATIONAL PLANNING
- TAILOR FORCES TO EXECUTE OPERATIONS
- ENGAGE IN REALISTIC TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL TRAINING
- ENHANCE LEADER DEVELOPMENT THROUGH LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES DURING A BCTP WARFIGHTER EXERCISE

CAPSTONE PROGRAM FOR WARFIGHTERS

- EXECUTION OF CORE CURRICULUM AND ADVANCED APPLICATIONS
- FOCUS ON THE TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL LEVELS OF WAR
  - ALL STUDENTS PARTICIPATE AND EXECUTE OWN PLANS
- SCENARIO BASED ON LOGICAL PROGRESSION OF CURRICULUM (FOCUS ON SWA)
  - INTER-ACTIVE EXERCISE DRIVER WITH INVISIBLE GAMEBOARD
**ELECTIVES PROGRAM**

- TIED TO CORE TO PROVIDE ADVANCED APPLICATIONS

- AREAS OF CONCENTRATION
  - COMBINED ARMS OFFICER
  - COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT
  - JOINT AND COMBINED OPERATIONS
  - GENERAL MILITARY STUDIES

- SUPPORT FOCUSED PROGRAMS
  - MILITARY HISTORIAN
  - JOINT PLANNER
  - STRATEGIST
  - SPACE OPERATIONS
  - FORCE DEVELOPMENT/INTEGRATION

- PROVIDES SPECIALIZED STUDY TRAINING
  - DOCTRINE
  - DRUGS
  - FORCE MODERNIZATION
  - TECHNOLOGY

**GUEST SPEAKER PROGRAM**

- DESIGNED TO COMPLEMENT THE CURRICULUM

- PROPOSED TOPICS:
  - FORWARD DEPLOYED FORCES
  - REINFORCING OPERATIONS
  - CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
  - LIC
  - DISASTER RELIEF/EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE
  - INTERDICTION OF DRUG TRAFFIC
  - SUPPORT OF ALLIED & FRIENDLY NATIONS
  - FORCE STRUCTURE
  - MODERNIZATION
  - LEADER DEVELOPMENT
CONCLUSION

AY 91-92 CURRICULUM:

• REFLECTS CSA’S STRATEGIC ROLES FOR THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE

• SUPPORTS ARMY FUNDAMENTAL IMPERATIVES
  † PRODUCES HIGH QUALITY WARFIGHTERS WHO UNDERSTAND THE ARMY’S ROLES AND MISSIONS
  † FOCUSES ON DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION
  † REQUIRES STUDENTS TO SOLVE FORCE STRUCTURE AND FORCE MIX PROBLEMS
  † CREATES A TOUGH, REALISTIC TRAINING AND EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE
  † REQUIRES THE STUDENT TO CONSIDER THE IMPACT OF MODERNIZATION AND TECHNOLOGY ON COMBAT OPERATIONS

• DEVELOPS COMPETENT AND CONFIDENT LEADERS
Mr. Skelton. Thank you, Mr. Machtley.

Mr. Machtley. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. I have just a few questions and then you will have to excuse me as I have to go next door to a military installation hearing. Admiral, I noticed in your testimony at the end that you talked about the concern for your faculty members being unable to write and receive compensation when publishing is a major role for civilian faculty members. Would you comment on this briefly and can the Army comment if this is a significant problem in trying to get civilian faculty members to join your schools?

Admiral Strasser. Yes, sir, Mr. Machtley. We think this is a serious roadblock to academic excellence and to the type of work that a faculty should be doing. A faculty should be publishing and should be speaking. The Ethics Act that became effective the first of this year prohibits employees of the Government, with a few exceptions, from receiving an honorarium for publishing an article or making a speech.

In my judgment, this inhibits the faculty from doing these types of activities, and also makes it very difficult to hire faculty. When you go out and try to get some outstanding member of the academic community to come aboard as a faculty member and you say, “Oh, by the way, if you do this, you are not able to receive an honorarium for publishing an article or making a speech,” first of all they do not believe that you are really being serious with them, and second they say, “I am really not interested,” because that is the life blood of an academic, to publish and to speak.

I strongly support the initiative underway to amend that legislation to allow members of our faculty to engage in what are normal academic activities.

Mr. Machtley. As I understand, it would have to be almost a broad brush because any faculty member who wants to write could not write about anything other than what is in their specialty. So it has to be broad enough to permit them to write about anything, even a subject of military strategy. Is that correct?

Admiral Strasser. Well, that is right. Right now, they are prevented from writing or speaking about anything or receiving an honorarium. Some of the legislative relief that has been proposed has wording such that it would require an interpretation by the Office of Government Ethics as to whether faculties are allowed to do it or not. I think it says something like strictly related to their official activities. But it just seems to me that this is a burden that we should not have to put on our faculty, and they should be able to write and speak freely and receive just remuneration.

Mr. Machtley. About any subject, even military strategy or something they are teaching?

Admiral Strasser. I would think so, yes, sir.

Mr. Machtley. As long as they are in the academic world?

Admiral Strasser. As long as they are in the academic world. Now there are obviously certain restrictions. They cannot do it on their teaching time and so forth, but they should be able to do this on their own time and publish it. Even though it is based on research they have done in preparation for their classes, if they write it on their own time, they should be able to publish on any subject and get paid for it.
Mr. Machtley. Does the Army care to comment?

General Cerjan. Sir, I strongly second Admiral Strasser's remarks. Over the long term, I think you will lose qualified civilian faculty, particularly when you get into the business of hiring them, because they will be differentiated from their civilian colleagues in other institutions.

As an individual becomes more and more qualified in his particular area of expertise, he becomes in great demand. Because of that it drives him to do more publishing and more speaking. When other academics from civilian institutions go out on the road and do this they are remunerated for it. So I think our civilian faculty should have the same opportunity.

It is all in the realm of academic freedom. Everything is put forth in the disclaimer mode and they know full well—at least the ones at the military institutions—that they cannot speak in the realm of policy, and they stay away from policy. But I think it will hamper us in the long run.

General Miller. Sir, I concur with remarks that have been made previously. I would comment that as we are accredited, the Command and General Staff College by the North Central Association, having a faculty that is regularly publishing and speaking in public is certainly beneficial to our further accreditation and is essential to our further accreditation. I would also say that we encourage professional military officers who are there as officers students and faculty members, to also engage in professional writing.

Mr. Skelton. Is that not the case in the other two schools, you request the students to do the same?

General Cerjan. Exactly.

Admiral Strasser. Yes, sir.

Mr. Machtley. One other question, I noticed in the GAO report what appears to be a constant comparison between the MEPD standards and the panel's recommendation. I had nothing to do with the panel's recommendation. I was not here so I cannot really speak to whether the MEPD standards are better than the panel's recommendation.

But my question is this: are these MEPD standards better, particularly in the student faculty mixes where you have chosen to adopt the MEPD recommendation as opposed to the panel's? Are you saying in effect that they are better than the panel's recommendation, or you just do not want to adopt the panel's recommendation, or the panel's recommendation is frankly inappropriate? What are you saying when you adopt MEPD?

General Cerjan. Sir, I will take it on first. Let me comment from the standpoint of the Army as we looked at the panel's recommendation. The recommendations, for example in faculty mix, stated that 33 percent or one-third of your faculty should be civilian and then with the remaining faculty, 50 percent should be non-host faculty members and the other 50 percent should be host school.

Well, if we took a look at that mix from the Army standpoint, that would mean that only one-third of the faculty instructors would be U.S. Army faculty instructors. Since we are the senior leadership institution for land warfare, we feel that we have to have service expertise in our faculty. So we have established as a baseline a 50-percent level for Army faculty.
That baseline, in fact, is the way we have designed our faculty with a seminar teaching team of four individuals, which would consist of two Army, one civilian and one non-host service. This would give us a 25/25/50-percent ratio, which is the MEPD standard.

The same is true in the student mix in the classroom, except the percentages would turn out to be only about 41 percent of the students would be Army. Again we feel we have to hit the 50-percent mark.

On the student side of the house, we meet the MEPD standards, but we have indicated at the Army War College that we are prepared to take additional non-host service into our 16-person seminar groups. Currently we have one from the sea service and one from the air.

We are willing to reduce by two the number of Army students in that seminar group, which would not break our 50 percent threshold. It would allow us to put four of the non-host services into a seminar group, which we think would be a great mix, but at the same time we need to have comparable seats at the other service colleges to replace those Army students who would not be able to fit into the USAWC class.

Mr. Skelton. May I interrupt at this point, Mr. Machtley. Admiral, you do not go to that lower floor, you go to the higher level set forth in our recommendations, do you not? Would you explain to the general how you do this.

Admiral Strasser. Well, sir, I think we were perhaps a little further along than some of the other schools at the time the recommendations were made. It is true that we do meet in the area of faculty mix and student mix, both the MEPD and the panel guidelines. But I think that the MEPD in most areas was designed to support the panel goals.

It is true that there are some areas where the MEPD guidelines are somewhat less stringent than the panel goals, but I think that the Chairman in putting forth this document had some understanding that this was going to be difficult for some of the other services to do and provided some guidance which in his judgment was perhaps more realistic in the short term.

However, as I said at the time the panel visited and made its report, and the MEPD came out, we were further along. So it did not provide insurmountable obstacles for us to meet the panel's goals, and we have met the panel's goals.

Mr. Machtley. Well, if I may just continue. If the Army said, "Well, we are going to strive to meet the panel's goals, but we can only reach the MEPD goals in the next year or 2 years," then I would suggest that you are saying that the panel's goals are the preferred. But what I hear you saying, and I do not want to put words in your mouth, is that you disagree with the panel and you prefer to——

General Cerjan. Sir, that is correct, I disagree——

Mr. Machtley. Adopt the MEPD?

General Cerjan. Sir, that is correct only from the standpoint of the 50-percent threshold. Because if we are going to enter the joint arena, we need to take service expertise into that arena, and in order to do so we feel we have to have at least a 50-percent threshold in terms of Army students and faculty personnel.
Admiral Strasser. Mr. Machtley, may I add one more comment on that. We meet the panel’s goals, as of now. Now the panel’s goals for the 1995 timeframe are even more rigorous. If we were to meet them completely by the 1995 timeframe, Navy officers would be in a minority in our school. I am not sure that that would be a good situation. But as of now, we meet the interim goals.

Mr. Machtley. Thank you very much.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you. Mr. Browder.

Mr. Browder. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Skelton. Well, in the establishment of goals, we come up with two sets. One is the MEPD as set forth by the Chairman’s folks and the other is ours. The MEPD, as far as we are concerned, is nice. But that is not the standard by which we are holding this hearing or making judgment.

General Miller, let me speak about faculty mix at your school if I may, sir. Four percent are Air Force, 4 percent are Navy/Marine combined, how can you teach the joint subjects in your mission with such a mix as that where you have such a small amount of Air Force and Navy/Marine?

General Miller. First, let me comment that we have requests forwarded to the Department of Army to coordinate with the other services to increase that mix to about 5 percent, which is the current MEPD direction to us. Second, I would say that we are teaching Army officers about joint matters from an Army perspective and the important aspect is that we have the correct subjects addressed and we deal with them accurately in our curriculum.

In fact, we have been reviewed by the Joint Staff Accreditation team and have been found to have a very healthy robust and complete JPME phase I curriculum available to our officers. In addition to the faculty members themselves, we at this time have at least one sister service officer in each staff group and as I indicated in my opening remarks, we are seeking the addition of another sister service officer per staff group so that we would have one air service and one sea service officer in each staff group. These individuals bring their service prospect to the educational process.

Mr. Skelton. Without beating the subject to death, MEPD, Military Education Policy Document, we consider it at best a floor and will not use it except for reference.

General Miller. Yes, sir.

Mr. Skelton. We are striving in the future with all three of you folks. The panel recommended that only resident phase I and intermediate school instruction be given phase I credit. The intent behind this recommendation was to ensure that the best officers were selected and trained for Joint Staff specialties. Now what are the reasons for granting phase I credit for non-resident courses? I suppose, General Miller, we should probably ask you and Admiral Strasser this question.

General Miller. Sir, it is certainly a fair question. As we look at those Army officers who—the positions that the Army is expected to fill, the JDAL position, 9 percent of those positions come from infantry, armor field, artillery, aviation, air defense, special forces and combat engineers, our primary combat and combat support arms. Sixty percent of the Army’s positions contrastingly come.
from signal, military intelligence, foreign area and quartermaster officers, officers in those career fields.

Contrast that with the student body that comes to the Command and General Staff College that is selected because of the nature of our mission, to teach combined arms warfighting; 61 percent of my in-resident student body are combat arms officers, 20 percent are combat support and 19 percent are combat service support.

To meet that correct student mix, the Army establishes selection floors within each of the branch and specialty areas within the Army, and selects against those floors officers to come in-resident. So it is entirely conceivable that you have a high-quality officer in one of these branches who is in high demand in JDAL and who is not selected to come in-residence at the Command and General Staff College, but would complete that educational experience through our non-resident program.

That officer's skills in his specialty area are highly needed by the Joint Staff, and his phase I could be completed then through the non-resident program in our view. That is the rationale.

Mr. SKELTON. You do not think they miss a great deal in not rubbing elbows with those in other service for the 10 months?

General MILLER. Sir, I think that there certainly is a loss there. The body of knowledge that they experience is the same. But we believe that the 12 weeks at the Armed Forces Staff College gives them that opportunity to gain first-hand contact with officers from other services. In addition, I would look to the Army to select those officers carefully who will go on and serve in those joint billets. You would probably find a percentage of those, an identifiable percentage who have had that kind of exposure in their operational assignment prior to that time.

Mr. SKELTON. Admiral.

Admiral STRASSER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We would much prefer that our officers have the opportunity to attend the resident course. Of course, there are advantages to the resident program they do not achieve in the non-resident program. We would not argue that for a minute. However, we are talking here primarily about access, Mr. Chairman. We do not get as many officers as we would like to through our resident program, and there are many officers who do not come who are of very high quality.

So we tried to design a program where we could give, in a non-resident fashion, as much as possible that which we give to our students in our resident programs. We have two programs. In addition to our correspondence program, we have non-resident seminars that are now held in 14 locations throughout the United States, primarily in those areas of heavy fleet concentration. We have a faculty of about 35 that present these, many of whom have Ph.Ds and are retired two- and three-star officers.

We also have in our non-resident program officers from other services. Now we do not meet the requirements of the panel for jointness in our non-resident seminars. But 20 percent of the officers who take our non-resident seminars are from the other services. About half of those are Marines, but we also have 31 Army officers and 11 Air Force officers who take our non-resident program, which is a 3-year program administered by a very high-quality faculty.
We just had that program certified by the Joint Staff. They looked at many areas and listed strengths and weaknesses. In the area of the faculty who teach our non-resident seminars, there were no weaknesses noted. That was the only area of the report with no weaknesses; there were only strengths for that faculty. We hire that faculty with the same kind of criteria that we hire our resident faculty.

So, while we do not think it provides the degree of jointness that our resident program does, we are teaching at the intermediate level, to the knowledge level, and we feel that anyone who finishes that 3-year program certainly has acquired the knowledge. There has been some joint interplay during the seminars, although not nearly to the extent that we have in the resident program.

I would also add, Mr. Chairman, that we have, for example, submariners who come ashore as commanders, some for the first time in their careers. These submariners are among our finest officers, and should have the opportunity to get phase I. We have this opportunity in some of our fleet concentration areas in San Diego, Norfolk, Newport and Mayport and San Francisco, to try and give those officers who would not otherwise have the opportunity, the opportunity to get phase I credit.

Mr. SKELTON. One of the major concerns of our panel is the degree of academic rigor. We began, before any of you came on board, our whole series of hearings looking at the instruction of jointness and the instruction of strategy. It became very apparent that there was a great discrepancy in the area of academic rigor, you may have another term for it among the various schools. To the credit of every school, academic rigor has been elevated to a much higher level.

That, of course, includes challenging curriculum, student accountability, academic standards and that old thing that we discuss from time to time called grading. Despite the fact that the panel report and the JCS Military Education Policy Document mentioned the importance of effective student evaluations or grading systems, there are major differences between the Army and the Navy War Colleges.

The Navy War College uses a grading system. The Army War College does not use a formal system. I have had various discussions, particularly with General Cerjan on this. Tell us in a brief minute, if you do not grade, how you evaluate, which maybe a form of grading? Admiral, we will start with you.

Admiral STRASSER. Well, sir, we do grade. Throughout the course of the year our students will have—we—

Mr. SKELTON. This occurs in both schools?

Admiral STRASSER. Both schools, yes, sir. Each student will have probably five papers and seven examinations in the core curriculum. That is not counting our electives. But in the three-core curriculum, he will have—

Mr. SKELTON. Do you grade in the electives as well?

Admiral STRASSER. The electives are pass/fail.

Mr. SKELTON. I see.

Admiral STRASSER. But they are graded. In the core curriculum, in the three areas, Strategy and Policy, National Security Decision-making and Joint Operations, the student will have a combination
of seven exams and five papers, and they receive letter grades, even to the minus and plus.

Mr. SKELTON. Do you have honor graduates or distinguished graduates in each of the schools?

Admiral STRASSER. Yes, sir. In each school we have the top 5 percent graduate with highest distinction and the next 15 percent graduate with distinction.

Mr. SKELTON. General Cerjan.

General CERJAN. Sir, as you well know, we do have a formal grading system. It does not give letter grades. We evaluate our people from a meets standards, exceeds standards, basis. If you separate that from academic rigor, only for the purposes of discussion, in the last 15 months, we have undergone two independent evaluations of our system from an academic rigor standpoint. The American Council on Education as well as the GAO report—both agencies have specifically stated that we have rigorous academic performance standards. So we feel that the rigor is there. We feel that the formalized grading system is there. We just do not assign the letter grade. I think that we have explained over time our philosophy. We feel the senior leaders we are developing need to go out into a complex environment where jointness and compromise and working together are very, very important. We feel that when we step over the line into the competitive individual grades, we lose something in the academic environment that we do not want to lose.

Mr. SKELTON. Just assume, General, that I am the Army Chief of Staff.

General CERJAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. It is near graduation time and I pick the phone up and I say, “General, we have six very, very important slots requiring strategic thinking, three go to one place and three go to another. I want the top three students to go to one place and the next three in your graduation class, to go to this other place. Send me the names.” Can you do that?

General CERJAN. Sir, I can send the Chief of Staff recommended names by talking to the faculty and getting recommendations, but I would never recommend to him three individuals solely on the basis of what they did in the classroom at the U.S. Army War College.

I would go to their records and I would look at their operational background because I feel that the academic side is only one of the three pillars that we try to establish for the individual who is going to move into that environment as a strategic thinker and strategic leader. That is the operational aspect, the academic aspect and personal self-development. We look at the three, and if I was to recommend to the Chief of Staff, I would make sure that the other two pillars were considered also.

Mr. SKELTON. OK. Thank you, General Miller.

General MILLER. Yes, sir. We, of course, use a letter grading system. We do establish an honor graduate in our course. During this year, for example, we have 2 practical exercises which are graded, 6 briefings which are graded, 13 objective examinations, and 8 papers in 10 courses, which also evaluate and grade the student in seminar performance.
That does not include our electives program. Each officer is required to take a minimum of seven electives and—

Mr. Skelton. Are they pass/fail type?

General Miller. No, sir. In the main, they are graded. They require a major paper, a presentation, a briefing and that sort of thing as the basis for student evaluation. We do have a few that are pass/fail, and occasionally we will make one pass/fail for international officers, but graded for the U.S. officers.

Mr. Skelton. OK. Mr. Browder, do you have any further questions?

Mr. Browder. No.

Mr. Skelton. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. Barrett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could you tell us what is being done by the services and the Joint Staff to assist you in reallocating the faculty resources so that you acquire more Air Force and Army officers and Admiral Strasser and General Cerjan get the mix from the other services? Two of you have indicated a willingness to take more officers from the other services. What progress is being made by higher headquarters?

Admiral Strasser. In the case of the Navy, sir, the only area where we do not fully meet the panel goals is the number of Air Force officers at our senior course. We have 20 seminars in our strategy and policy curriculum and we have 15 Air Force officers, so I am short 5 Air Force officers from meeting the goal of both—I am closer to actually meeting the panel goal than I am the MEPD goal, but I need 5 Air Force officers to be able to meet both of them.

My service headquarters and the personnel headquarters from the Air Force are working together and I have every expectation that in this next academic year I will have those additional Air Force officers and be able to say then that I fully meet all the goals of both the MEPD and the panel.

General Cerjan. Sir, I have passed to the Department of the Army, and I believe they have passed to JCS my requirements to meet the goals that I have talked about. That is the mix of faculty as well as the mix of students in the seminar room. A request for an additional 18 of each services in the student category, twice the limit to 117, which would be the faculty goal.

So what I have said on the student side, I now have 36 non-Army, I would like to move to 72. I have a willingness to do so, if the JCS can provide the Army the corresponding offset seats in other senior service institutions. So that process is working.

On the faculty side, I need 10 additional other services. I have moved that request also to the Department of the Army and that is working in JCS also. So they are very much aware of it. I might add, this has been a very strong discussion topic at the Military Education Coordinating Committee that has met twice now.

We are very actively pursuing trying to meet the spirit and intent of the panel’s recommendations and at the same time, be able to accommodate the unique service requirements.

Mr. Barrett. Do you have a comment?

General Miller. I would just underscore what has been said. The J-7 of the Joint Staff and, in fact the Vice Director, Joint Staff, have chaired regular meetings of the Military Education Coordina-
tion Conference, and we have the Joint Staff's report helping us meet our needs and helping us work with the other services to meet our needs.

We will increase in the Command and General Staff College. This year we have 80 sister services, 1 per staff group, that will grow to 109 next year, and we want it to grow to 160 in the following year so that we will have 2, 1 sea service and 1 air service, per staff group.

That is under negotiation between the Army and other services at this time. One of the issues is reciprocity in number of seats, because the Army chooses to educate the upper 50 percent, in general, of a particular year group, we have a larger student body and for us to get the same number of seats would overwhelm the Marine Corps School, for example, and the Air Force School, and so forth.

I have a backlog right now of about 1,000 students who have been competitively selected to come to Leavenworth that I am trying to get through the school and find seats for. So for every sister service officer we take and we do not gain an Army seat in their school, that is a lost opportunity for an Army officer as well.

So it is in this balance, in this negotiation arena, that we are working through the Army Staff with the support of the Joint Staff to come to the right outcome.

Mr. Barrett. I assume from what you say that we will be making further progress on faculty. But with respect to student mix, in taking issue with the panel report, you will not be asking for a reallocation of students to increase the mix of students to meet the panel's recommendations. Is that correct?

General Miller. I just spoke to student mix. I am sorry. We are increasing the number of sister service students and the intent is to get 2 per staff group, 1 sea service and 1 air service per staff group, for a total of 160 in our student body at the Command and General Staff College.

General Cerjan. I have stated to Headquarters, Department of the Army, my willingness to take an additional 36 other service students, with the appropriate tradeoff in other service institutions for the Army students. That would give us, in our seminar model, four non-Army students and the other mix which would also give us the 50-percent Army student mix.

Mr. Barrett. You do not have anything to report on progress on that request, on that willingness to increase that?

General Miller. I do not. Other than it is working.

Admiral Strasser. Mr. Barrett, we have told the Air Force we will take the additional five Air Force officers without any tradeoffs in order to get to our goal.

Mr. Barrett. Admiral Strasser, one of the criticisms of the Naval War College is the lack of distinction between the intermediate and senior service courses there. As a result, subjects that do not fall within the realm of operational art, combined arms are included in the command and staff college curriculum. You discuss the similarities and the differences somewhat in your statement. Do you plan to continue to differentiate between those two schools?

Mr. Skelton. Excuse me, probably to make the hearing more interesting, you should ask your green suit counterparts if they...
expect their graduates to have trouble communicating with lesser educated sailors down the stream. I would not do that. The Admiral and I have an interesting discussion on this. We did help you, and will for 2 more years after this, in getting additional student officers. But with that footnote, you may go ahead and answer that question.

Admiral Strasser. Yes, sir.

Mr. Barrett. Could I just add one addition, since the Chairman brought it up. If you look at General Miller's statement, he talks about how the Army Command and Staff College will be shifting its curriculum to study the Philippines, Southwest Asia and Central Europe, lessons learned from the Gulf War, focusing on tactical and operational planning, and execution of combat operations at the division corp and joint task force level. There are other statements in here. The point is that it is difficult to understand how you can have one staff college focusing on that level of knowledge and then the Navy School having courses that, according to GAO and our report, are very similar for both the intermediate and the senior school.

Admiral Strasser. Well, I would say, Mr. Barrett, that since your panel visited, there has been a great effort to differentiate between the two schools and I think we have had a great deal of success in doing that. We do have, as you know well, the same three trimesters at each school.

We have a course in Strategy and Policy, we have a course in National Security Decisionmaking and we have a course in Joint Operations. In the Strategy and Policy course, we now have altered the length. We have 14 weeks of the Strategy and Policy course for the senior course and 12 weeks for the junior course. There are several case studies the seniors get that the juniors now do not get. The Strategy and Policy course has the least amount of differentiation.

In the National Security Decisionmaking course, the course length is about the same, 12 to 13 weeks. But we structure that course so that, for example, in the force planning portion of the course, which is the major portion of it, we teach the intermediate course from the perspective of a component commander of a unified commander. We develop the senior course from the point of a national leader in Washington so the focus of the course is different.

We teach the juniors the problems in force development, defense analysis, and policymaking and implementation, all part of our National Security Decisionmaking course, and how those problems will be looked at by a component commander of a unified commander. For the senior course, we look at it from the Washington level, or the more strategic level.

In the joint operations course, we have again altered the length. We now give the juniors 14 weeks of that course, and seniors 12 weeks. We spend 2 additional weeks with the junior course on the joint military operations. One month of that course is devoted to wargaming. The scenarios are different for the two groups and the problems are presented from a different perspective.

In one war game, the junior course is looking at a problem as a component commander or a joint task force commander in a Euro-
pean scenario. While the senior course deals as a unified commander with a problem in the Pacific, we have another 2-week scenario which is in the Caribbean.

Again, we ask the juniors to focus on the perspective of the joint task force commander, while the seniors take the scenario and work it from the unified commanders perspective. The seniors look at the political military aspects and concerns of outside involvement, including deterrence. They don't focus on what is going on right in the area of the amphibious landing or the area of operations. That is something that the junior course focuses on. The seniors are looking at the more strategic view.

So we have made an effort to differentiate between the courses. Now, I am not going to tell you that there are still not some similarities. There are, for the reasons I mentioned in my statement. We are going to get the average naval officer through the college once. We are only going to get a very, very few of our officers through a service college twice.

Given that fact, we think there are some important enduring principles and strategic lessons that must be mastered. Our course tries to teach our students to think. We think there are certain things that hold regardless of whether it is presented in the junior or senior course. If the person is only going to get that experience once, there are certain things he or she must get. That is why we have these similarities.

With the drawdown in the services that we see, we do not see that situation getting any better. Now we have, we think, a degree of differentiation which is substantial compared to when your panel was there in 1988, and is about right, given where we are in our deployment patterns and the size of our officer corps.

We have roughly 30,000 officers less than the Air Force, despite the fact that we have about 50,000 more enlisted troops. So we do not have the flexibility to be able to send people to a war college twice. Given that fact, we think we are about where we should be.

By the way, Mr. Chairman, in that regard, we are not doing as badly as I had thought, and I think that you had thought, in getting the officers to some kind of PMA. I received statistics yesterday from the Bureau of Naval Personnel that show that, excluding medical and limited duty officers, 45 percent of our 0-6s today have been to a war college.

Forty-five percent of our captains, 22 percent of our commanders and 9 percent of our lieutenant commanders have been to a war college. That is excluding medical and limited duty officers. For an overall total of those categories, 19 percent have been to a war college, which is higher than I thought it was. But that gives you an idea of how many people get there, and why we think we need some similarity in our courses to make sure that those things we want to get across, we do, regardless of which course it gets presented in.

Mr. Skelton. The compliment to the Navy is that we were quite critical of the limited type of individual that you were putting into the various schools. But at the various schools, it is not unusual to see a nuclear engineer type or the other rare breeds. Your predecessors had said this type is too busy to go to school. But that is happening now, and I am sure it is not just your school. I see it...
over here at National War College—I suppose you are sharing that type of individual with General Cerjan here—probably at Fort Leavenworth, also.

General Miller, do you know how much trouble it is to pass an amendment and make a law that spends a considerable amount of money. I had an amendment passed that enabled each of the schools, under title 10, to hire civilian faculty with very little strings attached. Your testimony states that you have not used that. I am not sure how much you are using it General Cerjan, but there is a historic reason for this.

The Navy back in 1956, had an amendment passed, someway; we do not know how. No one knew anything about it until we discovered it in our hearings. They use it and we know that at the beginning of our hearings, their civilian faculty was very high caliber. Is there a reason that you folks hesitate to use that authority?

General MILLER. Yes, sir. The reason is a very practical one. At the moment, we are able to sustain, to have and to hold, the quality of faculty that we need for the intermediate school. I think you need to put it in the perspective of where we are competing as we draw faculty to the Command and General Staff College, with respect to the great academic institutions such as Missouri U, KU, and K State.

The faculty salary structure there in those civilian universities is less competitive with the general schedule under which we hire under title 5. So in fact, the opportunities that we offer a faculty member financially and with career status, under title 5, are very attractive to them in the midwest.

Mr. SKELTON. It does the trick.

General MILLER. If we were competing on the east coast with some of the more expensive universities that have a higher salary structure, title 10. I think, would be an advantage to us and we would certainly use it. We have no philosophical objection to it at all, and we appreciate that flexibility, if we get into a situation where we need it, we will use it.

Mr. SKELTON. I specifically wanted to include all schools, both intermediate and—

General MILLER. Yes, sir. There may come a point in time where it is of particular advantage.

Mr. SKELTON. Senior schools and I hope that you would use it.

General MILLER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. General Cerjan.

General CERJAN. Sir, I mentioned last year that we were extremely appreciative of the panel for the amendment, and we have moved to put that into being. We received this year, in January, the authority from the Department of the Army, after having staffed it through and there are a lot of little things that had to be done, but we have received the authority to move to title 10. We are now in the process of converting 16 of our faculty members to title 10 and in that particular case, I have put in a 5-year grandfather clause because there are some older individuals who are in the General Schedule who really do not see an advantage. Of course, you are talking about change at a very late time in the career for an individual, so that is the reason for the grandfather clause.
But we are in the process of looking at all 16. All 16 have been
told where they will be graded in the process so they understand
how they would transition to the new system. Last year at the
panel, you asked me specifically, “How many civilian faculty I will
hire in the next year and a half?” I told you 5 in order to bring me
up to 18 for the seminar configuration.

I am in the process of hiring one of those individuals now, or at
least going through the recruiting process. For the four additional,
I have asked the Headquarters, Department of the Army, for the
funds to hire those individuals. Of course, with Desert Storm, very
honestly, resources have been tight, so I am hoping that sometime
in the near future I will receive a positive response. I feel I have at
least a 50/50 chance of getting the funds this year to do that.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, gentlemen, I really thank you for being with
us today. I have three closing comments. First, look at MEPD as
pass/fail and look at your performance under the panel reccom-
dendations as being graded. I say that with tongue-in-cheek, but I am
serious along that line.

MEPD in many respects sets a floor and we will continue to hold
the higher standards, because our goal is the same. Should those
uncertainties come to pass, we shall perform as we just saw, with
able decisionmaking leadership. That is your job. When will it
become necessary—who knows, 5 years, 10 years, tomorrow—we
just do not know. That is why you have to pour as much into them
while you have them in the particular schools.

Number two, we see, unfortunately, the cutback in military force
structure over a period of 5 years by some 25 percent because of
the uncertainty in the world. This is being budget driven as op-
posed to commitment and threat driven. But that is the world in
which we live, unfortunately.

If you look back in history, we really hit rock bottom back in the
1920s and 1930s concerning force structure. It was during that era,
for some unknown reason, that the war colleges flourished. We
were able to have and keep in the military, and that is always a
chore for you, people who not only attended those schools, but later
instructed at them. Those students and instructors were the tacti-
ocal operational and strategic thinkers of World War II, thank good-
ness. They had the experience of what you taught them.

So I hope you will join with me when you see financial threats
and cuts coming to the schools that in comparison to other areas,
you all are not expensive. I do not think we can afford to scrimp on
teaching future thinkers and future leaders. I feel very deeply
about that. I would like to see if we are going to have this force
structure cut that is coming to pass—which I deeply feel is
wrong—I would like to see another golden era of military educa-
tion. This leads me to my third point. When you come before a
panel such as this, the flaws are what you are asked about, but you
should know that I am very, very pleased with what I see. These
schools did not start at rock bottom. All of you got pretty good
grades—are you hearing me, grades, General Cerjan— when we had
our initial hearings.

But laying that aside, you have done more than your homework.
I hope that you will take not just our criticisms, our fault finding,
and the fact that you do not live up to one or two of our proposals,
as being devastating to what you are doing. I am really proud of what you are doing. I think in the days and years ahead, your contributions of today and tomorrow will be felt long past your passage in the positions which you now hold. So feel complimented 90 percent, feel scolded 10 percent. But I do want you to know that I and the other members of the panel want to say thank you. I know Mr. Machtley would join my in that as well, but he had to go to another hearing. As we say in Missouri, “You done goo-d.” Just keep it up. Thank you so much.

General Cerjan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Strasser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the panel was recessed.]
PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR JOINT PME

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL,

The panel met, pursuant to notice, at 9:25 a.m., in room 2216, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI. CHAIRMAN. MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL

Mr. SKELTON. Sorry for the delay. We have had reporter technical trouble that has delayed us 25 minutes. I might point out that we like to start on time and end on time. We like to start at 9 and end by 10 because we have other hearings and other matters. I am sorry we have to start later today and I hope that will not be repeated.

I wish to welcome you to this morning's hearing on the Military Education Panel, which is the final one in this series of hearings planned to follow up on the implementation of the panel's recommendations for improving phase I, Joint Professional Military Education of the service schools.

Today, we will hear from the commandants of the Air War and Command Staff Colleges and the Director of the Marine Corps Command and Staff Colleges.

The panel is gratified by many of the actions taken to date by many of the service schools in response to our report. I must, however, point out in the recent General Accounting Office Reports on the service schools, there are still some areas that need to be addressed in order to ensure that phase I, Joint Professional Military Education, meets all the requirements.

I wish to note at the outset that in your testimonies today, there is reference to your complying with the MEPD. That falls into the category of being nice, but that is not the standard we recommended. That is a lesser standard.

I would hope in future testimony, that actions and compliance will not be left to the MEPD, because that falls into the “That's Nice” category. That is a floor. We expect you to meet higher standards now.

The other alternative for us is to put this in legislation, which we can do quite easily, I doubt if there would be a single vote against us doing that. We have done our best to give you all the flexibility not to do that, so I give that to you as a caveat for your future actions.
Mr. Machtley.

STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD K. MACHTLEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL

Mr. Machtley. In the interest of time, I will just state that I look forward to hearing your testimony and I concur with the chairman's remarks that the standard of MEPD is the minimum acceptable standard. It is not something that you should come in, feel good about, beat your chest and say we have complied. Our view of that is that it just gets you in the door.

Thank you.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you. Without further ado, Colonel Vetter, our old friend, we welcome you, sir.

STATEMENT OF COL. DAVID A. VETTER, U.S. MARINE CORPS, DIRECTOR, MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

Colonel Vetter. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the panel and thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to describe the progress the Marine Corps has made in implementing the recommendations of the Military Education Panel concerning Joint Education.

Mr. Skelton. Colonel, may I interrupt you?

Colonel Vetter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Skelton. Because of the time problem that we have, without objection we will ask that the full testimony of each of you gentlemen be placed in the record and if you wish to condense it, feel free to do so.

Colonel Vetter. General Gray, our Marine Corps Commandant, recently noted in his annual report to the Congress that our Nation's military capability is indeed enhanced by a Marine Corps prepared for battle by demanding and comprehensive training and education programs. He said that these programs have institutionalized the qualities that have made Marines what they are. General Gray noted that your Marines are taught not only combat skills, but more important, they are taught to out-think any opponent and to seize and maintain the initiative.

I can report to you this morning that this has indeed been an exciting year at Quantico. In fact, I believe there has been a recent Renaissance period in Marine Corps professional military education that can only be compared to the 1920s and 1930s when the Marine Corps schools were founded at Quantico and the techniques of amphibious warfare were conceived, tested and perfected there.

Our class this year at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College is the largest in history. Our joint and international contingent of 72 officers, more than one-third of the class, is the largest ever, due principally to the fact that the Navy virtually doubled their student input to the college.

We were especially pleased to include our very first civilian student ever at the college—a fine representative from the Defense Intelligence Agency. Based on our successful experience this year, we hope to expand that program next year to also include civilian students from the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security
Agency, the State Department and, we hope, the Coast Guard as well.

As you know, our curriculum was completely restructured last year from a zero base to incorporate substantial education in the strategic and operational levels of war, as well as a fully integrated joint phase I curriculum that replaced a joint track that had been previously offered only on an elective basis to our sister service officers and a small number of Marines.

We also implemented a letter grading system this year at the Command and Staff College. We have now had over a year’s worth of experience with the new curriculum. The feedback, both from external observers and, more importantly, from the students themselves, including a number of those serving in Southwest Asia, is that the curriculum has been dramatically strengthened.

Most of the students whom you addressed, Mr. Chairman, when they graduated last June described their year at the Command and Staff College as a great experience. A significant number of them reported it to be the best year they had ever since they wore a uniform. Our curriculum is now in the refinement stage and we are attempting to make incremental adjustments and improvements to the best of our ability.

In the area of civilian faculty, I can report that our number of civilian professors has quadrupled since before the panel’s visit to Quantico. Of special note, only last week, the Marine Corps approved structure and funding for 10 additional civilian professor positions that we will be able to hire this coming year.

I also wanted to note that we are very pleased that joining our faculty next year as a visiting professor will be Dr. Martin Van Creveld, the noted Israeli historian and renowned scholar, whose works include “Command in War” and “Supply in War” and of special interest, “The Training of Officers.”

We are deeply grateful for the panel’s support relating to title 10 authority and all of its inherent advantages. In the near term, the Schedule B Except Service Hiring Authority has best served our immediate needs, but we have every intention of aggressively pursuing and implementing a title 10 program, as it is clearly the best means of hiring and retaining top quality civilian professors.

In fact, the very next civilian professor I intend to hire, one of his most important duties will be the development of the policies and programs we will need to implement our title 10 system.

Regarding joint military faculty, I can report to you that we are working on a proposal to realign current Army, Navy and Air Force officer positions at Quantico to bring additional non-host military department faculty to the college. I am optimistic that within a matter of weeks, at least, we will be in compliance with the MEPD standards in this area.

Mr. SKELTON. There we go again, Colonel.

Colonel VETTER. I would say, sir, that when the panel visited our college, we had no joint faculty. Now, we have all of our services represented. In this case, we will be doubling that faculty and on our way toward what we hope will be greater representation by all the services.

As part of a landmark PME initiative this year, the college has inaugurated two entirely new schools at Quantico beyond the inter-
mediate level of the professional military education. The School of Advanced Warfighting, a second year program of accelerated development for selected graduates of our Command and Staff College, will specially prepare officers for key positions in high-level joint and combined staff and provide the Marine Corps with officers to shape and meet the needs of the future.

This past July, those second year students were very honored, Mr. Chairman, to spend an entire day with you to discuss the impact of national values during the French and Indian War. They appreciated your invitation to attend the panel’s hearing in the fall regarding low- and mid-intensity conflict curriculums and, of course, they tremendously enjoyed the opportunity to play the Southwest Asia war game with you during your recent visit to Quantico. I think you were very pleased with the educational background and special capabilities they demonstrated during the course of the game.

A version of that strategic and operational level war game, by the way, was played by our Marine General Officers last fall and then again by all of our Command and Staff College students as part of their operational art instruction in November.

Finally, I would note that August 1990 marked the beginning of a new era in Marine Corps professional military education. Perhaps more than any previous educational initiative, the opening of the Art of War Studies demonstrated the conviction, vision and commitment regarding the paramount role professional military education will play in the future of the Marine Corps.

The Art of War Studies is the Marine Corps’ own senior level school for a handful of carefully selected officers who will then serve a 2-year follow-on tour as faculty members at the Command and Staff College after their graduation. This is truly a unique senior level school and faculty development program. The relatively small size of the student body affords certain novel advantages.

As an example, I would cite the fact that we were able to transport all of the students, as well as a portion of the faculty, to the best schoolhouse in the world at the time—our Marine MEF Headquarters in Southwest Asia. All of the students participated in actual operational planning, they observed the entire ground phase of Operation Desert Storm and they will bring greatly enhanced credibility and effectiveness to their performance as they join our faculty this summer and meet our new students.

I should further note that the Art of War Studies next year will also include students from the Army, Navy and Air Force, who will likewise serve on our faculty after their graduation. Thus, after 2 years, we will have 15 graduates of this senior level school on our faculty and I believe it would be difficult to overstate the impact and degree of excellence that they will bring to our PME program at Quantico. I think it is only fair to acknowledge that a good many of these exciting developments at Quantico this year would simply not have come to fruition were it not for the deliberations and impetus provided by the Military Education Panel.

I would note that many of the panel’s recommendations complemented and reinforced the vision and direction that we had already received personally from General Gray, whose staunch support for quality professional military education, as you recall from...
his testimony before this panel, is unsurpassed. We also appreciate
the fine support that has been provided by the Military Education
Division of the Joint Staff.

We have reviewed the GAO report on the implementation status
of selected recommendations contained in the panel report and we
consider it to be a basically fair and accurate assessment of our po-

tion. Similar to the situations in the other intermediate level
schools, the GAO found that the college had partially or fully im-
plemented the vast majority of the recommendations and, in the
case of the very few exceptions, the GAO correctly represented the
rationale that we provided to them.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased and proud to
report on the exciting developments at Quantico this year and we
eagerly look forward to even better and brighter days ahead. Gen-
tlemen, I hope that I have addressed your concerns and I would be
very happy to try to answer any questions you may have.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much. Staying with the Command
Staff level, we would like to have Brigadier General Ford’s testimo-

y.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. PHILLIP J. FORD. COMMANDANT, AIR
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

General Ford, Mr. Chairman, members of the panel, thank you
for this opportunity to address you. We too think we are doing
great and exciting things down at the Air Command and Staff Col-
lege. In the interest of brevity since you do have my testimony, I
will be brief.

In December of 1990, we took an overall new look at everything
ranging from what was in the schoolhouse to what we were teach-
ing. We call this long-range plan 2001, the mission to include a new
mission statement, which we did not feel was serving us in the new
way that we were heading, to include air power at the operational
level, joint warfare and the profession of arms. Over 70 percent of
our curriculum is on warfighting and we think we are producing
skilled planners and practitioners of the multi-service operations.

Thanks to your efforts in the title 10 arena, we are in the process
of hiring more civilian faculty instructors. Last week, I signed up
three new Ph.D.s, two more to go, which we hope to bring on board
soon. We have looked at each one of the areas that the panel re-
commends from student faculty to letter grades, to the training re-
ports to our faculty. We have had over 40 Ph.D. lectures on strate-
gy doctrine to date this year. We frequently have both three and
four stars, both active and retired, to come down to speak to us.

We have also addressed each one of the areas that the panel has
brought forward and the results are reflected by the GAO. To
quote them, “Out of the 31 recommendations applicable to the in-
termediate service school, the school reports that it is taking acts
to implement or partially implement some 30,” which we feel we
have done in good faith and for a 97-percent completion rate and
we feel very happy with those.

I, too, would say that because of the efforts of this panel, we have
increased what I considered to be the overall knowledge of our
people at the field grade officer level. We have gotten a few letters
back from the people who have participated, former graduates, who have participated in Desert Storm. It says, to quote one that particularly caught my attention, "All that stuff that you taught us and that we were forced to read down at your school is playing out, just as predicted." It was kind of amusing that they appeared to be somewhat surprised with that. So, we got a number of those letters back.

Again, in the interest of brevity, I will answer any questions that you may have.
INTRODUCTION

Good morning, Mr Chairman, and thank you for the opportunity to discuss our views on the implementation of the recommendations of your 1989 Report on Military Education.

We have made substantial progress at Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) towards focusing our curriculum at the operational level of warfare and at the same time improving the quality of instruction across the board. In December 1990, we developed a new long-range plan, known as "2001." We took a fresh look at all aspects of PME at ACSC to include our mission statement, curriculum, faculty, students, infrastructure, and associated programs. The purpose of this far-reaching plan was to thoroughly analyze ACSC's current and future direction, thus ensuring that our commitment to warfighting at the operational level, application of airpower, joint concepts, and the profession of arms underpins every area of ACSC.

