The current social studies curriculum was invented in the United States in the early part of the 20th century. Its primary purpose was to socialize the children of the diverse social groups immigrating to the country to the norms and values of U.S. social life. Based on three main arguments, the time has come to abolish social studies as it is currently known. The structure of social studies was built on a model of students' psychological development that no one any longer accepts. The structure, particularly for the first 6 years of the program, virtually has gone unchanged since 1916, even though the ideas on which it was developed have been discredited. It is impoverishing to continue to conceive of children as "concrete" thinkers able to make best sense of the immediate contents of their social environment. The structure of social studies carries a powerful and undesirable ideology that often is in contrast to its overt concerns with multiculturalism and valuing other cultures. The accretion of a range of socializing aims has ensured that the objectives for the social studies are all out of proportion to the means available within it to achieve them. The results of surveys of students' knowledge of the content of social studies testifies eloquently and depressingly to this. A 13-item list of references is included. (DB)
THE SOCIAL STUDIES CURRICULUM: THE CASE FOR ITS ABOLITION

Maria do Céu Roldão
Escola Superior de Educação de Portalegre
7300 Portalegre
Portugal

Kieran Egan
Faculty of Education
Burnaby, B.C.
Simon Fraser University
Canada V5A 1S6
The current social studies curriculum was invented in the U.S.A. in the early part of the twentieth century. Its primary purpose was to socialize the children of the diverse social groups immigrating to the country to the norms and values of American social life. The paper argues that the time has come to abolish Social Studies as we currently know it. Three main arguments are pursued. First, the structure of Social Studies was built on a model of students' psychological development that no-one any longer accepts. The structure, particularly for the first six years of the program, has remained virtually unchanged since 1916, even though the ideas on which it was developed have been discredited. The paper argues that it is impoverishing to continue to conceive of children as "concrete" thinkers able to make best sense of the immediate contents of their social environment. Second, the paper argues that the structure of Social Studies carries a powerful and undesirable ideological message that often is in contrast to its overt concerns with multiculturalism and valuing other cultures. Third, it argues that the accretion of a range of socializing aims has ensured that the objectives for the Social Studies are out of all proportion to the means available within it to achieve them. The results of surveys of students' knowledge of the content of Social Studies testifies eloquently and depressingly to this.
The Social Studies Curriculum: The case for its abolition

Introduction

Given the title, we might be wise to begin by indicating some of the things this paper is not, so that inappropriate expectations will not be carried into the claims that it will make. It is not, first, an attempt to abolish the educational aims that have been a constant part of the Social Studies curriculum, such as educating students to become democratic citizens aware of social problems and equipped to address them. The recommendation to abolish is based on the claim that we can reconstruct the curriculum to better achieve those aims without a distinct area called Social Studies. It is not, second, a neo-conservative expression of distress at attempts towards integration of disciplines or interdisciplinary work. And while we will recommend that students might be better served by a new kind of history curriculum in the early grades, in place of current Social Studies, this is not based on an older conservative appeal for "purity" of academic disciplines in schools.

The general objective of the paper is to argue that the purpose for which John Dewey, among others, promoted the Social Studies — to be a central, humanizing core to the curriculum, making connections from all subjects to the daily living experience of students — is not being achieved by Social Studies today. Instead of this humanizing, integrating core, it has become a distinct area in the curriculum, with its own subject matter (even though the subject matter that constitutes Social Studies varies quite widely from place to place.) Any "humanizing" of mathematics, science, and other
disciplines tends to go forward on initiatives other than those that were intended with others. The paper also argues that the more general goal of ensuring that students will become well-equipped for the responsibilities and opportunities of democratic citizenship is not adequately related to the means available in the curriculum to achieve that end.

