This book contains 236 abstracts of dissertations that concern the ideas and/or lives of educators and scholars who were born and taught in Great Britain, or who, if not born in Great Britain, did important teaching, writing, and other work there. The dissertations featured were completed at colleges and universities and other educational institutions in the United States, Canada, and some European countries. The abstracts of the dissertations are compiled in alphabetical order by the author's name. An index is included. (DB)
American Dissertations

on

Foreign Education

Britain: Biographies of Educators;

Scholars' Educational Ideas
American Dissertations
on
Foreign Education
A Bibliography with Abstracts

edited by
Franklin Parker
and
Betty June Parker

Volume XX
Britain: Biographies of Educators;
Scholars' Educational Ideas

The Whitston Publishing Company
Troy, New York
1990
Dedicated to

Gurney Chambers, Dean
School of Education and Psychology
Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, NC
This is the twentieth volume of abstracts in the series, AMERICAN DISSERTATIONS ON FOREIGN EDUCATION, compiled and edited by Franklin Parker, Distinguished Visiting Professor, Western Carolina University, Cullowhee, North Carolina, and Betty June Parker, who form a research and writing team. Volumes thus far in the series, all published by the Whitston Publishing Company, include:

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The editors attempted to examine and abstract all locatable doctoral dissertations completed in the United States, Canada, and some European countries. The dissertations included bear significantly on public and private education at all school levels and on all school subjects. They deal with the work and influence of educational, scientific, and cultural agencies, individuals, and movements. Some dissertations which deal only marginally with education and learning are included when they seem to be of special relevance.

The abstracts of dissertations in Volume XX include the ideas and/or lives of educators and scholars who were born and taught in Britain or who, if not born in Britain, did important teaching, writing, and other work in Britain.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INTERNATIONAL officials have graciously given permission to use abstracts from that source. Thanks are also due to the many university reference and inter-library loan librarians who made dissertations available for study, and particularly to the many dissertation writers and their families who generously aided the editors in securing and correcting bibliographical data, abstracts, summaries, or tables of content.

The expanded list of 'Sources: Abbreviations Used in the
Series," indicates part of the wide range of sources examined. DAI has published nearly 200 subject catalogs of dissertations, each of which was searched for this series.

Franklin and Betty J. Parker
School of Education and Psychology
Western Carolina University
Cullowhee, North Carolina 28723

April 1990
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Dossick


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GPCFT Contributions


Gordon & Shulman

Leonard H. D. Gordon and Frank J. Shulman (compilers and editors), Doctoral Dissertations on China: A Bibliography of Studies in Western Lan-
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Parker

Franklin Parker, LATIN AMERICAN EDUCATION RESEARCH: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF 269 UNITED STATES DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS. Austin: University of Texas Institute of Latin American Studies, 1964.

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Shulman-ASIA

Frank J. Shulman (compiler and editor), DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS ON SOUTH ASIA 1966-1970; AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY COVERING NORTH AMERICA, EUROPE, AND AUSTRALIA. Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1971.

Shulman-CHINA


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Curtis W. Stucki, AMERICAN DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS ON

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A


In 1786 John Horne Tooke brought out the first volume of his *Diversions of Purley* at London, and in the same year Sir William Jones delivered his discourse "On the Hindus" to the Asiatic Society at Calcutta. Both were profoundly influential: Tooke's work in England, Jones's chiefly on the Continent, where, through Rask in Denmark and chiefly Schlegel and Bopp in Germany, it gave the impulse (though not all the motives) to the formation of the historical, comparative study of language, which since has generally been called philology or more precisely the "new philology." By 1860 the Philological Society of London had undertaken the publication of what is now the *Oxford English Dictionary*. The purpose of this dissertation is not merely, nor even primarily, to record the chronological sequence of the relevant events, but to seek out the reasons that will explain the events themselves and their sequence. Hence, the object is to give a coherent account of the intellectual development that links the philosophically oriented preoccupations of the 1780's with the philological concerns of the 1850's. The central thesis is that 19th century philology has its historical origin in the philosophical discussions of language that began in the 17th century, and not—as has generally, though never clearly, been assumed—in the earlier work that superficially has the closest resemblance to philology—in 17th century Anglo-Saxon scholarship for instance. In the 18th century these discussions came to center on the two problems of universal grammar and the origin of language, the former the legacy of Rationalism and the latter of Locke's philosophy; together they formed the comparative, etymo-
logical method. This thesis requires the substitution of term "study of language" for "philology" to remove the major source of confusion.

Chapter I considers the background from ca. 1650: The Royal Society's program for plain language, Wilkins' philosophical language, Locke's Essay (especially Book III) and the Port-Royal grammars with the subsequent 18th century discussions in Berkeley and Hume, in James Harris, Priestley, Adam Smith, and Monboddo. Chapter II gives a critical exposition of Tooke's philology, which asserted that "what are called the operations [of the mind] are merely the operations of language." Hence, in the 18th century fashion, the study of language is the study of mind; Tooke's purpose was to do away with "all the different systems of metaphysical (i.e., verbal) imposture," and his starting point was Locke's Essay, which Tooke said was "merely a grammatical essay, or a treatise on words, or on language." Chapter III considers Tooke's influence and reputation to 1830. Aided by the powerful analogy of contemporary science (chemistry), Tooke's materialist philology was accepted by the Utilitarians and by James Mill's Analysis given a very prominent place in their psychology. Tooke's "etymological metaphysics" was most cogently and effectively criticized by Dugald Stewart, largely but not entirely in the tradition of Reid's common sense philosophy.

Stewart placed emphasis on usage as one of the chief factors behind meaning. Chapter IV takes up Jones, his work in England and India, his reputation in Germany, and the followers Schlegel and Bopp, with the background in Leibniz, J. D. Michaelis, and Herder. Chapter V surveys the new philology in England to 1842, introduced by B. Thorpe, who studied under Rask, and J. M. Kemble, who became Grimm's pupil; their chief contribution was Anglo-Saxon text publication, spurred by N. F. S. Grundtvig's prospectus (issued in 1830) of texts that should first be printed. Chapter VI accounts for the formation of the Philological Society; its membership; its close link to Trinity College, Cambridge; its work; and the plan for the dictionary. Chiefly responsible for the Dictionary was Archbishop Trench, who wished, as a move against the "false prophets," to anchor words in their usage through the centuries. The lexicography was derived from Franz Passow and from Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon, not as generally believed from Richardson's Dictionary. Thus this dissertation deals with a highly significant part of English thought, at the same time as it provides a new orientation in the history of European philology.
William Gilbert, a physician of Elizabethan London, wrote an important treatise on magnetism and a group of shorter works on various aspects of scientific studies including meteorology and cosmology which were collected after his death and edited into the so-called De Mundo. Reputed to be a great chemist, he was interested in the composition of matter and its disposition in the universe.

Gilbert has frequently been regarded as a progressive, forward-looking figure in the history of science, an experimentalist and anti-Aristotelian. My research has suggested an alternative view, that he was rather a product of the conservative university education of his day, steeped in Aristotle and Galen, and that his science, when all of his works are considered, appears as the work of an amateur who shared few of the ideas on information exchange and publication which were to become characteristic of modern science and which were already developing in his time.

Gilbert was born to middle-class parents in Essex. He matriculated at St. John's College, Cambridge, at the beginning of Queen Elizabeth's reign. There he studied an arts curriculum which stressed a humanistic approach to language learning and provided its graduates with the training in logic and rhetoric basic to the pursuit of careers in government and the professions as well as with knowledge of natural and moral philosophy. After completing his arts degrees, Gilbert entered the medical curriculum. The course of studies leading to the M.D. was grounded on a thorough study of the classical authorities Galen and Hippocrates and their humanistic editors and commentators of the sixteenth-century. Medieval and Arabic writers were also studied, and, most interesting, the work of the sixteenth-century Italian medical scholars who did so much to advance medical study was also given a prominent place. At Cambridge Gilbert took his place in a dynamic and growing medical community and received an adequate and up-to-date medical education.

After leaving Cambridge, Gilbert moved to London, where he...
Lois Irene Abromitis

established a practice and fulfilled the requirements for a fellowship in the Royal College of Physicians of London during the 1570's. From about 1580, he was a prominent member of the College, holding numerous offices and participating in the foundation of a medical garden and an attempt to compile a municipal pharmacopoeia. His duties as an officer of the College and his practice, which included prominent court families, placed him in a position to be exposed to the intellectual currents of Elizabethan London.

It is clear, however, that Gilbert's nature was retiring rather than gregarious. His name is absent from the annals of Elizabethan science until the later 1590's, when it appears in close association with that of Edward Wright, and his later fame is associated almost entirely with his printed treatise on the magnet. Without the urging of Wright, Gilbert would have carried on his scientific studies as a private hobby, without thought of publication. Baconian and seventeenth-century ideas of the public functions of science were entirely alien to him.


This study is intended as a chapter in the history of rhetorical theory. The focus of this study is on Alexander Richardson, a Puritan philosopher and rhetorical theorist of late 16th and early 17th century England. The purpose of the study is, first, to edit Richardson's lectures on philosophy, "Grammatical Notes," and "Rhetorical Notes," and, second, to explicate his theory of speech.

Although Richardson's conception of the nature or precepts of speech is based on Peter Ramus' Grammatica and Omer Talon's Rhetorica, Richardson's conception of the role of speech in general and the particular functions of grammar and rhetoric is based on his philosophy of art, which in turn is influenced by Christian realist
John Charles Adams

views of metaphysics and epistemology, and Puritan views of the
social order. Richardson grounded his theory of speech in his concep-
tion of "encyclopedia." Encyclopedia emphasizes:

1. Productive well doing (eupraxie).

2. Network of relationships among distinct arts and distinct
but dependent vocations.

3. The belief that art is God's idea of art infused in the natural
world.

In the context of encyclopedia, the role of speech in general is to
maintain harmonious social relations by disclosing the usefulness of
the vocations that set people apart. Moreover, for Richardson, all
human speech is testimony and all human testimony is dubious. All
human testimony is dubious because all human beings are fallen and
are likely to speak untruthfully either out of ignorance or evil inten-
tions. Grammar and rhetoric are viewed as styles of speech suited to
the tempers of different listeners. By styling speech to the tempers of
listeners, the speech appeals to their affections, thereby making the
speech believable to particular listeners. For Richardson, both gram-
cmar and rhetoric perform persuasive functions.

Most generally, by tracing the connections between Richardson's
theory of speech and his philosophy, the study provides insight into
how an author's assumptions about reality, knowledge, and the
nature of man and society influence the development of his rhetorical
theory.

4. AGEE, Steven Craig (Ph. D.). "An Empirical Examination of the
Roles that Consumption, Investment and Money Played Dur-
ing the Great Depression." University of Kansas, 1982. 194 pp.
Source: DAI, XLIII, 8A (February, 1983), 2748-A. XUM Order
No. DA8301707.

The fifty years following the Great Depression have been filled
with numerous explanations of what caused that significant economic event. In 1931, John Maynard Keynes cites what may have been one of the first explanations of the Depression which began around the middle of 1929. According to Keynes, a drop in investment, coupled with the effects of the spending multiplier, led to a dramatic fall in income and output. This hypothesis of the Depression was challenged in 1963 with the publication of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz's A Monetary History of the United States. They argued that the severity of the Great Depression was the result of inept monetary policy, waves of bank failures beginning in late 1930, and a subsequent severe decline in the money stock, all of which demonstrated the importance of the quantity of money. This "monetarist" argument received surprisingly little criticism from Keynesians until 1976 when Peter Temin published his book, Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? Temin rejected both the Keynesian hypothesis of a fall in investment spending and the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis of monetary factors as having caused the Depression. Instead, Temin attributes the initial contraction to a drop in autonomous consumption.

It is the purpose of the present study, by using current macroeconometric methods, to critically analyze these three hypotheses. Chapter I, introductory in nature, discusses the current debate and identifies the main participants. Chapter II presents a brief description of the disastrous nature of the Great Depression together with a survey of alternative hypotheses which attempt to explain the cause of the catastrophe. The remaining chapters critically analyze, in order, Temin's consumption hypotheses, Keynes' investment hypothesis, and the Friedman-Schwartz monetary hypothesis. Chapter III presents a series of regression results designed specifically to test Temin's hypothesis. The results derived in this chapter reject his assertion that a fall in autonomous consumption in 1930 was the cause of the Great Depression. Chapter IV presents a series of regression results and alternative tests designed to evaluate the Keynesian hypothesis of a fall in investment. The findings in this chapter reject Keynes' assertion that a fall in investment caused the Depression. The fifth chapter develops an econometric simulation model for the interwar period in an effort to test the monetarist hypothesis that alternative monetary policies could have prevented the severity of the great Depression. The conclusion reached in Chapter V was that the monetarist hypothesis could not be rejected.
The "New Science," so called, was not so much an instauration of a new system of inquiry as the transformation and co-optation of the old: the system of literature. Although the dissertation is principally a study of Francis Bacon, it locates his philosophical program in a wider European context. Bacon follows the example of Copernicus and Galileo, and draws upon fiction and the theatre as a strategy to domesticate natural philosophy, and so to placate hostile or conservative civil and religious authority.

Literary discourse proved effective for this end because of its equivocal relationship to authority: on the one hand, it could provide a celebration of regal privilege and power, as with the Jacobean masque; on the other, as Sidney's *Defense of Poetry* indicates, it transcends the limitations of the given, as scientific forms attempt to do. Thus such typical scientific productions as the thought experiment and the hypothesis show themselves in the seventeenth century as analogues of literary genres. However, these analogues institute a system of knowledge that proves inimical to its origins: the need to produce conditions favorable to the development of science also necessitates an alienation from the world as experienced—and from the world as literature represents it.

Chapter One introduces the problem of science, literature, and authority through the writings of Copernicus and Galileo: both use literary form to sidestep religious conflict over the heliocentric hypothesis. Chapter Two considers Bacon and Jacobean authority; he uses the mechanism of courtly patronage, closely associated with literature, to establish natural philosophy both as an adjunct of King James's power and as a system of control. Chapter Three then goes on to consider the nature of that control: alienation from nature, which corresponds to an ultimate alienation from narrative conventions. This is the prediction encoded in the fragmentary tabulations of Bacon's seldom read texts, like the *Sylva Sylvarum*.

Chapter Four examines Bacon's most canonical work, the *New
Denise Albanese

Atlantis, as a thought-experiment analogous to Galileo's. Its use of empiricism as its narrative basis demands a rejection of closure; thus it preempts literary form for the purposes of subversion from within. As this analysis demonstrates, the contiguousness of literature and science in the Renaissance is not an idyll foreclosed, but a struggle for authority.


It was the purpose of this study to determine the consistency between the theoretical constructs central to object relations theory and the observations and data-based inferences of Jean Piaget regarding the development of the object concept and the advent of object representation during infancy. The theories of four major writers of the British School of Psychoanalysis were critically examined in light of a time-table marking the infant's advance toward human object concept formation and representation.

Based on a Piagetian critique of Klein's theories, it was concluded that none of the fantasies as described by her exists during infancy. Rather, it was concluded that, while rooted in sensorimotor experience influenced by object relationships, such fantasies constitute a "representational overlay" of which only certain young children, not infants, are capable.

A similar critique of Fairbairn's theory of endopsychic ego-structure development led to the conclusion that Fairbairn's accounting of the relationship between object splitting and ego structure formation is reversed; it was determined that in the context of object relationships, ego structures emerge well before the occurrence of object representation and the build-up of "internal objects."

Winnicott's theory pertaining to the structure of the neonate psyche and the young infant's relation to his objects was found to be highly consistent with Piagetian findings. Those portions of his work
based upon Kleinian postulates regarding infant fantasy were found to be the source of inconsistencies within the body of his overall work. Guntrip was found to be somewhat aware of limitations pertaining to object representation during early infancy, but his work was found to be subject to many of the same criticisms applied to Klein and Fairbairn. It was hypothesized the Guntrip's "schizoid core" consists of an affectively charged, sensorimotor domain wherein experience is not represented and therefore is poorly modulated.

Finally, it was concluded that object relationships, not object representations, are of primary importance in the emergence of endopsychic structures during the first 15 months of life.


In chapter 1 we show the importance of John Colet (1467?-1519) as a key transitional figure in the movement for Catholic humanist reform known as Erasmianism; and also the formation of the via media of Anglicanism. In chapter 2 we discuss the development of Oxford humanism during the fifteenth century and demonstrate the confusion regarding the meaning of Renaissance humanism in the secondary material regarding Colet. In chapter 3 we show that Colet's family background and early years in Oxford, Italy, and France were strongly influenced by the studia humanitatis. We trace Colet's intellectual relations with Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Lefèvre D'Etaples. In chapter 4 we show the influence of the studia humanitatis on Colet's enarrationes on the Pauline Epistles. In chapter 5 we give conclusive evidence for the importance of Colet's influence upon Erasmus. In chapter 6 we show the real nature of Colet's Platonism and the significance of the Pseudo-Dionysius for his thought. In chapter 7 we discuss in detail Colet's Convocation Sermon on ecclesiastical reformation. In chapter 8 we describe the papalist tradition of the ecclesia Anglicana in the later Middle Ages. We show that Colet be-
John Joseph Wenham Alden

lieved that reformation should be led by the pope and bishops of the various parts of the Church, by means of a return to the canon law. Our detailed research on Colet demonstrates the great importance of Renaissance humanism and Erasmianism for a true understanding of the Catholic and Protestant Reformations (including the development of Luther's approach to exegesis), and the Anglican via media.


The specific problem of this thesis is to describe the psychoprophylactic essentials of hygiene as these appear in the general practice and theory in education to Herbert Spencer's time, inclusively. Since present knowledge of the conditions of healthful mental activity is still far from complete, essentials instead of principles of mental hygiene are considered.

Among the chief essentials are involved function, training, integration, orderly association, purposive activity, social training, individual differences, attention, hygiene of the emotions, active attitudes, productive inhibitions, self-control, adjustment, facing reality, a normal sense of dependence and somatic health, as conditions of normal growth and development.

The method of treatment is expository and genetic and surveys primitive education, ancient Oriental education, Greek education, Roman education, education during the Middle Ages, and education during the Renaissance period. The education of humanism and the Reformation, realism and naturalism in education, and the psychological and scientific tendencies in education in the order named are reviewed as sources from which contributions have come to mental hygiene in education.

Among the contributors to mental hygiene are considered: Confucius, Laocius, Tschu-hi, Gautama, Jesus, Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Quintilian, Plutarch, the early Church
Adolph William Aleck

Fathers, Charlemagne, Alcuin, Rabanus Maurus, Erigena, King Alfred, Roger Bacon, Vittorino, Erasmus, Sturm, Vives, Luther, Melanchthon, Trotzendorf, the Jesuits, the Port-Royalists, the Christian Brothers, Rabelais, John Milton, Francis Bacon, Ratieh, Comenius, Locke, Rousseau, Basedow, Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel, Huxley, Spencer, and others.

The purpose of this thesis is twofold. In presenting this historical survey of the psychoprophylactic essentials of hygiene in general educational theory and practice before the advent of the scientific tendency in education (which may be said to have begun with the work of Herbert Spencer), the purpose has been, on the one hand, to provide the student of education with an account of the place mental hygiene has held in education, and, on the other hand, to place at the disposal of the mental hygienist an introductory account of the historic applications of his science in the field of education.

Among the original sources from which have been drawn material are the writings of Bacon, Comenius, Froebel, Herbart, Huxley, Locke, Pestalozzi, Plutarch, Plato, Rabelais, Montaigne, Milton, Rousseau, and Spencer. Historians of education, whose works were consulted, are Karl Schmidt, Davidson, Quick, Kloepper, Monroe, Painter, Grünwald, and others.

Among the writers on mental hygiene, whose views are represented, are Burnham, Heller, White, Sherrington, Holt, Stiles, Halleck, Clouston, Bianchi, and many others. Anthropologists upon whose studies rest the views presented in the chapter on primitive education are Hrdlicka, Radin, Osborn, Fallaize, G. Elliot Smith, Wallis, and others.

The dissertation comprises ten chapters, the conclusions, a bibliography, and two appendices.

The first chapter presents a statement of the specific problem, its limitations, general setting, importance, the general method of treatment, and the sources of data.

The second chapter is a phylogenetic approach to the study of mental hygiene in education. It deals with the environment of primitive man (in point of time as well as culture) and its significance for mental health. The status of the primitive child, primitive concepts of personality and the ego, primitive thinking, and the limitations of primitive education are discussed in this chapter.

Since primitive mentality approaches our own mind processes far more nearly than one is likely to suppose, it is not unreasonable to
suppose it may be more clearly understood when studied phylogenetically. The integrity of personality under primitive conditions is significant for mental hygiene, and the possibilities and limits of primitive education may be evaluated from this standpoint.

Ancient Oriental education and its meaning for mental health are the subject of the third chapter. The contributions of Chinese, Japanese, Ancient Indian, Egyptian, Persian, and Hebrew education to mental hygiene in education are reviewed. The work and personalities of the great Oriental teachers are considered. The various conceptions of personality, facing reality, adjustment, activity, and the like, as they are found in ancient Oriental education, are presented in this chapter.

The fourth chapter deals with the concept of integration in Greek education. Athenian and Doric education are noted as sources of essentials of mental hygiene. The contributions of Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle to mental hygiene are described. Serenity, poise, self-control, and integrity of personality, as taught by these teachers, are among the significant additions which they made to education.

The fifth chapter deals with Roman education and mental health. Activity, social hygiene and hygienic habit formation are among the Roman contributions. The work of the great Roman teachers is reviewed, and their contributions to education are considered from the standpoint of mental hygiene. These teachers are Cicero, Seneca, Quintilian, and Plutarch (Greco-Roman).

Mental hygiene in education during the Middle Ages is the subject of Chapter VI. The various conceptions of personality, the influence of superstition, of medieval theology, and philosophy during the Middle Ages are discussed with reference to their significance for mental hygiene in education. The work of Roger Bacon in its emphasis upon the inductive method is specially noted as significant for mental hygiene. Repression, not development, of personality characterizes education during this period.

Chapter VII has to do with mental hygiene in education during the Renaissance period. Types of humanism and their conceptions of personality and education are reviewed. The contribution of Vittorino, Vives, and others, is described.

The place of mental hygiene in education during the Reformation period, the work of Luther, Melanchthon, and specially of Trotzendorf is noted in the eighth chapter. Types of education, such as Jesuit,
Adolph William Aleck

Jansenist, and Christian Brothers, are dealt with also in this chapter, as they relate to mental hygiene.

Chapter IX comprises a discussion of mental hygiene implicit in realism and naturalism in education. Humanistic, social, and sense-realism are considered, and the work of their chief exponents. Naturalism and the work of Rousseau and Basedow as mental hygienists conclude the chapter.

The tenth and final chapter shows the growing significance of the psychological and scientific tendencies in education and their bearing on the problem of mental health. The contributions of Pestalozzi, Herbart, Froebel, Huxley, and Spencer, the immediate predecessors of the educator today, are noted. Among these are the genetic method and the developmental view of education.

Among the general conclusions are several of major importance:

1. Mental hygiene in education can rightly be said to be over 5,000 years old.

2. The progress of mental hygiene in education has not always been uniform, but often quite irregular (frequently, it has been influenced by metaphysics and theology; often it has been hampered by superstition and ignorance).

3. The relation of somatic to mental health has not always been understood, but with the approach towards the scientific tendency in education, the relations of the two become clearer.

4. From time immemorial function has played an important part in education, and in some form, there has existed emotional training. Physical education, the simplest and wholesomest form of training, is also the oldest.

5. The mental hygiene of Sozialpädagogik has not kept pace with that of Individualpädagogik.

6. The contributors to mental hygiene in education appear in all ages and come from every walk of life.

7. Often, they illustrate in their own person the importance of
adolph william aleck

8. The prophylactic character of education as developmental may be traced to antiquity.

9. Finally, the evidence from history offers much in support of Burnham's view that, apart from accident, infection, or heredity, a person cannot be quite sound mentally without the essential conditions of a task, a plan, and freedom.

In order to understand the place of mental hygiene in education today, it is necessary to know how this place has come to be. In order to avoid the repetition of mistakes in the past, as well as to know what may reasonably be hoped for in the future, in mental hygiene in education, it is necessary to approach the problem genetically. This thesis represents such an approach, and as such is an original contribution to the literature on mental hygiene in educational theory and practice.


Herbert de Losinga was one of the many Normans brought to England as high ecclesiastics following the Conquest. After having been monk and prior at Holy Trinity Monastry, Fécamp, he was preferred as abbot to the great Benedictine house at Ramsey in 1087. Four years later he purchased the East Anglian see, then centered at Thetford, for himself and the abbacy of Hyde for his father. In 1093 he sought and received absolution for this simony from Pope Urban II. The Bishop moved the diocesan seat to Norwich in 1094, commenced construction of the great cathedral there in 1096 and established a priory of Benedictines to serve as canon clergy.

Twice a royal diplomat to the papacy, this curialist bishop was unsympathetic to all aspects of the Gregorian Reform which tended to diminish royal power in England. His actions reveal him to have been
his king's man, although Anselm trusted him sufficiently to use him as emissary in the dispute with York over primacy. Herbert's relations with the papacy were—excepting his excommunication in 1103—purely formal. Herbert founded two schools in an age when they were comparatively rare and maintained an interest in education revealed in his letters. The extent of his acquaintance with classical literature is difficult to assess as he may have derived his classical allusions from florilegia or from grammars. The evidence for his patristic knowledge is more secure. His sermons reveal a considerable familiarity with patristic and early mediaeval authors, particularly Augustine, Gregory the Great, and the Venerable Bede. No theologian, Herbert used allegory and symbolism in his Biblical exegesis. He taught, but did not expound upon, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception.

The writings of this Bishop, who died in 1119, reveal the mind of a man who represented an older tradition on the eve of the "twelfth-century Renaissance."


The purpose of this study was to determine what kind of educational theatre exists in the elementary and secondary schools in Iraq. The study described the socio-economic situation, education, theatre, and educational theatre in Iraq from the late 19th century to 1985, thus presenting an overview of the development of the country in general and educational theatre in particular. The basic hypothesis was that educational theatre existed in Iraq before the advent of modern theatre, and its development has been related to socio-economic, political, and educational changes in the country. Since Iraqi education and educational theatre are completely state-operated, the researcher looked for government influences on school administra-
tion, curriculum, and enrollment. The study also focused on selected English educational theatre theorists and practitioners, including Brian Way and Dorothy Heathcote as well as several American educational theatre programs, to discover their methods of teaching educational theatre and to gather information which could be useful for improving the Iraqi educational theatre.

Methods of investigation included:

1. Interviews with personnel from pertinent Iraqi government offices, persons with experience in Iraqi educational theatre, and teachers of educational theatre programs in American schools.

2. A survey of literature related to the subject of this study.

3. Visits to selected Iraqi and American schools to observe methods of teaching educational theatre and to determine the extent of and/or need for changes in Iraqi educational theatre.

One major finding was a need for improved planning and management in Iraqi educational theatre. Another finding was a lack of personnel trained in modern methods of teaching Iraqi educational theatre. The study indicated anticipated increase in educational theatre activities throughout the country due to strong government support. Finally, it was found that development of educational theatre was related to development of other fields in the country.


The question to which this dissertation addresses itself is whether, and in what ways, the arts have a cognitive role in the spectrum of human knowledge. The purpose of the dissertation is to formulate an epistemological theory which accounts for a clearly
cognitive role for the arts, and to overcome the objections of philosophers who disclaim such a role.

Various traditional and contemporary philosophers of the arts have failed to account for the proper role of the arts in human knowing because their epistemologies establish an unabridgeable dualism. The main forms of this dualism are:

a. A split between reason and emotion.
b. A division between knowledge and acquaintance.

This dualism is considered in Chapter II, along with its difficulties and its modern source in the philosophy of Kant.

The most promising attempts to accord a legitimate cognitive function to the arts have rested upon epistemologies which do not incorporate a dualism between kinds of knowledge. R. G. Collingwood has developed one such theory. In opposition to the British Empiricists, Collingwood argues that ideas do not arise directly from sensation but are produced by an intermediate level of cognitive activity which he calls imagination. His analysis paves the way for understanding the cognitive role of the arts as proper to this second stage of development. In spite of two central problems, i.e., a faulty sense-datum epistemology and a restrictive expressionist theory of artistic cognition, Collingwood’s philosophy of art serves as a background for the theory developed in Chapter III.

The artist creates "symbolic forms" (following Ernst Cassirer) which may serve a dual cognitive function:

a. Symbolizing actual things in one possible way.
b. Symbolizing possibilities so that they may appear in the world.

I maintain that the distinction between the cognitive roles of the arts and the sciences is not a difference in kind but one of the degree of abstraction. This means that symbolic forms such as paintings, poems, plays, statues, symphonies, and dances can symbolize actual things, i.e., denote them, but they do so implicitly, whereas explicit denotative reference lies in the province of reason, a more abstract level of consciousness.

In addition, symbolic forms serve to symbolize and embody possibilities. Fictional individuals, for example, are of great signifi-
cance to the artist, but epistemological and ontological problems are raised by their incorporation in works of art. Such "possible individuals" do not subsist or exist in some transcendent fashion. Their on-ological status is limited to the symbolic form which embodies them, and their epistemological role depends upon such embodiment. This symbolic function is developed in terms of the notion of exemplification. A symbolic form exemplifies when it not only symbolizes but also possesses some property.

The application of true and false, real and unreal, and other such terms to works of art is a function of the rational and not the imaginative level of cognitive development. The artist imagines possibilities, whereas it is the function of the critic to explicate the propositions implicit in art works and to interpret and evaluate them. The arts, per se, do not offer explicit judgmental activity, whereas criticism and other rational activities do incorporate such judgments.


The current ecumenical wave has emphasized the need for continued detailed study of the persons and religious currents of the Reformation. One cannot move to satisfactory discussion in the twentieth century without understanding the issues and interplay of the sixteenth. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationship between the English and German Reformations, especially as it is seen in the activities of an English Augustinian, Dr. Robert Barnes.

The paper is divided into two main sections: first, the person of Barnes is discussed, and second, his theological position. Additional chapters deal with his theological roots, his importance according to contemporary evaluation, his place in the English scene, and his significance for the Reformation in England and Germany.

The subject's checkered ecclesiastical career is developed from
the sources. He is followed to the Augustinian house at Cambridge, to the University of Louvain, back to Cambridge, and finally, after ecclesiastical trial, to prison, escape, and to a new life on the continent. The town of Wittenberg and its leading figure loom large in the period of Barnes' exile, and in his subsequent theological writings. From 1535 to 1540 the orthodox Henry VIII found it necessary to use the runaway heretic as his representative in dealing with the Germans. Henry's desire for unity with the Schmalcald League brought Barnes to a position of momentary prominence as he negotiated with the Germans and Danes, and even returned to England as an active reformer. When the royal hopes for a German alliance foundered on the rocks of doctrinal problems, and imperial pressure decreased, Henry's need for Barnes' services was ended and the fires of Smithfield finished the friar.

Barnes' theological position was characterized by marked changes. Beginning as an orthodox Augustinian, he moved to Erasmian Humanism after study at Louvain. The shift to biblical Humanism was soon to follow, and then a conversion experience under the guidance of Thomas Bilney and Hugh Latimer, two of his Cambridge colleagues. In this period, the early 1520's, he was not, by his own testimony, a Lutheran. After fleeing to Germany, however, and living in contact with the central figures of its new religious movement, Barnes' stance became distinctly Lutheran. His literary efforts are from this period and all bear the German stamp. He remained constant in this position even to the stake in 1540.

Barnes was by no means one of the giants of the Reformation. He rightfully belongs in the shadows of Cranmer, on the one hand, and Luther, on the other. His significance lies in his efforts to bridge the Channel that there might be an exchange of benefits. In the context of his activities Luther, for example, shows himself willing to make surprising compromises in doctrinal issues, while the English formularies to this day bear certain Lutheran tinges that must be traced to Barnes' part in the negotiations. As a loyal servant of his king, and at the same time a dedicated promoter of the Reformation in its Lutheran garb, Barnes was uniquely fitted for his moment in history.

13. ANDREWS, Grace Hughes (Ph. D.). "The Problem of Didacticism in Matthew Arnold's Literary Criticism." University of Ala-
For many years scholars have been studying Matthew Arnold's literary criticism in an attempt to define his poetic theory. From these studies there has developed a large amount of disagreement among critics on the basis of Arnold's attention to questions of morals and to the relationship between morality and art. The present study was undertaken in order to determine exactly to what extent Arnold's evaluation and analysis of works of literature are colored by his expectation that literature teach a moral lesson.

The method used is that of description and analysis. After a brief introduction, Arnold's theoretical and practical criticism is surveyed to determine his views on the origin of the work, the nature of the work, and the ends expected from the work. The discussion follows the stages of Arnold's career in which he was occupied as poet (1847-1857), professor (1857-1867), and prophet (1868-1888), treated in Chapters I, II, and III, respectively. The procedure has been first to describe briefly the views of the critics about Arnold's literary criticism in each period, and then to analyze Arnold's prose to determine whether Arnold expected literature to teach and if so how. Because Arnold has devoted so much attention to moral questions and because they are at times related to the literary criticism, a concluding section of each chapter has been devoted to Arnold's discussion of morals and morality in that stage of his development.

The investigation of Arnold's views shows that his analysis and evaluation of works of literature is independent of the moral lessons pointed up in them. The teaching Arnold expects from literature is the intellectual development of taste which results from the study of excellent literature and the development of the power of discrimination—the ability to separate that which is merely good from that which is excellent. It is true that Arnold is interested in morals and devotes much attention to moral questions. However, the development and expansion of his poetic theory is clearly a classical theory—a theory which describes and evaluates literary works according to intrinsic elements of form, subject, and style. This classical theory was developed in the first stage of Arnold's career (1847-1857), expanded in the second stage (1858-1868), and illuminated with examples in the last stage (1868-1888). In his criticism, Arnold practiced the classical
Grace Hughes Andrews

theory in all three stages of his career.


This dissertation examines the origins of computer science in that branch of mathematical logic known as recursive function theory. In particular, it discusses the contributions made by Alan Turing and John von Neumann.

The first third of the dissertation examines the mathematical background that led to the development of recursive function theory. It argues that, due to the use of abstraction and infinity, there was a foundational crisis in mathematics. The crisis centered around counter-intuitive and meaningless results, unwarranted assumption of powerful principles, and outright contradictions in mathematics. The answer to the crisis was a conservative, philosophically based reaction, known as constructivism, which attempted to reformulate the foundations of mathematics by constructing every object of mathematical interest from primitively accepted objects.

The attempts to make mathematically precise which objects were constructable led to the new mathematical discipline of recursive function theory. Many different characterizations of the recursive functions were given by the mathematicians. However, the first one to be both precise enough to be used in formal mathematics and intuitive enough to convince the mathematical community that it characterized the constructable functions was given by Alan Turing. His characterization was in the form of a theoretical machine which would carry out the computations.

The second section of the dissertation examines the attempts to work Turing's logical idea of an idealized computing machine into the design of modern computing machinery. To that end, Turing's work
on computing machinery at Bletchley Park (Robinson Series, COLOS-SUS), the National Physical Laboratory (ACE), and the University of Manchester (MANIAC) is examined. Von Neumann’s work on the ENIAC, EDVAC, and Institute for Advanced Study computers is also considered, with emphasis placed on his logical design of computers.

The third section of this dissertation considers the development of theoretical computer science and, more generally, the theory of information processing. It argues that, after the second world war, a small group of diversely trained scientists, including Claude Shannon, Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch, Turing, and von Neumann, developed a number of new scientific disciplines around the general concept of information processing. These fields included communication theory, cybernetics, physiological psychology, automata theory, and artificial intelligence. Von Neumann’s work on automata theory and Turing’s work on artificial intelligence are discussed in particular detail.

The dissertation is distinguished from other work in the history of computers by its attempt to go beyond the discussion of genealogies of machines and machine technology. It aims to demonstrate roots of computer science in mathematics, logic, philosophy, psychology, physiology, and physics.


John Stuart Mill’s A System of Logic (1843) is an extended argument on induction and the methodology of the natural and social sciences. Its text provides a strong example for the modern theory that rhetoric can function epistemologically. However, our analysis shows that constraints of subject matter imposed on the formulation of these techniques require re-defining "epistemic rhetoric.” The result is a rhetoric based on: language axioms, order, assurance, truth-seeking and probability.

Mill’s argument first emphasizes language and its axiomatic
functions. His arguments against intuitionism and the syllogism result in his famous four canons of induction. This rhetorical ordering technique generates a set of truth-values. Traditions that influenced Mill's rhetoric included the psychologism of his father, James Mill; the invigorating, argumentative styles of his fellow empiricists—Locke, Berkeley, Hume; and the emergence of rhetorical camps of Campbell and Whately. Mill's performance incorporates our modern notion of a "rhetoric of assurance," defined by:

1. Access to countervailing opinions.
2. Defense against competing viewpoints.
3. Correction and completion of the author's opinions.

These parameters, however, do not consider textual substance. In this case, Mill's text is a methodology and thereby especially accommodated by an epistemic rhetoric. Our conclusion is that a methodology, but not a philosophical program, is enhanced by a truth-generating rhetoric.

This premise is tested by three comparisons. First, similarities with Aristotle's Rhetoric are shown, especially his arguments for the probable. Second, Mill's An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (1865), in contrast, is shown as a philosophical program without epistemic rhetoric, although still a truth-seeking performance because of Mill's defense of mathematics. Third, the advances in symbolical logic by George Boole, in geometry by the non-Euclideans, and in the breakdown of the Newtonian universe according to modern principles are all cases to test whether Mill's text can adapt to innovation and not be limited to mono-methodological application. His methodology survives intact largely because of its epistemic rhetoric.
It was John Malcolm Forbes Ludlow (1821-1911) who conceived of English Christian Socialism and convinced many contemporaries of its value. He was responsible for establishing the Christian Socialist producer co-operatives of 1849-1850 in accordance with ideas gained in France from the socialism of Louis Blanc and Benjamin Buchez.

With F. D. Maurice, John Ludlow shares the credit for founding a college for the education of working men (still in existence as the Working Men's College of London).

As a lawyer, Ludlow acted as constant legal advisor to the great 19th century organizations of self-help: labor unions, friendly societies, and cooperatives.

As a cooperator, Ludlow was involved in such activities as helping to organize an Annual Cooperative Congress in England, 1869, and later an International Cooperative Congress in 1895. He was also one of those responsible for the legalization of both cooperatives and trade unions.

One of John Ludlow's goals was to unite the various organizations of self-help into one vast cooperative enterprise. To this end he worked closely with such organizations as the Cooperative Wholesale Society and the Amalgamated Society of Engineers, one of the most powerful labor unions of the time.

Finally, as Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies from 1875-1891, Ludlow was in a position to know more about labor conditions and achievements than men in even higher government position. His outstanding work was recognized and praised by such famous contemporaries as Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill.

Stressing the work of John Ludlow has a two-fold significance:
first, as stated above, he is important because of his personal contributions, and, second, the significance of the self-help organizations to which he devoted his life has been poorly evaluated due to the modern emphasis on state socialism.

Ludlow has been almost forgotten, although recent historians have begun to show interest in his contributions. Charles Earle Raven's work on Christian Socialism concentrates on Ludlow's work, and G. D. H. Cole's detailed study of the cooperative movement, when compared with older histories, also demonstrates an increasing interest.

This, however, is the first work of any length written on John Ludlow, and is the first to make extensive use of his manuscript autobiography, only recently available at Cambridge University Library. The Ludlow tracts, Goldsmith's Library, University of London (chiefly pamphlets and periodicals), were of primary importance as were the Furnivall tracts in the British Museum, Ludlow Letters at the Working Men's College, and the Howell Collection, Bishop's Gate Institute, London.

The dissertation deals primarily with the cooperative movement, but some space is devoted to such related topics as the legalization and progress of labor unions and the development and influence of Friendly Societies.


This dissertation relies heavily on unpublished correspondence and personal interviews in an effort to date all relevant biographical facts and to date Samuel Beckett's activities relating to writing and publication. Chapter I covers his birth, family background, residence and education including Trinity College. Chapter II begins with his term as exchange lecturer at the École Normale Supérieure. It deals with his relationship with James Joyce, early publications, friendships with other young Irishmen in Paris, the writing of Proust, and his resignation from Trinity. Chapter III discusses the beginnings of his writing
career, especially *Echo's Bones* and *Murphy*, his residence in London and visits to relatives in Germany. Chapter IV tells of Beckett's testimony in the Gogarty-Sinclair libel trial, his residence in Paris, his relationship with Peggy Guggenheim, and the bizarre stabbing incident in early 1938. This chapter concludes as World War II is about to begin.

World War II, Beckett's increasing anger and frustration at the treatment of his Jewish friends by the Nazis, and his involvement in the French Resistance comprise the first part of chapter V. His flight to the Vaucluse, two years of hiding, and the writing of *Watt* conclude it.

Chapter VI discusses the delayed publication of *Watt*, Beckett's great period of creative activity which followed the end of the war, and the several impasses which he claims followed. The long and drawn-out chronology of the production of *Waiting for Godot* is discussed, as is the change it brought to his literary and personal life. The chapter concludes with a summation of the dates and events surrounding the post-war works, including *Lessness*, *Le Depeupleur*, and *Not I*.

The last chapter seeks to arrive at a characterization or personality portrait of one of the most enigmatic figures in twentieth century literature. Here, personal interviews with his family, friends, publishers, and associates, as well as conversations with Samuel Beckett himself are the major sources of information.

Throughout the dissertation, I have attempted to explain or correct many here-to-fore incomplete or incorrect biographical statements. I have not attempted to discredit previous critical studies or biographical interpretations, but I have drawn attention to errors of fact which they have unintentionally perpetrated.

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1. Introduction

In the nineteenth century when sociology was in its infancy, its founders attempted to organize the subject matter in a scientific manner and develop syntheses of known uniformities and trends into grand systems of macroscopic theories. Today, the focus of sociology is to establish "theories of the middle range." The present day orientation has a tendency to lead some empiricists into studies of minutiae or at least into a habit of not interrelating the findings with others into wider theories of society. We are cautioned by some theorists that we are not ready for macroscopic theories. We are now in the third quarter of the twentieth century, and although we may not be ready to build adequate theories of society as yet, it is suggested that this thesis can serve as a reminder of what has been done with less empirical knowledge. It can serve both as a guide toward the construction of eventual synthetic theories and as an example from which we can profit by an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Buckle's theoretical propositions.

References in sociological textbooks today cite Henry Thomas Buckle as a minor nineteenth century theorist who represented geographical determinism. In his own time Buckle was thought of as a geographical determinist by some and as an economic determinist or as an intellectual determinist by others. His major contributions are:

A. The formulation of a theory of progress or social evolution (the progenitor of present theories of social change).

B. The development of social science methodology:

a. By suggesting that the proper form of analysis of civilizations (which term he sometimes used interchangeably with society) was through inductive and deductive study.

b. By advocating that the major tool of the science should be statistical analysis.

C. As a major proponent of positivism in England, along with J. S. Mill's popularization of Comte, and Herbert Spencer's sociology, he helped to establish the foundations of sociology.
2. **Scope and Limits of This Study**

Buckle, as was the case with nineteenth century writers in general, did not adhere to academic boundaries, mainly because the boundaries had not yet been established. He meant to create a science of society analogous to the physical sciences. He thought that this new science would properly be contained under the rubric of history. Thus, we found him as a philosopher of science who discussed social science methodology in an historical framework. This paper will include philosophical and historical data only where it is pertinent to the development of Buckle's sociology. It will not concern itself with the merit of Buckle's philosophy or history.

3. **Definition of Buckle's Terms Used in This Study**

Nineteenth century sociology cannot justifiably be attacked for the imprecision of its terminology because of the infancy of its subject matter.

A. Civilization and society are used interchangeably except when referring to primitive societies.

B. Progress is the value-laden term used instead of social evolution or social change.

C. Intellectual or mental factors or truths refer to ideas or knowledge within the cultures of particular societies.

D. The term "aspect of nature" refers to natural catastrophes and gross physical features of topography such as earthquakes and mountains, respectively.

4. **Method of Research Used in Preparing the Study**

The study was carried out as a library research by:

a. Reading Buckle's works: *History of Civilization in England; Influence of Women on the Progress of Knowledge*
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(an essay); Mill on Liberty (an essay); Buckle's Miscellaneous and Posthumous Works.

b. Reading the three major books on Buckle and his theory: A. H. Huth, The Life and Writings of Henry Thomas Buckle; G. St. Aubyn, A Victorian Eminence; J. M. Robertson, Buckle and His Critics.

c. Reading other secondary sources:

1. Books
2. Journal articles by his contemporaries and recent ones (see bibliography).

The material was read and collected both here and in England (Summer of 1964) during the past four years.

CHAPTER II
EMINENCE AND UNCONVENTIONALITY

This is a presentation of the impact of Buckle's work upon his contemporaries and is also the chapter on his life.

CHAPTER III
PREDECESSORS

This chapter contains a discussion of the philosophers who influenced Buckle, some of whom also influenced Comte. Similarities and differences between Buckle and Comte conclude the chapter.

CHAPTER IV
THE MAJOR THESIS OF HENRY THOMAS BUCKLE

Buckle's theory is detailed in this chapter.
CHAPTER V CRITICS

The criticisms of the contemporaries of Buckle were numerous. They ranged from complaints about his lack of academic training to attacks on his literary style, history, philosophy, lack of awareness of Darwinian evolution and, lastly, sociology. This chapter discussed the earlier criticisms and the more recent ones as well as those of the writer.

CHAPTER VI BUCKLE’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIOLOGY

1. Buckle’s work is summarized and commented upon in relation to modern sociological thought and subdivisions of the field. Conclusions about his theory of progress and scientific methodology are stated.

2. It is suggested that we continue to review, in individual studies of this nature, other early pioneers of sociology:

a. To correct some of the errors which tend to be found in our more recent textbooks through the passage of time and the remoteness of the original works.

b. To review the merit of early sociological contributions.

c. To inspire the eventual construction of theories of society again.

Alexander Gill, the elder, was High Master of St. Paul's School in London from 1609 until his death in 1635. John Milton attended that school until in 1625 he matriculated at Christ's College, Cambridge. As no records of the school are known to have survived the great London fire of 1666, the date of Milton's entrance into St. Paul's School depends almost entirely on inference and conjecture. We may best assume that young John Milton was at St. Paul's School for only the upper forms, these forms being under the tutelage of the High Master himself.

This study is an attempt to reconstruct Gill's formal education and to enumerate the written materials known to him, as revealed in his education and in his extant writings, as these may have been brought to the attention of young John Milton.

The designation, the elder, in connection with Alexander Gill, is used to distinguish him from his son of the same name, who, on the evidence in surviving letters, was a close friend of John Milton. Alexander Gill, the younger, was appointed Under Usher at St. Paul's School in 1621 while Milton was there, and on the elder's death succeeded to the Highmastership in 1635.

Nothing is known of Alexander Gill, the elder, from his birth, February 27, 1565, in Lincolnshire, until he was admitted scholar in Corpus Christi College, Oxford, about September 1583. Although Gill was frequently referred to as "doctor," there seem to be records of only bachelor's and master's degrees both received from Oxford. The younger Gill received a D.D. from Oxford in 1637.

As Gill himself mentions only once "my time at Oxford," it is not possible to outline Gill's grammar school or college education, but merely to set the pattern of the time. None of the positions which Gill may have held occupying him for twenty years after college and preparing him for St. Paul's School are known.

Three works of the elder Gill survive. The Treatise concerning the Trinitie of Persons in unitie of the Deitie in 1601 was a slim volume with few citations, Biblical or otherwise. The purpose of the Logonomia Anglica of 1619 with a second edition in 1621 may have been largely orthographic reform, but it was also a systematic grammar with extensive citations from Spenser's Fairy Queen and others, from the classics to poets and grammarians of Gill's own day. In the Logonomia Anglica, Gill cited about eighty authors with whose works he was familiar.

The Sacred Philosophie of the Holy Scripture, Gill's life work,
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was published in 1635 a few months before his death with a reprint in 1651 under the title The Truth of the Christian Religion. Although it was Gill's purpose to base his defense of the Articles of Faith on reason and to "take his Light" from Raymond Lull and Thomas Aquinas, Gill cited in this book of more than 400 folio pages about 250 works, innumerable people and more than 2000 Biblical references.

From the great number of references cumulated from the Logonomia Anglica and the Sacred Philosophie and the complete lack of duplication between them, we realize that surely the works of few men at the time of Alexander Gill, the elder, showed greater contact with books. That Milton may have been influenced by this wellspring is reason for further study of the education, readings, and writings of Alexander Gill, the elder.


In this dissertation I examine the place of bourgeois thought in American education. I argue that, from the seventeenth century to date, bourgeois epistemology and ethics had and continue to have a major role in shaping our educational policies and practices.

The term "bourgeois" is defined with reference to the works of Thomas Hobbes (Leviathan) and John Locke (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Second Treatise of Government) where they discuss: the nature of man; what constitutes a valid claim to knowledge; what it means to be free and to be reasonable. Their writings are used as the clearest, earliest statements of the general bourgeois position, though no claim is made that any given bourgeois read a word either wrote.

From Hobbes's and Locke's discussions, bourgeois ethics and epistemology are deduced:

1. Man can only have knowledge of that which has a physical basis.
2. Human happiness consists in obtaining and preserving as many objects as can be engrossed.

3. The process of obtaining and preserving can best be served by the use of reason.

4. Reason means applying logic and the "scientific method."

5. Reason is claimed to be available to all.

6. Reason is the distinguishing human characteristic.

7. Following the assumption that most of human happiness consists in accumulating as many physical objects as possible, which is predicated upon the use of reason, a person's humanness becomes measured by the amount of property he controls.

The reasonableness of my claim regarding bourgeois ethics and epistemology's influence on American education is supported by philosophic analysis and by showing that much of American educational history and practice, in its broad outline, is made intelligible by reference to the presence of bourgeois thought.

Chapter One is a general introduction. I discuss the scope and limits of the dissertation and bring out the importance of examining society's normative framework.

Chapters Two and Three present the ideas of Hobbes (Two) and Locke (Three) on epistemology, reason, happiness, full humanness, control of material goods, and education.

Chapter Four examines the relationship between the bourgeois position, identified in the preceding two chapters, and the American bourgeois support of representative politics and mass public education. I argue that security in property and maximum individual freedom are best served, according to bourgeois principle, by representative politics, which is only possible if the majority of people act reasonably. That is only possible if the masses are given (and compelled to take) public education—that they may come to use their ability to reason.

Chapter Five considers the relationship between bourgeois ethics and the place of vocationalism in American education. Voca-
Vocationalism is defined as only that in-school teaching which prepares a person to engage in producing goods and marketable services. I argue, citing the historical record, that vocationalism was, and is, a prime impetus to mass public education. Vocationalism is shown to be strongly sponsored by bourgeois ethics and needs. By preparing others to be productive, the bourgeois both increase their security by diminishing the need of others to steal to live, and increase the quantity of goods produced, hence, available to satisfy their desires.

The final chapter, Six, criticizes our educational system for its too strict adherence to bourgeois epistemology and ethics. I argue that our system is unjust because it treats unequals equally and it is psychologically damaging because it fails to give proper attention to the human need to belong, to feel a part of something more than oneself, to be able to express inner needs or demonstrate one's humanity in ways other than consumption of material goods. The prognosis for correcting these shortcomings is bleak—yet it is hoped that by understanding why what is done is in fact done, we may cease doing it to so harmful an extent.


Positions Concerning the Training Up of Children is a treatise on the social, political, and ethical grounds of education, and was intended as the preface to a series of books on schooling by Richard Mulcaster. This edition is a photo-facsimile reprint of the copy at King's College, Cambridge (A.6.52), with additional pages from copies at the Folger Shakespeare Library and Cambridge University Library, and has an apparatus indicating differences from other copies (7 complete copies were collated fully, and a total of 27 out of a known 35 were examined). A number of significant variants were found which indicate the corrector's familiarity with Mulcaster's orthography (and which suggest Mulcaster himself may have had a hand with the proofs). The apparatus also provides a small number of emendations.
tions to the text, which was found to be remarkably well prepared by
the printers.

The introduction to the edition provides a biography of Mul-
caster; a closely argued discussion of the central ideas of the book as
they reflect contemporary concerns with issues in education; an
extensive analysis of the author's rhetorical method; a brief outline of
contemporary and later reaction to the work; a discussion of sources
(with special concentration on Mulcaster's use of Gerolamo Mercuri-
ale's De arte gymnastica libri sex for the chapters on physical exer-
cise); and an analysis of the printing and publication of Positions.
Appendixes provide a list and description of the known copies of
Positions and an analysis of Mulcaster's theory of spelling as it
pertains to the text of Positions.

The commentary following the text gives present day English
senses for some of Mulcaster's often difficult language (read against
the Oxford English Dictionary, with corrective interpretations sug-
gerstated), and offers background to Mulcaster's many allusions, both
classical and contemporary. Indexes of words and names provide a
key to the commentary.

22. BARNETT, Richard Chambers (Ph. D.). "The Household and
Secretariat of William Cecil, Lord Burghley." University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1963. 407 pp. Source: DAI,
XXIV, 8 (February, 1964), 3305-3306. XUM Order No. 64-1832.

Sir William Cecil, Knight, son of a Northamptonshire squire,
was at the Princess Elizabeth's side in 1558 when she received the news
of her accession. Promptly sworn a Privy Councillor, Cecil was given
sole responsibility for the office of Principal Secretary of State. After
the failure of the northern rebellion in 1569-1570, Cecil's reactionary
opposition was silenced. His promotion to the Lord Treasurership in
1572, after receiving the Garter and a barony, underlined his preem-
minence in Elizabeth's Council. Cecil retained his paramount role until
his death in 1598.

So long a tenure in high office suggests considerable success as
an administrator. A study of the hidden portion of the machinery of
administration helps explain Cecil's success. In the households of Tudor officers of state were to be found employed men whose duties were primarily of a public nature. Civil servants today, they were then the personal servants of men like Burghley. From such apprenticeship the fortunate and competent were often promoted to the royal service.

Burghley's household never included more than 120 servants. Most barons had less; several great earls employed more. This study identified 123 commoners who served Lord Burghley at various times from 1544, when he first established a household, until 1598. Most of the eighty-seven gentlemen and squires who served had some contact with government work. No geographical pattern of recruitment is apparent. Of the thirty-six who can be traced to their country of origin, five came from Wales. Two of these, Gabriel Goodman and Thomas Bellot, were the most esteemed of all. All sixteen university educated men attended Cambridge. Of twenty-three servants whose religious position can be established, all were puritan. Sixteen servants were members of Parliament. Thirteen received knighthoods.

Many of the gentlemen, including Burghley's chief steward, received no salary. Instead, they were given gratuities, wardships, offices and leases. Thirty-three persons received fifty-four wardships. Approximately thirty-four obtained fifty-one offices at Burghley's disposal.

As a consequence of the dispersal of his servants during Elizabeth's reign, Burghley had direct influence in and intelligence from many quarters. The queen was well supplied with Burghley's men. The borough of Westminster was administered by one of his most trusted servants, Gabriel Goodman, also an intermediary between Wales and the Court. Two of Burghley's nephews served as secretaries of the Council of the North. Two clients were prominent in northern border affairs. Similarly, Burghley's clients were continuously in the Irish service. Cambridge University was essentially a Cecil preserve. Finally, the Company of Stationers, charged with a degree of public censorship, was influenced through William Seres, five times Master of the Company and a longtime servant of Lord Burghley.

These facts emerge from the study of the biographies assembled for those of Burghley's household who could be traced. They reveal how ubiquitous Burghley's influence was as he became the focus of a functioning machine, orderly, stable and responsive to his direction. The biographies also tell part of the story of the administra-
tion of the kingdom—the recruitment, training, employment and promotion of personnel.


Although elementary-school children have been objects of many quantitative studies, noticeably fewer attempts have been made to describe some of the more qualitative dimensions of childhood. The purpose of this study is to discuss three aspects of childhood's animating spirit—Wonder, Play and Construction/Reconstruction—by means of which young school children author and authenticate their life-experiences, values, and commitments. Toward this end, a critical appraisal is made of two distinctive types of related literature:

1. That which treats childhood in discursive form and is written by adults for an adult audience.

2. That which adult authors have written, in nondiscursive form, for young children themselves.

In opening chapters, a theoretical rationale is presented, within which a concern for Wonder, Play, and Construction/Reconstruction finds its contemporary meaning and educational significance. From this conceptual schema, criteria are extracted for conducting content analyses of the collected children's poems by Robert Louis Stevenson, Kate Greenaway, and Christina Rossetti, three poets whose verses have survived a century of social and cultural changes and still remain widely anthologized. The aim of this examination is to ascertain, through a method of dialectical criticism, the extent to which these poems illumine a conceptualization of the childlike spirit by exemplifying qualities of childlikeness, viz., Wonder, Play, or Construction/Reconstruction.
Both an overview of the three poets' work and detailed results from critiques of 281 poems are included. Poems that emerge the strongest by standards employed in this study are of three major types:

1. Those in which a single childlike quality (either Wonder, Play, or Construction/Reconstruction) is extracted from a complex life-experience context and refined in such a way that the reader recognizes its solitary features, but still feels its symbolic contextual wholeness.

2. Those in which two or more childlike qualities are interrelated or synthesized.

3. Those in which several lines of an otherwise mundane verse resurrect the whole with their metaphoric aptness or beauty.

It is found that either as actual topics or as more subtle elements of poetic styling, Wonder, Play, and Construction/Reconstruction appear in the work of all three poets. Not only do one or more of these childlike qualities exist in almost every poem, but they occur in unanticipated variety, as well as in complex intra- and inter-relational forms. Discovered among the strongest Rossetti poems is a group dealing with Construction/Reconstruction and death, in both human and ecological forms, which were written for children but currently are deleted from American versions of her anthology.

If, as a result of this investigation, the poets themselves were to be ranked for contemporary relevance and overall excellence of product, Rossetti would be considered best, followed by Stevenson and then Greenaway. Each author's work, however, provides unique perspectives on the nature of childhood and some of its frequently sacrificed values.

It is concluded that resurgent qualities of childlikeness, which have an impact upon both creativity and maturity, may be an important factor in explaining the longevity of the poems studied. In addition, it is proposed that a valuation of Wonder, Play, and Construction/Reconstruction could afford clues to sustaining fruitful communication between youth and their eiders that have forceful implications for both the teaching and the curricula of technologically oriented young children.
Among the many concerns of contemporary American education is the lack of clarity in educational direction. This study was undertaken to see if Herbert Spencer's views on the concept of progress could shed some light on this concern.

The focus of this study was to explicate Herbert Spencer's views on the concept of progress, to show how they relate to his social and educational theories, and to consider their educational implications.

Herbert Spencer, from a naturalistic position, viewed man as part of and continuous with nature. He argued that, through adaptation and adjustment, growth, development and movement are inevitable and fundamental to nature, to human life, and basic to all progress. Spencer's position on progress, and in turn education, was essentially that of movement from homogeneity to heterogeneity, with emphasis on individuation and mutual dependency. It was found that Spencer's social and educational theories relate to his views on the concept of progress, in that individuation and mutual dependency acknowledges and accepts a unique, diversified and pluralistic society that requires equitable social arrangements both in the classroom and in society.

While it is recognized and acknowledged that Spencer's views come from a nineteenth century English perspective, some implications for contemporary American education were found. The first was that there needs to be an interdisciplinary approach to subject matter and a reconciliation between learning and life. That is, as subject matter moves from specialization toward mutual dependency, curricular effort becomes an integrated and interdisciplinary one. This implication was made in the context of a second and much larger one; namely, for educational progress there must exist an equilibrium, harmony and balance between the individual and the subject matter. There is a need for application of the subject matter to the life of the individual. That is, subject matter needs to be individuated and
related to the needs of the individual student. Further, the progression of the subject matter must keep in mind the ability and interest of the individual. It follows then that teachers must address individual ability and need differences, and every effort must be made toward the adaptation and adjustment of the subject matter and the method to this ability and need difference. Teaching and learning must proceed from the simple to the complex, from the particular to the general, from the concrete to the abstract.

It was also found that since all that can be learned in the school setting is limited, it becomes necessary to select the subject matter that is regarded as of greatest importance and value at any given time. In this regard, the study of science was found to be of paramount importance, particularly because as a discipline that teaches and explains the laws' underlying phenomena, and as a method that verifies what is observed it enlarges the meaning and perception of experience.

Finally, the conclusion reached was that there must be more responsiveness to the psychological and social needs of the individual than in the past. For, to be able to deal effectively with personality dimensions is as important as becoming skilled in problem solving. This conclusion strongly suggests a need for a holistic approach to teaching and learning.


A revolution occurred at the University of Cambridge with the introduction of French analysis in the early nineteenth century. That revolution and the factors conducive to the continuation of physical mathematics is the subject of this dissertation. The failure of English mathematicians to lead in, or even to fully appreciate, the rigorization of analysis beginning with Augustin Cauchy was primarily a result of the approach to mathematics at Cambridge, an approach which allowed the continued success of physical mathematics. William

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Whewell was representative of this traditional approach, and one of the men most responsible for its continued domination, his career at Cambridge from 1812 to 1866 spanning the years in which Cambridge leaders determined to what extent French analysis should replace the traditional mathematics in the curriculum.

As a young mathematician, Whewell displayed innate ability and a mastery of the French analytical methods that had revolutionized mathematics. However, whether the year was 1820 or 1850, he revealed a disdain for the subtleties and rigor of analysis, using analysis more in the fashion of Euler than mid-nineteenth century continental analysts, and he exhibited an attachment to geometry similar to that of eighteenth century English mathematicians. More interested in natural theology, morality, and philosophy than in mathematics, he never developed an intrinsic interest in analysis. Consequently, although he became the epitome of the English scholar of universal knowledge, he failed to make any important contribution to mathematics in the form of original research.

Within a decade after helping to promote the analytical revolution at Cambridge through his lectures and his textbooks on mechanics which guaranteed that England would receive mechanics as physics rather than as a branch of analysis, Whewell, hoping to undo some of the effects of the revolution, began a campaign to preserve part of the pre-revolution curriculum. Exalting the mathematics of the eighteenth century, he denigrated analysis, which he viewed as formalism, a necessary evil that produced results, sometimes, if the mathematician were grounded in the geometrical, the intuitive, and the physical.

Rigor is relative. From the modern vantage point, mid-nineteenth century analysis lacked a foundation. The proponents of analytical methods at Cambridge preferred to base analysis on the expansion of functions rather than the concept of limits, thereby giving some credence to Whewell's equation of analysis with formalism. Whewell disparaged analysis, however, not because he was more perceptive, but because he failed to appreciate the rigor of his day. Whereas his countrymen properly called for the expulsion of intuition and geometry from analysis, Whewell attempted to found all of mathematics on intuition and geometry.

Underlying Whewell's actions was his intuitively founded philosophy of knowledge formulated to establish the existence of necessary truths which demanded that man go beyond the phenome-
nal to the noumenal to gain glimpses of the Divine Mind. By teaching these truths, Whewell hoped to send forth students secure in their belief in the existence of absolute knowledge and the mind's immortality, and, therefore, grounded in morality and religion, linked with the past and the temporal and eternal future. To achieve the ends of the liberal education, he demanded the retention of Newtonian mechanics and synthetic mathematics within the curriculum and asserted that analysis was extraneous and even detrimental to his goals. Ensnared in philosophy, his disdain for analysis, and his love for the synthetic mathematics of the past, especially Newtonian synthesis, Whewell became dogmatic in his attacks against analysis within the liberal education. He found a modicum of support among his peers, and Cambridge turned back toward the geometrical.


This study had the following main purposes:

1. To explain the development of I. A. Richards' criticism.
2. To explain the development of his education theory.
3. To examine the relationship between his criticism and educational theory.
4. To ascertain what recommendations for the teaching of literature can be drawn from his work in education and criticism.

Richards' early criticism is based on a materialist philosophy and a behaviorist psychology. He gradually moved away from this position until at the end of his career he had assumed an intellectual orientation that best can be described as pragmatic-linguistic. There were many
reasons for this change. His study of language led him to believe that the traditional idealistic-materialist argument was not a "real" philosophic problem but a semantic confusion. From his study of Coleridge he developed a respect for Coleridge's critical theories and idealistic philosophy. Richards also was disappointed by the failure of the behaviorist psychologists to make significant discoveries. However, the main reason for his change of outlook probably was due to the development of his contextual theory of meaning. The theory originally was based on behaviorist principles and stressed the tone, attitude, mental and physical history and condition of the speaker and listener, writer and reader. Literature was basically a stimulus that triggered a response. The contextual theory also emphasized the importance of the contexts of words within a sentence and work. Richards developed this later emphasis until he reached the conclusion that words could only be understood in context with other words, that words had meanings rather than meaning, and that the meanings were dependent upon the reasonable choices of the reader. This emphasis on the reader's choices, on the reader's will, was instrumental in causing Richards to break with his early deterministic views. In his later work Richards looks to the study of meaning to solve philosophic problems and explain human psychology. He looks upon works of literature as possibilities of meaning about which the reader forms and tests hypotheses, then choosing the most workable or efficient meanings—hence, the pragmatic flavor of his later theorizing.

Richards' educational theory is based on his later contextual theory and on his theory of synaesthesia, a behaviorist theory of the value of literature which postulated that literature was a stimulus which resulted in a response that produced a harmony and equilibrium of the reader's mental impulses. Although Richards dropped the use of the term "synaesthesia" along with his behaviorist beliefs, he continued to hold that the chief value of art is its affective qualities. The contextual theory that develops close reading techniques is instrumental in attaining the proper experience of the work of literature. This experience of literature is then instrumental in developing better adjusted human beings and more harmonious societies. These of course are open-ended pragmatic values.

Richards' practical criticism and his theory of education are very similar. Both the teacher and critic should be concerned basically with reading methods and techniques that lead to an adequate re-
Ronald James Beck

response to works of literature. The teacher of literature will be concerned also with how these techniques best may be taught.

The recommendations made in the study are based on Richards' critical and educational theory. The most important recommendations are:

1. The need to develop better close reading techniques, especially those which lead the reader to question himself about the value and meaning of what he reads. These techniques must be accumulated, preserved, and widely disseminated.

2. The need for structuring the material in literature courses from the simple to the complex.

3. The need to emphasize qualitative rather than quantitative reading. Only qualitative reading can lead to the proper experiencing of works of literature.


This study is an examination of the life of Robert Proud—a man remembered in varying degrees as a Quaker, a loyalist, a teacher, a merchant, and an historian of colonial Pennsylvania.

Born in rural England in 1728 of hardy and devoted Quaker parents, he was the first-born of six children. As an impressionable youth he was taught the beliefs of the Quaker faith. This demanding religion and the appreciation of the hard work of a tenant farm produced in him the sobriety and sternness that marked the introversion of his personality. When exposed to learning, he reflected an uncommon giftedness which caused him to be desirous of further education.

At eighteen he was provided the opportunity to live and study with the aging Quaker zealot, David Hall. The atmosphere of the
1740's was marred by the civil strife of that period and by the threat of suppression of dissenter schooling. Despite this adverse climate Proud was greatly impressed by Hall's scholarship and by his dedication to Quaker principles. A close bond formed which lasted until Hall's death a few years later.

Equipped with a classical education and consequently dissatisfied with life as a farmer, he journeyed to London. There he entered into the circle of such notable Quakers as Dr. John Fothergill and Timothy and Sylvanus Bevan. As a tutor for the latter family he was permitted the use of their extensive libraries. By the end of seven years in that setting he judged London society to be artificial, decadent, and offensive to his moral standards. He had been absorbing the tales of Pennsylvania, and he developed a perception of a Quaker Utopia, attractive enough to cause his emigration to America.

Upon arriving he was received kindly but was beset by the problems of securing a residence and of finding steady employment. He settled into teaching at the Friends Latin School, later called the William Penn Charter School. He was simultaneously exposed to the notable reformers, Anthony Benezet and John Woolman, as well as grandees such as James Pemberton and George Logan. He seemed to live in the shadow of great men here, as he had done in England.

In 1770, after nearly a decade, he left teaching and went into business as an importer and merchant with his brother John who had recently arrived from England. The business climate, precarious in 1770, declined after 1773, and the venture was forcibly ended in 1775 with the outbreak of revolution.

The frustration of another failure and revulsion with the rebellion caused him to become more insular. His attempts to defend his sect in writing from the harassments and persecutions induced by the war were ignored. Because of his loyalist attitudes, he secluded himself during much of the war period. At that time the Society of Friends commissioned him to write a history of Quakers in Pennsylvania. In 1780 he returned to teaching, but the period was marked by further conflicts with the Society over his salary, the education curriculum, and also the history he had written. In poor health and in bitter frustration he left teaching in 1790. The remaining years were spent in further disillusionment involving land speculation, publication, and promotion of his History of Pennsylvania. The family ties which he had attempted to maintain were weakened by distance and time. He died in 1813 leaving behind his History, an autobiographical
sketch, and profuse personal memoranda and correspondence as his only material legacy. He left, however, the story of the evolution of a personality in a traumatic era and of marked commitment in a hostile environment.


Egon Wellesz was born in Vienna. He began instruction in composition with Arnold Schoenberg in 1904. Although devoted to Schoenberg's tenets as a teacher, Wellesz's own compositional career followed an independent path. Drama attracted him. His friendship with Hugo von Hofmannsthal resulted in their collaboration on several operas, which, along with his ballets, enjoyed popularity throughout the German Weimar Republic.

Prior to the German Anschluss in 1938, Wellesz fled to England and settled in Oxford, where he continued his career. He became a fellow of Lincoln College and later Reader in Byzantine Music. While chamber music, songs, and compositions for solo instruments were important in his output, his compositional path in England most importantly followed the line of symphonic writing abandoned after Bruckner's work. He composed nine symphonies.

Before his success in Germany, Wellesz had taken a doctorate in musicology from the University of Vienna under Guido Alder. In addition, he had been specifically recognized as a specialist in the study of Byzantine music, as he sought in the chant of the Eastern Church clues to the origin of Western chant. Both Wellesz and the English scholar H. J. W. Tillyard discovered clues to the decipherment of Byzantine notation. With the Danish philologist Carsten Høeg they founded the Monumenta Musicae Byzantinae in Copenhagen in 1932. In 1949 Wellesz saw his A History of Byzantine Music and Hymnography published.

While the main body of the present study consists of Wellesz's biography, including three chapters relating to Byzantine research,
seven chapters focus on his music. Each of these chapters provides an analysis of several compositions drawn from his total œuvre by providing examples from every major genre in which he composed.

A catalogue of Wellesz's compositions, found in the Appendix, gives an accounting of his more than 112 compositions.

Most importantly, this study makes use of Wellesz's own letters and those from others, his autographs, and personal memorabilia housed in the National Library in Vienna. Among other important sources of first-hand information were interviews and correspondence with Wellesz's widow Emmy Wellesz and their daughter Elisabeth Kessler.


Edward Augustus Freeman (1823-1892) was regarded during his lifetime as one of Britain's most formidable historians, yet he has not had his work examined thoroughly and justly by later historians. Freeman's contributions to historical writing and thinking, while limited, were influential and valuable, yet they have been largely ignored or misrepresented in this century.

The thesis deals with Freeman's historical thought and the influences on its formation and development. The work is divided into ten chapters, opened by a short review of Freeman's life and work. Three chapters which follow examine Freeman's historical methodology. He is revealed as a crusader for broadening the number of approaches to history through the employment of information and techniques developed in auxiliary sciences such as geography and philology, and through the use of comparative method. Freeman's contribution to the development of more critical use of source materials is shown to be substantial and influential.

Three chapters are devoted to Freeman's philosophy of history. While Freeman himself boasted that he had no philosophy of history, his work reveals a relatively coherent body of thought which is here
Robert Nicholas Bérard

explored. He is shown to have believed strongly in the scientific character of historical study but to have doubted that historians could achieve more than limited certainty in their conclusions. Freeman also made a significant contribution to the debate over the place of moral judgments in historical writing. With most other historians of his day, he made moral and character judgments an important part of his narrative, but those judgments were almost always tempered by a profound historical sense and thoughtful personal empathy. An attempt is made to clarify Freeman’s poorly understood vision of the unity of history; and attention is given to the way in which this theory influenced Freeman’s writing and that of later historians.

The thesis takes up the question of Freeman’s place in a trans-Atlantic school of Teutonists. This analysis of his serious historical work on national history indicates that he was neither the blind racist nor the uncritical nationalist that he is often portrayed as being. His work was a powerful impetus to the study of national institutional history in both England and the United States, but no evidence was found to indicate that Freeman ever consciously or seriously distorted history in the service of his theories of national origins.

Finally, some key principles in Freeman’s poorly understood political philosophy are examined. The historian best known for his remark that “History is past politics and politics present history” drew his political principles from his historical study. Indeed it is only by considering Freeman’s political positions as the fruit of his historical research that one can find a real coherence in what might seem to be a superficial political faith that ranged from radical to reactionary.

The study attempts not only to analyze Freeman’s history but to place it in the wider context of British and nineteenth century historiography. A transitional figure, Freeman, by training and temperament a visionary, universal historian of the mold of Niebuhr and Arnold, became an advocate of a more detailed, scientific, and professional type of history. The marriage of the two was not always happy in Freeman’s own writing, but he strove to impart a loftier vision and a more sober and scholarly methodology of history to both historians and the general public.

30. BERHEIDE, Michael Charles (Ph. D.). "Methodology and Meta-physics: Karl Popper and the Practice of Political Science."
Contemporary political science suffers from a methodological schism which penetrates to assumptions about the place of values in a science of politics, the proper unit of analysis, the place of metaphysics and historical understanding, and even the possibility of practicing the study of politics as a science. With a few notable exceptions, the profession has managed to paper over these controversies, reaching an uneasy orthodoxy which disguises its underlying methodological problems.

Methodological assumptions, however, are not without serious consequences. This dissertation makes the claim that methodologies based upon positivistic principles, such as behavioralism and certain varieties of historicism, cannot justify themselves, owing to an axiomatic denial of any role for metaphysical analysis. Such analysis is seen to be necessary in light of any scientific methodology's inability to justify itself, a conclusion derived from Kurt Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, as interpreted and applied by Karl Popper.

Popper's use of incompleteness and of his own criterion of falsifiability in science is shown to be successful as a preliminary criticism of the assumptions of logical positivism and historicism. This analysis is then seen to be itself lacking in finality, in that Popper's own disavowal of metaphysics leads his program into an unacceptable relativism.

Michael Polanyi and Eric Voegelin are then used as examples of thinkers who would construct the metaphysical backing necessary for the ultimate success of Popper's arguments against both positivism and historicism. The result, as the dissertation concludes, is a political science capable of examining its methodological presuppositions and thus of learning and growing, and of utilizing historical studies in a constructive way.
Modern critical evaluation of Defoe's ideas on education has been remarkably limited. Neither of the two cursory studies published on the subject makes a comprehensive analysis of Defoe's educational philosophy, nor has any scholar yet assessed what is radical, original or conventional in his contributions.

Showing a lifelong interest in education for persons of all stations, Defoe discussed the proper curriculum for a dissenting academy, set forth a plan for an academy for women, said that gentlemen should be interested in modern foreign languages as well as Latin, told tradesmen to write clear letters, and proposed the establishment of a school for military training.

During the forty years that Defoe addressed his readers as a journalist and writer of fiction, until just before his death in 1731, an increasing number of people clamored for some sort of formal education in England. Evidence of this ferment is seen in the rise of popular literature, and the development of a rudimentary school system which foreshadowed the arrival of universal education. The privilege of education was slowly being extended to a widening segment of the population, but without any serious alteration in the relationship of the classes.

In setting forth his ideas on education, Defoe was in effect participating in this gradual and typically English revolution. For all of his preachment about self-improvement, he considered each class in need of its special kind of schooling.

This study deals with Defoe's views on education for the upper, middle and lower classes and for women as reflected in his total body of writing. In his proposals for upper-class education, notably The Compleat English Gentleman (ca. 1728-1729), Defoe was hardly a root and branch reformer although his suggestion for the establishment of a university in London (August Triumphans, 1728) was advanced for his time. His advice to the middle class was to succeed and grow wealthy. He did not propose to transform merchants and their wives into lords, ladies or learned skeptics. In such works as The Complete English Tradesman (1725-1727), he recommended strictly
practical subjects such as bookkeeping, accounting and letter writing—effective vocationalism, in a word.

His program for the poor ("Giving Alms No Charity," 1704, and "Everybody's Business is Nobody's Business," 1725) was concerned with moral, rather than with intellectual or material betterment. Like several contemporaries, he favoured the institution of the charity school, fully accepting its mixture of Christian teaching, severe discipline and fragments of the 3R's as suitable to the minimal needs of the lower class. Defoe had much to say on the subject of the education of women in An Essay Upon Projects (1697), Conjugal Lewdness (1727), Moll Flanders (1722) and Roxana (1724). He believed that the limited scope and availability of female education was a problem of serious magnitude, particularly because he subscribed to the Lockean notion of the potential equality of the sexes. The traditional curriculum of needlework and dancing displeased him and he hinted that women and mothers could even master subjects regarded as provinces for male minds such as economics and mathematics. In various late writings, however, Defoe retreated to the conventional, safer issue of female morality, expressing his overriding interest in a woman's moral condition rather than in her intellectual ability.

Defoe was not a consistent educational theoretician as was Comenius, nor a persistent educational innovator as Rousseau was about to be. Essentially, he saw education as a way of "getting on." However, by gathering together disparate ideas and disseminating his theories in his fiction and innumerable nonfiction writings, he helped to stimulate public consciousness of education in England.