The 2001 strategy evaluation as well as the GAO's report helped us focus and look ahead as best we could into the future of the Air Force for the way the College could best contribute to our own service, the other services, and the nation. First and foremost, we found that our current mission statement required updating to better focus the school's direction. This new mission statement will reflect the following elements: broadening the professional knowledge of our students, emphasizing the history and values of the profession of arms, the role of air power at the operational level, and the concepts of joint warfare.
I am proud of our curriculum and the direction it is going. It is a solid program, concentrating heavily on the tenets just mentioned. Over 70% of our curriculum is dedicated to warfighting. We believe that a majority of graduates will leave Air University as skilled planners and practitioners of both unilateral airpower employment and integrated, multiservice combat operations. As we continue forward, our goal is to foster higher levels of learning.

To ensure that we continue to attain the higher levels of learning we consistently look at improving our faculty. I have just hired three Ph.D.'s with two more to go. As for the quality and qualification of our military faculty, over 90% have master's degrees and are experts in operational specialties. However, to strengthen our faculty program we are employing a team-teaching concept. The concept ensures that first-year faculty instructors are always teamed with experienced alternates or a pool of subject matter experts. This fusion of faculty members should ensure that higher levels of learning are attained.

Last year, over 600 Air Force majors attended resident ISS, keeping in line with the historical opportunity rate of 18-20%. However, this year, the attendance has been reduced to about 460 because of the change in mission of the Armed Forces Staff College. This lowered the attendance opportunity for this year's group to approximately 14-15%. I believe we have fallen below the minimum rate for resident ISS Air Force graduates. Over the long term this will impact our ability to produce enough officers steeped in Service specific knowledge to fill future Air Force leadership roles. This reduced opportunity becomes even more critical when one realizes that, for over 75% of the Air Force's ISS attendees, it is the last resident PHE they will ever receive.
Since aspects of several recommendations overlap, let me briefly review the issues without referring to specific recommendation numbers.

STUDENT AND FACULTY MIXES

The mix of services both in the student body and on the faculty was the focus of four separate recommendations in two different chapters of the Panel report. We are presently increasing sister service student accessions to comply with the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD) goals of one Army and one sea service student in each of our 44 seminars. Currently, we are short 9 Navy/Marine officers. By this fall, we will have our full complement of 44 sea service officers. We presently comply with the Chairman's MEPD guidance and believe this serves our Air Force requirements well.

LETTER GRADES

With regard to grades, we presently assign three grades to our formal examinations: "Top 20 Percent" for superior performance, the equivalent of an "A"; "Professionally Competent" for satisfactory exams, equal to a "B"; and "Referral" for unsatisfactory exams, comparing to a "C" or below. Those with an unsatisfactory grade are required to remediate the exam and take and pass a retest to demonstrate they have adequate grasp of the material. Mr Jones, in his February testimony, indicated that using this A and B system to represent acceptable performance, with C as failing, is "the practice of most graduate programs." Additionally, our instructors formally evaluate all other student academic activity, to include: seminar, speaking, and writing performance as primary factors in distinguished graduate determination and training report preparation. So even though we don't use actual "letter" grades per se, I
believe our grading of student performance complies with the spirit and intent of your panel's views on evaluation.

TRAINING REPORTS

Along similar administrative lines, we continue to find the Air Force Training Report more adequately suited to assess an officer's effectiveness in the academic environment than the Performance Report. The Training Report is precisely designed to allow us to report academic as well as general performance. Since both are maintained in chronological order in the officer's promotion folder, it continues to make sense to use a form specifically designed for school purposes.

STRATEGY FACULTY

Regarding that portion of the faculty which teaches operational art strategy, I am comfortable with our present lineup of in-house and visiting expertise--to include retired flag officers. Presently we have three Ph.D.'s--all with military experience--working at ACSC, plus ready access to all the professors of Air University. As I mentioned before, we've already hired three new professors and are presently searching for two more. More than 30 different professors have been on our stage this year, presenting over 40 separate lectures, dealing primarily with strategy, doctrine, and operational art. Active duty and retired three- and four-star generals frequently teach at ACSC. Last year, we had presentations from General Thurman, General Schwarzkopf, and Lieutenant General Horner, to name a few. This year, the tradition of distinguished general officer presentations continues with over 10
three- and four-star generals visiting ACSC to date, such as General Joulwan, USCINCSOUTH, and General Gabriel, former CSAF and CINCUSAFFE.

We too have a strong desire to use senior military officers. However, those with the quality we need are also highly sought after by prestigious civilian institutions and businesses. Unfortunately, we are placed at a competitive disadvantage due to our starting salaries and dual compensation restrictions. We ask you to continue your support in helping us to resolve this important issue.

ACADEMY EXCHANGE PROGRAM

We presently have a previous Air Force Academy faculty member at ACSC. However, it will take several years for the individual involved to graduate, teach, and help us evaluate the feasibility of an exchange. For practical reasons, I do not envision any extensive exchange. As an undergraduate academic institution, the Academy has a relatively small military science faculty—all of whom focus on military basics, not military art. Hence, the Academy faculty doesn't represent a sizable pool of candidates for Air Command and Staff College duty.

RETAINING GRADUATES FOR FACULTY DUTY

With regard to faculty development, most of the original Report's recommendations were either already in place or quickly implemented at ACSC. However, the Panel opposed retention of graduates for faculty duty, a practice we retain. In fact, we find selecting the "best of the best" and keeping them in an environment with which they're already familiar, fosters excellence. We agree there may be certain benefits by having a senior faculty, older and one...
grade higher than the students. However, this would require the Air Force to change a wide variety of personnel policies affecting all officer career patterns: promotions, assignments, command opportunities, and sequencing, to name a few. We continue to believe we can provide quality professional military education with the excellent majors we employ on our faculty. In fact, the promotion rate from 0-4 to 0-5 in 1990 was over 95% for ACSC faculty compared to the 64% Air Force-wide average. Granted, this is a compromise, but it's the best way to meet the unilateral needs of the Air Force and the joint arena.

Our Major's faculty indoctrination process includes a thorough course in education theory. We also encourage them to blend their operational expertise with solid education skills. The results, in the classroom, are students who are challenged by extremely talented peers who happen to be on the faculty. So, from our point of view, the question of experience is only part of this issue. In sum, I expect this recommendation to remain "partially implemented" for some time to come.

STUDENT/FACULTY RATIO

We characterize the student/faculty ratio as partially implemented. Given our current size, when all US students, plus our 80 international officers are present, our ratio is 4.4 to 1. However, when the international officers leave each February, it drops to 3.8 to 1. We will continue to strive to lower this ratio with initiatives such as our new civilian faculty hiring.

NONRESIDENT PHASE I JOINT EDUCATION

As a final note, I must address an issue we presently characterize as "implemented." In November 1990, ACSC earned Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff accreditation for nonresident Phase I joint education. This is a provision we must maintain to permit quality officers who might otherwise be selected for joint billets and would require joint training but, for whatever reason, cannot accomplish Phase I in residence. Lacking this safety valve, every Joint Specialty Officer would, in effect, have to be a resident Intermediate Service School graduate. More importantly, the primary intent of Goldwater/Nichols is to increase the number of military officers with a broadened joint perspective.

By pursuing this avenue of Phase I joint education, we have another source of quality officers with an appreciation for jointness to better accommodate the current and future manpower requirements of the joint arena.

This completes my prepared statement.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much. Representing the Air War College is Maj. Gen. Charles Link.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES D. LINK, COMMANDANT, AIR WAR COLLEGE

General LINK. Mr. Chairman and members of the panel, I appreciate this opportunity to address you on our activities at the Air War College during the past year. Again, in the interest of brevity, I will just make a few introductory remarks.

Those of us presently charged with the responsibility for professional military education have benefited from the attention of your panel and the resulting focus on these activities throughout the military establishment. For this, we are grateful. In this regard, the Air War College has made significant progress in the past year, as we continue to review and refine our program in order to ensure the best possible educational experience for our students.

In my personal remarks, I cite specific improvement in organization, objective orientation, curriculum development, faculty recruiting, making good use of the title 10 authority supported for us, faculty development and evaluative measurements.

As I stated in my prepared remarks, the Air War College continues to work at improving its curriculum and its faculty as we strive to produce the very best possible future leaders. These officers are the best of the best, and we are confident in the continuing value of the contribution of the U.S. Air Force to the common defense. These are the leaders who will develop and execute the strategy of the future.

We continue to enjoy the enthusiastic and wholehearted support of our Air Force Secretary, the Chief of Staff, and the Commander of Air University in these endeavors. Mr. Chairman, we look forward to having you with us on 20 May during our concentrated look at the Desert Shield and Desert Storm operations. Thank you again for giving me this opportunity and I am prepared for any questions.
Introduction

Mr. Chairman and members of the panel, I appreciate this opportunity to address you on our activities at the Air War College during the past year. I believe the events over the last eight months have made abundantly clear the value we must attach to professional military education to prepare our nation's military leadership for future challenges to American security interests.

Those of us presently charged with the responsibility for professional military education have benefited from the attention of your panel and the resulting focus on these activities throughout the military establishment. For this we are grateful. In this regard, the Air War College has made significant progress in the past year, as we continue to review and refine our program in order to insure the best possible educational experience for our students. I will cite specific improvements in organization, objective orientation, curriculum development, faculty recruiting and development, and evaluative measurement in these brief introductory comments.

In order to establish a common understanding, let me state at the outset that the Air War College uses as its benchmark, the standards defined in the Chairman's policy guidance to all PME schools contained in the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD). This document draws heavily on the recommendations of your panel, the results of the Long...
Committee and the JCS Initial Certification Group, and implements the Chairman's statutory responsibility to establish policy for the coordination of professional military education.

Organization

You may remember, Mr. Chairman, that you have been briefed, during last year's panel sessions, and during your visit to Air University in March of last year, on our plan to divide the academic year roughly in half, and to organize into two academic departments, Strategy and Forces, and Warfare Studies. Our implementation of this plan over this academic year has persuaded us that further adjustment is necessary. From an organizational perspective, the range of topics which compose an appropriate system of studies at the war college level simply do not fall neatly into one or the other of two departmental entities. For that reason, the intrinsic logic and coherence of subject matter necessary for the development of strong departmental identities was missing. Without strong, internally consistent departmental entities, we were concerned with the overall long term strength of the college as a whole. This lack of clear departmental identity also complicates the problem of projecting an ordered and rational progression of studies throughout the year from the perspective of the student. We are proud of the way we have executed our curriculum this year, but it has been more of a struggle than it should be.
In close and frequent consultation with LGen Boyd, the Commander of Air University, and working with our new civilian dean, Dr. Chuck Davis, and his faculty, we have developed an organizational construct based on three departments and a trimester approach for next year. During the first trimester, the Department of Military Studies will use military history to introduce and define the principles and concepts which have characterized mankind's search for military security. In the second trimester, the Department of National Security Studies will concentrate on the processes of national security, the allocation and management of resources, comparative approaches to national security management, and the relationships of the actors and agents involved. In the third trimester, the Department of Military and Warfare Studies will focus on the operation, the day to day pursuit of US national security interests around the world, and the employment of military forces in simulated conflicts ranging from support of foreign internal defense, to regional or theater warfare, to global confrontation. As you can see, we now have an overarching construct which guides our year effort along the logical path of Principles, Processes, and Application.

In the intense internal debates which led to the adoption of this trimester approach, it became increasingly obvious to many of us that our traditional treatment of a number of fundamentally important topics, such as leadership, strategy, and doctrine, which we presented as specific blocks of instruction, was inadequate for our purpose.
For example, if we attempted to complete our study of strategy as a topic during the first trimester, how did we relate the impact of resource constraint, or change in threat during the second or third trimesters? With this new perspective, we are better able to understand the difficulty of teaching leadership, as a further example, in an early block of instruction, to a group of students who understand quite clearly that their very presence at the War College attests to their well developed talents for leadership.

Our solution to this problem is the establishment of themes which will focus our educational efforts throughout the year. We have established themes of strategy, doctrine, leadership, political-military integration, technology, and airpower for the academic year which begins this August. Each theme will be introduced, defined, and framed in historical context during the first trimester. The second trimester will develop relationships among the themes and to other factors of the processes of national security management. In the third trimester, the focus will be on further developing and confirming the student's understanding of the themes through application to strategic and operational simulations and case studies.

Objective Orientation

Our efforts over the past year have reinforced the fundamental importance of maintaining an objective orientation. Many winds have blown on the college in the past few years, and in an honest and
commendable effort to satisfy the perceived concerns of others, those involved most directly in the conduct of college affairs shifted their focus more and more to process and less and less to objective. When we are unsure of our destination, almost any path will do.

We have worked hard over the past year to reestablish a focus on understanding what we do and why we do it. We are working to articulate specific objectives for every college activity, from specific learning objectives to student oriented trimester and year end goals. This is not easy work but it must be done. We cannot control what we cannot measure; and we cannot measure that for which we have not established clear and achievable objectives.

Curriculum Development

Our focus on objective has favorably influenced curriculum development practices. Careful definition of year-end, then trimester, then course, then block, then lesson objectives focuses our efforts on a coherent and rational curriculum process. Without some overarching structure such as "principles, process, and application", there is a natural tendency for each teacher to try to include in his or her block of instruction everything he or she believes is important to the student. The result is a "packed" curriculum with redundancies and inconsistencies which may go unnoticed by the faculty but are all too visible to the student. The combination of overarching structure and objective orientation produces a rational and progressive
coherence which is important to our highly motivated and demanding student body.

Faculty Recruiting and Development

A first rate education is not possible without a top quality faculty. In this regard, I believe, the Air War College has made extraordinary progress. Of particular significance is our civilian hiring initiative.

Historically, the Air War College has employed 7 to 9 civilians at the PhD level on our teaching faculty. As you can imagine, in a college of about 250 students, normally organized into 20 seminars, this academic expertise was spread pretty thin. With your support, Mr. Chairman, in changing the statutory provisions, and with the support of the Commander of Air University and our Chief of Staff in providing the necessary funding, we obtained additional authorizations for a total of 6 visiting (Intergovernmental Personnel Act), and 14 tenure-track positions. These 20 civilian PhD professor positions now make up over one-third (20/49 or 41%) of our teaching faculty. We began our hiring process last year and were able to attract a number of high caliber individuals. We left a few positions vacant rather than hiring applicants with less than the desired qualifications. Our policy in that regard has been validated by the larger number of
highly qualified applicants we have been able to interview this year. It looks like we will be able to fill nearly all our positions this year.

One of the approaches recommended to me has been to increase the number of PhD holding military faculty members. Frankly, such an approach held greater appeal for me early in my Air University experience than it does now. With almost two years of watching this process, I understand that when a civilian professor stands before an audience of military students, he is accepted for what he is, an academic expert on the topic at hand. They listen. On the other hand, put him in uniform, give him the same academic qualifications, and they will tend to wonder what he has flown, how many he has commanded and so forth. Our profession is such that very few officers are able to progress through the kinds of jobs which are necessary to operational credibility and still find the time to complete the requirements of the doctoral degree. For these reasons, I have placed emphasis on hiring military officers with proven operational credentials, emphasizing successful experience in command and service and/or joint headquarters first, and doctoral academic credentials second.

Our experience this past year, in blending the military and civilian faculty has been absolutely outstanding. The two components of our faculty complement each other superbly, each enriching the other's experience, and the students reap the benefits.
We have developed an aggressive internal faculty development program. We precede each academic period with a faculty workshop that emphasizes the educational objectives of the lesson and reviews suggested teaching techniques and methodologies. Also this year we tested a new concept of workshop in our Joint Fundamentals course. The teaching faculty held practice seminars using the actual course materials and working through the lessons as envisioned by the course author. I participated in these practice sessions and was impressed with the utility of the concept. We plan to expand the practice next year.

Of course, our civilian faculty is deeply engaged in scholarly research and other professional activities, adding a further dimension to our program of faculty development. Our experience over the past year leads us to believe that our military faculty will continue to be drawn into this scholarly activity to the benefit of everyone involved.

**Evaluative Measurement**

During this last year, I established an Office of Evaluation which reports directly to me. We are building a program that evaluates our curriculum, our faculty, and our students on a continuing basis. Our goal is to understand objectively how well our curriculum was developed, taught, and learned; to identify weaknesses
for management attention, and to identify strengths to emulate and repeat. Of course, we can only measure against the educational objectives we have established. To ensure our objectives are appropriate, we actively seek comment from a variety of external sources including the Air Force's senior leadership, previous Air War College graduates, and others such as our board of visitors. Throughout the year, classmembers and faculty rate the curriculum and offer recommendations for improvement. This feedback, when combined with results of student evaluations, provides a useful measure of curriculum effectiveness and helps us to continually refine our curricular materials.

The faculty's effectiveness in the classroom is evaluated by the students and supervisors. We solicit candid feedback from the classmembers to provide our teachers useful information upon which to base individual improvement efforts. Supervisors also analyze these results in light of their own observations, noting trends and areas for increased emphasis during faculty development.

Classmember evaluation at the Air War College provides another measure of our mission success and helps to indicate the extent to which specific educational objectives have been achieved. Recognizing that there is an inherent subjectivity in evaluating higher levels of learning on extended response essay examinations (such as those requiring the ability to analyze or offer alternative solutions to problems), we have developed procedures that improve grader
objectivity—an essential element in assuring that evaluations are fair and provide useful feedback to the institution and the individual. These procedures involve careful construction of examination rationale, establishment of an acceptable range of response criteria, the identification of the characteristics of superior and inferior responses, and the use of multiple graders.

The increased objectivity results in a more honest appraisal of success, which is invaluable for both the institution and the individual. The level of understanding demonstrated by the aggregate student body provides the course developers and senior leadership of the college a useful indication of the extent to which educational objectives were achieved. Discontinuities between intended outcome and actual performance are more easily identified, and areas in need of increased attention become evident. From the student's perspective, increased confidence in the objectivity of the grading process increases the acceptance (and the likelihood of internalization) of the resulting feedback.

Student/Faculty Mixes and Ratios

I want to inform the panel of our progress in meeting the student/faculty mixes and ratios as set forth in the MEPO. This year we have at least one Army student in each of our 18 seminars, but have
had only 16 of the desired 18 sea service students. We project 20 seminars next year and expect 20 Army students, and 21 (15 Navy, 5 Marine, and 1 Coast Guard) sea service students.

On the faculty side, we require two additional sister service officers to meet the MEPD standards of "a minimum of 10% from each non-host military department with a combined total of no less than 25% from the non-host military departments." We are working with the other services to correct this problem.

Our student faculty ratio is 250:64 or 3.9:1 this year. Our projected ratio for next year is 253:72 or 3.5:1, which is the MEPD standard.

Other Topics

Mr. Chairman, at your request the GAO conducted an audit of the Air War College during the period from July to December 1990 to determine the level of our implementation of your panel's recommendations. The GAO found that we had implemented or partially implemented 29 of 32 applicable recommendations. I would like to address the three that we have not implemented at this time.

The first recommendation requires the use of officer performance reports in place of the training reports presently in use. We believe that the training report is better suited to the school environment.
and is as effective as the performance report, which as you know, is designed to rate a person's performance in a specific duty. I might add that the training report does become a permanent part of the officer's record, presently filed in chronological order between the previous and the following performance reports.

The second recommendation deals with the feasibility of improving the faculty by using members of the service academy faculties on an exchange basis. Although we currently have several former Air Force Academy faculty members at the college, we do not have such an exchange program. These former Academy faculty members have accumulated valuable practical experience between their tours at the Air Force Academy and the assignment here. Considering the very different focus of our educational programs, and my previously mentioned desire for military faculty with substantive operational experience, we do not believe that a significant enhancement to our faculty would result from such an exchange.

The third recommendation deals with establishing a distinguished graduate (DG) program. I can tell you with great certainty that the establishment of a DG program at the Air War College last year would have been a disaster. If, in the selection of 10% of a class for special recognition, you are seen by the remaining 90% to be incapable of reasonable discrimination, then your act causes more institutional damage than can be balanced by any potential benefit. Our ability to select the right 10% depends on the extent to which we
can objectively measure their contribution over the 10 months we have them. There must be wide acceptance of the appropriateness and the objectivity of the criteria if such a program is to bring added value. A year ago, the lack of perceived objectivity would have doomed a DG program to failure. During this year we have worked hard on achieving an objective orientation, and at the end of this academic year I will meet with my staff to revisit the DG program decision. I ask your understanding, Mr. Chairman, of our position in this regard. If we were to institute a DG program at the Air War College before we could be certain that the individuals recognized had not earned the enmity or the disdain of their peers, we would be irresponsibly damaging our institution; perhaps, even, rewarding behavior that we would otherwise like to discourage in our senior officer corps.

A Final Observation

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make an observation based on my experience at the Air War College over the past year. I want to focus on the issue of passive/active learning, an area where the faculty of the Air War College responded vigorously to your panel's recommendation. As a matter of fact, the college dean mandated in his written guidance for the academic year we are now executing, a specific reduction of time spent in our auditorium to no more than 1/3 of total contact hours for each course. I learned this upon inquiring as to the absence of a discussion opportunity following a presentation in the auditorium by Col Harry Summers. Further inquiry revealed that
presentations by Generals Curt LeMay and Pete Quesada, scheduled in previous years, had been deleted in our effort to comply with "guidance." Question and answer sessions which would normally follow presentations by such notables as Dr Phoebe Marr, Dr Richard Millet and others had been deleted for the same reason (or lack of reason). In this kind of "bookkeeping" environment I detected, even, some initial resistance to assembling the class for a lecture by John Keegan.

Based on my experience this year, I would argue that the ratio of passive/active learning is not, in and of itself, a useful measure of the quality of an educational program. More importantly, I would argue that the recommendations of prestigious and influential panels such as yours are better focused more on the objective than the process. We have very good people on our faculties at the War Colleges, but if we give them very specific process oriented guidance they will forget to notice what it was that they started out to do in the first place.

Our guidance to the faculty who are developing the curriculum for next year is to consider carefully the cost of assembling our highly engaged student body in the auditorium and the cost of transporting and paying a guest speaker. The faculty member whose lesson requires a guest speaker should be prepared to justify the costs in terms of the unique contribution of a specific speaker to the desired learning objective of the lesson at hand.
Conclusion

As I stated in my introduction, the Air War College continues to work at improving its curriculum and its faculty as we strive to produce the very best possible future leaders. These officers are the best of the best, and we are confident in the continuing value of the contribution of the United States Air Force to the common defense. These are the leaders who will develop and execute the strategy of the future.

We continue to enjoy the enthusiastic and wholehearted support of our Air Force Secretary, the Chief of Staff, and the Commander of Air University in these endeavors.

Mr. Chairman, we look forward to having you with us on 20 May during our forum to study the successful Desert Shield and Desert Storm operation. Thank you again for giving me this opportunity.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much. I appreciate all of you coming and your testimony. Needless to say, I am pleased with the progress that we have seen in yours and other schools as the result of this panel’s work.

I want to comment on the Air Force’s guest lecture program. Each of us has been a guest lecturer and been invited to your various War Colleges throughout our country, which all of us enjoy. But you upped us one by having as your guest lecturer the President of the United States the other day. We will try to make up for that somehow.

Colonel Vetter, it was an absolute thrill to be with you on those two occasions and I think the record should reflect the fact that the war games that we did were followed by General Schwarzkopf quite successfully. We were just paving the way for him.

Mr. Machtley.

Mr. MACHTLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, the Nation and the world has been very proud of our military services. Anything that we are doing here in no way should be reflected as adverse criticism of what you are doing or of what our military is doing in general. I think this panel, this Congress and certainly the Nation appreciate the success which you have just enjoyed and which we, the members of the Armed Services Committee, vicariously have enjoyed.

However, it’s too easy to rest on our laurels and we have to keep moving forward. The panel made some good recommendations and the purpose of these hearings is to see where we are and if we can’t move forward, rather than to determine why we can’t. In that regard, I looked at your formal statements and it is not clear to me whether there are any former flag officers currently full time on either of your faculties.

Colonel Vetter. Not at Quantico, sir.

General Link. Only me, sir.

Mr. Machtley. I mean former.

General Link. No, sir, none at all.

Mr. Machtley. Is that just because you cannot entice them to come and teach at your price or is it that you do not have a role for them or why is it?

Colonel Vetter. We, of course, do utilize them extensively, sir, in our guest lecture program and beyond even random occasions, for example, the capstone academic experience for the year we feature Operation Dewey Canyon, one of the most successful Marine operations in the Vietnam war. We invite this year, as we did last year, all of the commanders from the Corps level down to the company. We use them extensively.

However, at Quantico the civilian faculty positions are relatively new, as I mentioned. When the panel visited, we only had one at that time. We will be filling 10 positions this year and we will advertise those positions as widely as we can and if the applicants falling in that category would seem to be the most attractive to us, we certainly would be happy to hire them and bring them to our faculty.

At this point, I have not had any applications from retired officers.
Mr. Machtley. Are you going to seek retired flag officers or are you going to just hope that someone reads—my question is, are you out there seeking flag officers or do you just not want them?

Colonel Vetter. Again, we bring them to the college as often as possible, sir.

Mr. Machtley. I am talking about full-time faculty.

Colonel Vetter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Machtley. I understand you have a good guest lecture program.

Colonel Vetter. We will use every means that we can to advertise those programs, sir. Scholarly journals, word of mouth, through the chain in the Marine Corps, there certainly would be no objection.

Mr. Machtley. I am not asking for objection. I am asking do you want them on your faculty, yes or no?

Colonel Vetter. Yes, sir, if they are the most qualified individuals.

Mr. Machtley. Air Force?

General Link. I would say we want them on our faculty too. On the other hand, I cannot give you a record of having sought them. At this point, we have been concentrating primarily on increasing the number of Ph.D. level, civilian academicians.

We also enjoy the presence of, at this time, three retired General officers on our Board of Visitors. As I think you know, sir, we have the joint flag officer warfighting course, which is largely mentored by retired General officers. We do take advantage of those General officers to participate in our curriculum.

Mr. Machtley. Last week, I made a telephone contact with a retired Air Vice Marshal who is presently employed by the Smithsonian. I received a letter and it is in my briefcase presently. We are looking at trying to agree on the money and, quite frankly, that is going to be part of our problem, to see if it can meet his own personal needs.

So, I think the answer to your question is yes. We certainly would enjoy having those folks down there. But then it becomes a matter of economics, whether or not we are going to have the capability of hiring in that capacity.

Mr. Machtley. Now, as I understand, the Marines have one civilian, but your testimony says you have quadrupled?

Colonel Vetter. We have 4, sir, at this time.

Mr. Machtley. You have 4 and you hope to have 10 additional?

Colonel Vetter. We will add 10 this coming year. That funding for instructors has been authorized and we hope beyond that there will be two more, sir.

Mr. Machtley. What percent would that be of your total faculty?

Colonel Vetter. Our total faculty right now at the Command Staff College itself is 28, those we count as faculty. When we include the other 2 schools, 34, in our second year program and our senior level school. So, we are moving toward a model in which we would have in each of our 12 seminar groups a sort of a team approach, a military faculty advisor alongside a civilian Ph.D.

Mr. Machtley. On the Air Force side, I would ask the same question. What is your number of civilians and what is your per-
cent of graduates on the faculty and do you intend, as a policy, to change that or is that something you intend to keep?

General LINK. I will have to look for the percent of graduates; it is not very high. We worked this year with 15 Ph.D. level civilians. We have hired 2 additional and we have a firm commitment from a third and sufficient applicants to persuade me that we will fill out our full compliment of 20 before we begin the next academic year.

Our experience this year has been a good one in that we have had more than one applicant for every position we have held open. That wasn’t the way it was a year ago. As a matter of fact, a year ago we chose to leave five positions unfilled, rather than hire beneath the quality level that we were looking at.

But the word is getting out that it is a good place to work. So, we were able to be selective in filling those positions with very good people.

Mr. MACHTELY. I am sorry. What was the percentage of civilians?

General LINK. I will look that up for you.

[The following information was received for the record:]

As stated earlier, we have 15 civilian professors presently assigned. That number represents 30 percent of our authorized teaching faculty. When we reach our objective of 20 civilian professors, that number will constitute 41 percent of our faculty.

With regard to the question on the number of graduates we retain as faculty, three officers of the class of 1990 were assigned to resident faculty this year. In addition to these three officers, six officers were assigned as command chairs from the class of 1990 as part of a continuous program to ensure active liaison between Air Force Major Commands and the College. Each year, the commanders of the major commands designate officers to attend the Air War College resident program and then to fill the “command chair” position as a representative of that command for the following year. The command chair program provides valuable connectivity with the operational Air Force and we intend to continue it for the foreseeable future.

Mr. SKELTON. You can bet in the interest of time assuming that someone will ask about letter grades. Mr. Pickett.

Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, as I understand the focus of what we are talking about this morning is the impact on your respective schools, bringing them into some degree of conformity with the Military Education Policy Document.

I would like to hear from you of what you see individually as the impact on your schools: how the students are reacting, how the faculty is reacting and whether or not you see these changes as favorable or unfavorable for the long-range future of your respective schools.

You can comment on the issue of grading and distinguished graduate programs and progress, if you want.

Colonel VETTER. Sir, I think the impact of the panel deliberations, as well as our Military Education Policy document, is clearly viewed by our students in a favorable light.

I noted in my testimony our reactions from our students last year. I would put them on sort of a bell curve. On one end of the spectrum, a few students said we had a good year and we recognize the changes that were made and they did.

Congressman Skelton visited us last year and spent the entire day and I briefed the students and shared with them the panel’s assessment of the Marine Corps Staff College, when they visited several years ago. We all shared a chuckle about that, given the
changes that had occurred since the panel had visited. The great majority of the students indicated they had a great year and a good number of the students indicated it was the best year they had had since they had worn a uniform.

That has been reinforced by the letters, the comments we have received this year on the evaluations that we sent to last year’s students, and the unsolicited letters that we have received, including letters from some of those students in the Gulf.

I think it is clearly recognized that major strides have been made in military education by our students, by our faculty and by the Marine Corps in general.

Mr. Pickett. General Link.

General Link. Sir, I moved to the War College from the Air Command and Staff College last year in May, so I had a brief period of time in which to take the pulse of the class who had already spent 8 months in school by that time. As I compare last year’s class to this year’s class, and I do it against two really different programs at the War College, the latter one being more fully impacted by the renaissance in PME, I am very pleased with the result.

A large part of that I attribute directly to the panel’s interest. Some of it has to do with the need at the school level to go back and understand what it is we are about and what it is we should be doing and it is the thing that I referred to as an objective orientation.

When we impose change at the school, it has to be rational. It has to fit in the construct of the school that the students are comfortable with. They have to see it as useful and because we have a very sophisticated set of folks there, they have to see it as useful and worthwhile. From that regard, I think it is working out.

Mr. Pickett. I noticed in the case of your school there were several of the guidelines that you had not yet complied with. Do you want to comment on those three?

General Link. Yes, sir. The recommendation to use a performance report instead of a training report. A performance report is designed to measure duty performance in a specific responsibility; the training report is designed to measure academic accomplishment. We continue to use the training report.

I think it should be of interest that the training report is filed in the same folder as officer training reports and it will be between the individual’s last duty performance and his next, when that folder is reviewed for assignment or promotion purposes. We continue to use the training report as a matter of Air Force policy.

There was a recommendation for us to establish an exchange program with the faculty of the Air Force Academy and we have looked at that and are unable to find equivalent kinds of experience or backgrounds that are useful at the senior level PME school. The academy has more of a general education in a military environment, while we have more of a military education. So, this does not seem to hold out any advantages for us.

The last recommendation, which we have not implemented is a distinguished graduate program. In May of last year, I found too little objectivity in the evaluation process to persuade me that if we were to identify some percentage of officers as being an academ-
ic cut above the rest, that there would be broad consensus among their peers that those would be the right officers.

That gives me a problem because it harms the school's credibility that we worked hard over the past year to develop. We are looking for a passion for objectivity. I think we have, at best, some respect for objectivity, but it is driving the whole school down a very healthy road.

This summer I will sit down with my faculty and review where we are and make a decision with respect to a distinguished graduate program.

Mr. Pickett. OK, General.

General Ford. To answer your question about the panel's impact on our school, having been a 1978 graduate of the Air Command Staff College, I think the impact has, in fact, been dramatic.

In fact, we were, in my opinion——

Mr. Pickett. Good or bad?

General Ford. In a positive vein, sir. We were probably seeking a level of what was our identity. We were SOS or company officer's grade 2 and our Air Command War College, No. 1. So, we were really caught in between in the way that our curriculum was flow-

Since the changes of the panel, and our own initiatives, we have, in fact, made an outstanding difference for the better. Our students are prepared to be warfighters and to do those things that, quite frankly, the Air Force hadn't focused on previously.

For some of your specific questions about the letter grades, we, in fact, have letter grades, albeit they are not A, B, C. We have a DG Program, which is quite extensive, which is one of the things we have tried to include. Not only does the faculty rate the people to obtain DG status, which is the top 10 percent, but we also allow their peers to rate them, which we think is equally important. You can make 100 on a quiz, but you may not have the leadership capa-

cibilities necessary to go forward in the right manner.

The difference in our letters grades—we have a top 20 percent, a professional competent and a referral, similar to that of a graduate level course, where the top 20 percent equals the equivalent to an A, the professional competent is satisfactory or equivalent to a B and referral is C or below.

I share General Link's view about the training report and I think, for what it does for the time, the individual is in the academic environment, means that it is part of the permanent record. I think it serves and meets our purposes.

Mr. Machtley. Were you the commandant at the school at the time that the Distinguished Graduate Program was implemented?

General Ford. No, sir. The Distinguished Graduate Program has been implemented for the last 20 years.

Mr. Machtley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Skelton. Let us run over these grading systems again, if we may. Mr. Pickett will recall when we initially did our hearings, in our first report, the Navy War College the most impressive. No question about it. This, of course, was a few years ago and, needless to say, they had difficult, better grades. Since that time, we have urged other schools to give grades.
Let us run down the line again. Colonel Vetter, do you grade and do you have a Distinguished Graduate Program?

Colonel Vetter. Yes, sir. We implemented a letter grading system this year and we have a Distinguished Graduate Program. This is its third year, sir.

Mr. Skelton. General Ford, you have a system whereby you call the top 20 percent having had superior performance. That would probably be an A for professionally competent, or for satisfactory exams it would be a B. Unsatisfactories would seem to be a C or below, is that correct?

General Ford. That's correct, sir.

Mr. Skelton. But you don't give the letter grades?

General Ford. No, sir, we do not.

Mr. Skelton. Why not?

General Ford. Sir.

Mr. Skelton. Why not? What is the difference in what you call superior performance? The fellow knows he has received an A. Why not?

General Ford. I think it is just a matter of semantics, Mr. Chairman. Those people who are, in fact, in a 20 percent have gone through an intensive, comparative ranking against the norm and against the peers with the papers and the essays: four essays tests, eight tests at the end.

Mr. Skelton. Do you have a Distinguished Grade Program?

General Ford. Yes, sir, we do. It is the top 10 percent.

Mr. Skelton. That's the top 20 percent?

General Ford. No, sir. The top 10 percent.

Mr. Skelton. So, you split the top 20 percent in half, even though all of them received an A. The top 10 percent are the distinguished graduates?

General Ford. Sir, as a I alluded to in the beginning, to obtain distinguished graduates, you have a series of wickets, if you will, to include examinations to include peer rating, to include the rating from the faculty instructor, to include the rating from the squadron commander, and also at the end, I can vote, should I find somebody who has been an exceptional performer.

But the Distinguished Graduate Program takes in both sides, not only the academic part of it, but the leadership part of it. The top 20 percent has to do with the grading of the examinations. For the eight tests, you can make the top 20 percent in one, but not the top 20 percent in the other. It depends whether you had a good day or a bad day or whether you studied or you did not study.

Mr. Skelton. Now, General Link, at the Air War College, you are still mulling this over, is that correct?

General Link. No, sir. We have a grading system, but they are not letter grades. We have a spread of five grades from superior to excellent to satisfactory to marginal to unsatisfactory.

Mr. Skelton. You, in essence, have A, B, C, D and F, is that correct?

General Link. Yes, sir, we do.

Mr. Skelton. But you don't call it that?

General Link. No. I think we have a fairly good reason not to. For those students who have been involved in graduate school programs, for example, we gave 55 percent of our students a satisfac-
tory grade, which would have been a C. For those students who are familiar with graduate school programs, that would have been very difficult for them to take. From my experience, we wind up in most graduate school programs, giving mostly As and Bs. Cs are fairly unsatisfactory performance.

By using this spread, we can discriminate fairly thoroughly and focus over time on which students are weak across the board, on which students are weak in a particular area, and we know where to focus our remediation effort.

Mr. Skelton. I am trying to recall, General. I think you folks promised to have a rating system hearing last year, is that not correct?

General Link. I believe General Reed said we had a rating system at that time, which we did.

Mr. Skelton. Let me ask you this. You say you are still mulling over the distinguished graduates, is that correct?

General Link. Yes, sir.

Mr. Skelton. Assume General Horner picks up the phone from Saudi Arabia and he says to send him your three top graduates today. Could you do that?

General Link. Yes, sir, absolutely.

Mr. Skelton. So, what is the problem with this Distinguished Graduate Program? Would not those three be the same?

General Link. Yes, sir. But I would not ask all the students to come into the auditorium and say that today I was sending the best three of them to work for General Horner and point them out, because there would be a range of opinion that would prevail as to whether or not I had picked the best three.

Please understand, sir, I do not oppose the idea of a Distinguished Graduate Program, but what I want is—

Mr. Skelton. What you want is a Distinguished Graduate Program where everybody in the class is going to say that you did the right thing.

General Link. No, sir. I just want to avoid the possibility of picking officers who have earned either the disdain or the concern of their fellow officers over the year. If I do not have an objective evaluation program in place that measures more things than just academic grades, I think that possibility is there.

Mr. Skelton. Are you throwing popularity into the equation as to whether someone is a distinguished graduate or not? I doubt if Douglas MacArthur would win any of those on a popularity basis.

General Link. I think at the level we operate that we can count on a peer evaluation to assess subjective qualities of leadership and interpersonal skills as well.

Mr. Skelton. I think, General, we are going to have to do some continued visiting in the days ahead.

General Link. All right, sir.

Mr. Skelton. I look forward to doing it.

General Link. Yes, sir.

Mr. Skelton. Does the Air Force or the Marine Corps have any plans or have you even thought about the idea of instituting entrance exams for your intermediate school? Colonel Vetter?
Colonel Vetter. We currently do not use an entrance examination for any of our schools, sir. In the near future, I can say we do not anticipate doing so.

Mr. Skelton. You do not?
Colonel Vetter. No, sir.

Mr. Skelton. How do they get there?
Colonel Vetter. In the case of our intermediate level students, sir, they are selected by our assignment personnel, those determined best suited for attendance at intermediate level schools, our senior level students, are board-selected.

Mr. Skelton. They look at their past records, is that correct?
Colonel Vetter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Skelton. Say that this gentleman or this lady is qualified?
Colonel Vetter. Yes, sir.

Mr. Skelton. How about you, General Link?
General Link. If you are asking about the intermediate school—

Mr. Skelton. Excuse me, then I will get to the War College. General Ford?

General Ford. Sir, in the 2001 study, we, as a faculty, looked at the process of grading our people as they entered to Air Command Staff College. Having said that, what we find is that heretofore we have not held our people somewhat responsible to be at a certain level when they enter. We have people who enter in at a lower level of knowledge about warfare, and we have people who enter at a higher level of warfare knowledge. So, we somewhat have to structure our curriculum to meet those demands.

The way that you are selected presently in a resident's course is based upon your previous record and your previous education and experience, your aeronautical rating in your professional area, your current projected Maj. Com. assignment, what you are projected to do upon graduation, other formal military education and also school preference, whenever we try to factor that in. The bottom line is that the Major Commands recommend those people who come to our college.

As far as the testing program, you could certainly increase the depth of your curriculum, if you had people establish when they walked in the door that they were at a similar level of knowledge, but currently today that is not the case.

Mr. Skelton. How about on the senior level, General Link?

General Link. No, sir. We don't have an entrance program. As I think you know, our students are selected on the basis of their record of performance to date and the assumption that they have some potential for senior leadership positions within the Air Force and throughout the defense establishment.

I might point out, sir, in our student body we could develop roughly three groups of officers. I would say the core group are those officers whose kinds of experience and records of success indicate to us that they are possibly the Eisenhowers and the Marshalls of the next decade.

Then in a slightly larger group, I would include those technical-oriented officers whose informed expertise is important to the success of the missions of the first group: combat engineers, maintenance kind of people, supply people. It is very important that those
two groups are educated together, so that they understand how each other thinks and what each of them brings to that process.

By the time we put everybody in those two groups, we still have some people left in the class. Those people are folks whose sympathetic understanding of the activities of the first two groups is in the long-term interest of the institution.

If we were trying to apply an entrance exam, it would be difficult to find the level at which we would write that exam and still continue to bring a representative number across the Air Force to PME, so it becomes a philosophical question. Are we only educating the core warfighters or are we educating all the officers who might assume senior leadership positions in their respective specialties.

General Ford. Mr. Chairman, could I follow up with that just a second?

Mr. Skelton. Yes, sir.

General Ford. One of the things, like General Link says, is the mix when those people come to our particular school. The interaction and the learning level that happens is phenomenal.

You get the support officer who comes, who has no idea what the F-16 pilot does, and, conversely, you get the F-16 pilot who doesn't have any appreciation for some of the support activities. I get that comment a large percentage of the time, that the benefit of the school was to learn what other people in their Air Force do.

For the first 10 years of our career, we are basically oriented along one single channel, whether that be a rated career or a support career.

Mr. Skelton. Colonel Vetter, concerning your second year class, do you have any type of examination for that? How are they chosen?

Colonel Vetter. Sir, we have had two experiences in selecting the student body for that class—the initial class for this year and then next year's class.

In both years, we solicited the class for volunteers. Our first year we had about 40 volunteers, essentially a third of the Marines in the class. This year we had fewer, sir. I think you understand we addressed that topic before the hearing this morning. Many of the students, when we were thinking about next year's course, their minds were elsewhere and they were anxious to move to another assignment.

From those volunteers, we convened a board at Quantico and screened each of those officers, interviewed them individually and then sent a prioritized list through our chain of command to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who made the ultimate selection and approval.

This year, because we had fewer volunteers and because we did not have the occupational specialty mix that we wanted for that class, there were, in several cases, assignments directed by Headquarters, Marine Corps. There were very fine officers selected. In fact, I probably would have picked the same ones. They are amenable to the assignment and I think we have a student body next year that will be every bit as qualified as our initial experience this year.
Mr. SKELTON. You might be interested in our research. We went to various war colleges in other nations. The German Army has historically had a tradition of going back to the 18th Century actually and providing education to the finest of officers. You might be interested in knowing that the selection, training and education of both perspective officers and staff officers, which in the German hierarchy, I guess, was considered the elite, was a well-organized educational system, highly competitive and very challenging.

To give you an example, the officers in the German Army in the 1920s, who hoped to serve on the general's staff, first underwent 5 months of preparatory course, conducted by correspondence, followed by two 3-day examinations that culminated in a 4-day final examination and 270 officers passed in the 1927 preliminary cuts. That was preparatory to the final course and the two 3-day evaluations, where a total of only 37 were selected for General staff candidate training education.

We might point out though that the German military educational system had two drawbacks. Number one was the inability of the German officer, particularly during the Nazi era, to question higher authority and, most glaringly was the lack of strategic vision, which they left out in their military leadership.

I hope you stressed upon your students the importance of what they were doing, even though they were here rather than with Desert Storm. If you look back in history, there is a fellow by the name of Eisenhower who sat out World War I training recruits, never saw the other side of the ocean and yet he took advantage of his educational opportunities and his positions here and was afforded the opportunity to lead. So, I hope that in visiting with your students, you will tell them that their day will come for leadership, though it may not be now.

I would like to ask this question of the three of you. As you know, the panel recommended that only resident phase I instruction be given and only phase I credit be given in the joint arena. The intent, of course, was to ensure that the best officers who were selected and trained for Joint Staff specialties got to know each other as well as the joint instructors. This, we felt, should be at the resident courses.

How can you advocate granting phase I credit for non-resident courses, as correspondent courses, Colonel Vetter and General Ford?

Colonel VETTER. Mr. Chairman, there are a relatively small proportion of our officers who are fortunate enough to get a resident seat at an intermediate level PME school, and the Marine Corps has approximately 25 percent. If we add our sister service intermediate level schools, that increases to about 1 in 3. So, the fact is there are a great number of very, very highly qualified officers who are not able to receive resident professional military education. We want those officers to have some opportunity to increase their knowledge and understanding of joint issues and, we feel that they should not be denied that opportunity.

We would encourage them to take a certified, accredited, non-resident course, which, again in the case of intermediate level, teaches those four specified learning areas of joint education only to the knowledge level, which per Bloom's Taxonomy, is essentially
recall and recognition. We feel that can be captured effectively in a non-resident course.

