Public support for individual and media rights of freedom of expression was examined in this study. Data were analyzed from a national probability sample of 1,508 adults, with items pertaining to freedom of expression formed into two indexes: media rights and individual rights. These indexes were used as dependent variables to test hypotheses based on the demographic variables of sex, age, education, and political orientation. Results indicated that: (1) men supported both rights significantly more than women, with greater disparity for media rights; (2) support for freedom of expression was higher at the left side of the political spectrum than the right; (3) as education increased, support for rights tended to increase, while increasing age seemed to be associated with decreasing support; and (4) three-way interactions between sex, education, and age and between political orientation, education, and age showed relationships to support for expressive rights. (Three tables and three figures of data are included; 26 references are attached.) (Author/RS)
How Gender and Select Demographics Relate to Support for Expressive Rights

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ABSTRACT

Public support for individual and media rights of freedom of expression was examined in this study. Data were analyzed from a national probability sample of 1,508 adults, with items pertaining to freedom of expression formed into two indexes: Media Rights and Individual Rights. These indexes were used as dependent variables in a MANOVA testing hypotheses based on the demographic variables of sex, age, education and political orientation.

Men supported both rights significantly more than women, with greater disparity for media rights. Support for freedom of expression was higher at the left side of the political spectrum than the right. As education increased, support for rights tended to increase, while increasing age seemed to be associated with decreasing support. Three-way interactions between sex, education and age and between political orientation, education and age showed relationships to support for expressive rights.
In the past few months, the coverage of such events as the Clarence Thomas-Anita Hill hearings and the William Kennedy Smith rape trial have renewed debate on news media rights. NBC and the New York Times, among few others, identified the alleged victim in the Smith case early on, but dropped the policy after criticism from the audience, some feminist groups and competing media. The extent of Persian Gulf War coverage, or lack thereof, caused nearly as much controversy as the war itself.

Perhaps more interesting for many Americans, though, are the recent controversies over individual rights of freedom of expression. Flag-burning to protest government actions was debated during the 1988 presidential campaign, as was school prayer. More recently, abortion rights protesters in Wichita, Kan., stirred debate over whether their protesting at an abortion clinic was their First Amendment right or whether they violated the privacy rights of women seeking abortions.

Although phenomena like these sometimes serves as the impetus for studies of coverage content or initial public opinion on the specific event, surprisingly little recent research has been done on how far the public believes media rights -- and its own personal rights -- should go. Gallup, Roper and other polling organizations have had a field day reporting superficial statistics during an ongoing event like the Persian Gulf War (Badger, 1991), but scholarly studies are few. This study examines support for media and individual rights and whether sex, age, education or political orientation are related to that support.

Studies suggest that Americans tend to be inconsistent in supporting
individual rights, perhaps because surveys have most often addressed expression issues relevant to the social and political milieu of the time. For example, more than three-fourths (77%) of the respondents in a survey conducted during World War II wanted to curtail the rights of people to make speeches against certain races in the United States (Cantril, 1951). Similarly, a 1970 survey found that nearly two-thirds of its respondents opposed allowing others to make speeches against God, and more than half wanted to prevent the publication of books attacking the government (Wilson, 1975). It should be noted, however, that Wilson's study consisted of only three arguably loaded questions; therefore, its sensitivity is dubious in determining actual support for various rights. In a 1982 study, the respondents expressed the greatest support for an individual right of freedom of expression—a person peacefully picketing the construction of a nuclear power plant (73% agreed this was a right) — in a set of eight questions on various rights (Immerwahr & Doble). The notion that environment is related to support for freedom of expression is further supported by research that was not designed to measure attitudes toward timely topics. One survey designed to measure the relationship between political tolerance and support for civil liberties found that people differentiate sharply between different types of speech, with speech critical of the American system of government receiving most support and speech designed to incite an audience to violence getting the least support (Gibson & Bingham, 1982).

As asked about their support for media rights specifically, Americans again seem to vacillate. In 1943, for example, 63% of respondents said newspapers should be allowed to criticize the government (Cantril, 1951). A 1982 study that focused primarily on fairness laws found several seeming contradictions on the part of its respondents; the researchers wrote that "people have not worked through the
complexities ... the shifts observed above involve respondents' attempts to reconcile two important social goals—freedom of the press and a fair, objective presentation of the news" (Immerwahr & Doble, 1982, p. 185).