The major thrust of this study is to offer a critical examination of the behavioral understanding of human selfhood in John Dewey's thought by using John Macmurray's thought as a helpful, critical tool. The reason for the greater emphasis upon Dewey is that his social
behaviorism is a major influence in American intellectual life, while Macmurray's thought is highly individual and without any extensive influence. The primary question regarding Dewey's view of the self is whether it does justice to the full range of human, personal existence in terms of its bio-social analysis of the human person.

The first chapter is devoted to Dewey's analysis of the self and how the self functions in the distinctively human area of expressing and realizing itself in choosing and pursuing values. Dewey developed his views by seeking out the implications of the Darwinian understanding of man as biological organism seeking an effective adjustment to his environment. Man's continuity with nature destroys all the old dualisms built upon the notion of a substantial soul or mind or consciousness radically distinct from the natural environment. All of man's activities, including the higher, ideal realms of morals and esthetics, are rooted in nature. Man is a biological organism.

But, in man nature has achieved a more complex functioning of natural energies. Man has the capacity to share experience through the development of abstract symbols—language. The human person is, therefore, a bio-social organism seeking a harmonious adjustment to his natural and social environment amidst the changes and uncertainties of ongoing life. Man prizes certain goods or values as enrichments of his experience and he can, by the use of his intelligence, make experience more accessible to his control. Intelligence refined as scientific inquiry enables man to evaluate different ends and values to determine which shall bring him greater enrichment of life when it is threatened by insecurity and conflict. The behavioral sciences can give us the same control of our human destiny that the natural sciences have given us over nature. In all of this, "freed intelligence" or "organized cooperative inquiry" is the key to adjudicating conflict and effecting social progress.

Chapter two deals with John Macmurray. This Scottish philosopher has developed his views of the self as the basis for a religious interpretation of the human experience. Rejecting the "I think" starting-point of traditional Western philosophy which inevitably leads to isolating persons, he defines man as essentially an agent, not an epistemological subject and the essential character of human existence is the mutuality of personal relationships. Science cannot capture the nature of personal relationships and Macmurray develops the formal categories for understanding "persons in relation" or "communion."
Religion's role is to affirm and strengthen communion. The mutuality of human relationships can best be represented by the idea of a personal God in communion with all persons.

Chapter three is essentially a critique of Dewey's views and, incidentally, of Macmurray's. Dewey's commitment to publicly observable behavioral continuities and transactions amenable to scientific control obscured his commitment to an open universe where choice is real and free. His desire for a scientific morality did not permit him to see that the criteria for value choices cannot be validated or evaluated scientifically except where a basic value-consensus already exists. His belief in the manageability of human conflict led him to see no problem of harmonizing conflicting interests. His belief in the capacity for self-objectification obscured the role of bias and partiality in human affairs. His total view of the self as a part of nature did not permit him to see what Macmurray saw clearly—that man is sharply distinguished from the rest of nature and must be treated in some ways as a substantial entity possessing characteristics not amenable to scientific scrutiny. There are aspects of the traditional notion of the soul that Dewey's behaviorism fails to take account of, while granting the validity of much of Dewey's analysis.


This essay examines the question as to whether Marx's theory of knowledge is a realist theory. Some theories of knowledge belonging to the empirical tradition—those that assume that our knowledge is based on sense-experience—have made claims to realism. This claim consists in asserting that the theory of knowledge presented can show that we come to know a real external world, and what we know it to be is independent of our knowing it. In trying to uphold the claim, theories in the empirical tradition have encountered, I have suggested, insurmountable difficulties. The essay undertakes to see
whether Marx succeeds where others fail.

The analysis begins with an examination of theories in the empirical tradition—and why they fail to be realist. The first subject for scrutiny is the theory of knowledge formulated by Locke, and the parts of it that have survived to the present day, under the rubric of "traditional empiricism." This is followed by an examination of Popper’s critique of traditional empiricism and an analysis of his suggested remedy. In turn follows Dewey’s critique of traditional empiricism and an analysis of his alternative. It is argued that Popper’s rejection of traditional empiricism because of its subjectivist inability to comprehend a rational history of science, and Dewey’s rejection of traditional empiricism on the ground of the latter being derived from a pre-Darwinian metaphysics, are appropriate.

Popper’s own alternative is based on the recognition that rejection of traditional empiricism implies the rejection of a subjectivist psychological model of knowledge. Popper tries to introduce a theory of knowledge based on a theory of society. This theory of society assumes that society is constituted of individuals and abstract structures relating them, called "institutions." Popper’s second assumption is that the history of science, which his theory of knowledge seeks to explain, is a history of ideas, where theories are sequentially rejected in favor of better ones. We cannot know a theory or a hypothesis to be true, but can have grounds for rejecting it. Under the assumption of "methodological individualism" such a march of ideas must be presided over by appropriate institutions. Popper’s third assumption is that there is the character "truth" that beliefs can possess which is a metalogical notion (following Tarski). The conjunction of these three presuppositions leads to a notion of knowledge that is either possessed by individuals as behavioral dispositions, or is transcendental in the sense that it belongs to no one at all.

Dewey’s alternative is based on the premise that the individual is a biological organism and the structure of cognitive activity or inquiry is a correlate of the structure of biological activity. Truth, in this theory, "happens" to cognitive activity, is an outcome of successful cognition. Lastly, human individuals have habitual dispositions arrived at by membership in a pre-existent group of individuals behaviorally organized as institutions. With these three assumptions we get a conflicting description of knowledge as either a property of institutions or of individuals but not both.

For Marx, knowledge arises out of social practice. The assump-
tions here are that the life-activity of humans consist in transforming nature, not biologically adapting to it. This is done on a social and not an individual basis. We arrive at a theory where the object of our knowledge is the human artifact, and not a given pre-existing nature. The world we know is the real world of constructed objects.

In this essay, an attempt has been made to present a rational reconstruction of the outlines of Marx's theory of knowledge deriving from his theory of human nature, and this theory of knowledge has been examined to see whether it passes muster as a realist theory.


This is a study of the historical treatments of ancient Greece which influenced or reflected the thought of nineteenth century Britain. Many works, starting with Herbert Butterfield's The Whig Interpretation of History in 1931, have shown how the political leanings of historians have influenced their view of English history. This consideration asserts the thesis that Greek history also reflected the political bias of those who wrote it. The bulk of the work concentrates on the major scholarly histories which influenced the intelligentsia, though popular and minor histories are considered as part of the general ethos. The mode of analysis is essentially comparative, and presents a short biography of the historian, concentrates on the political and methodological presuppositions in his Greek histories and other writings, then details the critical reception and public acceptance of the work. A general knowledge of Greek history is presumed, with British intellectual and political history given primarily as background for the views seen in the histories.

A prefatory chapter on the British views of Greek history from the middle ages to Gibbon is followed by an analysis of the Tory histories which dominated the first half of the nineteenth century. The histories of John Gillies and William Mitford show an acquaintance with critical methodology which anticipates the advances of Niebuhr
and Ranke and challenges the view that modern historical bias is shown by constant aspersion of the Athenian democracy, modern liberalism, and the French revolution, interspersed with praise of Sparta, Macedon, and monarchy as seen in Georgian England. Popular histories show a complete lack of critical method and a use of history for moral examples that is close to medieval.

The central section of the thesis examines the great Whig histories which shaped the Victorian view of Greece. The temperate and balanced political views of Connop Thirlwall's Greek history were derived from German idealism, and his awareness of historical relativism anticipates most British considerations by fifty years. George Finlay's work shows an Enlightenment neglect of scholarly niceties and a generally confused use of later Greek and Byzantine history to prove the value of middle class participation in government. An extended treatment of George Grote shows him to have modified many of the Benthamite criteria for history in his treatment of "Legendary Greece," but to have allowed his utilitarian tenets and sympathy for democracy full sway in "Historical Greece." The result was a political bias which rivaled the earlier Tory histories, despite his consummate mastery of sources.

The last section details the increase in political histories to the end of the century, with the Greek histories of E. A. Freeman showing the continued influence of Grote. There is a discussion of the rise in quality of popular histories and the development of social and cultural history based on the work of J. P. Mahaffy, plus a consideration of the advance of archeology and other auxiliary sciences centered on the life and work of C. T. Newton. J. B. Bury shows the development of Byzantine studies after Finlay, and his history of Greece offers a combination of English political usage and continental methodology to judge the actions of historical characters both by the criteria of their own time and by the course of subsequent Greek history.

This study of John Campbell Shairp (1819-1885) has three aims: to describe his intellectual and spiritual development; to supplement Knight's memorial biography by providing, for the time covered, fuller and more accurate descriptions of his personal history, his environment, and that environment's effect on him; to discover and present the materials necessary for a full critical biography. Its scope is not that of a complete life, for the most significant stages of this development had taken place by the time Shairp was in his mid-forties, when he wrote his essays on Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keble, and "The Moral Motive Power." Its unity derives from its first aim: throughout, Shairp's development is traced by describing the major formative influences on his life and his responses to them. The second chapter describes his heredity and home environment and their lifelong effect. The next three describe the stages of his formal education at Edinburgh, Glasgow, and Oxford, and the nature of his responses to the education, religious climate, and other influences experienced in these communities. The third chapter describes his education at Edinburgh Academy, his response to the whole Edinburgh experience, and his first acquaintance with the theologians Campbell and Erskine, and with the poetry of Wordsworth. The fourth treats the Glasgow environment, the non-academic aspects of Shairp's life there, the religious influences present (particularly in the lives of his friends), and the influence of the university courses. Especially important was the influence of the Scottish philosophy. He benefited from the method employed in its teaching but responded both positively and negatively to its content. He adopted its basic characteristics but disliked its tendencies to view analysis as the goal of moral philosophy and to separate philosophy from religion. He discovered Coleridge's philosophy and found it more inspiring. The fifth portrays Shairp's personality at Oxford and describes the aspects of Oxford life particularly relevant to his experience of it. It sketches the basic intellectual and religious patterns of the age on the basis of the dominant epistemological views (the Rationalist, Supernaturalist, and Intuitive-Rationalist) and shows the relationship of this schema to that based on Church parties. Shairp's responses to the religious tensions at Oxford are analyzed: his response to Tractarianism was
Allan Richard Bishop

ambivalent; the continuing influence of his Scottish friendships reenforced the Liberal ideals of comprehensiveness and of an anti-dogmatic approach to Christianity, but it also strengthened his loyalty to the Presbyterian religious traditions in which he had been brought up; doubts concerning the moral efficacy of historical Christianity led to his choice of a Rugby teaching post rather than a curacy (four unpublished letters to Clough discussing this decision are quoted in full). The last chapter continues the description of Shairp's development and describes fully his friendship with Clough. It compares their backgrounds and personal characteristics; describes the course of their friendship (principally through five groups of letters which show a widening distance between the commitments of the two men); and contrasts their intellectual and spiritual development, Shairp's being towards an articulate, morally and intellectually harmonious commitment to orthodox Christianity.

The introductory chapter traces the decline of Shairp's reputation, evaluates Knight's biography, and describes this dissertation. The appendices include:

1. A bibliography of Shairp's writings and of writings about him (writings by Shairp which appeared in more than one edition or form were collated and the results are summarized).

2. A catalog of Shairp's correspondence (173 letters, located, either in manuscript or in published sources other than Knight's biography, are listed and summarized).

3. A catalog of miscellaneous documents (holograph will, certificates of appointments, degrees, etc.); genealogical charts.

Lillian Marie Perrault Bisson

Chaucer consciously accepted the medieval conception of the poet as teacher, but he rejected the open didacticism prevalent in medieval poetry. His approach to teaching is examined in the light of his treatment of his narrator who is discussed in connection with his literary predecessors, the first person narrators in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*, Alan of Lille's *De planctu Naturae*, Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun's *Roman de la Rose*, and Dante's *Divine Comedy*. In each of these works, the primary movement consists of the narrator's gradually coming to understand and accept the teachings of authoritative allegorical figures and having those teachings confirmed through the experiences undergone in the work. The level of instruction and the level of action are fundamentally united; throughout the works, the two levels intermingle and finally merge as the student-narrator achieves insight into the objective reality presented on the level of instruction.

In the early love visions, Chaucer depicts his narrator as a student attempting to derive from authority and experience the wisdom which will fit him for the task of instructor to mankind. Here the levels of instruction and of action do intermingle but they do not merge; what the narrator comes to know at the end is not simply what authority has taught. The narrator in the "Book of the Duchess" both confirms and expands the wisdom derived from Ovid's tale of Ceyx and Alcyone; in the "House of Fame," the narrator, having been taught sound Boethian values by the eagle in Book II, goes on to explore the nature of his art and pursues new materials with a sense of independence born of his sound philosophical basis; and in the "Parliament of Fowls," the narrator does not accept the asceticism of Affrican as the final value and depicts himself as continuing the search for wisdom at the end of the poem.

In the "Troilus," Chaucer radically alters his mode of presentation by separating the level of action from the true level of instruction. Here Pandarus and Troilus play the conventional role of teacher and student respectively with the former offering advice which becomes increasingly inadequate and the latter falling increasingly into despair because he lacks proper guidance. The true level of instruction in this poem is conveyed by the narrator whose role has been transformed from that of student to that of teacher. He becomes the recorder of events long past whose course he is unable to alter. Unlike the traditional allegorical teaching figures, he does not interact with his characters and thus is powerless to affect them. Rather he conveys
... through any openly pedagogical pronouncements but by having the audience see him. Through the duality of his language the narrator enables the audience to see as God sees so that human affairs assume their proper proportions in God's overall plan while at the same time he conveys an appreciation for the consuming beauty and pain of those affairs for those involved in them. From the beginning of the poem the duality of the narrator's language paves the way for the explicit lesson of the epilogue, a lesson which does not negate the experience of love recorded in the poem, but elevates it.


An examination is made of the general pedagogical thought of two philosophers of the seventeenth century to see if any useful principles can be obtained for the development of a philosophy of education for bilingual education in the United States in 1979. Although neither writer was specifically speaking about bilingual education as it is known today, both insist upon the use of the native language of the child in instruction.

Johann Amos Comenius (1592-1670) was a Moravian bishop and teacher who suffered through all the vicissitudes of the Thirty Years War. Driven from his native Moravia, he taught in Poland, fled to Amsterdam, was invited to England, wrote books for the King of Sweden, taught in Hungary and finally died in Holland. Despite his many misfortunes, he remained optimistic and was confident that mankind would someday live in peace. The agency to accomplish this golden age was the school.

Although Comenius advocated the eventual learning of a universal language, possibly Latin, to promote world understanding and world peace, he insisted that the elementary school should provide instruction in the mother tongue of the child so as not to break the continuum between what he had learned at his mother's knee and his
first school years. Later in high school, Comenius thought, there would be time enough for him to learn other languages from other countries. He also placed the responsibility for the student's success or failure on the teacher and always argued for patience and understanding rather than threats. He was confident that the schools could bring about universal peace.

John Locke's *Some Thoughts on Education* was specifically written for the bringing up of a young British gentleman. Yet Locke had also traveled extensively on the continent and thought much about this matter. Consequently his ideas possess value for all types of education. Locke feared that excessive stress on Latin, Greek, and French in the English public schools of his time would prevent the students from ever learning how to reason or discuss ideas in depth in their own language, English. Rather than spend time on writing essays in Latin, or worse yet, composing Latin poems, Locke urged them to spend more time on mastery of their own language. Locke believed that most of the problems of his country in that century were caused by men accepting ill-conceived ideas and prejudices of others without examining them. Through training men to think carefully, to "bottom" their conclusions, Locke hoped to create a generation of thinking, rational men who could resolve problems calmly and objectively and avoid all strife and war.

The writer of the dissertation takes the major point of these two theoreticians: the use and emphasis of the mother tongue as a starting point upon which a philosophy for bilingual education could be constructed. The thesis is divided into considerations on language, teacher-pupil attitude, books, curriculum, and philosophy for the bilingual school.


Locke was an active participant in the scientific revolution of his age and in his philosophy sought to lay the groundwork for the
advancement of scientific knowledge. One dominant concern of the new science was the study of the powers of bodies; that is, their abilities to operate upon one another in various ways. As a philosopher for the new science Locke laid special emphasis upon the concept of power. He attempted to give the concept an empirical justification and cast powers in a major role in at least three key areas of his philosophy—his doctrine of perception, of substance, and of knowledge.

Building upon the foundation of a scientific atomism, Locke traced ideas of sensation to powers which exist in bodies by virtue of the primary qualities of their atomic parts. Thus powers figure as the originals of many of the basic data of perception. Locke explicitly states that our ideas of secondary qualities (e.g., colors and scents) answer to nothing in bodies but powers to produce ideas in the mind, while in several passages he seems to suggest that the dimensional properties may be treated as powers as well. Locke also finds in powers the key to his realist metaphysic, since the feeling of power ingredient in perception points to a causally efficacious world beyond.

Substances provide the basic units of Locke's ontology, and hence serve as the subjects in which powers inhere. Locke recognizes two general types of substances, minds and bodies. Powers enter prominently into the makeup of each, the power of initiating motion by thought being the defining characteristic of mind and the power of communicating motion by impulse the defining characteristic of body. The ontological ground for the powers of a substance is its real essence, which as an atomist Locke identified with its atomic constitution. The powers which flow from the real essences determine the sorts of substances, the "nominal essence" or complex idea of each sort being defined primarily in terms of its powers.

Locke's theory of knowledge is intended to provide a program for the scientific study of bodies and their powers. To realize this aim Locke undertakes a critique of older techniques for extending knowledge, most notably the method of deducing from essences. He recognizes the theoretical possibility of a deductive knowledge of powers, but holds that since we cannot know the real essences of things this method remains a practical impossibility. The only way to improve our knowledge of bodies is by experience. Through observation and experiment we can discover the latent powers of bodies and thus arrive at more accurate accounts of their natures.
Robert Theodore Bobilin


The purpose of this study was to investigate the issues involved in the relationship between values and social change in the thought of the social philosopher Karl Mannheim. Particular attention was directed to his writings in the area of ethical relativism and his concept of "relationism."

Ethical relativism raises problems and difficulties for philosophy, social science, and religion. Are values dependent on the social and historical situation? Are they without basis in "objective" knowable reality? Can a society endure without a consensus about and commitment to some basic principles and ultimate values?

The methodology employed was an examination of the writings of Karl Mannheim, of the critical materials dealing with his thought, and of selected writings in philosophy and sociology relevant to the above issues. In considering the metaphysical, intuitive, approval, process, and skeptical theories of ethics, it was a hypothesis of this study that Mannheim's thought could be identified most clearly with the "Process" theories.

Findings

A. Karl Mannheim's approach to value, knowledge, and social change includes the following assumptions or methods of thought:

1. All of our knowledge is incomplete. Only formal and logical statements may be complete and they are used according to the context in which they operate.

2. Consistency and comprehensiveness are limited, but important, criteria of the validity of knowledge.

3. Thought, knowledge, mind—together with action, sensation,
Robert Theodore Bobilin

and matter—are interrelated aspects of the same process and same reality.

4. The discovery of knowledge and value are functions of our total experience. Unconscious factors are as much a dimension of the social as are the conscious.

5. The possibilities of error and of a continuing ordering of data logically imply an objective sphere of truth and order. Suggesting the existence of an objective order does not mean our knowledge of it is objective.

6. Knowledge and values have as their most important function the orientation and guidance of future action.

7. Men and society will benefit by the sharing of fragmentary and limited knowledge and insights.

8. Modern society needs to search for and establish agreement upon those values that are lasting and common.

B. Relationism assumes that values are not limited to, or bound by, the position of the knowing subject, nor solely based on the culture of which the individual is a member. Values are related to the following:

1. The knowing subject and his historical and social reality.

2. The reconstruction of reality in line with consciously chosen purposes.

3. The common human needs and values of most complex societies.

4. The ontological nature of the self.

5. The "unfolding substratum of life itself."

There have been a number of serious criticisms of Karl Mannheim’s thought. Weaknesses and ambiguities in his concepts, circular rea-
Conclusions

1. The above criticisms do not invalidate Mannheim's central thesis that out of the "reciprocal inter-relationship" between persons in a given situation, the conditions of existence, and the need for resolving conflicts and clarifying problems come knowledge and value.

2. This concept of relationism, while needing further development and clarification, is a tenable philosophic position and contributes to the solution of the difficulties raised by relativism.

3. Mannheim shows marked similarity to Dewey and Whitehead in their concepts of "contextualism" and "organism" and to some pragmatists, but he does not readily fit into any of the classification of the ethical theories mentioned above. He can be associated with the "process" school because of his repeated attention to the dynamic nature of knowledge.


This dissertation summarizes the methodological views of each of the major participants in the nineteenth century British Methodenstreit in political economy and isolates those currents in nineteenth century economic methodology which have persisted into the twentieth century. Among those involved in the British Methodenstreit, I have examined the relevant writings of Walter Bagehot, John E. Cairnes, J. K. Ingram, Richard Jones, T. E. C. Leslie, Alfred Marshall,
Craig Jay Bolton

David Syms, and William Whewell.

Three major conclusions arise from this study. First, each of the writers considered possessed a somewhat ideosyncratic conception of the scope and procedures appropriate to economic inquiry. In this respect, then, it is misleading to speak simply of Historical and Orthodox "schools," since these labels have frequently been interpreted as denoting homogeneous points of view.

Second, those fundamental characteristics which were shared in common by writers within each of the two methodological traditions are not the characteristics which have frequently received the attention of the intellectual historian. The Historical School, for example, has often been associated with its German counterpart and portrayed as a reaction against all economic theorizing. Instead of disposing of economic theory, however, the typical British Historian of the period prior to the 1890's was interested in tying the existing theory to specific institutional contexts, thus integrating into economic analysis some important behavioral constraints. So far as this attempt was successful, it resulted in economic theories yielding definite predictions and testable consequences, as opposed to a theory which was nebulous enough to explain everything but which predicted only *ex post*.

Third, the Historical and Orthodox orientations toward the meaning of and justification for economic studies have persisted, in somewhat mutated forms, to the present day. Frank Knight, Fritz Machlup and, to a lesser extent, Milton Friedman have emphasized the role of economics as a way of viewing the world and organizing our perception of social events. While prediction is granted a role in most versions of neo-Orthodoxy, the certainty of the theory is still guaranteed by introspective inspection of our own motive and by the intuitive appeal of economic reasoning. Prediction on the basis of economic analysis is still limited by the reputed inaccessibility of controlled experimentation in social science and by the "partial" character of economic motives in the direction of human action. Opposed to the neo-Orthodox tradition have been writers such as T. W. Hutchison, Eugene Rotwein and, to some degree, Paul Samuelson. These neo-Historicists have demanded that theories be clearly specified, tested by comparison with existing data sources, and either modified or rejected if found to be contradicted by test results. Although many neo-Historicists, like their nineteenth century counterparts, have been more concerned with generalized consideration of what is to be done,
rather than with the mechanics and experimental techniques required to carry through their proffered research programs, they do represent a recognizable and distinct alternative to the neo-Orthodox methodology.

The nineteenth century conflict between Historical and Orthodox economic method is thus found to have a close parallel in recent economic discussions. The case of the British Methodenstreit is instructive not only as a premature and abortive "scientific revolution," but also as the historical background for concerns of more immediate interest to modern economists.

Source: DAI, XLV, 10A (April, 1985), 3223-A.

This dissertation attempts an outline of a method of scientific investigation which the writer calls the "hypothetico-deductive method." He views this method as a fruitful approach to a solution of a number of theoretical problems in sociology. The discussion received its incentive from the result of a search of the sociological literature where a number of theoretical problems relating to the advancement of knowledge in sociology are discussed; and where a host of metatheoretical problems have been created from efforts aimed at solving these theoretical problems.

Based on a study of some ideas expressed in the writings of Karl Popper on scientific matters, the writer proffers the thesis that a conscious application in sociology of Popper's ideas of the scientific enterprise could clarify many of the theoretical problems now facing sociology, and set sociology on a course which could lead to a significant growth of knowledge.

The idea of the hypothetico-deductive method as elaborated in Popper's works assumes the form of a tetradic procedure of scientific investigation which proceeds:

1. From a problem to be solved.
Emmanuel Joy Bonaparte

2. To a theoretical solution.

3. To the testing of the solution.

4. To a higher order problem.

Because of the abstract nature of the discussion, three case studies from the sociological literature are cited in an effort to exemplify the nature of the hypothetico-deductive method. From the conjunction of these studies, however, only the first three steps of this method could be exemplified. The writer could find no other sociological studies through which the last step could be exemplified. This state of affairs led to the proffering of a number of suggestions by the writer, as to how he thinks the problems could be tackled. These include:

1. Carrying out an investigation beyond the point where investigations are terminated in sociology.

2. Stating sociological theories in a testable fashion.

3. Separating the ideas of the refutation of a theory and the repudiation of it.

4. Relinquishing the claims of a theory when mounting evidence warrants such as action.

The discussion ends with a five-point summary of the strong points, and also some weak points of the study.

   Source: DAI, XXIII, 9 (March, 1963), 3349-3350. XUM Order No. 63-195.

Conspicuously unsuccessful as a schoolmaster, Samuel Johnson had, nonetheless, characteristically strong convictions about educa-
tion. He shared, of course, many of the attitudes of his age; not unexpectedly, he also exhibits independence of mind and a determination to test theory by experience. This study represents an attempt to examine the remarkable comprehensiveness of Johnson's observations on education in general and on eighteenth century educational theory in particular.

Chapter I examines the schools and universities of eighteenth century England. Chapter II describes Johnson's own education: his experiences in a "dame" school, in grammar schools, in Pembroke College, Oxford. Consideration is also given to the importance of his sojourn with his cousin at Stourbridge, of his opportunities as the son of a bookseller, of his friendship with the urbane and cultivated Gilbert Walmesley. This second chapter also gives an account of Johnson's unhappy experiences as a schoolmaster—at Stourbridge, Market Bosworth, and at his own academy in Edial.

Johnson's theories of education, gleaned from Boswell's Life, from Thraliana, and from other contemporary records, are the subject of Chapter III. The curriculum that he devised for his academy in Edial is presented as evidence of his fundamental conservatism; the preface that he wrote for The Preceptor is analyzed in terms of Johnson's awareness of social change and of its impact on educational patterns.

No account of eighteenth century educational theory would be complete without advertence to conversation and social intercourse as culminating elements in the formation of a polite and civilized man. Johnson's virtuosity as conversationalist and his rationalization of his career in drawing room and tavern are studied in Chapter IV.

Examination of Johnson's educational theories and of educational experiences contributes to a better understanding of Johnson's attitudes in general: his deep commitment to truth, his complementary faith in an empiricist approach to life, his distrust of optimism, his sense of responsibility to the general welfare. Many of Johnson's remarks about education are very well-known; this study has attempted to collect all of the most significant observations and to arrange them in such fashion as to facilitate understanding of their relationship to one another.

43. BOORNARD, Carol Ann (Ed. D.). 'The Place of Speaking and Writing in the Educational Thought of Plato, Locke, and Rous-
This study examines the role of speaking and writing in the educational thinking of Plato, Locke, and Rousseau, and despite some divergence in focus and approach, broad convergence exists. On one issue, all concur that the word selected does not necessarily represent reality. For example, Plato contends that names are unstable and manipulative; Locke and Rousseau caution that there must be congruence between the idea of the speaker or writer and that of the listener or reader.

Regarding speaking, all agree that clarity is a major objective, with Locke and Rousseau insisting that the child hear only lucid, correct, and honest speaking models. Plato, however, expands its role by assigning it a position in his philosophical process of dialectic. Usually commenting on speaking and writing jointly, Locke recommends that the student seek accuracy and polish in both. However, like Plato, Rousseau prefers speaking and suggests specific methodologies to avert errors. For example, to Rousseau the child should be exposed only to comprehensible, utilitarian, and easily pronounceable vocabulary.

On the role of writing, Plato and Rousseau issue severe cautions, with Locke the most tolerant of those examined towards the issue. Plato terms writing an imitator of discourse and faults it for failing to transmit his views on philosophical inquiry. Rousseau is similarly derogatory towards writing and openly refuses to discuss it. Convergence among all three writers is also observable in their rejection of poetry and oratory. To Plato, poetry is diversionary, mute when questioned, and injurious. To Locke, poetic pursuits are libertine, and to Rousseau the language of poetry is unnatural and resistant to adoption in prose. Regarding oratory, all writers warn of its malevolent lures. Through semantical manipulation, participants often "use" truth rather than seek it.

Regarding the educational significance of their views on speaking and writing, this study adopts a position suggested by Locke in the controversy between the ancients and the moderns. Like Locke, it proposes the most adoptable in their views and rejects the impracticable or inimitable recommendations.
The discovery in 1902 by the English physiologist William Bayliss and Ernest Starling of the prototype hormone (secretin) has hitherto been taken to be the major event in the emergence of the new scientific field of endocrinology. In the dissertation, I show that this discovery was a natural consequence of earlier efforts in the 1890's to discover in animal tissues potent chemicals called "internal secretions."

In April, 1891, the neurologist and physiologist C.-E. Brown-Séquard and his assistant Arsène d'Arsonval recommended a new program of research to their colleagues in the French Society of Biology. They had become convinced that all tissues produce specific chemical substances. They suspected that certain diseases result from the lack of these substances and proposed that aqueous extracts of healthy animal tissue might be used by physicians to treat patients lacking them.

The suggestion that most tissues have characteristic internal secretions led both to the development of a new branch of therapeutics (organotherapy) and to the discovery of some of the substances which were soon to be classed as hormones. In the early 1890s two important discoveries were made in Britain which added credence to the doctrine of internal secretion developed by Brown-Séquard and d'Arsonval. These discoveries were, first, the cure of myxoedema by subcutaneous injection of thyroid extract reported in 1891 by George Redmayne Murray and, second, the observation in 1894 of the vasopressor effects of adrenal extract made by George Oliver and Edward Schäfer. As a result of these discoveries, investigations concerning internal secretions were gradually removed from the clinic to the laboratory; that is, specific questions were asked by investigators and standard physiological techniques were employed to answer them. These discoveries effectively transformed the research program by designating an alternative to the essentially therapeutic program developed by Brown-Séquard. Under Schäfer at University College, Lon-
don, there was a continuing effort to identify by standard laboratory methods the physiological responses to a wide variety of tissue extracts.

Bayliss and Starling had been colleagues of Schäfer both at University College and in the British Physiological Society. Although they were working on a problem unrelated to internal secretions, that is, on the control of the release of pancreatic juice, they found in duodenal extract a chemical which triggered this response. Their discovery did alter the strategy of research on internal secretions. In the years 1902-1905, physiologists became acutely aware that many of the presumptive internal secretions probably served to activate processes which had been thought to be under neural control. In 1905, Starling introduced the concept of the hormone and designated the chemical coordination (as opposed to neural coordination) of physiological processes as a new and important problem for biological investigation. The tissues that Starling designated as probable sources of hormones were virtually the same tissues singled out by Brown-Séquard and d'Arsonval in 1891.

For this reason, I emphasize the origins of Brown-Séquard's ideas on internal secretions. In particular, I reexamine the medical and scientific response to his rejuvenation experiments with testicular extract, experiments which he developed from nineteenth-century assumptions about human sexuality. As a result of the popular reception of this work and the enthusiastic claims of some organotherapists, a persisting tension between clinical and laboratory studies of internal secretions developed. Nonetheless, questions raised in the clinic were eventually transformed into scientific problems which were accessible, promising, and theoretically important.


Diverse avenues of research have been stimulated by the life and thought of John Wesley (1703-1791), the eighteenth century
Anglican priest and founder of Methodism. Except for a few journal articles, however, scholars have not studied Wesley as a bookman. Thus, the focus of this study is on Wesley's reading interests and his reading advice to countless numbers of people in the eighteenth century.

The study begins with the implicit hypothesis that Wesley's reading covered many rather than few categories of interest and that his reading guidance was likewise broad rather than narrow in scope.

On the basis of casual observation, some have assumed because Wesley was the founder of a rigorous and well disciplined religious movement that he was consequently narrow in his literary and intellectual culture. This is a clearly mistaken assumption, and nowhere is its error more evident than in an analysis of Wesley's personal reading and his reading advice.

Methodology

A thorough analysis of reading references in primary historical documents is implicit to this investigation, and the validity of the findings and conclusions depends upon it. Fortunately, John Wesley left to posterity a sizeable quantity of personal documents (diaries, journals, letters) as well as other primary sources. These resources usually give the contextual circumstances of his reading, identification of authors, subject matter or literary form, clues concerning his purpose in reading certain works, and often his response or reaction to what he read. Thus, this study utilizes the sources, principles, and techniques of historical inquiry to determine the reading characteristics of John Wesley.

Findings and Conclusions

Over five hundred reading references plus quotations and allusions are examined in this study. Approximately 60 percent of these citations are in subject areas other than formal religion. Frequent references to classical writers reveal that Wesley was grounded in classical literature. He was equally familiar with English poets and authors except for novelists. He read publications in all of the following languages: Latin, Greek, Hebrew, French, German, Span-
ish, and some Italian. Historical topics, particularly British and ancient history, held intense interest for him. He was also fascinated with scientific discoveries, especially in the field of medicine. Only philosophical works were least admired, although he read several titles in the area. Other subjects which claimed his attention from time to time included music, education, law, rhetoric, slavery, and mathematics. Furthermore, he was concerned that his friends and followers be well read men and women. His reading guidance covered most major branches of learning, and in general, he popularized literature among a class of people who had previously not been literate.

Regardless of the subject area, however, Wesley attached high importance to writing style, good taste, and decorum. As such, he was very much influenced by the neoclassical values of the early eighteenth century.

In conclusion, books were not passive, ineffective things to Wesley. Instead, he viewed the printed page as a dynamic and powerful medium of communication. His most decisive moments were nearly always associated with it. On the other hand, he was no mere bibliophile. He was a systematic and discriminating reader with extensive interests throughout his life. Few eighteenth century men were better read than John Wesley. Popular stereotyped notions that he was only interested in religion have no basis in fact.


Source: DAI, XXXVII, 1A (July, 1976), 14A. XUM Order No. 76-14,419.

William Hone's Political Journalism, 1815-1821 examines with bibliographical, historical emphasis the publishing activities of the English bookseller and author William Hone, a man of vigorous nonviolent radical convictions, who chose to bend all of his efforts to an effective use of the printing press as a weapon in the struggle to gain freedom from severe governmental oppression for all citizens of England. Notoriety first came to Hone in 1817, when he was the victor in a confrontation with the government, which brought him to trial on
three consecutive days for the publication of three political parodies written in the style of the Anglican ritual. After three successive acquittals, Hone was hailed as a political martyr and described by his supporters as a man of "extensive knowledge," "varied talents," "manly intrepidity," "energy of mind," and "unshaken perseverance." The strain of the trials, and the temporary relief from financial concerns because of a nationwide subscription, resulted in a virtual cessation, during 1818, of the active publication program he had pursued in 1815, 1816, and 1817. In 1819, in response to further intolerable oppression, Hone again began active publication, with many of the titles being parodies illustrated by George Cruikshank. The most popular of Hone's titles was the Hone/Cruikshank collaboration entitled The Political House that Tack Built, which gained best seller status with dozens of imitations being published in support of both Radical and Tory views. The death of King George III, the accession of King George IV to the throne, and the latter's attempted divorce of Queen Caroline, gave the radicals a cause célèbre during 1820, which Hone actively supported until the death of Queen Caroline in 1821. The Queen's unexpected death, combined with a certain liberalization of Governmental tyranny on the national scene, as well as Hone's growing interest in the value of publications based on antiquarian matters and unrelated to politics, ended his career as a political journalist. Hone's corpus of more than 190 titles, the great majority of which were politically motivated, proved to have a significant effect upon the thinking of the people, and also upon the gradual progress made by the Government toward the reforms instituted in the Great Reform Bill of 1832.


Friedrich Max Müller (1823-1900) and Andrew Lang (1844-1912) were equally eminent Victorian mythologists, and are counted among the founders of the modern disciplines of anthropology, folk-
lore, and comparative religion or history of religions. Müller distinguished himself in his Sanskrit translations, his researches in comparative philology and his investigations into the origin of myth and religion. Lang gained recognition as a journalist, literary critic, poet, classicist, folklorist, historian and psychical researcher, and is chiefly remembered among scholars for his discovery of the primitive high god, later elaborated and popularized by Wilhelm Schmidt.

From 1856 until the mid-1880's Müller's system of comparative mythology was accepted throughout England and most of Europe as the standard interpretation of what was then commonly termed Aryan mythology. In 1871, however, with the publication of Darwin's *Descent of Man* and E. B. Tylor's *Primitive Culture*, evolutionism emerged as a serious rival to Müller's essentially rationalistic theories of human origins. Lang was the first to recognize the implications which Darwinism held for the science of mythology and in 1873 published a critique of Müller's theories which stressed the priority and antiquity of the folktale over the myth.

The controversy between these two scholars continued throughout the next three and a half decades, reaching a climax in the mid-1880's which catapulted Lang to national recognition and captured the interest of a large segment of the British reading public.

This study is a history of that controversy. As such it examines both men's intellectual orientations, traces their interaction, and notes the effects each had upon the other's development. In so doing, the examination opens up several important issues. In viewing the controversy as a cultural controversy between Lang, a Scottish journalist, and Müller, a German Oxonian, it points toward the cultural depths which divided their understandings, not only of myth, but of language, religion, imagination and the primitive. In tracing the modifications of their positions, it reveals that each moved closer to the position of the other and indicates the inadequacy of the empirical and idealistic traditions to which each had originally appealed. And in the final ambiguity of their last statements, it attests to their common turning away from Western values in their search for either an Eastern form of synthetic wisdom or a primitive re-experience of the powers of mystery.

48. BRETT SCHNEIDER, Bertram D. (Ph. D.). "Some Educational
In recent years educational philosophers have been attempting to develop an educational philosophy based upon a philosophical system which incorporates the basic insights of the contrary philosophies, modern idealism and modern realism.

The methodological problem of this thesis is to determine whether or not the philosophy of Samuel Alexander succeeds in effecting a synthesis of these contrary philosophies. Alexander's philosophy poses an important problem in this connection: on what grounds can an avowedly realistic philosophy adopt idealism's coherence theory as its theory of truth? The substantive problem of this thesis is to develop by implication the major points of emphasis of an educational philosophy based on Alexander's philosophical system.

Chapters II and III are devoted to stating the basic principles of modern idealism and modern realism as represented by the philosophies of F. H. Bradley and Bertrand Russell, respectively. The purpose of these chapters is to develop concepts of idealism and realism by which to evaluate Alexander's philosophical system in Chapters IV-VII.

In Chapter IV, it is argued that Alexander's method is not properly realistic. He shifts the epistemological orientation of realism to ontology by locating ontological ultimates of primordial Space-Time on the basis of an intuitional procedure similar to Husserl's epoch. This is a rejection of the neo-realistic doctrine of the primacy of sensory apprehension.

In Chapter V, it is demonstrated that Alexander's universe is a structural isomorph of the Bradleyan absolute universe. Alexander's absolute is Total Space-Time conceived as a synthesis of all spatiotemporal perspectives. Idealism's coherence theory of truth is employed by Alexander as a principle of cosmogenesis and as a principle of ontological structure.

In Chapter VI, it is shown that Alexander's theory of mind is a theory of empathy in which the mind relates itself to its object in a relation of coherence, taken both ontologically and epistemologically.

In Chapter VII, Alexander is shown to conceive value as a...
coherent relation with the collective standard. His concept of "nisus towards deity" is shown to be a cosmological implication of the coherence principle. It is concluded that Alexander can adopt idealism's coherence theory of truth because his philosophical system is not a modern scientific realism, as claimed by him, but a crypto-idealism.

The methodological problem of this thesis has yielded a null conclusion: an educational philosophy based on Alexander's system would not effectively synthesize the basic insights of modern realism and modern idealism. However, Alexander's philosophy does seem to provide fertile ground for inquiry by educational idealists.

The substantive problem of this thesis receives consideration in Chapter VIII. An educational philosophy based on Alexander's system would be ontologically oriented. Educational theory would be grounded in an analysis of the structural organization of individual symbolic behavior and the effects of the collective standard on such behavior. Individual symbolic behavior is described in terms of a quality-relation continuum; the collective standard is similarly described in terms of a myth-ideology continuum.

Education would thus be deliberate training in the manipulation of symbols in accordance with:

2. The parent culture's dominant locus on the myth-ideology continuum.

Education would exercise a liberating function: an individual is free to the extent that he realizes his structural potential within the bounds imposed by cultural restrictions.

Proceeding from evidence gathered at random from The Idea of a University and the Oxford University and Parochial and Plain sermons, this study explores the thesis that the images used by Newman so correspond to the structures of his thought that they become the analogue of his mental world. Initial support for the thesis comes from Newman’s statements of the correspondence in his theory of literary style and from his practice in verse and prose.

The basic principles of his thought, as productive of his imagery, reveal themselves in accounts of his religious and intellectual growth, found in letters and journals, manuscripts, and major works. The development is considered in the light of influences from Patristic, Anglican, and Evangelical writers; from classical sources, eighteenth-century thinkers, and his contemporaries, with special attention to Butler’s Analogy, the Fathers of the Church, and the empiricists.

Four chapters deal respectively with experience as the basis of knowledge in a holistic view of reality; with the fundamental analogy between the experience of conscience and the nature of certitude in reason and faith; with the principle of development as analogous between the mind and the object of belief; and with self-consciousness as the prime analogue of all acts of knowledge. The overriding conclusion is that imagination, as Newman shows it operative in the acts of Reason, or the Illative Sense, is the vital principle of knowledge and the unitive ground of knower and known.

As mental image and notion are the two-fold form of knowledge derived from experience, reasoning, and judgment, so the verbal image and predicative or notional statement are both needed to express this holistic knowledge, particularly in religious experience and belief. This intimate relation between mental impression and verbal expression is the principle of the analogous image, distinguishing it from the imagery of illustration or parallel, and from the simile and metaphor, more direct comparisons. The analogous image, as here analyzed, is the result of a fusion of experience, thought, and symbol.

The nature of the image, as an epistemological and linguistic phenomenon, becomes, in Newman’s thought, a link between the empirical and realist traditions; through it he modifies the sceptical-principle of the relativity of matter, knowledge, and language with the principle of real apprehension as the basis of certitude. Through it he establishes the integrity of reason and faith, the natural and the supernatural, consciousness and conscience. His speculation on the
nature of apprehension and belief and his sacramental view of reality suggest implicit theories on the relation between meaning and presence.

In two chapters, the nature of analogy and the relation between experience, belief, and language, as reflected in image and symbol, are examined from several theoretical viewpoints; and the development of the literary image is briefly traced in order to identify the analogous image in a larger dimension. The figure as it evolves in Newman's writing is the subject of two concluding chapters. Evidence indicates that the relatively organic qualities of his analogous figures and the patterns into which they fall are dependent on their relation to his analogous habits of thought. The sources of his images in everyday experience, nature, and tradition, and their ground in realized assent to dogma reveal themselves in the original style as well as the traditional content of his sermons.

From the conclusions reached concerning the analogies between Newman's thought and imagery and the coincidence of many of his ideas with current theories of knowledge and language, the suggestion follows that his epistemology, in all of its implications, should indicate the direction of future studies of his theology, his philosophy, and his style.


In the course of a fruitful academic, intellectual, and artistic life, filled with both literary and political activity, Matthew Arnold became profoundly discontented with English indifference to ideas in literature, in politics, and specifically in religion. He chose as his intellectual causerie the goal of rousing his countrymen out of their philosophic apathy and intellectual bathos. If a single thought concept could summarize him, it would be "academic." His position is distinctly independent, with his motivation not to subjugate opinion
Theodore Kenneth Bundenthal

but to emancipate it. He could be praised for having "seen life steadily and seen it whole," a phrase he utilized to describe Sophocles.

The essence of the historical investigation and research at hand will deal with Matthew Arnold and his relevancy to the philosophical and religious revolutions of his day. His life span involved him in the cataclysm of neo-orthodoxy, continental rationalism, German Biblical criticism, Tractarianism, and the raging battle of the liberal in opposition to the orthodox theological position of the historical church of England. Working with French, German, and the classical languages as well as English he prepared sympathetic studies of Spinoza and Marcus Aurelius, and contrasted the parallel between the religious ideas of Ptolemaic Alexandria and Medieval Assisi, an unknown prelude to his later, major works. One of his most important essays depicts Heinrich Heine as the intellectual liberator, the man whose special function it was to break up stereotyped forms of thought. In this essay, Arnold delineates the mission which he had imposed upon himself, and to which the best of his energies were devoted for the major portion of his life.

Thus, he also treats Plato, Theocritus, Goethe, Spinoza, and Newman, along with his contemporary friends Colenso, Temple, Jowett, and Stanley. He dealt with the thought and philosophy of these men as he struggled to delineate for himself and others the essential answers to the questions of his day. He was engrossed in the revolutionary movements of the continent by 1848, and had in turn conceived the germs of most of the ideas which he would develop in the course of his life.

Arnold's major emphasis dealt with the "Great Victorian Debate," the monumental philosophic-religious confrontation of liberal and orthodox theology. His was a crucial critical crusade against British Philistinism and imperviousness to ideas. He categorized the populace as the "few" (the intellectual, the clergy) and the "many" (the plebian canaille). His penultimate apogee was to confront the masses of the British populace. His crusade is primarily for "the lapsed masses." He is battling for their souls.

Religio-philosophical storms were raging both on the continent and in Britain, with unrest among the population much like the years just prior to the posting of the theses of Martin Luther. Arnold awaited a second such great reformer to sweep upon the scene of contention, and when one did not appear, he became the "second Martin Luther." He reasoned that his position was tenable, for in 1876,
the some 22,000 Anglican clergy divided almost equally on both sides of the liberal-orthodox scale regarding such basic religious beliefs as the virgin birth, miracles, the historicity of the Old Testament, and the vicarious atonement.

Thus, for Arnold, the battle was drawn. An accomplished poet, critic and Oxford tutor, as well as a polished official in government, Arnold produced such works as Culture and Anarchy, God and the Cosmos, St. Paul and Protestantism, Literature and Dogma, and The Bishop and the Philosopher.


Despite research and training efforts to discover remedial methods to help adults enhance divergent thinking abilities, no standardized, time-efficient medium has come into widespread usage. An approach offered by Edward deBono at Cambridge University appeared to have high potential, but remained untested by any controlled research. This controlled study of the use of deBono's materials and methods with adults attempted to address this deficiency.

Eighty adult volunteers were randomly divided into an experimental and a control group. The experimental mean age was 33.7 years; the control mean age was 32.7 years. The experimental mean educational level was 16.1 years; the control mean educational level was 15.8 years. The ratio of females to males in the experimental group was 24:16; the control group ratio was 22:18.

The training medium was deBono's Cognitive Research Trust Lessons 1 (CoRT-1). Testing instrumentation was the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) Verbal Forms, with variables fluency, flexibility, originality and elaboration. Also, two sets of hypothetical questions developed by deBono in previous teaching were graded for fluency and polarized responses.

Subjects were divided into subgroups and trained using CoRT-1 lessons for 10 hours, or placed in a no-treatment control group. Trainees and controls were tested before and after the training with
Data was analyzed with analysis of covariance and $t$ tests. The experimental group was significantly different (higher) $p<.05$, than the control group on the posttest dependent TTCT variables—fluency, flexibility, and originality—and on fluency on deBono's hypothetical questions, but the group was not significantly different on the TTCT variables, elaboration, or on numbers of polarized responses. A regression equation on the attribute variables revealed age to be significantly negatively correlated to fluency scores.

Edward deBono's method and supporting media, emphasizing shifting perceptual sets and directed searching using simple conceptual tools, appears to be capable of enhancing adult divergent thinking abilities—specifically, verbal fluency, flexibility, and originality—in a time-efficient inexpensive, standardized format. Further testing appears warranted. Age is a factor to be controlled for in future designs.


This study represents an analysis and evaluation of Alfred North Whitehead's educational philosophy when seen variously as related and unrelated to his formal philosophy. The study is an outgrowth of a concern to see Whitehead's educational philosophy in its systematic character, which Whitehead himself never explicitly developed.

The procedure followed is that of logical analysis of the meanings of the basic concepts in the two philosophies, critically examining the consistency of the basic concepts internal to the educational philosophy, and their consistency and consonance with basic concepts of the formal philosophy. Accordingly, the study is divided into three parts. Part One consists of a systematic analysis of the meanings of the basic concepts of Whitehead's educational writings. Part Two consists of a systematic analysis of the meanings of the basic concepts
of Whitehead's formal philosophy. In the third part the two sets of concepts are related to each other. Part Three concludes with an evaluation of the educational philosophy from the criteria of internal consistency and, with respect to its relation to the formal philosophy, consistency and consonance.

The analyses of the three parts lead to the findings, first, that the philosophy of the educational writings is internally consistent; second, that the basic concepts of the educational philosophy have a general consistency and consonance with the basic concepts of the formal philosophy; and third, that the major difference between the two philosophies lies in the failure of the educational philosophy to capture the emphases and utilize fully certain specific concepts of the formal philosophy. Regarding this last point, for example, it is found that the educational philosophy does not possess either implicit or explicit counterpart concepts which adequately connote the meanings of the basic concepts of "god, eternal objects," or "peace" in the formal philosophy.

There is a fourth finding; namely, that the educational philosophy gives a more complete and specific treatment of the nature of the human learner than is found in the formal philosophy.

The general conclusions drawn in the study are:

a. That the greatest consistency and consonance between the two philosophies is found with respect to the concepts of what constitutes human society and civilization, factually and ideally; but,

b. That the educational philosophy lays stress on the individual human being's nature and conditions for value, whereas the formal philosophy lays stress on the cosmological approach to the nature of reality and the conditions for value.

In each philosophy the emphasis of the other is taken into account, and there is an overlapping, but each is concerned mainly with a different phase of reality and purpose.

The study concludes with two recommendations for further research. First, the degree of consistency and consonance found to exist between the two philosophies indicates that it would be possible and desirable to undertake an exposition of Whitehead's educational philosophy which would be systematically developed from the basic
concepts of his formal philosophy. Second, the degree of similarity which a number of the basic concepts of the educational philosophy have to some of those of the formal philosophy suggests the feasibility of a study to trace the development of Whitehead's formal philosophy from the early educational concepts, rather than (as seems usual) from Whitehead's early mathematical and logical concerns.


Arthur Balfour's reputation as a statesman of unusual ability has been generally considered irrefutable. On the other hand, as a political leader—that is, as the leader of a political party—he has often been described as temperamentally unsuited to the task, inept, ineffective, and unsuccessful. Through an examination of his role as architect of the Unionist Party and his rise to the leadership of that party and by an analysis of his efforts to preserve it from the disruptive effects of three divisive constitutional questions which faced him during his administration, this dissertation seeks to demonstrate that through 1905, at least, his leadership of the party was what the conditions of the times demanded.

He rose to political eminence under the wing of his uncle, Lord Salisbury. As Leader of the House of Commons and Salisbury's lieutenant, he functioned as the active agent of conciliation between the heterogeneous adherents to unionism—Conservative, Whig, and Radical. This necessity to find middle ground upon which antagonistic factions could stand to seek mutual aims characterized and conditioned, even determined, his role in the party during his rise to the premiership, dominating it until his resignation in 1905. Had he and Salisbury not recognized the necessity to accommodate party leadership to the realities of the situation, the Unionist Party would have been stillborn. In order to lead the Unionists, he had to endure the factionalism which the times and the personalities and prestige of Joseph Chamberlain and the Duke of Devonshire produced. Had not
Balfour been willing to play the role of peacemaker, the party and his government would have been torn asunder before his first year as nominal head of the party was complete.

During Balfour's premiership, three constitutional issues threatened to destroy the party he had built.

1. His efforts to reform national education brought to the front the deepseated divisions in the party over church-state relations. Using all the strength at his command, he defeated Chamberlain's attempt to block the bill in the cabinet, enlisted his support, and thereby reduced the revolt of the nonconformist faction in the parliamentary party to a minimum, demonstrating his superiority over Chamberlain as well as his dependence upon Chamberlain's cooperation.

2. Chamberlain's tariff reform campaign severely tried Balfour's ability to retain sufficient unity in the party to maintain his government in power. He refused to stand still with the free fooders or to be hurried by Chamberlain into an endorsement of what he considered a premature program of fiscal reform. Disunity became acute and threatened to destroy the government and the party; but Balfour endured, avoided an absolute split with either of the fiscal factions, and continued to exercise government power for the better part of the legal life of parliament.

3. Balfour refused to capitulate to the Ulstermen in the Wyndham-MacDonald affair. He continued his policy of conciliation in Ireland, emphasized the necessity for maintaining law and order but refused to make coercion the essence of unionism, and demonstrated again his resolution to maintain the course upon which he had chosen to lead his party. On religious teaching in the schools, tariff reform, and Irish policy, Balfour was determined to lead the party only where he believed it was willing to follow. Only in this way could he preserve the Unionist Party for both its priestly and prophetic roles in society—for its task to provide for both stability and change.
This study is based upon the unpublished papers of the men involved, unpublished journals by contemporary observers, and various categories of printed material.


This dissertation is primarily an examination of Shadworth Holloway Hodgson’s (1832-1912) treatment of experience. We have utilized for our purpose his maturest work, the four-volume series The Metaphysic of Experience, 1898. This essay is both expository and critical with the main emphasis on a detailed examination of the first volume of that series which is devoted to the analysis of experience.

Our secondary objective has been to show the similarity between Hodgson's subjective method of analysis and the later Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. We have attempted to establish that Hodgson was in intention, at least, working toward something very much akin to Phenomenology. Our contention is that he should be viewed historically as an English precursor of that movement.

Hodgson as an independent scholar of means was also the first President of the Aristotelian Society and one of the co-founders of the British Academy. He was also instrumental in the support of the prestigious philosophical journal Mind and one of its earliest contributors.

His philosophical importance lies, perhaps, in his influence on
the members of the Aristotelian Society who were to develop realism
in England at the turn of the century, men such as Moore, Russell, and
G. Dawes Hicks. Philosophically speaking, his is an intermediate
position between idealism and realism. It was his belief that he was
working in the traditions of Hume and Kant, whose failings he
endeavored to correct.

The attempt to correct what he took to be the inadequacies of
empiricism and transcendentalism lead to a method which is strik-
ingly similar to that of Edmund Husserl. Hodgson's method is, no
doubt, along with some of his analyses, his chief contribution to
philosophy. The analyses of time, space and feeling comprise the
three main divisions of experience. The method employed in these
analyses is that of a reduction to a transcendental consciousness incor-
porating a suspension of all beliefs. This suspension attempts to
forestall any introduction of unwarranted assumptions.

The nature of Hodgson's "phenomenology" is rudimentary
when compared with Husserl. We, however, have not concerned
ourselves with a detailed comparison, but have endeavored to indi-
cate in a broad fashion points of mutual agreement.

We hope, thus, to have provided a position from which further
reappraisals of Hodgson may be inaugurated.

55. CARDEN, William Raymond, Jr. (Ph. D.). "The Political
Historical Ideas of Joseph Priestley." Emory University, 1966.
Order No. 67-763.

Among the lesser known but more interesting of the British
rational dissenters was Dr. Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), who distin-
guished himself in numerous disciplines, especially in the field of
science. His scientific activities have been amply, if not generously,
acknowledged. Unfortunately, however, historians have usually
evaluated Priestley as a misguided theologian whose one redeeming
feature was an enjoyment of science, from which emerged significant
discoveries in chemistry and physics. This is an entirely false, one-
sided, and unflattering portrayal of the man. Priestley's non-scientific
interests, especially his political and historical work, have never received their deserved recognition.

This dissertation is not an attempt to undertake an extensive study of the life of Priestley but to explore those aspects of his life and writings which are germane to the specific problem of whether or not historians have been just in dismissing or ignoring Priestley's political and historical work as of little consequence. The primary purpose of the study is to evaluate systematically the extent of his interest in political and historical subjects and to describe and analyze his writings in these areas. A second, and closely related, purpose is to determine the relationship between his political and historical ideas and his fundamentally religious approach to life. Finally, it is hoped that the study can evaluate Priestley's place in the eighteenth century and establish something of his abilities as a political thinker and historian in comparison to other scholars of his age.

The development of the dissertation is both chronological and topical. The first two chapters serve as a kind of intellectual biography of Priestley. The third chapter explains his religious philosophy. The section on his political thought occupies three chapters. The first of the chapters explains how his political outlook changes from liberalism to radicalism. The second (Chapter V of the dissertation) describes Priestley in the political upheaval of the French Revolution. The section concludes with an examination of his political experiences during his exile in the new American republic. The seventh chapter treats Priestley's ideas concerning the teaching and writing of history, and evaluates his attempts at writing histories of science. His shift in interest to histories of religion and religious development is traced in chapter eight. The conclusion evaluates Priestley's work and assesses him as a figure of his age.

This development of Priestley's interests and writings has been set forth, not as a monistic explanation of the whole man, but as a neglected factor of his character which must be taken into consideration if he is to be understood.

In 1774 the eminent British music historian, Charles Burney, developed a plan of music education which he hoped might be adopted at the Foundling Hospital in London. Burney's ill-fated plan was modeled after the design of the Italian conservatories in Naples and Venice with which he became acquainted during his travels on the Continent from 1770 to 1772. The problem of actualizing his prospectus and subsequently obtaining the approval of Parliament nearly caused the abandonment of the now more famed general History of Music.

It is the aim of this investigation to evaluate Dr. Burney's position in and contributions to the history of music education in England and to provide evidence that Burney's philosophy of music education was an entirely innovative one, music for everyone, the musically gifted and the consumer of music.

This study is the result of an examination of the primary sources which relate to the Burney letters of correspondence, Memoirs, and lectures; the philosophy and nature of his educational theory; his travels and acquaintance with prominent eighteenth century schools, teachers, composers and historians of music; Burney's actual experience as a music teacher; his pedagogy, his transcriptions and music for teaching purposes, and the accomplishments of his notable students; Dr. Burney's aim of establishing a public music school in England; the influence of the Italian conservatories, and the compatibility of his plan with the philosophy and nature of contemporary British education; the documents of the Foundling Hospital which were concerned with the implementation and ultimate termination of the program; and the letters to, from and about Burney.

Archival research was carried out by the present writer at the following locations: The British Museum Manuscript Department, London; the Bodleian Library, Oxford; the Beinecke Rare Book Library of Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut; the Berg Collection, New York City Public Library, New York City; and the Thomas Coram Foundation for Children in London, where the portion of the extant minutes concerning Burney's plan for an English conservatory are preserved.

The conclusion that may be drawn from this study is that
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Burney was at one and the same time historian, philosopher, aesthete-
tician, and educator of music. His contributions as historian and critic
of music have received a great deal of emphasis. However, excerpts
from his letters of correspondence, memoirs, travelogues and history
indicate that his life was devoted to the development of what the
twentieth century music educator identifies as music appreciation or
understanding, aesthetics, musical taste, skills, proper performance
practice and excellent compositional techniques. He taught music
both privately and through letters of correspondence for more than
fifty-five years of his life. Dr. Burney was a musical visionary.
Although he was not given the satisfaction during his lifetime of
realizing the far sighted plans he made to develop a fine system of
music education in England, his ideas were finally brought to fruition
by his followers in succeeding generations. In 1822 the first National
Academy of Music was established in London, and the basis of its
philosophy of music education was developed from Burney's ill-fated
plan. As historian and critic of music, he endeavored to establish a
standard of musical taste for the English musical audience. Dr.
Burney's own definitions of "taste," which consider the relationship
between the composer, performer and the listener and its relevance to
our own music educational concepts, can be understood only insofar
as it involves a process of music education, and that process is relevant
to Harry S. Broudy's definition of music education as stated in Basic
Concepts of Music Education, that is, "any procedures designed to
shape the musical skills, knowledge and taste of the learner."

57. CATTANACH, Bernice Isabella (Ph. D.). "Jacob Bronowski: A
   Twentieth Century Pontifex." Northern Arizona University,
   XUM Order No. 8017871.

With the death of Jacob Bronowski in 1974, society lost one of
its most humane and knowledgeable voices. As poet, mathematician,
playwright, philosopher, historian of science, literary critic, and scien-
tist, Bronowski labored to create a philosophy for the 20th century and
to eradicate the destructive prejudices of the age.
Bronowski explained science to a generation horrified by the atomic bomb and fought to demonstrate the harmony of science and the humanities. Bronowski summarized his work with the following observation: "All that I have written turns to the same center; the uniqueness of man that grows out of his struggle to understand both nature and himself." He was convinced that both science and the arts were essential and that education should correlate experience (poetry) with knowledge (science). His numerous publications were directed toward this end.

To Bronowski, many of the distinctions drawn between literature and science were superficial. His own learning experience convinced him of this. At the age of twelve, having spent his early years in Poland and Germany, he arrived in England, where he learned science and English concomitantly. At Cambridge, he immersed himself in both literature and science. He came to know the arts and the sciences as two expressions of the one human imagination. Thus, along with his mathematical and scientific work, he published a comprehensive work on William Blake, an award-winning drama, several essays on literary criticism, and works on language, architecture, and creativity. Not surprisingly, he attacked the concept of the Two Cultures even before C. P. Snow made the term popular. And after Snow's work, Bronowski continued to warn of the danger of viewing the sciences and humanities as separate disciplines rather than branches of one holistic body of understanding.

Not only was Bronowski a bridge-builder between the sciences and the humanities, he was also a bridge-builder between science and society. He believed that society needed to be unified on the basis of a common ethic derived from science and a liberal education encompassing both the humanities and the sciences. Bronowski's most significant work in this context was the film series, The Ascent of Man, wherein he presented a unified picture of the intellectual world in its social setting historically. The Ascent of Man achieved both worldwide acclaim and criticism. Bronowski achieved worldwide recognition. He had become the pontifex.
This dissertation is a study of John Milton's Prolusions or Academic Exercises, written and delivered in Latin during his years at Cambridge University (1625-1632) in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Bachelor of Arts and Master of Arts degrees.

The writer contends that if one is to understand and appreciate these Exercises, he must consider them through the avenue of Milton's training in the linguistic arts of the Trivium—Grammar, Rhetoric, and Logic. It was this training which dominated the curriculum at St. Paul's Grammar School and at Cambridge University—a training designed to turn out people with well-developed faculties, capable of polished performance in ars dicendi.

Chapter One investigates the role of St. Paul's in Milton's early education, and stresses the influence of those who masterminded its curriculum, such scholars as Erasmus, Colet, Lily and Milton's Herdmaster, Alexander Gill, the Elder. Attention focuses on the learning processes: memorization of precepts, imitation of model authors, and practice of exercises, as well as on the proliferation of text-books available. Such were the positive disciplines and intellectual resources for eloquence which equipped Milton for the University.

Chapter Two reconstructs the academic picture of seventeenth century Cambridge, with major consideration given to Scholasticism, a legacy from the Middle Ages, yet still the heart of the University's hidebound curriculum. Investigation into the methodology and external practices peculiar to the University leads to a detailed discussion of the declamation and disputation, as Scholastic exercises of capital importance to the "embryo orator."

The burden of Chapters Three and Four is to analyze the seven Prolusions as stylized art forms, four of which are categorized as declamations, two as disputations, and one as an extracurricular exercise. Chapter Three examines the declarations entitled: "Whether Day is More Excellent than Night" (Prolusion One); "On the music of
the spheres" (Prolusion Two); "Against the Scholastic Philosophy" (Prolusion Three); "Knowledge Renders Man Happier than Ignorance" (Prolusion Seven). Chapter Four considers the disputations: "In the Destruction of Any Thing a Resolution to Primary Matter Does Not Occur" (Prolusion Four); "Partial Forms Do Not Occur in an Animal in Addition to the Whole" (Prolusion Five); also the extracurricular exercise, "That Sometimes Sportive Exercises Are Not Prejudicial to Philosophic Studies" (Prolusion Six). Emphasis is placed on the application of rhetorical and dialectical precepts affirmed by most distinguished teachers: Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, Longinus and Demetrius. Also discussed are sources and precedents, architectural framework, structural and stylistic patterns.

The writer concludes that the pervading influence determining the Prolusions as an art form is a particular type of education bequeathed to the seventeenth century by the Classical, Medieval, and Renaissance Schools. Evident also is the fact that Milton's condemnation of the Scholastic System does not deter him from compliance with the rules. Each Prolusion, cast as a classical oration, compels Milton to think in a form, yet he succeeds in displaying the resources of his mind in varying interests and moods. Such artful artlessness pleased his academic audience, trained as he, to hold eloquence in high esteem. This was the heritage of generations of schoolboys. The Prolusions are witness to John Milton's commitment to that heritage.


After World War II Herbert Read gained a wide reputation as an aesthetic theorist who supported modern visual art; it is not so well known that he had a similar reputation after the first war for his literary criticism, which is now somewhat neglected, perhaps because Read himself repudiated part of it during the thirties and
because his thought was associated with neo-classicism and conservative politics. The editor to T. E. Hulme's papers, closely associated with T. S. Eliot, Read was one of the earliest spokesmen for Imagist poetic theory and for the philosophical and social foundations of the New Criticism. I hoped that an organization and close examination of his vast output might allow its value to appear and might also shed light upon the broad literary and social movement of which Eliot was the center.

Like Eliot, Read wrote during the twenties from an elitist position, asserting that criticism could be much more philosophically exact and that popular taste, lacking such exactness, was romantic and associated with the multiplicity of science rather than the unity of faith. Yet in Reason and Romanticism (1926) Read's judgments show a change of taste rather than an alteration of intellect; not a Christian believer, he was a weak neo-Thomist and contributed little to discussions of intuition and the value of humanism. By nature Read was a collector of other men's suggestive ideas rather than an original thinker.

From T. E. Hulme's linguistic theory Read formed his support for Imagist poetic technique and, alone in the Eliot group, he tied this to the philosophical aesthetic of Wilhelm Worringer, giving literature the anti-human hardness of abstract visual art. Highly critical of modern novels, Read purged his prose theory of personality and subjective interest, and in English Prose Style (1928) and The Sense of Glory (1929) argued for an unreflecting objectivity which, rejecting social ethics, approached religious revelation. He assumed language was completely visual and thus that the value of poetry was immediately apparent; Phases of English Poetry (1928) makes wide statements on the essence of poetry unsupported by any close reading. Though in Form in Modern Poetry (1932) Read argued for free verse, the free poetic personality, and romanticism, his sudden shift away from tradition and T. S. Eliot did not rest on any textual analysis such as the New Critics employed.

Known as a psychological critic, Read wrote early on Jung and Freud, but he accepted psychoanalysis with deep reservations and, in particular, never recognized the importance of the unconscious mind. Wordsworth (1930) uses David Hartley more than Freud; indeed, Read's constant advocacy of innocent aesthetic experience during the thirties, like that for sincerity in poetry, drew little from modern psychology. In Defence of Shelley (1936) reveals an uncritical will-
Philip George Cavanaugh

ingness to base all on a single psychological theory, and leads to a plea that poets be completely asocial. From this developed Read's support of surrealism and anarchism.

Read's attraction to exact definitions and broad dichotomies kept his thought from attaining the suppleness good criticism requires. Though alert to a multitude of thinkers and ever enthusiastic for the new, he treated ideas as if they were objects to be moved about. Making inconsistency a virtue, he left not philosophical or new criticism but the impressionism the moderns had begun by rejecting. He wrote too much too fast, and used his sources unwarily. Like Eliot, melancholy about their accomplishments between the wars, Read had been barred by his conception of philosophical argument and by his outmoded linguistic thought from the most rewarding achievements of modern criticism.


Purpose

It was the purpose of this study to introduce the educational philosophy of an Eastern thinker to Western educators. An additional purpose was to examine in detail the philosophy of Krishnamurti and to establish its relationship to both his educational thought and practices as found in the school at Brockwood Park, England.

The central theme of Krishnamurti's philosophy is that man is conditioned by his family, culture, language and that, as a result, he perceives reality—called "What is"—in a distorted and fragmentary way. In order to see "What is" exactly as it is, man must transcend his environment. This may be accomplished through a process of self examination, free of any tendency to justify or condemn oneself. Krishnamurti maintains that through this process of "instan-

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taneous self observation," man and therefore society will be transformed.

Krishnamurti's educational philosophy reflects the same concerns as his general philosophy. The central purpose of education is to develop integrated human beings who have both the ability to view reality with scientific detachment and the capacity to be open to all experience.

In order to implement his educational ideas, schools have been established in Europe, Asia, and North America. This study, however, was concerned with only the school in England.

**Procedure**

This study was based on an analysis of the philosophical ideas of Jiddu Krishnamurti as found in his books published between 1929 and 1976, unpublished tapes of his discussions with teachers, and notes taken both at talks given by him and during visits to the school at Brockwood Park. His school was visited in order to observe the relationship between his ideas and their actual application to education.

**Selected Findings and Conclusions**

It was found that Krishnamurti's educational ideas were applied with success to the school at Brockwood Park. The school was democratically organized and administered; relationships between staff and students were good and were characterized by a warmth not normally present in schools. The research also showed that the school was free of competition for grades or university entrance and therefore reflected Krishnamurti's ideas on this topic. Given his concern for the development of "wholeness" of perception in man, one expected to find in his school an attempt to fuse subject matter and provide the students with multi-disciplinary courses. A move in this direction would have helped students to see that reality is basically unified and not separated into art, science, or mathematics. However, the research revealed that there was no concerted effort by staff to use Krishnamurti's ideas to shape the curriculum into something whole. Each teacher did attempt to incorporate them into class, but the reality in
respect to the curriculum was that Brockwood Park's course offerings were similar to those found in the typical state secondary school.

In the light of the findings, it was concluded that Krishnamurti's ideas are of value to Western philosophy and have specific relevance to Western educational thought and practices. The major contribution of his thinking to general philosophy is the focus he gives to the idea that the mind is a reflection of its environment. A particular strength of his position is his insistence that the mind can transcend its limitations by using the tools of rational thought and intuition. In respect to education, Krishnamurti's major contribution rests on the great emphasis he gives to schools developing the whole person. The whole person, in his view, is the product of good relationships, a rational education and meditative experiences. Such an individual is capable of encountering reality with the detachment of the scientist and the sensitivity of the poet.


This study explores Alfred North Whitehead's relevance for political philosophy by attempting to locate his work within the tradition of classical political philosophy. Classical political philosophy is understood to involve a determined quest for "vision" in all matters, including politics. The quest is constituted by several interlocking inquiries which are schematically represented as:

1. The quest for comprehensiveness: speculation.

2. The quest for God: theology.

3. The quest for wholeness: ethics.

4. The quest for man: philosophical anthropology.

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Each of these inquiries is embodied in the key works of classical political philosophy such as Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, and the inquiries coalesce to form an architectonic mode of interrogation.

The schematic representation of classical political philosophy is explained and illustrated. The scheme is applied to Whitehead’s writings by exploring the elements of speculation, theology, ethics and philosophical anthropology in them. Additionally, an attempt is made to map out a roughly Whiteheadian position on some contemporary and perennial issues in political philosophy. This discussion includes the topics of order, freedom, utopia, crisis and humanism.


The position of John Colet (c. 1466-1519) as a humanist and educator has often been misunderstood and treated inadequately. Starting his career as a theologian, Colet gradually turned his attention to education. This transition had its roots in his own education, both in England and on the continent in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, itself an epoch of transition. His devotion to Cicero and Plato, to the patristic theologians, and to the contemporary Italian Platonists, especially Marsilio Ficino, was seminal in his mental development. The philosophical eloquence of Plato and the Platonizing theologians like Ficino impressed him, while the style of the scholastic theologians seemed dull and sterile.

Another source of his dislike of the schoolmen, especially the Thomists, was their "rash and overweening" application of speculative philosophy and logical subtlety in a theology which tended to disregard the primacy of scriptural texts. To counteract this tendency, Colet advocated not only a literal exposition of the scriptures, but also knowledge of Greek and Hebrew in order to provide sound textual understanding. Colet's theological credo was thus directly related to
the promotion of linguistic scholarship which the humanists of the
Renaissance propagated.

Although Colet championed the literal exposition of the Bible, he also accepted the validity of the allegorical interpretation. Under the influence of Plato and Pseudo-Dionysius, a neo-Platonist theologian, Colet conceived of the writings of the ancient philosophers as well as the Old Testament prophets as embodying poetic representations and prefigurations of the divine truths of Christianity. In this theological tenet of Colet is to be found yet another link between him and those humanists who justified the study of classical literature through allegorical interpretations.

Approaching theology from such humanist points of view, Colet came to regard humanist education as a necessary prerequisite for the revival of the pristine theology of the Church Fathers, Augustine, Jerome, and Ambrose, all of whom were classically educated and wrote in the tradition of the classical Latin eloquence. Colet's belief that scholastic education taught the priests of his time only to quibble, but did not give them real education, allied him all the more with humanist pedagogy. Association with Erasmus, for whose rhetorical abilities and educational opinions Colet had the highest regard, strengthened his belief that the lack of classical education made the scholastics barren and dull and that the pristine theology would be revived only with the spread of "polite learning," that is, eloquence and good literature.

So persuaded, Colet founded a new school in the churchyard of St. Paul's, of which he himself was the Dean. Erasmus' educational works, De Copia Verborum ac Rerum and De Ratione Studii, both inspired by Colet's school, and the joint work of Colet, Lily, and Erasmus, commonly known as Lily's Grammar, gave substance and purpose to the humanist program of education at St. Paul's School, which, among other things, called upon the young learners to imitate poets and orators, rather than memorize painstaking rules, in order to attain pure and chaste eloquence. The expressions "the true Roman eloquence," "eloquence joined with wisdom," and "good literature" as the goals of education occur repeatedly in Colet's directives to the masters and pupils of St. Paul's School. The phrase "good literature," as used by him, like the phrase bonae literae by Erasmus, embodied a quintessential vision of all that is good and great in the literary and philosophical training of the youth in the educational philosophy of the humanists.
Michael Robert Cheney


This work presents an historical and analytical study of British mass communication research. As such, this study details the early history of British mass communication research in the late 1950's and early 1960's when mass communication research was only a small aspect of British scholarship. Then, in the mid 1960's, British mass communication research, largely through the activities of the government-established Television Research Committee, emerged with a number of important studies. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, this development continued as more scholars and studies investigated the phenomenon of mass communication. Within this historical context, the study then analyzes the work of three British mass communication scholars—Raymond Williams, James Halloran and Denis McQuail. In discussing each author's works, the study delineates the idea of communication which informs the various scholars' research and theoretical writing. The study concludes by offering a theoretical synthesis of the various scholars' idea of communication. This collective idea of communication is described in terms of the elements, structures and functions of communication, as well as the assumptions such an idea makes about the nature of man, science and communication.


This dissertation has a dual objective. In the first place, it
explores the prospects of the sociology of knowledge for the methodology of the social sciences. This entails a discussion of the methodological importance of the sociology of knowledge for social scientific formulations. Secondly, it examines the explanation of inequality, from a sociology framework, in the functional theories of stratification of Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore, Talcott Parsons, and Bernard Barber. The functional theory of stratification is employed as a vehicle for demonstrating the methodological importance of the sociology of knowledge for the social sciences.

The first substantive chapter is an overview of the sociology of knowledge. It begins with a definition of the area and takes as its point of departure an explication of Karl Mannheim’s formulation of the sociology of knowledge as both theory and methodology. This discussion is tempered by a critical appraisal of the sociology of knowledge in general, and Mannheim’s formulation in particular. The review of the critical literature identifies problems which have obscured the contribution of Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge as a methodological framework.

The next chapter is an analysis of the three formulations of the functional theory of stratification. It begins with a characterization of these three dominant statements, and then identifies the shared premises of the functional explanation of inequality. Lastly, an attempt is made to present a selective review of the critical literature on the essential functionalist argument.

Once the review of the critical literature has provided evidence to delimit the theoretical scope and judge the empirical adequacy of the functional theory of stratification, the explanation of inequality is examined from the framework of the sociology of knowledge. Basically, this step of the analysis involves the identification of the perspective which underlies the functional theory of stratification. There follows a critical analysis of the conceptual workings of the explanation, i.e., a demonstration of the way in which the perspective informs the theory. Lastly, in accordance with the basic postulates of the sociology of knowledge, the functionalist perspective is articulated with the mid-twentieth century American socio-cultural milieu from which it emerged.

The last chapter returns to some of the problems which have obscured the contribution of the sociology of knowledge to the methodology of the social sciences. In light of the analysis of the functional theory of stratification, it is argued that perspectives are identifiable,
internally organized, and integrally related to the more explicit socio-
logical theories. As such, they are of fundamental importance to the
understanding and evaluation of sociological theory.

The results of this dissertation suggest that, while traditionally
sociologists of knowledge have sought to identify perspectives and
related them to societal value systems and the structural position of
sociologists, its major contribution will come from arousing interest in
the theoretical importance of underlying perspectives, and critical
analysis of the perspectival basis of sociological theory. The final
portion of the dissertation is addressed to the prospects of the sociol-
ogy of knowledge for sociology. A paradigm is developed for the
analysis of sociological constructions of reality. Finally, a proposal is
advanced to examine the "theoretical consequences" of specific
"dominant trends" in American sociology.

65. CHIU, Chun (Ph. D.). "Educational Theories of the Utilitarians."
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Although Richard Morison's multifarious pursuits spanned three Tudor reigns and his occupational output was truly prodigious, his life story has remained untold. Other historians have confined their investigations to Morison's "public relations" work under Henry VIII. Certain aspects of the trenchant propaganda tracts penned by the humanist have been subjected to analysis as has been Morison's personal and professional relationship with Thomas Cromwell, the coordinator of government polemics and panegyrics. However, in view of Morison's myriad accomplishments, the resultant publications, although valuable, have been circumscribed and frequently repetitive.