Sometimes there is the argument that they don't have the same seminar experience that resident students do, that would be hard to argue. Although I would note and tell you, Mr. Chairman, I was visiting with one of our students last week, a Navy student, who is taking the Navy non-resident course in conjunction with his resident course down at Quantico. He is in a seminar mode and he mentioned to me that in his group, in addition to the Naval officers, there are two Marines in his seminar, two Army officers, a staff member from the House and a number of civilians from OSD.

So, those opportunities do exist and we feel that the many fine officers who don't have the opportunity for resident school should not be denied an opportunity to increase their level of joint education.

Mr. SKELTON. General Ford.

General FORD. Sir, it's a matter of numbers, but it is a little bit bigger than that. Air Command and Staff College cannot accomplish all the goals in every school and in one 10-month sitting that is necessary, again, because of the number.

We have attacked the problem. We are now just setting up a school of advanced air power studies where we took a pool of 180 of the brightest, shiniest people we had coming to our school. We pared that number down to 100 and then we further pared it down to 25. Next year starting on July 22, we are going to start those people, who you made reference to about the German staff college there, in an extensive year getting a Master's degree in warfighting. That is one.

Then, whenever you have, because of the reduction of what the Armed Forces Staff College did, we reduced our numbers that are available to go to Air Command and Staff College. The availability now will be down around 14 or 15 percent. That is one.

Seventy-five percent of our graduates will never go to another PME school. So, we have to do it in a phased approach and one school or one level of stuff cannot go and meet the entire spectrum of all the people we need to educate and are trying to get to the joint duty assignment level.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Barrett has some questions to be answered for the record within 30 days. Mr. Barrett, would you, please?

Mr. BARRETT. I will quickly run through these. General Ford, could you explain how the new mission of the statement is different from the old one?

Mr. SKELTON. Next question?

Mr. BARRETT. Could each of you provide for the record how many hours that you have spent in phase 1 joint education?

Could each of you indicate how the panel's goals of student mix and faculty mix that contribute to phase I joint education can be achieved in a correspondence course?

General Link, jointness is not one of the themes that you outlined in your statement for the Air University. Could you explain why and how jointness or the idea of jointness and the joint perspective is addressed at the Air War College?

Also, General Link, you indicate that in the third trimester of the curriculum, it deals with regional warfare studies. Did you in-
dicate, if you just did a mathematical division, one-sixth of the curriculum would be devoted to warfare studies. I suspect that’s not correct, but could you indicate—

General Link. That is absolutely not correct. I will provide you with the data.

[The following information was received for the record:]
QUESTION: General Ford, could you explain how the new mission statement is different from the old one?

B/Gen Ford: Our mission statement is a reflection of the goals and objectives of the College. Through the years, it has changed slightly from time to time; however, our overall mission continues to be directed at improving the competence of Air Force and sister service officers. The previous mission statement (AY 90) reflected our environment, the mood of the country, the military, and our own attitudes. Our mission was "To broaden the knowledge and increase the professional qualifications of future commanders and staff officers, emphasizing combat and combat support operations." The breadth of study was increased by the emphasis on jointness. An important focus was on the commander, which represented a shift away from management theory. We recognized the importance of combat support as a critical component of warfighting. Overall, the mission statement was manifested in a rigorous, intense curriculum which reflected our continuing emphasis on warfighting at the operational level.

With the changing environment and our own 2001 internal review, a new mission statement was needed. The College's mission is now "To produce officers who understand the nature of war, the profession of arms, and the application of aerospace power at the theater level of war." This statement is more directive and clearly states what we do at the school. The statement reflects the emphasis of our curriculum, the bedrock of our discipline, the profession of arms, and modern warfare. It also recognizes the military, academic, and political influences of our environment. The new statement was necessary in order to shift back towards reflection, depth, and understanding of the profession of arms. The graduates are expected to know that airpower is an integral element of US combat capability bringing to the battle timely, relevant, and enduring principles of warfare. I believe the new statement speaks of an understanding of the nature of war through contemporary and historical analysis. Hands-on understanding of the enduring principles is now an established practice. We have made the traditional values of our profession emerge, once again, as the foundation upon which the services will grow into the 1990's and beyond.

QUESTION: Could each of you provide for the record how many hours that you have spent in Phase I joint education?

B/Gen Ford: During academic year 1990-1991, 403 hours of instruction supported the Program for Joint Professional Military Education (PJE) Phase I learning areas and objectives. This equates to 53% of 759.75 total academic core hours.

Question: Could each of you provide for the record how many hours that you have spent in Phase I joint education?
This year we spent approximately 250 academic hours in Phase I joint education. Additionally, we allotted over 80 academic hours to our Field Studies Program in which each class-member visits one of the regions assigned as an area of responsibility to a unified command to study joint and combined warfare from the perspective of the CINC. Unfortunately, the activities associated with Desert Shield/Desert Storm required us to replace some of these trips with other methods of acquiring regional expertise. Finally, we should identify about 35 additional hours which we set aside to address the historical effectiveness of jointness during World War II, the Korean conflict, and Vietnam.

Question: Could each of you indicate how the Panel's goals of student mix and faculty mix that contribute to Phase I joint education can be achieved in a correspondence course?

General Link: I do not believe the Panel's explicit goals of student mix and faculty mix can be achieved in a correspondence course.

Question: Could each of you indicate how the Panel's goals of student mix and faculty mix that contribute to Phase I joint education can be achieved in a correspondence course?

B/Gen Ford: While we encourage sister service enrollment in our nonresident programs, a desired composition of the student body mix is difficult to obtain in a correspondence program. Although student mix quotas are not met, quality joint Phase I instruction is being made available to those officers who want to continue their professional military education. As I mentioned before, in a perfect world I would like each of our officers to attend an in-residence program. Nevertheless, budget constraints, operational requirements, or service needs constrain the Air Force from accomplishing this goal. Therefore, the seminar and correspondence programs provide an alternative method of professional military education, providing both service-oriented and joint instruction. The nonresident programs offer an opportunity to the 85% of AF officers unable to attend resident programs. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, ACSC has developed a quality nonresident Phase I curriculum; we do offer correspondence students the opportunity to attend selected seminars taught by ACSC's joint faculty. The bottom line is the Air Force wants to offer PME to all its officers and wants joint PME to be an integral part of officers' professional development.

As for the desired faculty mix, the College believes it complies with the panel's recommendation. This is the result of our faculty organization and curriculum development efforts in our nonresident programs. The school's faculty (sister services included) develops and reviews the curriculum for all nonresident programs. Materials from the resident program are tailored for distance education. The same course material is used for both nonresident seminar and correspondence programs. This approach ensures that Phase I of joint education is being taught to all of our nonresident students.
Question: General Link, could you explain why and how jointness or the idea of jointness and the joint perspective is addressed at the Air War College?

General Link: I welcome the opportunity to discuss why and how jointness or the idea of jointness and the joint perspective is addressed at the Air War College. By way of establishing a common reference point at the beginning, let me point out that the primary function of the Air War College is the development and improvement of specialized competence in the exploitation of the aerospace medium of warfare. This is our primary function because it is this competence which ensures the effectiveness of the forces trained, organized, and equipped by the United States Air Force (whether they are employed "jointly" or not). Inculcating the idea of jointness and the joint perspective, albeit important, must then constitute a secondary function of the Air War College in that, without a solid foundation of airpower competence, an Air Force officer with an otherwise thoroughly joint perspective is not only ineffectual, but potentially dangerous. Just as the cardio-vascular specialist is expected to bring a specialized and vital competence to the operating room, so is the airman expected to bring specialized and vital competence to the war.

I find it necessary to make this point because, on taking command of the Air War College in May of 1990, I found a college full of people whose enthusiasm for an externally defined concept of jointness had clouded their vision and confused their purpose. I found a curriculum in which the "warfare" focus was very specifically "joint and combined." I found, in general, an airpower construct in which the value or utility of airpower was expressed almost exclusively in terms of its contribution to the missions of land and naval forces. I found a "campaign planning" notion in which the envisioned role of the air component commander was reactive in nature, and secondary in importance, largely confined to the generation and matching of "sorties" against "targets" nominated by the land force commander in support of a ground forces campaign. In short, I found a college which met, in the strictest sense, all of the requirements for "jointness," as those requirements had been mandated or implied by legislation and various follow-up actions. What the Air War College was lacking was "air war." As I look back, I am convinced that nothing in the direction the college was headed a year ago would have produced the kind of airpower competence displayed in the planning and conduct of the air campaign which preceded ground hostilities in the recent Gulf War. The college resembled the patient of a doctor who, having discovered the healing powers of 2 tablespoons of castor oil, was prescribing it by the gallon.

My experience at the Air War College has persuaded me that we need a more thoughtful definition and articulation of the concept of jointness and a more precise understanding of the relationship between joint competence and what some call "service competence" than has been developed to this point. The comments which follow constitute a sincere attempt in that direction.

**JOINTNESS**

In the context of present use, jointness has two identifiable
components. One is competence based, the other may be described as attitudinal. The competence based element of jointness can be further divided between the technical requirements of joint planning and operations and what my comments will address as "visionary" requirements.

TECHNICAL JOINT COMPETENCE

The technical requirements of jointness can be satisfied by factual knowledge such as that required to integrate and/or deconflict the planning and operating functions of the separate services. In this arena, matters of interoperability (such as common frequencies and signalling techniques), and specific tactics, techniques and procedures comprise the body of joint knowledge. While this joint technical knowledge is necessary to the successful integration of specialized forces, it will not necessarily cause that integration.

VISIONARY JOINT COMPETENCE

The successful integration of specialized forces is caused by visionary competence rather than technical competence in jointness. Visionary competence proceeds from an almost intuitive understanding of the unique contributions of the separate forces and the ability to envision synergistic and/or complementary schemes of employment which result in more certain or efficient achievement of a theater level or joint objective. Now, how is this visionary competence to be developed?

On one level, one might point to the senior officers of the United States Marine Corps as examples of such visionary competence. After all, the Marine Corps operates forces on the surfaces of both the sea and land as well as forces in the air. Surely, such experience in the integrated employment of specialized forces must develop the kind of visionary joint competence we seek. On the other hand, one should remember, the Marine Corps is itself a specialized force. Its mission is oriented on tactics rather than strategy, on battles rather than wars. It is not a land, a naval, or an air force; it is an amphibious force, organized, trained, and equipped to accomplish primarily tactical objectives. The land, naval, and air elements of its forces are optimized to achieve tactical objectives in situations requiring more mobility than firepower. The Marine aviator sees the ultimate expression of his professional contribution in the direct support of Marine ground forces. There is, then, no reason to believe that the senior Marine Corps officer's experience would necessarily prepare him for the visionary requirements of integrating forces which are specialized in land, sea, and air elements of warfare in support of theater/strategic objectives.

On another level, one might postulate that visionary jointness would more naturally proceed from conditions under which the specialized forces have submerged their separate identities in such a way that the entire armed forces resembles the jointness seen in the Marine Corps.

It was this kind of thinking which led the Canadian armed forces into their experiment with enforced unification of the separate services. While the Canadians have pretty much abandoned their venture into entirely unified forces, it is important to note that their armed forces remain more likely candidates for
forces of the United States. This assertion is based on the differences in both the size and the scope of responsibilities between the two nations' armed forces. Much of the problem of Canadian defense is solved by her geographical and cultural connection to the United States. Her separate land, sea, and air elements enjoy narrowly scoped responsibilities in comparison with their American counterparts.

Conversely, the people of the United States cannot depend on Canadian armed forces for any aspect of US defense beyond the opportunity to emplace early warning systems. It is in the understanding of the immensity of the task falling to the US defense establishment that the notion of limits on the value of jointness is based. It is the size and scope and complexity of the US defense task which demands such carefully developed specialization in the training, organizing and equipping of American armed forces.

**JOINT EMPLOYMENT**

Often overlooked in discussions of this kind is the fact that the utility of specialized competencies is not limited to the functions of training, organizing and equipping US forces. Just as important to our discussion of jointness is the understanding that the successful employment of US armed forces is conducted by specialists as well. Although US forces are employed under joint command, their operational tasks are indeed specialized under the system of component command outlined in JCS Pub 02, Unified Action Armed Forces. Soldiers devise and carry out schemes of land maneuver; sailors plan and conduct naval blockades and engagements; and airmen envision and execute aerial bombardment and air superiority missions. The combination of the separate military departments, each specialized in exploiting a particular medium of warfare, and an employment scheme in which the advantages of unified action are balanced against specialized employment, has developed the most powerful and efficient fighting forces in history.

**JOINTNESS AS AN ATTITUDE**

The vigorous public debate has impacted in a noticeable way on the attitudinal aspect of jointness mentioned earlier. Our experience at the Air War College leads us to believe attitudinal aspects are no better understood than are the requirements of joint competence. Ideally, a desirable joint attitude might be exemplified by an officer with expert competence in his or her service's contribution to national security balanced with a working knowledge of the contributions of the other services in terms of relative strengths and weaknesses. On the basis of this knowledge, and motivated by commitment to a common objective, this officer would be open to others' views with regard to appropriate means of achieving the common objective. Of course, an officer's joint attitude is shaped by knowledge gained from personal relationships as well. An important aspect of professional military education is the opportunity to know personally representatives of the other services. The conclusion one hopes is reached by officers so engaged is that the "other service" officer is found to be as dedicated and professionally competent, and therefore as worthy of our loyalty and attention, as are "our service" officers. An unfortunate but all too common result of an aberrant notion of
jointness is the molding of officers who, uncertain of the importance of their own services contribution, are not likely to devote themselves assiduously to the development of their service competence as the American people might wish.

JOINT "ATTITUDE" AND COOPERATION

The great and continuing emphasis on "jointness" has also resulted in an unfortunate tendency for officers to confuse cooperation between services at the component level with desirable jointness in force employment. As an example, I would cite our experience in May of 1990 with the Air War College class of 1990, as they played out the force employment requirements of a theater level exercise based in the NATO environment. Air Force officers playing various air component entities displayed a strong tendency to satisfy, to the exclusion of all other airpower employment considerations, the requirements of Army officers who were representing land force components. The only "campaign" envisioned was that of the land force commander. As a result, the joint force commander's strategic mission suffered while Air Force officers mistakenly believed they were displaying great "jointness." Indeed, when such an attitude prevails, the "jointness" becomes an end in itself, the ultimate measure of merit, and real military effectiveness suffers.

A number of factors have contributed to the currently pervasive emphasis on jointness, not the least of which has been the debate leading to the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, the legislation itself, the implementation of the legislation, and the focus of this panel and others on "joint education." For an officer with personal experience that would indicate otherwise, an interpretation of "jointness" as an independently powerful and universally positive construct has been forcefully generated. Indeed, to many, joint now means "good," and service "bad." Conversely, the possibility of any natural limits on the value and utility of jointness has been largely ignored or seriously understated in the congressional and public dialogue.

THE AIR WAR COLLEGE TASK

It is then, the intent of the Air War College to present a clear and balanced view of jointness, to develop first an unchallengeable competence in airpower and, based on that competence, an understanding of the contributions of land and naval forces in terms of relative strengths and weaknesses in tactical, operational and strategic engagement. The Air War College devotes specific lessons to the objective of "other service" knowledge. The Report of the Panel on Military Education cited "other service" knowledge such as capabilities and limitations, organization, doctrine, and command and control systems, as an integral part of an officers joint education. Although not specifically acknowledged in the panel report, the Air War College believes that the panel would agree that knowledge of one's own service should be developed in "absolute" terms and knowledge of other services is then understood in "relative" terms. It is this understanding of the other services in relative terms that is the objective of the Air War College with regard to "other service" knowledge.

The attitudinal aspect of jointness is addressed primarily in
the seminar environment at the Air War College. The representatives of the other services serve as effective spokespersons for a non-host department point of view. The personal relationships which result from the seminar experience are important factors in increasing our students' tolerance and appreciation for an "other service" perspective. We optimize exposure to non-host department officers by "re-mixing" the seminar in mid-year. Additionally, the College sponsors a brief orientation visit for selected students to observe first-hand the operational activity of the other services. Our goal is a graduate, confident in the importance and uniqueness of his or her own service's contribution, who sincerely appreciates the unique contributions of the other services. Education in joint force employment, or the effective integration of these separately developed capabilities, is approached from the perspective of the theater or joint force commander. We work to ensure that the planning emphasis is placed on the strategic objectives of the theater or joint force commander in order to ensure that joint or complementary employment is optimally effective and efficient.

The Air War College works to develop the "visionary" jointness desired in commanders of joint forces through careful analysis of joint force employment in past military campaigns during the study of military history. Specific attention is paid to the problem of "joint force development" during the study of defense management. Finally, simulations, exercises, and evaluations focused on campaign planning and warfighting emphasize the use of specialized forces to achieve theater or national level strategic objectives.

Question: General Link, you indicate that in the third trimester of the curriculum, it deals with regional warfare studies. Did you indicate if you just did a mathematical division, one-sixth of the curriculum would be devoted to warfare studies?

General Link: No, I did not indicate that one-sixth of the curriculum would be devoted to warfare studies. Let me cite once again the value of the objective orientation we seek in the Air War College curriculum. As a matter of fact, we study warfighting throughout the year. In the first trimester we use the study of history to develop the principles of warfare. During the second trimester we study the processes involved in the development, organization, and management of the national security establishment. Finally, in the third trimester, we concentrate on the application of these principles and processes of warfare.

There are 392.85 joint hours integrated into the curriculum at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. This represents 37.7% of all lecture and seminar instruction at the College. Attached for the record is a copy of the College's PJE Working Syllabus. This Syllabus is published at the start of the academic year and represents the protected PJE curriculum. As each course is completed, the Syllabus is updated to reflect the joint education that is actually executed. The attached Syllabus is current through the CINCSOUTH course of instruction. When the Capstone Exercise is complete, this Syllabus will be republished as the PJE Syllabus and will reflect the executed PJE for Academic Year 90-91. In this form, it will serve as the basis for next year's PJE curriculum.
Our Commandant, General Gray, has directed the Command and Staff College to develop a Nonresident Program "that is as good as the Resident Program." This simply stated challenge has guided all of our efforts in the design of the revised and Staff College Nonresident, and we are taking every possible practical action to ensure program quality and equivalence.

The intent of the revised Command and Staff College Nonresident Program is to provide officers with an understanding of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war and their interrelations within a joint and combined environment. The focus of the program is the development of an officer who understands the capabilities and potential roles of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) at the operational level, and how to best task organize, deploy and employ its forces in any tactical environment across the entire spectrum of conflict.

The revised Command and Staff College Nonresident Program takes a "top down" development approach. The curriculum consists of a sequential series of seven individual courses, each designed to parallel the Command and Staff College Resident Program as closely as possible. The seven courses are tied together by recurring themes that provide the educational link throughout the curriculum. The entire program will take the average student between two and three years to complete.

The revised Command and Staff College Nonresident Program is a dynamic education process, designed to present a graduate level academic challenge to the student. The program requires serious study and application, and relies heavily on required readings from many sources. To assist with questions and academic difficulties encountered, students will be assigned a mentor from the Command and Staff College resident faculty for each course.

To ensure academic rigor, student progress will be evaluated by means of proctored examinations administered for each course. Some examinations will consist of subjective questions and practical application only, while others will be a combination of both subjective and objective questions. Command and Staff College faculty members will be responsible for the evaluation of student examinations. This program will be conducted at the graduate level and any work assigned a grade below "B" will require remediation.

The revised Command and Staff College Nonresident Program courses are being developed "in house" by the Command and Staff College faculty. These courses are being derived directly from the Resident Program courses and will parallel them as closely as possible within a nonresident medium. The Nonresident Program student, therefore, is utilizing the product of the Resident Program faculty mix. Furthermore, the joint expertise of that faculty mix will be available to the student, as required, via his assigned faculty mentor for each course. Additionally, each revised Nonresident Program course will be carefully reviewed every academic year to ensure that each reflects any changes in its parent Resident Program course.
Because it is the content of the program courses that is critical in a nonresident program, and the original course content is developed by the Resident Program faculty, I believe that the Nonresident Program meets the intent of the Panel's recommendations concerning faculty mix.

The issue of student mix is more difficult to address. Nonresident, or correspondence, programs are, by nature, individual pursuits. This circumstance reduces the opportunity for the same type of student interaction and "cross-pollination" that is provided in a resident seminar group environment. However, the lack of these opportunities neither precludes learning nor nullifies the value of a well designed nonresident program. If the course content is sound and the student applies himself to his studies, he will learn.

The revised Nonresident Program will be available to officers of all four Services and, although no other Service officers are required to enroll, it is expected that there will be some degree of student mix. As this mix develops, it will be utilized in providing the nonresident student the opportunity to interact with members of the other Services through a nonresident program. As I noted in my testimony, some would argue that the seminar experience with an appropriate Service mix cannot be replicated in the nonresident format. However, one of our Navy students at the College this year is currently enrolled in the Naval War College nonresident course and he told me that his seminar group in Washington includes two Marines, two Army officers, one Congressional staff member, and a number of civilians for OSD.

Although the Nonresident Program graduate may not enjoy the additional benefits provided by interaction with a mix of students during the Phase I portion of his education that is the same as the resident student, I do not believe this to be a critically limiting factor. The guidance provided to intermediate level schools is to teach to the "knowledge" level. The knowledge level is defined in Bloom's taxonomy as "recall and recognition." we believe this goal is definitely attainable in a nonresident program. In addition, Phase II joint education is available only through resident attendance at AFSC. Any nonresident program graduate being assigned to a JSO billet must, therefore, attend Phase II in residence. Any officer graduating from an accredited nonresident Phase I PJ E course and attending AFSC will receive the other Service perspectives as he is taken to the application level there. He will also enjoy ample opportunity for association with his professional peers of the other Services, and experience the sharing and "bonding" that occurs as a result.
FORWARD

This syllabus is provided to describe the educational requirements of Joint Professional Military Education, Phase I and how these requirements are accomplished at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. Objectives described in this syllabus have been directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff in his role as the individual singularly responsible for military education in the Armed Forces.

This syllabus describes the "Jointness" that is integrated into the College curriculum in each of the four major courses. Reference to individual classes, blocks, and exercises described herein will be found in the "parent" syllabus description.
# Joint Professional Military Education Phase I

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JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION, PHASE I

1. COURSE OVERVIEW

"He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious."
- Sun Tzu

The problems that our nation faces require leaders that understand the integration of all elements of national power, and appreciate the limitations and strengths of military power. Current and future conflicts require multi-service forces, employed to best take advantage of the synergistic potential of combined-arms forces. The focus of professional military education at Marine Corps Command and Staff College is, by design, on maneuver warfare and the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

To provide a context for the employment of the MAGTF in maneuver warfare, the curriculum uses a "top down" examination of warfare from the Constitution to the five paragraph order. The requirement to relate the curriculum to Joint and Combined employment at the operational level of war is a direct result of the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, which, among other things, directs the enhancement of "jointness" and further defines the focus of "joint matters" to be:

...matters relating to the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces including matters relating to:

- national military strategy
- strategic planning and contingency planning
- command and control of combat operations under unified command

The Joint Phase I curriculum is completely integrated into the core curriculum at Command and Staff College. The standard used to define the scope of this curriculum is the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD) dated 1 May 1990. The specific sections of the MEPD that will be used to determine and evaluate JPME requirements are Annex A to Appendix A "PJE Phase I (Intermediate Level) Program Goals, and Objectives" and Annex B to Appendix B, "Guidelines for the Process for Accreditation of Joint Education."

2. OBJECTIVES. The objectives of the Command and Staff College PJE are:

a. To prepare the graduates to operate in a joint environment primarily at the operational and tactical levels of war and to be able to produce quality tactical, operational, and strategic thought from a joint perspective.

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b. To develop in the faculty, staff, and students a joint attitude and awareness, and to insure that they understand the relationship between the school's mission, intent, and objectives, and the PJE requirements of the MEPD.

c. To instill joint attitudes and joint perspectives in the students while building upon the individual's service expertise.

d. To provide a learning environment that actively involves the student in the learning process to promote retention, deeper comprehension, and development of professional attitudes and to develop faculty that are subject matter experts and have the ability to employ instructional strategies that ensure a high quality learning experience for the students.

e. To provide a program of evaluation that measures student achievement in relation to the goals and objectives of the College's PJE program.

f. To, through the use of post graduation surveys of both graduates and their supervisors, insure that the PJE curriculum meets and supports the needs of the field.

g. To conduct a program of recruitment for faculty and establish faculty standards that insure the assignment of faculty with appropriate qualifications and experience in joint matters.

h. To conduct ongoing faculty development programs to maintain the faculty expertise in joint matters and to conduct faculty training on changes to doctrine as necessary.

3. DESCRIPTION. The core curriculum, and therefore the Joint Phase I curriculum (integrated) is divided into four major courses: Theory and Nature of War, Strategic Thought, Operational Level of War, and MAGTF Operations.

a. The intent of the curriculum is to: "...provide officers with an understanding of the interrelationship of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war within a joint/combined environment and, by adapting doctrine and techniques to the changing conditions of warfare, the ability to out-think, and out-fight any opponent."

b. The methodology to accomplish this intent includes the active participation of a small, professional faculty with a highly motivated, professional student body consisting of Marine Corps, Army, Navy, and Air Force, International Officers, and civilian government employees, organized into seminar groups of 13 to 16 officers. The "Joint Mix" in each seminar includes at least one member from the Army, Navy, and Air Force plus two
International Officers with the remaining members being Marines from aviation, ground combat arms, and combat service support specialties. When attending the course, civilian government employees are integrated into the seminar groups.

c. Military History provides a perspective through war, campaign, and battle case studies. Professional reading and written communications requirements are integral to the course, with complementary assignments for both oral and written work. The distinguished speaker program provides expert opinions and counterpoints, many from military and government organizations in the Washington D.C. area, to support the entire curriculum.

d. MAGTF Operations courses are oriented around conceptual roles for employment of Marine Corps units. Each course, and its accompanying exercise, is placed in a particular Unified Command area of responsibility with a real or constructive subordinate Joint Force (usually determined by students in command relationship problem/discussions)—"Real-world" considerations are joined with exercise requirements to provide a realistic backdrop for the study of planning, deploying and employing operational forces. Plans are developed, then tested in force-on-force wargames that seek to present the reality of operations on the modern "battlefield." The MAGTF Operations course consists of five areas: MAGTF Education, CINCEUR, CINCPAC, USCINCSOUTH and the Capstone exercise. Each of the areas are used to present a potential aspect of MAGTF operations and planning; offense and defense: high, mid and low intensity conflicts; and the Capstone exercise which provides for the application of all previous instruction.

e. Each MAGTF Operations exercise is preceded by extensive Theater orientation with selected Joint "modules" to integrate strategic and operational focus to support tactical planning and employment. Joint focus in MAGTF Operations include modules on: Deliberate and Crisis Action planning - Campaign planning - Command relationships - Joint aviation issues (omnibus agreement/JFACC) - Strategic/Operational Mobility - Unified Action Armed Forces - Threat doctrine, organization and weapons.

f. This syllabus is published twice an academic year. At the start of the academic year it is published as a working syllabus and contains the projected JPME as submitted by each Problem Director. The distribution of the working syllabus is limited to the faculty and staff. As each block of instruction is executed the JPME classes are evaluated and reviewed and this syllabus is adjusted as necessary. At the conclusion of the Capstone Exercise this syllabus is published as the PJE Syllabus and is distributed to all students, faculty and staff. The published syllabus reflects the JPME that actually took place during the academic year and serves as the base document for the next academic year's PJE working syllabus.
g. Detailed descriptions of the classes/courses listed in this syllabus are contained in the syllabus that pertains to that course.

h. Hours are recorded by learning objectives within each area whenever possible. In some cases a discussion/lecture/exercise will address an area or areas and it will not be possible to specifically assign hours to a particular learning objective, although it is clear that multiple learning objectives were addressed. In these cases the learning objectives covered will have an "X" under them and only a total number of hours for all learning objectives covered during that discussion/lecture/exercise will be recorded.
PURPOSE: This index will detail those courses in the College core curriculum that have total or partial focus on Joint related matters. The DoD standard for each area is listed for clarity prior to the listing of class/course/exercise. Course educational objectives and additional non-Joint classes are detailed in syllabus descriptions of "Theory and Nature of War," "Operational Level of War," "MAGTF Education," "CINCEUR," "CINCPAC," "CINCSOUTH," and "Capstone."

DOD STANDARD AREA

AREA I - JOINT FORCES AND THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL OF WAR

SUMMARY. This area of study gives students a basic knowledge of the characteristics of US air, maritime, ground, and special operations forces and produces awareness of the broader consideration that must be incorporated when employing joint forces at the tactical level as part of a theater operation. It also covers the way the US Armed Forces are organized, trained, and equipped to meet their tasks and responsibilities and introduces students to the theory and principles of warfare at the operational level of war.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. KNOW how the roles, missions, capabilities, and limitations of US military forces affect joint and combined operations.

b. KNOW how current Service doctrine affects the other Services in joint and combined operations at both the tactical and operational levels of war.

c. KNOW selected definitions and basic concepts used in studying the operational level of war.

d. KNOW why selected joint and combined military operations failed or succeeded at the operational level.

e. KNOW how to examine military operations at the operational level of war using lessons learned from the study of classic military writings and significant military campaigns throughout history.

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AREA II - ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

SUMMARY. This area gives students basic knowledge of the principles of operational command and logistic support in joint commands and how the US military is organized to plan, execute and sustain joint and combined operations. It concentrates on organizational and command relationships applicable to US joint force commands, combined commands, and the existing organization of the US military establishment.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. KNOW the command structure, organizational concepts, and command relationships applicable to US military forces in selected joint and combined commands.

b. KNOW how the US military is organized to plan, execute, and sustain joint operations.

c. KNOW the strengths and weaknesses in organization and command relationships within US joint and combined commands.

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AREA III - JOINT COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS (C3) AND INTELLIGENCE

SUMMARY. This area introduces the C3 that extends from the strategic to the tactical levels in supporting the National Command Authorities and warfare fighting CINCs. It is designed to give basic knowledge of the operational aspects associated with C3 systems and makes students aware of national intelligence organizations, their structures, and their capabilities in acquiring necessary intelligence support for joint commanders.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. KNOW the basic C3 requirements for joint and combined operations.

b. KNOW how the US national intelligence organizations and C3 systems support US military commands during joint and combined operations.

c. KNOW major C3 and intelligence issues and problems that face commanders and staff officers in planning and conducting joint and combined operations.

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AREA IV: DEFENSE PLANNING SYSTEMS

SUMMARY. This area gives students basic knowledge of the defense planning systems that affect joint operation planning. It concentrates on the joint operation planning processes such as the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), the Joint Operation Planning System (JOPS), the Joint Deployment System (JDS), and eventually the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). This area also touches on the National Security Council (NSC) system and the Joint aspects of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

LEARNING OBJECTIVES

a. KNOW how joint and combined planning is influenced by national policy and strategy and the NSC system, PPBS, and JSPS.

b. KNOW the basic requirements of the joint planning and deployment execution systems such as JOPS, JDS, and JOPES.

c. KNOW the time-sensitive planning processes used for joint operations.

d. KNOW the deliberate planning processes used to produce concepts of operations and operation plans.

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Mr. Barrett. Finally, General Link, would you indicate your policy on passive versus active education. You indicate that one-third is not a good standard. However, at some point, you lose continuity in your course. I agree with the examples that you gave in your testimony, but I think the panel would be concerned if active versus passive got very much above one-third. You didn’t indicate what your policy is. You indicated the problems with the policy that you had before.

General Link. I don’t think I said that one-third was not good. I said that in the attempt to emulate what was cited by the panel as an ideal of 10 percent versus 90 percent, we did some stupid things. But I will provide some more data on that.

[The following information was received for the record:]

Classes at the Air War College are composed of individuals from diverse backgrounds. Consequently, we must consider the class members and their life experiences as successful, professional military officers and civilians so that we may engage them in the consideration of ideas that are critical to their careers and to push them toward critical thought and analysis.

The process of education within the college is designed to employ a broad spectrum of methodologies which range from reading and individual study to lectures, seminars, exercises, and research.

Initially, we must employ some means of providing a common base or point of departure. This is often accomplished most effectively through readings and through presentations by experts, specialists, commanders, or key policymakers in a lecture or lecture/discussion format.

The presentation of this kind of information, however, is not sufficient if class members do not have the opportunity and challenge of discussing and defending their understandings with their peers and with faculty members. It is this opportunity which allows them to bring to bear their own background experiences and their professional judgments within the context of a small seminar, to develop their thoughts and understanding, and to defend them. Beyond the seminar experience are the challenges of individual research and writing, written and oral examinations, and specially designed exercises which require them to apply what they have learned to several war/conflict scenarios. These also require active thought and application. It is this kind of risk-taking activity that leads to the greatest learning.

To my mind, therefore, it is incumbent upon the Air War College to develop the most effective combination of methodologies to allow this process to occur. We have been steadily increasing the percentage of “active” or participatory methodologies in the curriculum, and it is my policy to use those to the maximum extent possible. However, I do not want a fear of using “passive” methodologies to prevent class members and faculty from hearing presentations from some of the top thinkers in the world. Such presentations and the questions which follow often provide the basis for the best and most effective seminars. We should always look first to the learning objective and then determine which combination of methodologies will allow us to reach it.

Mr. Skelton. Gentleman, we thank you for being with us today. Before you leave, let me comment that you have heard us in our questions today. They have sounded more critical than we intend, in all probability.

We have come a long way. Believe me, we have come a long way. The schools represented here today, without reiterating in a couple of cases, the sadness that we experienced in testimony of some of the schools. We have seen not just marked improvement, but great improvement.

Frankly, the GAO has visited your schools and it looks like you have complied with some 90 percent of our recommendations without legislation and I want to applaud you for that.
Also, you have taken advantage of the amendment that we got passed concerning title 10. I congratulate you on that. You are really headed in the right direction.

But as we all know, and you in the military field far better than I, that nothing stays the same. We are always either getting better or we are getting worse. It is your job to continue to get better. It is our job to urge you not just to comply with the MEPD standards, but to comply with the standards that we set, which frankly, are quite high.

We see that strategic, as well as operational and tactical thinking, pays off. We have a great example of it. One of the finest planned military operations in modern history, if not the best, is as a result of what you teach in your schools—a thing called Desert Storm. Those that have studied the art of warfare did very, very well at it. It is your challenge to make your students not just as good, but better in the art of warfare.

So, I urge you to continue on your upward course. You are there. You are doing a fine job. We will be here to continue to try to prod you and point out at hearings such as this and through visits to your school where you can improve. We can be a bit more objective than you.

So, feel that you are complimented, as well as receiving a few criticisms along the way. I am really proud of what you have done.

Thank you so much. The hearing is concluded.

[Whereupon, at 10:27 a.m., the panel was recessed.]
JCS JOINT EDUCATION POLICY INITIATIVES

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL

Mr. SKELTON. The hearing will come to order.

This is the Military Education Panel of the Armed Services Committee. I might point out as a bit of a background that we have been in existence since late 1987, all through 1988. We had a series of hearings and we promulgated various recommendations which we will discuss today with our guest. We recently had a piece of testimony from the General Accounting Office to the effect that the military services, the five intermediate schools and five senior schools, have complied with the recommendations to the tune of some 90 percent. This pleases us immensely, but we still see room for improvement.

In my opinion, the seed corn of American national defense is going to be the military education schools, as it was between World War I and World War II. We have to guard the higher education very carefully and make sure that it is doing its job for those unforeseen contingencies that may come to pass decades from now. That is exactly what happened between the wars fortuitously.

Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome you to our hearing of this Military Education Panel. We will discuss the actions taken by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve joint military education and some significant jointness issues raised in our panel report. Up to this point, the panel has directed much of its attention to the service intermediate and senior schools. It is now time to turn our attention to the role of the Chairman and the Joint Staff in professional military education at the joint schools.

The panel is pleased by the actions taken to date by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to improve the professional military education framework for the Active Forces especially in the area of joint professional military education. While there is still a great deal to be done, we are pleased with the progress that has been made to date.

This morning, the panel will hear testimony from Brig. Gen. Kenneth Simpson, Vice Director of Operational Plans and Inter-
operability for the Joint Staff. General Simpson will discuss some of the important initiatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Military Education Policy Document—the MEPD, as it will undoubtedly be referred to in our hearing—and the evolving responsibility of the J-7 directorate.

General Simpson, I personally want to express my appreciation for the cooperation you and your staff have given us and your efforts to improve the professional military education system. I think we have come a long way since we started our efforts. The military services individually and collectively have been responsive to Congress and our recommendations. We have only had to have two amendments in legislation, and the rest has been done by the various services and by the Chairman and his staff. You being here today representing those efforts is certainly appreciated.

Thank you.

Mr. Edwards, do you have a statement?

STATEMENT OF HON. CHET EDWARDS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS

Mr. EDWARDS. Mr. Chairman, I would just briefly like to say that I want to commend you on continuing these hearings on military education.

I happen to represent Fort Hood, which had, I believe, the second largest contingent of soldiers in Desert Storm, and I think the most important lesson in Desert Storm—and there certainly are many—is that our smart weapons are no smarter than our people who man them. As we begin to have a force restructuring and downsizing, I think your efforts, Mr. Chairman, to see that we have the best possible military education at all levels in this country, are even more important rather than less important. So I want to thank you for continuing these hearings.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

I do know of Mr. Edwards’ interest in Fort Hood. I was there recently with him, and they do look up to you for your help and guidance, and we appreciate your help on this panel so much.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. General Simpson, without further ado, we welcome you and we recognize you at this time.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. KENNETH W. SIMPSON, USA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF, FOR MILITARY EDUCATION

General SIMPSON. Thank you, sir.

Sir, I have prepared a statement which, with your approval, I will submit for the record and provide only some brief opening remarks.

Mr. SKELTON. Without objection, the entire statement of the general will be placed in the record, and you may proceed as you wish.

General SIMPSON. Thank you, sir.

I am Brig. Gen. Ken Simpson and, as you pointed out, the Vice Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability at the Joint Staff.

Mr. SKELTON. Now what does that mean in English?
General SIMPSON. Sir, the Directorate is primarily responsible for the maintaining of the war plans, the evaluation of the war plans that the CINC's prepare and submit, and the interoperability having to do with the ability of our services and our allies to operate together in joint and combined operations.

Mr. SKELTON. What does J-7 mean?

General SIMPSON. The J-7 is just a short numerical designation for the Directorate itself. Operational Plans and Interoperability is its proper title. There are eight directorates within the Joint Staff, and the J-7 is just one of the eight.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

General SIMPSON. I am also the Deputy Director for Military Education on the Joint Staff, and in that capacity my chain of command runs directly to the Director of the Joint Staff.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this panel today and discuss the status of military education in our Armed Forces and address issues of concern to the panel members.

It has been almost 21/2 years since this panel published its report on military education. I know of no one who is seriously involved in the business of educating the force who is not familiar with this far-reaching document. It was, and remains, an important influence on how this Nation educates its current and future military leaders. I know this to be a fact because the report played so heavily in shaping the Chairman's policy document on military education, the MEPD, which was published in May of 1990.

At the time this panel rendered its report, it was the membership's basic judgment that the Department of Defense military education system was sound. Indeed, the panel was assessing a system that had produced contemporary leaders such as Generals Colin Powell, Norman Schwarzkopf, Charles Hoerner, Walter Boomer, just to name a few.

But the panel also noted correctly that the system could and should be improved. I believe if you use the date of the panel's report as a stake in the ground—that is, a marker at which you can measure forward movement—you will notice that tremendous progress has been made in a wide range of areas that concern you. There is no question that a good system has become even better, and this panel's work has contributed greatly to that end.

Since Adm. Dave Robinson testified before this panel 1 year ago, important initiatives have been undertaken to help forge the future of professional military education. To cite just a few, our phase II program at the Armed Forces Staff College has been completely revamped and expanded to 12 weeks, as you know.

Mr. SKELTON. Which we acknowledge and appreciate, and which, by the way, is in compliance with the law.

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

The services continue to improve their student/faculty service mixes and ratios. Key educational issues have been addressed by our college presidents and commandants in two separate Military Education Coordination Conferences, and procedures have been established to implement the Chairman's accreditation process, or the Chairman's Process for Accreditation of Joint Education, or PAJE.
Clearly, the military education in our Armed Forces is on the right track. The Chairman is firmly in control and has a vision of where we need to go with military education in general and joint professional military education in particular. A coherent educational framework is in place; goals and objectives have been set; and, of equal importance, we have policies and mechanisms in place to ensure that the military education system continues to improve and reflect the ever-changing state of the world. I am convinced, as the Chairman is, that we have an education system that is producing and will continue to produce the confident and competent officers we need to lead our Armed Forces into the 21st century.

Thank you again, sir, for this opportunity to appear before your panel. I look forward to answering your questions.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. KENNETH W. SIMPSON, USA

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before you today and provide a progress report on military education in our armed services, and to answer questions on issues of particular interest to the panel members.

I am Brig. Gen. Kenneth W. Simpson, the Vice Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate, J-7, and, of more interest to this panel, the Deputy Director, Joint Staff, for Military Education. One of my major responsibilities is to serve as the principal advisor to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on all matters pertaining to military education.

It has been 1 year since my predecessor, and current Director of Operational Plans and Interoperability, RADM David Robinson, appeared before this panel. To say there has been considerable change in the world in the intervening months is an understatement. But even as the strategic landscape was being altered by events in Europe, Southwest Asia, and elsewhere, the day-to-day business of training and educating our military leadership continued. I believe real progress has been made on the education front in general, and joint education in particular.

As you know, title 10, U.S. Code, as amended by Goldwater-Nichols, gave the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the responsibility for formulating policies to coordinate the military education of members of the Armed Forces. In executing this responsibility, the Chairman approved and signed his Military Education Policy Document (MEPD) in May 1990. This document was not a product developed solely by the Joint Staff. Rather, having received its impetus from the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it drew on the vast institutional experiences of all the services, the outstanding work of many special study groups focused on military education, and, perhaps most significantly, the insights and recommendations provided by this panel. The MEPD is a holistic document that frames the Chairman’s philosophy and defines the military education policies, goals, and objectives for our service schools and colleges.

During this past year, I have seen substantial progress toward achieving the goals and objectives set forth in the MEPD. As we gain experience and assess our effectiveness in educating and developing officers, we will continue to make steady and impressive progress. The military education community is clearly focused on the task of preparing our current and future leaders for the challenges that lie ahead.

As Adm. Dave Robinson indicated in his testimony last September, the MEPD is a living document; it will continue to be refined and improved.

The panel’s involvement has clearly been a positive factor in the recent improvements in the military education system. In fact, over 85 percent of the recommendations contained in the panel’s 1989 report on military education have been implemented. The more significant of these include the establishment of a military educational framework within which joint and service needs are addressed and coordinated, the establishment of the two-phased approach to Joint Professional Military Education, and a formal accreditation process to ensure standards and rigor are maintained in the joint curricula. Improving the quality of faculty at all our institutions is firmly in control.

Improving the quality of faculty at all our institutions is firmly in control. The Capstone course has been strengthened into a substantive course which includes the study of national security strategy and national military strategy. Indeed, even the establishment of my position as Deputy Director, Joint Staff, for Military Education, reflects the Chairman’s commitment to this important area.

There are, however, some areas of difference between where we are today and what the panel recommended. At this point, I would like to review some of those areas I believe are particularly important and deserve a little of our time today.
In terms of faculty mixes, the Chairman's policies require the military faculty at senior service colleges include at least 10 percent from each non-host department and a total of no less than 25 percent from all non-host departments. It requires a military faculty at intermediate service colleges of at least 5 percent from each non-host department. The Chairman adopted the Morgan Initial Certification Group's recommendation which emphasized providing a graduate with "service-unique excellence." Service expertise is most critical at the intermediate level, where the focus is on operational art. As the panel itself noted, "service schools provide valuable service-oriented PME and they should be preserved." The faculty mixes we currently have ensure the service character is maintained while providing good representation from the non-host services. These mixes remain an area of close scrutiny and careful evaluation to see if increases in non-host faculty are possible and appropriate without altering the service unique thrust of the respective programs.

As regards student mixes, current policy requires the presence of at least one officer from each non-host military department in each seminar for both intermediate and senior service colleges. Again, as in the area of faculty mixes, the Chairman adopted the Initial Certification Group recommendation which stressed the requirement to provide a graduate with "service-unique excellence." As with faculty mixes, the goal is to ensure non-host representation without diluting the primary focus of the service college, i.e., service expertise.

In both of these areas, I would like to emphasize the MEPD is the first step. As we achieve established MEPD standards, we will evaluate the effects on each school's curriculum. Based on these "lessons learned," we can more accurately determine if, and how much, the student and faculty mixes should be changed.

Concerning student/faculty ratios, the panel envisioned a range between 3 and 4 to 1, with the lower ratios being employed at the senior schools. Our standard meets the intent of the panel by prescribing ratios of 4:1 for the intermediate service colleges and 3.5:1 for the senior service colleges. There is aggressive action being taken by the services to improve existing school programs, and I am confident the long-term results from these efforts will be education more capable of meeting military educational requirements.