We will argue that the Social Studies curriculum as it has been conceived and implemented in North America and Australia has had from the beginning structural problems that have undermined its ability to achieve the aims set for it. In particular, it has embraced, and then built on, a conception of the child-as-learner that derives from turn-of-the-century psychological theories which no-one any longer takes seriously, but which have remained as structuring elements of the curriculum area. More generally there has been, and remains, a dramatic mismatch between statements of aims for Social Studies and what it has delivered and can deliver. We cannot continue to make grandiose claims about the aims of a curriculum area when we cannot provide evidence that we are achieving those aims, and are having grave difficulties achieving even the minimal objectives that follow from the content of Social Studies. Surveys of students' knowledge of Social Studies content (e.g. Ravitch & Finn, 1987) cannot simply be ignored. If we are not achieving the immediate minimal objectives with significant reliability, we cannot continue confidently assuming that we are achieving the more complex and vaguely stated, goals.

Psychology and the Structure of Social Studies

Social Studies was formed early in this century under the influence of what are now discredited recapitulationary developmental theories (Gould, 1977). These gave shape particularly to the first six grades of the typical Social
Studies curriculum and have come to the encapsulated in such terms as "expanding horizons." The content for these early grades has remained one of the few constants from about 1916 to the present; the child begins with self, home, families, neighborhoods, and gradually works out to wider communities, interactions among communities, and then to other countries and cultures. Only in the past few years have we seen the first hesitant breeches in this structure (as exemplified in the 1987 History-Social Science Framework in California). It has proven more resilient than the developmental theory that helped to form it, and it has even absorbed more recent developmental ideas, such as Piaget's, to support its largely unchanging structure.

The enormous influence of evolutionary theory during the latter half of the nineteenth century led to recapitulation theories in education. That is, children's development was seen as a recapitulation of the "evolution" of human cultural history. G. Stanley Hall confidently asserted that when evolution, "when explored and utilized to its full extent will reveal pedagogic possibilities now undreamed of" (Hall, 1904, Vol. 2, p. 221). The basic principle was stated by Herbert Spencer:

If there be an order in which the human race has mastered its various kinds of knowledge, there will arise in every child an aptitude to acquire these kinds of knowledge in the same order...

Education should be a repetition of civilization in little (Spencer, 1861, p. 76).

John Dewey, though critical of some implementations of "culture epoch" was far from curricula, immune to the appeal of recapitulationary ideas: "There is a sort of natural recurrence in the child mind to the typical activities of primitive people; witness the hut which the boy likes to build in the yard,
playing hunt, with bows, arrows, spears, and so on" (Dewey, cited in Gould, 1977, p. 154). There were two directions in which this off-shoot of evolutionary theory went. First, a logical one, which led to curriculum plans that sequenced content in the curriculum on the basis of appearance in cultural history. Progressivist ideas undermined these, largely German, "culture-epoch" curricula. The second direction was psychological, influencing Dewey among others. It led in general to seeing children's minds as in significant ways like those of "primitive" people. They were assumed to be unable to deal with complexity and abstraction. This psychological perspective was blended to the social concerns of the progressives, and led to the "expanding horizons" curriculum for Social Studies. So we have a curriculum made up of immediate social content organized in concrete and simple terms at the beginning, gradually introducing more complex and abstract concepts over the years. More recently, with the absorption of Piaget's developmental theory, these principles have remained much the same though given more precision, on somewhat different terminology, and a confidence that they now have a more scientific basis. In Dewey's formulation, for example, the geography of the geographer may be abstract and complex, but it is important to remember that it must be built on the geography that each of us is first familiar with, of the home and of movements around the locality (Dewey, 1966, p. 216).

We see the persistence of these ideas everywhere in modern Social Studies texts. "Early childhood social studies are hands-on and concrete" (Sunal, 1990, p. 9). The common direction this leads to may be seen from a typical example. The "expanding horizons" curriculum yields in the early grades a topic such as "transportation." We are encouraged to make the curriculum from naturally occurring, familiar experiences, and we always to
seek ways of concretizing topics. So transportation should be instantiated in
terms of, say, automobiles. The hands-on, concrete requirement dictates that
study should be experiential, and so children should sit in, and ride in
different kinds of cars, big ones, small ones, station wagons, sedans, old cars
and new cars. They should visit an automobile showroom, and a junkyard,
should play with varied styles of model cars, and so on. (We take this directly
from Sunal, 1990.)

