This volume presents the research findings of numerous scholars on the theme, The Ghetto Underclass: Social Science Perspectives. The following 13 articles are included: (1) "The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City" (L. Wacquant and W. Wilson); (2) "Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass" (J. Kasarda); (3) "Absent Fathers in the Inner City" (M. Sullivan); (4) "Sex Codes and Family Life among Poor Inner-City Youths" (E. Anderson); (5) "Employment and Marriage among Inner-City Fathers" (M. Testa, and others); (6) "Single Mothers, the Underclass, and Social Policy" (S. McLanahan and I. Garfinkel); (7) "Puerto Ricans and the Underclass Debate" (M. Tienda); (8) "Immigration and the Underclass" (R. Reischauer); (9) "The Urban Homeless: A Portrait of Urban Dislocation" (P. Rossi and J. Wright); (10) "Equal Opportunity and the Estranged Poor" (J. Hochschild); (11) "The Logic of Workfare: The Underclass and Work Policy" (L. Mead); (12) "Institutional Change and the Challenge of the Underclass" (R. Nathan); and (13) "The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy" (W. Wilson). The volume also includes reviews of 41 books in the following categories: (1) International Relations and Politics; (2) Africa, Asia, and Latin America; (3) Europe; (4) United States; (5) Sociology; and (6) Economics. (VM)
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Special Editor: WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

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The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City

By LOÏC J. D. WACQUANT and WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

ABSTRACT: Discussions of inner-city social dislocations are often severed from the struggles and structural changes in the larger society, economy, and polity that in fact determine them, resulting in undue emphasis on the individual attributes of ghetto residents and on the alleged grip of the so-called culture of poverty. This article provides a different perspective by drawing attention to the specific features of the proximate social structure in which ghetto residents evolve and try to survive. This is done by contrasting the class composition, welfare trajectories, economic and financial assets, and social capital of blacks who live in Chicago's ghetto neighborhoods with those who reside in this city's low-poverty areas. Our central argument is that the interrelated set of phenomena captured by the term "underclass" is primarily social-structural and that the inner city is experiencing a crisis because the dramatic growth in joblessness and economic exclusion associated with the ongoing spatial and industrial restructuring of American capitalism has triggered a process of hyperghettoization.

Loïc J. D. Wacquant is pursuing doctorates in sociology at the University of Chicago and the Ecole des hautes études en sciences sociales, Paris. He is presently a research assistant on the Urban Poverty and Family Structure Project, investigating the relationships between class, race, and joblessness in the United States.

A MacArthur prize fellow, William Julius Wilson is the Lucy Flower Distinguished Service Professor of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Power, Racism, and Privilege; The Declining Significance of Race; The Truly Disadvantaged; and coeditor of Through Different Eyes.

NOTE: This article is based on data gathered and analyzed as part of the University of Chicago's Urban Poverty and Family Structure Project, whose principal investigator is W. J. Wilson. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the Institute for Research on Poverty, the Joyce Foundation, the Lloyd A. Fry Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Spencer Foundation, the William T. Grant Foundation, and the Woods Charitable Fund.
AFTER a long eclipse, the ghetto has made a stunning comeback into the collective consciousness of America. Not since the riots of the hot summers of 1966-68 have the black poor received so much attention in academic, activist, and policymaking quarters alike. Persistent and rising poverty, especially among children, mounting social disruptions, the continuing degradation of public housing and public schools, concern over the eroding tax base of cities plagued by large ghettos and by the dilemmas of gentrification, the disillusions of liberals over welfare have all combined to put the black inner-city poor back in the spotlight. Owing in large part to the pervasive and ascendant influence of conservative ideology in the United States, however, recent discussions of the plight of ghetto blacks have typically been cast in individualistic and moralistic terms. The poor are presented as a mere aggregation of personal cases, each with its own logic and self-contained causes. Severed from the struggles and structural changes in the society, economy, and polity that in fact determine them, inner-city dislocations are then portrayed as a self-imposed, self-sustaining phenomenon.


This vision of poverty has found perhaps its most vivid expression in the lurid descriptions of ghetto residents that have flourished in the pages of popular magazines and on televised programs devoted to the emerging underclass. Descriptions and explanations of the current predicament of inner-city blacks put the emphasis on individual attributes and the alleged grip of the so-called culture of poverty.

This article, in sharp contrast, draws attention to the specific features of the proximate social structure in which ghetto residents evolve and strive, against formidable odds, to survive and, whenever they can, escape its poverty and degradation. We provide this different perspective by profiling blacks who live in Chicago’s inner city, contrasting the situation of those who dwell in low-poverty areas with residents of the city’s ghetto neighborhoods. Beyond its sociographic focus, the central argument running through this article is that the interrelated set of phenomena captured by the term “underclass” is primarily social-structural and that the ghetto is experiencing a “crisis” not because a “welfare ethos” has mysteriously taken over its residents but because joblessness and economic exclusion, having reached dramatic proportions, have triggered a process of hyperghettoization.

Indeed, the urban black poor of today differ both from their counterparts of earlier years and from the white poor in that they are becoming increasingly concentrated in dilapidated territorial enclaves that epitomize acute social and economic marginalization. In Chicago, for instance, the proportion of all black poor residing in extreme-poverty areas—

THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY

that is, census tracts with a population at least 40 percent of which comprises poor persons—shot up from 24 percent to 47 percent between 1970 and 1980. By this date, fully 38 percent of all poor blacks in the 10 largest American cities lived in extreme-poverty tracts, contrasted with 22 percent a decade before, and with only 6 percent of poor non-Hispanic whites.

This growing social and spatial concentration of poverty creates a formidable and unprecedented set of obstacles for ghetto blacks. As we shall see, the social structure of today's inner city has been radically altered by the mass exodus of jobs and working families and by the rapid deterioration of housing, schools, businesses, recreational facilities, and other community organizations, further exacerbated by government policies of industrial and urban laissez-faire that have channeled a disproportionate share of federal, state, and municipal resources to the more affluent. The economic and social buffer provided by a stable black working class and a visible, if small, black middle class that cushioned the impact of downswings in the economy and tied ghetto residents to the world of work has all but disappeared. Moreover, the social networks of parents, friends, and associates, as well as the nexus of local institutions, have seen their resources for economic stability progressively depleted. In sum, today's ghetto residents face a closed opportunity structure.

5. The following is a summary description of the sample design and characteristics of the data for this article. The data are from a survey of 2490 inner-city residents of Chicago fielded by the National Opinion Research Center in 1986-87 for the Urban Poverty and Family Structure Project of the University of Chicago. The sample for blacks was drawn randomly from residents of the city's 377 tracts with poverty rates of at least 20.0 percent, the citywide average as of the last census. It was stratified by parental status and included 1184 respondents—415 men and 769 women—for a completion rate of 83.0 percent for black parents and 78.0 percent for black nonparents. Of the 1166 black respondents who still lived in the city at the time they were interviewed, 405, or 34.7 percent, resided in low-poverty tracts—that is, tracts with poverty rates below 20.0 percent and 29.9 percent—to which were added 41 individuals, or 3.5 percent, who had moved into tracts with poverty rates below 20.0 percent; 364, or 31.2 percent, lived in high-poverty tracts—inhabited extreme-poverty areas, including 3.5 percent, who had moved into tracts with poverty rates above 30.0 to 39.9 percent—and are excluded from the analyses reported in this article; and 356, or 30.5 percent, in extreme-poverty areas, including 9.6 percent in tracts with poverty rates above 50.0 percent. The latter include 63 persons, or 17.7 percent of all extreme-poverty-area residents, dwelling in tracts with poverty rates in excess of 70.0 percent—public housing projects in most cases. All the results presented in this article are based on unweighted data, although weighted data exhibit essentially the same patterns.

The purpose of this article is to begin to highlight this specifically sociological dimension of the changing reality of ghetto poverty by focusing on Chicago's inner city. Using data from a multistage, random sample of black residents of Chicago's poor communities, we show that ghetto dwellers do face specific obstacles owing to the characteristics of the social structure they compose. We begin, by way of background, by sketching the accelerating degradation of Chicago's inner city, relating the cumulation of social dislocations visited upon its South and West sides to changes in the city's economy over the last thirty years.
RACIAL AND CLASS EXCLUSION

DEINDUSTRIALIZATION AND HYPERGhettoIZATION

Social conditions in the ghettos of Northern metropolises have never been enviable, but today they are scaling new heights in deprivation, oppression, and hardship. The situation of Chicago’s black inner city is emblematic of the social changes that have sown despair and exclusion in these communities. As Table 1 indicates, an unprecedented tangle of social woes is now gripping the black communities of the city’s South Side and West Side. In the past decade alone, these racial enclaves have experienced rapid increases in the number and percentage of poor families, extensive out-migration of working- and middle-class households, stagnation—if not real regression—of income, and record levels of unemployment. As of the last census, over two-thirds of all families living in these areas were headed by women; about half of the population had to rely on public aid, for most adults were out of a job and only a tiny fraction of them had completed college.6

The single largest force behind this increasing social and economic marginalization of large numbers of inner-city blacks has been a set of mutually reinforcing spatial and industrial changes in the country’s urban political economy7 that have converged to undermine the material foundations of the traditional ghetto. Among these structural shifts are the decentralization of industrial plants, which commenced at the time of World War I but accelerated sharply after 1950, and the flight of manufacturing jobs abroad, to the Sunbelt states, or to the suburbs and exurbs at a time when blacks were continuing to migrate en masse to Rustbelt central cities; the general deconcentration of metropolitan economies and the turn toward service industries and occupations, promoted by the growing separation of banks and industry; and the emergence of post-Taylorist, so-called flexible forms of organizations and generalized corporate attacks on unions—which has intensified job competition and triggered an explosion of low-pay, part-time work. This means that even mild forms of racial discrimination—mild by historical standards—have a bigger impact on those at the bottom of the American class order. In the labor-surplus environment of the 1970s, the weakness of unions and the retreatment of civil rights enforcement aggravated the structuring of unskilled labor markets along racial lines,8 marking large-num-


7. Space does not allow us to do more than allude to the transformations of the American economy as they bear on the ghetto. For provocative analyses of the systemic disorganization of advanced capitalist economies and politics and the impact, actual and potential, of postindustrial and flexible-specialization trends on cities and their labor markets, see Scott Lash and John Urry, The E d of

8. See, for instance, Norman Fainstein, “The Underclass/Mismatch Hypothesis as an Explana-
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Families below Poverty Line (percentage)</th>
<th>Unemployed (percentage)</th>
<th>Female-Headed Families (percentage)</th>
<th>Median Family Income* (thousands of dollars annually)</th>
<th>Residents with Four-Year College Degree (percentage)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Side</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Near West Side</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Garfield Park</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td>North Lawndale</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Garfield Park</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Side</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Near South Side</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
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</table>


*In thousands of dollars annually.

†Increases due to the partial gentrification of these areas.
RACIAL AND CLASS EXCLUSION

members of inner-city blacks with the stamp of economic redundancy.

In 1954, Chicago was still near the height of its industrial power. Over 10,000 manufacturing establishments operated within the city limits, employing a total of 616,000, including nearly half a million production workers. By 1982, the number of plants had been cut by half, providing a mere 277,000 jobs for fewer than 162,000 blue-collar employees—a loss of 63 percent, in sharp contrast with the overall growth of manufacturing employment in the country, which added almost 1 million production jobs in the quarter century starting in 1958. This crumbling of the city’s industrial base was accompanied by substantial cuts in trade employment, with over 120,000 jobs lost in retail and wholesale from 1963 to 1982. The mild growth of services—which created an additional 57,000 jobs during the same period, excluding health, financial, and social services—came nowhere near to compensating for this collapse of Chicago’s low-skilled employment pool. Because, traditionally, blacks have relied heavily on manufacturing and blue-collar employment for economic sustenance,9 the upshot of these structural economic changes for the inhabitants of the inner city has been a steep and accelerating rise in labor market exclusion. In the 1950s, ghetto blacks had roughly the same rate of employment as the average Chicagoan, with some 6 adults in 10 working (see Table 2). While this ratio has not changed citywide over the ensuing three decades, nowadays most residents of the Black Belt cannot find gainful employment and must resort to welfare, to participation in the second economy, or to illegal activities in order to survive. In 1980, two persons in three did not hold jobs in the ghetto neighborhoods of East Garfield Park and Washington Park, and three adults in four were not employed in Grand Boulevard and Oakland.10

As the metropolitan economy moved away from smokestack industries and expanded outside of Chicago, emptying the Black Belt of most of its manufacturing jobs and employed residents, the gap between the ghetto and the rest of the city, not to mention its suburbs, widened dramatically. By 1980, median family income on the South and West sides had dropped to around one-third and one-half of the city average, respectively, compared with two-thirds and near parity thirty years earlier. Meanwhile, some of the city’s white bourgeois neighborhoods and upper-class suburbs had reached over twice the citywide figure. Thus in 1980, half of the families of Oakland had to make do with less than $5500 a year, while half of the families of Highland Park incurred incomes in excess of $43,000.


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TABLE 2
THE HISTORIC RISE OF LABOR MARKET EXCLUSION
IN CHICAGO'S GHETTO NEIGHBORHOODS, 1950-80

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<th>Adults Not Employed (percentage)</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
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<tr>
<td>City of Chicago</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>44.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Side</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Near West Side</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>64.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Garfield Park</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lawndale</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Side</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakland</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Boulevard</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Park</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>52.0</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Labor market exclusion is measured by the percentage of adults not employed, aged 16 years and older for 1970 and 1980, 14 years and older for 1950.

A recent ethnographic account of changes in North Kenwood, one of the poorest black sections on the city's South Side, vividly encapsulates the accelerated physical and social decay of the ghetto and is worth quoting at some length:

In the 1960's, 47th Street was still the social hub of the South Side black community. Sue's eyes light up when she describes how the street used to be filled with stores, theaters and nightclubs in which one could listen to jazz bands well into the evening. Sue remembers the street as "soulful." Today the street might be better characterized as soulless. Some stores, currency exchanges, bars and liquor stores continue to exist on 47th. Yet, as one walks down the street, one is struck more by the death of the street than by its life. Quite literally, the destruction of human life occurs frequently on 47th. In terms of physical structures, many stores are boarded up and abandoned. A few buildings have bars across the front and are closed to the public, but they are not empty. They are used, not so secretly, by people involved in illegal activities. Other stretches of the street are simply barren, empty lots. Whatever buildings once stood on the lots are long gone. Nothing gets built on 47th. . . . Over the years one apartment building after another has been condemned by the city and torn down. Today many blocks have the bombèd-out look of Berlin after World War II. There are huge, barren areas of Kenwood, covered by weeds, bricks, and broken bottles.11

Duncan reports how this disappearance of businesses and loss of housing have stimulated the influx of drugs and criminal activities to undermine the strong sense of solidarity that once permeated the community. With no activities or organizations left to bring them together or to represent them as a collectivity, with half the population gone in 15 years, the remaining residents, some of whom now refer to North Kenwood as the "Wild West," seem to be engaged in a perpetual


belum omnium contra omnes for sheer survival. One informant expresses this succinctly: "It's gotten worse. They tore down all the buildings, deteriorating the neighborhood. All your friends have to leave. They are just spreading out your mellahs [close friends]. It's not no neighborhood anymore."12 With the ever-present threat of gentrification—much of the area is prime lake-front property that would bring in huge profits if it could be turned over to upper-class condominiums and apartment complexes to cater to the needs of the higher-income clientele of Hyde Park, which lies just to the south—the future of the community appears gloomy. One resident explains: "They want to put all the blacks in the projects. They want to build buildings for the rich, and not us poor people. They are trying to move us all out. In four or five years we will all be gone."13

Fundamental changes in the organization of America's advanced economy have thus unleashed irresistible centrifugal pressures that have broken down the previous structure of the ghetto and set off a process of hyperghettoization.14 By this, we mean that the ghetto has lost much of its organizational strength—the "pulpit and the press," for instance, have virtually collapsed as collective agencies—as it has become increasingly marginal economically; its activities are no longer structured around an internal and relatively autonomous social space that duplicates the institutional structure of the larger society and provides basic minimal resources for social mobility, if only within a truncated black class structure. And the social ills that have long been associated with segregated poverty—violent crime, drugs, housing deterioration, family disruption, commercial blight, and educational failure—have reached qualitatively different proportions and have become articulated into a new configuration that endows each with a more deadly impact than before.

If the "organized," or institutional, ghetto of forty years ago described so graphically by Drake and Cayton15 imposed an enormous cost on blacks collectively,16 the "disorganized" ghetto, or hyperghetto, of today carries an even larger price. For, now, not only are ghetto residents, as before, dependent on the will and decisions of outside forces that rule the field of power—the mostly white dominant class, corporations, realtors, politicians, and welfare agencies—they have no control over and are forced to rely on services and institutions that are massively inferior to those of the wider society. Today's ghetto inhabitants

12. In ibid., p. 21.
13. In ibid., p. 28.
15. Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis.
16. Let us emphasize here that this contrast between the traditional ghetto and the hyperghetto of today implies no nostalgic celebration of the ghetto of yesteryear. If the latter was organizationally and socially integrated, it was not by choice but under the yoke of total black subjugation and with the threat of racial violence looming never too far in the background. See Arnold Hirsch, Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), for an account of riots and violent white opposition to housing desegregation in Chicago in the two decades following World War II. The organized ghetto emerged out of necessity, as a limited, if creative, response to implaceable white hostility; separatism was never a voluntary development, but a protection against unyielding pressures from without, as shown in Allan H. Spear, Black Chicago: The Making of a Negro Ghetto, 1890-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968).
comprise almost exclusively the most marginal and oppressed sections of the black community. Having lost the economic underpinnings and much of the fine texture of organizations and patterned activities that allowed previous generations of urban blacks to sustain family, community, and collectivity even in the face of continued economic hardship and unflinching racial subordination, the inner-city now presents a picture of radical class and racial exclusion. It is to a sociographic assessment of the latter that we now turn.

THE COST OF LIVING IN THE Ghetto

Let us contrast the social structure of ghetto neighborhoods with that of low-poverty black areas of the city of Chicago. For purposes of this comparison, we have classified as low-poverty neighborhoods all those tracts with rates of poverty—as measured by the number of persons below the official poverty line—between 20 and 30 percent as of the 1980 census. Given that the overall poverty rate among black families in the city is about one-third, these low-poverty areas can be considered as roughly representative of the average non-ghetto, non-middle-class, black neighborhood of Chicago. In point of fact, nearly all—97 percent—of the respondents in this category reside outside traditional ghetto areas. Extreme-poverty neighborhoods comprise tracts with at least 40 percent of their residents in poverty in 1980. These tracts make up the historic heart of Chicago's black ghetto: over 82 percent of the respondents in this category inhabit the West and South sides of the city, in areas most of which have been all black for half a century and more, and an additional 13 percent live in immediately adjacent tracts. Thus when we counterpose extreme-poverty areas with low-poverty areas, we are in effect comparing ghetto neighborhoods with other black areas, most of which are moderately poor, that are not part of Chicago's traditional Black Belt. Even though this comparison involves a truncated spectrum of types of neighborhoods, the contrasts it reveals between low-poverty and ghetto tracts are quite pronounced.

It should be noted that this distinction between low-poverty and ghetto neighborhoods is not merely analytical but captures differences that are clearly perceived by social agents themselves. First, the folk category of ghetto does, in Chicago, refer to the South Side and West Side, not just to any black area of the city; mundane usages of the term entail a social-historical and spatial referent rather than simply a racial dimension. Furthermore, blacks who live in extreme-poverty areas have a noticeably more negative opinion of their neighborhood. Only 16 percent rate it as a "good" to "very good" place to live in, compared to 41 percent among inhabitants of low-poverty tracts; almost 1 in 4 find their neighborhood "bad or very bad" compared to fewer than 1 in 10 among the latter. In short, the contrast between ghetto and non-ghetto poor areas is one that is socially meaningful to their residents.

The black class structure in and out of the ghetto

The first major difference between low- and extreme-poverty areas has to do with the sampling design: areas with less than 20 percent poor persons in 1980 were excluded at the outset, and tracts with extreme levels of poverty, being generally relatively underpopulated, ended up being underrepresented by the random sampling procedure chosen.
with their class structure (see Figure 1). A sizable majority of blacks in low-poverty tracts are gainfully employed: two-thirds hold a job, including 11 percent with middle-class occupations and 55 percent with working-class jobs, while one-third do not work.18 These proportions are exactly opposite in the ghetto, where fully 61 percent of adult residents do not work, one-third have working-class jobs and a mere 6 percent enjoy middle-class status. For those who reside in the urban core, then, being without a job is by far the most likely occurrence, while being employed is the exception. Controlling for gender does not affect this contrast, though it does reveal the greater economic vulnerability of women, who are twice as likely as men to be jobless. Men in both

18. Class categories have been roughly defined on the basis of the respondent's current occupation as follows: the middle class comprises managers, administrators, executives, professional specialists, and technical staff; the working class includes both blue-collar workers and noncredentialed white-collar workers; in the jobless category fall all those who did not hold a job at the time of the interview. Our dividing line between middle and working class, cutting across white-collar occupations, is consistent with recent research and theory on class—for example, Erik Olin Wright, Classes (New York: Verso, 1985); Nicolas Abercrombie and John Urry, *Capital, Labour and the Middle Classes* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983)—and on contemporary perceptions of class in the black community—see Reeve Vanneman and Lynn Cannon Weber, *The American Perception of Class* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987), chap. 10. The category of the jobless is admittedly heterogeneous, as it should be given that the identity of those without an occupational position is ambiguous and ill-defined in reality itself. It includes people actively looking for work (half the men and 1 woman in 10), keeping house (13 percent of the men and 61 percent of the women), and a minority of respondents who also attend school part- or full-time (16 percent of the males, 14 percent of the females). A few respondents without jobs declared themselves physically unable to work (6 percent of the men, 3 percent of the women). types of neighborhoods have a more favorable class mix resulting from their better rates of employment: 78 percent in low-poverty areas and 66 percent in the ghetto. If women are much less frequently employed—42 percent in low-poverty areas and 69 percent in the ghetto do not work—they have comparable, that is, severely limited, overall access to middle-class status: in both types of neighborhood, only about 10 percent hold credentialed salaried positions or better.

These data are hardly surprising. They stand as a brutal reminder that joblessness and poverty are two sides of the same coin. The poorer the neighborhood, the more prevalent joblessness and the lower the class recruitment of its residents. But these results also reveal that the degree of economic exclusion observed in ghetto neighborhoods during the period of sluggish economic growth of the late 1970s is still very much with us nearly a decade later, in the midst of the most rapid expansion in recent American economic history.

As we would expect, there is a close association between class and educational credentials. Virtually every member of the middle class has at least graduated from high school; nearly two-thirds of working-class blacks have also completed secondary education; but less than half—44 percent—of the jobless have a high school diploma or more. Looked at from another angle, 15 percent of our educated respondents—that is, high school graduates or better—have made it into the salaried middle class, half have become white-collar or blue-collar wage earners, and 36 percent are without a job. By comparison, those without a high school education are distributed as follows: 1.6 percent in the middle class, 37.9 percent in the working class, and a substantial
majority of 60.5 percent in the jobless category. In other words, a high school degree is a *condition sine qua non* for blacks for entering the world of work, let alone that of the middle class. Not finishing secondary education is synonymous with economic redundancy.

Ghetto residents are, on the whole, less educated than the inhabitants of other black neighborhoods. This results in part from their lower class composition but also from the much more modest academic background of the jobless: fewer than 4 in 10 jobless persons on the city's South Side and West Side have graduated from high school, compared to nearly 6 in 10 in low-poverty areas. It should be pointed out that education is one of the few areas in which women do not fare worse than men: females are as likely to hold a high school diploma as males in the ghetto—50 percent—and more likely to do so in low-poverty areas—69 percent versus 62 percent.

Moreover, ghetto residents have lower class origins, if one judges from the economic assets of their family of orientation. Fewer than 4 ghetto dwellers in 10 come from a family that owned its home and 6 in 10 have parents who owned nothing, that is, no home, business, or land. In low-poverty areas, 55 percent of the inhabitants are from a home-owning family while only 40 percent had no assets at all a generation ago. Women, both in and out of the ghetto, are least likely to come from a family with a home or any other asset—46 percent and 37 percent, respectively. This difference in class origins is also captured by differential rates of welfare receipt during childhood: the proportion of respondents whose parents were on public aid at some time when they were growing up is 30 percent in low-poverty tracts and 41 percent in the ghetto. Women in extreme-poverty areas are by far the most likely to come from a family with a welfare record.

19. And from the education of their fathers: only 36 percent of ghetto residents have a father with at least a high school education, compared to 43 percent among those who live outside the ghetto. The different class backgrounds and trajectories of ghetto and non-ghetto blacks will be examined in a subsequent paper.
TABLE 3
INCIDENCE OF WELFARE RECEIPT AND FOOD ASSISTANCE AMONG BLACK RESIDENTS OF CHICAGO'S LOW- AND EXTREME-POVERTY AREAS (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low poverty</td>
<td>Extreme poverty</td>
<td>Low poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On aid when child</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently on aid</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never had own grant</td>
<td>45.9</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>68.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expects to remain on aid*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 year</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 5 years</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives food stamps</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receives at least one of five forms of food assistance†</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Asked of current public-aid recipients only.
†Including pantry or soup kitchen, government food surplus program, food stamps, Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children, free or reduced-cost school lunches.

Class, gender, and welfare trajectories in low- and extreme-poverty areas

If they are more likely to have been raised in a household that drew public assistance in the past, ghetto dwellers are also much more likely to have been or to be currently on welfare themselves. Differences in class, gender, and neighborhood cumulate at each juncture of the welfare trajectory to produce much higher levels of welfare attachments among the ghetto population (Table 3).

In low-poverty areas, only one resident in four are currently on aid while almost half have never personally received assistance. In the ghetto, by contrast, over half the residents are current welfare recipients, and only one in five have never been on aid. These differences are consistent with what we know from censuses and other studies: in 1980, about half of the black population of most community areas on the South Side and West Side was officially receiving public assistance, while working- and middle-class black neighborhoods of the far South Side, such as South Shore, Chatham, or Roseland, had rates of welfare receipt ranging between one-fifth and one-fourth.20

None of the middle-class respondents who live in low-poverty tracts were on welfare at the time they were interviewed, and only one in five had ever been on aid in their lives. Among working-class residents, a mere 7 percent were on welfare and just over one-half had never had any welfare experience. This same relationship between class and welfare receipt is found among residents of extreme-poverty tracts, but with significantly higher rates of welfare receipt at all class levels: there, 12 percent of working-class residents are presently on aid and 39 percent received

20. See Wacquant and Wilson, "Poverty, Joblessness and Social Transformation," fig. 2.
welfare before; even a few middle-class blacks—9 percent—are drawing public assistance and only one-third of them have never received any aid, instead of three-quarters in low-poverty tracts. But it is among the jobless that the difference between low- and extreme-poverty areas is the largest: fully 86 percent of those in ghetto tracts are currently on welfare and only 7 percent have never had recourse to public aid, compared with 62 percent and 20 percent, respectively, among those who live outside the ghetto.

Neighborhood differences in patterns of welfare receipt are robust across genders, with women exhibiting noticeably higher rates than men in both types of areas and at all class levels. The handful of black middle-class women who reside in the ghetto are much more likely to admit to having received aid in the past than their male counterparts: one-third versus one-tenth. Among working-class respondents, levels of current welfare receipt are similar for both sexes—5.0 percent and 8.5 percent, respectively—while levels of past receipt again display the greater economic vulnerability of women: one in two received aid before as against one male in five. This gender differential is somewhat attenuated in extreme-poverty areas by the general prevalence of welfare receipt, with two-thirds of all jobless males and 9 in 10 jobless women presently receiving public assistance.

The high incidence and persistence of joblessness and welfare in ghetto neighborhoods, reflecting the paucity of viable options for stable employment, take a heavy toll on those who are on aid by significantly depressing their expectations of finding a route to economic self-sufficiency. While a slim majority of welfare recipients living in low-poverty tracts expect to be self-supportive within a year and only a small minority anticipate receiving aid for longer than five years, in ghetto neighborhoods, by contrast, fewer than 1 in 3 public-aid recipients expect to be welfare-free within a year and fully 1 in 5 anticipate needing assistance for more than five years. This difference of expectations increases among the jobless of both genders. For instance, unemployed women in the ghetto are twice as likely as unemployed women in low-poverty areas to think that they will remain on aid for more than five years and half as likely to anticipate getting off the rolls within a year.

Thus if the likelihood of being on welfare increases sharply as one crosses the line between the employed and the jobless, it remains that, at each level of the class structure, welfare receipt is notably more frequent in extreme-poverty neighborhoods, especially among the unemployed, and among women. This pattern is confirmed by the data on the incidence of food assistance presented in Table 3 and strongly suggests that those unable to secure jobs in low-poverty areas have access to social and economic supports to help them avoid the public-aid rolls that their ghetto counterparts lack. Chief among those are their financial and economic assets.

Differences in economic and financial capital

A quick survey of the economic and financial assets of the residents of Chicago's poor black neighborhoods (Table 4) reveals the appalling degree of economic hardship, insecurity, and deprivation that they must confront day in and day out.21 The picture in low-poverty

21. Again, we must reiterate that our comparison excludes ex definitio the black upper- and the middle-class neighborhoods that have mushroomed
areas is grim; that in the ghetto is one of near-total destitution.

In 1986, the median family income for blacks nationally was pegged at $18,000, compared to $31,000 for white families. Black households in Chicago's low-poverty areas have roughly equivalent incomes, with 52 percent declaring over $20,000 annually. Those living in Chicago's ghetto, by contrast, command but a fraction of this figure: half of all ghetto respondents live in households that dispose of less than $7500 annually, twice the rate among residents of low-poverty neighborhoods. Women assign their households to much lower income brackets in both areas, with fewer than 1 in 3 in low-poverty areas and 1 in 10 in extreme-poverty areas enjoying more than $25,000 annually. Even those who work report smaller incomes in the ghetto: the proportion of working-class and middle-class households falling under the $7500 mark on the South and West sides—12.5 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively—is double that of other black neighborhoods, while fully one-half of jobless respondents in extreme-poverty tracts do not reach the $5000 line. It is not surprising that ghetto dwellers also less frequently report an improvement of the financial situation of their household, with women again in the least enviable position. This reflects sharp class differences: 42 percent of our middle-class respondents and 36 percent of working-class blacks register a financial amelioration as against 13 percent of the jobless.

Due to meager and irregular income, those financial and banking services that most members of the larger society take for granted are, to put it mildly, not of obvious access to the black poor. Barely one-third of the residents of low-poverty areas maintain a personal checking account; only one in nine manage to do so in the ghetto, where nearly three of every four persons report no financial asset whatsoever from a possible list of six and only 8 percent have at least three of those six assets. (See Table 4.) Here, again, class and neighborhood lines are sharply drawn: in low-poverty areas, 10 percent of the jobless and 48 percent of working-class blacks have a personal checking account compared to 3 percent and 37 percent, respectively, in the ghetto; the proportion for members of the middle class is similar—63 percent—in both areas.

The American dream of owning one's home remains well out of reach for a large majority of our black respondents, especially those in the ghetto, where barely 1 person in 10 belong to a home-owning household, compared to over 4 in 10 in low-poverty areas, a difference that is just as pronounced within each gender. The considerably more modest dream of owning an automobile is likewise one that has yet to materialize for ghetto residents, of which only one-third live in households with a car that runs. Again, this is due to a cumulation of sharp class and neighborhood differences: 79 percent of middle-class respondents and 62 percent of working-class blacks have an automobile in their household, contrasted with merely 28 percent of the jobless. But, in ghetto tracts, only 18 percent of the jobless have domestic access to a car—34 percent for men and 13 percent for women.

The social consequences of such a paucity of income and assets as suffered by ghetto blacks cannot be overemphasized. For just as the lack of financial


## Table 4

**Economic and Financial Assets of Black Residents of Chicago’s Low- and Extreme-Poverty Areas (Percentage)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low poverty</td>
<td>Extreme poverty</td>
<td>Low poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than $7,500</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $25,000</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finances have improved</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial assets</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has checking account</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has savings account</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has none of six assets*</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>40.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has at least three of six assets*</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent owns nothing†</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>75.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material assets of household</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owns home</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a car</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>75.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Urban Poverty and Family Structure Survey.

*Including personal checking account, savings account, individual retirement account, pension plan, money in stocks and bonds, and prepaid burial.
†Home, business, or land.

Resources or possession of a home represents a critical handicap when one can only find low-paying and casual employment or when one loses one’s job, in that it literally forces one to go on the welfare rolls, not owning a car severely curtails one’s chances of competing for available jobs that are not located nearby or that are not readily accessible by public transportation.

**Social capital and poverty concentration**

Among the resources that individuals can draw upon to implement strategies of social mobility are those potentially provided by their lovers, kin, and friends and by the contacts they develop within the formal associations to which they belong—in sum, the resources they have access to by virtue of being socially integrated into solidary groups, networks, or organizations, what Bourdieu calls “social capital.” Our data indicate that not only do residents of extreme-poverty...
TABLE 5
SOCIAL CAPITAL OF BLACK RESIDENTS OF CHICAGO'S LOW- AND EXTREME-POVERTY AREAS (Percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current partner</th>
<th>All Respondents</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low poverty</td>
<td>Extreme poverty</td>
<td>Low poverty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent has no current partner</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent married*</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>40.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner completed high school</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>83.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner works steadily</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner is on public aid</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best friend</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent has no best friend</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best friend completed high school</td>
<td>87.4</td>
<td>76.4</td>
<td>83.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best friend works steadily</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>77.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Best friend is on public aid</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*And not separated from his or her spouse.

Areas have fewer social ties but also that they tend to have ties of lesser social worth, as measured by the social position of their partners, parents, siblings, and best friends, for instance. In short, they possess lower volumes of social capital.

Living in the ghetto means being more socially isolated: nearly half of the residents of extreme-poverty tracts have no current partner—defined here as a person they are married to, live with, or are dating steadily—and one in five admit to having no one who would qualify as a best friend, compared to 32 percent and 12 percent, respectively, in low-poverty areas. It also means that intact marriages are less frequent (Table 5). Jobless men are much less likely than working males to have current partners in both types of neighborhoods: 62 percent in low-poverty neighborhoods and 44 percent in extreme-poverty areas. Black women have a slightly better chance of having a partner if they live in a low-poverty area, and this partner is also more likely to have completed high school and to work steadily; for ghetto residence further affects the labor-market standing of the latter. The partners of women living in extreme-poverty areas are less stably employed than those of female respondents from low-poverty neighborhoods: 62 percent in extreme-poverty areas work regularly
as compared to 84 percent in low-poverty areas.

Friends often play a crucial role in life in that they provide emotional and material support, help construct one's identity, and often open up opportunities that one would not have without them—particularly in the area of jobs. We have seen that ghetto residents are more likely than other black Chicagoans to have no close friend. If they have a best friend, furthermore, he or she is less likely to work, less educated, and twice as likely to be on aid. Because friendships tend to develop primarily within genders and women have much higher rates of economic exclusion, female respondents are much more likely than men to have a best friend who does not work and who receives welfare assistance. Both of these characteristics, in turn, tend to be more prevalent among ghetto females.

Such differences in social capital are also evidenced by different rates and patterns of organizational participation. While being part of a formal organization, such as a block club or a community organization, a political party, a school-related association, or a sports, fraternal, or other social group, is a rare occurrence as a rule—with the notable exception of middle-class blacks, two-thirds of whom belong to at least one such group—it is more common for ghetto residents—64 percent, versus 50 percent in low-poverty tracts—especially females—64 percent, versus 46 percent in low-poverty areas—to belong to no organization. As for church membership, the small minority who profess to be, in Weber's felicitous expression, "religiously unmusical" is twice as large in the ghetto as outside: 12 percent versus 5 percent. For those with a religion, ghetto residence tends to depress church attendance slightly—29 percent of ghetto inhabitants attend service at least once a week compared to 37 percent of respondents from low-poverty tracts—even though women tend to attend more regularly than men in both types of areas. Finally, black women who inhabit the ghetto are also slightly less likely to know most of their neighbors than their counterparts from low-poverty areas. All in all, then, poverty concentration has the effect of devaluing the social capital of those who live in its midst.

CONCLUSION: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURING OF GHETTO POVERTY

The extraordinary levels of economic hardship plaguing Chicago's inner city in the 1970s have not abated, and the ghetto seems to have gone unaffected by the economic boom of the past five years. If anything, conditions have continued to worsen. This points to the asymmetric causality between the economy and ghetto poverty and to the urgent need to study the social and political structures that mediate their relationship. The significant differences we have uncovered between low-poverty and extreme-poverty areas in Chicago are essentially a reflection of their different class mix and of the prevalence of economic exclusion in the ghetto.

Our conclusion, then, is that social analysts must pay more attention to the extreme levels of economic deprivation and social marginalization as uncovered in this article before they further entertain and spread so-called theories about the

23. By this we mean that when the economy slumps, conditions in the ghetto become a lot worse but do not automatically return to the status quo ante when macroeconomic conditions improve, so that cyclical economic fluctuations lead to stepwise increases in social dislocations.

24. We say "so-called" here because, more often than not, the views expressed by scholars in this
potency of a ghetto culture of poverty that has yet to receive rigorous empirical elaboration. Those who have been pushing moral-cultural or individualistic-behavioral explanations of the social dislocations that have swept through the inner city in recent years have created a fictitious normative divide between urban blacks that, no matter its reality—which has yet to be ascertained—cannot but pale when compared to the objective structural cleavage that separates ghetto residents from the larger society and to the collective material constraints that bear on them. It is the cumulative structural entrapment and forcible socioeconomic marginalization resulting from the historically evolving interplay of class, racial, and gender domination, together with sea changes in the organization of American capitalism and failed urban and social policies, not a “welfare ethos,” that explain the plight of today’s ghetto blacks. Thus, if the concept of underclass is used, it must be a structural concept: it must denote a new sociospatial patterning of class and racial domination, recognizable by the unprecedented concentration of the most socially excluded and economically marginal members of the dominated racial and economic group. It should not be used as a label to designate a new breed of individuals molded freely by a mythical and all-powerful culture of poverty.

regard are little more than a surface formalization of the dominant American ideology—or commonsense notion—of poverty that assigns its origins to the moral or psychological deficiencies of individual poor persons. See Robert Castel, “La ‘guerre à la pauvreté’ et le statut de l’indigence dans une société d’abondance,” Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 19 Jan. 1978, pp. 47-60, for a pungent critical and historical analysis of conceptions of poverty in the American mind and in American welfare policy.

25. Initial examination of our Chicago data would appear to indicate that ghetto blacks on public aid hold basically the same views as regards welfare, work, and family as do other blacks, even those who belong to the middle class.

26. Let us emphasize in closing that we are not suggesting that differences between ghetto and nonghetto poor can be explained by their residence. Because the processes that allocate individuals and families to neighborhoods are highly socially selective ones, to separate neighborhood effects—the specific impact of ghetto residence—from the social forces that operate jointly with, or independently of, them cannot be done by simple controls such as we have used here for descriptive purposes. On the arduous methodological and theoretical problems posed by such socially selective effects, see Stanley Lieberson, Making It Count: The Improvement of Social Theory and Social Research (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), pp. 14-43 and passim.
Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass

By JOHN D. KASARDA

ABSTRACT: Major U.S. cities have transformed industrially from centers of goods processing to centers of information processing. Concurrently, the demand for poorly educated labor has declined markedly and the demand for labor with higher education has increased substantially. Urban blacks have been caught in this web of change. Despite improvements in their overall educational attainment, a great majority still have very little schooling and therefore have been unable to gain significant access to new urban growth industries. Underclass blacks, with exceptionally high rates of school dropout, are especially handicapped. Whereas jobs requiring only limited education have been rapidly increasing in the suburbs, poorly educated blacks remain residentially constrained in inner-city housing. Within underclass neighborhoods, few households have private vehicles, which are shown to be increasingly necessary for employment in dispersing metropolitan economies. The implications of interactions among race, space, and urban industrial change are explored. Reasons for the success of recent Asian immigrants in transforming cities are considered, and policies are suggested to rekindle social mobility in the black underclass.

John D. Kasarda is Kenan Professor and Chairman of the Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he also serves as director of the Center for Competitiveness and Employment Growth. He is the coauthor of six books and more than fifty scholarly articles on demography, formal organizations, and urban economic development. His current research focuses on job creation and the spatial redistribution of people and industry.

NOTE: This article benefited immeasurably from the input and assistance of John J. Beggs and Robert L. Boyd. Maria T. Cullinane assisted in table preparation.
RU BAN INDUSTRIAL TRANSITION

Research broadening our understanding of urban opportunity structures can be traced back to the early Chicago school. Scholars documented how the dynamic economies of our emerging industrial cities generated excesses of low-skilled jobs that attracted waves of foreign-born and rural migrants in search of employment and a better life. Their field studies vividly described how each migrant group initially concentrated in highly segregated enclaves within deteriorating inner-city zones, where they faced suspicion, distrust, discrimination, and outright hostility from earlier ethnic arrivals. Yet these studies also showed how, with the passage of time, each group was able to carve out a niche in the economy, adjust to city life, assimilate into mainstream institutions, climb the socioeconomic ladder, and eventually move to desegregated housing beyond the core ghettos and slums—only to be residentially replaced by another wave of immigrants who replicated this spatial and temporal process of assimilation and mobility. It was these successive movements from first-generation settlement in the core followed by residential progression outward toward the periphery that accompanied the assimilation processes that were responsible for the reported correspondence between (1) length of residence of the ethnic group in the city, (2) the group’s socioeconomic status, (3) its degree of segregation, and (4) the average distance that group members resided from the urban core.

Congruent processes of social and spatial mobility that characterized earlier disadvantaged residents of cities apparently do not apply to large numbers of underprivileged blacks currently residing in our largest cities. Indeed, the economic and social plight of a substantial segment of the urban black population is actually worse now than it was a generation ago as we have witnessed the formation of an immobilized subgroup of spatially isolated, persistently poor ghetto dwellers characterized by substandard education and high rates of joblessness, mother-only households, welfare dependency, out-of-wedlock births, and crime. The economic and social conditions of this subgroup, labeled the urban underclass, have deteriorated despite targeted infusions of public assistance, affirmative action, and civil rights legislation—programs traditionally supported by liberals—and have persisted in the face of national and urban economic recovery, solutions espoused by many conservatives.

One reason why neither liberal nor conservative prescriptions worked, I propose, is that both were overwhelmed by fundamental changes in the structure of city economies affecting the employment prospects of disadvantaged urban blacks. These structural changes led to a substantial reduction of lower-skilled jobs in traditional employing institutions that attracted and economically upgraded previous generations of urban blacks. Loss of these employment opportunities, in turn, had devastating effects on black families, which further exacerbated the problems of the economically displaced.

In this article I demonstrate the close relationship between urban industrial transition and black joblessness, especially among the poorly educated. I begin with a brief overview of urban employment change during the past two decades.
Next, data from the Census Bureau's 1950, 1970, and 1980 Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) Files are drawn together to explicate changes in the structure of employment in major Northern cities and associated increases in unemployment among blacks ill-equipped to work in new urban growth sectors. I then consider why recent ethnic immigrants to cities, including those with limited education, have been less affected by the urban industrial change and have been climbing the socioeconomic ladder while so many blacks have slipped off. The article concludes with a discussion of policies apropos the black underclass.

URBAN EMPLOYMENT IN TRANSITION

America's major cities are different places today from what they were in the 1960s, when our assumptions about urban poverty were formed. Advances in transportation, communication, and industrial technologies interacting with the changing structure of the national and international economy have transformed these cities from centers of the production and distribution of goods to centers of administration, finance, and information exchange. In the process, many blue-collar jobs that once constituted the economic backbone of cities and provided employment opportunities for their poorly educated residents have either vanished or moved. These jobs have been replaced, at least in part, by knowledge-intensive white-collar jobs with educational requirements that exclude many with substandard education. For example, by 1980, New York City and Boston each had more employees in information-processing industries—where executives, managers, professionals, and clerical workers dominate—than in their manufacturing, construction, retail, and wholesale industries combined. This is a dramatic metamorphosis compared to the situation in the mid-1950s, when employment in these more traditional urban industries outnumbered information-processing employment in Boston and New York by a 3-to-1 margin.

Blue-collar employment decline was accelerated by the urban exodus of white middle-income residents and the neighborhood business establishments that once served them. This exodus further weakened secondary labor markets for lower-skilled consumer and personal services that, along with goods-processing industries, had employed the largest numbers of urban blacks.

The implications of urban industrial transition for the changing nature of jobs available in major Northern cities and their suburban rings are illustrated in Tables 1, 2, and 3. These figures, assembled from place-of-work data from the 1970 and 1980 PUMS Files, show changing characteristics of jobs—including jobs held by commuters—and their occupants by the actual location of employment.

Table 1 reveals that while the suburban rings of the six largest Northern cities added employment across every occupational classification, the central cities lost substantial numbers of jobs in clerical, sales, and blue-collar occupations. These losses were responsible for overall central-city employment declines between 1970 and 1980. At the same time, all cities exhibited considerable growth in employment of managers, professionals, and employees engaged in higher-level technical and administrative support functions. New York City, for instance, added over 260,000 workers in these two information-


## Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>Managerial and Professional</th>
<th>Technical and Administrative Support</th>
<th>Clerical and Sales</th>
<th>Blue-Collar</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
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<td>-40,400</td>
<td>-62,500</td>
<td>-46,480</td>
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<tr>
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<td>75,820</td>
<td>89,460</td>
<td>118,440</td>
<td>366,380</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-88,660</td>
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<td>Suburbs</td>
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<td>120,660</td>
<td>115,380</td>
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<td>630,040</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-34,580</td>
<td>-42,720</td>
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<td>23,800</td>
<td>97,060</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
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<td>15,840</td>
<td>-35,540</td>
<td>-89,860</td>
<td>-104,860</td>
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<td>Suburbs</td>
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<td>62,500</td>
<td>43,240</td>
<td>29,320</td>
<td>186,920</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>Central city</td>
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<td>173,780</td>
<td>-187,820</td>
<td>-171,500</td>
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<td>23,040</td>
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<td>-70,860</td>
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<td>Suburbs</td>
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<td>55,880</td>
<td>36,240</td>
<td>29,500</td>
<td>171,900</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### Intensive occupational categories

Intensive occupational categories while losing more than 170,000 jobs in blue-collar occupations.

Cross-classification of blue-collar employment change by industry, presented in Table 2, reveals that central-city blue-collar job losses were heavily concentrated in traditional urban employment sectors.3

3. The goods-producing sector comprises all those working in agriculture, forestry, fisheries, mining, construction, and manufacturing. The trade sector includes those in wholesale and retail trade. The producer-services sector is made up of those in finance, insurance, real estate, business services, and professional services. Those in transportation, communications, other public utilities, repair services, personal services, and entertainment and recreation services are in the consumer service sector. Public sector workers include those employed by all levels of government.

Goods-producing industries—primarily manufacturing—accounted for the majority of city blue-collar employment declines in each of the six central cities. Corresponding to the industrial shifts initially noted, all central cities also lost substantial numbers of blue-collar jobs in retail and wholesale trade and the consumer-service sector. The smallest losses were in producer-service industries—primarily financial and business services—and the public sector. In fact, both New York City and Chicago added blue-collar jobs in their public sectors and producer-service industries, the latter reflecting growth in custodial and maintenance jobs that accompanied the downtown boom in these office building industries during the 1970s.
TABLE 2
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF BLUE-COLLAR JOBS IN SELECTED CENTRAL CITIES AND SUBURBAN RINGS, BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 1970-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>Goods Producing</th>
<th>Trade</th>
<th>Producer Services</th>
<th>Consumer Services</th>
<th>Public Sector</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
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<td>-7,780</td>
<td>-2,200</td>
<td>-9,220</td>
<td>-6,540</td>
<td>-62,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>56,220</td>
<td>24,840</td>
<td>13,360</td>
<td>6,720</td>
<td>15,300</td>
<td>118,440</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
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<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>-84,360</td>
<td>-20,880</td>
<td>4,320</td>
<td>-23,340</td>
<td>5,380</td>
<td>-118,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>112,220</td>
<td>53,980</td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>30,380</td>
<td>22,640</td>
<td>237,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>-20,020</td>
<td>-5,200</td>
<td>-940</td>
<td>-6,500</td>
<td>-1,920</td>
<td>-34,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
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<td>13,460</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>1,840</td>
<td>23,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>-53,560</td>
<td>-15,880</td>
<td>-6,280</td>
<td>-14,680</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>-89,860</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
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<td>19,420</td>
<td>8,340</td>
<td>8,320</td>
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<td>Central city</td>
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<td>-49,560</td>
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<td>-171,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>-33,200</td>
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<td>13,340</td>
<td>-10,300</td>
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<td>27,080</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>-48,780</td>
<td>-9,980</td>
<td>-1,280</td>
<td>-13,820</td>
<td>-1,340</td>
<td>-75,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburbs</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>16,700</td>
<td>7,800</td>
<td>-2,400</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>29,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Whereas the Northeast and Midwest were characterized by marked deindustrialization between 1970 and 1980, the suburbs of Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, and Philadelphia all added blue-collar jobs in their goods-producing industries. Boston and Chicago represent particularly striking city-suburban contrasts in blue-collar employment change in goods-producing industries, with suburban increases substantially exceeding central-city job losses. Retail and wholesale trade industries also significantly expanded the number of their blue-collar employees in the suburban rings of all metropolitan areas, in sharp contrast to blue-collar employment decline in these same industries in the central cities.

Central-city employment increases in managerial, professional, and high-level technical and administrative support occupations that occurred concurrently with precipitous drops in blue-collar and other jobs requiring lower levels of education contributed to major changes in the educational composition of occupants of central-city jobs. Table 3 displays the net changes in the number of central-city jobs by education of the occupants. For instance, the number of jobs in Boston held by those who did not complete high school declined by 80,260 between 1970 and 1980, which

4. The 1980 PUMS File is a 5 percent sample of the U.S. population. For reasons of economy, the Census Bureau coded only the information on
TABLE 3
CHANGE IN NUMBER OF CENTRAL-CITY JOBS,
BY EDUCATION LEVEL OF JOBHOLDERS, 1970-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central City</th>
<th>Less than High School</th>
<th>High School Only</th>
<th>Some College</th>
<th>College Graduate</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>-80,260</td>
<td>-48,880</td>
<td>25,700</td>
<td>58,280</td>
<td>-45,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(-58.7)</td>
<td>(-28.9)</td>
<td>(32.9)</td>
<td>(71.4)</td>
<td>(-9.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>-211,400</td>
<td>-81,020</td>
<td>91,320</td>
<td>112,500</td>
<td>-88,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(-41.8)</td>
<td>(-18.6)</td>
<td>(43.9)</td>
<td>(66.7)</td>
<td>(-6.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>-64,660</td>
<td>-20,220</td>
<td>26,300</td>
<td>15,980</td>
<td>-42,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(-48.2)</td>
<td>(-14.0)</td>
<td>(53.5)</td>
<td>(31.0)</td>
<td>(-11.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>-107,300</td>
<td>-55,460</td>
<td>35,320</td>
<td>22,320</td>
<td>-105,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(-55.0)</td>
<td>(-28.7)</td>
<td>(48.4)</td>
<td>(35.3)</td>
<td>(-20.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-443,800</td>
<td>-161,180</td>
<td>237,580</td>
<td>266,360</td>
<td>-101,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(-40.4)</td>
<td>(-15.8)</td>
<td>(61.0)</td>
<td>(47.3)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
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<td>-31,640</td>
<td>48,280</td>
<td>65,540</td>
<td>-71,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(%)</td>
<td>(-47.2)</td>
<td>(-11.1)</td>
<td>(60.5)</td>
<td>(57.4)</td>
<td>(-9.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOURCES: Bureau of the Census, Machine Readable Public Use Microdata Sample Files, 5% A Sample, 1980; ibid., 15% County Group Sample, 1970.

NOTE: Percentages in parentheses denote percentage change.

represents a 58.7 percent drop. Conversely, the number of Boston's jobs held by college graduates grew by 58,280, a 71.4 percent gain. There was also a major contraction in the number of jobs in all cities held by those with only a high school degree. Thus, in our industrially transforming cities, there are declining employment prospects not only for workers without a high school degree but also for those with just a high school degree. At the same time, slots being filled by those with formal education beyond high school have mushroomed.

Portions of the decrease in city jobs occupied by those without a high school degree and growth in jobs held by those with higher education reflect improvements in the overall educational attainment of the city labor force during the 1970s. These improvements, however, were not nearly as great as the concurrent upward shifts in the education levels of city jobholders. As a result, much of the job increase in the college-graduate category for each city was absorbed by suburban commuters while many job losses in the less-than-high-school-completed category were absorbed by city residents.

The figures in Table 3 strikingly highlight the direction that urban labor markets are taking vis-à-vis the hiring of persons with different levels of educational attainment. Given that structure is formed by the relative growth rates of component parts, the educational structure of city employment experienced a major shift between 1970 and 1980. This shift is described in Table 4, which dis-
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CENTRAL-CITY JOBS,
BY EDUCATION LEVEL OF JOBHOLDERS, 1970-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than High School</td>
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<td>Some College</td>
<td>College Graduate</td>
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<td>Baltimore</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
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<td>29.4</td>
<td>36.4</td>
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<td>13.9</td>
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<td>22.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
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<td>33.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>12.5</td>
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<td></td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>11.3</td>
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<td>24.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


plays the percentage distribution of city jobs by education of their occupants in the six cities listed in Tables 1, 2, and 3 plus three additional cities—Baltimore, St. Louis, and Washington, D.C.—for which central-city resident data for 1970 and 1980 could be assembled from the PUMS Files.

In just 10 years, the percentage of Baltimore's jobs occupied by those who had less than a high school degree dropped from 48.3 percent to 29.6. Roughly analogous declines occurred in other cities in the proportions of jobs occupied by persons with less than a high school degree. All but Baltimore and St. Louis also experienced declines in the percentage of jobs held by persons with only a high school degree. Both Baltimore and St. Louis actually had net declines in jobs.
occupied by those with only a high school degree but the percentage rose as an artifact of the precipitous drop in the number of jobs held by those with less than a high school degree. At the higher-education end of the continuum, job-holder percentages rose considerably in all cities. Combining the "some college" and "college graduate" percentages, we find that by 1980, 65 percent of all those employed in Washington, D.C. had at least some higher education, 58 percent in Boston, and 49 percent in both Chicago and New York. Except for Baltimore, more than 40 percent of all jobs in the cities shown in Table 4 were, by 1980, occupied by persons with educations beyond high school.

In sum, Tables 1 through 4 illustrate the dramatic changes that have occurred since 1970 in urban economies both in terms of the types of jobs performed—occupational changes—and the educational qualifications of those occupying city jobs. As major cities have transformed industrially from centers of goods processing to centers of information processing, knowledge-intensive, white-collar jobs have mushroomed while jobs typically filled by those without education beyond high school have shrunk considerably. The next section assesses the implications of these structural changes for employment opportunities for urban blacks.

CONSEQUENCES FOR URBAN BLACK EMPLOYMENT

While overall educational attainment of black city residents improved during the 1970s, it was not sufficient to keep pace with even faster rises in the educational attainment of those persons being employed by city industries. Moreover, general improvements in city residents' education levels meant that lesser-educated jobless blacks fell further behind in the hiring queue. Particularly affected were those large numbers of urban blacks who had not completed high school, especially younger ones. For city black youth, school drop-out rates ranged from 30 to 50 percent during the 1970s and early 1980s, with case studies of underclass neighborhoods and schools suggesting even higher drop-out rates among the most impoverished.5

Table 5 illustrates the structural dilemma facing sizable portions of the black urban labor force. This table compares the 1980 educational distributions of those employed by city industries, including the self-employed, with the educational distributions of all out-of-school black males aged 16-64 and out-of-school black males aged 16-64 who are not working. The contrasts are dramatic. Despite their educational gains, black urban labor still remains highly concentrated in the education category where city employment has rapidly declined—the category in which people have not completed high school—and greatly underrepresented in the educational-attainment categories where city employment is quickly expanding, especially the category of college graduate. As late as 1980, the modal education-completed category for out-of-school black male residents in all cities except Boston was less than 12 years.

Those out-of-school black males who are jobless display an even more disadvantageous educational distribution. In Baltimore, for example, while 54.4 percent of all black males who were out of school had less than 12 years of education

### TABLE 5
EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF JOBHOLDERS IN SELECTED CENTRAL CITIES AND EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF OUT-OF-SCHOOL BLACK MALES AGED 16-64 RESIDING IN THESE CITIES, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central City</th>
<th>Less than High School</th>
<th>High School Only</th>
<th>Some College</th>
<th>College Graduate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Baltimore</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boston</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>33.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chicago</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cleveland</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
<td>46.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Detroit</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>New York</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philadelphia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>St. Louis</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Washington, D.C.</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City jobholders</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>40.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black male residents</td>
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<td>Black male residents not working</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** Bureau of the Census, Machine Readable Public Use Microdata Sample File, 5% A Sample, 1980.

In 1980, 67.5 percent of black males out of school and jobless had not completed high school. With the exception of Boston, where 47.6 percent of jobless black males did not complete high school, more than 50 percent of jobless black males in
all cities had completed less than 12 years of schooling, including a remarkable 60-plus percent in Philadelphia and St. Louis, along with Baltimore. Comparing these figures with the percentage of city jobs filled in 1980 by those with less than a high school degree (top left figure of each city panel) and with changes in city jobs occupied by the poorly educated between 1970 and 1980 (Tables 3 and 4) exemplifies the substantial educational disparity faced by urban blacks in general and those not at work, in particular.

This educational disparity between city jobs and black residents poses a serious structural impediment to major improvements in urban black employment prospects. It may be the case that any individual black male who has not completed high school can secure employment in the city—some vacancies almost always exist, even in declining employment sectors. But, given the distributions shown in Table 5, if large portions of out-of-work urban blacks all sought the jobs available, they would simply overwhelm vacancies at the lower end of the education continuum.

The disparities between city jobs and black labor that are displayed at the higher-education end of the continuum help explain why policies based primarily on urban economic development have had limited success in reducing urban black joblessness. Most blacks simply lack the education to participate in the new growth sectors of the urban economy. While city jobs taken by college graduates have mushroomed, the percentage of urban black males who have completed college remains extremely small. For those who are out of work, the disparity at the higher-education end is even greater.

Confinement of poorly educated blacks in cities rapidly losing jobs that do not require knowledge associated with a high school education poses another serious impediment to lowering their unemployment rates. As blue-collar and other less knowledge-intensive jobs expanded in the suburbs, whites were able to relocate much more easily than blacks. Between 1972 and 1982, the U.S. censuses of manufacturers show that New York City lost 30 percent of its manufacturing jobs, Detroit 41 percent, and Chicago 47 percent. During approximately the same period, 1970-80, the non-Hispanic white population declined by 1.4 million in New York, by 700,000 in Chicago, and by 420,000 in Detroit, while the black populations of these three cities increased by 180,000, by 111,000, and by 102,000, respectively.6

Decline in manufacturing jobs, we have seen, is by no means the only pertinent indicator of losses in traditional blue-collar employment, but it corresponds to other indicators of the capacity of a city to sustain large numbers of residents with limited educational attainment. This reduced capacity had direct bearing on the employment status of undereducated blacks during the three decades ending in 1980, as is illustrated in Table 6.7 Between 1950 and 1970 there was considerable growth in all cities in the number of blacks employed who had not completed 12 years of education. Aside from St. Louis, this growth occurred across all major industrial sectors. After 1970, the bottom fell out in urban industrial demand for poorly educated blacks. This was particularly the case in goods-producing industries. While goods-producing industries in Philadelphia, for instance, added over 14,000 blacks who

7. Cities selected are those for which residence as well as place of work could be determined for all years from the PUMS Files.
had not completed high school to their payrolls between 1950 and 1970, from 1970 to 1980, the number of blacks without a high school degree in Philadelphia's goods-producing industries dropped by over 20,000. Overall, Philadelphia's employment declines during the 1970s among blacks who had not completed high school (−57,760) nearly equaled the total numbers of poorly educated blacks it added to its job rolls between 1950 and 1970 (63,050).

Corresponding to these employment declines between 1970 and 1980 were dramatic drops across all cities in the percentage of poorly educated black males who worked full-time and a leap in the percentage not working. By 1980, fewer than half in each city had full-time jobs. Conversely, the percentage not working at all rose in Baltimore from 24.7 to 45.0; in New York from 28.2 to 43.9; in Philadelphia from 26.7 to 50.6; in St. Louis from 31.8 to 48.4; and in Washington, D.C., from 23.4 to 42.1. Clearly, the loss of low-education-requisite jobs in traditional city industries had at least an accelerating effect on the growth of joblessness among their least-educated black residents.