With respect to Armed Forces Staff College course length, we initiated the 12-week intermediate-level course last month, and have begun a phased-out of the 3-week senior-level course. Current projections show there will be relatively few, if any, seniors requiring phase II by January 1994. Those seniors who require phase II after the phase-out will attend the 12-week course with some accommodation made for their seniority and experience.

In addressing non-resident education, the Chairman provides phase I credit for accredited non-resident courses. The use of non-resident programs to meet phase I education is clearly in the best interest of pursuing joint education throughout the services. It ensures high-quality officers, not able to attend in residence, receive the phase I joint program taught to the knowledge level of understanding. This also allows them the opportunity to attend phase II and become Joint Specialty Officers (JSO) if they are selected for such qualification by their services and the joint community. Further, phase I credit for non-resident courses ensures the programs are evaluated by the Program for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) and effectively achieve approved learning areas and objectives. I believe this is consistent with Goldwater-Nichols and the intent of the panel, "to strengthen joint education for all officers." Currently, Air Force, Navy, and Army intermediate-level non-resident courses have been certified for phase I education. Each will in turn be evaluated by the PAJE for accreditation.

In consideration of academic grading and distinguished graduate programs, the Chairman's policy requires schools to establish rigorous academic programs and requires commandants to establish systems to evaluate student performance. At this point, the Chairman's policy emphasizes the outcomes of the evaluation system and holds the commandants responsible for ensuring these outcomes are achieved. We believe emphasis on the high academic standards appropriate to graduate-level education is essential, and some appropriate system of evaluation is necessary to ensure those high standards are achieved. All schools have an evaluation program to assess performance, provide feedback to students, and ensure academic rigor. The key point of any grading system is to ensure the continued high quality of each school's graduates. Similarly, the utilization of a distinguished graduate program should be weighed and evaluated by commandants to ensure they contribute to the achievement of educational goals. Both grading and distinguished graduate programs have been items of considerable discussion and review by the PME commandants at our two Military Education Coordination Conferences held in the past 9 months. The
importance of such programs to the educational experience provided by each school is clearly recognized and appreciated by the leaders of our educational community. If recent history is any indication, the state of the world will continue to change which, in turn, will drive budget and force structure adjustments. It is in this environment of tumult and transformation that we must continue to develop our military leaders. I submit that our past efforts have not been off the mark, as our performance during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm attests—a clear indication that we have been doing something right. We must continue to build on that success.

In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation for the panel’s interest and support in improving military education. I look forward to working with you on our common goal—developing competent and confident leaders for today and the future.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much.

Mr. Edwards.

Mr. Edwards. I will defer to you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Skelton. In your opening statement, General, you indicated that the Military Education Coordination Conference was an important factor in the military education system. Explain to us the role of the Military Education Coordination Conference and why it is important.

General Simpson. The Military Education Coordination Conference—or MECC for short—is a forum that was established in the Chairman’s policy document that allows the college presidents and commandants to come together, work the issues of concern to them, and to exchange information generally.

The Director of the Joint Staff, Gen. Henry Viccellio, is the chairman of that committee. I am the vice chairman, and, of course, all the commandants of the colleges are full members of the conference. We also invite CINCs representatives, the services, and representatives from the DOD agencies to attend this conference. The original idea was that we would hold one of these about once a year. After we held the first one, we found that the output was so good and so productive that everyone in agreement that we should do it more frequently. We have had two of those conferences thus far.

Mr. Skelton. How many have there been, General?

General Simpson. Two, sir. We are scheduled to have the third one later this fall in, I believe, December.

Mr. Skelton. Tell me the format of each of the conferences thus far.

General Simpson. It begins with a message to those that I just described, the commandants of the colleges, the CINC’s, services, and the DOD agencies, and we ask what issues are on their minds that they would like to put on the agenda. The agenda is coordinated with them to make sure that we cover everything that is of particular interest, and we bring the group together, and, as I indicated, the Director of the Joint Staff chairs this body. The issues are taken, one at a time, through the agenda until the matter is exhausted.

We also use the opportunity to get better acquainted, because these commandants don’t always come together for just routine business, so the conference does allow that. Examples of the kinds of issues that we have taken on board and worked have been the panel recommendations and the progress toward achieving those—
for example, in the student/faculty mixes, service mixes, and the student/faculty ratios. As you know, in order to achieve that, you have to have cooperation between the services, and that issue has been discussed at considerable length.

The Ethics Act of 1989 was an issue that was discussed at a very recent conference—the one having to deal with honoraria for speeches, appearances, and so forth—and the impact that that would have on the commandant's ability to attract and hire quality faculty members. We also have recently begun the process of updating the Chairman's Policy Document, and that serves as a forum to go over the issues that the commandants feel should be adjusted.

Mr. SKELTON. During either conference, did you review or discuss in detail the recommendations of this Military Education Panel of the Armed Services Committee?

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir. I would say that the panel's recommendations, its report and all that flows from that, in the last two conferences have really been the central issues to be discussed—how to implement those, how much progress we can make and how quickly.

Mr. SKELTON. Let's talk about an issue that concerns me, General. The recent hearings have often highlighted the differences between the panel recommendations, this Armed Services Committee panel recommendations, and the MEPD, the educational and professional standards as set forth by the Chairman. At the same time, we recognize that the scope and the purpose of the MEPD makes it a very important aspect of the professional military system. What do you consider to be the major strengths of the MEPD and what are the areas where there is a difference? Do you see that gap closing in the future?

General SIMPSON. Sir, the policy document's greatest strength is that it brings together into one policy document the Chairman's philosophy on joint professional military education and military education in general. Within that document, there is a framework. It is a coherent framework that lays out military education from precommissioning to general flag officer rank, a progressive and sequential program that has embodied in it the joint professional military education learning objectives that we want to achieve. While at the same time providing this framework, it also retains the prerogatives of the various services in developing their own officers within their own skill areas.

I think that rather than underscore the differences between the panel's recommendations and the MEPD, it would be not inappropriate to underscore the fact that there is considerable similarity in the two. In fact, the panel's recommendations were central in developing the military education document in the first place. I think that, depending on how you count, we are talking about a substantial number of the recommendations of this panel being incorporated into that Military Education Policy Document.

Finally, sir, it is also a strength of this document that it is not something that has been carved in stone. This is a document that is evolving. It is currently under review to make sure that it is conforming to not only the changing state of the world but, as education itself evolves, this policy document will reflect those changes.
The gap, if you want to call it a gap, between what this panel recommended and what the Military Education Policy Document currently reflects will close, and, as each of these is reviewed for update and revision, I think you will see forward progress in those areas where we may have a void right now.

Mr. Skelton. I think one of the great strengths of military education is the fact that you have students from other services, young men and young women, wearing different colored uniforms in the various seminars. An A-10 pilot can bring a lot of interesting background to a sailor who has spent a great deal of time aboard ship, for instance.

In the intermediate service schools, we recommended for each seminar, which is roughly 15 or 16 individuals in intermediate schools such as Fort Leavenworth, one student from each of the other military departments for each seminar for the 1990 and 1991 years and two for the 1995 and 1996 and a goal of three later on. Your document provides for one student from each of the other military departments for all seminars without increasing that through the years.

Also, concerning the faculty, we recommend that 10 percent of the military faculty be from each of the other military departments by the end of 1990 and 15 percent by the 1995/1996 school year. You have as your recommendations from the MEPD, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff document, 5 percent from each of the other military departments regardless of the year when it would be.

Would you discuss those two and tell us why you do not have the higher ratios as we recommended?

General Simpson. Yes, sir. As you pointed out, the policy document does require one non-host member in each seminar, and the panel's recommendation, of course, was to grow from two to three. When the policy document was established, first of all there was no prescription as to how many would be in each seminar, and I believe that if you went back and took a look at where we were prior to 1987/1988 you would see that, even with the MEPD's requirement of just one, we have made substantial improvement from that point.

The issue is really twofold. One is: how do you maintain the service uniqueness of the service college while also increasing the number of non-host students in the seminar group? The other part of that is: What is the impact on the services that are providing these students to the host college?

At issue is whether the service colleges at the intermediate level that are focused on operational art maintain an appropriate representation of their own service in the classroom? The MEPD prescribing one, for example, just using an example, the Air Command and Staff College which currently conforms to the MEPD standard of one non-host student per seminar group. That gives you Air Force representation in that seminar group of somewhere around 60 percent. If you carry that to three non-host members—that would be Army and sea services in the Air Command and Staff College intermediate class.com—the Air Force would be 30 percent in that seminar group. In other words, they would be a minority in their own service college. The concern here is how a service can in-
struct and teach and educate the members in that seminar group on a particular service area?

Mr. SKELTON. Wait a minute. You have a seminar of 16, and you have three from the Navy Department, which means of course Navy and Marines, and three from the Army. That is six. That leaves 10 Air Force people.

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir. We need to factor in also the civilians and the international students who also participate in those seminar groups. I think the international student program is an extremely strong one, and their representation in that group, given that your seminar group is about 16 or less, depending on the college, you wind up with a service representation that is less than half.

Mr. SKELTON. Yes. General, you will find that in our recommendations we did not include the civilians or the foreign students in our computation for the simple reason, they are not the main object of our attention. The main object of our attention, of course, is the people wearing the uniform. But you all are factoring in the others is that correct?

General SIMPSON. We must, sir. If you say a seminar group—take whatever size it is—it includes as part of that 16 the international students, the civilians who might be from the DOD agencies, in that seminar group. When the formulation says that you will have three from each non-host group, then you are going to place six into that body that already has representation from other than the host service, and that is what causes the representation of the host service to go down so low.

Mr. SKELTON. General, I asked you the same questions that I asked concerning the intermediate schools, such as Fort Leavenworth. I asked the same questions of your senior service schools, such as the Army War College at Carlisle. We made similar recommendations on student mix and faculty mix of 10 percent military faculty from each of the other military departments, et cetera. You have come up with some 5 percent, with the exception of the senior service schools, with a minimum of 10 percent from the others. What is your answer regarding the senior service schools in this regard?

General SIMPSON. The senior service colleges have a similar concern, although it is not as great as it would be at the intermediate level, the concern being service representation in the seminar groups.

The MEPD, when the formula was established for the mix in the seminar groups at the war colleges, was considered a starting point, and I think all of the services in some cases have exceeded the MEPD already. As we go through the review of the MEPD we are going to consult with the services and commandants of the colleges and see how much additional representation from the non-host services can be placed in those seminar groups.

To answer your question, sir, I think that you could regard the MEPD as really a starting point in that particular area.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask you, do you think you could come up with a projection and submit it to this panel at a later date as to where you think you will be in 1995?

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir.
Mr. SKELTON. Would you do that for us, please?

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir, will do.

Mr. SKELTON. I would certainly appreciate it.

[The following information was received for the record:]

PROJECTED STUDENT/FACULTY MIXES FOR 1995

During discussions between HASC panel staff member, Mr. Miller, and Chief, Military Education Division, J-7, Colonel Murphy, it was agreed a more meaningful input could be provided after staffing with services and service colleges during the Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) Working Group and MECC, to be held in January 1992. Therefore, as agreed, the status/plan requested will be provided in early spring 1992.

Mr. SKELTON. As you know, two of our initial thrusts in establishing this panel were to establish a better instruction in our professional military educational system for strategy. The second was instruction of jointness. As a result of the law that we passed back in 1986 known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the issue of jointness is a very important one. Would you tell us how the schools are doing in that regard compared to what they were doing in the area of jointness prior to the panel’s recommendations in 1988?

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir. As an outgrowth of the panel’s recommendations, the Military Education Policy Document established for each of the levels of education joint professional military education learning objectives. For example, at the intermediate level there are four broad learning areas with a whole host of subordinate specific learning objectives. These are contained in the policy document. That is the foundation of what we call the phase I part of the two-phased joint education. Phase I is taught at all of the colleges of all the services, and heretofore those broad learning objectives, if they were contained in the programs of instruction at the colleges, it wasn’t a disciplined, coherent program that is currently outlined in the policy document.

The senior colleges have their own set of broad learning areas that raise the level of joint education from just a simple knowledge, the recognize and recall level, to an application level. So as one progresses through this progressive and sequential framework, you will find that they begin the intermediate level, they will get the four broad learning areas, and then, as they progress on to the senior level, this is broadened and raised to a level of application.

Mr. SKELTON. As you know, we recommended there be a phase I in the intermediate schools; phase II would be at the Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, VA; and then people from there on would go into, at least hopefully, 3 years of joint assignment.

The panel recommended that only resident phase I instruction be given the phase I credit. The intent behind that was to ensure that the best officers were selected and trained for Joint Staff specialties. Furthermore, the panel believes that non-resident phase I courses do not provide the necessary joint experience either through contacts with fellow students or other services such as faculty members, but yet, as I understand it, phase I is given in the non-resident courses as well. Is that correct?

General SIMPSON. The learning objectives for intermediate level colleges have been incorporated into the non-resident programs of the Army, Navy, and Air Force non-resident program. That is correct, sir. It is at the intermediate level now, and, as the Chairman’s
policy document points out, the focus of education at the intermediate level, in the joint education, is to the knowledge level, talking about recognition and recall.

We examined those non-resident programs, sent a certification group to each of the colleges to take a look at exactly what was being taught, to verify that those courses contained the Chairman's learning objectives and that there was a system to administer and ensure that discipline and rigor were provided to those non-resident courses. That certification group returned with a recommendation to the Chairman that all three of those programs at different times be certified as providing phase I learning objectives.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me point out that those who attended the Armed Forces Staff College for the academic year 1990/1991, from the Air Force 60 percent—60 percent, General, received their phase I through non-resident—that is, correspondence—courses or had no professional military education at all. That is kind of jumping a requirement, as I see it. Is that not correct?

General SIMPSON. That situation has been corrected. The current class at the Armed Forces Staff College—when you go down to visit later this month, you will find that there are only currently two, and when the seniors join that group it will be a total of four from all services represented. Approximately 1 percent of that group is now in the direct entry category. The direct entries, of course, include more than those who didn't take the course by non-resident or took it by some other means.

Mr. SKELTON. I would appreciate it, prior to us going down for our hearing, if you would submit for the record an exact breakdown of the Armed Forces Staff College non-resident and no prior PME experience, if you would. You could probably submit that for us some time today.

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir, I will.

[The following information was received for the record:]

**BREAKDOWN OF AFSC STUDENTS WITH NON-RESIDENT/NO SERVICE PME**

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General Simpson. There is a point I would like to make with respect to the course taught at the Armed Forces Staff College and
non-resident instruction. The Armed Forces Staff College, phase II, of course, exists solely to better qualify potential joint specialty officers, those who have been nominated by their service, recommended by the Chairman, and approved by the Secretary of Defense, to become joint specialty officers. That is a process that is separate and distinct from the non-resident education program. Frequently the two are linked.

What I am saying is that officers can sign up for non-resident education, and it doesn’t qualify them to become joint specialty officers at all. All it does is impart to them the joint learning areas that the Chairman thinks is important for the intermediate level student. The fact that an individual takes a non-resident education program says they complete it successfully. They now have the knowledge, the fundamental building blocks, for the Joint Education Program.

If that individual’s performance indicates that they have the potential to become a Joint Staff officer, they can be recommended for such an assignment, and, the joint assignments are selective in their own right—an individual’s performance record and future potential indicates that they would be a good joint specialty officer and they have the phase I knowledge level learning areas, then they would qualify to go to Armed Forces Staff College for phase II, which has a broadened program of joint professional military education and raises that knowledge level to an application level while at that college.

Mr. Skelton, General, will the document known as MEPD, which comes from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, be rewritten periodically, on a yearly basis, or will it remain static throughout the next several years?

General Simpson. It is an evolving document. It is currently being reviewed for revision, because, as you pointed out, legislation has been passed that altered some of the policies contained in that document. The Chairman was responsive to that, and we are in the process of revising the document. In that particular area, it is already out of date.

As we look down the road and we see that the learning objectives, for example, need to be revised and updated to reflect the lessons that we have gained from Desert Storm and Desert Shield, those will also be reviewed and, if necessary, revised to reflect those changes.

Mr. Skelton. Let me at this point compliment your Chairman, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Powell, for his attention to the work of military education and his responsiveness to us. We have had discussions with him, and I have seen personally that his staff, people such as you, taking this quite seriously. I am convinced that what you do today, what Chairman Powell directs today, and the sincerity with which this is taken, will decades from now pay off in national security.

I keep going back to the lessons we learned in between the wars. It was Admiral Nimitz who once said, after World War II, that the major battles of the Pacific were all war-gamed at the Naval War College during the 1920s and the 1930s and that there was no surprise in any of the battles with the exception of the Japanese kamikazes. That was good work. That is what you all are about today, the thinking of the unthinkable in trying to plan ahead.
You mentioned a few moments ago lessons from Desert Storm. Actually, General Schwarzkopf and his staff took a very interesting part of history, several parts of history, and glued them together. That is why I have, at each of the schools we have been to, asked about the history instruction, how deeply they get into it, because I am convinced there are links of leadership between great captains of the past, of battles of the past, of conflicts in the past. General Schwarzkopf, in my estimation, puts the lessons of three battles together. The first was to have the deception, as was done by Montgomery in the Battle of Al-Alamein with the First Cavalry Division, going up the Wadi Albatein, attempting to draw in the Iraqi Army. At the same time they sent the rest of the army around, as did Stonewall Jackson at the Battle of Chancellorsville. The lessons of Tarawa showed up in the lack of American bombardment to precede a ground attack, in that case an island attack. I think the air forces, both the Navy and the Air Force, did themselves quite proud in preparing the entire area for a successful and short ground campaign. So those three pieces of history were glued together in Desert Storm and worked quite well.

I am hoping that at all levels past campaigns, both successful and unsuccessful, will be studied so that future military conflicts will find our commanders not stepping in the holes that were stepped in before, that they could have avoided by studying the conflicts decades ago. Do you see an increased interest in the learning and the teaching of military history in each of these schools?

General SIMPSON. Absolutely, sir. The commandants and presidents of the colleges are eager to get their hands on the lessons learned from Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The doctrine developers, both service and joint doctrine, are looking very carefully at the lessons learned that flow from Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

Of course, of the participants in that operation, some of them are now students in our service colleges, and commandants are taking advantage of that opportunity to have those students participate in the seminar discussions and write monographs and do the other things that will contribute to the educational experience of all, even those who did not have an opportunity to serve in the Persian Gulf area itself.

The lessons we have drawn from that—of course, there are many, many lessons. Take the joint lessons in particular, and the CINC is required to submit an after-action report, and in that after-action report he will list all of the joint lessons learned. Those are put into a data base. It happens to reside with the J-7. It is one of our responsibilities in the J-7.

Mr. SKELTON. That is your business.

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir, exactly.

The service centers for lessons learned can draw on that, and they are also connected to that process. But of particular importance to us is that the doctrine that drives course material at the colleges is going to be shaped as a result of those joint lessons learned, and that will be reflected in a very formal way in the classroom.

I think that as you review the curricula of the various colleges in the near and far term you are going to see the lessons of Desert Shield and Desert Storm reflected in those.
Mr. SKELTON. One thing that concerns me a great deal and in the study of Desert Storm and Desert Shield in the years ahead is that the wrong lessons not be learned. This was the fourth largest army in the world. If you look at a one-page critique historically you are going to see that within 100 hours, the American and coalition forces did away with the Iraqi forces. I am concerned that we draw the right lessons from this as opposed to the wrong lessons, that we not be overconfident in our abilities. We did this because we had outstanding people, they were highly trained, we had excellent equipment, and the planning, the strategic thinking, was first class. That is the element that we have to maintain for the days and years ahead. If we lose that bright, strategic thinking in the days ahead, we can cause ourselves not only to lose a battle or a conflict, we stand to lose a lot of very precious American lives.

What lessons, in your opinion, from what you have seen, General, are the lessons not to be learned from Desert Storm and Desert Shield?

General SIMPSON. Obviously, if there was similarity from Desert Shield to past wars and future wars, it is probably reflected in the fact that our soldiers, sailors, and airmen performed so superbly under fire and that our leadership did such a tremendous job in executing this operation.

I think that a lesson that any combat leader would want to avoid, or at least it is hard to say that you have a lesson that you are going to avoid, but if you observe that this was an operation that was very intense and short in duration, it was made up of a coalition unprecedented in our Nation's history, and it had technology embodied in the operations that again were unprecedented heretofore.

The lesson that I think we would all want to avoid is that we will fight a similar battle again and that the tactics and techniques that we learned there are set piece and can be applied again in a rote fashion, and that our overwhelming success in the Persian Gulf would create a false sense of confidence that we could do this again so swiftly and with so few casualties.

Mr. SKELTON. I think this is probably, in my reading of history, the first truly great set piece battle since Al-Alamein. Can you draw a similarity there, General?

General SIMPSON. There are some similarities, absolutely, sir—geography if no other, and the fact that we were talking about a highly mobile campaign.

I think that obviously, if you study lessons of past battles and view Desert Storm in that context, that will provide you with the ability to look at future situations, new situations, if you are a CINC or a Joint Task Force commander, and apply those lessons but not in a rote fashion that is predictable and would be disastrous.

Mr. SKELTON. I have further questions, but I will ask the other gentlemen at this time what questions they have.

Mr. Edwards.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Simpson, as I observed Desert Shield and Desert Storm, I was somewhat overwhelmed by thinking about the management challenges of putting together half a million troops from the
United States and thousands from all over the world, coordinating that effort, the logistics, and every other aspect of management that would have been necessary to make that operation successful.

Could you just go back a moment and walk me through the type of management training that a young person would receive starting at a military academy and then progressing through to lieutenant general, in a few brief moments. Just generally, what type of management training do they receive? Are there joint programs with our business schools—Stanford, Wharton, Harvard, or others? Aside from the importance of military history, strategy, and training, I can see the tremendous needs for budget skills, quality control skills, communication, people skills, leadership, knowledge of computers, logistics. The same skills it would take to make a great corporate chief are necessary to make a great military leader.

I know that is asking a lot in a few moments, but could you give me a thumbnail sketch starting out with the freshmen at one of the service academies and going through their career emphasizing the kind of management training they would receive?

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

The framework I have alluded to before in the policy document lays this out in a generalized way, and it does take the Armed Forces officer and provides a program that would carry them from precommissioning as a cadet, midshipman, to general flag officer level. There is a program that lays that all out. It is not precise what is exactly taught in each of those levels except for the joint area, because the services, of course, have the primary responsibility to train the forces, and they do so within the context of their own service.

But to answer your question more directly, as an officer progresses from the precommissioning phase where they get, of course, the foundation for their own service, the education that is necessary to understand their own service, it is more functionally oriented along the lines of what a young Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine officer would expect as a company grade officer. The management at that level is more service specific, because that is where the young company grade officer spends most of their time.

As they transition to midgrades or the field grades of major, lieutenant commander, through lieutenant colonel and commander, the education we have been talking about, the intermediate-level college, is where you begin to see the different parts of military service coming together in a coherent way—the budget, planning, and execution systems, the management of the force structure. At the intermediate college, it has a very service-specific orientation, as it should have, but it is at that point that you begin to see these different areas synthesized in a way that the midgrade officer can see how that plays out at the operation level on the battlefield.

When they move to the senior service college level, the level is, of course, raised to that of an application level, as we would call it, where the senior service college student now is dealing with military strategy and, in its broadest sense, bringing together the different components of the Armed Forces in a coherent way and applied on the battlefield, or if you are talking about budget, force structure issues, or other things, how to manage all of that.
Finally, at the general flag officer level, there is a host of courses that deal with management that the general flag officer could be involved in. By and large now, they are all products of this earlier education, the progressive process, but they are also given courses such as the Capstone course that is mandatory for all newly selected O-7s, and at the Capstone course you once again bring together the different components of the Department of Defense, and you view them from a national strategy level and how the CINCs bring all of these forces to bear in their particular areas of operation.

So it is a progression. It goes from precommissioning all the way through the general flag officer.

Mr. Edwards. At any point in that stage, is there interaction between faculty members at our service schools and faculty members at our business schools around the country? I am not sure who can teach whom a lesson. After watching Desert Storm, perhaps our military academicians can teach our business academicians some lessons about management. But is there any kind of interaction there?

So many of the skills, I think, are very, very similar. I know there are other skills that are totally different from running General Motors or General Foods or Proctor and Gamble to running the U.S. Army or Air Force. But certainly there are a lot of management skills that are similar, regardless of the setting. Is there any kind of interaction there so that our military education leaders stay in touch with the latest management thoughts and philosophies and schools of thinking?

General Simpson. Yes, there is, to answer your question directly. Of course, all of the colleges hire civilian faculty members. These come, obviously, from the private sector, and they bring with them the management skills that they possess and have gained through experience. We do have programs—fellowships, for example—where the Army officer or the military officers would participate in a fellowship with Harvard training—

Mr. Edwards. An advanced management program?

General Simpson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edwards. You do send military officers to that type of program?

General Simpson. Yes, sir.

The services have their graduate degree programs also, and any of those focus on the management specialty areas. But I am talking mainly about how that plays in the classroom of our intermediate and senior service colleges. We have the civilian faculty who is hired in; we also have the military faculty, many of whom have acquired advanced degrees—masters' degrees, Ph.D.'s—and some of those are in the management area.

We have another area such as the Defense Systems Management College which deals with the acquisition world; we have training with industry, where we send Active-Duty officers to actually work with our private sector and learn from them the management techniques, the things that work and don't work.

Mr. Edwards. Very good. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Skelton. Mr. Taylor.
Mr. Taylor. General, I would like to get back to what Congressman Skelton was talking about, and that is the emphasis on lessons learned. I gather from some of the things I have read and some of the testimony I have heard, going back to Vietnam, that one of the major mistakes that our Nation made was that we thought it would be cheap and easy with a minimal commitment. I have read where some have speculated that Vietnam was sort of an outgrowth of World War II. Many of the lieutenants and junior officers served at the tail end of World War II when things were going our way and had never known anything else. They thought that just the arrival of the American Army would be all that was needed to prop up the South Vietnamese Government and that things would start swinging our way. Obviously, that wasn’t the case.

I think the second part of what I have picked up is that many of the junior officers who had served in Vietnam and realized that that wasn’t the case were now the senior officers for the Gulf War. They realized that if you truly want to minimize your casualties, you do so by overwhelming your enemy certainly; the tremendous logistic moves on the part of Chairman Powell in bringing the VII Corps out of Europe, the half a million men, the tremendous naval presence. I was wondering if that lesson could be conveyed in your college for the next time on the basis of a win as well as it was conveyed tragically on what happened in Vietnam?

General Simpson. Yes. The colleges’ commandants and presidents are, by and large, products of the experience of the Vietnam era that you described. They also, of course, watched very closely what transpired in the Persian Gulf and do want to capture the right lessons and impart those to the officers as they progress through this educational system.

The lesson that you don’t engage in combat unless you intend to win is perhaps the most significant lesson that we can probably impart to our young officers coming up through the ranks. If that means a significant commitment in terms of people and materiel and actual resources, then so be it.

The decision, of course, to engage in that endeavor is one that rests with our civilian leadership, but once the civilian leadership has committed us to it, the military leader today, a lesson that is partly an outgrowth of the Vietnam era experience is that we are going to go forth and do so in a way that assures victory.

Mr. Taylor. Obviously, the defense buildup of the 1980s in every aspect—in materiel, in people, in training—contributed a great deal to the success in the Gulf War. I am concerned that with a relatively frozen defense budget, the technological superiority that was used to minimize casualties and overwhelm the enemy in the Gulf War will be diminished—obviously, there were Russian advisors, Soviet advisors, in Iraq. There is a great deal of talk that many of these people will become freelance defense specialists with the drawdown of the Soviet Army available for selling their expertise to the highest bidder. I am concerned, with a fairly static defense budget, how we get that technological advantage next time? Can we accomplish solely with training and make up for the loss of what I would guess to be about $50 billion of high-tech wizardry that certainly did the job and minimized American casualties?
General SIMPSON. Sir, of course we did have a technological advantage, a significant one. The key is to maintain that over any potential adversaries. As the leadership looks down the road and sees where potential adversaries might be going with their own technology, we, of course, have to stay abreast of that and apply our scarce resources in those areas where there is the greatest risk that that technology will come to bear against us.

I can tell you that within the Joint Staff, Department of Defense, that has been examined very closely. As you know, title V required on the conduct of the war has a question very specifically oriented on that, and the Secretary of Defense's interim response that was provided to Congress very recently deals with that in a very general way and will be a little more specific later on.

But the technological issue is one that is very much on the mind of our leadership. The idea is, of course, to maintain that edge, to try to foresee where our potential adversaries would be going with technology of their own, and to make sure that our scarce resources are applied in the proper way against those advances that they might have in the technological area.

Mr. TAYLOR. In the 2 years that I have had the privilege to serve up here, I have come at a time, I guess, of the greatest change in the past half-century. I think the Berlin Wall came down a couple of days before or a couple of days after I was elected. How do you respond to such a dramatic shift away from a NATO versus Warsaw Pact scenario to the Third World confrontation and still not let your guard down. In the event that some coup would succeed in the Soviet Union and that the reactionary forces would succeed in having those 30,000 nuclear weapons and that massive army once again at their disposal, can you progress along parallel courses and do both? Or what do you all see, and what are you planning on as the greatest threat?

General SIMPSON. Well, the changing strategic landscape that you describe is something that, of course, occupies the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense a great deal. I know that as the situation in Eastern Europe, for example, changes, the Chairman and the CINCs who are affected by that spend a considerable amount of time trying to anticipate what those changes mean to our alliances and to our Nation in particular. How that translates down to the classroom—of course, we have discussed how the students and the commandants of the colleges have observed that and are applying that experience in their classrooms to make sure that our leadership that is going to face those challenges in the future fully understand its implications from the standpoint of what it means to the Armed Forces of the United States.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, there has been a great deal of talk about the Soviet troops leaving Eastern Europe and peddling their weapons—AK's, RPG's. With a region of the world, the Middle East, where there is just enormous wealth, and with the perceived chaos in the Soviet Union, obviously some of the members of the military may be disillusioned with the vast changes that they are seeing. The country that they swore allegiance to 30 years ago is certainly not the country they are serving today.

I have concerns that the future Saddam Husseins won't be trying to build a weapon as much as they will be showing up at someone's
doorstep with a $500 million check trying to buy a weapon. Instead of the 20 nations that we estimate will have nuclear weapons by the year 2000, that number could be much larger, and it would be harder to track. How do you plan for something like that, or do you even consider that to be a problem?

General SIMPSON. Well, it is certainly an issue that needs the attention of the Chairman and the CINCs. To plan for that problem, to the point exactly, is that each of the CINCs, of course, is tasked to prepare to conduct certain operations within their AOR. That, of course, is tasked to them by the JSCP by a strategic capabilities plan which tells the CINCs exactly what they need to do and apportions the forces to them to do that.

In the CINCs AOR, and if you are talking about CINCEUR, for example, JSCP anticipates what that situation should be and tells the CINC this is what you need to prepare for. So, when you say how do you plan for it, well, that is in a broader sense accomplished through the Joint Strategic Planning System.

Mr. TAYLOR. But is that part of the equation of the future Third World confrontations that you envision?

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir. It takes that into account.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. General, there are those who say that nothing more is necessary in future conflicts than air power. Air power has proven itself, and ground forces, such as the Army, such as your Marine ground forces, are not really needed. There are people who are saying that. How would you respond to that? How would you have the various joint as well as service schools respond to that?

General SIMPSON. Well, those who would say that, sir, I would submit are uninformed and really didn't examine the lessons from Desert Storm very carefully. That was a victory, one that we can all take great pride in, but it was one that was accomplished by a joint and coalition force that included both the—or all the components of our forces, the air, ground and sea. The students of military matters I think would quickly recognize that to be a fact.

Mr. SKELTON. How important was the Army in Desert Storm?

General SIMPSON. Well, sir, if you are going to occupy your enemy's territory, it is very difficult to do that with aircraft or ships. So I think that the ground forces, both Army and Marines, played a significant role in the defeat of Saddam Hussein.

Mr. SKELTON. How important was the Navy?

General SIMPSON. Pardon me, sir?

Mr. SKELTON. How important was the Navy?

General SIMPSON. Well, the Navy, of course, covered the Gulf areas and provided aircraft and TLAM. I mean their role in this was significant in and of itself.

Mr. SKELTON. Air power in Desert Storm was really a joint integrated Air Force, Navy, Marines, Army helicopter under the direction of one commander. We saw that the results were spectacular, but it was obviously tough putting this together.

Service planning officers at the central headquarters had to learn about each other's capabilities in the middle of the crisis. What is being done in the various schools to improve the cross-service workings of air power, and also future air doctrine? Where will that be written?
General Simpson. Well, the joint doctrine as it affects the application of air power, the process is managed within the Joint Staff. The actual authoring of the joint publications, the review and validation of those is a collective effort. A service may be given the lead but others also participate in the development of that joint doctrine. That applies regardless if we are talking about air or ground or sea operations.

How that plays out in the classroom must reflect current service and joint doctrine. As the doctrine evolves, the classroom will reflect those changes just as well.

Mr. Skelton. The air-land battle concept, which has been around for sometime, was validated in Desert Storm, at least in my opinion. But am I correct when I say there was not much close air support being flown in that war?

General Simpson. There was close air support flown.

Mr. Skelton. Was it extensive?

General Simpson. I guess it depends on your perspective, sir. I think that given that the ground phase of this operation was relatively brief, necessary but relatively brief, one would say, well, if you only had 100 hours of intense ground combat where close air support, obviously, would be applied, that wouldn't be very much. But for the soldiers and marines who relied on close air support at any particular point in confrontation with the Iraqis forces, I think that they would find and they would say in their reports that the close air support was good.

Mr. Skelton. Some critics say that you need not have close air support, but that you have close support, such as helicopters of your own service, ATACMS, artillery, MLRS, rather than the close air support which the Air Force supplies. Would you agree or disagree with that, sir?

General Simpson. Well, what I would say, sir, is that in many cases when we get into these discussions about fire support we get into definitional problems. If you have a target and its location on the battlefield is close, intermediate or far, and you can engage that target with a weapons system that accomplishes what you intend, be it neutralize or destroy that target, then what you call it is really irrelevant to the young soldier or marine who is facing an enemy across the trench line.

If that fire support comes from cannon artillery, close aircraft—close support aircraft, helicopters, as long as the target is successfully engaged and it accomplishes what that young soldier or marine needs to accomplish, then I think that what you call it is really irrelevant.

Mr. Skelton. There are projected cuts in America's military in the years ahead which, personally, bother and concern me. That is the way the President has recommended and our budget has been reflected here in Congress.

Now, in this forced drawdown and cutback in the military, I am concerned about the possible effects that it might have on the professional military education system. I am a strong believer that this is the seed corn, and if anything there should be more concentration on professional military education as the overall military budgets go down. Because if you are going to have a smaller mili-
tary, there is all the more reason to be able to outthink and out-smart any potential adversary in the days or years ahead.

My recollection is, General, that the only—and correct me if I am wrong—the only school or schools that have increased their budget this last cycle, rather than decreased it or stayed the same, was the Navy War College and the Intermediate War College. Is that correct?

General SIMPSON. I would have to examine the numbers precisely, sir, and what they mean in terms of education per se. The budgets for the college often include such things as base operations—in fact, generally do—so to say that a budget has increased or decreased would have to be examined in light of what is really being accomplished during that budget period. Are we trying to improve the quality of education in the classroom through upgrades in courseware, or has the budget been used to do other things that would be related to the operations of the base, for example?

I can't answer your question directly because I don't have the numbers all laid out before me and with the underlying reasons for why they change one way or the other.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, it would be my intention to pursue this issue rather vigorously in the months ahead as to the budget for each of the military schools, both intermediate and senior as well as the one at Norfolk. We need to measure it against the standard you just set forth to see if we are spending money on better education rather than a new tennis court. If there is anyplace where the military budget should increase, not just in dollars but increase in quality, it should be in our professional military education.

Do you agree or disagree with that?

General SIMPSON. Absolutely, sir. I would agree with you that education is really the bedrock of our professional development program and that the quality of education is the key point. If that translates to more dollars because you need to hire additional faculty, for example, I think that the commandants need to so state.

As I look at what has actually occurred in the past year, I would point out that at the National Defense University, for example, their budget request has been substantially met and that currently we only have a very small amount of unfinanced requirements. We still have some time left in the budget year. I do not know if we will be able to close that gap to zero, but the point is that in a rather significant budget, the service, the executive agent, in this particular case being the Army, has managed to provide to the president of NDU substantially what he asked for to support his institution.

Meanwhile, the request to hire civilian faculty——

Mr. SKELTON. Which we gave you additional authority to do——

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. So you could compete with the other high-paying colleges and universities. Are you using that?

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir. The schools are requesting and the Chairman has approved the additional hire of civilian faculty. It takes, also, money to pay that additional faculty, and that is also being provided as it can be to—as the colleges are capable of hiring the civilians, some of these are more difficult than others, but those requirements are being substantially met.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Edwards has an additional question.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Simpson, the primary purpose of this panel is to evaluate the military education system in this country and find ways to maintain its quality, and perhaps even improve it in areas. But one reason I am happy to be on this panel is I hope to learn enough about the military education system to learn some lessons we can apply to everything from professional business school training and education in our colleges and universities to our public schools.

It has always amazed me how the military in this country can sometimes take young teenagers that have had problems with crime, perhaps even drugs, perhaps they have not been the best of students, certainly you get a whole range of recruits—but it amazes me. We ought to learn something from how our military takes some of those young people that come from broken families, perhaps not the best of values, difficulties in education, and within a few months or a few years gives them self-esteem, respect and makes them into real quality soldiers and citizens.

Does the Department of Defense ever work with our public school systems or with juvenile delinquent rehabilitation programs to try to take some of the lessons you have learned from decades and decades of experiences in the military and apply those lessons to our public schools in order to rehabilitate teenagers that don't have self-respect?

One reason I mention this is that someone started a program here, a summer program for kids from some of the ghetto areas in the Washington, DC, area. I think it is junior marine training, and I think they put them in fatigues and train these kids. From the articles I have read, a lot of these kids, compared to their peers, have developed solid values and self-respect and esteem.

What a tremendous contribution to our country's future if we could take our military education lessons and apply those to the areas where we are having difficulties. Is anything being done in that arena? I know that is a little outside the primary purview of this panel, but I would be interested in your comments on that.

General SIMPSON. I can't speak to any specific Department of Defense program that would be targeted at such an objective. To the extent that a local community calls upon its military that might be represented by an installation to assist in their community matters, of course, this depends on the relationship that that community has with the military.

I know that we in uniform are very proud of the fact that we bring in a vast cross-section of our Nation and try to enforce the values that are important to us as a society and adhere to them as much as we can. To the degree that we are successful at doing that is reflection of the quality of the professionals that we have in uniform and their consistency in insisting upon the application of these values, not only in professional day-to-day business, but also in our personal lives.

How much the private sector can apply those lessons I think depends a lot on the locale and the society that might be in the vicinity of a particular military installation and call upon them. We do, of course, have some very unique aspects to discipline within the military that wouldn't have an application in the private sector.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you.

Mr. Skelton. Mr. Browder.

Mr. Browder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask a question about the faculty mix. I know you are concerned about the faculty mix and you are constantly scrutinizing that to see if increases in non-host faculty are possible and appropriate without altering the service's unique thrust of the respective programs.

I notice that the panel made some recommendations, most of which the Chairman has implemented or adopted as policies. But, at the intermediate service colleges, the panel recommended 10 percent from each of the non-host departments by academic year 1990-1991 and 15 percent by academic year 1995-1996.

In your report you have said that you are requiring at least 5 percent from each non-host department. Could you tell us why you selected 5 percent rather than the recommended 10 and 15 percent, and whether you think you can satisfy what you were trying to get at there with 5 percent?

General Simpson. Yes, sir. When the Chairman's policy document was being put together in late 1989, early 1990, we really didn't have much of an experience factor to go on. We didn't know how far you could go and how quickly. So the ratios that were established there were regarded at the time as a starting point, the mark on the wall, to see if, one, we can get there and what the impact would be on the day-to-day business of the service colleges.

Now that we have essentially achieved that ratio across the board we can now take a look at where we can go from here. As I indicated to you earlier, we can provide to you where we are precisely today in each case and where we would be—where we think we would be in the near term.

If the policy requires—by the way, the policy does say that these are just floors. These are not the maximums. These are not the point at which you will go and stop. Every commandant recognizes that, and I believe as they appeared before this panel they made that point clear. That they just view those particular goals as the floor which they must achieve, and then they can go beyond that to the degree that (1) their service curriculum will allow it; (2) they have the authority to go out and recruit additional faculty, and that the services, the other services are providing faculty to these schools, are able to support them with qualified faculty members.

Mr. Browder. Let me see if I understand correctly what you are saying. You are saying that the 5 percent is a benchmark and that you are going to look at whether you can increase that, say, to the 10 and 15 percent without damaging the quality of the program, rather than saying we have just decided that 5 percent is the proper mix for all time.

General Simpson. You have it correct, sir. That is not regarded as the formula.

Mr. Browder. That is a beginning.

General Simpson. Yes, sir. When the document was being put together we really didn't know how this would play out in the classroom. As we gain experience, that policy will be reviewed in light of what the services can do and should do in supporting the other colleges with faculty members.

Mr. Browder. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. SKELTON. I think there should be a footnote compliment to you folks who are involved with the military education system. It was our discovery early on in our first hearings that a great historical body of knowledge and historical military conflict knowledge was not being included in any instruction. Mostly as a result of then Major General, now Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan, extensive research and study in the whole body of the American Indian wars is now taking place, as well as at the Marine Corps Intermediate School. This is no small thing because there are great military lessons to be taken from any one of those extensive conflicts. As a matter of fact, the sole existence for the U.S. Army for decades was the fact that there was a frontier. I compliment those who have implemented extensive research and studies in this area—and I mean this as a compliment—those who have undertaken that. Very quickly—we were talking, General, about foreign students in seminars and civilians in seminars. Let me refer you, sir, to the mission statements.

First, the Army Command General Staff College: Your mission statement is to develop leaders who will train and fight units at the tactical and operational levels, and develop combined arms doctrine and assist in its promulgation.

The Naval War College mission is to enhance the professional capabilities of its students to make sound decisions in both combat command and management positions, and to conduct research leading to the development of advanced strategic and technical concepts for the future employment of naval forces.

The Air Command General Staff College mission is to enhance the professional knowledge, skills and perspectives of mid-career officers for increased leadership roles in command and staff positions.

You will note that the object of all of these missions is the potential American uniformed leader. I think it is very, very fine that we have both civilian and foreign students there. I think that is probably a major plus. But the object of our attention is the future military leader, and we cannot lose sight of that in putting these seminars together. I hope that in the days ahead you will keep that in mind.

I have no further comments. I have to catch an airplane in just a few moments, and I am sure the others have to, too.

Mr. Taylor, you have a quick question?

Mr. TAYLOR. General Simpson, I was curious. When things went so well in the Gulf, one of the many successes was the success of the total force concept and the use of the Guard and the Reserve. In your statement, where you are talking about having the interaction of the services in strategic areas, does that include senior level members of the Guard and the Reserve? Is the total force concept going to remain in effect? Is that the strategic plan for the next decade? Are their senior officers given access to this, or is this solely for Active, Regular Active-Duty officers?

General SIMPSON. Yes, sir. I don’t see anything that would diminish the importance of the total force concept in the near future, or at least in the foreseeable future. I think that you are exactly right. That the use of the total force concept in the Persian Gulf proved that it is a success and a viable concept.
As regards the senior officers or intermediate officers, intermediate grade officers in the Reserve components, I would say to you that absolutely they will be held accountable to know and understand the joint areas as much as the active component does. It brings us back to a point earlier that we discussed having to do with non-resident instruction. The non-resident instruction route is one of the major ways that a Reserve component officer who can't take off a significant amount of time from his civilian career to attend a year of a service college, the non-resident route is one of the primary ways that they can acquire the joint learning objectives prescribed by the Chairman. That is one of the reasons why we took a very close look at the non-resident instruction for intermediate college. Because as Reserve components subscribe to those courses this will be the way that they will learn to the knowledge level the learning objectives that are so important to success in the planning and employment of joint forces.

Mr. TAYLOR. So, as far as your strategic plan and what you are educating your officers for, we will continue with the total force concept for the foreseeable future?

General SIMPSON. Absolutely. Absolutely, sir. The learning objectives are equally applicable to Active and Reserve components.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. General, we really thank you for your attendance today and your excellent testimony. I think you all are very much on the right track, and I compliment you and your Chairman for your efforts and the sincerity with which you take this all important subject for the future security of our Nation.