These principles, which used to be justified by reference to earlier
psychological theories and progressivist ideas, are now typically justified by
reference to Piaget's theory, and the progressivist ideas are taken-for-granted.
Indeed, it is becoming increasingly common to see the Piagetian ideas taken
for granted too, and the principles asserted as a kind of obvious
commonsense: things we all know to be obvious about children's thinking
during their early years (Roldão, 1990). But it is useful to remember that
Piaget's theory deals with a relatively narrow range of logico-mathematical
intellectual activity. Even if we grant that Piaget theory describes some
features of children's intellectual development accurately, we need also to be
aware that significant features of children's intellectual activity are not dealt
with by the theory.

If we consider, even generally and informally, children's imaginative
activity we may see at work intellectual capacities that throw into doubt some
of the foundations of the "expanding horizons" structure of the Social Studies
curriculum. Consider the kind of fairy stories that most readily engage young
children. The simplest observation we may make about the structure of these
stories is that they are based on conflicts between courage/cowardice,
security/fear, good/bad, and so on. The content of, say, Hansel and Gretel or
of Cinderella is built on such powerful underlying binary concepts. What
makes such stories so engaging and meaningful to young children? It is
hardly familiar everyday content.

Arthur Applebee (1978) says that Peter Rabbit is comprehensible to
young children because of its familiar family setting. If it is familiar
features that make it comprehensible, we must ask why Peter is a rabbit, and why Mr.
McGregor's garden is dangerous, and the wild wood is safe, and why death is
so close, and so on and on. Jack and the beanstalk hardly qualifies for familiar
settings and content for the average child. Clearly something else is going on
in these stories that must be uncovered to explain their appeal.

Let us look again at those structural elements on which the stories are
articulated: life/death, safe/dangerous, rich/poor, hope/despair, and so on.
The first observation we can make is that they are enormously general
abstract ideas. The second is that it seems to be through these abstractions that
children have access to the content (see F.A. Hayek 1969). That is, the content
of the giant's castle that Jack invades after climbing the beanstalk is not of
itself obviously a part of children's everyday experience. But once articulated
on the binary conflict that moves the story along, children have no difficulty
grasping the content and finding the story meaningful and engaging.
Similarly if you tell children the story of Robin Hood and the sheriff of
Nottingham, you presuppose that they have direct access to the new content
by means of such concepts as oppression, resentment, and revolt. Only if they
already know such concepts in some profound sense can the story make
sense. Without such concepts giving meaning to the sequence of events it
would just be an incoherent and meaningless set of actions.

When it is claimed that young children are concrete thinkers, then, we
have to ask what sense such a characterization makes. When we see young
children employing abstractions constantly in the most basic fairy-stories, we
must acknowledge that the claim that they can only deal with concrete content is at best inadequate. And when we observe that their access to the concrete content seems to come by means of the abstractions, we must call into question a first foundation of the "expanding horizons" curriculum.

The mirror of this claim for older children is that they can understand content best if it is relevant to their everyday experience, and that we should begin any topic by finding within it something that is connected with students' lives. Consider a situation in which you are asked to take a grade six class because their regular teacher is sick. You want to engage their interest, and have a choice between two lessons already prepared. The first is on "The structure of your local neighborhood," the second is on "Torture instruments through the ages." Which do you think would be easier to engage students' interest with? One could of course make either engaging but the sense of a joke here simply points out what we all know about what is more likely to engage grade 6 children.

Now this is not a curriculum recommendation, but the obviousness of the answer brings into some question the "expanding horizons" principle of "relevance," that would lead us to the opposite conclusion. Why are sixth grade children so commonly fascinated by a topic such as torture instruments through the ages? It certainly cannot be explained by the principle urged on us by the expanding horizons curriculum, nor by the principle of "relevance."