The American public apparently is willing to go even further. A 1990 nationwide survey (Thomas Jefferson Center, 1990) found that a surprisingly high number of respondents believe freedom of expression should not cover the media (28% opposed coverage for newspapers, 31% for network television). Moreover, 58% said the government should have the power to censor. More than half (59%) said that the government should keep sex off of television. Ironically, qualitative interviews in the Immerwahr and Doble (1982) study found that words like "dictatorship" were used to describe similar regulations.

With the recent controversies discussed above, however, questions arise as to how much protection the public is willing to grant its fellow citizens and the media when they exercise various rights. For example, Dworkin (1981), among others, has documented the inherent harm to women that accrues not only from pornography but other displays of nudity and sexual activity. It seems that women might be less supportive than men of the media's right to present depictions of nudity, sexuality and pornography, as well as the rights of individuals to purchase or view such materials. Recently, best-selling books such as Backlash (Faludi, 1991) and The Beauty Myth (Wolf, 1991) have charged the media with keeping women from achieving equal social and economic status with men. Women may be more skeptical than men about the extent to which the media should have free rein; therefore, they may be less willing to support the media's First Amendment rights.

Numerous studies have found disparities in the attitudes of men and women toward the media. Men and women seem to differ in evaluations of news stories
(Burkhart & Sigelman, 1990; Shaw, Cole, Moore, & Cole, 1981), syndicated political
columns (Andsager, 1990; White & Andsager, 1992) and credibility of Army
spokespersons (Brame, 1977). But other studies have not found a divergence
between the sexes in evaluating news stories (Espitia, 1983) or student editorials
(Noel & Allen, 1976). It would appear, then, that more variables are operating than
simply the sex of the respondent. Most of the research cited here used college
students as subjects, which precludes examination of education. Political
orientation, discussed below, was also not a variable in these studies.

Whether disparities between men and women in attitudes toward the media
themselves apply to media rights -- and individual rights of freedom of expression --
as well is the question of interest here, however. That men have feelings of greater
political efficacy than do women and are more likely to participate in politics is "one
of the most thoroughly substantiated [findings] in political science" (Milbrath &
Goel, 1977). (Although this source is somewhat dated, a casual glance at the
demographics of the U.S. Congress suggests that little has changed in the past 15
years.) Similarly, the media are often perceived by women as being dominated by
men, nearly to the point of excluding women's voices (Rush, 1989). Together, these
notions suggest that women, as a whole, may perceive comparatively little benefit in
strongly supporting media rights. As for support of individual rights of free speech
or personal freedom, however, some research has found negligible differences
between the sexes (Christenson & Dunlap, 1984; Prothro & Grigg, 1960).

Although it did not consider interactions among demographic variables, a
survey on the believability of the three major network news found that sex and
educational status were significant predictors of how much respondents believed the
news (Robinson & Kohut, 1988). Women are more likely to believe the news than
are men, and educational level correlates negatively with believability, as might be predicted.

Intuitively, one might predict that people with more education would support First Amendment rights more than their less-educated counterparts. Bobo and Licari (1989) suggest that "education changes cognitive style in ways that increase the likelihood of recognizing the importance of extending civil liberties to those we dislike" (p. 291). Bobo and Licari found that the highly educated are more tolerant of others' freedom of expression than are the less well-educated, whether the issue in question is upheld by left-wing or right-wing groups. Education was by far the most influential variable that predicted support for democratic principles in a 1960 study that included questions about free speech (Prothro & Grigg). This is not always the case, however. For example, education has been found to make people more opposed to government repression but less supportive of protest issues that reflect interests of people with less education (Hall, Rodeghier, & Useem, 1986).

Political orientation has often been tested as a predictor of support for rights or other politically related activity. In Prothro and Grigg's (1960) study on agreement and disagreement regarding democratic principles, political party did not affect the bases of disagreement. Although personal freedom was rated the most important value out of 15 on Rokeach's two-value model in one study, only negligible differences were reported between liberals and conservatives (Christenson & Dunlap, 1984). On the other hand, Bobo and Licari (1989) found that political conservatism significantly, negatively affected support for civil liberties.

Similarly, conflicting information has been reported for the effect of age on support for rights or civil liberties. Whether the relationship is significant or not, studies show that age is nearly always negatively correlated with support for rights.
Age was a significant, negative predictor of support for civil liberties in research by Bobo and Licari (1989), but was not significantly related to bases of disagreement on democratic principles in a survey conducted by Prothro and Grigg (1960).