You did make a comment earlier, which is probably the most important thing you said, that the most important lesson is that we don't want to engage in combat unless we plan to win. That is what this is all about. Second place doesn't count on the battlefield. With hard work in our various war schools, intermediate and senior war colleges, with adequate funding, top-notch faculty, sincere students following the guidelines of thinking strategically, working jointly and doing it in a very rigorous fashion, I think we will see decades from now the efforts of those involved in military education pay off and cause our Nation to be all the more secure.

Thank you for your testimony. We will look forward to seeing you again sometime soon. Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the panel was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL

Mr. Skelton. Ladies and gentlemen, we will go ahead and begin the panel hearing. I always like to start on time and end on time, and I know we have a number of questions for the general today.

I welcome you and thank you for your interest and your attention. We planned to hold this hearing at the Armed Forces Staff College down in Norfolk but our legislative calendar doesn't permit us to get away because we have votes today. We suggested the general come up here and we thank you for that.

The purpose of our hearing is to discuss the new 12-week phase II course of instruction at the Armed Forces Staff College. The witness, as I mentioned, is Brig. Gen. Stanley Kwieciak, the commandant at the school. Four years ago this panel began its examination of military education because the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act made it extremely important that an established framework of joint professional military education for selected officers be established.

During our examination it became apparent we needed to reorient the Armed Forces Staff College to make it the premiere educational institution for officers assigned to joint duty. In order to accomplish this, the panel made a large number of recommendations concerning the scope of instruction and quality of education.

I know I speak for all the members of this panel when I say it is gratifying to see how well you have responded to these recommendations. The outstanding success of Desert Shield/Desert Storm can, in part, be attributed to the presence of many officers with an understanding of joint operations. You can certainly take pride in the contribution of the Armed Forces Staff College in educating these officers.

General Kwieciak, I commend you. I really commend you and your staff at the college for your dedication, for the actions you have taken to develop and implement the new course. It has not been easy. I recognize that there are many difficulties involved in
initiating a completely new course while, at the same time, continuing your normal academic programs.

We appreciate your being with us. I regret we did not have the opportunity to visit you. You did mention to me some of the things we are missing in not being able to come down there and you may want to touch on those in your testimony. I wish you continued success in your new assignment at Fort Lewis. You will be the assistant Corps—tell me the title again.

General KWIECIAK. Chief of staff.

Mr. SKELTON. Chief of staff of I-CORPS. Is that correct?

General KWIECIAK. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Which is headed at Fort Lewis.

Owen Pickett.

Mr. Pickett. Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome General Kwieciak this morning and express my regret that we cannot hold this meeting at the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, but we certainly welcome you here and we look forward to your testimony. I don't have any further statement this morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

General, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. STANLEY KWIECIAK, JR., COMMANDANT, ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE, NORFOLK, VA

General KWIECIAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I provided a detailed statement, which I would like to have entered into the record, and I will just summarize a couple of points.

Mr. SKELTON. Without objection, the entire statement will be in the record.

General KWIECIAK. I have about two or three points I would like to cover this morning. To assist, I have given you a chart, and I would like to just talk in some limited detail about precisely what we are doing in the 12-week program.

But before I get into that, let me say that you are absolutely right, Mr. Chairman, when you say that there has been a lot of change at the Armed Forces Staff College. I reviewed the testimony of my predecessor, General Dailey, of 2 years ago, when you were at Norfolk, and I reflected on the things that he talked about and where we are today. As you mentioned in your opening remarks, I think we have accomplished the mission. However, the mission is a changing one, and I will talk to that in a moment.

The first point I would like to make is that when we started to look at changing from the 5 1/2-month program to the phase II program, we took into account a lot of things. We took into account the recommendations of the panel; we took into account the guidance we had received from the Joint Staff and from National Defense University. With respect to the panel recommendations, we had in my judgment two ways of looking at this. We could have done it as a matter of compliance, or we could have taken a very hard look at these recommendations, internalize them and made them really our own ideas as opposed to being just the Skelton recommendations that were issued and implemented. I would say to you, sir, had we chosen the path of only compliance, we would have
had a mediocre program at best. We worked very hard to do it the latter way, to really internalize all the recommendations and guidance, make them our own ideas and then execute them.

The reason I point this out is that because of the significant change that happened at the Armed Forces Staff College, I think it is the only path we could have taken. If I could call your attention to the chart before you, I will talk through what we are doing in the 12-week program; we will finish the first 12-week course up next Friday.

Let me say that this 12-week course depends—its success depends—on the fact that the students that come to us are service-unique experts. That is, they have had their service experience, whether it is flying airplanes, being a battalion executive officer in the infantry, etc. With such practical experience linked to their education from the intermediate service colleges, they bring a service-unique expertise to the seminars. We have an equal mix of students from all services, and the exchanges that occur between the service experts initiate a great deal of learning among the students.

This course is interactive, it is collaborative, it is scenario based. In fact, we have, if you will look at the right side of the chart, a war game. That war game really starts in week two and I will explain that in a moment.

When the students arrive, we in-process them for about half a day and then we throw them immediately, without any instruction whatsoever, into a crisis simulation. It's a military problem we present to these students. It is centered in the Middle East, and they have to be able to figure out how they are going to solve the problem. This includes movement of forces, the right kinds of mix of forces, and so forth.

The reason we open our course in this manner is to provide a stressful environment, so the students can very quickly get to know one another. It starts to get the service-unique expert out of his comfort zone, out of the service paradigm, and to begin to recognize complexities of joint warfighting. It provides a basis for follow-on education and follow-on courses for the remainder of the program. We can reflect back to that first week when we are trying to make a point, we can point to practical experience that the seminar has been through.

Moving beyond that first week, we get into strategic synchronization. It is at this point that the seminar starts to work and think as a staff. They go through the rest of the period of time they are there creating products.

During strategic synchronization, we focus at the Joint Staff level. We go through the entire Joint Strategic Planning System, and we have the students come to grips, as a seminar, with such things as the Risk Evaluation Force—where they have to be able to decide on a force for an area of operation. They assign the final force structure to their unified command; they are required to come up with a Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan which provides tasks to a command. They also develop a National Military Strategy Document.

We also spend time during this period in which we have the service-unique experts from the Army, from the Navy, Marine Corps,
and the Air Force, educating their colleagues in the seminar about their service. The focus is really on service document trends. They have to lay out the capabilities of their service and service limitations which is the more tougher issue. This of course, leads to an awful lot of dialog among the students as they are educating one another.

If I might digress for a moment. One of the things we have done with our seminars is that in our quartering of them, we put these officers in former family housing units which we have converted to bachelor officer quarters. They are cul-de-sacs. We can put a whole seminar together in that cul-de-sac, and within each unit, three officers live. You will never find three Army officers living together, three Navy; there is a mix of officers.

So, for example, when we are talking about airland battle, doctrine for the Army, if a student wants to follow on, he will be living with an Army officer from his seminar. In fact, after work we find that the students will, at dinner or whatever, talk about these tough issues and continue their education.

As we press on from strategic synchronization, we focus on the unified command level. It is at this point where now we ask the seminar to start the development and organization of a unified command. The theater of interest is in North Africa. They have to develop their command structure to get into all the joint publications, figure out precisely what the functions are going to be and how they are going to organize it. They have to come to grips with issues such as will they have a standing joint task force or not. They debate all these issues, and then they finally settle on how they are going to organize their headquarters.

Once they organize, headquarters organization stays with them for the rest of the course. They also have to source their command with forces. We do not give them unlimited money. They are constrained so they have to get into all the debates. Do I want another carrier battle group, or do I want another division? How about a wing as opposed to an armored cavalry regiment? They get into all these debates and settle on their force.

Then we get into the regional contingency planning for the next 3 weeks, and it’s in this period where we require the seminar to go through, in the geographical area of North Africa, and develop a complete plan. They have to do mission analysis, commander’s estimate, develop assumptions. They have to, in fact, finally come up with a concept of operations exactly the same way it occurs on the unified command staffs.

We then give seminars the tough task of figuring out how they are going to flow those forces from the continental United States and other places to the theater of operations, to do it in a manner that is consistent with what the commander in chief of that unified command intends, to do the right flow, to get them there in a timely way, and to deal with all the difficulties of available transportation. This is a very tough thing they have to do. Nonetheless, we make them do it.

Having completed that through week eight, we then get into crisis action planning. They are taught how to do crisis management. Then, during week ten, we throw them into a crisis in the
theater of operations. We, in fact, change everything around. We change the threat; we change the mission; and they are in a time-constrained environment, having to come up with an execution of a plan.

They can go back to the plan, the deliberate plan they developed, they can change it, they can start with a new plan; but regardless they are confronted with the problem. Most go back to their own plan, and in a time-constrained environment, adjust it, as we do in the real world.

Having done that, they go into the final war game. This war game is an interactive war game. We use a computer model called JAWS, Joint Armed Forces Staff College Wargaming System, which we developed, and which is a very good one.

It is the only game that I know of that you can do deployment, sustainment, employment, and force synchronization. This is really the test of the seminar. It is their test as to how well over the past 11 weeks they have planned. In fact, right now at the Staff College, I have 140 reservists who are the red teams. They fight against each seminar. I have 12 seminars, 12 unique war games ongoing at this very moment. The games will be ongoing through Thursday of next week.

The last thing we do in this course is a lengthy after-action review. We spend 4 hours, at least 4 hours, in analyzing what we have done.

This is not a hot wash, but critically analyzing what we have done, and how we could have done it better. There is just as much learning in the last day, I believe, as any other part of the course, and then the students graduate.

In this case, next Friday will be their graduation. They will go back to their unified commands and their joint assignments.

Now, among all of these weeks of instruction, we have some nine case studies, historical case studies that we have embedded throughout the curriculum. They range from World War II, where we look at Guadalcanal, the Battle of Coral Sea; we look at, for example, Grenada; we are developing a case study for the future on Just Cause.

What we do with these case studies is not simply a historical review, but we try to draw key principles and key issues to hammer home. Things a joint warfighter ought to be thinking about. We relate these to the recent experiences of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Then we show how these principles apply to planning in their own unified commands.

Finally, the last thing I'll say, we do have exams, and I will talk about that later, if you wish. We have a mid-term and a final exam, and they are pretty tough. On that note, Mr. Chairman, I will stop here and take whatever questions you may have.
Mr. Chairman, and members of the Panel. It is a great pleasure to welcome you here today and to have an opportunity to update you on the progress the Armed Forces Staff College has made in implementing the recommendations of your 1989 Report on Military Education.

As you know, the General Accounting Office (GAO) has completed its review of Professional Military Education (PME) at the four intermediate-level and the three senior-level Service institutions, and most recently examined this college. The GAO's published report provides detailed documentation of the extent to which we have met the relevant criteria set forth by your Panel, Mr. Chairman, as well as those of the Military Education Policy Document (MEPD). Therefore, I would like to offer a more conceptual overview and assessment of the college's achievements during the past year.

The Skelton Panel has had a profound positive impact on Joint PME and on this institution in particular. At the outset I want you to know how we, as an institution, approached your recommendations. There were two paths we might have taken: mere compliance--or joint ownership. We brought all our critical resources to bear on the recommended educational improvements, and as soon as we recognized that they were indeed feasible and deliverable, we got on board and made them our own. Far from being merely "in compliance," we have internalized the Panel's recommendations because we firmly believe they are sound and right for this college. It is extremely important for me
to assert this because, given the significant changes involved, without such co-ownership a mediocre educational program would have resulted. Such a disappointing outcome is far from the case. I think you will be as pleased as we are with the wide-ranging improvements that have been realized in our curriculum, our instructional methods, our educational objectives and the standards for their achievement, and our conceptual framework. We are already seeing the benefits that have resulted from these improvements and from our management of student and faculty issues.

Curriculum

The new curriculum for the 12-week Intermediate course provides a challenging and academically sound course of study. It incorporates only the very best of the old 5 1/2-month curriculum (which we carefully scrutinized to determine what was essential to retain) plus new teaching material developed by a task-dedicated team of faculty members. This team integrated all subject matter seamlessly and paid particular attention to streamlining the students' reading material, the teaching methods, and the lesson objectives. The underlying theme remains, of course, joint warfighting at the operational level.

We have significantly expanded the focus of the curriculum, however, to include not only deployment and sustainment, as before, but also employment and synchronization of land, sea, and air forces—in other words, joint forces. As soon as the intermediate students arrive, we plunge them into a crisis action exercise which previews the concepts and problems they are about to encounter throughout the course. They then examine the complex
issues related to strategic synchronization, regional organization and command relationships, regional contingency planning, and finally crisis action planning. Cumulative mid-term and final examinations assess their ability to apply, in writing, the concepts they have learned to date. The students then move into a totally interactive joint planning exercise and war game which simulate the realities facing the unified command and the joint task force. Each block in the intermediate program builds upon everything that has gone before; and ultimately the students see, for perhaps the first time in their professional careers, how the integrated employment of land, air, and sea services actually works.

Meanwhile, during all this cognitive activity on several levels, the course we call "the joint perspective" is going on as well. Its primary objective is in the affective domain: each student must internalize a comprehensive understanding and a healthy respect for the capabilities, missions, cultures, and "character" of the other Services. Reaching the higher levels of affective learning requires internalization of values over a considerable period of time; for that reason, a joint perspective cannot be taught effectively as a single module in a discrete block of instruction.

The same requirement applies to the senior program as well. In addition to the pervasive emphasis on the joint perspective, the college has developed a challenging sequence of courses for the senior students. Like the intermediates, the seniors begin with a crisis exercise and then proceed from service concepts through four aspects of synchronization—strategic, operational, force, and functional—to a culminating exercise. The course particularly promotes, in addition, long-lasting team building and bonding as
these students travel together to visit key joint commands. This program too
has been completely rebuilt, and we believe its content and instructional
methods represent a significant qualitative improvement.

Instructional Methods

For both the intermediate and the senior course, we have aimed our
instruction at the application level or higher. Collaborative and
interactive learning have virtually replaced the old passive forms of
learning. In this way, our students model the desired format--while they are
learning the actual content--of joint planning and execution. We now are
initiating a more sophisticated use of case studies as well as practical
exercises and war games, as your Panel has recommended: to teach the combat
employment of joint forces. And our instructors also continue to move ahead,
away from the old method of briefing with stacks of visual aids, to
concentrate instead on teaching. Thus the new focus is on ideas, not mere
facts. The former concentration on process and procedure can safely be left
to the Phase I schools so that AFSC can educate its students in terms of
thinking skills, problem solving, and the transfer of previously acquired
knowledge to new contexts and scenarios.

More Rigorous Standards, Higher Level of Learning

We have been careful to match the achievement of higher levels of
learning in subject matter and instructional methods with a comparable level
of assessment. In the Phase II program the Armed Forces Staff College has
dropped its multiple-choice testing, except for diagnostic exams for the
intermediate course, in favor of essay examinations which are evaluated and critiqued in depth by the faculty. We still prefer to measure achievement and ensure student accountability by means of criterion-referenced standards rather than norm-referenced ones; i.e., the goal is that all students should reach a high level of accomplishment of learning objectives. Given the group of mature professionals who make up our student body, we conform to the usual NDU practice that evaluates student achievement by "exceeds standards," "meets standards," or "fails to meet standards." Most important is the fact that our evaluation instruments now give appropriate emphasis to the higher-level thinking and writing that we believe are essential in fulfilling this college's specific teaching-learning mission.

Strengthened Educational Framework

While re-examining the curriculum, methods, and standards of the college with regard to the points made in the Panel's Report, we also thought it prudent to take a fresh look at our educational underpinnings. As a result, we concluded that improvements could be made in such areas as the college's educational philosophy, our faculty development program, and our perception of the college's function in the JPME architecture. To summarize these improvements briefly, (1) we reformulated our statement of educational philosophy to reflect more clearly our educational priorities such as excellence in teaching, interactive learning, critical thinking, and socialization to a joint viewpoint; (2) we established an innovative multi-phased faculty development program articulated in a new college regulation and directed full time by a civilian career educator; (3) most fundamental of all, we had to change our way of doing business and our view of the
college as a stand-alone institution to accord with its new status as the final element (Phase II) in a cohesive, coherent educational system.

Today our blocks of instruction fit together internallly with better connectivity than ever before; and with respect to the necessity for close coordination with the Phase I schools, we are in frequent touch with the senior Service leadership to ensure that no gaps open up and that only such minimal overlap as we agree is pedagogically sound does occur.

Students

Turning now to the objects of all our endeavors, I have to say that I am very satisfied with the caliber of our students and with the field experience and the enthusiasm that they bring to the course here. Representation from each Service is and has always been the cornerstone of jointness here. We reinforce the class-time interaction among students from very different backgrounds with their housing assignments: representatives of each of the three military departments live together, and entire seminars are located together in the residential cul-de-sacs.

Our attention to the evolving needs of the students means that adjustments are necessary from time to time. We listen carefully to the feedback we get from the students and occasionally see the wisdom of making changes based on their rationale: for example, I have recently directed that the average classroom day be shortened to permit more time and effort to be devoted to outside reading and to the informal student interaction that is essential to attaining a joint viewpoint. In general, our students
demonstrate their professionalism and their motivation to carry on their own self-development, reflecting credit on us in their follow-on assignments.

Faculty

I am also very pleased to say that our current faculty are well qualified and performing at a very high level. They are dedicated teachers who have proven time and again that they can rise to the occasion, no matter what curriculum turmoil, time constraints, or reduced manning we have had to impose upon them. The credentials of our incoming instructors continue to improve because we are more rigorously selective these days about whom we will approve for teaching assignments. However, I am concerned that the perception remains that such teaching billets do little to aid career advancement.

On the other hand, I am less concerned about prior teaching experience as a requirement. With our new faculty development initiatives, including videotaped and critiqued practice-teaching sessions, we have the capability to turn inexperienced instructors into seasoned ones in a relatively short time. We have recently hired two more civilian faculty members with considerable joint, operational, and planning expertise who will provide further continuity and stability. And, finally, we have been very successful in our use of eminent retired flag and general officers as adjunct faculty. They come in to take student briefings in a day-long exercise, they occasionally serve as guest lecturers, and in a few weeks they will begin accompanying our senior students as they travel to visit combatant commanders.
We requested 15 and have been authorized nine additional military faculty positions and the Joint Staff is working with the services to fill all 15 billets. The current shortage situation can create an unfavorable faculty overload during those times when faculty members have to develop new curriculum materials as well as teaching a full schedule. I will continue to press to have the authorized billets filled, and am considering hiring additional civilian faculty, if it becomes necessary, to provide the proper balance of students and faculty.

Closing Remarks

In sum, we have just concluded a period of major change and we are happy to be where we are today. I am entirely satisfied with what we have achieved in implementing your recommendations to date. In particular, I’m very pleased with the quality, the challenge, and above all the relevance of our new curriculum. I believe it is important to remember, nevertheless, that that relevance is transitory: the joint arena is a fast-moving train, and for that reason the AFSC curriculum that reflects it will never be "done"--fixed forever in focus or in detail. Right now we are anticipating the changes that will be required for the next class in order to incorporate the new Joint Operation Planning and Execution System into our instruction. And when that change is accomplished, others perhaps related to academic professionalization for the faculty or in very different areas will be needed. The only thing that appears to be immutable is our mission. Jointness is recognized everywhere as the defining characteristic of modern
warfare. It is also the reason for this college's existence and, as such, will remain the basis for all our teaching and learning here.

Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your being with us today as one more evidence of your support in the military's quest for attainment of academic excellence.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you very much.

We have reviewed the GAO report. We have reviewed your full statement that you were kind enough to supply to us. I think in your statement you said something to the effect that you applied 95 percent of our recommendations, and we will go over some of those in a moment.

But before I make you feel like the little boy that came home and told his daddy he got a 98 on a math test and the daddy asks, why you missed those two questions, I really want to commend you on not just doing what we recommended, but on the spirit in which it was done.

If your follow-on assignments are like that, you will continue to do great service to our Nation, and I thank you for that.

General Kwieciak. Thank you.

Mr. Skelton. This report is very good.

What insights, General, have you gained and what have you been able to incorporate into your curriculum out of the experiences from Desert Shield and Desert Storm? I know that's relatively recent, but what do you pluck from that?

General Kwieciak. A number of things. First, let me say that on the 2d of August, 1990, I recall that day vividly, because it was on that day, when the Iraqis invaded Kuwait. We found out that morning.

First thing we did at the Armed Forces Staff College was to suspend the afternoon classes that we had scheduled. I required the students to spend the afternoon reviewing what options they would have if they were at the National Command Authorities, what actions they would be doing if they were down at MacDill—right now in Central Command.

Interestingly enough, in talking to a number of the students, after all that—and remember where we were—we weren't at that time, certain what was going to happen beyond Kuwait—there was great concern—many frustrated students. They were frustrated because they couldn't figure out a way to get forces over there in a timely way.

Then, as we watched the whole series of events unfold, and we had probably nothing more than anyone else did, CNN and the other networks. We, in fact, used Desert Shield and Desert Storm as our laboratory at the Staff College. We would tie in certain things, whether the deliberate planning, deployment, the sustainment mode, or the employment or mode, we would look at what was happening and try to relate the academics to what was going on in the real world.

With the current class we have also, as an additive to their curriculum, brought in a number of the key commanders to talk to the students. For example, I have had the XVIII Airborne Commander, General Luck, in a week or so ago to talk about XVIII Corps participation. I had the former VII Corps commander, now the training and doctrine commander, General Franks, come in. He talked about VII Corps to the students. I have had Admiral Mixs on, who was the carrier task force commander for the Red Sea—for all the forces in the Red Sea. He talked not only to actions of the Navy in the Red Sea, but also the Persian Gulf.
I haven't been able to schedule the Air Force and Marines, but as we go on, we are going to do that in future classes. We, as I mentioned in my opening comments, relate our case studies, our historical case studies to the recent events of Desert Shield/Desert Storm in trying to drive home teaching points.

Then finally our library has spent several thousands of dollars, on anything we can get our hands on in the public domain or on the market relative to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We have built up a collection that will be very rare in any other library. This will allow the faculty to develop case study. I would tell you I would expect the case study in the next year or so on Just Cause, Panama, and on Desert Shield/Desert Storm to be developed for the curriculum.

Mr. Skelton, Mr. Pickett.

Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Looking for a moment at some of the operational aspects of your school, how has the instructional process developed insofar as lecture versus the discussion type of instruction gone on?

General Kwieciaik. There has been, over the past 2 years, a fairly dramatic change. It used to be faculty would walk in with a stack of slides, and they would start passing out data in the seminar.

We have worked very hard to get away from all of that, we are now into optimizing the experience of the students. We are into guided discussions, and these are not BS sessions. These are guided discussions leading toward certain objectives.

I think we are, we can even improve on that, and I think we are moving in that direction. One of the things, Mr. Pickett, I would say, is that the faculty had to grow with this just like everything else at the Staff College.

One of the areas we had to grow in is the fact we had a different student coming in than we had before. We had service-unique experts now walking in, who are a lot more savvy and a lot more experienced than what we had in the past. That was an adjustment we had to make over time. That didn't happen overnight.

Mr. Pickett. So you feel like you are getting a more sophisticated type of student coming into the school now?

General Kwieciaik. More sophisticated, more experienced student coming in and the faculty has had to adjust to that. The only way to adjust is experience with the students.

Mr. Pickett. I notice in your comments about the faculty that you have been authorized nine additional military faculty positions but are apparently having some difficulty in filling those positions with the kind of people that you want. You put a comment in here about the fact that teaching billets do little to aid the military career advancement.

Would you want to comment on those two things, please?

General Kwieciaik. Yes. On the first point, when we converted to the new program, we submitted a new manpower document up to the Joint Staff in which there was a validation of nine additional people to be on our faculty. Of course, this will get us closer to the ratios we ought to be having.

Now, that has been working up there for some time. My understanding is ‘at that is now back down to the services to say we
need to get those people. I am not precisely sure at this moment exactly how that is going to turn out. Let me say that, I recognize and I understand the problem that the services are really having. An alternative I would offer, if we cannot get the active military, is to get the authority to hire some retired military. One attractive way to do that is, if I hire these folks and get the money to do that, is to exempt them from the dual compensation restrictions. Let them come on board. I can bring some very talented retired colonels and Navy captains on board, and I think that will do the things I need to do.

What is important here to the Staff College is that we fill these positions. This curriculum that I have now, that I briefed you on, is changing. I had the luxury last year to convert to 12 weeks because I wasn't full up in student load. I could take faculty members away from teaching. I didn't have to have all 12 seminars; I had 8. I could dedicate them to developing new curriculum. We are now full. This class right now is full. The class in January is going to be full. I foresee that my faculty will be fully engaged.

So, I don't have curriculum developers, people I can pull aside and deal with the change that is ongoing in the joint world to make sure we are relevant.

Mr. SKELTON. Some of us up here will help you do that.

General Kwiecian. Sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Some of us will be happy to help you.

General Kwiecian. I would welcome that, sir. I have got plenty of chores I can have you——

Mr. Pickett. General, I know this issue about faculty is one that concerns the panel, and I know it concerns you also. One of the things many of us have wanted to see happen was to take advantage of the capabilities of some of our senior military people when they do retire. Many of them would like to continue some involvement with the military, and they may look forward to an opportunity to participate in a school of this type.

So I wish you much success in that endeavor, and, of course, we would be interested in knowing if the school continues to experience difficulty in getting the kind of qualified instructional personnel they think they need to carry out this program.

Just a couple more items here. What kind of student feedback have you been getting from the classes that have gone through the new program?

General Kwiecian. We have gotten feedback. Now if you strip out the extremes which—I call it hate mail—and you strip out the feedback that says it is the greatest course I have ever been to, and focus in on the feedback from the students who were more temperate in their views, more thoughtful in their views; some very useful things emerge.

For example, we took rigor literally when we started off with this course in July 1990. I think it was overkill. We had students going from 8 in the morning to 4 and then we gave them 4 to 5 hours reading at night.

Feedback we got from one student—he doesn’t realize the impact he had, but he had an impact on me—he said, sir, I go back to my BOQ room and I am supposed to be living with this Navy and Air Force guy and talk to them. In fact I run home, I eat, I run to my
room, close the door, and do all my reading. So I am not doing anything I am supposed to be doing.

I also found, because last summer I took the course with the students, that going to class from 8 in the morning to 4 in the afternoon, by 2:30 I was wandering, my mind was on the golf course, it was someplace else.

So when we started to put the 12-week program together, we throttled things back a little bit. We streamlined the reading. We cut the hours back down to 3 o'clock in the afternoon. We provided more opportunities for students to have some interaction. Yet, I still think we have the rigor. So this is one example of student feedback we got.

Another example is with our senior program. The senior program, the 5-week program, has been totally redone. We have just started, this last week, our new 5-week program. It's a totally different program than we had a year ago. That is because of our own self-critique and the feedback we got from students. It wasn't a bad program, but it wasn't all that good. I think, based on our experience, we have made it pretty good right now.

Mr. Pickett. I know that in the old Armed Forces Staff College setting that quite a few foreign military officers attended the course. This was due in part, I believe, to the fact that the NATO headquarters is located there in Norfolk.

I would like to know what's happening to these foreign officers? Where are they going to get this kind of education now? Are they still coming to that program or going to some other program?

General Kwieciak. I dearly would like to have them come back. I do not have any allied international officers at the college right now. I really would like to have a representation back at the Staff College.

When we first started the phase II program, the view by the senior leadership was that we were going to be full up and so we ought to hold off before we open the doors to international officers.

The policy originally was to wait till next summer to get them back in. We got the policy changed. The doors are open now. I did not get any international officers this last class. We might have some in January; it is uncertain right now.

The problem, I think, that some of our contributing nations might be having is the rules I put out. That is, they have to be a phase I graduate just like our students.

So we are trying to work through all of that to get them to come. But it is important to have the kind of rule I established, otherwise I think allied students are going to be lost early on in the course.

Mr. Pickett. I can certainly understand that, but I know that the foreign officer looked upon this school as something that they would very much like to participate in.

General Kwieciak. Yes, sir. The reason I really want to get them to this Staff College is that we have to start thinking about coalition warfare. One of the things that happens when an international officer, a Brit, a German, a French, a Korean officer, comes, is that they learn how we think about joint warfighting. They take these insights back to their countries, to their ministries of defense. I think the more we do that, the better off we are. They also bring
a lot to the table from their perspective. So we really need to do that.

Mr. Pickett. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to prolong this, but I think that what the general has just told us leads logically into these questions about what your assessment is of the relative qualifications of officers without phase I compared to those who have completed phase I courses.

General Kwiecia. I would really like to talk about this, because I may have a perception, perhaps, of it based on where I sit that might be different than yours. I would like to lay out my view of that on the table.

To me, what is important and what makes our phase II program a success is the fact that service-unique experts come to our school. The fact that they take phase I and they learn about joint things to the knowledge level is important, but not as important as the fact that they are service-unique experts.

I am not suggesting that phase I joint track is not important. The phase I joint track, I would argue, is extremely important for the officers who do not come to my college. For the officers that go out to their service components that it is important they have some about joint operations and planning.

To me, there is a bit of a concern that if we start going to of the service colleges and requiring them to do a number of things there in terms of either faculty mix or student mix or things like that, the service college may start to lose their focus in terms of developing those service-unique experts. This sort of thing could hinder what I am doing at the Armed Forces Staff College. Because the great learning that happens is when I get six Army troops, six Air Force officers, six Navy officers, three Marines in a room who really understand their service and the service doctrines, which are different.

The thing that I would argue is when you start looking at these officers, they are very comfortable in their service doctrine. An Army guy ought to, at this point, understand airland battle Army doctrine pretty darn good.

Same with the Air Force, Marines, and the Navy. But when you bring these four service paradigms together, they don't neatly fit from a joint warfighter's perspective. So they come as service experts and what we challenge them to do intellectually is teach each other about capabilities and limits, but now let's throw some problems at you in which things don't fit from a joint warfighter perspective.

An example. Use of air power. The Marines view use of airpower differently than the Air Force, differently than the Navy. How do you optimize these things? How do you deal with these kinds of tough joint warfighting issues? You have to be a service expert first before you can start to grapple with these real tough issues. So it is a rather long-winded answer, but my concern is that we preserve down at the service colleges the service-unique capability and the kind of instruction that they are having down there.

Mr. Pickett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you.

Mr. Browder.

Mr. Browder. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kwieciak, let me tell you I am sorry we were not able to visit your college, because we were looking forward to it. As a new member of this panel, I was especially looking forward to that and especially as an academician myself.

I would like to thank you for the work you have done and, Mr. Chairman, if you don't object to me saying it, I would like to commend you and this panel. I think I can do so with a certain amount of detachment since I had nothing to do with the work of the panel up to this moment. But from what I have read it is very evident to me that the panel and the college have taken some very positive steps here.

I would like to ask you one question, General. I have experienced the hate mail and the fan mail myself, and I read with interest your identification of the curriculum, the faculty, the broad educational environment, and teaching method. In there, you make a point that you have periods, breakup periods where you talk with the students and get their feedback.

Have you institutionalized any process of feedback from graduates, with experience, a period of time where they go out and can take their learning experience with them and then come back and give you some feedback about the curriculum, the teaching, the faculty and so forth? Have you institutionalized this, and could you tell me what, if any, positive feedback you got?

General Kwieciak. First, while they are there, we have institutionalized a number of things. I meet with students routinely in an informal setting. We get instant feedback while they are there.

When they depart, we give them a rather lengthy survey and it is not “fill in the blanks,” but it is “write it out and tell us basically what you think.”

What we have not done is, and I think we are going to need to do this probably in about 6 months—once this program produces enough people—is to go back to the graduates and ask them to tell us, “All right, you have been out for a period of time, now tell us what you think.”

I will also tell you, though, we do go out to the various unified commands around the world and we do talk to their bosses. We do talk to the chiefs of staff, the directors of the staff, and I even talk to the CINCs when I see them to get feedback from them. That is, how is it going, how are we doing, and we get a lot of useful feedback from them about that.

Mr. Browder. It may be that you haven’t had time to do this with your graduates, but I would recommend that you do this.

General Kwieciak. Yes, sir.

Mr. Browder. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you, Mr. Browder. On behalf of all the panel, we thank you for your words about our work.

Mr. Machtley.

Mr. Machtley. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I am sorry we aren’t at the Armed Forces Staff College. I looked forward to going down there to see what you are doing on site. It gives us a better opportunity to observe and appreciate the course and schooling that the school provides.
I don’t have any personal knowledge of your school. I hope to some day get down there to see it. But one of the questions I had is now that you are down to the 12-week course, are you getting students before they go to their next billet, or are you getting students who are in a billet who are being sent over to you? If that is the case, are you getting students who have less challenging positions so their boss wants to let them go, or are you getting the students for that 12-week period?

General Kwieciak. The students are all in billets. Most of them are in joint billets. Your second point, I suspect there is a lot of frustration out there because the commands are sending, because the service is selecting these people. The services are saying, Major, you are going—but the students boss is concerned that he is gone for 3 months. I do get that feedback.

Nonetheless, the commands are taking the problem on board and they are sending their people to the school, to the college.

Mr. Machtley. Since it is a relatively short course now, would it be possible to pick up people in between positions, so that you could get the best? In other words, have them assigned to you TAD maybe while assigned to their former command permanently. just so that you could get the very best?

General Kwieciak. First, I think we are getting, I really think we are getting amongst the very best. Certainly in any groups you may get some that are less so than others, but by and large these are the cream of the crop, at least from what I have seen over the past year plus with the phase II program.

In terms of trying to get them any other way than what we are doing, I don’t think we physically can. My capacity at the college is 300 students. We have a requirement to put through at least 900 a year. So I have to run at least three different courses at different times. That means when an officer graduates from, say, Leavenworth in June, he may not come right away. He may have to wait until April or January to come to the course. In the meantime, he is already billeted in his follow-on assignment.

Mr. Machtley. The other question is, do you track these officers to determine how they are doing, what assignments they get? Is there any way that——

General Kwieciak. We know exactly where they are, where they are going.

Mr. Machtley. Beyond their initial assignment afterwards?

General Kwieciak. Well, actually the initial assignment is pretty much what we know because they are in that for a number of years. Most of the officers who come to us have just finished their intermediate service college and have just started their follow-on assignment. They are going to be there a number of years. So those officers come to us, while they are there, and they go back to their same duty assignment.

Mr. Machtley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Skelton. Thank you.
General Blaz.
Mr. Blaz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to express my disappointment about not going to Norfolk. I was ready to go, had my shoes polished, my hair cut, and here we all are sitting in the same room.

Mr. SKELTON. Be careful. They will enlist you.

Mr. Blaz. Same thing happened a long time ago, Mr. Chairman. I recall so vividly the steps you went to that finally resulted in that great Goldwater-Nichols Act. It was just one of those things that may look like a very ordinary hearing, under this chairmanship, virtually materializes into something as majestic as was demonstrated in the Persian Gulf; all due to the kind of work that has been done here.

I don't know if it is appropriate or not, Mr. Chairman, but, I would like to ask unanimous consent to have a very nice article in this morning's Washington Times, November the 1st, Military Role of Congress, by Harry Summers, be entered into the record of this hearing. Mr. Chairman, how is that?

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. Blaz. It is not even Christmas. It is Thanksgiving and I am thanking you for this.

[The following information was received for the record:]
Military role of Congress

Earlier this month, following a lecture to the Marine Command and Staff College at Quantico, Va., the conversation among the listeners turned to the depths into which some members of Congress had recently fallen. "What a tragedy to see them all tainted with the same brush," said one Marine. "The reforms they made in our command procedures and in military education helped make victory in the Gulf possible," another remarked.

Although it is not generally recognized, Congress has always played a major role in military matters. "By whose authority do you act?" asked the British commander of Fort Ticonderoga in bewailed amazement as the Americans demanded his surrender in the opening days of the American Revolution. "In the name of the great Jehovah and the Continental Congress," was American Gen. Ethan Allen's reply.

Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the American commander in the Gulf war, could have given Saddam Hussein the same answer. As the Constitution makes clear, the Congress — and the Congress alone — has the sole power to "raise and support armies," "provide and maintain a navy" and "provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia of the several States, and for constituting a proper Militia in time of peace, subject to be called forth, as may be required by the Congress." The Congress"shall have power .. to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces." Sponsored by then-Sen. Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican, in the Senate and Rep. Bill Nichols, Alabama Democrat, in the House in 1986, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. And he saw early that the military's education system was emphasizing management skills at the expense of strategy.

To the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. And he saw early that the military's education system was emphasizing management skills at the expense of strategy.

"Quiet and unassuming," Rep. Ike Skelton was one of the original proponents of the Goldwater-Nichols reforms. And he saw early that the military's education system was emphasizing management skills at the expense of strategy.
Mr. BLAZ. You mentioned the dual compensation. I have a very personal problem with dual compensation because I am forfeiting to the great U.S. Treasury an enormous sum of my retirement pay as a military officer. I know you are going to have a struggle with that because it is something that, for some reason, the Congress and others find it necessary to do even under the most unusual circumstances.

Not too long ago I was down at the Marine Military Academy in Arlington, TX, and the same question arose. I asked how they solved the problem. The way they did it was to make some kind of arrangement whereby the military officers, versus the enlisted men, were just given their full pay and allowances as though they are still on Active Duty. I don’t know if it would apply to you all, but I know that to some lieutenant colonels and colonels, who could be given the full benefit, may well consider doing that. I don’t know. But it is just such a reservoir of talent.

One of the tragedies of our educational system is that we sometimes in the military prematurely require people at the epitome of their career, after having served enough time, push them out for some other younger people coming in because of the law.

So I urge you, sir, to pursue that because I think this panel, being the main educating panel, would be most likely helpful to you.

My question is, there is the idea of service. This very service is sending students to your school. Do you get any kind of sense among the Army, Navy, Air Force, or Marine students that they would have preferred to have gone to their own school or to another school?

What I am trying to say is that in the various services, it has been my experience that some people may suffer a little from having to be taken out of pocket to attend a school and then come back to their own service. No matter what else they learn from that jointness and program, they come back and he becomes a battalion commander and he competes in that cone from battalion commander. You know how it works, General. I always felt there was some resentment for those people who have to go to school someplace and come back. Do you think that still exists in today's environment at the level of your school?

General KWIECIAK. I will say this, and I don’t have any empirical data, just a gut feeling I have watching this for a year. The officers come for 12 weeks. They are away from their job, away from their families. I would say that at about the 6- or 7-week period, about halfway through, a certain amount of stress starts to emerge. They all work through it and they all get along just fine.

We work very hard to provide the kind of quality of life at the Staff College which makes it challenging, but a lifestyle as pleasant as we can in terms of where they live, services available to them after duty hours, in terms of fitness and athletics and that sort of thing.

I would also say that in terms of being concerned about whether or not they are going to our school and then becoming a joint officer, is that helpful or not, I think they are beginning to realize that it is really not the case. I found it very interesting when the Army lieutenant colonel promotion list was released several weeks ago.
In selection of majors to lieutenant colonels, we had, I believe, 17 officers that were selected of our students. What I found fascinating—I went through every seminar and I told them—was that the Army’s selection rate for majors to lieutenant colonel was 61 percent. That is significantly less than what we have had in the past by a factor of 10 to 15 percent, I believe. What was interesting was that on the Joint Staff, selection rate was 100 percent. Those who were in JSO billets, the selection rate was 89 percent; those who were in joint billets but not in JSO billets, 71 percent; this far exceeds the Army average of 61 percent.

Now, this does not fall on deaf ears when you tell the students. They realize maybe this is something we ought to be involved in, understanding about jointness, and it also tells me the commitment, at least I know one service and I would tell the other service as well, toward putting quality folks into joint billets.

Mr. BLAZ. I think that is precisely my point, to make the students realize from the very beginning that it is going to be more and more rather than less and less, and the student that adapts in this environment and works with other services is going to be the officer of the future.

There has been resistance to this, but I think if we continue as you are doing, it may well enhance the prestige of that kind of an assignment rather than this feeling of being out of pocket, out of mind. But I thank you for your answer, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and can I count on going to Norfolk someday soon?

Mr. SKELTON. We will get there. The good general will be on the other coast, but we will get there.

Mr. BLAZ. OK.

Mr. SKELTON. I am sure. Sorry it didn’t work out today, but as you know, we have a vote. Now, General, for the two questions that you missed. Question one: You do not grade? Question two: You do not have distinguished graduates?

General KWIECIAK. Question one, we do not letter grade.

Mr. SKELTON. Explain that to the panel, please.

General KWIECIAK. OK. We have two exams we administer to the intermediate program. By the way, I brought the exams and I would like to pass those out if you would like to look at them.

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, pass them out. Pass out the blue book.

General KWIECIAK. These exams are open book, bring whatever you want. They are 4 hours long, and at midterm we gave three questions, the final exam we gave two questions. They are all essay.

I will tell you they are very tough. There are three grades that you get. You either meet standards, you exceed standards, or you fail to meet standards. You can equate that to A, B, F if you like. We happen to call it the way I just described.

Now, in the midterm exam that we had, of 228 officers—remember these are very talented troops we have here, very smart people, 228—seven officers failed to meet standards on that midterm exam.

On our final exam, which surprised me and made me feel good, because I thought it was a tougher exam and I thought we would have more failing the standards, five failed to meet standards. The procedure is when you fail to meet the standards you are notified and given a period of time, a number of days. Then you appear
before a panel of colonels and Navy captains for an oral examination. In many cases, for most students, it becomes almost a religious experience. Typically an officer will go in and the panel will work with that student 45 minutes to 1 hour, trying to ascertain and ensure that this officer really grasped and understands and can grapple with the complexities of joint warfighting.

We have a situation—this really gets to the issue of rigor, I think—we have a situation where we had, this week, we had the orals for the finals, four made it, one did not. So we are grappling with the one who did not. I have a policy advisory board of colonels who met all day yesterday.

Mr. SKELTON. Would he get a certificate of completion—

General KWIECIAK. That is to be determined. What is not going to happen next Friday, that officer will not go across the graduation platform, he is not going to get anything. We are looking at things to remediate him, pulling him beyond next Friday, to see if we can't make sure he has it.

They are going to give me a recommendation this afternoon, having deliberated the better part of yesterday on that particular issue. That is how we grade and how we follow up on the officers in terms of those who don’t meet the standards.

Now, with respect to a distinguished graduate, we privately talked about that before. I have always said I don’t like that, don’t want to have one, and I don’t have one. A 12-week period, to try—there are not enough marks out there that you can say one officer should be a distinguished graduate.

Moreover, you will find that in my intermediate program, even though I have service-unique experts in terms of experience in the service—I have lieutenant colonels, majors, and captains who are all competing against one another. I am not sure how fair that is, the captain, his experience and his education, balanced against that of a lieutenant colonel.

So it is not necessarily a level playing field of students in terms of experience. It is building teamwork, being able to throw it on the table and not worry how am I doing on a particular exam, and help one another. I am hesitant to get into this kind of competition for one grade.

Mr. SKELTON. Is the 12 weeks too short a period of time? If your schooling were 10 months—

General KWIECIAK. Twelve weeks for the mission is fine. In terms of trying to determine a distinguished graduate, 12 weeks might be short.

Mr. SKELTON. One thing that concerns me and I am sure it concerns you is the promotion rates of your faculty members. Would you be kind enough before you leave to furnish us by letter for the record in this hearing—you technically have 30 days to do it, but if you could do it within the next few days, we would appreciate it—the promotions, percentage of promotions, any way you wish to set it out, of those on the faculty.

We discovered during World War I and World War II that your heavy hitters, your bright young majors, captains, et cetera, were sent to schools and then they were kept to instruct at schools. The list of them at the Army War College in Fort Leavenworth is amazing; future two-, three-, four-star generals in World War II.
I don’t see that syndrome happening from what I know in your school, and if you would be kind enough to furnish us with that letter for the record, we would surely appreciate it. General KWIECIAK. I will.

[The following information was received for the record:]

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY,
ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE,
Norfolk, VA, November 6, 1991.

Hon. IKE SKELTON,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SKELTON: As a follow-on to our discussion last week, I've enclosed our promotion selection statistics. Included are those officers considered in all three zones—above, primary, and below. But the critical zone is the primary zone in which we've had a 25-percent selection rate. While this is not too far below the service selection rates, I do wish we could do better.

I certainly appreciated the opportunity to appear before your panel to tell the Armed Forces Staff College story. Speaking for the college, I appreciate all that's been done for JPME and look forward to your continued support.

Very respectfully,

STANLEY KWIECIAK, JR.,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army Commandant.

Enclosure.

AFSC 0–6 PROMOTIONS

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Total AFSC primary zone rate—7/28 = 25 percent
Service primary zone rates (most recent boards):
Army—38.6 percent
Air Force—45.0 percent
Navy—35.0 percent
Marine Corps—44.6 percent
Mr. SKELTON. Do you have any recommendations on how we can make that better? This concerns me. We want the young General Kwieciaks to come there and instruct for 3 or 4 years rather than someone who may or may not get promoted and feels that this is his last assignment and will not push as hard.