This biographical study, while integrating all past treatments of Morison, emphasizes those facets of his career hitherto ignored and their impact on the Tudor zeitgeist. Numerous previously unexplored or unidentified works, several still in manuscript form, illustrate that Morison's role in the English Reformation went far beyond mere apologetics. He was a prolific and influential architect of Tudor theological reconstructions. One lengthy manuscript in Morison's hand, On the Seven Sacraments, attests to an explicit Lutheran bent. 

Prima facie the manuscript appears to be simply a preparatory draft for the official 1537 formulary of faith, the Bishops' Book. A comparison of Morison's manuscript with the official statement demonstrates that the differences are at least as striking as the points of concurrence and that Morison was unwilling to mask his Lutheranism for the sake of officialdom. Morison's Treatise of Faith and Justification is proof positive that the English humanist was spending his off hours imbibing German Protestantism. This tract, written in a private capacity and never printed, is a virtual paraphrase of Luther's 1520 pamphlet, On the Freedom of a Christian Man. Morison showed a consistent interest in pure Lutheran theology and did not accommodate his beliefs to the variegations of the Anglo-Lutheran diplomatic rapprochements of the 1530's. Henry VIII and Cromwell were both
aware of Morison's religious inclination; indeed on more than one occasion they employed him to handle assorted details in their dealings with the Lutherans. Morison survived Thomas Cromwell's fall in 1540, and there is no evidence that he lost Henry's favor even during the ensuing religious reaction.

The reign of Edward VI found Morison engaged in a new vocation. As resident ambassador to the court of Charles V in Germany, he attempted unsuccessfully to negotiate a settlement in the Franco-Imperial conflict. Although his essay at diplomacy was mediocre, Morison's diplomatic dispatches and the memoirs of his secretary, Roger Ascham, give incisive portrayals of the primary personages on the diplomatic front. Morison's ambassadorial stint was remarkable for the theological wrangles between the Protestant Englishman and the foremost protector of Catholicism. Morison overtly flaunted his religious views at a time when England, severely weakened by the machinations of Northumberland, could ill afford antagonists.

The subsequent ascendancy of the Catholic Queen Mary to the throne of England signaled the demise of Richard Morison. Too compromised by his Protestantism to serve in the Marian vanguard, Morison went into exile. After roaming about the Continent he eventually managed to obtain a residence permit from Strasbourg, where he apparently spent his few remaining years intriguing and writing against the contemporary English government.

The conventional conception of Richard Morison as a sycophant who produced a few pretentious propaganda pamphlets for profit before disappearing into obscurity is no longer tenable. Morison certainly supported the Henrician and Edwardian politico-religious framework, but all his efforts were undergirded with genuine Protestant sympathies. In fact, Morison's most durable interest was not the vindication of a governmental system or the acquisition of personal political power. His raison d'être was the perpetuation of Protestantism, and all of his domestic and foreign forays on behalf of the government were a disproportionate fusion of perfunctory politics and fervent religion.

67. CLAPP, James Gordon (Ph. D.). "Locke's Conception of the Mind." Columbia University, 1937. 122 pp. Source: Published, Same
Having set forth the distinction between qualities, ideas perceived as subject matter, and knowledge, and indicated their relationship, we can point out the character of the mind.

In the act of perception the mind is chiefly passive; ideas are simply there. By the same token all that is perceived by the mind is termed an idea. In this sense the mind is the locus or place of ideas. This faculty is called perception and provides the reflective mind with subject matter. The subject matter however is a natural sign of particular powers of particular substances. Because, according to Locke, these natural signs have a regular and orderly sequence, connection, and relation, corresponding with the things of which they are signs, knowledge of this sequence, connection and relation of ideas will be, through the translation of sensation, knowledge of the sequence, connection and relation of things even though only particular things exist.

The mind of a man, moreover, has certain powers; namely, the powers to perceive, will, reason, think, remember, etc. All these powers are perceived by the mind in terms of their manifestations; but taking them to be manifestations of real powers, the mind must discover some substance wherein they inhere. It is in terms of these powers that the mind is called a substance or a locus of qualities and powers. These powers may be more properly referred to more as substance than mind, and although Locke offers no good reason why they should not be so referred, he offers several excellent ones why they should. In any case it is clear that a mind is called substance in terms of the powers which a man has to think, will, remember, etc.; as such it is the locus of these powers. But the mind has one further power which makes it most distinctive. In the act of intuition, whereby ideas in the mind are known, the mind is active in that it reflects upon the ideas perceived, forms judgments, or mental propositions about them, and in this act of reflection intuitively perceives that the propositions formed are true, or false, or uncertain, etc. It is in this that we are said to have knowledge. It is this aspect of the mind which Locke suggests in his simile wherein he compares the mind to a candle.

In the act of intuition, and in reflection, the mind is most truly active, and actualizes reflective ideas as knowledge of the subject.
matter which is potentially knowable, but actually known only in intuition, whereby the mind perceives that some proposition agrees or disagrees with the ideas perceived. This act of intuition of the mind is as ultimate as motion, time or perception and does not admit of explanation, yet is evident in experience, and as certain in its evidence as is the perception of the simple idea of red. It would seem from this that, if qualities and ideas have different loci, then knowledge must have a still different locus; but this does not follow, because reflective ideas are perceived as well as any other, and this constitutes the basis of the common locus of all ideas. Reflective ideas differ from ideas as subject matter in that ideas as subject matter, potentially knowable in themselves, are actualized in reflection as knowledge. This act of actualization is called intuition, and when in the relata of the act of intuition we perceive a proposition to be true of its subject matter, we have knowledge, clear, and certain, but not till then; all else is probability, faith, or opinion. Our conception of mind, then, is not simple but complex. Mind is a locus of ideas, a collection of powers, a locus of powers, and an active reflection upon ideas. All of these characteristics are necessary for knowledge and Locke finds them all in the mind, and attempts to show their function. He insists, however, that they can produce only limited knowledge and that we must confine ourselves within these limits set for us.

This seems to be the upshot of the Essay. The relation between ideas as subject matter and the qualities of which they are the actualization is similar to the relation between reflective ideas or propositions and ideas as subject matter; the first act is called perception, the second intuition, and in both we may be deceived, a proposition may be false, we may have an hallucination. Hence perception is a middle term between knowledge and reality. When one term is missing no conclusion can be drawn; i.e., we cannot be certain that our knowledge is real. This seems to me to be the end towards which the Essay moves both in intention, and because of Locke's fundamental assumptions. There are many statements in the Essay which seem to indicate something else is a fact not to be ignored. But, on the other hand, should one go to the other extreme, replete with endless difficulties, because this view, which I believe, reflects the intentions, and issues from the assumptions of the author of the Essay? This view will explain much that was obscure and paradoxical in the Essay in that it shows that many of Locke's statements acquire meaning and significance in terms of his assumptions, and in terms of the procedure of the
James Gordon Clapp

Essay, which they hardly seemed to have in their original appearance. The art of the Essay is that it, like the mind, is reflective, and throws light upon itself, one part revealing the other, so that it seems many different things when viewed from different aspects. It is for this reason that had this book been immeasurably more scholarly, exhaustive, penetrating, and catholic, it could hardly claim to have exhausted and laid bare the full meaning of the Essay. Certainly Locke never discerned the full meaning and significance of his work, nor have any who have followed him, and studied the Essay: I join their ranks.


Social Darwinism, the application to human social life of Charles Darwin's famous theory of evolution by means of natural selection, has been studied by historians interested in its manifestations in England, the United States, and Germany. Investigations of the reception of Darwinism itself by the scientists of many nations, including France, have also been conducted. This study attempts to assess the impact of Social Darwinism on French thought between 1860 and 1915.

Whereas Englishmen and Americans readily found Social Darwinism useful for supporting the prevalent doctrine of laissez-faire and business practices of the day, certain conditions peculiar to France limited the adoption of both biological and Social Darwinism there and also helped determine which forms of Social Darwinism found most favor. The major limiting factors were the strength of the Catholic Church, which was hostile to Darwinism because of its religious and moral implications; the penchant of evolutionists for viewing their countryman Lamarck rather than Darwin as the discoverer of evolution; and the nationalistic tendency to call Social Darwinism a peculiarly English or German doctrine too banal to warrant serious attention from Frenchmen.
The amount of criticism of Social Darwinism voiced in France between 1860 and World War I makes it impossible to say that the doctrine dominated French thought of the period. Nevertheless, there were French Social Darwinists, and their ideas constituted an important ingredient of late nineteenth century French thought. French acceptance of Social Darwinism was most widespread between 1880 and 1900, and the actual term darwinisme social was in use by this time.

In France, as elsewhere, intellectuals drew various and often contradictory conclusions from Darwin's Origin of Species. The theory of evolution was used to argue for competition and cooperation, equality and inequality, militarism and pacifism, progressive evolution and regressive movements. By the 1890's defenders of unhindered competition were being opposed by people representing all parts of the French political spectrum. The latter asserted that the true application of Darwinism to human life revealed that man was evolving beyond the brutal competition of the Darwinian "struggle for life" toward a condition of social cooperation or "accord for life."

French literary figures did not neglect Social Darwinism either. In fact, the preoccupation of some writers with creating fictional Social Darwinists during the 1880's and 1890's suggests that discussion of Social Darwinism was becoming general by then and was not limited to academic circles.

After 1900 Social Darwinism was no longer a novelty and neither was the argumentation supporting or opposing it. Many writers continued to adopt a highly critical attitude toward its various tenets. Nevertheless, Social Darwinism remained a feature of French writing up to World War I. During the war the repudiation of Social Darwinism by many French writers became still more evident, for publicists intensified an earlier, inaccurate tendency to label Social Darwinism a barbaric and peculiarly German doctrine.

69. CLIPPINGER, Frank Warren (Ph. D.). "Ruskin's Ideas On Education In Relation To Twentieth Century Educational Reform."

Like many another Victorian man of letters, John Ruskin devoted his art in large measure to the social problems of the day. A precocious study of nature was expanded to include a study of the fine arts; the resultant theory of art grew into a theory of political economy, which in turn led to the utopian dream of the Guild of St. George.

Chief among many interests related to Ruskin's conception of the place of art in life was education; it became one of the principal means by which he would establish a perfected social order. His conception of the nature and function of education was formulated early, when he was little more than thirty years old; and it was characteristic of his genius that later exposition of his ideas was but amplification of his original point of view. Significant it is, too, that throughout his life education became a subject of increasing interest, and that this interest was reflected in his writings. From 1853 onward he maintained almost unbroken contact, as teacher and patron, with a wide variety of educational institutions, private and public, elementary and advanced. When, in 1870, he was made Professor of Art at Oxford, he looked upon that appointment as an event in his life almost as momentous as was the publication of Unto This Last. Thenceforward all his energies were directed to bringing the many facets of his life-work to bear upon educational objectives.

Ruskin made no formal statement of a theory of education. His views were expressed in incomplete sketches and in brief, sometimes casual comments scattered throughout his writings on other topics. His ideas are frequently phrased in an arresting manner, but their meaning is often dependent upon an understanding of the author's social idealism and of his temperament. Examination of these comments reveals, however, that they were related in his mind to a consistent and, in his opinion, practical scheme of education.

It is the purpose of this study, first to set forth, as has not yet been done, the whole of Ruskin's thought on education, embodying, as completely as Ruskin expressed them, his conception of the function of education, the principles governing instruction, the organization and content of the plan by which he would achieve his objectives. In addition, we have made a comparison of Ruskin's ideas on education with those which currently express the spirit of educational reform in America, primarily with the hope that such comparison will add to our understanding of Ruskin.

Ruskin's social idealism has its roots deeply embedded in a religious faith which he had absorbed in earliest childhood. Maturity
and expanding knowledge did not change its fundamental assumption: a beneficent, paternal God; an ordered universe governed by God's cosmic law; thinking Man, the central object of creation, endowed with a moral faculty by which he becomes capable of love for God and His handiwork and of recognizing his own place in the universal plan. That religious faith was the inspiration for all Ruskin's study, of nature, of art, of political economy. It dyed indelibly his conception of education.

Ruskin's plan of education was built upon several basic educational principles. The first of these was repeated at every opportunity with all the emphasis he could command: All education must be moral first. Education must form character; beyond everything else it must establish in every individual the "law of rightness in human conduct." The moral virtues which Ruskin would emphasize are the ones which the world has been least willing to put into general daily practice. These to Ruskin were but practical application of the altruism embodied in Christian ethics: humility, gentleness, compassion, reverence, and obedience. He found in them, however, a dynamic force much greater than is conventionally ascribed to them.

The second of Ruskin's principles is contained in the statement: The essential foundation of education is to be skilled in some useful labour. It is in work that man finds his most substantial happiness, though it must be work which exercises all of a man, head, heart, and hand combined, and it must be truly useful. Therefore, the core of the school program would be such basic occupational activities as gardening, carpentry, weaving, and sewing. One of its purposes would be to discover the capacities and aptitudes with which the child is endowed at birth. Through the disciplines of the school these potentialities would be developed and the child would be prepared to take that place in the social order for which he is by nature best fitted. Moreover, training in vocational skills and knowledge is an important support to moral education, for "it is physically impossible that true religious knowledge, or pure morality, should exist among any classes of a nation who do not work with their hands for their bread."

Another principle is that the school must teach "the laws of health and the exercises enjoined by them." The habit of cleanliness would be insisted upon, and physical development would be encouraged in connection with the various activities of the school program. Ruskin had no interest in gymnastic exercises. Recreational games might be played, but these should be non-competitive and should
Frank Warren Clippinger

have some instructive objective. Better than games would be such exercises as riding and sailing, which bring the individual into companionship "with the wild natural elements" and with animals.

The most unconventional of Ruskin's ideas, and yet an eminently characteristic one, is his insistence upon the necessity of keeping clearly in mind the end or use of knowledge. "The great leading error of modern times is the mistaking erudition for education." "Intellectual education before—much more without—moral education is in completeness impossible; and in incompleteness, a calamity." Even the intellectual skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic should be restricted to those who show ability to use them properly; consequently, they would not be taught formally in the elementary school.

There is, of course, a certain minimum body of knowledge which should be taught to all; but it would be limited to those elements and first principles which the learner can immediately put to use. What children cannot apply they should not be troubled to know.

Thus Ruskin worked upon the principle that the child, and not the subject-matter, is to be the real focus of attention. One of the obligations of education is to discover what capacities the individual may possess. But capacities differ; there is no such thing as equality. "No training, no forming, nor informing, will ever make two persons alike in thought and power." Beginning with the simpler types of occupational activity, the training of each individual would progress to finer and more specialized forms until he has discovered both what he can do best and that which he is not fitted to do. And so progress would be measured largely on the basis of individual standards. Examinations, while necessary, should be considered only as means by which the pupil discovers his own true position and powers in the world.

Moreover, no compulsion, especially in intellectual education, is possible. External stimuli of either reward or punishment are forbidden, and competition in school, as in economic life, is to be recognized as entirely evil. In education no stimuli are possible except those which accompany moral development.

Too often Ruskin's brief comments taken by themselves reveal only partially the substance of his educational purpose. Especially is this true of his intentionally provocative assertions in respect to the place of intellectual education. Actually, he would include in his program most of the conventional "subjects" of instruction; in many
instances, however, he had very unconventional ideas about how they should be treated. His attitude toward the various branches of knowledge can best be expressed by grouping them, as did Ruskin, according to the "three great occupations of men," art, science, and literature.

"Art gives Form to knowledge and Grace to utility." It makes visible things which otherwise could neither be described nor remembered; it gives delightfulness and worth to the implements of daily use. It can have a place in education, therefore, as in life, as an elevating influence which works through all parts of the environment and through every activity. Ruskin would use every means at his disposal to teach by aid of the eye, "a nobler organ than the ear," through use of drawings, charts, and photographs. Every school would have, as one of its most important forms of equipment, its own small museum of art and natural history.

Ruskin had great confidence in the possibilities of the museum as a means of imparting knowledge, in school and university, in village and city. But it must be a place for serious study, containing relatively few items, each the best of its kind and in its natural condition, representative of familiar rather than strange subjects. To the establishment of museums Ruskin devoted some of the best and most successful efforts of his life.

In conformity with his larger view of the place of art in life, however, Ruskin had no interest in teaching artistic expression as a subject in its own right. He would teach simple drawing, but only as a means of obtaining and communicating knowledge. "He who can accurately represent the form of an object, and match its colour, has unquestionably a power of notation and description greater in most instances than that of words."

Ruskin found in choral music, as did the Greeks, a means of education which combined physical, intellectual, and moral education. And in the same spirit of emulation of Plato, Ruskin would include worshipful dancing. It is apparent, however, that he had no clear idea about how to bring dancing into his program. There would also be instruction in speaking, confined chiefly to what is best described by the term, oral composition, and to recitation of Bible passages and poetry.

Ruskin was rather violently opposed to the trend of scientific research of his own time because, it seemed to him, it pursued knowledge for its own sake, forgetting that knowledge is of value only
as it serves practically the spiritual and material well-being of mankind. The man of science uses his energies to better advantage if they are spent not in the discovery of new facts but in gaining a proper grasp of facts already known.

He therefore had little use for such physical sciences as chemistry and "anatomy." He was, however, greatly interested in natural history, and would give to the study of this subject a high place in education, especially at the elementary level. "I think the vital and joyful study of natural history quite the principal element requiring introduction, not only into University, but into national education, from highest to lowest." "Rightly comprehended, half of schooling consists of making children familiar with natural objects, and the other half in teaching the practice of piety towards them (piety meaning kindness to living things and orderly use of the lifeless)."

In such statements spoke the artist and the deeply religious man. The practical study of natural history gains for man control over the sources of food and shelter, knowledge of the materials with which man needs must work; but it also deals with things as God made them, in all their natural beauty and in their living condition. Moreover, it has a high moral value, for to Ruskin a sympathetic understanding of man's natural environment is the first step on the road to a knowledge of God. As he had written in Modern Painters, "the one who loves Nature most will be always found to have more faith in God than the other. For nature-worship brings with it a sense of the presence and power of a Great Spirit as no mere reasoning can either induce or controvert; and where that nature-worship is innocently pursued... it becomes the channel of certain sacred truths, which by no other means can be conveyed."

And so Ruskin desired his pupils to study "botany," but to him botany meant "teaching children the beauty of plants as they grow," "their biographies—how and where they live and die, their tempers, benevolences, distresses, and virtues." Similarly, in "zoology" he would take the greatest pains to get at the creature's habits of life and know its "talents." He would have the pupils know enough astronomy to follow the stars in their courses.

Such knowledge is not gained in a laboratory; it comes from developing the habit of accurate and sympathetic observation of living things in their natural condition.

In Ruskin's scale of "sciences," a knowledge of human nature ranks higher than a knowledge of natural things. Such knowledge is
to be acquired through literature and history. Properly understood, history deals with the record of households, not of wars. "Literature does its duty in raising our fancy to the height of what may be noble, honest, and felicitous in actual life" and in giving us the companionship of the greatest men of all times. The greater the art, however, the greater its power for evil, when corrupted; and so Ruskin strove to reserve literary knowledge for those whose moral strength and whose sensitivity to the finer aspects of human nature had been sufficiently developed to permit them to make proper use of it. In the elementary school he would not teach reading; it was possible that a pupil might meet all his elementary requirements without the use of books. For in the earlier stages of education, when dealing with a yet unselected body of pupils, Ruskin relied upon direct contact with things and the oral instruction of the teacher. The teacher would read to the pupils daily. What is read may be fact or fiction, history or romance, but it should be set before them only the "most worthy in human deeds and human passion." However, those who of their own accord might choose to learn to read would find available in the school library a supply of the best books. And it is to be noted that Ruskin was rather extravagantly optimistic about the amount of literature and history he expected his pupils to know.

Nowhere did Ruskin outline his whole program or attempt to show the relation of its parts, but when these parts are brought together we find that they fit with rather surprising consistency into a pattern consisting of universal elementary training and a variety of forms of advanced and specialized training for those who are capable of receiving it.

In its beginnings elementary education would be universally compulsory, but beyond the initial stages continuation of schooling would depend upon the pupil. Ruskin's plan was so arranged that a gradual sifting of the coarser elements would take place without disturbance either to the pupil or to society, because from first to last education deals with skills and knowledge in relation to their use. We see this practical aspect of Ruskin's thought in all his ideas. Schools would be small. Occupational activities would be suited to the environment, whether it be city, country-side, or sea-coast.

Each school would be equipped with a library and a reading room, perhaps better called a "listening room." There would be a laboratory for purposes of demonstration which would also be the school museum. There would be shops, always a carpenter's shop,
perhaps a potter's, and more, if possible. And "each school would have garden, playground, and cultivable land around it spacious enough to employ the scholars in fine weather mostly out of doors."

It is impossible to determine the actual program of a day in Ruskin's elementary school, but it would be composed of the following exercises. There would be morning and evening worship services for the spiritual experience derived from choral singing which exalts the deeds of noble persons. There would be instruction in singing, dancing, speaking, and drawing. The last of these would be in relation to exercises in geography, astronomy, and natural history; but it would occupy as much of the day as would singing. Some time would be spent in the study of natural history through the medium of drawings and specimens in the museum. For an hour the teacher would read stories to those who cared to listen. During the larger part of the day the children would be busy in fields and shops. Here in addition to developing practical skills, the child would gain much of that moral training upon which Ruskin set such store, including disciplines in attentive observation, repeated effort, obedience in carrying out instructions, and the deep-seated satisfaction and self-respect which comes from accomplishment. Here, too, in relation to these practical activities would come most of that knowledge of natural history which would start the child on the road to realization of his place in God's world.

Higher education would be of two kinds. Its character is suggested by two sentences: "Shopmen are to be educated in shops; craftsmen, including artists, in the schools of their craft."

"A youth is sent to our Universities, not to be apprenticed to a trade, nor even always to be advanced in a profession; but, always, to be made a gentleman and a scholar."

Ruskin assumed that the world will always have its large mass of simple folk who are capable of doing only the simpler kind of work; at the other end of the social scale are the members of an aristocracy of talent, from whom are recruited the leaders and professional men. Between the two would be the skilled workers. For these skilled workers there would be schools of a technical nature in which "first the principles of their special business may be perfectly taught, and whatever higher learning, and cultivation of the faculties for receiving and giving pleasure, may be properly joined with that labour," for example, a school of agriculture, of mercantile seamanship, a school of metal-work "at the head of which will be, not the ironmasters, but..."
the goldsmiths."

The university, however, is primarily a school of literature, training modes of philosophic and imaginative thought. "The object of university teaching is to form your conceptions—not to acquaint you with arts, nor sciences—that you may in peace, in leisure, in calm of disinterested contemplation be enabled to conceive rightly the laws of nature, and the destinies of Man."

Ruskin's university training is therefore a liberal course of study with emphasis upon a "judicious involution" of its studies. As a postscript to a letter written in response to an inquiry about his ideas of how art might be related to the existing university curriculum, Ruskin set up a comprehensive final examination for the student of botany to demonstrate his conception of "judicious involution." The examination would consist of ten parts beginning with "State the habit of such and such a plant" and ending with "Describe its influence upon civilization." Of all these questions, he said, there is not one which does not test the student in other studies than botany; and he proceeded to point out that involved were geography, drawing, mathematics, chemistry, political economy, and (in four of the parts) literature.

In America, we have lately come to realize that the disturbances to life and thought in Victorian England which stimulated such critics as Carlyle, Mill, Arnold, and Ruskin foreshadowed in many of their essential qualities the problems of our own times. Because education, by its nature, tends to reflect changes in social ideals, the questioning critical attitude of the present time toward education is reminiscent of the national atmosphere in which Ruskin lived. It would appear, then, that whatever interest there may be in Ruskin's ideas on education lies chiefly in their relation to contemporary thought and that they may best be interpreted in the light of the current trend.

Criticism of education today tends to ally itself with one or the other of two points of view representative of rival claims as to whether education should be primarily concerned with providing free scope for the fullest development of the individual in accordance with his own capacities and interests or with shaping the individual to the existing pattern of life. Their contemporary labels are Progressivism and Essentialism.

Progressivism has for nearly a generation aggressively sought to bring about a thorough-going reorganization of the whole educative process. Although the movement is still associated in the public
mind with private schools, its influence upon practices in our public schools, especially at the elementary level, has grown steadily.

In a very real sense, the founder of Progressivism was John Dewey. His School and Society, an exposition of the organization and objectives of an experimental school (1896-1904) at the University of Chicago, has been the most influential statement of Progressive doctrine. If we compare Ruskin's ideas about elementary education with those expressed in School and Society we find some rather significant similarities.

Dewey, like Ruskin, organized his school on the basis of activities which reproduce or resemble adult occupational activities of an era prior to the advent of modern industrialism. School took on the informal nature of a busy shop, and knowledge was acquired in relation to such activities as, for example, the making of cloth. Even the three R's were subordinated to the activity program. The school consciously focussed its attention upon the individual child rather than upon the material to be learned, on the principle that learning should not be imposed upon the individual but must grow out of his own felt needs.

Thus, as the student of Ruskin, grown aware of the prophetic character of his thinking, might have been led to expect, there are resemblances in Ruskin's plan of education suggestive of the three outstanding characteristics of Progressive practice: the activity or project method, with its principle of learning by doing, by first-hand experience; the realistic or practical curriculum, providing skills and knowledge which can be comprehended by the child and immediately applied; individualized instruction, the child-centered school.

But these are very largely similarities of educational method. Further examination, especially if it be examination of objectives and of underlying conceptions of man and society, reveals a very real difference. This contrast can best be explained if we turn to the earlier reform movement out of which Progressivism evolved. This was a movement, stemming from the teachings of Rousseau, which was shaped during the nineteenth century by such famous educators as Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel. It was this "New Education" which Dewey converted into Progressive education in the early years of the twentieth century.

The primary characteristic common to the thought of all of these earlier reformers was their sense of the significance of the individual. Their educational theory drew its support and took its
shape from a conception of the individual which was based upon an
intuitive idealism, religious in its recognition of a controlling super-
human Power from which human life gains its peculiar importance
and optimistic in its assumption that everything, including man, is
good "as it comes from the hands of the author of nature." It was a
theory which added its force to the rising tide of democracy, with its
ideal to extend social rights and privileges to all. From these assump-
tions the New Education developed its doctrine of natural growth; in
that doctrine are the origins of the activity method, the realistic cur-
riculum, and the child-centered school.

Shortly after the middle of the century, however, materialistic
forces growing out of the Industrial Revolution, especially science,
came into conflict with the intuitivism upon which these reformers
had relied. Quite generally, where that conflict did not lead to loss of
religious faith, there was a disposition to avoid facing the issues
involved. In either case there resulted a preoccupation with the
material aspects of life at the expense of the theoretical. Education
followed the current and became a science; interest in Pestalozzi,
Herbart, and Froebel was concentrated not upon their philosophies
but upon their principles and methods.

It was left to Dewey to accommodate nineteenth century
democratic idealism and the doctrine of natural growth to the twen-
tieth century preoccupation with science, and so to bring to the fore a
philosophic support for the Progressive methods which evolved from
those of the New Education. Dewey made that adjustment by reject-
ing everything which cannot be made subject to scientific analysis. He
is essentially materialistic. He has no interest in first causes or ultimate
ends; he is content to take Life for granted, and concerns himself only
with living. His goal of individual self-realization is to be accom-
plished by the effective use of intelligence; the mind is an instrument
which has evolved through trial-and-error methods of experience into
an effective tool which can be further improved by intelligent use. But
intelligence must not be hampered by supposedly absolute values or
by fixed goals. Growth itself is the only goal, the only moral "end."

Dewey's fundamental position is, then, the antithesis of Ruskin's.
It is true that their social goals—for Dewey is as much a social reformer
as ever was Ruskin—are much alike, for both work toward a co-operative
social order in which all men may participate according to ability.
They would approach their goals, however, by very different routes.
Whereas Dewey, and the Progressivists, holding to the democratic
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idealism of the New Education, disposed of the clash between revelations of science and the intuitive conception of the significance of the individual by rejecting the latter in favor of a materialistic philosophy of experimentalism, Ruskin held firmly to his faith in a Supreme Being and the altruistic ethics of Christianity. Consequently, in spite of whatever similarities there may seem to be in their methods of instruction or in their organization of the school, Ruskin cannot be considered a pioneer Progressivist.

But what relation may Ruskin's ideas have to those of the New Education before it lost its religious faith? The most respected biographical and critical studies of Ruskin, with a natural tendency to emphasize the forward-looking qualities of Ruskin's social thought, imply that Ruskin's educational ideas are in line with those of the Rousseauian tradition. Actually, however, Ruskin was only partially in sympathy with New Education thought.

He had their conception of the significance of the individual, based on intuitive idealism. He had their democratic interest in bringing all men actively into the social order. He had their desire to make education universal. But he had no sympathy with their assumption that human nature is innately good, needing only opportunity for release of its powers through natural growth. Man's God-given capacities are limited, said Ruskin, and potentially good or bad, depending upon how they are developed. To come to their best maturity they must be trained by deliberate and constant exercise. As he fought the materialism of science, he opposed the nineteenth century democratic idealism which emphasized liberty and quality. Instead of the selfish demand for opportunity and "rights," he emphasized responsibilities and obligations. By placing themselves in a position to deserve things, he thought, men will inevitably acquire what democracy demands as rights. Thus, in effect, he would guarantee that for which the democratic ideal was striving: security of opportunity for self-realization, for the full development of the powers of the individual, and active participation, in accordance with capacity, in the significant affairs of society. It would be gained, however, through inculcation of altruistic virtues, through discipline and self-control, rather than through natural unfolding of innate goodness.

Opposition to the growing influence of Progressivist practices is of long standing, but it has only recently shown signs of becoming organized. In 1935 the late Michael Demiaskevich pointed out that
there is an opposing school of educational thought to which he gave the name, "Essentialist." Three years later there was formed an Essentialist Committee for the Advancement of American Education, initiating an Essentialist movement of counter-reform. The spokesman for this committee is W. C. Bagley, who says, "The Essentialist emphasizes the basic significance of the accumulated experience of the race, and affirms the chief concern of education to be the transmission to each generation of the most important lessons that have come out of this experience." In pointed contrast to Progressivist doctrine, the Essentialist would establish a community of culture through a standardized and systematic program of studies and activities; he would develop the capacity of self-discipline through imposed disciplines, requiring of the pupil effort devoted often "to the mastery of materials the significance of which must be taken at the time on faith." Thus, in his view, education is a form of training rather than of self-development.

The Essentialist traces his educational philosophy to "Socrates and the Socratics." He would bring back into the foreground of educational thought the conception of education first recorded by Plato and adapt educational procedures, in the light of modern knowledge and modern conditions, to the classical ideal.

In the basic structure of Ruskin's view of education, there is close similarity to that of the Essentialist's, much closer than to the thought of the New Education or Progressivism. It is a resemblance all the more pointed because Ruskin drew heavily upon Plato in the exposition of his social ideals, and of his ideas on education as well.

Ruskin had much of Plato's belief in absolute values of the good, the true, and the beautiful, though Ruskin would expect men to achieve recognition of the ultimate Goodness, or God, through development of the moral sense rather than by way of the intellect, as did Plato. In Ruskin's conception of the ideal social order we find the Platonic goal of justice, of every man in his place, and the same extensive governmental regulation of society administered by a relatively small group of the intellectual elite. Ruskin accepts the Platonic assumption that individual capacities are fixed or limited at birth and that these are to be trained by social pressures.

Consequently, Ruskin's plan of elementary education has significant resemblances to that of Plato, as outlined in the Laws. Plato would defer intellectual education until after the child had become habituated to established standards of thought and action, an habituation fixed by a program of training which permitted no deviation
from prescribed disciplines or from a rigidly censored body of knowledge. It would be a program composed almost wholly of activities which combined physical, moral, and intellectual education in exercises emphasizing practical preparation for the duties of citizenship, and especially for future military service. It would be a program universally compulsory at the elementary stage; later, on the basis of proved ability, selection would be made of the few who are to receive advanced training which would fit them to become the governors of society.

When we turn to the Essentialist’s point of view we find differences which set him off from both Ruskin and Plato. It is a difference primarily of procedures, and of organization of the educational program. For the Essentialist holds rather closely to the traditional view of education, as it has come down through the centuries. He clings to the formal organization of subject-matter, to the emphasis upon intellectual education, and to vicarious rather than first-hand experience. He rejects not only the “child-centered school” of the Progressivist but also the practical curriculum and the “activity method,” except perhaps at the lowest level of the elementary school.

That traditional view, intellectualistic and aristocratic, is classical in its origin; but it derives from the Plato of the Republic and from modifications of Platonic thought made by Aristotle, who preferred the cultural rather than the practical objective. Ruskin’s independent spirit, however, led him directly to the otherwise disregarded Laws, a much more practical treatise than the utopian Republic. In the Laws Plato’s social view is much broader. His society is, in a sense, an upper middle-class democracy, and his program of elementary education is one made suitable for all citizens, whereas in the Republic he had been interested mainly in higher education suitable only for the intellectual aristocrat. That combination of Progressivist practice and Essentialist structure which we have already noted in Ruskin’s plan of education is therefore to be found suggested in the Laws.

We must not conclude, however, that Ruskin was merely a disciple of Plato, for Ruskin’s plan of education is suffused with a spirit which is essentially Ruskinian. In Plato’s society the significance of the individual is lost in a state conceived as an end in itself; but Ruskin, by depending upon the individual’s consciousness of responsibility to others, managed to maintain the dignity of the individual life.

Thus, in summary, Ruskin’s plan of education takes its character from the fusion of two qualities: the first is its democratic idealism,
resembling that of early New Education thought, which finds significance in the life of every individual and seeks to provide a way by which each can share actively in the life of society; the second is classical authoritarianism, which would habituate the individual to established standards. These are not antagonistic, for in Ruskin's plan the established standards would be the Christian altruistic virtues, which draw their vitality from a faith in man as the son of God.

As long as our age continues to be dominated by the utilitarian and materialistic spirit which has characterized the advance of industrialism, as long as democratic idealism maintains its emphasis upon self and self-expression, Ruskin's proposals for the reform of education will attract no sympathetic interest.

However, materialistic objections to Ruskin's plan can not be pressed too far, for there is in Ruskin's social idealism a fundamental truth which lies too closely beneath the surface. Although it may be true that the Christian theology of a century ago must needs be interpreted anew, it cannot be said that the twentieth century has discarded Christian ethics. Moreover, Ruskin faced with courageous logic problems which the democratic and scientific mood of the last hundred years has thus far preferred to ignore. He would recall all men to the realization that living involves the obligation of working, that the greatest satisfactions are gained by those whose activity exercises not hand alone, nor head alone, but hand, head, and heart in one organic, integrated expression of individual vitality. Furthermore, Ruskin faced squarely the problem of differences in individual capacities without sacrificing personal dignity. Democratic idealism has long sought to minimize the fact that individuals differ, especially intellectually. But as the complexities of life multiply, the trend is unmistakably toward Ruskin's position that we must frankly recognize the necessity of adjusting our social—even our political—arrangements on the principle of tools to him who can use them, in harmony with the larger principle of social justice.

There are innumerable signs pointing to the conclusion that the age of science has already passed its zenith, and that a reaction has set in against the tendencies which have characterized the age. Collapse of the economic structure in 1929 broke the spell of the wholly materialistic life. The last decade has shown a marked movement away from laissez-faire in government, rugged individualism, and the older democratic ideals. There has been a return of intuitive idealism on the high intellectual level of the physical sciences. There
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is evidence of an increasing desire to re-create discipline, order, and national vitality within the framework of democracy for the purpose of preserving that democracy.

The recent emergence of the Essentialist movement in education may be taken as another sign of the reactionary spirit of our times. Ruskin, in effect, anticipated this spirit and the Essentialist's revival of the classical view of the function of education. He sought to check the revolutionary social trend of his own time at exactly the point from which, since then, the Progressivists have sought to develop it.

The program of the Essentialist, however, follows Ruskin's at a great distance. Still under the influence of educational traditionalism, he has as yet made only partial adaptation of an aristocratic, intellectualistic system of education to a social order vastly more inclusive in theory and steadily growing more inclusive in fact. It would seem, then, that Ruskin has more nearly achieved that balance of responsibilities and rights, towards which the Essentialists needs must aspire, by constructing his scheme of education in such manner that it effectively combines the two essential objectives:

1. Social justice, adapted to a social order in which all men may actively participate.

2. The formation of character, conceived in terms of Christian ethics.

Whether such a plan of education as Ruskin's could be made to function in America today is an open question. It would depend, chiefly, it would seem, upon whether we are ready to make practical application of the rules of human conduct and the law of social relationships to which a world, which still likes to call itself Christian, clings tenaciously as expressive of man at his noblest, but which—strangely enough—it has never tried.

Sir Ernest Barker (1874-1960), a life-long scholar in the British tradition, had the distinction of teaching in England's two oldest universities. He lectured and tutored in history at Oxford University for the first two decades of this century and, following seven years as principal of King's College (London), he occupied the chair of political science at Cambridge University for eleven years. He wrote voluminously during all these years and in the long period following his retirement as professor emeritus in 1939.

The range covered by Barker's books, pamphlets, and articles, which numbered nearly a hundred, was wide. But the vast majority of his publications were concerned with the study and practice of things political. Political theory dominated his attention, and he brought a keen sense of analysis and interpretation to bear upon the thought of the ancients, the middle ages, and post-Reformation social and political thinkers. Political institutions also captured his interest, and a historical temperament supplemented by descriptive genius enriched his text with illustrations of the political practices of earlier civilizations. Moreover, he added to the basic political literature available in English by his translations of German, Byzantine and Greek treatises.

Barker was a liberal in the English manner, and he early attached himself to the political and social theories of Thomas Hill Green. His efforts in political philosophy emerge as a defense of liberalism complemented by a detailed discourse on its application to the many facets of contemporary western civilization. The task involved him in a sustained and conscious effort at synthesis—at a synthesis of modern social institutions with traditional liberal institutions, and at a synthesis of the several major trends in the political theories of the early 1900's. Taking his cue from T. H. Green, Barker applied the method of Aristotle to the assumptions of liberalism, the claims of groups and the exigencies of democratic theory. In the course of his synthesis he investigated the theories of Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, Gierke, Rousseau, Green, Herbert Spencer, John Stuart Mill, the pluralists, and a host of lesser lights who had added to the streams of western social thought.

The result of Barker's synthesis was a social and political idealism largely congruent with the liberalism of T. H. Green. Yet Barker hesitated to commit himself fully to the idealism his thought demanded. He tempered his conclusions with the typical distrust the English have for abstract systems, and with a faith in the time-proven
trust of the English in compromise and tradition. As a result he left solutions to the key political problems of sovereignty, pluralism and political resistance indeterminate.

The purpose of this dissertation has been to develop a systematic analysis of Barker's political philosophy as it is unfolded in his publications. The result has been presented in six discrete but interrelated chapters presenting various aspects of his thought. Barker's political science methodology is examined in the first chapter and compared in detail with that of Aristotle, whom he acknowledged as his mentor and whose method he faithfully emulated. The second chapter is an investigation of the assumptions, difficulties and basic propositions of Barker's liberalism, which is so compatible with the theory of Thomas Hill Green and the Kantian claims for individual freedom. Chapter III indicates Barker's use of the analogy of personality to define the nature and scope of groups in contemporary society, and presents the indeterminacy of his pluralist views. His notions of the idea of justice, the nature of law, the locus of sovereignty and the grounds and limits of political obligation are presented in the fourth chapter. It is in these areas that Barker encountered the greatest difficulty. Chapter V discusses his defense of democracy and summarizes his description of the democratic process. Barker's detailed explication of democratic government, which he calls government by discussion, is perhaps his finest work. The penultimate chapter analyzes his views of religious and economic institutions and evaluates their compatibility with his group theory. The concluding chapter examines his theories from the perspective of a coherent philosophy, and evaluates the contributions of Barker's political publications as a whole.


After three decades of acceptance, the policy conclusions of the Keynesian model have been challenged by the re-emergence of clas-
sical type macroeconomic models. The Keynesian analysis has long been used to justify the need for government intervention to reduce unemployment and to stabilize the economy. Proponents of these new classical models argue that economic policy aimed at reducing the rate of unemployment will be ineffective in the long run. The active use of policy will destabilize not stabilize the economy.

Keynes was not the only economist who presented an alternative to the classical model in the 1930s. Hayek developed a model of the business cycle that was an alternative to the classical model and to the model of Keynes. Both Hayek and Keynes were critical of the neglect of the role of time and of money in the classical models. Keynes's model provided theoretical justification for active policy intervention. Hayek's theory argued that such policies would be ineffective and were actually the ultimate cause of cyclical fluctuations and unemployment.

The policy conclusions of the new classical models are in many ways similar to the conclusions arrived at by Hayek. However, these new models retain many of the inadequacies of the old classical model. Many of the issues that were at the heart of the Keynes-Hayek debate were never resolved. The Hayekian model presents strong policy arguments that are opposed to Keynesian policy, as are the policy arguments of the new classical model. But the Hayekian model, like the Keynesian model, addresses important theoretical problems that cannot be adequately dealt with by classical-type models.

A redirection of the current policy effectiveness debate along the lines of inquiry suggested by Hayek and Keynes would enhance our understanding of the operation of a monetary economy and better our chances of making a correct rational choice about policy.


James Bryce, 1838-1922, historian, Oxford don and Member of Parliament, first visited the United States in 1870. He subsequently re-
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turned eight times, his longest stay being made as British Ambassa-
dor, 1907-1913. America's fascination for him grew with succeeding
years and diverted him from his academic and parliamentary careers.
His life mission came to be the promotion of better Anglo-American
relations and the establishment of an entente between the two nations.

Bryce's influence in the United States was exercised through
both friendships and extensive writings, the success of the latter
increasing the number of the former. These American friends came
from the most influential classes and professions, including three
Presidents, two Secretaries of State, Justices of the Supreme Court,
university presidents, historians, political scientists, authors, clergymen,
reformers, railroad leaders, millionaires, jurists and politicians.
Much of his influence with ordinary Americans stemmed from the
classic success of The American Commonwealth (1888), a compre-
hensive study of American institutions and society. All Americans
who attended high school or college came under its influence for
many years. Further his numerous articles in American journals
reached a broad spectrum of the population as did his historical
juristic and political monographs, which brought him incidentally
great pecuniary rewards.

Conscious of the need to meet as many Americans as possible
if his mission to allay anti-British sentiment was to succeed, Bryce
accepted many speaking and lecturing engagements. As ambassador
especially, he took care to meet demands for addresses from colleges
and universities, because he hoped to influence the young. His
assistance to American scholars in all fields was given ungrudgingly,
many monographs owing their inspiration to his work. The years
1906-1913 enabled him to extend his influence from the East to all parts
of the country, although Iowa, Minnesota and St. Louis had previ-
ously known him. In these years, too, Bryce settled all outstanding
diplomatic problems between his country and the United States.
When he departed for England in 1913, British influence was stronger
than it had ever been and Anglo-American relations were harmoni-

During World War One, Bryce's role was to convince Ameri-
cans of the justice of the British cause, to prevent the war from creating
an open rupture between Britain and the United States and to promote
the League of Nations concept. The publication of the Bryce Report on
German atrocities was an important factor in turning Americans away
from Germany. He moderated tensions between the two peoples a-
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rising from American neutrality and played a role in fostering the American intention of joining a League of Nations, only to be disappointed in this hope. Elated by the American decision to join the war, he was dismayed by the revival of anti-British sentiment caused by Anglo-American postwar naval rivalry, the British treatment of Ireland and the disillusion toward the war which marked American sentiment after Wilson's defeat. Bryce's achievements in promoting friendship were largely destroyed.

Other monuments to Bryce's work remained. His promotion of professional journals, such as The English Historical Review, his contribution to the establishment of political science as an academic discipline, and the encouragement of interdisciplinary studies in the relation of history to geography, economics, sociology, and psychology are examples. His classic studies, The Holy Roman Empire and The American Commonwealth, inspired new generations of American scholars. Finally, in England, he had placed several Anglo-American societies on a firm basis, had assisted in the purchase of Sulgrave Manor, George Washington's ancestral home, and helped establish American studies at the University of London. The erection of a statue to Abraham Lincoln in Parliament Square, London, with Bryce presiding over the occasion, symbolized the friendship between the two nations for which he had striven. Occurring in 1920, it was a fitting climax to his career.


The purpose of this study was to investigate the rhetorical theory of Hugh Blair. Dr. Blair was born in 1718 and died in 1800. From 1757 to 1796 he was minister of the High Church of St. Giles in Edinburgh. Between the years 1754 and 1783 he lectured on Rhetoric at the University of Edinburgh.

In his day Blair enjoyed a tremendous reputation as a teacher of rhetoric, preacher, and intellectual figure. Among his close associates were most of the important British intellectuals of the time.

Blair's rhetorical theories are contained primarily in his Lec-
Herman Cohen

tures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, published in 1783. The Lectures exercised a profound influence in Blair's day and in the period following. His text on rhetoric was reissued many times, in Britain and throughout the world. In the first half of the nineteenth century Blair's Lectures was used in practically all of the English and American universities.

Blair's rhetorical theory has not been studied previously. The several biographers do not deal with his theory of public address. The studies in speech are more largely concerned with Blair's speaking than with his theory of rhetoric. This investigator believes that an examination of Blair's ideas concerning rhetoric will substantially supplement the conclusions of the earlier studies.

The author examined carefully the writings of Blair himself and of Blair's predecessors and contemporaries who dealt with aspects of rhetorical theory. He read widely in the periodicals, letters, diaries and journals of the time. He sought to examine Blair in the light of the forces at work in the period in which he lived and the heritage which came to that period out of the past. The investigation proposed to determine the nature of Blair's ideas concerning public address. It sought to isolate the major divisions of Blair's theory in order to examine his basic postulates with regard to rhetoric and to come to conclusions concerning their sources and possible contributions. In attempting to determine the sources of Blair's ideas, the writer gave consideration, not only to possible contemporary influences, both British and Continental, but also to the influences of the classical rhetoricians of Greece and Rome. An attempt was made also to isolate the unique characteristics of Blair's rhetoric, the contributions which he made to rhetorical theory.

Blair's work is essentially a re-writing, for the eighteenth century audience, of the principles of rhetoric set forth in classical times by the Greek and Roman writers. Blair was heavily dependent, in particular, upon the writings of Quintilian. He was more selectively dependent upon the writings of Cicero and Aristotle. Blair also drew materials from the writings of his contemporaries, some directly concerned with speech, and some from other disciplines. Among those who influenced him most were Sheridan, Lord Kames, Hume and Reynolds. Blair was not an indiscriminate borrower; rather his theory is a synthesis of selected views of other authorities. His point of view was essentially that of the period in which he lived, the Age of Reason. Thus, it was characterized by a highly rational approach.
In spite of its derivative nature, Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres embodies several major contributions to rhetorical theory. Blair was unique in that he was one of the first major writers to direct his rhetoric not only to the practitioner but also to the listener as a critic. The most pervasive characteristic of Blair's criticism is the application of the principles of speech composition which are outlined in the didactic sections of the Lectures. His critical method also reflects his basic concept that all eloquence must be functional and that the highest goal of eloquence is persuasion. He, therefore, seeks to determine, in his critical system, whether the orator under consideration uses rhetoric to elicit a response or merely for sake of ostentation, pomp, and style.

Closely related to Blair's contribution in the area of criticism is his contribution in the field of taste. Blair's critical canons grew out of a firm belief that the development of rhetorical criticism must find its foundation in the understanding and improvement of human taste. Criticism for him is the application of good taste to the various species of oral discourse.

His concept is one which holds that taste is an innate but precisely improvable faculty. The criterion which he proposes is the neo-classical standard of "the taste of men in general." That must be held to be the most beautiful or most good on which the most human beings concur in admiring. Blair applies this principle to rhetorical criticism.

Another of Blair's contributions to rhetorical theory is his concept of oral style. It is from a perspective which regards perspicuity as the fundamental characteristic of style that Blair discusses oral language. Ornament is desirable; clarity is essential. A unique aspect of Blair's view of oral style is its relationship to other rhetorical factors. He regards style as relatively meaningless unless it is closely related to the individual speaker and his peculiar methods of thought. In addition, Blair views style as being closely related to all of the other elements of speech composition.

The last of Blair's major contributions is his thesis, posited in his discussion of the history of oratory, that eloquence thrives in free societies and decays when liberty is removed. Blair finds that Grecian eloquence first appeared with the rise of the democratic Greek state. Athenian eloquence came into being with the birth of the republic and decayed with its death. Similarly, it was the short duration of democracy in Rome which caused its oratorical excellence to be so...
short-lived. Even in his own time, Blair points out true eloquence is found only in societies where free expression is permitted.

The overall dimension of Blair's contribution to rhetorical theory and criticism is not inconsiderable. The analysis of The Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres leads the writer to list the following distinctive features:

1. His utilization of the precepts of rhetoric for the critic as well as the speaker.
2. His application of the principles of taste to rhetorical criticism.
3. His conception of a perspicuous oral style, closely related to the speaker, subject and audience.
4. His establishment of the relationship between freedom and eloquence in his discussion of the history of oratory.


This dissertation offers an interpretation of the works of Adam Smith. The basic thesis developed in this dissertation is that Smith's view of society was formulated out of historical influences that were far broader than generally conceded by commentators in economic thought.

It is acknowledged that Smith's basic behavioral concepts of sympathy and self-interest are significant contributions to economic thought. These concepts, however, did not appear as in a vision to Adam Smith but were results of the psychological studies dating back to the middle ages. These influences along with philosophical thought during the later seventeenth and eighteenth century had profound
Edward Watkins Coker

influence on Adam Smith. Emphasis is placed on not only the positive influences exerted on Smith but, also, negative forces in the philosophy of the day such as Mandeville and the Physiocrats.

Basically, the view of Adam Smith as a philosopher who viewed society solely from a standpoint of economic progress will be questioned. Instead, Smith will be viewed as having a philosophy of human nature based on liberty and freedom and not simply the creation of wealth.

Many interpretations of Adam Smith have been offered, emphasizing his philosophical stance. Even those that focused on Smith as a moral philosopher generally seemed to regard Smith's approach in the context of Lockean-Newtonian-Hume tradition of empiricism/rationalism. These influences are clearly present in Smith but the behavioral/romantic influences of the Moral Sense School and Rousseau merit closer scrutiny.

Thus, the vectors of influence that converged on Adam Smith were of varied and even contradictory natures. Yet the result of this collision of philosophical forces was clearly an event of significance in the history of philosophical and economic thought. The overriding influence on Adam Smith's economic thought has, over time, partially obscured much of his original thought, including his stated intention of creating a view of society as a system based on both economic and humanistic factors.


A. J. P. Taylor is a most interesting problem in twentieth century English intellectual life. He is at once a historian and a polemicist, contributing regularly to both the academic and journalistic worlds. This work attempts to assess his worth in both areas, and to comprehend the nature of his outlook and attitudes regarding those historical and contemporary problems most germane to modern European civilization. The years 1934 to 1965 cover the major portion of his career; in evaluating his work in this period, over four hundred pieces of writing, both Taylor's and his critics', were examined in order
Charles Robert Cole

to describe Taylor's historical and political ideas, and to ascribe to him a place among the British intellectuals of his generation.

The underlying point of identification to emerge from treating Taylor's writing is that he belongs to a school of thought best described as the English Idea—the historiographically liberal descendant of T. B. Macaulay, and the politically radical outgrowth of the attitudes of Thomas Paine, John Bright, and Lloyd George. Taylor's consistent humanism, love of freedom, devotion to truth, and insistence upon intellectual and political toleration are the characteristics which most clearly identify him in this category.

But also he is a man of the twentieth century: a socialist in domestic and international politics. In this regard he has devoted himself to defending in history and contemporary argument the rights of the people; he has noted their emancipation from political and social inequality over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and has argued for their right to decide their own destiny against the encroachments of elitists, political dictators, intellectual authoritarians, and ideological dogmatists. As part of this outlook Taylor has combined with the collectivism of the ideal of socialist equality, the individualism of libertarian freedom as defined by nineteenth century English Radicalism.

The course of Taylor's career is followed chronologically, which reveals that his ideas were set early by intellectual training, family background, and cultural nourishment in the North Country, the birthplace of latterday English Radical thought. Appearing from the start almost as platonic ideals, his convictions changed little; apparent inconsistencies were only those arising from changing conditions in the outlook of national and international policies, politics, and alignments. Ideologically he was always a man of libertarian leftist views, scornful alike of conservative and leftist dogma, both of which he regarded as dangerous to the rights and liberties of the people. His position on intellectual and political viewpoints was revealed in works as diverse as The Struggle for Mastery in Europe and The Origins of the Second World War, both studies of major problems in diplomatic history, and in a number of journalistic efforts ranging from book reviews in The Manchester Guardian and The Observer to emotional contemporary comments in the pages of The Sunday Express.

In spite of a number of reviews and commentaries, scurrilous on the one hand and overly complimentary on the other, on Taylor's
career and work, this study has attempted to cut through personal preferences, critical antagonisms, and the highly tempestuous facade of Taylor himself, in an effort to see the subject purely in terms of his ideas in relation to the conditions and the times in which they were formulated. The final picture is that of a historian, conventional in format, and of a polemicist, unique in his capacity to inspire, infuriate, instruct, and confuse.


This is a study of the historical, political and religious thought of the eminent twentieth century Cambridge historian, Sir Herbert Butterfield, and its relationship to the theory and practice of international politics. The sources include published works, as well as numerous unpublished manuscripts and letters.

An introductory chapter sets forth the salient themes of Butterfield’s writings in the context of his life and personality; and his preoccupation with history, diplomacy and statecraft, and the philosophical and political implications of Christianity for the contemporary world. The first major section follows, discussing Butterfield’s extensive work on the origins and development of historiography, his concern with the methods and assumptions of the historian’s mind, and his tentative efforts towards a philosophy of history centered around the themes of divine providence and judgment. The relevance of all these issues of historical science for political theory and practice in international affairs is assessed through the links suggested by Butterfield himself in his commentaries on Acton and Ranke, and his debates with Marxist historiography and Sir Lewis Namier.

A second section explores Butterfield’s understanding of politics, and the role of tragedy, sin, the moderate cupidity of Everyman, the struggle for power, and man’s quest for moral and intellectual coherence in political life. Butterfield’s views on the relationship of ethics to statecraft are clarified through an analysis of his commentar-
ies on Machiavelli and Richelieu; his discussions of the balance of power, diplomacy and international order; his study of the origins of World War I; and his writings on the Cold War, the challenges posed by the Third World and the possibilities for East-West accommodation.

A third section presents some of the major aspects of Christianity's influence on Western civilization, from Butterfield's viewpoint, and an outline of the role Christianity may play in the political, intellectual and social climate underlying international relations in the twentieth century and beyond. The dissertation concludes by summarizing the contributions of Butterfield's thought to be a renewed understanding of wise statecraft suitable for the trying challenges of our times.


The purpose of this study was to examine the contributions of representative theorists from the five major movements of counseling theory in terms of how those theorists viewed the nature of man. Each theory was examined to determine:

1. The goals and method of the approach.

2. The stated view of man.

3. An extrapolated view of man based on the extent to which the theorist attributed to man the characteristics of trustworthiness, altruism, independence, strength of will and rationality, complexity, and variability.

4. The relationship of the theorist's view of man to philo-
philosophical issues, the cultural milieu of the theorist, and counseling methodology.

The findings of the study indicate that nearly all theorists assume some philosophical view of the nature of man, whether or not that view is explicitly stated. It was further found that the view of man was quite directly related to the view of man in the theorist's cultural milieu, to very fundamental philosophical questions, and to the goals and methods of the theory.

It was found that Freud assumed man to be characterized by aggressiveness and destructiveness, a view which involved such basic philosophical issues as the essential goodness of man and the extent to which he is a determined being. Williamson emphasized the rationality and potentiality of man and was concerned with the philosophical issue of freedom. Wolpe stated no view of man, but his theory implied a view of man similar to Locke's tabula rasa model. Rogers optimistically believed that man possessed the capacity to actualize himself, a view which also raised the question of man's goodness. Frankl described man as free and in search of meaning; freedom was found to be a key philosophical issue in his theory. Each of those views of man was consistent with the theorist's approach to counseling and reflected the prevalent view of man in the theorist's milieu.

As a result of the findings, the following conclusions were drawn:

1. The question of the underlying philosophical view of the nature of man is a vital issue in counseling theory.

2. The counseling profession has failed to adequately consider the nature of man and other philosophical presuppositions of counseling theory.

3. Many of the differences among theories at the operational level can be accounted for in terms of differences which exist in such philosophical presuppositions as the nature of man.

4. There are ethical considerations inherent in any counseling relationship which become crucial in light of the therapist's view of the nature of man.
5. To the extent a theorist's counseling approach is determined by his view of man, the theory can be viewed as related to the cultural milieu of the theorist.

6. To the extent differences in methodology can be accounted for in terms of the theorist's view of the nature of man, serious questions arise concerning eclecticism as an approach to counseling.

Those conclusions suggested the following recommendations:

1. The counseling profession should give greater attention to philosophical presuppositions of counseling in general, and particularly to the philosophical view of the nature of man.

2. The historical and cultural milieu should be emphasized in the study of counseling theory.

3. Counselors should be sensitive to the ethical issues involved when they adopt a particular view of man or employ a particular counseling methodology.

4. There should be an emphasis on viewing counseling from a holistic frame of reference in which underlying philosophical presuppositions, counseling goals, and counseling methodology are viewed as interrelated, and in which counselors are sensitive to inconsistencies between philosophical foundations and methodology.


Anna Freud, youngest daughter of Sigmund Freud, psycho-
Gay Coleman Collins

analyst, researcher, writer, ex-officio director of the Hampstead Child Therapy Course and Clinic in London, has worked throughout a long professional life on concerns regarding children. With the advent of psychoanalysis as a science, the need arose to tailor psychoanalytic technique to meet the particular needs of children. Anna Freud was instrumental in developing the sub-specialty of child analysis as a respectable science in its own right. Not only has she worked to develop appropriate techniques in therapeutic situations, but she has directed much of her concern to elucidating the aspects of normal development which comprise the theory of psychoanalytic child psychology.

Perhaps because she began her own career as a teacher of eight and nine year olds, she has always felt keenly the need to translate theory into practice, so that parents and teachers can also benefit. This writer contends that psychoanalytic child psychology offers the most comprehensive developmental picture of the child. The theoretical framework it offers has direct application and use to teachers not only in understanding the children they teach, but in supplying the authority to defend the rights of children against the inroads of administrative restraints and political expediencies.

This writer has scrutinized her writing and attempted to winnow out those aspects of her work which speak particularly to teachers, not only the developmental perspective she provides, but also those insights gained from a long career in working with children.

The dissertation is divided into four chapters. The first chapter supplies the biographical context of Anna Freud's work. It details her childhood, young adulthood and early training, and early professional life in Vienna. It also discusses the challenge presented by the work of Melanie Klein, and compares and contrasts the Freudian and Kleinian positions. Work at the Hampstead War Nurseries with Dorothy Burlingham is detailed. The Hampstead Child Therapy Clinic is described, specifically the use of the Diagnostic Profile, the Hampstead Index, and the Developmental Lines.

Chapter two presents the content of Anna Freud's work, particularly those principles of psychoanalytic child development which are of immediate use to those who work with children. It reviews the psychosexual stages specifically with Anna Freud's contribution. It discusses her formulation of the four differences between children and adults: egocentrism, primary versus secondary process, time sense, and immature sexual apparatus. It describes the Develop-
Gay Coleman Collins

mental Lines, with an example of practical application: entrance into nursery school. Included are the lessons learned from the war nurseries on the effects of separation, the critical aspects of socialization, and her unusual study concerning attachment, "An Experiment in Group Upbringing." The metapsychological point of view is represented by the assessment criteria used at Hampstead.

Chapter three discusses teaching from a psychoanalytic perspective, including teacher attributes, training needs, the historical perspective of psychoanalysis and education, and the role of the teacher. It offers suggestions on managing behavior by describing two therapeutic settings.

Chapter four presents two teaching models that are congruent with the principle of psychoanalytic child psychology. The first is the Bank Street Model which personifies the developmental-interactionist approach. The second model is the British Infant School.

The dissertation ends with a specific example of the outreach of the educational aspects of Anna Freud's work in the Center for Early Education in Los Angeles. It also suggests a reason why the American cultural ethos has made it difficult for psychoanalytic principles to have much impact on teaching practice.


The Cardinal Principles Report of 1918 marked a significant milestone in the "great transition" of American educational theory and practice. It denotes an initiation as well as a culmination of a trend known as the "new education." This National Education Association document has been compared with Herbert Spencer's educational essays, but an analysis of related literature indicated that in no study has anyone undertaken a comparison with Spencer's general philosophical principles. Spencerian philosophy enjoyed tremendous popularity throughout the world, and especially in the United States,
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

This void in research, in addition to the need for a philosophical interpretation of the Cardinal Principles, underlies the two purposes of this dissertation—to compare some principles of Spencerian doctrine with the Cardinal Principles, and to clarify and exemplify the relationship between philosophy as such and educational theory and practice. The second aim lies implicitly within the first and is fulfilled by rendering the educational meaning of certain philosophical principles. This kind of study, which directs attention to what education ought to be, has not been adequately represented in American educational research.

Methods from the history of ideas and history of philosophy were employed. Before undertaking the actual comparison, it was necessary to analyze the relevant aspects of Spencerian doctrine and to establish a philosophical interpretation and foundation of the 1918 document. The foundation was sought in a review of pertinent periodical literature of the 1920's and 1930's, and in the views of William H. Kilpatrick, a member of the reviewing committee of the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education (1918) and a prominent spokesman for the new (philosophy of) education. Between these two points of reference is a brief survey of the philosophical aspects of the "Twenty-Five Years of Revolution" (1893-1918) in American social and intellectual life. Instrumental in understanding this era, the background for the Cardinal Principles, is the Committee of Ten Report (1893), also an NEA project.

Evidence clearly indicates that the CRSE Report reflects the same kind of thinking illustrated in the writings of the evolutionist-naturalist Spencer. Principles common to both are found in the following philosophical-educational areas:

1. Human nature and the learning process
2. Extent of change
3. Use of the scientific method
4. Educational aims
5. Socialization of education
6. Character education
7. Role of religion in education

Two reservations must be made, however:
Peter M. Collins

1. Some problems basic to Spencer's thought are not considered directly by the CRSE nor "its philosophers."

2. The Cardinal Principles Report is not necessarily adaptable to all the implications of Spencer's theory of evolution and epistemology.

The philosophical premises in each of the poles of our comparison found a naturalistic and secularistic relativism.

The findings of the dissertation support the existence of a definite relationship between philosophy as such, and the theory and practice of education.


At the beginning of the sixteenth century, England was politically and socially unstable. The legacy of the War of the Roses, social and economic trends, and an uncertain dynastic situation combined to undermine the old order. While most educated men continued to believe that the social and political order was a divinely inspired hierarchy, some writers questioned the permanence and value of such a structure.

Generally speaking, there were two main groups of social critics: traditional religiously oriented writers descended from such medieval sources as Piers Plowman and Wycliffe, and a variety of more secular critics. Among these latter were certain Christian humanists. The Christian humanists sought a revival of the classics, especially the Christian classics, to serve as a guide to practical living. In terms of Tudor politics, they were united by personal association, mutual interest in politics, and agreement on certain social and political reforms. Among these were education in the classics and in Christian ethics, preference for the active life, proposals to insure good counsel for the king and the prevention of tyranny, and such specific
reforms as restoration of the countryside and prevention of idleness and poverty.

Much of the inspiration for humanistic reform may be traced to Erasmus, but in England the leader was Thomas More. Most of the reform writers and politicians knew More personally or were influenced by his Utopia. In Utopia, More presents a model of a society united in a common philosophy and in pursuit of a common goal. The institutions, philosophy, and even religion of Utopia reflect a search for a regenerated social order based on a modified Epicureanism. However, Utopia is primarily intended to stimulate thought and discussion and to teach by fable; it does not present specific proposals, nor does More suggest how Tudor England can be made to more closely approximate Utopia.

As Tudor policy gradually became more precise and detailed, so did the works of the humanistic reformers. Their programs fell into two broad categories: those related to the education of the ruler and his advisors, and those advocating specific reforms. Thomas Elyot's Governour is an example of the former. While accepting the hierarchical framework of Tudor society, Elyot urges the education of its rulers in the classics. In his Dialogue, Thomas Starkey advocates a number of specific programs to improve England. He suggests that births be encouraged, the health of the population be increased, and a number of institutional reforms, like elective monarchy, be implemented.

While Elyot and Starkey held minor political positions, both remained primarily scholars. Soon other humanists began to serve the state. When they came to make policy or advise the ruler, however, such men as Richard Morison revealed their humanistic background. This can be seen in the Tudor legislation concerning the poor. The Tudor Poor Law's history closely parallels the advance of humanistic opinion. The proposed legislation of 1535-36 was apparently based on a draft prepared by a humanist in the government service.

While humanistic reformers had considerable impact on Tudor thought and policy, they failed to gain entrance to England's elite. Following the advice and example of the humanists, England's existing social elite entered the universities, secured educations and the skills of government, and eventually made the humanists superfluous. Meanwhile, the humanists became increasingly tied to the monarchy. By the early seventeenth century, they had ceased to be an important independent factor in politics.
Since existing biographies of John Colet are in almost total disagreement on the more important questions of the educator's life, it has proved best to argue from internal evidence. Colet's own writings were taken as the best expression of his mind: his religious writings as evidence of the character of the man, his educational works as demonstrating his principles and theories.

Colet was a child of the Renaissance, learned in its lore, somewhat impatient with its enemies, confident of its future. He cannot be accepted as the shadow of Erasmus. In his more limited sphere of thought and action, he showed a virility not to be found in his more spectacular and more interesting associates.

His personal abstemiousness, his apparent severity in his clerical governing of the chapter of St. Paul's, united with a certain rigorism in manner and thought, gained for him the reputation among later writers of having been a pre-Reformation Puritan. This charge, however, is not borne out by the facts of his life and the tenor of his writings. The great Convocation Sermon, preached in 1512, if examined critically, proves the opposite of what his early biographers would make of it. Colet was a reformer in the sense that his Oxford associates were, but no forerunner of Protestantism.

Colet was somewhat broad in the Scriptural commentaries he began at Oxford, but not dangerously so. His writings must be judged by the style of the times, which in itself offers difficulties, since the exactness of the Scholastic era no longer held sway.

Colet's school at St. Paul's was close to the modern high school idea. In the destruction of schools and foundations at the time of the Reformation, Colet's school remained, and has continued to the present day. Its plan, even its textbooks, were accepted as part of the English tradition. Because it systematized and solidified classical study, many writers have not hesitated to consider it the first really Humanistic school in England and the model for many others founded later.
Edmund Corby

The major part of Colet's theory is contained in his Statutes of St. Paul's, his Accidence. Here are found his idea of a true teacher, his insistence on a solid foundation built slowly and understandingly. His teacher had to show that use comes before the rule. A text, for him, was an aid. Though directly applicable to the teaching of Latin, Colet's principles apply to the entire field of teaching.

82. CORMIER, Ramona Theresa (Ph. D.). "Toynbee and the Problem of Historical Knowledge." Tulane University, 1960. 225 pp
Source: DAI, XXI, 8 (February, 1961), 2324-2325. XUM Order No. Mic 60-6479.

The author of this study has attempted:

1. To analyze the structure of the system explicated by Toynbee in A Study of History.

2. To formulate a theory indicating the criteria which justify the several levels of historical knowledge.

The theory formulated in this study not only furnishes criteria for justifying historical knowledge but is also the basis for more adequate criticisms of historiographies. To avoid the ambiguous usage of the term "history," this concept is defined as past actuality, and "historiography" is defined as our knowledge of past actuality. Chapter I examines the methodologies of Geyl, Collingwood and Romein and their criticisms of Toynbee's work. In the process of analyzing their theories and criticisms, two problems to be taken into account in the justification of historical knowledge are pointed out. These are the relationship of the historian's account of the past to past actuality and the relationship of the historian's psychological and sociological conditioning to his interpretation of the past. An attempt is made to show how the resolutions of these problems by Geyl, Collingwood and Romein affect their criticisms of A Study of History. Chapters II, III and IV analyze the major concepts and principles of A Study of History. Toynbee's conceptual scheme depends upon his designation of society as the basic historical unit. He believes
Ramona Theresa Cormier

that his concept eliminates from the context of historiography the historian's psychological and sociological prejudices. An analysis of the concept reveals that the definition of society substitutes religious prejudice for nationalistic prejudice, hence does not escape Toynbee's environmental conditioning.

Society is defined by a pattern of challenges and responses. Challenge and response is a hypothesis of a high level of generality which defines the challenge or the cause of social change in terms of the response. In defining the cause of social change in terms of the response, many conditions are assumed which are relevant to the explanation and which cannot be accounted for by this principle.

Toynbee's system has a psychological, social and cosmological level of explanation. Social and cosmological change ultimately depend upon the psychological level for their explanations. Hence inconsistencies in the psychological level which arise from the psychological dualism upon which this explanatory level is based appear in the social and cosmological theories.

Chapters V, VI and VII propose the criteria justifying the various levels of historical knowledge. The most primitive level of historical knowledge is that of the "historical fact." A "historical fact" is a hypothesis referring to an actual past occurrence which is inferred from evidence and is confirmed by identifying the evidence from which it is inferred, by relating the inferred "historical fact" to "historical facts" identifying the evidence through generalizations and laws and by the congruence of the inferred "fact" with the already confirmed dimension of "historical fact." "Integral facts" are hypotheses inferred from several "historical facts."

The criteria of adequacy and relevance justify an ordering and interpretation of "historical" or "integral facts." What is relevant to a historiography depends upon the historian's definition of his subject matter, upon his point of view and upon the problem he is attempting to resolve. Adequacy depends upon the truisms, laws, probability statements, rules or definitions which justify the explanations of "historical facts." Adequacy and relevance are not determined by precise criteria. The imprecision of these criteria make the factors in the historian's spatiotemporal perspective relevant to the context of historiography.

The criteria justifying the various levels of historical knowledge are consistent with the methodologies of Geryl, Collingwood and Romein. Although some of the concepts and principles of A
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Study of History do not conform to these criteria, Toynbee has presented an interpretation of the human past which is highly suggestive and worthy of consideration.


Mandell Creighton (1843-1901) is principally remembered as a historian and churchman. In re-assessing Creighton's life, however, it is clear that a dominant theme was his persistent interest in education and its impact on English society. Yet no effort has ever been made to evaluate his connection with education in the latter half of the nineteenth century, a period when English educational thought underwent major transformation. This study traces Mandell Creighton's involvement in education with a view toward explaining his ideas and relating them to the changing social scene.

The chief sources used in this research include over 400 MSS letters concerning Creighton, most of which have never been critically examined before. Heavy reliance was also placed upon Creighton's books and other writings (essays, lectures, addresses, sermons and charges), many having been collected and edited by his widow. Of special importance was her two-volume Life and Letters of Mandell Creighton (1904). A number of nineteenth-century periodicals were consulted as well as published works by Creighton's contemporaries, either of a memoir nature or specific educational studies. Moreover, numerous government documents were used, e.g., Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons Sessional Papers, containing specific Royal Commission Reports and legislation concerning education, Reports of the Committee of Council on Education and Reports of the Poor Law District Conferences. Finally, invaluable and otherwise unobtainable information was gained through correspondence with certain individuals in England, especially several surviving members of the Creighton family.

Mandell Creighton's life mirrored much of the educational progress in England during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Concerned with virtually all levels of education, he favored many of
the changes, while regarding others with degrees of suspicion. He made an effort, however, to comprehend the broad significance of this so-called "silent revolution" and in some measure to direct its course. He supported the board schools in principle, but because of their growing influence, he felt compelled to defend private, denominational education. Accepting moderate state intervention in education, he clung to the precept of decentralized control. Creighton was primarily interested in what he termed the "contents" of education rather than administrative organization and, therefore, left a legacy of thought regarding curricula and teaching methodology.

While favoring major reforms at Oxford and Cambridge, Creighton's chief contribution to these older universities was his effort to preserve the traditional tone in the face of needed modernization and to improve historical study. He realized the urgency for wider educational opportunities also; besides supporting popular education, he labored to influence the civic universities and such movements as university extension, technical and women's education and teacher training. He was especially enthusiastic about the instructional value of history for the adult population. Fearful of the socioeconomic and political changes affecting English life, particularly the drift toward democracy, Creighton's ideal became an educated society where a genuine respect for learning would serve to promote a new social responsibility as well as deepen the traditional reverence for individual freedom and historical institutions.

Mandell Creighton was not the vociferous propagandist for educational reform that Matthew Arnold was, nor a government bureaucrat as in the case of Robert Morant, nor an educational philosopher such as John Henry Newman. Rather, Creighton was a consistent spokesman for educational improvement who either critically observed or directly participated in the reform movement and who lent it pith and purpose. What made his contribution unique was that his scholarly intellect and historical sense brought a cool and discerning mind to bear on the heated educational arguments of his era.

This thesis has two theses:

1. That Francis Galton's contributions to genetics, statistics and psychology were based, chronologically and logically, upon his commitment to a particular social program—eugenics.

2. That Galton's contribution to genetics can best be understood as a redefinition, or perhaps a reconceptualization, of the word "heredity."

A close analysis of Galton's first study of heredity (1865) indicates that before having learned anything about the laws of heredity, Galton had decided that manipulation of heredity would provide the key to the reformation of human society. Galton's denial of the inheritance of acquired faculties appears to have been logically dependent upon his commitment to eugenics.

Galton's interest in eugenics, and his subsequent interest in heredity, stemmed from his dissatisfaction with then current proposals for social reform, particularly the program of the Philosophic Radicals. Galton was enthusiastic about eugenics because he believed that it would provide a substitute for Christian morality, an ethical code which seemed to him to have outlived its usefulness. Galton's assertion of the continuity of germ-plasm (1865) stemmed in part from his denial of the inheritance of acquired faculties, and in part from a metaphysical presumption that germinal continuity was a better description of the nature of life than descriptions based upon Scriptural theology.

When Darwin's pangenetical hypothesis appeared (1868), Galton greeted it with much enthusiasm; he liked pangenesis because it was mathematizable and because it fit his presumptions about the nature of life. Nonetheless, Galton quickly realized that in providing a mechanism for the inheritance of acquired characters, pangenesis contradicted some of his own ideas about heredity. The "stirp" theory, which Galton developed between 1872 and 1875, was an attempt to construct a pangenetical mechanism which would make the inheritance of acquired characters unlikely, if not impossible. An analysis
of the correspondence between Galton and Darwin during these years indicates that Darwin could not understand why Galton felt the need to eliminate this feature of pangenesis, and that conversely, Galton, because of his lack of familiarity with evolutionary theory, could not understand why Darwin insisted on including it.

After 1875 Galton turned from physiological theories to statistical studies of heredity. In the course of these studies (1875-1889) Galton developed techniques for anthropometric measurement and collected large amounts of data about the characters of parental and filial human populations. In analyzing this data, Galton discovered two statistical phenomena of great significance: regression and correlation. Each of these discoveries was made because Galton was trying to understand inheritance patterns among humans, in an effort to find information that would bolster his eugenic program. Thus, in a sense, biostatistics grew out of eugenics.

Many of Galton's purely genetical discoveries and pronouncements were naive and were subsequently proven false. Galton assisted the progress of genetics not so much by making discoveries but by helping to redefine the word "heredity." Previously the phenomena of heredity had been difficult to separate from the phenomena of reversion and variation. In psychology, embryology and anthropology the heredity doctrine was entangled in a number of debates that only added to the confusion. By studying heredity statistically, Galton changed "heredity" from a vital force to a relationship, and in so doing he provided a definition of heredity which could be researched. Furthermore, Galton demonstrated that reversion and variation could be incorporated into heredity, and were not antithetical to it—as had been thought. Galton was able to change the status of "heredity" because he had not been trained in natural history or in anthropology, and was consequently more or less oblivious to the issues that had previously clouded the field.

David Lee Cox

An historical study of the early scientific contributions (1921-39) of Charles Elton, a twentieth century British ecologist, was initiated because of the profound influence he exerted on both the theoretical and institutional development of the nascent science of animal ecology. It was felt that such a study might add to the understanding of the way in which an embryonic ecology emerged from more traditional natural history, particularly in Great Britain. With this in mind, an extensive study was made of the early influences, both empirical and theoretical, that led Elton to create a unified model of the functioning animal community. His participation in the Oxford University Expeditions to Spitsbergen, during which he organized cooperative plant-animal ecological surveys, has been examined in depth because of its repercussions in his later scientific activities. A study was made of the institutional innovations advanced by Elton to coordinate long-term ecological research, and to communicate ecological information on a world-wide scale. Also examined in detail was Elton's preoccupation with problems concerning animal numbers. It is proposed that his interest was at first in relative, or non-quantifiable, numbers, and that this led him to recognize numbers in an absolute, or quantifiable, sense as central to his picture of living communities. This is followed by an analysis of his classic Animal Ecology, wherein he proposed four major organizing ideas to help systematize the vast amount of previously uncoordinated natural historical knowledge. The four empirically based generalizations:

1. Food-chains and the food cycle,
2. The principle of food size,
3. The pyramid of numbers,
4. Niches,

were each discussed and one, the idea of ecological niche, was singled out and its early development traced (1910-1939).

The thesis presents Elton's unified model of communities as the product of an interactive dynamic, a process requiring a kind of mental oscillation between persistent explanatory statements and a body of new observations, by means of which science evolves. The data in this thesis tend to indicate that this process did not in this case operate in an intellectually "pure" atmosphere; on the contrary, direction and rate of change, cognitive boundaries, criteria for acceptance of methods and explanations, were all shaped by socio-economic
pressures within the larger cultural envelope. A critical question that needs to be asked is: "Why should this process work at all?" While the present study does not answer this question, it does point out a conceptual and social transposition that can provide valuable evidence of the way a young science grows, one that will eventually lead to basic insights into the process of science.