THE ROLE OF SPACE

Since John Kain's seminal article in 1968 on the effects of metropolitan job decentralization and housing segregation on black employment, spirited debate has surrounded the question of whether spatial factors play a role in the rise of joblessness among urban blacks. At issue is whether the suburbanization of blue-collar and other lower-skilled jobs has worked to the economic disadvantage of blacks who remain residually constrained to inner-city housing. David Ellwood's impressive study has been accepted by many as conclusive evidence that spatial factors—more specifically, differential residential proximity to jobs—account for little to nothing in understanding black unemployment. Ellwood systematically analyzed employment rates of out-of-school youth aged 16-21 in Chicago in 1970 using three methods: (1) multiple regression analysis of census tract and local community employment rates, (2) comparison of unemployment rates of blacks in two different sections of Chicago that purportedly had vastly different degrees of job accessibility, and (3) comparison of black and white employment rates in the same section of the city. Based on these analyses Ellwood concluded that it is "race, not space," that accounts for black-white differences in employment.

While there is no question that race, including outright discrimination, plays a potent—and probably the most powe-


TABLE 6
CHANGE IN CENTRAL-CITY EMPLOYMENT OF BLACKS WITHOUT A HIGH SCHOOL DEGREE, BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, 1950-80, AND EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF BLACK MALE CITY RESIDENTS AGED 16-64 WHO ARE OUT OF SCHOOL AND DO NOT HAVE A HIGH SCHOOL DEGREE, 1970 AND 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industrial sector</th>
<th>Baltimore</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Philadelphia</th>
<th>St. Louis</th>
<th>Washington, D.C.</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Goods producing</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-70</td>
<td>6,680</td>
<td>34,350</td>
<td>14,200</td>
<td>-1,580</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
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<td>-29,460</td>
<td>-20,040</td>
<td>-7,440</td>
<td>-8,560</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Trade</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-70</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>19,790</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>4,660</td>
<td>8,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>-1,520</td>
<td>-18,840</td>
<td>-8,560</td>
<td>-2,980</td>
<td>-7,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Producer services</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-70</td>
<td>8,690</td>
<td>30,790</td>
<td>11,440</td>
<td>5,840</td>
<td>10,390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>-1,280</td>
<td>-6,200</td>
<td>-3,960</td>
<td>-1,780</td>
<td>-2,660</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Consumer services</strong></td>
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</tr>
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<td>1950-70</td>
<td>8,020</td>
<td>32,270</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>12,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>-8,660</td>
<td>-26,780</td>
<td>-16,340</td>
<td>-5,660</td>
<td>-9,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Government</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-70</td>
<td>15,890</td>
<td>30,180</td>
<td>16,760</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>23,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>-1,020</td>
<td>-8,860</td>
<td>-120</td>
<td>-15,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>All</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-70</td>
<td>43,620</td>
<td>147,380</td>
<td>63,050</td>
<td>14,600</td>
<td>60,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-80</td>
<td>28,800</td>
<td>-82,300</td>
<td>-57,760</td>
<td>-4,117</td>
<td>-43,480</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Employment status of out-of-school black males with no high school degree

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed full-time (percentage)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not working (percentage)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


It should be recognized that in Ellwood's regression analysis of census tract data, the dependent variable was not black-white differences in employment rates but rather census tract employment rates with all races aggregated together. Inferences drawn must correspond to the measure. Nevertheless, while percentage black was consistently the most powerful role in the relatively poor employment performance of blacks, one should be cautious in using the Ellwood study to dismiss space as a contributing factor. Let me briefly elaborate.
predictor of the aggregate employment rates, a number of the job-accessibility indicators had significant effects in the expected direction despite their likely low measurement reliability. These significant effects remained after controls were introduced not only for percentage black but also for percentage Spanish speaking, percentage of high school graduates, percentage of persons in the tract over age 25, average family income, percentage of persons in poor families, and percentage of children in single-parent families (see footnote to Ellwood's Table 4.6). Related to this, Ellwood's findings that the inclusion of job-proximity variables did not alter the regression coefficient of census tract employment rate on percentage black is not evidence that job proximity has no effect on employment. It may simply mean that proximity has some effects on census tract employment rates distinct from racial composition.

While statistical critique inevitably seems to follow even carefully crafted aggregate-level analyses such as Ellwood's, what appears far more devastating to job-proximity arguments are the results of his comparison of black youth unemployment rates in the South Side ghettos of Chicago with those on the West Side. According to Ellwood, Chicago's West Side ghettos were flush with spatially accessible jobs in 1970 while few jobs existed on the South Side. Yet, his results show that black youths on the West Side had nearly the same high unemployment rates as black youths on the South Side, leading him to conclude that in "what appeared to be the purest of natural experiments, reasonably identical populations with reasonably different labor markets, the labor market results were not measurably different." 12

In point of fact, data for Chicago's West Side ghettos in 1970 suggest that their labor markets were not different from those of the South Side, at least with respect to job access for black youths. Between 1960 and 1970, Chicago lost 211,000 jobs, the bulk of them in manufacturing, trade, and blue-collar services. Particularly hard hit were the West Side ghetto areas that prior to the 1960s had large concentrations of manufacturing and distribution facilities as well as commercial establishments. The spatial and economic core of this area was North Lawndale, which lost 75 percent of its industries and businesses between 1960 and 1970.14

Temporal patterns are important here. The loss of low-skilled jobs accelerated following the West Side ghetto uprising in 1966, which markedly raised insurance rates of commercial establishments. On 4 April 1968, following the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., the West Side ghettos exploded with rioting, burning, and looting, cutting a nearly two-mile swath of devastation from Madison Avenue to the Horner Homes housing project. That night alone, 559 fires were reported on the West Side. Madison Avenue, its main commercial strip, was totally destroyed.

16. Ibid.
Although some large job sites remained functioning on the West Side in 1970, the dynamics of the area were those of rapid blue-collar employment decline. This loss at the employment margin would be expected to affect new labor force entrants—for example, teenagers—most severely as, in fact, is revealed in Ellwood’s finding that “fully half of the school dropouts in both areas (south and west sides) reported that they were interested in work but unable to find it.” The point is that the labor markets for new entrants were not measurably different on the West Side and South Side ghettos in 1970. It is not surprising, then, that black youth unemployment rates in the two areas were similar.

Nevertheless, we are still left with Ellwood’s third major finding, leading him to conclude that the problem is not space, but race. In the same West Side area, 79.4 percent of white out-of-school youths were employed compared to 54.3 percent of black out-of-school youths. Whereas the small sample size (N = 100) could have played a role here, the reason for the discrepancy may well be that residential constraints on whites were less than those on blacks, enabling jobless white youths to flee an area of declining employment prospects, thus depressing their rates of unemployment compared to blacks who remained behind. Evidence supporting this interpretation is provided by Kain and Zax, who found that when integrated firms relocated from the central city to the suburbs, white employees were much more likely to follow in order to keep their jobs. Such an interpretation is also consistent with reports that black unemployment is higher relative to whites where jobs are most suburbanized and black populations least so.

What this implies is that future research on underclass joblessness might prove more profitable if it were cast in terms of race and space, including their interactions, rather than race versus space. That both play a role in affecting the economic opportunity of urban blacks is suggested by a number of other studies. On the wage front, Price and Mills find that while blacks earn 19 percent less than whites due to poorer labor qualifications and 15 percent less due to employment discrimination, they also lose an additional 6 percent due to their concentration in the central city.

An analogous study by Vrooman and Greenfield concludes that 40 percent of the black-white earnings gap could be closed by suburbanization of central-city black labor. Consistent with both studies, Strazheim reports a positive wage gradient from city to suburban employment among lesser-educated blacks, in contrast to whites.

Regarding space and employment, Leonard’s study of census tracts in Los Angeles shows that the ratio of jobs to population is lowest in areas surrounding black census tracts and that blacks have the highest commuting times, the latter also reported by Ellwood. Leonard finds that job accessibility significantly affects

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18. Ibid., p. 181.
teenage employment rates after controlling for percentage black and a full range of census tract socioeconomic variables, though, as in Ellwood's study, percentage black is the most potent predictor. In a detailed study of individual establishments, Leonard reports that establishment distance from the ghetto is the most significant determinant of blacks' employment share. The farther the establishment is from the ghetto, the fewer blacks it employs and the more slowly it adds black employees over time. Because most new job growth in metropolitan areas is toward their peripheries, those concentrated in the urban core are spatially disadvantaged. This disadvantage is reflected in the longer commuting times of blacks to suburban jobs.

Table 7 extends Ellwood's and Leonard's results by looking at black-white differences in commuting times among lesser-educated central-city residents working in the suburbs of nine major metropolitan areas. In every city, blacks have longer commuting times than whites whether one compares those without a high school degree or those with only a high school education. Additional analysis revealed that racial differences are not accounted for by transit mode, because nearly the same percentages of blacks who work in the suburbs commute by private automobile as do whites.

The final column of Table 7 reveals the great dependence lesser-educated black city residents have on private vehicles to reach suburban jobs. The percentage relying on private vehicles ranges from 68 percent in Boston to 91 percent in Detroit. On average, across the nine cities, four out of five of the least-educated blacks depend on a private vehicle to travel to their suburban jobs. What about those who are jobless?

When complementary analysis was conducted using the PUMS Files of the percentages of unemployed black males aged 16-64 who resided in households with no private vehicle, and out-of-the-labor-force, out-of-school black males aged 16-64 who resided in households with no private vehicles, the figures were remarkable—in New York, for example, 72 percent of the males who were unemployed resided in a household with no private vehicle, while 78 percent of those who were neither in school nor in the labor force had no vehicle in their household. The figures for Chicago are 45 percent and 55 percent, respectively, and for Philadelphia 54 percent and 60 percent, respectively. I then analyzed the 1980 Census Tract Machine Readable Files to look at automobile availability in Chicago's low-income black census tracts. In the near West Side, the area studied by Ellwood, more than three out of four households did not have an automobile in 1980. In Chicago's South Side ghetto of Oakland the figure was the same. In those black census tracts with the greatest joblessness, more than 80 percent of the households did not possess a private vehicle in 1980. Residential confinement of disadvantaged blacks in areas of blue-collar job decline together with their limited automobile ownership—the latter increasingly necessary to obtain employment in a dispersing metropolitan economy—would surely seem to contribute to their high rates of unemployment.

Finally, that space—including distance from appropriate jobs—plays a role is suggested by Table 8, which presents, by region, changing jobless rates of black males who have not completed high school and who resided in the central cities and suburban rings from 1969 to 1987. Over this entire period, jobless rates generally climbed in both the central


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Mean Travel Time (minutes)</th>
<th>Blacks without a High School Degree Who Commute by Private Vehicle (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Less than High school</td>
<td>High school degree only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blacks</td>
<td>Whites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>32.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>44.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

growth averaged 156,000 annually, with over 75 percent of it occurring in the South. The slowing suburban black migration also continued to be selective, leaving behind those blacks with the lowest education and the least resources.\(^{28}\)

**HOW HAVE THE NEW ETHNIC IMMIGRANTS ADAPTED?**

If spatial confinement and poor education are such handicaps to gainful employment in industrially transforming cities, why is it that America’s new urban immigrant groups, especially Asians, have had such high success in carving out employment niches and climbing the socioeconomic ladder? Like blacks, many Asian immigrants arrived with limited education and financial resources and are spatially concentrated in inner-city enclaves. Recent research on ethnic entrepreneurship casts light on the reasons and is suggestive for reducing underclass problems.\(^{29}\) These studies show the critical importance of ethnic solidarity and kinship networks in fostering social mobility.

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**TABLE 8**

PERCENTAGE NOT AT WORK OF OUT-OF-SCHOOL CENTRAL-CITY AND SUBURBAN BLACK MALE RESIDENTS AGED 16-64 WHO HAVE NOT COMPLETED 12 YEARS OF EDUCATION, 1989-87

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region of the United States and Metropolitan Residence</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1982</th>
<th>1987</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All regions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban ring</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northeast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban ring</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwest</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>55.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban ring</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban ring</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central city</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suburban ring</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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28. Ibid.

in segregated enclaves through self-employment.

Unlike most urban blacks, many Asian immigrants and certain Hispanic groups have been able to utilize ethnic-based methods to (1) assemble capital, (2) establish internal markets, (3) circumvent discrimination, and (4) generate employment in their enclaves that is relatively insulated from both swings in the national economy and urban structural transformation. Ethnic businesses are typically family owned and operated, often drawing upon unpaid family labor to staff functions during start-up periods of scarce resources and upon ethnic contacts to obtain credit, advice, and patronage. The businesses are characterized by thriftiness and long hours of intense, hard work, with continuous reinvestment of profits. As they expand, ethnic-enclave establishments display strong hiring preferences for their own members, many of whom would likely face employment discrimination by firms outside their enclave. They also do business with their own. A San Francisco study found that a dollar turns over five to six times in the Chinese business community while in most black communities dollars leave before they turn over even once.30

Kinship and household structures of ethnic immigrants have significantly facilitated their entrepreneurial successes. Among recently arrived Asian immigrants, for instance, “other relatives,” those beyond the immediate family, constitute a substantial portion of households: 55 percent among Filipinos and Vietnamese, 49 percent among Koreans, 46 percent among Asian Indians.31 In addition to serving as a valuable source of family business labor, these extended-kin members enable immigrant households to function more efficiently as economic units by sharing fixed household costs such as rents or mortgages, furnishing child-care services, and providing economic security against loss of employment by other household members.32 In short, by capitalizing on ethnic and family solidarity, many new immigrant businesses, ranging from laundries to restaurants to green grocers, have started and flourished in once downtrodden urban neighborhoods, providing employment and mobility options to group members in what in other respects is an unfavorable economic environment.33

Native urban blacks, in contrast, have been burdened by conditions that have impeded their entry and success in enclave employment, including lack of self-help business associations, limited economic solidarity, and family fragmentation. A survey by Black Enterprise magazine, for example, reported that 70 percent of self-employed blacks consider lack of community support as one of their most formidable problems.34 This, together with the documented flight of black-earned income to nonblack establishments, led well-known black journalist Tony Brown to comment, “The Chinese are helping the Chinese, the Koreans help the Koreans, Cubans help Cubans, but blacks are

32. Ibid.
34. Kotkin, “Reluctant Entrepreneurs,” p. 84.
helping everyone else. We have been conducting the most successful business boycott in American history—against ourselves."35 Apparently, racial political unity that has led to significant black electoral successes in major Northern cities during the past two decades has not carried over to the economic sphere.

Given the demonstrated importance of family cohesiveness and kinship networks in pooling resources to start businesses, provide day-care assistance, and contribute labor to family business ventures, the black underclass is at a distinct disadvantage. As Wilson found, approximately two-thirds of black families living in Chicago's ghettos are mother-only households.36 These households are the poorest segment of our society, with female householders earning only a third as much as married male householders.37 In short, it takes discretionary resources to start a small business and it requires patrons with money to sustain that business, both of which are in limited supply in underclass neighborhoods.

All the factors previously mentioned have converged to depress black self-employment rates during the past two decades, especially in the inner city.38 Table 9, computed from the 1980 PUMS Files, shows for major cities the consistency with which lesser-educated blacks are underrepresented in self-employment, particularly when compared to Asians. Among more recent Asian immigrants, self-employment rates are even higher. Data from the same source show that Korean immigrant self-employment rates range from a low of 19 percent in Chicago to a high of 35 percent in New York.39

Just as striking are Asian-black contrasts from the most recent census survey of minority-owned businesses. Between 1977 and 1982 the number of Asian-American-owned firms with paid employment expanded by 160 percent. During the same period, the number of black-owned firms with employees actually declined by 3 percent.40 With small business formation becoming the backbone of job creation in America's new economy, blacks are falling further behind in this critical arena.

Financial weakness and family fragmentation among the black underclass not only preclude capital mobilization for self-employment but also create barriers to their children's social mobility. Living in a mother-only household was found to increase the risk of young blacks' dropping out of school by 70 percent.41 The link between female headship and welfare dependency in the urban underclass is also well established, leading to legitimate concerns about the intergenerational transfer of poverty. At the root of this concern is the paucity of employment among welfare mothers and how this affects attitudes of their children toward work. Of those receiving welfare benefits, 85 percent have no source of income other than welfare.42

35. Ibid.
40. Boyd, "Ethnic Entrepreneurs."
## Table 9
### PERCENTAGE SELF-EMPLOYED OF ALL EMPLOYED MALES, AGED 16-64, WITH LESS THAN HIGH SCHOOL EDUCATION AND RESIDING IN SELECTED CENTRAL CITIES, BY RACE OR ETHNICITY, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central City</th>
<th>Non-Hispanic blacks</th>
<th>Hispanics</th>
<th>Asians and others</th>
<th>Non-Hispanic whites</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baltimore</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland*</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detroit</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Bureau of the Census, Machine Readable Public Use Microdata Sample File, 5% A Sample, 1980

*Includes those with high school degree only.

than public assistance. Furthermore, 65 percent of the recipients of Aid to Families with Dependent Children at any one point in time are in an interval of dependency that has lasted for at least eight years. One does not require a deep sociological imagination to sense the attitudinal and behavioral consequences of growing up in an impoverished household where there is no activity associated with the world of work and a household that, in turn, is spatially embedded in a commercially abandoned locality where pimps, drug pushers, and unemployed street people have replaced working fathers as predominant socializing agents.

### Rekindling Underclass Mobility

It is clear from a substantial amount of research that strengthening the black family and reducing the exceptionally high percentage of impoverished mother-only households must be key focuses of policies to rekindle social mobility among today's urban underclass. These policies should be complemented with programs that improve opportunities for ghetto youths to be reared in household and neighborhood environments where adult work is the norm and to attend public schools that will provide them with necessary skills and social networks for employment in a rapidly transforming economy. In this regard, it has been shown that low-income black youths who moved from inner-city Chicago to predominantly white suburbs as part of a subsidized housing experiment performed remarkably well, both academically and socially.

It was also shown herein that, as cities have functionally changed from centers of goods processing to centers of information processing, there has been a signifi-

cant rise in the education required for urban employment. If greater portions of disadvantaged black youths do not acquire the formal education to be hired by the white-collar service industries beginning to dominate urban employment bases, their jobless rates will remain high. For this reason and because demographic forces portend potential shortages of educationally qualified resident labor for the white-collar industries expanding in the cities, there have been appropriate calls from both the public and private sectors to upgrade city schools, reduce black youth drop-out rates, and increase the proportion who continue on for higher education.

Such policies, however, are unlikely to alleviate the unemployment problems currently facing large numbers of economically displaced older blacks and yet-to-be-placed younger ones with serious educational deficiencies—those caught in the web of urban change. Their unemployment will persist because the educational qualifications demanded by most of today's urban growth industries are difficult to impart through short-term, nontraditional programs.43

The implausibility of rebuilding urban blue-collar job bases or of providing sufficient education to large numbers of displaced black laborers so that they may be reemployed in expanding white-collar industries necessitates a renewed look at the traditional means by which Americans have adapted to economic displacement—that is, spatial mobility. Despite the mass loss of lower-skilled jobs in many cities during the past decade, there have been substantial increases in these jobs nationwide. For example, between 1975 and 1985, more than 2.1 million nonadministrative jobs were added in eating and drinking establishments, which is more than the total number of production jobs that existed in 1985 in America's automobile, primary metals, and textile industries combined.46 Unfortunately, essentially all of the net national growth in jobs with low educational requisites has occurred in the suburbs, exurbs, and nonmetropolitan areas, which are far removed from large concentrations of poorly educated minorities. It seems both an irony and a tragedy that we have such surpluses of unemployed lower-skilled labor in the inner cities at the same time that suburban businesses are facing serious shortages in lower-skilled labor.

The inability of disadvantaged urban blacks to follow decentralizing lower-skilled jobs has increasingly isolated them from shifting loci of employment opportunity and has contributed to their high rates of joblessness. To reduce this isolation, a number of strategies should be considered, including (1) a computerized job-opportunity network providing up-to-date information on available jobs throughout the particular metropolitan area, the region, and the nation; (2) partial underwriting of more distant job searches by the unemployed; (3) need-based temporary relocation assistance, once a job has been secured; (4) housing vouchers for those whose income levels require such assistance, as opposed to additional spatially fixed public housing complexes; (5) stricter enforcement of existing fair-housing and fair-hiring laws; (6) public-private cooperative efforts to van-pool unemployed inner-city residents to suburban businesses facing labor short-


ages; and (7) a thorough review of all spatially targeted low-income public assistance programs to ensure that they are not inadvertently anchoring those with limited resources to distressed areas in which there are few prospects for permanent or meaningful employment.

The aim of these people-to-jobs strategies is not only to bring a better balance between local supplies and demands for labor, but also to facilitate the means by which disadvantaged Americans have historically obtained economic opportunity and a better life. In this regard, it is not fortuitous that the three great symbols of social and economic opportunity for America's disadvantaged all relate to spatial mobility—the Statue of Liberty, the Underground Railway, and the covered wagon.
Absent Fathers in the Inner City

By MERCER L. SULLIVAN

ABSTRACT: The influences of structural economic factors, social ecology, and culture on producing young absent fathers in the inner city and on defining their relationships to their children are examined. Ethnographic data on three low-income urban neighborhoods are reported and compared with respect to the careers of young males, patterns of sexual activity and contraception, and responses to early pregnancy.

Mercer L. Sullivan received his Ph.D. in anthropology from Columbia University. He has conducted studies of school desegregation, youth crime and employment, and the male role in teenage pregnancy and parenting. He is a senior research associate at the Vera Institute of Justice in New York City.

NOTE: The research reported here could not have been carried out without the sensitive and dedicated work of three field research assistants: Carl Cesvette, for Projectville; Richard Curtis, for Hamilton Park; and Adalberto Mauras, for La Barriada. Our research on the role of young males in teenage pregnancy and parenting has been supported by the Ford Foundation and the W. T. Grant Foundation.
THE long-standing and increasing relationship between officially female-headed households and poverty has prompted much recent speculation that absent fathers are a major cause of concentrated and persistent poverty in the inner cities. Child support enforcement is now widely touted as a major solution to the emerging formation of a so-called underclass. As part of this strategy for reducing poverty, many proponents of reform do recognize the need for addressing the employment, education, and training difficulties of young men. Yet current welfare-reform proposals are more emphatic about the need to collect child support payments from young men than they are about the need to improve their economic opportunities. Meanwhile, knowledge of the economic circumstances of young, unmarried, officially absent fathers and of their relationships to the households in which their children live is sadly lacking. Official statistics do not convey an accurate picture of the extent to which officially absent fathers are really absent from the households and lives of their children or of the extent to which these men are actually able to support families.

Explanations of the relationship between family form and poverty have long been controversial in social science and in discussions of public policy. Although the association between poverty and female headship of households has been apparent for some time, the direction of causal relationships between the two has been hotly debated. Because poverty and female-headed households both occur at high rates among members of cultural minority groups in the United States, there has also been much controversy about the role that culture plays in the processes that produce both female-headed households and poverty. The culture-of-poverty theories of the late 1960s drew harsh criticism because they seemed to imply that cultural values concerning the control of sexual activity and the value of marriage were the causes rather than the results of poverty.

These theories provoked such heated reactions that research on family patterns among the poor was virtually suspended during the 1970s. During that decade, however, the proportions of female-headed households increased across society and soared among minority residents of inner-city areas. The associations between female headship of households, welfare dependency, and concentrated and persistent poverty became stronger than ever, eventually prompting social scientists and leaders of minority groups to pay renewed attention to family patterns among the poor. Fortunately, much of the recent research on these questions has maintained a steady focus on structural causes of both poverty and family disruption. Recent work by William Julius Wilson has sharpened this focus on structural factors by linking economic changes to powerful demographic shifts that have concentrated poor blacks in certain central-city areas while upwardly mobile blacks have left these areas.1

Unfortunately, the role of culture in these social changes remains as neglected as it has been since the days when overly vague notions of the culture of poverty brought disrepute to the culture concept as a tool for understanding the effects of the concentration of poverty among cultural minorities. This neglect of culture is unfortunate because it leaves us in the dark as to how people deal collectively with economic disadvantage, prejudice,

and the dilemmas of procreating and raising families under such conditions. Lacking such an understanding, we are left with two sorts of explanatory framework, structural and individual, both of which beg crucial questions of how people in real communities devise collective responses to their problems. Too extreme an emphasis on individual causation ignores growing evidence of the proliferation of low-wage jobs and increasing joblessness in inner-city labor markets. Too much emphasis on structural causation ignores evidence that postponing childbearing leads to greater occupational success even within inner-city populations.

The neglect of culture stems both from a lack of ethnographic research, which alone can portray culture, and from theoretical confusion concerning the ways in which individual action, culture, and social structure are interrelated. The comparative ethnographic research on young fathers in three inner-city neighborhoods reported here attempts to resolve some of these issues, first by providing data on cultural processes and, second, by relating these cultural processes both upward to the structural constraints of the political economy and downward to the choices and strategies of particular individuals, which vary even within these neighborhoods.

A key to the theoretical approach employed here is the concept of social ecology, the idea that each neighborhood we studied is distinctive not just because of primordial cultural values that may have been retained from a distant past but, perhaps more important, because each neighborhood occupies a distinctive ecological niche in relation to the regional economy, the educational system, and other institutions of the larger society. Though even the early culture-of-poverty theorists maintained that culture is adaptive to structure, their tendency to portray pathology and not adaptation led to the unfortunate current tendency either to dismiss culture or to reify it as a set of mysterious and immutable values. By focusing on social ecology, the present comparison of the adaptive strategies of young people in three different inner-city communities attempts to portray cultural process in a more complex way, as the collective adaptations of different groups of people with different group histories to similar yet distinctive difficulties in obtaining a living income, procreating, and supporting and raising children.

THREE NEIGHBORHOODS AND A RESEARCH PROJECT

The three neighborhoods we have studied are in Brooklyn, New York. In order to maintain the confidentiality of the very detailed and personal data we have gathered, we refer to these places using the pseudonyms Hamilton Park, Projectville, and La Barriada. The three neighborhoods are all relatively low income, yet they differ in class and in culture. Hamilton Park is a predominantly white, Catholic area many of whose adult residents are third- and fourth-generation descendants of immigrants from Italy and Poland. Though census figures show this neighborhood to have some of the lowest income levels among predominantly white, non-Hispanic neighborhoods in New York City, median income levels are still significantly higher than those in the two minority neighborhoods. Less than 12 percent of families are below the poverty level and less than 10 percent of households receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Projectville

is a predominantly black neighborhood whose adult residents are first- or second-generation immigrants from the southern United States. La Barriada is a predominantly Hispanic area in which all of the families we have contacted are headed by first- or second-generation immigrants from Puerto Rico. Family poverty levels and household AFDC enrollment levels are around 50 percent in both these areas.

We began research in these areas in 1979 in a study of the relationships between schooling, employment, and crime in the careers of young males. In that study, we described distinctive career patterns in each neighborhood and related these patterns to the distinctive social ecology of each neighborhood. In 1984, we began to look at young men who had become fathers at an early age and how their responses with respect to marriage, child support, and household and family formation related to the career patterns we had already been studying. At that time, we recontacted some of the young males who had become fathers during our study a few years earlier; we also were introduced by them to younger males in their neighborhoods whose sexual partners had become pregnant. Some of the similarities and differences within and between these neighborhood-based groups of young men in how they became fathers and what they did about these critical life-cycle transitions are reported and compared here.

In order to assess the influences of both culture and economic opportunity on the ways in which young men become fathers and how they react, the three neighborhoods are compared in terms of (1) the careers of young males; (2) patterns of teenage sexual activity; and (3) responses to pregnancy, including whether abortions are sought, whether marriage and coresidence are entered into, and how the children of young mothers are supported. The data are reported for 16 young males from Projectville, 17 from La Barriada, and 15 from Hamilton Park. These are not random samples but were recruited by ethnographic snowballing techniques. In addition, there is considerable variation within each sample. Each includes about a third who are nonfathers and each includes fathers who have been more and less effective in providing support for their children. Nonetheless, variation within each neighborhood sample falls within a distinctive range that reflects both community values and the resources available within that community.

All of those referred to as fathers fathered children by teenage mothers. Many of the fathers, however, were one to two years older and not themselves teenagers at the time they became fathers.


wage. As they get older, some find their way into relatively well-paying and secure unionized blue-collar jobs. Education plays very little role in their access to work. Most have attended a public vocational high school, but only about a third of them have obtained any sort of diploma.

Young males from the two minority neighborhoods fare much worse. They suffer more from lack of employment, and they earn very low wages when they do work, both as teenagers and as young adults. Yet the career patterns differ between these two minority neighborhoods in distinctive ways that are related to the neighborhoods' social ecology. La Barriada's young males leave school earlier than their peers in the other two neighborhoods. They tend to work in unskilled manual jobs in nearby factories and warehouses when they do work. Projectville's young males stay in school longer than their counterparts in La Barriada or in Hamilton Park. Nearly half of our sample from Projectville had either completed a diploma or were still working toward one. As a result of their prolonged participation in schooling, they tend to enter the labor market somewhat later than the others. They then tend to move into clerical and service-sector jobs in downtown business districts. Many of these jobs require a high school diploma. As a result, though they enter the labor market somewhat later than young males in La Barriada, they have better prospects for upward mobility. Yet they still tend to earn less than their less educated counterparts in Hamilton Park.

In our earlier study of crime and employment, we found that, although many young males in each of these neighborhoods are involved in exploratory economic crimes, the blocked access to employment among the minority youths leads to more sustained and prevalent involvement in intensive criminal activities and to periods of probation and incarceration. Census and police statistics generally support our findings concerning the relative involvements of those in the three neighborhoods in schooling, work, and crime.

These career patterns are described as background for understanding the different ranges of responses to early pregnancy within each of the neighborhoods.

SEXUAL ACTIVITY

Before looking at how young males in the three neighborhoods respond to early pregnancy and whether or not they become absent fathers, it is necessary to compare their patterns of early sexual activity and contraceptive use. If we had found substantial differences, we might conclude that differences in becoming fathers at an early age were due to later or less frequent sexual activity or, alternatively, to greater use of contraceptives. In fact, our data show relatively few such differences between the neighborhood groups, although we do find such differences within each group. Almost all those in each group had experienced intercourse by the age of 15, and few had used contraceptives in their first acts of intercourse.

These findings differ somewhat from survey findings that indicate a greater likelihood of early intercourse among blacks than among whites, although Hamilton Park's whites are much poorer than the middle-class whites often sampled in these surveys. In fact, we found in each neighborhood that, from their early teens

on, males are almost entirely outside of adult supervision, except when they are in school, as they frequently are not. They also are encouraged to prove their manhood by sexual adventures and receive little consistent encouragement or instruction in the use of contraceptives.

What our data do suggest, however, is variations within each neighborhood in the use of contraceptives. We first sought out young fathers in each place and subsequently interviewed four or five friends of the fathers who were not themselves fathers. The nonfathers generally began sexual activity as early and heedlessly as the fathers. Some seemed to have avoided becoming fathers through chance, but others reported developing contraceptive practices that prevented their becoming fathers. These practices included some use of condoms but more often involved careful use of withdrawal or a long-term relationship with a partner who used birth-control pills.

RESPONSES TO PREGNANCY

In contrast to this relative lack of difference between the neighborhoods in patterns of early sexual activity and contraception, the ranges of response to early pregnancy differed between the neighborhoods in quite distinctive ways that can be related to differences in culture, class, and social ecology. After the discovery that the partners of these young males had become pregnant, those involved in each community faced a number of choices. The first choice was whether or not the young female should seek an abortion. If not, then it had to be decided whether the young couple should get married and/or establish coresidence and what extent and manner of support and care the young father should be expected to provide for his child. These choices usually involved not just the conceiving young couple but also their parents and even extended families. In this way, individual choices became embedded in the context of the wider neighborhood community and its values and resources.

In all these choices, we found distinctive neighborhood patterns, although a range of choices was apparent within each neighborhood group. These patterns are described separately for each neighborhood. We begin with Projectville, which fits many of the stereotypes of underclass neighborhoods with high rates of out-of-wedlock childbearing by teenage mothers and related high rates of absent fatherhood. We then compare these patterns with Hamilton Park in order to assess the effects of different levels of economic opportunity. Finally, we examine La Barriada, an area that is similar to Projectville in class but different in culture and social ecology.

In Projectville, we found very ambivalent attitudes and behavior concerning the decision to seek abortions or not. Most of the young males reported extreme disapproval of abortion, often calling it murder and saying that they had urged their partners not to abort. Yet the same individuals would often say that their mothers might support abortions for their sisters. Three of them reported that they had been involved in pregnancies that terminated in abortions. In two of these cases, the decision was made by the female and her family, and the males were not involved. In the other case, the abortion was of a second pregnancy. Health statistics, which cover a fairly homogeneous area in this neighborhood, indicate that more than half of all teen pregnancies in Projectville end in abortion.

Attitudes toward marriage as a response to early pregnancy, however, were more uniform. Projectville residents gener-
ally did not encourage immediate marriage or coresidence for young parents. Two couples eventually did marry, though not until over a year after the birth, during which time the father's employment status had improved, in one case because the father had joined the military and had completed basic training. Another marriage occurred when a young mother married another male, not the father of her first child. The other fathers would be classified officially as absent. They neither married, nor, in most cases, did they establish coresidence.

Yet the absence of marriage and coresidence did not mean that they had no further relationships with the mothers and children. Although romantic commitments to the mothers tended to be volatile, most of the fathers reported strong commitments to their children. Their paternity was recognized within the neighborhood. Most eventually also established legal paternity. Further, most provided some measure of care and support, to the extent that they were able. They contributed money, some from employment, usually part-time and/or low-wage, others from criminal activities. Some continued with education and training for a time after the birth, unlike their counterparts in the other neighborhoods. In these cases, the mothers' families saw the young fathers' continued education as being in the best long-term interests of the children. These unmarried young fathers also visited regularly and frequently took the children to their own homes, for weekends or even longer periods of time. Many reported providing direct child care when they were with their children, to a greater extent than fathers in either of the other two neighborhoods.

The only ones who provided no care or support at all for some period of time were those who became heavily involved in crime or drug use and underwent incarceration, including 6 of the 16 at some point. Even these were involved with their children before or after incarceration.

These data were, of course, collected from a self-selected sample of young fathers who were willing to talk with researchers. All also reported that they knew of fathers who had "stepped off," as they put it, from their children. They attributed stepping off in some of these cases to the young fathers' inability to make contributions. Despite the self-selected nature of our sample, however, participation by young, unmarried fathers in informal systems of care and support for their children does seem to be quite common in this neighborhood. Other studies have shown that poor, black, officially absent fathers actually have more contact with and provide more informal support for their children than middle-class, white absent fathers.6

In Hamilton Park, we found quite different patterns of abortion, marriage, coresidence, and support. None of the young males we interviewed expressed strong condemnations of abortion, and several openly supported abortions in cases where the couple was not ready to get married. One of those who had not become a father as a teenager had avoided doing so by encouraging an abortion. Another nonfather said he would "slip her the two hundred dollars" if his partner

became pregnant. Even one of the young fathers and his partner had aborted a first pregnancy and then married after a second pregnancy and before the birth.

Marriage was also more common in this group. Over half the fathers in this group married after conception and before the birth. One married before conception, he being the only one whose child was planned. Marriage also entailed setting up coresidence in apartments of their own. This pattern of family formation has deep roots in working-class tradition. Early sexual activity is a recognized form of risk taking that is often understood to lead to marriage if a pregnancy occurs.

This pattern of family formation is also strongly linked to the traditional working-class career patterns that are still maintained in this neighborhood, despite the recent pressures of economic change that threaten this way of life. Decent jobs are available, through neighborhood and family contacts, that do not depend on educational credentials and that allow young males to establish independent households and support their families. Those who got married found both work and housing through these local channels. These early unions were often troubled, and household arrangements did shift over time. Significantly, the only case of court-ordered child support we encountered in any of the three neighborhoods was among this group of relatively economically advantaged youths.

In La Barriada, young males whose partners became pregnant also faced disappointing economic opportunities. Like their peers in Projectville and unlike some of their peers in Hamilton Park, they had relatively poor chances of being able to find jobs that would allow them to marry and provide full support for their children. Yet culture and social ecology led them to a different set of responses to their predicament.

Their attitudes toward abortion were even more negative than those we discovered in Projectville, yet some of them also had been involved in abortions. One of the nonfathers reported an abortion. In addition, three of the fathers reported abortions of second pregnancies. They said that they still disapproved of abortions but simply could not afford a second child right away. Health statistics for La Barriada and Hamilton Park were not readily comparable to those for Projectville, but statistics for the city as a whole did show the same patterns that we found: among pregnant teens, whites had

Though even less likely than those in Projectville to see abortions as a solution, the young males in La Barriada were far more likely to pursue marriage and co-residence, despite formidable obstacles in the way of their being able to support families. Only 5 of 11 fathers did not marry legally, but 3 of these described themselves as being in common-law marriages and had established co-residence. Common-law partners openly referred to themselves as “husband” and “wife,” unlike the unmarried but still involved couples in Projectville.

One father, a highly religious Pentecostal, married as a virgin at 18, indicating the relatively young age at which even so-called normal marriage and parenting can occur in this group. The others married after conception, either before or after the birth. Marriage entailed co-residence, though usually in the household of one of the young couple’s parents. Most co-resident couples lived with the father’s parents, a distinctive pattern not found in the other neighborhoods and tied to cultural expectations that the father and his family are responsible for the child and mother.

Despite their willingness to marry and establish co-residence, however, these fathers’ prospects for finding jobs that paid enough and were steady enough to allow them to support families remained poor. As a result, they entered the labor market somewhat earlier than those in Projectville, yet with fewer prospects for advancement. All the young fathers ceased attending school after they became fathers, though some later returned to school or training programs. None of them remained in school continuously, as did some of the Projectville fathers.

Structural circumstances also discouraged marriage for some in La Barriada. The mothers and children in the common-law marriages, for example, all received AFDC. Refraining from marriage concealed their unions from scrutiny by the AFDC program.

Even though the young fathers from La Barriada were more likely to marry, their own family backgrounds suggested that the future of these marriages was highly doubtful. Most of them came from families in which the parents had been married, by ceremony or common-law arrangement, yet almost all their own fathers had left the households when they were young children. The departure of their own fathers was usually related to employment difficulties and led to household AFDC enrollment.

Crime and drugs also were involved in the inability of some of these young fathers to support their families. Two were incarcerated at some point and five others had some history of heavy drug use.

None of the officially absent fathers from La Barriada or Projectville had ever been involved in legal child support proceedings. Local child support agencies assigned a low priority to young fathers and especially to young, unemployed fathers. Young fathers who themselves lived with families on AFDC were automatically excluded from child support actions.

\textit{CONCLUSION}

These comparisons of young males in three neighborhoods demonstrate the in-
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Terrelated influences of structural economic factors, culture, and social ecology in shaping processes of family and household formation. The high rates of female-headed and AFDC-receiving households in the two minority neighborhoods are clearly related not only to an overall lack in this region of jobs paying wages that could allow men to assume traditional breadwinning roles but also to social-ecological factors that link the different neighborhoods to the regional labor market in quite different ways. The distinctive range of responses to early pregnancy in each community depends heavily on the resources that are available within that community.

Culture also plays a role in shaping local responses to teenage pregnancy. When cultural values are seen in relation to social ecology, however, they appear not as unchanging, primordial entities but rather as collective responses of people with distinctive group histories to different and changing structural positions in society. Hamilton Park's residents most closely adhere to a long-standing working-class tradition, in which teenage sexual activity is understood to be a risk-taking enterprise that should lead to marriage when pregnancy results. The erosion of well-paying entry-level jobs that have made this way of life possible, however, threatens these understandings as more young men, unable to find such jobs, turn to drugs and away from marriage.

Projectville's residents have known the link between lack of jobs and lack of marriage longer and live with much greater concentrations of joblessness and dependency, yet they have well-defined attitudes toward how to cope with these problems. They put great faith in education, despite its frequently disappointing payoffs in the job market, and they have developed complex ways of supporting children in kin-based networks. Young males play important roles in these networks, which are highly flexible and adaptive to shifting circumstances.

La Barriada's residents are the most recent immigrants and cling tenaciously to a traditional culture even as its assumptions about a male's role in the family clash harshly with the realities of the low-wage labor market and the welfare system.

The influences of structural economic factors, culture, and social ecology on the actions of young men demonstrated in this analysis are not intended as disavowals of individual potential; nor are they intended as claims for an absolute cultural relativism, which would imply that processes of family formation in these neighborhoods, though different from those in the mainstream, are entirely satisfactory for local residents. To the contrary, the relationships between early pregnancy, absent fatherhood, and persistent poverty are quite evident to the residents of these communities. Some individuals in these communities do manage to escape these and other hazards of life in the inner cities. These struggles are particularly evident among Projectville residents, for example, as seen in their perseverance with education and their ambivalence toward abortion.

In none of these communities is any honor given to fathers who do not at least try to support their children. All the accounts we have heard indicate that failure to support one's children is experienced as a loss of manhood. The standards for judging individual fathers are clear within each neighborhood but differ somewhat between the neighborhoods in terms of relative emphasis on immediate cash.

contributions, continued education, marriage, and the provision of child care. The higher rate at which young men in the two minority neighborhoods fail to meet such standards is a function neither of the random occurrence of high rates of pathological individuals in these areas nor of the content of ethnic culture but rather of blocked access to decent jobs.

Social policy that hopes to deal effectively with persistent poverty must move beyond assumptions that uncontrolled sexuality and an undeveloped work ethic are at the root of the problem. Policies and programs must recognize not only the powerful structural economic factors that concentrate poverty and dependency in the inner cities but also the unique ways in which individual communities attempt to reconcile their lack of access to jobs and their universal, human desire to reproduce.

At present, young males in these areas are particularly ill served by the job market, the schools, and the social welfare system. Males must be redefined as important parts of the solution and not merely as the sources of the problem. Some recent innovative efforts have been undertaken. Programs for the prevention of unwanted early pregnancy have begun to include males in their services. Some discussion has also begun concerning ways to alter the child support enforcement system to provide incentives for young fathers to acknowledge paternity. Such incentives could include connecting them to job-training and employment programs, encouraging continued education, recognizing in-kind contributions and not just cash payments, and expanding the amount they could contribute to AFDC households without having their contributions deducted from that household's AFDC budget. In order to be effective, these efforts will need to be part of an overall program of intensive and comprehensive services for inner-city children and adolescents.
Sex Codes and Family Life among Poor Inner-City Youths

By ELIJAH ANDERSON

ABSTRACT: Sexual conduct among poor black inner-city adolescents is resulting in growing numbers of unwed parents. At the same time, many young fathers are strongly committed to their peer groups. They congregate, often boasting of their sexual exploits and deriding conventional family life. These two interconnected realities are born of the extremely difficult socioeconomic situation prevailing in ghetto communities. The lack of family-sustaining jobs or job prospects denies young men the possibility of forming economically self-reliant families, the traditional American mark of manhood. Partially in response, the young men's peer group emphasizes sexual prowess as a mark of manhood, at times including babies as its evidence. A sexual game emerges and becomes elaborated, with girls becoming lured by the boys' often vague but convincing promises of love and marriage. As the girls submit, they often end up pregnant and abandoned, but eligible for a limited but sometimes steady income in the form of welfare, which may allow them to establish their own households and, at times, attract other men, in need of money.
SEXUAL relations and out-of-wedlock pregnancy among poor black inner-city adolescents is a major social problem, yet we know little and understand less about these phenomena. To be sure, many studies deal in whole or in part with the subject, and they offer valuable insights into the dynamic of sexual interaction between youths in the ghetto and other socioeconomically circumscribed settings.1 The wealth of information, however, tends to be fragmented and has led to differing, even contradictory, assessments of the state of such relations. My purpose in this article is to present a holistic account of the situation in the form of an informal ethnographic essay that focuses on actual behavior and the motivation behind it.

To this end, I interviewed some forty people who are personally involved with this issue, including teenage mothers, pregnant teenagers, teenage fathers, and prospective teenage fathers, and grandmothers, grandfathers, sisters, brothers, fathers, and mothers of youthful parents. I conducted those interviews in what could be described as natural settings: on stoops, on trolleys, in respondents' homes, in restaurants, and in other neighborhood places. Through these conversations, my goal was to generate a conceptual essay on the general subject of sex and pregnancy among poor inner-city black young people ranging in age from 15 to 23.

Sexual conduct among poor inner-city black youths is to a large extent the result of the meshing of two opposing drives, that of the boys and that of the girls. For a variety of reasons tied to the socioeconomic situation in which they find themselves, their goals are often diametrically opposed, and sex becomes a contest between them. To many boys, sex is an important symbol of local social status; sexual conquests become so many notches on one's belt. Many of the girls offer sex as a gift in their bargaining for the attentions of a young man. As boys and girls try to use each other to achieve their respective ends, the reality that emerges in the eyes of the participants sometimes approximates their goals, but it often results in frustration and disillusionment and the perpetuation or even worsening of their original situation.

In each sexual encounter, there is generally a winner and a loser. The girls

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have a dream, the boys a desire. The girls dream of being taken off by a Prince Charming who will love them, provide for them, and give them a family. The boys often desire sex without commitment or, if they do impregnate a girl, babies without responsibility for them. It becomes extremely difficult for the boys to see themselves enacting the roles and taking on the responsibilities of conventional fathers and husbands on the basis of the limited employment opportunities available to them. Yet the boy knows what the girl wants and plays the role in order to get her to give him sex. Receptive to his advances, she may think that she is maneuvering him toward a commitment or, even better, that getting pregnant is the nudge the boy needs to marry her and give her the life she wants. What she does not see is that the boy, despite his claims, is often incapable of giving her that life. For, in reality, he has little money, few prospects for gainful employment, and, furthermore, no wish to be tied to a woman who will have any say in what he does, for his loyalty is to his peer group and its norms. Consistent with this, when the girl becomes pregnant, the boy tends to retreat from her, although she, with the help of local social pressure from family and peers, may ultimately succeed in getting him to take some responsibility for the child.

SEX: THE GAME AND THE DREAM

To an inner-city black male youth, the most important people in his life are members of his peer group. They set the standards for his conduct, and it is important for him to live up to those standards, to look good in their eyes. The peer group places a high value on sex, especially what many middle-class people call casual sex. Although the sex may be casual in terms of commitment to the partner, it is usually taken quite seriously as a measure of the boy's worth. Thus a primary goal of the young man is to find as many willing females as possible. The more "pussy" he gets, the more esteem accrues to him. But the young man must not only get "some"; he must also prove he is getting it. Consequently, he usually talks about girls and sex with every other young man who will listen. Because of the implications sex has for local social status and esteem for the young men, there are many of them willing and ready to be regaled by tales of one another's sexual exploits. The conversations include graphic descriptions of the sex act.

The lore of the streets says there is something of a contest going on between the boy and the girl even before they meet. To the young man, the woman becomes, in the most profound sense, a sexual object. Her body and mind become the object of a sexual game, to be won over for the personal aggrandizement of the young man. Status goes to the winner, and sex becomes prized not so much as a testament of love but as testimony of control of another human being. Sex is the prize and sexual conquests are a game, the object of which is to make a fool of the other person, particularly the young woman.

The young men variously describe their successful campaigns as "getting over [the young woman's sexual defenses]." In order to get over, the young man must devise and develop a "game," whose success is gauged by its acceptance by his peers and especially by women. Relying heavily on gaining the confidence of the girl, the game consists of the boy's full presentation of self, including his dress, grooming, looks, dancing ability, and conversation, or "rap."

The rap is the verbal element of the game, whose object is to inspire sexual
interest in the boy. It embodies the whole person and is thus extremely important to the success of the game. Among peer-group members, raps are assessed, evaluated, and divided into weak and strong. The assessment of the young man's rap is, in effect, the evaluation of his whole game. Convincing proof of the effectiveness of one's game is in the "booty": the amount of pussy the young man appears to be getting. Young men who are known to fail with women often face ridicule at the hands of the group, thus having their raps labeled "tissue paper," their games seen as inferior, and their identities discredited.

After developing a game over time, through trial and error, a young man is ever on the lookout for players, young women with whom to try it out and perhaps to perfect it. To find willing players is to gain a certain affirmation of self, though the boy's status in the peer group may go up if he is able to seduce a girl considered to be "choice," "down," or streetwise. When encountering a girl, the boy usually sees a challenge: he attempts to "run his game." Here the girl usually is fully aware that a game is being attempted; however, if the young man's game is sophisticated, or "smooth," or if the girl is very young and inexperienced, she may be easily duped.

In many instances, the game plays on the dream that many inner-city girls evolve from early teenage years. The popular love songs they have listened to, usually from the age of seven or eight, are filled with a wistful air, promising love and ecstasy to someone "just like you." This dream involves having a boyfriend, a fiancé, a husband, and the fairy-tale prospect of living happily ever after in a nice house in a neighborhood with one's children—essentially the dream of the middle-class American life-style, complete with the nuclear family. It is nurtured by a daily involvement with afternoon television soap operas, or "stories," as the women call them. The heroes or heroines of these stories may be white and upper middle class, but for many, these characteristics only make them more attractive as role models. Many girls dream of the role of the comfortable middle-class housewife portrayed on television, even though they see that their peers can only approximate that role.

When approached by a boy, the girl's faith in the dream helps to cloud or obscure her view of the situation. A romantically successful boy has the knack for knowing just what is on a girl's mind, what she wants from life, and how she wants to go about obtaining it. In this regard, he is inclined and may be able to play the character the script calls for. Through his actions, he is able to shape the interaction, calling up those resources needed to play the game successfully. He fits himself to be the man she wants him to be, but this identity may be exaggerated and only temporary, until he gets what he wants. He shows her the side of himself that he knows she wants to see, that represents what she wants in a man. For instance, the young man will sometimes "walk through the woods" with the girl: he might visit at her home and go to church with her family, showing that he is an "upstanding young man." But all of this may only be part of his game, and after he gets what he wants, he may cast down this part of his presentation and reveal something of his true self, as he reverts to those actions and behavior more characteristic of his everyday life, those centered around his peer group.

In these circumstances, the girl may see but refuse to accept evidence of the boy's duplicity. She may find herself at times defending the young man to her
friends and family who question her choice of a boyfriend. In those cases in which the male is successful, the young woman may know she is being played, but, given the effectiveness of his game, his rap, his presentation of self, his looks, his wit, his dancing ability, and his general popularity in the peer group, infatuation often rules. Many a girl fervently hopes that her boy is the one that is different, while some boys are very good actors and can be extremely persuasive.

In addition, the girl's peer group supports her pursuit of the dream, implicitly upholding her belief in the young man's good faith. But it is clear that the goals and interests of the girl and the boy often diverge. While many girls want to pursue the dream, the boy, for the immediate future, is generally not interested in "playing house," as his peer-group members derisively refer to domestic life.

While pursuing his game, the boy often feigns love and caring, pretending to be a dream man and acting toward the girl as though he has the best intentions. Ironically, in many cases, the young man does indeed have the best intentions. He may experience profound ambivalence on this score, mainly because of the way such intentions appear to relate to or conflict with the values of the peer group. At times, these values are placed in sharp focus by his own deviance from them, as he incurs sanctions for allowing a girl to "rule" him or gains positive reinforcement for keeping her in line. The peer group sanctions its members with demeaning labels such as "pussy," "pussy-whipped," or "househusband," causing them to posture in manners that clearly distance themselves from such characterizations.

At times, however, some boys earnestly attempt to enact the role of the "dream man," one with honorable intentions of "doing right" by the young woman, of marrying her and living happily ever after, according to their versions of middle-class norms of propriety. But the reality of the poor employment situation for young black males of the inner city makes it extremely difficult for many to follow through on such intentions.  

Unable to realize himself as the young woman's provider in the American middle-class tradition, which the peer group often labels "square," the young man may become ever more committed to his game. With ambivalence, many young men will go so far as to "make plans" with the women, including house shopping and window shopping for items for the prospective household. A 23-year-old female informant who at 17 became a single parent of a baby girl said the following:

Yeah, they'll [boys will] take you out. Walk you down to Center City, movies, window shop (laughs). They point in the window, "Yeah, I'm gonna get this. Wouldn't you like this? Look at that nice livin' room set." Then they want to take you to his house, go to his room: "Let's go over to my house, watch some TV." Next thing you know your clothes is off and you in bed havin' sex, you know.

Such shopping trips carry with them important psychological implications for the relationship, at times serving as a kind of salve that heals wounds and erases doubt about the young man's intentions. The young woman may report to her

parents or to her friends on her latest date or shopping trip, indicating the type of furniture looked at and priced and the supposed terms of payment. She continues to have hope, which he supports by "going" with her, letting her and others know that she is his "steady," though in order for him to maintain a certain status within his peer group, she should not be his only known girl.

Such actions indicate a certain level of involvement on the part of the couple, particularly the young man. For him, the making of plans and the successive shopping trips may simply be elements of his game and often nothing more than a stalling device he uses to keep the girl hanging on so that he may continue to have the benefit of her sexual favors.

In many cases, the more he seems to exploit the young woman, the higher his status within the peer group. But to consolidate this status, he feels moved at times to show others that he is in control. There may be a contest of wills between the two, with arguments and fights developing in public places over what may appear to be the most trivial of issues. In order to prove his dominance in the relationship unequivocally, he may "break her down" in front of her friends and his, "showing the world who is boss." If the young woman wants him badly enough, she will meekly go along with the performance for the implicit promise of his continued attentions, if not love. Again, a more permanent relationship approximating the woman's dream of matrimony and domestic tranquility is often what is at stake in her mind.

As the contest continues, and the girl hangs on, she may be believed to have been taken in by the boy's game but particularly by his convincing rap, his claims of commitment to her and her well-being. In this contest, anything is fair. The girl may become manipulative and aggressive, or the boy may lie, cheat, or otherwise misrepresent himself to obtain or retain the sexual favors of the girl. In many of the sexual encounters related by informants, one person is seen as a winner, the other as a loser. As one informant said:

They trickin' them good. Either the woman is trickin' the man, or the man is trickin' the woman. Good! They got a trick. She's thinkin' it's [the relationship is] one thing, he playing another game, you know. He thinkin' she alright, and she doing something else.

In the social atmosphere of the peer group, the quality of the boy's game tends to emerge as a central issue. In addition, whatever lingering ambivalence he has about his commitment to the role of husband and provider may be resolved in favor of peer-group status, which becomes more clearly at stake in his mind.

In pursuing his game, the young man often uses a supporting cast of other women, at times playing one off against the other. For example, he may orchestrate a situation in which he is seen with another woman. Alternatively, secure in the knowledge that he has other women to fall back on, he might start a fight with his steady in order to upset her sense of complacency, thus creating a certain amount of dynamic tension within the relationship, which he tries to use for his own advantage. The result is that the young woman can begin to doubt her hold on the man, which can in turn bring about a precipitous drop in her self-esteem.

In these circumstances, the boy may take pride in the fool he thinks he is making of the girl, and, when he is confident of his dominance, he may work to "play" the young woman, "running his game," making her "love" him. Some young men, in such instances, will brag
that they are “playing her like a fiddle,” meaning that they are in full control of the situation. The object here, for the young man, is to prove he “has the girl’s nose open,” that she is sick with love for him. His goal is to maneuver her into a state of blissful emotionality with regard to himself, showing that she, and not he, is clearly the “weak” member in the relationship.

Strikingly, it is in these circumstances that the young girl may well become careless about birth control, which is seen by the community, especially the males, as being her responsibility. Depending upon the effectiveness of the boy’s game, she may believe his rap, becoming convinced that he means what he has said about taking care of her, that her welfare is his primary concern. Moreover, she wants desperately to believe that if she becomes pregnant, he will marry her or at least be obligated to her in a way he is not to others he has been “messing with.” Perhaps all he needs is a little nudge.

In these circumstances, however, the girl thinks little of the job market and job prospects for the boy. She underestimates peer-group influences and the effect of other “ladies” she knows or at least strongly suspects are in his life. She is in love, and she is sure that a child and the profound obligation a child implies will make such a strong bond that all the other issues will go away. Her thinking is clouded by the prospect of winning at the game of love. Becoming pregnant can be a way to fulfill an old but persistent dream of happiness and bliss. Moreover, for the young woman, becoming pregnant can become an important part of the competition for the attentions or even delayed affection of a young man, a profound if socially shortsighted way of making claim on him.

THE ISSUE OF PREGNANCY

Up to the point of pregnancy, given the norms of his peer group with regard to male and female relations, the young man could be characterized as simply messing around. The fact of pregnancy brings a sudden sense of realism to the relationship between the young man and the young woman. Life-altering events have occurred. The situation is usually perceived as utterly serious. She is pregnant, and he could be held legally responsible for the long-term financial support of the child. In addition, if the young couple were unclear about their intentions before, things now may crystallize. She may now consider him seriously as a mate. Priorities may now begin to emerge in the boy’s mind. He has to make a decision whether to claim the child as his or to shun the woman who for so long has been the object of his affections, often for reasons of peer-group concerns.

To own up to such a pregnancy is to go against the peer-group ethic of “hit and run.” Other values at risk of being flouted by such an action include the subordination of women and freedom from formal conjugal ties, and in this environment, where hard economic times are a fact of daily life for many, some young men are not interested in “taking care of somebody else,” when to do so means having less. In this social context of persistent poverty, young men have come to devalue the conventional marital relationship, easily viewing women as a burden and children
as even more so. Moreover, with regard to such relationships, a young man wants "to come as I want and go as I please," thus meeting important peer-group values of freedom and independence. Accordingly, from the perspective of the peer group, any such male-female relationship should be on the man's terms. Thus in coming to an understanding of the boy's relationship with the girl, his attitudes toward his limited financial ability and his need for personal independence and freedom should not be underestimated.

Another important attitude of the male peer group is that most girls are whores: "If she was fucking you, then she was fucking everybody else." Whether there is truth to this with respect to a particular case, a common working conception says it is true about young women in general. It is a view with which so many young men approach females, relegating them to a situation of social and moral deficit. The proverbial double standard is, k, and for any amount of sexual activity, the women are more easily discarded than the men.

Therefore, among the young men and women there is a fair amount of sexual activity. In this social atmosphere, ambiguity of paternity complicates many pregnancies. Moreover, in self-defense, the young man often chooses to deny fatherhood; few are willing to "own up" to a pregnancy they can reasonably question. Among their peers, the young men gain ready support. Peer-group norms say that a man who is "tagged" with fatherhood has been caught up in the "trick bag." The boy's first desire, though he may know better, is often to attribute the pregnancy to someone else.

In these general circumstances, the boy may be genuinely confused and uncertain about his role in the pregnancy, feeling a great deal of ambivalence and apprehension over his impending fatherhood. If he admits paternity and "does right" by the girl, his peer group likely will negatively label him a chump, a square, or a fool. If he does not, however, there are few social sanctions applied, and he may even be given points for his stand, with his peers viewing him as fooling the mother and "getting over," or avoiding the trick bag. But here there may also be some ambivalence, for there is a certain regard to be obtained by those of the group who father children out of wedlock, as long as they are not "caught" and made financially responsible to support a family on something other than their own terms. Hence, the boy, in these circumstances, may give, and benefit socially from, mixed messages: one to the girl and perhaps the authorities, and another to his peer group.

Generally, to resolve his ambivalence and apprehension, the boy might at this point attempt to discontinue his relationship with the expectant mother, particularly as she begins to show clear physical signs of pregnancy.

Upon giving birth, the young woman wants badly to identify the father of her child, if primarily at the insistence of her family and for her own peace of mind. When the baby is born, she may, out of desperation, arbitrarily designate a likely young man as the father. As mentioned, there may be genuine ambiguity surrounding the identity of the father. In this atmosphere, there are often charges and countercharges, with the appointed young man usually easing himself from the picture over time. There is at times an incentive for the young woman not to identify the father even though she and the local community know whose baby it is. Given that job prospects for young black men are so limited as to be effectively nil, the woman may be better off denying that she knows the father, for a check
from the welfare office is much more dependable than the irregular support payments of a sporadically employed youth.

To be sure, there are many young men who are determined to do right by the young woman, to try out the role of husband and father, often acceding to the woman's view of the matter and working to establish a family. Such young men tend to be those who are only marginally related to their peer groups. They tend to emerge from nurturing families, and religious observance plays an important role in their lives. Strikingly, these men are usually gainfully employed and tend to enjoy a deep and abiding relationship with the young woman that is able to withstand the trauma of youthful pregnancy.