Research that looks specifically at support for rights may have produced unsatisfactory results because interactions, if any, among independent demographic variables have not been studied. Christenson and Dunlap (1984) found no interactions between political orientation, sex and race, however. In one article, Immerwahr and Doble (1982) reported demographics for only one complicated question from their telephone survey: "A newspaper has the right to give opponents of a controversial policy such as the SALT treaty less coverage than those in favor of the treaty get" (p.180). This finding may be attributed to chance. They did not find significant differences between the sexes, but some disparity was produced at different educational levels, with a direct, positive relationship between higher education levels and disagreement with the statement. As discussed above, it seems logical that more educated people should be more capable of seeing the links between freedom of speech for individuals and freedom of the press.

Despite Robinson and Kohut's (1988) caution that demographic variables – with the exception of political orientation – are relatively weak in predicting attitudes toward the press, the above observations lead to the following hypotheses:

H1. Men will be more supportive of expressive rights (both individual and media) than women.

H2. Support for media rights and individual rights will decrease with age.

H3. Sex and type of right will interact, such that the difference between men and women will be greater for media rights than for individual rights.

H4. Education and sex will interact, such that as education level increases,
support for expressive rights will increase for both men and women, with women evincing a more dramatic increase in support.

H5. Ideology and sex will interact, such that men and women who identify themselves toward the left on the political orientation measure will be more supportive of expressive rights than those who identify themselves toward the right.

Method

An analysis was performed on data collected through a nationwide telephone survey conducted for the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1990. Random-digit dialing allowed researchers to survey 1,508 adults – 793 women and 708 men – in 50 states, with a 30% refusal rate (Wyatt, 1991). In addition to sex, demographic information on age, education level and political orientation was gathered from the respondents. Age was treated as a categorical variable, with four categories (18-34; 35-49; 50-64; 65+). Each respondent was placed in one of three education level categories: high school graduate or less; some college or trade school; college graduate to post-graduate.

Respondents reported their political orientation as belonging in one of five categories: far left, liberal, middle of the road, conservative or far right. Because of small cell sizes in the far left and far right categories, political orientation was collapsed into three categories for the present study: left (including far left and liberal respondents), middle of the road and right (conservative and far right).
The survey gathered responses to questions about individual rights of freedom of speech (see Table 1). Respondents were asked their attitudes as to whether an individual's right should be protected by law "all the time," "protected under certain circumstances" or "not protected at all" for 24 different kinds of expressive behavior.

Wyatt (1991) also gathered responses to similar kinds of situations in which media rights were at stake. Again, respondents were asked whether the media's rights should be "protected all the time," "protected under certain circumstances" or "not protected at all." The 14 media rights variables used in the present study are presented in Table 2.

In the survey, the items were either phrased "Do you feel the media should be protected when..." or "Should a person's rights be protected by law when..." (Wyatt, 1991). The wording in the items was designed so that the respondents would differentiate between the media rights variables and the individual rights variables. Although more items on rights tangentially related to the media were included in the survey, only the variables that specifically dealt with the media were retained for this analysis. To reduce complexity in the present study, responses to the variables in both the individual rights and media rights groups were summed to form two additive indexes -- Individual Rights and Media Rights. Reliability tests produced a coefficient alpha of .89 for the Individual Rights index and an alpha of .86 for the
Media Rights index. To facilitate ease of interpretation, both indexes were standardized to Z-scores, with means of 0 and variance equal to 1. This eliminated the within-subjects differences, so that any variation in the model was clearly due to the independent variables or their interactions.

A 4 X 3 X 3 X 2 MANOVA, using a repeated measures design with Type III sums of squares, was then performed on the data. The repeated measures design was used to test interaction of expressive rights indexes with between-subjects variables. The Individual Rights and Media Rights indexes served as the dependent variables. Sex, age, education and political orientation were used as independent variables. Two- and three-way interactions between each combination of independent variables, as well as the four-way interaction, were included in the model. Means were tabulated for each cell.

Results

The findings indicate support for four of the five hypotheses, with mixed support for the hypothesis dealing with education. One finding on the differences between men and women in terms of support for expressive rights proved particularly intriguing; it may prove worthy of consideration in future studies.