General KWIECIAK. I have some ideas on that. First, let me say that with the faculty I have on board now, you have to look at what we have done over the past 2 years. Those are the people that did it, and those are the people that were teaching, developing curriculum, all out of hide, and they have met the challenge.

Every time a class is taught, the faculty gets better. They are great teachers and I stand by them. I certainly would like to see all of them get promoted. You are right, that is not the case. That does not happen.

I think one way to do this is—and I don't know how you will view this—but one way to do this is to bring in at least a number, not everybody, but a number of officers perhaps—instead of officers at the lieutenant colonel/commander grade—one grade lower. The assumption would be that these officers are on the fast track and assume they are only going to be there 2 years and then they are going off to command battalions, squadrons, etc.

Or you bring in a former battalion commander, a lieutenant colonel, and assume he will be with you maybe a year or two before he goes off to command a brigade. You have to be willing to accept that if you want to get those people in.

I don't think it would be useful or wise to get the whole faculty that way, but it is I think useful to have a blend. This is one way you could start moving toward the kind of things you describe.

Mr. SKELTON. Last, would you for the record tell us your joint experience before you became commandant at the school.

General KWIECIAK. Yes, sir. I spent 1975 to 1978, 3 years, on the Joint Staff in J-5 where I was a part of the strategic negotiations. We were responsible for negotiating SALT II. I spent a year prior to coming to the Armed Forces Staff College as the Army member of the Chairman's staff group, on Admiral Crowe's personal staff, and 2 years at the Armed Forces Staff College. That adds up to 6 years I have been in the joint business.

Mr. SKELTON. Do you think that was valuable so far as doing your best as a leader at that school?

General KWIECIAK. Yes.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. The panel recommended that the joint schools participate in the development of joint doctrine and I understand that the National Defense University has been given some role. Can you discuss what the Armed Forces Staff College is doing in this regard?

General KWIECIAK. To date, we have done the following things. In Norfolk, there is a joint doctrine center that works for the J-7, Admiral Robinson and General Simpson. We have a Memorandum of Understanding with them; I negotiated that with him about 2 years ago. One of the things we do is, when draft joint doctrine manuals are being circulated, we are one of the key players in re-

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viewing and participating in the development for a review process of those documents.

We also assisted in the recent publication that Chairman Powell just approved. It is an overarching publication which is a joint warfighters publication. We worked in detail with the author of that particular document in terms of providing insight into campaign planning and that sort of thing.

In my view, I see in terms of the future of the college a greater role in terms of doctrine development as well as in terms of wargaming.

I would argue, Mr. Barrett, that if you had to look to the future vision of the college, it ought to become the Joint Operational Arts Center for the DOD. What we are talking about are some things in terms of doctrine, wargaming. I have some ideas that I would rather not go into detail here because they haven’t been fully vetted in the Joint Staff. However, in time, you might find some interesting things emerge with respect to that. We do our own thinking and writing about joint doctrine development.

I brought this, and I will leave it with you—

Mr. SKELTON. Let the record show, what is it?

General KWIECIAK. It is our publication, still in draft form, called Service Warfighting Philosophy and Synchronization of Joint Forces. What we did, is to we compile all the service warfighting doctrines into about 120 pages. An officer could read through that and get a pretty basic understanding of how services approach their doctrine on warfighting.

We then did a more important part. We tried to come to grips with how you do force synchronization at the joint level; how to do campaign planning; how to do operational synchronization of forces; functional synchronization; intelligence, maneuvers; the kind of things that joint warfighters ought to think about.

This is designed to be a companion piece to the Joint Staff Officer's Guide, used worldwide by joint officers because of its ease of reading and understanding. As a matter of fact, at the beginning of Desert Shield, we were shipping cases of these publications to Central Command for officers to use. We hope the draft publication will be viewed the same way. The idea of both of these publications is that, if an officer reads through them, he will understand what he has to do.

Mr. SKELTON. That is why we won the war, they had the manual in front of them?

General KWIECIAK. Absolutely.

Mr. SKELTON. If there are no further questions, we will end the hearing.

We again thank you, not just for your testimony and for coming here, but for the job you do. This is pioneer work in following the legislation that changed your mission and the recommendations that we came forth with. We commend you and wish you continued success as you move forward in the Army.

We are recessed.

[Whereupon, at 10:10 a.m., the panel was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]
PME FOR RESERVE OFFICERS

House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Military Education Panel,

The panel met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman of the panel) presiding.

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL

Mr. Skelton. We will begin our panel hearing. Evidently the incorrect time was transmitted to some of the people and it is our fault. Because of the limited amount of minutes that we have, we will elect to proceed. I hope by doing so we will not embarrass anyone. Other members of the panel, as you can see, will be floating in a little bit later.

I welcome you to our hearing this morning. This is the Military Education Panel. Today, we will be discussing professional military education for Reserve officers. We will hear testimony from the chiefs and directors of the National Guard and Reserves concerning professional military education for their officers.

Desert Shield and Desert Storm clearly established the importance of the Reserves as part of the total force. In these days of declining Active Force strength, the maintenance of a strong ready Reserve is important to our continuing national security. For this reason, the quality and availability of professional military education for officers in the National Guard and Reserves is an area of particular concern to this panel.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has instituted actions to improve the professional military education framework for the Active Forces, especially in the area of joint professional military education. We compliment him for following through on that. Our panel is gratified by the actions taken to date. At the same time, we are also interested in ensuring that these improvements be applied to the Guard and Reserves.

General Davison, I announced a moment ago that it is our fault and not yours or anyone else's fault about the mixup on time, but because of the number of witnesses we chose to proceed. You will not be marked tardy.

[Laughter.]

General Davison. Thank you Chairman Skelton.

Mr. Skelton. We apologize to you and Admiral Taylor and the others who got the wrong word, so our face is red and not yours.
We are aware that our citizen soldiers face many challenges in maintaining their professional competence at a level comparable to that of their Active-Duty counterparts. Consequently, considerable thought and effort need to be applied to ensure that the professional military education system meets the needs of the Reserve Forces as well as the Active Forces.

We have as witnesses this morning Major General Sandler, Chief of the Army Reserve; Brigadier General D’Araujo, Deputy Director, Army National Guard; Rear Admiral Taylor, Director, Navy Reserve, Major General Davison, a fellow Missourian, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Marine Corps; Major General Closner, Chief of the Air Force Reserve and Major General Killey, Director, Air National Guard.

I know that each of you has been told that we would appreciate your submitting your testimony in toto and then summarizing it. Because of time constraints we would hope that your testimony would be limited.

Preparatory to that, I would like to ask this question and hopefully you could address it somewhere in your thoughts. We recently had a very successful military operation, Desert Shield and Desert Storm. We are immensely proud of everybody, everybody; Active Duty, Guard, Reserves and others wrote a new brilliant chapter in military history. I think military historians will bear that out 50 years from now.

My question to you is this: First, were members of the Guard and Reserve that were qualified as the proper rank, did they receive proper military education as we would hope that their Active Duty counterparts did?

Second, were any of them used? Were any of them used over there in a capacity, a staff capacity, where their thinking helped the generals and colonels make up their minds on tough issues?

There is no sense in educating them if they did not play a part in that. If you educate them, give them a diploma, give them a good job as a reservist and then do not use that knowledge when push comes to shove—Desert Shield/Desert Storm was not a small operation—then why have military education for the Guard and Reserve? I am a great advocate for it and if you have some bright people out there—lieutenant colonel, major types, colonel types, brigadier general types that would be a great asset to a staff during a Desert Storm operation—they should be there. I do not care whether they are Reserve or Active Duty or Guard.

Mr. Taylor, do you have an opening statement?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. I welcome a member of the full Armed Services Committee to the panel, a gentleman who is the father of the Guard and Reserve, not just in the Congress but in our country, Congressman Montgomery from the State of Mississippi.

Do you have any opening comments?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I have no comments.

Mr. SKELTON. I really appreciate your being with us this morning. We will start from my left, General Sandler, and go down the line.

Please proceed, sir.

General SANDLER. Yes, sir.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROGER W. SANDLER, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE OFFICE, CHIEF, ARMY RESERVE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

General SANDLER. Mr. Chairman and members of the panel, it is a pleasure to be here today representing the over 600,000 citizen-soldiers of the U.S. Army Reserve to discuss an issue of considerable importance to us, officer professional education.

I have a statement that I would like to submit for the record, as you suggested, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. General, each of the six statements will be submitted without objection for the record and you may summarize.

General SANDLER. All right, sir. Therefore, I will mention some key points from my record statement.

Attention to the development and training of our leaders has produced military men and women of the Army Reserve who have proven that they are equal to meeting the challenge of achieving the very highest professional standards.

Twice within the past 2 years, the total Army has been called upon to be the primary instrument with which the United States achieved its national military objectives and to successfully advance the United States national interests.

In each operation, Just Cause in Panama, and Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Southwest Asia, the Army Reserve provided trained, combat-ready leaders to support the total Army in accomplishing all of its strategic missions and objectives.

The Army's professional military education system produces the leaders required by today's warfare, leaders with the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary for success in conflict.

The Army Reserve Forces School System together with important innovations such as the Combined Arms and Services Staff School course has proven itself to be an integral part of the professional military education of officers in all three components of the total Army.

Sir, this concludes my opening remarks and I will be happy to answer the specific questions which you may have.
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the panel:

The American citizen-soldiers of generations past established a high standard of personal values and conduct—courage, devotion to duty, and self-sacrifice—that is, to this day, the standard by which all American soldiers judge themselves. The military men and women of today, both Active and Reserve component, have proven that they are equal to meeting the challenge of achieving that high standard, so well established by our forefathers.

Twice within the past 2 years, the Total Army has been called upon to be the primary instrument with which the United States achieved its national military objectives, and to successfully advance U.S. National Interests.

In each Operation, Just Cause in Panama, and in Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Southwest Asia, the Army Reserve provided trained, combat-ready units and individual soldiers to support the Total Army in accomplishing all its strategic missions and objectives. Army Reserve units and individual soldiers established themselves as an integral and indispensable part of the Total Army team.

We live in a complex and ever-changing world. This is evidenced by the rapid altering and demise of old political and economic systems, giving rise to new challenges. Proliferation of high technology allows nations to produce tools and machines of war so effective that the battlefield is markedly more intricate and more lethal today than it was less than a decade ago. The Army's overall responsibility is to field trained and ready forces capable of winning on the modern battlefield, anywhere in the world. A trained and ready force, however, is only as capable as its leaders, soldiers, and units.

The Army's professional military education system produces the leaders required to perform on the modern battlefield—leaders with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary for success across the continuum of conflict. The professional military education of Army Reserve officers is paramount to the Total Army.

The professional military education of Army Reserve officers spans their entire military careers. Like their Active component counterparts, USAR officers may typically attend officer basic and advanced courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, the Command and General Staff Officers Course, and War College. In addition to education required for promotion, they are encouraged to enroll in and complete functional courses designed to enhance their technical and tactical competence.

To supplement the mandatory courses required for promotion, the Army Reserve is pursuing leadership development training specifically tailored towards the needs of combat support and combat service support officers, the majority of whom are in the USAR. Another initiative we are pursuing is a program called "Team Train." This program will provide opportunities for troop program unit officers to work with their Active component partners, train in the Active Army units with which they would go to war, and perform in their wartime roles in an active duty for training status.
Each year, Army Reserve officers are invited to apply for limited resident seats in the intermediate and senior service college courses conducted by the Army, its sister services, and other Department of Defense schools. USAR officers who attend these courses are selected by a Department of the Army board, in a highly competitive process. In addition, Army Reserve officers can, and do, attend resident schools conducted by Active Component service schools. During the past 3 fiscal years, nearly 14,000 Army Reserve officers graduated from full-time resident professional military education courses.

Because of their civilian employment and family responsibilities, most Army Reserve officers must take advantage of the training opportunities offered by the United States Army Reserve Forces (USARF) School system and the Army's correspondence course programs to accomplish their professional training. The Army Reserve operates USARF schools at carefully selected sites across the U.S. and Puerto Rico, as well as Europe and the Pacific.

Courses taught in the USARF school system are specially configured for use by the Reserve components. The curricula, training schedules, and supporting course materials permit Army Reserve officers to attend classes during weekly, evening hours and attend short periods of resident training, normally a 2-week period during the summer months. In the past 3 fiscal years, more than 22,000 Army Reserve officers were enrolled in courses conducted by the USARF schools.

The USARF School system enables Army Reserve officers to complete mandatory, military educational requirements as part-time students while they continue to work full-time in their civilian careers and take care of their family responsibilities. If we are to retain a Army Reserve officer corps that is trained to the high state of professionalism and readiness required by today's warfare, one that has the support and encouragement of their civilian employers, families, and communities, we must continue to provide these officers the opportunity to obtain high-quality training, close to their homes and work places, with a minimum amount of disruption to their personal lives. Regardless of the method chosen by Army Reserve officers to complete required professional military education, Total Army standards remain the same.

The Total Army, continually evaluates the leader training currently required to ensure all of the training systems and subsystems satisfy present professional military education needs. At the same time, future leader training requirements are identified and planned. An example of this continuing effort for the Army Reserve is the Combined Arms and Services Staff School (CAS3) Course. This outstanding course provides intensive training to prepare Army captains for higher level command and staff assignments at battalion, brigade, and higher levels.

The success of the CAS3 course has resulted in the restructuring of the Army's Command and General Staff Officer Course for the Reserve components. This course will become two-phased, replacing the current six-phased course. Completion of Phase I will
be required for promotion to lieutenant colonel, and completion of Phase II will be required for promotion to colonel.

To paraphrase the former Chief of Staff of the Army, General (Ret) Carl E. Vuono, the rapid assimilation of Reserve Component forces in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm is proof positive of their training to [Total Army] standards. In the future, standards must not be relaxed as the Reserve components become even more fundamental to our Nation's defense.

The Army Reserve school system is vital to the education and development of tomorrow's Reserve component leaders, be they commissioned or noncommissioned officers. Solid, challenging field training is an indispensable element of a thorough, competent professional military education system.

The Army Chief of Staff, General Gordon Sullivan, has said that the effective edge we demonstrated in Desert Storm is fragile and can quickly diminish. He believes, "Our imperatives in maintaining that advantage are high quality soldiers, trained to a razor's edge who must understand the Army's doctrine and be developed as leaders."

The Army Reserve school system has proved itself to be a significant linchpin in the professional military education of soldiers in all three components of the Total Army. It is meeting the challenges of the former and present Chiefs of Staff of the Army.

This concludes my prepared remarks. I shall be happy to answer any questions you might have.
Mr. SKELTON. All right. Thank you.

General.

General D'ARAUJO. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. SKELTON. Pronounce your name so that I do not butcher it.

General D'ARAUJO. It is D'Araujo, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN R. D'ARAUJO, JR., DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

General D'ARAUJO. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before you today to report on professional military education in the Army National Guard and to answer your questions of particular interest.

I would point out that Army National Guard officers participate in the same military courses as their Active Duty counterparts. The typical progression runs through the completion of the Officer Basic, Officer Advanced and now Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff Officers Course and the Senior Service College.

Under the current system, all newly commissioned lieutenants in the Army National Guard attend the Officer Basic Course in residence at Army installations. The remaining courses, of course, may be completed by attending in residence through a combination of resident/non-resident instruction by the Army Reserve Schools or, in the case of the Command and General Staff College, exclusively by correspondence.

Army National Guard officers are selected by a board of officers for attendance at the resident Command General Staff course and the Senior Service College courses, as well as the Army War College corresponding studies program.

During the past fiscal year, the Army National Guard had 25 quotas for fellowships and resident attendance at Senior Service Colleges and 45 quotas for the Command and General Staff college course. At the primary level, we had over 1,500 quotas for the resident Officer Basic course, 521 for the Advanced and 51 quotas for the Combined Arms and Services Staff School at Fort Leavenworth.

Completion of professional military education requirements is required for promotion in the Army National Guard. Current regulations require completion of the Officer Basic course for promotion to first lieutenant, the Officer Advanced course for promotion to major, 50 percent of the Command and General Staff College course for promotion to lieutenant colonel and 100 percent completion of Command General Staff for promotion to colonel.

Mr. SKELTON. Say those last two again. I am sorry.

General D'ARAUJO. All right, sir.

For promotion to lieutenant colonel, 50 percent of the Command and General Staff College and for promotion to colonel, completion of the Command and General Staff College. That is a promotion requirement.

Mr. SKELTON. I understand.
General D'ARAUJO. The participation levels resulting from the policies that implemented these requirements have been excellent. Fifty-one percent of Army National Guard majors and 88 percent of the lieutenant colonels have completed the Command and General Staff officer course or its equivalent. Four percent of the lieutenant colonels and 18 percent of the colonels and 40 percent of the general officers have completed Senior Service College.

In addition to the required military education courses that I mentioned for promotion, I would also point out there are numerous others that are available to Army National Guard officers for specialty producing courses in their functional areas of personnel, intelligence, logistics and what have you.

The Army also provides senior level courses tailored specifically for Reserve component officers such as the Senior Reserve Component Officers course.

In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation for this panel's interest and support for Reserve component military education.

Some of the successes we feel we have achieved in improving military education in the Army National Guard can be attributed to the panel's recommendations to improve military education in the total Army.

I am convinced that the military education system provides the formal instruction that our officers need to operate on the modern battlefield and that the recent initiatives to improve Reserve component officer education will even further enhance their competency in the future.

Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before you today to report on professional military education in the Army National Guard, and to answer questions on issues of particular interest to the Panel members.

Professionally educated officers in the Army National Guard continues to be a high priority. The increased fielding of modern equipment and high priority missions given to the Army National Guard over the past decade have increased the need for technically and tactically competent officers to execute the Army's Airland Battle doctrine. Operation DESERT STORM demonstrated that Army National Guard officers are receiving the professional military education they need to operate on the modern battlefield.

Army National Guard officers participate in the same military courses as their active Army counterparts. The typical progression in the military education of Army National Guard officers is completion of the Officer Basic Course, Officer Advance Course, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff Officers Course and Senior Service College.

Under the current system, all newly commissioned lieutenants in the Army National Guard attend the Officer Basic Course in residence at Army installations. The remaining courses may be completed attending in residence, through a combination of resident/non-resident instruction conducted by the Army Reserve.
schools or by correspondence study.

The preferred method for completion of military education courses is attendance at resident instruction because of the interaction with Army officers from both the active and Reserve Components. However, the goal of resident attendance at intermediate and senior level courses is not attainable for all Reserve or active component officers, based on the current level of resources. The time requirements of civilian jobs, military unit training, and family demands further restrict resident attendance by Army National Guard officers. Therefore, many of our officers rely on other than pure resident instruction to complete their required military education.

Army National Guard officers are selected by a board of officers for attendance at the resident Command and General Staff Officer Course and Senior Service College courses, as well as the Army War College corresponding studies program. During the past fiscal year, the Army National Guard had 25 quotas for Fellowships and resident attendance at Senior Service Colleges and Fellowships and 45 quotas for the Command and General Staff Officer course. At the primary level we had 1543 quotas for resident Officer Basic Courses, 521 quotas for resident Officer Advance Courses, and 51 quotas for the Combined Arms and Services Staff School. The quotas for the Command and General Staff Officer Course and Senior Service Colleges are very limited.
Military education requirements for promotion in the Army National Guard are similar to those in the active Army. The active component does not require, by regulation, completion of military education courses for promotion. They achieve the same results by scheduling officers to attend the Officer Advance Course and Combined Arms and Services Staff School. The use of "best qualified criterion" promotion boards, require completion of the Command and General Staff Officer Course to be competitive for promotion to lieutenant colonel and colonel.

Completion of professional military education requirements is required for promotion of Army National Guard Officers. Current regulations require completion of the Officer Basic Course for promotion to first lieutenant, the Officer Advance Course for promotion to Major, fifty percent of the Command and General Staff Officer Course for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel, and completion of Command and General Staff Officer Course for promotion to Colonel.

The participation levels resulting from these policies have been excellent. Fifty one percent of Army National Guard majors and eighty eight percent of the lieutenant colonels have completed the Command and General Staff Officer Course or an equivalent course. Four percent of the lieutenant colonels, eighteen percent of the colonels and forty percent of the general officers have completed Senior Service College.
The military education system has served us well for the past decade, but is constantly under review. The Army completed a study of the Reserve Component Officer Education System in 1989. The Army Chief of Staff approved the study's recommendations to reconfigure the Reserve Component courses and to require completion of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School as part of the Reserve Officers military education. The Department of the Army published its implementation guidance for the new Reserve Component Officer Education System last month. The Reserve Component courses program will be reconfigured and fully implemented by October 1995. It requires completion of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School for promotion to Major effective in October, 1994 and establishes minimum grade requirements for enrollment in each of the required military education courses. The new system aligns attendance at military education courses with the periods in the officer's career that course content is utilized.

In addition to the required military education courses, I also want to point out that many other Army military education courses are available to Army National Guard officers. Also, there are opportunities for our officers to attend the intermediate and senior level courses of the other services in residence. The Army also provides senior level courses tailored specifically for Reserve component officers, such as the Senior Reserve Component Officers Course.
Army National Guard officers also participate in Joint Professional Military Education through completion of intermediate and senior level military education courses. The requirement for additional joint professional military education is limited because there are few joint designated assignments to which Army National Guard officers may be assigned. Currently, there are only four positions designated as joint assignments in the National Guard Bureau, other than the Chief and the Vice Chief, National Guard Bureau.

In conclusion, I would like to express my appreciation for this Panel’s interest and support for Reserve component military education. Some of the success achieved in improving military education in the Army National Guard can be attributed to the Panel’s recommendations to improve military education in the Army. I am convinced that the military education system provides the formal instruction that our officers need to operate on the modern battlefield and that the recent initiatives to improve Reserve component officer education will further enhance their competency in the future.
Mr. SKELTON. Admiral Taylor. Welcome.

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. JAMES E. TAYLOR, U.S. NAVY, DIRECTOR OF NAVAL RESERVE, COMMANDER NAVAL RESERVE FORCE

Admiral TAYLOR. Good morning, Mr. Chairman.

Professional Military Education is a key element affecting the future of the military services and the Naval Reserve fully recognizes its importance.

The Naval Reserve is firmly committed to taking advantage of all PME opportunities. Of the approximately 2,000 Reserve officers on full-time Active Duty, whom we call TARs, about 8½ percent of the officers in grades O4 through O6 are PME graduates.

Drilling reservists currently have five full-time resident quotas available at the Naval War College and 473 non-resident quotas allocated at various service schools.

Naval Reserve officers are encouraged to take advantage of PME to enhance their mobilization and readiness and few quotas go unused. During fiscal year 1991, we filled nearly 500 quotas at schools ranging in length from 5 days to 10 months.

The continuing emphasis on joint operation may require a higher priority for PME for both TARs and our inactive drilling reservists in the future. We expect to be able to expand the quotas within the Navy as needed. The active Navy has to this date been able to accommodate all of our requests.

Presently, we do not use PME or JPME as a criteria for promotion of either the Active Duty or Inactive Duty Reserve officer communities. Completion of PME by our officers is a factor along with other achievements that would be considered favorably when reviewed by the selection board.

Sir, that concludes my statement.

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Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your committee.

Professional Military Education (PME) is a key element affecting the future of the military services and the Naval Reserve fully recognizes its importance. The current environment in which we operate has become more demanding than at any time in our history and requires that we provide our leaders with a greater appreciation of joint operations and procedures. The emergence of new geo-political national security threats such as terrorism and third world hostilities -- as demonstrated in Operations Desert Shield/Storm -- has accelerated the need to infuse joint thinking at all levels within the services and Reserve Components.

The Naval Reserve is firmly committed to take advantage of all PME opportunities. Of the 2,000 reserve officers on full-time active duty, referred to in the Navy as Training and Administration of Reserves (TAR), 8.5 percent (79) of the officers in the grades of Lieutenant Commander (O-4) through Captain (O-6) are PME graduates. Of the resident graduates (62) in the grades of Lieutenant Commander through Captain, approximately 65 percent (40) are senior level graduates with the remainder at the intermediate level. TAR officers of all
designators are included in the Navy's annual PME service school plan. Current allocation of annual reserve full-time support active duty quotas are:

Four Intermediate level (Lieutenant Commander), three at the Naval War College and one at the Air University;

Seven Senior level (Captain/Commander), two at the Naval War College, two at Industrial College of the Armed Forces, one at the National War College, and two at the Air University.

Present annual TAR quotas are adequate and afford our most promising active duty reserve officers PME opportunity at a level that the community can use, as measured against overall billet requirements in support of the Naval Reserve Force.

Drilling reservists currently have five full-time resident quotas available at the Naval War College and 475 non-resident course (two-week) quotas allocated between the Naval War College, National Defense University, Air Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and a NATO Reserve Officer Course.

Naval Reserve officer participation, both active and inactive duty, at the Naval War College during FY-92 will represent nearly 10 percent of the annual non-resident seminars and more than 20 percent of correspondence enrollments offered. The percentage of reserve officers attending these courses is
considered to be adequate and represents a fair share of the quotas based on the Selected Naval Reserve personnel as 20 percent of the Navy's Total Force.

Naval Reserve officers are encouraged to take advantage of PME to enhance their mobilization readiness and few quotas go unused. During FY-91, we filled nearly 500 quotas at schools ranging in length from five days to 10 months.

The continuing emphasis on joint operations may require a higher priority for PME for both TARs and our inactive drilling reservists in the future. We expect to be able to expand the quotas within the Navy as needed. The active Navy has been able to accommodate all our requests to date.

Presently, we do not use PME or Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) as a criteria for promotion in either the active duty or inactive duty reserve officer communities. Completion of PME by our officers is a factor, along with other achievements, that would be considered favorably when reviewed by the Selection Board.

I appreciate the opportunity to share this information with you and will be happy to respond to any questions that you may have.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much, Admiral. We will come back to you with some questions, particularly on the numbers that you have given us.

General Davison, welcome, sir.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. HOLLIS E. DAVISON, U.S. MARINE CORPS, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS, FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General Davison. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Distinguished members of the panel, it is a privilege to address you concerning the Marine Reserve officers' professional military education or PME.

In 1985, after a thorough review of the military education system, the Marine Corps implemented a series of changes, some of which are still ongoing, designed to institutionalize the officer and enlisted PME programs.

The changes included a curriculum review of nonresident PME courses which resulted in granting equivalent status with resident PME courses; establishing an integrated and progressive system of resident PME, nonresident PME and professional readings for all Marines; establishing the Marine Corps University located at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, to reinforce the concept of PME as a mainstream part of every Marine's career, Active or Reserve; and the publishing of a Marine Corps Order, Professional Military Education, that was published this past June. That order will become fully effective in June of 1992. As indicated, it applies equally to the Active component officers as well as Reserve component.

The officer PME for the Marine Corps consists of five levels: precommissioning, primary or career level, intermediate, senior and general. All officers, Active and Reserve, attend the precommissioning resident level. The remaining four levels may be accomplished through resident and/or nonresident courses. For fiscal year 1992, 13 percent of our Marine Corps Reserve officers will attend some form of professional military education.

As PME is an integral part of every Marine's professional development, PME requirements for nonresident PME, professional reading and professional self-study are applicable and available for all members of the Marine Corps to include members of the Reserve. However, it is not a requirement for promotion. It is a factor that is considered along with many other factors to determine the best and fully qualified for selection to promotion.

In conclusion, the Marine Corps' PME program is a lifelong study of the foundations of the military profession. It is a dynamic system for educating Marines throughout their careers, providing a building block progression, equipping each Marine with the requisite skills and knowledge to advance successfully to the next higher grade.

As a force in readiness, the Marine Corps is truly a total force made up of Active and Reserve personnel performing in a way only as Marines can. We look to the Congress to continue its support of the total force Marine Corps.

Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Committee, it is a privilege to address you concerning Marine Reserve officers' professional military education (PME).

In 1985, after a thorough review of the military education system, the Marine Corps implemented a series of changes designed to institutionalize the officer and enlisted PME programs. The changes included a curriculum review of nonresident PME courses which resulted in granting equivalent status with resident PME courses; transferring responsibility for PME at the Corps' SNCO academies from officers to SNCO's; establishing an integrated and progressive system of resident PME, nonresident PME, and professional readings for all Marines; establishing the Marine Corps University located at Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Quantico, VA, to reinforce the concept of PME as a mainstream part of every Marine's career; and publishing the Marine Corps Order - Professional Military Education.

The Marine Corps Order reflects the guidance provided by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff military education policy and provides a PME progression for all Marines - corporal through general, Active and Reserve. The major objectives of our PME program include the resident education of every sergeant, staff sergeant, and gunnery sergeant; and resident
or nonresident education of every captain, major, and lieutenant colonel.

The Marine Corps University is the focal point for all PME programs, Active and Reserve, and encompasses the Staff Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO) Academy, The Basic School, the Amphibious Warfare School, the Communication Officers School, and the Command and Staff College.

The officer PME consists of 5 levels: precommissioning, primary/career, intermediate, senior, and general. All officers, Active and Reserve, attend the precommissioning, resident level. The precommissioning level focuses on the fundamentals of military science, and includes the service academies, ROTC units, and Officer Candidate School.

The remaining 4 levels may be accomplished through resident and/or nonresident courses. The primary/career level reinforces service values, develops warfighting skills, enhances leadership and decision-making ability, and improves management and communication skills. This level is taught through The Basic School (a resident requirement for all officers), Amphibious Warfare School, Communication Officers School, and other service schools.
The intermediate level focuses on the tactical employment of larger units at the operational level of war. It is the principle level for learning "jointness." Emphasis shifts from skill training to development of the officer's analytic capabilities and creative thought processes. This level is taught through the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting, other service schools, Armed Forces Staff College, and professional self-study.

The senior level focuses on strategy, the plan that translates power into the achievement of objectives. This level is taught through the Marine Corps Art of War Studies, other service schools, Joint PME Schools (National Defense University), and professional self-study.

The General Officer level is inherently joint in nature. The focus is on theater-level joint and combined operations and on the highest levels of strategy; integrating the components of national power to achieve national objectives. This level is taught through the CAPSTONE, Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Flag and General Officer Seminar on Joint Planning, National War College, and professional self-study.
As PME is an integral part of every Marine's professional development, PME requirements for nonresident PME, professional reading, and professional self-study are applicable and available to all members of the Marine Corps, to include members of the Reserve.

The Reserve quota for the resident Marine Corps Command and Staff College is 2, the resident Naval Command Staff College is 1, and the resident Naval Warfare College is 1. We are examining the feasibility of increasing Reserve Officer attendance at resident PME schools.

The Amphibious Warfare School and Command and Staff College will be incorporated into a phased 2-week summer resident program to augment the nonresident professional development.

In addition to the courses taught through the Marine Corps University, the Marine Corps Reserve is allocated quotas in 2-week schools - senior level, intermediate level, and career level. Some examples are the Reserve Officer National Decision Making Course and the Reserve Officer Strategy and Policy Course taught at Newport, RI; the Joint Warfare Course taught at Poole, England; the Canadian Militia Command and Staff taught at Ontario, Canada; and the Staff Planning Courses taught at the Landing Force Training Commands - Atlantic and Pacific.
In FY91, the Reserve PME board selected 1104 Reserve officers to attend professional military education in FY92. A total of 1413 officers applied for the courses.

In FY90, we sent 4 Reserve officers to the resident courses and 824 to the 2-week Reserve courses. We currently have 3 Reserve officers attending the resident courses and 750 attended the 2-week FY91 Reserve courses. It should be noted attendance in FY91 was affected by the activation of Reserve officers in support of Operation Desert Storm.

In the joint arena, the Command and Staff Course (nonresident program), currently under review for accreditation, is the most attainable and appropriate method for educating the majority of Reserve officers.

CONCLUSION

The Marine Corps' PME program is the lifelong study of the foundations of the military profession. It is a dynamic system for educating Marines throughout their careers, providing a building-block progression equipping each Marine with the requisite skills and knowledge to advance successfully to the next higher grade. The Marine Corps, America's force in readiness, is truly a Total Force made up of Active and Reserve personnel performing in a way only Marines can. We look to Congress to continue its support of the Total Force Marine Corps.
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, sir.
General Closner.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. JOHN J. CLOSNER, CHIEF OF AIR FORCE RESERVE

General Closner. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Taylor, Mr. Montgomery, it is my privilege to be here and represent the 84,000 selected reservists who we think did such a fine job in Desert Shield/Desert Storm and to discuss the professional military education in the Air Force Reserve.

Air Force Reserve officers have the opportunity to attend a variety of resident and nonresident programs. The resident offerings include the Air War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National War College, Naval War College and Air Command and Staff College. We have a total of 23 quotas.

Nonresident programs of the Air Force and the other services are open to all Air Force reservists who meet the basic course qualifications without quota limitations.

Most of our officers participate in professional development. In the Selected Reserve, 73 percent of all colonels have completed intermediate PME. For senior PME, the number is 71 percent. Over 65 percent of lieutenant colonels have graduated from intermediate school programs and 20 percent have already completed the senior service schools.

We recently expanded the resident PME program to afford even greater opportunities. Two quotas at Naval War College were obtained this current school year. We have a request pending for two at the Army War College. Also, the caliber of applicants prompted an additional quota at the Air War College for the 1991-1992 period.

The Air Force Reserve parallels the Active Duty policy as regard PME and promotion, much as General Davison just spoke about. There are no formal education requirements for eligibility or selection for promotion, but reservists, like their Active Duty counterparts, are judged on the whole person concept. Job performance is the single most important factor. Some ancillary factors naturally include PME, the positions that they serve in, the breadth of experience and certainly the command experience and career broadening experiences they obtain.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the PME programs that we participate in are sound, properly focused and are serving the Air Force Reserve and our Nation very well. I am open for any questions, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. General Killey.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. PHILIP G. KILLEY, DIRECTOR, AIR NATIONAL GUARD, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. AIR FORCE

General Killey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other members of the panel. I appreciate the opportunity to offer my views also on professional military education for the Air National Guard.

I agree with you that the events during the Gulf War clearly established the importance of the Reserve component as equal partners in the total force. Air National Guard officers served with distinction alongside their active counterparts and provided visible
proof of their readiness, their professionalism and their combat capability. Many of our activated members served in command positions in the theater of operation and earned the respect of their Active Duty counterparts. That this combination of forces worked smoothly testifies not only to the professionalism of the forces involved but to the value of training and education as a total force.

Mr. Chairman, I share your concern that as the size of the active military is reduced the necessity of professional military education for Reserve component members becomes increasingly important. We must identify our future leaders now and give them the same opportunity to hone their military skills as their Active Duty counterparts.

As the Air Guard continues to increase participation in joint exercises and prepare for real world contingencies, it is vital that our total force commanders, Active, Guard and Reserve, have the opportunity to develop their military leadership abilities to the fullest extent possible.

I am pleased to report that the Air Guard has adequate opportunities for its officers to attend in resident professional military education programs. I am submitting today a statement for the record which details the numbers of quotas the Air Guard receives in the various levels of officer professional military education.

In addition to the in residence opportunity, Air Guard officers may obtain their professional military education through correspondence courses or by seminar. Individuals who elect to complete these programs by one of these methods receive the same credit as if they had gone in residence. My statement for the record goes into more detail on these options.

Mr. Chairman, you also voiced interest in the educational requirements for promotion. Let me just say that we in the Air Guard have two types of promotion. The first is described in as the Reserve Officer Promotion Act and since there are no statutory requirements that suggest professional military education is essential for promotion, Air Guard policy does not require PME completion for this type of promotion. However, failure to complete the appropriate level of PME may have a negative impact when an otherwise eligible individual is considered for promotion by the Air Reserve component Central Selection Board.

Second, the Air Guard may promote officers under the unit vacancy promotion system. This program is designed for officers who have demonstrated exceptional ability and high potential. It is considered a “below-the-zone” type promotion and is not intended to be routine. Officers considered for promotion under this program must have completed the appropriate level of PME. Accordingly, our policy requires completion of Squadron Officer School for promotion to major, Intermediate Service School for promotion to lieutenant colonel and Senior Service School for promotion to colonel.

In closing, let me say that the Air Guard fully supports professional military education for its members. In addition to the obvious benefits to the military, professional military education also provides the student with management and leadership skills that they can take back home to their communities and civilian jobs, thus adding value to America.
I have personally asked my commanders to identify future leaders in the officer corps and impress upon them the importance of completing military education. I am also committed to ensuring that professional military education opportunities are available to as many of our highest quality officers as possible.

Thank you.
Mr. Chairman and members of the panel:

I am pleased to be here and appreciate the opportunity to offer my views on professional military education for officers (PME) in the Air National Guard. I agree with you that the events during the Gulf War clearly established the importance of the Reserve Components as equal partners in the Total Force. Air National Guard officers served with distinction along side their active counterparts and provided visible proof of their readiness, professionalism and combat capability. Many of our activated members served in command positions in the theater of operations and earned the respect of their active duty counterparts. That this combination of forces worked smoothly testifies not only to the professionalism of the forces involved, but to the value of training and education as a total force.

As further testimony to the value of joint training and exercises and to the quality of training in the air reserve components, I would be remiss if I did not mention that an Air National Guard unit recently took first place and an Air Force Reserve unit took second place in Gunsmoke 91, which is the Air Force’s world-wide air to ground gunnery competition.

Mr. Chairman, I share your concern that as the size of the active military is reduced, the necessity of professional
military education for reserve component members becomes increasingly important. We must identify our future leaders now and give them the same opportunity to hone their military skills as their active counterparts. As the Air National Guard continues to increase participation in joint exercises and prepare for real world contingencies, it is vital that our total force commanders--active, reserve or guard--have the opportunity to develop their military leadership abilities to the fullest extent possible.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

I am pleased to report that the Air National Guard, with few exceptions, has adequate opportunity for its officers to attend in-resident professional military education programs. The Air Force's first stage of professional military education is Squadron Officer School. This course is seven weeks long and is conducted at Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. It is designed for Captains. The ANG has great interest in Squadron Officer School--approximately 60 applications this year. Due to the relatively short length of this program, more of our members are able to consider attending this course in residence than the longer Intermediate and Senior Service Schools. The Air National Guard has received 25 quotas for Squadron Officer School for Fiscal Year 1992. We would like to see that number increased
and have made preliminary contacts with appropriate Air Force staff with the hopes of obtaining additional quotas in this valuable course.

The next level of officer PME is Intermediate Service School. The ANG sends 12 officers per year to Air Command and Staff College and 1 officer per year to the College of Naval Command and Staff. Majors are eligible to apply for these programs which are 10 months long. Although the opportunity for our officers to attend these programs may seem limited, the length of the course and the nature of the career and community commitments of many of our members makes attending these programs impractical.

The third level of PME is Senior Service School. These schools, for which Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels are eligible, are also 10 months long. The ANG sends officers to the following Senior Service Schools:

- Six officers to Air War College
- Three officers to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces
- One officer to the National War College
- Two officers to the Naval War College
- One officer to the Army War College
- One officer to the Harvard University Fellows Program
In addition, we have been successful over the past two years in having the opportunity to send one individual per year to the Inter-American Defense College. Although this opportunity was made available due to a last minute cancellation, we are hopeful that this quota will continue. Again, because of the length of these courses, many of our mid-level officers are not able to consider attending in residence and our quotas are generally adequate to meet our needs. However, since we are actively encouraging our most qualified officers to apply for these schools, we anticipate an increase in interest in resident PME programs. If this occurs, we will work with appropriate Air Force staff in an effort to increase ANG seats in these courses.

In addition to the in-residence opportunity, Air National Guard officers may obtain their professional military education through either correspondence courses or by seminar. Individuals who elect to complete these programs by one of these methods receive the same credit as if they had gone in residence. Seminar programs are generally offered on active duty Air Forces bases. Students meet in structured seminars one evening per week over a 10 month period. Since many of our members do not live near active duty bases, the correspondence method of PME completion has become the method of choice for the majority of our members.

Mr. Chairman, I have mentioned that I share your belief
in the importance of professional military education for our members. Frankly, I am concerned that many of our officers do not get the required level of knowledge through the correspondence courses as they are currently presented. To remedy this situation, we are examining other alternatives that may meet the objectives of the Air Force and the Air National Guard and are consistent with the training time available to Guardsmen.

I would also like to briefly mention several short courses designed for reserve component members that our officers are able to attend. Air University, through its Air Command and Staff College, offers two adjunct courses for members of the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard. We are generally invited to send approximately 50 members per year to these courses. In addition the National Defense University offers three times per year a two-week Reserve Component National Security Course which brings together members from all the reserve components. This course is open to Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels. The ANG sends approximately 75 officers per year to these courses.

Although these short courses are designed to give our officers a glimpse of the "total picture," they are of necessity limited in scope and do not qualify as completion of PME for credit on personnel records.
Mr. Chairman, you also voiced an interest in the educational requirements for promotion. Let me just say that we, in the Air National Guard, have two types of promotions. The first are known as Reserve Officer Promotion Act (ROPA) promotions. These promotions are subject to federal statutes (10 U.S.C. Sec 8366(d) and 8367). Since there are no statutory requirements that suggest Professional Military Education is essential for promotion, ANG policy does not require PME completion for this type of promotion. However, failure to complete the appropriate level of PME may have a negative impact when an otherwise eligible individual is considered for promotion by the Air Reserve central selection board.

Secondly, the Air National Guard may promote officers under the "unit vacancy" promotion system. These promotions are statutorily described in Title 32 U.S.C. Sec 307 and are designed for officers who have demonstrated exceptional ability and high potential. They are considered "below the zone" promotions and are not intended to be routine. Officers considered for promotion under this program must have completed the appropriate level of PME. Accordingly, ANG policy requires completion of Squadron Officer School for
promotion to Major, Intermediate Service School for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel and Senior Service School for promotion to Colonel.

In closing, let me say that the Air National Guard fully supports professional military education for its members. In addition to the obvious benefits to the military, professional military education also provides the students with management and leadership skills that they take back to their communities and civilian jobs thus adding value to America.

I have personally asked my commanders to identify future leaders in the officer corps and impress upon them the importance of completing military education. I am also committed to ensuring that professional military education opportunities are available to as many of our highest quality officers as possible.

Thank you again for inviting me to share my views with you in this vital area. This concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Mr. SKELTON. General, in your prepared testimony you say, "I would be remiss if I did not mention that the Air National Guard unit recently took first place and an Air Force Reserve unit took second place in Gunsmoke 91, which is the Air Force's worldwide air-to-ground gunnery competition." We congratulate you all. That is fantastic.

General KILLEY. Thank you.

Mr. SKELTON. I have one question—well, I have a series of questions but I will ask one and then I will call on the other members of the panel. Again, we thank you, Congressman Montgomery, for joining us.

My question is, General Sandler to your knowledge, did any member of your people, major on up who has taken advantage of military education, participate at a decisionmaking staff level where he or she could use this military education in the planning phases and bringing together the Desert Shield/Desert Storm operation?

General Sandler. Mr. Chairman, I can give you a couple of examples where that did occur.

Mr. SKELTON. All right. Please do.

General Sandler. The ones with whom I am most familiar are those who were mobilized and deployed to the desert, and I can tell you that the major military police command commander was a participant in the planning process for the reception and containment of EPW, for example. That is the 300th MP Command out of New York.

We had the 416th Engineer Command commanded by a major general which also was involved in much of the engineering planning processes which took place and were indeed involved with the planning on how to deal with the oil slick which was coming down the Arabian coastline.

Third, the civil affairs commands, we had two general officer commands which deployed to Saudi. Their commanders, brigadier general level, were involved in the civil affairs effort and the planning for the restoring of Kuwait City as well as the help which was rendered to the Kurds in northern Iraq. So there was involvement at that level. I do not have the details with me, but I can surely get that for the record, sir, on specifics at major level through the ranks.

Mr. SKELTON. That will not be necessary. I do not want you to go to all that trouble but I just want to know if we are going to educate the Guard and Reserve officers, are we going to use them? Were they used?

General D'Araujo.

General D'Araujo. Yes, sir. We had some specific examples of that. I will just highlight a few for you.

First of all, as you know, we deployed two artillery brigades to Southwest Asia. The commander of the 142d Artillery Brigade was the principal artillery operator for the VII Corps Artillery commander there in the desert and was a very key participant in the fire planning for the VII Corps.

In addition to that, we deployed a total of 60—

Mr. SKELTON. What was his rank, General?

General D'Araujo. Full colonel, sir.
We deployed a total of 60 lieutenant colonel and colonel-level commands there, service support, engineer type units and we had a number of field grade officers on the 3d Army staff from the South Carolina Guard, the 218th Signal Brigade specifically, that were part of the communications planning effort there for the 3rd Army.

Mr. SKELTON. Good. Thank you.

Admiral Taylor.

Admiral Taylor. Mr. Chairman, to my knowledge, none of our naval reservists were recalled or mobilized to a position where they would have contributed at the decisionmaking level on a joint capacity or Joint Staff.

We did recall an augmentation unit for the Navy Component Commander's staff whose members served with him on the U.S.S. Blue Ridge and assisted in the decisionmaking at the Navy level. But the majority of our personnel were in support units not involved in that type of decisionmaking.