Barring such a resolution, a young man may rationalize his marital situation as something of a "trap" into which the woman tricked him. This viewpoint may be seen as his attempt to make simultaneous claims on values of the peer group as well as those of the more conventional society. As another young man said in an interview:

My wife done that to me. Before we got married, when we had our first baby, she thought, well, hey, if she had the baby, then she got me, you know. And that's the way she done me. [She] thought that's gon' trap me. That I'm all hers after she done have this baby. So, a lot of women, they think like that. Now, I was the type of guy, if I know it was my baby, I'm taking care of my baby. My o'lady [wife], she knew that. She knewed that anything that was mine, I'm taking care of mine. This is why she probably wouldn't mess around or nothing, 'cause she wanted to lock me up.

In general, however, persuading the youth to become "an honest man" is not at all simple. It is often a very complicated social affair involving cajoling, social pressure, and, at times, physical threats. An important factor in determining whether the boy does right by the girl is the presence of the girl's father in the home. When a couple first begins to date, some fathers will "sit the boy down" and have a ritual talk; some single mothers will play this role as well, at times more aggressively than fathers. Certain males with domineering dispositions will, "as a man," make unmistakable territorial claims on the dwelling, informing or reminding the boy that "this is my house, I pay the bills here," and that all activities occurring under its roof are his singular business. In such a household, the home has a certain defense. At issue here essentially are male turf rights, a principle intuitively understood by the young suitor and the father of the girl. The boy may feel a certain frustration due to a felt need to balance his desire to run his game against his fear of the girl's father. Yet, the boy is often able to identify respectfully with the father, thinking of how he himself might behave if the shoe were on the other foot.

Upon encountering each other, both "know something," that is, they know that each has a position to defend. The young boy knows in advance of a pregnancy that he will have to answer to the girl's father and the family unit more generally. If the girl becomes pregnant, the boy will be less likely to treat the situation summarily and leave her. Further, if the girl has brothers at home who are her approximate age or older, they, too, may serve to influence the behavior of the boy effectively. Such men, as well as uncles and male cousins, possess not only a certain degree of moral authority in these circumstances but often the believable threat of violence and mayhem in

3. See Williams and Kornblum, Growing up Poor.
many cases. As one boy said in an interview:

The boys kinda watch theyself more [when a father is present]. Yeah, there's a lot of that going on. The daddy, they'll clown [act out violence] about them young girls. They'll hurt somebody about they daughters. Other relatives, too. They'll all get into it. The boy know they don't want him messing over they sister. That guy will probably take care of that girl better than the average one out there in the street.

In such circumstances, not only does the boy think twice about running his game, but the girl often thinks twice about allowing him to do so.

A related important defense against youthful pregnancy is the conventional inner-city family unit. Two parents, together with the extended network of cousins, aunts, uncles, grandparents, nieces, and nephews, can form a durable team, a viable supportive unit engaged to fight in a most committed manner the various problems confronting so many inner-city teenagers, including drugs, crime, pregnancy, and social mobility. This unit, when it does survive, tends to be equipped with a survivor's mentality. It has weathered a good many storms, which have given it wisdom and a certain strength. The parents are known in the community as "strict" with their children; they impose curfews and tight supervision, demanding to know their children's whereabouts at all times. Determined that their children not become casualties of the inner-city environment, these parents scrutinize their children's friends and associates carefully, rejecting those who seem to be "no good" and encouraging others who seem to be on their way to "amount to something."

In contrast, in those domestic situations in which there is but one adult—say, a woman with two or three teenage daughters and with no male presence—the dwelling may be viewed by young boys, superficially at least, as essentially an unprotected nest. The local boys will sometimes become attracted to the home as a challenge, just to test it out, to see if they can "get over," or be successful in charming or seducing the women who reside there. In such settings, a man, the figure the boys are prepared to respect, is not there to keep them in line. The girls residing in these unprotected situations may become pregnant more quickly than those living in situations more closely resembling nuclear families. A young male informant had the following comment:

I done seen where four girls grow up under their mama. The mama turn around and she got a job between 3 p.m. and 11 p.m. These little kids, now they grow up like this. Mama working 3 to 11 o'clock at night. They kinda raise theyself. What they know? By the time they get 13 or 14, they trying everything under the sun. And they ain't got nobody to stop 'em. Mama gone. Can't nobody else tell 'em what to do. Hey, all of 'em pregnant by age 16. And they do it 'cause they wanna get out on their own. They then can get their own baby, they get their own [welfare] check, they get their own apartment. They want to get away from mama. They really want to be grown.

As indicated in the foregoing statement, a woman may have an overwhelming desire to grow up, a passage best expressed by her ability to "get out on her own." In terms of traditional inner-city poverty experience, this means setting up
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one's own household, preferably with a "good man" through marriage and family. As indicated previously, some single young women may attempt to accomplish this by purposely becoming pregnant, perhaps hoping the baby's father will marry her and help to realize her dream of domestic respectability. At the same time, there are an undetermined number of young women, unimpressed with the lot of young single men, who wish to establish their households on their own, without the help or the burden of a man. It has become increasingly socially acceptable for a young woman to have children out of wedlock—significantly, with the help of a regular welfare check.

Because the woman emerges from such poor financial circumstances, the prospect of a regular welfare check can seem like an improvement. In this way, the social situation of persistent poverty affects norms of the ghetto culture such as the high value placed on children, thus having a significant impact on decisions to bear children. Hence, among many young poor ghetto women, babies have become a sought-after symbol of status, of passage to adulthood, of being a "grown" woman. In such circumstances, babies can become valued emblems of womanhood. Moreover, it is not always a question of whether the young girl is going to have children, but when. Thus, given the young woman's limited social and financial outlook, she may see herself as having little to lose by becoming pregnant and, coinciding with the culturally reinforced perception, as having something to gain.

The reality of pregnancy, however, is often a bitter pill. As previously indicated, as the girl begins to show signs of pregnancy, becoming physically bigger, she often loses the connection with her mate, although she may gain the affirmation and support of other women who have followed the same path as she.

In their small, intimate social groups, women discuss their afternoon stories, or soap operas, men, children, and social life, and they welcome prospective members to their generally supportive gatherings. Interestingly, although the women tend to deride the men for their behavior, especially their lack of commitment to their girlfriends, at the same time they may accommodate such behavior, viewing it as characteristic of men in their environment. Yet, in their conversations, the women may draw distinctions between "the nothin'" and the "good man." The nothin' is "a man who is out to use every woman he can for himself. He's somethin' like a pimp. Don't care 'bout nobody but himself." As one older single mother, who now considers herself wiser, said in an interview:

I know the difference now between a nothin' and a good man. I can see. I can smell him. I can tell nothings from the real thingi can just look at a guy sometimes, you know. The way he carries himself. The way he acts, the way he talks. I can tell the bullshitter. Like, you know, "What's up, baby?" You know. "What's you want to do?" A nice guy wouldn't say, "What's up, baby? What's goin' on?" Actin' all familiar, tryin' to give me that line. Saying, "You wanna joint? You wan' some blow? You wan' some 'caine?" Hollerin' in the street, you know. I can tell 'em. I can just smell 'em.

The good man is one who is considerate of his mate and provides for her and her children, but at the same time he may run the risk of being seen as a pussy in the eyes.
of the women as well as his peer group. This inversion in the idea of the good man underscores the ambivalent position of the girls squeezed between their middle-class dreams and the ghetto reality. As one woman said with a laugh, "There are so many sides to the bad man. We see that, especially in this community. We see more bad men than we do good. I see them [inner-city black girls] running over that man if he's a wimp, ha-ha."

Family support is often available for the young pregnant woman, though members of her family are likely to remind her from time to time that she is "messed up." She looks forward to the day when she is "straight" again, meaning a time when she has given birth to the baby and has regained her figure. Her comments to others who are not pregnant tend to center wistfully on better days when she was not messed up. As her boyfriend stops seeing her so regularly, she may readily attribute this to the family's negative comments about the boy, but also to her pregnant state, saying time and again that when "I get straight, he'll be sorry; he'll be jealous then." She knows in a sense that her pregnant status is devalued by her family as well as her single peers, who have the freedom to date and otherwise consort with men. She may long for the day when she will be able to do that again.

When the baby arrives, however, the girl finds that her social activities continue to be significantly curtailed. She is often surprised by how much time being a mother actually takes. In realizing her new identity, she may very consciously assume the demeanor and manner of a grown woman, emphasizing her freedom in social relations, her independence. At times, during what is really a period of adjustment to a new status, she has to set her mother straight about "telling me what to do." This is usually a time when other family members go through a learning process as they become used to the young woman's new status, which she tries on with a variety of stops and starts. In fact, she really is involved in the process of growing up.

Frustrated by the continued curtailment of her social activities, especially as she becomes physically straight again, the girl may develop an intense desire to get back into the dating game. Accordingly, she may foist her child-care responsibilities onto her mother and female siblings, people who initially are eager to take on such roles. In time, however, they tire, and otherwise extremely supportive relations can become strained. In an effort to see her daughter get straight again, the young woman's mother, often in her mid-thirties or early forties, may simply informally adopt the baby as another one of her own, in some cases completely usurping the role of mother from her daughter. In this way, the young parent's mother may attempt to minimize the deviance the girl displayed by getting pregnant while simultaneously taking genuine pride in her new grandchild.

OF MEN AND WOMEN, MOTHERS ANDsons

The relationship between the young man and woman undergoes a basic change during pregnancy; once the baby is born, he or she draws in other social forces, most notably the families of the couple. The role of the girl's family has been discussed. The role of the boy's family is also important, but in a different way. There is often a special bond between a mother and her grown son in the community that effectively competes with the claims of his girlfriend. The way in which this situation is resolved has important
consequences for the family and its relationship to the social structure of the community.

In numerous cases of teenage pregnancy among the poor, the mother of the boy plays a significant role, while the role of the father, if he is present at all, is often understated. Depending on the personality of the woman, her practical experience in such matters, and the girl's family situation, the mother’s role may be understated or explicit. At times she becomes quite involved with the young woman, forming a maternal bond that becomes truly motherly, involving guidance, protection, and control of the young woman.

From the moment the mother finds out that the young woman is pregnant, an important issue is whether she knows the girl or not. If the young woman “means something” to her son, she is likely to know her or at least know about her; her son has spoken of the girl. On hearing the news of the pregnancy, the mother's reaction might be anything from disbelief that her son could be responsible to certainty, even before seeing the child, that her son is the father. If she knows something about the girl's character, she is in a position to make a judgment for herself. Here her relationship with the girl before “all this” happened comes into play, for if she liked her, there is a great chance the boy's mother will side with her. The mother may even go so far as to engage in playful collusion against her son, a man, to get him to do right by the girl. Here, it must be remembered that in this economically circumscribed social context, particularly from a woman's point of view, many men are known not to do right by their women and children. To visit such inner-city settings is to observe what appears to be a proliferation of small children and women, with fathers and husbands largely absent or playing their roles part-time. These considerations help to place in some context the significance of the mother's role in determining how successful the girl will be in having the boy claim and take some responsibility for her child.

For in this role, the mother is usually constrained, at least initially, because she is often unsure whether her son has actually fathered the child. She may, however, be careful about showing her doubt, thinking that when the baby arrives, she will be able to tell “in a minute” whether her son is the father. Thus during the pregnancy, the mother of the young man nervously waits, wondering whether her son will be blamed for a pregnancy not of his doing or whether she will really be a grandmother. In fact, the whole family, both the boy's and the girl's, is often an extended family-in-waiting, socially organized around the idea that the “truth” will be told when the baby arrives. Unless the parties are very sure, marriage, if agreed to at all, may be held off until after the birth of the baby.

When the baby arrives, real plans may be carried out, but often on the condition that the child passes familial inspection. The young man himself, the presumed father, generally lays low in the weeks after the baby's birth. He usually does not visit the baby's mother in the hospital on a regular basis; he may come only once, if at all. In an effort to make a paternal connection between the child and father, some mothers name the baby after the father, but, by itself, this strategy is seldom effective.

In a number of cases of doubtful paternity, the boy's mother, sister, aunt, or other female relatives or close family friends may form informal visiting committees, charged with going to see the baby, although sometimes the baby is brought to them. This kind of familial
inspection is often surreptitious and usually takes place without the acknowledgment of the girl or her own family. The visiting committee may even go by the girl's house in shifts, with a sister going now, the mother another time, and a friend still another. Social pleasantries notwithstanding, the object is always the same: to see if the baby "belongs" to the boy: it is said to. Typically, after such visits, these women will compare notes, commenting on the baby's features, saying whom the baby favors. Some will blurt right out, "Ain't no way that's John's baby." People may disagree, and a dispute may ensue. In the community, the identity of the baby's father becomes a hot topic of conversation. The viewpoints have much to do with who the girl is, whether she is a "good girl" or "bad girl" or whether she has been accepted and taken in by the boy's family. If the girl is well integrated into the family, doubts about paternity may even be slowly put to rest with nothing more being said about it.

As previously indicated, the word carrying the most weight in this situation, however, is often that of the boy's mother. The following account of a young man is relevant:

I had a lady telling me that she had to check out a baby that was supposed to be her grandbaby. She said she had a young girl that was trying to put a baby on her son, so she said she fixing to take the baby and see what blood type the baby is to match it with her son to see if he the daddy. 'Cause she said she know he wasn't the daddy. And she told the girl that, but the girl was steady trying to stick the baby on her son. She had checked out the baby's features and everything. She knowed that the blood type wasn't gon' match or nothing. So, the young girl just left 'em alone.

If the child very clearly physically favors the alleged father, there may be strong pressure for the boy to claim the child and approach the attendant responsibilities. This may take a year or more, as the resemblance may not be initially so apparent. But when others begin to make comments such as, "Lil' Tommy look like Maurice just spit him out [is his spitting image]," the boy's mother may informally adopt the child into her extended family and signal for all other family members to do the same. She may see the child on a regular basis and develop a special relationship with the child's mother. Because of the social acknowledgment by the boy's mother of her son's paternity, the boy himself is bound to accept the child as his own. Even if he does not claim the child legally, in the face of the evidence he will often claim the child in the sense of "having something to do with him." As one informant said:

If the baby look just like him, he should admit to hisself that that's his. Some guys have to wait 'til the baby grow up a little to see if the baby gon' look like him Tore they finally realize that was his's. Because yours should look like you, you know, should have your features and image.

Here the young man informally acknowledging paternity may feel that pressure to "take care of his own."

But due to his limited employment and general lack of money, he "can only do what he can" for his child. In such circumstances, many young men will enact the role of the part-time father. In self-consciously attempting to fulfill this role, the young man may be spied on streets of the inner-city community with a box of "Pampers," the name used as a generic term to refer to all disposable diapers, or cans of Similac, liquid baby formula, in his arms, on his way to see his child and its mother. As the child ages, a bond may develop, as the young man
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may take the child, if it is a boy, for a haircut or shopping for shoes or clothes. He may give the woman token amounts of money. Such support symbolizes a father providing for his child. In fact, however, the support often comes only sporadically and, importantly, in exchange for the woman's favors, be they social or sexual. The woman's support may thus depend upon the largess of the young man and may function as a means of her control.

When and if the woman "gets papers" on the man, or legalizes his relationship to the child, she may sue for regular support, what people of the community call "going downtown on him." If her case is successful, the young man's personal involvement in the making of support payments to the child may be eliminated: his child support payments may be simply deducted from his salary, if he has one. Sometimes the incentive for getting papers may emerge in the young woman's mind when and if the young man obtains a "good job," particularly one with a major institution that includes family benefits. While sporadically employed, the youth may have had no problem with papers, but when he obtains a good job, he may be served with a summons. In some cases, particularly if the young man has two or three children out of wedlock by two or three different women, young men lose the incentive to work at such good jobs when to do so only ensures that much of their pay will go to someone else. In the case of one of my informants, after the mothers of his four children got papers on him and he began to see less and less of his money, he quit his job and returned to the street corner.

There are conditions under which the male peer group will exert pressure on one of its members to admit paternity. Most important is that there be no ambiguity in the group members' own minds as to the baby's father. This is established on the basis of the baby's features. When it is clear that the baby resembles a peer-group member, the others may strongly urge him to claim it and go on to help the mother financially. If the young man fails to claim the baby, group members may do it themselves \( \text{``publicly associating him with the child, at times teasing him about his connection with the mother and his failure to take care of what is his''} \), as one informant said:

My partner's [friend's] girlfriend came up pregnant. And she say it's his, but he not sure. He waitin' on the baby, waitin' to see if the baby look like him. I tell him, "Man, if that baby look just like you, then it was yours! Ha-ha." He just kinda like just waitin'. He ain't claimin' naw, saying the baby ain't his. I keep tellin' him, "If that baby come out looking just like you, then it gon be yours, partner." And there [on the corner] all of 'em will tell him, "Man, that's yo' baby." They'll tell him.

While the peer group may urge its members to take care of their babies, they stop short of urging them to marry the mothers. In general, young men are assumed not to care about raising a family or being a part of one. Some of this lack of support for marriage is due to the poor employment prospects, but it also may have to do with the general distrust they have of women. As my informant continued:

They don't even trust her that they were the only one she was dealing with. That's a lot of it. But the boys just be gettin' away from it [the value of a family] a whole lot. They don't want to get tied down by talkin' about playing house, ha-ha, what they call it nowadays, ha-ha. Yeah, ha-ha, they saying they ain't playing house.
In a great number of cases, peer group or no, the boy will send the girl on her way even if she is carrying a baby he knows is his own. The young man very often lacks a deep feeling for a female and children as a family unit. He often does not want to put up with married life, which he sees as life with a woman who will have something to say about how he spends his time. This emphasis on "freedom" is generated and supported in large part by the peer group itself. Even if a man agrees to marriage, it is usually considered to be only a trial. After a few months, many young husbands have had enough.

This desire for freedom, which the peer group so successfully nurtures, is deeply rooted in the boys. It is, in fact, often nothing less than the desire to perpetuate the situation they had in their mothers' homes. A son is generally well bonded to his mother, something the mother tends to encourage from birth. It may be at sons, particularly the eldest, are groomed in this way to function as surrogate husbands because of the commonly high rate of family dissolution among poor blacks.7

With respect to family life, so many young boys really want what they consider an optimal social situation. In the words of peer-group members, they want it all: they want a "main squeeze," or a steady and reliable female partner who mimics the role played by their mothers in their original families, a woman who will cook, clean, and generally serve them with few questions about the "ladies" they may be seeing and even less to say about their male friends. The young man has grown accustomed to the good home-cooked meals, the secure company of his family in which his father was largely absent and thus unable to tell him what to do. He was his own boss, essentially raising himself, with the help of his peer group and perhaps any adult who would listen but not interfere. Many of the young men have very fond memories of the situation in which they grew up. For an undetermined number, such a life is too much to give up in exchange for the "problems of being tied down to one lady, kids, bills, and all that." In this sense, the young man's home situation with his mother competes quite effectively with the household he envisions with a woman whom he does not fully trust and whom his peer group is fully prepared to discredit.

Now that he is grown, the young man wants what he had growing up plus a number of ladies on the side. At the same time, he wants his male friends, whom he is required to impress in ways that may be inconsistent with being a good family man. As the young men from the start have little faith in marriage, little things can inspire them to retreat to their mothers or other families they may have left behind. Some men spend their time going back and forth between two families; if their marriage seems not to be working, they may easily ditch it and their wife, although perhaps keeping up with the children. At all times, they must show others that they run the family, that they "wear the pants." This is the cause of many of the domestic fights in the ghetto. When there is a question of authority, the domestic situation may run into serious trouble, often resulting in the young man's abandoning the idea of marriage or of "dealing" with only one woman. To "hook up" with a woman, to marry her, is

to give her license to have something to say about what "you're doing, or where you're going, or where you been." For many young men, such involvement on the woman's part is simply unacceptable.

In endeavoring to have it all, many men become, in effect, part-time fathers and part-time husbands, seeing women and children on their own terms, when they have the time, and making symbolic purchases for the children. In theory, the part-time father is able to retain his freedom while having limited commitment to the woman and the little ones "calling me daddy." In many instances, the man does not mind putting up with the children, given his generally limited role in child rearing, but he does mind putting up with the woman, who is seen as a significant threat to his freedom, as someone with a say in how he runs his life. As one informant commented about marriage:

Naw, they [young men] getting away from that. They ain't going in for that 'cause they want to be free. Now, see, I ended up getting married. I got a whole lot of boys ducking that. Unless this is managed, it ain't no good. My wife cleans, takes care o' the house. You got a lot of guys, they don't want to be cleanin' no house, and do the things you got to do in the house. You need a girl there to do it. If you get one, she'll slow you down. The guys don't want it.

Unless a man would be able to handle his wife so that she would put few constraints on him, he may reason that he had better stay away from marriage. But as indicated earlier, with a generalized sense of increasing independence from men, financial and other, there may be fewer women who allow themselves to be so handled.

As jobs become increasingly scarce for young black men, their roles as breadwinners and traditional husbands decline. The notion is that with money comes a certain control and say in the domestic situation. Without money or jobs, many men are increasingly unable to "play house" to their own satisfaction. It is much easier and more fun, some say, to stay home and "take care of mama," when taking care consists of "giving her some change for room and board," eating good food when possible, and being able "to come as I want to and to go as I please." Given the present state of the economy and the way in which the economy affects the employment situation of young black men, such an assessment of their domestic outlook appears in many respects adaptive. The peer group, largely with poor employment prospects, has nurtured and supported the idea of freedom and independence from family life, in which one would have to face bills and a woman having a say in one's affairs. From an economic and social standpoint, it seems very attractive for the young man to stay home with mama, to maintain his freedom, and to have a string of ladies, some of whom contribute to his financial support.

CONCLUSION: SEX, POVERTY, AND FAMILY LIFE

In conclusion, the basic factors at work here are youth, ignorance, the receptivity of the culture to babies, and the young male's resort to proving his manhood through sexual conquests that often result in pregnancies. These factors are exacerbated by the impact of present economic conditions and persistent poverty on the inner-city community.

In the present hard economic times, a primary concern of many inner-city residents is to get along financially as best they can. In the poorest communities, the primary sources of money include low-paying jobs, crime, including drugs, and
public assistance. Some of the most desperate people devise a variety of confidence games, the object of which is to separate others from their money. A number of men, married and single, incorporate their sexual lives into their more generalized efforts at economic survival. Many will seek to “pull” a woman with children on welfare mainly because she usually has a special need for male company, time on her hands, and a steady income. As they work to establish their relationships, they play roles not unlike the roles played in the young male’s game to get over sexually with a female. There is simply a more clear economic nexus in many of these cases, for when the woman receives her check from the welfare department or money from other sources, she may find herself giving up a part of it just to obtain or retain male company and interest.

The economic noose constricting so much of ghetto life encourages both men and women to attempt to extract maximum personal benefit from sexual relationships. The dreams of the middle-class lifestyle nurtured by young inner-city women become thwarted in the face of the harsh socioeconomic realities of the ghetto. Young men without job prospects cling to the support offered by their peer groups and their mothers and shy from lasting relationships with girlfriends. In this situation, girls and boys alike scramble to take what they can from each other, trusting not in each other but often in their own ability to trick the other into giving them something that will establish or perpetuate their version of the good life, the best life they feel they can put together for themselves in the inner-city social environment.

It is important to remember the age of the people we are talking about; these are kids—mainly 15, 16, and 17 years old. Their bodies are mature, but they are emotionally immature. These girls and boys often do not have a very clear notion of the long-term consequences of their behavior, and they have few trustworthy role models who might instruct them.

The basic sexual codes of inner-city youths may not differ fundamentally from those expressed by young people of other social settings. But the social, economic, and personal consequences of adolescent sexual conduct vary profoundly for different social classes. Like adolescents of all classes, inner-city youths are subject to intense, hard-to-control urges and impulsiveness. Sexual relations, exploitative and otherwise, are common among middle-class teenagers as well, but middle-class youths take a strong interest in their future and know what a pregnancy can do to derail that future. In contrast, the ghetto adolescent sees no future to derail, no hope for a tomorrow very different from today, hence, little to lose by having an out-of-wedlock child.

Another difference between middle-class and poor youths is their level of practical education. The ignorance of inner-city girls about their bodies is startling to the middle-class observer. Many have only an abstract notion of where babies come from and generally know nothing about birth control until after the birth of their first child, and sometimes not even then. Parents in this culture are extremely reticent about discussing sex and birth control with their children. Many mothers are ashamed to “talk about it” or feel they are in no position to do so, as they behaved like their daughters when they were young. Education thus becomes a community health problem, but most girls come in contact with community health services only when they become pregnant, sometimes many months into their pregnancies.
Many women in the underclass black culture emerge from a fundamentalist religious orientation and practice a pro-life philosophy. Abortion is therefore usually not an option. New life is sometimes characterized as a “heavenly gift,” an infant is very sacred to the young women, and the extended inner-city family appears always able to make do somehow with another baby. In the community, a birth is usually met with great praise, regardless of its circumstances, and the child is genuinely valued. Such ready social approval works against many efforts to avoid an out-of-wedlock birth.

In fact, in cold economic terms, a baby can be an asset. The severe economic situation in the inner city is without a doubt the single most important factor behind exploitative sex and out-of-wedlock babies. With the dearth of well-paying jobs, public assistance is one of the few reliable sources of money in the community, and, for many, drugs is another. The most desperate people thus feed on one another. In these circumstances, babies and sex are used by some for income; women receive money from welfare for having babies, and men sometimes act as prostitutes to pry the money from the women. The community seems to feed on itself.

The lack of gainful employment opportunities not only keeps the entire community in a pit of poverty, but it also deprives young men of the traditional American way of proving their manhood, namely, supporting a family. They must thus prove their manhood in other ways. Casual sex with as many women as possible, impregnating one or more, and getting them to “have your baby” brings a boy the ultimate in esteem from his peers and makes him a “man.” Casual sex is therefore not so casual but is fraught with social significance for the boy who has little or no hope of achieving financial stability and so can have no sense of himself as caring for a family.

The meshing of these forces can be clearly seen. Adolescents, trapped in poverty, ignorant of the long-term consequences of their behavior but aware of the immediate benefits, engage in a mating game. The girl has her dream of a family and a home, of a good man who will provide for her and her future children. The boy, knowing he cannot be that family man because he has no job and no prospects yet needing to have sex with the girl in order to achieve manhood in the eyes of his peer group, pretends to be the good man and convinces her to give him sex and perhaps a baby. He may then abandon her, and she realizes that he was not the good man after all, but a nothing out to exploit her. The boy has received what he wanted, but the girl learns that she has received something, too. The baby may enable her to receive a certain amount of praise, a steady welfare check, and a measure of independence. Her family often helps out as best they can. As she becomes older and wiser, she can use her income to turn the tables, attracting the interest of her original man or other men.

In this inner-city culture, people generally get married for “love” and “to have something.” This mind-set presupposes a job, the work ethic, and, perhaps most of all, a persistent sense of hope for, if not a modicum of belief in, an economic future. When these social factors are present, the
more wretched elements of the portrait presented here begin to lose their force, slowly becoming neutralized. But for so many of those who are caught up in the web of persistent urban poverty and become unwed mothers and fathers, there is little hope for a good job and even less for a future of conventional family life.
Employment and Marriage among Inner-City Fathers

By MARK TESTA, NAN MARIE ASTONE, MARILYN KROGH, and KATHRYN M. NECKERMAN

ABSTRACT: This article uses data from the Urban Poverty and Family Structure Survey of inner-city residents in Chicago to examine the effect of employment on the likelihood that single fathers marry. Our results show that employed fathers are twice as likely as nonemployed fathers to marry the mother of their first child. These results run contrary to Charles Murray's argument that welfare discourages employed, low-income men from marrying. They are consistent with William Julius Wilson's hypothesis that the rise in male joblessness is linked to the rise in never-married parenthood in the inner city. Our analysis also shows that couples are more likely to marry when the woman is a high school graduate. In this population, the enhanced earnings potential of a woman increases, not decreases, the likelihood of marriage. This result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the closer a woman's earnings potential is to a man's, the less likely the couple is to marry. Neither employment nor education fully accounts for the racial and ethnic differences we observe in the marriage rates of fathers in inner-city Chicago.

Mark Testa, Ph.D. in sociology, is an assistant professor in the School of Social Service Administration at the University of Chicago.
Nan Marie Astone, Ph.D. in sociology, is a postdoctoral fellow at the Institute on Aging and the Center for Demography and Ecology at the University of Wisconsin at Madison.
Marilyn Krogh is a Ph.D. student in the Sociology Department at the University of Chicago.
Kathryn M. Neckerman is a Ph.D. student in the Sociology Department at the University of Chicago.

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SINGLE-MOTHER families are among the most economically vulnerable groups in the United States. They are more likely than other families to be poor, to be dependent on welfare, and to live in inner-city neighborhoods. Their numbers have grown dramatically during the past two decades. Concern over the association between poverty and family structure has led policymakers and researchers to examine the economic and social changes related to the growth in the number of single-mother families.

Of course, for every child of a single mother there is also a father. Yet we know little about the factors leading to single fatherhood in the inner city. A lack of appropriate data has hampered our understanding in several ways. First, there is little detailed fertility and marital data about men. Consequently, fathers are often left out of analyses of one-parent families. Second, researchers often lack sufficient numbers of respondents for whom parenthood precedes marriage. This leads to their focusing on marital separation and divorce—the more typical middle-class experience—rather than on the decisions leading to an out-of-wedlock birth. Third, proportionately fewer whites than blacks have low incomes and live in poor neighborhoods. As a result, it is difficult to distinguish the effects of race from those of class or neighborhood. Fourth, although Hispanics are a significant and growing presence in the inner city, surveys rarely sample Hispanics by national origin. Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and other Hispanic groups are lumped together even though their experiences and characteristics are distinctive.

Our purpose in this article is to redress these gaps in research on single fathers by examining the fertility and marital experiences of a sample of inner-city Chicago residents. We examine the influence of economic variables and race or ethnicity on whether men legitimate premaritally conceived births or marry the mother of their first child after the child's birth. Following a review of the literature, we describe our data, dependent variables, and sample-selection effects. Next, we describe the statistical models and methods used in our analysis, and then report the findings. Our discussion draws out the implications of these findings for several recent theories of poverty and family formation and suggests directions for future analyses.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Ethnic variation in levels of single parenthood has become a central issue in most discussions of the underclass. Even though the percentage of mother-only families has risen as sharply for whites as for blacks, there are significant racial differences both in the absolute levels and in the processes of becoming single parents. Most whites become single parents through marital breakup, while most blacks become single parents by having children before they marry.¹ In 1985, for example, 60 percent of black births were to unmarried mothers compared to 15 percent of white births.² Most of these out-of-wedlock births were to never-married mothers.

Blacks are more likely than whites to become never-married parents for several reasons. Among them are a younger age


EMPLOYMENT AND MARRIAGE

at sexual initiation,3 lower levels of contraceptive use,4 and lower rates of legitimation.5 Blacks are also less likely than whites to marry after the child's birth.6

Although some attention has been paid to cultural differences,7 explanations for racial disparities in marriage tend to emphasize economic variables.8 Researchers have focused on three key factors: welfare, the joblessness of males, and the economic independence of women.

Charles Murray's book, Losing Ground, contends that the proportion of out-of-wedlock births has risen because welfare rewards low-income parents for avoiding marriage.9 Arguing within a "rational choice" framework, he asserts that low-income parents have abandoned the traditional norms of family formation in order to maximize their joint income under existing welfare eligibility rules. He argues that since the mid-1960s, when the Great Society welfare policies were instituted, low-income parents have intentionally avoided marriage so that the mother could continue to collect Aid to Families with Dependent Children even if the father were employed. As long as the couple lives together without marriage, the wage earnings of the father are not included in the calculation of the family's eligibility for Aid to Families with Dependent Children. Thus in the absence of vigorous paternity determination and child support enforcement, the rational choice for a low-income couple is to live together unmarried.

In The Truly Disadvantaged, William Julius Wilson dismisses Murray's argument as inconsistent with welfare and illegitimacy trends after 1972.10 Instead, he argues that recent trends and racial differences in levels of never-married parenthood reflect more traditional concerns over whether a potential husband can provide a steady income. If the father is stably employed, Wilson argues, then a couple with a child or expecting a child view marriage as financially viable; otherwise, they are likely to remain unmarried.

According to figures compiled by Wilson and Neckerman, black women face a shrinking pool of stably employed, or "marriageable," men.11 Trends in joblessness, incarceration, and mortality show that the number of employed black men per 100 black women of the same age has decreased over the past twenty years. Trends in employment and family struc-

10. Wilson, Truly Disadvantaged.
ture, they argue, support the hypothesis that the rise of never-married parenthood among blacks is directly related to increasing black male joblessness. Further, indirect empirical support for an economic argument can be found in both historical and demographic research. Historically, out-of-wedlock births become more common during periods of economic dislocation.\(^\text{12}\) Demographers also report that unfavorable economic conditions lead to marital delay\(^\text{13}\) and that high unemployment and low wages are associated at the aggregate level with the incidence of single-parent families.\(^\text{14}\)

In some respects, Wilson and Necker-man's male-marriageable-pool hypothesis resembles the demographic hypothesis of the marriage squeeze. This hypothesis links variation in women's marital behavior to sex-ratio imbalances caused by changes in birthrates. Because women tend to marry slightly older men, increases in the birthrate create larger cohorts of younger women who are attempting to find spouses among smaller cohorts of older men.\(^\text{15}\) The marriage squeeze resulting from the post-World War II baby boom, however, ended in the 1970s. Consequently, black women who have reached marriageable age in the 1980s have faced a larger pool of prospective husbands than did their predecessors of a decade ago.

Because this marriage squeeze ended in the 1970s, Reynolds Farley disputes that the rise in black single-mother families is linked to a shortage of black men for black women to marry.\(^\text{16}\) He also cites the rising rates of never-married parenthood among more educated blacks to question the importance of male joblessness as the key determinant of family structure among blacks.

Instead, Farley suggests, the narrowing earnings differential between men and women opens up alternative family lifestyles to all women by lessening their dependence on marriage for economic support. Because black women are approaching economic parity with black men far more rapidly than white women are approaching parity with white men, Farley reasons that trends toward never-married parenthood should be more pronounced among blacks than whites. If white women continue to approach economic parity with white men, he suggests, the trends in family structure that we observe among blacks may be leading indicators of what may happen among whites in the near future.

Whether trends in never-married parenthood are being driven by greater economic parity between the genders, male joblessness, welfare incentives, or a mixture of economic and cultural factors has important implications for the development of policies to deal with the problems of persistent family poverty. Yet for the reasons mentioned earlier, very few studies have used individual-level data to examine the impact of economic status


\(^{14}\) See Sara McLanahan, Irwin Garfinkel, and Dorothy Watson, "Family Structure, Poverty, and the Underclass" (Paper prepared for the Committee on National Urban Policy of the National Research Council, Washington, DC, 1986), for an overview of these studies. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., *Unplanned Parenthood, the Social Consequences of Teenage Childbearing* (New York: Free Press, 1976), is one of the few individual-level studies of the effect of economic status on entry into marriage.


\(^{16}\) Farley, "After the Starting Line."
on whether a father marries the mother of his child.

DATA

Data for our analysis come from the Urban Poverty and Family Structure (UPFS) Survey of 2490 inner-city residents in Chicago. The UPFS Survey was developed under the direction of William Julius Wilson and fielded by NORC, a social science research center. It contains extensive retrospective data on fertility, marriage, and employment for parents 18 to 44 years old who lived in Chicago poverty tracts in 1986. A poverty tract is defined as a census tract in which 20 percent or more of the residents enumerated in the 1980 census had family incomes below the federal poverty line. At last census count, 1,283,000 persons, or 40 percent of the Chicago population, resided in poverty tracts.

The sample was stratified by parental status and race or ethnicity. There were 784 completed interviews with fathers, 1506 interviews with mothers, and 190 interviews with a subsample of blacks without children. The overall survey completion rate was 79 percent, which compares favorably to completion rates for other surveys of similar populations. The highest completion rate was for black parents, 83 percent; followed by black nonparents, 78 percent; Mexican parents, 78 percent; Puerto Rican parents, 75 percent; and non-Hispanic white parents, 74 percent.

Dependent variables: Legitimation and postpartum marriages

Table 1 shows the percentage of fathers in our sample whose first child was conceived after marriage, conceived before marriage and legitimated, or born out of wedlock. The time of conception was dated as seven months before the birth of the child. The data show substantial racial or ethnic differences in the percentage of men who fathered their first child after marriage. While 22 percent of black fathers and 42 percent of Puerto Rican fathers conceived their first child after marriage, 64 percent of the Mexicans and 62 percent of the non-Hispanic whites did. There are also group differences in the legitimation of first births. Both Puerto Ricans and blacks were less likely than Mexicans to marry the mother of their first child between the time of conception and the child’s birth. The figures in the second to last column of Table 1 show that about 8 percent of black and Puerto Rican premaritally conceived births were legitimated, compared to about a third of Mexican and non-Hispanic white premaritally conceived births.

Most studies of never-married parenthood end at this point—an out-of-wedlock birth. With our data, however, we can consider whether unwed parents eventually marry each other after the child’s birth. The estimates in Table 2 show the cumulative proportion of fathers who married the mother of their first child by that child’s first, second, and third birthday. The percentage “censored” refers to the proportion of fathers who were still single at the date of the survey or had married other women.

The group differences in postpartum marriage parallel those observed for legitimation. Both Puerto Rican and black single fathers were much less likely than Mexican and non-Hispanic white single fathers to marry the mother of their first child. By the child’s third birthday, about 20 percent of the Puerto Ricans and blacks had married the mother, compared to 43 percent of Mexicans and 60 percent of non-Hispanic whites. The cumulative effect of ethnic differences in the probabilities of marriage before parenthood,
TABLE 1
FIRST BIRTHS BY ETHNICITY AND MARITAL STATUS
OF FATHER AT CONCEPTION AND BIRTH

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Total Births</th>
<th>Conceived before Marriage</th>
<th>Conceived after Marriage</th>
<th>Married at birth</th>
<th>Single at birth</th>
<th>Legitimation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td></td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>Odds*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>71.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>42.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic white</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>61.6</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Fathers were aged 18-44 and lived in Chicago poverty tracts, 1986. Percentages calculated from weighted sample.
*Legitimation odds = married at birth / single at birth.

TABLE 2
CUMULATIVE PERCENTAGE OF FATHERS MARRYING MOTHER
OF FIRST CHILD AT SELECTED AGES OF THE CHILD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Premarital Births (number)</th>
<th>Cumulative Percentage of Fathers Marrying Mothers When Child Is Aged</th>
<th>Censored* (percentage)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6 months 12 months 24 months 36 months</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>5.8 8.8 17.8 23.1</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>9.8 17.7 26.9 43.4</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>5.3 8.4 14.9 20.4</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic white</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21.3 41.9 54.2 60.2</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Fathers were aged 18-44 and lived in Chicago poverty tracts, 1986.
*Fathers still not married at date of survey and fathers who married other than the mother of the first child.

during pregnancy, and after the child’s birth is such that by age 3, an estimated one-half, or 54 percent, of the first children born to black fathers in Chicago poverty tracts had parents who had never been married to one another, compared to an estimated 42 percent of Puerto Ricans, 13 percent of Mexicans, and under 10 percent of non-Hispanic whites.

Sample-selection effects

The race and ethnic differences in marriage that we observe in a poverty-tract population are smaller than those in the general population. These differences are smaller because a poverty-tract sample is more economically homogeneous than a sample of the entire population; most poverty-area residents are low-income if not poor. Therefore, any race or ethnic differences in family structure that are related to class are attenuated in our data.

In order to see how restricted the race or ethnic differences might be, we compared UPFS Survey statistics on the legitimacy status of first children born between 1960 and 1981 to similar statistics computed from the June 1980 and June 1982 Current Population Surveys. In the Current Population Surveys, 10 per-
percent of white infants and 50 percent of black infants were born out of wedlock. In the UPFS Survey sample, by contrast, 33 percent of white infants and 68 percent of black infants were born out of wedlock. Thus the racial difference in the legitimacy status of first births is smaller in our poverty-tract sample.

Although the higher levels of out-of-wedlock births in our data are not surprising, we also expect that the statistics we generate from the UPFS Survey will tend to underestimate the actual rates of legitimation and postpartum marriages in poverty-tract neighborhoods. Because our sample is a cross section of poverty areas, it includes recent immigrants and a residual population of persons who over the years have stayed in these neighborhoods. To the extent that marriage is related to geographical mobility, the marriage rates that we calculate from the retrospective data will tend to be lower than if we had data on all persons who ever lived in poverty tracts. In this sense, our estimates will be biased because they are weighted toward the experiences of never-married residents of poverty tracts. While the effects of this sample selectivity on our analysis need to be evaluated in greater detail, our guess is that the nature of the statistical bias works against our finding significant employment effects on marriage.

MODELS AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

While Murray, Wilson, and Farley stress economic variables, they arrive at different conclusions about the intensity and, in some cases, the direction of particular economic effects. One of the more intriguing implications of Murray's argument is that father's employment ought to lower or at best have a neutral effect on the probability of legitimating a premarital pregnancy. In Murray's thought experiment, the couple with the largest incentive to avoid marriage is the one in which the man is employed. This couple should be less likely to legitimize a premarital pregnancy compared to the couple in which the man is unemployed. According to Wilson, on the other hand, couples are more likely to marry if the man has a steady income. Finally, Farley's argument suggests that couples tend to marry when the woman is most dependent on the man's earnings. Because earnings tend to rise with years of school completed, the gap in potential earnings is greater when the man's education exceeds the woman's. Therefore, one would infer from Farley's argument that for similarly educated men, couples in which the man's education is greater than the woman's are more likely to marry than couples in which the man's education is equal to or less than the woman's.

We will test these predictions by fitting a set of logistic and hazards regression models to our data. The logistic regression model relates individual characteristics to the odds of legitimation, that is, marriage after conception but before birth. The hazards regression model relates individual characteristics to rates of marriage after childbirth.

Our approach will be to fit four separate models to the data. Model I includes only the effects of race or ethnicity. A significant race or ethnicity effect means that the odds of legitimation or the rate of postpartum marriage differs between ra-

cial and ethnic groups. Model 2 includes race or ethnicity and paternal employment status. This analysis will test Murray's and Wilson's predictions about the effect of father's employment on the likelihood of marriage; Murray's work suggests a negative effect, while Wilson's predicts a positive effect.

Model 3 adds the effects of the man's and the woman's educational status. Like Farley, we are using educational attainment as a proxy for lifetime earnings. If Farley's hypothesis is correct, the couples in which the man's education exceeds the woman's should be the most likely to marry, and the couples in which the woman's education exceeds the man's should be the least likely to marry.

Finally, in addition to the independent variables whose effects are the main concern of this article, we control for a number of other variables reported in the literature as affecting the likelihood of marriage in the general population. Although these studies usually do not distinguish between potential spouses who are childless and those who have children, we included these variables in our final model to see if they would predict fathers' first marriages. These variables include socioeconomic characteristics of the family of origin, religion, cohort, and age effects.

Table 3 shows the means of the independent variables to be used in the analysis. These statistics are calculated separately for each of three groups of fathers: those who legitimated the birth of their first child, those who married after the birth, and those who had not married the mother of their child at the time of the survey.

FINDINGS

In this section, we present the findings from our multivariate analysis of ethnic variation in both the odds of legitimating a premarital pregnancy, and in rates of marriage after the first birth, among fathers in Chicago poverty tracts.

Racial and ethnic differences

Model 1, in Tables 4 and 5, includes only race or ethnicity. The estimated effects for all models are expressed as changes in the expected odds of legitimating a pregnancy or rate of postpartum marriage relative to a baseline group, non-Hispanic whites. For instance, Table 4 shows that the relative odds of legitimation for Mexicans are 0.775; in other words, Mexicans are three-quarters as likely as non-Hispanic whites to legitimize a premaritally conceived birth. By contrast, the relative odds for Puerto Ricans, 0.146, and blacks, 0.156, are only one-sixth the odds for non-Hispanic whites. In both tables, estimates marked with an asterisk are not statistically significant.

The results of Model 1 in Table 5 show that the relative rate of marriage to the mother after the first child's birth among Mexicans, 0.554, is slightly above one-half the marriage rate among non-Hispanic whites. Puerto Ricans, with 0.272,
and blacks, with 0.251, have postpartum marriage rates that are one-quarter the non-Hispanic white rate.21

Father's employment

Model 2 extends our analysis by estimating the effects of father's employment status. Our results show that paternal employment is positively related both to the odds of a father's legitimating a premarital pregnancy and to his likelihood of marrying the mother after the first child's birth.

More specifically, Model 2 in Table 4 shows that fathers who were employed at the time of pregnancy are over two and a half times more likely to legitimate the birth than men who were not employed: the relative odds of legitimation among employed fathers was 2.557. In Table 5, the relative rate of marriage for employed fathers at each period after the first child's birth.

### Table 3

**Means of independent variables for fathers whose first child was conceived before marriage**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Fathers Who Married before Birth</th>
<th>Fathers Who Married after Birth</th>
<th>Fathers Who Never Married Mother of Child</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.489</td>
<td>.645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>.362</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic white</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed*</td>
<td>.725</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is a high school graduate†</td>
<td>.397</td>
<td>.295</td>
<td>.308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner is a high school graduate†</td>
<td>.538</td>
<td>.554</td>
<td>.468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother graduated from eighth grade</td>
<td>.541</td>
<td>.488</td>
<td>.545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sibship greater than four</td>
<td>.478</td>
<td>.625</td>
<td>.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>.536</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family of origin ever received welfare</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.241</td>
<td>.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother-only family of origin at age 14</td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>.314</td>
<td>.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother and stepfather at age 14</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of birth</td>
<td>52.8 (5.8)</td>
<td>62.6 (6.0)</td>
<td>66.0 (6.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age at conception of first child</td>
<td>22.3 (3.5)</td>
<td>21.4 (4.3)</td>
<td>21.1 (4.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner's age at conception of first child</td>
<td>20.5 (4.5)</td>
<td>18.8 (3.2)</td>
<td>19.6 (4.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year of child's birth</td>
<td>75.8 (6.7)</td>
<td>74.6 (6.1)</td>
<td>77.7 (6.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Standard deviations in parentheses.

*Any employment reported for the period from seven months before the birth of the first child to that child's birth.

†Status at conception of first child.
TABLE 4

RELATIVE ODDS OF LEGITIMATION OF A PREMARITAL CONCEPTION
BY MALES 18-44 YEARS OLD IN CHICAGO POVERTY TRACTS, 1986

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race or Ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.156</td>
<td>0.177</td>
<td>0.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>0.775</td>
<td>0.744</td>
<td>0.914*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.146</td>
<td>0.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic white</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male not employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education of partners†</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male &lt; HS, female &lt; HS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male &lt; HS, female HS+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.448*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male HS+, female &lt; HS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.740*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male HS+, female HS+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of observations</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness-of-fit p value</td>
<td>.927</td>
<td>.927</td>
<td>.236</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Baseline levels are indicated by relative odds of 1.

*Estimates not statistically significant at the .05 level.
†"< HS" stands for less than high school education; "HS+" stands for high school education or more.

birth, 1.87, is nearly twice as large as the rate for unemployed fathers.22 Both sets of findings are inconsistent with Murray’s hypothesis that employed fathers have a disincentive to marry, and they are consistent with Wilson and Neckerman’s male-marriageable-pool hypothesis. Still, father’s employment does not explain the large racial and ethnic differences we observe between inner-city fathers in Chicago in levels of never-married parenthood: the race or ethnicity estimates change only slightly from Model 1 to Model 2.

Education of the man and woman

Model 3 provides a partial test of Farley’s hypothesis that the shift away from marriage, particularly among blacks, is caused by the narrowing of the earnings differential between men and women. Although we have no direct measure of the man’s and woman’s potential earnings, we use the joint educational attainment of the man and woman, which indexes lifetime earnings, as a proxy for potential earnings differential. We find in Table 4 that the likelihood of legitimation increases as the man and woman’s joint education level increases. The increased likelihood is statistically significant only for high-school-educated couples. Model 3 in Table 5 shows a similar pattern for postpartum marriage, with one anomaly.
TABLE 5
RELATIVE RISKS OF MARRIAGE TO MOTHER OF FIRST BORN AFTER CHILDBIRTH FOR MALES 18-44 YEARS OLD IN CHICAGO POVERTY TRACTS, 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race or Ethnicity</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>0.251</td>
<td>0.265</td>
<td>0.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexican</td>
<td>0.554</td>
<td>0.606</td>
<td>0.679*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hispanic white</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male not employed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education of partners</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male &lt; HS, female &lt; HS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male &lt; HS, female HS+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male HS+, female &lt; HS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.323*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male HS+, female HS+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of observations</strong></td>
<td>301</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Baseline levels are indicated by a relative risk of 1.
*Estimates not statistically significant at the .05 level.
†“< HS” stands for less than high school education; “HS+” stands for high school education or more.

Couples in which the mother is a high school graduate but the father is not are more likely to marry after the child’s birth than other couples. Two of these effects are statistically significant at the .05 level. These effects are net of the effect of male employment status on marriage, which changes little with the introduction of the education variable (compare Models 2 and 3 in both tables).

These education findings run counter to Farley’s expectation that marriage occurs less among couples when the woman’s earning potential equals or exceeds the man’s. In our data, higher male and female education generally improves the probability of legitimation and postpartum marriage, and significantly so in the latter case. Although controlling for education reduces the difference between Mexicans and non-Hispanic whites to statistical insignificance, Puerto Ricans and blacks still show lower rates of marriage compared to whites.

**Interaction effects**

In separate analyses not shown, we examined whether the effects of male employment and education of the partners on marriage differed significantly by race or ethnicity. There are plausible reasons for believing this might be true. For instance, employment could increase marriage more for whites than for blacks if whites have less tolerance for unemployed husbands than blacks do. In addition, the female independence effect might be especially strong among blacks, given that, of all women, black women are closest to parity earnings with men of the same education.
We tested the first hypothesis by adding a term for the interaction of race or ethnicity and employment to Model 2 in Tables 4 and 5. We found that the interaction term was statistically insignificant and that the coefficients for the other terms changed very little. This means that the effect of male employment on marriage is equally strong among white, black, Mexican, and Puerto Rican fathers.

Similarly, we tested the second hypothesis by adding a term for the interaction of race or ethnicity and joint education to Model 3 in Tables 4 and 5. In this case, the interaction term did not significantly improve the model's fit to the data. Thus we found no evidence that allowing for different female independence effects by ethnic group improves our explanation of marriage rates among inner-city parents. Finally, we found no strong interaction between male employment status and the joint education of the partners.

Other explanatory variables

In our final model, also not shown, we added the other explanatory variables stepwise and as a group into the logistic regression predicting the likelihood of legitimation. Only one variable, the father's year of birth, had a statistically significant effect: the younger the father, the less likely he was to marry. This effect, however, was modest and did not change the coefficients of the ethnic, employment, or joint-education variables.

We also entered these variables as a group into the hazards regression predicting the likelihood of marriage after the birth of the child. We found significant effects of the father's year of birth, his age at conception of his first child, and his partner's age at that time. These effects, however, did not substantially change the coefficients of the ethnic, employment, or joint-education variables.

DISCUSSION

Our analysis provides direct evidence that employed men are more likely than jobless men to marry after the conception of their first child. These results are consistent with Wilson's marriageable-pool interpretation of changes in family structure; indirectly, they contradict Murray's argument about the impact of welfare incentives on the marriage of low-income couples. The effect of male employment on marriage is equally strong among white, black, Mexican, and Puerto Rican inner-city men. High school graduates are also more likely to marry than high school dropouts, suggesting that both short-term economic realities and long-term prospects shape the marriage decisions of inner-city couples.

Regardless of their own education level, men whose partners are high school graduates are also more likely to marry than those whose partners are high school dropouts. With the exception of one group, the higher a man and a woman's joint earnings potential, the more likely they are to marry. For this population, at least, the economic viability of the couple is more important than any independence effect a woman may derive from having her own source of income. These findings are inconsistent with Farley's interpretation of changing family structure. But, under the joint pressures of poverty and family responsibilities, it is not surprising that inner-city parents would marry if the match were economically viable. Farley's explanation remains a highly plausible account of marriage patterns in the rest of the population.

These results leave some questions
unanswered. Substantial differences remain in the marriage rates of racial or ethnic groups. We used very simple measures of economic status—current employment and high school graduation. It is possible that a more refined measure of economic status of men and women might decrease the size of racial or ethnic differences. In addition, it is possible that neighborhood characteristics influence marriage behavior over and above their correlation with individual characteristics. Although our poverty-area sample greatly reduces the variation between racial or ethnic groups in neighborhood status, blacks and, to a lesser extent, Puerto Ricans tend to live in much poorer areas than Mexicans or whites, and these differences are not controlled in our analysis. Finally, it is possible that racial or ethnic differences in the networks of family support available to unmarried parents influence the propensity to marry.

Nevertheless, these initial findings show that employed men are more likely than jobless men to marry the mothers of their children. We also can tentatively conclude that men are more likely to marry women with good economic prospects. Although one needs to be cautious about drawing policy prescriptions from observational findings, one message for policymakers is clear: improvements in the economic status of both low-income men and women promise to enable more parents to marry and thus provide a financially and, it is hoped, socially better environment for themselves and their children.
Single Mothers, the Underclass, and Social Policy

By SARA McLANAHAN and IRWIN GARFINKEL

ABSTRACT: This article focuses on the question of whether mother-only families are part of an emerging urban underclass. An underclass is defined as a population exhibiting the following characteristics: weak labor force attachment, persistence of weak attachment, and residential isolation in neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty and unemployment. We find that only a small minority of single mothers fit the description of an underclass: less than 5 percent. But a small and growing minority of black, never-married mothers meet all three criteria. We argue that welfare programs are necessary but that too heavy a reliance on welfare can facilitate the growth of an underclass. In contrast, universal programs such as child support assurance, child care, health care, children's allowances, and full employment would discourage such a trend and promote economic independence among single mothers.

Sara McLanahan is an associate professor in the Department of Sociology and the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Her research focuses on the intergenerational consequences of family disruption. Irwin Garfinkel is the Edwin Witte Professor in the School of Social Work and the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His major interest is in income transfer policy, most recently child support. Professors Garfinkel and McLanahan are coauthors of the book Single Mothers and Their Children: A New American Dilemma.

NOTE: Support for this research was provided by the National Institute for Child Health and Development under grant HD19375-03 and by the Ford Foundation.
FAMILIES headed by nonmarried women have increased dramatically during the past three decades. Whereas in 1960 about 7 percent of all children were living with a single mother, in 1987 the proportion was more than 21 percent. Over half of all children born today will spend some time in a mother-only family before reaching age 18, about 45 percent of all white children will do so, and about 85 percent of black children will. Clearly, the mother-only family will have a profound effect on the next generation of Americans.

Increases in marital disruption and single parenthood have stimulated considerable debate during the past few years and there is much disagreement over whether recent trends are a sign of progress or decline. On the one hand, the growth of mother-only families is viewed as evidence of women's increasing economic independence and greater freedom of choice with respect to marriage. On the other, it is often treated as a proxy for social disorganization. With respect to the latter, three aspects of divorce and single motherhood are seen as especially problematic: (1) the high rate of poverty among families headed by women, variously referred to as the "feminization of poverty" and the "pauperization of women"; (2) the lower rates of socioeconomic attainment among children from mother-only families as compared with children from intact families; and (3) the potential role of mother-only families in the growth and perpetuation of an urban underclass in American cities.

In our book, *Single Mothers and Their Children*, we describe in detail the first two problems: poverty and intergenerational dependence. In this article, we focus on the last question, whether mother-only families represent the crystallization of an urban underclass. We begin by discussing various definitions of the underclass and by presenting our own views on the subject. Next we ask whether there are mother-only families who fit the description of an underclass, and, if so, what proportion might belong in this group. Finally, we review domestic social policy from the perspective of whether the current system and recent proposals for reform serve to perpetuate or break down the boundaries that isolate mother-only families from the rest of society.

DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

The underclass has been the focus of considerable discussion during recent years, beginning with the publication of a series of articles in the *New Yorker* magazine in the early 1980s. While there is no general consensus on whether the underclass is a place or a group of people, most analysts agree that it is more than just another name for those at the bottom of the income distribution. Auletta defines the underclass as a group of people who suffer from "behavioral as well as income deficiencies" and who "operate outside the mainstream of commonly accepted values." He includes street criminals, hustlers and drug addicts, welfare mothers, and the chronically mentally ill in his characterization of the underclass.

Whereas Auletta bases his definition of the underclass on individual behavior, others have used the word to describe particular geographical or residential areas. Sawhill and her colleagues at the Urban Institute speak of “people who live in neighborhoods where welfare dependency, female-headed families, male joblessness, and dropping out of high school are all common occurrences.”

Finally, Wilson speaks of the underclass as poor people, mostly black, who live in urban ghettos in the north-central and northeastern regions of the country and who are “outside the mainstream of the American occupational system.” He contends that changes in these communities during the 1970s, including deindustrialization and the exodus of middle-class blacks, greatly altered the conditions of families left behind. Ghetto residents are worse off today than they were in the 1960s, not only because their environment is more dangerous but also because they have fewer opportunities for social mobility and fewer positive role models.

**Weak attachment to the labor force**

A common thread running through all of these definitions is an emphasis on weak labor force attachment. Underclass people are generally described either as living in neighborhoods with high rates of unemployment or nonemployment, or as marginally attached to the labor force themselves. Weak attachment is viewed as problematic for several reasons. First, nonemployment clearly has costs for the individual, given that in a market society such as ours wages are the primary source of income for all nonelderly adults. Those who are not attached to the labor force, either directly or indirectly, are very likely to be poor or to be involved in some form of criminal activity. Moreover, their chances of gaining access to valued resources and/or power in the future are significantly lower than are the chances of those who are part of the labor force.

Weak attachment to the labor force also has costs for the rest of society, whose members ultimately must pay for high levels of nonemployment either through direct income transfers such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) or indirectly through the crime and social disorganization that accompany unemployment and a large underground economy. In addition, conservatives and liberals express concern that weak attachment undermines the work ethic and thereby reduces productivity, whereas Marxists worry that it undermines the solidarity of the work force and thereby reduces the likelihood of successful collective action.

Disabled workers, widows, and married homemakers may be indirectly attached to the labor force either through their personal work history or through the current or past employment history of their spouse. In the case of disabled workers and widows, the primary source of household income comes from social insurance, which is linked to the past work history of the individual and the individual’s spouse, respectively. In the case of married homemakers, the primary source of income is the partner’s current earnings.

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Persistence of weak attachment

Weak attachment to the labor force is a necessary but not sufficient condition for defining an underclass. Individuals who are temporarily out of work or ill or dependent on welfare are usually not viewed as part of the underclass, even though they may be living below the poverty line. Rather, it is the persistence of weak attachment that distinguishes underclass behavior and underclass neighborhoods from poverty areas and the poor in general. Persistence may occur either over time, as when a person is unemployed and/or dependent on welfare for a long period, or it may occur across generations, as when a child of a welfare recipient also becomes dependent on welfare. We argue that persistence across generations is a necessary condition for establishing the existence of an underclass.

The emphasis on persistence for individuals and across generations highlights the fact that the underclass does not simply signify a particular structural position or group at the bottom of the income distribution. Rather, it means that certain individuals and their offspring occupy this position over a period of time. Thus the problem is not merely inequality—the fact that some locations or statuses in society carry with them fewer rewards than others—but an absence of social mobility—the fact that some persons do not have the chance to improve their situation. When Wilson and his colleagues talk about those left behind in the ghettos of the central cities, they are expressing concern for what they view as declining opportunity and increasing immobility.9

Concern about the persistence of weak attachment to the labor force has surfaced recently. The predominant view among poverty researchers during the 1970s was that nonemployment and dependence on public assistance were relatively short-term phenomena. According to researchers at the University of Michigan, nearly 25 percent of the population was poor at least 1 year during the 1970s whereas less than 3 percent were poor for at least 8 of 10 years.10 This perspective, which emphasized the fluidity of the poverty population, was seriously challenged in the early 1980s by Bane and Ellwood, who noted that a nontrivial proportion of those who became dependent on welfare were dependent for 10 or more years.11 Bane and Ellwood's findings coincided with a new interest in the underclass and fueled concern that certain forms of poverty, especially those associated with weak labor force attachment, might be self-perpetuating. Mother-only families have been a particular concern, because they appear to experience longer periods of economic dependence than other poor groups and because the intergenerational implications of their prolonged dependence may be of greater consequence.

Social isolation

A final characteristic essential to our definition and common to most discus-


sions of the underclass is the notion that its members are isolated from the rest of society in terms of both their connection to mainstream social institutions and their values. Isolation, be it in urban ghettos or rural areas of the South, is of concern because it reduces knowledge of opportunities. Isolation combined with spatial concentration, as occurs in urban ghettos, is especially worrisome in that it may lead to the development of a deviant subculture. Isolation is a mechanism by which weak labor force attachment persists over time and across generations.