The first hypothesis was tested by combining the two indexes to obtain a measure for expressive rights. As predicted, men were more supportive of First Amendment rights than women. For women, the mean support for expressive rights was -.05; for men, the mean was .25. This difference was significant (F_{1,1172} =
The second hypothesis — that older people will be less supportive of rights than younger people — was supported, as age was a significant between-subjects main effect ($F_{3,1172} = 13.14; p<.001$). Support for freedom of expression dropped sharply for people aged 65 or more (mean = -.39), a steady decline from the highest mean of .22 for those aged 35 to 49.

For both Individual Rights and Media Rights, men in this survey were significantly more supportive than women, though the disparity was not as great for Individual Rights. The difference between sexes in mean support for Media Rights was .41, and for Individual Rights, it was .11. Men were much more likely to support Media Rights than Individual Rights, and the opposite was true for women. This relationship, which indicates support for the third hypothesis, is presented in Figure 1. The within-subject effect (sex by indexes) was significant at the $p<.001$ level ($F_{1,1172} = 14.53$).

Hypothesis H4 was tested with the interaction of sex and education, but it was not supported by these data. Not surprisingly, education was a significant main effect in the between-subjects test ($F_{2,1172} = 17.35; p<.001$), with a direct, positive effect on both indexes: the more educated the individual — either male or female — the greater the support for expressive rights. Contrary to the hypothesis that higher education would have a more dramatic, positive effect on women's support, college-educated men and women showed a slightly greater divergence in support for the two indexes than did individuals with a high school education or less, but
this was not significant (see Table 3). No within-subject effect was produced by education because increasing education levels had the same direct, positive relationship with both indexes.

**TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE**

Education combined with other variables to produce significant three-way interactions, however. Together, sex, education and age had a significant between-subjects effect on the indexes ($F_{6,1172} = 2.55; p<.05$). Increased education levels were related to men's support for both indexes, with the highest level of support evinced by college-educated men aged 18-34 (mean = .54). Education also related to women's support for the indexes, with college-educated women reporting the most support, especially college-educated women aged 35-49 (mean = .45). For women, age seemed to be more strongly related to support than was education, with women's support for the indexes dropping dramatically at higher age levels. Age had a similar but much slighter tendency for men. These interactions are illustrated in Figure 2.

**FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE**

Men and women who identified themselves as on the left side of the political spectrum were significantly more likely than those on the right to support both rights indexes, a finding that indicates support for the fifth hypothesis. In the test of between-subjects effects, political orientation was a significant main effect at the $p<.01$ level ($F_{2,1172} = 5.83$). Again, because political orientation's fluctuations were basically the same in both the indexes, it did not produce any within-subject effects. The greatest differences occurring for both men and women in terms of political orientation came between those in the left and middle of the road categories, where
there were sharp declines in support for both indexes. Only slight, if any, decreases in support for the indexes occurred between the middle of the road and right categories. These decreases, overall, seem to be greater for men than for women. The only incidence where this trend did not hold true was for conservative women with high school educations, who were more likely to support the indexes than were middle-of-the-road women at the same educational level.

A significant three-way interaction among political orientation, education and age occurred as a between-subjects effect ($F_{12,1172} = 1.76; p < .05$). The support from people on the left seemed to fluctuate with education level more than that of those in the middle of the road or right categories, while people in the middle of the road category tended to change their support with age (see Figure 3). People on the political right remained comparatively stable in their support for freedom of expression regardless of education level, and increasing age was only slightly related to their support.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

The highest cell mean of support (.91) was produced for Media Rights by college-educated men who were on the left politically. This same group, however, had a mean support of .72 for Individual Rights. Women in the same education and political orientation categories, on the other hand, produced mean supports of .42 and .53, respectively. For politically left respondents with high school educations, men's mean support for Media Rights was .24 and .16 for Individual Rights; women's mean supports were -.24 and -.08, respectively. It appears, then, that high school-educated, politically left women see a greater difference between individual and media rights than do college-educated women, but the opposite is
true for men on the political left. For women on the right politically, the converse is true: support for both indexes begins to converge among the high school educated, but widens for college-educated women. No appreciable change occurs among men. This finding suggests that perhaps women are more influenced by political ideology than previous researchers have asserted. Granted, the interaction between education and political orientation among women is statistically insignificant, but the trend is apparent. Future research should examine this finding in greater detail, with other independent variables such as income and age, to see whether political orientation interacts with these characteristics.