Mr. SKELTON. All right. Thank you. Can you tell me the number of reservists that would have fit in that category that were on the decisionmaking level in the Navy?

Admiral Taylor. I do not have that number available, sir. I would guess it would be less than 35.

Mr. SKELTON. OK.

General Davison.

General Davison. Sir, we had, as you know, somewhere over 13,000 Marine Corps reservists deployed to Southwest Asia to the theater of operations there. They spanned a wide range of activities. We augmented the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force staff with some Reserves, the Marine Central Command Component there with some. We have some eight billets on the CENTCOM staff that are individual mobilization augmentees. We also had an infantry regimental headquarters and several battalions involved over there.

So we had a number of field grade Marines and colonels involved in Southwest Asia in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. I can provide you a more detailed breakout if you desire for the record.

Mr. SKELTON. No, General, that is fine. You said you had eight on the Central Command Staff that were reservists?

General Davison. We have a total of 14 Reserves we carry on the CENTCOM and SOCOM staff.

Mr. SKELTON. How many were used? You said eight a moment ago. Is that correct?

General Davison. We have a total of eight. I will have to get for the record the number that was actually used for you.

Mr. SKELTON. That would help.

General Davison. Yes, sir.

[The following information was received for the record:]

We have seven billets on the CENTCOM staff. We activated all seven in support of Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Mr. SKELTON. But there were a considerable number that were actually Marine reservists that were on General Schwarzkopf's Central Command Staff?

General Davison. A larger number was, of course, on the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force and within their subordinate units.
Mr. SKELTON. That would be fine. Thank you.

General Closner.

General CLOSNER. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the numbers were very, very significant from the Air Force Reserve. A lot of groundwork was laid prior to the callup. I think a lot of the success and the smooth transition from recall to mobilization are related to the hard work of smart reservists who attended PME and built vital professional relationships.

People who worked on my staff, specifically a lieutenant colonel who is now a colonel, were very, very instrumental in the development of recall procedures and personnel tracking. Behind the scenes before this all occurred, a lot of seeds were planted in PME. They came to fruition in the execution of the war.

In the specific execution we had some examples of superior leadership. Colonel Efferson was an A-10 group commander in the Air Force Reserve. General Horner put him in charge of a forward operating location to manage that A-10 operation which had Guard, Reserve and Active Duty aircraft flowing through there. The confidence placed in him, what he learned and the contacts he made in PME, paid off very well.

Certainly we have an opportunity in the future, I think, to do much more. I think all of the Reserve component chiefs and directors here will say that the capabilities we have learned in PME and the contacts we have made would serve us well in the command and control area pre and post mobilization.

Thank you, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

General Killey.

General KILLEY. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to identify one individual, Brigadier General Mike Hall, who served on General Horner's staff and was responsible for the close air support part of the air campaign. He was what we call CINCAS. He worked directly for General Horner and also General Waller on the Army side and was a key player in decisionmaking on the CENTAF staff.

Of our units that were deployed over there, specifically our flying units, 12 of our 13 tanker units were mobilized. They were at four different locations throughout the AOR and all of those locations were commanded by an Air National Guard commander. One of them was the largest Air Force location over there (Jiddah) which had all of our tanker assets, and included some bomber assets as well, and was commanded by an Air National Guard colonel.

Our two fighter units from New York and South Carolina that were seen frequently on CNN were based at Al Karg, which was the prototype of the composite wings of the future in the Air Force. Our commanders were integrated into the command staff of that composite wing. Our RECCE unit initially from Alabama and then replaced by the High Rollers from Reno, NV, also had their commanders there who were integrated into that composite wing staff as well.

Back in the States, every major command, MAC, TAC and SAC, has an Air National Guard assistant, a two star general officer who worked very closely with the major command commander in utili-
zation of the Reserve component and how they were deployed and used in Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

In addition to what we call our 265 staff officers who are normally at the colonel level at each of those major commands, those men played an integral role working with the major command staff on the utilization of the Reserve component. The same applies in the Pentagon where my key staff members work very closely with the Air Staff and the contingency support staff or with each functional area on the utilization and employment of Air National Guard units and personnel. So throughout, we were very key and integral in the process, not necessarily policy decisionmaking but certainly in the utilization of Air Reserve component units and personnel.

Mr. SKELTON. General, thank you. It is gratifying to hear your comments on this. Admiral Taylor, one item I happen to know. A Navy captain reservist 13 miles from my hometown had one of the toughest jobs over there. He was the portmaster at Jabhal, a reservist and a farmer by trade but that is no small item that the Navy did.

Mr. TAYLOR. I will throw this out to the panel.

Getting back to follow up on Congressman Skelton's question, what percentage of PME grads were used in a decisionmaking process?

I think it is going to vary by the service but if you could—

General SANDLER. We will go down the line, if it is all right with you, Mr. Taylor.

I do not have at my fingertips the actual percentage, which we surely can get for the record, but what I would suggest is that every person who was involved in some form of decisionmaking had some level of professional military education. I would say it would have to be 100 percent at the level at which they were operating.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I guess to follow up, General, I had a very nice visit with General Pagonis in July. He put together about a 2-hour VHS tape of just what the Guard and the Reserve did for him in his logistics work.

My question is—and I certainly do not doubt that and they did a wonderful job. My question is as far as actually making the decision on how that was going to take place as opposed to getting it done, to what extent were the PME grads involved?

General SANDLER. Well, in the logistics side, General Pagonis' side of the equation, they were heavily involved because he had a great deal of Reserve component personnel working for him.

I also met with him as late as 2 weeks ago and saw the same video, by the way, and very complimentary—and I might add that at the present time, there is a Reserve component major general who is his deputy in Saudi who will have served there for 6 months in a decisionmaking capacity.

Mr. TAYLOR. What is his name, sir?

General SANDLER. General Marvin Back. Marvin Back is an ARCOM commander from Indianapolis, or rather, that is where his ARCOM is. He accepted an invitation to serve in Saudi during this drawdown period and he is the number two guy over there on the logistic drawdown. So he is heavily involved as we speak in deci-
sionmaking processes and he is an Army War College graduate. So I would suggest that if you were a major, because of the Reserve component requirements, at least in the Army Reserve and National Guard, these are gates which must be passed in order to get the promotion; therefore, the PME received was necessary for them to achieve the rank and, therefore, that is why I would say at the level at which they were operating, they would have to be 100 percent qualified for that particular grade in which they were functioning.

While I cannot tell you the percentage of the people on those staffs which were U.S. Army Reserve personnel I can tell you again that General Back is a Reserve officer, and that again goes back to General Pagonis' confidence in the level of capability of Reserve component personnel.

Mr. Taylor. If you would, if you could separate that from O5 and above and O5 and below, please, I would be curious.

General Sandler. I will have to get you that information for the record, sir.

[The following information was received for the record:]

ARMY RESERVE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

According to data extracted from the total Army personnel data base as of the end of August 1991, there were 2,839 lieutenant colonels (O5) through major general (O8) and 10,425 second lieutenants (O1) through major (O4) called to Active Duty. All U.S. Army Reserve officers deployed to SWA were graduates of the appropriate professional military education requirement for their grade and specialty.

Mr. Taylor. Sure.

Mr. Taylor. Yes, sir.

General D'Arabujo. As I had mentioned, let me just reiterate something General Sandler said, that to answer your question, if I understand it, because of the promotion gates, for example, if we had a lieutenant colonel commanding a battalion, a full colonel commanding a brigade, I would have to say that because those gates have to be met, he was qualified at the PME level required by his grade so therefore in direct answer, all the people involved were functioning at the PME level that those gates required.

An example of someone at a senior level, we have a volunteer from the Texas Army National Guard—and I apologize, his name escapes me—but he is running the redeployment station there at King Khalid Military City prepping the equipment for redeployment. He is a full-time director of logistics for the Texas Army National Guard. He is also a War College graduate, so I would answer your question for the National Guard participation that way.

Admiral Taylor. Sir, as I mentioned earlier, we had very few of our naval reservists involved at the decisionmaking level. I do not have the percentage of those officers who are PME graduates.

Overall, throughout the Naval Reserve, I would estimate approximately 15 percent of our officers have PME education. As I mentioned earlier, completion of PME is not a requirement to be assigned to a billet nor for a promotion. Our percentages actually in theater at the decisionmaking level are very small.

General Davison. Sir, we had a large number of field grade, as I mentioned earlier, in Desert Shield/Desert Storm deployed. I do
not have those exact numbers with me this morning but I can provide them for the record.

[The following information was received for the record:]

Mr. Taylor, 71 percent of the Reserve officers activated on the CENTCOM staff were PME graduates.

I can tell you that overall, for intermediate level college training or professional military education, for Command and Staff College, 35 percent of our Marine Corps Reserve lieutenant colonels and 35 percent of our colonels have completed that intermediate level course.

In addition, our Reserve officers of those same grades, lieutenant colonels and colonels, over 1 percent have completed the senior level college education, such as the National Security Management Course, Army War College Corresponding Studies Program, or the Air Force Associate Studies Program. I cannot break that out for you, though, for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

A much larger percentage attended other levels of courses such as the career level course, Amphibious Warfare School and so on. We send 13 percent of our Reserve officers to some sort of training each year.

General CLOSNER. Sir, I would say that in the Air Force Reserve, nothing is ever 100 percent but I would say virtually everyone who is in the decision or policymaking arena has had an appropriate level of PME for the particular grade that they are holding.

Among our full-time staff who work in the Pentagon right now and those out in the field working with the MAJCOMS, at the colonel level, 94 percent have completed senior professional military education. I see it all the way down. Essentially, the Air Force Reserve is heavily involved in education. A lot of our people also have advanced degrees.

General KILLEY. Mr. Taylor, in the Air National Guard, those people I mentioned who were in either leadership or decisionmaking positions, of which virtually all of them were colonels or above, have met their PME requirements.

To be promoted to colonel or above, they have to have a unit vacancy promotion in the Air National Guard. For this type of promotion, it is mandatory that they have met those PME gates for that grade.

Now, when we talk about lieutenant colonels who are in leadership type positions, you can be promoted to lieutenant colonel in the Air National Guard either by unit vacancy or by ROPA. I would say that those individuals who are in leadership or key decisionmaking positions who are lieutenant colonels or majors are all unit vacancy type promotions and have met those PME gates.

Those who were put into their position by a ROPA promotion more than likely met that gate also to be competitive or they would never have made it into one of those key positions, even though the requirement for that ROPA promotion does not specify that they have to have the certain level of PME appropriate for that grade.

Mr. TAYLOR. One question.

Mr. SKELTON. You bet.
Mr. Taylor. Again, all I am going to do is repeat what Congressman Skelton said in the compliments that all the services performed, and they really did an outstanding job. We have no complaints.

From a very casual observance, though, the trip with Congressman Montgomery in April and the trip again in July that the Air Force was kind enough to line up for me, I saw a great deal of people in 03 and below slots, E2s up, 03s down. But I did not see a lot of presence otherwise.

Was there a reluctance to activate people 04 and above or was I just in the wrong places?

General Sandler. Well, I can field it from the Army Reserve side. I would suggest that in July, we had several units, which by that time were starting to redeploy back to CONUS, of course. My guess is that inasmuch as we activated and deployed to Saudi Arabia 12 general officer commands, that perhaps you might have been in the wrong place to see the higher ranking people because within those organizations were colonels and lieutenant colonels and so forth, therefore, as the pyramid gets tighter at the top, of course, there will be less of those in the leadership roles where you might have been, many more captains and of course enlisted people.

But we felt that perhaps there could have been more Reserve officer commands mobilized and deployed. We did find that inasmuch as 12 were mobilized and deployed that they did an extremely fine job over there and we are very proud of them, just as you.

Mr. Taylor. General.

General D'Araujo. The same thing would apply for us. In July, for example, both of our artillery brigades were probably redeployed by then. A lot of our major units were on their way back, although we did have probably some 12,000 to 15,000 still there, of which a goodly number would have been field grade officers still in the commands. So I cannot account for your not encountering them.

Mr. Taylor. Of course, the exception would be flight crews, where there are a lot of lieutenant colonels, a lot of colonels still out there flying on a daily basis.

Admiral.

Admiral Taylor. Congressman, I am sure you were not in the wrong place during your visit. With regard to mobilization and recall, the Navy was not reluctant in any regard to mobilize or recall by rank.

We made a special effort, though, to ensure that we did not recall or mobilize people who would not be utilized. So, we validated very carefully the requirements delivered to us by the CINCs in theater and we mobilized to the CINCs requirements.

General Davison. Very similar to the Navy, Mr. Taylor, the Marine Corps had no reluctance at all to activate field grade officers. I would hope you would not be able to tell the difference between the Reserve component or Active over there for the Marines, but we did have a large number of colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors both in units and on staffs out there.
We did that on the basis of what was needed to augment and reinforce the Active component of the Marine Corps that was deployed to Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

General Closner. Mr. Taylor, the fact that less of our unit senior leadership was mobilized had a lot to do with the numbers that we had to look at.

As you know, the partial mobilization and the recall guidance flowed from Congress to the service secretaries in piecemeal fashion and it got to the point where you had to pull that one small group of people who were directly related to producing the combat capability. In some cases you were getting right down to three- and four-man units. That had a lot to do with the execution.

I think that all of the Reserve component chiefs and directors would say that we certainly could have contributed more but we do not think it was a particularly conscious decision to limit the participation. I really think the people we activated did a great job and effected a smooth integration of the Reserve Forces and effected the policy.

I certainly hope the constraints we had to work under such as the piecemeal activation will not impede the future use of this resource.

General Killey. Just to expand a little bit on what General Closner said, in the Air Component side of Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we did streamline our units significantly so that we were only taking what we needed over to the theater of operation. The constraints of the area of operation itself, the host nation support, the fact that we were going to be integrated Air Force units, the limitations of the 200K callup for allocation to each service, all of those things combined required us to streamline our units to the smallest possible size. When we did that, in many cases, we streamlined out some of the senior people who would normally deploy with that unit. Not in all cases, but certainly in our mission support areas.

As I mentioned before, our flying units, virtually every one of our units that went over, took their commanders but we streamlined those down and that is a testimony to the overall capability of our people. We train as units, we have previously trained for the big war in Europe where we would take all of our units, but we streamlined down to much smaller packages that fitted in with the Air Force, but were still able to do the job very effectively, which I think you all very much recognized, which is a testimony to the overall capability of each individual airman within the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.

Mr. Taylor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Skelton. Thank you.

Mr. Montgomery.

Mr. Montgomery. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for giving me this invitation. I have a deep interest in the Reserves and National Guard as well as education.

Mr. Chairman, I will not ask to go down the line because I have about three questions and I think that would take too much time. If one or two members of the panel would like to comment on areas that I touch, this would be helpful.
I think this Friday that we will have the Defense Authorization bill for the next fiscal year, it will be on the floor this Friday, and in that bill is one of the Skelton amendments that says that promotion to O3 in the Reserves or National Guard, you would have to have a baccalaureate degree and it would be implementation in fiscal 1996 and the actives already have that requirement.

Is that any problem to you and how do you feel about this amendment that will go into effect in 1996—O3s will have to have a degree?

General SANDLER. I will field that, Mr. Montgomery. Just for the purpose of the Army Reserve, I would suggest to you, sir, that right now, 82 percent of the U.S. Army Reserve commissioned officers are college graduates at one level or another.

I believe that that is a reasonable request and I do not think the U.S. Army Reserve would have any problem with that requirement.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Maybe one other. General Killey.

General KILLEY. Yes, sir, Congressman Montgomery.

One area that I have a concern with, in the Authorization Act, is our nurse corps. Both the Air National Guard and the Army National Guard and the Air Force Reserve do not require our nurses to have a 4-year degree. This would be a limitation on our ability to promote our nurses under the unit vacancy promotion.

Right now, numberswise, 46 percent of our nurses in the Air National Guard do not have a 4-year degree. They have either a 2-year degree or a 3-year degree. The absence of not having that 4-year degree has not affected their ability to do their job. At the State level, they still have to pass the same State exams as a 4-year degree person. That is the one area I have the biggest concern with and I would request that we look at someway to exempt them or amend that language to exempt them from 4-year degree requirement for promotion to captain.

Mr. SKELTON. May I interrupt?

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Yes.

Mr. SKELTON. Have you read the actual verbiage in the bill?

General KILLEY. I have it right here.

Mr. SKELTON. May we look at it, sir?

General KILLEY. Section 582 would require that no person may be appointed to the grade of captain in the Army Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve or to the grade of lieutenant in the Naval Reserve or be federally recognized in the grade of captain as a member of the Army National Guard or Air National Guard unless that person has been awarded a baccalaureate degree by an accredited educational institution.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, we have time to take a look at it. It certainly was not the intention of the chairman to give any problems. That is one of our biggest areas that we have a shortage in, is medical professionals, and we appreciate your bringing that up, General Killey, because that is very important to us.

This is kind of off the subject, but General Davison of the Marines, I was talking to General Boomer about Reserves in the Persian Gulf. I do not know what the rank of this battery commander was but he was a reservist. They had a counterattack and he had
155 batteries and they told him to lower the tubes and do direct fire—I do not know whether he had a Master's degree or what, but they were prepared for direct fire with the direct guns. I do not know whether you have heard that story or not.

General Davison. Yes, sir. That should have been a captain, I believe, from our Richmond artillery battery who was activated and sent over there. They did in fact take out some—if it is the same incident that I recall that you are talking about—enemy vehicles of various and sundry sorts with their fire, so it was effective. I do not know whether he had a degree or not.

We do have a few, and a very few, do not have degrees. But, again, we have considered on promotion historically the best qualified and fully qualified. Having a degree was very important in that equation but not the sole discriminator for promotion or not.

Mr. Montgomery. I think that leads into my next question that I am a little concerned about and I have talked to the chairman about it.

We have, I guess, 40 or 50 percent of the officers out of the Army Reserve and Army National Guard come through OCS and a number of them barely have high school educations. If you put too much professional education up above to be promoted to captain or to major, how is that going to affect getting some of these people to go to OCS? Actually, OCS graduates seem to stay in the Reserves longer than those who come out of the ROTC programs.

Mr. Skelton. May I interrupt? I think a prerequisite to the Army, I suppose this applies to the Reserve and the Guard as well, is at least 2 years, 60 hours. Am I correct on that?

General Sandler. Yes, you are.

General D'Araujo. Yes.

Mr. Skelton. So you cannot go from high school into OCS. You have to have at least 2 years of college. Am I correct?

General D'Araujo. That includes our State OCS program. You require 60 credit hours for acceptance.

Mr. Skelton. Yes. Now, go ahead and answer his question.

General D'Araujo. Congressman Montgomery, if I may, you also require a baccalaureate for promotion to the grade of major. That is in effect now, of course. But you do require the 60 hours on entering the State OCS program.

I would just tell you that as it stands right now, about 53 percent of all of our lieutenants in the population in the Army National Guard already have at least a baccalaureate degree.

Mr. Skelton. Fifty-three percent?

General D'Araujo. Fifty-three percent. About 65 percent of our captains already have a baccalaureate degree of our total population.

Now, if I can get back, if I may, sir, to your previous question. If the requirement moves to requiring a baccalaureate at the grade of captain, we would probably have to require, in order to meet those gates, we would look at implementing a 90-hour requirement, perhaps, for entry into the OCS program.

Now, Congressman, I will tell you that you are probably correct. That would cull some people out of the opportunity, there is no question about it. What those numbers are, of course, I could not begin to tell you at this point. But I would just like to point out for
the record that we are well on our way to addressing the civilian education requirement as we speak.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Well, maybe it is not that big a problem. We should look into that, though, Ike.

My last comment or question is in regard to our educational benefits for our officers and enlisted personnel in the Reserves. We do not have the Masters and Ph.D. degree eligibility. It is not a big cost item.

Mr. Skelton and I have talked before about it and it would have to come through Armed Services because it would come out of defense funds. At last estimate we had to have implementation where reservists could get Master's or Ph.D. degrees, it would cost about $20 million a year. We had an estimation from the Congressional Budget Office.

Do you have any comments on that, any of you? That is, professional education that gets out of the baccalaureate degrees.

General SANDLER. Well, in the absence of comments, sir, I would support that personally. I have gotten reports and comments as a troop commander from my people wondering why they could not go on and get advanced degrees. We have a variety of different programs, but your GI bill, sir, I believe is appropriate to expand to include that. I think when we are talking about professional military education, I believe the opportunity to get a civilian education through the opportunities created by either your GI bill or some other resource is well worth it and I think we can put their education knowledge to work for the benefit of the entire Armed Force. I would certainly personally support that.

Mr. SKELTON. General Killey.

General KILLEY. Yes, sir. I think as we draw down our forces and the Reserve component becomes a more and more important part of our total force in all the services, and we integrate and become a more joint force in our future military, I think it is critical that our Reserve component officers and personnel be offered those same education opportunities that our Active Duty members have. You all know that the number of postgraduate degrees in the Active Forces is significant. We need to have that same level of education opportunity in the Reserve component that we have in the Active so I fully support that.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. You were discussing a moment ago the GI bill, which is officially titled the Montgomery GI bill. One of the lessons we learn out of this entire Desert Storm operation is the high quality of young men and young women that we have. I do not think there is any question. There is no bar chart or graph that you can show to prove it, but I am convinced a great part of that is because of the efforts of the gentleman from Mississippi to implement it. I think all of you will agree with that, both Active Duty and Reserve. It is like a magnet to attract bright young folks, and it is easier to win a war with smart young folks than those that are not so gifted.

Mr. Browder, may I have your indulgence just a moment?

There is good news today, General Killey. You quoted from the report language, which is nice. Sometimes the generals and admi-
rals do not pay a bit of attention to it. But what you have to pay attention to is the law itself.

"Section 523. Baccalaureate degree required for appointment or promotion of Reserve component officers to grades above first lieutenant or lieutenant junior grade.

"(A) In general, after September 30, 1995, no person may be appointed to a grade above the grade of first lieutenant in the Army Reserve, Air Force Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve or to a grade above the grade of lieutenant junior grade in the Navy Reserve or be federally recognized in a grade above the grade of first lieutenant as a member of the Army National Guard or Air National Guard unless that person has been awarded a baccalaureate degree by an accredited educational institution.

"(B) Exceptions. Subsection (A) does not apply to the following:

the appointment to a higher grade of a person who is appointed in or assigned for service in a health profession for which a baccalaureate degree is not a condition of original appointment or assignment."

Feel better?

General KILLEY. I feel better.

Mr. SKELTON. All right.

"(2) The appointment in the Naval Reserve or Marine Corps Reserve of an individual appointed for service as an officer designated as a limited duty officer" and we know what those specialists are.

"(3) The appointment in the Naval Reserve of an individual appointed for service under the Naval Aviation Cadet (NAVCAD) program."

Mr. Browder.

Mr. BROWDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the interests of time, I have a couple of specific questions and I will direct them as Mr. Montgomery did to anyone who would like to respond.

This panel has expressed some reservations about nonresident courses because of the lack of interaction between students, which in the case of joint PME instruction is considered particularly vital. For Reserve officers, since there is no opportunity for this interplay with other reservists or Active Duty officers, this could be pretty important.

Do any of you have any strong feelings about requiring seminars or Active Duty periods as part of nonresident courses?

Admiral TAYLOR. I will take a crack at that, Mr. Browder.

While I believe that seminars would be very, very beneficial to the reservists who are enrolled in a nonresident course, I would have some reservations and it would depend upon that person's billet. In other words, if you are suggesting that he or she do that during his annual training period, there are some of our mobilization billets where their annual training periods are vital to keep up warfare specialties. For instance, our P-3 squadrons when they deploy on AT to the Western Pacific or the Atlantic must do so to maintain their ASW qualifications.

However, if that person's billet happened to be on a staff, an augmentation unit that supported a staff, then I would not have any problem with that because that would certainly benefit his mobilization.
An alternative to that would be to utilize ADT funds which are severely limited. Therefore, my reservation would be primarily in the utilization of AT funds across the board to do that.

But I certainly concur that seminars are valuable, the interplay is valuable.

General D'Araujo. Congressman, if I may. At the present time, the only option in our PME program for the Army National Guard where you would not have that opportunity would be if you chose the Command and General Staff Officers course by purely correspondence means. All others require at least a 2-week phase where you would have that interaction.

Mr. Browder. So you do have that interaction.

General D'Araujo. Yes, sir.

General Davison. I might add for the Marine Corps, Mr. Browder, if I could, that we do plan, in our nonresident course at the intermediate level and the career level, to have a 2-week seminar toward the end of that program where our Reserves come in and participate together.

Additionally, those who participate in the senior level course, the Army War College Corresponding Studies program, we have five quotas a year up there, will get the 3-week seminar that they offer as part of their program.

Mr. Browder. I am glad that that is included.

As you know, the National Defense University recently terminated the nonresident National Security Management course which is the only joint nonresident course available. How important was this course to the overall professional military educational needs of officers in your service?

Again, I will ask if you have a particularly strong opinion on that, one way or the other, I wish you would enlighten us.

General Davison. If I could continue, Mr. Browder, the Marine Corps typically had 50 Active component quotas to that course and 5 Reserve and so we found it very popular and worthwhile and recognized it as senior level credit for our officers who took that course. It was an important part of the overall professional military education offering that was out there for our Reserve officers.

General Sandler. Mr. Browder, if I may, I might add that inasmuch as the U.S. Army Reserve has the responsibility for over 300,000 individual ready reservists, we feel that we need just about as many opportunities as possible for our reservists to garner retirement points to keep their proficiencies current because they are not members of the troop program units and this gives them an opportunity to attend some form of professional military education and development, therefore allowing them to be used as a mobilization asset when needed and to continue to keep their educational levels at a proper point.

I might add that during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm we solicited 20,000 people in this category and ultimately mobilized almost 14,000 of them.

So I think it is critically important that we have access to as many of the professional development activities as possible. While I cannot give you the specific impact on NDU, I would suggest that the more available the better it is for the total Army.

Mr. Browder. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I am sure that there are good reasons for that decision but perhaps we could take a closer look at it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. Edwards. Last but not least.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I only have one question, actually, that was prompted by the discussion on health care professionals.

While you are here, I would like to take the opportunity to ask you if you have any sense yet of whether the impact of Desert Storm has affected the ability to keep physicians, particularly physicians in the Guard and Reserves.

Have you started to see retirements? Have you started to get any indication that this is going to be a serious problem? Did you have physicians that were making mortgage payments on $200,000 or $300,000 homes and whose being deployed or called up caused a hardship that might make it harder to either recruit new physicians in the Guard and Reserves or to keep the ones we have there now?

Any of you that would care to respond.

Admiral TAYLOR. Mr. Edwards, I am pleased to report that Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm affected us positively with regard to our health care personnel.

While I am sure there may be isolated individuals who are dissatisfied because of the impact on them. Prior to Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, we had a turnover of about 20 percent of our physicians. This year we are only having 16 percent turnover and no affect on recruitment of either doctors or nurses. People are proud of what they did.

Mr. EDWARDS. That is quite a compliment because I would think they made some very significant financial sacrifices. That is a real compliment to their commitment to the armed services.

General KILLEY. Yes, sir, Mr. Edwards. I would like to comment on that for the Air National Guard. That was one area we had a concern in at the start of Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We played heavily in the medical arena, both with our medical clinics and our hospitals, particularly backfilling in the United States and our Aeromedical units that were used fully over in the AOR.

We thought we would have a significant attrition of those people on return just because of the things that you said but I am happy to report that we have had no attrition above normal. The Air National Guard strength right now is over 100 percent. In our medical areas, it is extremely good, which is testimony to the caliber of people in our medical area who are serving. They know why they are serving, even though a lot of them had to sacrifice financially to participate, they did it willingly, knowing why they were doing it.

So I just really feel good, particularly in our medical areas.

Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you.

General D'ARAUJO. Congressman, from the Army National Guard standpoint, as you probably know, we had a significant part of our medical force structure not only mobilized but most of them ended up going to the desert.
We have heard some isolated anecdotal comments about what is happening with physicians, but there are no anomalies in our retention statistics for health care specialists within our force structure either. So at least at this point, it appears that—we had the very same concerns about attrition, because so much of the force was deployed there, that we would encounter that, but there has been nothing radical about the retention rates for medical people.

Mr. EDWARDS. Tremendous. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. You bet.

Mr. TAYLOR. Again, gentlemen, I know this is probably not something that any of you would have offhand but I am curious.

General Killey, getting back to your comment when I had asked you why I did not encounter very many O-4s and above but saw a lot of E-2s up through O-3s and really everywhere I went, Naval Station Sigonella, Italy. The CEO raved about what the Reserves were doing. Every single unit we stopped at, regardless of the branch, raved about the job the Reserves were doing. But I am again getting back to what I saw and other than the flight crews and the medical personnel who were activated, I am a bit interested in getting back to your comment where you said we took only what we needed, which really kind of gets back to what this panel is all about, are we educating the people that we need to be educating?

For the record, I would ask each of you representing your different services to give me a breakdown of those units, of those nonmedical, nonflight units and how many of those units were activated without their O-4s or above. Just for the record. Maybe it is something we—again, I may have just not seen the right people, and that is entirely possible but just for my own curiosity I would like to have it.

General Killey. I will provide you that.

Mr. SKELTON. That is for each of the services? Is that correct?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Across the board.

[The following information was received for the record:]

**Professional Military Education for Reserve Officers**

General D'ARAUJO. Mr. Taylor, the only Army National Guard units mobilized without its majors and above were the linguists teams from the 142d Military Intelligence Battalion. These teams were activated during the early stages of Operation Desert Shield to meet the Army’s need for linguists. At that time, there was not a requirement for the entire Military Intelligence Battalion. A total of 19 personnel were in the four teams mobilized.

**Army Reserve Mobilization**

General SANDLER. Out of 647 Army Reserve units called up, 4 were aviation units and 149 were medical units. To the best of my knowledge, all of these units were activated as structured to meet known CINC requirements. There were no unit members thereof segregated from the unit call-up because of their grade.

Admiral TAYLOR. The Naval Reserve did not activate any units organized to serve as units which had an O-4 or above without activating the O-4 or above leadership who occupied a valid mobilization billet.

General DAVISON. Mr. Taylor, the Marine Corps did not activate any Reserve units without their officers, O-4s and above.
General Closner. Following a complete review of our 11 Air Force Reserve units activated (with the exception of medical and flying units), we have determined that no whole units were mobilized without their 0-4s or above.

Essentially, the Air Force Reserve was mobilized using UTCs (Unit Type Codes) with a mix of selected personnel from various traditional whole units. This was done for efficiency. A UTC may have two members, or hundreds of members; deployed in its entirety, or tailored to meet the supported CINC's requirements.

During Desert Shield/Storm a total of 267 UTCs were activated, of which the following is a representative sampling (field grade representation depicted):

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</tbody>
</table>

Tailoring can cause seemingly "off center" adjustment of the original rank structure; however, this is not a limiting factor, as Reserve mobilized UTCs augment in-place Active Duty units. During Desert Storm, administrative control of Air Force Reserve Forces remained with the Reserve, while operational control was maintained by the Active Force field commander/CINCs. The command structure was functionally on-line and working; in a "total force" environment, mobilized reservists realize their command line will originate from the Active Force.

General Killey. To provide a clear explanation to the proposed question, the information is provided in chart format. Units that deployed as entire units took their command officers (04/05) for the most part. Since the Air National Guard used volunteerism and activation by Unit Type Code (UTC), and by partial UTC which in some instances was one or two people, the use of officers in command positions was more limited.

**UNITS (UTCs) ACTIVATED WITHOUT 04/05s**

(Engineering, services, firefighters and air base operability)

| Engineers | 5 units (UTCs). |
| Firefighters | 36 units (UTCs). |
| Services | 46 units (UTCs). |
| Air base operability | 0 units. |
| Mobile aerial port | 0 units. |
| Combat communications | 21 units (UTCs). |
| Security police | 2 units (UTCs). |

*Note. There are no officers in the firefighter career field

*Note This information pertains to the Air National Guard.

General Killey. That is when I talked about streamlining, and this applies for only the Air Force, the Air National Guard and pretty much the Air Force Reserve, but I am not going to speak for General Closner.

When I talked about tailoring units, we took whole units where we could. Where we could not, we took tailored UTCs, we call them unit type codes. Where we could not do that, we took very small
packages, we even took ones and twos and backfilled, particularly in those areas that you are taking about, mission support areas. Outside of the flying units, we did do a lot of piecemealing and fitting in at various areas, whether it would be supporting the Active component at their unit levels or backfilling in the United States. We did do a lot of that.

We were hoping to be able to take our entire units. We had trained to that for the last 10 years because of the scenarios we trained to. But I think we are in tune and that in the future this is more apt to be the type of scenario.

One of the lessons that we have learned, we think we tailored a little bit too much, streamlined a little bit too much and did take out our senior leaders possibly a little more than we should have, that 0-4 level, the 0-5 level with those mission support units. But bottom line, our people were able to do the job even if they did not have their leadership above them.

Mr. TAYLOR. General, please do not get defensive. This is not meant at all as a criticism. I do recall one of our senior officers kind of tongue in cheek telling some Russian senior officers that it is a lot easier to learn from a loss than from a win. But we still need to try to learn where we can and I am just curious how this worked out.

General KILLEY. We think that is a lesson learned, that possibly from an Air Guard perspective, now, because we have gone through a very thorough lessons learned process where we have totally involved the units out in the field and that is one of the things that we did too much, not necessarily under our control but we streamlined possibly too much and I think the major commands may feel we did a little bit too much of that also.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Taylor’s question should be answered within 30 days of today as I will submit two questions right this moment to be answered for the record.

A few moments ago we were talking about young officers in the Guard and Reserve who may not become an O3 unless they have a baccalaureate degree with, of course, General Killey’s exceptions. I would like for you to list, if it is appropriate, the requirements, the educational, the PME, professional military educational requirements for promotion to each grade all the way up to and including flag officer in your particular service or branch. Do that within 30 days.

[The following information was received for the record:]

**Professional Military Education for Reserve Officers**

General D’ARAUJO. Mr. Skelton, completion of professional military education requirements is required for promotion of Army National Guard officers. Current regulations require completion of the Officer Basic Course for promotion to first lieutenant; the Officer Advance Course for promotion to major, 50 percent of the Command and General Staff Officer Course for promotion to lieutenant colonel, and completion of Command and General Staff Officer Course for promotion to colonel. Effective October 1, 1994, completion of the Combined Arms and Services Staff School will replace the Officer Advance Course as the military education requirement for promotion of Army National Guard officers to major.
Army Reserve Professional Military Education

General Sandler. The professional military educational requirements for promotion to each grade are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Requirement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>Branch officer basic course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Branch officer basic course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Branch officer advanced course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>50 percent of the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>COL</td>
<td>100 percent of the Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Although there are no published Professional Military Educational Requirements for promotion to Flag Officer, 74 percent of the major generals in the U.S. Army Reserve have completed a Senior Service College (such as the Army War College).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Admiral Taylor. The Naval Reserve does not have specific educational or professional military educational requirements for promotion. Promotions are based on the whole person concept with individual performance and the potential to serve successfully at the next higher grade as the primary criteria for selection. Completion of educational programs, along with other achievements, would generally be favorably considered by the promotion Selection Board.

General Davison. Mr. Chairman, the Marine Corps does not have education requirements for promotion to any grade. The Marine Corps does have a policy which implies that officers should attain certain levels of professional military education before being promoted to the next higher grade.

General Closner. The Air Force Reserve has no formal requirements for promotion to colonel or below regarding civilian or military education. Completion of senior service school, however, is a prerequisite for promotion to brigadier general or major general.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Promotion to</th>
<th>PME Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPT</td>
<td>None</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Squadron Officer School (SOS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>Intermediate Service School (ISS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL and above</td>
<td>Senior Service School (SSS)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. Skelton. Next, I would like to ask this question. It is a bit complicated, but follow me closely. I would be interested in knowing the positions filled by your Reserve or Guard officers including the rank and nature or name of the position filled at each of these levels: on the Central Command staff, on the Central Command Component staff of the Army, of the Navy, of the Marines, of the Air and of the Special Operations, and the senior service slots on a corps level, such as on the VII Corps level.

If you have difficulty with that question, I am sure the reporter will be glad to prepare that for you in detail.

[The following information was received for the record:]

Professional Military Education for Reserve Officers

General D'Araujo. Mr. Skelton, the Army National Guard had very few officers assigned to any of the specific headquarters you mentioned because the majority of our units are TOE combat units or units designed to support operations rather than supplementing headquarters staffs. To the best of my knowledge the Army National Guard had one lieutenant colonel and two majors assigned to the Reserve Component Liaison section at Army Central Command Headquarters. Three colonels commanded area support groups in the 22d Support Command which supported the
Army Central Headquarters. At VII Corps headquarters, one lieutenant colonel was assigned as the ARNG Liaison officer, one lieutenant colonel was assigned as Port Operations officer, and one major was assigned as the Rear Area Operations Plans officer. One colonel commanded the 142d Field Artillery Brigade which was assigned to VII Corps Artillery. At XVIII Corps, one colonel commanded the 196th Field Artillery Brigade assigned to XVIII Corps Artillery and one major served in the facilities/protocol office.

ARMY RESERVE MOBILIZATION

General Sandler. All of the data provided is approximate because we did not, nor did the units in question keep such detailed records. These are not statistics maintained by the Army's wartime personnel accounting system. However, to the best of my knowledge: 62 Army reservists (37 were major to colonel) were assigned to the CENTCOM staff; 18 Army reservists (9 were major to lieutenant colonel) were assigned to the SOCCENT staff; and 373 Army reservists (80 were major to colonel) were assigned to the ARCENT and major command headquarters. These reservists were utilized primarily as analysts, desk and action officers.

Admiral Taylor. Attached is the list of Naval Reserve officer positions on the staffs of USCINCENT, USNAVCENT, and COM7THFLT (the U.S. Navy equivalent of VII Corps level.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USNORTHCENT</th>
<th>USNAVCENT</th>
<th>COMTHFLEET</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>06 05 04 03-W2</td>
<td>06 05 04 03-W1</td>
<td>06 05 04 03-W1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief staff officer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operations/planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 4 1</td>
<td>1 2 5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics/supply</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 2 1</td>
<td>1 3 4 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1 1</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical plans</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warfare specialist</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 1 3</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command center staff</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 3 1</td>
<td>1 1 1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals by rank within staff</td>
<td>1 7 6 2</td>
<td>4 12 8 3</td>
<td>10 20 21 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals by rank for all staffs</td>
<td>15 39 35 11</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Warfare specialists include amphibious, special ops, mine, electronic, oceanography

There are no Naval Reserve flag officers assigned to the above staffs.
General Davison. The positions filled by our activated reservists include the following:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Colonel-06 Intelligence Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Ordnance Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 United Marine Central Command Liaison Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Enemy POW Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Ground Operations Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CWO-4 Human Intelligence Collection Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps</td>
<td>Major-04 Ground Operations Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level</td>
<td>Lt. Colonel-05 Human Intelligence Collection Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Colonel-05 Deputy MEF Fire Support Coordinator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Colonel-05 Assistant Fire Support Coordinator.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Colonel-05 Surveillance Analysis and Reconnaissance Center OIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Colonel-05 Civil Affairs Operations Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Colonel-05 Operations Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lt. Colonel-05 Liaison Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Assistant Operations Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 G-3 Operations Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Combat Service Support Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Civil Affairs Team Commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Target Intelligence Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Rear Area Operations Center Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 G-6 Plans Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Ground Operations Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Air Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Assistant S-3 Forward Air Controller.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Assistant Operations Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Logistics Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 Maintenance Management Operations Analyst.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Major-04 POW/MIA Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 Combat Replacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 Assistant Team Commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 Reserve Team Commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 Team CO/OIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 Civil Affairs Team Commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 Assistant Targeting Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 OIC Saudi Liaison Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 Assistant OIC Kuwait Liaison Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Captain-03 Watch Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Lieutenant-02 Special Projects Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Lieutenant-02 Platoon Commander.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Lieutenant-02 Watch Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CWO-4 Counter Intelligence Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CWO-4 Morale Welfare Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CWO-3 Aviation Ordnance Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WO-1 Reserve Affairs Team.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WO-1 Watch Officer.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General Closner. The Air Force Reserve has a total of nine colonels and lieutenant colonels assigned to Central Command (CENTCOM), the air component of CENTCOM (CENTAF), and Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Their duty information, Desert Shield/Desert Storm involvement, and senior service completion is indicated below. This information is current as of November 22, 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORG</th>
<th>GRA</th>
<th>Duty area</th>
<th>DS/05</th>
<th>SSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Intelligence</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1 No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ERIC BEST COPY AVAILABLE
The position of Air Liaison Officer (ALO) for USCENTAF, based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, was held by an Air National Guard officer, in the rank of brigadier general. The officer-in-charge of Reserve Forces for CENTCOM, located at MacDill AFB, FL, was also an Air National Guard officer in the grade of lieutenant colonel.

Mr. SKELTON. I thank you very much for your attendance today. Again, we compliment you on your outstanding contributions and what you are all about, winning a war. Each of you can take pride and your predecessors back through the years can take pride in what they have done and crafted for the success. Without the participation of your individual branch, service Reserve component, we would not nearly have had the victory and the success that we had so I compliment you very, very much.

Thank you and if you would answer the questions put by Mr. Taylor and me, I do not believe we had any others for the record, within 30 days, we would certainly appreciate it and, again, we appreciate your being with us.

[Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the panel was recessed.]

[The following questions were submitted for the record:]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORG</th>
<th>GRD</th>
<th>Duty area</th>
<th>OS/DS</th>
<th>SSS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Comm/Computer Sys</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Judge Advocate</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTAF</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Air Operations</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>0-6</td>
<td>Air Operations</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Comm/Computer Sys</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Incumbent is full-time Air Force Reserve officer serving under section 265, 10 U.S.C.
Professional Military Education for Reserve Officers

Mr. Skelton. BG D'Araujo, what percentage of Army National Guard officers, by grade, have completed primary, intermediate and senior levels of their Professional Military Education? Please provide this information for the total officer population, your AGRs and Mil Techs, and the officers in the Inactive Army National Guard. Also the primary level should include the Officer Basic course and the Officer Advance Course.

BG D'Araujo. Mr. Skelton, the completion percentages for each of the required military courses are provided in the tables below. Because our automated system only stores the highest military education course completed, it is difficult to provide precise percentages. These percentages were determined from a review of officer personnel records by the State personnel officers, in conjunction with the information stored in the personnel database.

Table 1 - ARNG Selected Reserve Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>OBC</th>
<th>OAC</th>
<th>CGSOC</th>
<th>SSC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>96.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>98.1</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>82.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>1440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 - ARNG Full Time Support(AGR/MIL TECH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>OBC</th>
<th>OAC</th>
<th>CGSOC</th>
<th>SSC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1833</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 - INACTIVE ARNG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>OBC</th>
<th>OAC</th>
<th>CGSOC</th>
<th>SSC</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no second lieutenants or general officers in the inactive national guard as of the date of this report. Some percentages indicate deviations from stated promotion policy. These deviations result from special branch promotion policy.
Mr. Skelton. General D'Araujo, what percentage of Army National Guard officers, by grade, have completed primary, intermediate and senior levels of their Professional Military Education in residence? Please provide this information for the total officer population, your AGRs and Mil Techs, and the officers in the Inactive Army National Guard.

BG D'Araujo. Mr. Skelton, the completion percentages for each of the required military courses attended in residence are provided in the tables below. Because our automated system only stores the highest military education course completed, it is difficult to provide precise percentages. These percentages were determined from a review of officer personnel records by the State personnel officers, in conjunction with the information stored in the personnel database.

Table 1 - ARNG SELECTED RESERVE TOTAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>OBC %</th>
<th>OAC %</th>
<th>CGSOC %</th>
<th>SSC %</th>
<th>TOTAL OFFICERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>1440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 - ARNG FULL TIME SUPPORT (AGR/MIL TECH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>OBC %</th>
<th>OAC %</th>
<th>CGSOC %</th>
<th>SSC %</th>
<th>TOTAL OFFICERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>87.9</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1948</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 - INACTIVE ARNG

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>OBC %</th>
<th>OAC %</th>
<th>CGSOC %</th>
<th>SSC %</th>
<th>TOTAL OFFICERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are no second lieutenants or general officers in the inactive national guard as of the date of this report. Also keep in mind that military education requirements for special branch officers differ from the requirements for basic branch officers.

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43-949 0 - 92 - 10
Mr. Skelton. General D’Araujo, what percentage of Army National Guard majors and lieutenant colonels have completed both primary and intermediate levels of their Professional Military Education in residence? Please provide this information for the total officer population, your AGRs and Mil Techs, and the officers in the Inactive Army National Guard.