That is, once we consider even in an informal way students' imaginative intellectual activity, we find at play a set of learning principles quite at variance with those that are foundational to the Social Studies curriculum. We see that children readily employ abstractions to gain access to and directly engage exotic content disconnected from their everyday experience.
Instead of studying "transportation," "concretized" to automobiles with which children must have "hands-on" experience, which the currently dominant principles suggest, we could introduce a wider range of content — for example, we could introduce the history of the world as a struggle for freedom against oppression, or for tolerance against injustice. We could, that is, present the great dramatic story of human history built on the kinds of powerful abstract concepts we know they can grasp from the fairy tales that so engage them. The principles bound into Social Studies have produced an early curriculum of mindless trivia at a time when young children are ready and eager to engage the most powerful and basic themes of human life and experience. Given the currently dominant principles embedded in social studies we are forced to such conclusions as, "History itself as a content topic is inappropriate for very young children" (Sunal, 1990, p. 158). ("Very Young" here refers to "preoperational" children up to age seven.) If history is considered as merely a traditional accumulation of dates and facts, one does not need Piaget's warrant to condemn it. But if history is reconceived in terms of the imaginative intellectual capacities children so energetically exhibit in their early years, then it can be a resource of great educational importance for them (Egan, 1988).

This, in passing, is a different, and more profound, objection to the content of the early Social Studies curriculum than is embodied in the observation that children today, through T.V. and other media, early learn about other cultures, and know much more than content related to their own everyday environment. That argument leaves the structuring assumptions of the elementary Social Studies curriculum intact. Proponents of the currently dominant assumptions can acknowledge the validity of the objection and "expand" from the range of contents which T.V. has now made
a part of their knowledge base. What is wrong with the "expanding horizons" principle is not its assessment of the range of things students know, but its assumptions about how students learn about the world, and what they have to learn with. When we look even briefly at students' imaginative activities, we see forms of understanding that are at odds with the assumptions built into the "expanding horizons" model.

The Ideology of Social Studies

A central function of Social Studies in the curriculum is to perform the function of what Emile Durkheim (1858 – 1917) called "socializing." This is the process whereby the young are gradually initiated into adult society and come to share the values, beliefs, norms, and conventions that characterize the society. He argued that societies can survive only if there is inculcated in the young a sufficient degree of homogeneity, and "education perpetuates and reinforces this homogeneity by fixing in the child, from the beginning, the essential similarities that collective life demands" (Durkheim, 1956, p. 70).

Social Studies was invented in North America at a time when socialization was imperative, to generate that "essential similarity" among the children of the huddled masses coming from dozens of distinct European peasants. One deliberate feature was to instill an image of American democracy quite at variance with the traditional social structures from which the immigrants came. Incidental to that was the undermining of the hold of those un-American cultures. It is perhaps unnecessarily dramatic, but not inappropriate, to see the Social Studies doing for the cultures of the immigrant peasants of Europe what the U.S. cavalry was busy doing for the native cultures of this continent.
The structure of the Social Studies curriculum, focussed on the immediate social experience of the student as the paradigm of the real and meaningful, carries its own profound message. History and geography, once harnessed within Social Studies, are made subservient to an ideology which elevates current American experience into the ideal and paradigm form, and other times, places, and forms of life are relevant or meaningful to the degree that they share characteristics with it.

To take history, for example. The amount of history in the curriculum is proportional to its direct influence on current American experience. The millennia preceding the discovery of America by Europeans receive roughly the same curriculum space as the couple of centuries following that event, which in turn get less space than the more immediate past. That is, the closer to the present events are the more meaningful and relevant they are considered. Probably this structure seems obviously proper to many people. How else would one construct a history curriculum?

But consider the implication of this structure, especially when it is built in elementary years focused on, and expanding from, the local and immediate. The assertion is plainly that the point of human history and human experience is our present. That is, our present is not seen as a mass of cultural contingencies, but as the end and purpose of history. History was invented in our culture with the breakdown of myth. The psychological effect of history was to generate a sense of a past that was different from the present. It also thereby created a concept of a future that could also be different from the present. It generated both the conditions of more rapid social change, the conceptual capacity to plan for a different future, and the psychological capacity to deal with changing social circumstances. In all these features it was quite different from the mythic consciousness that preceded it.
Social Study's use of history is, ironically, more akin to the mythic than it is to the historical. It encourages a sense of the superior value of our present and consequently undermines the capacity to deal with changing social circumstances.