Discussion

That men are more supportive than women of freedom of expression rights for both individuals and the media has been suggested by previous research (Milbrath & Goel, 1977). The interesting finding in the present study is that while women are more likely to support individual rights than media rights, the opposite is true for men. It is possible that women see potential harm to members of society accruing from some of the media's actions -- identifying a rape victim; showing music videos that promote drug use or deal with sexual themes; advertising guns or harmful products. (This explanation may be true for the negative relationship between age and support for freedom of expression.) Perhaps women feel more protective than do men and are therefore more willing to restrict the media. That women tend to assume a peace-keeper kind of role was documented by Eagly (1978). Women may view the media as huge, impersonal entities that are either unwilling or unable to
regulate themselves for the good of society. It seems likely that older women (50 or older), who may have attended college but then married and exited the job market, see little reason to support freedom of expression because they perceive that they hold relatively no power in society. This explanation is somewhat supported by the dramatic drop in support for expressive rights among the respondents aged 65 and older, who also hold little power in society.

Another possible explanation for the finding is that women perceive the media as belonging primarily to men and expressing men’s points of view (Rush, 1989); maybe because they feel distanced from some benefits of the media rights, women are less interested in supporting those rights. This reasoning might explain why women are more willing to support individual freedom of expression: They think their voices are somewhat limited in the media, so they feel a need to protect their individual rights to a greater extent.

By the same token, though, men are not as willing to protect rights of freedom of expression for individuals as they are to support those rights for the media. One reason for this may be that men might believe greater good (in the form of information, for example) comes to a greater number of people through the media than through the expression of a few individuals. Perhaps it is more likely, however, that men feel uncomfortable with or threatened by some of the more extreme kinds of expressive behavior included in the Individual Rights index, such as advocating Satanism or homosexuality or burning the flag. Nothing quite so volatile is included in the Media Rights index.

This gender gap suggests that men and women may hold divergent theories on the role of the media in society. Men, who have been found to be more politically active and efficacious (Milbrath & Goel, 1977), may be more likely to view the media
from a libertarian theoretical standpoint. Because of the effect of sex in this study on varying support for First Amendment rights, this notion of differing theories seems plausible. It is an idea that needs further exploration.

If the sexes do tend to hold different theories of First Amendment rights, perhaps this disparity might help to explain why men seem to be the first to proclaim protesting in front of abortion clinics as freedom of expression. Women, though for reasons other than concern over freedom of the press, are the first to speak out against identifying rape victims.

Future research should examine the relationship between sex and support for individual rights and media rights in greater detail. Although education and political orientation do not seem to be related to either sex's support for freedom of expression, other demographic variables may be, especially age or even political party affiliation, which is not always the same as political orientation. For example, these data suggest that women who consider themselves politically moderate may lean more toward the right than do men in the same category. Independent variables other than mere demographics would undoubtedly shed more light on the subject. It seems likely that need for cognition, conformity and authoritarianism may play a role in whether an individual supports freedom of expression.

The indexes used in the present study might also be refined in future research. Given that a wide range of expressive behaviors are covered in the Individual Rights index, some of these may be affecting the levels of support reported by some kinds of individuals, although the high reliability coefficient suggests otherwise. The same may be true for Media Rights. Perhaps separating the rights that might be controversial from those that are fairly well accepted would yield a clearer understanding of the reasons why men and women evince such disparity in their
support for freedom of expression.

But recent events such as those cited at the top of this study are not debated merely from the standpoint of gender. Arguably, political orientation and education have influenced Americans' decisions to support or criticize flag burning, government censorship of the Persian Gulf War and the television broadcast of the Thomas-Hill hearings. From a political standpoint, it is easy to see why politically conservative people are significantly less supportive of First Amendment rights than are their liberal counterparts. The nation has been moving to the right for more than the last decade; perhaps conservatives believe that if the media and people are free to speak out critically, the right will begin to lose its grip on the country. This notion runs counter to the spiral of silence theory (Noelle-Neumann, 1973), which posits that the people who perceive their opinion to be in the minority will remain silent, thus allowing the perceived majority opinion to propagate. The present study suggests that those in power politically are somewhat willing to restrict the rights of their potential challengers. Further research should investigate whether political orientation affects an individual's propensity to differentiate between his or her own free speech rights and those of others, including the media.