This study forms the basis for future explorations of Elton's scientific contributions during the period 1940-67, which will also detail his applications of ecological knowledge to the realm of conservation and resource management. The ultimate objective of this research will be to understand the way in which ecology developed during its formative years, and the way that science reacted to and upon its broader socio-economic setting.


The dissertation is a collection of four essays whose purpose is to suggest materials and directions for educational theory by uncovering ideas of education in literary works. To suggest the range of works in the literary canon which contain valuable assumptions about and implications for education, each of the last three essays focuses on one literary mode: polemical, autobiographical or fantastic literature. One function of the essays is to bring a fresh and unusual perspective to the literary figures and works I have chosen. But as I study and evaluate implicit ideas of education in literature, I am also trying to broaden the scope and resources of contemporary thought about the process of education. Thus, the argumentative structure of the essays is designed to generate pertinent connections between literary problems and pedagogical problems.

The preliminary essay, "In the Footsteps of Whitehead," records an essential debt which all the essays owe to a major philosopher of education. This introduction establishes both the rationale and the largely first-person style of the succeeding essays. In explaining
Robert Thomas Crossley

Whitehead's theory of a psychological rhythm in education which includes stages of romance, precision, and generalization, I have concurrently described the genesis of my own essays on literature through their romantic, precise, and generalizing phases. In effect, the introduction constitutes the first and seminal idea of education in this dissertation: how the writing of an essay is a form of self-education.

"Literature and Science and Culture" studies the Matthew Arnold-T. H. Huxley and C. P. Snow-F. R. Leavis controversies on literature and science. My thesis is that the crucial differences in the debates are over assumptions about the nature of culture. I argue that Huxley and Leavis share the assumption that cultural consciousness means responsiveness to the insistent demands of the present, tempered by awareness of and judgment on the past and provision for the future; Arnold and Huxley both assume that cultural consciousness is a form of critical thinking—but their mode of criticism is escapist and negative, and tends to bypass or reject the confusions of the present in favor of either the imagined order of the past or the hoped-for stability of the future. The two controversies stemmed originally from polemical arguments about educational priorities, and I argue that the cultural assumptions behind the Huxley-Leavis and Arnold-Snow positions hold opposing implications for curriculum, educational aims, and pedagogy.

In "The Failed Educations of J. S. Mill and Henry Adams," I examine two autobiographies to determine in what ways education failed for the authors. The argument suggests that Mill's education failed in relevance—failed to enable a kind of knowledge that was personally meaningful and psychologically integrating. Adams' education lacked coherence, direction, and structure, and was thus a frustrating exercise in dilettantism and self-cultivation; essentially, his was a failure not in relevance, but in utility and application. The study's contribution to educational theory lies in proposals about teaching roles suggested by Mill's and Adams' search for satisfying pedagogical models. The essay also points to the need for clear distinctions between relevance and utility and between freedom and discipline as perpetual and complementary claims on education.

"Education and Fantasy" studies a variety of examples from fantastic literature and a variety of approaches to problems of fantasy as a mode of perceiving and knowing. Drawing both on student journal writing about fantasy and on theoretical formulations of Bacon, Freud, Marcuse, and R. D. Laing, I have tried to show how
Robert Thomas Crossley

some literary fantasies exemplify ways of knowing. The essay argues for the importance of nonrational modes of perception in education. Specifically, I develop the ideas of enactment, renewal, and self-discovery as contributions of the study and experience of fantasy to education.


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88. CUNNINGHAM, Ruth Johnson (Ph. D.). "William Malcolm Hailey: Contributions to Administration and Constitutional
Ruth Johnson Cunningham

Development in India and the British Colonies in Africa."

In 1895 William Malcolm Hailey began a career in the Indian Civil Service which was to last nearly forty years. During that career he held a variety of administrative positions within the British Government then ruling in India. He served as High Commissioner at Delhi and both as Home and Finance Member of the Viceroy's Council. He was Governor of two provinces, the Punjab (1924-28) and the United Provinces (1928-1934). As Governor of the Punjab he solved a religious and political problem of considerable magnitude involving a recalcitrant faction of Sikhs. In the United Provinces he dealt with the combined problem of economic depression and the disaffection of the Indian Nationalists. Because of his extraordinary administrative ability, he became the chief advisor to successive Viceroy's, notably, Lord Irwin and Lord Willingdon. Their reliance upon Hailey led to his selection as a major advisor to the Round Table Conferences and the Joint Select Committee Meetings. The Secretary of State for India, then Samuel Hoare, maintained that Hailey's advice had been "indispensable" and that the Provincial Governor had helped to draft many clauses of the resulting Indian Constitution of 1935. Upon completion of his tenure in the Indian Civil Service, Hailey embarked upon the second phase of his career. In 1938, the monumental An African Survey was published. This administrative study of conditions in the African continent brought Hailey recognition as an acknowledged colonial expert. His philosophy of economic advancement led to the inclusion of his ideas for colonial research and development in British legislation on the colonies in 1940 and 1945. He was commissioned thereafter to write for the British Government a series of studies on colonial development, such as National Administration in British Tropical Africa and South Africa and the High Commission Territories. Hailey also served as a member of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, as director of the London School of Oriental and African Languages and, among various other positions, as Director of the International African Institute. In 1956, at
Ruth Johnson Cunningham

the age of eighty-four, Hailey revised *An African Survey*, which once again received the highest praise for its content and execution. An investigation of the scope of Hailey's career reveals favorable comparison with noted administrative figures as Lord Lugard, because of his interpretation of concepts such as "indirect rule" and what he termed "Africanism."


It was the purpose of this inquiry to set forth a framework for the comparison of two competing models of the formal schooling process as a communications medium—the social assimilation model and the therapeutic model. Tentatively, the social assimilation model was defined as that model which assumes that it is the purpose of schooling to take individuals of varied backgrounds and through schooling to fuse them into a single cultural unit different from the original contributing units. The therapeutic model was defined as that model which assumes that it is the purpose of schooling to cure the physiological/psychological deficiencies of individuals or to further individual physiological/psychological development. It was hoped that the framework for the comparison of these two competing models would allow the researcher to describe the two competing models, to identify similarities and differences, and to analyze the consequences.
of each model for the individual, the family, the school and the nation. This inquiry was divided into five parts. The first part of the inquiry examined the works of selected social assimilation theorists (John Dewey, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber) and the works of selected therapeutic theorists (A. S. Neill, Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow). The researcher identified in these works the statements and assumptions of the selected theorists with respect to the needs, the functions and patterns of relationships among the individual, the family, the school and the nation. Statements common among social assimilation theorists were said to comprise the social assimilation model; statements shared by the therapeutic practitioners were said to comprise the therapeutic model. The inquiry concluded that the social assimilation and therapeutic models do exist. Further, it was discovered that both models begin with the same concept: man is born with innate physiological and psychological needs and abilities. From this initial point their assumptions diverge and so do the conceptions of man on which they are based. In the social assimilation model, man only becomes human in a social context; in the therapeutic model, the development and growth of man is founded upon innate, self-regulating processes. As a result, in the social assimilation model, the individual, the family, the school and the nation strive to maintain society, while in the therapeutic model these units strive to develop the individual.

In part two of the inquiry, the researcher described these models as they operate in classroom teaching. The works of selected assimilationist practitioners (John Dewey, William C. Bagley, Carl Bereiter and Jerome Bruner) and the works of selected therapeutic practitioners (A. S. Neill, Carl Rogers, John Holt and Herbert Kohl) were examined. The inquiry identified in the works of these practitioners what their statement and assumptions were concerning the needs, the functions and relationships among the individual, the family, the school and the nation with respect to actual teaching practice. The researcher concluded that classroom differences were consistent on an abstract level with the cited theoretical differences. It was also discovered that the classroom teaching of the practitioners was characterized by inconsistency and lapses in logic. This inconsistency limited the ability of the inquiry to formulate explicit recommendations for educational practice and decision making.

The third and fourth parts of the inquiry traced the emergence of the social assimilation and therapeutic models in American educa-
tional history and philosophy. The inquiry answered these questions: When did this model of the schooling process develop? From what intellectual contexts did it emerge? What particular social situations served as the context for the emergence of the model? What social problems did it solve? In particular, the influence of the process of structural differentiation and specialization in the development of the social assimilation model was noted. Further, the researcher observed that recent criticisms of the social assimilation model developed because of its inability to cope with our changing society and that the popularity of the therapeutic model can be traced to the contention that it can better deal with this social change.

In the final part of the inquiry, the long term consequences of the therapeutic model as an alternative to the social assimilation model were considered. This consideration was based on the assumption that the therapeutic model may be an extension of the social assimilation model, following the concepts of General Systems Theory. The inquiry concluded that the therapeutic model could be a viable alternative to the social assimilation model; however, it was further noted that the therapeutic model might not be a desirable alternative to the social assimilation model. The researcher argued that the therapeutic model does not develop the rational, critical perspective which is basic to democracy. It was argued that the therapeutic model develops individuals easily subject to unprecedented manipulation. Therefore, the researcher made the judgement that the therapeutic model would be an undesirable alternative to the social assimilation model.


This is a study of the relationship between the epistemological, religious, and political thought of four "representative" Pyrrhonian sceptics of the early modern period. They are: Michel Montaigne (1533-1592), Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), and
David Hume (1711-1776). The main purpose of the study was to discover whether a connection existed between early modern sceptical thought and any particular and especially extreme schemes of political thought.

All four of these sceptical thinkers held certain viewpoints in common about man, nature, and the universe. The most important of these constants were a pessimistic evaluation of human nature, a depreciation of man's ability to arrive at an understanding of the essence of anything through his rational powers, an opposition to change and reform, a fear of civil strife and turmoil, a belief that no relationship exists between religion and morality, and political conservatism. The degree to which each thinker conformed to each of these viewpoints was dependent upon his approach to the study of human nature, the intensity of his religious feelings, his personality and major interests, and the particular set of circumstances to which he responded.

The religious, epistemological, and political thought of the three French sceptics—Montaigne, Pascal, and Bayle—was predicated on their belief that Adam's fall from a state of perfect grace and communion with God caused man to suffer the loss of his true nature. As a result of this loss, man was forced to adopt an artificial subnature. These French sceptics were convinced that the human condition is weak and feeble, as evidenced by man's ignorance, vacillation, vanity, and unruliness. Also, their sceptical deprecation of human reason forced them to conclude that both nature and human knowledge were dependent on a transcendent power beyond man's control. Their political conservatism was based on two foundations, both dependent on their scepticism and negative view of the human condition. Their first political conclusion was that, because man cannot rationally know the general principles that undergird a perfect government, subjects should remain loyal to the form of government presently in existence in their locale and nation. Second, in this late sixteenth and seventeenth century French setting, these sceptics defended absolutism as the form of government best able to control the unruly passions of man and to maintain civil peace and order.

Contrasted to the French sceptics, Hume responded to quite different philosophical, political, and social conditions. Because he was a product of the English philosophical tradition, and an eighteenth century figure, Hume disagreed with many of the religious, epistemological, and political tenets held by his French predecessors.
Dale Nelson Daily

Hume's disbelief in a transcendent power in control of human actions caused him to conclude that man is not a fallen creature, and that human behavior is simply the result of natural responses to environmental conditions, a process in which utility plays an important role. Accordingly, Hume believed that government is an institution made necessary by the natural expansion of society rather than through divine dictate or reflective analysis. Also, Hume's recognition of individual liberty as an integral aspect of human nature caused his political thought to go far beyond the dim view of the rights of man held by his sceptical predecessors.

This study did not find any necessary connection between a sceptical point of view and a particular form of political extremism. It did reveal that the political thought of these four sceptics was predicated largely on their belief that secondary, subordinate truths are knowable through human experiences. Differences in their political thought are largely the result of each sceptic's understanding and personal interpretation of these secondary truths.


The purpose of this study is to make a comprehensive comparison of the educational theories of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This comparison takes it point of departure from Locke's "Young Gentleman" of his Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Rousseau's Emile. Other important philosophical and political works of the two writers are taken into consideration to obtain a clearer picture of their educational theories. Analyses by writers on Locke and Rousseau are used to shed further light on this subject. In particular, the question, "Is there a significant difference in their idea of an educated person?" is addressed.

Locke's and Rousseau's writings on education have been widely read since their first appearance. They are still shaping people's thinking of what it means to be educated and how to educate the
young. Their works contribute to a fuller intellectual and moral understanding of fundamental educational problems. They provide an unusual perspective from which to view these problems and give an insight into their nature. Both Locke's and Rousseau's ideas open up avenues for present and future theory, research and practice in education.

John Locke is considered by Merle Curti as "the Philosopher of America." His political and educational thoughts pertaining to natural rights, democracy and education according to one's abilities greatly influenced American thinking and these are still powerful elements in the American society.

Rousseau is equally as important as Locke to the American society. His concept of nature as a normative guide for education is a powerful element in educational thinking and continues to be a subject of much concern. The emphasis placed by American educators on understanding the level of the child's understanding is a contemporary expression of Rousseau's interest.

To determine whether there is significant difference between Locke's and Rousseau's ideas of an educated person, a comparison is first made of their theories of knowledge, nature, religion and ethics and politics and society. This comparison enables one to see the influence of Locke on Rousseau and understand more fully their educational theories. Then, their educational theories pertaining to educational aims, content, organization and administration, method, positions of pupil, parents and teacher, discipline and education of women and poor are compared. This analysis leads one to argue that there are fundamental similarities in their idea of an educated person.

There are a number of differences between Locke's and Rousseau's theories, but these differences are more often matters of emphasis than antithetical views. Rousseau is a close follower of Locke's and one fundamental difference may be traced to a difference in their educational aims. Rousseau is educating an individual who is to be capable of contributing to society if the need arises. Locke's educated man is required to contribute to society.

92. DAVIES, Frank Joseph John (Ph. D.). "Matthew Arnold and Education." Yale University, 1934. 449 pp. Source: Table of
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The subject of the thesis is the theory of mass society as it was propounded during the 1930s and '40s by such thinkers as José Ortega y Gasset, Karl Mannheim, T. S. Eliot, Emil Lederer, and Erich Fromm.

The dissertation argues that contemporary scholars have distorted this body of theory, primarily because these scholars identify the theorists of the 1930s and '40s according to their political orientation. This leads commentators like Shils, Kornhauser, and Parsons and White to divide mass society theorists into Left and Right and to blur any important similarities between the two groups.

Unlike these scholars, we begin from the commonalities between mass society theorists. All of these theorists were concerned about the persistence of an archaic set of assumptions about the individual's rationality, possessiveness, and apathy; about economic activity operating as a market; about society as a self-regulating and self-maintaining system of markets; about this system of markets serving the public interest.

Insofar as many of these assumptions are implicit, if not explicit, in the modern scholars' reformulation of mass society theories, the dissertation concludes that the most fundamental division in the theory of mass society is not one of political orientation, but one between the theorists of the 1930s and 1940s and the scholars of the 1950s and 1960s.

Of all living primates, only Homo sapiens are predominantly right-handed. Marian Annett, an English psychologist, has attributed this manual asymmetry to a single gene, one of whose alleles lateralizes speech and language in the left cerebral hemisphere and as a consequence inhibits the performance of the left hand. Annett thinks that the second allele of this hypothetical gene is neutral, or null, and has no effect on cerebral lateralization or handedness.

In part, Annett bases her theory on six findings which she has made among English subjects:

1. The distributions of manual preference and relative manual speed do not change with age.

2. Females are slightly more right-handed than males.

3. Left-, mixed- and right-handedness occur in binomial proportions.

4. Degrees of relative manual skill are closely related to degrees of manual preference.

5. The distributions of manual preference and relative manual skill among children suffering language delays are different from the distributions of preference and skill in the population at large.

6. Left-handers have greater manual agility than right-handers.

To test these findings and Annett's theory, tests of manual preference and skill were administered to four samples of Guatemalan children. All six of Annett's findings were confirmed to some degree, but large differences were unexpectedly found between some samples. These sample differences, I have concluded, do not reflect genetic differences but are due to varying degrees of social pressure against left-handedness and to the specific games and tasks to which
William Joseph Demarest

children are exposed. In short, cultural factors have a powerful influence on the degree of manual asymmetry found in human populations.

The discovery of possible cultural differences in manual asymmetry raises doubts about Annett's theory of handedness. Annett's belief that there is a null allele rather than an allele causing left-handedness is based on the fact that approximately half of the children of left-handed parents and approximately half of the individuals with right-hemisphere speech are right-handed. If cultural factors have increased the number of right-handers in these two special populations, however, Annett's null allele may, in fact, be an allele which causes left-handedness.


Richard Mulcaster (c. 1531-1611) served as the headmaster of two of London's most prominent grammar schools: Merchant Taylors' (1561-1586) and St. Paul's (1596-1608). Moreover, for nearly fifty years he devoted his learning and skill to the education of Englishmen. As a teacher administrator, he sought to promote patriotism and English culture, and in the process, he prepared two treatises, Positions (1581) and Elementarie (1582), on education and orthography respectively. Despite his extraordinary record of scholarship and service, however, no critical study has yet appeared. The purpose of the following thesis is to correct this condition and to provide a biography of Mulcaster which will identify and integrate his major interests and contributions. The work is subdivided into four chapters and includes an epilogue and five appendices.

The introductory chapter offers a biographical sketch of Mulcaster, partly based on newly discovered documents. As a result of this information, one learns that Mulcaster was born about 1531 in Carlisle, that he served as secretary to Dr. John Caius, classicist and court physician, in 1555; that he was a member of Parliament in the
same year that he authored the précis of the 1559 entry pageant; and that he conducted two private schools during the decade which separated his resignation from Merchant Taylors' and his appointment to St. Paul's.

Chapter Two presents the major educational contributions of Mulcaster against a background of contemporary theory. Mulcaster's ideas are compared with those of Sir Thomas Elyot, Roger Ascham, Juan Luis Vives and Michel de Montaigne. The chapter tends to emphasize Mulcaster's genius rather than his shortcomings. Consequently, Mulcaster emerges as a defender of tradition and an advocate of reform. He recommended such innovative ideas as public elementary education for all, the teaching of English in the elementary school, the importance of elementary school teachers, and the establishment of teachers colleges and parent-teacher conferences.

Chapter Three discusses Mulcaster's contribution to linguistics, especially orthography. His ideas on spelling reform are contrasted with those of Sir Thomas Smith, John Hart and William Bullokar. Mulcaster maintained a conservative position and recommended that English spelling be governed by custom, reason, sound and art. The second part of the chapter examines Mulcaster's probable influence on the poetry of Edmund Spenser and Thomas Lodge, two of his students at Merchant Taylors'. It is argued, for example, that Mulcaster may have been the "E.K." of the Shepheardes Calender (1579).

The concluding chapter focuses attention on Mulcaster's use of literary forms. Specifically, it attempts to show that Mulcaster employed pageantry, poetry and drama for hortatory and didactic reasons as well as for purposes of flattery and persuasion. In the section on pageantry, the chapter also distinguishes between the 1559 entry pageant, which was devised by Richard Hilles, Lionell Duckett, Francis Robinson, and Richard Grafton, and the summary or précis of the pageant which was devised by Mulcaster alone. The writer argues that Mulcaster wrote the published version of the pageant for the purpose of persuasion. In the section on drama, the writer suggests that Mulcaster, rather than Edward Pierce, was largely responsible for the revival of the boy company at St. Paul's (1599-1608). Furthermore, he contends that Holofernes in Love's Labour's Lost and Pedante in What You Will were deliberate characterizations of Mulcaster.

The Epilogue attempts to summarize the previous material and to convince the reader that Mulcaster was more than a headmaster, or
Richard Lee DeMolen

an educational theorist, or an orthographist and poet. Rather, it is argued, he was the principal teacher-scholar of the Elizabethan Age who combined the classical tradition of the university with a fervent commitment to England's future.

The appendices are devoted to:

A. Biographical Material
B. The Letters of Richard Mulcaster
C. Pageant
D. Plays Presented Before Elizabeth I by Mulcaster's Students at Merchant Taylors'
E. Latin Poems Composed by Richard Mulcaster


The major focus of this dissertation is an exegesis and critical discussion of the theoretical work of British sociologist Basil Bernstein. Bernstein may be considered the exemplar of the sociology of school knowledge in that his theoretical development encompasses the problems inherent in the development of the sociology of school knowledge.

The initial chapter briefly describes the genesis of the sociology of school knowledge as it developed from the sociology of knowledge and the sociology of education, outlines the conflicts between the more traditional paradigms and theoretical constructs of the sociology of education, and discusses the move towards the more analytical critical stance within the sociology of school knowledge.

Because many of the conflicts originated in the classical tradition of the sociology of knowledge, the dissertation next reviews the major exemplars of the parent discipline, including Durkheim, Mann-
hein, Marx, and Berger and Luckmann. The discussion is filtered through these writers' conceptions of the division of labor, social class stratification, and the impact of language on these classifications and on the writers themselves. Their theories are then tested for adequacy as a sociology of knowledge utilizing an original framework designed to emphasize either the restrictive or emancipatory aspects of the various writers’ sociologies.

Next the theories and the conflicts they engendered within the sociology of education are examined. The discussion focuses first on the conflicts in the sociology of education, detailing the major thrusts toward the development of the sociology of school knowledge, and then reviews the work of exemplars of the latter discipline, including Young, Keddie, Bourdieu, and Sharp and Green. Again, as with the traditional sociology of knowledge, the arguments of the writers are filtered through the concepts of the division of labor, social class stratification, and the impact of language on both. The writer's work is, as before, tested for adequacy as a sociology of school knowledge, utilizing the framework introduced previously.

The major portion of the dissertation is concerned with a detailed documentation and discussion of Basil Bernstein's theoretical work between 1958 and 1977, published as Class, Codes and Control, Volumes One and Three, second editions. His concepts are closely analyzed as to origins within the sociology of knowledge; the development of these concepts from a descriptive to a more critical analysis is detailed. The concepts of the division of labor, stratified social classes and the impact of language are again employed as a lens for the analysis, as is the original framework for testing the adequacy of Bernstein's theories. The dissertation concludes with some possible future directions for the sociology of school knowledge; possible extensions of Bernstein's work are suggested; and the work of others, such as Willis and Apple, is briefly outlined for actual or potential contributions to the sociology of school knowledge.

John Eachard (1636-1697), seventeenth century English author, educator and divine, has long been known to historians for his observations on the state of the English clergy of his time, mainly because Thomas Babington Macaulay, in the third chapter of his History of England from the Accession of James II, used Eachard's Grounds and Occasions of the Contempt of the Clergy as source material in such a way that he touched off a controversy over the state of the clergy which has lasted well into the twentieth century. Moreover, Eachard's criticism of preaching style, and the relationship of that criticism to the late seventeenth century controversy over prose style in general, have been dealt with thoroughly by Professor Richard F. Jones and other modern literary scholars. The significance of Eachard in English historiography, and in the shifting seventeenth century attitudes toward style, is thus clear. But Eachard's full status as a man of letters and hence his contribution to the history of English literature have yet to be determined, in spite of the fact that John Dryden, Jonathan Swift, and other men of literature from Eachard's own time to the present have valued him as a writer whose works reveal considerable wit and satirical power. It is therefore my purpose in this dissertation to evaluate as fully and carefully as possible the position which John Eachard and his writings hold in the stream of English literary history.

In order to accomplish this I have described the important elements of Eachard's works, with special attention first to the Grounds and Occasions and to his Observations upon an Answer to an Enquiry into the Grounds and Occasions, and the controversy over his use of wit and satire which these works aroused. There follows next an analysis of his two dialogues against Thomas Hobbes for their points of attack on Hobbes's philosophy and their special satiric techniques, after which the whole controversy over the proper place of wit and ridicule is traced from its earliest manifestations in the mid-seventeenth century through the age of Swift, and Eachard's significance in this controversy is made clear. Finally, Eachard's own writing style and his use of satiric methods are analyzed in some detail.

Thus it becomes clear that the significance of Eachard's literary position is mainly dependent upon three factors. The first of these has to do with what he wrote. From an examination of his first two works it is clear that what he had to say concerning matters of education and the condition of the Anglican clergy constituted valid, solidly based critical commentary upon problems which were real and vital to many
Englishmen of his day. Moreover, his two dialogues, directed against one of the most cogent thinkers of the period, would stand as real contributions to the literature of philosophical criticism, on the basis of their logical and critical qualities alone. A second factor of Eachard's position in literary history has to do with the significant relationship which the attack on his first two writings had to the growing controversy over true and false wit in literature, a controversy which was soon to affect Swift, and which would concern Pope as a threat to literature itself. The third and most important factor of Eachard's literary significance has to do with how he wrote. It was the quality of Eachard's wit and the range of his satirical talent which involved him in the controversy just mentioned, and which impressed men like Dryden and Swift. And it is this same satirical wit which more than anything else entitles Eachard to a place in English literary history which has not hitherto been accorded him.


Julius Hare is an unheralded figure in the intellectual and literary history of nineteenth century England, though he achieved eminence in his own day in a career that spanned literature, classical scholarship, university teaching, and the pastoral and administrative duties of a clergyman and archdeacon. As a law student Hare fell under the influence of Coleridge and Wordsworth. As an Assistant Tutor and Classical Lecturer at Trinity College, Cambridge, he devoted a decade to instructing undergraduates, including the brilliant young men who formed the club known as the "Apostles." As a scholar, teacher, and editor, Hare promoted the works of his friends, including Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Walter Savage Landor, as well as promoting the most advanced scholarship in the fields of biblical criticism and classical history.

Leaving Cambridge to accept a church living, Hare earned respect and distinction as a churchman, became Archdeacon of Lewes
in 1840, and was appointed a Royal Chaplain in 1853. In his scholarship and churchmanship Hare was a liberal, and an early member of that circle of divines which came to be known as the "Broad Church." As a "Broad Churchman" Hare was the personal link that tied together many of his contemporaries in bonds of friendship and kinship. His importance lies in his centrality. Standing amid a large circle of intellectuals, Hare's influence upon his contemporaries was genuine and pervasive, but he has been largely forgotten, and has received only minimal treatment by modern scholars. This neglect may be attributed to Hare's having spread himself too thinly over many fields of endeavour, to his having produced no substantial and original works, to the absence of a memorial biography, and to the fact that personal influence, however strong, is seldom the subject of great historical reputations or of monuments raised by posterity.

To rescue Julius Hare from obscurity and to analyze his career and influence, biography offers the natural medium. This study is the first full-scale biography of Julius Hare ever written. It is based upon extensive manuscript sources, many of them unpublished and unrecorded.


The aim of this study is to explore the impact of the political thought of the English idealists upon the western political tradition in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and to present their political ideas as a form of humanism. The diverse political expressions of English idealism are found to be unified by the conception of idealistic humanism and thus placed in the context of the main movements of nineteenth century thought. It is the general thesis of this study that by presenting English idealism in these terms, its contribution to modern political theory and its place in the history of political ideas may be better evaluated. This interpretation is not meant to give a complete view of the political thought of the English
idealists. It is concerned to provide a supplement to those studies which have explored the humanistic elements of idealist philosophy. In this way, it is intended to be a contribution to and elaboration of the continuing assessment of idealism and its place in the history of ideas.

The main sources of English idealist political philosophy as presented in this study are the writings of Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882), Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924), Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), and the American idealist, Josiah Royce (1855-1916). Their thought is unified as a humanism by virtue of their common insistence that neither the scientific conception of human experience nor the absolutistic conception of morality can fully contribute to the need of social philosophy to relate to social experience.

Part one of the study is devoted to the development and clarification of the conception of idealistic humanism as a unifying and synoptic point of view for the study. The intersection of idealism and humanism in the social philosophy of the English idealists is presented as an extension of the historians’ treatment of these thinkers. Part two explores this conception in the broader historical frame of modern political thought. Through an analysis of the idealists’ critique of the utilitarian science of human nature, and a reconstruction of their organic and philosophical conception of community, the English idealists are shown to have mediated between the two contending philosophical traditions of the nineteenth century.

In both its critical and constructive aspects, idealistic humanism combined the conceptual clarity and moral insight of a philosophical idealism on the one hand, and a responsiveness to the broader humanistic and practical concerns of political life on the other. The central conception of the socialized individual integrated an early, uncritical individualism and a later collectivism, leading to a more profound appreciation of individuality and a broader view of the contributions society could make to individual self-realization. The English idealists, in their political writings, abandoned the moral absolutism of the tradition to which they fell heir, and by adapting idealism to their humanistic viewpoint, they provided a progressive response to the social and intellectual concerns of their age.

Thomas Smith was born in Walden, Essex County, England, in 1513, probably just before Christmas. His parents were, as far as can be determined, of yeoman stock and perhaps his father had some sort of business in the town. Walden was a prosperous place, most of its people being occupied with raising saffron, a profitable crop.

When he was only three, Thomas fell ill so that for the next few years he was unable to participate in the pleasures of normal childhood. Probably at this time, however, he became interested in the history and antiquities of his birthplace which abounded in Roman ruins. He was able to attend the local grammar school, which had only recently been re-established by the vicar, John Leche, and his sister Lady Bradbury, widow of Thomas Bradbury, former Lord Mayor of London. It is entirely possible that this early education was humanistic, and because of the heretical activities around Walden, Thomas might have been exposed to Lutheran doctrines at this time.

He entered Queens' College, Cambridge, in 1526 where John Taylor was his tutor. Queens' was one of the centers of the New Learning, which by this time had come to be equated with Lutheranism. He proceeded to earn a B. A. in 1529-30 and in the latter year was elected a fellow of his college. There is reason to suppose that Smith was a very able student. He probably engaged in plays and other types of extracurricular college life. In 1533 he obtained his Master's degree.

Now he gave lectures privately in Greek while fulfilling his responsibilities in the schools. He and his friend John Cheke undertook to introduce a new method of pronouncing Greek and were at first successful. At length the Chancellor, Gardiner, took exception and their new method was forbidden. Smith was equally able in the mathematical sciences, and one of his students, Pomet, constructed a globe that showed various horological data. Probably in the 1530's, Smith concerned himself with a better method of writing the English language with the end in view of being able to write every sound spoken.

In 1540 Smith was appointed the first Regius Professor of Civil Law by Henry VIII. He immediately went to the continent to study the subject, and returned in a year with his degree from Padua. His first two lectures, preserved in the Baker Manuscripts, indicate that the subject is not popular. He points out the many occupations open to
Norton Downs

civilians and tries to stimulate interest. But he was not successful as only one man, Walter Haddon, proceeded to the doctorate in the next eight years.

Somehow Smith became known at court, perhaps through Cromwell or a Cambridge friend. At any rate he seems to have been appointed Secretary to the Queen, and so in 1546 was in a good position to assist his university when it was threatened with dissolution. Perhaps he did more than anyone else to prevent this.

Smith had a distinguished career at Cambridge, not only as a scholar, but in administrative positions. He was Vice-Chancellor in about 1542. He was also used by his college in business matters. He was not so beloved of his students as was John Cheke, but he was respected for his considerable learning and his devotion to humanism.


A great deal has been written on Matthew Arnold's life, and on the interpretation and evaluation of his work. Emphasis has been laid on his melancholy, on his stoicism, on his skepticism, on his standards of criticism, and on his essential modernity. His philosophy of dualism, however, has to a large extent been neglected.

The most important fact about human nature, to which Arnold gave expression, is that in man there are two contrary tendencies. By one of these, he is lured by the pleasures and satisfactions of the world; by the other, he achieves the nobility and dignity possible in human life. Man's nature, then, is twofold: he has a natural or lower self, which is swayed by impulse and desire; and he has a transformed or higher self, which acts on impulse and desire as a power of restraint and control.

This study is an attempt to discover the source of Arnold's philosophy of dualism, and to measure the extent to which it permeates his works.

The investigation is of a fourfold nature: a study of the critical
writing concerning Arnold for contributions others may have made to this problem; a study of Arnold's dual nature as revealed in his life and letters; an analysis of Arnold's philosophy of dualism as expressed in his poetry; and an examination of his prose works to discover how far his philosophy of dualism finds expression in his prose.

A survey of some of the critical studies of Arnold supplied in the Appendix shows how neglected this unifying approach to his work has been. It reveals, however, that there has gradually entered into the criticism on Arnold some discernment of the dualism either in Arnold himself or in his work.

We began our investigation with a brief biography, in which the attempt was made to focus attention upon Arnold's dual personality, as revealed in his letters and in the comments of relatives and friends. The more worldly side of his nature, it was seen, had the upper hand in his youth and young manhood; whereas, the more serious side triumphed as he grew older.

As a student at Oxford, Arnold experienced a partial blooming of what has been termed the "Byronic" element in his nature. His versatility, his wit, his gaiety and exuberance of spirits blossomed into full flower. This side of Arnold, to which he himself refers as the "worldly" element in his nature, was uppermost between 1841, when he left Rugby for Oxford, and 1849, when he gave up Marguerite, the girl he loved.

It was during these free years, from 1841 to 1849, that Arnold trailed a French actress, read with avidity George Sand's novels of revolt against the whole traditional structure of society, ethics, and religion, showed enough personal interest in George Sand to pay her a visit at her home in Nohant, and fell passionately in love with a girl not of his own social class, the Marguerite of the Switzerland poems.

We began the study of Arnold's poetry, at the most vital point, with the love poems. These are the poems which reflect the most important experience of his life. He was indebted to Marguerite for awakening in him a depth of feeling, which served to quicken his lyric impulse. He owed much to Marguerite, and he never forgot. It was an experience, furthermore, which revealed human nature to Arnold in all its complexities and contradictions. It brought vividly to his consciousness, moreover, a sense of his own twofold nature.

No one can read Arnold's poetry thoughtfully without recognizing the conflicting claims which distracted his spirit; for many of his poems emphasize the persistent struggle between the two sides of
his nature, and read, therefore, much like candid confessions of a divided self. Reading the personal poems gives one a feeling of witnessing the life of the human spirit.

In the love poems the poet gives clear evidence of the dramatic conflict going on in his soul. These are not lyrics in which the poet revels freely in the delights of love, and celebrates the charm of romantic passion with unalloyed pleasure. They vibrate between the radiant joy of love and the rigorous restraint of self-discipline with an intensity which is tragic. The conflict which goes on in the poet's divided nature as he is drawn on by the allurements of love and pulled back by the dictats of reason makes good drama. It is his divided nature which is responsible for his melancholy and his wavering. It is the reason for his failure to achieve satisfaction, not only in love, but in his career as a poet as well. The melancholy in Arnold's poetry has been universally recognized. Its source has been attributed almost without exception to his loss of faith; whereas, much of his melancholy in the personal poems arises from his loss of love.

Since Arnold's poem, *The Buried Life*, contains an important expression of his conception of man's fundamentally two-sided nature, it might be considered an index to his philosophy of dualism. There is that in man which distinguishes him generically from other animals. In the "buried life" there is a center of stability warranted to keep man from being submerged in the superficial pleasures and distractions of the world. The buried life, as the source of insight, has the power to resolve the central contrariety in human nature, the conflict between passion and the higher reach of personality above passion's sway.

The basis of man's dualism, then, according to Arnold's conception, lies in the antagonism between the buried life or the inmost, true self and the multitude of distractions of the external world, which appeal to the superficial self. The buried life is a kind of inner monitor to guide man toward the true goal of his being. A man's success in life and his happiness as well depend upon his obedience to this inward monitor, the mainspring of his moral and spiritual nature. It is an exceedingly difficult matter, however, to preserve an awareness of this innermost best self, because of the bewildering distractions of the world.

To escape from these distractions, solitude offers an important refuge; for it is in solitude that there comes a revelation of the buried life. But it is only in social relationships that the individual can find full
scope for his development toward perfection. The problem of personality becomes, therefore, the effort to possess one's soul in peace in the midst of the confusion and contention of the world.

From a study of Arnold's prose works it is apparent that his fundamental ideas are based on his conception of dualism in man's personality. Generally speaking, in his poetry we see the conflict between the two sides of his nature taking place, and we find Arnold philosophizing in regard to the nature of the struggle; in his prose we find him applying the philosophical point of view he has gained to all the more important phases of life.

As governmental inspector of schools Arnold issued, from time to time, extensive reports of his findings in regard to schools both at home and abroad. The main idea he stoutly championed in these reports is that compulsory secondary education and state supervision of it are necessary in a democracy. This idea rests basically on Arnold's conception of the dualism in man, because he believed that most people need a power outside themselves to help them rise above their ordinary selves. This power with respect to education, he was convinced, should be lodged in the state.


Unlike most commentators on William Cobbett, I make in this study no attempt to write a biography, nor do I try to add yet another to the long list of appreciations of Rural Rides; rather, it is my purpose to provide an intellectual profile of the writer who for the first thirty-five years of the nineteenth century concerned himself so intensely with the political and social problems of England and who served during most of that time as the spokesman for the largest social class in the nation. Because of the impact which his writings had on contemporary politics and because of the contentious manner in which he expressed his opinions, Cobbett attracted a great deal of comment in his own age and continues to do so today. Much of the criticism
directed toward his ideas is founded, however, in a misunderstanding of his basic convictions and in many cases reflects either a careless or a biased reading of his works. Coleridge, for example, is quoted by John Colmer in his Coleridge, Critic of Society (Oxford, 1959), p. 93, as stating in 1816 in his notebook that "the Cobbetts & Hunts address you (= the lower Ranks) as beasts who have no future selves—as if by a natural necessity you must all remain poor and slaving." Recently, Ian Jack, writing in English Literature 1815-1832 (Oxford, 1963), p. 319, reveals in a remark in his discussion of Cobbett that much the same misunderstanding still exists: "Once a man is provided for, Cobbett has no further interest in him except as a potential audience for his harangues and pamphlets." The answers to such representative charges and misconceptions are to be found in an identification and understanding of Cobbett's fundamental opinions on the nature of man as individual and as member of society; hence it is toward presenting and interpreting the ideas motivating Cobbett's pronouncements on the problems which plagued early nineteenth century England that I direct my attention in this study.

The division of this work into chapters dealing with Cobbett's views on education, religion, history, and landscapes seems to me to be dictated by the demands of Cobbett's writings themselves. A different sort of classification might indeed be made—economics, agriculture, politics, for example—but I think the topics I have chosen are more penetrative and pertinent to an understanding of Cobbett than are any others I might have selected. Each chapter is, in a sense, a separate unit but for the inevitable interconnections between Cobbett's ideas on related topics—the proper education of children and the benefits accruing to a life spent in close contact with external nature, for example. Each chapter, except for the last, is intended to illuminate one aspect of Cobbett's thought and to place his ideas in the context of his age. In the fifth chapter, through an examination of his prose style, I suggest reasons for his success in reaching such a wide audience, describe the connection between his cast of mind and the confidence of his style, and demonstrate the relation between his ideas and his expression of them.

103. DUSEK, Rudolph Valentine (Ph. D.). "The Implications of the Duhemian Argument for the Social Sciences." University of
A number of theories in the social sciences are characterized by critics as unfalsifiable by empirical test and hence non-scientific. These criticisms are based upon the falsifiability criterion of demarcation of science from non-science of Sir Karl Popper. Theories modified in the face of apparent counter-evidence are often judged to be tautologous and the modifications called "ad hoc."

These criticisms err on several counts. The so-called falsifiability criterion is often misapplied as a criterion of meaning rather than one of demarcation. The use of the criterion to designate certain social scientific theories as "metaphysical" and/or "tautological" neglects the logical qualifications upon the criterion shown necessary in recent philosophy of physical science. The characterization of the adjustment of certain theories in the social sciences by means of auxiliary hypotheses as an "ad hoc" move neglects the logical restraints on so-called "crucial" experiments and a number of limitations on the decisiveness of refutation.

The criticisms of crucial experiments and decisive refutability of scientific hypotheses by Pierre Duhem, the so-called "Duhemian argument," is the source of a number of limits to the use of the falsifiability criterion which have not been recognized by philosophical critics of the social sciences or by the social scientists themselves. The "Duhemian argument" is actually several arguments, against verifying crucial experiments, against falsifying crucial experiments with regard to single hypotheses or theories, and against decisive refutation of a central hypothesis when modifications of auxiliary hypotheses in the theoretical system under examination are possible. The recent criticisms of the Duhemian argument by Adolf Grünbaum, Karl Popper, and others fail to affect several moderate forms of the Duhemian argument although they do cast doubt on extreme generalizations of the argument due to W. V. O. Quine.

The logical schema of the Duhemian argument is here applied to a case study of the "power elite" debate in political science and sociology. "Pluralist" critics of C. Wright Mills' power elite theory of rule by a restricted minority have claimed that the theory is non-falsifiable and "metaphysical." These accusations are based in part on
Rudolph Valentine Dusek

misapplication of the falsifiability criterion. Robert Dahl's alternative theory of pluralist, democratic rule is examined and his "crucial experiment" purporting to refute local application of the power elite theory is discussed in terms of the Duhemian restraints on crucial experiments. The sequence of modified theories and attempted refutations in the pluralist vs. elitist debate fits the Duhemian characterization of scientific progress rather than the Popperian one. This application of the Duhemian argument shows the ranges of valid and of invalid appeal to Thomas Kuhn's portrayal of scientific progress.

The Duhemian argument shows that language analytic critics of the social sciences, such as A. R. Louch, err in claiming that the social sciences must be ad hoc or tautologous.


The chief purpose of this work is to reconsider exactly what is known about Roger Bacon, and what in the years since 1861, when Charles produced the first full-scale biography of this remarkable friar, has been added to our knowledge of him. The author has taken into account the printed works of Bacon which were not available to Charles, and attempted, with the aid of much conjecture, to fill in those periods in his life of which little is known for certain. The book is primarily a biography and not an estimate of the value of Bacon's
contributions to scientific thought and knowledge, although one long chapter is devoted to an attempt to compile that consistent philosophy of science which Bacon himself neglected.

Starting with the still uncertain date of Bacon's birth, the author questions each item in his biography, pointing out the nature of the evidence in its favor, and critically examining its value. He concludes that Bacon probably never knew Grosseteste, at least in the early years of his life; and that he was educated at Oxford in the ordinary scholastic subjects, without having his interests aroused in science until he was on the point of giving up his position as lecturer on Aristotle and philosophy at Paris in the late 1240's.

This period, the author believes, was crucial for Bacon's later career. He had to decide whether he would study theology, in which he was greatly interested, or follow some other intellectual discipline. Repelled by the theological curriculum, based on the book of the Sentences, and preferring the now old-fashioned method of scriptural exegesis and allegorical interpretation, Bacon hesitated to commit himself to the long period of study required for a subject which, as it was taught in the schools, did not attract him. What turned his gifts into a different field was the reading of the pseudo-Aristotelian Secret of Secrets. This opened to him all the possibilities of science, which he saw could also be used for a more perfect understanding of theology itself.

Returning to England, he plunged himself into the study of all branches of science, pursuing his researches with extraordinary diligence and single-mindedness, and as he studied, the vision of the relation between the sciences grew. He realized that it was not possible to have a complete knowledge of any science without knowing them all. This was fortified by his belief that at one time all science had been revealed by God to the sons of Seth and later to Solomon, and in part to Aristotle and Avicenna. But this knowledge had been partly lost; and Bacon believed that it was possible for a Christian to recover it, and even develop it further.

It is suggested that Bacon was not known as a scientist outside a small circle of his friends; that he himself did little experimenting, but that he acted as publicizer and synthesist for the workers of his circle and had a considerable knowledge of what they were accomplishing. Bacon himself took the initiative in drawing the attention of Cardinal Foulquois, later Pope Clement IV, to his work, and was rewarded by the famous mandate which he obeyed. At this time he
Stewart Copinger Easton

was an unimportant member of the Franciscan Order, possibly a sympathizer with the “left-wing” (Spiritual) group, with no renown or prestige in the Order until after the works for the Pope.

It is suggested that any constraint put upon Bacon within his Order was for personal reasons, and on account of his sharp tongue and extremist religious views. When in the 1270's, after Bacon had achieved by his work a more prominent position, Jerome of Ascoli, the Franciscan General, was having trouble with the "spiritual" dissidents, Bacon was disciplined at the same time and for the same reasons.

Since no direct evidence exists for these assertions, the author does not try to do more than establish the possibility, but points out how his hypothesis might explain the vagueness of the crime for which the fourteenth-century chronicler states Bacon was condemned to prison. He suggests that we should look no further for the "suspected novelties" because there were none; the prosecution was a political one, and the novelties were only an excuse for the punishment.

Throughout the book the author's avowed purpose is only to throw out suggestions and frame hypotheses which will explain the whole of Bacon's life and the few facts that are known for certain about him. Some of these hypotheses can in the nature of the case never be confirmed, and must remain in the realm of conjecture. Others, especially on the chronology of his works, and the nature of those as yet unprinted, and in some cases undiscovered, may be confirmed or denied by competent scholars who will be working in this field in the future.


William Sewell was regarded as one of the most brilliant men of his generation. During the height of his career, 1837-1845, Sewell was the most talked about man at Oxford, was considered as a rival to Newman for spiritual leadership of the University, was a significant influence on university reform and, because of Oxford's unique posi-
Arthur J. Eaves

tion in the intellectual and spiritual life of nineteenth century England, on his country as well.

During this period, Sewell developed into an important writer whose pen supported a conservative view of the state, the church, and the university. Important works of this period include Christian Morals (1840), and Christian Politics (1844), where Sewell develops his basic position in a combination of Platonism, High-Church Anglicanism and Tory politics. His topical writing on politics and Church appeared in the Quarterly Review, where he was highly admired by the editor, Lockhart. Using the Quarterly as a platform, Sewell wrote on the Oxford Movement, on the condition of England, on English politics, especially the Irish question, and on Church and University reform. After 1847, Sewell increasingly turned his energies toward his non-literary project, the founding of Saint Peter's and Saint Columbia's.

One reason for reviving Sewell's literary career is that his spheres of influence were so many and so close to the heart of the intellectual and spiritual life of the century. For instance, he is of considerable importance in the history of Oxford University, being in the forefront of the intellectual and institutional reform that occurred there during the first half of the century. As a lecturer in moral philosophy, Sewell was the first to bring distinction to the study of Plato in modern Oxford. As an educational theorist he was a staunch advocate of the tutorial system that has remained a unique feature of Oxford education and one of the University's strongest champions against the movement for state control at a time when the intrusion of the state would almost certainly have altered the intellectual character of England. He was also among the chief apologists for the Church of England, and it is said that he, more than any other, halted the flight to Rome after Newman's conversion. Yet, he was also one of the chief defenders of the Via Media and of the Catholic practices that became so important to the esthetic life of the century. More importantly, Sewell was an active writer who produced an extensive body of eloquent prose, including a multitude of sermons, twenty-three substantial essays for the Quarterly Review, three book-length essays, a volume of poetry and a novel.

This dissertation is a literary study of Sewell's essays on education and the church-state question, of his Christian Morals (1841), of Christian Politics (1845), and of his novel Hawkstone (1845), which is seen as a transmutation into art of the ideas developed in Sewell's
earlier work, and as a novel whose intrinsic quality and interest has been unjustly ignored.


A study of the correspondence of Arthur Henry Hallam (1811-1833) is appropriate because in the course of his short life he had a significant influence upon the development of English letters. The correspondence from his formative years reveals the nature and extent of that influence. Such a study suggests the direction of his education, the development of his mind, and the formulation of critical principles that affected the early poetry of his friend, Alfred Tennyson. It offers also a special portrait of their intellectual interaction with other young men who achieved stature in nineteenth century politics, religion, and letters.

From Hallam's correspondence with W. E. Gladstone, James Milnes Gaskell, Richard Monckton-Milnes, Alfred Tennyson, and others, we derive a unique perspective on the life of these men at Eton and Cambridge. Their personal letters identify topics which concerned them, their judgments about political and social matters, and the development of Hallam's intellectual and aesthetic sensibilities, both of which would later affect Tennyson.

At Eton, Hallam acquired the best of the English public school education and began to form friendships with W. E. Gladstone, James Milnes Gaskell, and others. There he began to write poetry. A staunch Whig fascinated by politics and English history, he also developed a love of debate as a member of the Eton Debating Society. He quickly formed many lasting friendships because of his gregarious nature, charm, wit, and breadth of mind, and with his friends he undertook the publication of the Eton Miscellany.

After Eton, Hallam left with his family for Italy. His letters express his continuing interest in political matters and his nascent
Robert Morley Esch

aesthetic sensibilities. In Italy, he fell in love for the first time. His acquisition of a deeper appreciation of artistic beauty and a theory of aesthetics would later impress Tennyson when they met, discussed poetry, and even considered publishing a joint edition of their works. Hallam ultimately set forth this aesthetic in a review of Tennyson's Poems, Chiefly Lyrical.

At Cambridge, Hallam was elected to the Cambridge Apostles. He formed within this elite circle many new friendships but was primarily devoted to Tennyson and his family. He encouraged Tennyson to publish; he introduced his more subdued friend to liberal political and religious opinion. At the same time he recognized that he seemed to be experiencing life too quickly. He debated his mission in life—whether to abide by his father's decision that he study mathematics or whether to study metaphysics and write poetry and criticism. He determined to achieve distinction as a creator of literature.

Membership in the Cambridge Apostles allowed both Hallam and Tennyson opportunities to discuss literature and determine the aims of a young writer. Tennyson came to appreciate the dilemma confronting a writer—to follow art for art's sake or to use it for more utilitarian purposes, serving the moral and spiritual growth of humanity. Letters exchanged between Hallam and his friends before his death, between Henry Hallam and a variety of public figures after Arthur's death, and among members of the Hallam-Tennyson circle offer rich insights into a formative period in Hallam's and Tennyson's lives and confirm what a creature of glorious but not wholly realized promise Arthur Hallam was.


This dissertation is a study of a theme that seems to be an important part of the Anglo-Saxon literary tradition: the idea that mortal man, try as he may, cannot know all he wishes about God and His ways. This concern with the limits of human knowledge not only

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appears in many Old English poems but is of central importance in King Alfred's adaptations of the philosophical dialogues of Boethius and St. Augustine, his two last and most ambitious works.

Chapter I draws attention to numerous passages in Old English poems which set limits on man's knowledge, and suggests that the prevalence of this theme in the surviving poetic corpus testifies to the idea's importance to the Anglo-Saxons. The second chapter surveys the writings of King Alfred the Great, a figure of importance in Anglo-Saxon literary history because of his promotion of learning and his own translations and adaptations of Latin works. The notion that man, while on earth, cannot fully understand God so deeply impressed Alfred that he gave it central importance in his adaptations of St. Augustine's Soliloquia and Boethius' De Consolatione Philosophiae. In Chapter III, a detailed comparison of Alfred's Blooms with its sources in St. Augustine's Soliloquia and De Videndo Deo reveals Alfred's own view of the limits of human knowledge of the divine: man, earnestly desiring knowledge of God, must recognize that full knowledge of Him is obtainable only in Heaven; there God will grant knowledge to the individual, if he has earned eternal life through good works, to the precise degree that he desired knowledge while on earth. Chapter IV presents the origins of this Alfredian view in Alfred's adaptation of Boethius' Consolation, again by comparing Alfred's text with its Latin source.

The fifth chapter finds an analogue to Alfred's view of man's limited knowledge of the divine in the Old English Advent Lyrics, which present characters struggling with the consequences of their limited knowledge of the Immaculate Conception. The poet suggests that a recognition of the limits of human knowledge should not be a source of despair, but an impetus to seek God in Heaven. Chapter VI argues that the Old English poem, The Order of the World, presents views of knowledge and nature so close to Alfred's that the King himself might have written the poem. In this work, a poetic persona urges his audience to seek knowledge of God's wondrous creation, but then remarks that man has a limited capacity for such knowledge. The poem closes in an Alfredian manner by exhorting man to seek a beatific vision of God in Heaven. A final chapter concludes that the Alfredian view of the limits of human knowledge is an important and distinctive part of the Old English literary heritage.
Social pathology may be defined as the use of the health of a population as a means of evaluating the condition of its social environment. Implied is the belief that disease is not only a biological but also a social phenomenon and that living and working conditions affect the health of people in some direct and knowable manner. The most obvious way of assessing the health of a social group is by the use of vital statistics. So used, vital statistics is a tool of both social statistics and preventive medicine. Its history therefore spans the borderland between the history of medicine and the history of the social sciences. When used by legislative investigators and by governmental regulatory agencies, as it was in the nineteenth century, vital statistics is an example of the kind of scientific expertise called upon to assist in the formation of public policy. Its history is therefore also germane to the history of the relations of scientific knowledge and government action.

William Farr was the leading British vital statistician during the middle three decades of the nineteenth century. He was the superintendent of the statistical department of the General Register Office for the first forty years of civil registration and the primary architect of the British system of national vital statistics, the world's most advanced system during the nineteenth century. He was a leader in the British statistical movement and made contributions to the theory and application of mortality statistics and actuary calculations. In particular he supervised the compilation of the first national life tables for an advanced industrial nation and showed how life table techniques could be used to study such diverse topics as age-specific mortality, effects of environment on life expectancy, rates of recovery or of dying in given diseases, human fertility, tenure of government ministries, and circulation of gold coins. Farr also designed a statistical nosology and perfected several very useful comparative techniques for exploring the national death registers.

To view Farr only as an important medical statistician is to
overlook much that he regarded as important in his own work. Mortality statistics became in his hands a means of assessing morbid conditions in industrial society, especially those instances of insanitation, bad housing, or harmful occupational conditions that shortened human life. He devised an arbitrary standard of healthy existence in the mortuary experience of certain healthy districts identified by their low mortality rates. By comparing the mortality rates or life table figures for certain geographical areas or occupational groups he could discover, he believed, the effect of the environment on human existence and could show at what ages the toll of social neglect was most acutely felt. Extraordinary circumstances such as cholera epidemics offered additional opportunities to compare the effects of differences in economic class or living conditions on mortality and became unique topics of etiological study in their own right.

It is in this sense then that Farr can be characterized as a social pathologist. He studied the health of groups of individuals and interpreted his results as indications of social malignancies. His scientific work was closely tied to his middle-class reform sympathies. He was a leader in the early British statistical and social science movements, both of which were founded by middle-class professional men in the belief that it was possible to create a science of society which could assess contemporary social problems and then help to order and direct needed social reforms. He was a sanitary reformer and an advocate of medical reform and of the extension of the political and social influence of the medical profession. Even his economics were reform oriented, being designed to bring economic security and health to the lower middle and working classes and to give the laboring class a financial stake in existing institutions.

109. FAGAN, Susan Ruth (Ed. D.). "Thomas Davidson: Dramatist of
Throughout the history of education, the study of the contributors to that history has been important. These educators have been studied both for their philosophies of education and for their contributions to the craft of teaching. This study examines one such figure, Thomas Davidson (1840-1900), a Scotsman by birth and an educator by choice.

Davidson received his early education in Scotland. After a brief period of employment there, he began his work as a wandering scholar. That work led him both geographically and intellectually to a number of different places. He finally chose to settle in the United States of America, where he found the intellectual climate to be much to his liking. Much of his most memorable work was done there, especially in New York City and in upstate New York.

Davidson worked both as a tutor and as a travelling scholar to members of wealthy families, and as a lecturer and writer. His work brought him into close and mutually rewarding contact with a number of people, including such notable contemporaries as William James and John Dewey. These men and many others found in Davidson a scholar worthy of respect and a friend worthy of love.

For all his travelling about, Davidson managed to spend a considerable amount of time on his writing as well as on the teaching he did so well. He published a number of books and lectures; a particular and enduring interest of his was Greek philosophy and education and its continuing value for those who would understand the intellectual evolution of humankind.

As a significant portion of his effort to live some of the Greek insights he valued, Davidson founded Glenmore in upstate New York. Glenmore was a summer camp for the study of the Cultural Sciences, as Davidson termed them. At the camp, the famous and the unknown came together; the bond was their communal interest in the quest for truth and understanding. Their leader and teacher and fellow-learner was Thomas Davidson.

In the last years of his life, Davidson concentrated his impressive efforts in a particular area of adult education: the education of the breadwinners, the workers. It was here most of all that his talents and
interests were to come together; Davidson described his work with the breadwinners as the goal to which all his other labors had led. His profound conviction by this stage of his life was that education was an inalienable right of all the world’s peoples, and that the workers formed a large body of the world’s population whose education had been sadly neglected. The education of the breadwinners that he espoused was multifaceted, including vocational, cultural, and social activist components.

Davidson dramatized the life of learning he advocated. His insights and his written words are clearest when read and seen in the light of his interactions with others as an educator.


This dissertation discusses the development of a new ideology in America and its importance to the educational institutions and the educational processes in America. Initially the ideology is traced from the French Revolution and the ideas of Saint-Simon and the early Positivists to and through modern thinkers such as Marx, Mannheim, Mills, and Marcuse. The thesis that is developed is that clear patterns of antidemocratic thought existed at the time of the French Revolution, and now some 200 years later, are manifested in the operation of scientific bureaucracies.

The essay contends that the crisis ideology results from what historically was a combination of the scientific method and the emerging bureaucratic structure of the modern corporate state. When these two social processes combined in the modern era they did not remain separate static isolated social entities. Rather the method on the one hand, and the system of social organization on the other, had mutual influences upon each other and upon the social world. Ultimately together they produced the crisis or problematic view of man and his world.

The immediate post World War II conditions that furthered the
development of the crisis ideology are specifically seen as the value
neutrality position in social thought, the end of ideology as a social
view of the world, and the subsequent reaction to these patterns of
thought, a mood of moral indignation among social critics. Specific
chapters in the body of the work show examples of the crisis ideology
by an analysis of existing social processes. Chapters on the counter-
culture, law and education, the drug problem, and special education
illustrate the range of discussion encompassed.

By way of conclusion to the essay, a chapter discusses the crisis
ideology and ethics. This chapter reveals how the pluralism that once
existed in American social life has been reduced by the crisis ideology.
Concerns with illusory ethical issues as well as the heart of the
question: that all ethics and morals are becoming functions of the
scientific-bureaucratic process, are mentioned in the final chapter.
The essay closes with the statement that moral and ethical questions
are asked only when there is ideational difference, often conflict
intellectually, and when the sociological equivalence, social pluralism
is protected and strengthened.

111. FEAGINS, Carroll Spurgeon (Ph. D.). "Critiques of Pacifism By
Some American and British Philosophers Since 1914." North-
western University, 1954. 287 pp. Source: DAI, XIV, 12 (1954),
2368. XUM Order No. 10,294.

The purpose of the investigation embodied in this dissertation
is that of seeking to clarify the position which ethical pacifism holds in
contemporary American and British philosophy. The relevant thought
of four Americans (Brand Blanshard, D. Elton Trueblood, Charles
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss) and one Britisher (Bertrand Russell) is
descriptively set forth and analyzed, the latter task being accom-
plished largely by means of internal criticism of each man's general
ethical doctrine. These particular philosophers were chosen because
of their explicit concern with pacifism as an ethical position which
commanded much attention, especially among intellectuals, during
the two-decade interval between the First and Second World Wars.

The general procedure followed, in making the descriptive and
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critical analyses indicated, consists in treating:

1. The given thinker's definition of pacifism.

2. His statement and criticisms of the main pro-pacifist arguments.

3. His statement and criticism of the main anti- or non-pacifist arguments.

Special consideration is given to the more philosophical of such arguments, both pro and con.

Blanshard, Hartshorne and Weiss are taken as representing anti- or non-pacifist points of view, although in the case of Weiss doubt is expressed as to the exact ultimate significance of his general ethical position for the problem of deciding whether or not he is a pacifist. Trueblood and Russell represent, respectively, religious and utilitarian forms of pacifism, from which standpoint each criticizes other forms of pacifist thinking.

Insofar as possible, the five philosophers are made, on occasion, both to criticize one another's formulation and interpretation of the definition of pacifism and to reply to each other's various criticisms of pacifist arguments. In addition, the writer injects, from time to time, considerations drawn from forms of pacifist thought other than those represented by Trueblood and Russell—and especially from the form which may properly be called deontological pacifism, based, as it is, on the Kantian-like principle of respect for the intrinsic value of persons.

Following an introductory chapter, the positions of Blanshard and Trueblood are analyzed and discussed, being linked as "Quaker Non-Pacifist and Pacifist Philosophers." Many of Blanshard's criticisms of pacifism are seen to depend on his failure to make the "crucial ethical distinction," supplied by Trueblood, between force and violence. In turn, however, Trueblood's position is found to be defective because of a fundamental ambiguity which results in a compromise fatal to the agent's moral life insofar as that involves holding to and expressing strong moral convictions.

Hartshorne and Weiss are next treated, joined as "Quaker-influenced" philosophers and considered against their common background of being largely inspired by Whitehead's philosophy.
Hartshorne's primary concern with pacifism as "political magic" is seen to be deficiently worked out, especially as regards his account of Gandhian nonviolent resistance. Moreover, it is not clear that Hartshorne's metaphysics of divine love unambiguously rules out the pacifist ethic. Weiss' highly relativistic ethics is found to be such that neither pacifist nor non-pacifist positions seem ultimately justifiable in its terms. The adequacy of such an ethics is seriously questioned.

The attempt is made to show that, despite appearances, Russell has always been and remains consistent in holding to "relative political pacifism." At the same time, the subjective nature of his general ethical position is found to be an insufficient grounding for a pacifist ethic.

In a concluding chapter, the writer seeks to arrive at a fundamental definition of pacifism, draws together the chief pro- and anti-pacifist arguments, sketches the Kantian-type of pacifism referred to above, and calls attention to the significance for ethical reflection of the general pacifist position.


This dissertation gives a strong historical base for a humanistic approach to the teaching of English. Detailing the theories of literature held by Arnold and by Wordsworth demonstrates that the teaching of "life" and "values" in literature does have a solid intellectual and academic foundation. Close examination of Arnold and Wordsworth shows that today's spokesmen for developing positive, feeling, human persons through English education are not radical innovators but rather they are transmitters of an old and fine tradition.

Those teachers who are concerned with maintaining the "heritage" held in literature, and who feel threatened by some of the student-centered approaches, can see that some of the giants in that heritage, such as Arnold and Wordsworth, did not consider literature
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to be a "given," a "body of knowledge" to be known for the sake of knowing. Instead these teachers can see that, above all else, Arnold and Wordsworth were concerned with the way readers respond to literature, with what happens to them when they read, with what they do as a result of reading.

Arnold's attention is directed primarily to the intellect. He encourages readers to make reading a meaningful experience by going to it for a "criticism of life," specifically for direction, for light, in understanding and living in the society of man. Wordsworth was more concerned with "feeling," with emotions that are common to man, stimulated by the experiences of common life, and developed by an active imagination. Taken together they present a cognitive and affective attitude toward literature which is grounded in man, in his conduct as a human being.

John Dixon, Louise Rosenblatt, and James Britton are among today's leading proponents for a humanistic approach to English teaching. Their attitudes, stated in more precise educational terms, seem to build upon the theories of Arnold and Wordsworth. They show that English programs limited to "skills development," or "cultural heritage," when divorced from the center of the student's own culture, needs, and interests, are self-defeating. They make clear the case that unless reading and writing are learned in the context of human living, they will not be learned or used effectively. Certainly, they will not be used to their fullest potential. Reasons and recommendations for implementation are given for a humanistic approach to the teaching of English which does not ignore skills, but rather develops them more completely because they can be seen as useful tools for living.


The dissertation attempts to solve the problem of faith and reason in the thought of St. Anselm. Traditionally this problem has
been seen as consisting in whether Anselm, in his search for the understanding of his faith, remains within the dimension of his faith or outsteps it, falling into a sort of rationalism. Anselmian texts offer motive for both interpretations.

Since there seems to be no way of solving the problem in a conflict-context, the thesis attempts a new start. This new start is from Anselm’s Credo... He commits himself to faith intending to remain a believer. He sees, however, that faith naturally seeks self-understanding particularly of the one God and of his activities within himself (Word and Love), outside himself (Creation), and in the history of man (Redemption).

Faith exercises a moral purification of man, elevates his intellect and sets guideposts to reason in its search for understanding. Man, however, has to be basically able to understand the Credo. He has this ability because he is the image of God and, therefore, capable of remembering, conceiving and loving. The thesis, then, endeavors to answer the question "What is the role of reason?" or "What is the meaning of Intelligere?" within a context of harmony between faith and reason.

The act of faith involves an intellectual element which Anselm calls conceptio. This element accounts for the Credo’s longing for understanding in the sense that it longs to grow and develop into full intellectus. The believer, therefore, desires to develop the inchoative grasp of his faith. Anselm does it by carrying out a work of conceptualization and verbal expression of the one God as well as a work of reconstruction of the divine activity within and without the Godhead.

Therefore, the faith’s search for understanding is ultimately a search for self-articulation. This statement is based on Anselm’s view according to which intelligere est dicere. The first major endeavor of the thesis, then, is to demonstrate that Anselm attempts to articulate his faith-experience of the one God. Having reached the understanding of both the faith-affirmation “God is” as well as of the faith-affirmation of “what God is” through articulation, Anselm has forged a double-edged sword in the sense that the intellectus Dei serves both as the growth of the conceptio and, therefore, of the act of faith and has also an intrinsic philosophical value.

The second major task of the thesis is to demonstrate that the second role of reason consists in the reconstruction of the divine activities whereby he attains their articulation and, consequently, their understanding. The result of the work of reason is that the be-
liever is able to "speak out" his faith.

Finally the thesis tackles the problem of the "necessary reasons." Their meaning is seen in the perspective of the major theme of the thesis: articulation. Through the concept of necessity Anselm reaches a even deeper understanding of those lofty things which his heart believes and loves.


A favorite assumption of Anglo-American scholarship, endlessly repeated in textbooks and monographs, is the thesis that Locke's ideas triumphed in every nook and cranny of western Europe. Intensive study in the sources of the German Aufklärung has convinced me that this popular argument is erroneous. In my thesis I try to show that Locke's ideas exercised very little influence on the German philosophers, whose loyalty to the Leibniz-Wolff philosophy was remarkably strong. The eudaemonistic-utilitarian Weltanschauung of John Locke simply could not make any headway against the rationalism of Leibniz and Wolff. The reigning philosophic ideas in eighteenth century Germany, being largely mystical and idealistic in nature, were inimical to the thought of Locke. Even in science, the Newton-Locke philosophy experienced powerful opposition in Germany, where a strange pre-romantic ideology of science captivated the imagination of many thinkers.

Locke, of course, had admirers in eighteenth century Germany. He found acceptance among two related groups—the Thomassians and the "Popular Philosophers." Thomasius and his followers (Buddeus, Gundling, Rüdiger, and Crusius) were active during the heyday of Wolffianism and proved singularly unsuccessful in promoting the cause of Locke. The "Popular Philosophers" sympathized with many Lockean ideas, but remained just as much attached to German school philosophy. Those who actively championed Locke's philosophic ideas such as Feder, Meiners, or Tittel were minor figures who
exercised very little influence on the future course of German philosophy.

It must be admitted that Locke was slightly more fortunate in his religious and educational theories, though, here again, native traditions always exercised a strong counterpoise. His educational and religious ideas were accepted to the extent that they harmonized with local developments. When they did, as in the case of some German neologians and philanthropinists, it is often impossible to show whether they directly influenced the men in question or merely reinforced what was already present. In any case, of all the men studied in this essay, only Steinbart, Feder, Meiners, Tittel and perhaps Basedow were under the direct spell of Locke—hardly a very impressive group of thinkers!

In the light of these findings, I argue that the traditional view of Locke’s role in the German Aufklärung must be radically revised. Of course, no one denies that Locke was well known and widely read in Germany. Being a major European philosopher, how could it be otherwise? But that he materially affected the direction of German thought—both in the Age of Enlightenment and beyond—is a claim that will not hold up under close historical scrutiny.


The period of Ruskin’s great social writings provides an educational opportunity that is rare in English letters. During this time, roughly from 1860 to 1889, Ruskin pursued the careers of both a man of letters and ideas and of a practical reformer. Despite this fact, it is impossible to separate one career from the other, since they were bound together in a relationship which was at times symbiotic and at times antagonistic. This dissertation examines Ruskin’s reform efforts, particularly as those efforts involved the working class of Victorian England, in order to achieve some better understanding of the relationship between his contributions to English letters and his
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contributions to society.

The dissertation begins with an account of Ruskin's role as an instructor of art at the Working Men's College, an institution which borrowed many of its guiding principles from Ruskin's early writings. His methods of instruction at the College are described, and examples are given of relationships formed between Ruskin and particular students enrolled at the College, relationships which became important in Ruskin's later reform attempts. The decade of the 1860's, when most of Ruskin's works of social criticism were published, is examined as a time when the theoretical foundations were laid and emotional seeds were planted for a career of social action.

The Guild of St. George occupies a central position in the dissertation, since it served as Ruskin's main organ for reform. The history of the Guild, from its beginnings to the present day, is recounted, and its various successes and failures are analyzed. As an aid in evaluating these successes and failures, Ruskin's important role in the housing reform activities of Octavia Hill, contemporaneous with the Guild, is followed, and the principles and practices of both Ruskin and Hill are compared.

Other industries and organizations in which Ruskin played a vital part are examined; including the origin of George Allen's publishing house, two revivals of the spinning and weaving trade in England, and C. R. Ashbee's Guild of Handicraft in London. The final chapter considers these particular industries and Ruskin's other, less tangible, contributions to the lives of working people in assessing his social legacy.


Two approaches to the study of the relation between leadership and intelligence are here compared in terms of method: Karl Mannheim's theory of the intellectual élite, and a theory of leadership as a function of practical intelligence.
Mannheim studies leadership by analyzing leaders' traits and skills. The critical trait is relatively detached status in relation to the class structure, industrial organization, and the bureaucracy. The critical skill is mastery of "a genuine synthetic political science." The method of judgment appropriate to the inevitable age of planning is the Hegelian method of Reason, which achieves a dialectical transcendence above partisan perspectives and a synthesis of goals in a collective destiny. Reason grasps the principia media, concrete applications of general principles, and builds a rational plan upon them. Freedom consists in self-discipline under the plan and the protection of some unregulated areas in it. Leadership in planning requires the manipulation of institutional patterns which proliferate around a few key positions in cyclical structures, and the extension of rational control over the irrational matrix of society.

An exclusive leading elite capable of comprehensive rational judgments affording maximum calculability of social behavior will best serve freedom. Since judgments are adequately projected when symbols are detached from the concrete structure of events, an elite understanding the complex judgments of planning must be detached from the class structure in order to satisfy the criteria of symbolic adequacy in the method of Reason. These conditions are satisfied by the free-floating intellectual elite whose leadership insures freedom in planning.

According to the method of practical intelligence, leadership in self-regulative groups is regarded as the function of a community of judgers, the investment of authority in an agent. Authority has reference to the support essential to continuity in individual or group development, and accrues to the individual through participation in a community of judgers. Freedom is a condition, not a product, of judgment; it has reference to maintenance of a maximum of alternatives for continuity in development and to the open communication that facilitates maximum guidance and self-regulation. Leadership is studied in the general context of the pragmatic concept of intelligence as a means of moving from unsettled to more satisfactory situations, and is analyzed as varying with the modes of practical intelligence.

Mannheim views the task of the intellectual as the development of a rational plan characterized by totality and calculability; manipulation of mass behavior according to the plan; "sublimation of psychic energies" and "mass analysis of depth disturbances" in the
mass. The élite must be organized as an exclusive, incisive, dedicated, skilled order, selected on the basis of achievement (education), awareness (grasp of future possibilities), and detachment.

According to the method of practical intelligence, not planning but problem-solving is the present task of society. The intellectuals have the responsibility for involvement in, not detachment from, processes of social organization, and especially of participation in communities of judgers. They must especially concern themselves with developing maximum skill in the method of practical intelligence in the community of judgers; relating emotions and feelings to judgmental processes as cues for judgment and motivation for action; finding the infinitely variable "middles" between extremes in a situation and facilitating the development of consensus on goals and programs; developing maximum guidance in judgment through adequate generalizations and open communication.

Mannheim's method of Reason eventuates in a theory of the élite, and offers no concept of intelligence or of authority. It does not offer adequate guidance to the role of the intellectual in society, or to the study of the relation between intelligence and leadership. However, Mannheim's prophecy of disorganization, alienation and despair ought to be taken seriously. But in studying problems in the relation between intelligence and leadership in democratic and pluralistic societies, more guidance seems to be offered by the theory of leadership suggested by the method of practical intelligence than by the theory of the élite.


Source: DAI, XXV, 8 (February, 1965), 4752. XUM Order No. 64-13,461.

Robin George Collingwood (1889-1943), archeologist, philosopher of history, esthetician and Waynflete Professor of Metaphysical Philosophy at Oxford from 1935-1942, developed a theory of metaphysics which it is the aim of this dissertation to examine.

In the first place, Collingwood professed to find in Aristotle the
paradigm for conceiving metaphysics as the science of absolute presuppositions. These suppositions constitute that knowledge which can neither be questioned nor verified in contrast with relative presuppositions which do admit of verification. In opposition to Ayer, Collingwood holds that absolute or metaphysical presuppositions are uncovered by a kind of analysis called the logic of question and answer. This method is based on the conviction that no oral or written statement is fully intelligible unless it is conceived as an answer to a question, and the discovery of the question behind the evidence will help to lay bare the presuppositions the writer or speaker had in mind. Those suppositions which have the character of being the unquestioned and unquestionable assumptions of natural science are the properly metaphysical ones for Collingwood.

The third chapter deals with Collingwood's identification of metaphysics with history. His researches into the philosophy of history had convinced him that if an historian is to use his evidence scientifically, he must re-enact the thoughts of the past in his own mind. Re-enactment is the theory that the historian, in order to understand his data, must discover the thoughts behind them and re-think these thoughts in his own mind. But such a method is implicit in Collingwood's logic of question and answer where the metaphysician attempts to discover the question behind the evidence he has before him, in order to reconstruct the presuppositions from which the question arose. After seeing that the method of metaphysics was an historical method, Collingwood then examined the subject matter of metaphysics and found that absolute presuppositions were historical data. For Collingwood, history was concerned only with the "inside" of events by which he meant the ideas behind them. Since absolute presuppositions are those assumptions which give rise to men's thought and ultimately to their actions, absolute presuppositions are the subject matter of history. Having identified the method and subject matter of metaphysics and history, he assimilated metaphysics into an historical science.

An example of the application of Collingwood's presuppositional theory is considered in Chapter four. This is his historical analysis of the proposition "God exists," considered as a presupposition underlying natural science in pre-Christian and Christian thinking. Natural science meant for Collingwood the domain of those things which happen outside human control. Using Aristotle as an example of pre-Christian thinkers, Collingwood held that the sage's
postulation of the unity of nature presupposed the existence of one God, having a mind, and of one science which could investigate the world of nature. Both ancient and modern European science agree on these two presuppositions, but Collingwood saw that there were divergences between the two views. Aristotle held:

1. That God did not create the world.
2. That motion is a perceivable feature of the natural world.

Modern science maintains the reality of both creation and motion and regards both of them as presuppositions. According to Collingwood, Aristotle failed to analyze correctly the presuppositions in the proposition "God exists."

The following perplexities arise in his theory of metaphysics:

1. No real division seems possible between absolute and relative presuppositions.
2. Absolute presuppositions cannot be re-enacted.
3. The identification of history and metaphysics appears impossible since absolute presuppositions appear to be more akin to preconscious thinking than to conscious thoughts.

Nevertheless, Collingwood has contributed a valuable service to philosophy by highlighting the important role that presuppositions play in determining man's attitudes and commitments and by developing his logic of question and answer as a tool for philosophical inquiry.

This study examines the comedy of the seventeenth century in London. It is an attempt to probe the nature, and to some degree the causes, of those differences which lurk beneath the surface of generic convention. A major focus is on audience response, with particular attention to the image of society dramatized in the comedies and to the social character of the theatrical experience itself. The purpose of the study is to throw into relief the specific differences of comedy as experienced early in the century ("the Renaissance") and at its end ("the Restoration").

The problem is approached from two angles. Part I, "The Dwindling Spiral," is a study in the history of ideas. It comprises two chapters, the first one examining attitudes to language during the century, the second one tracing alterations in the philosophy of human nature and relating these specifically to parallel changes in staging methods and theatrical architecture. Part II, "The Comedies," devotes two chapters each to Elizabethan-Jacobean comedy and to Restoration comedy, with particular attention to Shakespeare, Jonson, Marston, Heywood, Shadwell, Etherege, Wycherley, and Congreve.

Part I demonstrates that language became an increasingly problematic area during the seventeenth century, with attacks on its communicative effectiveness coming from all sides (Bacon and the Royal Society, Comenius and educational reformers, Hobbes, Locke, and other "psychologists"). At the same time, an important Renaissance view of human nature—at least since the time of the Platonic Academy at Florence—was coming under heavy attack. This view had maintained that human nature was unlimited in ability to shape its own character and destiny (Pico); that, structurally, human nature was composed of a body, a mind, and a soul, of which the last was the person himself and the former two mere instruments. It is my contention that the Cartesian and mechanist attacks on this philosophy are not unrelated to the contemporary pessimisms over language, and that both of these developments shed light on changes in comic form, theatrical presentation, and audience experience over the century.

It is concluded that the Renaissance view of man and confidence in language is artistically more productive than its successor, resulting in a broader range of comic forms and an audience experience which may be both morally and socially creative whereas Restoration comedy rests content, for the most part, with mere diversion and social criticism. By the end of the century, Horace's aut delectare
aut prodesse has become a disjunction.