Not all analysts agree that the underclass has a unique culture, that is, its own set of norms and values. In fact, since the late 1960s, liberal scholars have tended to avoid discussions that attribute a different set of attitudes to those at the bottom of the income distribution. Most recall that in the 1960s scholars who expressed concern over the so-called culture of poverty, even those who cited unemployment as the fundamental cause of deviant attitudes and behavior, were accused of blaming the victim. Thus recent discussions of social isolation have tended to emphasize macroeconomic conditions and the institutional aspects of isolation as opposed to its norms and culture. For example, Wilson and his colleagues describe urban ghettos as communities with few employment opportunities and lacking in the leadership and interorganizational networks that facilitate job search and sustain community morale during times of high unemployment. Weak institu-


In turn, the underclass is a driving force behind cultural differences.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF SINGLE MOTHERS

Some would argue that single mothers are engaged in household production and therefore cannot be part of an underclass, even if they are not working in the paid labor force. Certainly, raising children is a valued activity that contributes to the public good by producing the next generation of young workers. A large proportion of married women devote full time to child care, at least while their children are very young, and many experts believe that this is the best use of their time. Furthermore, most industrialized countries provide children's allowances and various forms of parental leave, which make explicit the social value of children as well as the value of parental time spent on infant care. Yet in the United States, only those single mothers who are widows are provided sufficient public benefits to allow them to invest in full-time child care without paying the penalty of stigma and poverty. The fact that widowed mothers are treated differently from other single mothers suggests that something other than the mother's lack of paid employment and the cost of public transfers underlies the recent concern over welfare mothers.

One explanation for the negative attitudes toward welfare mothers is that they serve as proxies for nonemployed men, who are the primary concern of many analysts. According to this view, for every welfare mother, there is potentially a nonworking father who is part of the underclass. For critics of the welfare system, such as Murray, the AFDC mother is not only a proxy for the nonemployed father; she and the system that
supports her are a cause of his unemployment. According to Murray, single motherhood encourages male irresponsibility, which in turn undermines the work ethic and social productivity. In stark contrast, Wilson argues that the welfare mother is an indicator of a failing economic system in which low-skilled men can no longer support their families. According to this view, unemployment and low-paying jobs lead to family dissolution and nonmarriage, which give rise to single motherhood.

Although the causal relationship between single motherhood and male employment is opposite in these two views, both Murray and Wilson focus on male employment as the primary problem. Concern for male employment also explains why widowed mothers are treated differently from other single mothers, even though they work fewer hours and receive higher public benefits. First, widowhood is caused by the death of a spouse and therefore is not a voluntary event. Providing for widows does not encourage male irresponsibility or reduce the motivation to work. Second, Survivors Insurance (SI), like all aspects of social insurance, is closely tied to the previous work attachment of the spouse—in the case of widows, the deceased spouse—and thus it enhances rather than undermines the work ethic. In sum, widowed mothers who are eligible for SI are indirectly attached to the labor force even though they are not currently employed.

Quite apart from what it suggests about male employment, nonemployment among single mothers appears to be a growing concern in and of itself. The issue is not simply whether weak attachment to the labor force increases welfare costs, although for some this is the major problem, but whether full-time mothering has personal costs for women and children and social costs for the rest of society beyond the immediate transfer payments. Recent trends in the labor force participation of married mothers suggest that social norms about women's employment are changing, and this in turn affects how policymakers and the general public view nonemployment among single mothers.

When Mothers' Pensions programs were instituted in the beginning of the century and when SI and AFDC were instituted in the 1930s, the prevailing view was that mothers should stay home and care for their children. Today, this view is changing to reflect the fact that a majority of married mothers spend at least part of their time working in the paid labor force. The fact that over half of married mothers with young children work outside the home suggests that policies that encourage long-term economic dependency are not likely to be tolerated by the public. The welfare mother is increasingly isolated from mainstream society by virtue of the fact that she is not in the labor force.

**EXTENT OF PERSISTENT WEAK ATTACHMENT**

Are single mothers weakly attached to the labor force, and if so does weak attachment persist over time and across generations? Both the absence of earnings and the presence of welfare are indicators of weak attachment. Although the former is the better measure in that it measures attachment directly, research on the duration of welfare dependence is more readily available. In 1987, 69 percent of single mothers reported earnings whereas 33


percent reported receipt of some welfare. Both the earnings and welfare figures suggest that about one-third of single mothers could be classified as weakly attached to the labor force. Of this group, 56 percent will be dependent on welfare for 10 years or more. Multiplying the 33 percent of single mothers who report weak attachment by the 56 percent who are destined for long-term dependence yields an estimate of 18 percent of current single mothers who are potentially at risk for being in the underclass.

As discussed previously, nonemployment and economic dependency alone do not constitute sufficient evidence for classifying single mothers as part of the underclass, because these women are engaged in socially productive activity—taking care of children. Hence the more important question is, what happens to the children in these families? If the offspring of nonemployed single mothers become productive, independent citizens, the underclass characterization is inappropriate. Thus although some people may complain that the cost of supporting these families is too high or unfairly imposed on the rest of society, their concern is different from that of whether welfare mothers are socially productive.

To address the question of intergenerational welfare dependence, detailed family histories over at least two generations are required. Such data are only now becoming available from longitudinal studies such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, both of which follow families and their offspring over a long period of time. Based on research by Gottschalk, we estimate that about 60 percent of the daughters from families who experience long-term welfare dependence will receive welfare themselves for at least 1 year. Based on Ellwood's research, we estimate that about 40 percent of these daughters will receive welfare for 10 or more years.

To combine and summarize these crude estimates: about 18 percent of single mothers in 1987 were dependent on welfare for a long period of time, and about 24 percent of their daughters will be


16. Ellwood, "Would-Be" Long-Term Recipients of AFDC.


18. Ellwood, "Would-Be" Long-Term Recipients of AFDC. We use the figure for unmarried mothers, which is 38 percent. We also assume that the estimates for daughters would apply as well to sons.
dependent on welfare for 10 more years. We conclude, therefore, that about 4 percent \((0.24 \times 0.18)\) of single mothers can be classified as members of an emerging underclass.

On the one hand, the figure of 4 percent is an overestimate of the association between single motherhood and underclass status, given that only a portion of those women who ever experience single motherhood are single mothers in any particular year. Half of all women who divorce remarry within five years, and presumably most of these are not at risk for being part of an underclass.19

On the other hand, 4 percent is an underestimate for some groups.20 Persistence of welfare dependence among single mothers varies substantially. Ellwood finds, for example, that whereas 20 percent of whites who ever receive welfare will be dependent for 10 or more years, the figure for blacks is 32 percent.21 Similarly, Gottschalk finds that whereas half of white daughters of welfare-dependent mothers become recipients themselves, the figure for blacks is 70 percent. Even more striking, whereas only 14 percent of divorced mothers who ever receive welfare will be dependent for 10 or more years, the figure for unmarried mothers is nearly 40 percent. Thus among some subgroups of single mothers—in particular, young unwed black mothers—the risk of being in the underclass is high.

**EXTENT OF SOCIAL ISOLATION**

Are mother-only families more socially isolated than other families, and does their isolation lower their mobility? As noted earlier, social isolation may occur because the community no longer functions as a resource base for its members, as when a neighborhood has no jobs, no networks for helping to locate jobs, poor schools, and a youth culture that is subject to minimal social control. Cultural isolation, on the other hand, refers to deviations from normative standards, such as the absence of a work ethic or a devaluation of family commitments.

One way to measure social isolation is to ask what proportion of mother-only families live in urban neighborhoods with high proportions of poor people. Table 1 presents information on the proportion of different types of families in the United States who live in neighborhoods in which 20 percent or more of the population is poor or in which 40 percent or more is poor. Poverty areas are restricted to neighborhoods in the 100 largest cities. Several findings in Table 1 merit attention. First, families headed by single mothers are more likely to live in poor urban neighborhoods than other families. Second, only a small proportion—about 5.6 percent—of mother-only families live in extremely poor neighborhoods. Final-

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20. More generally, the figure in the text should be considered a lower bound. To see this, suppose each mother has only one daughter who either does or does not become dependent on welfare for a long period of time. If the daughters do not become long-term dependents, we classify the mothers as outside the underclass because they have raised a productive child, which is in itself productive. But in reality, many mothers have more than one daughter. In some cases, one or more of the daughters will become long-term dependents while one or more will not. By multiplying the 36 percent of daughters of long-term welfare-dependent mothers who themselves become long-term dependents by the 18 percent who are long-term dependents, we are implicitly assigning a portion of each mother with multiple children to underclass or nonunderclass status. An argument can be made, however, that even if only one of several daughters of a mother with long-term nonattachment to the labor force exhibited the same behavior, that family would be appropriately included as part of an underclass.

21. Ellwood, "Would-Be" Long-Term Recipients of AFDC.
TABLE 1
PROPORTION OF U.S. FAMILIES LIVING IN URBAN POVERTY AREAS IN 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>20 Percent Poverty Areas</th>
<th>40 Percent Poverty Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mother-only families</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other families</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White mother-only families</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black mother-only families</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>10.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black persons</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Information is not available on the proportion of white and black mother-only families living in areas that are 40 percent poor. We estimate these percentages by extrapolating from the proportions observed in 40 percent areas for other families and black persons. The estimate for white mother-only families was obtained by assuming that the ratio of white mother-only families to other families that pertains to the 20 percent areas also pertains to the 40 percent areas. The estimate for black mother-only families was obtained by assuming that the ratio of mother-only families to black persons that pertains to the 20 percent areas also pertains to 40 percent areas.

ly, there are huge racial differences in the degree of isolation of mother-only families. Whereas less than 5 percent of white mother-only families live in areas in which 20 percent of the residents are poor, over 34 percent of black mother-only families live in such areas. About 10 percent of black mother-only families and less than 1 percent of white mother-only families live in areas of extreme poverty.

To what extent did black mother-only families become more socially isolated during the 1970s? Our research suggests that the proportion of black mother-only families who reside in neighborhoods in which at least 20 percent of the residents are poor declined. Yet the proportion of those who reside in neighborhoods that are at least 40 percent poor increased dramatically—by about 30 percent. In other words, in the face of general economic progress for black families in the last 25 years, the proportion of poor mother-only families who are isolated increased. Finally, these extremely poor neighborhoods became more desolate with respect to the proportion of males employed and the proportion of families on welfare.22

In addition to residential characteristics, offspring from mother-only families also differ with respect to certain community resources and parental values. Research based on data from High School and Beyond, a survey of 50,000 high school sophomores and seniors, shows that black adolescents in mother-only families attend lower-quality high schools and are more accepting of nonmarital births than their counterparts in two-parent families, even after controlling for socioeconomic status. In contrast, the educational aspirations of their mothers are no different from those in two-parent families.23


23. Sara S. McLanahan, Nan Astone, and Nadine Marks, "The Role of Mother-Only Families
SINGLE MOTHERS AND SOCIAL POLICY

In sum, whereas only a small proportion of mother-only families live in extremely poor—or what might be called underclass—neighborhoods, there is evidence that this group is growing. Moreover, there is some evidence that children from mother-only families are more accepting of the single-parent status than children from two-parent families. The issue of intergenerational female headship and its consequences is especially important for blacks, given their higher concentration in urban poverty areas and their high prevalence of mother-only families. An important question, which we have not attempted to answer here, is whether an increasing proportion of new birth cohorts are being born to single mothers in extremely poor neighborhoods, and, if so, how this will affect the gains in socioeconomic status made by blacks during the past three decades.

SOCIAL POLICY TOWARD SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE UNDERCLASS

All communities develop institutions to aid dependent persons. As capitalism replaced feudalism, providing for the poor became a public responsibility. In the United States, we have always had public welfare programs, and they have been the most important source of government income for poor single mothers. Though welfare programs are necessary, too heavy a reliance on them is conducive to the emergence of an underclass.

AFDC and other means-tested welfare programs undermine the indirect labor force attachment of poor single mothers by promoting female headship and reducing the likelihood of marriage. While the effect of welfare on the aggregate growth in mother-only families is quite small, its effect on the poorest half of the population is more substantial. Our own crude estimate suggests that the threefold increase in AFDC and welfare-related benefits between 1955 and 1975 may account for as much as 20 or 30 percent of the growth in mother-only families among the bottom half of the income distribution.

Welfare also undermines direct attachment to the labor force by imposing a high tax rate on earnings. Welfare recipients lose nearly a dollar in benefits for each dollar earned, and they may also lose health care and other income-tested benefits. Because of the high tax rate and loss of benefits, and because their earnings capacity is very low, many single mothers would be worse off working full-time than depending on welfare.

Finally, AFDC promotes social isolation by creating a separate institution for the poor and by encouraging nonemployment at a time when married mothers are entering the labor force in increasing numbers. Ironically, whereas AFDC was originally designed to allow single mothers to replicate the behavior of married women—that is, to stay home with their children—it currently functions to separate the two groups further.

So why not reduce dependence by simply cutting or even eliminating welfare benefits as some have suggested? Unfortunately, such a strategy would do great harm to families who rely on welfare benefits.

25. For a critical summary of the literature, see ibid., chap. 3.

at some point but who are in no danger of becoming part of the underclass. Such families constitute the overwhelming majority of those who ever become dependent on welfare. Furthermore, such a strategy would leave the mothers with the fewest skills and least experience worse off and even more desperate than they are today. Reducing welfare could lead to increased dependence on illegal sources of income and even further isolation for those families at the bottom of the income distribution.

In this connection, it is important to recognize that the existence of intergenerational welfare dependence is not prima facie evidence of the ill effects of welfare. In the absence of welfare, intergenerational transmission of poverty is to be expected. Indeed, one justification for welfare programs is to break this intergenerational link. Whether welfare ameliorates or exacerbates the intergenerational transmission of poverty is a complicated question that merits further research.

Whereas welfare programs discourage work and isolate the poor, universal programs have the opposite effect. Because benefits in universal programs are not eliminated as earnings increase, they provide an incentive to work for those who would otherwise be dependent on welfare. That is, benefits from universal programs make low-wage work more competitive with welfare. Aiding the poor through institutions that serve all income classes is itself integrative.

Universal programs are also more successful in preventing poverty and reducing economic insecurity. By providing a common floor to everyone, they lift the standard of living of the poorest, least productive citizens without stigmatizing them as economic failures. The common floor facilitates the efforts of such citizens to escape life on the dole, by making life off the dole more attractive. Universal programs therefore prevent both poverty and welfare dependence. The common floor, of course, also cushions the fall of middle- and upper-income families who come upon hard times. Finally, because universal programs provide a valuable good or service to all citizens, they develop a more powerful political constituency and are therefore funded far more generously than programs for the poor.

27. Ellwood, "Would-Be" Long-Term Recipients of AFDC. Although this statement about the proportion of families ever receiving welfare who become long-term recipients may appear to be inconsistent with the earlier estimates of the proportion of welfare families at a point in time who are long-term recipients, there is no inconsistency. The point-in-time estimate will always be higher than the lifetime exposure estimate because the short-term recipients are less likely to be on welfare at any point in time.

28. Gottschalk has proposed to address this issue. See Gottschalk, "A Proposal to Study Intergenerational Correlation of Welfare Dependence."

29. In addition to the cushion provided by a common floor, social insurance programs—which, along with free public education, are the two most important universal systems in the United States—provide additional protection to middle- and upper-income families by providing higher benefits to workers with histories of higher earnings.

recent comparison of six industrialized countries shows that the poverty rates of single mothers are substantially lower in countries that rely most heavily on universal and employment-related income transfer programs as compared to countries that rely heavily on means-tested programs.31

Although universal programs have clear benefits for the underclass, some analysts have argued that they are inefficient. The small amount of research that directly addresses this issue, however, suggests that whether universal or welfare programs are more efficient is difficult to ascertain and that, in any case, the differences are not likely to be large.32 What is clear is that universal programs will be more costly than welfare programs to upper-middle- and upper-income families.

The new child support assurance system (CSAS), which is being implemented in Wisconsin and other parts of the country, encourages labor force attachment and reduces isolation.33 Under CSAS, the financial obligation of the nonresidential parent is expressed as a percentage of his or her income and is withheld from earnings as income and payroll taxes are. The child receives the full amount paid by the nonresident parent, but no less than a socially assured minimum benefit. When the nonresident parent is unemployed or has very low earnings, the government makes up the difference just as it does with the social security pension. CSAS is at least a cousin of our social insurance programs, which require a contribution from all member families but guarantee a minimum pension irrespective of the contribution. CSAS increases indirect attachment to the labor force by providing a link between the mother-only family and the nonresidential parent who is employed, and it increases direct attachment by providing a source of income that supplements rather than replaces earnings.

Universal child care, health care, and child allowance programs also help to integrate the poor into mainstream society. At present, the government has two different mechanisms for subsidizing the cost of raising children. Middle- and upper-middle-income families receive their subsidies through three provisions in the tax code: the dependent-care tax credit, the personal exemption for children, and the exclusion of employer-financed health-insurance benefits from taxable income. Lower-income families receive subsidies primarily through two welfare programs, AFDC and Medicaid. To beat welfare, unskilled single mothers need health care, child care, and cash outside of welfare.

Replacing the personal exemptions for children in the federal income tax with an equally costly refundable credit or child allowance would shift resources toward the bottom half of the population and provide a small cash supplement to earnings. Making the child-care tax credit refundable and more generous at the bottom would help the poor pay for child care.
care.34 Adopting a universal health-insurance program would reduce the incentive to remain on welfare as a way of ensuring health-care coverage.

The most universalistic policy of all, and the one most important to poor single mothers, is full employment. High unemployment promotes both loose attachment to the labor force and female headship. Despite some gaps and anomalies, there is now a strong body of empirical research that documents that one of the costs of increased unemployment is increased female headship.35 With the exception of the Vietnam war, unemployment rates for blacks have gone up steadily since the 1950s. William Julius Wilson has argued, and our own examination of the evidence has led us to concur, that this increase in unemployment has probably been the single most important cause of the increase in female headship among poor blacks.36

For single mothers themselves, a high demand for labor increases both the availability of jobs and their rate of pay. It also increases the ability of nonresidential fathers to pay child support. In sum, nothing will do more to forestall the development of an underclass than a full-employment policy.

SUMMARY

Although the vast majority of single mothers do not fit the description of an underclass, there is a small group of predominantly black single mothers concentrated in Northern urban ghettos that is persistently weakly attached to the labor force, socially isolated, and reproducing itself. Although welfare programs are necessary for those who are failed by or who fail in—depending upon one’s political perspective—the labor market and other mainstream institutions, too heavy a reliance upon welfare can facilitate the growth of an underclass. In contrast, aiding single mothers through more universal programs such as a child support assurance system, child care, health care, children’s allowances, and a full-employment macroeconomic policy will retard the growth of an underclass.

34. Another alternative is for the government to provide child care for all and to charge a sliding-scale fee based upon income.

35. For a summary of the literature, see Garfinkel and McLanahan, Single Mothers and Their Children. See also Scott South, “Economic Conditions and the Divorce Rate: A Time Series Analysis of the Postwar United States,” Journal of Marriage and the Family, 47:31-42 (1985); Andrew Cherlin, Social and Economic Determinants of Marital Separation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976); Wilson, Truly Disadvantaged; Moynihan, Negro Family.

36. Wilson, Truly Disadvantaged.
Puerto Ricans and the Underclass Debate

By MARTA TIENDA

ABSTRACT: This article uses data from the Current Population Surveys of 1975, 1980, and 1985 and the 1980 census of population to investigate why the economic status of Puerto Ricans has declined more than that of Mexicans and Cubans. The working hypothesis—that structural factors, namely, rapidly falling employment opportunities in jobs where Puerto Ricans traditionally have worked and the concentration of Puerto Ricans in areas experiencing severe economic dislocation, are largely responsible for their disproportionate impoverishment—finds considerable support. Results based on the Current Population Surveys show that Puerto Ricans are distinct from Mexicans and Cubans in that their labor market instability and complete withdrawal began earlier—in the mid- compared to the late 1970s—and was more extreme. Furthermore, the analysis of census data shows that the constraints on Puerto Ricans resulting from ethnic labor market divisions and high unemployment rates are stronger than those on Mexicans or Cubans, lending support to structural interpretations of the Puerto Ricans' economic distress.

Marta Tienda is professor of sociology at the University of Chicago and associate director of the Population Research Center. She is coauthor of The Hispanic Population of the United States (1987) and coeditor of Divided Opportunities: Poverty, Minorities and Social Policy (1988) and Hispanics in the U.S. Economy (1985). Her current research interests include the work and welfare consequences of amnesty and the migration and employment patterns of Puerto Ricans.

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Despite the appreciable drop in poverty since 1960, recent empirical work on the economic status of minorities has documented persisting and in some instances widening differentials in poverty and economic well-being according to race and national origin. Among Hispanics, between 1970 and 1985 Puerto Ricans experienced a sharp deterioration in economic well-being while Mexicans experienced modest, and Cubans substantial, improvement in economic status.\(^1\)

A few indicators illustrate the extent to which economic disparities between the three major Hispanic populations have widened. Puerto Rican family income declined by 7.4 percent in real terms during the 1970s and by an additional 18.0 percent between 1979 and 1984. Mexican and Cuban real family incomes increased during the 1970s, then fell after 1980; but the decline for neither group approached the magnitude experienced by Puerto Ricans. Unlike that of Puerto Ricans, black real family income rose gradually during the 1970s, then fell 14.0 percent following the recession of the early 1980s.\(^2\) While real family incomes of all population groups—minority and non-minority alike—fell between 1979 and 1984, the decline was steepest among minorities, Puerto Ricans in particular.

Equally disturbing are findings that family income concentration has increased for Puerto Ricans since 1970. The share of Puerto Rican families with income below one-quarter of the median income of whites rose from 11 percent in 1960 to 15 percent in 1970, 26 percent in 1980, and 33 percent in 1985.\(^3\) A similar pattern was not discerned among Mexicans or Cubans, indicating that Puerto Ricans are diverging from other Hispanics. William Julius Wilson and others claim that black family incomes have become bifurcated, with increasing shares of families concentrated at the upper and lower tails of the income distribution.\(^4\) So severe has the decline in Puerto Rican economic status been that this minority group has fared worse than blacks in the 1980s, a reversal of the situation prevailing during the 1960s. This generalization obtains whether based on national data or those for New York City, which houses the single largest concentration of Puerto Ricans.\(^5\)

Although the reasons for the measured increases in racial and economic inequality are not well understood, there is a growing consensus that three interrelated sets of circumstances are involved: (1) uneven changes in family composition and labor market position according to race and national origin; (2) a heavier toll of cyclical downturns on the job prospects of minority workers; and (3) the persisting significance of race in allocating social position. By themselves, these factors do not explain why some minority groups, such as blacks and Puerto Ricans, have lost more economic ground than others, such as Cubans, Mexicans, or Native Americans, nor do they enable us to


\(^2\) Ibid., tab. 1, p. 27.

\(^3\) Ibid., (tab. 2, p. 31.


predict the future course or magnitude of inequality.

Signs of economic distress among Puerto Ricans have fostered considerable speculation that Puerto Ricans have become part of the urban underclass, but the available evidence is more suggestive than conclusive. Answering this question in the affirmative requires, at a minimum, longitudinal data showing that extreme economic deprivation is both chronic and concentrated among a segment of the Puerto Rican population; that chronic deprivation is accompanied by labor market detachment; and that both conditions are sustained by social and spatial isolation from mainstream institutions and activities. Although inadequate for demonstrating the coincidence of these three conditions for Puerto Ricans, repeated cross-sectional census surveys can shed some light on the emerging debate about whether and to what extent the deteriorating economic status of Puerto Rican families is accompanied by labor market detachment; and that both conditions are sustained by social and spatial isolation from mainstream institutions and activities. Although inadequate for demonstrating the coincidence of these three conditions for Puerto Ricans, repeated cross-sectional census surveys can shed some light on the emerging debate about whether and to what extent the deteriorating economic status of Puerto Rican families is accompanied by labor market detachment.

One objective is to examine the labor market position of Puerto Rican men in comparison with that of Mexicans and Cubans. A second objective is to document the influence of structural factors, namely, ethnic labor market concentration and ethnic job queues, on Puerto Ricans' earnings. The working hypothesis guiding the analysis is that structural factors—to wit, rapidly falling employment opportunities in jobs where Puerto Ricans traditionally have worked, and the concentration of Puerto Ricans in areas experiencing severe economic dislocation—are major factors accounting for the impoverishment of this minority group.

The following section sets forth theoretical issues bearing on the significance of national origin in producing and maintaining labor market inequality. The next sections compare the labor market standing of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban men from 1970 to 1985, emphasizing the uniqueness of the Puerto Rican labor force withdrawal process both in timing and magnitude, and then assess the economic consequences of ethnic job queues and ethnic labor market concentration on earnings. The concluding section discusses these empirical findings in light of growing speculation that Puerto Ricans are becoming part of the urban underclass.

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Evidence from cross-sectional data suggests that the declining economic status of Puerto Ricans can be traced both to poor economic performance and to the low stocks of human capital possessed by Puerto Rican workers. Although a substantial literature documents the importance of education for labor market success, the low educational achievement of Mexicans challenges the completeness of the human-capital explanations. Mexicans have not experienced declines in labor market standing and economic well-being comparable to those of Puerto Ricans, even though their educational levels are similar.

That a steep increase in poverty was not experienced by all Hispanic groups raises questions about the salience of structural factors in restricting these effects to Puerto Ricans. My case is that the weakened labor market position of Puerto Ricans and their consequent impoverishment have roots in their placement at the bottom of an ethnic hiring queue coupled with residential concentration in a region that experienced severe economic decline and industrial restructuring after 1970. Each of these ideas is elaborated in the following pages.
ETHNIC HIRING QUEUES

The significance of ethnicity for the labor market stratification of minority workers depends not only on local employment conditions but also on how individual ethnic traits circumscribe choices, how ethnic traits are evaluated in the marketplace, and how ethnic traits are used to organize the labor market. If national origin is used as a criterion to define and maintain job queues, then the economic costs and benefits of residential concentration will derive not only from opportunities to interact with members of like ethnicity but also from the role of national origin in channeling minority workers to particular categories of jobs.

The viability of ethnic hiring queues, however, is related to patterns of ethnic geographical concentration. Stanley Lieberson, who succinctly summarized the ecological foundations of racial or ethnic occupational differentiation, claimed that a discriminatory hiring queue results when employers activate their prejudices and preferentially hire workers on the basis of ethnic traits rather than market skills.6 Two aspects of Lieberson's queuing premises have direct implications for the ensuing analyses. One is that the job configuration of groups will vary in accordance with their share of the labor force in a given labor market. Second, because of the existence of ethnic hiring queues, shifts in unemployment will be highest for the group or groups at the bottom of the queue in the event of a wave of unemployment.7 This interpretation appears to be consistent with the Puerto Rican experience after the mid-1970s.

Lieberson's argument has considerable appeal for explaining the growing economic inequality among Hispanic workers. For example, Mexicans have been preferred workers in agricultural jobs at least since the mid-1800s. While the incomes of agricultural workers are low compared with those in other low-skilled jobs, when evaluated against the alternative of unemployment or nonparticipation in the labor force, agricultural work is preferable because it at least ensures some earnings. Puerto Ricans, unlike Mexicans, never have been preferred laborers for specific jobs, with the possible exception of women in garment and textile industries. Unionization initially protected textile and garment workers, but the massive industrial restructuring in the Northeast,8 which has resulted in the elimination of many unskilled and unionized jobs, has dimmed the employment prospects of all Puerto Ricans, including youths and mature men.

Viewed in this way, the declining economic status of Puerto Ricans may have resulted partly from the rapid decline in the types of jobs in which they were disproportionately concentrated and part-

6. See Stanley Lieberson, A Piece of the Pie (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). His ideas about the existence and operation of an ethnic job queue are derived from the following propositions: (1) that the occupational composition of a community is independent of the ethnic or racial composition of its population; (2) that groups differ in their objective qualifications for various occupational activities; (3) that group membership directly affects occupational opportunity, owing to employer preferences and tastes; (4) that occupations—jobs—differ in their desirability; and (5) that groups differ initially in their dispositions toward certain jobs.

7. Alternatively, during periods of labor shortage, groups at the bottom will experience broadened employment opportunities because the preferred groups will not fill all of the traditional employment opportunities. Under those circumstances, employment shifts could be most favorable for groups at the bottom of the queue. This is consistent with the experience of Puerto Ricans during the 1960s.

ly from a loss in relative earning power owing to low stocks of human capital in a market whose demand for labor increased in some sectors while it decreased in others. That Cuban men did not have a similar experience, despite their disproportionate representation in two of the same labor markets as Puerto Ricans—in New York and New Jersey—suggests either that Cubans are ranked higher in an employment queue or that Cuban workers displaced by the employment-restructuring processes were more successful finding alternative employment by moving from New York and New Jersey to Miami.

LABOR MARKET CONCENTRATION

The burgeoning literature on structural aspects of labor market outcomes has identified both positive and negative effects of ethnic residential concentration on employment outcomes. For present purposes it suffices to note that positive effects of minority labor market concentration are consistent with an overflow or power thesis: the former would derive from the spillover of minorities into higher-status jobs and/or the reorganization of labor markets along ethnic lines, while the latter would stem from greater political leverage of minority groups as a function of increasing group size. Negative effects would be consistent with the discrimination and subordination theses, whereby minorities are systematically excluded from jobs or relegated to the least desirable jobs. This process would be accentuated by the demarcation of hiring queues along ethnic lines.

These ideas concerning how ethnic density and ethnic typing of jobs influence employment outcomes suggest two working hypotheses. First, I hypothesize that the unequal labor market experiences of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban men during the 1970s reflect their unequal placement in a hiring queue, with Cubans at the top of the Hispanic queue and Puerto Ricans at the bottom. Second, the disadvantaged labor market status of Puerto Ricans results partly from the unequal benefits of minority labor market concentration reaped by each group. These ideas will be empirically evaluated here, after a brief review of the extent of labor market detachment experienced by Puerto Ricans since 1970.

LABOR MARKET DETACHMENT IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Failure to participate in the labor market, along with social isolation and persisting deprivation, is a defining feature of the urban underclass. Although national data on chronicity of poverty and labor force nonparticipation do not exist for Puerto Ricans, annual Current Population Survey data permit an initial foray into questions of labor market detachment and withdrawal. For this purpose, Hispanic men were classified into three categories based on their employment status at the time of, and five years prior to, the 1975, 1980, and 1985 Current Population Surveys: the stable active category consists of persons, including

9. Some indirect evidence on this point is afforded by comparisons of Puerto Rican unemployment rates in industries where they historically have been concentrated. These tabulations are available from the author.

the unemployed, who were in the labor force at both points in time; persons who were in the labor force at the beginning of the five-year period but not at the end, or vice versa, are classified in the unstable active category; the stable inactive category includes persons who were out of the labor force, and not looking for work, at both the beginning and the end of the period.

While less than ideal for evaluating the hypothesis of labor market detachment because these cross-sectional data do not represent the continuous employment history of the same individuals over the entire time span, results summarized in Table I—first row for each panel—clearly show a steeper rise in labor market instability and incomplete withdrawal from the work force among Puerto Ricans. Whereas the category of stable inactive was virtually nonexistent prior to the onset of economic decline in the mid-1970s, the share of unstable employment rose between 1970 and 1985, a period characterized by slow growth and two major recessions.

The share of men experiencing unstable employment hovered around 8 to 9 percent among Mexicans and 4 to 7 percent among Cubans. For Puerto Ricans it was not only considerably higher than that for either Mexicans or Cubans throughout the period but also rose more steeply between the 1975-80 and the 1980-85 intervals, from 13 to 19 percentage points. An increase in unstable employment experiences is significant because it appears to be a precursor to complete withdrawal. By 1985, the share of chronic detachment among Puerto Ricans had reached nearly 6 percent, compared to 1 percent for Mexicans and 3 percent for Cubans.

The notable rise in Cuban labor market instability and withdrawal during the 1980-85 interval partly reflects the presence of a large segment of low-skilled immigrants whose labor market integration process was more difficult than that of earlier Cuban immigrants. A similar period-immigration-effect cannot be claimed for Puerto Ricans, yet among them labor market withdrawal was even more pronounced. Moreover, the lower levels of market withdrawal and detachment among Mexicans, who also have become increasingly diversified by a high influx of immigrants since 1970, challenge any simplistic explanations that international migration or, in the case of Puerto Ricans, circular migration—between island and mainland—was largely responsible for the observed instability and withdrawal.

Table 1 also provides information about social and economic characteristics...
of the men according to employment-experience categories. Although the sample characteristics are weighted to approximate those of the total population, the small sample sizes warrant cautious comparisons between some categories, particularly for Cubans. Nevertheless, the contrasts between Mexicans and Puerto Ricans are striking and instructive.

That labor market position is directly associated with economic well-being is clearly apparent in the poverty and income data, which show substantially higher poverty risks for men whose labor market experience was characterized by instability or inactivity. Of course, stable employment does not always preclude poverty, because a share of the poor are full-time, year-round workers whose poverty status derives from low wages, but the incidence of poverty for the stable active experience category is considerably less than for workers in the other two categories. 15

While real family incomes declined for most groups between 1980 and 1985, they did so differentially according to employment category and national origin. Cuban men illustrate one pattern: essentially, stably employed men did not experience a decrease in real family incomes throughout the period, although the rate of growth slowed during the early 1980s, from roughly 6.6 percent for the 1975-80 period to 2.9 percent for the 1980-85 interval.

In sharp contrast to the Cuban experience, family incomes of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans who were stably employed during the 1975-80 period rose roughly 11 and 9 percent in real terms, while the family incomes of men unstably employed—unstable active—fell by 5.6 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively. During the 1980-85 interval, among Mexicans real incomes of those stably employed fell 9.7 percent, incomes of the unstably employed were virtually constant, and those of chronically inactive men dropped substantially, by 7.5 percent. Puerto Ricans fared somewhat worse in the 1980s: family incomes fell 6.4 percent among men stably employed, 9.0 percent among those unstably employed, and 3.0 percent among those who were out of the labor force continuously. Thus the declining economic status of Puerto Ricans appears to be rooted in two factors: the rising shares of prime-age men with unstable employment and chronic inactivity, and sharper declines in the incomes of those with unstable labor market experiences. The latter may contribute to the withdrawal process, as chronically low earnings and unstable work lead to total discouragement and alienation from the market.

Arguments about the importance of education for labor market success also find some support in the tabulations reported in Table 1. For all groups, labor force withdrawal and detachment were associated with lower stocks of education. The average educational attainment of Mexican and Puerto Rican men was roughly similar at the beginning of the period, 8.4 and 8.6 years, respectively, but over time, as the average schooling stocks for these groups rose, differentials within experience categories increased, favoring Puerto Ricans over Mexicans among those stably employed, and Mexicans over Puerto Ricans among those unstably employed or chronically out of the labor force. If human capital were the major determinant of labor market withdrawal and detachment, then the shares of Mexicans with unstable and inactive work trajectories would be greater than those of similarly classified Puerto Ri-
### TABLE 1
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF ADULT HISPANIC MEN AGED 25-64 BY LABOR FORCE EXPERIENCE (Means or percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1970-75</th>
<th>1975-80</th>
<th>1980-86</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Unstable</td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>active</td>
<td>active</td>
<td>inactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mexicans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category total (percentage)</td>
<td>91.0%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s.d.)†</td>
<td>(4.5)</td>
<td>(4.1)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income (1974 dollars)</td>
<td>$8,015</td>
<td>$5,935</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s.d.)†</td>
<td>(4,947)</td>
<td>(4,411)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty rate (percentage)</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[N]‡</td>
<td>(652)</td>
<td>(67)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Puerto Ricans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category total (percentage)</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education (years)</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s.d.)†</td>
<td>(3.6)</td>
<td>(3.2)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family income (1979 dollars)</td>
<td>$7,752</td>
<td>$4,750</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s.d.)†</td>
<td>(4,287)</td>
<td>(3,721)</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Poverty rate (percentage)</td>
<td>[N]</td>
<td>Category total (percentage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cubans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.6% 49.4% 11.1% 68.1% 12.2% 49.2% 46.7%</td>
<td>(152)</td>
<td>95.8% 4.2% 0.0% 95.7% 4.3% 0.0% 90.0% 6.8% 3.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Unless otherwise indicated, the figures in this table are weighted to approximate population parameters.
*Stable active: in labor force at beginning and end of interval; unstable active: changed labor force status during interval; stable inactive: out of labor force at beginning and end of interval.
¹Standard deviation.
²Unweighted sample size.
cans. In fact, just the opposite occurred. This justifies a search for structural explanations, which is the topic of the following section.

JOB QUEUES AND DECLINING LABOR MARKET OPPORTUNITIES

The theoretical and substantive issues raised earlier focus on how residence in ethnic labor markets—that is, whether individual workers reside in labor markets with high levels of ethnic concentration—and ethnic job segmentation—whether jobs were ethnic typed, Anglo typed, or not ethnically differentiated—operate to stratify the annual earnings of Hispanic-origin men. The data used for this part of the analysis are from the 5 percent sample of the Public Use Microdata Samples of the 1980 census.

My arguments about the influence of ethnic concentration and ethnic segmentation

16. The distinction between high- and low-ethnic-density labor markets is derived from an analysis of both the ethnic composition of labor markets and the distribution of each ethnic group among them. Briefly, a labor market area was defined as one of high ethnic density for a given reference group if the group was overrepresented relative to its share of the total population, based on standardized, or z, scores.

17. The statistical procedures we used are detailed in Marta Tienda and Franklin D. Wilson, "Ethnicity, Migration and Labor Force Activity" (Paper delivered at the National Bureau of Economic Research Workshop on Migration, Trade and Labor, Cambridge, MA, 11-12 Sept. 1987). A log-linear analysis was used to determine whether each ethnic group was overrepresented (ethnic-typed), underrepresented (Anglo-typed), or approximately equally represented (nontyped), after adjustments for group differences in education and age composition.

18. The sample includes approximately half of the men aged 25-64 who self-reported their race or national origin as Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban. Restricting the lower end of the age distribution to 25 rather than 16 ensured that most respondents had completed school at the time of the census, hence school enrollment would not limit labor force participation. Additional restrictions on the sample excluded individuals who met the following conditions: (1) never worked, or were out of the labor force continuously during the five years prior to the census; (2) were enrolled in school or in the military in either 1975 or 1980; or (3) resided outside the United States in 1975.
TABLE 2
DEMOGRAPHIC AND LABOR MARKET CHARACTERISTICS
OF HISPANIC MEN AGED 25-64, 1980

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent variable</th>
<th>Mexicans</th>
<th>Puerto Ricans</th>
<th>Cubans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annual earnings (logged)</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>9.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(s.d.)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual mean earnings</td>
<td>$13,342</td>
<td>$12,687</td>
<td>$16,368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9,414)</td>
<td>(5,647)</td>
<td>(13,088)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Individual characteristics             |          |               |        |
| Education (percentage)                  |          |               |        |
| Did not complete high school            | 62.3%    | 59.9%         | 41.2%  |
| High school graduate                    | 33.3%    | 36.1%         | 40.9%  |
| Some college                            | 4.4%     | 4.0%          | 17.9%  |
| Age (years)                             | 39.3     | 39.5          | 46.1   |
| (s.d.)                                  | (10.8)   | (10.1)        | (10.0) |
| Good English (percentage)               | 78.0%    | 82.7%         | 63.6%  |
| Foreign born (percentage)               | 36.3%    | 77.3%         | 93.3%  |
| Work disabled (percentage)              | 5.0%     | 5.8%          | 3.5%   |
| Weeks worked                            | 46.2     | 46.7          | 48.1   |
| (s.d.)                                  | (11.0)   | (10.8)        | (9.2)  |
| Average hours worked weekly             | 41.7     | 40.0          | 42.6   |
| (s.d.)                                  | (10.2)   | (10.0)        | (11.1) |
| Household head (percentage)             | 85.2%    | 79.6%         | 89.6%  |
| Married (percentage)                    | 81.3%    | 71.7%         | 81.8%  |
| Market characteristics                  |          |               |        |
| Ethnic job queue (percentage)           |          |               |        |
| Ethnic typed                           | 13.0%    | 18.0%         | 13.0%  |
| Anglo typed                            | 4.3%     | 6.8%          | 14.4%  |
| Nontyped                               | 82.7%    | 75.4%         | 72.6%  |
| Concentrated area (percentage)         | 85.9%    | 83.2%         | 84.4%  |
| Area wage rate                          | $7.21    | $7.88         | $7.37  |
| (0.97)                                  | (0.77)   | (0.61)        |        |
| Area unemployment rate                  | 6.19     | 6.66          | 5.86   |
| (1.98)                                  | (1.23)   | (1.30)        |        |
| [N]                                     | [5,728]  | [5,908]       | [3,895]|


NOTE: The sample includes approximately half of the men aged 25-64 who self-reported their race or national origin as Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban. Restricting the lower end of the age distribution to 25 rather than 16 ensured that most respondents had completed school at the time of the census, hence school enrollment would not limit labor force participation. Additional restrictions on the sample excluded individuals who met the following conditions: (1) never worked, or were out of the labor force continuously during the five years prior to the census; (2) were enrolled in school or in the military in either 1975 or 1980; or (3) resided outside the United States in 1975. In this table, standard deviations appear in parentheses; they are descriptive statistics based on a sample with nonzero earnings in 1979.
be disadvantaged relative to Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, reflecting the shorter immigration history of the Cuban population. The national-origin groups also differ in terms of their family status: among men aged 25-65, Puerto Ricans were less likely to be married and to be household heads than either Mexicans or Cubans.

My argument about the influence of structural factors in explaining the weakened labor market position of Puerto Ricans finds some support in the summary market characteristics. Puerto Ricans' residential configuration afforded them the highest unemployment rates and the highest average wage rates. Cubans, on the other hand, resided in labor markets with relatively lower unemployment—a difference of nearly one percentage point, on average, compared to Puerto Ricans—while the unemployment rates where Mexicans resided were between the Puerto Rican and Cuban extremes.

Space restrictions preclude a full discussion of the implications of market conditions for the labor supply decisions of Hispanic men. Suffice it to note that, in a separate analysis, area unemployment rates exerted a significant negative effect, and average area wage rates a significant positive effect, on the labor force decisions of Puerto Ricans, while for Cubans and Mexicans these effects were essentially zero. This appears to indicate that the labor market behavior of Puerto Ricans is more sensitive to labor market conditions than that of either Cubans or Mexicans, but why this is so is less obvious. Moreover, among those individuals who do secure employment, uneven placement in the job queue further weakens their labor market position, leaving them vulnerable to economic cycles and ethnic prejudices.

Support for this proposition is found in Table 2, which shows that Puerto Ricans were more likely to work in ethnic-typed jobs than either Mexicans or Cubans, and in Table 3, which shows that Puerto Rican incumbents of ethnic-typed jobs were penalized 17 percent relative to their statistically equivalent counterparts engaged in nontyped jobs. For Mexicans, the earnings penalty for incumbency in ethnic-typed jobs was somewhat lower, roughly 12 percent, while incumbency in Anglo-typed jobs sustained economic rewards 19 percent above those received by incumbents of nontyped jobs. These effects are net of individual productivity characteristics—for example, education, English proficiency, disability status, age, and the conditional probability of being in the wage sample. Puerto Ricans, however, did not reap additional earnings bonuses from incumbency in Anglo-typed jobs.

Equally interesting are the earnings consequences of labor market conditions. Whereas both Mexicans and Cubans gained significant financial rewards from residence in high-wage areas—13 percent and 3 percent, respectively—no such benefit accrued to Puerto Ricans. Moreover, residence in labor markets with high concentrations of the respective nationality groups translated into an economic liability for each group, but less for Puerto Ricans than for either Mexicans or Cubans. This suggests that residential concentration does not increase the ability of these groups to protect ethnic workers via political leverage derived from group size, nor does group concentration result in massive spillover into high-status and well-paying jobs. That Mexicans and

19. These results were based on a probit regression of 1980 labor force participation and are available from the author.
TABLE 3
EFFECTS OF ETHNIC JOB QUEUES ON EARNINGS OF
HISPANIC MEN AGED 25-64, 1980 (Metric coefficients)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic job queue</th>
<th>Mexicans</th>
<th>Puerto Ricans</th>
<th>Cubans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic typed</td>
<td>-.116*</td>
<td>-.170*</td>
<td>-.285*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo typed</td>
<td>.193*</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.112*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.048)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area wage</td>
<td>.126*</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.035*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concentrated area</td>
<td>-.172*</td>
<td>-.079*</td>
<td>-.180*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.029)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school graduate</td>
<td>-.253*</td>
<td>-.068</td>
<td>-.238*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.050)</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did not complete high school</td>
<td>-.412*</td>
<td>-.183*</td>
<td>-.283*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td>(.070)</td>
<td>(.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.042*</td>
<td>.032*</td>
<td>.025*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age²</td>
<td>-.0004*</td>
<td>-.0003*</td>
<td>-.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
<td>(.0001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good English</td>
<td>.185*</td>
<td>.126*</td>
<td>.208*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.027)</td>
<td>(.028)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>-.080*</td>
<td>-.070*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.024)</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work disabled</td>
<td>-.135*</td>
<td>-.192*</td>
<td>-.200*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.045)</td>
<td>(.042)</td>
<td>(.080)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lambda²</td>
<td>.120*</td>
<td>.098*</td>
<td>.083*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.015)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>5.552</td>
<td>6.330</td>
<td>6.708</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.334</td>
<td>.300</td>
<td>.336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[N]</td>
<td>[5,726]</td>
<td>[5,908]</td>
<td>[3,895]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


NOTE: Effects of ethnic job queues are adjusted for the effects of weeks worked and usual hours worked. Standard errors are in parentheses. The sample includes approximately half of the men aged 25-64 who self-reported their race or national origin as Mexican, Puerto Rican, or Cuban. Restricting the lower end of the age distribution to 25 rather than 16 ensured that most respondents had completed school at the time of the census, hence school enrollment would not limit labor force participation. Additional restrictions on the sample excluded individuals who met the following conditions: (1) never worked, or were out of the labor force continuously during the five years prior to the census; (2) were enrolled in school or in the military in either 1975 or 1980; or (3) resided outside the United States in 1975.

*Inverse of Mills ratio to correct for self-selection into the wage sample.

†Significant at the 95 percent level.
Cubans were more residentially concentrated than Puerto Ricans in 1980 partly explains why the effects of concentration were more pronounced for them, but it is also conceivable that discrimination has intensified because of the loss of low-skilled jobs in New York City coupled with the growing presence of Dominican and Colombian immigrants willing to work in jobs that offer low wages and poor working conditions.  

Substantively, the findings in Table 3 suggest that the process of channeling Puerto Ricans into so-called Puerto Rican jobs, coupled with the absence of earnings bonuses for securing nontyped jobs, reinforces the low earnings of Puerto Ricans who do manage to secure employment. But, as the analyses in Table 1 show, since 1975 increasing shares of adult Puerto Rican men have not secured jobs, and residence in high-concentration areas has not improved the chances of employment for Hispanics, irrespective of national origin.

**DISCUSSION**

During the 1960s and 1970s it was commonplace to attribute the existence of racial and economic inequality to discrimination and to direct policy initiatives aiming toward equal employment opportunity and affirmative action. The experience of the 1980s, however, has reaffirmed that a healthy economy is a necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for reducing inequality. The economic experiences of Puerto Ricans provide stark testimony concerning the deleterious consequence of economic decline.  

Although discrimination may still be a major factor accounting for the disadvantaged economic status of Puerto Ricans, it does not address the issue of why the economic status of Cubans and especially Mexicans has not followed suit. While not denying the importance of prejudice in maintaining socioeconomic inequality along racial and ethnic lines, a structural interpretation is consistent with the uneven regional effects of economic growth and decline that occurred during the late 1970s and early 1980s. But a simple Rustbelt-Sunbelt dichotomy set against the backdrop of major recessions also is inadequate to explain the impoverishment of Puerto Ricans; their increasing labor market instability and withdrawal (Table 1) can only partly be understood in these terms.

Additional and equally important insights into the declining economic status of Puerto Ricans obtain from the results showing that the existence of ethnic labor market divisions also places constraints on the earnings frontiers of Hispanic workers, and Puerto Ricans in particular. This is evident in results (Table 3) showing strong negative penalties for incumbency in Puerto Rican jobs, and no additional compensation or bonus for the small share of Puerto Ricans who manage to secure Anglo-typed jobs. Yet these results also raise many questions about the economic significance of ethnic job queues, which appear to operate differently for Mexicans and Cubans. While both groups benefit financially from incumbency in Anglo-typed jobs, the share of each group able to secure these better-paying jobs differs (Table 2). Moreover, both groups are penalized for incumbency in ethnic-typed jobs, Cubans more so than Mexicans.

On balance, the empirical results presented are more suggestive than conclusive as to the importance of structural factors in explaining the declining economic status of Puerto Ricans. While the evidence

20. See Borjas and Tienda, eds., *Hispanics in the U.S. Economy*, chaps. 10 and 11.
of labor force withdrawal has aroused speculation about the emergence of an underclass among Hispanics, largely concentrated among Puerto Ricans, the absence of longitudinal data prevents examination of the duration of labor market detachment.

My results place the Puerto Rican experience in a comparative perspective and emphasize the promise of a structural interpretation of labor force withdrawal. While evidence of growing labor market instability and withdrawal is consistent with one of the premises of the persisting poverty syndrome, further scrutiny of the concentration of labor market withdrawal and social isolation is needed before concluding that Puerto Ricans have become part of the urban underclass. Priority issues worth investigating include establishing whether increased labor market competition from immigrants—Dominicans and Colombians in particular—has exacerbated the economic problems of Puerto Ricans and the extent to which industrial restructuring has been responsible for the labor market withdrawal of Puerto Rican men. Beyond these structurally focused lines of inquiry, additional study of labor market trajectories is essential to determine whether the patterns of nonparticipation based on repeated cross sections represent the accumulation of chronic spells and permanent withdrawal among a segment of the total population, or whether the observed increase in nonparticipation among Puerto Ricans reflects the increasing prevalence of short spells of nonparticipation among the total population. Until these questions are satisfactorily answered, discussions about the development of a Puerto Rican urban underclass will be largely speculative.
Immigration and the Underclass

By ROBERT D. REISCHAUER

ABSTRACT: The size and nature of recent immigration to the United States have raised the possibility that immigrants have diminished the labor market opportunities of low-skilled, native minority workers and, thereby, might have contributed to the emergence of the urban underclass. To the extent that immigrants and native workers are substitute factors of production, immigrants may reduce the wage rates of native labor, increase their unemployment, lower their labor force participation, undermine working conditions, and reduce rates of internal mobility. While casual empiricism would seem to support the notion that immigrants have depressed the opportunities of low-skilled native workers, careful and sophisticated analyses by a number of social scientists provide little evidence that immigrants have had any significant negative impacts on the employment situation of black Americans. Thus competition from unskilled immigrants should not be included on the list of factors that have facilitated the growth of the underclass.

Robert D. Reischauer is a senior fellow in the Economic Studies Program of the Brookings Institution, where he is completing a book on America's underclass. He served as senior vice-president of the Urban Institute from 1981 to 1986 and before that was the deputy director of the Congressional Budget Office. Reischauer has written extensively on domestic policy issues, fiscal federalism, and the federal budget. He received a Ph.D. in economics and an M.I.A. in international affairs from Columbia University.

NOTE: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be attributed to the Brookings Institution, its trustees, or its funders.
IN recent years, a large number of immigrants, both documented and undocumented, have entered the United States. Some observers have feared that this wave of immigration might have contributed to the emergence of the urban underclass by eroding the labor market prospects of low-skilled native minorities. The size and nature of the recent immigration make such concerns plausible. Over the decade 1975-84, some 5.1 million aliens entered the country legally and an estimated 1 to 3 million persons entered in an undocumented status. In raw numbers, this inflow came close to equaling the nation's largest immigration wave, which occurred during the first decade of the twentieth century. Relative to the size of the nation's population, however, the recent inflow is substantially below that of the first three decades of this century.

The recent flow of immigrants has been notable not only for its magnitude but also for its characteristics. After the enactment of the National Immigration Act of 1965, an increasing fraction of the new arrivals were drawn from Asia, Latin America, and other less developed areas. Compared to previous immigrant waves, fewer of these newcomers came from Europe and Canada, more were non-white, and more had relatively low skill and educational levels. For example, while 68 percent of legal immigrants came from Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand during the 1951-60 period, less than 15 percent of the immigrants arriving during the 1980s came from these areas.

The impetus behind immigration has also changed somewhat over time. As travel costs have fallen, desperate economic conditions, population pressures, and civil strife have continued to push many from their countries of birth. But the American economy has not been very vibrant. Rising unemployment and slow wage growth have characterized the economy during this period of increasing immigration.

The size and characteristics of these recent immigrant flows, and their occurrence during a period of high unemployment, have rekindled fears that immigration may be hurting the labor market prospects of native labor, in particular low-skilled, minority workers. This possibility has generated particular concern because certain minority groups, most notably black males with few skills, have experienced significant labor market problems during the past decade and a half. Black unemployment rates have risen dramatically, the incomes of less educated blacks have not kept pace with those of whites, and black male labor force participation rates have fallen. Specifically, the unemployment rate for black males aged 25 to 34 rose from 8.5 percent in 1974 to 13.8 percent in 1985 while the rates for white males of the same age rose from 3.6 percent to only 5.7 percent. The incomes of less educated black males rose at a rate that was under two-thirds of that of whites with similar levels of educational attainment. Finally, the fraction of the black males aged 25 to 34 participating in

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2. The occupational-preference visas provided by the 1965 act tended to increase the skill and educational levels of immigrants relative to those of the native pop. lation while the kinship preferences and the growth of undocumented immigration had the opposite effect. See Barry R. Chiswick, "Is the New Immigration Less Skilled than the Old?" Journal of Labor Economics, 4(2):169-92(1986).
the labor force fell from 92.8 percent to 88.8 percent over the period from 1974 to 1985.¹

This article explores the possibility that the size and character of recent immigration have hurt the labor market prospects for low-skilled minorities and thereby might have contributed to the emergence of the urban underclass. The next section of the article summarizes the theoretical framework used by labor economists to analyze the impact of immigration on the native labor force. This is followed by a description of the specific avenues through which the arrival of immigrants might worsen the labor market prospects of the native workers with whom they compete. The concluding section discusses several reasons why there appears to be so little evidence that immigration has played any appreciable role in the deterioration of minority job prospects and the growth of the urban underclass.

THE IMPACT OF IMMIGRATION: THE THEORY

Immigration both increases the supply of labor and raises the overall level of economic activity as the immigrants who work and those who do not increase the demand for the goods and services needed for daily existence. The popular discussion has focused solely on the increase in the supply of labor and has assumed that this increase must lower the wages of native workers. In other words, it has been assumed that immigrant labor and native workers are what economists refer to as substitute factors of production.

While an increase in the labor supply caused by immigration should act to reduce the labor market prospects for some groups of native workers, this may not be the case for all or even most types of native labor. In other words, some groups of native labor may be complements to immigrant labor and may find their labor market prospects improved and their wages bid up as a result of increased immigration. Whether immigrant workers are a complement or a substitute for a certain category of native workers will depend very much on the characteristics of the immigrants, the relative numbers and characteristics of the native workers living in the labor markets in which the immigrants settle, and the strength of those local labor markets.

Under certain circumstances, immigrants could even prove to be a complementary factor of production for all categories of native workers. This would be the case if the immigrants filled an empty niche in the labor force; in other words, if they were willing to do the jobs that no native worker would accept at the prevailing wage. Such a situation could lead to an increase in the demand for all types of native labor. For example, a certain type of manufacturing might be unprofitable in the United States because no native workers are willing to do the most unpleasant tasks required by the production process even for the highest
wage that the manufacturer could pay and still compete effectively with imports. When immigrants who are willing to do this work at a low wage arrive, an industry is created. This then increases the demand for native workers who fill the other jobs in the new industry and in the industries that supply goods and services to the new industry. The apparel and furniture industries in Los Angeles conform to this pattern as does much of the fruit and vegetable farming in the West and Southwest.

A similar situation could occur if the positions of native workers, whom one might expect to be competitive with the immigrants, were somehow protected. For example, it has been suggested that Mexican immigration into southern California might have raised incomes for black workers because a significant portion of California's blacks are employed by the public sector and immigration has driven up the demand for public services. Because citizenship or legal entry is a prerequisite for public-sector employment, many of the immigrants were precluded from competing with the blacks for these government jobs.

The more normal situation would be one in which the immigrants compete with some segments of the native labor force and complement other segments. Those for whom they act as substitutes would find their labor market prospects damaged, while those for whom they are complements would be helped. The characteristics of the immigrants, both actual and those perceived by employers, would be important in determining which specific groups of native workers were helped and which were hurt.4

4. There is no reason why the negative impact of immigration need be confined to the unskilled portion of the labor force. For example, at the top end of the skill spectrum, a case can be made that the influx of foreign medical professionals has reduced the earnings of native doctors.

The price reductions and increases in economic activity caused by immigration should act to offset some of the detrimental labor market effects of an increased supply of a particular type of labor. Under some extreme circumstances, the increase in economic activity could completely offset any detrimental labor market impacts and all groups of native workers could find themselves as well or better off after the immigration. For example, an influx of wealthy political refugees—Iranians, for instance—few of whom intended to work, or an increase in the number of immigrants who were the retired relatives of natives could produce this result.

AVENUES OF IMPACT

Most of the public discussion of the impact of immigration on labor markets has focused on wage rates, but wages are only one of five possible avenues through which the impact of immigration might be felt. Unemployment represents a second avenue. Institutional rigidities could make wages relatively inflexible. The minimum wage and collective-bargaining agreements are two such rigidities, but there are others. For example, many large national companies have uniform wage policies across geographic areas, some of which are affected by immigrants and others of which are not. Such rigidities would preclude the full expression of the impact of immigration on wages and instead may lead to increased unemployment among those groups who must compete with recent immigrants. To the extent that immigrants are viewed as better, less troublesome, or harder workers, they would be preferred at any fixed wage over native labor. If this is the case,
native labor may suffer more unemployment because of immigration but little noticeable reduction in the wage rates of those who remained employed.

A third avenue through which the impact of increased immigration might be felt is the labor force participation of competing workers. In recent years, the labor force participation rate for black youths has fallen significantly. Most analyses indicate that many of the young persons who are out of the labor force do want to work. At first glance, their reservation wages do not seem to be unreasonably high; in fact, they are slightly below those for white youths. These reservation wages may, however, be considerably above those of competing immigrant workers. The net result may be that competition from recent immigrants has increased the fraction of native youths who have dropped out of the labor market. Those remaining in the labor force may be disproportionately in protected jobs, such as the government sector, or in positions that require a strong communications ability. In other words, they may be protected or complementary factors of production.

A fourth avenue through which immigration could affect the prospects of competing groups of native labor is internal migration. U.S. history is replete with examples of vast internal flows of workers seeking better opportunities. The movements west during the Gold Rush, the flight of the Okies from the Dust Bowl in the 1930s, the migration from rural areas to the industrializing cities that took place during the world wars, and the post-World War II exodus of blacks from the South to the cities of the North and Midwest are just some examples. One possible effect of the recent influx of immigrants may have been to slow down the pace of internal migration. Thus the major impact of the flow of immigrants into such expanding metropolitan areas as San Diego, Phoenix, Los Angeles, and Miami may not be found among the unskilled native work forces of those cities but rather in St. Louis, Gary, Newark, and Detroit, where potential migrants to these more vibrant labor markets might now be trapped because they cannot compete successfully for the available jobs in the boom areas.

Finally, the impact of immigration may manifest itself not in wages, employment, migration, or labor force participation but rather in the working conditions and fringe benefits of the jobs taken by immigrants. If significant numbers of blacks also hold these jobs, the effects of immigration on black workers may be felt through a relative reduction in the generosity of the health insurance, vacations, pensions, and workplace safety offered by these jobs.

To summarize, there are a number of different channels through which immigration might affect the labor market prospects for native workers, and it is unlikely that the impact of immigration would be expressed through just one or two of these. The most probable situation would be for all to be active to some degree.

THE CASUAL AND CIRCUMSTANIAL EVIDENCE

The public has long been fearful that immigration has a harmful effect on native workers. Periodically, this fear has erupted into political movements to restrain immigration. The nation's first restrictions on immigration—the Chinese
Exclusion Act of 1882 and the 1907 agreement to stop the entry of Japanese—were manifestations both of this fear and of racism.