The findings here regarding education and age are not particularly surprising; however, the interactions between these variables and political orientation and sex may merit further investigation in future studies. These data suggest that, for whatever reason, people on the right are set in their beliefs, while people on the left move further toward the liberal end of the spectrum as they become more educated, if support for expressive rights can be called a "liberal" notion. As mentioned above, interactions among demographic variables are seldom reported in surveys on freedom of expression. Including them might yield a rich source of information
about who will support the First Amendment — information that becomes increasingly important as the United States places greater restrictions on the rights of its citizens and its media to express themselves.

Conclusion

Although education, age and political orientation are significant influences in determining an individual's support for First Amendment rights, the intriguing finding in the present study is the influence of sex on that support. Women and men tend to differentiate between both the rights they perceive as belonging to the media and those they as individuals can exercise, and the levels of support they are willing to give the two sets of rights. Future research should determine whether women are reluctant to support media rights because they feel protective of society and its members, and why men are less supportive of individual rights than of media rights. It is possible that men and women operate under differing theories of what the media's role in society should be and how best to accomplish that role.

Educated people seem to be more capable of recognizing the inherent links between individual rights and media rights granted by the First Amendment because they are more willing than the less educated to support both. Whether this support is unequivocal remains unclear, however: Is there a limit as to how far even college-educated people will protect freedom of expression? The answer should be found in future research. The same questions exist with regard to political orientation, because people on the left or liberal end of the political spectrum are also more supportive of freedom of expression than those in the
middle or on the right. It seems likely that politically conservative people may be more willing to restrict the rights of others than are liberals; if the nation was moving toward the left, would the politically liberal be less supportive of freedom of expression than they are now? It is a question that may never be answered.

With controversies over First Amendment rights continually popping up in today's society and the United States's shift toward traditional conservatism, the question of how strongly Americans feel about protecting their freedom of expression looms large. Perhaps more important for communications scholars is the extent to which we are willing to protect the media's right to free expression. To be sure, the larger issue of what kinds of individuals will exercise their own rights and protect those of others and the media may hold tremendous import for the future.
References


Table 1. Variables forming the Individual Rights index.

Should a person's rights be protected by law when ...

- Buying magazines or books that feature nude pictures
- Nude dancing, including the "strip tease"
- Using slang words that refer to sexual acts
- Dancing in a sexually suggestive manner
- Taking God's name in vain or saying other sacrilegious things
- Using words or phrases that may offend people from a different religious group
- Disagreeing with the president or other high government officials
- Speaking out in favor of any candidate for public office
- An employee differs publicly with his or her boss about political issues
- Employees report misdeeds by their boss or employer
- Advocating dating or marriage of people of different races
- Speaking out in favor of a right-wing dictatorship if one thinks that government is right and the United States is wrong
- Speaking out in favor of a Communist country if one thinks that government is right and the United States is wrong
- Advocating Satanism or other religious cults in public
- Advocating homosexual behavior in public
- Burning the flag to protest actions of the government
- Using obscene gestures in public
- Using words or phrases that would offend people from a different racial or ethnic group
- Discussing other people's sexual habits in public
- Children cuss out their parents in public
- Making statements that the president says may damage national security
- Giving classified information to a foreign government
- Yelling "Fire!" in a crowded theater as a prank
- Spreading lies and untruths that damage the reputation of another person
Table 2. Variables forming the Media Rights index.

Should the media be protected all the time, protected under certain circumstances or not protected at all when ...

- Television broadcasts pictures of graphic sexual acts
- Television shows music videos that deal with sexual themes
- Advertising pornographic or obscene material
- Television shows music videos that seem to promote drug use
- Television broadcasts pictures of nude or partially clothed persons
- Refusing to run advertising for certain products
- Advertising guns for sale
- Newspapers take sides in editorials during an election campaign
- Advertising products that are legal but harmful to the public, such as tobacco or liquor
- Newspapers or television stations run graphic photographs of violent events
- Journalists report about the mistakes a public figure made more than 20 years ago
- Reporting about the sexual habits of public figures
- Journalists report the name of a juvenile charged with a crime
- Journalists report the name or identity of a rape victim
Table 3. Mean support for individual and media rights by age, political orientation and education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Individual Rights</th>
<th>Media Rights</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High School</td>
<td>Some College</td>
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<tr>
<td>Left</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>Middle of road</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Support for expressive rights by sex.
Figure 2. Support for expressive rights by sex, education and age.

Women

Men

- High school
- Some college
- College grad.
Figure 3. Support for expressive rights by political orientation, age and education.

- High school
- Some college
- College grad.

Right

Middle of road

Left

26