BG D’Araujo. Mr. Skelton, the completion percentages of majors and lieutenant colonels who completed both primary and intermediate levels of professional military education in residence are provided in the table below. Because our automated system only stores the highest military education course completed it is difficult to provide precise percentages. These percentages were determined from a review of officer personnel records by the State personnel officers, in conjunction with the information stored in the personnel database.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>RESERVE</th>
<th>FTS</th>
<th>ING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mr. Skelton. General D’Araujo, what percentage of Army National Guard colonels, brigadier generals and major generals have completed primary, intermediate and senior levels of their Professional Military Education in residence? Please provide this information for the total officer population, your AGRs and Mil Techs, and the officers in the Inactive Army National Guard.

BG D’Araujo. Mr. Skelton, the completion percentages for colonels, brigadier generals and major generals who completed all levels of professional military education in residence are provided in the table below. Because our automated system only stores the highest military education course completed it is difficult to provide precise percentages. These percentages were determined from a review of officer personnel records by the State personnel officers, in conjunction with the information stored in the personnel database.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>RESERVE</th>
<th>FTS</th>
<th>ING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Army Reserve Officer PME

Mr. Skelton: Furnish for the record:

1. Percentage of officers, by grade, who have completed primary, intermediate, and senior levels of PME.
2. Percentage of officers, by grade, who have completed resident primary, intermediate, and senior levels of PME.

3. Percentage of 04/05s who have completed both primary and intermediate levels of PME in residence.

4. Percentage of 06, 07 and 08s who have completed all levels in residence. This information should be provided for the Selected Reserve (total, AGRs & Mil Techs, and Individual Mobilization Augmentees) and the Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard. In addition, primary level PME should be broken out to reflect completion rates for basic, advanced, and warfare specialty courses.

General Sandler:

1a. The percentage of officers, by grade, who have completed the primary level of PME is: 
- 0% of 2LTs, 4% of 1LTs, 30% of CPTs, 68% of MAJs, 77% of LTCs, 81% of COLs, 92% of BGs and 100% of MGs.

1b. The percentage of officers, by grade, who have completed intermediate levels of PME is: 
- 0% of 2LTs, 0% of 1LTs, 1% of CPTs, 20% of MAJs, 65% of LTCs, 72% of COLs, 92% of BGs and 100% of MGs.

1c. The percentage of officers, by grade, who have completed the senior level of PME is: 
- 0% of 2LTs, 0% of 1LTs, 0% of CPTs, 0% of MAJs, 1% of LTCs, 9% of COLs, 61% of BGs and 74% of MGs.

2. The percentage of officers, by grade, who have completed resident primary, intermediate, and senior levels of PME is not maintained because the US Army Reserve does not discriminate between resident and non-resident graduates when incorporating completion information into the data base.

3. The percentage of 04/05s who have completed both primary and intermediate levels of PME in residence is not maintained for the reasons cited in answer 2.

4. The percentage of 06, 07 & 08s who have completed all levels of PME in residence is not maintained for the reasons cited in answer 2.

5. Completion rates for primary level (basic, advanced, and warfare specialty courses) are not maintained.

6. The information provided here includes all officers of the Selected Reserve and Individual Ready Reserve. The percentages reflected were obtained from unaudited automated data from CARSTATS/EOM OCT91.
Congressman Skelton: What is the Air Force Reserve's:

1. Percentage of officers, by grade, who have completed primary, intermediate, and senior levels of PME?
2. Percentage of officers, by grade, who have completed resident primary, intermediate, and senior levels of PME?
3. Percentage of 04/05s who have completed both primary and intermediate in residence?
4. Percentage of 06, 07 & 08s who have completed all levels in residence?

This information should be provided for the Selected Reserve total, AGRs & Mil techs, and the Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and the Individual Ready Reserve/Inactive National Guard. In addition, primary level of PME should be broken out to reflect completion rates for basic, advanced, and warfare specialty courses.

General Closner: See Tables 1, 2, and 3 (Attached) for Air Force Reserve officer PME profiles.
### Air Force Reserve PME

**Percentage of 0-4/5's who have completed primary and intermediate levels of PME by a residence method:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>ART</th>
<th>IMA</th>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Total Ready Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prct</td>
<td>Pop</td>
<td>Prct</td>
<td>Pop</td>
<td>Prct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>2330</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3649</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Selected Reserve**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prct</th>
<th>Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>0% 4873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>0% 3835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0% 8708</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Percentage of 0-6/7/8's who have completed all levels of PME through a residence method:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>ART</th>
<th>IMA</th>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Total Ready Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prct</td>
<td>Pop</td>
<td>Prct</td>
<td>Pop</td>
<td>Prct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-7</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Selected Reserve**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prct</th>
<th>Pop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0% 1198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0% 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5% 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0% 1274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**

- Prct = Percentage
- Pop = Population

**Note:**

ART tables were broken out from any figures for the purposes of this evaluation, as requested.
## Air Force Reserve PME

Percentage of Officers who have completed PME, through residence method only, by grade and levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>ART</th>
<th>IMA</th>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Total Ready Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 452</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 36</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 1</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 496</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 1101</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 9</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 3</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 1547</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>9% 0% 0% 2655</td>
<td>16% 0% 0% 162</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 5</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 4657</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>12% 0% 0% 2330</td>
<td>18% 1% 0% 333</td>
<td>15% 1% 0% 404</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 4873</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>9% 1% 0% 1319</td>
<td>18% 3% 1% 315</td>
<td>13% 2% 0% 414</td>
<td>12% 2% 0% 3833</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>5% 2% 2% 243</td>
<td>19% 9% 10% 101</td>
<td>11% 4% 4% 782</td>
<td>4% 5% 1% 128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-7</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 1</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 10</td>
<td>24% 7% 10% 45</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 0</td>
<td>0% 0% 100% 1</td>
<td>21% 18% 5% 19</td>
<td>0% 0% 0% 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes:
- Only one PME course is offered at the primary level in the Air Force, basic, advanced, and warfare specialty primary level courses are not offered.
- ART figures were broken out from unit figures for the purposes of this exposition, as requested.

Legend:
- Pri = Primary
- Int = Intermediate
- Sen = Senior
- Pop = Population

As of 14 Nov 12
Air Force Reserve PME

Percentage of Officers who have completed PME, through any method, by grade and levels:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>ART</th>
<th>IMA</th>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>IRR</th>
<th>Ready Reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pn</td>
<td>Int</td>
<td>Sen</td>
<td>Pop</td>
<td>Pn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-1</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-2</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-3</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-4</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-5</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-6</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-7</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-8</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Only one PME course is offered at the primary level in the Air Force, Basic, Advanced, and Warfare.
- Specialty primary level courses are not offered.
- ART figures were broken out from unit figures for the purposes of this exposition, as requested.

**Legend:**
Pn = Primary, Int = Intermediate, Sen = Senior, Pop = Population

As of 14 Nov 1971

Table 1
PME FOR RESERVE OFFICERS

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY EDUCATION PANEL

Mr. SKELTON. Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for joining us today, and I welcome you to this afternoon’s hearing by the Military Education Panel.

Today, we will be discussing professional military education for Reserve officers. We are pleased to have the Honorable Stephen M. Duncan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, with us today to testify on this very important subject, professional military education for officers in the National Guard and the Reserves.

Since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has taken many actions to improve the overall professional military education framework for Active Forces, especially in the area of joint military education. This panel is pleased by the improvements made to date, and we want to ensure that the professional military education system meets the needs of Reserve as well as active officers.

I think this is an extremely important subject because, as we have seen in the recent Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Active Duty, Reserve, and Guard units were thrown together in many different types of situations where military education could or should have played an important part. That is why we are insistent that we review this together to see where we go from here, hopefully toward doing something very positively for the Guard and Reserve in regard to military education.

Many Reserve units and individual reservists were mobilized and sent to Saudi Arabia, where they performed admirably in many difficult circumstances, and obviously, in light of the planned drawdown of active services, maintenance of a strong and Ready Reserve is a vital aspect to our national security.

Our citizen soldiers face many challenges in maintaining their professional competence at levels comparable to that of their active counterparts. The demands of their civilian careers, coupled with the demands of their military profession, make it considerably dif-
ficult for them to do everything. We need to find ways to better enhance professional military education for these reservists and for the Guard members. In this respect, the panel is particularly concerned about the availability and quality of professional military education for officers in the Guard and Reserves.

I personally, Mr. Secretary, am of the opinion that we should do all that we can because when they go on Active Duty, you don't know if they are reservists, or guardsmen. The enemy doesn't know. Their contribution will not be as a guardsman or reservist, it will be as someone wearing the uniform, doing his job, whether it be a platoon leader or whether it be making major decisions by guards and reservists on staffs. I think that they should have the benefit of every bit of the military education that we can possibly give them. In that regard, we thank you for being with us, and we look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Secretary, if you wish to introduce your entire statement into the record and offer excerpts, please feel free to do so, and it will be done like that, without objection.

STATEMENT OF HON. STEPHEN M. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESERVE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think what I would like to do is to offer the entire statement for the record, but if I could have your indulgence I would like to supplement the prepared statement with a few additional observations which I think will help set the context of some of the issues you are interested in.

Mr. SKELTON. You bet.

Mr. DUNCAN. Let me first of all thank you for addressing this subject. I agree, it is important, and, more than that, I think it is very timely, since we are engaged in the very important business of designing the Armed Forces, including an appropriate force structure and force mix, for the future.

I guess as we address generally the subject of professional military education, there are certain themes or principles which I would encourage us to keep in mind. First of all, reservists are not "fungible" items, even within the Reserve components, much less with the Active Duty components. What do I mean by that?

As we go through and look at each of the individual Reserve components—and I know you did with the chiefs of the Reserve components recently—I'm sure you noticed that the educational background of the officers in each of the components varied, that their operational experience while on Active Duty varied, that the kind of training that is required for the performance of the missions assigned to each of the Reserve components varied, and that the training challenges as well as the opportunities varied. In many cases, those variations were quite wide.

Consequently, I would encourage us to remember that the professional military educational needs of each of the components also vary widely. Even within a single Reserve component, the needs of individual officers can vary widely.
For example, in the case of the Air Reserve components, we deal with many outstanding officers who need a great deal of professional military education because they are assigned to either staff positions or the kinds of jobs where they are going to have broad responsibilities in the event of mobilization. We need to make sure they have the tools to do the job.

Within the same Air Reserve components, however, we have many Reserve officers who have no desire to have those kinds of responsibilities. Indeed, the only reason they are in the Air Reserve components is because of their love of flying and operational missions, which are totally unrelated to staff work and those kinds of things.

The gist of all of this, in my opinion, is that the professional military educational needs within each component have to be tailored to the needs of that component as reflected in the specific mission assignments.

Second point: As a broad proposition, I strongly endorse efforts to increase the educational opportunities for reservists. I have argued very strongly in other contexts and at other times that we simply cannot ask our Reserve Forces to accept the kind of responsibilities that we are assigning to them these days if we don’t give them the tools to do the job. I have argued in the past that the “tools” might include equipment, but it might also be the requisite minimum professional military education opportunities.

Many reservists, have a great deal of operational experience. Many do not. Because reservists generally have very little operational training experience during the course of the year—it may vary from 39 days of training to 120 or something days—I would argue that the relative importance of military education is greater, because if you don’t have the operational experience you have got to do something that supplements that lack of operational experience. If we are going to have smaller forces in the future—which clearly we are—I would further argue that it is important to ensure the highest possible quality, and I don’t see how anybody could oppose more education as opposed to less.

As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, and as the President pointed out in his address to the Congress on March 6, right after the temporary cease-fire went into effect, our recent experience has been spectacular. Our Reserve Forces are the best in the world. The President described them as part of the finest fighting force the Nation has ever known in its history.

I would argue, however, that we have to be very careful about assuming that there are obvious professional military education requirements that should cut across the board for both the Active and Reserve components, i.e., for everyone. Mandatory PME requirements cause me a little problem. Opportunities for them, yes, you bet. But I am looking for ways to—

Mr. SKELTON. Let me interrupt you right there. I’m having an ongoing discussion with the Navy on this, and we are doing our best to get as many of their people into the higher level professional military schools. There is a problem getting everybody at sea and in the schools.

But I think if you are someone—one who is an O-5 level/O-6 level that will have anything to do with joint planning and oper-
ations, you should have the equivalent, in my opinion, of the military education that the active duties have. Because their contribution should be equal, they should go there with equal footing. If we do not do this, they will be looked at as not having much to offer, or, if they do, the ideas that they proffer may or may not be on point; they will not have had the extensive challenges to thank.

That is what these schools are; it is more than knowledge, it is somewhat like law school. I mean what you really learn is how to think. I think you are doing everybody a disservice if you throw someone in the tank or in a decisionmaking category that involves lives when they aren't on the same par as the others.

Happily, we are getting somewhere with the Navy in that regard, but, as you know, they haven't required as the other services. If you are going to be an O-6 Active Duty Army, you better have gone to the intermediate and senior level or its equivalent, or you are just not going to make it. You are going to be playing this same ball game or this same tank game when the reservists come to Active Duty time, and you had better have the same education opportunities.

Mr. DUNCAN. I couldn't agree more. I think we are saying the same thing. What I am suggesting is that if there are O-5 and O-6 billets that are assigned to reservists on joint staffs, then certainly the reservists who fill those billets ought to have at least the same educational background as their Active Duty counterparts.

What I am suggesting is that it doesn't make sense to require that all O-5s and O-6s have that, because they may be in an operational billet that will never require it, and, frankly, with limited training time, the first priority always has to be readiness to perform wartime missions. If that is a staff position, that means you need professional military education, but if it is going to be a shipboard assignment or an air wing assignment, obviously there will be comparatively less of a requirement, especially if you have had a whole lot of operational experience that makes up for it.

All I am suggesting is, that we have to be flexible enough to make sure that we don't broadly require levels of training which are nice to have, but which are not really related to wartime missions. That is all I am suggesting. As a broad proposition, of course, we are all looking for the same thing.

"Professional military education" means different things to different people. I am still interested in integrating the Reserve and the Active Forces of a single service, because a lot of our reservists need more than joint service experience. They need to find out about what is going on in their own service, and the Active Duty people in that service need to find out what is going on in the Reserve Forces.

Mr. SKELTON. We have made great strides, honestly, in overcoming the second-class citizen syndrome, but I still think we have a way to go. That is what you want to do.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, to that end, I might just note that I learned somewhat to my dismay about a year or maybe—some time ago—that the Capstone Course, which I think is an outstanding opportunity for new Active Duty flag and general officers, does not spend much time discussing Reserve Forces. While the students may have talked to somebody along the way about a little bit of something
relating to the Reserve components, perhaps something that relates to some mission, there was not a single time during the entire course where they received a talk from someone on the Reserve components. So, I have requested and received—and I appreciate the support of NDU, for me to come over. I now go over to the Capstone Course, and every one of our new active flag and general officers hear me talk a little bit about the Reserve components. You can't learn all that much in a few minutes, but I may trigger an interest and give an exposure. I think it is important that new flag officers in the Navy are aware of the kinds of roles that Army National guardsmen play, and it is important for new Army generals to learn about Naval Reserve medical and carrier squadrons and so forth. So, we are trying to integrate the education of both the Reserve and the Active Forces, even within a service.

I might just simply conclude my opening remarks by saying that clearly we support increased opportunities for the Reserve components for professional military education. But, first and foremost, we have got to have reservists ready to perform wartime missions. In some cases, that will require broad military education. In other cases, it will require great operational experience. But, whatever the wartime mission, that is our first priority.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Panel on Military Education:

I welcome this opportunity to discuss professional military education opportunities for officers who serve in the Reserve components of the Armed Forces. The review which you are conducting is particularly timely in view of the fact that the Nation's reliance on Reserve forces has recently been tested in ways that are unprecedented since the adoption of the Total Force Policy. The call to active duty of nearly a quarter of a million National Guardsmen and Reservists in support of Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM was the largest activation of Reserve forces since the Korean conflict. Many factors contributed to the extraordinary success of our Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf War, but there can be no doubt that the performance of the Reserve forces was a major factor.

This Panel has played a central role in the enhancement of the quality of professional military education and the development of strategies for its improvement. I am gratified that you are now focusing on the professional military education of National Guard and Reserve officers. As we review the ways in which recent improvements in the content and structure of professional military education for active-duty list officers can be applied to Reserve officers, it will serve us well to remember that factors unique to the Reserve environment suggest the need to emphasize different aspects of officer education and development programs in the case of Reserve officers. Imaginative new approaches may be called for.
As the Panel reviews the information which was received from the Reserve components in response to requests for the record following your November 5th hearing, I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you keep in mind two points. First, that great differences exist between the seven Reserve components of the Armed Forces. These differences arise, for the most part, from the nature of the roles and missions of the Armed Forces in peacetime and in combat, and the various demands which they place on their respective Reserve components. The size and geographic dispersion of individual units, also differs markedly among the Reserve components. Partly as a consequence of these factors, significant differences exist in the demographic characteristics and background of officers in the seven Reserve components.

The second and more general point is that, at least with respect to non-operational matters, no need exists for the Reserve components of each of the military Services to be mirror images of their active component. This point may seem obvious, but it is often overlooked when we establish programs and set training and education requirements. The best approach to the education and professional development of Reserve officers, it seems to me, is not necessarily the pattern which has been established for active officers. I am not prepared today to say precisely what the best approach is for each Reserve component, but a consideration of the environment in which National Guard and Reserve officers serve our country may be helpful.
First, and most obviously, it must be recognized that Reserve officers usually serve on a part-time basis. The term "part-time" is even something of a misnomer, because although National Guard and Reserve officers spend only a portion of their working life engaged in military training, they carry the obligations of their commission with them at all times. Because of their limited availability, there may be significant differences in our priorities for the training and professional development of Reserve officers, as compared to their active-duty list counterparts.

A corollary to the part-time nature of Reserve duty is the difference which exists between active and Reserve officers in terms of their respective availability for full-time military activities extending over a period of days or weeks. This difference follows from the fact that the vast majority of Reserve officers are employed in civilian occupations on a full-time basis. There are many differences between the training objectives and the training environment of active and Reserve component units, but the most fundamental is the time available for training. Continuity of training is also a factor, as Reservists seldom can devote long continuous periods of time to their training.

Within the active components of the military Services, statutory and regulatory requirements, command emphasis on the
importance of professional military education, and strict limits
on waivers from school attendance are reasonable and effective
tools to ensure uniform quality of professional education. The
challenge is greater within the Reserve components, since many of
the most promising Reserve officers are also leaders within their
civilian professional and occupational communities who have less
time available for military education.

Data provided by the Reserve Components indicates that a
much higher percentage of officers in pay grades 04 through 06
have completed intermediate or senior professional military edu-
cation programs in those Reserve components where selection for
promotion through the grades of lieutenant colonel/commander is
on a "fully qualified basis." The three components which, under
existing statutes, select for promotion on a "best qualified"
basis, i.e. the Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast
Guard Reserve, show lower rates of program completion. This
suggests that there may be a tendency within the former group to
base promotions to a greater degree on completion of professional
military education. Whatever the merits of such emphasis, the
ultimate objective is to ensure that the Services are augmented
in future conflicts with Reserve officers who have the necessary
preparation in terms of operational training and military
education. Focus must be placed on warfighting requirements and
priorities must be established to meet those requirements.
Another difference between active and Reserve forces that is worthy of note is the structure and composition of the Reserve forces. While all of the Armed Forces seek to achieve readiness for the performance of wartime missions, the training of Reserve forces is based almost exclusively on the direct and immediate preparation for the execution of those missions. In contrast, Total Force requirements demand that most active force officers serve in an increasingly wide range of assignments within their respective military Services, and in the joint arena, as they progress through the ranks. Service and joint-Service billets are important, as are acquisition, program analysis and research and development jobs.

This pattern is much less characteristic of officers in the National Guard and Reserve. The Reserve components are composed primarily of units which must be ready to perform wartime combat or support missions. Billets for Reserve officers in research and development, acquisition, personnel planning, unified commands and joint-Service plans are quite limited. While such functions are obviously important to the active components, they are peripheral to the wartime missions assigned to the Reserve components.

While we search for ways to improve the professional military education of Reserve officers, we also need to continue the search for ways to improve the education of officers in the active components about Reserve forces. Because of the impor-
tance of the Total Force Policy, it is critical that career professionals in the active component of each Service understand and appreciate the missions and capabilities of the Reserve components, especially the Reserve components of their Service. This panel has previously recognized the fact that it is not uncommon for senior officers to possess relatively limited knowledge of the capabilities and perspectives of other Services. There is evidence of a similar lack of knowledge by active officers about National Guard and Reserve forces.

Fortunately, progress is being made. The actual performance of large numbers of National Guardsmen and Reservists in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM made many active component officers aware of the capabilities of Reserve forces for the first time. I have also initiated a practice of personally addressing new flag and general officers on the subject of the Reserve components during the CAPSTONE course which they attend.

The education of active component officers on the subject of the Reserve forces should be supplemented with actual experience working with National Guard and Reserve forces. Earlier this year, the Department of Defense provided a report to the Congress on the practicability of requiring that, prior to their promotion to full colonel or (Navy) captain, active-duty list officers complete a tour of duty with or in support of the Reserve forces. While it is generally acknowledged that such duty is desirable, we concluded that such a requirement could not be implemented in
practice. The conclusion was based in part on the sheer numbers of officers that would be involved and in part on a recognition of the competing priorities in the career development of active-duty list officers, including professional military education and joint-service requirements.

As officers in the active components need to understand Reserve forces, it is also clear that Reserve officers need to keep abreast of developments in the active component of their Service. Opportunities to do so obviously vary by Service and mission, but it is helpful that the majority of Reserve officers have served with the active forces. This is another area where there are considerable differences between the Reserve components. For part-time Selected Reserve officers, the percentage of officers with two or more years of active component experience ranges from 45 percent in the Army National Guard, to 93 percent in the Marine Corps Reserve. These differences stem from Service structure and requirements as much or more than they do from Service policies. Nevertheless, they exist and must be considered as we assess educational programs and priorities.

Professional military education in residence is, of course, clearly desirable for Reserve officers. It is usually not practical, however, either as an objective or as a requirement for most Reserve officers, because of the numbers involved and because of competing priorities.
Professional military education, experience, and advanced operational or skill training for mid-level and senior officers are complementary. For National Guard and Reserve officers, limited training time means that experience is acquired at a slower rate. Limited training time, however, is often offset by long experience with a single mission or weapons system. Some 45 percent of Selected Reserve officers have served for four or more years in their current Reserve unit. Indeed, the average length of service of Selected Reserve officers in their current unit ranges from a low of 3.2 years for the Naval Reserve, to nearly 8 years for the Air National Guard. As the most recent Air Force "Gunsmoke" competition has once again illustrated, the experience resulting from this stability can result in exceptional proficiency in warfighting skills. The first priority in expanding or broadening the experience of Reserve officers must be to ensure adequate training in the exercise of operational skills with the active component units of their Service or, where applicable in terms of the weapons and missions, of other Services.

Despite the kinds of differences which exist between the professional military educational needs of Reserve officers and those of active component officers, I fully endorse the idea of achieving and maintaining high quality Reserve leadership by improving professional military education opportunities for Reserve officers. The ultimate objective, however, should be the design and use of curricula which enhance the capability of
individual Reservists and Reserve units to successfully perform their wartime missions.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, permit me to say how much I appreciate your great interest in the professional military education of Reserve officers. Reserve forces are going to continue to be critically important to the implementation of the President's military strategy and as the size of the Armed Forces is reduced, it will become even more important to ensure the high quality of the leadership of each of the Reserve Components. The development of clear performance-related criteria for the professional military education of Reserve officers, and the establishment of requirements based on their criteria and programs to meet identified needs are important priorities. I look forward to working with you and the Panel on Professional Military Education on this timely and important issue.
Mr. Skelton. Mr. Secretary, we appreciate your testimony, and I am glad that you and I are singing off the same sheet of music. I would like to craft something this coming year, and I want you to give it some thought. I don't expect you to have a lot of the answers right now. I would like to craft something that would be of help toward attaining those ends that you and I seem to mutually agree upon. So put that in the back of your mind, and I would like to work with you over the next few months on that.

Now, unlike active officers placed in student status to attend professional military education courses, most members of the Selected Reserve or Guard must complete requirements of military education on their own time in addition to the time devoted to their Reserve duties. We both know and understand that. It is tough for someone to do that, and you really have to pat them on the back when they do.

So let me ask if it would be feasible to establish some sort of a student account, a PME student account, which would permit Reserve officers to be temporarily assigned to attend PME courses in Active Duty pay status and then return to their units?

Example No. 1: There is this lawyer back home who took off a year to go to the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth. He was practicing law—a sole practitioner. I don't know how he did it, but he did it.

The other way, of course, would be for someone to become inactive insofar as their company or their battalion is concerned. But every weekend, that is required while he is with the battalion or the company, he can attend a regional PME course, and do the same thing during his 2 weeks of Active Duty, and get paid for it. I think this would be an incentive for any number of those, particularly those that you designated. If they are going to be on staff or if they are going to have anything to do with heavy decisionmaking, you could probably get them to do it. What do you think of a PME student account to do that?

Mr. Duncan. Possibly. I guess I would want to reflect on it a little bit more. It depends upon the nature of the mission which is assigned to an individual reservist.

Mr. Skelton. Let's assume he meets the criteria. Let's suppose he is a logistics officer, and his job or specialty might be in getting ammunition to the front. He will be dealing with high-level sorts of people in the Army, and he will also be dealing somewhat with the Navy and the Air Force to get all this done. Your second example would be someone who will be on a joint staff. Both those probably meet the criteria.

Just for discussion purposes, let's assume you have those two officers at the major level. They would meet our criteria to get PME and actually use it. Now what do you do with them?

Mr. Duncan. I have no problem if we do it on a mission-by-mission basis. Everything for me starts with the proposition that you start with the military strategy. You design the force structure and the force mix that you need to carry out and implement that military strategy. Then you figure out what missions have to be assigned to what kind of units, you decide whether they should be assigned to Reserve or to active units. Once you get to that point—let's say that you have a logistician's mission or a joint staff mis-
sion. Those are ideal kinds of missions. You could argue very strongly that those people should stand at the front of the line for Command and General Staff School or whatever the military education may be.

If, however, it is an operational mission or something that is less "joint" oriented, it is very difficult for me to see why it should be mandated if it would in any way reduce the readiness of the unit to perform its mission. Maybe the individual is the operations officer for an air squadron.

But I think you are not talking about that. As I understand the question, it is really related more to the joint assignments or the staff assignments, and I don't see any problem in the abstract with assigning somebody to a student account or whatever it may be.

Mr. SKELTON. On top of that, you want your heavy hitters to go. Someone that you honest to goodness know, should push come to shove, that they are going to make a real contribution in Saudi Arabia or wherever in the world they are sent, rather than someone just to fill the billet because he is a major.

Mr. DUNCAN. You see, the reason that appeals to me in a broad sense—I do want to think about it a little bit more, but one of the things I worry about is, who are these people that serve in those billets? Typically, the kind of people who have reached the seniority to serve in a complex kind of billet like that are precisely the same kind of people who are the highly motivated leaders of their civilian professions and occupations. As they increase their responsibilities in their civilian occupation, they usually have less time to devote to training for things military. Yet, they are precisely the highly motivated kind of leaders that we want to encourage to remain in the Armed Forces.

Mr. SKELTON. I bet they would go. If you gave them an opportunity and some incentive such as a PME student account, I bet they would go.

Mr. DUNCAN. Especially if, for the year, their training was to go for that education, knowing that that would qualify them the next year for going back to their billet.

Mr. SKELTON. That is correct, and knowing there is a billet or even something better maybe left open for them.

Mr. DUNCAN. If that did not affect the operational readiness for the conflict that might take place this year, then it would be a good thing.

Mr. SKELTON. Think about that, will you?

Mr. DUNCAN. Sure. I would be happy to.

Mr. SKELTON. I would appreciate it.

I am also concerned about providing better management of the Reserve professional military education by actually scheduling time for officers to complete their military education requirements. This fits pretty much in the last question too. If they are selected reservists, they are going to at least go 39 days a year. Chances are, they will spend 60 days or more doing things for the Guard, you know they will, and asking them to go to a PME course may just be the straw that breaks the camel's back.

How do we manage the people and schedule them so that they can do these PME courses? Give that some thought, would you?
That is not a question, that is a request, along with establishing a PME account.

Mr. Duncan. Of course, one of the problems we have had there from the beginning of my tenure is making sure that the individual services design course curricula which can be made available to reservists.

When I assumed office I found that the biggest problem facing Reserve readiness had been equipment, but it was shifting. Because we were receiving modern equipment in 1987, the readiness problem was becoming MOS misqualification. People, for whatever reason, may leave Active Duty, go back to their home town, and they are assigned to a Reserve unit that requires a different MOS. Finding the time to go to a course is difficult. In many cases, the courses offered by the services were first-class courses but, you see, they took 8 weeks to complete, and what civilian can go do that?

There has been considerable progress in the last very few years by the services in redesigning their course curricula to improve the opportunities for reservists.

Mr. Skelton. Well, we are almost asking the same thing.

As I understand, there are some 95 Army schools spread across America. Isn’t there some way we could utilize these particular places in crafting a Command and General Staff course, for instance, for the majors in the Guard and Reserve?

Mr. Duncan. Let me give you some encouragement on that. I was just in Iowa recently addressing a general audience, and the next morning, very early, I traipsed around with the adjutant general of Iowa. He was telling me about what is going on in Iowa with respect to his ability to communicate with the 50 National Guard armories located physically all over the State of Iowa. They are putting in a system using fiber-optics and some other things that will actually permit him to put on training programs at one spot in Iowa and simultaneously train National Guardsmen in 50 different locations.

Similarly, there is an effort under way using various forms of communication to have presentations put on at Fort Leavenworth that might go out to individual Reserve and Guard units all over the country. As we improve the technology I think we are rapidly reaching the point where we are going to be in a position to bring the educational programs to the reservists instead of having to take the time to have them physically come to the school.

Mr. Skelton. Just a few days ago, I was in Monterey, CA. I was mainly there for the Naval Post-Graduate School, but I went over to the Language Institute, the Armed Forces Language Institute. I witnessed two Korean instructors, by video, there in Monterey, CA, conducting a Korean language class from Georgia. I suppose they will end up speaking Korean with a southern accent, but was almost as if they were sitting in the same room. They could see each other, and most of the time they could see themselves on one screen and the class of about seven guardsmen on the other screen. I think what you are talking about is highly feasible.

Mr. Duncan. There are some similar ideas that I have been pursuing in the last couple of years which would take advantage of institutions that may be physically located in a Reserve community.
For example, if there is a junior college or community college that exists near an area where large numbers of reservists live and train, to what extent might we be able to have that college's facilities and perhaps even faculty resources used for certain kinds, not all, of course, but certain kinds of curricula that might be applicable to professional military education.

Now if we can do that and work out arrangements that make it available to the reservist at no additional expense to the Government, we all win. So all kinds of things are potential today that wouldn't have been even 5 or 6 years ago.

Mr. SKELTON. I appreciate your thinking on that.

A mere correspondence course, in and of itself, although important, isn't going to do the trick. You have to have the questions, the answers, the picking of each other's brains. I saw this on the screen at Monterey the other day and as you have in a seminar, the people are in the same room discussing a problem.

It is in the interaction, the discussion, disagreeing and agreeing, that you really more than make your money in the military educational field. That is why we should do more of that than merely rely on the correspondence courses, although the correspondence courses do call for a great deal of discipline.

We find that there are a good number of correspondence courses that are not completed by your Guard and Reserve people because they just don't. They are not challenged to the best that is in them, and consequently they just lose interest in the reading and the amount of writing.

Let me ask you this question. At this moment, how satisfied are you with the professional military education that is available to Reserve officers?

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, I guess I am never satisfied with it, but I detect an improving trend. With respect to the correspondence course, some are better than others. I continually receive great compliments about the Army War College course, for example, and reservists who go through that course. I would not assume that that quality applies to all correspondence courses everywhere, but it is possible to have some pretty good military education that is not resident in nature. But, it may require a combination of some correspondence things and, from time to time, a resident seminar or something of this sort.

Generally, one of the things I am encouraged about, while we are focusing on this subject, is—I won't be able to tell you for a little bit longer precisely what kind of force size and force mix we are going to have, but when we get there it is important that, if we are going to be smaller, we continue to improve in quality. We had better have our i's dotted and our t's crossed when it comes to knowing exactly what educational requirements must be fulfilled for the performance of certain missions.

So I am going to be looking for ways to block logjams that may interfere with opportunities for reservists to pursue education. All I suggest as a qualifier is that I want to, to the greatest extent possible, make sure that we tailor the requirements and the opportunities to the operational needs as opposed to suggesting something across the board that is mandatory in nature—for example, "you can't be promoted unless you complete this"—because that may be
a waste of the reservist's time; he may need to be spending more time on being prepared for his wartime mission than engaged in broad military education.

In the abstract, I fully support increasing the opportunities. I urge you, however, not to make PME mandatory—except for certain missions. There are going to be certain missions where it's perfectly appropriate to say, "Mr. Reservist, this is the mission; this is the job. If you're going to fill this job, this kind of professional military education goes along with it. You cannot fill this job unless you have this kind of background." Then the reservist might say "That's for me," or he might say, "No, I really want something that's more operational in nature and I accept the consequences. I may not be promoted, but I'll be one heck of a pilot" or whatever. In that way, we keep him in the force. He's excited, he's doing what he wants to do, but we can ensure that those who fill that position have at least as good credentials as their Active Duty counterparts.

Mr. SKELTON. I'm interested in helping the Guard and Reserve through this process. As you know, the intermediate level, the Fort Leavenworth level, has a phase I jointness in it. They're going to get a fair amount of jointness just by going through the intermediate level. By I've done that. For those that receive the senior level, the Army War College level, in all services—which, of course, includes the Air and the National War College up here—they get a phase II jointness.

In crafting what we're going to do, we should keep in mind that they be getting a good dose of jointness at each or both places. However, your war college is not designed merely for jointness. The is a required part of the curriculum. But jointness enables them to be a better Army officer, a Marine officer, whatever the case may be. But I hope you will keep in mind, as you come up with your thoughts, that these schools are really the way to learn jointness, at least through the academic atmosphere. Mr. Barrett.

Mr. DUNCAN. I might just add, Mr. Chairman, that I certainly subscribe to that concept. That's a good example, though, of something that may be terribly important to senior Active Duty officers, important, but perhaps less so across the board to all Reserve senior officers. Because many Reserve senior officers with limited training time, it's all they can do to maintain their operational readiness for their wartime mission, if they're assigned to missions which——

Mr. SKELTON. Which I understand a second-class soldier, whether he be Active or reservist, is not what you're looking for.

Mr. DUNCAN. Oh, absolutely.

Mr. SKELTON. You're looking for a first-class soldier, not only active but Reserve and Guard in your case. They have to be good at what they're doing. Frankly, in the atmosphere of learning jointness, the better a soldier is at his sailing the ship or flying the plane or shooting the artillery, the greater contribution he's going to make in the joint, academic atmosphere. If he's a second-class pilot, he's not going to offer an awful lot.

Mr. Barrett.

Mr. BARRETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you know, title IV of the Goldwater-Nichols Act was and is a very detailed title, that could probably correctly be characterized as "micromanaging."—

Mr. DUNCAN. I've never heard that term before.

[Laughter.]

Mr. BARRETT. Certain aspects of an Active Duty career officer's career advancement. But with respect to Reserve officers, it's just the opposite. It's merely a delegation of authority to the Secretary of Defense. It asks the Secretary to establish personnel policies emphasizing education and experience in joint matters for Reserve officers. Then it suggests that those policies should be similar to policies provided for active, but it gives no further guidance.

Could you explain what we have now for the structure. I know the various Reserve components are very different and you have to take that into account. What structure have you for education or what are your plans to develop that structure in the future.

Mr. DUNCAN. Sure. One of the things I do on a routine basis is to meet with the Secretariats of the military departments and the uniformed Reserve chiefs. The chiefs and I recently discussed this issue. My thinking broadly goes along these lines:

As we design the forces of the future, we need to think totally afresh about what kind of educational requirements we need, everything from the new statutory requirement of having a college degree to make O-3, to what we want out of certain kinds of officers, who have certain skills, for what purposes and so forth.

Mr. SKELTON. By the way, that's the law.

Mr. DUNCAN. I understand that's the law. But how might that principle apply in other contexts? Are there certain minimum standards that we might want to insist upon, for certain kinds of missions? I'm not sure. But I have solicited their recommendations and we're going to be working over the next few months as they help me understand the uniqueness of the needs of their individual Reserve components and how the requirements for a senior officer in the Naval Reserve should be different than those for the Air National Guard; how the requirements of senior officers in the Air National Guard may vary from one another; and how it all relates to our missions.

Right now, there is no danger of getting the cart before the horse. But, I'm sensitive to the fact that in many cases we are now redesigning missions. It's difficult for me to define educational requirements before I even know what the missions are that have to be performed, by what kinds of reservists.

We have, for example, a congressionally mandated study which is about to begin, to look at the force mix, the force structure and so forth. That's not due until December. Basically, I think the mission performance, the requirements of the mission, drive the educational requirements. So we manage those factors.

I see my office's responsibility generally along these lines: permit the individual services who have the expertise to establish professional military education policies. Then, as we do with so many policies, we should grade the report cards to see if the service policies meet the Secretary's guidance and the law and so forth. That, in fact, helps Reserve units to be ready to perform their wartime missions.
So generally, I'm satisfied with where we are, only because the most recent example—in fact, the only example since the end of the draft—of the call up of reservists could not have gone better. Having said that, we recognize that was yesterday’s war. Now we're preparing for tomorrow’s possible conflict.

Mr. Barrett. So we might expect something like the Joint Staff developed Military Education Policy Document for the active. Might we expect something like that in the future with respect to the Reserves?

Mr. Duncan. Yes. We're looking at it from the perspective of the individual Reserve components, but not the Joint Staff because I would prefer, frankly, to have people who deal with reservists on a daily basis be the ones who inform me of what are things that are so general in nature they might be established as policy require-ments across all services, and what kinds of things are unique to individual Reserve components where they may need special assistance or special flexibility. I don't know. I'm just not prepared to say that that is right now.

Mr. Barrett. In our discussions with your staff, I think the point was made very strongly that the requirements for Reserve components as you say in your statement, are much different than those for active. The active itself spends a year or two or three just taking a very low-ranking individual and teaching him about his own service, about his own narrow field. It is only at that point that they start to broaden the officer. It just takes much longer in the Reserve components to do that because you have less time in any given year to work with them. To me, it was a very convincing point, and you brought it out in your statement, that a different pattern has to be developed.

I also think that the Goldwater-Nichols Act recognized that in the passage that I alluded to this.

Mr. Duncan. Right, I think so.

Mr. Barrett. Sir, you indicated on page 5 of your statement that we also need to find ways to improve the education of active officers about the Reserve Forces. Once again, there's not going to be anyone here that disagrees with you. Do you have some ideas on how we might accomplish that?

Mr. Duncan. Well, I mentioned the Capstone course a few moments ago. That is one of the ways.

When the issue came up this last year about whether we should require service in the Reserve components for promotion, it seemed to me, that was desirable as a general objective. But from a day-to-day, management standpoint, such a policy would be unwieldy. I do look for ways to integrate the Active and the Reserve components, and to make active officers much more aware of the capabilities, the training limitations and so forth of those folks called reservists—and I include that broadly to include National Guardsmen—and also integrate reservists so they understand the needs and the objectives of the Active Forces. I support such things as round-out brigades, Capstone concepts, the kinds of things that require people to train together, training opportunities, new ways to do the full-time support better, a whole range of things to integrate the active and Reserve Forces.
That's not just rhetoric. We really do find that when people are intimately familiar with the units to which they will be assigned, or with which they will be working when called to Active Duty, it goes much better. Whether we’re talking about operational performance or whether we’re talking about administrative management, such as just pay records or whatever, we want to integrate Active and Reserve Forces so that we don’t waste time on mobilization, having to learn fundamentals about how to get people paid, so we don’t have to go back to ground zero. When we mobilize reservists, we want them ready.

Mr. SKELTON. We just gave you a big boost in this area. I had an amendment that gave you all 1,100 Active Duty officers to be advisors with the Guard. Senator John Glenn had the same idea, but he had a different figure of 1,300 and I yielded to him.

You have a golden opportunity for 1,300 officers with Active Duty time, and hopefully they will be of high caliber, to start living with, advising, and learning of the problems of which you speak. I hope you and the active officers will give that high priority because I would like to see a report on that after about a year to see how you’re coming along.

Mr. DUNCAN. The reason it’s important—I’ll give you two quick examples. One, the reservists need association with Active Duty people to stay current on doctrine. I mean, technology alone is changing quickly, doctrine is also changing. If you were a pretty well-informed reservist 3 years ago, the world has changed so dramatically that you can’t assume even the same doctrine.

There is also the other side of the coin. I think back to the story that I heard from the commanding officer of an aircraft carrier during Desert Storm, a Navy captain who had spent his entire career with the active Navy. He was told that he was going to be receiving some reservists aboard. He was afraid to death about how that might interfere with his day-to-day operations. He had things to worry about. He was in the Gulf. They reported aboard, switched their uniforms, and he said, from that moment on, he couldn’t tell any difference at all.

Well, that came as a surprise. That should not be a surprise. Our Active Duty commanders should know what the capabilities and the limitations of reservists are, and our reservists should have access to the doctrinal changes and operational changes and leadership policy changes. They need to work together, and that’s what integration is all about.

Mr. SKELTON. Arch.

Mr. BARRETT. As you know, at the present time the National Defense University is phasing out the National Security Management Course. A large number of Reserve component officers take that course, or have traditionally taken it. What is your reaction to the phasing out of that course and do you see an alternative to that course, or should it be continued? What are your views?

Mr. DUNCAN. I don’t have a definite answer today. I’m looking into it. I think back to the time when I was a reservist myself for 18 years. I went through a course similar to that at NDU many years ago. In fact, I remember hearing a lecture from a guy named Cheney, who was then in a much different position than he is today.
But we also have the very real problem of budget that's considerably less than President Reagan anticipated the defense budget would be for this year when he was planning ahead 5 years ago. I've got to ensure that everything we're doing is the most cost-effective way to go. I'm simply not prepared today to say that that course—I understand that the chief of one of the Army Reserve components, the Marine Corps Reserve, thought it was very, very useful. I have no doubt about its usefulness. I guess the question I would have would be is there an alternative that's more cost-effective. I'm not prepared to say whether there is or is not. So we're looking into it.

Mr. Barrett. Thank you.

Mr. Skelton. Mr. Secretary, I want to make sure that those Guard and reservists of all services that want to go to a professional military educational type of school have that opportunity. It's really tough for a lot of them to do it. I think we can craft something.

Along the line of which you speak, if it is in their mission, or probable mission, they ought to have that opportunity and be urged to go. We really do want to help in this respect.

Now, I've asked you some questions earlier in the hearing and I don't expect you to give me quick answers on how to craft this. But I want to know how we can help you glue this together, what legislative actions you would suggest. We need to improve the process. Quite frankly, it is my goal this coming year to do something in this area, so that when they're called up, you don't ask, "Are you a reservist?" Saddam Hussein may not shoot quite as accurately as you do, but you're part of the same team. You wear the same uniform and your mission is the same. Consequently, your educational opportunity and requirements for whatever you're doing, particularly on the joint staff assignments making decisions at a relatively high level, all of these people, whether they be Active Duty, Guard or Reserve, ought to have professional military education under their belt to make the right decision and the right judgment.

War is an art. It is not a scientific certainty. We know that. The military educational colleges that we have, intermediate and senior level, recognize it as an art. That's why there is so much discussion and argument on different ways of getting at the same end. We want to help you make sure this comes to pass. This is my personal objective and I hope you and I can work together on it.

Second place doesn't count on the battlefield. There is no distinction on the battlefield between Guard, reservists, and Active Duty.

Mr. Duncan. I couldn't subscribe more to your comments. Let me suggest that, as a broad proposition, one of the things we do, since we have limited training time, is to insist—and I must tell you that my colleagues in Europe who head up the Reserve Forces in NATO don't understand how we do this. We insist that reservists are held to the same standards of performance. We don't want to lower the standards, but we continue to look for ways to help reservists meet those standards.

Mr. Skelton. That's correct.

Mr. Duncan. We may choose to train them on fewer tasks, if that's the requirement, but we want to make sure that the tasks they are trained on are the ones that relate directly to their war-
fighting mission. If we do this smart and we have sufficient flexibil-
ity, I think we can do it well. It's an exciting subject and I certain-
ly support your goals.

Mr. Skelton. I think we can do it. We have to look for incen-
tives; we have to find the time for them. I would personally like to
see them get paid. If they're taken out of the company or the bat-
talion to go to school that same amount of time I would like to see
them get paid. That's why I suggest the PME student account.

Well, I had this law professor that taught contracts to those
many years ago, and at the end of each class period he would pose
a difficult question and walk out the door and say, "Think about
it." So, Mr. Secretary, we will close our hearing with a thank you
and the words "think about it." Thank you so much.

Mr. Duncan. I would be glad to do so, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
very much.

[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the panel adjourned.]