Public opinion polls suggest that these concerns are strong today and represent some of the impetus behind the immigration reform legislation that Congress passed in 1986 after four years of debate. For example, a poll conducted in mid-1986 found that one-third—34 percent—of the total population and 44 percent of blacks felt that immigrants were taking jobs away from Americans.6 A June 1983 poll of the Los Angeles area, which ranks second only to Miami among metropolitan areas most affected by recent immigration, found that almost half—48.2 percent—of the respondents felt that undocumented aliens were taking jobs away from native workers and over two-thirds—68.6 percent—felt that immigrants lowered the wage levels in at least some occupations.7 When compared to whites and Asians, black respondents expressed significantly stronger convictions that undocumented aliens were undermining the labor market and that this was affecting black workers the most.

Casual observation of labor market trends in large American cities would seem to support these popular views. Many of the low-skilled jobs that one might expect to find filled by minority workers with little education appear to be held by immigrants. Taxicab drivers are one noticiable example. The skills required for this job are an ability to communicate in English, an ability to drive a car, and some knowledge of the geography of the local area. A dropout from an inner-city high school should certainly have an advantage on all of these dimensions over a recent immigrant from a Third World nation. Yet, in some cities, disproportionate numbers of cab drivers are recent immigrants. For example, a recent survey found that 77 percent of those applying for new hack licenses in New York were born outside of the continental United States.8

Cab driving is not the only low-skilled occupation in which immigrants appear to have a strong foothold. In many cities, the crews that clean large office buildings are increasingly dominated by recent immigrants, as are the kitchen staffs of many restaurants, the personnel hired by upper- and middle-income working women to care for their children, and operators, fabricators, and laborers in low-wage manufacturing industries. A well-publicized example of the latter was the composition of “the New York 21,” the group of 21 workers at the Hantscho, Inc., plant in Mount Vernon, New York, who, on 22 August 1985, won one-third of what, at the time, was the nation’s largest lottery prize. Only two of the workers were native-born, the remainder having come from such countries as Paraguay, the Philippines, Poland, Trinidad, China, the Dominican Republic, Thailand, Yugoslavia, and Hungary.

Some crude indication of the potential for competition between immigrants and black workers can be obtained by examining the changes in employment, unemployment, and labor force participation that

occurred between 1970 and 1980. During this period the size of the immigrant working-age population—aged 20 to 64—increased by roughly the same amount as the working-age black population: 3.29 million blacks versus 3.39 million immigrants. Recent immigrants, however, filled a disproportionate number of the new jobs created during the decade. Of every 8 new jobs, 1 was filled by a recent immigrant, while blacks filled only 1 out of every 11 new jobs.

Over the same decade, the unemployment rates and labor force participation rates of blacks and immigrants diverged. Black male unemployment grew from 6.3 to 12.3 percent between 1970 and 1980, while the unemployment rate for male immigrants rose from 3.7 to 6.5 percent. The labor force participation rate for all black males fell from 69.8 to 66.7 percent over this period, and for those in their prime working years—ages 25 to 44—it fell from 87.8 to 84.6 percent. In contrast, the labor force participation of all male immigrants rose from 64.0 to 68.9 percent and that for prime-working-age immigrants fell slightly from 91.8 to 89.4 percent.

While these divergent trends are disturbing, there may be little causative connection between the labor market behavior of blacks and immigration. A more detailed look at the employment changes by occupation over the decade does not provide any strong evidence of competition or displacement. Black job growth took place disproportionately in the more rapidly growing occupational categories such as managerial, professional, and technical workers, sales and clerical workers, and nonhousehold service workers. Immigrant job growth was more heavily concentrated in the slower-growing occupations. Of course, it is possible that blacks were forced out of these more slowly growing occupations. This, however, does not seem to be a likely source of the problem because not much of black male employment had been in these occupations.

A simple comparison of black unemployment, labor force participation, net migration rate, and earnings in the metropolitan areas that have experienced the largest recent inflow of immigrants with comparable data from those metropolitan areas that have experienced little new immigration also does not reveal any striking evidence that immigration has had a substantial impact. The average unemployment rate for black males in the metropolitan areas with the greatest immigration rose less than did the average rate for the areas that experienced little immigration (see Table 1). Similarly, in the metropolitan areas experiencing the most immigration, the average black male labor force participation rate fell less and the average earnings of black workers increased more than was the case in the metropolitan areas with little immigration. The change in net black out-migration, however, was slightly greater in the high-immigration metropolitan areas.

Of course, these measures of labor market performance are affected by many factors that are not controlled for in the crude comparisons presented in Table 1. Therefore, these data do little more than rule out the possibility that immigration has had an overwhelming effect on black labor market performance. If the effects are subtle, more complex and sophis-


TABLE 1
CHANGE IN BLACK LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES, UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, MEDIAN EARNINGS, AND NET MIGRATION RATES FOR METROPOLITAN AREAS THAT EXPERIENCE SUBSTANTIAL AND INCONSEQUENTIAL IMMIGRATION, 1970-80

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metropolitan Area</th>
<th>Recent Immigration*</th>
<th>Labor Force Participation†</th>
<th>Unemployment Rate‡</th>
<th>Median Earnings§</th>
<th>Net Migration‖</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miami</td>
<td>16.64</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>218.5</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td>12.93</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>102.1</td>
<td>-4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>-6.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Francisco-Oakland</td>
<td>6.88</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>107.6</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houston</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>96.8</td>
<td>159.5</td>
<td>2.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>4.48</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>252.0</td>
<td>104.8</td>
<td>-2.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>9.05</td>
<td>-5.3</td>
<td>117.7</td>
<td>111.4</td>
<td>-2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low immigration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indianapolis</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>113.9</td>
<td>-1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cincinnati-Hamilton</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>238.7</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>104.7</td>
<td>115.2</td>
<td>-3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsburgh</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>187.4</td>
<td>122.7</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas City</td>
<td>0.87</td>
<td>-11.0</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>-2.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buffalo</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>-21.6</td>
<td>134.4</td>
<td>113.8</td>
<td>-6.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>-9.3</td>
<td>120.5</td>
<td>105.7</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


†Percentage change from 1970 to 1980 in labor force participation for black males aged 25 to 29.
‡Percentage change from 1970 to 1980 in unemployment rate for black males aged 25 to 29.
§Percentage change from 1969 to 1979 in earnings of black males working full-time, full-year.
‖Percentage-point change from 1970 to 1980 in five-year net black migration rate.

Sophisticated statistical procedures would be required to ferret them out.

THE ANALYTICAL EVIDENCE

A number of recent analyses, using sophisticated statistical techniques, have attempted to measure the degree to which immigrants have hurt the labor market prospects of native workers. These studies have used three approaches. The first of these employs a generalized Leontief production function framework to estimate the factor price elasticities of various categories of native labor with respect to increases in immigrant labor. These models are estimated across samples of individuals. The second approach examines in detail the experience of a particular labor market, one that contains a large number of recent immigrants. The third approach involves analyzing labor market outcomes across standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) or industries to determine whether native labor in areas or industries with high immigrant shares have been affected by this immigration.

The major contributions based on the production function approach are contained in a series of articles written by...
George J. Borjas and several others contributed by Frank D. Bean, B. Lindsay Lowell, and Lowell Taylor. These articles utilize several different data sources to estimate the effects of various types of immigrants on the wage rates, earnings, and participation rates of different groups of native workers. Using data from the Survey of Income and Education, Borjas found no evidence to support the view that Hispanic male labor—either immigrant or native—depressed the wages of black male workers. Instead, this study uncovered some weak evidence to support the view that Hispanics and blacks are complements.

In another paper, using 1970 and 1980 census data, Borjas examined the impact of immigration on the annual earnings of various classes of native workers. Annual earnings, of course, are a product of wage rates and hours worked and thus encompass unemployment, the second avenue through which immigration may affect the native labor force. Borjas's estimates suggest that male immigration increased the earnings of both young and older black males in 1970; that is, that male immigrants were a complementary factor of production to black male workers. Black male earnings were unaffected by female or Hispanic immigration. Similar estimates using data from the 1980 census provided no statistically significant evidence that black male earnings were reduced either by recent—occurring between 1970 and 1980—or earlier—pre-1970—immigration.

In a third study, using data from the 1970 census, Borjas separated the impact of Hispanic and non-Hispanic immigrants and found that neither group appeared to reduce the wages or annual earnings of black males. Under certain circumstances, however, native Hispanic males appeared to be a substitute for black males. Borjas also found that women were substitutes for men and that the increase in the labor force participation of women has had a particularly large impact on black male labor market prospects. Borjas also looked at effects of immigration on labor force participation rates and found some evidence that white male immigration and the increase in female participation had reduced the participation rate of black males.

In yet another paper, Borjas examined the impact of four separate categories of male immigrants—black, white, Hispanic, and Asian—on five categories of native workers—black, white, Hispanic, and Asian males, and all females—using data from the 1980 census. All immigrant groups were found to depress the earnings of white native males, but only black and Hispanic immigrants had an even marginally negative effect on the earnings of native black males. The depressive effect of Hispanic immigrants was confined to Mexican—as distinct from Cuban, Puerto Rican, and other Hispanic—immigrants, but the magnitudes of these effects were minuscule. For example, one set of Borjas's estimated parameters indicated that a doubling of Mexican immigration would reduce the earnings of black native males by less than 1 percent.
Frank Bean and his colleagues have used a similar methodology and 1980 census data to examine the impact of undocumented Mexicans on the annual earnings of native workers in 47 SMSAs in the Southwest.16 Their results suggest that the size of the undocumented Mexican population has no depressive effect on the annual earnings of black males or females and that legal Mexican immigrants and native Mexicans are complementary to blacks. The major detrimental impact of immigration, both legal and undocumented, was found to be on the earnings of other immigrants. A second study confirmed these findings and extended them to cover black females and blacks working in blue-collar occupations.17 While the findings of these studies are significant, their relevance may be limited by the fact that they focused only on the SMSAs of the Southwest, many of which have very small black populations.

A number of studies have employed the second approach, which involves careful examination of the interactions between immigrants and native workers in a particular labor market. One of the most detailed of these is the Urban Institute's analysis of the impact of immigration on the economies of southern California and the Los Angeles metropolitan area.18 This analysis found that the large inflow of unskilled immigrants into Los Angeles did not seem to have any negative labor market consequences for the native black population. Over the 1970-82 period, labor force participation of black adults in Los Angeles was consistently higher than the national average. The labor force participation rate for black females rose more than the national average over this period, while the participation rate for men fell less than elsewhere. Similarly, the unemployment rates for blacks in the Los Angeles area increased far less dramatically than they did in the nation as a whole over this period despite the substantial inflow of immigrants into the area.

The Urban Institute analysis concluded that there was little direct job competition between blacks and Mexican immigrants in the Los Angeles area. Over 90 percent of the net increase in black employment occurred in white-collar jobs, and, as a result, black wage gains in the area seemed to outpace those in the nation as whole. The institute's researchers did find considerable evidence, however, that the influx of immigrants had depressed wages in certain low-skilled occupations where immigrant labor was concentrated.

Researchers at Rand have also examined the impact of Mexican immigration on the economy and social structure of California.19 They found that wage growth in California and Los Angeles over the 1970-80 decade was slower than in the nation as a whole probably because of immigration. While immigration affected the earnings of native whites and

blacks, their earnings still remained considerably above the national averages at the end of the period.

The Urban Institute researchers are among those who have employed the third approach, which involves examining the effects of immigration across metropolitan areas or industries using the areas or industries as the unit of observation. They used regression analysis to examine the effect of Mexican immigration on black unemployment rates and family incomes in a sample of 51 metropolitan areas in the Southwest and to estimate the effects of variation in the size of the Hispanic population on black unemployment and family incomes across 247 of the nation's metropolitan areas. These models uncovered no evidence of any significant effects on unemployment rates and only a very small effect on family incomes in the sample of 247 metropolitan areas.

CONCLUSION

The empirical work that was reviewed in the previous section provides no strong evidence that immigration has significantly diminished the labor market prospects for black workers. This conclusion appears to be fairly robust; it is based on studies that use a variety of analytical approaches and a number of different data sources. Therefore it is unlikely that recent immigration has played an appreciable role in the emergence of the underclass.

Nevertheless, there are several reasons why this conclusion should be regarded as tentative. Prime among them are the limitations of the available data. Most of the studies reviewed in the previous section are based on fairly old data, data that were collected in 1970, 1976, or 1980. Labor market dynamics could have changed some during the 1980s. About 5 million additional immigrants have entered the United States since the 1980 census, many local labor markets have become extremely weak, and the minimum wage has not been increased since 1981.

Not only are the available data old, but they also may not be sufficiently detailed to isolate the types of effects that are of interest. These effects may be quite localized, may affect only small groups of native workers—for example, young minority workers with limited educational attainments—and may be caused by only certain types of immigrants—for example, recent immigrants with few skills. Analyses that examine national data may not be able to uncover effects that are felt in only a few geographic areas. The concentration of recent immigration suggests that this shortfall could be a problem. The metropolitan areas of Miami, Los Angeles, New York, Houston, San Francisco, and Chicago absorbed more than 40 percent of the net increase in immigrants over the 1970-80 period; the post-1980 immigration may have been even more concentrated.

Similarly, it may be necessary to disaggregate immigration even more than has been done to uncover the effects it has had on certain small segments of the native labor force. The labor market characteristics of the various groups of immigrants differ greatly. One would not expect many of these immigrant groups to diminish the labor market prospects of poorly educated, native minorities. For example, immigrants from Western Europe and Canada have characteristics that are very similar to those of the native white work force, while those from India have very high educational levels and are
disproportionately competing for professional jobs. Some 66 percent of the Indian immigrants enumerated in the 1980 census had completed four years of college and 43 percent of those employed were in professional specialty occupations.

It is also possible that the effects of immigration are being manifest less on the wages, earnings, and unemployment that the existing studies have examined and more on the dimensions—such as labor force participation, fringe benefits, working conditions, and internal migration—that have received less attention.

While there are these reasons to re-examine the question when data from the 1990 census become available, the existing evidence suggests that immigration has not been a major factor contributing to the emergence of the urban underclass.
The Urban Homeless:
A Portrait of Urban Dislocation

By PETER H. ROSSI and JAMES D. WRIGHT

ABSTRACT: In this decade, homelessness has been recognized as a serious and growing urban social problem. Using a new research approach to the study of undomiciled urban populations, we describe the social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the literally homeless population in Chicago. The homeless in the Chicago sample are unaffiliated persons living in extreme poverty, with high levels of physical and mental disability. Homelessness is interpreted as a manifestation of extreme poverty among persons without families in housing markets with declining stocks of inexpensive dwelling units suitable for single persons.

Peter H. Rossi, S. A. Rice Professor of Sociology, is acting director of the Social and Demographic Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and the recipient of the Common Wealth Award for contributions to sociology. His latest work, Down and Out in America, a monograph on homelessness and extreme poverty, will be published in 1989.

James D. Wright is the Charles and Leo Favrot Professor of Human Relations in the Department of Sociology at Tulane University. He has authored or coauthored more than 80 scholarly papers; among his 11 books the most recent is Homelessness and Health, coauthored with Eleanor Weber.
EW of our contemporary social problems rival homelessness in the public attention received in this decade. There are ample and obvious reasons for this attention, for the plights of the homeless easily evoke sympathy and concern. In a society that places so high a value on the concept of home and devotes so much attention to housing and its accoutrements, the vision of being without a home is clearly a frightening one, bound to evoke sympathy for persons so afflicted.

The high level of concern about homelessness has not produced much in the way of empirically adequate knowledge about the extent of homelessness and the conditions that produce it. Estimates of the size of the national homeless population vary from about a quarter million to upward of 3 million; equally wide variations exist in the estimates for specific cities and states. The sources of homelessness are also not understood in any detail. Is homelessness primarily a housing problem, an employment problem, a condition created by deinstitutionalization of the chronically mentally ill, a manifestation of the breakdown of family life, a symptom of the inadequacies of our public welfare system, or a combination of these and other factors? To be sure, there have been many dramatic and moving descriptive accounts of the plight of homeless persons, but these do not cumulate to precise knowledge about the extent and character of the problem of homelessness.

Reasonably valid data on homelessness is unquestionably difficult to obtain. National statistical series contain little or no information on the homeless population. The U.S. census essentially counts the homed population; conventional surveys are ordinarily derived from samples of households and therefore miss those without conventional dwellings. This article describes the findings from research using an adaptation of modern sample-survey methods, a study that is the first to provide reasonable valid data on the homeless of a major city, Chicago.4

A major significant obstacle to the study of the homeless is the lack of an agreed-upon definition of homelessness.5

1. The rather sudden welling up of concern can be indexed by the number of listings under "homelessness" in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature (New York: H. A. Wilson, 1976, 1983-85). In 1975, there were no listings; in 1981, 3; in 1982, 15; in 1983, 21; and in 1984, 32.


3. The 1980 population census included some partial attempts to enumerate persons living in shelters and in public places, such as train and bus stations, but this effort did not cover all places where homeless persons might be found nor did the census cover all cities. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Persons in Institutions and Other Group Quarters, 1980 Census of Population, pub. PC80-2-4D (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1984). Virtually all survey- or census-based estimates omit homeless persons, and most pass over institutionalized persons as components of such estimates, leading to corresponding underestimates of poverty-impacted populations.

4. A full account of the methodology and the findings can be found in Peter H. Rossi, Gene A. Fisher, and Georgianna Willis, The Condition of the Homeless of Chicago (Amherst: University of Massachusetts, Social and Demographic Research Institute; Chicago: University of Chicago, National Opinion Research Center, 1986).

On the most general level, the homeless can be defined as those who do not have customary and regular access to a conventional dwelling or residence. But what is a conventional dwelling or residence, and what is customary and regular access? There is a continuum running from the obviously domiciled to the obviously homeless, with many ambiguous cases to be encountered along that continuum. Any effort to draw a line across that continuum, demarcating the homed from the homeless, is of necessity somewhat arbitrary and therefore potentially contentious.

These definitional ambiguities are not simply scholastic issues. A definition of homelessness is, ipse dixit, a statement as to what should constitute the floor of housing adequacy below which no member of society should be permitted to fall. It is equally obvious that the number and existential conditions of the homeless depend in no small part on how the phenomenon is defined.

In dealing with these definitional problems, we have found it useful to distinguish between (1) the literally homeless, persons who clearly do not have access to a conventional dwelling and who would be homeless by any conceivable definition of the term; and (2) precariously, or marginally, housed persons, with tenuous or very temporary claims to a conventional dwelling of more or less marginal adequacy. This distinction, of course, does not solve the definitional problem, although it does more clearly specify subpopulations of likely policy interest.

METHODOLOGY USED IN THE CHICAGO STUDY

Most conventional quantitative social research methods depend on the assumption that persons can be enumerated and sampled within their customary dwelling units, an assumption that fails by definition in any study of the literally homeless. The strategy devised for the Chicago study therefore departed from the traditional sample survey in that persons were sampled from nondwelling units and interviews were conducted at times when the distinction between the homed and homeless was at a maximum. Two complementary samples were taken: (1) a probability sample of persons spending the night in shelters provided for homeless persons—the shelter survey; and (2) a complete enumeration of persons encountered between the hours of midnight and 6 a.m. in a thorough search of non-dwelling-unit places in a probability sample of Chicago census blocks—the street survey. Taken together, the shelter and street surveys constitute an unbiased sample of the literally homeless of Chicago, as we define the term.

Our research classified persons as literally homeless if they were residents of shelters for homeless persons or were encountered in our block searches and found not to rent or own a conventional housing unit.

In the street surveys, teams of interviewers, accompanied by off-duty Chicago police officers, searched all places on each sampled block to which they could obtain access, including all-night businesses, alleys, hallways, roofs and basements, abandoned buildings, and parked cars and trucks. All persons encountered

Instructions to interviewers were to enter all places until they encountered locked doors or were forbidden—for example, by managers or proprietors—to go further. Police escorts were hired to protect interviewers. Cooperation rates were 81 percent in the shelter surveys and 94 percent in the street surveys. The majority of the shelter respondents not interviewed were not present at the time of interview, being temporarily out of the shelter for one reason or another.
were queried to determine whether they were homeless, and they were interviewed if found to be homeless.

We believe the Chicago Homeless Study to be the first attempt to apply modern sampling methods to the study of the homeless, and, as such, it provides the first scientifically defensible estimates of the size and composition of the homeless population in any city.

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LITERALLY HOMELESS

Being homeless is predominantly a male condition; three out of four—76 percent—of the homeless were men, in sharp contrast to the proportion of the Chicago adult population that is male, 46 percent. Blacks and Native Americans constituted considerably more than their proportionate share of the homeless, with whites and Hispanics proportionately underrepresented. Although the average age of the homeless—40 years—was not far from that of the general adult population, there were proportionately fewer of the very young—under 25—and the old, or those over 65. Nor were the homeless very different from the general population in educational attainment, the typical homeless person being a high school graduate.

The modal homeless person was a black male high school graduate in his middle thirties. Average characteristics, however, obscure an important fact, namely, that the homeless population is somewhat heterogeneous. Especially significa

7. The percentage of women—24 percent—among the homeless is in stark contrast to the homeless, or skid row, population of Chicago as studied in the late 1950s, virtually all of whom were men. See Donald Bogue, Skid Row in American Cities (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1963).

nificant was a minority of young black women—about 14 percent of the homeless—who were, typically, homeless with their young children and apparently in transition from unsatisfactory housing arrangements to establishing new households with those children. In addition, older males—over 40—tended to be white and were usually homeless for relatively long periods of time.

In the wealth of social and economic detail contained in our interview data, three salient characteristics of the homeless stand out: extreme poverty; high levels of disability resulting from poor physical and mental health; and high levels of social isolation, with weak or nonexistent ties to others.

Extreme poverty

The literally homeless are clustered at the extreme lower boundary of the American population that is in poverty. Within the rather narrow income range found, there was some heterogeneity, as the differences between the various measures of central tendency show. The mode comprised the almost one in five—18 percent—who reported no income at all in the month prior to the survey; median income for the month was $99.85, and average, or mean, income for the same period was $167.39. Given that the 1985 poverty level for single persons under 65 was $5250, the official poverty level was 2.6 times the average annual income and 4.4 times the median annual income of Chicago's literally homeless. On average, the literally homeless survive on substantially less than half the poverty-level income.

In Chicago there is almost no affordable housing at these levels of income. In 1985, the average monthly rental for SRO rooms, among the cheapest accommodations available for single persons, was $195, $27 above the average monthly income of the homeless. At this level of extreme poverty, spending one's entire available income would still not be quite enough to afford the cheapest available housing, much less also cover the costs of food and other necessities. That the literally homeless manage to survive at all is a tribute to the laudable efforts of the shelters, soup kitchens, and charitable organizations that provide most necessities.

The homeless make some contribution to their own support. Although a very small percentage—4 percent—held full-time jobs, almost two in five had worked for some period over the previous month, mostly at casual, poorly paid part-time jobs. Remarkably, work and other economic activity was, on average, the source of 29 percent of total monthly income. Even more of a surprise, income transfer payments accounted for very little of their income, with only about a quarter—28 percent—receiving Aid to Family with Dependent Children (AFDC) or General Assistance (GA)—mostly the latter. Income transfer payments amounted to 30 percent of the total income; another 21 percent was accounted for by pension and disability payments, received by about one in five, or 18 percent.

Job histories of the literally homeless suggest that they have been among the extremely poor for years. On the average it was more than 4.6 years, or 55 months, since their last steady job, defined as full-time employment lasting three or more months; the median amount of time was 3.3 years, or 40 months. Interestingly, elapsed time since last steady job was very much greater than time currently homeless, the latter averaging about 22 months, with a median of 8 months. This suggests that many among the literally homeless were helped by their families and friends through relatively long periods of unemployment, but that the patience, forbearance, or resources of these benefactors eventually ran out, with literal homelessness then added to chronic unemployment as a problem experienced daily.

**Disability**

Many disabling conditions plague the homeless, ones that would ordinarily make it difficult or impossible for a person to lead a full life—to obtain employment, participate in social life, or maintain relationships with others. Of course, disability is a matter of degree, so that it is difficult to calculate precise proportions; nevertheless, it is abundantly clear that the proportions among the literally homeless are much higher than in the general adult population.

More than one in four reported that they had some health problem that prevented their employment. Prominent among the conditions reported were men-


10. "Time currently homeless" is counted as months elapsed since last domiciled. Many homeless people have been homeless more than once; among those who had become homeless sometime in the year prior to the interview, 11 percent had had one or more homeless episodes in previous years.

tual illness, cardiovascular ailments, and gastrointestinal disorders. Likewise, more than one in three—37 percent—reported themselves as being in only “fair” or “poor” health, a level of self-reported ill health about twice that found in the general adult population, 18 percent. Behavioral indicators support these self-reports, with more than one in four reporting a hospital stay of more than 24 hours during the previous year. High levels of alcoholism and drug abuse are also indicated by the one in three who reported stays in detoxification centers.

Relatively high levels of mental illness are evident in the data. Almost one in four—23 percent—reported having been in a mental hospital for stays of over 48 hours, more than eight times the level found in the general population. Among those who had been in mental hospitals, three out of five, or 58 percent, had had multiple hospitalizations. Nearly one in five—16 percent—reported at least one suicide attempt.

In addition to the self-report data, two short scales were administered to measure psychiatric symptomatology. On a scale measuring symptoms of depression, nearly half—47 percent—of the Chicago homeless registered levels suggesting a need for clinical attention, compared to about 20 percent in the national Health and Nutritional Examination Survey. On a second scale, measuring psychotic thinking, one in four showed two or more signs of disturbed cognitive processes; almost every item showed significantly higher levels of psychotic thinking than a comparison group tested in a New York City working-class neighborhood.

Contacts with the criminal justice system represent yet another, albeit qualitatively different, disability that is rather widespread. Such contacts at least indicate prior adjustment difficulties, some of a rather serious nature. Two of five—41 percent—had experienced jail terms of two or more days, 28 percent had been convicted by the courts and placed on probation, and 17 percent had served sentences of more than one year in state or federal prisons, presumably for felony offenses.

The cumulative incidence of these various disabilities is staggering. More than four out of five—82 percent—of the homeless either reported fair or poor health, or had been in a mental hospital or a detoxification unit, or received clinically high scores on the demoralization scale or on the psychotic-thinking scale, or had been sentenced by a court. A majority had had two or more such experiences or conditions. Although these data clearly do not sustain precise estimates of the degree of disability among the literally homeless, it is clear that the prevalence is several magnitudes above that encountered in the general adult population.

Social isolation

A high degree of social isolation is also endemic among the homeless. Most—57 percent—have never married; of those ever married, most are separated or divorced, on either count in sharp contrast to the patterns of the general adult population. The very few—9 percent—who are still with families are almost exclusively homeless women with dependent children.

The literally homeless are relatively isolated from extended family and from friends. Nearly nine in ten—88 percent—have surviving relatives and family members, but only three in five—60 percent—maintain even minimal contact with them—visiting, writing, talking with, or telephoning them at least once every two or three months. Similar low levels of contact with families of procreation—spouses, ex-spouses, or children—were also reported; 55 percent had such persons, but only one in three maintained contact with them. Overall, one in three reported no contact with any relatives and almost one in four reported no contacts with either relatives or friends.

Further evidence on strained relations with family and relatives was shown in replies to a sequence of questions on preferred living arrangements. We asked whether respondents would like to return to their families and whether their families would take them. Among the young homeless women, very few wanted to return; many of the young men would have liked to but believed they would not be welcome.

The social isolation of many of the homeless implies that they lack access to extended social networks and are therefore especially vulnerable to the vagaries of fortune occasioned by changes in employment, income, or physical or mental health.

AN INTERPRETATION OF HOMELESSNESS

The characteristics of the homeless as derived from the Chicago Homeless Study pertain only to the literally homeless and are not necessarily descriptive of the precariously homed. Indeed, there is some evidence that the latter may also be in extreme poverty but differ in other important respects. The Illinois GA rolls for the city of Chicago in 1985 contained about 100,000 individual recipients, most of whom were single-person households, largely male, and with annual incomes below $1848, the eligibility cutoff point.

Given that GA monthly payments of up to $154 are by themselves insufficient to bring recipients above $1848 per year, we can consider GA clients as among the extremely poor. Because only few are literally homeless, we may regard the clients as reasonably representative of the precariously homed of Chicago or at least of some large portion thereof.

Stagner and Richman's study of those receiving GA in 1984 provides a description of this group showing them to be similar to the literally homeless in demographic composition. Most—68 percent—are male, 71 percent are black, and 91 percent are unmarried; they tend to be slightly younger—the average age was 34—than the literally homeless. GA recipients contrasted strongly with the literally homeless in three important respects. First, GA recipients are considerably more integrated socially, with half living with relatives and friends and an addi-

14. It is interesting that, despite their marital histories, more than half—54 percent—had children, but current contact with these children tended to be minimal.

15. Stagner and Richman, General Assistance Profiles.
tional 30 percent receiving financial assistance from such sources. Second, disability levels among GA clients are much lower. Far fewer—9 percent—have physical-health conditions that prevented employment or had been in mental hospitals, the latter amounting to 1 percent. Third, GA clients had work histories with shorter median periods—19 months—since their last full-time jobs.

There are undoubtedly other persons in Chicago, as poor or poorer, who are not on the GA rolls. Some of the precariously homed extremely poor participate in other income-maintenance programs such as AFDC or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), receive payments under Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) or other retirement plans, or are receiving unemployment benefits. It is difficult to estimate the total number of the extremely poor of Chicago, although the magnitude is at least 100,000 and possibly as many as 200,000 persons whose annual incomes from all sources are under $2000, 38 percent of the official poverty level. Most, if not all, of these extremely poor persons are at high risk of becoming literally homeless.

Considering jointly the special and distinctive features of the literally homeless in relation to the contrasting characteristics of other extremely poor persons, we offer the following interpretation of homelessness and some speculation about the forces that influence changes in the size of the homeless population.

At the base of our interpretation is the viewpoint that literal homelessness is primarily a manifestation of extreme poverty. Literal homelessness, or the proportion of persons being literally without conventional housing, is a function of extreme poverty, in a housing market that has an inadequate supply of very low cost housing to offer to single-person households. The incidence of literal homelessness falls very heavily on persons who are unaffiliated with households and upon those who have been extremely poor for long periods of time. The homeless therefore are the long-term very poor who have been unable to maintain supportive connections with—or have been rejected by—their parental families and friends and who have not been able for a variety of reasons to establish their own households.

Why the literally homeless have been extremely poor for so long, why they have been rejected, and why they have difficulty establishing such households are issues very likely connected with their disabilities. Persons with serious disabilities are likely to experience difficulty connecting with full-time lasting employment and also difficulty maintaining their shares in the webs of reciprocity that constitutes the support structures of kin and friends. It should be noted that because their parental families and friends likely also are among the poor and have few resources to share with others, the burden of taking on the support of an additional adult is high. If the adult in question presents behavioral difficulties and a prospect of being dependent indefinitely, it is quite understandable why relatives and friends may be reluctant to take on a burden that would strain both resources and patience.

The literally homeless constitute only a very small fraction of the very poor, most of whom manage somehow to avoid literal homelessness. Using the size of the Chicago GA rolls, 100,000, as a conservative estimate of the magnitude of the very poor, the literally homeless constitute about 2.7 percent of the very poor. To understand literal homelessness properly and to predict its course, we need to know more about how most of the very
poor manage to avoid that condition. We can speculate, on the basis of some knowledge, that they do so mainly by either overspending on housing or being subsidized by their families and friends.

**Overspending on housing**

Some of the extremely poor may avoid literal homelessness by spending all or mostly all of their cash income on housing. These are persons who live in single-room-occupancy hotels or furnished rooms or share inexpensive apartments and who obtain food through food stamps or handouts from food kitchens; clothing from charitable sources; and medical care from free clinics and through Medicaid. To pursue this pattern of life consistently, one must also have a consistent source of income as provided by minimum OASI payments, small pensions from other sources, GA, disability payments, and perhaps small remittances from relatives or ex-spouses. They must also live close to facilities that can provide free or low-cost meals, casual employment, and the other amenities.

We suspect that the reason why there were so few very old persons among the literally homeless is because even minimum OASI payments provide sufficient consistent income to enable retired persons or their surviving spouses to live alone or share dwellings with others. The same line of reasoning can explain why so few of the literally homeless were receiving disability payments: SSI recipients received enough consistent income from SSI payments to connect with the lowest end of the housing market. The homelessness literature is full of references to persons in extreme poverty who spend as much as they can on housing from their small pensions or other remittances but find that they do not have enough money to be in rented quarters all the time. Their small pensions or welfare checks can be stretched to cover, say, all but the last few days before the next check arrives. These are persons who are homeless on a part-time basis, supplementing their rented quarters by spending some nights in shelters or on the streets.

**Private subsidies**

Most of the extremely poor avoid literal homelessness by being given housing and subsistence at little or no charge by their relatives—mainly parents and siblings—and friends. The households that provide these subsidies incur the marginal costs of adding another person to be housed and fed. Note that these costs may not be a severe financial drain on the household in question, especially if the person in extreme poverty provides some payments to the subsidizing household or shares in household chores. For example, adding another adult person to a household may not mean any additional rent outlay, nor may it be necessary to purchase any additional food, if the rations given to every household member are diminished in order to share with the additional member. But there are other, nonfinancial costs, including increased space pressures, reduced privacy, lower food quality and quantity, and increased wear and tear on facilities. In addition, there is also the potential for interpersonal conflict.

Private subsidies may be virtually the only way that extremely poor single persons can live on the income-maintenance payments to which they may be entitled. Illinois's GA payments of $154 per month are simply not enough to allow a recipient to enter the private housing market. AFDC payments to single-parent households, although more
generous than GA, also fall short of providing enough to live on without additional income in kind or cash.

The foregoing suggests that the size of the literally homeless population is driven by those macro processes that affect the availability of low-skilled employment, the ability of poor families to help their less fortunate members, the market conditions affecting the supply of very low cost housing for single persons, and the coverage of income-maintenance programs for disabled and single persons, as follows:

1. Changes in demand for low-skilled worker-. The employment prospects for low-skilled workers can affect the number of literally homeless in two ways: directly, by influencing the job prospects for low-skilled single persons and hence their abilities to earn sufficient income to keep them from being extremely poor; and indirectly, by influencing the abilities of families to provide subsidies to their long-term unemployed peripheral adult members. A major difference between the description of Chicago's skid row in the late 1950s and the portrait emerging from the our 1985 study is that in the earlier period a strong market demand apparently existed for casual labor from which the homeless men living in the flophouses and cheap hotels could earn enough to pay their rents and buy food. Side by side with the flophouses on Madison Street in Chicago were employment exchanges for casual laborers. With the decline in demand for low-skilled casual labor such employment exchanges are no longer available.

2. Changes in the level of income-maintenance support for poor families and for poor single persons. The more generous the levels of welfare support, the more likely families are to put up with their long-term unemployed and disabled adult relatives. Many commentators on the homeless problem suspect that cutbacks in social welfare programs have led to an increase in homelessness. In this connection as well, the processes involved may work indirectly, by providing lower incomes to poor families and thereby lowering their abilities to subsidize their adult unemployed members, and directly, by lowering the coverage and real value of income-maintenance programs available to single persons. Income transfer payments over the past two decades have not kept pace with inflation. The recent rise in the size of the literally homeless population may be at least a partial reflection of the lowered real value of welfare payments and the consequent decreased ability of poor families on AFDC or other income-maintenance programs to subsidize their peripheral unemployed adult members. Similarly, the decline in the real value of GA payments implies a correspondingly decreased ability of single-person households in that program to afford rentals available at the bottom of the housing market.

3. Changes in the coverage of income-maintenance support programs for disabled persons, including admission into total-care institutions such as mental hospitals. The greater the coverage of disability payment programs, the more likely are disabled single persons to be able to afford low-cost housing for single persons. Hence the less likely are such persons to become homeless. Similarly, changes in the coverage of indoor support programs, such as mental hospitals, can also influence the number of persons who are literally homeless. In this view, being institutionalized may be regarded
as a form of public subsidy for the maintenance of extremely poor persons. Deinstitutionalization forces such extremely poor persons either into the literally homeless group or into the privately subsidized poor.

4. Quantitative and qualitative changes in the supply of very low cost housing. As low-cost housing units for low-income families become short in supply or smaller in size, the greater becomes the burden imposed on such families by support for their long-term unemployed and disabled peripheral adult relatives. Similarly, the shorter the supply and the higher the cost of inexpensive housing for single-person households, the more likely single-person households are to be homeless. In city after city, the supply of low-cost housing for single-person households has experienced precipitous declines in the past decade. In Chicago, single-room occupancy capacity has been estimated to have declined by almost 25 percent in the period 1980-83. This trend almost surely has contributed heavily to the growth of the literally homeless experienced in the past decade.

5. Changes in the numbers of persons who are disabled in middle adulthood. Although disability levels in a population ordinarily may be only indirectly and weakly influenced by social policy, the special character of the disabilities of the literally homeless may be more amenable to such purposeful policy moves. Many of the homeless men are disabled mainly because of alcohol and, to a lesser extent, other substance abuse. Measures taken to reduce the amount of alcohol abuse during early adulthood, particularly among males, would do much to reduce the prevalence of disability in their middle years.

These macro processes suggest both short-term and long-term remedies for the extremely poor and the literally homeless in America. Short-term measures that would considerably ameliorate the condition of the homeless include measures that would increase the amount of income available to the extremely poor. In particular, more generous income-maintenance programs and wider coverage for disability programs would both help poor families to provide help to their long-term unemployed adult members and help such members directly. Indeed, one may even consider some of the possible programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Adults! The long-term measures would include increasing the supply of low-cost housing, particularly for single persons; providing more low-skilled employment opportunities in ways that would be accessible to the extremely poor; and measures designed to lower the prevalence of disabling conditions among young adult males. In the meantime, support for shelters, food kitchens, and other charitable organizations serving the literally homeless is necessary at least to lessen the extreme hardships imposed by that condition.
Equal Opportunity and the Estranged Poor

By JENNIFER L. HOCHSCHILD

ABSTRACT: This article is concerned with people who so lack marketable skills and material resources that they are excluded from mainstream society, and who lack faith that they can succeed through conventional means. They are usually poor, but they are a small subset of the poor and are not necessarily poor throughout their lives. Most are excluded because the American rhetoric of equal opportunity for all is belied by political choices that deny to some any chance of success. Programs to enable the estranged poor to enter mainstream society must provide skills, a starting place, and faith in the possibility of achievement. Such programs are long-lasting, intensive, and comprehensive—thus costly. To ensure that estrangement is not reproduced in the next generation, programs to aid the poor must, furthermore, eliminate gender biases in their prescriptions and must change the structural conditions that create the gap between the promise and practice of equal opportunity. These programs should not necessarily be targeted on minorities or the poor, but should build on Americans' support for social policies that give everyone a chance for at least some success.

Jennifer L. Hochschild, professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University, received her Ph.D. in political science from Yale University in 1979 and has taught at Duke University and Columbia University. She is the author of What's Fair?: American Beliefs about Distributive Justice and The New American Dilemma: Liberal Democracy and School Desegregation and a coauthor of Equalities. She is a panelist on the National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Status of Black Americans and was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.

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A

n early contributor to the recent
upsurge of interest in poor Amer-
cans claims that "the underclass is dis-
tinguished from the lower class principally
by its lack of mobility." This defi-
inition is imprecise and incomplete, but it points
toward the core problem of American
poverty: in a land dedicated to opportu-
nity for all, some people lack the skills
and resources they need to get ahead and
lack faith that they can obtain them
through conventionally accepted means.
Enabling those people to escape their
condition and reducing the gap between
the promise and practice of equal oppor-
tunity in the future are not impossible but
will require levels of political understand-
ing and commitment beyond what Amer-
ican citizens and especially policymakers
have recently offered. This article seeks to
further that understanding and suggest
appropriate avenues for that commit-
tment. My starting—and ending—point is
the assertion that the problem of severe
poverty and its attendant behaviors and
emotions can be solved only when Ameri-
cans choose actually, not merely rhet-
rically, to open the opportunity structure
to all regardless of their race, class, or
gender.

THE PROBLEM OF BEING
LEFT OUT

A defining characteristic of American
society is its faith in equality of oppor-
tunity and the likelihood of success. At least
since the early nineteenth century, most
Americans have agreed that in principle
all men are created equal, all have the
inalienable right to pursue happiness, the
government should help in that pursuit,
and most people should be able to succeed
to some extent if they deserve to. That
mixture of faith, hope, and political
demand is full of ambiguity: until recently
"all men" did not include blacks or
women; the government is sometimes
directed to stay out of the economy and
sometimes to intervene; definitions of
success and desert vary widely. Those
ambiguities are philosophically and politi-
cally significant, but they should not be
allowed to obscure the underlying ideo-
logical unity behind the phrase "equal
opportunity." Americans who lack the
skills or resources to enable their participa-
tion in the opportunity system, or who
are given no chance to participate, and
who have no hope or faith that they
might get ahead through conventionally
acceptable channels, are seriously out of
step with the dominant American culture.

My concern in this article is that small
but important group of profoundly es-
tranged Americans. Readers of this vol-
ume are by now familiar with poor
blacks' increasing concentration in urban
ghettoes, unmarried teenage mothers' dis-
mal prospects, young blacks' high unem-
ployment rate, children's increasing in-
volvement in drug use and sales, and all
of the other social, economic, and demo-
ographic problems of the urban poor. But
the ideological and political context of
the apparently growing underclass has

2. Over 95 percent of Americans agree that
"every citizen should have an equal chance to
influence government policy" and "everyone in
America should have equal opportunities to get
ahead." Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, The
American Ethos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1984), tabs. 3-5, 3-9. For an analysis of
the equal-opportunity theme in popular literature
of the nineteenth century—perhaps the closest
analogue to modern opinion polls—see Irvin Wyllie,

3. At least one scholar, however, sees the
apparent rise in underclass behavior as mainly a rise
in "deviant" behavior at all levels of society. See
Mark Hughes, "Moving Up and Moving Out:
Confusing Ends and Means About Ghetto Dis-

1. Douglas G. Glasgow, The Black Underclass
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE ESTRANGED POOR

not received as much attention as it warrants.
Not all of the poor have lost faith in achieving success through conventional means. Indeed, as the vast literature on why there is no socialism in the United States shows, most poor Americans historically have kept their faith in the promise of opportunity long after it was clear to observers that they had no realistic chance to improve their circumstances. Other poor Americans have found alternative ideologies and social networks that give them dignity, self-respect, and hope for the future outside the equal-opportunity framework. They include members of the Nation of Islam, fundamentalist Christians, and egalitarian socialists, to give but a few examples. Thus only a small proportion of the poor are included among the estranged Americans who are my subject here.

Conversely, some people start life with resources and skills and therefore a reasonable chance to maintain or improve their situations, but they lack the talents, gumption, emotional strength, or simple luck to sustain themselves. They fall into poverty and despair and thereby join the group with whom I am concerned. Others start out poor but attain wealth for at least part of their lives; an obvious example is drug dealers who amass large fortunes in their usually brief and violent careers. In short, the estranged Americans who are my subject here may spend part of their lives out of poverty.

People manifest in varied ways their lack of faith in getting ahead through conventional means. Some simply drop out of society, living lives of quiet—or noisy—misery. Others sell drugs, leave high school and the labor force, or have children with no means of supporting them except welfare because they are responding rationally to the incentives they face. Still others can hardly be said to make a choice, in that no one has taught them that to keep a job, for example, one must report to work on time every day, respond appropriately to a supervisor, maintain decent relations with coworkers, and so on. Finally, a few simply reject conventional values as well as conventional means of achieving their goals; they will take what they want however they can.

Obviously I am not providing a rigorous definition of the underclass, nor would this combination of objective and subjective characteristics necessarily be a fruitful start toward a rigorous definition. My goal here is not to define and measure but rather to add an ideological context, a political explanation, and policy suggestions to the standard sociological and economic definitions. Let us turn, then, to that context and explanation.

THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY

Some people lack skills, resources, and faith because they have not taken advantage of the chances they were given. Everyone knows, indirectly at least, of people who were so witless, emotionally damaged by some experience or relationship, or slothful that they sank far below their original status and were abandoned in despair by their families and friends. Enabling these people to improve their circumstances is part of my concern here, but their reasons for falling in the first place are not, because those reasons are more personal and idiosyncratic than political and general. Once a pattern is found—such as middle-class wives' being beaten or abandoned by their husbands—a political analysis becomes appropriate, but up to that point, individual disasters are more the province of psychologists than of political scientists.
Let us, then, consider the pattern of choices made by American policymakers—with the support or at least the acquiescence of most citizens—that have created or increased estrangement among a minority of the poor. Those choices are best understood in terms of a gap between the rhetoric and reality of opportunity for all.

Much of American history can be read as a set of political choices that created and consolidated racial, ethnic, and gender disparities in wealth and power. I have no room to consider them here, but they form the backdrop for the thirty-year period I do want to examine. Americans’ response to poverty and discrimination since the 1960s has been curiously double sided. On the one hand, citizens from President Kennedy to the average television watcher were genuinely shocked by the evidence of malnourishment and vicious racial prejudice that confronted them in the early 1960s. Their response was sincere and vehement; these things had to be stopped. Congress passed three civil rights acts with bite in quick succession after stalling for decades over much weaker proposals; presidents and mayors made eloquent speeches about breaking the shackles of the past; money and energy flowed into ghettos, barrios, rural hinterlands, and even suburban households.

This new commitment to opening channels of opportunity had effects. Poor blacks who were in a position to take advantage of their new legal and economic resources did so; by the late 1970s, young, married, well-educated, professional blacks living in the Northeast had average incomes greater than their white counterparts. The number of black voters rose considerably and the number of black elected officials rose dramatically. Women moved in unprecedented numbers out of unpaid housework and low-paid office work into professional and white-collar jobs, and by the 1980s their salaries and political power had begun to rise accordingly. Legally immigrating Hispanics began to resemble older white ethnic groups in their range of incomes, occupations, and residential and marital choices.

This is a familiar and justly celebrated story. Opportunities really did become more equal than they had ever been in American history, and many women and minorities took advantage of them. Then came the 1970s, with oil cartels, combined inflation and unemployment, the glut of new female and young workers, the movement of many factories to newly industrializing nations. Political and psychological changes accompanied these demographic and economic shocks. Citizens grew weary of the so-called excesses of the 1960s. Politicians and academics cautioned against too much democracy and overly high expectations. Books about people taking advantage of the welfare system and the decline of academic and personal standards hit the best-seller lists. The number of whites who preferred “something in between” to either “desegregation” or “strict segregation” rose from 48 to 61 percent between 1964 and 1978.

Americans’ apparent rightward move is an equally familiar story with perhaps less familiar results. “The real value of the median state’s maximum AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent Children] payment declined by 27 percent between 1970 and 1983.” By 1983 a family of four

5. Rebecca Blank and Alan Blinder, “Macroeconomics, Income Distribution, and Poverty,” in
at the poverty line was paying more than 16 percent of its income in direct taxes, almost double the percentage paid in 1965. Between 1979 and 1985, the annual median family income for the poorest 40 percent of the population declined $918 (in constant 1986 dollars) whereas the wealthiest 40 percent of families gained $2775, and the wealthiest 10 percent gained $6369. Courts stopped ordering mandatory school desegregation and in a few cases reversed long-standing busing plans; racial segregation in schools increased over 13 percent in the Northeast between 1968 and 1980. Policymakers decided that the concept of full employment permitted an official unemployment rate of around 6 percent, a figure that many had considered unacceptably high in the late 1950s. The minimum wage declined sharply in real value during the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Equal Rights Amendment was defeated. It is important to note that these and other changes were policy choices, not simply unintended or inevitable outcomes of uncontrollable economic, social, or demographic forces.

In short, the 1960s' fervor to improve opportunities for those left out ran out of steam before its promises were fulfilled for all of the poor. Legally and normatively, all minorities and women benefited; socially, economically, and politically, only some did. By the 1980s the rhetoric and memories of the 1960s, but little of the political commitment, remained.

Into this context came the children of the 1960s' generation. Their grandparents often expected little from the larger society, so they were not surprised when they received little. Their parents were led to expect and demand more, especially for their children, and for some the dreams came true. But today's poor youths have inherited convictions of their rights and hopes for their future with few of the structural conditions for fulfilling them.

Albert Hirschman describes this gap between promise and fulfillment as the "tunnel effect," as when drivers of cars in a traffic jam in a tunnel are initially pleased that cars in the adjacent lane are beginning to move. The tunnel effect operates because advances of others supply information about a more benign external environment; receipt of this information produces gratification; and this gratification overcomes, or at least suspends, envy. . . . As long as the tunnel effect lasts, everybody feels better off, both those who have become richer and those who have not.

At some point, however, those left behind in the tunnel come to believe that their
heightened expectations will not be met; not only are their hopes now dashed, but they are also left in a relatively worse position than when the upward mobility began. "Nonrealization of the expectation [that my turn to move will soon come] will at some point result in my 'becoming furious,' that is, in my turning into an enemy of the established order." Some of the infuriated will be galvanized into extraordinary efforts to pull themselves up by their bootstraps; others will unite in political rebellion or withdraw into an alternative social order. A few will sink into apathy or erupt into violence; they are the estranged poor.

Particular forms of relative deprivation will probably vary by race and gender.


Blacks of both genders will focus on persisting racial discrimination in the face of white insistence that discrimination has almost disappeared.11 Women of both races may be attuned to intractable gender discrimination in jobs and households.12 Poor Hispanics may especially react against inflated promises that the United States is the land of milk and honey. But all could plausibly respond to both past promises and present discrepancies between themselves and others like them with the question, "Why not me, too?"

Another gap between the rhetoric of the 1960s and the reality of the 1980s is more cultural than material. Many white Americans stopped demanding that blacks and ethnic minorities assimilate into mainstream—that is, white—styles and mores and started proclaiming the virtues of cultural pluralism. Similarly, some people stopped expecting employed women to act just like employed men, and began praising nurturant men and professional women who no longer hid their children. Blacks, ethnic minorities, and women took new pride in their distinctiveness and began to expect new accommoda-

11. In 1978, fewer than one-fourth of white Americans perceived discrimination against blacks in acquiring jobs, pay, and promotions or in treatment by police, teachers, labor unions, or home owners. Up to 75 percent of blacks felt discriminated against in at least one of these arenas. Of white respondents, 39 percent in 1964 and 63 percent in 1976 felt that there has been "a lot" of "real change in the position of [blacks] in the past few years." Blacks' views were the mirror image; the proportion who saw a lot of real change declined from 60 percent in 1964 to 32 percent in 1978. Louis Harris and Associates, A Study of Attitudes toward Racial and Religious Minorities and toward Women (New York: Louis Harris, 1978), pp. 4-34; Converse et al., American Social Attitudes, p. 79. Surveys in the 1980s show similar results.

EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND THE ESTRANGED POOR

...tions. But however sincere the proclama-
tions and praise, practice was something else again. Employers found that blacks with nonstandard English and unconventional styles made white customers and coworkers nervous. They found that female employees who became pregnant, sought maternity leave, and needed good day care added new and unwanted complexities to personnel management. Californians declared English to be the only official state language. Too many middle-class white male Americans seemed unable or unwilling to distinguish what they liked and were used to from what was really crucial for running a business or society. Cultural pluralism went the way of the war on poverty, leaving behind high expectations and unsatisfying results.

Poor urban blacks already angry at withdrawn promises of opportunity and pluralism may be tipped into fury or despair by a weakening sense of community. A middle-class white author can easily romanticize in hindsight blacks’ sense of mutual commitment in the days of racial segregation. But blacks themselves, like ethnic whites whose enclaves are also broken up by physical and social mobility, mourn the decline of the solidarity forced upon them by a common enemy. That curiously bittersweet loss is worsened by a simpler but more devastating problem. Poor blacks, like poor whites in Appalachia and ethnic slums, survive as well as they do by sharing resources and responsibilities. But if their resources decline past a certain point, they must choose which responsibilities to fulfill and which to abandon. The weakening of community among urban blacks may be due not only to the movement of middle-class blacks to the suburbs but also to the rise in unemployment and decline in incomes during the 1970s and 1980s. At some point, people must choose to feed themselves and their young children and let their cousins and older children fend for themselves. If those older children are already inclined to hostility or despair, they may slide from the merely poor into the estranged poor. Thus the deterioration of well-off Americans’ general commitment to their poorer fellows can lead to a deterioration of poor Americans’ particular commitment to their even poorer neighbors and relatives. Even if only a small minority of the poor are forced into such triage, the people at the very end of the line could well experience a devastating loss of place and faith.

Even the decline in old-fashioned racism and sexism during the last three decades may do little to help poor minorities enter the mainstream. White employers have invented new ways to discriminate without admitting prejudice. One method is statistical discrimination: denying positions of responsibility to members of some group because of a belief—perhaps correct—that that group causes more problems than other kinds of people. Young black men, for example, may be more likely to come to work late, borrow petty cash, or talk back to obnoxious customers than young white men or older black women, so employers behave rationally by choosing older, white, or female employees. The difficulty, of course, is that a likelihood of 5 percent more thefts leads to a nearly 100 percent denial of employment to young black men, thereby punishing many more innocent than guilty. Surveys of employers show that statistical discrimination is especially likely in jobs that require at most a high school education—just the

13. Carol B. Stack, All Our Kin (New York: Harper & Row, 1974). I also owe the next point in this paragraph to Carol Stack.
jobs, of course, that most poor youths are able to pursue. To the degree that statistical discrimination is a cover, conscious or not, for lingering racial or gender prejudice, would-be workers face an additional barrier to their efforts to prove themselves exceptions to the rule. No wonder so many eventually give up.

Combining employers' suspicions of no-longer-deferential adolescents with poor youths' suspicions of proclamations of equal opportunity is lethal.

Self-consciously aspiring toward self-respect, many young blacks see themselves and are seen by others as not taking "the stuff" that has traditionally been dished out to black Americans. Add to this new image of militancy a stereotype of black [male] youth as being primarily responsible for urban street crime and general incivility, and one is faced with the specter of a nearly "unemployable" person.

Then add poor education and lack of work experience among many ghetto youths, and the recent excess of potential workers, and the "nearly" may well drop out of that verdict.

There are many other ways in which the gap between the promise and reality of equal opportunity works to create the physical, social, economic, political, and psychological conditions that add up to estrangement from mainstream America. My main point should, however, be clear:

Political choices ranging from slavery to a preference for unemployment over inflation in the context of a particular ideological framework helped to create a group of people with no resources, no skills, and no faith. But political choices can undo what they have done; I turn now to that possibility.

NARROWING THE GAP BETWEEN RHETORIC AND REALITY

Two strategies are necessary to help the estranged poor, but neither suffices alone. The first addresses particular individuals—and their children—as they are now; the second seeks to halt the reproduction of a similar group of people in the future.

The most urgent task is to enable the estranged poor to enter mainstream society or to find a satisfying alternative. Teaching skills and even providing a starting place without restoring faith will not work, and trying to instill faith without giving a material grounding also will not work. Thus either workfare alone or social services alone—never mind simple income maintenance—are insufficient.

The literature on programs to help the poor supports this claim powerfully if unsystematically. Despite controversy over what the underclass is and whether and why it is growing, analysts surprisingly concur on what to do about it. Consider the following programs and recommendations. The directors of an extensive research program on black male unemployment conclude that "public or private policies...should include not only government jobs programs for youth and aggressive anti-discrimination activity, but also the efforts of a broad range of public and private social institutions, ranging from the welfare system to employers to schools, to the criminal..."
justice system, and to families."\textsuperscript{16} The New York Times praises a program that has prevented pregnancies among 32 teenage girls through "care that is as multidimensional as the care that's supposed to come from one's own family.... Institutional programs can work, but require a lot of money."\textsuperscript{17} In 1981, Eugene Lang promised to pay college costs for a class of Harlem sixth-graders and to make himself and a full-time counselor available for tutoring, advising, companionship, and intervention on their behalf; as of June 1987, 27 of the 48 students remaining in Harlem had graduated, the rest were expected to, and so far 25 had been admitted to college.\textsuperscript{18} The most extensive analysis of job-training and placement programs concludes that "income maintenance should be deemphasized.... More intensive investments are needed."\textsuperscript{19}

The common thread in these disparate programs and analyses is that successful efforts to aid the estranged poor cost a lot, last a long time, and involve a wide array of activities aimed at changing skills, views, and life circumstances.\textsuperscript{20}

The political implications of this conclusion are clear. On the one hand, politics as usual will not suffice. On the other hand, the situation is not hopeless; if the United States chose to devote enough private resources and public actions to the effort, many of the worst-off could be moved into the ideological, behavioral, and economic mainstream.

The costs of such an effort would be substantial, but the benefits greater. Some analysts argue that programs such as the Women, Infants and Children Feeding Program, Head Start, Chapter I—addressing compensatory education—of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act, the Jobs Corps, the California Conservation Corps, and others "not only improve the lives of participating children, but 'save public moneys as well' by raising wages and reducing heavy problems, crime, welfare dependency, and unemployment."\textsuperscript{21} None of these programs serves more than a fraction of the eligible population, and the staff members of all

\textsuperscript{16} Richard Freeman and Harry Holzer, "Young Blacks and Jobs—What We Now Know," Public Interest, 78:31 (Winter 1985).


\textsuperscript{21} Grant Foundation Commission, Forgotten Half, p. 31, quoting from U.S. Congress, House,
of them have had enough experience to know how to start and maintain high-quality programs. Their expansion seems an obvious first step.

Other analysts are less sanguine about both the ratio of financial benefits to costs and the long-term social benefits of these programs. But the question is not whether these programs are as successful as we would like—they are not—or as successful as many programs that serve a less disadvantaged population—they are not. The issue is whether Americans are willing to let some fellow citizens destroy their own and others' lives without using the available knowledge to stop some of the destruction. I am not simply calling for throwing money at the problem, for two reasons: money is not enough, and we know with some precision where to throw it most effectively. What we now need is a political decision to spend what it will take to give faith, skills, and a starting place to people who lack them all.

A second cost of successful programs is personal rather than financial. They take a lot of people, time, and emotional energy. We could, however, turn a potential flaw into a virtue by relying on local talent that is now mostly wasted. Peer tutoring teaches the tutor even more than the pupil; peer counseling reduces juvenile crime and teenage pregnancy and improves race relations; parents' involvement in the schools improves children's learning. Again we must beware roman-

cization. Programs for citizen participation often increase disparities between middle-class and poor families, camouflaging bureaucratic ineptitude and patronization, or simply die from inertia. At best, using even highly trained community members as counselors and teachers raises unexpected and complex problems. But here, too, the main issue is political will. There are enough successful models of how to train and employ community members to help the poor that the appropriate question remains, Why don't we do more of it? rather than, What should we do?

Successful programs will also be costly to organizational stability. Public officials traditionally tackle problems one at a time. Legal-aid lawyers jostle with social workers about clients' rights and responsibilities, and both perceive the police as competitors for public resources. Local officials, perhaps especially new black urban administrators, mistrust suburban- and rural-dominated state legislatures. Both fear federal control as much as they want federal dollars. But helping the estranged poor requires attacking racial and gender discrimination and poverty and crime and lousy schools and anger, frustration, ignorance. No feature in our policymaking system prohibits such coordination, but conventional American political practice inhibits it.


25. A simple example of interorganizational suspicion is the case of Judge Leonard Edwards, who is spearheading an acclaimed effort to reform the juvenile justice system in California. Administrators from almost all agencies are cooperating; the holdout agency is the Department of Social Services, which supervises cases under court jurisdiction. The public defender says, "I've heard social..."
Institutional constraints on successful programs go even beyond these three costs. They include “a strong need for overselling whatever is to be done,” which generates backlash and a proclamation of failure; “the tendency of our political processes to accord special treatment only to groups that are well organized, politically active, and sophisticated in pursuing a uniform set of interests”; politicians’ inability to refuse any claimant, so that new resources are spread too thin; and a history of weak administrative capacity in federal labor market programs. Perhaps the most severe institutional constraint is the politician’s “strong need for overselling whatever is to be done.” That means that the inevitable failure of a large proportion of programs to help the estranged poor and the inevitable failure of a large proportion of the participants in even the most successful programs will make the whole effort seem futile, not merely risky. Add the fact that public opinion polls show over and over that “Americans favor government action to help the poor, but they generally dislike the subset of government programs that are intended to be targeted on the poor,” and the prospects become dismal for expensive programs for the worst-off of the poor.26

It is just as well that I am focusing here on only the extreme end point of poverty and despair. I cannot say just how many people need such a comprehensive commitment, but it is surely a minority of the poor and of any ethnic or racial group. Perhaps the best political strategy for overcoming the daunting constraints just described would emphasize how small the group of estranged poor is. That would permit two arguments: (1) the disproportion between the number of targeted people and the amount of damage and misery they represent suggests that the benefits of aiding even some will have large social payoffs; and (2) these almost unmanageable problems are of a manageable scope. We do not, after all, need very many foster homes, or public jobs, or Eugene Langs to make a big impact.

