Reform and Reaction: The Political Economy of Education in Kentucky.

Kentucky has a long history of educational problems and of reform efforts that failed because of state neglect. These problems, which deeply affect rural economic development and are closely tied to patterns of unequal development, have become more troublesome as world markets have changed. The roots of these problems are planted in the state's sociocultural history of rural values and attitudes, the attendant political economy based on low-skill jobs, and rural and urban class structures that reinforce social inequality. Middle-class farmers and capitalists involved in extractive industries and textiles traditionally have seen little value in worker education and have resisted tax increases for education. This paper examines the 1990 Kentucky legislative session, passage of the Kentucky Educational Reform Act of 1990, and subsequent political developments related to educational finance issues. The education reform package, which was mandated by the state Supreme Court, passed by a solid majority but still faces considerable opposition from a predominantly rural class-based group. However, this powerful group may be losing ground as Kentucky state government becomes more responsive to capital from Japanese manufacturers now locating in the state. This paper provides 61 references, the major provisions of the reform package, and tables and maps describing Kentucky's educational and socioeconomic characteristics, per-pupil revenues, and legislators' votes on the reform bill by party and occupation. (Author/SV)
Reform and Reaction: The Political Economy of Education in Kentucky

By Timothy Collins
Department of Sociology
College of Agriculture
University of Kentucky

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ABSTRACT

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Problems with educating Kentucky's children date back to the early 1800s, and there is a long history of reform efforts that have failed because of state neglect. These problems -- which deeply affect rural economic development and are closely tied to patterns of unequal development -- have become more troublesome as world markets have changed. The roots of these problems are planted in the state's sociocultural history of rural values, attitudes, and beliefs and the attendant political economy based on low-skill jobs. They are complicated by an increasingly fractured capitalist class structure, which traditionally has revolved around rural industries such as agriculture, horses, whiskey, timber, coal, and apparel manufacturing. These rural and urban economic elites historically have been able to bolster social inequality through state education policy. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 1990 legislative session to show that the court-mandated education reform package that passed by a solid majority still faces considerable opposition from a predominantly rural class group. The group, which has lost considerable strength, but is still a powerful force, faces tremendous pressure as Kentucky state government becomes more responsive to capital from Japanese manufacturers now locating in the state.
Introduction

The clarion call for education reform in the United States, heard most recently in the 1980s, is not a new phenomenon. With the industrial revolution and the evolution of capitalism over the years, schools have become more crucial in efforts to secure a skilled, motivated, and, at least, somewhat controllable, workforce.

There are numerous threads of educational philosophy in the United States. Nasaw (1981) lists two, traditional and vocational. DeYoung (1989) lists four philosophies visible in the U.S. by the early nineteenth century: instruction in Protestant morality, education in democracy, liberal arts, and even specialized professional training. Washburn (1930) also lists two philosophies: One is the force for child-centered education, also called progressive, which reached its peak before World War II. Under this philosophy, children are helped to pick subjects of interest so they can develop capacities for satisfactory living in society (Smith, 1948). Washburn's (1930) other philosophical thread is a conservative, society-centered education, designed to make education "relevant" and useful for children in their adult lives; here, the emphasis is on common understandings and specialized skills considered requisite for social solidarity and security (Smith, 1948).

Each of the above philosophies has varied in importance over time, but as DeYoung (1989), demonstrates, no matter which has been ascendant, the emphasis of schooling has become more closely
tied to economic development. Over time, education has tended toward being conservative, society-centered and vocational, geared toward providing workers for the labor market.

This situation has posed a particularly thorny problem for many nonmetropolitan areas. As Mingione (1981) points out, uneven economic and political development has put these areas at an increasing disadvantage as they have become more and more marginalized. Nonmetropolitan areas face numerous problems as they attempt to educate their children: 1) They do not have the concentration of wealth that metropolitan areas have. 2) Property taxes, which have tended to be the basis of school funding, cannot generate enough money in rural areas to compete with urban schools. 3) Because enrollments often may be lower and because of low population densities, costs of operating nonmetropolitan school systems are higher per pupil in the classroom and in terms of transportation. 4) Nonmetropolitan areas often do not have control of the their wealth, especially in areas of natural resource extraction tied to major corporations. 5) The rural labor force generally has lower skills; there is a lack of diversified educational and employment opportunities, especially in skilled services, high technology, and professional positions, among others. 6) There is a longstanding tradition of lower educational levels in nonmetropolitan areas; in many places, there has been suspicion of education.