Consider the purpose of putting the self as the starting point of the Social Studies curriculum. The notion that children first know themselves is plainly nonsense. Consider when you came to know yourself in any meaningful way. Children are supposed then to know their families. Consider when you came to know your parents. T.S. Eliot in "Little Giddings" makes the keen observation that "it is at the end of all our exploring that we came to where we started and know it for the first time."

When we are young ourselves, family and locality are like water to a fish — too taken-for-granted to be the subject of meaningful study. When fish are taken from the water is when they discover it for the first time. But by putting the self, the family, the neighborhood, the country at the beginning, we assert these as the norms and the paradigms by which other places, times, experiences are to be considered meaningful or valuable.

Social Studies of late — being a porous kind of curriculum area — has become the subject in which multi-culturalism and appreciation of difference from one American norm are promoted. While these are explicit topics dealt with in the curriculum, it is important to recognize that the underlying structure of the Social Studies curriculum carries a much different and powerful message. Multicultural programs yoked to Social Studies face a conflict not unlike that which the study of history faces. Both embody ideas and ideals that are in conflict with the ideology promoted by the structure of Social Studies.
Means and Ends

Many Social Studies educators see a significant purpose for this curriculum area as the development of students' critical awareness of their society, both of its strengths and weaknesses, and helping them to develop the problem-solving skills to analyse and address the weaknesses and support the strengths. In particular, such educators seek to empower their students to play a significant role in the democratic life of their society and to equip them to change it for the better. This can lead to a more or less subtle kind of indoctrination to the perspective preferred by the teacher if abused, but on the whole this may appropriately be seen as a significant part of socializing to a set of the norms and values of a self-renewing democratic society.

The question that needs to be faced here is whether the means deployed, and deployable, in Social Studies classes are proportionate to the ends desired. That is, one can declare the most grandiose ends, but if the means seem disproportionate to achieving them, then skepticism about the whole enterprise arises. Consider the criticisms faced by E.D. Hirsch Jr.'s proposals to make all American culturally literate. In his book on the subject (1987) he announces that cultural illiteracy is at the root of nearly all the major social ills of America, and that rooting this out will help us win the wars against poverty, crime, injustice, drugs, and so on (Ch. 1). The solution he offers — learning a list of topics — invites skepticism. The means do not match the ends.

Statements of aims for Social Studies have invited similar skepticism. Consider the list of aims that typically preface Social Studies textbooks and curriculum documents. They normally include the promise that students will learn considerable amounts of history, geography, and details of state and national legal, economic, and governmental systems, and that students will
be taught to be effective democratic citizens of a pluralistic society, will show respect for human dignity, will use reason, evidence, judgement and skill in acquiring and validating knowledge, will act upon a well-developed value system, will be skilled critical-thinkers, problem-solvers, and decision-makers, and so on. In standard textbooks a number of pages are taken up listing the range of aims for the Social Studies curriculum (e.g. Michaelis, 1985). One has to match these aims with the actual things done in Social Studies class through the years and ask whether the activities the student engages in likely to produce these prodigious results. Of course we all hope that students will develop these skills and virtues, in the same way that a cleric giving a sermon about attaining saintly virtue hopes it will stir his or her congregation in that direction. If the cleric expects his or her flock to find the influence of the sermon greater that the other influences that shape and determine people's behavior, then disappointment is the probable result.

The Social Studies curriculum is not, of course, the only influence on students' development of democratic virtues. Indeed, in European countries that do not have a Social Studies curriculum, it is hard to see in what respects their citizens are evidently less equipped to deal with democratic social life than are Americans. The question for the Social Studies educator, then, is to show the effects of Social Studies instruction with regard to the goals that are claimed to justify its existence in the curriculum.

It seems unlikely that democratic society would stagger if we ceased, for example, to teach about neighborhoods in grade one or two. These lessons about firefighters and mail-deliverers are not easy to square with any of the claims made for the purpose of Social Studies. If students are uncertain of the roles of firefighters and mail-deliverers when they are twenty-five years old, it is unlikely to be a product of the topics having been badly taught in grade
two. If it is argued that it is the processes of learning and inquiry that are the important part of what is learned, then we can obviously dispense with that particular content; those same processes of learning and inquiry can be stimulated and developed while students learn other content.