Arguments about the small number of estranged poor will have bite only if it is clear that current members who escape will not simply be replaced by a new generation. That point brings us to the other essential set of policies—those needed to reorganize the economy and polity to minimize the number of people who grow up with no skills, place, or faith in the opportunity system. My first observation about the next generation focuses on the children of the existing poor, or more specifically, on a curious set of common recommendations for the parents of those children. Bearing and raising a child, even at too young an age and without a husband, does not automatically make a mother a member of the underclass. The amount of damage to mother and child depends on the emotional well-being of the mother and the social circumstances of the family. If unwed teenage motherhood is problematic mainly because of the mother’s poverty, it is not obvious why providing jobs for fathers—mostly unmarried—is the best way to solve the problem. At best, it

is one step removed from the mother's and child's poverty, and because any program to aid the poor has a high failure rate and is very costly, indirectness adds a needless inefficiency. After all, not all of those newly employed fathers will marry—and stay married to—the mothers, or support their children. Why not, then, concentrate just as much on jobs for mothers?27 At worst, increasing the number of marriageable men by improving their skills and providing them jobs without providing the same service for women reifies a patriarchal social structure in which women are dependent upon individual men—rather than on men collectively, as in the welfare system—for their and their children’s livelihood.22

Caution is clearly called for here; I am not arguing that public policies should encourage unmarried women to have children or that public policies should not make strenuous efforts to help men finish school, secure a job, and support their children. I am simply arguing that the common recommendation of a "macroeconomic dating service," in Adolph Reed’s brilliant phrase,29 has worrisome normative implications and the potential for more spillage than necessary from the proverbial leaky bucket of social policy.

As my argument for providing jobs for women as well as for men implies, policies to prevent the reproduction of the estranged poor should begin with skills and, especially, a starting point, rather than with faith, if for no other reason than that it is probably easier to provide skills and a starting point and then let faith grow than to create and sustain faith in an empty promise.

That reasoning implies programs to reduce gender and racial discrimination, improve schools and ease the transition to work, reduce teenage pregnancies and births, provide jobs to inner-city youth, break down the barriers between jobs in the primary and secondary labor markets, assert more political control over plant closings and industrial relocation, give previously disenfranchised people more control over local political decisions, and so on. It may imply even broader policies if race- and poverty-specific programs cannot sustain popular support, especially during economic downturns, when they are most needed.30 In that case, the United States needs programs in which the downwardly redistributive component is submerged economically and politically in the horizontally redistributive component. Social Security is one such program; family allowances, full-employment policy, and national youth service programs are others.

The broader the policy, the more controversy there will be over how to

27. Women in job-training and placement programs increase their income more than comparable men do, even though women have been generally underrepresented in the programs and disproportionately placed in their least successful tracks. Lynn Burbidge, “Black Women in Employment and Training Programs,” in Slipping through the Cracks, ed. Margaret Simms and Julianne Malveaux (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1986), pp. 97-114. The rise occurs because women increase the number of hours they work than because their wages rise; thus programs of comparable worth or steering women into traditionally male-dominated jobs could produce even greater benefits for previously unemployed poor women. Bassi and Ashenfelter, “Direct Job Creation,” pp. 140-47.


achieve it and the less we know about the
links between efforts and results. Those
facts imply that even the best-designed
programs will be inefficient, full of flaws,
and less successful than we hope. In
addition, these programs must be down-
wardly redistributive to some degree really
to affect poverty. The political strategy
for embarking on such ambitious pro-
grams should therefore focus on the
conservative, stabilizing outcomes of these
apparently radical reforms. Public opinion
surveys have shown repeatedly that Amer-
icans want to be generous toward people
in need; they want to be free from gender
and racial discrimination; they want peo-
ple to have jobs that support them and
their children. Above all, Americans want
to believe that equal opportunity is neither
a sham nor the privilege of a few. The
estranged poor challenge these beliefs
and deny these desires. American citizens
may be willing to do more—both as
individuals and through their chosen
policymakers—than is normally assumed
in order really to open the system to all.
So far, the American policymaking system
has made a lot of wrong choices, but
there is no reason why we cannot change
our course, and lots of reasons why we
should.
The Logic of Workfare:  
The Underclass and Work Policy

By LAWRENCE M. MEAD

ABSTRACT. Much of today's entrenched poverty reflects the fact that poor adults seldom work consistently. The problem cannot be blamed predominantly on lack of jobs or other barriers to employment, as the chance to work seems widely available. More likely, the poor do not see work in menial jobs as fair, possible, or obligatory, though they want to work in principle. Government has evolved policies explicitly to raise work levels among the poor. Workfare programs, linked to welfare, show the most promise but still reach only a minority of employable recipients. Welfare reform should, above all, raise participation in these programs, as the share of clients involved largely governs their impact. Welfare should also cover more nonworking men to bring them under workfare. While work enforcement may seem punitive, the poor must become workers before they can stake larger claims to equality.

Lawrence M. Mead is an associate professor of politics at New York University, where he teaches public policy and American government. He is the author of Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship and other works on social policy, especially welfare and employment programs. He has been involved in deliberations on welfare reform in Washington, D.C. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University in 1973.
A n important reason for entrenched poverty and dependency in American cities is that poor individuals and families no longer work with the regularity they once did. In 1959, 32 percent of the heads of poor families worked full-time, and only 31 percent did not work at all, even though 22 percent of those heads were elderly, or beyond the normal working age. In 1984, in contrast, only 17 percent worked full-time, and 51 percent did not work at all, even though the proportion of elderly had fallen to 10 percent, due to growing Social Security payments.

The change primarily reflects rising welfare dependency by single mothers and less regular work by single men, many of them the fathers of welfare children. In ghetto neighborhoods today, welfare is the economic mainstay while many more men and youths are jobless than would have been true a generation ago. Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), the main welfare program, supports 4 million families, mostly female headed, yet only 5 percent of the mothers work at a given time compared to 33 percent for all single mothers with children under 18. In 1960, 83 percent of both black and white men were either working or looking for work, but by 1982 the rate had fallen to 70 percent for blacks, as against 77 percent for whites.


The drop was apparently even greater for the low-skilled black men with the highest unemployment. Many, though not all, of these poor but nonworking adults have problems severe enough for them to be included in the underclass.

We are far from the world of the turn of the century when whole families of immigrants on New York's Lower East Side labored long hours six or seven days a week, yet still were destitute. In the intervening century, rising real wages have lifted the vast majority of working-aged Americans above need—if they work. At the century's turn, the poor were needy despite employment. Today, on the whole, they are poor for lack of it. Their overwhelming economic problem is nonwork, in which I include both inability to obtain a job and failure even to look for one. Rising nonwork by working-aged adults is the main reason the overall poverty rate, now 14 percent, has fallen little in the last twenty years despite economic growth and decreasing need among the elderly.

The reasons for nonwork remain controversial, but both liberals and conservatives have given up hope that the problem will yield to general measures such as an expansionary economic policy or civil rights enforcement. Government has had to embark on policies and programs aimed specifically at raising work levels among the poor. Of these, much the most important is workfare, or recent requirements that employable welfare recipients work or prepare for work in return for support. In this article, I summarize the reasons behind this development, describe what current workfare programs achieve, propose some further developments in

work policy, and consider the implications of workfare for equality.

THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT

The tradition among American policymakers has been to blame poverty on barriers to opportunity. It has been assumed that poor adults will work if they have access to jobs, so poverty can only be due to a lack of jobs or to other practical impediments to employment. The great fact shaping the work debate today is that these barriers no longer seem as compelling as they once did.

Those seeking barriers ask, above all, whether jobs are accessible to nonworking adults, most of whom are low skilled and live in urban areas. Groups that are heavily poor—minorities, women, and youths—typically have much higher unemployment rates than normal for the economy, reaching, in the case of inner-city black youths, catastrophic levels of 40 percent or more. Such figures seem to compel the conclusion that jobs must be lacking. They arouse deep-seated memories of the Great Depression, when an economic collapse threw a quarter of the labor force out of work.

But in the postwar era, the economy has suffered no contraction comparable to that of the 1930s, not even the severe recession of the early 1980s. Decade after decade, it has generated new jobs on a scale never seen before. Total employment rose 35 percent between 1970 and 1985. Millions of immigrants, legal and illegal, have flooded into the country to do jobs for which, apparently, citizens are unavailable. At this writing, overall unemployment has fallen close to 5 percent, a level many economists consider close to full employment.

As the special editor of this volume has noted, confidence in prosperity caused the architects of the war on poverty in the 1960s almost to dismiss structural economic causes of poverty. They assumed jobs existed for the poor. The emphasis was all on compensatory education and training programs to make poor adults more able workers.5 In the current tight labor market, that conviction remains compelling.

The nation has, however, experienced economic troubles since 1970 that have given new life to the belief that the economy might deny employment to many low-skilled workers. In the 1970s, recessions including higher oil prices led to recessions that pushed the overall jobless rate into double digits. Employment growth was for several years outpaced by a massive growth in the labor force due to the maturing of the baby-boom generation. Most seriously, the economy encountered competitiveness problems that seemed to constrict opportunity for low-skilled job seekers. Industry and manufacturing, formerly staples of well-paid manual employment in the Northern cities, declined due to foreign competition, and the remaining jobs tended to shift to the suburbs, the Sunbelt, or overseas.

While new employment has mushroomed, it is predominantly in service trades, which pay less than unionized factory jobs, and there are more jobs in the suburbs than in the urban centers where most jobless poor people live. Better-paying urban jobs are mostly in the new high-technology economy based on information processing, which typically requires more education than earlier employment. But in the inner city, education levels have fallen due to high drop-

out rates and the failure of many students to absorb even minimal skills.

In short, there appears to be a mismatch between available jobs and unskilled job seekers. The inability of poor adults to commute to or qualify for today's employment might explain the catastrophic rates of joblessness found in the inner city, even if the surrounding economy is prosperous. Unemployment, in turn, explains high illegitimacy and dependency in the ghetto, since poor mothers prefer welfare to marrying poor men who cannot support them. From the decline of family stability, many of the other social problems of the underclass follow.

To date, however, proponents of the mismatch theory have appealed mostly to the high-level trends in the labor market just mentioned. They have not demonstrated a concrete connection between the workers victimized by deindustrialization and jobless poor people in the inner city. Research that does look at individual workers suggests, rather, that many jobs are still available in the inner city, even if they are usually not very good jobs.

If the ghetto were depressed in the 1930s sense, we would expect to find that most job seekers were unemployed long-term. But, while a minority are, most are out of work for only a few weeks. Among the groups with the highest measured unemployment—minorities, women, and youths—employment and unemployment tend to be highly transient. There is rapid turnover, with workers moving quickly into or out of employment or the labor force, not a pattern that suggests that jobs are absolutely lacking in the ghetto. We do not know that there would be enough jobs if all unskilled workers sought them at once, but jobs clearly seem available at the margin. It is inconsistent work, not a total lack of employment, that largely explains today's adult poverty and dependency.

The poor themselves say that jobs of a kind usually are available. Only 40 percent of poor adults working less than full-time give inability to find work as the main reason for their short hours, and only 11 percent of those not working at all do so. Much more often, the constraint is that they are ill, retired, in school, or keeping house. These figures rise to 45 and 16 percent among poor blacks and to 59 and 23 percent among poor black men, the main focus of the mismatch theory. Even among jobless inner-city black youths, the group with the highest unemployment, 71 percent say it is fairly easy to get a job at the minimum wage. They complain, rather, about the quality of these jobs, which are mostly menial and low paid.

Research has also failed to show that employment is really inaccessible to inner-city job seekers due to distance or qualifications. Black workers do have to commute further than others to find work, but this fact is only a minor reason for their much higher unemployment rate.


9. Calculated from Bureau of the Census, Characteristics of the Population below the Poverty Level: 1984, tab. 10, pp. 37, 45, 47.

higher unemployment compared to other groups; differences of race and education are much more important. The increase in education requirements for available jobs has been overstated, in that the share of positions requiring more than a high school education has actually changed little despite high technology. Also, some part of rising credentialism reflects, not a real demand for higher skills, but an attempt by employers to compensate for falling standards in the schools.

THE SOCIAL CONTEXT

Such findings leave it a mystery why nonworking adults do not take and hold available jobs more consistently. Inquiry has sought out barriers of a more social nature, but these, too, turn out to be less substantial than often claimed.

Nonwork has frequently been blamed on racial discrimination, since most of today's long-term poor are nonwhite. However, minority employment rates were much higher before civil rights than they are now, and working blacks today earn wages closer to those of comparable whites than ever before. Such trends make it implausible that nonworking blacks are being denied all employment. There is some evidence that employers prefer to hire women, both black and white, rather than unskilled black men and youths, whom they view as unco opera-

tive, but this preference reflects experience and is not entirely invidious.

Many have supposed that welfare deters employment because recipients typically have their grants reduced dollar for dollar for any earnings they make. But extensive research has failed to show that these disincentives are strong enough to explain the very low work levels found in the ghetto. Most welfare mothers would be better off, at least economically, if they worked, yet few do, and work levels vary little with welfare benefit levels. It has been estimated that even the total abolition of AFDC would raise working hours by the recipients by only 30 percent.

Nor is it clear, as is commonly asserted, that poor women fail to work because of the burdens of children or their inability to find child care. While numbers of children do deter work, most welfare mothers now have only one or two dependents, and those with preschool children are as likely to work their way off welfare as those with older children. Surveys have shown that most working mothers, rich and poor, manage to arrange child care fairly easily, mostly informally with friends and relatives. Only 9 percent make use of organized facilities, yet only 6 percent lose working time in a given month due to a breakdown in child care. Government must clearly


pay for care if it wants welfare women to work, and it already does pay, but there appears little need for more center-based child care.

Nor is lack of skills usually an impediment to work in some job. Welfare mothers with education and work experience are more likely to work than those without, but the influence of these and other demographic variables is less than one would expect. For example, younger, black mothers are just as likely to work their way off the rolls as older, white women.17

Work for the poor involves real burdens, but they are mostly the demands inseparable from finding jobs and organizing one’s life to hold them, not impediments peculiar to the needy. On the whole, economic and social barriers explain inequality rather than nonwork. That is, they explain why the poor do poorly if they work, not why so many fail to work at all. Unquestionably, most poor adults lack the education and background to succeed in the sense of obtaining good jobs, and recent trends in the economy may have made prospects more difficult for them. But these factors cannot explain why so many do not work even enough to escape poverty and welfare. By implication, barriers cannot explain the existence of an underclass.

CULTURAL FACTORS

If barriers to work are not prohibitive, we must finally reconsider the orthodox presumption that poor job seekers seek out employment as assiduously as the better-off. Studies suggest that the poor want to work as strongly as other people,18 but since they do not work as consistently in practice, this finding has to be interpreted.

One reading is that they want to work, but only if they can also succeed, that is, attain jobs paying mainstream wages. They reject jobs that pay little, especially if they are “dead-end.” That is, nonwork has a political element. It is in part a protest against the menial jobs the economy offers the unskilled. This view has some plausibility for nonworking inner-city men and youths, who, studies show, can be fractious employees. Many black youths insist on earning the same wages white youths earn, but since they are less able to attain them, they more often remain jobless for long periods. When they do work, they more often come into conflict with employers, causing them to leave jobs or be fired.19

Another interpretation is that nonworkers, despite their professions, do not really seek work. They are oriented to private life and have abandoned advancing themselves through employment. Economic fatalism is a feature of poverty culture, particularly on the part of minorities who, until recent decades, saw little chance to get ahead. The ghetto culture of today’s Northern cities may, in part, reflect the defeatism poor blacks learned under Jim Crow in the South.20 In the


background is the fact that the most heavily dependent American ethnic groups—blacks, Hispanics, and American Indians—have origins outside the West. Where Western culture has sought to overcome material hardships through rationalizing economic activity, non-Western culture, on the whole, has counseled acceptance. That heritage helps to explain why today’s poor seem more passive in the face of apparent opportunity than other ethnic immigrant groups, even if most blacks and Hispanics have absorbed the acquisitive individualism of the mainstream culture.

However, the most persuasive interpretation of nonworking psychology, especially for welfare mothers, is what in the 1960s was referred to as culture of poverty. In this view, the poor want to work and observe other mainstream mores, but they do not feel they actually can work given the impediments they face. While the barriers to work do not seem unusual to an impartial eye, nonworkers often feel them to be. They feel that someone else, typically government, should find them a job and arrange child care and other logistics before they actually can work. Thus they have absorbed orthodox values but not with the force needed to bind actual behavior. For them, work is something they would like to do, but not something they feel they must do at any cost. It is an aspiration but not an obligation.

This psychology is no doubt long-standing, but it has become more visible due to changes in the inner city. Under Jim Crow, when blacks of all classes were confined to separate residential areas, better-off blacks provided the role models and supported the social institutions—such as churches—needed to uphold work and other mainstream mores for the group as a whole. But after the advent of civil rights, these leading elements departed for the suburbs. Many poorer blacks then rejected legal but low-paying jobs in favor of welfare, crime, and the underground economy. The ghetto lost its connection with the legitimate economy, and far fewer residents now have regular contact with working people. They thus find it more difficult to locate “straight” jobs even if they want to.

In this analysis, the major task of work policy is not to dismantle barriers to work, because they seldom literally bar employment. Rather, it is to restore conventional work norms to the authority they had in the inner city before civil rights. Public programs and policies must somehow take over the leadership role previously exercised by the black middle class. They must reconnect the ghetto with the legitimate economy, for only through the workplace can poor blacks enter mainstream society.

POLICY DEVELOPMENT

Federal policymakers have gradually accepted that work by the poor must be enforced, not simply facilitated by expanded opportunities. Work policy has been closely tied to welfare, as it is nonwork by welfare adults that is most controversial, and it is only the recipients of benefits whom government has the authority to require to work.

The approach given the longest trial was work incentives, or the attempt to give recipients stronger financial inducements to work. As mentioned earlier,
welfare seems to remove the material payoff to work by deducting any earnings from assistance. To reduce this "tax" on work, reforms in 1967 allowed working recipients to keep somewhat over a third of their earnings. But work levels did not rise, and the Reagan administration largely eliminated the incentives in 1981. Research, too, has shown that changes in the payoff to work, like varying benefit levels, have surprisingly little effect on work effort by recipients. The reality is that welfare recipients, especially the long-term cases, are not very responsive to economic incentives. Indeed, if they were, they would seldom be poor in the first place.

A later strategy was public employment. Provide disadvantaged adults with attractive, temporary jobs within government, the argument went, and they will become more involved in work and will move on to regular employment. As many as 750,000 such jobs a year were funded under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) during the 1970s. While the recipients usually contributed useful labor, they seldom made the transition to private employment. Most went back on welfare or unemployment benefits or, at best, took other jobs within government. The problem was that the level of pay and amenity necessary to raise clients' commitment to work was more than they could usually command in the private sector. Thus the jobs were in part disguised welfare and did not really solve the problem. For this and other reasons, Congress killed the program in 1981.

Increasingly, work policy has relied on administrative work requirements, or stipulations that welfare recipients look for work or enter training as a condition of receiving assistance. Such a test was added to AFDC in 1967 and was stiffened in 1971 and 1981. The requirement differs from an incentive in that employable recipients are faced with a cut in welfare if they do not seek to work, rather than promised higher income if they do. The offender's share of assistance is eliminated from the family's welfare grant, which, however, continues for the rest of the family.

The work requirement bears on recipients who are employable, which is currently defined to include unemployed fathers, teenagers not in school, and mothers whose children are aged 6 or over. That constitutes only about 38 percent of all recipients over 16, chiefly because of the exemption of mothers with preschool children. Furthermore, while all the employable must register with a work program, only a third to a half ever participate actively in work-related activities, due to funding limitations and the reluctance of staff to work with the more disadvantaged clients.

The participants mostly look for jobs under staff direction, but some enter training or government jobs. The term "workfare" originally applied only to assignments where clients "worked off," or earned, their grants in unpaid public positions, but it has acquired a broader meaning, preferred here, that includes all the mandatory, work-related activities in which clients may engage, including job search, training, or education, as well as work.

Work programs hitched to welfare show potential. Many new programs have appeared since 1981, when Congress allowed states and localities to develop alternatives to the Work Incentive (WIN)

program, which previously had been the nationwide AFDC work structure. Evaluations of several of the recent initiatives by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) make them look promising. In most instances, welfare clients who were involved in the programs worked more hours, earned more money, and drew less welfare afterward than comparable clients not so exposed. While running the programs cost money, it was usually more than recouped due to savings in welfare grants as more recipients went to work.24

In most cases, the economic gains are still marginal. Workfare’s main effect is not to reduce dependency, at least not right away. In the typical work program, 52 percent of the clients entering jobs earn enough to leave welfare,25 but many will return later. Rather, the effect is to make the welfare experience less passive. The major potential of workfare is simply to increase work effort, to raise the share of the employable recipients who are doing something to help themselves, whether or not they leave welfare, whether it be training, looking for work, or actually working. Short of abolishing welfare, this is government’s best hope to enforce the work norm in the inner city.

Despite its long history, however, workfare has only begun to be implemented seriously in the United States. Few states have programs that levy a real work demand on more than a token slice of the employable caseload. Workfare is still too controversial in most places to be instituted more forcefully. Even where the will to enforce work is strong, difficult statecraft lies ahead. A serious program requires that welfare departments and other local agencies coordinate many services and change many routines. In most states, that process has only begun. There is still doubt as to whether government can carry out workfare in practice, whatever its potential.26

WHAT WORKFARE DOES

Workfare reflects the analysis of the work problem presented earlier. It assumes that jobs exist but that jobless recipients must be motivated to take them. For motivation to exist, work must be enforced, much as other public obligations—such as tax payment—are by other public agencies. The aim is not to resocialize the poor, a task probably beyond the capacity of government. It is only to close the considerable gap that now exists between the desires of the poor to work and their actual behavior.

Workfare involves more than an inducement to work. Recipients are not left to respond to work opportunities on their own, as with work incentives. Rather, there is a definite program to follow up on them. Special personnel help them look for work and provide necessary support services, particularly child care. And because participation is mandatory, the staff have an authority over clients lacking in voluntary employment programs. They can demand effort and cooperation from the client in return for the benefits they are receiving.

The combination of services and requirements places clients in a structure where they find they can work and also


that they must. Previously, welfare was essentially an entitlement, a right to support regardless of effort made to overcome dependency. Now that right is balanced with an onus to work or seek work. Previously, work was only a hope for most clients. Now it becomes an obligation, something they actually have to do here and now, in many instances for the first time.

The power of such requirements to raise work effort is potent. The rhetoric of barriers has convinced many welfare experts that to insist on work could have little impact. In reality, the degree of obligation in work programs is the main determinant of their performance. One measure of that expectation is the participation rate, or the share of all the employable clients who participate actively in a work program. That rate is generally low, for reasons given earlier, but it varies widely across state and local programs. In WIN, that variation was the strongest determinant of the share of clients in those programs who entered jobs. This was so even controlling for the alleged barriers, that is, the disadvantages of the clients and economic conditions. It has probably been by raising participation, more than for any other reason, that the recent work programs have improved on WIN.

Opponents typically view workfare as coercive, but it should rather be seen as an exercise in authority. Enforcement assumes that the poor want to work, not that they do not, for otherwise work would be unenforceable, just as Prohibition was. If workfare clients truly participated against their will, we would find many being penalized for noncooperation. In fact, sanction levels are low, with only about 5 percent of participants losing their benefits, even though the penalty for noncooperation is now very limited.

The MDRC studies of recent programs reveal that most participants approve of them. They think the work requirement is fair, and they feel positively about their work experience under the program. The main reservation is that those working off their grants would prefer regular jobs. This reaction is not what one would expect from middle-class people, and it reveals much about the psychology of workfare. Those who have not fully internalized the work norm resist requirements less, not more, than those who have. It is better-off people who resist being told what to do by government, quite rightly, because they are more able to tell themselves. My impression is that the clients who are sanctioned in WIN tend to be the most self-reliant, not the least. Most activists who oppose requirements are not themselves dependent. Conversely, those on welfare usually appreciate the guidance workfare provides. They know they need that structure to work in practice.

The notion that workfare is repressive projects a middle-class psychology on the poor. Actually, effective programs work against repression. Typically, welfare clients coming to workfare are profoundly withdrawn. They have often been failures in school and earlier jobs and see little opportunity around them. They have the same belief in insuperable barriers evinced


by liberal analysts of the work problem, but it leaves them powerless. Hence their reluctance to do more to help themselves. We think of social deviance as something assertive, akin to breaking the law, but for this group it rather arises from defeatism. Some are aggressive, but many more are passively aggressive.

Much that workfare does, besides help recipients with the logistics of work, is prompt them to be more assertive. Only then can they seize opportunities and control their lives. Two activities dominate in most programs, both of them dedicated to this end. One is job search, in which staff send individual recipients to interviews with employers. The other is job clubs, a form of job seeking in which groups of recipients support each other in the endeavor to find work. Group members encourage each other, but they also levy expectations to keep each other from "shirking." The dynamic works against passivity, as defeated individuals are drawn out of themselves.

Besides aiming for high participation, successful workfare programs encourage intensive interaction between clients and staff and among the clients themselves.30 The work obligation is levied more through these interchanges than impersonal bureaucratic requirements. Recipients are not coerced; they are expected to participate and then to work by other human beings whose demands they experience as just and unavoidable.31 Relationships are the main lever that forces them to become more active. Programs that rely heavily on legal coercion are much more passive, more impersonal, less able to motivate, and thus less successful.32

Workfare should be seen in the broadest sense as a form of public education. Just as we require children to attend school, so we should require adults to do something to improve themselves if they are employable yet on welfare. Just as in public education, mandatoriness is essential to achieve participation, to draw recipients out of their homes and into constructive activities. The message is that defeatism is not acceptable, that able-bodied adults must do something to help themselves. But, given participation, the developmental objectives of workfare can be uppermost. Learning is directed inward as well as outward. Participants have much to learn about themselves as well as the outer world. The emphasis is on opportunity and hope.

According to MDRC, the new work programs are upbeat and not punitive in tone.33 Most of them do not seek primarily to cut welfare but rather to reduce passivity on the rolls. Most of them offer training and education options alongside immediate work. Some, indeed, include "learnfare," or requirements that teenage welfare mothers remain in school rather than drop out, a policy that makes explicit the parallel to education. All embody a presumption, deep-seated in the culture, that both education and work are public activities to be expected of all competent citizens, for their own good and society's.34

WELFARE REFORM

The success of recent work programs has prompted many work-oriented proposals for welfare reform in Washington.

31. For a vivid portrayal of such interaction within a comparable program, see Ken Auletta, The Underclass (New York: Random House, 1982), chaps. 1, 3-4, 6, 8-11, 15-16.
34. Mead, Beyond Entitlement, chaps. 5, 10-11.
At this writing, however, little change is foreseeable. The reform bills most likely to become law, drafted by Democrats Daniel Moynihan in the Senate and Thomas Downey in the House, would increase welfare benefits in marginal ways, but states would control most parameters of work programs, as they have since the 1981 reforms. They could define as employable welfare mothers with children as young as 3—rather than 6, as now—and the participation rate, or the share of the employable clients actively involved, could remain low.

Changes on this scale would not alter the token character of most existing work programs, which typically “cream,” or work with only the most employable recipients. The tendency among liberal legislators is to play down the mandatory aspect of workfare in favor of the new services it provides for willing job seekers. This approach suits their political needs, which are to satisfy public concerns about work on welfare without disturbing large, entrenched urban caseloads. But programs that cream tend to serve recipients who might well go to work without special assistance. Thus they have little impact on the more seriously dependent cases, those most central to the underclass.

Rather, reform should expand participation in workfare so that many more of the employable recipients share actively in work activities. This is the only way to ensure that work effort becomes an integral part of the welfare experience. Federal rules now set a minimum participation rate in state work programs of only 15 percent. As a counter to the Democratic proposals, House Republicans, with the support of the Reagan administration, drafted a plan that would have raised the floor to 70 percent over several years.

The effect on work effort and job entries would have been sharp. At present, some 2 million recipients are registered in work programs in a given year, but only about 700,000 have to participate actively. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the Downey bill would have added only 210,000 participants and would have caused only 15,000 families to leave welfare over five years; the comparable figures for the Moynihan bill were only 86,000 and 10,000. The Republican plan, however, would have raised participation by 935,000 and caused 50,000 families to leave the rolls. It also cost less—$1.1 billion versus $5.7 billion for Downey and $2.3 billion for Moynihan—because more of the new services would have been defrayed by welfare savings.

The defeat of the Republican proposal means that no version of reform will expand workfare very much. However, it is likely that some minimal participation standard will be added to the final legislation. At the urging of the White House, the Moynihan bill was amended, when it passed the Senate in June 1988, to specify that 22 percent of the employable recipients had to participate actively in workfare by 1994. That, at least, is somewhat above the 15 percent in current law. The possibility of higher participation levels will also be studied. A level of 50 percent is probably achievable over several years, as this is the level reached in the more demanding of the recent workfare programs.35

Besides the small scale of the work programs, the other main limitation of current work policies is that they affect women much more than men. Workfare can obligate only the adult recipients of assistance, most of whom are welfare mothers. It cannot directly reach nonworking men, few of whom are on welfare but

whose employment problems are even more central to the underclass. At best, there is the hope that to require welfare mothers to work will make them less tolerant of nonworking men as sexual partners.

Work effort by men outside welfare must be enforced by suppressing the alternatives to legal employment, meaning crime, particularly drug trafficking, and the underground economy, or work that is legal but done off the books to escape taxes. The defenses sometimes made of illegal work are unpersuasive. It is not true that crime is a rational choice for unskilled black youths, since over a year most will make more money in legal jobs. Nor is illegal work morally or socially equivalent to legal employment. Few underground workers are successful husbands or fathers, nor can they earn full acceptance by other citizens. The way forward for today's poor, like yesterday's, lies through the legitimate economy.

As a secondary measure, I would also expand welfare to cover more low-skilled fathers, so that more of them could be reached by workfare programs. At present, states may cover two-parent families under AFDC, but only if the father has a work history and is unemployed. If he works more than 99 hours a month, the family loses all benefits, even if it is still needy; his earnings may not be supplemented up to the welfare level, as those of working mothers may be. Only about half the states cover unemployed parents, and the small size of the programs indicates that few welfare fathers find the rules attractive. The current Democratic reform proposals would mandate coverage in all states but would still forbid the father to work and remain on welfare.

It would be better to cover the father but require him to work. That is, a father could receive welfare provided he was working and his family was still needy. He would have the same right to supplementation as a working mother, except that he would face a much tougher work test. He would have to be working full-time in a legitimate job or a workfare job even to apply for aid, and he would have to keep working to maintain eligibility. That requirement is also what differentiates this proposal from the many plans offered in the 1960s and 1970s to extend welfare from single-parent to two-parent families. One move in this direction was another amendment added to the Moynihan bill on its passage by the Senate, a requirement that unemployed fathers work at least 16 hours a week in workfare jobs. But there is no need to confine them to government employment. Private-sector jobs would satisfy the work norm as well or better.

Obviously, this proposal would help only workers with the lowest wages and sizable families, particularly in states paying high welfare benefits. For others, to work steadily in virtually any job places one above the welfare level. But more welfare fathers might accept these rules than the current ones, and for that portion, government would have more leverage to enforce work than it does now.

WORKFARE AND EQUALITY

The leading objection to any steps to strengthen work policy is that they would condemn the poor to a life of drudgery in "dirty jobs." The dead-end quality of such jobs is exaggerated, as poor and black people show mobility comparable

to that of the better-off over time—if they work.37 But there is no question that, for many low-skilled adults, to work initially means menial labor. Should they have to work under such conditions?

It is hard to argue otherwise as long as the public so clearly wants the poor to work more than they do.38 It is easier to argue for raising job quality. Workfare can enforce work only in jobs that pay the minimum wage and meet other rules for conditions and benefits set by government. Those standards could be raised—for instance, by increasing the minimum wage or requiring that all jobs include health benefits. But they would have to be raised for all workers, an expensive proposition. To offer "better" jobs just to the poor, as experience with public employment shows, does not achieve integration, as the beneficiaries do not meet the norms faced by other workers.

Work policy presumes that even dirty work is preferable to the distress now faced by the working-aged poor both on and off welfare and that it would help to integrate the underclass. About two-thirds of recipients who work their way off welfare escape poverty.39 Even if the effect of enforcement were only to increase the number of working poor, the latter would have much greater resources, both economic and political, to demand redress than the nonworking poor have now. New economic claims can be made only by citizens in full standing, who in this culture must have a work history.

Workfare is not opposed to greater equality, but it addresses rather the problem of economic participation that must be solved before issues of equity can even get on the agenda. The last generation has given poverty unprecedented attention, but finally at the expense of equality. Poverty raised issues of social order, including nonwork, that ultimately took priority. For a generation, those who would have government do more to promote equality have been stymied by the charge that the poor are undeserving. Likewise, those who want government to do less, including the Reagan administration, have faced the charge that the poor would be hurt. The underclass is the albatross around the necks of social reformers, on both the Left and the Right.

A rise in work effort among the poor, more than any other change, would give both sides freer rein. Both the collectivist and the free-market ideology would become more defensible, for both are visions on behalf of working citizens. The country would much rather argue about these New Deal options than about poverty, for both presume exactly the competence among the poor that has recently been in question.

Institutional Change and the Challenge of the Underclass

By RICHARD P. NATHAN

ABSTRACT: This article calls for greater emphasis on the institutional challenge of the urban underclass, particularly on implementation studies of new social programs. The need for such a shift in emphasis is examined in historical context, stressing the pluralistic and competitive nature of the American policy process, the structure of American federalism, and the critical role of state governments in chartering and overseeing the major institutions that provide social services. Two types of action are proposed to give greater attention to institutional dimensions of the challenge of the urban underclass: (1) evaluation research that incorporates institutional, attitudinal, and community variables; and (2) new consultative arrangements involving panels of academics and experts to assist government agencies in the implementation of social policies focused on the urban underclass.

Richard P. Nathan is professor of public and international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University. He received his Ph.D. degree in political economy and government from Harvard University in 1967. Nathan has written extensively on welfare, urban affairs, and federalism. He is a former U.S. government official and senior fellow of the Brookings Institution. His most recent book is Social Science in Government, Uses and Misuses.
FIVE years ago, Ken Auletta's book *The Underclass* was published. In the intervening period, William Julius Wilson, Isabel Sawhill, Robert Reischauer, Ronald Mincy, Erol Ricketts, Mark Hughes, Greg Duncan, and others have wrestled with the issues involved in defining and measuring the elusive condition of what is widely believed to be a growing urban underclass in America. This special issue of *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science presents a cross section of the views of these and other leading experts on the subject of the urban underclass. I was asked to write the penultimate article, focusing on the institutional challenge of the urban underclass. Rather than use valuable space in this compendium to present my ideas on the reasons for and character of the urban underclass, I begin with a series of assumptions and then turn my attention to two questions that fascinate me. First, given the existence of an urban underclass, what can we do about it? And more specifically, what can be done to assure that the institutions in the society whose actions are critical to the nation's response to the problem of an urban underclass rise to this challenge? I particularly focus on the second question in this article.

**ASSUMPTIONS**

I assume that the dramatic increase over the past two decades in the geographic concentration of multi-problem poor persons—predominantly members of racial-minority groups—in large cities in the United States is more than a difference of degree from past periods. It is a new condition that is, and should be, deeply troubling to the nation. In part, this condition is a function of the success—not complete, but substantial nonetheless—of the civil rights revolution in America. As William Julius Wilson has pointed out, one of the reasons for the concentration of the multi-problem minority poor in large cities is the out-migration of role models—teachers, merchants, civil servants, professionals—from the distressed areas of cities as opportunities have opened up for them to live and work in other and better-off areas.¹

By “multi-problem,” I refer to three interconnected conditions: (1) economic needs as measured by such indicators as poverty, unemployment, and educational deficiencies; (2) behavioral problems such as long-term welfare dependency, family instability, drugs, crime, and prostitution; and (3) attitudinal problems of deep isolation and alienation. All three of these conditions are extremely difficult to measure, especially when they coexist. Moreover, even in those situations where national or local data are available, they usually are cross-sectional rather than longitudinal, so our knowledge of the character, depth of severity, size, and duration of the urban-underclass condition is limited.²

Despite these and other measurement problems, we have become increasingly aware in recent years of the existence of a growing and ever more isolated urban underclass.³ One indicator is the greater


². A new study of the urban underclass under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council and sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation includes neighborhood ethnographic studies. Similar research at the neighborhood level, which will add an important dimension to our knowledge in this field, is being conducted by William Julius Wilson in Chicago.

³. My views on this subject are summarized in “Will the Underclass Always Be with Us?” *Society*, Mar.-Apr. 1987, pp. 57-62.
concentration in urban census tracts of multi-problem conditions. Decennial census data for 1970 and 1980 show that the number of tracts with high concentrations of poverty and other social problems increased in the 1970s, although the population of these tracts in many cases declined. This latter phenomenon—the thinning out of urban distress—has been widely noted in the literature. It is obvious in windshield surveys of what formerly were concentrated ghetto neighborhoods that now have large numbers of abandoned and burned-out buildings and vacant lots.

In my view, the striking characteristic of this underclass situation, a characteristic that has tended to be left out of our analysis, is that it is spatial. A recent study by the Urban Institute shows that in the 1970s, “a significant proportion of the black population shifted away from established ghetto areas.” The increased geographical concentration of the urban underclass has the effect of reinforcing the behavior and attitudes that draw people into the patterns of deviance—deviance, that is, from prevailing social norms—that characterize the urban underclass. My assumption is that this greater concentration of problem conditions differentiates this issue of the urban underclass from that of high levels of poverty and related concerns in rural areas. In the summer of 1987, just a few months before he died, Bayard Rustin referred to this situation as the rise of a “lumpen black underclass” in our cities, which he said required a new and expensive governmental response unlike that of the civil rights policies begun in the 1960s.

Instead of devoting more attention here to a diagnosis, I turn now to the response. This subject falls naturally under two headings, one involving the character of the response, the other its execution. As stated earlier, my main interest is in implementation—the institutional challenge of the underclass. First, however, we need to consider the policies and programs that can be part of the kind of new response as advocated by Bayard Rustin.

THE RESPONSE

The first and critical point to make about the response to the underclass is that it is bound to be extraordinarily difficult to reach into this hardened social-problem milieu and save even a relatively small proportion of the people trapped in the urban underclass. The cultural isolation, danger, and depth of severity of the social environment we are considering is hard to exaggerate. The people who need help are often resentful, alienated, and prone to hostile acts. This makes the politics of response much more difficult than in an earlier period, when a war on poverty included helping the old and the sick, that is, a much larger number of persons whom the society defines as the deserving poor. In short, the political challenge of putting together a coalition of supporters for what Bayard Rustin said have to be “new and expensive” government programs to affect the problem of the urban underclass adds a dimension of great difficulty.

4. Research by Mark Alan Hughes being conducted at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University, uses detailed mapping analyses of 15 major cities for all census tracts to study conditions and trends relevant to the urban underclass.


7. This challenge is discussed in other articles in this issue of The Annals of the American Academy.
Despite the fact that both the social and the political conditions involved are so difficult, there are arguments for action and types of action that I believe are feasible in terms of both their chances for success and the prospects for winning support for their adoption.

A number of the authors of the articles in this special issue of The Annals were part of the working seminar on family and American welfare policy sponsored jointly by the American Enterprise Institute and Marquette University and chaired by Michael Novak. The seminar included a group of experts on domestic and social issues who reflected a wide range of ideological positions. In its report, issued in May 1987, the working seminar emphasized the emergence of what it called "the new consensus" between liberals and conservatives on social policy. This new consensus is grounded in the concepts of "mutual obligation" and behavioral change. It involves a political bargain in which, on the one hand, conservatives are willing to support programs that instill the dominant social values of the society, such as the obligation to obtain an education, to work, and to fulfill family and community responsibilities and, on the other hand, liberals are willing to highlight these values as a trade-off for obtaining more money for social programs.

Recent developments in the field of welfare policy give concreteness to this treaty on the part of political ors in the field of social policy. Such developments include, for example, the state programs adopted during the past five years to institute a combination of work and welfare, or so-called new-style workfare reforms. Under these state programs, able-bodied heads of welfare families—mostly females in single-parent families—are obligated to enter into what is often called a social contract. This social contract requires them to participate in services like training, remedial education, and job search and to accept employment. In exchange, the state provides the needed services to make this bargain work. Similar concepts are embodied in the inner-city education reforms emanating from the program developed by Eugene Lang, a businessperson and philanthropist in New York City. His approach involves a deal whereby students—typically in junior high school—agree to stay in school in exchange for a commitment on the part of an individual, such as Mr. Lang, or an organization, such as the Boston Compact, to provide help to those who stay in school and to guarantee a fully paid opportunity for higher education when they graduate from high school.

Likewise, in the field of corrections, where there has been rapid growth in the prison population and in the proportion of blacks and Hispanics in prison, state governments are experimenting with new approaches that at their roots involve institutional change. Examples are programs for closely supervised probation, including daily check-ins and frequent contact with parole officers, and intensive, supervised corrections facilities for youths with rehabilitation programs that emphasize behavior change, job training, and education.

The political bargains reflected in these approaches for reaching in and saving

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Academy of Political and Social Science, including Jennifer L. Hochschild, "Equal Opportunity and the Estranged Poor."


some of the people in the urban underclass have now been sufficiently noted, and in some cases tested, so that there is substance to the idea of a new consensus as embodied in the report from the seminar sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and Marquette. I should add that this agreement does not entail the commitment of large amounts of resources to new social programs, but it does translate into support for more spending and more intensive programs focused on the urban underclass on the part of many state and local governments and private groups. Moreover, even though it is not widely known, the national government under the Reagan administration has provided some support, though not huge, for program innovations in this area, particularly in the welfare field, where various federal waivers have enabled state governments to use federal matching funds for new-style workfare initiatives.

My own view is that these quiet incremental steps are promising. One reason for optimism is that the steps have been taken without the expansive rhetoric and overpromises typical of new federal social programs. Some states—Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania, California, and New Jersey, to mention examples—have been embarked on efforts to institute new-style workfare systems for as long as five years. They are developing concepts and systems to do this without the spotlight of attention that accompanies new social programs and often produces inflated expectations and impatience for rapid results. Another positive factor is the support of business groups like the Committee for Economic Development, which stress the need to upgrade the nation’s human capital because of the projected decline in the labor force.

While these developments bode well, there are also negative factors that bear mention. One is that liberal groups that in the past have been important to efforts to adopt new social programs have tended to drag their heels on or even oppose these relatively small steps, which in some cases—notably workfare—involve obligations that they oppose.

In sum, there is wider agreement now on some potentially effective responses to the problem of the urban underclass, but it is not wholehearted and general agreement and it does not at this time entail a willingness to devote large amounts of new money to such programs on a broad basis. Nevertheless, an agenda is forming that is grounded in the diagnosis, given previously, of the urban underclass that for many of its proponents is refreshingly realistic about the depth of the problem and the immensity of the challenge involved. Implicit in this formulation is the recognition that it will take a long time to achieve change, that even then only some people will be affected, and that the politics involved are very difficult.

For me, this situation is hopeful—with one big caveat. The caveat concerns institutions and implementation. The key to the new consensus is institutional change of welfare systems, school systems, child-care systems, and other institutions that deliver social services to needy people in troubled inner-city neighborhoods. The remainder of this article deals with the institutional challenge of the new consensus. Both in social science and in social policy, I see this institutional dimension as the neglected frontier that is an important key to success in dealing with the problem of a growing urban underclass.

THE NEGLECTED FRONTIER

Generally speaking, the bulk of the attention of political actors and experts on social issues is devoted to the diagnosis
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND THE UNDERCLASS

of problems and to the formulation and adoption of policy. The rewards—publicity for policymakers, and publication for experts and scholars—tend to favor these activities. The task of implementing new policies is left to people who are less central to the intellectual process, and the implication often is that they are less important players in the policy game.

Yet implementation is a special challenge in the American setting. The American political system is distinctively open, pluralistic, and competitive; Tocqueville called it full of "striving and animation." As a result, public policy decisions often are complex political bargains made under the pressure of a deadline without much, if any, attention to how they will be carried out. The more controversial the policy areas that are addressed, the more complex, turbulent, and unstable the political bargains that emerge. In the social policy field in the United States, we are almost immune now to the fact of constant change in program requirements and resources.

What is more, the special character of our political system involves a high level of uncertainty and instability in the staffing for implementation processes. The chief officials of many public agencies are relatively short-term political appointees, often with little experience, who are constantly looking to the next rung on the career ladder. This characteristic of the American political system is compounded by the division of authority and responsibility, often along lines that are unclear, between federal, state, and local governments. It comes to roost, for the purposes of this article, in troubled inner-city neighborhoods, where both public agencies and community organizations deal with the complex web of problems and pathology of the urban underclass in the provision of public services.

One can think of the American political system of checks and balances as having both a horizontal dimension and a vertical dimension. The horizontal dimension is reflected in the sharing of powers between the executive, the legislature, and the courts, with the latter coming to have an ever more assertive role in many areas of social policy. The vertical dimension is that of federalism, which involves the replication of this threefold sharing arrangement—executive, legislative, judicial—at many levels of government. Structurally, culturally, and intellectually, this dynamic, competitive political system places heavy pressure on those charged with the task of implementation in an issue area as basic and complex as dealing with the problems of the urban underclass.

In political science, the academic literature on implementation is relatively new and not extensive; the principal theme of the best work in the field highlights the immensity of the gap between an idea and its execution in the American governmental setting.10 This academic literature has its roots in an earlier period in the work of specialists in public administration as a subfield of political science. Now out of fashion, the leaders in public administration at one time had much higher standing. They taught courses in personnel management, coordination, budgeting, auditing, and accounting as elements of a paradigm that viewed policymaking as the work of politicians and its execution as the work of professionals with neutral competence in administrative processes. But wiser heads took charge in the discipline, with their central point being a critique of the idea that policy and

administration can be separated and assigned to different political actors. Their point, surely a legitimate one, is that the policy process is continuous and that values are brought into play in both the legislative and the administrative processes. As public administration has fallen away in political science, a focus on economics, statistics, and organizational behavior has replaced it in graduate education in public affairs.

Political science's sister discipline of economics has contributed to this shift. In an earlier day, economics gave more attention to institutions. John R. Commons, at the University of Wisconsin, and his followers stressed the idea that institutions behave differently from the sum of the rational men and women who make them up. This insight caused Commons and others, including a generation of labor economists at Princeton University, to view the workings of social programs on a basis that highlighted the role and importance of the way institutions behave in the public sector. All of this is gone now in economics.

To put together several of the ideas in this section, I believe that both the character of the American policy process—not unique, but distinctive in these pluralistic, Madisonian terms—and the intellectual heritage of the social sciences are such that we must now find ways to give more attention more systematically to institutional aspects of governance and specifically to the implementation process in the conduct of social policy. How do we do this?

'A NEW INSTITUTIONALISM''

In political science, James G. March and Johan P. Olsen have called for "a new institutionalism" that holds promise for change and redirection toward implementation studies in the social sciences. They stress the importance of symbolic action and the "interdependence between relatively autonomous social and political institutions." In turn, March and Olsen "deemphasize the simple primacy of micro processes in favor of relatively complex processes and historical inefficiency." Their call for "a new institutionalism" and that of others are beginning to influence a number of scholars. This is all to the good. In particular, I see the need to have this movement be interdisciplinary, encompassing both political science and economics. It is also important for other disciplines, especially sociology and social psychology.

To extend the argument here about the need for institutional and particularly implementation studies in the social sciences, and specifically to connect it to the challenge of the urban underclass, the next two sections of this article deal with areas in which this linkage can be made. Specifically, I believe that evaluation research in the social sciences can make an important contribution on the institutional side of the urban-underclass issue. I also believe that we can be creative in devising new consultative arrangements to involve scholars, experts, and universities, particularly schools of public affairs, in explicit and helpful ways to assist in the implementation process for new social policies.

EVALUATION RESEARCH

Evaluation research in the field of social policy came into prominence in the late 1960s. Actually, it includes two types

12. Ibid., p. 738.
of studies: demonstration studies, to test new policies; and evaluation studies, to assess the effects of existing, ongoing programs. The large-scale and systematic practice of both types of policy research in the field of social policy in the United States dates from the Great Society period, especially the inception of the New Jersey demonstration studies to test the idea of a negative income tax. A number of evaluation studies were also conducted of President Johnson's Great Society programs. Later, under Presidents Nixon and Ford, demonstration studies were undertaken to test other new social policies. These studies included the health insurance experiments, the housing experiments, and education vouchers.

My experience in this field involves both demonstration and evaluation research. The demonstration studies I know best are closely related to the topic of the underclass, namely, the studies undertaken by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (MDRC) to test new employment and training and work/welfare programs to assist disadvantaged population groups, which, for the purposes of this article, in most cases would be included in the underclass.13 I have also had experience conducting field network evaluation studies of the implementation of new federal grant-in-aid programs, including employment and training and community development programs targeted on disadvantaged people and distressed places.

In an important sense, the rise of these two types of large-scale applied social science studies—demonstration and evaluation studies—can be seen as a fallback position to the earlier, ambitious effort by Lyndon Johnson to adopt a planning-programming-budgeting system on a governmentwide basis. It was not possible, as Johnson had envisioned, to identify the goals and measure the results of all domestic programs and policy alternatives as a way to make the budget process more scientific and rational. Demonstration and evaluation research is selective, involving large-scale studies of those programs, either potential new programs or existing programs, that are believed to warrant special attention.

In the 1960s, when demonstration and evaluation research rose in prominence—it has fallen from grace in the Reagan years—economists were far and away the dominant group among social scientists in the design and conduct of these studies. This is to their credit; however, the downside of the strong influence of economists in this area is that subjects that economists have not been interested in have received short shrift. The most important subject in this category, for the purposes of this article, is the institutional dimension of the policy process. Political scientists and sociologists were not featured guests at demonstration and evaluation research banquets, although sometimes they were invited to fill in at the back tables. This has meant that certain variables in the research equation—both independent and dependent variables—have been given no or relatively little attention. They include institutional variables and also attitudinal and community variables.

In my opinion, these omissions are not as serious in the case of demonstration research as they are in the case of evaluation research. When the issue is what works, as it is in demonstration research, we tend to be most interested in specific economic values like the effect of a new program on income, earnings, employment, and the like. The work/welfare

demonstrations conducted by MDRC are a case in point. Tests by MDRC in eight states involved the random assignment of 35,000 people to treatment and control groups, with the principal dependent variables being earnings and welfare benefits. But what if new-style workfare worked?

When a government decides to generalize a work/welfare program tested in a demonstration study, the research challenge is transformed. Politicians in this situation are likely to be interested in whether we can change the pertinent institutions so that the program will be put in place effectively and as intended. They have ideas, even data, about what they want to do. The question now becomes, Can government do it? In the case of work/welfare initiatives, for example, can the governmental entities involved change the behavior of schools, the welfare systems, the employment service, and child-care services in ways that focus on the rehabilitative needs of welfare recipients on an interconnected basis? In the assessment of such programs, we are likely to be interested in individual economic impacts like earnings, employment, and welfare recipiency. But the funders of such research—government agencies and foundations—are likely to be much more interested in political and institutional variables and processes. This is the kind of knowledge that can help us cross the frontier of institutional change critical to dealing with the stubborn, hard problems of the urban underclass.

The bottom line for this discussion is that we need broader, multidisciplinary evaluation studies that incorporate the idea of "a new institutionalism." This entails moving back—or, if you like, forward—in terms of pushing policy-oriented social science into the administrative arena. While I favor doing this for good intellectual reasons that go beyond the topic of the urban underclass, such a development would be highly beneficial in enhancing our knowledge base and our capacity for acting in this area. The intellectual mode of evaluation research as envisioned here would be more inductive and descriptive than evaluation research driven by economics. Likewise, it would rely more heavily on qualitative, as opposed to quantitative, research methods and data. It would focus on questions involving the degrees to which, and the ways in which, the major organizational actors involved in implementing a new policy responded to changed policy purposes and signals. It would make heavier use of interviews, survey data—especially on attitudes toward policy change—and program information.14

NEW CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Not only should the members of the fraternity I belong to, policy-oriented institutional social scientists, augment our research capacity to deal with the underclass challenge, but we also ought to bring this capacity to bear in a more direct and immediate way in the execution of new programs. Here, I think we need to do some institution building of our own. The aforementioned MDRC work/welfare demonstrations indicate the kinds of possibilities involved. These demonstrations were conducted in eight states. On the basis of the findings of the research and also for other reasons, a number of state governments decided in effect to replicate the demonstrated programs and program ideas on a larger scale. California is a case in point.

MDRC did its first and probably best-known work/welfare demonstration to test new approaches to job search linked with community work experience for welfare applicants and recipients in San Diego County, California. Some 5000 persons participated in this demonstration, and the results were encouraging. Significant, though not huge, increases in earnings and lower welfare benefits were found for the participants compared to the controls. Based on these findings and also taking into account other ideas and purposes, the state of California in 1985 enacted a statewide program called Greater Avenues to Independence (GAIN). The program involves an intricate set of interconnected steps to provide continuous service—education, job counseling, training, work experience, child care—to heads of welfare families. These services are to be provided by a multitude of social agencies under the supervision of county governments, of which there are 58 in California. The law gives counties two years to plan their program, which must be approved by the state.

At its roots, the idea of GAIN is to convert the welfare system from a payment system into a service system focused on work preparation and facilitation. Now, nearly two years into the GAIN program, it is abundantly clear that the ambitious system-reform objectives of this new law stretch the state's capacity to design and oversee changes in social programs and administrative procedures across a broad array of communities and agencies. The logistics involved for the service agencies that are called on to participate—schools, the employment service, junior colleges, training programs, child care—and the task of keeping integrated records and making timely payments for welfare assistance to the individual participants and to service providers are appreciable hurdles to the achievement of the goal despite the fact that the goal is widely shared.

The state of California has committed itself to a major evaluation of the GAIN program. In the normal course of affairs, however, the main outputs of such a study follow, rather than coincide with, the implementation process. As state officials turned their attention to implementing the GAIN program, it became increasingly apparent that the task was a formidable one.

It is in this kind of territory that I believe we would benefit from some inventive institution building that would bring the intellectual community—experts and academics—closer to the implementation process. I have in mind the creation of on-the-scene advisory panels that would work with government officials and prepare material for their internal use and periodic reports for public dissemination. I realize that such arrangements are often made and furthermore that they involve many and diverse kinds of special political conditions and interests. Nevertheless, I believe there would be value in having some central organization develop, organize, and oversee the creation of consultative arrangements for panels of academic experts and consultants to have formal ties to implementation processes for important new social policy initiatives. A group like the National Academy of Public Administration, for example, could play this role on a national basis whereby it would develop the expertise to identify participants, provide staff, and perhaps also help obtain funding for such arrangements.

The advantage of having a central organizing unit is that there would be a body of experience—not unlike the case of MDRC as a research intermediary in this field—that could be drawn upon in
arranging for the auspices, time commitment, publications, funding arrangements, and staff for the panels to aid in the implementation process for social policy initiatives, especially those focused on the intractable problems of the urban underclass. If nothing else, the central unit would provide a sounding board and discussion arena for defining key issues and considering problems as they arise in the execution of important and complex new social policies. At some points along the way in the implementation process, it could also help to clear the air or obtain support on key issues just by the fact of having independent and well-developed analyses of the major choice points and issues in the implementation process.

My image of these central groups is that they would involve multidisciplinary panels of academics and experts, including former officials in the field, perhaps using faculty members and graduate students at schools of public affairs or other similar programs as principals and support personnel. The groups would have a single chair or director and a specified relationship with program officials. There would be financial resources and space for staff and an agreed upon schedule of their tasks and main products. The work of these special panels would be time limited. They would go out of existence once the program being considered had been developed and put in place. They could operate at different levels of the political system—in state government or in large local jurisdictions, including counties, cities, and school districts.

Under the general heading of inventing mechanisms for institutional change, I would go one step further. With respect to the earlier discussion of the pluralism and diversity of American domestic government, we need to return to the federalism dimension of the American policy process. It is state governments that have the dominant policy and oversight role for many of the services that are critical to addressing effectively the hardened social problems of the urban underclass. Historically, the main role of the U.S. national government in domestic affairs has been in the area of income transfers, such as social security, unemployment compensation, and welfare. In the service area, its role has been more limited, focusing on stimulating and supporting state and local social services. The emphasis of federal policy has been on grants-in-aid for social service programs, and not so much—as I argue is needed now—on promoting institutional change. We need to shift our attention from specific and narrow programs to a broader concern for systems—schools, welfare, corrections, hospitals—in providing for the poor. This requires rethinking the federal role. The National Institutes of Health could be considered as a model, with the aim being to give both financial and intellectual support on a systematic basis to state governments and through them to their major local entities—big cities, urban counties, and school districts—to transform the institutions critical to dealing with the problems of the urban underclass.

RECAPITULATION

The articles in this special issue of The Annals reflect a convergence in their diagnosis of the problem of a hardened, troubled, and predominantly minority urban underclass. The underlying challenge of racial differences is the main story line of the history of social conditions and social policy in the United States. Our capacity to deal with this challenge is the critical test of the American democratic idea.
There is now an emerging consensus in the social policy community about strategies that are likely to make a dent in these intractable problems. The missing ingredient in dealing with these problems that is highlighted in this article is greater and concentrated attention on the institutional dimension of the policy changes needed to reach the problems of the urban underclass, particularly the implementation process for new strategies and programs. This article examines the reasons why this ingredient is so often missing and the consequences of its absence. It highlights ways in which intellectual resources, both evaluation research and new consultative arrangements, could be brought to bear in more systematic ways to help turn goals into accomplishments in the field of social policy related to the urban underclass. It is in the interest of lighting a dark area of government that this article offers suggestions for dealing with the institutional challenge of the urban underclass.
The Underclass: Issues, Perspectives, and Public Policy

By WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

ABSTRACT: This article critically reviews the other articles in this volume and integrates some of their major arguments. Attention is given to the substantive arguments advanced by each author and how they relate to the points raised by the other authors. In conclusion, the policy recommendations put forth in several of the articles are assessed.

A MacArthur prize fellow, William Julius Wilson is the Lucy Flower Distinguished Service Professor of Sociology and Social Policy at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Power, Racism, and Privilege; The Declining Significance of Race; The Truly Disadvantaged; and coeditor of Through Different Eyes.
DURING the decade of the 1970s, significant social changes occurred in ghetto neighborhoods of large central cities; however, they were not carefully monitored or researched by social scientists. In the aftermath of the controversy over Daniel Patrick Moynihan's report on the black family, scholars, particularly liberal scholars, tended to shy away from researching any behavior that could be construed as stigmatizing or unflattering to inner-city minority residents. The vitriolic attacks and acrimonious debate that characterized this controversy proved to be too intimidating to liberal scholars. Accordingly, for a period of several years, and well after this controversy had subsided, the problems of social dislocation in the inner-city ghetto did not attract serious research attention. This left the study of ghetto social dislocations to conservative analysts who, without the benefit of actual field research in the inner city, put their own peculiar stamp on the problem, so much so that the dominant image of the underclass became one of people with serious character flaws entrenched by a welfare subculture and who have only themselves to blame for their social position in society.

In the early to mid-1980s, however, as the nation's awareness of the problems in the ghetto has been heightened by a proliferation of conservative studies and sensational media reports, the problems of inner-city ghettos have once again drawn the attention of serious academic researchers, including liberal social scientists. Accordingly, an alternative or competing view to that of the dominant image of the underclass is slowly emerging, a view more firmly anchored in serious empirical research and/or thoughtful theoretical arguments. The work of some of the social scientists responsible for this different perspective is included in this volume.

ANALYSIS OF INNER-CITY SOCIAL DISLOCATIONS

The article by Wacquant and Wilson sets the tone for most of the research articles in this volume. In contrast to discussions of inner-city social dislocations that strongly emphasize the individual attributes of ghetto residents and a so-called culture of ghetto poverty, Wacquant and Wilson draw attention to the structural cleavage separating ghetto residents from other members of society and to the severe constraints and limited opportunities that shape their daily lives. In highlighting a new sociospatial patterning of class and racial subjugation in the ghetto, Wacquant and Wilson argue that the dramatic rise in inner-city joblessness and economic exclusion is a product of the continuous industrial restructuring of American capitalism.

Lawrence Mead challenges this view in an argument based on the selective use of secondary sources. Mead maintains that since opportunities for work are widely available, the problem of inner-city joblessness cannot be blamed on limited employment opportunities; rather, it is inconsistent work, not a lack of jobs, that largely accounts for the high poverty and jobless rates in the inner city. Mead speculates that there is a disinclination among the ghetto underclass both to accept and to retain available low-wage jobs because they do not consider menial work fair or obligatory.