This dissertation attempts to isolate and define Roger Ascham's literary intellect. Literature of the mid-sixteenth century included more than "belle letters"; by contemporary standards all three of Ascham's English works—Toxophilus, A Report... of Germany and The Scholemaster—may be considered literary works and analyzed as both artistic and functional creations. Although much serious literature was written in Latin or based on classical doctrines of rhetoric, English writers like Ascham had little difficulty adapting rules and figures from one language to another, metrics excepted. Each language, however, had its own range of literary decorum, English being generally more colloquial in diction and more logical in grammar. In studying sixteenth century style especially, the critic must distinguish carefully between a writer's rhetoric, his theories of style, and his style itself. Many critics, failing to make these distinctions, reveal little of use to the inquiring reader. Critics of style usually pursue one of two goals: some give precedence to rhetoric, seeking to analyze a writer's manipulation of standard aesthetic criteria; the others include rhetoric in a broader concept of personal style, from which they hope to discover the uniqueness of a writer's artistic genius insofar as it may be inferred from his text. This study follows the second method.

Ascham's style changes significantly during the twenty-three years which encompass his English writings. In Toxophilus he avoids neat "truths" by reconciling apparent contradictions and joining apparently exclusive alternatives. His syntax moves correlative, with incessant qualification; he so eagerly seeks data that evidence and examples often lead him into digressions. He seeks more to clarify truth than to ornament it, and his object is to join the purity of scholarship with the practicality of the real life of common men. Moderation is the vehicle of his art.
The Report of Germany was Ascham's first real opportunity to use academic theory for the betterment of human (especially English) action. His narrative is full of description based upon observation during his tenure at the court of Charles V, but evidence is now used to support moral evaluation. His style is less conciliatory, yet still he refuses to accept simple extremes as truth. The Report contains more aphorism and demonstrates an ability to manage abstract thought which compares favorably with that of Ascham's contemporaries. Yet Ascham retains a remarkable informality in loose syntax, selective use of colloquial detail, and the honesty of his reaction to events. The seriousness of his purpose dictates artful portraits of the characters who represent his moral findings, but also a straightforward, unpretentious exposition of contemporary history.

Ascham's final work, The Scholemaster, attempts to correct the failings of Elizabethan society and to promulgate an educational theory. In this work, evidence and description are used as exempla for preconceived moral principles. Less able than before to maintain an awareness of the complexity of truth, Ascham emphasizes the necessity of order and deplores symptoms of factionalism. Yet, especially in passages written in 1563, he maintains a fine control over rhetorical art, revealing complexity in language where he yields to absolutism in morality. Aphorism, begun in Toxophilus and developed in the Report, is sometimes abused in The Scholemaster as, forgetting in anger what is planned in calmness, Ascham leaves imperfectly defined generalizations open to misreading by critics.

Ascham's style evolves through a search for practical truth toward the narrowness of absolute moral conviction. In this change and in the consistency of his honest and unpretentious colloquialism are the roots of his intellect and the clue to his contributions to English humanism.


The study of literacy from a rhetorical perspective can best be understood if we think of literacy not as a single skill but as a range of
skills enabling people to make use of letters, including high-level interpretive and expressive intellectual abilities. When basic literacy skills are associated with different orientations, they result in different literacies.

Extending and adapting the work of the British sociolinguist Basil Bernstein in light of current literacy research, we can distinguish at least two literacies: local literacy, which relies upon features of the immediate rhetorical scene and is used to reaffirm the values of the social group by and for whom it is produced; and collegiate literacy, which relies upon the conventions of an acquired code to determine what assumptions can be left implicit and facilitates the expression of individual models of experience.

Writers tracing the development of literacy have drawn distinctions similar to Bernstein's in contrasting literate and oral cultures, but many of these claims have been challenged on the basis of individual instances of literate and oral usage. It is the premise of this study that the orientations of literacy and orality both survive in the form of sociolinguistic codes, which are independent of the medium of any particular instance of contemporary linguistic usage. The orientation associated with oral culture now serves as the nucleus of local literacy and can still be found regulating speech in most social situations and the expectations readers bring to some genres of popular literature. The orientation associated with literate culture serves as the nucleus of collegiate literacy and regulates the conventions of most expository prose.

These codes can be used to account for some phenomena associated with the practice of literacy, including the popularity of popular literature and some discrepancies between theory and ethnographic data on the relationship between literacy and what has been called decontextualized thought. When understood as components of a system which allocates societal resources, the distribution of sociolinguistic codes raises significant questions about the relationship between pedagogic practice and social justice.

Sir John Cheke, Tudor Tutor, is a study of the life, writings, and influence of Sir John Cheke, 1514-1557. It is based on his own writings and translations and any other extant evidence concerning his life. Intensive work in rare books and manuscripts was necessary; the published portion of Cheke's work is now extremely rare, and much was never published. Some of these materials were found in this country in the Folger Shakespeare Library; others were located in the British Museum and the Public Record Office in London and in various libraries in Cambridge and Oxford. Extensive work was done in a wide variety of other sources dealing with this era, and with individuals with whom Cheke had close association. Bits and pieces from many such sources eventually fell together in a distinct pattern. The only previous full biography of Cheke is that by John Strype, published in 1705. This provided a helpful outline to be filled in from numerous other sources. Twentieth century American literary studies of specific works were also especially helpful, especially concerning Cheke's The Hurt of Sedition, and his translation of Matthew.

Cheke grew up in the university city of Cambridge at a time when humanism was an especially strong influence. He became a classical scholar of great ability, with special proficiency in Greek. He became Regius Professor of Greek at Cambridge and developed a new method of Greek pronunciation which he felt was more accurate, but which was strongly opposed by Stephen Gardiner. He translated a number of relatively obscure Patristic and Byzantine works into Latin. His fame as a teacher led Henry VIII to hire him as a tutor to Prince Edward, which gave him considerable importance at Court, especially when his young pupil became King. He remained Edward's tutor throughout his reign. Cheke wrote a logical exposition against the rebels of 1549, which had wider influence as a warning against the follies of sedition. Many other interests occupied his mind. He attempted an English translation of the Bible, which was noted for Anglo-Saxon vocabulary and a new system of spelling. He maintained a close association with continental Protestants residing in England, and helped them understand the changes taking place in the English Church by translating key English documents into Latin. He went along with the development of Protestantism but opposed the secular despoiling of church property. He had close contact with many of the leading men at the time, especially Archbishop Cranmer and William Cecil. He participated actively in the scheme to place Lady Jane Grey on the throne, but strictly for reasons of religion and...
to please his dying royal pupil, for he had no interest in the personal ambitions of Northumberland.

In Mary's reign he was imprisoned at first for his support of Lady Jane but later released and given royal permission to travel on the Continent. Two years later, however, he was forcibly returned to England after being kidnapped in the Low Countries. After great pressure was brought to bear upon him to do so, he publicly recanted of his Protestantism to save himself from martyrdom. He soon regretted this action and fell into an intense personal depression which led to his early death. Within the length of his short life he left a great heritage, as classical scholar, royal educator, eloquent writer, and participant in various aspects of the English Reformation.


The finite-God theories of William James and Alfred North Whitehead have received consideration as alternatives to the more traditional infinite-God theories. In three of his major works, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Pragmatism, and A Pluralistic Universe, William James develops a pragmatic concept of God. Alfred North Whitehead, in Process and Reality, describes two natures of God through which the immanent and the transcendent characters of God are presented.

The first part of this study is a presentation of the theistic views of both James and Whitehead in an attempt to discover the evidence which each presents for the existence of God and the nature of the divine limitation. A coordinate task is the delineation of the basic conflicts which both James and Whitehead have with the infinite God position. Special emphasis is given to the philosophical motives of James and Whitehead in relation to their philosophical methodology. Although James and Whitehead differ in their philosophical methods,
both men consider their philosophical approach to God as partially an empirical one.

This dissertation is to a significant degree expository. Its major purpose is to explicate both James' and Whitehead's theories of a finite God. Further, it attempts to clarify some of the terminology used and to elucidate the conceptual issues encountered. Both men are intent upon discussing God in terms which are religiously meaningful to man, namely, the area of religious experience. With neither James nor Whitehead do we find the certainty of knowledge about God which is claimed by the traditional theist's position.

Considerable emphasis is given to James' ideas of the special need man has for God. Further, it is shown that God has need of man, because God, too, has limitations. Whitehead gives us two notions of God; the primordial and the consequent natures. An examination of both of these natures of God and their finite implications is pursued.

Finally, this dissertation attempts a comparative study of the finite natures of God as conceived by both James and Whitehead. Implicit within this summary are the motives which each man has suggested for the position of God as finite.


Like most English humanists of the sixteenth century, Thomas Elyot gave considerable thought to the nature of language. His many statements about language, found mostly in the Governour, but in other works as well, are usually presented in relation to discussions of literature, communication, and education. His interests and opinions reveal his indebtedness to the traditions of sophistic rhetoric. The consistent theory of language which emerges when these statements are correlated with one another owes much to the writings of Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian.
Joel Edward Foreman

Plato's theory of language is most evident in the Cratylus, where Socrates attributes the meaning of words to the transcendent "forms" which they dimly represent. Socrates argues that language is a poor instrument for the communication of knowledge because the sounds which convey thoughts to the intellect through the senses lack fixed definitions. The ideas expressed in the Cratylus and reiterated in the Seventh Letter indicate that the reforms of rhetoric proposed in the Gorgias and the Phaedrus were attempts to remedy what Plato saw as the inadequacy of language to convey philosophical truths. Thus Plato's theory of language affects his view of the relationship between the study of rhetoric and the study of philosophy.

For Cicero the basic distinction between a conception and its manner of expression organizes distinctions between reason and speech, invention and elocution, wisdom and eloquence, and philosophy and rhetoric which are prominent in his rhetorical treatises. From the beginning of his career as a writer of treatises on rhetoric, Cicero argues on behalf of educational programs which give attention to both the ideas a speaker wishes to communicate and the words he uses to convey them. However, the emphasis on these two components of speech shifts in successive works. In De Invenzione Cicero writes that the "matter" of speech and the processes of invention are the orator's first and central concern, but in Orator, his last work, he argues that the orator should regard words and elocution as of primary importance.

Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria reiterates and reinforces the attitudes toward language developed by Cicero in his later works. For Quintilian, rhetoric is the science which describes actual speech and prescribes methods for its improvement. Rhetoric is principally concerned with the forms of expression and subordinates to its own ends the subject matter of all other intellectual disciplines. It is the most important of all human pursuits because the ability to use language is the faculty which sets man apart from the beasts.

Thomas Elyot selectively incorporates the ideas of Plato, Cicero, and Quintilian in a theory of language which has its own identity. He thinks of words as containers of ideas. His habit of distinguishing between outer and inner components—sounds or letters and thoughts—is consistent with his distinctions between the body and the soul, and the bodily senses and the intellect. The ears or eyes perceive the forms of expression and the mind apprehends the intended meaning. These distinctions inform discussions of subjects as disparate as the nature of eloquence, the method for arriving at a
definition, the studies appropriate for educating the English nobility, and the function of poetry.

Source: DAI, XLVIII, 6A (December, 1987), 1531-A. XUM Order No. DA8715180.

Wilhelm von Humboldt is known to most students of politics in the English speaking countries only as the man who was mentioned at the beginning of John Stuart Mill's On Liberty. Relatively little has been written about Humboldt as a political thinker. This study, therefore, attempts to prove that Humboldt liberalism represents a particular type of liberal thought different from that of other liberal thinkers.

Humboldt's political philosophy is examined on two levels: the influence of other theorists on his thinking and his own concepts and ideas. The first level traces the development of Humboldt's ideas by discussing and analyzing the main intellectual and philosophical influence of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Since Humboldt was an original thinker, the ideas of others were seldom explicitly acknowledged and can therefore quite often be inferred only indirectly.

The second level discusses Humboldt's distinctive concepts such as Innerlichkeit, Harmony, and particularly his understanding of Bildung, the focal point of his liberal philosophy, from which he viewed the place and function of the state.

These various concepts are reflected in Humboldt's only political work, The Limits of State Action. In this early liberal and utopian essay, Humboldt advocated extremely limited state functions in order to ensure freedom for Bildung, or self-education of all men. He argued that the absence of state action frees the individual for uncoerced community action and cooperation with others, and he even denied any participation of the state in education. As chief reformer of the Prussian educational system, however, he initiated positive state actions, which in his theory were left to private initiative only.
The concluding part of the dissertation deals with a comparison of Humboldt's and Mill's liberal theory by first examining their similarities and then their differences. By accepting Humboldt's ideas of Bildung and individualism, Mill's values differed substantially from the utilitarian principles of his predecessors. Whereas Humboldt wanted freedom of the individual from the tutelage of an absolutist, paternalistic and bureaucratic state, Mill feared the potentially much more oppressive democratic state as the instrument for legislating social tranquility and uniformity of thought and action.


John Dee (1527-1608) was among the most renowned and remarkable men of Renaissance England. He taught Sir Philip Sidney and Sir Edward Dyer, the leaders of the poetic renaissance, and was an intimate friend of such men as the Earl of Leicester and Sir Francis Walsingham, the confidant of Elizabeth herself. He introduced into England the ideas of Vitruvius, the great Roman architect whose theories about harmony and proportion inspired the revival of neoclassical building throughout the Continent. He was in the vanguard of scientific and technological developments—indeed inspired many of them through his teaching and writings—and was at the center of the navigational and antiquarian movements. But Dee was also a magician deeply immersed in the most extreme forms of magic and manticism, Elizabethan England's great magus. He was very much in the mainstream of philosophical thought stemming from Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Agrippa.

The purpose of this study is to put Dee in his proper context and to show that a basic re-assessment of him in the light of modern scholarship will throw valuable new light on the development of the Renaissance in England. Hermetic seals, mathesis, and mysticism, attempts at direct communication with angels, formed his world view. Nevertheless, he also promoted practical science and utilitarian edu-
cation, toleration in an age of intolerance, and religious harmony. He pursued all forms of knowledge relentlessly, but in groping for universal knowledge he was a complete Renaissance man. This study shows that he was a kind of paradigmatic figure for the Renaissance as a whole.


Considering the number of works for piano by Frank Bridge, one may admire the great wealth of imagination that poured forth from this virtually unknown and long-under-rated composer. Best known now for a composition written by Benjamin Britten (Variations on a Theme by Frank Bridge), Bridge was regarded as one of England's finest composers in the early twentieth century, certainly one of the leading contributors to the field of chamber music in that country. Yet by the time of his death, he had been all but forgotten, and today, he languishes in obscurity, known only as Britten's teacher.

Bridge's waning fortune, after the meteoric ascent of his early years, was directly attributable to the remarkable stylistic metamorphosis that he underwent during his career and to the corresponding increase in antagonism from the musically intolerant Victorian establishment. The progress of that evolution is chronicled in this dissertation through an analysis of all the solo piano works. They represent a significant, though not the most important, portion of his œuvre and serve as a barometer of his rising success and eventual decline.
Examined here are the works from his early years, such as the Berceuse and "Dramatic Fantasia," which were influenced by the readily accessible harmonic and melodic idiom of late nineteenth century composers like Brahms, Fauré, and Charles Villiers Stanford and demonstrate the young composer’s success in absorbing the musical styles of his time.

Analyses of the works from Bridge's transitional period, such as Suite: The Hour Glass, Four Characteristic Pieces, and Three Poems, reveal his quest for a more profound musical expression, one that led him to the works of Debussy, Ravel, and Scriabin.

Bridge's most extended piano work, the Piano Sonata (1921-24), discussed here in detail, is the climax of those experimental years which resulted in a powerfully bitter bitonal harmonic language that effectively exiled him from the English musical scene. The works immediately following the Sonata (In Autumn, Hidden Fires, and Gargoyle, for example) are also carefully examined. Two chapters are devoted to the children's pieces (Miniature Pastorals and Suite: the Hour Glass) and to some amusing diversions, such as The Turtle's Retort and Suite: Vignettes de Marseille, that periodically captured Bridge's attention during his remarkable career.


The main goal of this thesis is to study the role played by Bertrand Russell in the origin and development of the paradoxes of set theory.

First, I describe what I call "a standard interpretation of the origins of the set theoretic paradoxes." This chapter describes the explanation of other historians of how the paradoxes were discovered. I also present a discussion of the major reasons why this interpretation—with all its small variants—has to be discarded.

Second, I analyze Russell's early philosophical and mathematical background to his writing of The Principles of Mathematics. I try
to show how his study of Kant, Hegel, Cantor, among others, is related to how Russell became interested in philosophical antinomies, and how he originally studied the relations between mathematics and logic. Throughout this analysis, I describe the stages of early drafts of The Principles, and the influence of Georg Cantor which most historians influenced by Russell's own later recollections have overlooked.

I next describe how Russell discovered Cantor's paradox; his own paradox; and how he formulated the elements that would provoke the discovery of yet another paradox, the Burali-Forti paradox. Russell's correspondence, especially with Louis Couturat, and the comparison between the manuscript of The Principles with the printed version are used to support my analysis. I maintain that Russell himself discovered at least two of the three most famous paradoxes of the theory of sets—and set forth the elements to provoke another one; that there are some inconsistencies contained in The Principles related to the paradoxes; and, that Russell's later recollections of these developments are inaccurate.

Fourth, I finally discuss the emergence of the nowadays called "semantic paradoxes." The description of the polemics and debates concerning the Well-Ordering Theorem help clarify how these paradoxes originated and spread. I attempt to show that, contrary to the previously described standard interpretation, these paradoxes did not develop as an immediate and reasonable consequence of the origin of the logical ones. I try to prove that it was the polemic surrounding the Well-Ordering Theorem that dominated the whole outlook.


Education is a timeless subject about which many theoreticians from Plato to Dewey have written. Of all the educational commentators, Sir Thomas Elyot, gentleman-scholar of the English Renaissance, is one of the most interesting, readable, and perspicuous. The Boke Named the Governour, his major work, is known to students of the Renaissance, but his other works have been undeservedly neglected.
With few exceptions, the minor tracts have not been reprinted since the sixteenth century. The few modern reprints, a recent biography, and occasional articles virtually make up the Elyot bibliography.

This dissertation analyzes all Elyot's known works. The objectives are:

1. To study these works as tracts on education—humanistic education, health education, political education, and religious education.

2. To reintroduce the little known works to a modern audience.

Content, style, dates of composition, sources, contemporary allusions, and timeless principles are discussed. Elyot's frequently expressed purpose was to use his pen in the service of the governor and the public to inspire learning and virtuous conduct. The aim of education was preparation to serve oneself, to serve the state, and to serve God. The emphasis was on service to the state. Elyot was concerned with the governing class, and he outlined a broad humanistic course of study appropriate for the prospective governor. The classical curriculum occupied the student from about age seven to twenty-one. Only knowledge could lead to Platonic virtue and Christian perfection. The importance of the teacher was recognized. Elyot pleaded for highly qualified and well paid tutors. The methods of teaching can well be presented in modern pedagogy. Elyot demanded a friendly environment, motivation, inspiration, variety in program, creativity, individuality, and certainly no use of force or physical punishment. Languages, such as Latin and Greek, were taught through conversation first and were begun when the student was very young. Elyot was very much interested in language, especially his native English. His own prose is lucid and smooth. He saw language as the key to learning, and in order to promote the knowledge of language, he composed a Latin-English dictionary. This lexicon was enlarged later by Cooper and became a standard reference book for the schoolboys. Elyot's instructive instinct did not stop with the student. He enumerated the virtues necessary and desirable in one already in political office. The people could benefit from a virtuous ruler both through imitation and from his wise governing. Elyot did not forget that a healthy mind requires a healthy body. He composed the Castel of Helth, a handbook on diet and hygiene. He did not overlook the needs...
Lillian Gottesman

of the soul and wrote short religious pieces for the faithful.

Elyot's religious conviction was traditional and unshaken. He was a humanist, but not a reformer. His humanism found expression in education. He was the first to write an educational treatise in English (Governour), the first to write a pasquinade in English (Pasqyvll the Playne) in which the role of the counselor is debated, and the first to compose a dictionary of value to English which can rightfully be called a dictionary. He was probably the first to translate an oration directly from Greek into English (Doctrinal of Princes) and to use the Platonic dialogue somewhat modified in English (Defence of Good Women and Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man). Elyot cannot be called a great literary figure, but his achievements are noteworthy and characteristic of the Renaissance.


The main purpose of this dissertation has been to describe the history of the American Summerhill movement, which organizationally was manifested by the American Summerhill Society (founded 1961). In addition, the dissertation describes the antecedents to the creation of the Society by examining the written response in this country to Neill's published writings prior to the 1960s.

In the first part of the dissertation, the antecedents are examined. Often it has been assumed that prior to the 1960's the work of A. S. Neill (author, educator, and headmaster of the innovative Summerhill School in England) was unknown in the United States. This dissertation reveals that Neill's writings were known in this country as early as 1916 and that reviews of his earlier books continued throughout the Twenties. Besides focusing on the early written response, the first part of the dissertation searches for a connection between Neill and the American Progressive Education Movement of the Twenties and Thirties.

After further describing the American response to Neill in the
1940's and 50's, emphasis shifts from the antecedents of the American Summerhill movement to the movement's actual establishment when the American Summerhill Society was founded. The organization's attempt to establish an American Summerhill school, as well as some of its accomplishments, are described. However, because the Society was characterized more often by failure rather than success, the dissertation examines the repeated internal conflicts which afflicted the Society throughout its history. In the final chapter, the last, devastating clash within the Society's leadership is described, along with other factors which explain why the Society did not survive beyond 1971.


This dissertation contains two main divisions. One is a transcription of the forty-four diaries Matthew Arnold kept from 1852 through 1888 (there are two diaries for each year 1875-77 and 1880-83). The other consists of headnotes, bound together in volume I for convenience, commenting upon each year's transcript and relating the materials of the diaries to his letters and to his other works.

The transcription preserves Arnold's spelling, punctuation, and grammar. It also retains his spacing of entries, his line length, and his placement of notations on the page (vertical and inverted ones are indicated). In the original copy only, entries made in pencil and those in pen and ink are distinguished. The transcription is a complete supplement to Lowry, Young, and Dunn's The Note-Books of Matthew Arnold; cross references indicate where literary entries printed in their volume occur. One transcript is out of sequence. The journal which Arnold kept from March through August 1859, to supplement his Pawsey diary, was located as this project was being completed; its transcription is included in the headnote for 1859.

The biographical and other information about Matthew Arnold is organized in the headnotes as follows: his whereabouts,
literary projects, finances, educational matters, reading, miscellaneous material, and school reports. The headnotes summarize the transcriptions (with some additions); they are not a substitute for them.

Two kinds of entries—school appointments and itineraries of trips—reveal Arnold's whereabouts. The former disclose his geographical movements for approximately nine months; the latter establish his location during holiday jaunts both in Great Britain and on the Continent, tours of European countries in an official capacity, and travels in America.

There are several kinds of entries of literary significance. One consists of Arnold's first draft of passages incorporated in his works. Other kinds, which help to date literary projects, consist of entries which indicate when he was composing works, mailing them to the publisher, reading and returning proof for them, and sending complimentary copies of them to friends. Another consists of Arnold's financial records, among which is a record of payments received from publishers.

A large portion of the diary entries is devoted to professional activities. For handy reference, Arnold has copied out problems and their answers to use in testing students. He also gives considerable space to facts and observations about schools jotted down as he inspect them, such as number of pupils in different standards, quality of their work, and evaluation of teachers. These served as a basis for his biennial general reports. In addition, he has noted other educational duties—the supervision of examinations and the grading of papers.

Arnold's lists of reading and quotations he copied out have been carefully checked against the published ones in Lowry, Young, and Dunn; omissions have been supplied and corrections have been made. His reading has also been correlated with his literary projects.

The miscellaneous notations record observations about the weather, addresses of friends, people to write, lists of shrubbery planted at Pains Hill Cottage, domestic trivia, and periodic resolutions to amend his daily routine. Because of the inaccessibility of Thomas Smart's Bibliography of Arnold's works, Smart's entries for 1852 forward are reproduced in this dissertation.

On the evidence of the diary entries, to which most previous writers on Arnold have not had access, errors or probable errors, particularly with regard to the dating of letters, have been corrected or questioned.
William Bell Guthrie

In Dryden's words, "here is God's plenty" for all Arnoldians. Access to the full diary entries, here first transcribed, would seem to be essential to any future biographer of Arnold or to any student of Arnold's life in relation to his works.

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An avowed atheist who became a Christian in his twenty-ninth year, C. S. Lewis continued as a professional man of letters at Oxford and for the last nine years of his career at Cambridge. Already recognized for his work in literary criticism, after his conversion he began writing in the field of classical Christianity. He regarded his task as one of turning learned English into the vernacular for an audience that was often bypassed by the rabid emotionalism of religion on the one hand and the sophisticated, arcane language of some of the clergy on the other. He regarded his task, then, as one of translator.

Since the text—classical Christianity—was both well-known and remained a constant in Lewis’s writing by design, this study concentrates on the rhetorical elements in Lewis’s work which invites readers to give a well-known subject reconsideration, since the problem of dealing with topics already well-known to an audience is common to rhetoricians.

The first chapter introduces bibliographical materials telling of Lewis’s immersion in the field of languages and literature from his earliest history, equipping him from the outset for the work that later became his specialty. A second chapter explores Lewis’s view toward his own work both in his chosen profession and in his work in which he considered himself an amateur, the field of religion. This study maintains that the word "translator" is an apt description of his work in both areas. A fourth chapter elicits those characteristics which Lewis regarded as contributory to an effective style.
Paul W. F. Harms

The fifth chapter reveals Lewis's detailed translation of nine of his works.

A sixth and final chapter provides a summary, an identification, and a fuller evaluation of the characteristics of Lewis as translator. Noteworthy is a rich command of language, a fertile imagination, a clearly defined concept of audience, a strong commitment to the dignity of human beings, a firm conviction that "to interest is the first duty of art," a capacity "to render imaginable for audience that which was for them only intelligible," a pervasive humor, a penetrating intellect, and a conviction that holiness and goodness are not incompatible with joy.

Lewis may have rejected originality in matters of doctrine. Fortunately, he was not successful in rejecting an orchestration of the old elements of rhetoric which promotes new consideration of old matters.


The purpose of this edition of The English Schoole-Maister is to develop, from the text, conclusions as to the extent to which this work represents scholarly views about elementary education and early modern English in the Elizabethan era. A secondary purpose is to make available the text of a book that has been out of print since 1737. The text here printed is based upon the first edition of 1596 and on two pages of "copies" for instruction in handwriting from the 1630 edition.

Chapter I is devoted to matters concerning the text. The second chapter shows how the curriculum and pedagogy of the book support and, to a small extent, extend scholarly assumptions about the tradition of Petty School education at the end of the sixteenth century.

Comparisons of The English Schoole-Maister with previous works in the tradition reveal that Coote's materials and methods were
William Robert Hart

very largely derived from the Petty School Tradition. In particular, he drew upon the ABC, on primers, on catechisms and on Biblical passages which were common to the Petty School curricula. Furthermore, he borrowed many ideas from at least two, and perhaps three, spelling and reading books of his time: Richard Mulcaster's *Elemen
tarie* (1582), Francis Clement's *The Petie Schole* (1587), and William Kempe's *The Education of Children* (1588). The English Schoole-
maister departed from the tradition of its predecessors, however, in its briefer presentation of an even broader curriculum than those outlined by its predecessors. It also organized the material in simpler, more easily comprehensible forms. It was these, primarily, that influenced later writers like Charles Butler (1634), Richard Hodges (1644) and Charles Cooper (1687).

The third chapter shows how Coote followed the tradition of Mulcaster, Clement and Kempe in his assumptions about language. The chapter further shows how distinctive spellings and comments about pronunciation support a recent phonemic analysis of Early Modern English, proceeding from this to analyses of a very few morphophonemic and morphemic matters. Attention is next given to Coote's spelling practice in the corpus of material in terms of the phonemic system that has been assumed for Early Modern English. This description reveals Coote's confusion of spellings with "sounds" (phonemes), and illustrates how his attempt to describe usage clashes with his inclination as a schoolmaster to prescribe and to proscribe. At the conclusion of the chapter Coote's "Table" or dictionary of "hard" and common words and his etymological assumptions are shown to support and in some cases to extend materials in the OED.

In all these matters Coote appears solidly traditional. In his assumptions about language and usage, we see that in some ways he is slightly more conservative than his predecessor, Mulcaster. His material is useful in supporting a phonemic analysis of standard London speech while revealing a number of incidences of the phonemes in words of dialects other than that of London. His morphophonemics and morphemics are also standard. His spelling and vocabulary are useful for the understanding of Elizabethan standard English.

134. HAY, Carla Humphrey (Ph. D.). "Crusading Schoolmaster:

Born in Scotland in 1714, the dissenting schoolmaster, James Burgh, was the son of a minister in the Church of Scotland and the first cousin of the historian William Robertson. As a young man Burgh came to London in search of a livelihood. He eventually established an academy in the London suburb of Newington Green, a pleasant community of merchants and tradesmen and known as a stronghold of dissent. His neighbors included the eminent Arian divine, Richard Price, whose influence on Burgh is certain, though difficult to determine precisely.

Likewise, Burgh's opinions were undoubtedly affected by his association with the Honest Whigs, a political club imbued with Commonwealthman traditions, and by his friendship with Benjamin Franklin, a fellow club member. In addition, as a dissenter Burgh shared that group's interest in public and private morality, education and contemporary politics.

It was Burgh's righteous distress at widespread public immorality and corruption that launched his literary career in 1746 with the publication of Britain's Romancer. Thereafter, though regarding writing as a "bye-business" to be indulged in his spare time from teaching, Burgh published a variety of pamphlets, letters, and full-length studies on practically all aspects of eighteenth century life. In his unpolished, stream-of-consciousness style, he popularized the viewpoint of a progressivist, often radical, minority whose opinions gradually modified English attitudes and institutions.

Burgh's writings are valuable indices of the interests and opinions of large segments of Anglo-American society. His diatribes against public and private corruption and immorality and his "thoughts on education" received the critical and popular approval of his contemporaries. His treatise on elocution, The Art of Speaking, was especially influential and established Burgh as one of the foremost proponents of the elocution movement in England.

More controversial were Burgh's political theories. The machinations of George III's first decade as king, in particular the Wilkes affair and the colonial crisis, convinced Burgh that political corruption
threatened public morality and popular liberty. He was certain that the constitutional balance was imperiled by aristocratic influence over the House of Commons. To restore the independence of the Commons and thus safeguard the constitution and the liberties of the people, he advocated annual parliaments with rotating membership; the removal of placemen and pensioners from the House of Commons; and adequate parliamentary representation based on franchise reform, the secret ballot, and proportional representation.

Parliament's failure to implement these reforms voluntarily prompted Burgh, a lifelong enthusiast of association, to urge the establishment of a national association to pressure Parliament to reform itself. He was unduly optimistic about the possible success of such an organization and avoided meaningful discussion of the alternatives should association fail. Though a subscriber to Locke's contract theory, Burgh recommended recourse to revolution as a last resort and then only if the majority of the people supported it.

Burgh's controversial political ideas had their greatest impact in the colonies. The subscribers to his Political Disquisitions included the foremost men in America. His heavily documented picture of British corruption confirmed the colonial conception of a degenerate mother country dominated by avaricious aristocrats whose quest for power and enrichment threatened the liberties of Englishmen on both sides of the Atlantic. In the aftermath of revolution Burgh's ideas on such subjects as political parties, standing armies, and the nature of power continued to influence Americans. The scope of Burgh's writings enabled Federalists and Antifederalists to cite Burgh in defense of their conflicting positions.

In England Burgh's political opinions reflected and had their greatest impact on a minority that included John Cartwright, John Jebb, Richard Price, and the Society for Constitutional Information. In particular these men were influenced by Burgh's call for a GRAND ASSOCIATION. Though essentially a propagandist for ideas long familiar in Commonwealthman circles, Burgh enjoys special distinction as one of the most important forefathers of the political association movement of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

As a pioneer in the field of elocution, as an early advocate of political association, as a popularizer of moralistic, educational and political ideas current among educated contemporaries, James Burgh exercised untold influence over his age. His death August 26, 1775, terminated a productive career of considerable historical importance.
The importance of a teacher grows out of his personality and his personal contact with his students. Roger Ascham was one of the best teachers of the mid-sixteenth century, and, however important a "monument" of English prose his Toxophilus may be, however important a "source-book" of German history his Report and Dis-course, and however important a "stimulus" to morality and learning his Scholemaster, the personality that pervades all three is yet more important. His English letters combine all the four above-mentioned, and add one more, which, in a teacher, is all important, for they are the record of his personal contacts.

John Wilson probably is best known to those few scholars who are aware of his name through the almost cruel mention he received in Burney’s writings. Burney’s remark that “Dr. Wilson, indeed, seems to have set words to music more clumsily than any composer of equal rank in the profession” provoked the present writer to attempt to disprove the learned historian’s opinion. The study has demonstrated that Burney’s judgment was born of ignorance and was unjustified.

Throughout his long career as a composer, teacher and per-former—both as lutenist and singer—Wilson was in the service of the court of the Stuart kings and was held in highest esteem by his contemporaries, who, in the words of Anthony Wood, considered him to be “the most curious judge of musick that ever was.” Wilson remained in favor with Cromwell during the period of the Common-wealth, during which time he held a post as Doctor and Professor of
Hubert Platt Henderson

Music at Oxford.

Little is known of his early life, but sufficient evidence has been gathered to gainsay the theory promulgated by Rimbault that Wilson was an associate of Shakespeare.

This study has endeavored to collect and transcribe Wilson's entire musical output, present a style-critical analysis of the music, and edit a representative sample of his work. A Source Index has been included which contains more than 300 incipits, with complete references to the manuscript and printed sources from which the music was obtained.

The music consists primarily of solo songs with continuo, many of which Wilson arranged also for two and three voices with continuo. Probably most interesting are the solo songs with lute accompaniment, for these offer opportunities to study his harmonic style and seem to represent his best efforts as a composer. Included in his music is a collection written in honor of Charles I, during the King's exile, setting twenty-seven poems adapted by Thomas Stanley from the Biblical psalms of David. Dialogues, duets, trios, rounds and two motets complete his vocal production. Noteworthy is the fact that his collection, *Cheerfull Ayres or Ballads*, 1660 [1659]), was the first music ever printed at Oxford.

The writer has discussed Wilson's songs by dividing them into tuneful airs—based on dance rhythms—and declamatory airs—more closely allied, rhythmically, with the text than are the tuneful airs. It has been shown that Wilson's music relies heavily on dance rhythms, irrespective of this division, though there are certain melodic and rhythmic characteristics unique to each type of air. Wilson is keenly sensitive to the demands of the texts and many of his melodies are conspicuous by long spans and copious chromatic inflections.

Wilson seems to have had an urge to experiment harmonically in some of his songs, but his over-all harmonic treatment is conventional and conservative. His music is neither completely tonal nor modal, conforming to the general inclination of mid-seventeenth century English music: a gradual but definite progression toward complete tonality.

One primary reason for Wilson's relative obscurity throughout the past 300 years is the fact that almost all of his music is conceived on abbreviated architectural designs. Many of his songs suffer from a too methodical squareness of phrase and gain breadth only through an additive process of joining phrases and periods which often have
possibly Wilson's most important contribution can be seen in his use of the lute as a true accompaniment instrument, foreshadowing the later similar use of the keyboard instruments and breaking away from the traditional employment of the lute—in lute songs—as an equal partner of the voice.


Three authors have explored the development of mathematical economics. William Stanley Jevons developed a bibliography of mathematical economics books, articles, and pamphlets in his The Theory of Political Economy in 1871. Irving Fisher revised and updated Jevons' list in his doctoral dissertation, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices, published in 1892. Finally, Ross M. Robertson reviewed the early development of mathematical economics in his 1949 article, "Mathematical Economics before Cournot," which appeared in the Journal of Political Economy. Each of the writers reached the conclusion that the early mathematical economists worked in isolation and did not contribute to a current of thought. Further investigation into this topic refutes this conclusion with respect to the British mathematical economists who wrote between 1822 and 1850. William Whewell drew on the efforts of two authors, Edward Rogers and Colonel T. Perronet Thompson, whose works appeared prior to the publication of Whewell's first article. The authors who wrote after Whewell's first and second articles appeared, John Edward Tozer, Sir John William Lubbock, and Dionysius Lardner, were influenced by Whewell's work. The mathematical economics works of these six authors are reviewed and the current of thought which flowed between them is analyzed.

Besides their use of mathematical techniques, the six authors employed the inductive approach to economic analysis. Rogers, Thompson, Whewell, and Tozer used the mathematical, inductive approach to attack the deductive conclusions reached by the Ricar-
Lubbock and Lardner, as well as Thompson, employed the mathematical, inductive approach to develop new explanations of certain economic phenomena. Another factor which drew these authors together was the fact that all were connected with Cambridge at one time in their careers.

Finally, the influence exercised by these authors on other economists is examined. Strong cases of influence are found in the cases of Whewell and John Stuart Mill, Whewell and Alfred Marshall, Whewell and George Pryme, Lubbock and William Stanley Jevons, and Lardner and Jevons. A number of interesting circumstantial cases are explored between Whewell and the Italian mathematical economists, Lubbock and Irving Fisher, Lardner and A. A. Cournot, and Tozer and Cournot.


John Henry Newman proposed a theory of development in his Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine published in 1845. The theory was offered as an explanation for Newman's conversion to the Roman Catholic Church. Its contemporary readers and reviewers were intensely interested to know the sources from which he had drawn the theory and the process by which he had come to hold it. His critics insisted that it was ultimately derived from German liberal Protestant thought. Although Newman denied the dependence of his theory on any continental sources, his own accounts of the theory do not completely illuminate its genesis and evolution.

Newman claimed that his change of religion, in which the theory's formation was involved, was caused by the evolution of ideas which he encountered in his Oxford milieu. This claim is borne out by the study of his intellectual history. Early in his theological formation...
Lawrence Joseph Henry

at Oxford he was impressed by the idea of Revelation as a developing historical process. His reading of contemporary Romantic historians reinforced the idea of history, secular and sacred, as a process of organic development. Also in his early theological studies, Newman met with and was influenced by liberal, progressive theories of the development of Christian doctrine, but he later rejected such theories as unorthodox. His subsequent formulations of his ideas of development generally were deliberately anti-liberal.

Newman's rejection of liberalism was in part caused by his coming under the conservative influence of Richard Hurrell Froude and John Keble. Keble's ethical doctrine employed a notion of development to explain the role of tradition in society. This notion of ethical development was later to enter as an element in Newman's formulation of his theory of development. From Froude, Newman learned a more dynamic conception of Christianity and especially an attitude more favorable to Rome. At the outset of the Tractarian Movement in 1833, Newman and Froude, two of its leaders, used the term "development" as a key to their plan of reform for the Church of England.

The term "development," and the various and sometimes conflicting notions which it represented, became more and more prominent in the controversies which raged in Tractarian Oxford. The term finally became the focus of the competing Anglican ecclesiologies which underlay the various positions in the Oxford controversy. Newman's Essay culminated the debate.

Since Newman's name was linked with the term "development" in that debate and especially after the publication of the Essay, a study of its reception reveals Newman's reputation at the most critical point of his career. His Anglican critics labeled the theory as rationalistic and infidel and took it as a reflection of the skepticism of Newman's mind. Some saw his conversion as an emotional escape from the tendencies of his own theory. Practically all found a profound flaw in his intellectual, moral, and emotional character.

The literature of the Recusant exiles in the Low Countries is still a comparatively unexplored field. Although one work has repeatedly been claimed as a spiritual classic, little critical attention has been paid to either its author or its message, and thus one of the deepest currents of spirituality among Englishmen during the Reformation has somehow been overlooked. This study, therefore, is an investigation of the life and teaching of Augustine Baker, as seen in Sancta Sophia, a posthumous compilation of over forty of his treatises, the Commentary on the Cloud of Unknowing, the Confessions, the Life of Dame Gertrude More, and his partial autobiography.

Using this autobiography, the three extant seventeenth century biographies, and scattered sections in Baker's published works, I have attempted an historically accurate survey of his life. His research and antiquarian studies undertaken in England admitted him to the circle of Cotton, Selden, and Camden and gained him the reputation of a distinguished scholar. However, by 1624, Baker turned his full attention to the problems and pursuit of a life of prayer with the result that his religious writings, dating from this period, are valuable evidence both in the history of religious thought and the development of the English mystical tradition.

A study of the spiritual temper of the day showed Baker's relation to two trends stemming from the reforms initiated by Gerard Groote and the Brethren of the Common Life, trends which in sixteenth century England took the form of a growing psychological awareness of the act of prayer and of a deep concern for the restriction of the life of the spirit by formalism. As spiritual director to the English Benedictine nuns at Cambrai, Baker saw the contemporary need for detailed, precise teaching in the realm of contemplative prayer. More originally, he accepted woman's nature as an asset for the affective prayer of the will, and he saw the fulfillment of her potential for a true interior life in terms of solid teaching and informed independence.

Finally, a study of Baker's doctrine of liberty showed him a contemplative spirit who progressively withdrew from the outer, national struggle for religious freedom, yet who was deeply committed to the most profound aspects of that struggle. Baker taught interior liberty as the fundamental condition for the true encounter of the soul with God, for the fruitful action of both asceticism and prayer, which lead the soul to ever widening levels of freedom, and finally for the contemplative moment when the soul sees and loves nothing but God. In an age marked by the distortions of both dogmatists and enthusiast...
asts, Baker's teachings on the life of the spirit are marked by the breadth of vision of the trained scholar, the practical clarity of the experienced teacher, and the daring independence of a man of God.


This dissertation describes one aspect of the history of the relation between science and religion in Great Britain and the United States. It focuses on the problem of miracles, which it takes to lie near the center of the network of intertwined interpretations of the order of nature and divine activity. Drawing from published writings of scientists, theologians, philosophers, anthropologists, and other intellectuals, it considers this central theme in the light of both the complex synthesis of order and miracle in the history of Christian thought and the development of professional self-understanding in the sciences and in theology. Various formulations of the problem given in the former tradition have persisted into the twentieth century, while the latter development in academic disciplines has aggravated the tension resulting from attempts to maintain both autonomous areas of experience and the unity of truth.

The dissertation is divided into two parts. Part I analyzes the thought of Baden Powell (1796-1860), Savilian Professor of Geometry in the University of Oxford and Anglican clergyman in the Broad Church party, and the controversies that his writing stimulated. After a brief biographical section, Chapter One outlines Powell's view of both the history of religion and science and contemporary German scholarship on the problem of miracles. His thought on the historical nature of truth, on the uniformity of nature and the unity of science, on the mathematical order of the world and its use as the basis for natural theology, and on miracles is presented in Chapter Two. Powell's discussion of these problems, especially in Essays and Reviews (1860), provoked an intense and extended defense of miracles.
which Chapter Three analyzes. The key to their apologetic was the analogy between free human action and divine activity, an analogy that has continued to appear throughout the century.

The second part first recounts, in Chapter Four, the debates in the periodical press in the last third of the nineteenth century over possibility and credibility of miracles, and such related issues as the origin of force and evidence for prayer. The dissertation further argues that the evolution controversy should be seen in the context of these debates, so Chapter Five views both the question of reconciling evolution and divine activity and the need for specific interventions in order to explain the origin of life and the first human. Discussions about miracles did not deal only with intellectual abstractions, however. Chapter Six presents a pattern for contemporary allegedly miraculous phenomena. They were marked by ambiguity, surprise, secrecy, geographical specificity, a liturgical context, and an authority taken more for granted by the laity than by the clergy. Chapter Seven describes medical and Catholic interpretations of these phenomena, the disputes and agreements between them, and the changes in each during the fifty years around the turn of the century.

The question of miracles also arose in late nineteenth and early twentieth century discussions about the nature and history of mankind; specifically, as Chapter Eight relates, in such topics as historicism, the uniformity of human nature, spiritualism, the possibility of freedom, and a personally oriented cosmos. Chapter Nine examines solutions to the problem of miracle and nature in Protestant theology in the first half of the twentieth century. It points out the tension between the influence of German theologians, with their emphases on the autonomy of religion and theology, and the English-speaking theologians' continuing concern for the "holy alliance" between science and theology. Chapter Ten outlines the personal positions of twentieth century scientists on the relation of science and religion, on miracles, and on world harmony—positions which sometimes corresponded to themes in their scientific work. The final chapter picks up a sub-theme which runs throughout the dissertation, namely that both miracles and order have been viewed using the categories of myth and symbol. This chapter relates the term secularization to three characteristics of these ambiguous, changing symbolisms: interiorization, authority, and mystery. For, finally, both order and miracles are "mysteries" (Marcel) in which we historians, as well as our subjects, are involved.
Historically, the exhilarating prospects of social melioration and individual betterment for humankind have proven among the most commanding and captivating notions held by Western man. No period appears more generally optimistic about man's fate than the eighteenth century and few thinkers of that time were as confident of progress as the English philosopher-scientist-theologian Joseph Priestley (1733-1804). The political, economic, scientific, and social events of his age appeared to vindicate the expectations of change and improvement held by the liberal avant-garde of the preceding two centuries. Thus the nature and currency of progressive visions can provide a meaningful index of the rising bourgeois liberal ideology. It has been the purpose of this investigation to present Priestley as such a bourgeois liberal and to explicate his liberalism—theologically, politically, educationally, economically, and philosophically—through his ideas of progress, religious and secular. This work is akin to intellectual biography, thematic and topical in arrangement, but directed toward ideological trends which encompass Priestley and enable us to achieve a largely new understanding of his ideas and their context.

Priestley historiography has traditionally focused on the merits and demerits of his scientific work, with little regard for the scientism which influenced his entire "system" or the legitimacy of the scientific image of progress. Priestley's Socinianism is often treated in isolation or only as part of the freedom of conscience issue. Similarly, his millenarianism has commonly been seen as an aberration. Priestley's political ideas are usually considered only on a formal level of political abstraction and carelessly tagged as democratic or radical. His views on education, commerce, history and especially Hartleian psychology frequently appear to bear no relation to the whole, except as further examples of erudition or liberality. Using the content of his visions of progress as a guide through over 100 of Priestley's works and several hundred of his letters and sermons, a more synthetic and
critical portrait of his liberal ideology is constructed. It is not argued
that Priestley was a rigorous and consistent thinker in all respects,
guilefully class conscious, or wholly typical of his age or peers; only
that his various concerns bear important relation to one another, carry
the sociological imprint of certain interests, and plainly reveal
important—and frequently disturbing—qualities in the coalescent
liberal tradition.

The Introduction provides an evaluation of liberalism and the
multiform nature of Progress. Chapter I is a rounded treatment of
Priestley's life, character and major concerns. The doctrines of mate-
rrialism and necessity and the mechanistic quality of Priestley's thought
are presented in Chapter II. Chapters III and IV discuss individualism
and perfectibilism in relation to associative psychology and Priestley's
educational ideas. Chapters V and VI deal with Priestley's concepts of
an uncorrupted and rational religion and his fervent chiliasm, another
and no less "reasonable" form of progressivism. The final four chapters
present Priestley's expectations for science, government, commerce
and history itself in light of liberal and progressive theories. Several
problematic qualities emerge, among them a mechanical view of man
and society, a political formula that depended heavily on social
differentials, property, conformism, and utility, a pervasive scientism
and nominalism, and an overall attachment to order, organization and
the practical and tangible which tended to undermine and limit
Priestley's notions of religion, education, individual autonomy, his-
tory, and even Reason itself.

Priestley is a major transitional figure, appearing on the scene
as natural law and the standard of Reason were ebbing and as the age
of revolution began, inheriting much of the puritan, capitalist, mecha-
nomorphic and empirical ideas of the past and helping to initiate the
utilitarian, organizational, positivistic and bourgeois ethos of the next
century.

142. HOFFMAN, C. Fenno, Jr. (Ph. D.). "Roger Ascham and Humanist
Education in Sixteenth Century England." University of Penn-
XUM Order No. 5600.
Humanist education, the subject of this dissertation, was fostered in England by Erasmus and developed during the sixteenth century by teachers and writers such as Vives, Colet, Lyly, Mulcaster, Lawrence Humfrey, and Sir Humphrey Gilbert. Roger Ascham is seen as a central figure in developing the humanist tradition, especially as it was applied to secondary school education. Other sixteenth and seventeenth century educators considered, besides Ascham and the others named above, include Cleland, Brinsley, Peacham, Hoole and Milton, in England, and continental writers including Castiglione, Rabelais, Montaigne, and Comenius.

From his arrival at St. John's College, Cambridge, in 1530, until his death in 1568 Ascham was preoccupied with the study of Latin and Greek literature. Forming his tastes at St. John's largely under the influence of John Cheke, he developed a passion for scholarship which expressed itself in study, in teaching, and in writing about his work. Ascham's own interests coincided with the exclusively literary subject matter of humanist education, as Erasmus, Colet, and Lyly had formulated it. As a teacher, Ascham insisted on the need for translation to supplement the study of grammatical rules. The brutality practiced in many schools led Ascham to defend translation on grounds of humaneness, as well as sound scholarship. As Queen Elizabeth's tutor, Ascham was in a position to advocate the same course of study for women as for men.

Primarily a private tutor, Ascham encouraged scholarship among the gentry in order to make them worthy of their responsibilities. He had the advantage of being a lover of outdoor sports, particularly archery, and he saw that the tradition of arms rather than studies among the gentry was one that must be modified and not altered overnight. He defended archery as valuable exercise in itself, as relaxation from study, and as a great English tradition.

As a humanist, Ascham might have shared in the humanist contribution to science, that is in supplying fresh translations of Greek scientific works, as Linacre had translated Galen. However, he distrusted science, believing apparently that it tended to deform the characters of those who devoted themselves to it. Humanist education, as Ascham saw it, was uniquely able to build good moral character.

Sound morality (based on Greek and Christian doctrines) and a proper literary style were Ascham's goals as an educator, and the goals of most humanists. Extreme humanists had concentrated on
style alone, giving rise to a controversy over "imitation." Following Erasmus, Ascham used imitation (a refinement of translation) as a teaching device because he believed that the greatest classical writers had not been equalled and that a close study of the best stylists would produce the desired results for the scholar in literary style and in good character. The inherent conservatism of humanist educational thought must be seen in the light of Renaissance achievements in literature, but it led inevitably to attack and, in some instances, to reform. The humanist stamp, nevertheless, remained unmistakably on English secondary education, at least until the last half of the nineteenth century.

Chapter headings in this dissertation are as follows:

I. Humanism and Education, an Introduction
II. The Grammar School
III. The Education of Women
IV. The Education of the Gentry
V. Sport: The Book and the Bow
VI. Science in Education
VII. Protestantism and Philosophy
VIII. The Goal of Literary Style.


Within the study of argument, the problem of presumption is deceptively simple: to what, specifically, does "presumption" refer? Four scholars in modern and contemporary rhetoric have devised formal definitions of "presumption"—Richard Whately, Stephen Toulmin, Charles Willard, and Thomas Goodnight. Many other scholars, without the benefit of formal definitions, have declared particular theoretical "locations" where the meaning of "presumption" may be found, such as in a probability, in a tension with the concept "burden
of proof," or in audiences. Arguably, there are multiple working hypotheses to specify the meaning of the term "presumption," and these meanings will vary depending upon the context for research in argument. However, I believe theories of presumption will lead researchers in a hapless direction unless they are expected to include in their inquiry:

(a) What surprising observations are to be explained;
(b) To what arena of argument these observations are pertinent;
(c) What epistemology is implicitly endorsed by the perspective on presumption.

And if there be a fitting way to develop a theory of presumption, it must be one that meets the above three expectations and, furthermore, is fundamentally based upon a theory of language.

Adapting Charles Peirce's theory of presumption, and the philosophy of language presupposed by it, I define "presumption" in his sense for the purpose of studying arguments in a scientific field. In developing a complete theory of presumption from Peirce's works, and applying this to scientific arguments, I intend to provide a new answer to the question posed by Stephen Toulmin: How are rational arguments themselves part of a rational, changing process?

Applying my theory of presumption to the study of Charles Darwin's arguments, in which he discovered the revolutionary hypothesis of the origin of species, at least two new findings are brought about. First, one can see the significance of presumption, and rhetorical argument generally, to an explanation of Darwin's logic of discovery in the revolution in biology. From the results of such an explanation, one can further conclude that the study of rhetorical argument makes an essential contribution to the understanding of advances in scientific knowledge.

Cardinal Newman’s views on the nature and function of literature are considered in the present dissertation against a background of some of his religious opinions. The essential unity of his religious opinions is illustrated in terms of his lifelong insistence on the principle of dogma, on holiness, and on a sacramental view of the universe. Newman held that any proper religion must be dogmatic. The dogmas of Christianity reveal as much of the truth as men are able to comprehend and at the same time as much of the truth as human language is able to express. Dogma for Newman always implied action, living a holy life. All actions must be judged according to absolute Christian standards. Newman also held that the dogmas of Christianity are closely related to a sacramental view of the universe, the view that material phenomena are both types and instruments of unseen spiritual realities. Although dogmas are types and instruments of spiritual truth, they are necessarily only shadows of that truth because they are expressed in the feeble language of human beings. In the same way, many parts of the Bible are only shadows of the spiritual truth they attempt to convey. This strictly religious sacramentalism is so closely related to Newman’s views on literature that almost all of his views may be included in a sacramental theory of literature which he held throughout his life.

According to Newman’s essay on "Poetry, with Reference To Aristotle’s Poetics" (1829), the mind of the true poet is one filled with eternal forms of beauty and perfection. It is a mind which sees sacramentally, a mind which is especially sensitive to the shadows of divine realities in the material universe. The true poet must approximate to a right moral center if he is to perceive things sacramentally, that is, poetically. Newman always held that there is a clear distinction between the perception of poetical beauty and the expression of it. Every proper Christian is a poet in the sense that he sees sacramentally although he may not have the slightest talent for composition. But the literary genius described by Newman in The Idea of a University is the master of the two-fold Logos, the thought and the word. In the genius the poetical talent, or the mind sensitive to feelings, thoughts and visions, is joined to the talent for composition. Nevertheless, even the greatest genius is seldom if ever able to put into words the whole picture of his vision. Literature or poetry as written is essentially sacramental in that it is only a shadow of the vision in the writer’s mind or imagination.

Insofar as literature or poetry tends to look below the surface
things and to draw men's minds away from the material to the spiritual world, it tends to perform a proper religious function. But Newman felt that there was always the danger for both the author and the reader of letting the literary exercise the imagination and affections take the place of action. If holy actions are the proper goal in life, as Newman of course insisted they are, literature must be judged in terms of its effect on the reader. Mere realism in literature can easily result in a morbid concern with the things of this world. Poetry or, more generally, fiction must be poetically just if it is to satisfy the natural yearnings of the reader for an ideal truth which this world does not give. Newman's theory of literature does not then include tragedy or pure realism. The best literature must be idealistic and sacramental.


The work of Bernard Mandeville constitutes an analysis and defense of the commercial society which emerged in England following the Restoration of 1660. The social thought of this period was dominated by the categories of virtue and corruption, and Mandeville, more than any of his contemporaries, sought to understand and justify the commercial forces that others only saw as corrupting. He developed a coherent theory of society's development and operation based entirely on the self-interested actions of men.

Mandeville's thought was first developed in opposition to the movement for the reformation of manners which sought to enforce the laws against moral offences. He continued to oppose the reform movement when it shifted to setting up charity schools for the education of the children of the poor. When the enthusiasm behind the reform movement waned, Mandeville continued to develop his thought against the ideas of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. The ideas of both the reformers and Shaftesbury, Mandeville believed, were incompatible
with a prosperous and powerful England.

To debunk the arguments for public-spiritedness, Mandeville relied upon the traditions of Jansenism, scepticism, and mercantilism—all of which placed a strong emphasis on self-interest. La Rochefoucauld and La Fontaine, both influenced by Jansenism, provided him with a method of psychological investigation that uncovered the operation of self-love in all human actions. The sceptic Pierre Bayle not only stressed the importance of egoism, but also provided Mandeville with an empiricist theory of knowledge, moral relativism, and a justification for luxury. And from mercantilism he received not only specific doctrines about the poor, the balance of trade, and luxury, but, more basically, a model of society based on the spending of the wealthy and the labor of the poor, all held together by the power of the state.

Mandeville made his most important contributions in trying to understand how self-interested men live together. He brought together the ideas of self-interest, an empiricist theory of knowledge, the division of labor, and the long history of mankind's development to explain the operation and material progress of a commercial society. He applied these ideas to the state to explain how direction could be provided to such a society. At the same time, he defended merchants who are unapologetically self-interested and attacked throughout his writings aristocrats whose pretensions to honor he traced to pride and self-liking.

However, Mandeville never put forward a moral justification for commercial society. Because his defense was carried out in an age which still believed in the duty of men to consider and act upon the public good, he was not able to show the moral praiseworthiness of self-interest. Instead, he was content to rest his case for commercial society on its material benefits and his belief that any alternative was impossible. The incorporation of self-love, and with it commercial society, into the moral world through utilitarianism had to await those who followed Mandeville—Hutcheson, Hume, and Smith—who could build, indeed were forced to build, on what Mandeville had written.

Chapter One finds the immediate impetus to Mandeville's work in the Societies for the Reformation of Manners and documents his opposition to these societies. Chapter Two finds the origins of some of Mandeville's ideas in the traditions of seventeenth century French moral thought. Chapter Three focuses on his own alternative view of society as it was developed against the work of the Third Earl
Thomas Allan Horne

of Shaftesbury. Chapter Four provides the mercantilist context of his thought and presents his views on economics and his prescription for national wealth. Chapter Five considers the reaction of his contemporaries, both in the more obscure pamphlet literature and in the work of more substantial critics such as Hutcheson and Hume, and the process by which the antagonism in Mandeville's thought between virtue and commerce is overcome by these writers.


The career of Anthony Benezet (1713-1784), humanitarian leader, social critic, and educator of the revolutionary period, had roots in his French Huguenot background and English education. In 1731, Benezet emigrated from London to Philadelphia, where he worked for several years in an import-export business with his father and brothers. But he dropped his commercial pursuits and began teaching school, a vocation he found more satisfying. By 1743 he had taken the position of English School Master at the Quaker sponsored "Publick School" of Philadelphia, later known as the William Penn Charter School. For the next four decades, Benezet led the school through its greatest period of development. He was responsible for establishing the first permanent secondary level school for girls in the colonies, as well as the first full time school for black students, during his tenure. In addition he wrote school books, introduced numerous innovative teaching methods, modernized curricula, and ruled out harsh disciplinary measures in his classrooms, as part of a long campaign to humanize education and make it serve more effectively the needs of growing children and a changing society.

Benezet became the leading humanitarian reformer and social critic of late eighteenth century America, as well. In response to real needs created by the Seven Years' War and the Revolution, he tested his theories and bourgeois ideals in the laboratory of daily life. His utopian vision of community rested on values drawn eclectically from
many sources in Western civilization. These sources included his radical Protestant heritage, his rising middle-class economic background, the Whig political tradition, and contemporary Enlightenment thought. The result was a social vision of essentially traditional patterns in which every person contributed voluntarily and happily to the good of the whole community. On the basis of the Christian brotherhood ideal and his Quaker principle of peace in the family of mankind, Benezet pressed for the transformation of certain social institutions in order to preserve all that he saw as valuable from the past.

His goal was never to overturn the established social structure, but to change it drastically by gradual and peaceful methods. This called for a revolution of sentiments, in which rational people would become convinced of the need to correct various evils that threatened their collective happiness. Benezet wrote prolifically on the subjects of slavery, war, ignorance, and poverty, attacking what he believed to be the causes of these social cancers. Invariably, as he analyzed the problems, he concluded that they had roots in a spreading economic greed. He condemned the selfish acquisitiveness that threatened to overwhelm sociability and lead to inexcusable oppression of less aggressive groups—the children, black people, and poverty-ridden immigrants who comprised a growing segment of the city’s population. Failure to correct these evils, he warned, meant ever worse chaos and social disorder.

Benezet’s most significant campaign was that directed against slavery and the slave trade. His sustained attack on the institution was founded on an unequivocal assertion of the full intellectual and moral equality of the races. It was a concept he first proved to his own satisfaction in his teaching of black students, beginning about 1750, and one that became the cornerstone of his antislavery campaign. From 1759 onward, Benezet’s published research in African history, his exposés of the inhumanity of slavery, his synthesis of Christian and Enlightenment arguments, and his sustained political campaign against the institution, established his leadership in a growing libertarian movement in the colonies.

In 1766, amid repercussions from the Stamp Act, Benezet published his widely reprinted Caution and Warning to Great Britain and Her Colonies. The book attacked English hypocrisy for condoning the slave trade while loudly proclaiming “British ideas of liberty.” The American antislavery crusade, which peaked in 1774,
became one important catalyst for intercolonial cooperation and resistance to Great Britain, a powerful popular movement which patriot leaders found useful in their drive for independence. During and after the Revolution, however, antislavery sentiment became politically embarrassing—a divisive force in a nation struggling for survival. But in England and France, beginning in the mid-1780's, Benezet's books in the hands of his antislavery converts and colleagues, served as the basis for a sustained campaign to outlaw the slave trade and the institution of slavery throughout the world.


This dissertation treats moral philosophy as taught at Harvard in the early nineteenth century. "Moral philosophy," as the subject was then understood, encompassed not only ethics, but also epistemology and aesthetics, as well as most of what we call the social sciences: psychology, sociology, political science, and economics. Also typically conjoined to the study of moral philosophy was "natural theology," or the study of religion, independent of Christian revelation. Thus broadly defined, moral philosophy occupied an important place in the curriculum of the typical antebellum American college.

The terminal dates of this study, 1805 and 1861, seem to approximate the duration of the sway classic Unitarianism enjoyed at Harvard... "In 1805... Unitarianism gained undisputed control of the University from the Old Calvinists by securing the election of Henry Ware the elder as Hollis Professor of Divinity, and the Civil War seemed to mark the alteration and decay of the old Unitarian system of thought. But, for the relatively long period between these dates, a firm consensus was maintained at Harvard on questions of fundamental importance, and this consensus is best studied as the moral philosophers organized it.
In the period treated, four men occupied the chair of moral philosophy at Harvard: Levi Frisbie, Levi Hedge, James Walker, and Francis Bowen. The dissertation discusses their ideas, and those of four other Harvard professors whose work overlapped into the broad area of moral philosophy: Andrews Norton, Edward Tyrell Channing, Henry Ware, Sr., and Henry Ware, Jr. To help show how the precepts of Harvard moral philosophy operated outside the classroom, four Unitarian ministers, all trained at Harvard, have also been included: John Emery Abbott, Joseph Stevens Buckminster, Joseph Tuckerman, and Samuel Gilman.

The thesis presents Harvard Unitarian moral philosophy as an integrated system of thought, treating it topic by topic. Some of the chapters, in consequence, deal with relatively technical points of philosophic theory (the nature and meaning of ethical judgments, the possibility of synthetic a priori statements, and the like), as these were taught by antebellum Harvard philosophers. The Harvard moralists were greatly influenced by certain British thinkers, including Thomas Reid, Joseph Butler, William Paley, and Richard Price, so considerable attention is devoted to tracing these lines of influence. Among the themes treated are religious rationalism, moral absolutism, perfectionism, and sentimentalism. The process known to Harvard Unitarians as "the cultivation of a Christian character," by which they sought to find regeneration through an alternative to the Puritan conversion experience, is also examined. The later chapters attempt to show the implications moral philosophy had for Unitarian preaching, literary criticism, and philanthropy. In this connection, there is some discussion of the extent and quality of Unitarian participation in the "Second Great Awakening" of American Protestantism.

Some attempt is made to evaluate, as well as to describe, Harvard Unitarian thought; certain fundamental ambiguities in it are pointed out, e.g., progressivism versus conservatism, and complacency versus anxiety. The writer's contention is that Harvard moral philosophy offers an instructive example of the accommodation of Enlightenment ideas to traditional Christian values. The Harvard Unitarians may be taken as representatives of a world-wide movement of Christian humanism, of which the English Latitudinarians and Scottish Moderate Presbyterians formed a part. Harvard moral philosophy is also interesting as an early and coherent statement of beliefs which (in a popularized form) came to characterize the outlook of many nineteenth-century Americans. Ideas expounded by Harvard
Unitarian moralists seem especially important in the development of modernist Protestantism, genteel literature, and middle class reform.


Recent treatments of sociobiology have emphasized its divergence from traditional social science. However, there are many continuities and similarities between contemporary sociobiological thinking and the ideas of the classical sociological theorists. The convergences between sociobiology and early sociological thought are examined, with the double purpose of:

1. Reassessing the work of the early sociologists, and
2. Searching for leading ideas that may prove useful to present-day sociologists in evaluating and using sociobiology.

The first chapter of the dissertation gives an overview and statement of purpose. The second defines sociobiology, giving particular attention to the logic of inference from animal to human behavior. The major elements of its "general orientation" or "paradigm" are identified in the third chapter, and are compared with the treatment of corresponding elements by several early sociologists, notably Comte, Spencer, Small, Sumner, Ward, and Giddings. The fourth chapter suggests some of the sources of interest in sociobiology among later sociologists and reflects on elements of the general orientation, especially the relation between general social analysis and human social analysis. The fifth focuses on two sets of supposed polarities in sociology; that is, the relation between the individual and the group, and between learning and instinct. Their reconciliation within the evolutionary paradigm is discussed, with special reference to the contributions of Spencer and Mead. The sixth chapter gives a
brief account of Pareto's contribution to this line of thought, along with a summary of this taxonomy in relation to other ideas about human nature from sociology, ethology, comparative psychology, and sociobiology. The seventh and final chapter reviews and assesses some of the main ideas under consideration, in particular, the concept of "human nature" and its relation to social theory and social reform.


The chief objective of this dissertation is to expose the methodology operative in Whitehead's writings, beginning with the early mathematical treatises and extending through the final metaphysical works. A single methodology is found to be functional in these writings. Accordingly, a second objective presents itself: to use this single methodology as an engine for the unification of Whitehead's writings.

Whitehead's methodology is herein termed the "methodology of modular constructionism," where "modular" designates the use of cognitive models. The aim of this methodology is to construct cognitive models—systems of interrelated concepts—for the purpose of interconnecting assemblages of data which are acknowledged as given for interpretation. The relationship of the model to the data is analogous to the relationship between a mathematical equation and the group of physical quantities which the equation ranges over. When the data are interpreted as instances of the systematic concepts, they become illuminated and interconnected in the same way that physical quantities become interconnected when they are interpreted as values for the variables in the equation.

Whitehead's methodology is seen as deriving from two chief influences: James Clerk Maxwell and Immanuel Kant. Maxwell used the methodology of constructionism in physics, and it is thought that Whitehead's studies in applied mathematics led him to adopt this methodology for his own use in mathematics, logic, and philosophy. Kant is viewed as having exerted a subjectivist influence on Whitehead.
Patrick Joseph Hurley

As a result of this influence, Whitehead turns to the experiencing subject for the data acknowledged as given to methodology. The task for methodology, as colored by subjectivism, thus becomes that of interconnecting the assemblage of data given within subjectivity.

The first chapter outlines the difficulties involved in a developmental study of Whitehead's writings, presents the reasons supporting the claim for Maxwell's and Kant's influence, and introduces a linguistic distinction into Whitehead's terminology. The second chapter focuses on the influence of Maxwell. Maxwell's scientific models are discussed, and his methodology is traced through Whitehead's Universal Algebra, Mathematical Concepts of the Material World, Principia Mathematica, and The Concept of Nature. The third chapter deals with the influence of Kant. The Kantian revival which occurred in Great Britain during Whitehead's undergraduate days is discussed, and the subjectivist orientation of Whitehead's thought is seen to emerge in the essays of 1914-1916 and later lead to a problem with solipsism. The resulting struggle with solipsism is traced through the Principles of Natural Knowledge, The Concept of Nature, and The Principle of Relativity.

The fourth chapter deals with methodology and subjectivity in Process and Reality. The data acknowledged as given for interpretation are described, the cognitive model is developed, and finally the model is used to interpret the data. The work is seen to effect a synthesis of Maxwellian and Kantian strains of thought, and to resolve the solipsist difficulties which had troubled Whitehead earlier. The fifth chapter takes a closer look at methodology and system by attempting to interpret both in terms of the system of Process and Reality.

I


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John of Salisbury has long been recognized as an astute observer of his age, a brilliant commentator on the mores of his contemporaries, the outstanding classical scholar of his times and a letter-writer of such distinction that he deserves a place among the front rank of those who have engaged in the epistolary art. A great deal of attention has been given to his political thought and to his general contribution to Western culture. His account of his own education has been thoroughly scrutinized for the information and insights it gives into the nature of twelfth century education. However, little effort has been put into an examination of his educational theory as opposed to his accounts of the educational practices of his time. This would be of less concern if it were not for the fact that the twelfth century was a time of great intellectual ferment, when many of our great modern institutions, among them universities, were founded.

The dissertation, therefore, has two aims. First, to examine, in as much detail as possible, John's educational thought, and second, to place his thought in the context of the twelfth century. By doing so, a great deal can be learnt concerning the processes as well as the content of the thought both of one man and of his contemporaries, at a time of critical significance to the history of Western education. The insights thus gained are of importance not only to the study of twelfth century education, but also to an understanding of the growth and development of commonly held educational concepts.

The study begins with an account of John's life. This is important because of the light thus shed upon his formative influences and also because it establishes his authenticity as a spokesman on education. John's criticisms of the educational thought and practices of his contemporaries follows, which leads into a discussion of the nature of teaching and learning. John's epistemology and psychology are discussed and an account given of the teaching methods which he advocated. The curriculum is the next topic, and it is shown that it consisted very largely of the study of grammar and logic. These subjects are essential, in John's view, first in order to acquire eloquence, then to combine with eloquence in order to make a scholar into a philosopher and finally to make sure that the philosopher understands and practices virtue. The final aim of education is the
Virtue for John was a practical concern. By an act of will a man can choose to act virtuously. The role of education is twofold. First it provides the knowledge which allows meaningful choice to be made, and second, it trains the will to make the right, that is the virtuous, choice. The choices made by an uneducated man are random and are virtuous or not virtuous by chance. The choices made by an educated man, however, have great meaning if they are taken seriously. Therefore, the educated man who makes consciously virtuous decisions and choices is the ideal man to govern. Virtue, then, has the practical value of producing better rulers and better subordinates and advisers to those rulers.

John thus places himself, not altogether unknowingly, in the mainstream of Western educators, who began with Isocrates and Cicero and Quintilian, and whose aim has always been to produce men who can govern competently. The main characteristic of these men is to form sound opinions and to make good judgements. It is not possible to do either of these things except by means of education.

J


Bertrand Russell believed that before an educational program could be formulated, one had to have a clear concept of the type of individual to be produced by such a program. He noted that one of the enduring controversies in education was whether the aim of education should be to cultivate the good individual, or train the good citizen.
When Russell first entered the field of educational theory in 1915, he was a strong advocate of education for the cultivation of the good individual. He proposed the development of an educational program based on respect for the rights of the child, and designed to produce intellectually capable and emotionally stable individuals who would go out into the world and bring about the social reforms Russell envisioned. Given the nature of Russell's lonely and aristocratic upbringing, his early preoccupation with intellectual pursuits, and his concern for the plight of humanity, this was understandable.

In 1932, however, Russell became an advocate of education in citizenship. This study suggests that three factors were associated with the change of emphasis in Russell's educational aim. The first was Russell's realization that the international situation was volatile and in urgent need of organizational and educational reforms. Survival demanded the establishment of a world state. The second, and closely related factor, was that the tension that Russell had long experienced between his strong elitist tendencies in education, and his sense of noblesse oblige, was resolved in favor of the latter. Third, Russell's involvement with the educational enterprise known as the Beacon Hill School left him convinced that children in groups needed to be taught the elements of good citizenship.

The study concluded that Russell's advocacy of education in citizenship over education for the cultivation of the good individual represented an evolution or progression of his educational thought, mandated by new sets of circumstances and experiences, and entirely within the framework of the empirical view of knowledge which he so strongly advocated. Moreover, his expectation was that when the world was put to order, the aim of education could again be the cultivation of individual excellence.

The purpose of this treatise on John Maynard Keynes and Ludwig Edler von Mises is not to delineate the differences between the Keynesian and the Austrian Schools. Rather, the primary goal is to stimulate studies of the similarities of not only these but other schools of economic thought to determine if they are all tending to coalesce into one unified school.

If there is one of physics, one of chemistry, one of mathematics, why not one of economics? Possibly, the general skepticism with which the public views economics is because it is divided into various schools which, on the surface at least, appear not only to be different but actually to be adversaries.

Immanuel Kant tried to reconcile the subjectivism of Bishop George Berkeley with the materialism of David Hume. Albert Einstein tried to reconcile his own Theory of Relativity with the Quantum Theory of Max Planck. Similarly modern economics, possibly unconsciously, may be attempting to arrive at a synthesis of the subjectivist approach to economics of Mises with the objectivist approach of Keynes.

Mises attacked the prison of a narrow conventional economics dealing primarily with the material objects and services of man's livelihood. In its place he substituted the infinitely broader arena of human action (praxeology) dealing with all of man's activities.

Keynes assaulted the economic edifice of the academic world whose building blocks appeared to him to have a questionable relationship to reality. He presented to man a pragmatic field of macroeconomics to cope with man's problems.

The philosophy of both Keynes and Mises was based on 19th century liberalism. Both believed in fostering individualism, the primary difference between them being the degree of restraints each believed needed to insure social cohesion—Keynes believing in greater restraints than Mises.

As a secondary, and possibly presumptuously brash goal, the aim of this treatise is to indicate that it is within the realm of possibility that there is a unity not only of economic knowledge, but of all knowledge. Attempts are being made to unify man's concepts of the physical world on the assumption that a profound simplicity underlies the apparent complexity of Nature. If there is a basic simplicity in the physical world, and also in the socio-economic world, may there not also be an even more fundamental philosophical principle uniting the two, enabling man to have an amazingly simple, truly panoramic
Oscar Bernard Johannsen

view of all phenomena?


The revolt of T. S. Eliot and I. A. Richards against the literary criticism of their day (impressionistic, biographical, etc.) resulted in a tradition of criticism which stretches to the present time through men such as John Crowe Ransom, Allen Tate, Robert Penn Warren, and Cleanth Brooks. Richards' writings have been of central importance to both the theory and practice of this tradition. His early books, Principles of Literary Criticism (1924), Science and Poetry (1926) and Practical Criticism (1929), were broad investigations into the problems of verbal communication and human values; they also contributed to two predominant concerns of modern criticism: the close formal examination of the particular text at hand; and the contention that the language of literature, particularly poetry, was special, to be differentiated from the language of science and ordinary discourse.

Richards, however, has been influential in another realm of literary criticism, that of formulating an aesthetic of poetry: the relation of poetry to the other arts, and the broader contexts in which art exists, such as sociology, intellectual history, religion, philosophy, and psychology. This concern has been promoted and sustained by such men as Edmund Wilson, John Crowe Ransom, Kenneth Burke, Northrop Frye, R. S. Crane and Lionel Trilling. Richards' initial search for a comprehensive theory involved the application of behavioristic psychology to poetry and criticism: he enlisted the methods of science for clarity and precision, and he attempted to implement the findings of psychology to explain the relationship of poetry to life. Ultimately Richards' evocation of psychology for critical theory failed, but his early books nevertheless fostered an interest in the uses of psychology in criticism, the role of literature in society, and the social dimensions of communication. In addition Richards strove for and exemplified rigorous standards for both the critic and teacher, highlighting the
importance of continually relating theory to practice.

Finally the development from Richards' early Principles of Literary Criticism to The Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936) is highly instructive for the student of literature; Richards slowly abandons his early scientism and subsequently shapes a contextual approach to meaning. At the center of his change was the full comprehension of Coleridge's statement that "All knowledge rests on the coincidence of an object with a subject," that the imagination creatively shapes the perceived world. Richards left behind a concept of language as a signalling system in which a reader responds to signs with either an external or internal reference; he progressed to the theory that meaning in a non-scientific use of language results from the coalescence of the past and present contexts of the words being used. And furthermore, poetic language represents a completion in the sense that it is the occasion for the poet's mind to extend, grow, and order itself. Poetry can be the meeting ground for the speaker and that which he speaks about—all of which is presented to the hearer. Poetry therefore is neither verifiable science nor solipsistic projections of the poet, but the coalescing experience of a man with his environment. The literary critic's job, since the words on the page are the occasion (cf., musical score and music) for the poetic experience, is more a matter of sensitively... describing the poetic object; and central to the poetic process is the handling of metaphor.

The later, mature contextual theory of I. A. Richards provides on the one hand a useful and a valuable approach to the reading of poems, and on the other a means of probing the relationship of literature, myth, society and science.


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Alfred Day, whose controversial theories of harmony were of considerable influence on the nineteenth century English theorists George Alexander MacFarren, Frederick Arthur Gore Ouseley and Ebenezer Prout, was born in London in 1810. Day's musical education was ostensibly quite limited. Although his only teacher was William Henry Kearns, the association with several talented contemporaries (most notable of whom was George Alexander MacFarren) must have provided opportunities for further study and discussion.

Day began the writing of his *Treatise on Harmony* in 1840, but the work did not appear in print until 1845. Its publication was greeted with critical disdain, and for many years, MacFarren, who felt compelled to resign his teaching appointment at the Royal Academy of Music because he advocated Day's theories, remained the only influential proponent of Day's hypotheses.
In essence, Day believed that two styles of harmonic writing existed: the diatonic or strict style in which all dissonances needed careful preparation and the chromatic style, in which dissonances could be used with more flexibility and chromatic inflections could occur without resultant key changes. He thought that all chords were generated from one of three fundamentals: the tonic, dominant and supertonic. By superimposing as many as six thirds on each of these tones, Day formed three virtually parallel sonorities, with the exception that a chord of the eleventh could be fashioned only on the dominant.

Many unnecessary intricacies resulted from the arbitrary nature of these fundamental chordal constructions. Day, in his system, was not concerned with describing the functional significance of chords, but appeared, instead, to be concerned with determining their derivations and correct notations in order to justify his a priori considerations concerning the three generating tones.