The Social Study educator cannot continue to justify the curriculum area by asserting wonderful aims which are largely dissociated from the actual activities that go on in Social Studies classrooms. Stating the aims of Social Studies seems to have become an exercise in trying to characterize most neatly the set of virtues one would like to see in a citizen. The aims-stating activity, however, seems to have become unhinged from the everyday content of Social Studies. The activity looks increasingly like an irrelevant academic exercise when put against the results of tests of students' knowledge of the content of Social Studies. We are all too drearily familiar with those New York Times and Los Angeles Times surveys of college students' knowledge, and of the sad litany of ignorance uncovered by Ravitch and Finn (1987). It is no good making detailed methodological objections in the face of massive evidence of massive ignorance of even the most basic knowledge of Social Studies content. If even this level is so little learned or understood, what confidence can we have that the more sophisticated and less easily measured aims are being attained?

But how about critical reflection on social, political, and economic issues of the day? Even if we cannot measure the results of lessons precisely, surely classes that stimulate such critical reflection are valuable? Of course they can be. But skills of critical reflection are also taught in many subject areas. Applying them to current social issues, however, is a task for Social Studies, it might reasonably be argued. Issues of racism, abortion, strikes for better pay and working conditions, war and national security, rights of
women, gays, and minority religious groups with unusual beliefs and practices, and so on, can become topics for the development of critical reflection on social, economic, and political issues. The classroom can try to bring to these issues a more sustained and systematic use of reason than is common in the media or other contexts where students have to face them.

This area is, of course, commonly the most controversial part of Social Studies. It occurs mainly in secondary schools and often overlaps with the counsellors realm of activity. It is also vulnerable to parent and community objections. It is also difficult to engage in discussion of such issues without some significant degree of indoctrination.

It is hard to argue that this kind of intellectual activity has no place in school, but it is an activity unlike most of those that form the school curriculum. The issues are ones for which there are no experts, there are no correct answers, there is no compelling knowledge-base. But, even granting the implicit demurrer in these observations, we feel driven to concede a role for this kind of activity.

But — attenuating further the place for such activity in the curriculum — these issues overlap with those that constitute the virtues of democratic citizenship, and those virtues are not easily taught in school classes. That is, we learn the virtues of democratic citizenship best by living in a democratic state and seeing and feeling their benefits. If we consider freedom central to the virtues of democracy, there is something a little odd in compelling children to attend classes in which this virtue is applauded. The school is in many ways an undemocratic institution. The attenuating of the one activity we concede to Social Studies is due to raising the question of the a priori appropriateness of the school as a forum for such issues. By default it has become the institution compelled to deal with a range of social problems, but
it seems ill-equipped to deal with many of them. That is, we can justify the
total abolition of Social Studies, by seeking to move dealing with current,
controversial issues to some other social institution. But, of course, we lack
such convenient institutions for most citizens. The easier move, given that
this is all that remains of Social Studies, is to restructure the curriculum in
such a way that public debates and discussions of current issues would be
given a place. We would likely not want to call this Social Studies.

Conclusion

The principles which sustain the elementary Social Studies curriculum
are ill-founded, and they have led to a curriculum area whose content is
intellectually trivial, and an insult to the intelligence of young children
generally. The underlying structure of that elementary curriculum also
encourages an ideological perspective that leads to provincialism, in time and
space, and discourages imaginative expansion into quite different experience
and discourages the recognition of autonomy of that which is alien and
"other." This ideology continues in the focus of history and geography —
determined not by what individual teachers aim to teach but by the
profoundly influential structure of the curriculum itself — on the students' present, "relevant" experience. This socializing use of history and geography
tends to undermine their educational role to show the contingency of current
conditions. That educational purpose can be better served by releasing history
and geography from the constraining grip of Social Studies. In general the
grandiose claims made for Social Studies are out of proportion with what can
reasonably be expected from classes in typical schools. The one component of
Social Studies that seems educationally worthwhile, can be reconstituted in
the curriculum. So Social Studies should forthwith cease to be a part of the
school curriculum.
References