This thesis is seriously undermined by the evidence Kasarda has amassed on urban industrial transition. Carefully analyzing data from the Census Public Use Microdata Sample Files, Kasarda demonstrates that while employment increased in every occupational classification in the suburban rings of all selected Northern metropolises, blue-collar, clerical, and sales jobs declined sharply between 1970 and 1980 in the central cities even though...
there was substantial growth in the number of managerial, professional, and higher-level technical and administrative support positions. These occupational shifts have contributed to major changes in the educational composition of central-city jobholders: precipitous net declines in slots filled by persons with poor education and rapid increases in slots filled by those with at least some college training.

These changes are particularly problematic for the black urban labor force, which remains overrepresented among those with less than a high school education—for whom city employment has sharply declined—and greatly underrepresented among those, especially college graduates, for whom city employment has rapidly expanded. Kasarda points out that from 1950 to 1970 there were substantial increases in the number of blacks hired in the urban industrial sector who had not graduated from high school, but after 1970 “the bottom fell out in urban industrial demand for poorly educated” labor. As Wacquant and Wilson put it, “A high school degree is a conditio sine qua non for blacks for entering the world of work.”

Challenging the orthodox thesis put forth by economists that it is entirely race rather than space that determines the differential black employment rates, Kasarda’s data show that not only have blacks with less than a high school education in the suburban ring experienced considerably lower unemployment than their counterparts in the central city, but that these city-suburban differences have actually widened since 1969. Finally, Kasarda’s data reveal that compared with lesser-educated whites, lesser-educated blacks must endure considerably longer commuting time in reaching suburban jobs and are highly dependent on private vehicles to reach such jobs. Likewise, Wacquant and Wilson point out that “not owning a car severely curtails [the] chances [of ghetto blacks when they compete] for available jobs that are not located nearby or that are not readily accessible by public transportation.”

The arguments put forth by Sullivan reinforce those of Wacquant and Wilson and of Kasarda on the impact of macro-economic changes on inner-city neighborhoods and on poor blacks. Sullivan, like Wacquant and Wilson, is concerned that a heavy stress on individual causation neglects the mounting evidence of the relationship between increasing joblessness and the dismal employment prospects in the inner city. He notes that too great an emphasis on structural causation leads one to ignore the significance of culture and therefore leaves us unaware of the unique collective responses or adaptations to economic disadvantage, prejudice, and the problems of raising a family and socializing children under such conditions. Accordingly, Sullivan’s article relates data on cultural processes to the structural constraints of the political economy and to the different individual choices and strategies within these neighborhoods. Sullivan attempts to analyze the collective adaptations of different ethnic groups to similar yet distinctive problems in obtaining an income and raising and supporting children. Whereas he is able to show a strong relationship between poor female-headed households and an overall lack of decent jobs in the two minority neighborhoods under study, he does not clearly establish the linkage between culture and macro-structural concerns. Nonetheless, his analysis does strongly suggest that some of the effects of macro-structural constraints may be mediated by traditional ethnic values.

Sullivan’s subtle cultural analysis should not be confused with the culture-
of-poverty perspective on inner-city social dislocations. The term "culture of poverty" was introduced by the late Oscar Lewis to describe the configuration of cultural traits that tend to emerge, he argued, in class-stratified and highly individuated capitalist societies that have few, if any, of the characteristics of a welfare state: a sizable unskilled labor force that is poorly paid; high rates of unemployment and underemployment; few organizations, if any, to protect the interests of the poor; and advantaged classes who emphasize the value of upward mobility and the accumulation of wealth and who associate poverty with personal inadequacy or inferiority. Lewis argued that these conditions constitute powerful and enduring constraints on the experiences of the poor. As the poor learn to live within these constraints they develop a design for living—a culture of poverty—that is crystallized and is passed on from generation to generation. According to Lewis's formulation, then, the ultimate cause of the culture of poverty is the constraints imposed on the poor in highly individualistic class-stratified capitalist societies, and the principle reason for its stability and persistence is the transmission of this culture from one generation to the next. As Lewis put it, "By the time slum children are age six or seven, they have usually absorbed the basic values and attitudes of their subculture and are not psychologically geared to take full advantage of changing conditions or increased opportunities which may occur in their lifetime."

It is the cultural-transmission thesis of the culture of poverty that has received the most critical attention. As Ulf Hannerz noted, it is debatable, but certainly possible, that the father's deserting of mothers and children, a high tolerance for psychological pathology, and an unwillingness to defer gratification are products of cultural transmission. It is much more difficult, however, to entertain the idea that unemployment, underemployment, low income, a persistent shortage of cash, and crowded living conditions directly stem from cultural learning.

Hannerz argued that Lewis's work on cultural transmission had generated a great deal of confusion because he failed to draw a clear distinction between causes and symptoms, between what counts as objective poverty created by structural constraints and what counts as culture as people learn to cope with objective poverty. By failing to make this distinction clear, argued Hannerz, the notion of a culture of poverty tends to be used in a diluted sense as "a whole way of life." Emphasis is then placed not on the structural constraints or the ultimate origins of culture but on the "modes of behavior learned within the community."

But, as Hannerz noted, it is possible to recognize the importance of macro-structural constraints—that is, to avoid the extreme notion of the culture of poverty—and still see "the merits of a more subtle kind of cultural analysis of life in poverty." The point that Hannerz raised 20 years ago is still an open and crucial question today, namely, whether the e is a difference between "a person who is alone in being exposed to certain macro-structural constraints" and a person "who


3. Ibid., pp. 179-80. For an example of the extended and thus unrigorous use of the culture-of-poverty concept as "a whole way of life," see Edward Banfield, The Unheavenly City, 2d ed. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).
is influenced both by these constraints and by the behavior of others who are affected by them.4 Ghetto-specific practices such as overt emphasis on sexuality, idleness, and public drinking “do not go free of denunciation” in inner-city ghetto neighborhoods. But because they occur much more frequently there than in middle-class society, due in major part to social organizational forces, the transmission of these modes of behavior by precept, as in role modeling, is more easily facilitated.5 The term I have used to refer to this process is “social isolation,” which implies that contact between groups of different class and/or racial backgrounds is either lacking or has become increasingly intermittent and that the nature of this contact enhances the effects of living in a highly concentrated poverty area.6

Unlike the concept of culture of poverty, social isolation does not postulate that ghetto-specific practices become internalized, take on a life of their own, and therefore continue to influence behavior even if opportunities for mobility improve. Rather, it suggests that reducing structural inequality would not only decrease the frequency of these practices; it would also make their transmission by precept less efficient.

In this Annals issue, Elijah Anderson’s article on sex codes among black inner-city youths graphically depicts the problems of social isolation in the inner city and provides persuasive arguments on the relationship between ghetto-specific practices and structural inequality. Anderson points out that young black men in the inner city, facing limited job prospects, cannot readily assume the roles of breadwinner and reliable husband. They therefore “cling to the support” provided by their peer groups, and they back away from enduring relationships with girlfriends. The lack of employment opportunities not only impoverishes the entire community; it strips the young men “of the traditional American way of proving their manhood, namely, supporting a family.” Given the paucity of conventional avenues of success in the isolated inner city, the young ghetto male affirms his manhood through peer-group interaction. His esteem is enhanced, that is, he becomes a man, if he can demonstrate that he has had casual sex with many women and has gotten one or more of them to “have his baby.”

As Anderson emphasizes, casual sex is really not so casual. In the inner-city peer-group status system, it carries a special meaning. Inner-city adolescents “engage in a mating game,” states Anderson. The girl dreams of having a home and a family with a husband who can provide financial support. The boy, without any job or employment prospects, knows he cannot fulfill that role. He nonetheless convinces the girl to have sex with him, often leading to out-of-wedlock pregnancy, and therefore achieves “manhood in the eyes of his peer group.” In the subculture of the ghetto, argues Anderson, people generally get married “to have something.” This mind-set presupposes a job, the work ethic, and, perhaps most of all, a persistent sense of hope for, if not . . . a belief in, an economic future. . . . for so many of those who . . . become unwed mothers and fathers, there is little hope for a good job and even less for a future of conventional family life.

The impact of employment in the inner city is a central theme of the article

4. Hannert, Soulside, p. 182.
5. Ibid., p. 184.
by Testa and his coauthors. Drawing upon survey data collected by the University of Chicago's Urban Poverty and Family Structure Project, Testa and his colleagues find that employed fathers are two and a half times more likely than nonemployed fathers to marry the mother of their first child. This finding supports the hypothesis that male joblessness is a central factor in the trends involving never-married parenthood in the ghetto. Indeed, these findings reveal that the effect of male employment on marriage is strong not only among inner-city black men but among inner-city white, Puerto Rican, and Mexican men as well. Moreover, their unique data set demonstrates that high school graduates are more likely to marry than high school dropouts, suggesting, therefore, that the marriage decisions of inner-city couples are shaped both by current economic realities and by long-term economic prospects.

Although McLanahan and Garfinkel also support the view that the rise in male joblessness in the inner city is a major contributor to the growth of female headship of families, they likewise note the contribution of welfare to the growth of mother-only families. More specifically, when analyzing the social and economic situations of black single mothers who are weakly attached to the labor force and are concentrated in Northern ghettos, they argue that “too heavy a reliance on welfare can facilitate the growth of an underclass.” McLanahan and Garfinkel maintain that Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and other means-tested public assistance programs reduce the likelihood of marriage and promote female headship in the inner city and therefore weaken the labor force attachment of poor single mothers. Recognizing that the existing research reveals that welfare has a very small effect on the aggregate growth of female-headed families, they nonetheless maintain that its impact on the poorer half of the population is greater. They estimate that between 20 and 30 percent of the growth of mother-only families among the lower half of the income distribution can be accounted for by “the threefold increase in AFDC and welfare-related benefits between 1955 and 1975.”

But it is difficult really to separate the effects of welfare on family formation and labor force attachment from the effects of the overwhelming joblessness that has plagued the inner city since 1965 and especially since 1970. As David Ellwood has pointed out elsewhere, “Welfare benefits rose sharply until about 1973, but they have fallen since then.” Adjusted for inflation, the welfare package—AFDC plus food stamps—was 22 percent less in 1984 than it was in 1972. During the decade of the 1970s, the decade in which the real dollar value of welfare declined steadily after 1972, we nonetheless witnessed the sharpest rise in inner-city joblessness and related social dislocations such as the concentration of poverty, poor female-headed families, and welfare receipt.

Although McLanahan and Garfinkel state that joblessness is the single most important factor in the rise of mother-only families, they fail to address the complex relationship between jobless-

ness, family formation, and welfare. Joblessness aggravates both single-parent family formation and welfare receipt. If welfare receipt is related to the formation of single-parent families and labor force attachment—although careful empirical research has yet to establish this relationship firmly—it is best seen as a mediating variable or as part of a matrix of constraints and opportunities, a matrix that does not necessarily produce a single outcome, but rather a set of behavioral outcomes.

As shown in Wacquant and Wilson's article, blacks who live in the ghetto are confronted with a different matrix of constraints and opportunities from that confronted by blacks who live in low-poverty areas. These include differences in the class structure, availability of employment, economic and financial capital, poverty concentration, and social capital. For all these reasons, greater significance is attached to the availability of welfare in the ghetto than in the low-poverty areas. As reported by Wacquant and Wilson, welfare mothers who live in the ghetto are far less likely to expect to be welfare free within less than a year and far more likely to anticipate needing assistance for more than five years than welfare mothers who reside in low-poverty areas. Wacquant and Wilson argue, therefore, that those unable to secure jobs in low-poverty areas have access to social and economic supports to help them avoid the public-aid rolls that their ghetto counterparts lack. Indeed, the mere fact of living in a ghetto or an extreme-poverty area could increase one's uneasiness about entering the job market. "We all remember the anxiety of getting our first job," Thomas Corbett, of the Institute for Research on Poverty, has stated elsewhere. "For a woman who has been out of the job market for years, or maybe has never had a job, that anxiety can be greatly compounded. And many of these people live in isolated inner-city neighborhoods, where there aren't many role models to offer skills at coping with the job market."

As one welfare mother seeking a job in Chicago put it, "I get so nervous and scared going out looking for a job. Meeting all them strange folks, you know. And I never know how to talk to 'em." Such feelings are likely to be far more prevalent in socially isolated ghetto neighborhoods than in other areas of the city.

It is important, therefore, in any discussion of welfare's contribution to the growth of an urban underclass, to consider public assistance programs a part of the overall matrix of constraints and opportunities. The most important variable in this matrix, as so many of the articles in this volume demonstrate, is employment opportunities.

Decreasing employment opportunities are centrally related to the dramatic impoverishment of Puerto Ricans in large urban centers. In this Annals issue, Marta Tienda points out that since 1970 Puerto Ricans have witnessed a precipitous decline of jobs that they traditionally filled and an overall economic decline and industrial restructuring in areas where they are concentrated. As a result, the labor market position of Puerto Ricans represents the bottom of the ethnic hiring queue. Whereas Mexicans have been preferred laborers in agricultural jobs, at

10. "Joblessness" here does not refer simply to unemployment but to non-labor-force participation as well.


13. Ibid.
least in recent years, Puerto Ricans, except for women in the garment and textile industries, have never been preferred workers for specific jobs. But Tienda argues that the massive industrial restructuring of the Northeast has wiped out many unskilled and unionized blue-collar jobs, so much so that not only have the employment opportunities of Puerto Rican youths and men of prime working age been severely limited, but the job prospects of Puerto Rican women in the textile and garment industries have diminished as well.

If social scientists tend to emphasize the impact of changes in the organization of the American economy on the lives of urban minorities, the general public has identified the growing presence of immigrants, particularly immigrants from the poorer Latin American countries, as a prime factor in the labor market displacement of American-born groups, particularly black Americans.

But, as shown in Robert Reischauer's succinct article, there is "little evidence that immigrants have had any significant negative impacts on the employment situation of black Americans." Reischauer is aware that the data on which this conclusion is based are old and are not sufficiently detailed to isolate localized or regional effects or to capture the effects of recent immigration in cities such as Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Houston, San Francisco, and Chicago. Moreover, he raises the possibility that the effects of immigration could have been much greater on working conditions and internal migration, labor force participation, and fringe benefits, which have received less attention from researchers, than on the dimensions that have been the focus of current studies—unemployment, wages, and earnings. Nonetheless, "the existing evidence suggests that immigration has not been a major factor contributing to the emergence of the urban underclass."

The increasing problems of social dislocation among the underclass have been accompanied by a rise in the homeless population. As Rossi and Wright reveal in their article, the recent increase of the literally homeless population is associated with a number of macro processes, including changes in the demand for low-skilled workers that has led to a drastic reduction in the market for casual labor and has made it more difficult for the homeless to pay rent and buy food; changes in the level and coverage of income-maintenance support programs that have decreased access of the homeless to the cheapest available rentals, have discouraged their families from subsidizing them, and have reduced their probability of receiving adequate institutional care; and sharp declines in the quality and quantity of low-cost housing in urban areas across the country.

What is interesting to note is that all of these macro processes have also adversely affected the poor nonhomeless population in urban areas. Accordingly, comprehensive programs to address the problems associated with urban poverty in general will benefit not only the nonhomeless residents of the inner-city ghetto but the urban homeless population as well.

**POLICY OPTIONS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT**

Several of the articles discussed in the previous section draw out the policy implications of their analyses. Kasarda outlines a series of practical steps to reduce the spatial isolation from jobs that match the skills of inner-city residents, including a computerized job-opportunity network, job-search assistance, temporary
relocation assistance, housing vouchers for low-income citizens, stricter enforcement of fair-hiring and fair-housing laws, and a review of public assistance programs to determine whether they help anchor the poor to distressed areas.

Sullivan's article outlines some policy initiatives in which inner-city males are seen "as important parts of the solution and not merely as the sources of the problem." Included among these are those programs that include males in services designed to prevent unwanted pregnancy, more imaginative child support enforcement in order to encourage young fathers to accept paternity, and "an overall program of intensive and comprehensive services for inner-city children and adolescents."

McLanahan and Garfinkel believe that more universal programs—including full employment, health care, child care, child support assurance systems, and children's allowances—are needed to replace the current welfare system, provide aid to single mothers, and thereby "retard the growth of an underclass." Rossi and Wright put forth several recommendations to address the problems of the literally homeless, including more generous programs of income maintenance, broader coverage for disability programs, increasing the supply of low-cost housing, providing more low-skilled employment opportunities for the extremely poor, developing measures to reduce "the prevalence of disabling conditions among young adult males," and support for charitable organizations that serve the homeless.

Except for Kasarda's notion of the need for computerized employment networks, none of these suggestions represents entirely new recommendations. The question is, How effective are recommended programs such as these likely to be in addressing the problems spelled out by the respective authors? And if introduced, how much support are they likely to receive from the American public? For possible answers to these questions I turn to a critical discussion of the articles by Hochschild, Mead, and Nathan.

Jennifer Hochschild believes that the "problem of severe poverty and its attendant behaviors and emotions can be solved only when Americans choose actually, not merely rhetorically, to open the opportunity structure to all, regardless of their race, class, or gender." The fervor of the 1960s to enhance opportunities for the disadvantaged did not last long enough to fulfill its promises to all the poor. Although all minorities and women benefited in legal and normative terms, only the more advantaged tended to benefit socially, economically, and politically. By the 1980s, little of the 1960s' political commitment to erase inequality remained.

What Hochschild would like to see is a new political commitment to promote social and economic mobility among the estranged poor. In this regard, she has little faith in programs such as income maintenance, workfare, or social services because they do not change the "structural conditions that create the gap between the promise and practice of equal opportunity." She is also not enthusiastic about programs that are designed to provide jobs for men and not for women. What she ought to make clear, however, is that one must be careful not to confuse a now-popular explanation of the rise of poor female-headed black families—namely, that the increase of poor black female-headed households is associated with male joblessness—with a policy prescription that more jobs should be made available for men. Indeed, some authors in this volume who used this explanation and at the same time called for the creation of jobs for both men and women
as a major policy recommendation have been unfairly charged with gender bias because of careless interpretations of their work. Nonetheless, Hochschild is certainly correct when she emphasizes that any program that is designed to increase the employment of men without simultaneously increasing the employment for women "reifies a patriarchal social structure in which women are dependent upon ... men."

What is needed, she argues, is programs that enable the estranged poor to enter the mainstream of society, programs that "involve a wide array of activities aimed at changing skills, views, and life circumstances." Such programs would include steps to provide employment for inner-city youth, reform public schools and facilitate the transition from school to work, reduce racial and gender discrimination, remove the barriers between jobs in the primary and secondary labor markets, reduce teenage pregnancies and births, increase the political control of previously disfranchised people, and provide more political control over industrial relocation and plant closings. Such programs would be costly, she points out, because they would be intensive, long lasting, and comprehensive. They would also be politically vulnerable if they are not "submerged economically and politically in the horizontally redistributive component." In other words, wherever possible, programs that would help the estranged poor should "build on Americans' support for social policies that give everyone a chance for at least some success."

Of the programs recommended by contributors to this Annals issue and discussed in the previous section, Sullivan's proposal of intensive and comprehensive services for inner-city adolescents and children, McLanahan and Garfinkel's package of universal programs, and Kasarda's recommendation for stricter enforcement of fair-hiring and fair-housing laws come closest to meeting the criteria for successful programs outlined in Hochschild's article.

In direct contrast to Hochschild's comprehensive recommendation for bringing the underclass or the estranged poor into the mainstream of American society is Lawrence Mead's program of mandatory workfare. Although, as I have indicated previously, serious questions can be raised about Mead's assumptions concerning the reasons for the entrenched poverty in the inner city, especially when his arguments are contrasted with those of Kasarda, Mead's focus on mandatory workfare as a solution to inner-city social dislocations is also problematic. Mead's program is based on the assumption that a mysterious welfare ethos exists that encourages public assistance recipients to avoid their obligations as citizens to be educated, to work, to support their families, and to obey the law. In other words, and in keeping with the dominant American belief system on poverty, "it is the moral fabric of individuals, not the social and economic structure of society, that is taken to be the root of the problem." There is no existing rigorous research to support this view. As shown in the articles in this volume by Wacquant and Wilson and by Kasarda, in particular, the spatial patterning and basic timing of rising social dislocations, including welfare receipt, in recent years contradict it.

Aside from the questionable reasoning that underlies Mead's recommendation for mandatory workfare, a work-welfare
program that is not part of a broader framework to stimulate economic growth and a tight labor market remains at the mercy of the economy. As Robert Reischauer has pointed out elsewhere,

In recessionary periods, when jobs are scarce throughout the nation, a credible emphasis on work will be difficult to maintain. Unskilled welfare recipients will realize that they stand little chance of competing successfully against experienced unemployed workers for the few positions available. In regions of the country where the economy is chronically weak, this dilemma will be a persistent problem. Evidence from one such area, West Virginia, suggests that work-welfare programs can do little to increase the employment or earnings of welfare recipients if the local economy is not growing. A public sector job of last resort may be the only alternative in such cases.16

I am not suggesting that the so-called new-style workfare programs, described in Richard Nathan’s paper, that include an array of training and employment activities and services are without merit. But they represent, in Nathan’s words, “incremental” programs and therefore fall far short of the comprehensive reform package recommended by Jennifer Hochschild. Nonetheless, for Nathan the emphasis on new-style welfare reflects a liberal-conservative consensus that is quite compatible with the American process. Nathan argues that this consensus is in part based on the recognition that—given the structure of American federalism and the central role of state governments in establishing and administering the major institutions providing social services—“it will take a long time to achieve change, that even then only some people will be affected, and that the politics involved are very difficult.” Nathan believes therefore that it is necessary now to concentrate on the institutional dimension of the policy changes in order to address the problems of the ghetto underclass, especially the implementation of new programs and strategies to promote and facilitate institutional change. He also believes that both evaluation research and consultative arrangements could be useful in furthering this process.

But the history of social change in the United States has not always reflected a slow incremental process. Despite the structure of American federalism, despite the American political process, and despite the important role of the individual states, the major reforms of the New Deal, the comprehensive legislation of the civil rights movement, and the broad-based policies of the Great Society programs were all achieved within a short period of time. As Jennifer Hochschild so aptly puts it:

American citizens may be willing to do more . . . than is normally assumed in order really to open the system to all. So far, the American policymaking system has made a lot of wrong choices, but there is no reason why we cannot change our course, and lots of reasons why we should.

Cohen and Paranjpe have contributed two enlightening but distinct types of books to the existing literature on South Asian security. Cohen’s book is the product of a remarkable conference he staged at the University of Illinois in 1984 that brought together South Asian security analysts—including myself, whose paper was published separately in *World Politics* (January 1986)—from the United States, India, and Pakistan. Paranjpe’s book is the result of his research visit to the United States as a Fulbright fellow from Poona University in India.

The nature of the contributions to *The Security of South Asia* is disparate, given the assortment of participants, which included academics, retired foreign service officers, and military officers. But the variety of perspectives also constitutes the strength of the book, which is made all the more fascinating by the effort to convince some of the participants, especially from India and Pakistan, to discuss the security policies of each other’s countries. The approach did not entirely work. The Indian security policy analysis of Brigadier Noor Hussain—a Muslim originally from Uttar Pradesh, in India, whose family settled in Pakistan after partition—constitutes a scathing attack on India, revealing personal anger and bitterness. While displaying considerable knowledge of the fourth-century Kautilyan treatise of realpolitik, Hussain projects India as evil and manipulative and carrying no redeeming qualities. Hussain’s analysis is at least useful in gauging the lack of objectivity and the depth of antagonism that exists among some Pakistanis toward India. On the other hand, the analysis of Pakistan’s security policy by Eric Vaz, a retired lieutenant general of the Indian Army and an Indian Christian, shows a lack of understanding about Pakistan’s security fears and is further marred by digressions or discussions that are spread too thin.

There are, however, some penetrating, dispassionate, or simply different viewpoints provided by other Indian, Pakistani, and American analysts, including Leo Rose, P. R. Chari, Howard Wriggings, M. B. Naqvi,
Pervaiz Cheema, Selig Harrison, R. R. Subramaniam, William Barnds, Lieutenant General A. I. Akram, Jagat Mehta, K. Subramaniam, Thomas Thornton, and Rashid Naim. While the American analysts tend to lean toward India or Pakistan in their assessments, it is refreshing to read the sensitive—even objective—views of many of the Indian and Pakistani analysts. This incredibly wide-ranging and startling collection of security perspectives as seen from the inside and the outside, as it were, has been masterfully synthesized and organized by Stephen Philip Cohen in his introduction and conclusion. The book will be an indispensable source to the security specialist who wishes to understand the passion and prejudices of those who influence security policymaking in South Asia.

Paranjpe’s slim volume is a useful and well-researched study of the sources and dynamics of U.S. efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia. While there have been many books and articles written on the topic either from the U.S. perspective or the India and Pakistan perspective, this book is in some respects unique in that it constitutes an effort by an Indian scholar to perceive the problem from the standpoint of the United States. Given his earlier solid academic work, India and South Asia Since 1971 (New Delhi: Radiant, 1985), with this study Paranjpe is rapidly establishing himself as one of the rising scholars in the field of South Asian security studies.

RAJU G. C. THOMAS
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge


This is a tightly organized, sensibly argued, and extremely useful survey of changing British and American concepts of international relations. I recommend it in the strongest possible terms to all social scientists who value history for understanding relations with Africa and Asia. Darby does a magnificent job of presenting virtually every important insight the standard literature affords on ideas and images that influenced colonial and Third World policy.

“For the purpose of more ordered analysis,” as he puts it, the nine chapters here constitute triads within triads: three eras—1870-1914, interwar, 1945-70—divided into three “faces”: political power, moral responsibility, and economic interest. Darby’s concern is not the ministerial, legislative, corporate, or sectoral mechanisms by which explicit policy came to be drawn up, but rather the predominant moral assumptions, cultural outlooks, global power strategies, and convictions about economic growth and development that provided rationales for policy decisions. His job is to illuminate only “approaches,” and not “functions”—the working components of formal and informal imperialism—or “consequences,” that is, progress or the lack of it. For his exposition he has drawn on an immense body of readings, not only by economists, political scientists, and historians but also by biographers of key actors and even some novelists and devotees of psychohistory. The work is not encyclopedic, however; Latin America is explicitly removed from the analysis and U.S. “approaches” are almost entirely confined to the cold-war era.

The main lesson of this many-sided work, at least for me, is that—as Darby puts it—what people thought mattered. Policy decisions had as much to do with prevailing assumptions about right and wrong and about what, in international relations, works and does not work as they did with the nature of corporate capitalism or the imperatives of realpolitik. Structuralists and economic determinists will not approve.

Many sections in this work could be cited as examples of superbly cogent, frugal explication. Some of Darby’s sentences are so compressed they justify a second and third reading. In chapter 8, “Moral Responsibility III,” for example, he shows how until the 1970s,
America's external orientation was based on overwhelmingly internal features of our own culture and had little to do with real prospects and needs in Africa or Asia; this helps explain why, during the cold war, the more that externally derived reasons for our obligations to poor nations were aired, the smaller and less influential became the constituency that accepted moral terms as the proper way to approach foreign aid.

This is not a book for beginning undergraduates; Darby assumes his readers possess much background knowledge. He does not stop to explain, for example, why the "development model" is essentially optimistic but "development theory" is quite the opposite, or why Rostow's stages had such an impact on Western liberals. One wishes he would pause now and then and afford us illuminating examples of his main points; did Darby—or Yale University Press—decide to sacrifice events or systems descriptions in order to allow for the maximum topical coverage within the confines of a medium-sized book?

More advanced students may wonder why Darby entirely neglects the United Nations as a force in modifying American opinion and why he does not so much as mention the Peace Corps. Is it because these contradict his "internalized" argument? Another sort of problem is that because of his trinitarian chapter organization, often the same topic or concept surfaces in two or three places: consideration of British "imperial trusteeship," for example, appears in discussions of moral responsibility, economic interest, and power. Teachers of international relations, however, will certainly appreciate the way Darby's style of exposition makes it easy to locate areas of consensus and debate. Apart from stubborn structuralists or unreconstructed America-bashers, there will be, I feel, infinitely more thankful acceptance than faultfinding for Darby's book.

MARTIN WOLFE
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia

DOWTY, ALAN. Closed Borders: The Contemporary Assault on Freedom of Move-

The human right of freedom of movement—to remain, to depart, and to return after leaving one's country—is the cornerstone of personal self-determination. But today this basic right is severely curtailed. Millions are forced to depart their homelands and become refugees, other millions wish to depart their homelands but are prisoners within borders. Alan Dowty analyzes this poignant problem in Closed Borders.

Closed Borders is a study of serfdoms. The old serfdom was a progression from feudalism to monarchialism and mercantilism. Mass expulsions of Jews, Moors, and Protestants occurred, and African slavery was institutionalized in the Americas. But by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, immigration restriction had reached its minimum. This freedom of international movement was short-lived; in the twentieth century the new serfdom took root.

Between the two world wars "most who moved did not want to, and most who wanted to move could not." Dowty examines the policies of the Soviet Union, Fascist Italy, the creation of refugees and the absence of refuge, post-World War II forced population movements, the creation of international instruments of protection, European Communist countries, American policy, and the Inglês U.N. study on emigration. Problems in the Third World—the brain drain, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Cuba—are also analyzed. Restrictions on movement tend to be based on political rather than economic reasons, and Dowty proves his thesis with case studies of East Germany, Cuba, Iran, Ethiopia, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union.

All states worry about free movement; some nations do not want to lose population, others do not want to acquire immigrants. Nonetheless, a major objective of U.S. foreign policy should be to guarantee to all the right to remain or to leave. Not everyone will agree that the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974 was "the single most effective step the United States has ever
taken against the new serfdom." Refugee
advocates, however, will support Dowty's
view that American refugee policy should be
humanitarian and take precedence over short-
term considerations. His views on immigration
policy remain valid even though they were
written before the passage of the Immigration
and Reform Act of 1986. The idea he aims
for—unrestricted movement—is a laudable
objective, if not illusory given realpolitik.

Closed Borders is a well-documented, well-
written, scholarly book. It is a welcome
addition to human-rights literature.

NORMAN L. ZUCKER
University of Rhode Island
Kingston

xii, 321. Stanford, CA: Stanford University

Democratic forms of government, which
have enjoyed widespread popularity only in
the last century, are experiencing renewed
crises of legitimacy in industrial nations today.
In this timely and thought-provoking study,
David Held provides a critical reassessment of
major theories of democracy from ancient
Greece to the present, along with his own
prescription for revitalizing contemporary dem-
cratic polities.

Held, a senior lecturer in social science at
the Open University in Great Britain, identifies
four classic models of democracy. In early
Athens, state and society were indivisible, and
every citizen participated directly in political
decision making. Immigrants, women, and
slaves were excluded from the citizen body,
however, and considerations of size alone
made the example of the Greek city-state
unsuitable for later societies. Indeed, Held
points out, further democratic theorizing of
any kind languished until the seventeenth
century, when Hobbes and Locke initiated a
continuing liberal tradition.

Unlike the Greeks, liberal theorists sep-
arat ed the state from civil society and narrowly
circumscribed governmental power through
constitutional provisions. Although advocates
of protective democracy, such as Madison
and Bentham, saw less need for state intrusions
into the private sphere than did the spokesper-
s for developmental democracy, both
groups sought to maximize the freedom of
individuals to pursue their diverse interests
without governmental interference. By concen-
trating exclusively upon the reform of electoral
procedures and governmental institutions,
liberal models and their twentieth-century
variants—competitive elitist democracy, plural-
ism, and the legal democracy of the New
Right—ignored social and economic inequities
that made meaningful political participation
impossible for large numbers of people.

Conversely, the Marxist model of direct
democracy viewed the state as embedded in
civil society. Politics, the Marxists argued,
expressed the interests of a dominant capitalist
class, whose exploitive power had to be
broken before a genuine democracy could
develop. With the equalizing of economic
relations through worker control of produc-
tion, the organized state would gradually
disappear, as all workers would share directly
in the management of a classless and harmoni-
ous society. Although twentieth-century neo-
Marxists and New Left advocates of participa-
tory democracy have greatly refined this
argument, they have also ignored threats to
democracy that are not based on class, such as
bureaucratic power or the suppression of
dissenters.

Held's own model, which he calls "liberal
socialism" or "democratic autonomy," would
give constitutional protection to a broad
range of social, as well as political and
economic, rights. He promises to develop this
model fully in a forthcoming volume that, like
this one, should be read and pondered by
anyone interested in the future of democracy.

MAXWELL BLOOMFIELD
Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

At the dawn of the cold war, the world was frozen into two hostile blocs headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Conflicts persisted, but the superpowers’ strident relationship thawed appreciably during the détente period of the 1970s. Meanwhile the bipolar world melted away. In its place is a much more complicated, diverse, and unstable congeries consisting of the two superpowers, regional state powers, new economic powers such as Japan and the Pacific Basin economies, significant nongovernmental powers such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, and militant ideological powers such as Islamic fundamentalism. In this polycentric world, the U.S.-Soviet relationship, while still of paramount importance, no longer dominates or controls all other developments in the international arena. This is the crux of Peter Savigear’s *Cold War or Détente in the 1980s.*

The scope of this book is much broader than the title suggests. Among the topics explored are the USSR’s recent achievement of military parity with the United States; the increasing restiveness within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact alliances; the return to prominence, in Europe, of the German question; the nature of the international economy in the 1980s; the myriad wars and arms races plaguing the Third World; and the decreasing relevance of the capitalism-versus-communism ideological debate, which lingers in the rhetoric of the superpowers. The book seeks to analyze the impact of these factors on current Soviet-American relations.

This is a daunting project, and Savigear deserves credit for tackling it. But there are significant problems. The plethora of forces impinging on Soviet-American relations defy easy or brief explication. The book’s purported focus on the evolving relationship between the superpowers becomes enmeshed in, and ultimately obscured by, the attempt to describe and make sense of these many forces. Consequently, *Cold War or Détente in the 1980s* suffers from a certain disconnectedness, which is aggravated by Savigear’s sometimes awkward prose.

This book is also marred by a large number of factual misstatements. For instance, Savigear states that U.S. “influence in the Panama Canal Zone had gone with the Treaty of 1978 which passed sovereignty to . . . Panama.” But the treaty accords full sovereignty over the canal to Panama in 1999; even then the United States will continue to protect the canal against external threats. Savigear’s claim that “there was no military engagement” in the Soviet Union’s 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia is belied by the historical record. He implies that there are no U.S. military forces stationed in South Korea, but, in fact, a U.S. infantry division is deployed there. In discussing Southeast Asian warfare since 1975, he states that “Communist insurgents were active in Laos.” The communist Pathet Lao took power there in 1975. Savigear’s statement that “Soviet political influence brought an end to the war between India and Pakistan over the secession of . . . Bangladesh in 1975” is incorrect on a couple counts. The Bangladesh secession ended in December 1971 with Pakistani forces surrendering to the Indian army without the mediation of either superpower. His description of Iraq as a “radical Islamic nationalist” regime would shock the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, whose Baath Party is secular, pan-Arab, and socialist. Similarly, the statement that “strong religious ties” account for Syria’s alliance with Iran in the Iran-Iraq war is without foundation. Syria is governed by a rival wing of the Baath Party; the link with Iran is mainly a reflection of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad’s enmity for Saddam Hussein. Nor do the Syrians share with Iran “the more populist kind of Islamic organization.” In fact, Assad’s government has ruthlessly extirpated the Muslim Brotherhood, a Sunni Muslim fundamentalist organization. The internationally supervised partial expulsion of
Palestine Liberation Organization forces from Lebanon occurred in August 1982, not, as Savigear maintains, in 1984 and 1985. Finally, Savigear errs in stating that Cuban combat troops first came to Africa during the 1977 war between Ethiopia and Somalia, when in fact Cuban troops arrived in Angola during its 1975 civil war. His claim that Cuban military intervention in Africa is based on racial ties ignores the far more important factor of ideological affinity between Castro's Cuba and the governments of Angola and Ethiopia.

This book is further harmed by a number of grammatical and typographical errors, which eluded the scrutiny of the publisher. While Savigear's overview of the international arena of the 1980s is not without value or interest, this book, on the whole, must be rated a major disappointment.

SCOTT NICHOLS
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale


Why do Washington security analysts care about events in Central America? Is instability in the region a serious threat to the United States? Do policymakers really believe that the Sandinistas will overrun their northern neighbors and threaten the U.S. southern border? Lars Schoutz has provided a thoughtful, well-documented, and tightly argued book to address these questions.

Schoutz's thesis is straightforward: to understand U.S. policy toward Latin America one must consider the link made by policymakers between the causes of Latin American instability and the consequences of instability for U.S. security interests in the region. Yet policymakers hold widely differing beliefs about these core concerns. Until the mid-1970s, a cold-war consensus prevailed among officials on U.S. Latin America policy. No matter what caused instability, indigenous poverty, or Communist agitators, it was widely perceived that Communists would exploit unstable situations and, therefore, that this challenge would have to be contained. During the Carter administration, however, policymaking on Latin America turned into bureaucratic guerrilla warfare, with officials disagreeing about not only the causes of instability but also the consequences. In hopes of imposing a uniformity on the policy process, the Reagan administration purged the State Department of those area specialists who refused to return to cold-war conceptions in shaping foreign policy. This purge, however, merely shifted the site of the dispute to other political arenas.

With almost 300 interviews, Schoutz undertakes not only to describe and analyze policymakers' beliefs, but also, where possible, to assess the accuracy of these beliefs. On officials' beliefs about the relation between poverty and instability, he finds that while most agree that poverty is related to instability, significant differences exist over the consequences of unrest. Also examined are policymakers' beliefs about communism and, more specifically, Soviet intentions in the Western hemisphere. Here, too, widely divergent opinions exist about whether to characterize the Soviet Union as an aggressive state driven by a fundamentally evil ideology or a state with interests and values dramatically different from our own, but, nevertheless, one with which negotiation is possible.

Policymakers' beliefs about the causes and consequences of instability and potential Soviet gains in Latin America are examined in several case studies. Particular attention is given to the possible impact on the United States of denied access to raw materials, military bases, and open sea lanes around Latin America, along with the potential impact of Soviet military bases established in the region. Schoutz's persuasive conclusion is that, in all of these areas, the threat to U.S. security has been exaggerated.

Even if some Washington officials understand that denial of access to a part of the region would pose no direct threat to the
country, the core belief of American foreign policy toward Latin America remains that a loss in our backyard would mean a loss of faith in the U.S. ability to contain the Soviet Union. For Schoultz, the root problems in U.S. policy toward Latin America are the simplistic conceptualization of the region's importance in the global balance of power along with the notion that an indiscriminate commitment to stability is the key to ensuring U.S. security in the hemisphere.

Schoultz expresses guarded optimism that U.S. foreign policy toward the region may be changing. The prospects for transformation may hinge upon the prevailing mood of moderate policymakers who, in the past, have agreed with liberals on the causes of instability—poverty—but have agreed with conservatives on the consequences—a Soviet gain. Schoultz has rendered an accurate and even-handed description of the range of views on Latin America's importance for the United States. Significantly, though, he has not presented these beliefs, especially the dominant beliefs that are based on cold-war conceptions, without discussing their consequences. For most of the period since World War II, U.S. officials have focused on stopping Soviet expansion in Latin America. This has produced an unalterably negative policy that has harmed Latin Americans while also damaging our national self-image. The antidote is a positive approach to foreign policymaking guided by a desire to promote justice and equality in the region.

SHERRIE L. BAVER
City University of New York

This book, a very successful blending of two doctoral theses, is the first full-length study of the Egyptian working class. Beinin and Lockman have read a vast amount of literature in Arabic, English, and French, scanned local newspapers, searched several archives, including Egyptian ones, and conducted numerous interviews. The volume makes a significant contribution to our understanding of Egypt's modern history. But the price charged by the publishers is unconscionable.

Beinin and Lockman's approach is decidedly marxisant---the current term is "political economy"---but the timorous bourgeois reader can be reassured that he will not be scandalized by the analysis and the purist historian that the narrative has not been seriously distorted by the authors' bias.

The first half of the book traces the evolution of the labor movement up to 1942. The embryonic working class, employed in the railways, tramways, and a few large factories established before World War I, carried out various strikes and set up a few loose unions. Two features of the labor movement in this period and through the 1920s may be noted. First, many or most of the organizers and leaders were foreign--Greeks, Italians, Jews, Syrians. Second, the movement received much support from the nationalist parties, at first the Nationalist Party and then the Wafd. The hardships of World War I and the nationalist uprising of 1919 greatly stimulated working-class militancy, and the early 1920s saw a wave of strikes and agitation. The labor movement remained closely tied to the Wafdist until the late 1930s, sharing its ups and downs.

During World War II, industry expanded greatly and there was a large increase in the number of workers; the sharp rise in prices—far outstripping that in wages—and wartime shortages stimulated labor militancy and the formation of trade unions. The Wafdist government of 1942-44 was supportive of labor but thereafter lost control of the movement, which fell increasingly under the influence of the Communists and their opponents, the Muslim Brotherhood. In the years 1946-48 there were massive strikes, which were eventually ended by the martial law imposed at the outbreak of
the Palestine war. After the 1952 Revolution the trade unions, along with much else, were taken over by the government and the working class ceased to engage in either political or industrial action, but working conditions were improved and wages raised. Beinin and Lockman are probably right to conclude, however, that the working class “retains a potential for mobilization and collective action which will insure it a part in shaping Egypt’s future.”

CHARLES ISSAWI
New York University
Princeton University
New Jersey


In 1979, shortly after the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran, President Carter was asked whether the U.S. government would be willing to apologize to Iran for the 1953 coup engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency against Prime Minister Muhammad Musaddiq. Carter replied that “1953 is ancient history.” At the time, due to the anger caused by the hostage crisis, the insensitivity of Carter’s remark was lost even on the most liberal elements of the American public. But now, nearly a decade later, James Bill convincingly shows that for the vast majority of Iranians Mr. Carter’s “ancient history” was a vivid reminder that the United States was hostile to popular rule in their country and that moderation in the face of this hostility was futile. Even Ayatollah Khomeini did not know the intensity and pervasiveness of this anti-American feeling among the Iranian populace. It was not until a week or two into the hostage crisis that he discovered America was more useful to him as an enemy than as a friend.

The Eagle and the Lion is a history, as well as a systematic analysis, of U.S.-Iranian relations since World War II. Bill is at his best when he dissects the institutional or individual interests and ideological motives that shaped the U.S. policy toward Iran, both before and after the 1979 revolution. He is also well versed in the ways in which the late shah and his elite used and were used by Washington. When it comes to Iran’s postrevolutionary politics, however, Bill is on less familiar territory. For instance, his reference to class interest as the cause of conflict between religious extremists and the secularists is an oversimplification that misses the crucial importance of the secularists’ defense of political rights and cultural pluralism against the advocates of religious totalitarianism, many of them quite educated and wealthy.

On a more fundamental level, Bill shies away from subjecting the claims and behavior of the Islamic leaders to the same kind of rigorous scrutiny that he uses in his treatment of U.S. policymakers and, to a lesser degree, the Iranian secularists. He is particularly soft on Ayatollah Khomeini. He seems to suggest, for example, that Iran’s rulers were surprised when they learned Oliver North had lied to them in their 1985-86 secret contacts. Such a belief attributes a kind of naiveté or innocence to the Iranian clerics that is completely false. The Iranians who met North had no illusion about him. They had nicknamed him shahang bemokh (“brainless colonel”) after their first meeting and so long as he could deliver TOW and HAWK missiles they were prepared to hear his lies and reciprocate in kind.

Such minor deficiencies in the book do not diminish its academic value or political significance. For by fairly placing the current estrangement between the United States and Iran in its complex historical context, Bill has made a commendable effort to demystify the foreign-policy behavior of revolutionary Iran for his American readers. The chances are that the Iranian government will within a year publish the Persian translation of the book. His thorough research, lucid narrative, and impressive knowledge of both the Iranian and the American political cultures have combined to produce an indispensable source not only for specialists but also for policymakers and general readers. This achievement ought to be
appreciated in both Washington and Tehran because it can help create a favorable climate for the emergence of normal relations between the Islamic Republic and the United States.

MANSOUR FARHANG
Bennington College
Vermont


John Brewer, of the University of Belfast, has provided us with an extremely useful insight into the varied politics of African groups in South Africa. He has certainly refuted Kane-Berman’s assertion that nothing came out of the Soweto uprisings, as he shows the growth of a diverse revolutionary consciousness that has been spreading and growing steadily, as Sam Nolutshungu has argued for years.

The problem with this study is that it is limited to inside South Africa and leaves out a thorough analysis of the African National Congress (ANC). This revolutionary organization has become the major opposition force, as Brewer recognizes, and operates inside South Africa through the varied groups, such as the United Democratic Front, who reflect its views, though not its strategies.

It is surprising that such a thorough book would not examine the ANC in the same way that insights and details are provided about the Black Consciousness Movement, the Azanian People’s Organization, and Inkatha. And it is unfortunate that he seems to have bought the liberal South African view of terrorism as a tactic of the ANC. This revolutionary organization has become the major opposition force, as Brewer recognizes, and operates inside South Africa through the varied groups, such as the United Democratic Front, who reflect its views, though not its strategies.

Buthelezi Commission’s view of white participation in a future South Africa and that of the ANC, Brewer says, “The irony of the position of the ANC is that its vision of the future is much the same but it has chosen revolutionary terrorism to realize it, feeling that future peace can only be earned through present strife.” This both conjures up the wrong images of the ANC and leaves out the fact that most of the leadership of the ANC, in prison and outside of it, are nonviolent men, who turned to the use of force and the established strategy of liberation in final despair that peaceful tactics alone would not bring down the unrefomed South African apartheid structure.

This is not a small matter of interpretation because there have been so much propaganda and calculated attempts by both the South African government leaders and the outside sympathizers to place the ANC in the same nonacceptable category in the West as the Palestine Liberation Organization. The work of Tom Karis in two articles in Foreign Affairs in explaining the ideological and organizational strategy of the ANC has been very important in counteracting these myths.

This book, however, has great merit in the careful study and distinction it makes between other major black groups, trade unions, and writers in South Africa. The chapter on black literature and the black press is a gem of insight, in which Brewer shows how writers like Bloke Modisane, La Guma, Ezekiel Mphalele, and Nkose changed African consciousness and contributed to the enormous courage in resisting the system of oppression. His interpretation of the origins of black consciousness is the best since Gail Gerhart’s Black Power in South Africa (1978). Brewer appropriately quotes the old African proverb to characterize this work: “Wisdom is greater than force.”

GEORGE W. SHEPHERD
University of Denver
Colorado

DITTMER, LOWELL. China’s Continuous Revolution: The Post-Liberation Epoch, 1949-
Explanations of the constant turmoil in Maoist China frequently place conflict between two—or more—clearly defined policy lines at the heart of the political process. Lowell Dittmer looks beyond this conflict, emphasizing instead the underlying consensus among Chinese leaders that continuing the revolution was to take top priority on the political agenda. In rectifying past neglect of continuing revolution as an "actual phenomenon," rather than a theoretical innovation, he provides a wide-ranging and persuasive reinterpretation of Chinese politics.

Dittmer begins with a concise presentation of his analytical framework. Revolution, smashing the structure of political authority, has three functional requisites. First, charismatic leadership entails the performance of a salvationary mission and the personal means necessary for this performance. Second, an illegitimate and vulnerable authority structure provides the target against which revolutionary forces array in self-definition. Third, a mobilizable mass constituency can be induced to engage in new political activities by prospects of self-betterment rationalized in terms of the public interest. After the revolutionaries seize power, these functional requisites are perishable assets, and continuing the revolution tends to become increasingly problematical.

The bulk of Dittmer's study examines the interplay of charismatic leadership, authority structures—both residual and emergent—and mass mobilization during successive stages of the postliberation period: the first decade, the Great Leap and its aftermath (1958-65), two phases of the Cultural Revolution (1966-68 and 1968-76), and the early post-Mao years. The revolutionary tactics of the leadership or of its dominant factions are of central concern. These lurch along a spectrum defined by an "engineering" or bureaucratic approach at one pole and a "storming" approach at the other, with the heyday of engineering during the 1950s and that of storming during 1966-68 and with modified or transitional approaches during the other stages. While each stage is considered at some length, the 1968-76 phase of the Cultural Revolution is analyzed much more exhaustively than are the other four. By the last stage the functional requisites are depleted and the revolution burns out; changes in China during the 1980s therefore reflect not the restoration of a tradition temporarily submerged in radical excess but rather the dawning of a new postrevolutionary era.

Dittmer presents his case in a clear and systematic fashion, supporting it by appeal to documentary sources, visitors' reports, and 48 lengthy interviews with émigrés. Intriguing details and pithy characterizations make the book more readable than the plane of argument might suggest. Attempts to reconstruct the perceptions and motives of key actors are generally judicious; however, forays into psychoanalytical speculation will not appeal to some readers.

In sum, this is a careful, creative, and thought-provoking contribution and deserves a wide audience.

THOMAS P. LYONS
Cornell University
Ithaca
New York


The central question this book poses is whether epidemic diseases played the same role in stabilizing population growth in preindustrial Japan that they are thought to have played in preindustrial Western Europe. Janetta concludes that epidemic diseases were much less important in containing population growth in Japan than they were in preindustrial Europe. This conclusion is significant for the demographic history of Japan, particularly for attempts to account for the puzzling population stability in Japan between 1725 and 1850. There is reason to believe that mortality crises were less important in premodern Western Europe than they are thought
to have been (Watkins and Menken, Population and Development Review, [1985]); in this carefully documented, well-reasoned, and gracefully written book, Janetta shows that their role was probably even less significant in Tokugawa Japan, and she attributes this to the deliberate attempts of the Tokugawa rulers to limit contacts with foreigners.

Janetta traces the history of smallpox, measles, cholera, typhus, and plague in Japan using descriptive sources by contemporaries and two death registers from Buddhist temples. References to smallpox and measles are abundant, but plague, typhus, and cholera were rare or unknown until the opening up of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century. She makes a persuasive argument that contemporary observers were able to identify smallpox and measles and that they would have been able to identify plague, typhus, and cholera had they been present. The temple death registers are limited in coverage; however, the recording of age and date at death, important for establishing epidemiological patterns, seems to be accurate.

Given the nature of the sources, Janetta cannot establish the proportion of deaths due to epidemics of these diseases in the period of population stability. But she does show that their incidence did not increase during this period, and using the temple registers, dated 1771-1852, she shows that epidemics account for only 11.8 percent of deaths to people over 10 and for 26.7 percent of deaths to those under 10. Thus her conclusion that these epidemic diseases cannot account for population stability in this period is quite persuasive.

SUSAN COTTS WATKINS
Australian National University
Canberra
Australian Capital Territory


This book is a group biography of two generations of the Prado family, who contributed prominently to the transformation of São Paulo from a provincial backwater to the most metropolitan, industrial city in Brazil. It explores the careers and characters of Prado men and women, who included coffee planters, railway and banking entrepreneurs, politicians, intellectuals, and society mavericks. The family was representative not in the sense of being average but rather, as the word is used in Brazil, in the sense of being exemplary. Carefully noting the difference, this case study of the Prados connects Brazilian social change to patterns of elite family organization.

The story of the Prados follows a trajectory of rise and fall, or fusion and dispersal. The first half of the book describes the rise of the family in the Second Empire, 1840-89, emphasizing the relation of three brothers, Antônio, Martinico, and Eduardo, and their mother, Veridiana. It analyzes family customs of endogamous marriage that assembled a core of interrelated kin, family ventures into coffee planting and railways, and family politics in both monarchist and republican camps. The second half of the book deals with the fission of the brothers and their families in the Old Republic of 1889-1930. Exogamous marriage unraveled the Prado extended family into separate lines, and branches of the family pursued separate businesses rather than form a family conglomerate. Unreconciled to the authoritarian republic, the brothers retreated into opposition journalism or city politics. While individual Prados remained rich, powerful, and creative, the family lost its cohesive identity and its strategic position.

The most attractive and singular aspect of the book is its portrayal of the creative activities of the Prados. In two paired chapters, Levi shows the Prados grappling with the contrast between civilized Europe and backward Brazil, first as travelers abroad and then as nationalist essayists. The critical, comparative leverage of knowing Europe may have contributed to their cynicism and solitude, and it certainly informed the self-searching in major essays such as Paulo Prado’s Portrait of Brazil (1928).

Some of the arguments of this book have previously been available to specialists in a
Brazilian edition, *A família Prado* (1977). This revised edition adds an introduction on Brazilian family studies and reevaluates the Prados as failed elites who could not extend progress to poor Brazilians. General readers will find this an accessible introduction to the Brazilian elite, as its clear narrative and rich anecdotes compensate for careless editing, which has left some incoherent paragraphs and awkward phrases.

DAIN BORGES
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia


It would appear that the syndics of the Cambridge University Press have decided to give the reading public a new version of Indian history from the sixteenth century to the present, to replace the original *Cambridge History of India*, published from 1922 to 1937. Unlike the earlier volumes, the present series is conceived as being well over thirty monographs, to be produced under the general editorship of Gordon Johnson, assisted by C. A. Bayly and J. F. Richards. These volumes are to be organized under four heads: “The Mughals and Their Contemporaries”; “Indian States and the Transition to Colonialism”; “The Indian Empire and the Beginnings of Modern Society”; and “The Evolution of Contemporary South Asia.” The preliminary list of titles presented at the end of the present volume is puzzling, representing as it does a haphazard congeries of idiosyncratic themes. Also, I was unable to understand why, in the late 1980s, historians must conceive of the period 1500-1750 as “The Mughals and Their Contemporaries”—or for that matter, why the *doubt*-centric view of the Aligarh school must haunt us forever after. In sum, the general editor may be optimistic in his belief that these volumes will be “an essential voice in the continuing discourse” on Indian history.

The Pearson volume itself is divided into seven chapters, followed by a bibliographical essay and an index. Useful tables at the beginning provide us lists of rulers of Portugal, and of the viceroys and governors of Portuguese India. There are also three maps, where “São Tomé” is consistently misspelled. The chapters themselves deal with official and unofficial trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Indo-Portuguese society in Goa over the same period, and, to conclude, a somewhat cursory review of post-seventeenth-century developments.

While reading the book, I was struck immediately by the fact that it is squarely aimed at the nonspecialist. Anyone who has read Boxer's *Portuguese Seaborne Empire* and the chapters on trade in volume 1 of the *Cambridge Economic History of India* will find little here that is new. This is somewhat disturbing, given that Boxer wrote his survey nearly two decades ago, while the *Cambridge Economic History* essays are by historians who do not work with Portuguese sources—Ashin Das Gupta and K. N. Chaudhuri. It seems to me that Pearson has not integrated into the body of his monograph, or into the arguments adopted, most work done after about 1975-76. Instead, he lists these works summarily—and partially—in the bibliographical essay and for the most part relies on his own work of the 1970s and that of Niels Steensgaard dating from the same period.

Some of the more general criticisms both of Steensgaard and of Pearson's earlier work have come only in very recent times, perhaps too late to be included in this volume. But this cannot be said of, say, C. H. H. Wake's telling critique of Steensgaard (*Journal of European Economic History* [1979]), which Pearson refers to in his bibliography but of which he fails to take account. More serious still is the failure to absorb four or five major essays by Luis Filipe F. R. Thomaz, most notably “Les Portugais dans les mers de l'Archipel au XVle siècle” (in *Archipel*, 18 [1979]), which renders the discussion of “country trade” rather obsolete. Moreover, Pearson is content to discuss what were in the mid-1970s the relatively well-studied parts of India: Goa, Gujarat, and, to a
limited extent, Malabar. The Kanara coast finds little or no mention, and the Bay of Bengal is treated in a cursory fashion, given that Pearson does no more than summarize a pedestrian, as well as distorted, account of that region by George Winius (Itinerario [1983]).

The unevenness persists into the bibliographical essay, which finds Pearson giving expression to his somewhat idiosyncratic opinions. While the Paris school—Jean Aubin, Geneviève Bouchon, and others—are rapped on the knuckles for being "pedestrian," bouquets are freely handed out to works of limited—and on occasion negligible—merit. To say that Winius's essay, cited earlier, is "excellent on the subject of private trade and informal empire" is to exaggerate, and to tell us that Teotonio De Souza's Medieval Goa is a "splendid study of Goa" is perhaps overstating the case. But most startling of all is Pearson's assertion that "for the early pepper trade by far the best source is K. S. Mathew's excellent recent monograph, Portuguese Trade in India in the Sixteenth Century." This last book is fraught with almost every conceivable error, ranging from large conceptual distortions to inaccuracies in converting weights and measures. Readers are best advised to ignore Pearson's opinions here and use the magnum opus, available in both French and Portuguese, of Vitorino Magalhães Godinho. Equally, on Goa, the useful study by L. F. Thomaz, "Goa: Une société luso-indienne" (Bulletin des études portugaises et brésiliennes, numbers 42-43), may be used to balance De Souza's somewhat naive theoretical perspective.

If all these criticisms are made here, it is for two reasons. First, a book such as this will be used by courses in universities everywhere, and its view of the historiography may well be absorbed in toto. Second, they are meant to convey a very real sense of regret that a historian of Pearson's undoubted intelligence and ability has chosen to politicize the historiography, with all the dangers that this brings. The readability of this book is its principal merit, as is its competent handling of writings of the period 1950-75. If only it had been published a decade ago, and shorn of its bizarre bibliographical note, one would have recommended it unreservedly. As things stand, the reader must go back to the journals of the period 1975-88 to fill in the gaps.

SANJAY SUBRAHMANYAM
University of Delhi
India
Cambridge University
England

EUROPE


Abel Aganbegyan, the chief economic adviser to Gorbachev and initiator of perestroika (economic restructuring), presents in this book the case for economic reform and his set of restructuring strategies. The case for perestroika is fairly well known: Soviet growth rates have stagnated; labor morale is low, in part because consumer goods are scarce; and technology is antiquated by world standards.

While the problems are generally known and agreed upon, Aganbegyan's ideas for breaking up the Soviet economy into smaller, more independent units have generated much heated discussion and even dissent. Aganbegyan's presentation of the case itself is interesting: he is an economic modeler and forecaster. In an appendix, he discusses the technical procedures that he used to analyze the economy and the way that his strategy flowed from the structural analysis.

The strategies themselves, so much in dispute, build on the ideological and intellectual underpinnings of socialism but shape them to meet new needs. Aganbegyan is the ultimate pragmatist. He draws from the work of Western market-oriented economists, who would foster direct links between producers and consumers, but he also draws from Janos Kornai, a Hungarian who has hypothesized...
that shortages in a planned economy elicit hoarding and other uneconomic behavior.

Aganbegyan would bring socialism into a modern age, with both high productivity and social justice. He would substitute intensive growth—higher productivity from existing resources—for extensive growth, or more resources. He would allow employees to hire their own management, select their own technology, and bring democracy into the workplace. He would make management itself more responsive to consumers and workers. The question is whether his strategy will work.

Aganbegyan, even in translation, exudes abundant enthusiasm and élan. It is hard to find fault with the principles that he espouses, but in my judgment he only weakly understands the nature of entrepreneurship, which is so critical to a modern economy. In an understandable attempt to make his reforms palatable to a bureaucracy that was sure to oppose them, he has not recommended the steps that would unleash a spirit of risk taking, a supply of venture capital. I cannot imagine the ideas of Apple Computer's Steve Jobs surviving a workers' Technology Review Committee.

Aganbegyan, however, has left one window of technology opportunity: the voluntary contract collective. Aganbegyan would use this new form of economic organization, best known for providing small-scale consumer services, for bringing together like-minded, venturesome producers. This idea, virtually untested in the Soviet Union, raises good questions: Can a cooperative obtain raw materials? What prices can it set? What income tax will it pay? It is the most revolutionary suggestion from a path-breaking book.

ELIZABETH CLAYTON
University of Missouri
St. Louis


Atiyah and Summers's thesis is that the English and American legal systems, for all their similarities, differ profoundly. The English system is highly formal, and the American highly substantive. English law derives its validity merely from source-oriented standards, rather than having also to satisfy content-oriented standards. English case law is applied in light of strict notions of the *ratio decidendi*, whereas in America it is commonly applied in the light of substantive reasons on which the precedent is based.

Atiyah and Summers hold that statutes tend to be interpreted in England in accord with literal or plain meanings of the words used, whereas in America judges much more readily consider the purposes and rationales behind the words and even consult their own political morality in the process. They refer to "a rather narrow law-making role for the courts in England, as compared with the much larger law-making role in America." The English legal tradition is dominated by a positivism that tends to be highly formal while America has been much influenced by natural law and, latterly, by instrumentalist theories that are much more substantive.

Both countries recognize the concept of binding precedent, but their conceptions of precedent differ. The English conception is more formal: precedents bind because of their source, because they are decisions of higher courts, irrespective of their content. In America the authority of precedents is less exclusively source oriented. Precedents tend to bind because the principles they embody are widely thought to be right and good, and if they are not right and good, they are less likely to be treated as binding.