Although he did not acknowledge specifically any indebtedness to other theorists, it is quite clear that many of Day's ideas owed much to the speculations of Rameau and his predecessors, Descartes and Zarlin. The works of Zarlin were promulgated in England, to some extent, by the writings of Thomas Morley, Thomas Campion, and Christopher Simpson, while the works of Descartes were a considerable influence on the members of the Royal Society whose philosophical investigations of acoustics demonstrated an inclination toward a more scholarly approach to the study of musical phenomena by the English theorists of the seventeenth century.

Rameau's influence can be seen particularly in the writings of such eighteenth century theorists as John Frederick Lampe and Benjamin Stillingfleet (essentially through his promulgation of the works of Tartini who also owed much to Rameau). The writings of the nineteenth century theorists Charles-Simon Catel and Christopher Frederick Augustus Kollmann (an exponent of Johann Philipp Kirnberger's views) are also considered in order to determine the milieu in which Alfred Day's theories of harmony were developed.

The evidence heretofore uncovered concerning the life of John Taverner yields a spare and peculiar outline. Taverner was born probably in southern Lincolnshire around 1490. References to "Iohannis Taverner" are found in London in 1514 and at Tattershall (Lincolnshire) in 1525. The composer went to Oxford as choirmaster of Cardinal Wolsey's College late in 1526, became involved with the Lutheran heresy there in 1528, and left his post in mid-1530. Seven years later, he appeared in Boston as a member of a religious and social guild and as an agent of Thomas Cromwell. Now a well-to-do gentleman with landed property, he was appointed to the town council in June 1545; four months later he died, leaving a wife, a brother, and two girls thought to be his daughters. Throughout the Boston years, there is no reference to him as a musician.

This documentary skeleton has been fleshed out to form a generally accepted interpretation. Stated briefly, Taverner, born and probably educated in Lincolnshire, went to London as a young man, returned inexplicably to the provincial backwater of his youth and served a few years there as a musician. He was chosen, seemingly out of nowhere, to lead the choir of Wolsey's College. Two years later, however, he was converted to Lutheranism; soon after, he left Oxford and ceased composing. This interpretation has achieved wide currency through the work of Fellowes (notably in Grove V), who discovered in Taverner a "fierce fanatic" who was "compelled to abandon music under pressure of religious conviction" and thereafter played a malign role in the suppression of the Boston friaries.

For the early years, this interpretation is inadequate, and for the later years, incorrect. What kind of education, for instance, did Taverner receive? Where is his London music? Why did Wolsey choose an obscure musician? If Taverner left Oxford for religious reasons, why did he wait two years to do so? And if Protestant, why did he join a Catholic guild? Furthermore, this view demands that we account for a considerable and varied body of music displaying clear signs of growth within a period of ten years.

Discovery of a few documents, re-examination of those already known, and intensive study of Taverner's contemporaries, of the institutions he served, and of various documents of the time, have
David Sholom Josephson

yielded a radically revised biography which is psychologically credible and responsive to the historical facts, and which allows us, at long last, to grope towards a chronological ordering of the music. Taverner was almost certainly educated at Tattershall, a collegiate foundation with a sophisticated musical community, and came to London a fully formed musician. Among his London compositions are the four extant songs and several liturgical works, notably the Western Wind Mass. He came to Oxford a respected musician, and there absorbed not Lutheran heresy—he was only passingly involved in the disturbances—but the spirit of liberal learning and service to the king which was to lead to his association with Thomas Cromwell. His musical idiom underwent a radical change at Oxford. He left Oxford upon the collapse of Wolsey's patronage and then of his college. The years 1530-37 remain uncharted. The evidence is considerable that he continued composition during the Boston years; to those years we may ascribe at least one work, Quemadmodum, with certainty.

The musical sources of Taverner's music are set forth and evaluated; the church music is discussed in terms of style and liturgical function; the songs are analyzed and transcribed, and their provenance established; and a chronology, based on historical, biographical and manuscript evidence as well as style, is proposed.


Ideologies have a functional relationship to institutions and institutional change. This study deals with the role of ideological change in the modification of a social institution, in this instance, that of marriage and the family. It is assumed that just as an institution is a function of an ideology, so an institutional change is a function of ideological change. It follows that reorganization of the one generally involves reorganization of the other.

This study tests Karl Mannheim's proposition concerning the
relationship of ideological change to institutional change by means of a critical analysis of the Lutheran concept of marriage and the family as it evolved during the period of the Protestant Reformation in Germany.

Mannheim in *Ideology and Utopia* presents his conception of the role of ideological and utopian thinking in institutional change. According to Mannheim, utopian thinking tends to generate changes in the existing order, while ideological thinking directs activity toward the maintenance of the existing situation. To him institutional change is brought about by a change in the underlying ideology of an institution; and institutional change is a function of ideological change. Among the proponents of change there occurs, in time, a shift from a utopian to an ideological mentality. Mannheim used political institutions to demonstrate the relationship that exists between an institution and its ideology. The present study seeks to establish whether a utopia-to-ideology shift took place in Luther's concepts of marriage and family. Luther's views were taken from his original writings as they appear in the *Weimar Ausgabe* of Luther's *Werke*.

The Lutheran philosophy of marriage and the family which evolved during the Protestant Reformation seems to have undergone a shift from a utopian to an ideological position. Viewing the rediscovery of Scriptural principles involving marriage and family matters as utopian at first, Luther shifts to an ideological position. The Scriptures supplied him with those ideas which prompted him to work for change in the prevailing order. As part of the development of Luther's thinking during the Reformation, his views shifted from a "projected" to a "defensive" mentality, using the Scriptures to justify his new position. Being convinced that the Bible was the sole authority in marriage and family matters, he no longer felt constrained to uphold many of the prevailing laws and ordinances of the Church. In contrast to his earlier training, he now defends as Scriptural such principles as the clergy is not to be denied the right to marry; instead of forbidding divorce, the marriage relationship may be broken by divorce for reasons enumerated in the Scriptures; instead of upholding the claim that the Church is the final authority in the regulation of marriage, it is a civil matter to be controlled by the State; marriage is not to be viewed as a sacrament; forced celibacy is contrary to nature; the married state is not to be considered spiritually inferior to the celibate state. As these projected changes in the institution of
marriage and the family became ideological in nature, they appear to support Mannheim's thesis of ideological and institutional change.


Autobiography may be a chronicle of external events in the writer's life or a record of intellectual and spiritual developments—an account of what has happened to a man or of what has happened within him. Such English autobiographies as were written before the Victorian period mainly illustrate the former tendency; many Victorian autobiographies reveal a new concern with individual problems of belief and conduct.

This concern with inner experience was fostered by the generally problematic orientation of the Victorian era, by its social and economic evolution, by the perseverance of Romantic individualism, by Evangelical introspectiveness, and by the diffusion of German transcendentalism. These influences were factors in the growth of a type of personal record which differs from earlier autobiographies in content, style, and structure. Autobiographies of the type indicated may serve as important sources for the inner history of the principal Victorian thought movements.

The most basic issue in Victorian thought was the quest for values, which led particularly to the choice between a mechanistic and utilitarian philosophy and a spiritual and idealistic one. Harriet Martineau in her Autobiography shows the scientific and secularist response to this problem; Carlyle in Sartor Resartus and his Reminiscences shows the reaction in favor of traditional and idealistic views.
John Edward Keating

John Stuart Mill in his Autobiography illustrates an intermediate position, characterized by both eclecticism and skepticism.

Closely related to the problem of values was the problem of religious faith. The divergent drifts from Victorian Evangelicalism are autobiographically presented by Francis William and John Henry Newman. F. W. Newman's Phases of Faith reveals the path by which a devout Evangelical passed to thoroughgoing religious liberalism; his brother's Apologia pro Vita Sua, the path which led from Evangelicalism to Tractarianism, and ultimately to Rome.

Victorian advances in the rationale of geology and biology, above all the development of the theory of evolution, deeply affected thought far beyond the limits of science. In My Schools and Schoolmasters, Hugh Miller discloses the compromise by which a conservative scientist attempted to engraft new scientific views on the body of older philosophic and religious beliefs. In An Autobiography, Herbert Spencer reveals the development of a completely evolutionary outlook on the universe. Darwin, as he reveals his thought in his "autobiography," occupies an intermediate position between Miller and Spencer; fully committed to evolution as a scientific outlook, he confesses his inability to give it a satisfactory philosophical setting.

A fourth movement in Victorian ideas which is autobiographically documented is the reaction against the laissez faire liberalism which dominated earlier Victorian social thought. The Life and Struggles of William Lovett epitomizes the Chartist protest against the undemocratic political reform of 1832; Beatrice Webb's My Apprenticeship, the development of the collectivist outlook in the later Victorian period.

The immediacy and inwardness with which the autobiographers mentioned above treat key aspects of Victorian thought give their personal records a special value as sources for the inner history of the age. But their records are important for more than content. The approach to problems through the medium of personal experience marks the development of a genre which is peculiarly the creation of an era characterized by sharp individualism and widespread transition. The autobiographers under discussion utilized almost every technique of self-study; they developed styles and structures fitted to the requirements of a form for which they had few models. The resulting works are thus set off not only from biography, but even from most earlier and much contemporary autobiographical writing. They illustrate a genre, the autobiography.
John Edward Keating

devoted to the inner history of the individual and his time.


Peter Maxwell Davies is one of the few major 20th century composers who has worked extensively in the areas of music educating and composing for young performers. Since his tenure as music director at Cirencester Grammar School (England, 1959-62), he has produced a large body of works for school-age musicians; included with these are 10 instrumental pieces for either solo piano, chamber ensemble, or school orchestra. A formal and stylistic analysis of these instrumental works shows them to contain, in microcosm, all of the major devices of Davies' general compositional mode of expression. Such aspects as the use of borrowed and pre-Classical materials and techniques, a flair for the dramatic, and new types of musical organization and sonority are all present to some degree in this body of pieces. This music also reflects Davies' philosophy of music education. He has stated his belief in the receptiveness of young people to modern musical idioms, as well as in the ability of school children to perform and understand music written in an apparently advanced style. Ultimately, an examination of Davies' instrumental works for young performers, and a comparison of these works with his compositional development and ideas on music education reveals that a composer of Davies' stature need not condescend when writing for non-professional musicians.

Current education in psychometrics minimally explores the historical and social factors which contributed to the formation of the initial theoretical structures. Because the historical development is not reviewed, the basic theoretical assumptions are rarely investigated.

Science is a facet of the structure of society. The direction of scientific exploration is influenced by social attitudes and political forces.

Degradation of science occurs when theoretical assumptions are not adequately reviewed, presumed to be true, but in fact are faulty.

Psychometric theory has its origins in probability theory, psychophysics, and sociometrics. In the nineteenth century the astronomer Quetelet tried to apply the premises of the normal probability distribution to human behavior. He introduced two highly questionable assumptions: the measure of a trait is distributed in a normal (Gaussian) curve and there is equivalence between a person measured many times and a group measured once. Galton followed Quetelet, making the same assumptions in the exploration of individual differences. The statistics and psychometrics which developed from this lineage are comparative and highly differentiative. This perspective underlies a good part of modern psychometric theory; for example, the current evaluative technique of norm referencing. Because of the questionable assumptions embedded in the foundation of the Quetelet-Galton lineage and the overdevelopment of comparative and differentiative statistics, psychometric theory may reflect flawed assumptions.

If a new psychometrics is to be formulated, criterion referencing should be a major tenet of the system. The works of Fechner can serve to indicate the direction of the new theoretical structure. The holographic paradigm supported by Bohm and Pribram may provide the model for creating an integrative foundation for the new psychometrics.

161. KRJ APE, Elizabeth Chamberlin (Ph. D.). "The Educational
Elizabeth Chamberlin Krumpe

Ideas of the Clarendon Headmasters From 1860 to 1914."

By the middle of the nineteenth century, it had become customary for the English upper classes to send their sons away to be educated at select public schools. It was becoming increasingly evident, however, that these schools were not providing either an adequate education or appropriate living arrangements. In response to press criticism of the public schools, parliament appointed a commission in 1861, under Lord Clarendon to investigate conditions at Eton, Harrow, Rugby, Charterhouse, Westminster, Winchester, and Shrewsbury, which were boarding schools, and at St. Paul's and Merchant Taylors', which were London day schools.

This thesis discusses the family background and educational ideas of the seven boarding school headmasters: George Moberly (Winchester), Edward Balston (Eton), Richard Elwyn (Charterhouse), Charles Scott (Westminster), Frederick Temple (Rugby), Benjamin Kennedy (Shrewsbury), and Montagu Butler (Harrow), who all testified before the commission. The careers and ideology of these men are described in the first and second chapters. They all came from middle class backgrounds and all but Temple went to a public school, generally the one they subsequently headed. They were all graduates of Oxford or Cambridge with a first class degree. All were ordained in the Church of England. In their testimony they supported the classical curriculum, the emphasis on character training, and student self-government.

The subsequent four chapters describe the background and educational ideology of their twenty-two successors until 1914. They also usually came from middle class families, generally attended a public school, and went to either Oxford or Cambridge, where with few exceptions they obtained first class degrees. Their educational ideas were remarkably similar to their predecessors'. Involvement with sports was added to religious training and student self-government as a tool for character development. They acknowledged the need for a modern side which involved more science, mathematics, and modern languages than were included in the traditional curricu-
lum. In their view, however, the study of classical languages was the best education for their brightest students. Despite the social and economic changes which transformed England from 1860 to 1914, the educational aims of the leading headmasters scarcely changed.


The Composer

John Shepherd was an English composer of church music during the Tudor period. The earliest records available indicate that he was intermittently the organist of Magdalen College, Oxford University, during the reigns of King Henry VIII, King Edward VI, and Queen Mary I. During this time he was also a Gentleman of the Chapel Royal, which placed him in a position of esteem and regard. Little is known about his personal life, with the exception of several bizarre incidents that occurred during his appointment at Magdalen College. Charges brought against him by the authorities of the College reveal an arrogant and arbitrary personality. On one occasion he violated College statutes while representing himself as the Vice-President of the College.

Shepherd has been recognized as an important composer not only by musicologists such as Sir Richard Terry, but also by his own contemporaries. Both John Baldwin, the celebrated scribe of Windsor, and Thomas Morley included Shepherd in their lists of outstanding composers.
Herbert Barry Lamont

The Music

This dissertation presents a comprehensive inventory of all known sources of Shepherd's music, both manuscript and published. Forty-six manuscripts in eight different locations throughout England contain his music. The most important repositories are the British Museum in London and the Christ Church College Library and the Bodleian Library at Oxford University.

The corpus of Shepherd's work is Latin liturgical music. This includes five Masses and forty-three pieces that can be classified according to the forms of the day: antiphons, hymns, magnificats, psalms, responds, and a Te Deum. There is also some music for the emerging English Church: seventeen anthems, several services, and fifty-two psalms.

The second volume of this dissertation contains music transcriptions of representative works: three Masses, six responds, two Latin psalms, three Latin hymns, one antiphon, and a complete Morning and Evening Service in English. These transcriptions are intended to be scholarly rather than performance editions.

Chapter Five is a study of these works. Particular attention is given to Shepherd's musical style: formal structure, melodic and contrapuntal techniques, cantus firmus treatment, and the application of the music to the liturgy.

Shepherd's music is characterized by a strong, individual style that is often punctuated with extreme dissonances. His skill in formal organization involves not only cyclic techniques in cantus firmus Masses but also the manner in which he juxtaposes contrasting meters, voice groupings, highly imitative polyphonic and strongly rhythmic chordal passages. His alternatim treatment of vocal polyphonic hymns is quite rare, the only other examples being by Thomas Tallis. One noticeable characteristic of Shepherd's music is the frequent crossing of voice parts, with considerable demands on the vocal ranges of the performers.

Conclusions

There is a conspicuous gap in the study and availability of sixteenth century English church music. Periodic efforts to overcome this have resulted in such publications as the Tudor Church Music
Herbert Barry Lamont

Series. However, these fall far short of bringing to light the music of such composers as John Shepherd. This study has revealed him to be a composer of genuine creativity. His works cover a wide variety of musical forms. In his more mature works the full sonority of the Tudor choir reached a great height of musical expression.


The attempt to interpret society in biological terms was most fully formulated in the works of Herbert Spencer. His interpretation, with its emphasis on heredity, the "survival of the fittest," and complete "laissez-faire," was extremely popular in America during the latter part of the 19th century.

However, by the turn of the century a new group of social scientists arose to challenge this individualistic philosophy. Influenced by Darwin rather than Spencer, they regarded the group rather than the individual as the primary unit in society, and stressed the importance of environmental as opposed to biological factors. This led to a rejection of the concept of the survival of the fittest, and the theory of "laissez-faire" was repudiated in favor of the positive state whose duty was to enhance the general welfare of society. This group was represented in social psychology by such writers as Baldwin, Dewey and Mead; in sociology by Ward, Small, Giddings, Cooley, Ross and Ellwood; and in economics by Clark, Ely, Patten and Veblen.

Though their theories were to become the mainstream of American social thought, the older doctrines were revived by the eugenists. The eugenist movement, which was particularly active in America in the period from 1914 to 1929, represented a modern version of the biological approach to society. Influenced by European thinkers, they made heredity and the "survival of the fittest" the keynotes of their system and stretched the concepts to fit races as well as individuals. Insisting that environmental factors played virtually no role in determining individual achievement, they identified bio-
logical fitness with social success and deplored all attempts to meliorate social conditions. Their program for social reform was in strictly biological terms: the sterilization of the unfit and the propagation of the fit. The racist aspect of their theory led them to advocate miscegenation laws and to agitate for immigration restriction on racial rather than individual grounds. Their influence may be gauged, to some extent, by the miscegenation and sterilization laws of the period, and by the immigration laws of 1921, 1924, and 1929, which discriminated against immigrants from southern and eastern Europe.

164. LARIMORE, Edda Rees (Ph. D.). "The Ideas of Francis Bacon on Education." University of Nebraska, 1944. 224 pp. Source: University of Nebraska, ABSTRACTS OF DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS (1944), pp. 112-121.

Statement of the Problem

It is the purpose of this study to determine what areas of interests in education and in educational institutions are revealed in the complete writings of Sir Francis Bacon, and into what areas these interests fall.

Education has received many benefits from so-called non-professional educators. Not a few of these non-professional educators are found to be prominent in the field of literature and possess fame as literary characters. No student of literature or education could read Bacon's Novum Organum without sensing his theory of induction. His New Atlantis holds idealistic collegiate settings. The Advancement of Learning advocates the division of all knowledge into 3 divisions, that of history, poesy, and philosophy. These give evidences that Bacon possessed educational notions. It seems plausible, therefore, to assume that in the remaining works of Bacon, additional educational interests may be found.
Source of Data

Two trips were made to the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., and considerable time was spent in making a complete coverage of available source material located there. Three additional libraries were called upon to furnish source material as well: the University of Michigan, the University of Chicago, and the University of Nebraska.

The bibliography used in this study represents sources actually handled and used in this thesis. Some one hundred-fifty book-sources pertinent to this investigation furnished the bulk of source materials. The primary source of information used was the 1869 edition of The Works of Francis Bacon, edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath, published by the Riverside Press, Cambridge, England; Hurd and Houghton, New York.

Bacon's Educational Interest

Little is known of Bacon's education up to the time he entered Trinity College, Cambridge, at the age of 12. It is here one first notices Bacon's interest in education. He was familiar with the teachings of the schoolmen and imbued with a deep religious spirit. He mastered the principles of their faiths and the subtleties of their disputations. Bacon, a lad in his teens, had a profound thinking capacity and perception, as well as an intellectual concept of values regarding the hopelessness of the things of the past and the foretelling of things in the future. Bacon while still at Trinity began to dislike the philosophy of Aristotle, because he considered it unfruitful of the way, it being a philosophy only strong for disputations and contentions. Such a philosophy in Bacon's opinion was barren of the production of works for the benefits of man.

Bacon left Trinity College and entered Gray's Inn to study law. Various steps of the legal profession were studied, but the profession itself could not hold him.

When 31 years old, he wrote a letter to Lord Burleigh, in which he gave the crux of his educational desire. In this letter he stated that he had taken all knowledge to be his realm. He further explained what he proposed to do about present-day scholastic tendencies. He determined to do away with all disputations, confutations, verbosities, blind experiments, auricular traditions, and impostures. In their
Bacon proposed to develop industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions and discoveries. Bacon's educational interest led him to a possible solution of innovation. There was but one course—try the whole thing anew upon a better plan, and to commence a total reconstruction of the sciences, the arts, and all human knowledge raised upon the proper foundation, which was induction properly done.

The following paragraphs reveal to what extent Bacon did make pronouncements in the field or areas of education, and, if possible, justify the conviction that he, like many other lay leaders, did make a significant contribution in terms of the several phases of education.

Baconian Educational Principles

Bacon's principles of education are the real underlying philosophy of his educational concept. Several outstanding principles were discovered from his writings.

General Aim

Bacon's understanding of the general aim of education constitutes the foundation for additional principles. Bacon believed in the kind of training which would enable man to be productive, and use the ability to produce for the benefit of mankind. An educated man should be a rich storehouse for the glory of the Creator, and a relief of man's estate.

Specific Aims

Bacon listed 14 specific aims of education which were to aid in the realization of his basic educational aim. The study of the arts and sciences cannot be a hurried-up procedure but must be studied over a span of years in order for the right perspective to be obtained. One must give adequate time to the study of natural philosophy, the great mother of the sciences. Natural philosophy must not be considered a bridge to various professions, but must be an actual field of interest. Proper goals should be established and understood, the goal being that human life be endowed with new discoveries and powers. A passable way to this goal must be chosen; this would raise the dignity of the human mind to rightful thinking. One must do away with a
love for antiquity and authority. One must guard against an admiration by such abundance of so-called invention. Man in the attempt to understand basic knowledges should be aware of pretenders. One must learn to have faith in tasks already undertaken. The progress of the sciences has been slowed down by a zeal in religious sects and a response to superstition. Religion, according to Bacon, cannot be separated from philosophy. Natural philosophy is, after the word of God, the surest medicine against superstition, and the most approved nourishment for faith. The universities and colleges must have a definite understanding of the true scientific procedure. Rewards for efforts made in the field of the sciences must not be forgotten. The last specific aim as listed by Bacon admonishes less despair. One should not become discouraged because the true approach to the sciences has not been constant.

**Education Not For All**

Bacon did not believe in education for all. Education requires of individuals sound capacities, capable judgments, and deep understandings. Bacon’s concept of education was only to be followed by the ladder of the intellect. He would have his doctrine of education enter quietly into the minds that are fit and capable of receiving it.

**Health**

Health and health principles had been embedded upon Bacon’s mind from infancy. It therefore holds forth as one of Bacon’s basic educational principles. He believed that a man’s own health should be his first study. Bacon was minutely detailed in his instructions concerning diet, sleep, exercise, dress, and passions of the mind.

**Love of Beauty**

Bacon held two concepts which pertained to the ideas of beauty, that of personal charm, and that of natural beauty. Of the two, the latter holds precedent. Bacon leaves a living monument to the world which so clearly reveals his love of beauty in nature in his essay “Of Gardens.”

**Worthy Home Membership**

Bacon believed in parental authority and stressed familial pride and noble family living.
Religion
Permeating throughout Bacon's writings is noticed his zeal for religion. Religion meant more to him than a fickle moral or sentimental element. It meant the presence of Christ, for Christian living was an underlying factor in his entire existence and belief.

Leisure Time
Various leisure-time activities are found in Bacon's writings which indicate his interest and belief in this philosophy. Such recreational activities as walking, riding, playing, plays, dancing, jousts and tourneys, music, bowling, shooting, reading, and gardening are Bacon's suggested leisure-time outlets.

Freedom of Expression and Thought
Bacon believed in an education not bounded by immovable doctrine, but pliable to the point of self-interpretation. This self-interpretation should be well grounded by background study. This philosophy can be followed only by allowing a student freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of interpretation in the classroom. In order for this so-called freedom to be realized, it is necessary that an individual's judgment be sound, and that his ability to distinguish between interpretation and conjecture be developed.

Tax-Paid Education
Bacon would have educational expenses defrayed through taxation, not by some private purse or industry.

Baconian Educational Theory
Induction
Bacon prefaced his explanation of induction by a discourse on Idols of the Mind. These phantoms or images of the mind which are created by the misdirected human will are four in number. The Idols of the Tribe are caused by the homogeneity of the substance of the human spirit, its preoccupation, its narrowness, its restless motion, its infusion of affections, its incompetency of the senses, and by its mode of expression. The Idols of the Cave are created by one's peculiar environment, education, habits, or interests. The Idols of the Marketplace are caused by misconception established through the alliances of words and names. Idols of the Theatre spring from impressions.
accepted by the mind from play-books of philosophical system and
the perverted rules of demonstration.

Bacon's induction consists of the accurate, precise structure of
certain tables of information. The tables are long, laborious to read,
and much involved with detail.

First, a nature is given upon which a study evolves. Table I
consists of all known instances which agree in the same nature
although in substances are most unlike. This collection is made in the
manner of a history and serves as a foundation for a study, for one is
not to imagine or suppose, but to discover, what nature does or may
be made to do. This information is called Table of Essence and
Presence.

The next step is the presentation of instances in which the given
nature is not present. This is done by subjoining the negatives to the
affirmative instances which are listed in Table I. Table II deals with
instances in proximity where the given nature is absent and is called
Table of Deviation, or of Absence in Proximity.

The next step is a study which involves compiling instances in
which the nature under inquiry is found in different degrees. This is
done by making a comparison either of its increase and decrease in the
same subject, or of its amount in different subjects, as compared with
one another. Table III is one of degrees or comparisons of the nature
given and is called Table of Degrees or the Table of Comparison.

Not until these 3 tables are complete can induction proper
begin. The next step of true induction is a study of rejection or
exclusion of the several natures which are not found in some instance
where a given nature is present, or are found where the given nature
is absent, or are found to increase when the given nature decreases, or
decreases when the given nature increases. Through this study of
Exclusion or Rejection of natures which are found by the 3 tables not
to belong to the nature given, a true foundation for real induction is
laid.

By means of essays, Bacon submits next an interpretation of
nature in the affirmative way, on the strength of all material which is
thus far compiled. These essays are called the First Vintage or
Commencement of Interpretation concerning the nature given. In
these essays the given nature is limited whereby an arrival at a
definition is possible—the real end-result of Bacon's induction.
Edda Rees Larimore

Recognition of Individual Differences

Two additional theories are mentioned by Bacon. The recognition of individual differences is explained by Bacon as being a difference of intellectual types or intellectual interests. Some minds are given to an extreme love of antiquity, others to an extreme love and appetite for novelty. References were also made to "steady" and "acute" minds and to "lofty" and "discursive" minds.

Educational Guidance

Bacon asserts that the understanding, undirected and unassisted, is unequal to and unfit for the task of vanquishing the obscurity of things. This passage, along with many other like thoughts, undoubtedly indicates that Bacon had an interest and belief in educational guidance. He proceeds by listing characteristic qualities which a counsellor should possess along with some suggested techniques for counsellors.

Pronouncements on Higher Education

Size

Bacon mentions that the size of the "plant" need not be great, however it would be necessary because of the various research projects to have plenty of ground space, because the majority of Bacon's experiments were done out-of-doors. The buildings Bacon suggested were spacious and ample.

Libraries

Bacon pointed out quite clearly that the libraries in his own day were inadequate. He advocated new editions, correct impressions, truer translations, profitable commentaries, and intelligent annotations. Bacon recommended a general library for all subjects.

University Inspection

University inspection was advocated as to subject-matter taught and as to methods used.

Collegiate Education for Men

Bacon favored a collegiate education for boys and young men. The possibility of emulation among boys and between student and
Edda Rees Larimore

teacher is greater in colleges than in private houses or under one private schoolmaster.

Method Used

Bacon advocated, too, full liberty of belief in order to adopt the most enlightened plan of instruction. This plan, of course, was research through induction. The improved course of study would be brought about by the basic knowledge of induction possessed by the teachers of Bacon's institution. He admonished teachers to avoid abridgements and a certain precocity of learning.

Opportunity for Research Study

Bacon advocated that a certain retinue of research workers be appointed by the college to collect material and to carry on various and sundry experiments in all departments of learning. Each worker was to be assigned a specific task. The tasks ranged from the collecting of tangible evidence to the publishing and recording of some new finding.

Educational Results

As natural results of a devout pursuit of knowledge in an orderly and religious country, Bacon listed material wealth, comfort, and prosperity.

Teacher Qualifications

Every teacher, according to Bacon, should thoroughly understand the educational aims. The true ends of knowledge must be understood as well. These end-results should not be sought for the pleasure of the mind or for some self-aggrandizement.

Teachers must be most able and sufficient men. To Bacon, intelligence connotes alertness. A good teacher should be cognizant of the 9 unknown ignorances as listed by Bacon, and be able to guard against them by being constantly on the alert against false pretenses made by others, and by developing a strong power to judge accurately.

A true teacher cannot be inspired by self-triumphs, nor in any sense can he anticipate a crown of glory as a reward for his efforts. Lastly, Bacon's teacher is asked to deal fairly by his interests, to
lead his student, not force him, and to be of good hope. He must allow his imagination to visualize what realms of possibility lie ahead of him, and he must not feel that the things which are to be accomplished are infinite and beyond his power.

Suggested Course of Study

Bacon's interest in the 3 divisions of knowledge seems to rest on a definite need felt by him. Bacon's course of study was organized into definite areas. His curriculum was inflexible, all must be subjected to like areas. History, poesy, and philosophy comprised his "all knowledge" area.

History

Bacon's history knowledge divides into two general divisions, natural and civil. Natural history must deal with histories of celestial bodies, meteors, earth, sea, and common masses of matter. It should also include a history of various cultures and sects with their origins, progress, and declines. Civil history must include a study of the ecclesiastical church, a history of prophecy and divine judgment. Unfinished history, rough drafts, commentaries, and a complete history of the times should be included in Bacon's civil history.

Poesy

Poesy, the second division of knowledge, is dealt with but briefly, for this division is nothing but feigned history, according to Bacon.

Philosophy

It is in the division of philosophy that Bacon stresses the sciences, for he includes such studies as physics, astronomy, astrology, metaphysics, geometry, and arithmetic. Under human philosophy, Bacon includes the study of medicine, athletics, argumentation, grammar, discourse, rhetoric, conversation, business, political economics, and foreign language study.
The educational areas with which Bacon deals are not in themselves new. It is important to notice as well that many of the ideas and theories of which Bacon wrote possess striking likenesses to present-day practice.

Modern induction is a much shorter process because hypotheses are already established and accepted. What Bacon did give through his induction was an idea, not an execution of research procedure. Bacon gave the idea that a systematic and wide examination of facts is the first thing to be done in scientific research. Through Bacon's induction of better ways for considering and doing things, new impetus has been given to a scientific shift of methods of attaining knowledge from authority, through shallow speculation, to hypotheses and experimentation.

Although Bacon's Idols of the Mind in just that phraseology have not come down to us, the significant idea behind the Idols prevails today. In order to be susceptible to growth, one's mind must be absolutely free from biased thinking, and one must be willing to accept the idea that that which now exists is not always the right way, the correct solution.

Bacon did not believe in education for all. The benefits of education were to flow from the works and knowledges of those select few who were able to penetrate into the secrets of science, understand and interpret nature, build axioms from experience, and produce new experiments which would benefit mankind. His education was indirectly for all. Education for all is one present-day goal, but it is a direct school-to-individual procedure.

The Cardinal Principles of Secondary Education which were published in 1918 are in most part an exact replica of the principles propounded by Bacon some three hundred years prior to this time. From Bacon's writings one detects his belief in the following educational aims: health, command of the fundamental processes, worthy home membership, citizenship, worthy use of leisure, and ethical character. Because of the nature of Bacon's suggested course of study, the aim "vocation" was omitted.

The greatest influences which might be descended from Bacon's curriculum are these: a need for curriculum change; a general course of study for all; and well-defined areas of study.
Joseph Priestley was an important scientist, educator, political writer, and Unitarian theologian. A major intellectual figure in his own day, Priestley's influence and reputation faded rapidly after about 1820. Historical scholarship on Priestley has focused mainly on either his scientific work or his theology. The aim of this dissertation, however, has been to integrate Priestley's intellectual life by treating it as a whole. Underlying the encyclopedic expanse of his endeavors was a basic faith in a mechanistic world view which he adopted at the end of his student days at Daventry Academy (1753-55). The materialist epistemology of David Hartley's Observations on Man, to which Priestley was converted in late 1754, was the critical, unifying factor behind all of his subsequent thought.

After an introductory chapter in which the previous literature on Priestley is compared to the multitude of Priestley portraits (some so different as to be not recognizable as the same man, and a few of which do not depict Priestley at all), the approach is primarily topical. Chapter II argues that at age twenty-one, as he adopted Hartleyan materialism, Priestley was undergoing what the contemporary psychoanalyst Erik Erikson has termed an "identity crisis." Like other converts, Priestley was zealous in behalf of his new faith and exerted great energies in promoting Hartley's Observations on Man. Taking materialism one step farther than Hartley was willing to go, Priestley denied the existence of immaterial soul. He was utterly convinced that his unpopular mechanistic ideas would ultimately prevail and found consolation in them when troubles beset him in his old age.

The four chapters which follow discuss Priestley's educational, theological, scientific, and social and political writings. Because of the immense scope of Priestley's publications (about 150 separate items), the details of his intellectual positions provide insight into much of the thought of the late Enlightenment. Peter Gay, perhaps the leading American interpreter of the Enlightenment, has argued that the struggle of critical scientific thinking against Christianity was at the very core
of that intellectual movement. At least for Priestley, that was not the case. Despite their variety, all of Priestley's endeavors reflect the unity of his Hartleyan world view; religion, for Priestley, served as the motivation for morality in the clock-like structure of the cosmos, and he devoted the largest portion of his efforts to the defense of a Christianity which his scholarship had purged of irrational "corruptions." Because his thinking was constrained by the mechanistic universe of the theories of Hartley and Roger Joseph Boscovich, Priestley was unable to accept the great revolution in chemical theory to which his important scientific work contributed. Because he believed that men's minds were tabula rasa at birth and were formed totally by environmental factors, liberal and virtuous education was a central concern; he employed his considerable talents at summarizing knowledge to compile important compendia of a wide variety of subjects. Although never the firebrand radical depicted in the caricatures of the time, he believed truth must interact in a free competition of ideas, and so Priestley was a tireless foe of tyranny and advocate of intellectual freedom.

The final chapters recount Priestley's optimistic view that the machinery of the cosmos was a divinely ordained "best of all possible worlds," even despite a series of personal tragedies at the end of his life, and they describe the wide extent of Priestley's international influence. Appendices provide an extensive genealogy of the Priestley family and descendants, a chronology of his life which includes all his separate publications, and a bibliography of the huge Priestleyan Trinitarian controversy. A number of important bibliographic discoveries are noted.


Matthew Arnold was a Chief Inspector of Schools in England for thirty-five years; in total educational influence upon his own
country he ranks with his father, the famous Headmaster of Rugby. His status as one of England's greatest literary figures has no place in the present discussion. He is here regarded only in his capacity as a professional educator whose educational philosophy has had a marked effect in the United States. This study comprises an investigation of Arnold's principal educational theory ("Sweetness and Light") and the times that predicated it; the growth of his thinking about America's cultural needs; America's reaction to his educative efforts; the reasons for his initial failure and the effect in America, during the half century since his death, of the Arnoldian teachings.

A comprehensive study was made of the newspapers in America and of books on the history of English and American journalism, along with general historical and biographical works, to survey the Victorian Period with respect to its culture and its press, especially in connection with Arnold's social philosophy. All available biographies of Arnold's contemporaries were searched to find Arnoldian reference and especially to trace letters from Arnold which might supplement the letters already officially published. Magazine articles of the period, as well as those published during the fifty years since Arnold's death, have supplied much valuable data. The dissertation prepared at Yale by Dr. Chilson Hathaway Leonard, "Arnold in America: A Study of Matthew Arnold's Literary Relations With America and of His Visits to This Country in 1883 and 1886," was studied with a view to avoiding all possible duplication of exact sources in those chapters where the same events were treated. All available books dealing with social criticism in the United States since the beginning of the twentieth century were checked for reference to Arnold's sphere of influence. Books like Social Ideals in English Letters by Vida D. Scudder and The World's Great Age by Philo M. Buck, Jr., were of great suggestive value. But the most substantial source of material for the present study is comprehended, in the last analysis, in Arnold's own prose works. An unpublished Master's Thesis prepared at New York University three years before the completion of the above-mentioned dissertation ("Arnold in America: A Study of Matthew Arnold's Visits in 1883 and 1886" by S. G. Link) was of considerable value in expanding certain chapters in Parts III and V.

The study falls into six interrelated parts:

1. The "Elements of Conflict," a survey of the antagonism implicit in any relationship of "The Apostle of Sweetness and
and Light" with the America of the Victorian Period.

2. "The Times" in both England and America with respect to the general state of culture and the condition of the press.


4. "Educating America," a survey of Arnold's formal prose expression on and for the United States during the last three decades of his School Inspectorship.

5. "America's Answer" through the press and in literary expression.

6. "Arnold's Ultimate Victory," a survey of the reasons for his failure initially to influence America and the signs of his effect during the fifty years since his death.

The study opens with a survey of the place the two Arnolds, father and son, occupied in English education and of beliefs which they held in common. The bearing of his early background and training on Matthew Arnold's final philosophy of education is considered. There is a brief tracing of his educational career prior to his secretaryship to Lord Lansdowne, the position which was responsible for his later appointment as Inspector of Schools. It is pointed out that most of Arnold's literary admirers "fail to realize that by profession and full-time occupation during most of his mature years, he was an educator." There is also a description of Arnold's three appointments as Foreign Assistant Commissioner to study the state of education abroad.

These investigations did much to mold his educational thinking and the bulk of his writing on education pertains to the problems involved in training "a young democracy" like France or like America. While Arnold was trying to make the British on all levels "ascertain what perfection is and to make it prevail," schoolmen throughout his province were being influenced by his personal "sweetness and light." During all this time he was writing and formulating his central philosophy; and even in his literary criticism he had a central purpose:
to "conquer the hard unintelligence" which was the bane of Philistinism, to remedy it by culture and by an increase of reasonableness, of sweetness. Arnold's educational mission is described and summed up as a sort of aesthetized Benthamism, striving for the greatest cultural good of the greatest possible cultivated number. Some views are presented of Arnold as the great Missionary of Culture and there is brief mention of his sociological analysis: English society is made up of a materialized and frivolous upper class (Barbarians), a vulgarized middle class (Philistines), and a brutalized lower class (Populace); and "America is just ourselves, with the Barbarians quite left out, and the Populace nearly." In view of his call to preach to the Philistines of the world, America offered a vast and exciting missionary field. An ultimate apostolic invasion was well-nigh inevitable.

There follows an attempt to depict the opposite set of conflicting elements, principally America's unreadiness for either Arnold or his theory by virtue of a great prejudice that had been growing in America for nearly a century against visiting foreigners. Twelve years before the Apostolic Invasion, James Russell Lowell crystallized American resentment in his essay "On a Certain Condescension in Foreigners." There is a careful survey of British visitors to America and their "condescensions" prior to Lowell's assumption of leadership in the "defence of America," followed by a view of the reactions immediately subsequent. There is discussion of "the running sore made by British arrogance" and of the situation which Arnold was destined to face if he tried actively to educate America. The conclusion here is inevitable: "Not only was Denver, in the words of the prophecy made to the Bishop of Rochester, not ready for Mr. Arnold; America was not ready..."

The fourth part, "Educating America," devoted to Arnold's formal prose utterance, offers first a preliminary survey of the sweep of his educational contribution. With a survey now behind us of the "elements in the conflict," the general state of culture in Arnold's day, the press as representative of the anti-culture, and a comprehensive view of Arnold's private development with respect to the matters at hand, we are free to examine the formal prose utterance during the three decades when Inspector of Schools Arnold was readying his theories for application to "young democracies." Unhampered by the need for biographical or historical explanations, the three important decades are studied in the following chronological arrangement:
1. The decade 1859-1868 during which the first two visits as Foreign Assistant Commissioner were made. This period produced Popular Education on the Continent (1861), wherein Arnold formulated a national policy of education which was to be free from the two dread dangers: Prussianization and Americanization. During most of this period he was Professor of Poetry at Oxford; his educational utterances under this aegis are here considered. In A French Eton (1864) he continued his discussion of education in a democratic state and made certain prognostications for the coming America. Following the second foreign inspection, he produced Schools and Universities on the Continent and Higher Schools and Universities in Germany, both analyzed here with respect to their contribution for the present purpose. A summary is offered of Arnold's dicta to "nations about to build anew their school systems."

2. "Sweetness and Light," the decade 1869-1878. Under this heading comes the presentation of Arnold's great contribution to the field of social satire, Friendship's Garland, about one-fifth of which attacks the problem of compulsory education. (Here is perhaps the first satirical attack on the institution of the Ph.D.). In this book Arnold sums up in lighter vein all his previous thinking in the matter of the sin of Philistinism and prepares the ground for his great serious treatise, Culture and Anarchy. At last the rounded theory is here formulated and the cultural needs of England and America laid pitilessly bare. Culture, the pursuit of our total perfection, is the force he hopes to harness so that a "stream of fresh and free thought" may be turned upon our stock notions and habits; it is to lead to "a harmonious perfection, developing all sides of our humanity, and a general perfection, developing all parts of our society." And he finds that "in culture and totality," America falls short. In this book he displays how culture, balancing the Hebraic and the Hellenic, "must win in the end the battle for sweetness and light against the thraldom of the dark." There is here presented a summary of Arnold's cultural aims, especially with respect to the indispensability of 'sweetness and light' for America...
This work attempts to examine the entire corpus of Karl Mannheim's work in the light of the societies in which he lived: Hungary during the first two decades of this century, Germany during the Weimar Republic (1919-1933), and England during the 1930's and 1940's. Rather than trying to establish direct causal ties between the three societies, the important intellectual currents and the ideas of Mannheim, I have tried to show the interaction of theory and praxis and the alternatives which this interaction presented to him. In this respect, his work, particularly *Ideology and Utopia*, has had an important methodological influence upon me.

I have placed primary emphasis upon German society, especially upon the German university community, since that institution was the most important force in Mannheim's career. My analyses of the other two societies emphasize modifications of, continuance of and/or divergence from the basic patterns identified in German society. The analysis of German society aims at neither comprehensiveness nor balance, but rather emphasizes the problems facing Mannheim and his fellow academicians. For the latter, almost all of whom could be classified as conservative or moderate, the most important social issue was the conflict between the traditional forces rooted in the German empire and the progressive forces identified with industrial democracy, liberal or Marxist.

This social dualism was bound up with intellectual dualisms which pitted an organic *Weltanschauung* against a mechanistic one. The two most important of these dualisms were:

1. *Gemeinschaft* (organic pre-industrial society) versus *Gesellschaft* (mechanistic industrial society) and

2. *Geisteswissenschaften* (especially the philosophical-historical sciences) versus *Naturwissenschaften* (positivistic natural sciences)
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and those social sciences modelled on the latter. Most German academics opposed a mechanistic, or positivistic, approach to social science. This opposition meant a rejection of orthodox Marxian sociology, which remained outside the university. However, many moderates recognized the impossibility of the conservatives' rejection not only of Marxian sociology and democracy, but also of all sociology and democracy. The problem of such moderates, e.g., Max Weber, was to find some sort of compromise between the two sides of the organic-mechanistic dualism, to reject Marxist sociology and Marxist democracy without rejecting sociology and democracy.

Mannheim was one of these moderates. He advocated overcoming the dualism through a third approach, a structural synthesis. This trichotomy—organic, mechanistic, structural—was to remain throughout his writings. However, the conceptual content within this schema was constantly changing. I have divided this content into five temporal stages—three basic stages defined by the nature of the envisioned structural synthesis, and two transitional stages. The first of the basic stages, which began with Mannheim's early Hungarian writings, portrayed the synthesis as philosophical; the second, the high point of which was *Ideology and Utopia*, portrayed it as the sociology of knowledge; the third, developed most fully in the later English writings, portrayed it as social planning. At each succeeding stage Mannheim advocated a more important role for sociology than before, which increased the distance between him and the conservatives who dominated the German universities.

Matthew Arnold's views of the three classes may not be deduced simply from a reading of *Culture and Anarchy*. The purpose of that work made it necessary for him to heighten and simplify his class views and to give them a symmetry of form which they did not in fact possess. They were not neat; rather they were the complicated and changing products of his complete experience, they were rooted in the society in which he was raised, and they conditioned his views on practical, specific affairs and issues.

*Matthew Arnold and the Three Classes* first examines at length Arnold's family and school background in an effort to discover the point of view from which he saw himself and his society. From his father he learned the nature of authority, the necessity for it, and the resentment it arouses in those on whom it is imposed. Rugby and Balliol, both training grounds for the established order, made a stratified society seem the "natural" one. In the 'forties, Oxford Liberalism was primarily religious rather than political, and the notions of social reform there current aimed to correct specific abuses within the existing order and did not threaten the order itself. Arnold and his friends found it possible to seek desirable personal goals and ambitions within the existing social structure.

Arnold saw the ruling segment of the Whig aristocracy close at hand during his four years as secretary to Lord Lansdowne. Though he came to know these aristocrats when their political effectiveness was waning, their large culture and gentle manners drew him to them and affected his writing about them. He knew that the future was not theirs and that enormous evils flowed from the abuses of privilege. But he was nevertheless eager for their good opinion. He sought always to mitigate the abuses of the class and to soften the charges he made against it. He insisted more on its virtues than on its vices. For its part, the aristocracy was not hostile to Arnold. He was courted by great society, his circle of aristocratic friends was large, and he enjoyed the attention they paid him.

A chapter on the populace separates and describes the strands of feeling which made up Arnold's views of this class. His fundamental attitudes were developed by 1848, were modified by his French inspection tour of 1859, and were further modified by the political and social disturbances of the mid-'sixties. Infected by the age's "panic fear of revolt," Arnold did scant justice to the populace, especially to its rising and responsible segment of urban workmen.

Though technically Arnold was a member of the middle classes,
Patrick J. McCarthy

his family's position within the Establishment and his education gave him a sense of superiority and apartness. His long years as a school inspector made him closely acquainted with the middle classes, but this knowledge never warmed into sympathetic understanding. That the middle classes were largely composed of Dissenters and that political dissent threatened the existence of the Establishment made it difficult for Arnold to be objective. Philistine became a term of general opprobrium and most frequently was applied to the political Dissenters. For a time Arnold tried "to charm the wild beast of Philistinism," but he was too much out of sympathy with dissent to sustain the effort.

A final chapter examines the interrelation of the Irish Home Rule crisis in the 'eighties and Arnold's many-sided views on class. Under the stress of this crisis, Arnold's concern for England's greatness brought to the fore his distrust of the working classes and his preference for strong central authority.


Alexander Melville Bell was active as an elocutionist and as a phonetician for more than fifty years. Through his teaching and lecturing in Scotland, in England, and in America and through the publication of numerous books and pamphlets he won considerable recognition from his colleagues and from later students of speech.

Bell believed elocution to be an art the mastery of which demands an understanding of the principles of expression and a command over the mechanics of expression. In 1849 he published a comprehensive textbook, A New Elucidation of the Principles of Speech and Elocution, the elocutionary portions of which he revised several times as the Second, the Third, the Fourth, and the Fifth Elocutionary Manual and the phonetic portions of which he similarly revised in successive editions of Principles of Speech and Dictionary
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of Sounds.

He began his elocutionary instruction with an analysis of sound elements and then progressed to a study of syllabic composition, of word stress, of grammatical grouping for the expression of thought, and finally of the techniques necessary for an artistic expression of thought and feeling. He believed notations to be a valuable teaching aid and used them liberally to illustrate his elocutionary precepts. Bell claimed to have followed no other author in regard to his theory and his practice, but a marked similarity is apparent between the elocutionary tenets of Bell and of four writers who preceded him—Thomas Sheridan, John Walker, Rev. Gilbert Austin, and Dr. James Rush. The similarities are more apparent in Bell's early publications than in his later ones.

Bell considered phonetics to include "all oral effects of speech and their graphic representations." In 1849 he published his first sound classification comprising 37 "articulations" and 21 vowels, the latter arranged in a Triple Column Scale of labial, labio-lingual, and lingual varieties. In 1864 he published a revised classification of sounds comprising 36 vowels, 54 consonants, and 12 glides which he said are all the sounds possible in any language. Certain parts of Bell's analysis and classification of sounds resemble theories previously expressed by Bishop John Wilkins, John Wallis, Baron de Kempelen, William Holder, Robert Willis, Alexander John Ellis, and Karl Lepsius.

To clarify his phonetic teaching Bell utilized three kinds of sound notation and revised some of his schemes several times. The first type is based upon an understanding of alphabetic characters and includes his World English alphabet, his numbered vowels, and respelled, italicized, or capitalized consonant letters. The second type is based upon arbitrary symbols and includes his Shorthand and his Line Writing systems. Visible Speech, the third type and his best known notation, is based upon an alphabet of pictorial symbols representing the physiological formation of sounds. There is a noticeable similarity between Bell's World English alphabet and the phonetic alphabets of Ellis and Isaac Pitman, between the shorthand alphabets of Bell and Pitman, and between the linear and the pictorial alphabets of Bell and Wilkins.

It is concluded that Bell is important as an elocutionist because of his personality and because of his ability to synthesize the ideas of others clearly rather than because he made any outstanding original contribution to the teaching of elocution. It is concluded that he is

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important as a phonetician because in addition to his ability to explain ideas clearly he contributed new information to the study of vowels and invented the first practical phonetic alphabet based upon the physiology of sounds.


I. Life (1748-1832) and Intellectual Background

Jeremy Bentham, during his early life and study at Oxford, was greatly impressed by the success of natural science. In the preface of an unpublished and incomplete work, he dedicated himself to extending the method of the physical sciences to the social sciences. "What Bacon was to the physical sciences, Helvetius was to the moral. The moral world has therefore its Bacon, but its Newton is yet to come."

In addition, he adopted from Priestley and Beccaria the principle that the state should be devoted to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Combining this with the scientific atomism of his day, he declared that happiness was to be measured in the units of pleasure and pain enjoyed or suffered by individual members of society. Like the atoms treated by reagents in the hands of Dalton and the chemists, the individuals in the state were to be conditioned for social purposes by specific quantities of pleasure and pain applied to them by legislators and magistrates.

Bentham's study of law following his graduation from Oxford did not make him a practicing attorney, but a student and writer on social and legal problems. His principal writings deal with civil and criminal codes, but they treat as well of policies in administration, the poor laws, ethics, prison reform, and education.

The Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789) is generally accepted as the definitive statement of Bentham's general position. In it he eschews all metaphysical investigation, as well as all considerations of private ethics, and confines himself to the study of public morals as influenced by the legislator. Both as a matter of fact and as a matter of duty, men are influenced by the principle of utility: avoid-
ance of pain and seeking for pleasure. Actions are judged by their ability to increase pleasures and diminish pains. Any other standard for morals is either subordinate or unintelligible. Bentham is especially the enemy of every abstract and general principle (except that of utility) as a standard of action. His ideal would be a quantitative balancing of pleasures against pains, with equal pleasures and pains canceling each other like the credit and debit sides of a bookkeeper's ledger. But in actual practice the legislator cannot go to all this trouble; he is forced to deal with circumstances of the second order, like sex, race, education, profession, and climate, instead of examining pleasures and pains at their primary sources. The legislator has various punishments or sanctions at his disposal; of these, those of law and public opinion are the principal ones. Most of the Principles is devoted to the manner in which legislators can apply these sanctions to the prevention of crime.

In 1791, Bentham began to publish on the use of a circular or polygonal building which he called the Panopticon as a device for the furtherance of prison reform. Encouraged by the government, he devoted nearly all his fortune to the scheme. The inspector or warden was to be placed in a central court from which he could view everything that occurred, and apply punishment immediately upon the infraction of regulations. Bentham saw in this scheme of architecture a solution for all the social problems of his day, including poorhouses and schools as well as prisons. After 18 years of labor in the cause, when his fortune was practically spent, the government gave up the plan and remunerated Bentham for his expenditures.

Had Bentham's life followed the normal course, he would then at the age of 65 been a broken man. But, in 1809, he met James Mill, who was to become the channel through which his ideas were made known to the world. Mill brought to Bentham's house influential and progressive men like Lord Brougham, Place, Romilly, Roebuck, and James Mill's greater son, John Stuart Mill. Some of these men sat in Parliament, and through them Bentham became one of the most decisive influences for legal reform in nineteenth century England. In addition, he founded the Westminster Review as a journal of opinion in favor of his views. When he died in 1832, Bentham's followers were hard at work for his program.

The intellectual atmosphere in which Bentham worked was opposed to any show of enthusiasm. Men were believed to be conditioned by reason and prudence; Malthus had proposed that the poor
solve the problem of overpopulation by moral restraint. Bentham believed that men in the mass were governed by the same rational calculation of pleasures and pains as individual men. Legislators could solve all social problems by judicious application of pleasures and pains to the individual units which compose the social aggregate.

English education in Bentham's time followed no systematic plan. The Church and private charity provided elementary education for a few; the upper classes received secondary education in the so-called public schools; a small minority of the upper classes attended the university. The Industrial Revolution raised educational problems which were partially solved by Sunday Schools, where instruction in reading the Bible (in some cases writing and arithmetic) was provided for factory children on the day of rest. Andrew Bell and Joseph Lancaster proposed the monitory plan of instruction, using the argument of economy and efficiency and calling to mind the methods of production in factories. By this method, one master taught up to 1,000 children by appointing monitors from among the pupils over groups of 100 who in turn divided the school into groups of 10 on the same plan.

To further the plan on a subscription basis, two societies were organized, the National Society by the Established Church and the British and Foreign Society by Dissenters and Radicals. Parliament eventually came to appropriate money to the two societies for the purpose of building schoolhouses and for the training of teachers. Bentham's friends supported the British and Foreign Society and proposed to extend the plan to cover secondary education for the well-to-do.

Bentham was brought into the scheme to prepare a curriculum and plan methods of instruction for the school, which he did in a work entitled Chrestomathia. His writings on the Chrestomathic Secondary School, together with his plan for the education of the poor in connection with the Houses of Industry organized on the Panopticon plan, comprise Bentham's systematic work on education.

The plan for a secondary school failed both because of lack of funds and because of the inevitable quarrel on religion between Dissenters and Radicals. The importance of Bentham's work lies in its theoretical possibilities and in the influence it had on schools other than those he and his friends proposed to found.
II. General Point of View on Education

Bentham touched the subject of education at many places in his writings outside of his specific proposals for the education of the poor and well-to-do. The general background of these writings is legal and starts from his theory of status or domestic relations.

Parent and child have a definite legal status from which flows certain rights and certain duties. One of the duties of the parent is the education of children; the law makes the parent a sort of inferior judge or "domestic magistrate" for this purpose. Like the civil magistrate, the parent may apply punishment; his control is much more extensive than that of the ordinary civil magistrate. Best of all, the domestic magistrate has at his command an "inexhaustible store" of rewards.

Where the parent is too poor, or otherwise incapacitated, the state assumes the burden of domestic magistracy. When it establishes schools, it has a perfect right to derive a financial as well as a moral profit from them. But the parent rather than the state is fundamentally responsible; Bentham never was able to bring himself to think of the state as primarily responsible for public education.

He nevertheless believed education one of the main responsibilities of any system of government. In his Constitutional Code, he provided an Education Minister, who was to have entire charge of teaching and administrative personnel, to study and improve conditions, to prepare reports for parliament based on his studies, and to draft new legislation. With regard to education undertaken under private auspices his functions were to be purely regulatory.

In addition, Bentham suggested a scheme for adult education. Experts in human and veterinary medicine, chemistry, physics, botany, horticulture, and farming were to be allotted to every 30 or 40 mile-square districts in England to inform and train citizens in the latest practical developments in these arts; and libraries were to be provided for the private study of legislation, history, philosophy, and such other subjects as might interest adults. In the classics and history, Bentham had little interest. He says nothing of the cost of such a program.

The only type of school architecture admitted is the Panopticon. Under the management of a private company, a school for the poor constructed on this plan, and using the labor of its inmates, would yield financial profit to the shareholders; the pupils would get food, health, morality, and instruction; and the public would be re-
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lieved from the necessity of supporting the poor and would gain instructed, loyal, and healthy citizens.

III. The Education of the Poor

The enormous expenditures of the English government for the relief of the poor led Bentham to prepare a plan for Houses of Industry with a view to placing the poor on a self-supporting basis. He proposed a joint-stock company, the National Charity Company, on the model of the Bank of England or the East India Company with the power to apprehend and confine paupers, and to derive a profit from their labor not exceeding five per cent. Children as well as adults in the Houses of Industry were to engage in gainful occupations and be assigned the status of legally-bound apprentices.

From the labor of these pauper children, the Company would derive whatever profit it could. The child would get intellectual, moral, and religious instruction, habits of frugality, protection against vice and crime, security of employment in the apprenticeship stage and afterwards, in many cases, as an employee of the Company. The public would get relief from taxation and a body of useful citizens.

To save the expense of masters, pupils would instruct each other. A few of the superior pupils would be taught by the masters, and these in turn would instruct others. Bentham wrote in the same year Bell published his first work on the monitorial plan, but may have derived his ideas on instruction by pupils from Paulet's beggar schools in Paris rather than from Bell.

Bentham suggests that the plan may be extended to what he called the self-supporting poor, which comprises nineteen-twentieths of the population. Here he approaches the subject of general public instruction. He is so sanguine in his hopes for the success of the plan that he believes the education of the well-to-do might conceivably be organized on the same plan, thus reversing the usual scheme of modelling the education of the poor on that of the rich. At least, the plan affords an unparalleled opportunity for educational experiment.

Education does not have a single outcome, but a multitude of them, and Bentham proposes careful planning to attain all possible desirable objectives. Increase of happiness or "comforts" of the poor is the objective to which all others are subservient. He does not favor a recreational program; he is too serious in his thinking; rest is to be
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reduced to a minimum, and recreation is a by-product of useful, interesting work. Instruction is to begin at the earliest stage at which physical capacity permits and administered in as large a quantity as experience has shown it capable of being absorbed. As soon as the apprentice demonstrates that he is a useful member of society, he is to be liberated or promoted within the Company.

The House of Industry would not only educate its wards, but it would provide for the increase and dissemination of knowledge. The system of bookkeeping would not only yield information as to the best methods of pauper management and education, but it would also serve to increase our knowledge of medicine, dietetics, domestic management, child care, the trades, and of bookkeeping itself.

Discipline is a product of the Panopticon architecture. Where every offense committed is known as soon as committed, and can be punished on the spot, there will be few offenses committed.

We can not be certain to-day that Bentham's National Charity Company would have been so devoted to the public good as he supposed, or that the interests of the poor, the public, and the Company could have been identified by any such artifice as his. But he did conceive education for the poor from a genuinely social viewpoint, and wanted real benefits for them. In the determination of the curriculum and on the question of discipline, he was too authoritarian by contemporary standards, but he did want to give the poor genuine educational advantages.

IV. The Education of the Well-To-Do

Bentham's friends James Mill and Francis Place had proposed applying the monitorial plan to the secondary instruction of the middle classes. Bentham set about with his usual thoroughness to prepare plans, which were published under the title of Chrestomathia in 1816. In the course of his treatment of the problem, he devoted a great deal of interesting investigation to side issues, like the problems of language and mathematical instruction. The proposed school failed because of religious differences among its supporters and for lack of necessary funds.

Two Chrestomathic Tables with comments upon them set forth respectively the curriculum of the proposed school and the methods of instruction. The program is divided into five stages to be completed.
at the age of 14, when apprenticeship usually begins. The method of instruction is the monitory plan of Bell and Lancaster. The work was intended as a prospectus of the proposed Chrestomathic school, but it serves likewise as a vehicle for Bentham’s general thinking on secondary education.

Bentham starts his discussion with advantages instead of objectives. Interestingly enough, he does not mention increase of earning power as one of the advantages of education. Learning brings the respect of one’s fellows and provides security against the boredom which often fixes itself on retired men of affairs. In addition, the graduates of such a school, like the graduates of the English public schools, will have faithful, devoted, lifelong companions. An educated man has habits of order; his knowledge of health is an insurance against disease, and scientific knowledge saves him from superstition. Instruction on the monitory plan is economical. Least useful subjects are taught last, in case a pupil is compelled to drop out before completing the course. Corporal punishment is all but abolished. Good scholars are given the chance to distinguish themselves. And as in the case of the schools in the Houses of Industry, the Chrestomathic School will add to the sum of human knowledge.

Bentham believed that the monitory system had justified itself well enough. He cites the teaching of the classics in the Edinburgh High School, and asks if the system has succeeded in such “crabbed and repulsive” subjects as these, how much more may be expected from a practical curriculum? The experience of Scotland and Germany has not indicated that education produces a haughty or unmanageable citizenry. He also proposes that the sciences, taught at that time as a kind of polite accomplishment to adults by the Royal Academies, be brought into the curriculum of the school for children.

The curriculum of the Chrestomathic school is radical for its times. Instead of classical training, traditional in British secondary education, Bentham would have a course in general language primarily devoted to the improvement of English, but which could serve as a foundation for the study of other tongues. Formal mathematics, the logical arrangement of arithmetic and geometry, is deferred until the pupils have had wide acquaintance with practical applications and may, if necessary, be omitted altogether. At various stages of instruction, a whole host of subjects new in his time are proposed in their elementary forms: mechanics, botany, chemistry, zoology, human institutions (as a substitute for history), factory management, book-
keeping, mineralogy, anatomy, health, drawing, note-taking, and geography. He omits music, theology, and private ethics. The study of social sciences is deferred until the learner is more mature. Concrete learnings precede abstract ones. Everything is to be arranged in sequences, so that all instruction is dove-tailed.

V. Influence and Methods

Bentham can not be rightly said to have caused the great body of subsequent reforms in English education, but he expresses clearly many of the phases through which it was passing; and through his followers he influenced its development. He was in the current of scientific discoveries, those of Linnaeus and Dalton notably, and brought their influence into his reformed curriculum.

In Parliament, his most famous followers were Lord Brougham and John Arthur Roebuck. The former attributed his lifelong devotion to the cause of social reform to Bentham; and the latter derived Bentham's ideas through John Stuart Mill. Brougham introduced bills and secured their passage for the regulation of charitable, including educational, trusts, and got appropriations for the training of teachers, the inspection of schools, and the building of schoolhouses. Roebuck took the step from which Bentham recoiled, and advocated free, compulsory, state-supported education. This was not to become a fact in England until 66 years later.

Perhaps the greatest contribution of Bentham's followers to governmental reform was the creation of the British administrative system. One of the school inspectors in the system, Hugh Seymour Tremendheere, sounded the death knell of the monitorial system which Bentham had advocated by condemning the paucity of its results and the formality of its instruction. But through Tremendheere and others, the administrative system came in time to work according to a formula true to Bentham's methods, especially those advocated in the Constitutional Code; and this formula is today the essential feature of British governmental practice: inquiry, legislation, execution, inspection, and report.

Bentham's ideal of social method proposed a quantitative arithmetic of pleasures and pains, equal pleasures and pains cancelling each other, and sanctions applied quantitatively to the remainder to produce desired results. In practice, he was not able to carry out this
ideal, though he never lost faith that it was the basis of human action. Instead, in education as in every other field he investigated, he relies on classification rather than mathematical analysis. In this respect, he is "the Linnaeus rather than the Newton of the moral world."

A comparison of Bentham's social methods with those of John Stuart Mill, Wilhelm Dilthey, J. Rueff, and John Dewey reveals remarkable likenesses as well as outstanding differences. Bentham, Mill, Dilthey, and Dewey base social method on psychology, while Rueff insists on logic and mathematics as the basis of all knowledge. Bentham, however, treats his data as though they were of mathematical origin. Dilthey emphasizes the necessity for sympathetic historical understanding of facts; Bentham and Dewey are somewhat antihistorical, Bentham more so than Dewey. All, with the possible exception of Dilthey, are interested in the formulation of plans of action. But all insist on the careful analysis of primary facts and faithfully following them to conclusions. No social philosopher of any time has been more in touch with crucial problems than Bentham or has done more to influence practical solutions of them.

In his educational philosophy, Bentham approaches all questions from a legal viewpoint. He finds the basis for education in the relation of parent and child; when the state assumes this function, it does so only as a substitute.

He contributed to the introduction of more humane methods in the schools by his opposition to corporal punishment. Like Benjamin Franklin, he thought that there were more useful subjects available than the classics. Education has diversified outcomes; Bentham proposed carefully to plan for them. The schools should keep abreast of new developments in science, and have a genuine interest in the increase as well as the dissemination of knowledge. Every problem of education, like every other social problem, should be carefully investigated and described in intelligible language.

Viewed from the present day, Bentham must be charged with certain blindnesses. In the first place, he was insensitive to certain branches of instruction, like history and the fine arts. Second, he did not realize the value of play and recreation. Third, he failed to provide for a teacher with professional rights and duties.

This last shortcoming is common to many legally and administratively minded men. Bentham considered human beings in the mass, and sought to confer on them a sort of statistical mean of happiness. But this very shortcoming gave coherence to his thinking.
on any problem he attacked and provided him and his followers with a strong working program.

Source: DAI, XXXVI, 11A (May, 1976), 7248-A. XUM Order No. 76-10,566.

This dissertation examines the place the idea of the perfectibility of man has in the writings of Matthew Arnold. Perfection was an idea he argued for consistently in his prose work, from the political and social theorizing of Culture and Anarchy to the reports he wrote on schools as an Inspector. Perfection as an idea had its currency in the nineteenth century chiefly in the notion of progress; what Arnold sought was to humanize progress which, in the hands of those he called the Philistines, was a material progress mainly concerned with the development of industrial capitalism. Arnold set out the values by which he believed human life could become whole and perfected—values embodied in his wide-ranging term "culture"—and attempted to persuade his countrymen that the way to human perfection lay not in the increase of wealth and manufactures but in the increase of knowledge, understanding, and human sympathy. His perspective was that of a humanist and he was, perhaps, one of the most influential writers in the humanist tradition of his age, certainly a writer whose terms have remained current in humanist thought.

At the same time as Arnold was optimistic about the improvement of man, there was a deep imaginative unease in him—a prefiguring of the more bleak modern existential view of the world—which ran counter to his social optimism. His poems expressed this in eloquent and despairing ways. On the one hand he was a School Inspector seeing in the development of schools the great democratic reform of the century; on the other hand he was the poet who wrote of ignorant armies clashing by night. His response to his time is revealing both of the complexity of the time and of the depth of his own perception. In examining his idea of perfection we are at the bedrock of his idea of man.
The argument of the dissertation deals with Arnold's theoretical writing on politics and society, with his practical works in education, and with his poetic vision of the world. Chapter One traces the social and political side of Arnold's thought and his attempt, in Culture and Anarchy, to create a cohesive idea of culture that would develop the best features of life in the society. Culture, as Arnold used the term, was a complex idea that had as its aim the perfection of the individual and the society. It was an ambitious attempt to meet the increasingly complex needs of the newly democratic and industrial England of the nineteenth century. His political theory rested on two central ideas: on the idea of the State as the best organization to free society from the deadlock of its own imperfection, and on the need for what he called Hellenism, the need to see things as in themselves they really are. This chapter examines Arnold's ideas on the State and its place in the modern world, especially in relation to education, and it also examines his theory of history which is revealing of the overall structure of his arguments.

Chapter Two: Arnold's belief in education was a manifestation of his notions on perfectibility. His career as Inspector of Schools, writer on comparative education, literary critic, and defender of the humanities made him an important figure in nineteenth century education. His ideas on education are linked, both to his social and political ideas on the one hand, and to his literary theory on the other. As an Inspector of Schools he faced the major issues of education in Britain and his insights and recommendations often became educational practice. As a specific instance of how Arnold sought to apply his ideas to education, this chapter shows how he developed his notions on the teaching of literature. His belief in the formative power of literature is based on the Greek idea of mimesis; and his theory of poetics, when he applied it to education, was the practical implementation of his broader ideas on culture and perfectibility. His influence on the teaching of literature is still pertinent, and many of his assumptions about the value of a literary education are current in the modern defense of liberal education.

Chapter Three: Through Arnold's poetry a greater understanding is gained of the pessimistic private forces that gave shape and a certain ambiguity to the optimistic public side of Arnold. The public manifestation of his notions of perfectibility, those that emerge especially in the educational and social theories, are not reflective of his poetry which is despairing, doubting, and existential. He was torn
between the impulse to be reflective and solitary and the demands of an imperfect and chaotic yet insistent world. His poetry is a record of his struggle with this dilemma: his resolution was to go into the world and to try and exercise his powers in the civic life—a task he eventually undertook with optimism and hope.


Between 1531 and 1545 Sir Thomas Elyot published twelve works of prose, including a comprehensive treatise on the education of the English nobility, a Platonic dialogue on knowledge and goodness, a Lucanian dialogue on the duties of a counselor, a Latin-English dictionary, a book of medical remedies, a collection of the sayings of wise men, an edifying "life" of the Emperor Alexander Severus, a defense of women, a sermon instructing men how to prepare for death, and translations of brief works on religion, ethics, and education by Isocrates, Plutarch, St. Cyprian, and Pico della Mirandola. Elyot was primarily an educator and a moralist; hence all his works are didactic in purpose and tone. His chief aims as a writer were: to make available to his countrymen, in their own language, the wisdom, particularly the moral wisdom, of the Greeks and Romans; to foster the highest ideals of gentlemanly conduct and political morality; and to promote the establishing in England of a correct system of education for members of the governing class.

Except for brief discussions in literary histories and in various specialized studies of Renaissance thought or of other Renaissance authors, surprisingly little has been written about Elyot. The fullest treatment appears in the introduction, notes, and appendices of H. H. S. Croft's two-volume edition of the Governour (1880), where the reader will find a useful account of Elyot's life and literary career as well as a very thorough recording of the numerous sources of the Governour. More recent studies are also generally restricted to the Governour, or to a single aspect of Elyot's thought. His views on education are treated in William Harrison Woodward's Studies in Education During the Age of the Renaissance (1906). The influence
of Platonism in his writings is considered in two works: Kurt Schröder's *Platonismus in der englischen Renaissance vor und bei Thomas Eliot* (1920) and Friedrich Dannenberg's *Das Erbe Platons in England bis zu Bildung Lylys* (1932). On the question of Elyot's indebtedness to Italian authors, in particular Francesco Patrizi, two monographs offer opposing views: Josef Schlotters *Thomas Elyots "Governour" in seinem Verhältnis zu Francesco Patrizi* (1938) and Leslie Warren's *Humanistic Doctrines of the Prince from Petrarch to Sir Thomas Elyot* (1939). The relation of the Governour to the courtesy-book tradition has been discussed by several authors, most thoroughly by Ruth Kelso in *The Doctrine of the English Gentleman in the Sixteenth Century* (1929).

My own study is, I believe, the first comprehensive study of all the writings of Elyot, of the principal ideas expressed in these writings, and of his handling of material which he borrowed from classical authors. My analysis of the Platonic strain in Elyot's thought is also, so far as I am aware, the first detailed analysis of the subject in English.

The Book Named the Governour (1531) is the most important of Elyot's works. As originally planned, the Governour was to have been in two parts, the second part comprising a study of politics and law; this second part was for some reason never written, although the Image of Governance (1541) in a way takes its place. Elyot's broad aim in the Governour was to describe what things are necessary to the making of a perfect public weal. In carrying out this purpose, he may have been consciously imitating the Republic of Plato, which supplied him with the model of a perfect state. At the same time, to judge from the earnestness with which he on the one hand upholds the need for social classes and on the other attacks communistic and democratic doctrines, one of his purposes may have been to refute the political and social views and combat the influence of More's *Utopia* (1516). Other aims of the Governour are to justify the usefulness of education for gentlemen, to describe an educational curriculum for prospective governors, to offer advice to Henry VIII on how to rule wisely, to provide his countrymen with a handbook of ethics based on the teachings of the ancient moralists, and to improve the English language, mainly by the invention and exact definition of new words.

The loose organization of the Governour is to be accounted for by the number and diversity of the author's aims, by the lack of a model in the vernacular for a work of this kind, and by the fact that
the book is unfinished. In general, the plan of the Governour is determined by the author's views regarding the best method of establishing a just public weal. He believes that the essential need is for good governors, and that good governors can be produced through a proper system of education—a system that takes into account the intellectual, moral, and physical well-being of the student. Accordingly, in Book I he defines a just public weal and outlines a plan of education for the future governors during their childhood and adolescence; in Books II and III he analyzes for these prospective governors, now young men, the virtues and manners necessary in one who is to rule wisely.

The Governour is a composite of several literary types. It most nearly resembles the prince's mirror, examples of which are numerous in ancient, medieval, and Renaissance literature. The broad structure of the Governour, its partial aim, and many of Elyot's ideas on government are adapted from such well-known examples of the prince's mirror as Isocrates' To Nicocles (translated by Elyot in 1534 as the Doctrinal of Princes), John of Salisbury's Policraticus (1159), St. Thomas Aquinas' De regimine principum (c. 1265), Erasmus' Education of a Christian Prince (1516), and Francesco Patrizi's De regno et regis institutione (1518). The Governour is also in some respects a book of courtesy, like Castiglione's Courtier (1528), with which it has many ideas in common. As an educational treatise the Governour is similar to the writings of the fifteenth-century Italian humanist educators and to the De ratione studii (1511) and De pueris instituendis (1529) of Erasmus. And finally, as a handbook of ethics, it roughly follows the plan of Cicero's De officiis.

For his views on many important subjects Elyot's is greatly indebted to ancient authors, especially to Plato, Cicero, Aristotle, Plutarch, Isocrates, Seneca, and Quintilian. In varying degree, all these authors contribute to his general concept of virtue and to his definitions and analyses of the individual virtues. Apart from the dialogues of Plato, the works which he draws upon most heavily for his ethical opinions are the De officiis and Tusculan Disputations of Cicero and the Nicomachian Ethics of Aristotle. Of somewhat more limited value are the De amicitia of Cicero, Plutarch's Lives and Moralia, and the Letters and Moral Essays of Seneca.

From Quintilian's Institutio oratoria, Plutarch's Education of Children (translated by Elyot c. 1535), writings of Italian humanists of the fifteenth century, and Erasmus come Elyot's most significant ideas
on education: that the end of training is public service, that good and wise rulers are produced through education, that education must begin in earliest childhood and must seek to develop the whole man, and that the teacher must adapt his methods and the curriculum to the bent of the individual child. Cicero's De oratore and Quintilian's Institutio furnish him the ideal of the scholar-statesman.

The most pervasive influence in Elyot’s thought is exerted by Plato, or Platonism. It is visible in almost all his writings, but is most clearly seen in the Governour and the dialogue Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man (1533), the latter being a conscious imitation of the Platonic dialogue. By quotation, by reference, and by the assimilation of ideas, Elyot shows knowledge of the Republic, Laws, Apology, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Statesman, Meno, Epistles, Alcibiades I, Cratylus, Ion, Symposium, Euthydemos, and Epinomis. By and large this knowledge seems to have been acquired at first hand, although doubtless some of it came by way of the later Platonists, notably Cicero, Ficino, Pico della Mirandola, and Erasmus. Most strongly affected by the Platonic philosophy are Elyot’s views on politics, psychology, and ethics.

The concept of world order on which Elyot’s whole philosophy is based originated in the Timaeus, but had been greatly modified by Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, and Christian notions. His concept of the ordered state, on the other hand, although owing much to medieval theory, draws strength and clarity from principles laid down in the Republic and Laws. Ideas relating to the philosopher-king, to the responsibilities of governing, and to the principles of equity and true nobility derive from the Republic, Laws, Statesman, and Epistle VII.

Elyot’s views on psychology are generally in accord with the naturalistic theories of Aristotle and Galen, but in several particulars he seems to have followed Plato. Throughout the Governour and the dialogue Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man, there is heavy emphasis on the Platonic-Christian dualism of soul and body, intelligible and sensible, and reason and passion—ideas which originated in the Phaedo and Phaedrus. Elyot’s remarks on order in the soul are based on passages in the Republic, and to explain the effect of the body on the soul he seems to have preferred the moral interpretation of the Timaeus to the more scientific account of Galen. Elyot’s epistemology is wholly Platonic, being founded on the theories of knowledge as recollection, from the Meno, Timaeus, and Phaedo;
intellectual midwifery, from the *Theaetetus*; and cognition, from the *Republic*.

The influence of Plato and the Platonic tradition is also seen in Elyot's beliefs that happiness lies in the possession of goodness and wisdom, that virtue is one and indivisible, that virtue is knowledge and therefore can be taught, and that wisdom is knowledge in action. Most of these ideas appear in the dialogue *Of the Knowledge Which Maketh a Wise Man*, and are drawn from the *Alcibiades I, Republic, Apology, Phaedo, Meno, Euthydemus, Epistle VII*, and *Epinomis*.

Statements in the *Governour* that Plato approached nearest to Christianity make explicit what many signs in Elyot's writings point to: that in his opinion the ancient moralists, far from being harmful to the Christian, actually supported and confirmed him in his faith. Elyot thus takes his place beside men like John of Salisbury, Petrarch, Erasmus, Spenser, and Milton in the great tradition of Christian humanism.


The scholarship of John Nichols (1745-1826), best known for his *Literary Anecdotes* (9 vols., 1812-16), has received increasing attention in recent years, but the best available biographical accounts of Nichols are out of date. By consolidating information from previous biographies, from Nichols's own works, from unpublished manuscripts, and from recent articles and dissertations, this study sets out a fuller account of Nichols's life than has previously been available.

Nichols's character—gregarious and charming, politically and religiously conservative—is related to the nature of his scholarship: with a passion for factual authenticity fostered by his antiquarianism, he turned to the editing of eighteenth century English literature and to the writing of anecdotal literary history as ways of preserving a potentially endangered historical continuity. Partner and successor to the younger William Bowyer, Nichols inherited Bowyer's scholarly
interests and his wide circle of literary acquaintances—assets which helped to establish Nichols as, in Gibbon's phrase, "one of the last of the learned printers in Europe."

As editor and printer of the Gentleman's Magazine, as parliamentary printer, and as printer to the Royal Society and the Society of Antiquaries, Nichols had ample opportunities to turn his gregariousness to scholarly account; his accomplishments as a compiler of accurate and extensive biographical information about his predecessors and contemporaries are unparalleled.

Unpublished information about Nichols's personal life helps to convey a clearer sense of his personality: his veneration for the past derives partly from his gratitude to Bowyer, his benefactor; his scholarly accuracy is related to his desire for candor and integrity in business and friendship; and his indefatigable energy as a researcher and collector derives from his desire to preserve the most valuable aspects of the past.

Nichols's place in the history of scholarly printing and his relation to earlier scholar-printers is also discussed. A final chapter traces the history of a single project: Nichols's edition of Swift's works.


This study examines Sydney Smith's writings on education within the context of the social and moral changes taking place in Smith's day. When Smith, an Anglican clergyman, was born in 1771, England was still rural and patriarchal. When he died in 1845, almost seventy-five years later, nearly half of England's people lived in cities, and the process of industrialization was in high gear. Too, the older Christian theology, already drained of much of its substance by rationalist critiques, was subjected to even ruder handling by the French Revolution.

Like many of his contemporaries, Smith believed that the changes taking place had undermined traditional institutions, thereby
leaving men without specific and concrete guides for behavior. with the French Revolution a constant reminder, he argued that the break-down of traditional constraints could lead to widespread instability and the end of social peace. Accordingly, he argued for reform.

Reform was the major theme in Smith's approach to society and social problems. He believed that all societies changed, and that what once served society well might no longer do so. Believing that all institutions, even the church, were merely means to an end—the welfare of men and society—he insisted that they be subjected to constant and vigorous reformation. Religious, political, and, most importantly, educational institutions should, he argued, be brought into line with men's needs and wishes. Thus it was to education, more than to any other single influence, that Smith looked for meaningful and lasting change.

Although he did not believe that education was a panacea, he did believe that it represented the best chance for both the individual's and society's well-being. He argued for the education of the poor on the grounds that both they and society had a major stake in their welfare. He also attacked the poor moral environment within the public schools and the exclusive attention given to the classics at both the public schools and the universities. These institutions were not, he believed, preparing society's future leaders for their proper roles. Finally, he argued for improvements in women's education so that women too could enhance their own lives and contribute their talents to the larger society. There was, Smith believed, a direct relationship between education and social stability.

But Smith's emphasis on reform, especially in education, was marked by a conflict between, on the one hand, the older Christian conceptions of man as a moral agent and society as a moral enterprise, conceptions which leaned heavily on tradition and authority, and, on the other, an essentially rationalist ethos which saw man as an enlightened and progressive being. When Smith spoke of the educational process itself, he did so in Lockean terms, that is, as a means of inducting the young in the traditional values, conventions, and ideals of society. But when, for example, he attacked the classical tradition, he did so on the grounds that society was advancing and that reason, rather than tradition or authority, was the surest guide to society's welfare. Smith, then, was faced with what has by now become a classic problem in education—that of conducting what many believe is essentially a moral enterprise—education—in a society that is in-
Lawrence Patrick Mannion

creasingly rationalist and secular.


Are there relationships between new communications technologies and social and cultural revolutions? Communications processes and media are related to such changes by many scholars, including C. H. Cooley, H. A. Innis, and Marshall McLuhan. Those efforts produce fascinating but largely unresearchable concepts and ideas.

Most works on communications and change study only mass media. Other media should be studied. Computers, for example, affect parts of society—science in particular—the mass media affect little, if at all. But ordinary ways of studying computer-related social change illustrate the same difficulties besetting communications studies.

When examining technology and change, two contradictory conclusions repeatedly emerge: Technology opens new vistas, enriching the life of man; and new technology disintegrates society and mind, degrading culture and human dignity. There is evidence with every technology for both conclusions. A dialectical approach to opposing processes—for example, changing and changeless, adapting and adapted—develops concepts for uniting those conclusions.

A paradigm explaining that approach is developed through ideas from systems and other philosophers (A. N. Whitehead, Ervin Laszlo, Milic Capek, Karl Popper, Ernst Cassirer), historians, and social scientists. This paradigm leads to valid means for investigating change and the relations between new media and revolutions.

176. MARIAMPOLSKI, Hyman (Ph. D.). "The Dilemmas of Utopian

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The dissertation applies a sociological perspective in an analysis of the experiment in communitarianism established by Robert Owen at New Harmony, Indiana, in the years 1824-1827.

Developing a rational and methodological approach for a humanistic historical sociology, an attempt is made to utilize principles drawn from research into social movements and communal experiments in an explanation of the rise and demise of the venture. Theory, thus, is used as a guide in providing an understanding of a historical situation.

The type of organization here called a utopian community is distinguished by its being a voluntaristic and solidarity intensive group existing as a sectarian outpost in a larger society. As such, its institutionalization demands the solution of specific organizational problems. An extended discussion is developed showing how the fiasco at New Harmony can be understood as a consequence of the failure to promote these organizational requirements.

After speculation on the growth of Owenite ideology in response to the Industrial Revolution, the plans for the implementation of these ideas in the Indiana frontier village are described. We conclude that the failure of the New Harmony movement to become institutionalized may be understood with reference to six factors:

1. The inability to promote ideological certainty;
2. Ineffective methods of recruitment and socialization;
3. The failure to build feelings of economic reciprocity;
4. The inability to promote commitment to the central group at the expense of other foci of allegiance;
5. The absence of mechanisms fostering political legitimacy;
6. Ineffective boundary maintaining processes.

177. MARIZ, George Eric (Ph. D.). "The Life and Work of L. T. Hob-
George Eric Mariz

This study arose from the author's interest in the origins and rise of modern social science and his concern with the course of modern thought in general. The rise of social science was undoubtedly part of a general trend to bring man's understanding of social phenomena more completely into agreement with known scientific truths. Moreover, this tendency was itself part of a wider and well-established tradition among Western thinkers, extending back at least as far as the Greeks, to interpret social phenomena in terms of the sciences or scientific principles which have dominated a particular historical period. In addition to contemporary rhetoric and the principles of the dominant sciences, however, there are longer lived influences which form the core of all man's thought. More particularly, this view of ideas and their historical importance contends that the historian of ideas can usually divide ideas into two distinct parts: the rhetoric born of immediate influences and the longer-term currents which concern the basic problems of human social and individual existence. In the works of the subject of this essay, L. T. Hobhouse, and perhaps in the whole evolution of social science, the rhetoric changed, while the basic assumptions about man remained the same, and not without good reason.

In late nineteenth century England Liberal ideology both as a general outlook and as a political program was losing favor. This decline owed less to any inherent weakness in Liberalism as a political or social philosophy than to the rhetoric which supported it. In short, the evidence which men marshalled to buttress Liberal ideology seemed increasingly irrelevant. An age which more and more regarded natural science and especially biological science and biological principles as the solution to its problems recognized the need to refurbish many of its old ideas in order to make them more acceptable to a society nurtured on modern scientific thinking. Hobhouse's particular accomplishment was the reconstruction of the rhetoric, though not the bases, of Liberal ideology in an attempt to bring the underpinnings of that ideology into closer harmony with new scientific knowledge.

His life and work illustrate many changes in British Liberal
thought in the last years of Victorian England and during the first quarter of the twentieth century. The Oxford don and philosopher-epistemologist, faced with social transformations, turned to sociology and social philosophy. Thus armed, Hobhouse confronted the traditional issues with which nineteenth century Liberalism had battled. The most important of these was individual liberty. Liberal ideology had always espoused this as its foremost belief, but it had also faced the problem by attempting to reconcile individual freedom and social control. Hobhouse derived in many respects a new solution to this problem. He made social harmony, harmony between man and society, an evolutionary conception; it became a product of man's increasingly rational control of his own destiny. More original than that, however, was the evidence with which Hobhouse proved this theory. His work as a sociologist provided a fund of information from the fields of comparative psychology, comparative ethics, political theory and social philosophy. The evidence, in his opinion, demonstrated that as man's knowledge of the physical world grew he employed more intelligent and advanced methods of social organization. An increase in general knowledge allowed man to construct a more perfect social system through the utilization of that knowledge. With such evidence he declared that the trend of social development demonstrated that the tensions and social discord which characterized lower societies tended to diminish as man constructed a more rational social edifice. Under increasingly rational control, social discord could vanish all together.


In the years since Keynes wrote the General Theory, there has probably been more written about the consumption function than any other subject in economics. Much of the writing has been incorrect and based on misinterpretations of Keynes' analysis. One of the major purposes of this thesis is to re-examine Keynes' analysis and the literature that followed to determine what the errors and misinterpre-
James Wilson Marlin, Jr.

tations were and how they occurred. The other purpose is to determine what is required to provide a more satisfactory formulation of the consumption function.

Keynes used a simple mathematical formula to explain the relationship between income and consumption. He then went on to explain the numerous objective and subjective factors that affect individuals' propensities to consume. Much of the literature has evaluated Keynes' statement of the consumption function in terms of the mathematical formula $C_w = \alpha (Y_w)$ while ignoring the remainder of his analysis. Using this formula in empirical tests of Keynes' theory gave inaccurate results. Therefore refinements were "discovered" to make the theory more subject to empirical test. The relative income hypothesis of Duesenberry and the normal income hypotheses of Friedman and Modigliani, Brumberg, and Ando were attempts to explain consumption proportions in a "new" way with the use of "new" causal variables. An examination of the General Theory reveals that very little had been added. As a theoretical statement of the propensity to consume, Keynes' analysis has not been surpassed by his successors. The problems lie in the attempts to give empirical content to his theory.

The normal income hypotheses have had the best predictive record. There are some problem areas that remain. These theories have "added" the consideration of wealth, interest, and expected income to the simple Keynesian analysis. A major problem of these theses was that the primary independent variable, permanent or expected income, was of necessity an estimate. Clower and Johnson have attempted to solve this problem by making the primary independent variable measured wealth. Their "wealth hypothesis" maintains the improved empirical validity of the normal income hypotheses and at the same time solves one of the major problems.

In none of the post-Keynesian theories have all the variables mentioned by Keynes been included. This is particularly true in their disregard of the subjective factors. It is contended that this is one reason why some of their results have been inaccurate and misleading.

As Keynes indicated, the proportion of their income that people consume is the result of an individual decision process. This is a microeconomic approach, while the post-Keynesian theories are macroeconomic, aggregate approaches. The macroeconomic approach does not explain why things happen, merely that they do. The major
problem in using the microeconomic approach is that there is great difficulty in measuring non-economic variables. This could explain why the subjective factors have not been included in later theories.

There has been much work in measuring the non-economic variables, mostly by psychologists and sociologists, but the studies have not been specifically tied to economic behavior, particularly in terms of consumption as a proportion of income. Interdisciplinary studies will be needed to ascertain the real effect of motivations and decision criteria on consumption analysis. As more of Keynes' causal factors are included, we should have an increasingly accurate picture of the consumption decision process and be able to make more precise predictions and better policy recommendations.


This dissertation gives a detailed account of the influence that Charles Haddon Spurgeon had on the Victorian society in which he lived regarding the social and political issues of his day. A special effort has been made to determine exactly what his opinions were in respect to each issue, and how he endeavored to transform those opinions into action. Spurgeon was such a prolific writer and outspoken preacher that most of his opinions have been well preserved for posterity. The conclusions drawn in this dissertation, therefore, have generally come from an exhaustive study of his numerous publications. As is often the case with men who make their living by talking and writing, however, Spurgeon occasionally contradicted himself or changed his views on various issues. When this occurred, possible explanations have been offered using information gathered from secondary accounts as well.

Although this dissertation is not intended to add to the thirty or more biographies of Spurgeon, an introductory chapter including pertinent biographical material was deemed necessary. In addition, the concluding chapter attempts to place Spurgeon in the context of
the intellectual trends of his times and to consider some historiographical questions regarding the significance of his career.

Nineteenth century England witnessed the successful efforts of a number of social and political reform movements, and organized religion played a vital role in these endeavors. The Victorians established a national system of education, extended the franchise, recognized the suffering and deprivation of the poor, and made a concerted attempt to alleviate the worst of their social problems. All of this and more have caused historians to look upon the greater portion of the Victorian Era as an age of reform.

Charles Haddon Spurgeon was vitally involved in these issues. He was highly opinionated and published his opinions widely. He was not limited to mere words, however, for he was an active influence in politics, and in the area of social problems he established a number of institutions which lent a pragmatic aspect to his convictions. Politically, he did all he could to insure that England would be governed by what he considered to be Christian principles. He campaigned openly for the candidates he favored, he wrote letters of recommendation, gave speeches, and devoted sermons to the political questions of his time. He publicly denounced the government when he felt it was wrong and praised it when he believed it was acting justly. He campaigned to extend the franchise and was considered by some to have played a key role in at least two general elections.

Spurgeon was at least as influential in matters of social concern. He established schools on every level from childhood to college. He founded and administered a well-known and well-run orphanage that cared for hundreds of children. He ministered to a large church in the heart of the working-class district of south London and led that church to become involved in a number of social endeavors from mission houses to poor relief.

For unknown reasons, most of Spurgeon's biographers have failed to recount this aspect of his career. On the whole Spurgeon has been remembered as an orator, a preacher with a huge church and a vast literary audience in the readers of his sermons. Twentieth century evangelicals who have seen Spurgeon as a kinsman in doctrine have failed to recall that he was as actively involved in the social and political issues of his day as he was in his quest to win souls for Christ. Indeed, Spurgeon himself saw these tasks as two sides of the same coin. He believed that the Gospel provided not only the answer to man's spiritual needs, but also the motivation for social concern and
a desire to make the present world a better place to live.


The purpose of this study was to determine H. G. Wells' educational theories in the context of his social and political ideas, through a study of his works.

Wells' world view—is his picture of man, nature, education, society, personal growth and "salvation"—is the "cosmic" view of the "biologically trained observer." Man is Homo sapiens, the biological species, destined for "Cosmopolis or extinction." "Old Nature" is the ancient enemy with whom mankind must struggle. Education is man's "arm" in the struggle for survival, his instrument for bringing in the World State. The World State is the only desirable political structure. Man grows through fighting down the "ape" in himself and exalting the "god" in his heart, through escaping from himself in the service of the World State, thus achieving "salvation," "merger-immortality," in the deathless will and mind of the race.

Wells pictures the world as a vast laboratory, a great "university of life," in which every man learns throughout life. He advocates a standardized "schooling of the world," giving every person the "scientific vision of life in the universe." For the earlier Wells, 1900-1914, this "scientific" world view takes the form of "New Republicanism," the "making" of mankind through improving each succeeding generation. In his middle period, 1918-1930, Wells' world view becomes "Cosmopolism," the bringing about of the World State. For the later Wells, 1930-1943, his world view becomes "Eutrophism," the universal distribution of "informative" knowledge. Throughout, the Utopian "Cosmopolis" gives Wells' educational plans their unity—and their imbalance.

Wells' favorite gambit is the science-fictional "Let us imagine." His basic educational assumption is "Let us imagine that we have a free hand to plan an education for all the world." His educational prescriptions are, often, visionary and impractical exercises in Utopography. During his middle period, for example, his diagnosis is two-fold:
Ray Myron Merriam

1. The "whole world" is "undereducated."
2. The school-factory is "deficient" in the "quality" and "quantity" of its "product."

His prescription is three-fold:

1. The school-factory must "enlarge its scope."
2. All formal learning-teaching must be scientifically "machined," with complete teaching "aids" and completely "standardized" schools.
3. This standardized schooling must indoctrinate everyone with the universal world view, thus eventually bringing in the World State.

Wells' primary concern is with the group, rather than the individual. Anyon who cannot fit into his Cosmopolis or his school-factories is to be "eliminated." His Utopias are, in their early and intermediate stages, police states. They pose the threat of behavior control and intellectual "discipline," a threat which seriously limits the usefulness of Wells' plans for the world's schooling.

Wells' educational ideas are unsound as a structure—they are opinionated and unscholarly, inconsistent and one-sided. Though Wells claims to be "scientific," he is habitually didactic. His sociological-educational thinking is based upon his "beliefs," and his beliefs are seldom based upon verifiable "fact." "I make my beliefs as I want them," he says. "I do not attempt to go to fact for them." Wells' basic assumptions, social, political, and educational, are arbitrary and far-fetched. They mark him for what he is—not a scientist nor even a disciplined educationist, but a teacher-preacher, a prophet and a Messiah.

Though H. G. Wells is unsafe as a guide, he is useful as a gadfly—he stings the teacher into examination of his own theories and practices. For today's teacher-student, Wells' ideas can be a stimulus and a resource. He discourages discipleship, but he rewards exploration.

181. MESSMER, Michael Walker (Ph. D.). "Prince of Popularizers: The
This study seeks to do two things: to examine the development of the thought of C. E. M. Joad in the context of his life and times, and to assess the typicality of Joad's thinking.

After a preliminary sketch of the total scope of Joad's career, attention focuses first on his undergraduate years at Balliol College. This was the time when Joad's firmest convictions were forged. The years between the two World Wars are then examined twice, once from the perspective of Joad's developing socio-political beliefs, a second time from the perspective of the philosophical position he developed during those years. The intention is to show the relationship between Joad's developing ideas, to trace their origins into his earlier years, and to show what changes occurred in his thinking during the inter-War period.

Attention then focuses on the years from the outbreak of World War Two until Joad's death in 1953. This was the time when his youthful ideas and beliefs were challenged by the events in the world around him. The path of Joad back to religious belief is examined in detail, and an explanation of that return advanced. In brief, the assertion is made that it was the discovery of the overwhelming presence of evil in the modern world, both external to man and in his very heart, which pushed Joad back toward the faith he had abandoned as a young man at Balliol.

The last chapter attempts to assess Joad's position within the tradition of the popularization of knowledge in modern Britain. It deals not only with Joad as a writer and teacher, but also with his career as a popular member of the war-time Brains Trust radio program.

Finally, in an appendix, an attempt is made to relate certain discernible emotional configurations in Joad's life with the development of his ideas; it is a brief exercise in "psychohistorical" speculation.
In Hazlitt's intellectual growth, the influence of his Unitarian father was profound. The scholarly, rational, and steadfast Rev. William Hazlitt taught his son to be proudly independent and to act only on previously considered moral principles. A member of the small and persecuted sect led by the Rev. Joseph Priestley, Hazlitt's father combined piety with rationalism and put his trust in Scripture, toleration, and freedom of inquiry.

From this world of Rational Dissent Hazlitt also learned the political principles which he maintained fiercely throughout his life. He believed in "natural rights" and "the people"; he remained an incorrigible foe of "tyranny," "power," and "legitimacy." His inherited ideas were reinforced by the events of his youth: the exiling of his father to America, the Revolution in France, the burning of Priestley's Birmingham home and his departure for America, and the treason trials of Tooke and Holcroft. Under the impact of such events Hazlitt began to write an "essay on laws," which he continued after entering the liberal atmosphere of Hackney College.

There he gave up the idea of becoming a minister, partly because his imagination had been captivated by philosophy. He read Hartley, Hume, Berkeley, Locke, Hobbes, Bacon, and the French philosophes. He exercised his reasoning powers by criticizing "the modern philosophy" for its reduction of human motives to self-interest. In his Essay on the Principles of Human Action he set forth his "metaphysical discovery," a way of proving "the natural disinterestedness of the human mind." By means of the "sympathetic imagination," he thought, man is led to benevolence. He also criticized the theory of the association of ideas preached by Hartley and his followers as too coldly mechanical and oversimplified. He was, however, much indebted to Hartley for his own concept of the "sympathetic imagination," and in his assertion of human benevolence he was aided by Shaftesbury, Butler, and Rousseau. Though he was unsystematic and not always consistent, interested in only a few philosophic problems, and limited in his reading, he effectively combined skeptical common sense with romantic sensibility in the reasoned conclu-
Edmund Gillmore Miller

sions which served as foundations for his later work in the criticism of politics, art, and literature.

Hazlitt next returned to his disappointed but patient family to pass four years in outward lethargy but vigorous mental life. His real literary education belongs to this period. His chief preceptor in the value of broad literary taste was the Rev. Joseph Fawcett, and Coleridge inspired him by his articulateness. To a good foundation in the English classics Hazlitt added much reading in the eighteenth century essayists and novelists, the literature of sentiment culminating for him in Rousseau. Hazlitt's readings of these authors remained almost holy recollections throughout his life, and he never abandoned his taste for them as he learned to enjoy the newer modes of the nineteenth century.

In his twenty-first year Hazlitt went to London to study painting with his brother John. He now entered the active world; his career as a painter, though eventually abandoned, helped him to achieve self-confidence and maturity. Also, under the stimulus of his readings of Reynolds's Discourses and his conversations with Northcote he formulated his aesthetic principles. He distrusted neo-classic emphasis on "the rules," "ideal" nature, and academic training; he instead championed the ego-cancelling "sympathetic imagination," real and particular nature, and the unconscious workings of innate genius. But again he was further indebted than he admitted to the thinkers he criticized, to Reynolds, Burke, and the associationist psychologists. Nevertheless, the sharpened perceptions and the reasoned aesthetic principles he achieved as a painter were of highest importance for his later creation of criticism.


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William Vincent Wallace, popular and prolific nineteenth century Irish melodist, attained his reputation through his one outstanding operatic contribution, *Maritana.*

Born in Waterford on 11 March 1812, Wallace was the son of a
military bandmaster who eventually purchased his discharge and migrated with his family to Dublin. There, young Wallace became exceptionally proficient on violin, piano and organ. Relinquishing his position as violinist in Dublin's Theatre Royal orchestra in 1830, Wallace accepted an appointment as organist at Thurles Cathedral and professor of music at the Ursuline Convent in that town. There he became enamored of one of his students, Isabella Kelly, and in 1831 they were married.

For uncertain reasons (most likely wanderlust), Wallace set sail with his wife and son in 1835. Despite many romantic tales concerning Wallace's Australian visit, his life there was comparatively sedate. In addition to concert performances on violin and piano, Wallace established an academy for the instruction of young ladies in vocal and instrumental music. At some unspecified time, he and his wife became estranged.

From Sydney, the composer travelled to South America, then worked his way up through the southern part of the United States giving concerts in many of the major cities. He finally arrived in New York and there he participated as violinist and pianist in some of the early Philharmonic Society concerts. By the time of his departure in 1845, he had gained considerable recognition as a performer of both instruments.

Upon returning to London, it was Wallace's good fortune to be introduced to the Irish librettist, Edward Fitzball, who had been searching for a composer to write the music for his libretto, Maritana. This proved to be the turning point in his career, for it was not only most successful in England but was also performed in other countries with equal enthusiasm, and remained in the English repertoire well into the twentieth century. Of his future operatic attempts, the only one to achieve appreciable recognition was Lurline, again with Fitzball as librettist. Although a talented melodist, Wallace was a victim not only of bad librettists, but also of his own inability to achieve a personal musical style.

In 1850, Wallace returned to New York and became an American citizen. He met Hélène Stoepel, an American pianist, and while there is no proof that a marriage took place, the liaison lasted until his death. Wallace was now a celebrated composer and his popularity brought him many personal appearances and a lucrative contract with the publishing firm, William Hall & Son.

Returning to London in 1855, Wallace spent the next five years
as a fashionable piano teacher and continued composing prolific amounts of piano pieces and songs. Outside of a four-month recuperative stay in Wiesbaden, he remained in England until the close of the production of his opera, *Lurline*, in 1860.

Following a business trip to the United States in 1860, Wallace returned to London to produce three operas in rapid succession and of mediocre quality: *Amber Witch* (1861); *Love's Triumph* (1862); and *Desert Flower* (1863).

The final years of Wallace's life were marred by illness and he eventually succumbed to a heart ailment which had plagued him for a number of years. He died in the Pyrénées on 12 October 1865 and was buried in Kensal Green cemetery in London.
Maine's relevance as a sociological theorist is established by a chapter linking his work to current issues and writings in the areas of societal development and modernization. Maine's relation to the early approaches to modern sociology as found in some "formalisms" of his day is presented through an analysis of his critiques of social contact and natural rights theory, classical political economy, and utilitarianism and analytical jurisprudence. Selected comparisons are also made with the theories of Marx.

Maine's most distinctive contributions to comparative historical sociology are then examined in a series of chapters dealing with the transformations of societies in both East and West. The movement from status to contract, involving a dramatic change in the situation of persons, the nature of obligation, and the forms of property and alienability, is traced as a feature of what Maine called the "progressive" societies. Maine's views on the changing sociocultural contexts of the institutions of property, contract and the market are analyzed and illustrated through the use of comparative historical evidence gathered from the writings of historians, sociologists and area specialists, especially students of India, such as Dumont, the Rudolphs, Srinivas, and others. The movement from tribal political community, rooted in assumed kinship and religious communion, to territorial polities, based on a universalistic rule of law and civil personality, is discussed. Tribe, Nation, and Civilization are analyzed as fundamental forms of sociocultural solidarity. The distinction between what Maine called the "stationary" and "progressive" societies is traced through the analysis of prerequisites for the development of progressive outlooks toward history and society. The breakdown of cultural "stationary" orientations and the establishment of more progressive institutions in both historical and contemporary societies is analyzed through the use of materials especially from Greece, Rome and India. Maine's discussion of the agencies of juridical change, as an important component of the difference between stationary and progressive societies, is analyzed and illustrated historically and comparatively.

Finally, some gains and losses incurred in the extension of Maine by Toennies, Weber, Durkheim and Ogburn, in particular, are examined in order to collate Maine's ideas with later important sociocultural analysts.
This study of Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) as a grammarian, rhetorician, and critic is developed upon the hypothesis that just as Priestley has often been considered typical of the eighteenth century in science, philosophy, politics, theology, and education, so are his views on language, oratory, and criticism representative of those current in his age; and, consequently, that the best way to interpret him as a rhetorician is to view him as representative of the major developments in later eighteenth century English rhetoric.

The investigation of this hypothesis begins with an exposition of Priestley's views on grammar, primarily as presented in his Rudiments of English Grammar (1761), and A Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal Grammar (1762). As a grammarian, Priestley played a significant role in two important trends developing in his age—the movement toward freeing the English tongue from the unnecessary influence of Latin and French, and the establishment of usage as the standard of correctness.

Priestley's A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism (1777)—the work upon which the study is chiefly focused—is examined as the primary source of his views on rhetoric and criticism. The major portion of the dissertation presents an analysis of these views, supplemented when necessary by material in the grammars, and a detailed comparison of them with the four dominant trends in later eighteenth century English rhetorical thought—the restatement of the classical rhetoric, the broadening of rhetoric into the study of belles lettres, the development of the elocutionary movement, and the use of current psychologies to modify and shape rhetorical doctrine.

This comparison shows that Priestley, with apparent awareness of the directions in which contemporary rhetorical theory was developing, devised the most comprehensive system of his century in that he utilized to a considerable extent each of the dominant trends present in current rhetoric. The basic structure of his system he drew from the classical rhetoric, particularly as this was restated in the works of John Ward and John Lawson. Doctrines from belles lettres and elocutionism he attached primarily at their points of closest
Ross Stafford North

connection with his basically classical structure—belles lettres with style, and elocutionism with delivery; and in this connection he utilized the critical works of Lord Kames and Alexander Gerard, and the elocutionary works of Thomas Sheridan, John Mason, and possibly William Enfield. Finally, underlying Priestley's entire system was his use of the principles of association psychology—taken largely from David Hartley, and to some extent from Kames and Gerard—by which he explained and justified his doctrines. Thus, Priestley molded each of the dominant trends of his period into a single comprehensive plan, included with these certain novel theories of his own, and developed a structure suitable for this collection of ideas.

By taking materials primarily from various contemporary works, therefore, as well as from the philosophy and practices of the Dissenting academies in which he both studied and taught, and by fusing these elements in the crucible of his own intellect, Priestley produced an amalgam of rhetoric which bears the mark of each of the dominant trends of the period, as well as the stamp of his own genius. As in other areas, therefore, Priestley is remarkable as a grammarian, rhetorician, and critic, not so much for his originality or influence as for his representativeness; and for this reason, his works make a distinct contribution to our understanding of an important period in the development of modern thought in grammar, rhetoric, and criticism.


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Eva Turner, born in Oldham, England, in 1892, began her professional singing career in 1915 as a member of the chorus in the Royal Carl Rosa Opera Company. She soon established herself as the prima donna of this provincial English opera touring ensemble. In 1924 one of Arturo Toscanini's assistants heard her sing in London and urged her to leave at once to sing for the Maestro at the Teatro alla Scala in Milan, Italy. Toscanini engaged her immediately upon hearing her; and from those first performances in Italy her singing commanded the respect of audiences, colleagues, and conductors. Her singing of operatic roles throughout England, Western Europe, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, and the United States during the interwar years was notable in that she was the only English-born dramatic soprano to achieve this status. She performed such roles as Aida, Santuzza, Sieglinde, Agathe, and Isolde; but persons knowledgeable of her contributions to opera and singing continue to speak and write of her singing of the lead in Puccini's Turandot. Her performance of the title-role in this composer's final opera remains the yardstick by which all other executants of this role are measured.

Her second career began in 1949 when she was employed by the University of Oklahoma as a Visiting Professor of Voice. She remained in this position for ten years before returning to teach at her alma mater, the Royal Academy of Music in London, and to teach privately in her home. It is often true that singers who establish themselves in opera or upon the concert stage do not make the conversion into a teacher of the same quality. Happily in Eva Turner's case, this generalization has not applied. Her background for becoming a teacher of excellence was enhanced because she realized early in her career the necessity of establishing and maintaining an infallible
singing technique.

Her highest non-singing honor came in 1962 when Queen Elizabeth II conferred upon her the title of Dame Commander of the British Empire.

Cipriani Potter was born into a musical family. His paternal grandfather was Richard Potter, an important maker of quality flutes, and his maternal grandfather was Samuel Christian Baumgarten, a noted bassoonist. Cipriani Potter's father, Richard Huddleston Potter, was a pianist, violist, flutist and the organist of St. Bride's, Fleet Street, London. In the eighteenth century manner, Cipriani Potter began his musical training under his father. He also had instruction from Thomas Attwood, William Crotch and possibly from John Wall Callcott. His greatest progress as a musician was with Joseph Wölfl with whom he studied for five years. It was from Wölfl that he gained a piano technique noted for its clarity and also learned the principles of "plan" or form in composition, then little known in England. Cipriani Potter was named an associate of the newly founded Philharmonic Society in 1813 and was elected a member in 1815. The year 1816 saw Potter's first appearance as a pianist at the Society's concerts, as well as the performance of two works commissioned from him. Potter saw a great deal of service with the Philharmonic Society. He appeared as a pianist often, giving the first performances in England of many concertos of Mozart and Beethoven. He was often conductor of these concerts.
concerts through 1844. Potter served as a director many times and his compositions were performed rather often. Upon the opening of the Academy of Music in 1822, Potter was named the chief professor of piano for the male division and in 1827 he was given the additional duties of conductor of the Academy's orchestra. It was his custom to insist that even the beginning students participate in the rehearsals of the orchestra. In 1832, upon the resignation of Dr. Crotch, Potter was named the principal of the Academy. Throughout his lengthy tenure an aristocratic board dominated the affairs of the Academy and Potter seems to have concentrated on teaching piano and composition, the areas of his greatest influence. Potter was an early admirer of Beethoven and was a friend of the German composer during a journey to Vienna between 1817 and 1819. Potter later admired the music of Schumann and Brahms and remained open to the works of his students. Potter had himself begun to compose as early as 1806, but his earliest extant compositions date from 1816, the year of his first appearance with the Philharmonic Society. After 1837 he did little original composition, producing only revisions of a few early works and some light pieces. In his later years he did edit a good deal of the music of others. His most important contribution in this vein was an edition of the complete piano music of Mozart which began to appear in 1836. Potter's own music, almost all of which is instrumental, includes nine extant symphonies and eight concerted works. His music is skillfully orchestrated and includes some Beethovenesque traits such as the manipulation of short motives. His chamber music includes three piano trios, a string quartet and two sextets. Potter also wrote many other works for piano including three sonatas, eight sets of variations and numerous rondos. The second volume of the dissertation contains plates, genealogical tables, appendices which include a bibliographic-thematic catalogue, and a bibliography on music and musicians of the period.

Henry Butler (ca. 1590-1652) composed music for string instruments with basso continuo accompaniment. His known works comprise the following: divisions on grounds, preludes, and an untitled composition (sonata?) for bass viol and basso continuo; sonatas and an aria for violin, bass viol, and basso continuo; and a paired cancione and gallarda for two violins, "viola" (cello?), and basso continuo.

Seventeenth century archival records and publications indicate that Butler was an Englishman, a "gentleman of quality," a virtuoso viol player, a composer of exemplary divisions on grounds, a member of the Spanish royal chapel from 1623 to 1652, and a teacher of the viol to King Philip IV. Many documents are quoted and translated in the paper to illustrate Butler's activities in Spain. No records substantiate his English origins or aristocratic claim, but hypotheses are presented.

The paper places Butler and his compositions in a selective historical context. Because of their genres, instrumentations, and styles, Butler's compositions bridge a gap between English and Italianate instrumental music of his time. His divisions extend the limits of that English genre in length, range, and technical difficulty. Two sets of divisions are paired with preludes, nearly unique examples of such organization. His sonatas combine an Italian approach to form and style with an English type of instrumentation. The cancione and gallarda, on the other hand, are more English in style but Italianate in instrumentation.

Butler's sonatas, having been composed before 1652, are some of the earliest examples of that genre written by an English-born composer. His untitled "sonata" may be the earliest sonata-like work composed for bass viol and basso continuo.

Four compositions ascribed to Butler in some sources bear multiple attributions to Orlando Gibbons, Polewheele, "Jon" (William Young?), Peter Young, or Zamponi. One is definitely the work of Gibbons. The author assigns another to Polewheele and the remaining two works to Butler. An edition of the works of Henry Butler concludes the dissertation.
During a career that spanned more than fifty years, F. R. Leavis established himself as perhaps the most influential, and certainly the most controversial, English critic of this century. It is unusual for an academic critic to achieve such fame (or notoriety), and the explanation for Leavis' reputation defies a simple appeal to his published writings. To understand his career and its enormous cultural impact requires an analysis which moves at once into the center of his social and literary vision, and outward to the times and texts about which he wrote. The dissertation accordingly offers an exploration of Leavis' career that is both internal and contextual.

The analysis of the internal structure of his work argues that he was an holistic thinker whose ideas work as a system—a claim in sharp contrast to Leavis' own anti-systematic pronouncements. The author demonstrates how his social theory, critical theory and specific judgments are related by examining such topics as Leavis' view of the conflict between the "organic community" and the "organized state," of the role of the intellectual elite, of the unity of formal and moral values in criticism, and of the "great tradition" of the novel. His own appraisals of Bloomsbury, Eliot and Lawrence are taken as cases in point. At the same time, the author suggests that his system was unstable—contradictory and paradoxical—arguing that Leavis was torn between a set of elitist, classicist and modernist ideals and a different set of values garnered from the Romantic critique of utilitarianism; hence Eliot battled Lawrence, for example, while social radicalism vied with prelapsarian nostalgia. The argument as a whole might be glossed by tailoring Arnold for the occasion: Leavis saw life unstably, but he tried to see it whole.

This internal analysis is grounded in an examination of the connection between his values and larger currents in English culture. The author shows how Leavis' early work was formed by Cambridge University, its English School and the critical renaissance led by Eliot and Richards; and how his thinking was increasingly dominated by ideas found in Lawrence, Dickens and George Sturt. Finally, the dissertation traces the cultural preconditions of Leavis' great postwar influence by showing how his work fit into broad socio-cultural trends: the revolt against politics and aestheticism, the increased
John Richard Powers

valuation of anti-theoretical thinking, the rise of lower class intellectuals and the emergence of a New Left.

R

192. RAPPLE, Brendan Alphonso (Ph. D.). "Matthew Arnold: Comparative Educator and Critic of English Middle Class Society."
University of Alberta (Canada), 1987. Source: DAI, XLVIII, 10A (April, 1988), 2557-A.

This thesis focuses on aspects of the work of Matthew Arnold (1822-1888) in his role of comparative educator and English social critic. Arnold's views on the nature, purpose and methodology of Comparative Education are examined and note is taken of his official and unofficial visits to the Continent as a comparative educator. These visits, it is contended, convinced Arnold that England, despite her vaunted progress, was failing to meet the modern Zeitgeist as effectively as other nations, particularly France and Germany. He attributed this continental superiority primarily to the positive role of the State in these nations, especially in regard to education; he himself developed a quite Continental notion of the State which is analyzed in some detail as it provides the key to much of his thinking about English concerns. Careful attention is paid to Arnold's strictures on the English middle class whose lack of "culture" and whose rejection of State action inhibited national progress. Particular emphasis is laid upon his view of the educational deficiencies of this class who in spite of their Philistinism were for him the only possible agents of England's regeneration. Finally a lengthy discussion is provided of his prescriptions for improving middle class education through a thorough State post-elementary system modelled on those of France and Germany.
For it is the thesis' fundamental argument that the transformation of Philistine society by means of a Continental-style post-elementary educational system was the dominant leitmotiv of Arnold's comparative educational work and, indeed, one of the paramount goals of his life.


Thomas Hobbes is usually regarded as a herald of the English Enlightenment, and a figure who essentially belongs to the intellectual history of the second half of the seventeenth century. This study is an attempt to evaluate some of the traditional roots of his thought in the humanism of the late Tudor and Jacobean periods, and regards him rather as a figure of the later Renaissance in England. The study is biographical in nature since it follows a loosely chronological sequence, but its principle of organization, the four voyages that Hobbes made to the Continent, is a method for distributing emphasis rather than a means of periodization.

Hobbes's early years are reconstructed in terms of the intellectual traditions of Tudor education. His first publication was a translation of Thucydides, and this initial historical interest is discussed as an outgrowth of his humanistic training; it is examined for his ideas on the way language determines political phenomena, for his notion of historical causation, and for the closely related concept of method. An attempt is made to demonstrate how this early idea of method, which was developed in terms of the traditional categories of the conflict between reason and passion, logic and rhetoric, remained basic to his later "scientific" method.

The Euclidean method in geometry and the Galilean mechanics of motion were later determinants in Hobbes's search for a method appropriate for the analysis of political behavior. These are examined in the context of Hobbes's intellectual milieu on the Continent and in England, and they are related to his then dominant scientific interest,
optics. Hobbes's milieu during this middle period in his life was important for him because of both the intellectual stimulus it afforded and the conceptual instruments which he developed at that time. Moreover, the philosopher's new affiliation with some of the leading Continental thinkers established his reputation as a scientific savant.

An analytical description of the major ideas in Hobbes's *Leviathan* indicates the way the philosopher's concepts of method, language, reason and passion synthesized into a view of the state as the product of man's invention of speech. His political analysis thus became an investigation into the logical implications of the basic terms of political life and an evaluation of their ability to withstand the distortions of meaning caused by private interest. The critical response to Hobbes's ideas by his contemporaries indicates the novelty and relevance of his thought, and it had a decisive influence on his reputation for the rest of his life.

Inasmuch as Hobbes claimed he had made a science of the study of political phenomena, and was himself a scientist of some standing, the study concludes with a discussion of his relationship to the scientific world in England as represented by some of the leading members of the Royal Society. During the latter part of his life, Hobbes experienced increasing isolation from this world, and his reputation as a scientist in many professional scientific circles suffered a serious decline. That Hobbes never became a member of the Society was due to a variety of reasons:

1. He had an unenviable reputation politically and religiously and the Society would not risk an affiliation with him;

2. He was a poor practicing mathematician, but a much publicized one;

3. He disagreed with Robert Boyle on questions of method.

His exclusion from the Society, however, was also partly due to the fact that Hobbes shared little with the new scientific spirit which was developing then. His orientation was philosophic, not technical, and his approach to the whole scientific enterprise was quite different from that of the younger leaders of professional science. So far was Hobbes from representing early-modern scientific thought in Eng-
land that, by 1660, his scientific thought was considered somewhat antiquated.


The argument of the thesis is that four contemporary writers fall naturally into an ideological group and that analysis of much of their work reveals a literary-religious trend which is part of the intellectual history of the twentieth century. The four men—C. S. Lewis and Charles Williams (Anglicans), J. R. R. Tolkien (Roman Catholic), and Owen Barfield (Anthroposophist)—formed a rough group in life until Williams's death in 1945. Much of their work, both critical and creative, is best seen as an attempt to form a construct which may be called "romantic religion." Romantic religion is an attempt to reach religious truths by means and techniques traditionally called romantic, and an attempt to defend and justify these techniques and attitudes of romanticism by holding that they have religious sanction. This construct, which is a conscious revival of older beliefs, constitutes a middle ground between romanticism and formal religion on which the four men may meet, a middle ground which minimizes doctrinal differences and is the point from which the group defends both formal religion and romanticism against what they hold to be the twentieth century Zeitgeist: cold classicism, naturalistic science, and rationalistic irreligion.

Owen Barfield is the first man dealt with. His work in linguistics, anthropology, and religion is admittedly much influenced by the work of Rudolf Steiner, the founder of the school of Anthroposophy. But since he is more concerned with the philosophical aspect of Anthroposophy than he is with its more occult beliefs, it is necessary to see his work (and Steiner's) against the background of Kantian epistemology from which it largely stems. In Barfield's Anthroposophy, Coleridge's doctrine of the Creative Imagination and the Coleridge-
Kant epistemology are taken up into occult Christianity and made important religious facts as well as means of arriving at the great truths of that Christianity.

Lewis is much indebted to Barfield, as he has often said. His basic idealism as well as certain theories in linguistics and mythology are in great part taken over from Barfield. He is also a disciple of George Macdonald and an imitator of Macdonald's romances. When these two influences are taken into account, his fictional work is seen as an attempt to romanticize Christianity by placing the general outlines of it in far off places and times and by minimizing its doctrinal content. In the doctrinal books, Lewis has turned to the Kant-Coleridge distinction between the functions of the Practical and Speculative Intellects in order, first, to arrive at the necessity of belief in Christian dogma and, second, to defend it against the charge of absurdity.

Williams is the most explicit romantic religionist of the group. At the heart of his work is the notion which he called "romantic theology," which is a conscious attempt to "theologize" romance, especially the experience we call romantic love, in order to show that the romantic experience is God-sent and a special means of grace. Though many of Williams's explanations of his romantic theology are illustrated from the work of Dante and are embellished with certain occult trappings, he is best seen as in the tradition of Wordsworth. Like Wordsworth, he sees in the romantic experience a meaning beyond itself, though Wordsworth's interpretations are naturalistic or Platonic and Williams's are explicitly Christian.

Tolkien's contribution to romantic religion is explicit in his critical work on the fairy story and implicit in his adult fairy story trilogy. He defends the romantic doctrine of the creative imagination on the ground that by means of it the writer creates in essentially the same way as the divine creator: the writer of fairy stories, by means of the creative imagination, prescinds from the real world in order to effect in his readers the same state of soul (qualitatively considered) as that of the person who has reached the Christian heaven. The romantic experience that Tolkien is concerned with is the peculiar thrill felt by the reader at the "good turn" in the fairy story; but his view of the religious validity of this experience helps to explain the other claims for the romantic experience made by Lewis and Williams. The romantic experience is qualitatively the same as Christian beatitude.

The four men do not all revive the same elements of romanti-
cism, but they all contribute to the synthesis called romantic religion, the function of which is combative in the areas of both religion and literature.


The purpose of this study was to present an appreciation of Sir John Adams and to point out his unique contribution to modern education. Only that biographical material necessary to give the study a suitable background was considered as belonging to the scope of the problem. Yet it became increasingly evident as the work progressed that the principal contribution of the study would eventually rest in the special attention redirected toward Adams' long and brilliant life in the service of education. Detailed consideration is given in the study of Adams' life and achievements in the world of education and to an evaluation of these by means of comparisons between Adams and other important modern educators.

The materials examined in the pursuance of this investigation were for the most part from primary sources, made available through the kindness of Lady Adams, widow of Sir John, living in retirement in Hollywood, California. They consisted of Sir John's published volumes, countless magazine articles, press clippings, photos, other biographical material, and letters from former colleagues and students. Lady Adams further offered invaluable service by furnishing names and addresses of friends of Sir John, who were communicated with by the investigator, and by proofreading the manuscript before it was released for final copying. Of particular importance to the study was the correspondence between Adams and William C. Bagley between the years 1922 and 1934. This consisted of about forty letters written by Adams to Bagley, and carbon copies of Bagley's answers. William C. Bagley generously allowed the writer to make copies of these letters.
The secondary sources examined in the investigation were for the most part limited to background material in Scottish and English education, and material by and about educators with whom Adams is compared.

The first chapter of the study is devoted to the formal presentation of the problem under investigation, including its purpose, statement, scope, materials available, methods of research, importance, and organization of material into chapter divisions.

Chapter II presents a brief description of the status of education during the early years of Sir John Adams' career in Scotland and England, with special emphasis given to those conditions which stimulated him to the dedication of his life to educational reform.

In Chapter III, Adams' long and fruitful career as an educator is traced in considerable detail from his first post as a pupil-teacher in a Scottish elementary school to his final retirement from his position of lecturer in education at the University of California at Los Angeles in June, 1934, and his death in Los Angeles some three months later.

Chapters IV, V, and VI, respectively, are devoted to a consideration of Adams' activities as a man, as a teacher, and as a writer.

A critical analysis of three of Adams' most significant contributions to the literature of education, The Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education, The Evolution of Educational Theory, and The Protestant School System in the Province of Quebec, comprises chapters VII, VIII, and IX in that order.

In Chapters X, XI, XII, and XIII, Adams' position in the history of modern education is indicated by a detailed comparison of his work with that of Thomas Arnold, the American Herbartians, William C. Bagley and the American Neo-Herbartians or Essentialists, and John Dewey and the American Progressives.

Chapter XIV brings the study to a close with a summary and conclusions, and is followed by a bibliography and an appendix.

A summary of Adams' life in education presents an unparalleled series of successes dating back to his graduation from Glasgow University with highest honors in 1884 to his retirement at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1934. Adams successively was the director of three of the United Kingdom's most important teacher-training institutions: the Aberdeen Free-Church Training College, the Glasgow Free-Church Training School, and the London Day Training Institute. In the two latter instances he was also lecturer in education in the universities of Glasgow and London, where he coordinated the
university training of future teachers with the more practical aspects of their education presented in the training colleges. During the twenty years of his headship the London Day Training College developed into the Empire's most important educational institution. Its inauguration with Adams as its first head in 1902 marked the culmination of the movement which gave England a centralized system of teacher training.

Adams' administrative ability was a joy to contemplate. He had the happy faculty and good fortune of surrounding himself with most capable assistants, to whom he delegated complete administrative authority, allotting to himself the difficult task of most of the policy forming, and acting as the buffer between the Institute and the London Board of Education. As the University of London's first professor of education, Adams was confronted with the Gargantuan task of overcoming an almost intolerable contempt and resentment on the part of the rest of the faculty toward university courses in education and toward those who assumed courses in education were worth the teaching.

The cause of education in England was most fortunate when Adams was chosen to carry the struggle into such a stronghold of reaction, such a den of "teachers-by-the Grace of God." By dint of infinite patience, extreme modesty, unfailing tolerance, and by unquestioned scholastic genius, John Adams almost single-handedly gained respect and a great measure of cooperation from education's then most powerful deterrent, the universities. Adams' publication of his interpretation of Herbart's psychology (Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education) established him as a most effective writer, and, as Kandel expressed it, was a solvent for many of the educational ills of the entire British Empire. It brought him international fame, and also great prestige to the University of London and the London Day Training College, where he had taken up his career shortly after writing the volume. In a steady flow of brilliantly written treatises on educational theory and practice, Adams emphasized particularly the importance of the child as the focal point of educational procedure, and the necessity of systematic training in the technique of teaching comparable with training required for persons engaged in other professions.

In the classroom, on the lecture platform, and in the press Adams delivered his message and gained his converts. In every part of the English-speaking world approval of Adams' mission came back
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to London. In 1907 he taught in the summer session at the University of California. In the same year he was one of the principal speakers at the National Education Convention held in Los Angeles. The passing of years saw Adams' labors bearing rich harvest. Education as a fitting subject for the University curriculum was in Adams' own time at the University of London conceded by his colleagues. In Adams' later years few had the temerity to contend that teacher training was any less essential to satisfactory teaching than was apprenticeship to any other calling. School teachers themselves in ever-increasing numbers accepted Adams' leadership in progressive aims and methods in teaching. Again almost by himself, Adams freed them from the deadening grip of faculty psychology and gave them in place of it his explanation of Herbart's many-sided interests and self-realization as the ultimate goals in education.

By temperament, by training, and by grace, Adams was a teacher. Adams and teaching were synonymous; Adams was teaching. Throughout his entire active life Adams was first of all a teacher. His other activities, administration and publishing, stemmed from his devotion to teaching, with the conviction that infinite improvement therein could be effected through systematic training based on the psychology of the learning process. The bulk of his publications deal with this phase of education, and his work as administrator of teacher training institutions always included teaching assignments in educational theory and practice. In his writings one feels "the teacher’s desk, the convenient blackboard, the rows of eruptive youth, the eternal and complicated equation in which the factors are John, John Adams, and the job in hand." And his lectures on the art of teaching were incomparable examples of the art itself.

The remarkable literary gifts that Adams demonstrated throughout his long career, like his genius as a teacher, cannot be separated from John Adams the person—nor can they be dissociated with Adams the teacher. His personality made his teaching effective, and his writing and lecturing enabled teachers the world over to make education more human.

Adams' work in education is contrasted in this study with that of Thomas Arnold, the American Herbartians, the American Essentialists or Neo-Herbartians led by William C. Bagley, and the American Progressives led by John Dewey. In common with all these leaders Adams' aim in education was the development of moral character. Like the Herbartians and Bagley and Dewey, Adams believed the
means of achieving moral character were those which were primarily concerned with a knowledge of the individual child and the application of this knowledge to the teaching process. Whereas Arnold based his hopes for achieving moral character through the effect of the discipline involved in mastering the classics, Adams and the others depended upon the development of widespread interest on the part of the child in areas of learning more closely associated with activities of everyday life.

Although Adams was in the thick of the Herbartian movement which swept Europe and America in the late 1890's and early 1900's, he refused to lose himself in the shortsighted attempts of many leaders in the movement to accept the Herbartian technique of instruction as the panacea for all of education's ills. In his teachings and writings Adams continued to draw from the experience of Plato, Aristotle, Comenius, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Montessori, and a host of others.

With the two groups of educators who looked respectively to Bagley and Dewey for leadership, Adams had much in common; albeit more with Bagley and the Essentialists or Moderates than with Dewey and the Progressives. The goals of moral character and social efficiency, the importance of interest in the learning process, and experience leading to self-realization as the means of achieving moral character were characteristic of all these men. Adams and Bagley together differed from Dewey in the method of achieving these ends. The two former believed they could be achieved by better organization, better teaching, and gradual changes in the traditional curriculum; the latter advocated complete change in educational practice to provide conditions under which the learner himself could choose and identify himself with what was to be learned. Adams and Bagley were equally adamant over practices of the Progressives which gave the child too much freedom in the choice of learning material and too little responsibility for results of their learning. They both were thorough believers in the ideal of "Freedom through Discipline."

Adams was far less inclined to rearm the curriculum than either the Dewey or the Bagley group. He recognized the need of educating for complete living, of educating for social efficiency, but, in characteristic English fashion, felt that this social efficiency was incompatible with learning based on following the natural impulses of the learner to the extent advocated by many of his contemporary American educators.
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With Adams it must be kept in mind that the teacher and the pupil shared equally in the learning situation. During his long and successful career in education Adams never lost sight of the importance of both the learner and the teacher in the educational process. He refused to minimize either in favor of the other. Just as children in all parts of the English-speaking world have been happier, freer, and better taught because of Adams' struggle to make education more human, so have teachers the world over enjoyed directly or indirectly the fruits of his labors. Above all else, Adams was desirous of contributing to the advancement of his profession. Bagley writes:

This he did in a rich and enduring measure not only in his teachings and writings but also through personal charm, gentle manners, and genuine culture, which gave to all who knew him an enhanced respect for the profession which he served so well and represented so worthily.

The culmination of Adams' success in education was, of course, the recognition of his services by the crown, the bestowal of Knighthood upon him. Here in the United States, where class distinction is rather negligible when contrasted to that in England, it is difficult for Americans to fully appreciate the importance of this honor, the highest honor available to an Englishman.

This Royal recognition, as coveted as it was, came to Adams entirely unsolicited and as a complete surprise. After a quarter of a century of public approbation Adams was still the same modest, retiring, scholarly schoolman, to all outward appearances untouched by adulation. His remaining years of educational activity in the United States and the United Kingdom increased at the same time his prestige and modesty. To the very end, in 1934 in Los Angeles, Adams kept up his interest in education and educators. His pen never ceased nor did his platform appearances until the short illness prior to his passing incapacitated him.

Universal have been the great respect and admiration paid John Adams wherever men are thinking and striving in the cause of education. Yet it is with pardonable pride that this study is concluded with the tribute by John Dewey which expresses so simply and effectively Sir John Adams' unique contribution to education:

His vitality, his warm humanity, his insight and fairness, stand out in every page he wrote. And he brought to
educational literature a trait that is generally lacking, an abundant sense of humor which always seemed to me to be a part of his sympathy for everything of human interest.


In 1964, Trevor Ford immigrated to Norway from England to begin a career that would provide a dramatic influence on bands in Norway. As a former bandsman in the British Royal Marines, Ford possessed extensive knowledge and abilities as a performing musician, conductor and organizer. These abilities have been fully utilized in his role as Music Inspector for the Norwegian Band Federation. In his role as Inspector, Ford has helped to develop Norwegian bands from small, popular community groups with a long tradition of importance to larger organizations with higher standards, that includes over twenty-five percent of the Norwegian population as participants.

The history of bands in Norway began in the mid-eighteenth century with the fife and drum bands of the Norwegian military. The popularity and size of the bands grew at a rapid rate until the early twentieth century. After the establishment of a formal organization to administrate the Norwegian military bands in the late nineteenth century and after the formation of the Molesgate School Boys' Band in Oslo in 1901, there was a rapid growth of popularity in the boys' band movement, but development of the abilities and organization of the bands slowed significantly until 1965 when Trevor Ford was selected as the Inspector for Music. His purpose as Inspector was to improve the quality, organization, education, and opportunities for growth of the Norwegian band movement through the Norwegian Band Federation.

The accomplishments of Trevor Ford include the building of what is currently the largest per capita participation in bands in the world. This document traces the biography of Trevor Ford from his birth to his current station as spokesman for and one of the leaders of
Marion King Roberts

the Norwegian Band Federation. Ford has also been active as a composer of wind music, and analyses of several of Ford's compositions are included to show his ability as a composer.


This dissertation examines both the work and the social-philosophical influence and outlook of William Forster Lloyd (1794-1852), Drummond Professor of Political Economy at Oxford from 1832 to 1837. His views are compared with those of the orthodox school, such as Ricardo, McCulloch and James Mill, and with a group of their non-socialist dissenters, among them Bailey, Scrope, and Jones. In his Oxford lectures on population, the poor laws, value and rent, Lloyd took a position which supported Malthus' disproportionate ratios and the importance of moral restraint, but which was critical of his means of promoting such restraint. He did not support the New Poor Law of 1834, and he fashioned an analysis which showed that the wage-allowance system benefitted the poor as well as the rich and deserved the support of the landed classes in Parliament. The lectures also contain a slight modification of the Ricardian theory of rent and a clear statement of the law of diminishing marginal utility. Although certainly a fore-runner of Jevons, Lloyd did not develop a complete theory of consumer behavior and did not relate utility to value in exchange. His lack of influence among the political economists of his day may have been due in part to a social outlook which often placed him at odds with the process of industrialization and associated him with the views of Paley, Malthus, Jones, and Coleridge, rather than Bentham, Ricardo, and James Mill.

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Conclusion

In opposing the professional and the strictly "scientific" viewpoints in education, John of Salisbury was activated by no vague aestheticism or mere natural conservatism. His life and work, the extent of his interests, the confidence which his superiors and associates reposed in him, above all, the constant tribute of admiration which scholars for nearly a thousand years have accorded not only to his style but also to the perennial freshness and vitality of his thought, all forbid us to dismiss his testimony lightly.

Had John been a fastidious humanist, or had he withdrawn in distaste from the mundane struggle for existence, he might be set aside as impractical. Had he been a rapt admirer of the past, and disdainful of his own age and its achievements, his strictures might be dismissed as the biased opinions of a confirmed traditionalist. But we know that he was a poor man who earned his education as teacher and secretary; a busy man, with a profession that kept him constantly in touch with the most stirring and significant events of his time; a progressive man, who chose the realism of Aristotle in preference to the idealism of Plato; who admired and defended the philosophical views of such liberal thinkers as Abelard and Gilbert de la Porée; who, in short, was known as an undaunted champion of freedom and the enemy of all narrow dogmatizing in matters where faith had not said the last word. But, principally, he was an independent thinker whose long view restrained him from committing himself too enthusiastically to any movement. While the great majority of his contemporaries were plunging with impassioned zeal into one or other of the absorbing questions of the day, John of Salisbury was taking in the whole picture and seeing with remarkable clarity whither the current was bearing them.

One very commonly encounters in medieval studies a comment on the similarity between John of Salisbury and Petrarch. It is doubtless true that both had a deep solicitude for literary expression, and both opposed the excesses of scholasticism; but to think of John as a medieval Petrarch is to make the mistake of the Roman populace who showed their appreciation of Brutus by offering to make him
Caesar. For John of Salisbury would have been as much opposed to Petrarch as he was to the Cornicians. A one-sided emphasis on rhetoric would have appeared to him just as destructive of culture as a one-sided absorption in logic. What he stressed was wholeness, the indissoluble union of thought and expression, and the necessity of cultivating the one in constant conformity with the development of the other.

For this reason he insists that the arts of expression cannot be relegated to the preparatory school. Since language is not a matter of set rules but a living convention, it can be mastered only in the living word, and requires a constant and ever-deepening penetration into the best models. Rules are valuable, certainly, but only as a beginning. They can be but sign-posts which direct our study of the models.

John of Salisbury's theory of grammar is based on an understanding of the protean character of language. Though the word has a natural basis, since it is related to ontology (the thing-in-itself) on the one hand, and to psychology (the concept) on the other, it is, in itself, a conventional symbol, and therefore subject to the whims of caprice and the limitations of the human situation. This being so, language cannot be strictly formulated; the elementary principles may be exactly defined, but the more delicate nuances, a knowledge of which is necessary for penetration into the depths of a writer's thought, are to be acquired only by long and earnest study of the works of masters. It goes without saying that "grammar" in this sense involves much more than a knowledge of the parts of speech and the laws governing their agreement. An exact appreciation of the function of pauses (or punctuation), a nice discrimination in choice of diction, a judicious consideration of the demands of genre, an understanding of structure in its relation to the former, and a thorough knowledge of figures of speech and their function in discourse, were among the things which John would have deemed necessary for intelligent reading, and which, therefore, it was the duty of the grammarian to impart.

In John's estimation dialectic was a purely formal discipline whose function was the analysis of statements into their logical components so as to determine the validity of the reasoning processes which underlay them. He makes it perfectly clear that dialectic is concerned with statements, and neither with the reality to which the statement refers nor with the action of the mind by which the reality is apprehended. His urgent insistence that the dialectician be well grounded in the quadrivium, which constituted medieval "science,"
is founded on his realization that, though in theory these processes may be distinguished, they cannot be separated in practice. The dialectician, therefore, cannot actually pass on the validity of a statement unless he has some intimation of its truth or falsity. This information is not supplied by dialectic but by the sciences in whose proper domain of knowledge the material under consideration belongs. The mistake of some of the scholastics was to attempt to discover, by the mere application of logical means and without recourse to the principles of sciences other than dialectic, the answers to questions which only metaphysics, physics, or some other particular science was competent to discuss. John's attitude on this subject shows the degree to which he had assimilated the thought of Aristotle, who gave it as his opinion that he destroys dialectic who makes of it a science rather than a faculty.

Rhetoric was conceived by John in a distinctly Aristotelian framework. It was closely associated with dialectic as a branch of probable logic; but since it was distinct from the former in its purpose, its field of operation, and its instruments and methods, it employed invention and judgment in a manner totally different from the manner and methods of dialectic. Since the orator operates in a field where conviction is unattainable, and where persuasion of the will is the objective rather than compulsion of the intellect; since he directs his address to an audience more responsive to emotional and ethical appeal than to intellectual demonstration, he must of necessity speak or write more at length and with a greater dependence on the resources of language than the dialectician. In this adaptation of language to the demands of specific situations, the unerring norms of the orator must be clearness and propriety.

While he willingly admits that demonstrative science, where attainable, is the highest goal of the human intellect and the most worthy object of our striving, John realistically accepts human limitations and asserts that there is a vast field of knowledge in which probability is the highest certainty man can attain. But John would not admit that even demonstrative science can afford to divorce itself from eloquence. Both as an aid to his own progress, and in order to fulfill his obligation of charity to share his discoveries with his fellowmen, the scientist needs to be able to give clear and appropriate expression to his thought. When scholars become so alienated from the rest of their fellowmen that they devise for themselves a private language, and cease to share in the everyday emotional experiences of their
neighbors, they run the risk of destroying, eventually, even the good which they achieve by their efforts. The scholastic movement of the thirteenth century fostered immense intellectual activity and made important advances on many frontiers. But it neglected the arts of expression. The unmerited scorn heaped upon it by the humanists of the succeeding centuries should induce us, who also live in a period devoted to exact science, to weigh John's opinions thoughtfully. The trivium, which confers eloquence, must be cultivated hand in hand with the quadrivium, which attains truth. No civilization can afford to become so immersed in the pursuit of truth that it neglects the forms in which its activities are to be interpreted to posterity, for it is on the basis of these that its worth and value will ultimately be judged.


As the most systematic and prolific of the seventeenth century group known as the Cambridge Platonists, Ralph Cudworth attempted to construct a great humanistic synthesis against overwhelming forces, both religious and secular. At the same time he was a successful administrator as Master of Christ's College at Cambridge, though the intellectual controversies in which he participated were projected into college politics by certain ambitious members who wished to displace him.

As a humanist, Cudworth received his major inspiration from classical antiquity, particularly from the Platonic tradition, but personal relationships were also quite influential. He enjoyed the close
friendship of Benjamin Whichcote, who is frequently cited as the founder of the Platonist movement at Cambridge. Henry More was virtually an alter ego, so close was their lifelong friendship and the correspondence of their ideas. Cudworth had personal ties also with such prominent figures as Phillippe van Limborch, John Smith, and John Worthington. Unfortunately, his hypersensitivity threatened at one time to disrupt even his friendship with Henry More.

Cambridge Platonism was first identified with Latitudinarianism, providing the intellectual basis for its opposition to the extremism of Calvinism and the enthusiastic sects. To Cudworth, Divine Fatalism, his term for Calvinism, represented a comprehensive repudiation of humanism by its emphasis upon the omnipotence and arbitrariness of God, the degradation of man and his subjection to predestination. Cudworth's attack was two-fold. Against the idea of an arbitrary God, he argued that there are eternal and immutable essences which God cannot change any more than He can change His own essence, which is Perfection or Goodness and not omnipotence. Reflecting the characteristic interest of his group in ethics, he protested that God thereby cannot make wrong to be right or truth to be untruth. Epistemologically, he sought to show that the objects of knowledge are eternal and immutable, independent alike of an arbitrary God or mechanistic matter. Yet, in the second place, Cudworth insisted that within the framework of these eternal and immutable principles, man must have freewill. He based this upon the assumption that the human soul is capable of self-activity, a key attribute of all incorporeal substance. Freewill is obvious, he argued, from the simple fact that we commit both logical and moral error.

But, the appearance of certain secular philosophies in the mid-seventeenth century and particularly that of Thomas Hobbes, forced the Platonists to defend the logic of religion itself. Perhaps the most typically humanistic of Cudworth's ideas was his assumption that all truth and error had been expressed in classical antiquity, that therefore the ideas of Hobbes, Bacon, Descartes, Gassendi, and Spinoza were merely restitutions of ancient systems, just as were his own views. In his refutation of the resurrected Materialistic Atheism of Hobbes, which he presented in his magnum opus, The True Intellectual System of the Universe, Cudworth demonstrated the existence of the incorporeal by showing that motion, life, and thought could never have originated in matter.

The paradox of Cambridge Platonism was that its efforts were
in inverse ratio to the historical significance of its opponents. Thus, Cudworth regarded the other contemporary philosophers as merely erring Theists, whereas they really contributed much more than Hobbes to the seventeenth century divorce between Nature and God. The paradox was particularly sharp in the case of the Royal Society which, because of the conspicuous piety of many of its greatest members, appeared to be the Platonists' truest ally, but which, through its promotion of the scientific spirit, ultimately contributed the most to the disregard of traditional humanistic values.


Robert Wood, a traveling tutor and travel agent who gained a European-wide reputation as a classical scholar, played an important role in British politics and government. This dissertation deals with the grand tour, archeology, architecture, military and diplomatic developments, parliamentary politics during the 1750's and 1760's, the development of sociological and anthropological theory and Wood's contribution to the "Homeric Question." It also investigates the social and psychological pressures Wood experienced as a man rising from obscure origins to an insecure place on the fringes of a tightly structured aristocratic world.

Wood was born in Dublin, educated at the University of Glasgow and the Middle Temple and later was a "bear leader" for young aristocrats and gentlemen on their grand tours. During the 1750's he made a trip into the Near East, the turning point in his career. The trip, made in search of the site of Homer's Troy, took him to Anatolia, Egypt, Syria and Greece. Resulting in two important books on the ruins of Palmyra (1753) and Balbec (1757), it opened for him the opportunity to take the young Duke of Bridgewater on his grand tour. In 1756 Wood was chosen by William Pitt to become his principal undersecretary. During the Seven Years' War Wood performed a variety of tasks, but most particularly he was an important
Irwin Taylor Sanders, II

During peace negotiations in 1762 he helped settle the East Indian aspects of the Paris treaty. After publication of North Briton #45, Wood, acting under ministerial orders, supervised the ransacking of John Wilkes' house and thus became deeply involved in the general warrants affair. Wilkes prosecuted Wood for trespass in December 1763 and the undersecretary was fined £1,000. Despite his services to the government, Wood's low birth blocked his advancement and he was denied several lucrative posts.

Wood, who had been unhappy with the state of politics for some time, resigned his place as undersecretary in September 1763. He spent the next several years concentrating on scholarship. Instrumental in James Bruce's voyage leading to the discovery of the Blue Nile's source, he also directed the archeological program of the Society of the Dilettanti leading to their important studies of Greek architectural forms. Besides influencing Robert Adam, the architect who introduced the Classical Revival into Britain, Wood aided Nicholas Revett and James Stuart, whose study on Athenian architecture gave Britain its first taste of pure Greek architecture.

In temporary retirement he worked on an essay on Homer, published posthumously in England in 1775. Influenced by Scottish primitivists, Wood analyzed Homer's age in light of contemporary Near Eastern nomadic society. He made important contributions to fields that today one would term field anthropology and comparative mythology and sociology. Most important, however, was his theory that the Homeric poems were composed orally and reflected a "primitive" stage of European development. Although not immediately accepted in England, his work had an impact in Germany, helping mold the theories of Goethe and Herder particularly.

Wood returned to office in 1768, but was forced into retirement in 1770 when he urged a hard line against France and Spain during the Falkland Islands crisis in a vain attempt to bring Pitt back to power. With his politics in disrepute, elements of his scholarly endeavors under attack, and having suffered reverses in the stock market, Wood may have taken his own life the following year.
Symbols, both graphic and mathematical, exercised a life-time fascination for the Victorian scholar, Alexander John Ellis (1814-90) in connection with his investigations into spelling reform, phonetics, mathematics, physics, and particularly philology. In conjunction with the phonographer Isaac Pitman, he undertook during the 1840's to revolutionize reading instruction for the illiterate masses by utilizing a special phonotypic alphabet. In 1866, Ellis devised Palaeotype, a system of sound notation employing combinations of existing type faces to represent minute phonetic distinctions. Ellis then constructed an account of the evolution of English speech sounds through the course of twelve centuries in his monumental study *On Early English Pronunciation* (1867-89). Central to his account are his conjectured pronunciations of the sounds represented in the texts of Chaucer and Shakespeare. Expanding his investigation, Ellis conducted the first dialectal survey of the British Isles and drew the first reliable map of English dialectal boundaries. This landmark in English dialectal history was based upon dialect tests, comparative specimens, word lists, and viva voces. Providing assistance and encouragement with the complex survey were Thomas Hallam, Prince Louis Lucien Bonaparte, J. G. Goodchild, and hundreds of "dialectal informants." In order to preserve the nation's vanishing dialectal forms, in 1871 Ellis took the lead in establishing the English Dialect Society, whose efforts later were the basis for Joseph Wright's great *English Dialect Dictionary*. Ellis likewise conjectured the sounds of both Latin (1874) and Greek (1876). His vigorous leadership in the affairs of the Philological Society of London brought him into close contact with scholars like F. J. Furnivall, James A. H. Murray, William Aldis Wright, Francis J. Child, and Henry Sweet. Ellis figured prominently in those events leading to the publication of the *Oxford English Dictionary*, undertaken by the Philological Society. Extensive studies into theoretical mathematics, particularly his work on "stigmetrics," earned for him the admiration of his colleagues in the Royal Society of London. His
experiments regarding the nature of pitch in organs included a major revision and translation of Helmholtz's study *Tonempfindungen* (1875) and a scientific determination of the scales of non-European instruments (1885).


Theoretical in form and narrative in format, the dissertation is less an argument than an exposition of an argument. The sociological works of Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu are explicated, examined, and to some extent evaluated. A major premise of the dissertation is that these works remain largely inaccessible to American readers outside a relatively small circle of sociologists, curriculum theorists, and educational philosophers. Basil Bernstein, a British sociologist, has developed a linguistic theory of underachievement in school that is tied to social structure and social class relations. Pierre Bourdieu, a French sociologist, argues that school failure among large numbers of working class children is a pre-determined consequence of structural factors related to patterns of class stratification and amenable to empirical investigation.

References to the theoretical positions of Basil Bernstein and Pierre Bourdieu appear more and more frequently in American scholarship, due in part to the recent availability of translations of texts by Bourdieu that reflect their mutual influences on one another. While such references appear with greater frequency, expositions of their works are rare and generally sketchy. The purpose of this dissertation is to help clarify what it is they have to say both abroad and to an American audience.

Cultural reproduction theory refers to the study of processes whereby social class distinctions are transmitted from one generation to another by means of structured habits and strategies which recreate in the young a set of non-biological attributes recognizable by others as related to social class status. Cultural reproduction theory finds its
John H. Scahill

expression in educational sociology because class related cultural attributes are thought to be transmuted in school into educational advantages. Thus, cultural reproduction theory represents a challenge to notions that schools and equal educational opportunities can help bring about a more meritocratic social order apart from broader social reforms.

An effort is made to render some underlying philosophical issues more evident and better related to American approaches to similar issues. Considerable space is devoted to Bourdieu's earlier anthropological scholarship as his positions on issues in philosophy of science and sociology of knowledge are well developed in those sources.


William Stanley Jevons's Theory of Political Economy (1871) was the first British treatise to insist upon the complete mathematization of economic theory. "Economics," Jevons declared, "if it is to be a science at all, must be a mathematical science." This in itself constituted a radical departure from previous economic thought. In order to explain this transformation, the personal motives behind Jevons's campaign for mathematical economics and the campaign itself are examined here. It is argued that Jevons's program was primarily shaped by his study of logic and the philosophy of science and not, as some historians have maintained, from a reaction to problems inherent in the classical theory of value. This interpretation is based upon a careful reading of the primary sources, particularly Jevons's major theoretical works and extant correspondence.

As one of the first commentators on the logics of John Stuart Mill and George Boole, Jevons devised, in his Principles of Science (1874), an original approach to the methods and structure of scientific knowledge. More specifically, by establishing a criterion which demarcated mathematics from its logical roots, and by recognizing, in
opposition to Mill, that a mathematical treatment of a scientific theory did not entail greater exactitude or certainty, Jevons discovered the path by which mathematics could secure its rightful place in the "dismal science." Furthermore, as part of his general attempt to emulate classical physics, Jevons believed that economics must first devise a system of mechanics which, like its counterpart in physics, would be mathematical, reductionist and universal in scope. Economic phenomena, the prices and quantities of the market place, could be reduced to and thus explained by the motives of the individual mind, namely the feelings of pleasure and pain. The utility theory of value was thus an integral part of a more overriding concern by Jevons to establish, at the core of economic theory, a system of mathematical mechanics.

The reception of Jevons's economics has often been described as unfavorable. The present work, which also examines the reaction to Jevons's 1871 manifesto, suggests that this was not the case, that Jevons's new method received a fair hearing and was, particularly by the younger generation of economists, generally endorsed. Although it is not argued that Jevons was primarily responsible for establishing mathematical methods in economics, our findings indicate that, as a result of his work, mathematical economics definitely emerged in Britain as a permanent practice.


The thesis of the dissertation is that relations between statements of a formal language, which are suitably constrained to mirror the non-quantitative probability relation "is not more probable than," can serve as a semantics for that language and that this absolute, comparative, probabilistic semantics is a generalization of absolute, quantitative, probabilistic semantics; that is, the semantics for a formal language that employs one-place functions that obey the laws of the probability calculus.
Chapter one provides an historical sketch of the area to which the dissertation is a contribution. It traces the development of what came to be known as probabilistic semantics from the work of Sir Karl Popper through Robert Stalnaker, William Harper, Hartry Field, Kent Bendall, and Hugues Leblanc. It also provides a brief history of probability as a non-quantitative (comparative) concept by discussing the work of Bruno De Finetti, Bernard Koopman, and Charles Morgan. It concludes by explaining the thesis of the dissertation in light of the just-sketched tradition and spells out the program for the rest of the work.

Chapter two presents the syntax of a propositional language PL and provides an absolute comparative probabilistic semantics for it. It then shows that the language is sound and complete with respect to that semantics. The last section gives an account of generalization and argues that this semantics is a generalization of the absolute comparative probabilistic semantics for PL. This amounts to claiming that for every probability function there is a corresponding probability relation and for every member of a proper subset of probability relations, namely, that set which contains only comparable relations, there is at least one probability function corresponding to it.

Chapter three offers the same kind of results obtained in chapter two for a first order language FL.

The final chapter offers a summation of the results and highlights some of the features of absolute comparative probabilistic semantics such as the intensionality of the logical operators and the existence of what are termed "assumption sets." It also suggests possible avenues of application and research involving the new semantics.


This reappraisal of John Colet, a pre-Reformation English churchman, begins with a problem of interpretation in chapter one.
Colet is usually presented along with William Grocyn, Thomas Linacre, Thomas More, and Desiderius Erasmus as a humanist who made important contributions to Scripture scholarship, ecclesiastical reform, and education. He is presented as the inspiration of Christian Humanism, in general, and Erasmianism, in particular. Others, however, question his importance. In his approach to Scripture there is nothing new. There is no record of any reform success. In education, he was a reactionary. He was not a humanist at all, but an anti-humanist, a radical Augustinian. However divergent the interpretations of John Colet, his interpreters do agree that one of his main concerns was the need for reform. Chapter two deals with this need for reform, with the abuses that concerned Colet. This concern he chiefly expressed in his Convocation sermon, but it is also found throughout his writings. There was a reform movement at the time with programs for reform, and Colet is usually associated with it. In order to find out if this be so, chapter three examines the tenets of Christian Humanism and Erasmianism. With this background data chapter four moves to a systematic examination of Colet's theology, itself. Such a survey will give us, it is hoped, the data to make judgements about Colet, the "humanist," or about Colet, the "Augustinian," or "Platonist." Such a review will also help in an evaluation of his efforts in Scripture studies, church reform and education. The study up to this point, of the varying interpretations of Colet, his reform concerns, the tenets of Humanism, and the Dean's theology itself, allows us in chapter five to make some tentative observations about his "Humanism," "Augustinianism," and his "Platonism." We discover here many affinities that would allow Colet to be comfortable in the humanist camp. But he was not a humanist in the ordinary sense of the word. Colet's Paulinism and Erasmus' "Philosophy of Christ" also share common view points. While a minority of commentators have held that Colet is an anti-Augustinian, the majority of late have stressed his ties with St. Augustine. Colet is favorable to Augustine, uses similar language, and shares the same Pauline tradition. But the key difference between the Dean of St. Paul's and the Bishop of Hippo is the estimate of man's capability. Colet is the more optimistic. There is no dispute about the obvious presence of Platonism in Colet. But in his indebtedness to his Platonic sources, it was Colet's purpose to preach Paul. He used his Platonic sources as a handmaid to help him illuminate the meaning of the Bible. In the light of some rather extravagant claims made about John Colet's importance in the history
of Scripture scholarship, ecclesiastical reform, and education, it is time to evaluate his efforts in these areas in chapter six. It is also time to see if there is any cohesion between his theology and his interests in Bible, church, and school. The study will then conclude with a statement about Colet's significance in history. It is an overstatement to suggest that Colet was the originator of the later Scripture scholarship of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries or that the Dean made a lasting contribution to Biblical studies. When his approach, however, is contrasted with the medieval exegesis, it is a striking contrast. His reform program is consistent with his reform theology, but Colet's practical suggestions have the too narrow focus on the elimination of ecclesiastical abuses. As an educator, he is neither a conservative reactionary nor a radical innovator. He did found a school that, by and large, embodied the Christian humanist ideals of education. This study concludes that it is difficult to label Colet a humanist or Augustinian. He was an eclectic and unsystematic thinker. This reappraisal is also in agreement with that point of view that holds that assertions about Colet's importance and influence have been exaggerated.