In their conclusion, Atiyah and Summers criticize the English positivist thought about the separation of law and morals. A highly formal vision of law has the unhappy consequence "that the law may become less useful
Further, the formal vision of law held in
England may encourage a deeply skeptical
attitude toward all law, good and bad. The
more substantive vision of law in America
"may have more desirable social results." A
healthier public attitude toward law is likely
to result in a society "where it is believed that
the law and judicial decisions are probably
grounded in good substantive moral (and
other) reasons." At the same time, Atiyah and
Summers believe it would be impossible to
export American judicial activism to England.

ANTHONY TRAWICK BOUSCAREN
Le Moyne College
Syracuse
New York

LaPALOMBARA, JOSEPH. Democracy Italian
Style. Pp. xii, 308. New Haven, CT: Yale

Joseph LaPalombara has written an analy-
sis of Italian politics and society that anyone
who has ever wondered how Italy manages to
work must read. A distinguished analyst of
Italian politics, LaPalombara rejects many of
his own previous negative assessments of the
Italian polity. Whereas in 1965 he described
Italy as characterized by "fragmentation, isola-
tion, [and] alienation," he now argues that
"Italian democracy is alive and thriving."

LaPalombara's basic argument about
Italian democracy is widely accepted by special-
ists on Italian politics. Much more contro-
versial is his explanation of why Italians are
critically assessing their government and their
"political class," endlessly debating "the
crisis," and telling pollsters that although they
are improving their own lives, their nation is
in decline. In criticizing their polity, Italians
are actually showing satisfaction with it, LaPal-
ombara argues, for Italian politics must be
understood as spettacolo, as an ongoing drama.
Italians, in their role as critics, are actually
performers in the spettacolo. "This being the
case, the Italian is deeply 'inside' the political
system, and hardly as 'alienated' from it as so
many have claimed."

LaPalombara, however, does not seriously
consider the possibility that Italians may
simultaneously feel a deep attachment to
democracy, as opposed to an authoritarian
system, and may be deeply dissatisfied with
the policy outcomes their democracy pro-
duces. In fact, the finding that Italians feel
their individual well-being is better off than
that of the collectivity is not necessarily a
paradox nor does one need to use the notion
of politics as spettacolo to understand it.

The well-known characterization of the
postwar United States as exhibiting private
wealth and public squalor might be well
applied to Italy. In Italy's case, however, the
reason lies in ineffective rather than insuf-
ficient public expenditure. Although LaPalom-
bara notes some policy failures, he does not
seriously consider that policy performance
might account for much of the criticism
Italians direct toward their institutions. That
failure, however, is extensive and glaring, for
many policy areas are not delivering services
equivalent to those enjoyed by citizens of
other industrialized countries. The lack of
effective service delivery may well explain why
many Italians are dissatisfied with the public
goods their democracy produces while, by
contrast, enjoying the private goods the
flourishing economy produces. Dissatisfaction
with policy performance does not necessarily
lead to a search for an authoritarian solution-
blacks in America are a case in point--and
criticism combined with support does not
need to be explained by interpreting criticism
as contributing to theater.

In sum, LaPalombara has written a truly
provocative book for the intelligent reader.
His understanding of the dynamics of Italian
politics, however, is too driven by a cultural
explanation of Italian political life and not
concerned enough with the quality of the
public goods produced by the system.

ALBERTA SBRAGIA
University of Pittsburgh
Pennsylvania


Reichman's book is a rewritten dissertation based on extensive use of Soviet archives. It is a thorough and competently written account of the part organized railway employees played in the Revolution of 1905. When William Rosenberg of the University of Michigan completes his work on the railwaymen in 1917 and after, we shall know all we need to know on the subject.

My only criticism is that the topic is too narrowly conceived by Reichman. He does not explain, for example, that the Russian term profsoiuz (shortened from professional'nyi soiuz) derives not from some imagined professionalization of the All-Russian Union of Railroad Employees and Workers—there are some obscure lines to that effect—but from the fact that the Union of Unions, a politically significant group formed in the spring of 1905, actually consisted mainly of professionals—doctors, lawyers, and the like. He refers to the Union of Unions only once and does not even mention that the Railroad Union was a member. His wish to avoid retelling the story of 1905 is understandable, but the result is to abstract his subject too far from the overall course of events. Minor errors are almost absent from the text, though several mar the bibliography.

McDaniel's volume is a quite different sort of work. Its core is an interesting narrative of the history of the Russian labor movement from the 1890s to 1917. The central thread of interpretation is that there was a powerful and almost unique contradiction between autocracy and capitalism, or "a largely unreconstructed autocratic regime" and "rapid industrialization based on private initiative," though the former sponsored the latter. Moreover, McDaniel declares, it was that contradiction "that generated a revolutionary labor movement and so gave rise to the closest approxima-

tion in history to a proletarian revolution." This thesis, while not new in all respects, may claim by its pointed clarity some originality and illuminates the whole subject of the Russian Revolution. The text contains few slips—though the names Pobedonostsev, Skobelev, and Tsereteli are misspelled over and over—and the very complicated bibliography is nearly without flaw. The book's chief weakness is the burden it bears of sociological jargon and theoretical musings, complete with the footnoted ascription of commonplaces to other writers. McDaniel wishes to acknowledge theoretical indebtedness to the seldom-paired duo of Tocqueville and Trotsky. It is not clear that he needs to do so.

DONALD W. TREADGOLD
University of Washington
Seattle


William Shinn's engaging monograph has a most unusual provenance. Shinn spent a year as a graduate student at Moscow State University just before joining the U.S. Foreign Service. His research on the customary law of the peasant household led to a December 1961 article in the Slavic Review, but further work had to be laid aside until his retirement. Now he has amplified and updated his study under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University. The original article appears as an appendix, along with a lively description of a Christmastime visit in December 1960 to a collective farm some 50 kilometers east of Moscow.

Shinn's central concern is the social and economic institution that shaped peasant life for many centuries until overlaid by the Soviet collective farm after 1929. The peasant household, governed by an elder, controlled family life in rural villages, and initially it was not much disturbed by the new Bolshevik regime.
Though many of its rights were abrogated under forced collectivization, some limited independence survived in connection with the garden plot permitted each household. Shinn follows legal developments regarding the garden plots into the 1950s, by which time Khrushchev was pushing for their abolition. Nevertheless the private plots have survived to this day, and in modified form they may continue to form the basis for some agricultural activities in Gorbachev's Russia.

This rambling essay reminds one of Geroid Tanquary Robinson's *Rural Russia under the Old Regime* (1932), with its vivid descriptions of rural life as he saw it in 1926. Shinn shares Robinson's nostalgia for a vanishing way of life. The nostalgia was not shared by the author of a 1969 Soviet study of peasant life cited by Shinn, Raisa Maksimovna Gorbacheva, though perhaps she and her husband will be open to new ways of combining rural family initiative with modern mechanized farming.

HOLLAND HUNTER
Haverford College
Pennsylvania


The conviction is widespread that much of interest in Soviet studies is to be gleaned from studying matters other than the struggle for power. These two books, quite different in scope and content, concerned, in the first case, with Soviet political culture as shaped by a unique historical tradition, and, in the second, with the evolving relationship between Moscow and the periphery, will help to reinforce that view.

The first is a collection of previously published essays by Robert C. Tucker, who, among the Stalin biographers, has provided the best appreciation of Stalin's obsessive self-image as a revolutionary. He has had to swim against the stream of much Western literature that insisted on seeing in Stalin a mediocre bureaucrat. Tucker was at first influenced by his interest in psychology, but in these essays he puts the role of personal leadership into the larger framework of Russia's unique historical tradition. The political-culture approach causes him to draw a firm line between Lenin's ideas on cultural revolution and Stalin's imposition from above of a "neo-Tsarist Marxism." But rather than deny the continuity entirely, he adds the qualification that there were two Leninisms: one associated with the mild regime of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the 1920s and the other with the war communism of the Russian civil war. When Stalin introduced the collectivization of agriculture and his purges, he was still hewing to the tradition of the Leninism of the earlier period.

The approach of the two Leninisms strikes me as a particularly useful way to retain the lessons of the early period of American Sovietology, to which Tucker was an important contributor, without maintaining against all reason that the madness of the Great Purge was already foreordained when Lenin wrote *What Is to Be Done?* in 1902. A related view, however, argued today by Soviet writers such as Fedor Burlatsky, according to which Soviet history should be seen as a choice between war communism and NEP, gives what I think is too broad and undifferentiated a description of the Soviet historical alternance. It underestimates the turns within the NEP and indeed throughout Soviet history. Tucker does refer to the "Stalinist holocaust of 1934-39" without noting the neo-NEP of 1933-37. Perhaps it is best to integrate the struggle for power into these fertile explorations of political culture. Tucker finds post-Stalin communism to be an "extreme Communist conservatism of strong nationalist tendency," with the nomenklatura "service nobility" becoming a ruling class under Brezhnev. He finishes with a sensitive and insightful analysis of the glasnost literature.

In her valuable study of Soviet budgetary policy, Donna Bahry calls attention to the
"local revolution" dating from the sovmarkhoz reforms of 1957, which, in doubling the republics' budgets, has greatly increased their role in economic decision making. Bahry cautions that the me! at the top have not become pork-barrel politicians, at least not at the Politburo level, where republic representation offers little advantage in appropriation battles. Yet structured appeals processes and a balkanization of the central bureaucracy offer a few windows through which persistent republic and local officials can coax more resources. It comes as a surprise to read that not much in the economic agenda outside Moscow has changed as a result of the beginnings of perestroika. This is from the perspective of 1986. Perhaps Bahry will review developments again after the passage of a reasonable interval.

ANTHONY D'AGOSTINO
San Francisco State University
California


Vital defines his project as "a contribution to the political history of the Jewish people" and he dissects his subject with erudition and finesse. He begins with an analysis of the floundering of the World Zionist Organization in the years immediately before World War I and insightfully delineates its complicated problems with the Young Turk government. The real centerpiece of the book is a masterful examination of Zionist and British diplomacy during the war itself. The promotion of a pro-British position within a largely unsympathetic Zionist movement by figures such as Chaim Weizmann, Nahum Sokolow, and Vladimir Jabotinsky—on the assumption that support for the victorious allies would bear political fruit—was an important step in advancing Zionist goals and securing the Balfour Declaration of 1917. Vital weaves through the intricacies of British intentions and Zionist initiatives, showing how Britain's pro-Zionist turn was accompanied by doubts almost immediately. Still, the war years opened "a window of opportunity" for the Zionists, albeit one that was "in its way a fluke, an event none could have soberly predicted, let alone engineered," for it was a function of a very complex array of circumstances tied to the global conflict.

Vital's books are informed by a defined perspective rooted in Zionist political history. At the turn of the century a fierce debate arose between political Zionists—those who believed the movement's priority ought to be diplomacy aimed at attaining a charter and support from a great power for their project—and those who emphasized practical Zionism—establishing Jewish settlements in Palestine—and/or cultural nationalism. Vital clearly sides with political Zionism, which was championed initially by Herzl and later embraced in his own way by Jabotinsky, who became the leader of the Zionist right wing in the 1920s and 1930s. Consequently, the cultural Zionist Ahad Haam receives an excessively negative assessment in Vital's first two books, and the achievements of Weizmann, who was the most prominent synthesizer of political, practical, and cultural Zionisms, are belittled in the third. Furthermore, Vital's diplomatic focus leads to at least one important lacuna: there is no discussion of the shift in the Labor Zionist movement in Palestine between 1909 and the outbreak of the world war from a strategy partly based on class struggle to one of constructivist socialism, that is, one of establishing the infrastructure of an autonomous Jewish workers' community in Palestine. Not only is this an essential part of the
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period Vital covers; it later provided Labor with the means to become the dominant force in the struggle for statehood. But if in fact he gives us a chapter in a crucial phase of Zionism rather than the full story, his rich presentation of that chapter is an outstanding contribution.

MITCHELL COHEN
City University of New York

UNITED STATES


In August 1964, Arkansas Senator J. William Fulbright served as floor manager for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, giving President Lyndon B. Johnson broad powers to respond to an alleged North Vietnamese attack on American warships. By the end of 1965, however, Fulbright, from his position as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had emerged as one of the leading congressional critics of the Johnson administration’s policy in Southeast Asia. In 1974, after nearly a decade of articulate opposition to the war in Vietnam, Fulbright lost a bid for renomination in the state Democratic primary to Arkansas’s popular governor, Dale Bumpers. In William Fulbright and the Vietnam War: The Dissent of a Political Realist, University of Toronto historian William C. Berman traces Fulbright’s public career from the senator’s change of heart toward American involvement in Vietnam to his eventual political demise.

Originally sharing a widespread concern about Communist expansion in Southeast Asia, Fulbright at first acquiesced in administration policy. According to Berman, Fulbright hoped to preserve his influence with Johnson and hesitated to undermine LBJ in his 1964 campaign against the apparently more militant Barry Goldwater. After the American intervention in the Dominican Re-public in 1965, the nature of which Fulbright believed Johnson had misrepresented, Fulbright began his break with the president. Repelled by the prospect of a protracted war, Fulbright concluded that the preservation of a non-Communist regime in South Vietnam was not vital to the national interests of the United States. At the same time, Fulbright began to question the effects of the war on the United States, in particular, the growing militarization of American society and the shift of the power to wage war from Capitol Hill to the White House.

While sympathetic to Fulbright, Berman exaggerates neither his influence nor his sagacity. After Richard M. Nixon became president in 1969, Fulbright’s opposition to continued American involvement in Vietnam was tempered by his respect for the abilities of Henry Kissinger and by his support for the Nixon administration’s pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union. Indeed, Berman argues that, during the Nixon years, more outspoken senators like Frank Church and George McGovern eclipsed Fulbright as an antiwar leader. And, Berman concludes, Fulbright had no workable plan to end the war as an alternative to the precipitate American withdrawal that he opposed. Berman, in short, offers a balanced and judicious study of the Arkansas senator as a “political realist.”

JEFF BROADWATER
Vanderbilt University
Nashville
Tennessee


In this book, Green discusses the impact of words used in politics before and after elections from William McKinley to Ronald Reagan. He starts off by what to me is a false statement. He maintains that language is the most powerful of human weapons; but the old
adage that actions speak louder than words is as true as ever. Obviously, words and politics are inseparable, but that does not mean that the old adage does not hold. Actions continue to speak louder than words. Language can lie and the public knows this. Actions cannot lie. For instance, Lincoln's act of freeing the slaves was more convincing than discussion of advocating emancipation was.

The book falls short in many other ways. The sentence structure employed in it is most difficult to understand. Here is an example:

Only immersion in the historical data can provide the clues to which labels, phrases or verbal formulas are politically significant in a given situation, only a sustained analysis of this usage by specific individuals can shed light on who are the primary shapers of public consciousness to a given era.

Professor William Strunk, a the same university as Green's, and E. B. White outlined a formula for writing that Green does not follow. It called for one idea to a sentence, sentences not exceeding 16 words, and mono-syllabic words. Almost every sentence in the book needs to be changed to follow The Elements of Style.

In addition, the viewpoints about the public's beliefs expressed in the book are based on Green's assumptions and conclusions. Absence of further substantiation may have been appropriate up to the 1930s, but since then, polling has been a common method to measure the public's attitudes. There is no reference to polling in this volume, and the names of such distinguished pollsters as George Gallup, Louis Harris, and others are not even mentioned.

Interested readers would have benefited from the inclusion of a bibliography in this volume. They would also have gained if Green had done more than identify by surname the individuals he mentions. For instance, George Orwell's name appears five times, but without further description of him. Similarly, S. I. Hayakawa's book, Language in Thought and Action, is mentioned only in a footnote; I would think a lengthier treatment would be in order, given that it pioneered the subject of Green's book.

In sum, Shaping the Political Consciousness is a disappointing attempt to address the topic of language in politics.

EDWARD L. BERNAYS
Cambridge
Massachusetts


New Left historians of the 1960s and 1970s, such as William Appelton Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and Norman Pollack, probed the historical record for evidence of an American radical tradition in opposition to corporate social, economic, and political domination. In his earlier classic, The Populist Response to Industrial America (1962), Pollack found Populism proffering just such a radical alternative to capitalism. In The Just Polity, however, Pollack revises his earlier view of Populist radicalism. Through an exegetical reexamination of the writings of key Populist thinkers, including James B. Weaver, Tom Watson, William A. Peffer, Thomas Nugent, James H. Davis, and Ignatius Donnelly, Pollack seeks to restore scriptural purity to the debate over Populist identity. His principal contention is that Populism represented a critical political and ideological movement in American history, a movement whose significance has been obfuscated by distracting debates concerning regional ideological differences and the extent of xenophobia in Populist rhetoric.

While Pollack never totally disavows his 1962 contention that Populism offered a radical alternative to capitalism, he does seriously modify it. Borrowing heavily from Louis Hartz's thesis that "Lockean consensus" explained the historically weak "counterthrust to [American] institutions and values," Pollack labels Populism as more antimonopolistic than anticapitalist. But, insists Pollack, while Populism may not have been radical, a "pro-
cess of radicalization" was at work in the movement making it "an ideological powder keg" restrained only by the movement's patriotic commitment, constitutionalism, and a firm belief in the temporariness of the present painfully oppressive system of corporate monopolism. Moreover, although antimonopolistic capitalists, Populists passionately embraced public ownership and therefore transcended "mere reformism."

Pollack's exegesis of writers such as Peffer, Weaver, Lloyd, and Watson girds his main argument about the historical significance of Populism's ideological critique of industrialism, modernization, and the structure of American democracy. His analysis, for example, discloses a generalized fear among Populist writers of impending social upheaval. But his reading of Ignatius Donnelly revealed that Populists like Donnelly never desired civilization's overthrow but sought instead to prevent le dégâe by imploring an end to corporate abuses.

Pollack's new analytical framework is extrapolated from seemingly disparate Populist rhetoric that flowed freely from the pens of an equally diverse body of social and political thinkers. In this rhetoric Pollack brilliantly and insightfully discerns a comprehensible, unified body of complex thought about the nature of the American economy, constitutional government, and popular sovereignty.

Clearly Pollack's exegetical methodology has enabled him to tease new insights about Populism from literary sources and to propose a new holistic framework for the study of Populism. But Pollack himself admits the limitations of this approach. His study is confined to a relatively small group of Populist writers. His is, moreover, an unscientifically chosen sample. It therefore remains to be seen whether more rigorous and exhaustive analysis of the archival record will vindicate Pollack's new insights. Then, too, subjecting a limited number of Populist writings to microscopic textual analysis and topically structuring the analysis hazards stylistic nightmares. At best, Pollack belabor his points about the capitalistic strains in Populism; at worst, he is repetitive, occasionally even redundant. Nevertheless, Pollack's study provides needed grist for a desirable reassessment of Populism. It is an important statement by one of the giants of Populist historiography and should be read carefully and with profit by all students of American political thought.

JOHN F. BAUMAN
California University of Pennsylvania


During World War II, 130,000 black soldiers were stationed in Britain as part of the contingent of American troops. They were serving in an army that was still segregated and in a country where until then few blacks had ever been seen except as oddities. This book offers a series of vignettes that are by turns saddening, horrifying, and wryly amusing. It puts together a detailed picture of the reactions of the British to American segregation and racial friction, and the reactions of Americans to the variously bewildered, hostile, and self-righteous British.

It suffers from a lack of focus. Smith apparently could not decide if his topic was racial segregation and its impact on blacks in the American army, the impact of American blacks on the British population, or the impact of American segregationist attitudes on the British. If it was the first, he should have dealt systematically with the social context of the American South at that time, because it explains the background of segregation. If it was the second, he devoted too much time to the American army's practice of segregation. If it was the third, it should have focused on British attitudes toward all racial and ethnic minorities—including the Welsh, the Scots, and the Irish. Smith seems to have allowed the volume of his material to overwhelm him and to compel him simply to throw in every detail on the situation that he
could find. If he had mastered the material, his book would have been a tightly focused piece of historical research. As it stands, it is an inflated article.

Smith repeatedly distorts the American historical context of racial segregation. There is insufficient explanation of Roosevelt's decision to maintain a segregated army. This decision, in spite of Roosevelt's personal efforts to desegregate civil service offices in Washington and his wife's vigorous public efforts on behalf of civil rights, was taken in the interests of military efficiency and the fact that the professional officer and noncommissioned officer corps was disproportionately composed of white Southerners. Smith also refers to segregation as if it were a universal condition of blacks in the United States and to white American attitudes as if they were uniformly segregationist. This is patently false—segregation by law was a Southern phenomenon; I attended a fully integrated school, church, and Boy Scout troop in Boston in the 1940s. Furthermore, white Americans, as they do now, had widely varying attitudes about blacks.

The reason for this distortion is that Smith is engaged in what can be called the fallacy of historical transposition. This exercise is an invitation to the reader to judge events in the past by contemporary standards. Smith invites present-day readers to be shocked at segregationist practices in the American army over four decades ago. If practiced today, of course, such a policy would be unacceptable. At the time, it may have been practical, however much we may condemn it. But Smith makes no attempt to put the policy in its historical context. The result is a series of titillating anecdotes, without systematic explanation, like a historical version of the National Enquirer.

WILLIAM R. BEER
Brooklyn College
New York

STOWE, STEVEN M. Intimacy and Power in the South: Ritual in the Lives of the

The planter elite of the Old South has intrigued students of American history and culture for generations. Economists have analyzed their plantations, historians have dissected their defenses of slavery, and political scientists have traced their political machinations. In recent years, cultural and intellectual historians such as Bertram Wyatt-Brown and Drew Gilpin Faust have examined the social and cultural lives of the planters, adding another dimension to our understanding of this most unusual elite. Following the same path, Steven M. Stowe, a professor of humanities in the College of Medicine at Pennsylvania State University, utilizes the findings of linguists, sociologists, and anthropologists to dissect the rituals and language of Southern aristocrats.

The book is divided into two parts, with the first half outlining three important rituals in the lives of the planters: the affair of honor—the duel—courtship, and the coming of age. The second half of the book examines in some detail the lives of three planter families, illustrating with particular cases the themes developed in the earlier sections.

Stowe concludes that "sex and gender (not race or class) was the [planters'] most satisfying explanation for human values and action." This view will certainly raise eyebrows among more traditional historians of the South. He also stresses the importance of hierarchy in family and social life, the conflation of the personal with the social, and the planters' tendency toward ostentatious displays of their beliefs.

Stowe's subject is more interesting than his treatment of it, unfortunately. Long, involved analyses of seemingly trivial statements and complex explications of planter "consciousness" require an intense interest in cultural expressions on the part of the reader. A second criticism is that Stowe does not demonstrate in any detail that the ideals and beliefs of the planters were different from those of Northern elites. Perhaps Boston merchants conflated the personal and the social as much
as South Carolina planters. In short, we cannot be sure whether the patterns Stowe describes are Southern or American. Nevertheless, this is a useful book that complements the work of other cultural historians and takes us deep inside the lives of the planters. When other scholars carry the subject further with comparative studies, our understanding of the Southern elite will be further enriched.

RICHARD LOWE
University of North Texas
Denton


This short book contains the results of the latest in a series of research studies focusing upon the impact of electoral-system changes, promoted by urban reformers at the turn of the century, upon city politics. Specifically, Welch and Bledsoe examine the effects of at-large electoral systems versus district systems and nonpartisan elections.

Data for the study were collected from approximately 1,000 city council members in 218 municipalities over 50,000 population in 42 states. The surveyed municipalities were divided equally into cities with at-large elections and cities with district or mixed election systems. Cities over I million population were excluded from the study.

Welch and Bledsoe conclude “election structure does matter” and report that

- nonpartisanship no longer favors Republican candidates;
- nonpartisan council members spend more time on servicing constituents than partisan council members do and are more apt to favor increasing taxes than levying user charges;
- partisan and district elections produce members who “are not clearly more liberal than those elected by other means”; and

—conflict exists in all councils regardless of the electoral system employed.

Structure, however, apparently is not associated with council members’ views on policy issues.

The study’s findings differ in many instances from earlier research findings, and the differences are attributed to the increasing importance of campaign funds, the media’s greater impact, lack of a working-class political party, a higher level of education, and progressive-era reforms, including the primary election, voter-registration requirements, and secret ballots. One cannot quarrel with the conclusion that city politics in the late twentieth century is significantly different from politics in a typical city at mid-century.

The concluding chapter breaks important new ground by referring to the changes that have occurred in the world of municipal politics and raising the question whether a list or single transferable vote system of proportional representation (PR) would have a significant impact upon the composition and policies of city councils. Unfortunately, Welch and Bledsoe do not evaluate the experience of Cambridge, Massachusetts, relative to the use of the single transferable vote system of PR to elect its council and school committee, or the use of this system to elect members of community school boards in New York City. Evidence from the latter city reveals that PR does produce school boards that are descriptively more representative of their constituencies than members of the city council elected by single-member districts.

It is unfortunate that the short review of urban reform in the 1890s and early 1900s contains two errors of fact. Contrary to the statement that “all cities of significant size were members” of the National Municipal League, membership in the league—now the National Civic League—was open to individuals and not to cities. Furthermore, the National Municipal League did not endorse the city-manager system of administration “at the turn of the century (1899)” or restate its
endorsement "each year in the Model City Charter." The first city-manager charter was not drafted until 1909, and the Model City Charter, in its sixth edition (1964), is not issued each year. These errors of fact, however, do not detract from the value of this study.

JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN
State University of New York
Albany


Gerald Zahavi, assistant professor of history at the State University of New York at Albany, has made a significant contribution to a better understanding of labor-management relations in the United States. Workers, Managers, and Welfare Capitalism is a volume in the Working Class in American History series, edited by David Brody, David Montgomery, Alice Kessler-Harris, and Sean Wilentz. This case study of the workers of Endicott Johnson, centered in the Binghamton, New York, area, and the practice of welfare capitalism from 1890 to 1950 is a valuable and highly useful study; his concluding chapter contains comments on the 1960s as well.

Zahavi finds Eugene D. Genovese’s model of nineteenth-century plantation paternalism as set forth in Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (1974) useful to his own study of twentieth-century corporate paternalism. Indeed, the “dialectic struggle for control over definition of paternalistic obligations and rights” as manifested in this shoe-manufacturing industry is central. As Zahavi examines the origins, development, limits, and demise of worker solidarity under the umbrella of welfare capitalism, he argues that the struggle of labor has occurred within and without formal labor organizations.

Zahavi’s study, which he calls a hybrid—neither pure labor history nor pure business history—is effective. Keeping the shop floor at center stage, he persuasively argues that welfare capitalism was more than what employers said and did; it also revolved around how workers accommodated themselves to and used this paternalistic approach for their own ends. Welfare capitalism was essentially successful in warding off strong unionization and disruptive strikes among the thousands of Endicott Johnson workers. Until the changing world economic conditions since the late 1960s altered labor-management relations considerably, putting almost all American industrial workers in a much more vulnerable position, the officers at Endicott Johnson as well as other corporate practitioners of welfare capitalism were also trapped, to some degree, by the labor-management system that they had created. They could not abrogate the implicit or explicit expectations of the workers without some repercussions.

Zahavi has done his research thoroughly and has used oral history as well as other sources advantageously. He is a capable writer, and this volume is readable. It should be of particular interest to social historians, labor and economics specialists, eclectic scholars, and thoughtful general readers. Undoubtedly, this book will appeal to the surviving Endicott Johnson workers and their descendants, for Zahavi has told their story in interesting fashion.

MARGARET RIPLEY WOLFE
East Tennessee State University
Kingsport

SOCIOLOGY


The Catholic Worker Movement began with the publication of the Catholic Worker in 1933. Dorothy Day, a leftist journalist who had converted to Catholicism, edited the paper to publicize the ideas of Peter Maurin. Maurin advocated "primitive communism," rooted in a Catholic framework, particularly the social encyclicals of Popes Leo XIII and Pius XI (1891 and 1931, respectively). Together Day and Maurin founded urban Houses of Hospitality, as well as several communal farms. During Maurin and Day's lifetimes there were no rules for membership, and a community exercised little discipline over the lives of the members: Maurin believed that people should contribute to the life of the community as they felt called to do so.

Yet the Catholic Worker Movement had a significant impact. In the 1930s the Houses of Hospitality were on the forefront of providing food and shelter to indigent people. With her radical heritage, Day led the movement to participate in antiwar activities: Catholic Workers did draft counseling from World War II through the Vietnam war; in the 1940s they formulated the conscientious-objector option for Catholics and provided funds for alternative service camps. Aronica sees the Catholic Worker Movement as instrumental in forcing Catholic thinkers to reconceptualize traditional arguments about just wars.

In Beyond Charismatic Leadership Aronica uses the Catholic Worker Movement as a case study for examining Weber's theory of the routinization of charisma. Weber argued that, after the death of a charismatic leader, an organization develops routines and bureaucracy in order to continue the organization and to handle day-to-day activities. Aronica argues that Catholic Worker ideology—based in anarchism and agrarian traditionalism—precludes bureaucratization; she asks how the movement can survive. Her primary sources include archival materials, interviews, and two and one-half months of participant observation at Saint Joseph's House in New York in 1984. The first half of the book tells the story of the movement under the founders; the second half focuses on Saint Joseph's House as it operated in 1984.

Aronica concludes that since Day's death in 1980—Maurin died in 1944—the movement has lost sight of the founders' vision: new recruits are attracted by the history of service to the poor, but they have little familiarity with the ideas of Maurin or Day. Some procedures have been standardized but perhaps not enough: Aronica suggests that in order to carry on the vision of the founders, it may be necessary to alter some of the forms.

While Aronica looks at a small group of radical Catholics in the United States, Michael Hornsby-Smith gives us a report on the majority of Catholics in England and Wales. Roman Catholics in England reports on extensive research Hornsby-Smith has conducted over the last 15 years. The research projects attempt to capture various populations of Catholics: a general national survey, surveys of various activist groups, surveys of four parishes, plus interviews with Catholics who attended public events during Pope John Paul II's visit to England in 1982. He finds little evidence for the traditional stereotype of the English Catholic Church as a distinctive subculture; rather, the mainstream is remarkably heterodox.

From 1850 to 1950 the metaphor "fortress church" was used to describe the Catholic Church in England. Observers characterized the Church of that period as "united and insulated." Hornsby-Smith argues that the metaphor is no longer appropriate due both to social changes after World War II in the secular world and to the changes in the Church introduced by Pope John XXIII and Vatican II. Hornsby-Smith sees the Church of the 1980s in a transition period, with tensions between traditional Catholic elites and new middle-class progressives.

A major theme of the book is investigating the social mobility of Catholics—especially Irish immigrants, who contributed greatly to the growth of the Catholic Church in England from around 5 percent of the population in 1850 to 11 percent in 1978. The findings cannot be easily summarized in this space, but, in contrast with the United States, it does not seem that Catholics in general experienced
greater gains than the rest of the population during the postwar years.

Both of these books are concerned with Catholic institutions in transition, albeit very different institutions. Readers concerned with organizational supports for peace and justice activities will find Aronica's account of this underresearched arena well worth reading. Hornsby-Smith brings to the American reader data not easily accessible elsewhere. Less provocative than his American counterpart Andrew Greeley, Hornsby-Smith can be tedious, even repetitious. But his book provides the reader with necessary information for comparing the Catholic Church in England and Wales with what we know about the Church in the United States.

MARY JO NEITZ
University of Missouri
Columbia


With the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986, Congress marked the end of an almost twenty-year debate over how the flow of immigrants to the United States is to be controlled. What lay behind the law was the concern that immigrants were slipping across the borders and taking jobs away from low-skilled natives. The conventional wisdom suggested that displacement could be ended by prohibiting the employment of undocumented immigrants; after endless wrangling, Congress finally followed suit.

The message of Thomas Bailey's important book, Immigrant and Native Workers: Contrasts and Competition, is that Congress had it all wrong. Bailey argues against the simplistic but prevailing notion that immigrants and their counterparts in the labor market—black men, women, and teenagers—are low-skilled, interchangeable components. What characterizes immigrants, according to Bailey, is not that they are low skilled, though, indeed, they may sometimes be. The defining attribute, rather, is the social structure of immigration.

The argument that Bailey develops in this careful, well-written study is that immigrants are transitional workers: they come from societies with very different attitudes and orientations toward work from ours; they arrive uncertain as to whether to stay or return; and only gradually and unwittingly do they put down roots. For these reasons they take jobs that native-born workers often will not accept. Later on, when the dream of return has faded, it turns out that employment at the bottom has unintended consequences: immigrants pick up a few skills; they make contacts with other workers or with employers who might promote them. Equally important is the fact that from the start, newcomers are embedded in social networks of other members of the immigrant community. These networks help immigrants find jobs, acquire skills, and move up the job ladder—in the absence of formal training programs, seniority systems, and the like. Because immigrants work in environments where their coworkers, and often their bosses, are from the same homeland, they have role models that provide encouragement for upward mobility. Consequently, self-employment is an important component of the immigration employment situation.

Through case studies of the restaurant, construction, retail, and garment industries, Bailey documents these characteristics and shows how they produce a labor market role for immigrants that makes them different from other lower-skilled groups. The case studies provide the first, close-up comparison of immigrants with blacks, women, and youth. In addition, they convincingly demonstrate that the competitive impact of immigrants—whether they are illegal or otherwise—is much less severe than Congress ever thought.
Immigration is, at first glance, far removed from the concerns of Jay MacLeod, a sensitive and sophisticated ethnographer, whose book, *Ain’t No Making It: Leveled Aspirations in a Low-Income Neighborhood*, is a revised version of his Harvard College senior honors thesis. What MacLeod wants to know—following in the tradition of Bourdieu, Willis, and Girouix—is why working-class and lower-class youths develop the attitudes and expectations that allow social inequality to be reproduced from one generation to the next.

MacLeod seeks to answer that question by looking at two groups of lower- or working-class youth inhabiting a decaying housing project in some unnamed, Northeastern city. One group is nicknamed the Hallway Hangers. The Hangers are a mainly white group of adolescents, heavily into drugs, alcohol, and petty and not so petty crime; more out of school than in; episodically involved in work; and marked by a tendency toward violent behaviors. The Brothers, in an inversion of the expected pattern, is a mainly black group that inhabits the same physical world but does not partake of the subculture of the Hangers.

For MacLeod, the key differences between the groups lie in their attitudes toward school and their expectations of social mobility. The Hangers view their prospects of getting ahead as remote and see school as incapable of delivering on its promise of providing the skills needed to obtain a good job. Rejected by school, and rejecting it in turn, the Hangers develop their own value system: what counts are physical toughness, emotional resiliency, quick-wittedness, masculinity, and, above all, solidarity with the group. The pathos of the Hangers is that these norms effectively keep them in their place: without skills, the search for survival forces them to take jobs that are shameful, and because loyalty counts so much, the Hangers do not aspire to roles that would inevitably involve a break with the group. Aspirations are not so leveled among the Brothers, by contrast. They are achievement oriented; they prize accomplishments in school; they measure success in conventional ways. The problem is that their accomplish-

ments are modest, and unlike the Hangers—who neither play the game nor accept its rules—the Brothers blame themselves for their limited performance.

It is in exploring the source of variation between the two groups that issues of ethnicity and migration—reminiscent of Bailey’s work—emerge in MacLeod’s account. Race, MacLeod suggests, gives the Brothers an out that the Hangers cannot share. While the Brothers can at once blame racism for their families’ modest status and believe that hard work and education will yield future progress, the Hangers can only attribute their misfortunes to their parents’ shortcomings or to society’s raw deal; no surprise, therefore, that they view the world as rigged against them. More important, in my view, is a difference in the social structure of these two groups. Whereas most of the Brothers are either migrants or immigrants—for whom moving to MacLeod’s unnamed city and thence to the housing project he studied were steps up—the Hangers are the remnants of a now heavily suburbanized white working class. Also gone are the contacts, role models, and sources of informal support that would have given the Hangers reason to aspire to more than what they have. That is their tragedy—and ours.

ROGER WALDINGER

City University of New York


Gunnar Myrdal, in the monumental study of race relations conducted under his guidance, concluded that the United States was caught in midst of a profound “dilemma.” Racist beliefs and discriminatory practices flagrantly contradicted a popular allegiance to the “American Creed”—a social ethos rooted in a common set of egalitarian values that was “the cement in the structure of this great and disparate nation.” Such a dilemma,
Myrdal assuredly predicted, would eventually be resolved in favor of the “Creed,” and the assimilation and successful incorporation of minority groups would follow. It is optimistic analyses and commentaries in this liberal vein that British scholar Geoff Dench finds grossly misleading. Dench argues that the presumed eventual triumph of universalistic, egalitarian values and social justice obscures the complex set of interests that lie behind public affirmations of commitment to equality and integration.

For Dench, the real dilemma in open societies is the tension between promises of free and equal participation of all individual members and the continuing reality of communalism, that is, of group identity and solidarity forged around notions of common origin, race, and/or culture. Unlike other analysts, Dench does not regard this tension as a moral dilemma, nor as intrinsically destabilizing to the social order. Beneath the veneer of a national commitment to universalistic principles and individual equality, he sees the playing out of majority- and minority-group communalistic sentiments that fundamentally shape the nature of ethnic and race relations.

Dench's book is an attempt to theorize and extend observations made in his previous study of the Maltese community in Britain. In the Maltese in London (1975), Dench found that the majority group's expectations for the Maltese to assimilate were, somewhat ironically, a fundamental factor contributing to social disorganization among the Maltese. Universalistic creeds weakened the social controls that the Maltese community had exerted over its own members, leading to deviant behaviors, which, in turn, underscored, in the eyes of majority-group members, the inferior minority status of the Maltese.

Drawing on this insight, Dench presents a range of historical and contemporary examples from several open societies. His discussion is thematically divided into four parts. Part 1 examines the “dual character” of modern states that profess a formal allegiance to progressive, universalistic values while in reality serving the interests of members of the dominant majority group who interpret avowed ideals in ways that benefit them. Part 2 examines how “minority clients” are often called upon to provide integrative leadership during periods of social change and political crisis. Brief sketches of Pierre Trudeau (Canada), Joseph Stalin (the Soviet Union), John F. Kennedy (United States), and Benjamin Disraeli (Britain) illustrate how they came to the fore, with the backing of modernizing elites, during periods in which the conflicts endemic to pluralistic societies were particularly acute. Part 3 deals with the political, cultural, and personal dilemmas that confront minority-group members. In each realm, agonizing choices between an integrationist or communalistic path render it difficult to gain empowerment, avoid marginal status, and construct a satisfying personal identity. Part 4 summarizes and extends Dench's argument that communalist values continue to be a major force in modern states, shaping domestic conflicts and international relations.

While each part raises intriguing themes, their connection to the book's overall argument is often muddled and lost. This, along with the level of abstraction, tends to rob the book of clarity and coherence. This is unfortunate, given Dench's effective refutation of dominant liberal wisdom and the compelling way he illustrates that the dilemmas of minority-group, and indeed majority-group, existence extend far beyond a simple affirmation or negation of egalitarian and integrationist ideology.

MICHAEL OMI
University of California
Berkeley


Drawing on Durkheim, Simmel, and others, Gilmore argues that the formal politeness and peacefulness of Fuenmayor is complementary to its sub rosa conflicts. That is, the betrayal of confidences, scandal mongering, derisive nicknames, and raucous and obscene vilifications during Carnaval are integral to the community's system of social control. At another level, what begins as the malicious gossip of one person becomes shared knowledge; and the hostility of the victim—who inevitably is told—shifts from "thou" to "they." Gilmore thereby brings together microsociology and macrosociology and reasserts the validity of the currently disfavored collective-behavior approach to public-opinion formation. He discusses at length the phallicism of Fuenmayor's males, using a psychoanalytic approach; the work of David McClelland and his associates on the power motive, alcohol, and sex would have been more useful. Gilmore tries to put his conclusions into a larger theoretical framework but gets lost in the process.

The pre-Republican village of Los Olivos was dominated by an elite of large landholders, according to Collier. The Second Republic gave the Socialists control. Contrary to the theory of peasant land hunger, the Council changed the relations of economic production through restructuring the hiring practices of the large landholders; it was an attack on their autonomy and hence on their honor. The oligarchs had their revenge during the Falangist forty-year reign of terror. Is this why the peasants of Fuenmayor were anxious to avoid public conflict? The widows and daughters of the more than fifty men of Los Olivos who were executed—the "vanquished"—were compelled to beg for menial jobs, and their children had a minimal education; they were debased and lost honor. When the United States ended Spain's isolation, the policy of autarky was abandoned, and the vanquished led a massive emigration from Los Olivos. This caused labor shortages, and the local oligarchs lost honor because they now had to do their own field work. Former residents, who were now prosperous urban proletarians, ironically observed that the status system had been stood on its head! Collier's population pyramids are so crammed with data that they are virtually useless.

Each side of the Civil War committed atrocities; atrocities breed atrocities. The moral issues of injustice and inhumanity hang heavily over both the Second Republic and the Falangist regime. Nonetheless, Collier deserves our thanks for bringing us a history that the Falangists had repressed.

LEONARD BLUMBERG
Temple University
Philadelphia


As the personal and social costs associated with the difficulties of adolescents have risen, there has been growing interest in trying to prevent these problems in the first place. Based upon a study commissioned by the Commonwealth Fund, the authors of this book evaluate the current efforts to prevent drunk driving, teenage pregnancy, drug use, and dropping out of school among teenagers. They conclude that specific, targeted interventions designed to prevent these problems are very difficult and that the "prevention paradigm" borrowed from the medical sciences is not directly applicable to the social arena. Instead, they call for dealing with the broader and more basic causes of these problems: racism, unemployment, and the malfunctioning of schools.

Although Ginzberg, Berliner, and Ostow address an important issue, they do not provide the necessary careful and in-depth analysis to answer satisfactorily the excellent questions they pose. The book is really an extended essay rather than a detailed examination of each of the four problem areas they explore. The chapter on adolescent pregnancy, for example, attempts to cover this complex problem in only 17 pages. Missing from the discussion are numerous relevant published
studies, which are not even mentioned. In addition, when social-science studies of prevention efforts are referenced, almost no effort is made to evaluate the conceptual and methodological soundness of these works. Instead, Ginzberg, Berliner, and Ostow concentrate on reporting only selected findings. As a result, even if the reader agrees with some of their observations in any of the four case studies, one has little confidence that the authors arrived at their conclusions based upon a systematic review of all of the major studies in each of those fields.

Because the book is organized by looking at each of these problem areas separately, Ginzberg, Berliner, and Ostow devote little attention to whether or not many teenagers may be experiencing more than one of these difficulties at the same time. Are prevention programs designed to focus on only a specific problem, such as dropping out of school or teenage pregnancy, less effective than those that try to address several of them simultaneously? Furthermore, missing almost entirely from this consideration of the problems of teenagers is an appreciation of the importance of adolescent development from a life-span perspective and how this might affect the design of current policies and programs for youth.

While the authors are to be commended for undertaking such an ambitious and important project, the results are disappointing. The question of whether or not prevention is possible for young people at risk awaits a more rigorous and systematic analysis before we should hazard any definitive conclusions.

MARIS A. VINOVS KIS
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor


Neitz situates the development of the Charismatic Renewal Movement within an overview of American socioreligious change dating back to the 1730s. This book presents an interesting discussion of Protestantism, in particular, its emergence in American society and the development of Pentecostal groups, which points out the connection that exists between these religious phenomena and the Charismatic Renewal Movement. Neitz explains the transitions that took place within the Catholic tradition as its status changed from that of an immigrant church to an established religious denomination in society, and the impact that Vatican II had upon the believers. One becomes aware that the Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement was not a cult, sect, or splinter group but rather another expression of Catholicism. By using interviews and observation strategies, Neitz presents an in-depth study of the Precious Blood Prayer Group from 1977 until 1980 as a case study within the Catholic Charismatic Renewal Movement. Neitz acknowledges the generalizability limitations inherent in using field methodology. Nevertheless, she makes a strong and well-documented argument that religion has the power to become the dominant value system around which the believers organize their social environment. Turner's levels of meaning to interpret symbol systems were used in collecting ethnographic data on the following topics: knowledge and belief in doctrine, experiences of God, expressions of religious experience, and the process of conversion. Essentially this study provides a contemporary application of both Durkheim's and Weber's ideas: that religious beliefs provide for its believers a unifying force and a meaningful way to interpret as well as live out their social reality. In this book, however, Neitz draws little from their writing.

Neitz clearly indicates that, though the Second Vatican Council mandated renewal within the Church, the Charismatic expression of renewal was not hierarchically based; rather, it originated among the laity. In other words, the common folk, prompted by their new experiences of God, attempt to organize their social reality in a new way that places these God experiences at the core of their life. As a result, Neitz raises and answers questions such as: What are the relationships that exist
between membership in the Charismatic Renewal Movement and family life? How is membership within Charismatic Renewal groups connected to the self-awareness and self-help groups present in society?

Because the Charismatic Renewal Movement as a separate social movement within the Church has declined in the last ten years, this study leaves open for further exploration an examination of commitment, its intensity, the mechanisms utilized to nurture it, and its durability.

Michele Teresa Aronica
Saint Joseph's College
North Windham
Maine

ECONOMICS


Bajusz and Louscher ask what the costs are to the U.S. economy of restricting arms exports by U.S. firms. In their book they focus on the Middle East, and in particular, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar. They conclude that direct and indirect costs of export restrictions of just F-16 aircraft to Jordan and Saudi Arabia by the year 2000 would be around $14 billion, involving roughly 400,000 worker-years of employment. The direct costs are the lost sales, and the indirect costs are the support persons for the primary workers. In addition, the U.S. government loses tax revenue, and the U.S. firms have higher costs of producing aircraft because they must spread fixed costs over a smaller quantity produced.

While all who support restrictions on arms exports recognize that there may be costs to the U.S. economy, rarely are these spelled out in the detailed manner of this book. Bajusz and Louscher acknowledge that there must be perceived benefits to the United States of such restrictions, but they make no attempt to estimate these benefits. Thus the reader is left with the impression that export restrictions impose a significant cost on the U.S. economy. These costs will be less if the labor and some part of the other resources that would have produced the arms for export are used for alternative production. The costs will be more if current arms-export restrictions have detrimental effects on these export industries in the future as present buyers shift brand loyalties to the arms of other countries.

But the availability of arms from other suppliers than the United States poses still another issue. From a position of supplying as much as 60 percent of world arms exports in the 1960s, with the USSR adding another 30 percent, the United States supplies just over 20 percent of arms exports in the 1980s. The Russian share has not risen, but a number of other suppliers have come up, including Brazil, China, and Korea among the low- to middle-income countries and France, Germany, and the United Kingdom in Europe. The potential foreign-policy benefits to the United States of export restrictions would be more if no alternate suppliers of the equipment were available. While alternate sellers for some sophisticated items are not available, there are today many more potential sellers; in some cases this may mean that restrictions on arms exports may have costs, but few if any benefits. By making clear that the cost in terms of sales and employment can be quite large, Bajusz and Louscher put the burden of proving substantial benefits on those who would restrict U.S. arms exports.

Alan Heston
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia


Shipping is as long-established and as important a global industry as they come and is of obvious interest to students of interna-
tional relations and international political economy. That is why they will welcome this book for the mine of material that it offers on that industry, its place in the world of transnational corporations, and as a case study of a long-standing international regime. Carfuny has evident command of his subject, and his presentation is detailed, surefooted, and knowledgeable. His description of the post-1945 regime dominated by shipping firms as "privatization"—rather than "liberalism"—is persuasive, as is the organization of the exposition along the two main axes of "bulk trades" and "the liner sector." His discussion of such contentious issues as those of flags of convenience or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's Code on Conduct is frequently illuminating.

This confident marshaling of an impressive amount of industrial information is cast, however, within the framework of the theory of "hegemonic stability," and that framework shows procrustean tendencies. The book opens with an account of the several regimes that have governed shipping since the Dutch period. But it is a pity that it does not start even earlier, with the Maritime Revolution of the thirteenth century in the Mediterranean, and the Genoese and Venetian regimes—and shipping lines—it spawned, and that it dismisses as a "quasi regime" the system instituted by Portugal and Spain for the governance of the ocean spaces in 1494. For if it had, the "correlation between free trade and the presence of a hegemonic power" would not have been so "obvious."

It is Carfuny's key finding that despite predictions of "hegemonic decline" the shipping regime continues to be characterized by "America's predominance": it is currently being refashioned by the United States' becoming "a revisionist power, capable of maintaining its superiority if not of restoring hegemony." Carfuny makes an effort at reconciling this dissonance between theory and evidence by introducing new distinctions. Maybe it is the framework as a whole that needs rethinking.

GEORGE MODEISKI
University of Washington
Seattle


This book is an ambitious but failed attempt to create a conceptual framework that will generate fresh insights into recent economic and political history. There is no pleasure in having to say that it fails so completely that there is not even anything interesting about the failure.

The beginning point is to define types of work—Cox calls them "modes of social relations of production." These are found in different combinations in different states and include peasant/ lord, self-employment, enterprise labor market, state corporatism, and central planning. Politics entails class tensions across these categories, and class formations sustain and transform states. States in turn generate world orders. This all works in reverse and interactively: world orders constrain and influence states, state organization affects classes and work types. Ho hum.

The 12 modes of production and three "successive structures of world order"—the liberal international economy (1789-1873), the era of rival imperialisms (1873-1945), the neoliberal world order (post-1945)—create an extensive taxonomy into which the emergence and histories of modern states can be put.

Some key words jotted down during reading permit me to indicate lines of criticism:


2. Taxonomy. Most of the game is to put states—Germany, Italy, England, France, the United States—into "typical" categories. The activity to explain is how the states move—or are moved by classes and their position in the world order—from one branch of the taxonomic tree to another. The problem is that there are not enough countries to determine the validity of the branches of the tree. Usually
a single country exemplifies the "typical" case, and many cells of the taxonomy are empty. By the frequent use of "or" constructions, Cox constantly creates new branches in the logic. For example, world-order "transformations may be in the direction either of a unified and consensual, homogeneous, hegemonic order or toward a fragmented and conflictful, heterogeneous, nonhegemonic order." Wow!

3. Retrodetermination. Cox uses hindsight to write with an irritatingly ponderous certitude. Predicting the past is not very exciting.

4. Economics. Cox's economic pronouncements are not acceptable to most economists. An example is: "International finance is the preeminent agency of conformity to world-hegemonic order and the principal regulator of the political and productive organization of a hegemonic world economy." Other instances can be found throughout the book.

5. Columbia University Press. Congratulations to its editorial committee, as there are three more volumes to follow this one. For the worst printing error in this volume, see pages 269 and 273.

6. Advice to scholars and libraries. I urge them to ignore this book. The last thing we need is another Wallerstein industry.

JOHN ADAMS
University of Maryland
College Park
OTHER BOOKS


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Since the publication of the first edition of Black Families in 1981, the status of the Black Family in America has changed dramatically. In turn, this has given rise to a host of questions: What is the current economic status of the Black family in America today? What educational opportunities exist today for Blacks? What roles do Black fathers play in the socialization of their children? How does teenage pregnancy affect the Black family? This revised second edition provides the most comprehensive overview available to date on the state of the Black family. Topics addressed include: historic and theoretical conceptualizations of Black families; demographic, economic, mobility, and educational patterns; male-female relationships; socialization within families; and family policy and advocacy.

Sage Focus Editions, Volume 41
1988 (Summer) / 328 pages / $35.00 (c) / $16.95 (p)

BLACK CHILDREN
Social, Educational, and Parental Environments
edited by HARRIETTE PIPES MCADOO, Howard University
& JOHN L. MCADOO, University of Maryland

"A valuable and welcome contribution to dispelling the kinds of myths and generalizations that abound in this area of study."
— Ethnic Minority Digest

"This fine book will be of particular interest to researchers, both for the issues that appear to be laid to rest and for the compelling and nagging questions that emerge: the differential influence of ecological systems on black males and females, and what environmental characteristics may account for these differences. But this book will also be of great interest to practitioners and graduate students in education, social work, nursing, and mental health."
— The Journal of Negro Education

Sage Focus Editions, Volume 72
1985 / 280 pages / $35.00 (c) / $16.95 (p)
COMMUNICATING RACISM
Ethnic Prejudice In Thought and Talk
by TEUN A. van DIJK. University of Amsterdam

How do members of “in” groups talk about minority groups? How does everyday talk contribute to the spread, and acceptance, of ethnic prejudice? These are but two among the many fundamental questions raised in this revealing look at ethnic stereotypes and the way in which they are diffused through interpersonal communication and intergroup interactions.

By analyzing informal discourse about ethnic minorities, and the reproduction of racism within the white majority, Communicating Racism offers us a new understanding of many deeply rooted and poorly understood patterns of prejudice. In a clearly written and methodologically elegant analysis of conversation as an integral and revealing mirror of human behavior, the author teaches us far-reaching lessons about the cognitive, social, and communicative dimensions of racism.

Communicating Racism will be essential reading for a wide variety of social science and humanities professionals and their students, including specialists engaged in the study of discourse, cognition, persuasion, and communication. As a result it will be especially useful as background reading for upper division and graduate courses in linguistics, discourse analysis, cognitive and social psychology, microsociology, anthropology, speech communication, and ethnic studies.


1987 (February) 376 pages $35.00 (c)
DIVIDED NEIGHBORHOODS
Changing Pattern of Racial Segregation
edited by GARY S. TOBIN, Brandeis University

Housing segregation is as real today as it has been through most of this century. The landmark open housing legislation of the 1960s changed patterns of housing discrimination, but segregation, while more subtle, is still pervasive in the United States. This original, controversial collection provides an exceptional analysis of the nature of housing segregation. It clearly demonstrates the role of institutions in segregation: federal and local government and market actors such as realtors, insurers, and bankers. It forcefully dismisses the myths that segregation exists because minorities prefer to live with their own kind, or that segregation is a side-effect of low income, not discrimination. Further, this compelling volume convincingly argues that the failure to act on the part of federal authorities remains the key and most damaging aspect of continued segregation.

Divided Neighborhoods is essential reading for scholars, students, and professionals interested in urban studies, civil rights, and race relations.

Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Volume 32
1987 (Autumn) / 285 pages / $35.00 (c) / $16.95 (p)
THE DECLINE OF URBAN POLITICS
Political Theory and the Crisis of the Local State
by M. GOTTDIENER,
University of California, Riverside

"With this book, M. Gottdiener continues his development as one of the most incisive and original interpreters of the urban and metropolitan scene. Gottdiener provides researchers and students of the city with an important contemporary analysis of the local state and urban politics. His treatments of the content and the decline of local politics will be of wide interest, well beyond the confines of the urban field."

-Ira Katznelson, The Graduate Faculty, New School for Social Research

"His book brings social theory into the study of urban politics, brilliantly chronicling the decline of political culture and local democracy."

-Dennis Judd, Center for Metropolitan Studies, University of Missouri, St. Louis

Gottdiener's contribution comes at two different levels. On one hand, this book is a cogent examination of the decline and death of political culture and power at the metropolitan level. On a more theoretical level, it is a critique of many of the reigning theoretical paradigms of political science - public choice theory, neo-Marxism, the "new" political economy, new Weberianism - showing their inadequacies in explaining this transformation of urban politics. Also evaluated in this conceptually important monograph are current theories of the state, with a special emphasis on the local state. Gottdiener's conclusions force us to reevaluate both our conventional understanding of the workings of local political processes and our views on political theory itself. The book should be of interest to professionals and students of urban studies, political science, urban sociology, and public administration.

"The study of the city is once again emerging as a respected intellectual enterprise. Gottdiener's book is an important contribution to—and result of—this development. He eloquently documents how cities are part of a seamless web of economic and social relationships."

-Dennis Judd, University of Missouri, St. Louis

Group conflict is one of the most pressing issues facing society today. This volume analyzes conflicts between ethnic groups in order to understand the fundamental issues surrounding conflict, using a theoretical and conceptual basis that is applicable to analyzing all levels of conflict, including intrapower and superpower rivalry and violence.

The contributors identify themes common to all forms of interethnic conflict, and discuss various models of conflict. They identify factors that predict such conflicts, provide a theoretical framework which identifies crucial variables in interethnic disputes, and hypothesize the consequences of manipulating these variables. They examine the critical variables in a cross section of group conflicts, and then consider political, economic, and social solutions which decrease the probability of such conflicts. Scholars and students in political science, ethnic studies, sociology, and anthropology will find this approach gives them unique insights into the problems and processes of group conflict.

ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING AND POLITICAL RESPONSE
edited by ROBERT A. BEAUREGARD, Rutgers University

In Economic Restructuring and Political Response, Beauregard brings together distinguished contributors from diverse disciplines to examine the nature of postwar economic restructuring in the United States and the political response to these transformations. This innovative volume incorporates a temporal as well as spatial perspective, taking a broad look across and within neighborhoods, communities, and regions.

The first set of essays are devoted to contemporary economic restructuring, addressing such issues as economic restructuring as either a continuation of long-term trends or a disjuncture in capitalism, and economic restructuring's impact on the Pittsburgh and New York City areas. The second section focuses on the political response to economic restructuring, particularly how local regional upheaval contributes to a region's political temperament and action. Specific cases studied include Philadelphia and Chicago. Finally, Robert A. Beauregard concludes this volume with a theoretical analysis of economic restructuring and the means by which it has shaped political response. Although it would appear that economic restructuring would encourage political action, this is found not always to be the case.

PLANNING LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE

by EDWARD J. BLAKELY, University of California, Berkeley

Blakely covers both the conceptual and specific program issues of local economic development— unlike most other texts or guides on national industrial policy. Planning Local Economic Development: Theory and Practice clearly and concisely outlines the planning processes, analytical techniques, institutional approaches, and selection strategies in improving local economic development. An experienced professor and active practitioner of city and regional planning, Blakely back up conceptual issues with case studies offering practical guidance. This is the first complete analysis of the forces at work at the local level, and of approaches local leaders can take to improve the economic and employment base of their locales.

Sage Library of Social Research, Volume 168

1988 (Autumn) / 320 pages (tent.) / $35.00 (c) / $16.95 (p)
OF SPECIAL INTEREST

**URBAN ETHNICITY IN THE UNITED STATES**

*New Immigrants and Old Minorities*

*edited by LIONEL MALDONADO, University of Wisconsin—Parkside*
*& JOAN MOORE, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee*

Published in cooperation with the Urban Research Center, University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee

Hundreds of thousands of non-Europeans have settled in the United States since immigration laws changed in the mid-1960s. The contributors to this collection point out that neither urban specialists nor the general public have fully recognized the effects of this immigration on the American city. How do the newcomers differ from the older minorities? Are metropolitan areas more divided as a result of this influx? How have different sectors—education, health, criminal justice, and so on—responded to the more diverse ethnicity of the inner cities? The authors provide detailed answers to these and many more questions about the new immigrants.

This collection contains two parts. Part I gives basic historical and demographic analyses: a review of past efforts to reform the immigration system; a profile of the post-1965 immigrants; a critical assessment of existing data and research on new immigrants. Part II examines specific institutional responses to current problems: race, color, and language diversity in the schools; ethnic divisions of the urban labor market; political economy of ethnic crime; and new demands on the social welfare and mental health system.

Complete with an extensive, up-to-date bibliography, *Urban Ethnicity in the United States* is a useful reference work for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers in urban and minority affairs, education, health and social services, and other fields affected by recent immigration.

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THE HOMELESS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
edited by RICHARD D. BINGHAM, ROY E. GREEN & SAMMIS B. WHITE,
all at University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee

To emphasize the problems of the homeless, the United Nations designated 1987 as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless. Many of today's homeless are young and well-educated, unlike those of the past. This collection addresses these "new" homeless in two parts: (1) Understanding Homelessness, which describes the "new" homeless with historical context, and (2) Program and Policy Options, a discussion of the role of government and various other institutions in alleviating the condition of homelessness.

"A powerful and important contribution to the growing body of knowledge concerning the homeless in America. The text provides a comprehensive, in-depth analysis of the dimensions of homelessness and an assessment of programs intended to confront this problem. It will prove to be a valuable resource to policy analysts, practitioners, and scholars seeking to design and implement socially responsible programs and policies to alleviate homelessness in contemporary society."

—Earl R. Jones, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

"The persistence of poverty in America is sapping our collective strength and self-esteem. One face of that poverty is homelessness, and it is a monstrous face. Bingham, Green, and White have described homelessness as it touches every sector of society. Wide-ranging, their analysis moves from the international scale to the individual instance, from official rhetoric to street-level experience. The contributors vary as much as the subject matter: they are policymakers, social scientists, planners, and activists. . . . The Homeless in Contemporary Society will command attention and increase understanding. More important, it will help us move from shame to responsible action."

—Paul L. Neimanick, University of California, Santa Cruz

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