The key question raised by Karl Mannheim was how people think about the nature of social reality. Part of his answer was that, rather than perceiving social conditions realistically, most thought is influenced by social location. Thus obscured, social thought is not reflective of reality and becomes ideological, utopian, or substantively irrational.

It is important to note that a large part of Mannheim's concern with the practical knowledge by which people live their daily lives was motivated by his value position. This position encompassed the notion of emancipated individuals living in democratic societies.
Arnold Kraft Sherman

While his sociology of knowledge was oriented toward how we think, his sociology of education was oriented toward showing how the social production and transmission of knowledge could increase understanding of social reality and thus contribute to human freedom.

The problem of this study is to demonstrate important links between Mannheim's social values, epistemology, sociology of knowledge, social diagnosis, and sociology of education. This is useful as Mannheimian scholars have debated the question of the degree of congruity in Mannheim's work. The establishment of congruity is important not only for a study of Mannheim, but it is also critical to establish the logical relation between the various areas in which Mannheim worked. An examination of Mannheim's work, in relation to his critics, will show how Mannheimian theory helps to clarify a number of crucial contemporary issues.


Historians of oral interpretation and speech education acknowledge Marjorie Gullan as a pioneer figure. However, they limit their discussion to Gullan's activities as a pioneer in popularizing choral speaking and neglect her other professional involvements as a speech teacher, lecturer, and public reader. This study traces Gullan's career from the earliest years in Scotland to her death, and illustrates the interdependence between her experiences as a speech teacher and her experiments with choral speaking as an educational and artistic technique.

Born in the late nineteenth century, Gullan witnessed the waning days of elocution, and throughout her lengthy career, which extended into the 1950's, she encouraged the revival of verse-speaking and the inclusion of speech courses as part of the standard curriculum in the public schools and teacher training institutions. As the author of eight textbooks and anthologies; a pioneer and practitioner of
Ronald Eugene Shields

choral speaking with the Glasgow Nightingales and the London Verse Speaking Choir; the sponsor of a professional speech journal entitled Good Speech, later called Speech News; the president of the Speech Fellowship, an association formed to promote speech training in the schools; a popular lecturer and public reader; and a successful teacher in the public schools, teacher training colleges, and in her own private studio and schools in Scotland and England, Gullan's diverse activities contributed to her lifelong goal, the promotion of speech training in the schools and the advancement of the spoken world.

Primary sources for this study include interviews with members of Gullan's verse-speaking choirs; materials from Gullan's personal papers housed in the local history collection of the Mitchell Library, Glasgow, Scotland; professional correspondence, programs, and newspaper clippings from the archives at the University of London and the London Regent Street Polytechnic; and letters from and interviews with a number of Gullan's former students and friends.


The Problem

Cecil Reddie, the founder of the first of a long list of new schools, holds a definite place in the development of educational theory and practice. His school, Abbotsholme, Derbyshire, England, aroused much interest not alone in its native land but in almost every country in the world, yet historians of education have failed to give Reddie and his work due consideration. The attempt is here made to show the reasons for his neglect and to indicate Reddie's distinctive place in education.
The Purpose of the Investigation

1. To present and evaluate critically Reddie's educational philosophy and practice.

2. To trace the origin and content of his ideas.

3. To show how he applied his philosophy of education to the administration and supervision of Abbotsholme.

4. To show his influence on subsequent educators.

5. To establish the interrelationships between Reddie and the New School Movement.

6. To state his distinctive contribution to education.

Methods of Procedure

Examination of:

1. All available works of Reddie.

2. All pertinent contemporary and historical backgrounds.

3. The views of leading educators who agreed or disagreed with Abbotsholme's basic principles and practices.

4. Visitors' estimates and reports.

5. Correspondence with former pupils, the present headmaster of Abbotsholme, assistant masters, his biographer, the editors of the three organs of the New Education Fellowship, et al.

The Importance of the Study

Reddie launched an experiment in education which lighted the
Fanny K. Singer

torch of inspiration for many educators. So novel was the élan vital of his educational enterprise that he was acclaimed the founder of a new education. He put his theory to the acid test of practice; the school has survived five decades and is today "maintained in order to carry out education on the principles laid down by the founder." His work was the impetus for the creation and maintenance of an international bureau of educational experiments which led to the establishment of hundreds of similar schools dotting the educational map of the world. The founder of a pioneer school, the originator of a "world-wide symbol" to guide hundreds of educators in many lands deserves careful study.

The Life of Reddie

Reddie was born at Fulham, London, October 10, 1858. He received his education on earned scholarships—at Fettes College for six years, at Edinburgh as medical student for four years, and at Göttingen for two years.

While at Göttingen, he turned from his original purpose of studying medicine and science in favor of teaching. The following five years he spent teaching science at Fettes College, chemistry at the University of Edinburgh Extension Courses, and mathematics, physics, and chemistry at Clifton College. Gradually realizing that tradition and subordinate position in existing schools would prevent him from developing his ideas of a reformed education, Reddie, a man of vision and determination, opened the Abbotsholme School in October 1889, at Derbyshire, England, for boys of Britain's directing classes. He remained headmaster until his retirement in 1927, when Abbotsholme was taken over by the "old boys"; Colin H. C. Sharp was then appointed headmaster. The last five years of Reddie's life were spent at Welwyn Garden City near Abbotsholme, studying philosophy, politics, psychology, mysticism, sociology, and literature. On February 6, 1932, he passed away and was buried on the highest peak of the school estate.

The Sources of Reddie's Ideas

Socrates, Plato, Shakespeare, Carpenter, Maitland, Carlyle,
Ruskin, Herbart, Rein, Fichte, Goethe, and Froebel were only some of his precursors whose works he enjoyed and who undoubtedly influenced him. His love of the land, his poetical and mystical approach to life and reality, and the German science of organization were the groundwork of his philosophy.

**Reddie’s Philosophy**

Reddie’s "consistent philosophy of life" must be viewed from its three aspects

1. the sociological
2. the religious
3. the pedagogical

carefully interwoven. The framework of Reddie’s thinking was the detection of a dualism or polarity running through all reality and life.

**Reddie’s Educational Philosophy**

The aim of education is to integrate all the powers of the boy—intellectually, aesthetically, physically, practically, and morally. Preparation for participation in the social, economic, religious, and practical life of the nation is the concern of education. The recipients will aid in the socio-politico-economic regeneration of the nation. All education, then, is for national amelioration and improvement.

The chief agency for effecting an education from which each gets the "hang together of things" is the school. By recognizing and catering to individual needs, by providing the proper school environment, by fostering and developing the proper pupil-teacher relationship, by offering a modernized and practical curriculum, the school approaches its ultimate aim.

School subjects must be so correlated that their _Nacheinandernerness-und-Nebeneinandernerness_ contribute to an integrated development. History must give the boy an insight into the present and a foundation for future participation in sociopolitical affairs, at home and abroad. Foreign languages must produce conversationalists and readers rather than grammarians. Formal examinations and the in-
doctrination of "isms" cannot be part of a school program that hopes to implant the spirit of cooperation, mutual understanding, and aid. Music, art, sports and gymnastics, manual training (distinguished from industrial training), hikes and trips, all supplement intellectual training. Undogmatic religious education will eradicate one major cause for hatred and is indispensable for the "harmonious development of the whole personality."

The teacher must be a master in his speciality. But more than that, he must foster a relationship with each boy that is built on understanding, comradeship, confidence, and love. He must be father, friend, confidant, inspirer, and mentor to each boy.

Reddie's Accomplishments and Influence

Reddie founded the pioneer of a long list of new schools. Its fame spread so rapidly that within a decade assistant masters inspired by Reddie and Abbotsholme established schools of their own on similar lines. Thus the Landerziehungsheime and the Freie Schulgemeinde were born. Its fame was further spread by the publication of books, editorials, and press notices in native and foreign tongues. Visitors from almost every country in the world expressed enthusiasm for the novel pedagogical laboratory in which they saw hope of a reformed education. To answer the demand for information concerning the principles and practices of the new education, the International Bureau of New Schools was established in Switzerland before the close of the century. Today the new school movement boasts several hundred schools. Information concerning them is disseminated through the three publications of the new school movement: The New Era, Pour l’Ere Nouvelle, and Das Werdende Zeitalter. Reddie's greatest influence was on private education. Critics are generally agreed that Reddie's personality shortcomings stood in the way of his becoming a world-famous figure in education.

Abbotsholme

The characteristics of a new school were enumerated by Ferrière and Horne. Besides fulfilling twenty-two and one-half points out of the thirty listed, the pioneer and prototype school is characterized
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by the following:

1. It was founded as the concrete expression of Reddie's revolt against some of the features of the traditional English public school.

2. It recognized and made basic the particular needs of the secondary school, the school for the adolescent boy.

3. Emphasis was on English; modern foreign languages were made compulsory and preceded the classical; the classical were optional. The guiding principle for language teaching was utility.

4. The undogmatic study of religion and religious history.

5. Emphasis on social evenings to develop poise and gentlemanly bearing.

6. Use of sports and gymnastics for physical development and cooperation as against competition.

7. Autocratic government by rules understood and agreed to by the boys.

8. A boarding school in an environment charged with beauty.


10. Stress on sex education.

Comparison of the Philosophies of Education Held by Dewey and Reddie

Because the new education movement abroad is comparable to the progressive education movement at home, a discussion of the philosophies of the initiators is undertaken. Such a comparison results in a clarification of Reddie's philosophy.

Three major questions are involved:
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1. The common elements in the two educational movements.

2. The similarities in the philosophies of education held by Reddie and Dewey.

3. The differences between them.

Common Elements

Both

1. Were initiated at the end of the nineteenth century, simultaneously but independently.

2. Were expressions of the best pedagogical ideas inherited from Comenius, Basedow, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel.

3. Revolted against "Prussianism, extreme standardization and quantity production in education."

4. Were constructive efforts to build on certain theses, besides being a negation.

5. Maintained:
   a) There is no impression without expression.
   b) Education is a natural development involving experiences adapted to individual capacities and needs.
   c) Spontaneous interest surpasses external compulsion.
   d) Education must "liberate the intelligence."
   e) Educational processes are subject to improvement through experimentation.
   f) The method is psychological as against logical.

6. Responded to the same invigorating forces: the rise of the human sciences, the needs created by recent social-economic developments, the challenge of democracy and individualism, and the extension of altruistic idealism to youth.
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Similarities

Their approach to the field of education, their definitions and aims of education, the bases of their curriculum reorganization, and their ultimate aims and outcomes of education show a marked similarity.

The Differences

The differences revolve mainly around two issues:

1. The autocratic versus the democratic bias, and
2. The religious versus the nonreligious approach.

Criticism of Abbotsholme

The autocratic spirit of the headmaster, the high tuition fees, the isolation from city life, the small registration, the lack of female contact and influence, the perpetuation of the English traditional class system were some of the limitations of the life at Abbotsholme. The advantages, according to critics, outnumbered and outweighed the disadvantages.

Reddie's Contributions to Education

1. The founding of the first new school, the inspiration for a whole movement.
2. The successful application of the best accumulated pedagogical theories of previous centuries.
3. The successful reform in educational theory and practice in the traditional English public school.
4. The inspirer of hundreds of forward-looking educators.
5. The infusion of a new spirit into educational theory and
practice—a spirit of humanitarianism.

6. Modernization of the curriculum by emphasis on mother tongue, modern languages, and social and natural sciences.

7. Utility and practicality made the basis of choice of subject matter.

8. Restated and reapplied the "harmonious development" concept.

9. Emphasized the role of the school for the adolescent in a national system of education.

10. Brought emphasis on social relationships among men.

11. Applied the principles of cooperation, mutual aid, and understanding of fellowmen for civic education.


13. Travel, hikes, and trips as aids to geography, history, and language instruction.

14. Limiting the use of examinations.

15. Postponing special education until after thorough general education.

16. Attempt at freeing the secondary schools from dictates set up by colleges and universities.

17. Greater emphasis on physical and manual phases of education.

18. Distinguished between manual and industrial education.

19. Raised labor ad dignitatem.
20. Emphasis on removal of dogmatism from religious education. The study of religious history and biography to replace dogmatic and sectarian religions.


Reddie's contributions were not all original. But it is important to realize that he revolted against blind obedience to traditionalism in education; the concrete expression of his revolt initiated a reform in education. By the concrete expression of his theories he proved their practicability and their soundness, and gave direction to the reform he had initiated. Reddie's contribution, then, lies in the fact that he was an innovator, a reformer, and an inspirer.


This thesis essays the evaluation of Henry Lord Brougham as an orator, using as its standard of judgment the extent to which his oratory has influenced the history of England and, thereby, indirectly, the history of the world.

Brougham was, and is, a controversial figure. He was also a versatile one: his oratory is only one aspect of a many-sided personality. The attempt has been made in this thesis to create a valid and authoritative picture of Brougham the orator, set in the matrix of the historical movements in which he lived and in which he himself took part. Six areas of his activities have been outlined, and some description given of his oratorical efforts in connection with each. These areas, to each of which a separate chapter has been devoted, have been arranged under the following heads:

1. The Case of Queen Caroline;
2. Freedom of the Press;
3. The Reform of Parliament;
4. Law Reform;
5. The Abolition of Slavery;

The thesis includes, as well, evaluations of the political, historical, social and economic settings of the period 1810-1832, insofar as these are valid for the central purpose of the dissertation. There are also chapters specifically devoted, per se, to Brougham as an orator:

1. His rhetorical training and experience;
2. His style and methods of delivery;
3. Contemporary evidence as to his immediate impact and effectiveness;
4. Firsthand descriptions of Brougham as a public speaker in action;
5. A resume of his own rhetorical principles as they appear in his writings;
6. Synopses of six speeches to correspond with the six described areas of his work; and
7. A rhetorical analysis, in depth, of one representative speech.

The materials for the study were found to be virtually limitless and there was a problem of selection and condensation. Prolixity was consciously avoided, and the textual matter of the thesis condensed into 400 pages.

It is the theme of this dissertation that Brougham's total influence in the causes for which he was an advocate was dependent in large measure on the effectiveness of his public speaking in behalf of those causes. The conclusion reached is that since Brougham unquestionably moved history in the direction of the betterment of man and society and since his impact on the forces around him came significantly through his oratory, he deserves a high and permanent place in the tradition of "good men speaking well."

William McDougall was a British psychologist whose forty-year professional career, from 1898 to 1938, encompassed some of the most critical stages in the development of psychology as a scientific discipline. He came to the United States in 1920 to teach at Harvard University and spent the remaining eighteen years of his life in America. During that time, he was a participant in a number of controversies involving important scientific and social issues, and he was considered one of the outstanding psychologists of his day. The objective of this study is to examine the life of William McDougall in relation to the shifting scientific thought during the early twentieth century and to provide an insight into the impact of his theories upon the developing social and behavioral sciences.

As the son of a wealthy British manufacturer, William McDougall was born to middle-class affluence. Early in his career, he studied under some of the premier psychologists of Britain and Germany and was a participant in the Cambridge Anthropological Expedition to the Torres Straits, one of the famous anthropological expeditions of the nineteenth century. As his stature as a psychologist increased, he taught at several of the most renowned universities of the world and became a pioneer in the psychotherapy of war neuroses. He was a colleague and correspondent or teacher of many of the outstanding psychologists of the early twentieth century. Among his numerous publications were some of the most widely read psychological texts. After coming to America, he became a central figure in the instinct controversy of the 1920's. His major adversary in this conflict was John Broadus Watson, whose radical behaviorism with its disavowal of human consciousness was in direct opposition to McDougall's systematic teleological psychology. McDougall's search for the answer to the mind-body question led him into the area of psychical research. He was an actor in the Margery Case, one of the most sensational spiritualist dramas of the twentieth century, and he instigated the first parapsychology laboratory for the investigation of supernatural phenomena.

Criticism and disagreement by his colleagues often resulted from McDougall's involvement with such issues. A secondary focus of this inquiry will be the assessment of the extent to which the controversial nature of McDougall's personality and thought deterred the acceptance of his ideas. The conclusion of the study is that William McDougall's pioneer contributions exerted considerable influence in the formation of modern psychological thought during the early twentieth century.
Disjuncture describes the context within which Francis Bacon produced his scientific writings. Bacon's scientific ideas took shape through his straddling of two preeminent cognitive spaces: that of the Jacobean court and that of London's commercial marketplace. These two separate, but intertwining, spheres are best characterized, from an epistemological perspective, as theaters of knowing—as fields of cognitive action (to exploit the military connotation of the term) or as spaces in which ways of knowing could be imaginatively projected and dramatically enacted.

A senior official in the court of James I, Francis Bacon hoped to interest the King in his scientific ideas by casting science as a suitable tool of which the King and his royal administration could make profitable use. Bacon advocated a science which required the passive reception of knowledge from the natural world, rather than the imposition of knowledge upon it, thereby distinguishing his new natural science from the practices of scientific and magical predecessors who sought actively to produce change in the natural order of things. Bacon's science which purported to eliminate human subjectivity from scientific investigation depoliticized scientific activity, making science safe for monarchy and creating that "privileged" channel through which human beings gained truth about the natural world.

Paradoxically, to construct a science suitable for monarchy, Bacon had to reject the kind of natural philosophy which was favored at the Jacobean court. While James patronized alchemists and entertained himself with masques which imaged natural philosophy as a magical activity, Bacon rejected magic to advocate a science largely modeled on the experience of European explorers and merchant travellers. The Baconian scientist was to know like a traveller—to observe, collect, and appropriate natural knowledge from outside the self—not like a magician who imposed his learned desire upon the world around him.
Drawing upon the discourse of contemporary merchants, travel writers, and the literary genre of romance, Bacon constructs a scientific language which replaces the magician with the traveller and displaces the sovereignty of kings unto the sovereignty of nature. Baconian science inevitably privileges the experience of the English commercial class, whose relatively unlimited and recurrent access to the products and virtues of the natural world led to their material, and subsequent political, empowerment.


John Stuart Mill's political economy, and John Ruskin's critique of it, constitute the steppingstone for a study of their theses concerning modern politics. This dissertation examines their contrasting views on a number of key issues, including empiricism and intuitionism, science and art, commercialization and its socio-political outcomes, growth and the limits to growth, industry and agriculture, as well as their different approaches to the meaning of modernity.

By dividing their social and political prescriptions into three main aspects—economic systems, social atmospheres, and governmental procedures—the dissertation discusses their proposals concerning industrial socialism and agricultural self-sufficiency, the modern conception of liberty and the ancient notion of libertas, and representation and paternalism. These three elements are treated as complementary parts of each thinker's political vision. An explication of how their ideas in these regards may be related to their views on sexual politics is then given.

The dissertation argues that their different framework of ideas stems largely from Mill's belief in progress and Ruskin's faith in harmony. The main flaw in Mill's thought, it contends, results from his frequent use of the idea of progress without adequately substantiating it. Ruskin, on the other hand, always applies his theory of harmony without fruitfully locating it in the changing situation of modern times. In addition to the discussions of John Stuart Mill's and
John Ruskin's thoughts, the dissertation also relates their points to relevant contemporary debates concerning the relationship of ecology, epistemology, and economics to modern political issues.


Thomas Harper, Sr., was England's premier slide trumpet virtuoso during the early nineteenth century. Throughout this period, the trumpet underwent major changes in the musical style and performance difficulty of its repertoire, in its physical design and in the content of its instructional methods. Harper played a substantial role in contributing to the development of the instrument in terms of its performance standard, mechanical improvement and pedagogical emphasis.

The purpose of this study was to determine the contribution Harper made to trumpet performance technique and pedagogy. This investigation helps place nineteenth century English trumpet performance and educational methodology in context with the general history of the instrument. It is also the initial attempt to apply quantitative techniques of comparative content analysis to an instructional method for the trumpet.

Based upon primary source materials, Chapter I presents a biography of Harper in expanding the articles published in Fétis' and Grove's dictionaries. Chapter II gives an account of printed trumpet instruction from the early sixteenth century to ca. 1935. Chapter III undertakes a comparative content analysis of Harper's method Instructions for the Trumpet (1835) to thirteen other trumpet-type tutors dating from 1614 to 1875. Appendix I includes biographies of Harper's three sons (Thomas John, Jr., Charles Abraham and Edmund Bryan)—all important brass musicians of the period. Appendix II provides a genealogy of the Harper family from the mid-eighteenth century to the late-twentieth century.

It was concluded that Harper made an important contribution
to nineteenth century English trumpeting. Primarily, it was his virtuosity as an orchestral trumpeter and soloist, his endorsement "T. Harper Improved" engraved upon the bells of various contemporary trumpet-types manufactured by the firms of Clementi and Köhler, and his authoring of Instructions for the Trumpet that support this conclusion.


Includes Comenius from Czechoslovakia, Rousseau from France, Herbart and Froebel from Germany, Spencer from Great Britain, Plato and Aristotle from Greece, Quintilian from Italy, Pestalozzi from Switzerland, and James from the United States.


Computer technology offers tools of considerable pedagogic promise to college and university educators. Nevertheless, comprehensive conceptual bases for the appropriate utilization of the diverse modes of computer-assisted learning (CAL) have yet to emerge in the literature and assert themselves. This dissertation addresses that problem through establishment of a philosophically based theoretical framework for employment of these computer-based tools.

Whitehead's writings serve as the philosophical foundation for the framework exposted in the dissertation. The process of deductive derivation represents the method through which the framework takes form. A treatment of Whitehead's educational philosophy lays the groundwork for this deductive effort, and an examination of the
pertinent aspects of Whitehead's formal philosophy, the philosophy of organism, augments and elucidates the systematic review of his educational ideas.

Whitehead's concept of the rhythm of education constitutes a primary component of the theoretical framework for CAL. His ideas regarding the integral association of freedom and discipline represent a second aspect of the organic construct. The concept of a continuum illustrating the spectrum of CAL modes stands as the third major element of the theoretical framework. These three integral components define a curvilinear function that graphically demonstrates the connections among those components. The value claims of the framework derive from criteria for evaluation that, in turn, have their basis in Whitehead's organic philosophy.


Although they grew up in widely different settings, Beatrice and Sidney Webb both emerged from the intellectual and social ferment of the late nineteenth century as Fabian Socialists. Beatrice had enjoyed the stimulating environment of a well-to-do home at which Herbert Spencer was a frequent guest and Thomas Huxley and Francis Galton were occasional visitors. Prior to her marriage she had served a five-year apprenticeship as a social investigator. Sidney's lower middle-class parents saw to it that he received a good education and, at some sacrifice, they sent him to school on the Continent. On his entry into the civil service he quickly revealed a remarkable ability to pass competitive examinations and he became a first division clerk in the Colonial Office. In 1891 he resigned his post to devote himself to political activity, municipal affairs, and journalism. Meanwhile, he had met Bernard Shaw and had joined the Fabian Society.

Webb and Shaw, working in cooperation with Graham Wallas and Sidney Olivier, gave the Society its particular type of evolutionary socialism which was later to become the policy of the British Labour
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Party. When the London County Council was created in 1889 the Fabians saw an opportunity to penetrate the field of civic affairs and hasten the growth of municipal socialism. They succeeded in permeating the Progressive Party with Fabian doctrine and Webb was elected to the L.C.C. as a Progressive in 1892. During his 18 years on the Council he was primarily concerned with education and was the chief architect of educational policy for the Progressives.

Within a year of his election Webb became chairman of the Technical Education Board. For more than a generation scientists and educators had been advocating improvements in the quality and scope of technical education but little had been accomplished. England's declining position as the industrial leader of the world became a national concern in the last quarter of the century, but it was with some reluctance that Her Majesty's Government took even indirect steps to assist in the provision of technical instruction. The Technical Instruction Act of 1899 gave county councils the power to levy local taxes for many different types of technical education and the new government grants (the "whisky money") stimulated the local bodies to take up their new responsibility.

The greatest achievement of the Technical Education Board was in the field of evening instruction. It was during this period that the polytechnics developed so remarkably and technical institutes sprang up in many sections of London. The T.E.B. cooperated with private and philanthropic bodies in planning this expansion and through its grants and the supervision of its staff it was able to coordinate the growth of evening education. When the Board went out of existence in 1904 and was replaced by the Education Committee of the L.C.C. it had been instrumental in setting up a network of institutions which offered trade classes of every description. In several of the polytechnics students were enrolled in advanced science and engineering courses which carried credit for London degrees. Another notable achievement of the Board was its scholarship scheme which, by 1904, was providing free secondary, technical, and higher education plus maintenance grants for some 3,000 young Londoners.

England's attempts to achieve a compromise between educational individualism and state intervention can be seen in the development of secondary education during this period. Prior to 1902 a municipality was, by law, unable to set up its own secondary schools and all secondary education was provided through the Public Schools, the endowed grammar schools, proprietary schools owned by joint
stock companies, or schools of the private adventure type. The state
did, however, intervene during the last half of the nineteenth century
by insisting on the internal reform of the Public and endowed schools
and by providing a system of grants for the teaching of science and art.
Under the Technical Instruction Act the county councils could aid
secondary education and in London the T.E.B. not only awarded
grants to some fifty endowed and proprietary schools but gave
counsel and advice on the installation and use of laboratory and
workshop equipment. It was not, however, until the local authorities
began to build their secondary schools after the Act of 1902 that a
national system of secondary education came into being.

New legislation at the turn of the century resolved some of the
chaos into which the administration of English education had fallen.
The Act of 1899 merged three government departments into one
central authority, the Board of Education, with power to supervise
and award grants to education on all levels. The Balfour Act of 1902
abolished the school boards and gave to the county and borough
councils jurisdiction over elementary, secondary, technical, and higher
education and hence the opportunity of bringing unity and coherence
into local administration. Under the same Act the voluntary or
denominational schools were given aid from the rates (local taxes) and
placed under some measure of control by the local authorities. Thus
was the "dual system" perpetuated in spite of strong Nonconformist
opposition.

The Webbs worked closely with Conservative and Church
leaders in securing the new legislation and it was during this period
that their "permeation" was at its height. The Webb salon at 41
Grosvenor Road became the centre of a campaign in which both
partners sought to influence civil servants, county councillors, Mem-
bors of Parliament, and even Prime Ministers. This behind-the-scenes
activity reached its climax in 1903 during the debate on the London
Education Act. The Balfour Act did not pertain to London and it was
largely due to the brilliant campaigning of the Webbs that the L.C.C.
became the educational authority for London.

Despite the demands of L.C.C. committee work Sidney continued
to be a member of the Fabian Society executive and both partners
were deeply involved in social research. As a means of increasing the
study of social institutions the Webbs founded the London School of
Economics and Political Science in 1894 with money left by a former
Fabian. From the first, however, the School avoided a socialist bias
and every attempt was made to secure a staff which represented various political and economic points of view. Both partners taught at the School and Sidney became the first chairman of the Board of Governors. For many years the L.S.E. was, in fact, "the Webbs embodied in an institution." As the School grew in stature and influence it became an internationally famous centre of social research.

The founding of several civic universities at the turn of the century was something of an educational phenomenon in England. Although the University of London had existed since 1836 its reconstitution in 1898 marked the beginning of a new institution for it previously had been only an examining body. The efforts to reorganize the University into a teaching institution were intensified in the nineties, and by assiduous work behind the scenes and on the political backstairs R. B. Haldane and Sidney Webb succeeded in drawing up a Bill which Parliament found acceptable. Sidney became a member of the University Senate and saw to it that the School of Economics became one of the affiliated Schools of the new University. He saw clearly that London could not become another Oxford or Cambridge and in the early years he helped to chart its course as an urban university. Haldane and Webb again worked together in securing private gifts and government cooperation which were sufficient to establish, in 1907, the Imperial College of Science and Technology. This institution which also became affiliated with the University of London was designed to give the higher technological training which both men believed so important for the national well-being.

Two important changes mark the educational history of London in the early years of the twentieth century: a new spirit entered the elementary school, and secondary education became somewhat more democratic. The School Board had rescued children from the streets of London and had placed them in classrooms where the emphasis was on order and control. Elementary education was considered a gift by the state or voluntary agency to children of the lower classes, and government policy favored a narrow curriculum and a system of grants based on examination results. Toward the end of the nineteenth century there was a reawakened interest in the educational thought of Froebel and Pestalozzi and a new concern for better methods of teaching. Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley were influential in freeing the schools from some of their old rigidity and improving the teaching of science. The Board of Education adopted
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a new and more liberal attitude toward the elementary school and backed up its policy with more generous grants. As the Education Committee of the L.C.C. warmed to its task in the first decade of the century a new type of school began to appear with a curriculum which included elementary science, nature study, manual training, artistic crafts, and outdoor games.

It was during the period under review that the secondary school became somewhat more accessible to elementary children. In 1907 the Board of Education introduced the free place system under which secondary schools were given much larger government grants if they admitted elementary pupils without fee. The proportion of elementary pupils to be so admitted was fixed at 25% of the entering class. In London the L.C.C. adopted, in 1905, Sidney Webb's new scholarship scheme which was intended to provide, for poor but able children, a ladder from the elementary school to the university.

These attempts to democratize the secondary school did not get to the heart of the matter. The grammar school continued to be almost the only type of secondary institution and when the municipalities began to build their secondary schools they largely ignored other types of post-primary experiments and established grammar schools. London opened its first Central Schools in 1910 and since that time Senior and Modern Schools have become a part of the English pattern, but for many years they were associated with the elementary, not the secondary, school system. The high quality of the grammar schools together with their prestige and social standing made the demand for free places far heavier than Webb or his friend Robert Morant, Secretary of the Board of Education, ever expected. The short supply of free places and the small number of secondary schools made the qualifying examinations so fiercely competitive that elementary schools were forced to cram their pupils each year. The examination imposed severe emotional strains on young children and the psychological validity of determining a child's educational future at the age of 11 was, in later years, seriously questioned.

The extent of the Webb's contribution to education falls under four heads:
1. Sidney's administrative leadership in the L.C.C.;
2. His Fabian tracts which became national policy;
3. The behind-the-scenes political activity of both partners on behalf of the Education Acts; and
4. The founding of new institutions of higher education.

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As Fabian Socialists they believed in education as a great social force and were convinced that as the level of general enlightenment went up the demand for social reform would grow. They did not, however, take the naive view that simply by increasing the quantity and improving the quality of public education social and economic evils would pass away. Their social philosophy was, at this time, based on the policy of a "national minimum," by which they meant a legally enforced standard of life below which no citizen should be allowed to fall. They wanted, in addition to such matters as minimum wages and regulated hours of work, a generous minimum standard of education available to all children. They favored a leaving age of 16 to be followed by part-time education to 18 or even 21.

The Webbs were not highly original in their educational thought. They were essentially concerned with finding administrative and legislative ways and means of giving sound educational practice a chance to thrive. And yet, Sidney's goal of a school system for London, unified under L.C.C. administration but comprising schools of many different types, and his vision of a great university decentralized throughout the metropolis for its undergraduate teaching and centralized in a few institutions for graduate work and research, would in themselves indicate that he was well in advance of contemporary thought. When he retired from the County Council in 1910 the tradition of individualism in English education had been broken and the state was beginning to assume its proper responsibility for the training of its citizens. The pattern of English education was to become a compromise between individualism and state action and the success of that compromise in London was in no small measure due to the efforts of Sidney and Beatrice Webb.


Herbert Spencer was an extremely influential intellectual for a brief period of time. But very rapidly his influence declined so that
even in his lifetime he was a living anachronism. The aim of this paper is to explain his rise and rapid decline. It also attempts to put Spencer into historical perspective and to show how Spencer mirrored the Victorian frame of mind whose dominance was conspicuous from 1830 till 1870. It gives an account of Spencer's ideas and traces the development of Spencer's thought from youthful optimistic radicalism to his bitter conservatism in old age.

The explanation of Spencer's rise and decline lies in the changing intellectual climate after 1870. Herbert Spencer's faith in the existence of ultimate truths in religion and ethics, in politics, economics and aesthetics, and in the capacity of the human mind to discover them was characteristic of all the intellectuals in Victorian England. After 1870 the intellectual climate changed. Instead of the existence of absolute truths there was a growing belief in the relativity of knowledge and the subjective character of thought. Spencer, who was always aware of the intellectual climate, realized that his theories were becoming more and more irrelevant. His evolutionary system was outmoded and his scientific ideas were apparently incorrect. In ethics and philosophy pragmatism and experimentalism provided a different rationale for change from Spencerism. In politics Spencer's radical liberalism of the 1840's seemed old-fashioned in the liberalism of the 1880's.

The final part of the paper reviews some of the most important points in the various critiques of Spencer which culminated in the many forms of social Darwinism. This was the ultimate paradox of Spencer's life since social Darwinism, of which he was believed to be an advocate, was a parody and a distortion of his beliefs. This was especially devastating to Spencer since he had given himself so totally to his philosophy that it had become the great obsession of his life. When the system of thought to which he dedicated his life became outmoded—politically, logically and scientifically—his existence became meaningless and he died a despondent man believing that his ideas would be buried with him.

Lewis Carroll (Charles Lutwidge Dodgson) was interested in language as a cultural phenomenon, as an instrument of thought and communication, and as a vehicle for play. His studies as amateur philologist and professional logician led him to theoretical conclusions regarding the nature and function of language quite sophisticated for his time and broader in scope than is generally recognized. The purpose of this study is to define the nature and scope of Carroll's interest and linguistic insights. Since he rarely stated explicitly the theoretical principles he subscribed to, but preferred to illustrate them humorously through their practical manifestations, his theory must be inferred from individual passages in his works.

As a young man, he responded to the philological ferment of the mid-nineteenth century by pursuing a casual study of etymology, British antiquities, the historical development of the English language, and the processes by which words undergo changes in meaning. His philological interest is frequently apparent in his use of mock-etymologies and his imitation of archaic styles of writing. Throughout his career he was interested in matters of usage (grammatical "correctness," spelling, idiom, and pronunciation), and he frequently employed representations of various English speech dialects in his works. Lacking the necessary linguistic training in ancient and modern languages, he was severely limited in pursuing scientific philology as it was developing on the Continent; most of his knowledge of Indo-European comparative philology was acquired at second hand from his Oxford associates.

As professional mathematician and logician he studied language as an instrument of thought and communication—of necessity investigating the theory of meaning, the nature and function of signs, the process of classification, the nature and use of names, the necessity for nominal definition, and the practical effects of verbal and syntactic ambiguity. The fruits of his speculation are found throughout his literary works in humorously conceived illustrations of problems and classification, in discrepancies between appearance and reality, and in failures of communication arising through non-understanding or misunderstanding on the part of interpreters. Carroll realized that since most words are inherently equivocal, they create ambiguities in contexts that do not specify which of several alternative meanings is to be understood. He saw that language itself is responsible for most failures of communication. He felt that, since no word has a meaning inseparably attached to it, but means only what the user intends and
what the interpreter understands it to mean, there is no inherent connection between words and the reality they refer to. Yet he was aware that men often allow words to possess an emotional mastery over them. Carroll realized that although conventions of usage are necessary if communication is to occur, many of these are illogical, ridiculous if viewed literally, and capable of humorous exploitation if treated in a strictly logical fashion.

He conceived language as a vehicle for play in two senses: the purely manipulatory, in which he derived humor from the juggling of linguistic symbols merely as counters in a game, without regard to their potential or established significance; and the conceptual, in which he exploited for humorous effect the implications of the serious linguistic insights he had developed through his study of language.

The dissertation deals with all three aspects of Carroll's interest in language. Chapter Two establishes the biographical context, presenting a detailed account of Dodgson's linguistic training and the influences that may have contributed to his philological and philosophical interest. Chapters Three through Nine discuss in detail his insights into the nature and function of language as an instrument of thought and communication, the discussion being based upon a close analysis of illustrations drawn from his literary works.


John Gardner Wilkinson, more than any other individual, was the founder of Egyptology in Great Britain. He was the first to work in Egypt with a solid background in previous Egyptological scholar-
John Jason Thompson

ship, including the nascent science of hieroglyphic translation. During the years 1821-33 he repeatedly traveled the length and breadth of Egypt, engaging in a wide range of Egyptological activities, but devoting the bulk of his energies toward making drawings of antiquities, especially of tomb murals, the quality of which is virtually unsurpassed. Because many of the objects that he copied were subsequently damaged or destroyed, his copies are in many instances the only surviving record.

Wilkinson's most important achievement was to realize the value of the naturalistic murals, principally those in the tombs at Kurneh, for reconstructing everyday life in ancient Egypt. This view he communicated to the British reading public through Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians (1837), probably the most widely read book on Egyptology in the nineteenth century. The book's greatest strength was its richly illustrated, in-depth survey of ancient Egyptian society. Wilkinson gave the ancient Egyptians a freshness and reality that the Victorian reader could readily share. His book was enormously successful and helped shape popular ideas about ancient Egypt throughout the nineteenth century.

Although Wilkinson continued to travel and write during his later years, he never again achieved the level of success that he had with Manners and Customs of the Ancient Egyptians. Like many other gentleman-scholars of his time, he turned his attention to a wide variety of interests, and the fast-developing science of Egyptology passed him by. His career exemplifies the increasing difficulties confronting talented amateur scholars as professional scholarship developed in the nineteenth century.

220. VANDER MOLEN, Ronald Jay (Ph. D.). "Richard Cox (1499-1581), Bishop of Ely: An Intellectual Biography of a Renais-
Though intellectual biographies of great thinkers are numerous, English leaders who did not build their reputations as creative intellectuals are usually ignored or simply treated as mechanical figures. It is true that of late many scholars have studied such "mechanics" and have in fact glorified them, but one cannot help but deplore the artificial dichotomy which results: men of great ideas are segregated from the politiques, and the two types are never allowed to meet. The practical result of such an approach in historical scholarship has been insight into both ideas and the mechanisms of society; but such scholarship has also created distinctions as tenuous as those produced by traditional moralists who divide historical events and characters into either the good or the evil. While Reformation studies have turned away from moralistic distinctions, they have instead generally developed along two distinct paths: theologians specialize in belaboring doctrinal differences; social scientists rely completely on material interests, class distinctions, and political motives. Though both approaches have shed much light on the Reformation as one of the most critical periods of Western Civilization, they also have ignored the significant ways in which the ideological and the practical come together. Richard Cox provides a case study of an important English leader whose life and ideas combined both factors.

As a man of ideas, Cox was no great innovator; however, an examination of his thought does reveal a significant reliance on the great thinkers of the Renaissance and Reformation. Cox's ideals were first influenced by Renaissance humanists of Northern Europe, and as a result he became enamored of their humanistic scholarship and their social and religious criticisms as well. As a theologian, Cox found that his Christian humanism fit best into the religious ideas of the Swiss reformers: Ulrich Zwingli, John Calvin, Heinrich Bullinger, and most importantly, Martin Bucer. But more significant for the English Reformation was the way in which Cox adjusted both Erasmian humanism and Swiss Protestantism to conform to the needs of Englishmen. The result of combining these factors was an Anglican ideology. Richard Cox played an important practical role in formulating
Anglicanism and in institutionalizing it also.

Tudor monarchs usually left the task of formulating and enforcing the practical expressions of Anglicanism to religious commissions, and Cox performed significant duties on many such commissions: Thomas Cranmer relied on him during the creation of Henry VIII's King's Book; he was included on the Edwardian Prayer Book and canon law committees; he served Queen Elizabeth as a member of the Court of High Commission as well as aiding in the formulation of a new Book of Common Prayer and Book of Homilies; and Archbishop Parker relied on Cox when Anglican ecclesiastical policies required revision. In addition to bringing his ideas to practical expression in these ways, Cox also had many opportunities to institutionalize them as an educational administrator and church official. As head of Eton School in the late 1520's, Cox used textbooks which espoused religious and social criticism as well as Renaissance ideals of scholarship. As Dean of Henry VIII's college at Oxford, Christ Church, and as the head tutor of Prince Edward, Cox was given unique opportunities to instill his Protestant ideals. As Chancellor of Oxford in the Edwardian period, he attempted to establish Reformation ideals and at the same time tried to avoid either completely abolishing Catholicism or submitting to radical Protestant iconoclasm.

The most significant phase of Cox's career, however, was his role in leading Anglicans against Puritans. The struggle began during the Marian exile, and was basically an ideological clash. Anglicans, led by Cox, revered English religious traditions as being most suitable for Englishmen; Puritans, led by John Knox and William Whittingham, demanded a return to Christian practices of the first century A.D. Though both parties shared a common background of humanistic scholarship and a theological reliance on the Swiss Reformers, they created different ideologies. Puritans emphasized the creation of compact systems of thought, the contents of which served to measure one's Christianity. By contrast, Anglicans emphasized formal religious expressions as the main standard of judgement. Cox's role in developing and enforcing the Anglican approach was most pronounced after he became Bishop of Ely for he helped guide the English church against two types of aggression, that led by Puritans and that led by the queen's own courtiers.

By relying on letters, pamphlets, and biographical evidence, this study of Richard Cox brings together his ideals and his pragmatism. The value of the results in Cox's case are left to the reader's
judgement, but Cox himself demonstrates the close relationship between Renaissance and Reformation ideas and practical policies from the reign of Henry VII through the first two decades of Elizabeth I's rule. In practical policies, Cox's role was that of institutionalizing new ideas. On the ideological level, his loyalties demonstrate the framework within which the Anglican form of Reformation thought developed.


I

Mátyás Seiber is largely an unknown name in the United States, although he was one of the outstanding students of Zoltán Kodály at the Academy of Music in Budapest. His career as a composer, teacher, and performer was established in England, where he settled from 1935.

This study is concerned primarily with his development as a composer. Chapter One deals with his life, his training, and experiences that influenced his style of writing. Much of the data concerning his life and work was gathered by way of correspondence, telephone and in-person conversations with Seiber's associates. Information secured through these means is footnoted in the study but remains in the possession of the present writer. Chapter Two is an overview of his musical compositions with an emphasis upon the correlation between his residence in Budapest, Frankfurt, and London, and the works that were produced in these cities. Although certain compositional influences do seem to dominate in each of these three places of residence, it is not contended that each city represent a distinct period of his style. Chapter Three is an analysis of sixteen musical composi-
Michael Franklin Varro, Jr.

tions by Seiber which represent the various elements influencing his style. They represent instrumental and vocal aspects of his writing and include works for chorus, solo voice, piano, orchestra, and chamber ensemble. While most of them are from his London years, each period of his life is represented. Chapter Four is an assessment of Seiber through the eyes of those who knew him best: his colleagues and students. These assessments give insight into the many and diversified talents of a man who was a highly respected 20th century musician.

II

The second paper documents a doctoral conducting recital of music from the late Renaissance and early Baroque periods. This recital was performed by a chamber choir of sixteen select singers in the School of Music Auditorium December 6, 1972. The paper discusses:

1. aspects of the preparation for performance; and
2. the works performed.

Preparation for the recital was supervised by Professor Rodney Eichenberger. A tape of the performance is catalogued in the University Record Library.

III

The third paper documents a doctoral conducting recital of music from the Classic period. This recital was performed by the Sanctuary Choir at First Free Methodist Church, Seattle, Washington, on April 15, 1973. The paper discusses:

1. aspects of the preparation for performance; and
2. the works performed.

Preparation for the recital was supervised by Professor Rodney Eichenberger. A tape of the performance is catalogued in the University Record Library.
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IV

The fourth paper documents a doctoral conducting recital of music by Johannes Brahms. This recital was performed by the University Singers in Roethke Auditorium on May 29, 1973. The paper discusses:

1. aspects of the preparation for performance; and
2. the works performed.

Preparation for the recital was supervised by Professor Rodney Eichenberger. A tape of the performance is catalogued in the University Record Library.

222. VOS, Alvin (Ph. D.). "The Prose Style of Roger Ascham."


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Fred George Walcott


I. INTRODUCTION

Matthew Arnold became an inspector of elementary schools in 1851. At this time he was already a poet. His first book, The Strayed Reveller, had appeared in 1849, and a succession of new volumes and new editions followed during the '50s. With the increased publication, the measure of his fame was considerably augmented, and in May of 1857 he was elected Professor of Poetry at Oxford...

With Arnold's appointment as Her Majesty's Inspector of Schools, however, quite another side of his life had its beginning—a plodding, work-a-day side, exacting its full measure of drudgery and personal frustration. For thirty-five years he was to bear this onerous burden, with only a livelihood as recompense. Here, in this inglorious service, is a phase of Arnold's productive effort but little attractive to the critic and devotee of letters. The ends of such toil are official reports, with their prosaic facts and figures; it is literature alone that wins the popular acclaim. And yet there is a danger in regarding only the more alluring side, as there is in every incompleteness; all the endeavors of a man's life fit somehow into a pattern, bound by a myriad of links to each other as well as to the context of contemporary things.

In Arnold's case there are many close relationships between the literary side of his life and that devoted to inspecting his nation's schools. For one thing, he himself considered several of his official reports as worthy of private publication, and they were thus offered to the world. His Popular Education of France, etc., appeared in 1861. His Schools and Universities on the Continent followed in 1868. Fourteen years later he republished the nine chapters on Germany from the latter work, under the new title of Higher Schools and Universities in Germany (1882).

The value of Arnold's official papers soon impressed the friends
and promoters of national education. A few months before his death, his Special Report on Elementary Education on the Continent was reprinted, not by Arnold himself, but with his willing permission. The year following brought the publication of his collected Reports on Elementary Schools (1889), under the editorship of Sir Francis Sandford. This work was a compilation of Arnold's annual or biennial reports to the Committee of Council, under which he had served as Inspector of Schools. Thus were the "bluebooks" searched for the things that he had said.

There has been, then, a considerable body of Arnold's official discourse to invite the attention of the student. Research in this field has revealed a close affinity between the substance of the reports and that of the familiar essays commonly studied under the more alluring character of belles lettres. And still this promising lead has been but slowly explored. One thing is still needful: to reconstruct into an intelligible order the context of ideas and events which may help to interpret the things that Arnold said, both in the official reports and in those literary essays that bear a clear educational import—that is, to blend as far as possible the one voice with the other, so that a more complete, a clearer, pattern of his thought can be revealed. Such is the purpose of this study. . . .

I have chosen . . . to consider somewhat exhaustively,

1. the surcharged atmosphere of political excitement which enveloped Arnold in France;

2. the background of earlier revolutionary thought by which Arnold's reactions may be reasonably explained, especially as revealed in his earlier letters to Clough; and

3. the compelling inner urge which drew Arnold's thought into an inevitable pattern—centering his attention first upon the writing of a political pamphlet (England and the Italian Question), then upon the preparation of his official report (The Popular Education of France, etc.), and finally upon the writing of a prefatory essay ("Democracy") which sets forth the fundamental social principles that had guided his thinking and determined the practical conclusions at which he had already arrived.
Moreover, I have chosen to demonstrate the effect of Arnold’s observations on the Continent in shaping his more familiar patterns of philosophical thought: specifically, how in his foreign Reports—that is, in his thoughts on education—he developed the basic concepts already familiar to the students of his belles lettres, particularly of his great climactic essay, Culture And Anarchy. . . .

I have devoted a chapter (Chapter Two) to the parochial aspect of educational progress during the century, and to the Parliamentary conflict which characterized the first timid gropings toward the intervention of the State. Thus are established the historical developments which conditioned, and to a large extent determined, the character of Arnold’s thoughts on education at the moment when he joined the intellectual current of his time.

Then follows a chapter (Chapter Three) on the painful years of Arnold’s transformation—from the student and poet and literary essayist to the earth-bound Inspector of Schools—but a transformation also from the youthful revolutionary, the friend and companion of Clough, to the sober and perspicacious critic of humanity and of politics and of human institutions.

Chapter Four marks the meteoric brilliance of an Arnold re-inspired—the Arnold of sweetness and light, the prophet of culture and national redemption, exponent of the powers of human expansion: of the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, the power of social life and manners—as the quickeners of national life. Here is the Arnold of the sublime "Democracy" and of the great climactic essay of his career, the Culture and Anarchy of 1869. It is in this chapter that the growth of Arnold’s educational thought and experience is traced, from its humble beginnings in the annual Reports of the Inspector of Schools, to its grand culmination in his belles lettres, in the immortal and monumental things.

And finally we come to the practical aspects of his service in the cause of national education: to the history of his active intervention in the Philistine legislative blunder of 1862, known as "Payment by Results" (Chapter Five); to his thoughts on the developing curriculum and his counsels to his superior officials and to the friends of education in the nation at large (Chapter Six); and to his constructive, and often prophetic efforts in behalf of a national system, to the plan which he had conceived in 1868 but which must wait a full half-century for its eventual fulfillment in the Twentieth Century (Chapter Seven).
The problem restated is this:

1. to reconstruct about the things that Arnold said the context of current affairs;
2. to discover the ties, if any, between his official and his literary efforts;
3. to apprehend the philosophical tenor of his thought, and the tenets which governed his actions;
4. to estimate, if possible, the measure of his worth, the scope and value of his professional service, the immediate or prophetic compass of his critical and official advice.

If in the achievement of these purposes, the historical and the chronological factors appear at times to dominate, it will be only that the developmental thread of Arnold's intellectual life is thus made clear; for it is, after all, the history of his thought, with a discussion of its background and its milieu, that is expected to illuminate what is now obscure.


Based mainly on the Lancaster papers in the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts, this dissertation studies the contribution of Joseph Lancaster to the development of the British and Foreign School Society down to the year 1814.

Born in Southwark, 25 November 1778, Lancaster was religious from early childhood, and religion remained his basic motivation throughout life; joining the Society of Friends merely gave a definite form to a preexisting commitment. At the age of nineteen, armed with this commitment, several months' experience as an assistant teacher, and Locke's work on education, he opened his own school for the cheap education of the poor of his Borough Road neighborhood. Lacking money for an assistant, he made use of his
Edward Flavin Wall, Jr.

older pupils to instruct the younger ones, thereby systematizing a not uncommon practice of overworked teachers and precipitating a sterile quarrel with Andrew Bell over priority of invention. Justly criticized for, among other things, assuming that children are substitutes for mature teachers, the monitorial system at least conveyed the Three R's—the extent of Lancasterian instruction—to many who would otherwise have been left in ignorance; it had the additional appeal of being inexpensive.

His fund-raising efforts won him many important supporters, including the King, but unfortunately his optimism induced him to overextend himself, and after 1803 he was rarely out of debt. When the situation became critical in 1808, Joseph Fox, William Corston, William Allen, Joseph Foster, Thomas Sturge, and John Jackson, M.P., constituted themselves a committee to oversee his finances. This was a most significant development, because Lancaster's frequent absences on business enabled the Committee to become involved in all aspects of the work with the result that when Lancaster deserted the Committee, the transition was smooth.

English education owes much to Lancaster. Through his books and lecture tours he propagandized the idea of universal education of the poor. More concretely, his efforts led directly or indirectly to the establishment of at least 204 schools—and probably many more—in which over 50,000 were being educated at any given moment. In order to staff these schools, he instituted a training course at Borough Road; on the evidence available, the typical teacher produced was, considering what was expected of him, competent and dedicated and spent most of his life in the profession. Finally, on the national level, he associated with himself in the work of education a number of individuals—mainly Whigs, Quakers, Unitarians, Evangelicals, and secular humanitarians—who gave to his organization the status of a quasi-public body, thereby helping to assure its continuation, while on the local level he afforded many groups of public spirited individuals the opportunity of establishing much-needed schools.

Since he stressed undenominational instruction in general Christian principles, Lancaster understandably encountered much opposition from Churchmen, although it was not a clear-cut case of church against chapel as support from some prominent members of the church clearly shows. He was also opposed by those who thought educating the poor would raise them above their station. However, his greatest enemy was himself. His poor financial sense and his estab-
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Establishment of a private school in 1812 led to an estrangement from his Committee, culminating in 1813 in a bitter quarrel over finances and control of the training establishment. Intervention by the Royal Dukes of Kent and Sussex led to a settlement in favor of the Committee, who were decidedly in the right. Lancaster was reduced to the status of a well-paid employee of the Committee, smarted under the restrictions, and broke with them in April, 1814.

Source: DAI, XXXVI, 10A (April, 1976), 6906-A. XUM Order No. 76-9302.

An historical study of mechanism was undertaken in an attempt to examine the origins and development of mechanistic assumptions in the history of psychology. Mechanism was considered in relation to the literature on metaphor and to the concept of root metaphor. The root metaphor of mechanism involves the separation of nature into primary and secondary categories with emphasis on the reality of the primary qualities of matter and the mathematical laws of their interaction. The secondary qualities of nature, and their relations, are connected to the primary qualities but are distinct and ultimately less real. The root metaphor of mechanism was adopted as part of the scientific revolution in the new world view of Galileo, Descartes and Newton. It continued to have a great impact on psychology, as seen in the work of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and primarily, David Hartley, whose psychology was seen as a principal example of the culmination of mechanistic assumptions derived from the scientific revolution. The reductionism, naturalism and empiricism in his psychology resulted from his acceptance of a mechanistic view of nature which stressed efficient causality, quantitative laws and the reduction of natural phenomena to the primary qualities of objects in time and space. Hartley was also seen as a link to the mechanistic assumptions of 20th century psychology and to the modern preoccupation with the data of behavior. It was suggested
that the history of psychology should be seen in the context of the scientific revolution and in relation to the meaning and function of metaphor in theory.


The problem of the dissertation is to formulate the relationship of John Colet (1467?-1519), Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral, London, to the resurgent study of "humane letters" in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. More specifically, the purpose is to indicate what Colet thought humanism to be, what in it appealed to him, and how much of it he took for his own. Further, it is hoped that it may have a more general value in suggesting some of the reasons humanism held the interest it did in ecclesiatical and theological circles and some of the results to which the pursuit of that interest led. The method of the dissertation is descriptive and historical.

The plan of the dissertation is first to discover the kind of humanism which Colet actually encountered in England, France, and Italy—what it was saying and doing, the audience to which it was addressed, and the motives which directed it. Thus a wide variety of contemporary writings and of analytical studies in the Renaissance in general and in humanism in particular are used. Second, the study asks what Colet himself really understood the new "humane letters" to be, what the nature of their appeal was—personally and ecclesiastically. This latter step has demanded that the bulk of the work be done in Colet's own writings and in other relevant primary sources.

Out of the first part of the study the thesis emerges that Renaissance humanism was primarily a literary and linguistic phenomenon, not a philosophical, nor even an aesthetic one. Humanists were craftsmen above all else, skilled in the arts of letter and document composition, who found employment chiefly as personal or municipal secretaries, diplomats, and teachers of the skills basic to their work—grammar, rhetoric, "poetry," and somewhat later, history and
moral philosophy. Classical literature and style were increasingly seen to furnish nearly unlimited resources and actual models for the development of these skills. The characteristics of this humanism are then used as the criteria of comparison by which Colet is examined.

In exploring the significance of Colet's academic program, both at Oxford and on the continent, we discover that he exhibited a rather definite order in the importance he attributed to his various studies: Christian teaching, humanistic techniques of criticism, platonic studies. Further, his Latin style and even his handwriting suggest that among the current academic schools and fads, it was the humanists with whom he wished to be identified.

More revealing than these inferences is the assortment of writers he used in his own studies. They were not the great figures of the previous three or four centuries, but the "poets" of the classical world, especially of Rome, and of the early Church—the latter were significantly viewed not simply as the Church Fathers, but as the "Christian classics." Indeed, for Colet it was only after one had received the teaching of the Scriptures and these Christian classics that he could make proper use of the pagan classics. This seems clearly to reinforce the order of preference already noted in connection with his academic career. It was also the reason why Colet was so careful in defining the ancient authors who should be read by the 153 scholars in his St. Paul's School.

Though Colet is often not entirely successful in maintaining this order in his use of the two "classics," both his attempt to do so and the particular historical-textual approach he made to much of the ancient literature—Scriptural, patristic, and pagan classical—all tend to justify the label "Christian humanist" which has been applied to him.
This study reviews events in William Barnes's life and surveys a number of his poetical and philological works, with concentration placed on the contents of the 1847 edition of Barnes's Poems of Rural Life, in the Dorset Dialect. With a Dissertation and Glossary. This study constitutes the first in-depth analysis of Barnes's glossarial definitions and of his orthographic system, provides the first comprehensive proof of instances of Barnes's inconsistent adherence in practice—because of experimentation or other factors—to some of his spelling rules, and provides the first extensive presentation of comparative evidence of the evolution of Barnes's orthographic system.

As an educator, the poet-philologist William Barnes of England's Dorsetshire county recognized the problem of teaching in standard English, a language replete with foreign roots and foreign-word infusions and often confusing in its spelling. He contemplated the value of an English speech form that would be understandable to people of all walks of life and saw in the Dorset dialect a form of English heavily based on native Anglo-Saxon roots and prototypically free of foreign borrowings. While he spoke standard English, Barnes is best known for the composition of bucolic poetry written in the Dorset dialect by means of a self-developed, pre-International Phonetic Alphabet orthographic system and for philological writings championing the virtues of Anglo-Saxon speech.

While Barnes's life work and social communication with the famous poet and novelist, Thomas Hardy, was considerable in some ways, Barnes himself was neither a major poet nor a major linguist. His scholarly efforts advocating the worth of Anglo-Saxon emerged from an initial concern that took on aspects of a genuine personal cause, yet his theories constitute no more than interesting, if not stimulating, intellectual exercises because of their inherent impracticality vis-à-vis the viability, flexibility, and validity of standard English. Nevertheless, from Barnes's poetical and philological pursuits emerges an invaluable written record of the sound of the Dorset dialect of the English language as spoken in the nineteenth century.

Antonio Panizzi, the great librarian of the British Museum during the early part of the Victorian period, made numerous reforms in the administration of the library and acquired a large number of books both old and new. This study attempts to show what his book selection policies were and how he carried them out in practice. It is based largely on Panizzi’s unpublished reports to the trustees of the British Museum, his correspondence with book dealers, and certain Parliamentary Papers.

Panizzi placed strong emphasis on collecting materials which were not readily available to students and scholars elsewhere in England. He gave first priority to rare books, ephemera, costly and "voluminous" publications, and he also purchased much of what was being published in Europe and the United States as well as the more important books published in other areas.

His aim was to make the library of the British Museum the greatest in the world, and although he did not succeed in surpassing the Bibliothèque Nationale in size, he certainly gave the British Museum one of the finest general research collections ever brought together. When he became Keeper of Printed Books in 1837, the library had some 240,000 volumes, mostly acquired by gift and bequest. Nineteen years later, when he became director of the entire British Museum, the library contained more than 530,000 volumes, many of those added having been purchased. It has been said that in 1856 the library had the greatest collection of British and American books in the world and the greatest collection of books from many other countries outside the countries themselves.

The collections which had been acquired before 1837 were systematically developed under Panizzi’s guidance, and a substantial number of early printed books, books with important manuscript notes, collections of ballads, broadsides, chapbooks and other similar research materials were purchased.

Panizzi obtained a large increase in the book budget and several special grants for purchases. Through his reports to the trustees, his lobbying efforts with a large circle of influential friends, and especially by an extensive survey of the library’s resources, he showed what the needs of the library were, and he enlisted the support of the trustees and the government in making the library in many ways the
Philip John Weimerskirch

finest in existence. He set the tone for the future growth of the library, and his policies have been followed essentially to this day.


Despite his importance in the development of sociology and Liberal political theory in early twentieth century England, Leonard T. Hobhouse (1864-1929) has been neglected by historians. There is no general study of his thought written from the standpoint of the intellectual historian; the few studies which do exist give an inadequate account of the evolution of his ideas and of the basic concepts in his philosophy. This examination of Hobhouse's social thought investigates the principal philosophical problems he confronted, the importance of sociology in his response to these problems, and his place in the intellectual history of modern Europe. My interpretation rests entirely on his published writings. Enquiries at various British and American libraries and correspondence with members of the Hobhouse family indicate that no unpublished papers and only a few letters are extant.

Rooted in general philosophical problems that were central in Victorian intellectual history, Hobhouse's political and social thought challenged Herbert Spencer's interpretation of evolution and its implications for human society. Hobhouse accepted science as the most reliable means of ascertaining truth and regarded evolution as the essence of reality, but he maintained that Spencer's biological reductionism denied man any distinction from the animals, reduced social life to the vagaries of biological struggle, and made ideals and intellect irrelevant to the cause of progress. Unable to accept the traditional Christian image of man, Hobhouse undertook a philosophical and psychological examination of human development to demonstrate that evolution itself manifested man's uniqueness as a social and moral being capable of giving rational control to his life. This fundamental concept pervaded all of his thought.
After teaching philosophy at Oxford until 1897, Hobhouse spent five years writing for the Manchester Guardian. As an ideologist of the New Liberalism, he proposed a variety of economic reforms, some of which were established by the Liberal governments after 1906. He did not, however, directly shape Party policy.

Hobhouse left his mark on English intellectual life in sociology. After moving to London in 1902, he played a prominent role in the formation of the English Sociological Society, edited the Sociological Review, and, in 1907, was appointed Professor of Sociology at the London School of Economics. In his two most important works, Morals in Evolution (1906) and Social Development (1924) he defined sociology as a comparative and historical study which sought to establish laws of social development. Knowledge of those laws gave man a means to control social change. Though many of his contemporaries criticized his sociology for its excessive abstractness, Hobhouse viewed it as a necessary adjunct to social reform. He also presented his sociology as a complement to his philosophical and psychological study of man and as a scientifically valid statement of the primacy of freedom, reason, and cooperation in modern society.

Though widely read before World War I, Hobhouse's work did not have an enduring impact on English intellectual history. The appeal of his ideas was vitiated by the crisis of the war and its aftermath, which seemed to invalidate liberal optimism and make him, as he himself sensed, a figure of the past. As a scholar, Hobhouse represented the culmination of the nineteenth century traditions of empiricism, comparative psychology, and evolutionary social theory. He was not, aside from his reformist liberalism, an innovative figure, and he did not make a significant contribution to the reorientation of European social thought in the early twentieth century. Nevertheless, his work was a cogent defense of freedom, reason, and liberal reform in an age when such ideas were increasingly under attack.
Summary

This thesis examines the collective life and work of five British left-wing scientists ("The Visible College") active during the inter-war period, in order:

1. to reassess traditional views about their personal motivations and political roles of radical intellectuals during that era; and

2. to explore a neglected corpus of socialist thought distinguished by its emphasis on the socio-political dimensions of science and technology.

Its methods are derived in roughly equal measure from comparative biography, sociology and intellectual history; and here is how these practices relate to one another. To avoid an overly schematic analysis of the Thirties' movement of left-wing intellectuals, the thesis is anchored in the life histories of five men. Their experiences, on the other hand, are not simply collated and compared as a collection of anecdotes from which a series of ad hoc generalizations might be extrapolated. Rather an attempt is made to understand their political development in terms of a complex and longstanding dialectic between the objective social conditions of their home, education, careers and class positions and the objective state of British and international politics. Out of this dialectic there emerged a set of political practices aimed at organizing fellow professionals and a body of social theory chiefly concerned with the "scientific" aspects of socialism. Since the origins of and relationships between these theories and practices must themselves be explained, the tools of the biographer must be exchanged for those of the intellectual historian. The middle man in all such transactions is the sociologist.

The raw materials for this inquiry include: interviews with those subjects still living, as well as with their associates and enemies; unpublished writings, personal papers and photographs, together with archival material from the Public Record Office, the British Communist Party, the Association of Scientific Workers and the scientific journal Nature; and naturally the many books and articles by the "members" of the Visible College themselves. Special mention must be made here of Dr. Joseph Needham's extensive collection of
letters, memoranda, pamphlets and other political ephemera from the 1930's. So important was this unknown archive that the author felt obliged to spend the three-month period required for the organizing and cataloguing of its contents.

The main results of the investigation can be summarized as follows. In almost every instance current historical generalizations about the relationship of British intellectuals to their society, the origins, character and duration of intellectuals' commitment to left-wing causes and, finally, the size and nature of the so-called "Social Relations of Science Movement" were found to be unsound. Specifically, the social position of scientists in general and those on the Left in particular did not inherently predispose them to an acceptance of established institutions. And once the special circumstances of radical scientists had been grasped, it also became apparent that the intellectual Left could not itself be treated as a homogeneous grouping. For example, the radicalism of the Thirties' poets was not only shorter lived when compared with that of the scientists but strikingly different in its content as well. As for the movement of socially conscious scientific workers, it, too, represented a short lived and uneasy alliance between intellectuals who, however committed they might all have been to the notion of a "scientific" society, were unable to gloss over fundamental political disagreements. The theme of differentiation was in fact so strong that it could even be seen at work within the Visible College's discussions of the theory and practice of scientific socialism. Thus out of this tale of dissolutions and divisions there emerges at least one important historiographical caveat: given how rapidly the intellectual division of labor has elaborated itself in twentieth century Britain, historians will have to delineate that country's cultural life with greater care and concreteness than they have done in the past.

Otherwise the most general finding of the study is that the social thought of these left-wing scientists has a significance beyond the mere illumination of their own history. On the one hand, their attempt to develop a Marxist perspective on the history, philosophy, sociology and politics of natural science has—at least until quite recently—been the only sustained one (outside of Russia) in this century. To the extent that their commitment to "science" as they understood it prevented them from questioning crucial aspects of the scientific enterprise they may well be criticized. Perhaps that is why their work was so largely ignored in the 1960's by a New Left sensitized to the dangers of technocratic domination. On the other
hand, as the radicals of recent years shift their emphasis from political action and utopian demands to political analysis and concrete proposals, they may well begin to draw upon the writings of the Visible College as valuable reference points for mapping out the proper functions of science in a just society.


This dissertation explores the question: "Of what value is the study of science and literature for a liberal education?" The question is limited by examining the work of two men, Matthew Arnold and Thomas Huxley, who spent much of their lives attempting to answer this question, though not always directly. For a period of ten years during the middle of the nineteenth century, they publicly but amicably debated the worth of science versus the worth of literature: Arnold extolling the value of literature, and Huxley that of science.

Both men believed that obtuseness with regard to their respective fields implied general disabilities. They also believed that an understanding of their respective fields yielded certain benefits. They described these benefits in various ways; but if we were to sum them up in a word, it would be "progress." A society whose population has received a liberal education such that it construes literature intelligently and understands the method and results of science adequately is a society capable of making progress. Although progress is the crowning benefit of a proper knowledge of science and literature, many ancillary benefits not unrelated to progress—in most cases necessary for it—accrue also.

These benefits and how science and literature promote them are analyzed under six topics:

1. the idea of progress,
2. impediments to progress,
3. the proper attitude to discover truth,
Terrence Richard Whaley

4. the role of collaboration,
5. the nature of explanation,
6. the aesthetics of scientific discovery.

Because Huxley and Arnold were modern thinkers dealing with fundamental issues, an exposition of their debate not only rewards the general reader with fresh insights about the value of the study of science and literature but adds weight in support of a number of positions contested in education today.


Until recently the Commonwealth and early Restoration periods have been dismissed as representing one of the lowest points in the history of English music. The emergence of such late Restoration composers as Humphrey and Purcell frequently has been attributed to foreign influences from France and Italy; however, contemporary scholarship has revealed that there was a continuous and vigorous English musical tradition from the climax of the madrigalian era at the beginning of the seventeenth century to the appearance of these late Restoration composers.

One composer who contributed significantly to this early and mid-seventeenth century tradition was Benjamin Rogers. His life spans the entire century; born at Windsor in 1614, he lived until 1698, when he died at the age of eighty-four. Rogers served as lay clerk at St. George's Chapel, Windsor, and frequently substituted for the organist and composer, William Child. He later served as organist at Christ Church, Dublin, at Eton College, again at St. George's Chapel, and finally at St. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford.

The bulk of the composer's work is represented by his vocal music. There are thirty-two extant anthems for chorus, twelve of which are verse anthems, six Services, and a number of glees. Dering's Cantica Sacra includes seven of Rogers' works for two voices with

\[4.3\]
continuo. Thirty-six of his instrumental pieces are included in Playford's *Court Ayres* and *Musick's Handmaid*.

Many of Rogers' anthems and Services were published in early cathedral collections such as those by Cope, Clifford, and Boyce. At least six of his anthems and three of his Services are available in modern editions.

I felt that the music of Benjamin Rogers was of sufficient quality and volume to merit a more intensive investigation than had been previously attempted; therefore, a careful study of the composer's life and vocal music was undertaken. The principal thrust of the work is an examination and evaluation of Rogers' sacred choral works, and more specifically, his anthems.

The study is organized into two parts. Part I includes a biography of Rogers, a general survey of the composer's total output, a discussion of manuscript source materials, a general discussion of the composer's choral style, and a specific discussion and analysis of the works included in Part II of the study. Part II is a performance edition of seventeen anthems selected from Rogers' total output.

In summary, it must be admitted that much of Rogers' choral music is rather slender in its inventiveness, but a few of his works stand out as important contributions to the choral repertoire. These are worthy of new and continued performances and would be a valuable addition to the libraries of many small church choirs. Rogers' importance lies in his contribution to a vital and continuing development of English music during the mid-seventeenth century. Although he was not innovative in formal or melodic design, his harmonies are often daring and indicate a personal involvement in the development of Baroque tonality.


The chronological study of Matthew Arnold's English reputation between 1840-1877 reveals a steady development in the contem-
Charles Thompson Wilkins

Porcelain recognition of his importance as poet, educator, and literary, social, political, and religious—in short as a general—critic. Significantly, Arnold's acute concern with the effects his works, whether poetry or prose, produced on his contemporaries and the important part his reaction to his critics had in determining the direction, manner and matter of certain of his major works becomes evident.

Arnold wanted to be read, and his stylistic method, particularly in his social and theological criticisms, was calculated to persuade and to provoke response. Thus fully to appreciate many of Arnold's allusions and the course of development of the essays, it is necessary to know precisely what the critical reaction was or had been to his work. Such works as Culture and Anarchy, St. Paul and Protestantism, Literature and Dogma, God and the Bible, and Last Essays on Church and Religion bear a direct relationship to the critical response to particular essays that Arnold had previously published in periodicals and to Arnold's practice of publishing in essay or a book, examining its criticism, and, if need be, answering that critical response in another essay or preface.

The first concern of this study has been to discover what Arnold's contemporaries actually thought of him and his work as revealed in primary sources and not to study in detail the actual use Arnold made of the criticisms of his literary efforts, but criticism that Arnold alludes to either in his correspondence or in his formal work has been indicated as far as possible. One result of this investigation is a bibliography of Arnoldiana far more extensive than any before available. A particular contribution of the bibliography is a substantial number of reviews and criticisms from some fourteen contemporary newspapers.

As a whole, the criticism of Arnold's varied literary endeavors discloses that no one of his works failed to receive adequate, respectful, and provocative attention. The very controversial nature of his work, and much of it, including certain of his poems, was by design reformative and hence controversial, precluded anything resembling uniformity of judgments. The very diverseness of the evaluations indicates the multifaceted nature of the appeal of his poetry and essays. Yet there was a steady acceptance of Arnold as a significantly influential writer and thinker whose works demanded careful, often detailed, appraisal. Certainly Arnold was not considered by his contemporaries as a popular writer, but neither was he ever unpopular. Even when Arnold's work was the subject of rigorous attack, the critics

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generally manifested a respect for the man and his work that testified to their recognition of the selflessness of his aims, the pertinancy of his thought, and the facility and courage with which he advanced his ideas.

By 1877 Matthew Arnold was a major poet of his day; as a literary critic he was both a model and a seminal force; as an educator he was an authority whose contributions were considered germane even by those who opposed him philosophically and politically; as a social critic he had performed the beneficent service of bedeviling English pragmatic self-complacency; and as a liberal thinker on religion and theology he was recognized as the proponent of a salient intellectual attitude of the time, albeit one unacceptable to the orthodox. In 1877, having completed most of his major works, Matthew Arnold was rivaled by few, if any, of his contemporaries in the distinction he had achieved as a poet and as a literary and general critic.


Although Thomas Arnold's work in the fields of education, history, and theology has frequently been noticed by historians of nineteenth century thought and by biographers of nineteenth century figures, his religious and political criticism has not been fully treated. The present study was undertaken in order to supply this lack by providing a detailed treatment of his writings in these fields. It is intended to fill in the outlines of the excellent brief account of Arnold's thought in Basil Willey's Nineteenth Century Studies (1949).

The method used is that of analysis and historical evaluation. After a brief introduction and a chapter devoted to the formative influences on Arnold's religious and political views, Arnold's ideas on the Bible, the Church and the State are surveyed (Chapters III, IV, and V). The procedure has been, first, briefly to describe the problems which confronted Arnold (e.g., the growth of rationalism in Biblical
criticism, popular disaffection toward the Church of England, and exclusively secularistic thinking in politics), and then to expound the solutions which he proposed. A concluding section of each chapter is devoted to the results of his work and the continuation of some features of it by later writers in the Victorian period. Because the historical significance of Arnold's ideas depends in part on whether (and how far) they were influential, an account of his influence on certain arbitrarily selected well-known Victorians is included. The reactions of Arnold's contemporaries to his work have also been sampled. Finally, instances have been noted in which his recommendations were anticipatory of legislation or later thinking on the subjects he treated.

The analysis of Arnold's views shows that his religious liberalism may best be described as "concessive." With a definite practical goal in mind—the preservation of Christian belief—Arnold gave up what he took to be indefensible religious outworks (i.e., authoritative claims for the Bible and the Church). Next it appears that the relationship between Arnold's religious and political ideas was that between a theory and a plan of action. Reading the Scriptures as a source of moral guidance, he was conscious of the deficiency of the social institutions of his day and the separation of religion from everyday life. The chief result was his advocacy of the Christian state in which religious principles would be operative in politics.

Arnold's religious and political ideas, though not much accepted in his own time, were deeply influential on Victorian liberals of a later day. The thinking of Matthew Arnold, Arthur Hugh Clough, Thomas Hughes, Arthur Penrhyn Stanley, Benjamin Jowett, Frederick Temple, W. E. Forster, J. P. Cell, and W. D. Arnold, in varying degrees, was strongly colored by the religious and political teachings of Thomas Arnold.

Bertrand Russell was the most celebrated English philosopher of this century. His renown stemmed from two distinct sources: his technical philosophical work on logic and the philosophy of mathematics, embodied most famously in The Principles of Mathematics and Principia Mathematica, and his public campaigns, waged most notably in opposition to the First World War, the Vietnamese War, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Russell was thus a technical philosopher as well as a social activist, a bold intellectual as well as a public adventurer, a man who pursued two long and tempestuous odysseys.

But were there in fact two separate journeys, two unrelated lives, two Russells? This dissertation is an attempt to unite Russell's two careers, to offer, in a critical account of roughly the first half of his life, an appraisal which examines Russell as a whole and, in the process, joins the two Russells.

The first chapter discusses Russell's family background, childhood, and adolescence and suggests that his membership in one of the oldest, proudest, and most liberal families of the English aristocracy and his ascetic, deeply religious education permanently shaped Russell's moral and political values.

The second chapter treats Russell's undergraduate career at Cambridge, focussing on the many friendships he made there and his growing interest in philosophy. Chapter three details Russell's decision to marry and his choice of career. It also discusses his first book, a study of German social democracy.

The fourth chapter places Russell's philosophical education and early philosophical writings in the context of late nineteenth century British neo-Hegelianism. Chapter five treats his first technical work, An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, and argues that Russell's conception of the task of philosophy was akin to that of Plato, Hume, and Kant.

Chapter six discusses Russell's early religious crises and emotional development. Chapter seven presents the grounds of his (and of Moore's) rejection of the neo-Hegelian orthodoxy. The eighth chapter outlines the doctrines of the Principles and the Principia. The final chapter discusses Russell's ethical, religious, and political opinions on the eve of the First World War.
This dissertation is a study of Harold J. Laski as a pluralist and his later acceptance of Marxism. As such, it points out the unresolved difficulties between his advocacy of pluralism and his faith in the autonomous individual. It attempts to show that it is these difficulties, and the historical events of the early 1930's, which led to Laski's acceptance of the Marxist framework.

In the 1920's, Laski embraced an admixture of individualism and pluralism. In his individualism, he stressed the uniqueness of personality and the importance of individual conscience developed through the exercise of individual judgment based upon personal experience. His individualism was akin to anarchy to the extent that he emphasized the right and duty of every individual to follow the dictates of individual conscience even though it might "break the heart of the world."

On the other hand, Laski's pluralism stressed the importance of groups in society as the vehicle for the intellectual growth of individual personality. He emphasized the independence of groups from one another and their equality of moral status. Individuals were to retain their separate identities while moving in and out of groups as their individual judgment directed.

No attempt was made during this period to reconcile his thoroughgoing individualism with the implicit limitations which would be imposed upon such an individualism were his pluralism to be a viable philosophical position. In failing to reconcile the dilemma posed by advocating both individualism and pluralism, Laski as a political theorist was unable to account for the events of the early 1930's which, to him, demonstrated the denial of the process of reasoned discussion in political affairs and the failure of his pluralism to be truly representative of the social order.

His turning to the economic determinism and the doctrine of class struggle of Marxism rationalized individual behavior and pro-
vided, for Laski, the scheme by which the pluralism of the earlier Laski would ultimately become a reality. In so doing, he sacrificed his liberal emphasis upon the integrity of personality and placed his faith in the coming of an ideal classless society.
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