While some states have a long tradition of meeting rural
educational needs, others, especially in the South, and Kentucky in particular, have a long heritage of neglecting education. The sociocultural histories of these states include certain values and beliefs and economic and political structures that have mitigated against human development. Such states have struggled to maintain poor education systems, much less develop schools capable of meeting the demands of a complex world system. Increasing class fragmentation caused by growing contradictions of modern capitalism (Mingione, 1981) has made the position of the government even more difficult; capitalist struggles to maintain hegemony through the state apparatus are subject to constant challenges, not only from the petty bourgeoisie and workers, but also from capitalists with conflicting labor needs.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Kentucky Educational Reform Act (House Bill 940) of 1990 to show that the court-mandated education reform package, while solidly in place, still faces considerable opposition from a class-based rural-urban coalition that has helped build a culture and economic structures biased against education (Collins, forthcoming). The paper will illustrate how a fractured rural class structure based in traditional extractive activities of agriculture and mining continues to persist because of its alliance with low-skill rural and urban capitalist industries. Nonetheless, the group has lost considerable strength, mainly because of the rapid influx of chiefly foreign capital in the wake of Toyota's 1985 decision to build its U.S. assembly plant in Central Kentucky near Lexington.
The influx of Japanese industrial capital, coupled with the inflow of certain kinds domestic industrial capital since the late 1950s, has played a key role in altering economic and political power in the state and has challenged the predominant culture that has given education a low priority. The 1989 Kentucky Supreme Court ruling ordering a total overhaul of the public school system and passage of a massive school reform bill in the 1990 General Assembly are signs that Kentucky's political economy may be changing.

Industrial Development and Education

The Commonwealth of Kentucky is rife with contradictions. Its location as a border state places it at the fringes of the "rust belt" of the North and the historically underdeveloped South. Even before the Toycta announcement, decline and change in the traditional industries of coal, timber, whiskey, horses, tobacco and textiles had fractured the class structure, the labor force, and political processes.

Since the late 1940s, Kentucky has acted aggressively to attract new industries, while at the same time having to adapt its policies to a poorly educated labor force. More than half of its industrial jobs may be considered "obsolete" (Lynch, 1990). The state government has scrambled to deal with all of the changes and conflicts over the years, developing policies to assist capital accumulation, while at the same time trying to maintain its image as an impartial arbiter of growing conflicts between and among metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas.
Meanwhile, deeply entrenched poverty persists in the midst of vast reserves of coal, timber, and farm land. Migracion continues from the rich agricultural belt and from the mountains. Poverty lingers among residents of industrial cities. Even in the so-called "good times" of the 1980s, there seems to have been a growing polarization between the rich and poor across the state, where just under half of the population can still be considered rural (Collins, 1987).

High illiteracy and school dropout rates are embedded in the state's sociocultural milieu, which remains closely tied to a rural economy based on extractive capital. But industrial, financial, and service capital have penetrated the extactive economy and have created conflicts and pressure which state government has tried to mediate, especially in the area of education. The list of Kentucky's contradictions appears almost endless and often has been framed in a context of failure of the educational system.

Difficulties with educating Kentucky's children date back to the early days of the Commonwealth, and there is a long history of failed reform efforts (Clark, 1977, 1990; Tapp and Klotter, 1977). In reality, the problems of an undereducated labor force are linked to historic patterns of uneven economic development, conflict within and among classes, and an accepted political and economic order that historically has limited development of human potential for certain segments of society.

The roots of Kentucky's educational problems are planted in
the state's sociocultural history of values, attitudes, and beliefs which, at best, have minimized the importance of education. They also are planted in rural and urban class structures which reinforce social inequality. Members of this self-interested local and state elite dominated by petty bourgeoisie (middle class) farmers and some bourgeois capitalists involved in extractive industries and textiles traditionally have seen little, if any, value in worker education. There is evidence to suggest that they have often resisted economic development which might raise wages and have been unwilling to raise taxes to pay for public schools (Collins, forthcoming; Tapp and Klotter, 1977). In addition, geography has made it difficult to go to school, especially in Appalachia.

Kentucky's educational troubles have increased with advancing technologies, restructuring of world markets, and the rising competition for jobs among states. In the 1980s, Kentucky, like most other states, grappled with educational reform. The state, which has ranked near the bottom of the nation in education for most of the century, found itself in crisis, and yet, was able to attract one of the biggest plums of "smokestack chasing," the $1.1-billion Toyota auto assembly plant that would employ up to 3,500 workers.

Conditions for Initiating Education Reform

Nationally

During the 1980s, education received a tremendous amount of attention, facing its heaviest barrage of criticism since the
1957 Sputnik launching. Instead of the Cold War threat, this time the specter was foreign competition. Spring (1985) outlines three distinct camps in the national debate: One, made up of public school critics, moral reformers, and the Christian school movement, published President Reagan's agenda for education, "A Nation at Risk" (1983). The second group, the Task Force on Education for Economic Growth, included 12 governors, three state legislators, one representative of organized labor, six educators, four leaders of various organizations, and fourteen business leaders. Its report, "Action for Excellence" (Education Commission of the States, 1983), clearly represented development interests of state governments. The third group, sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation, had 23 members, 16 of whom were university faculty; the remaining six were associated with school systems, foundations, and educational research organizations. Its report, "High School" (Boyer, 1983), represented education interests.

Taken together, all three reports articulate educational philosophies described in the introduction. The Reagan and governors' reports come down clearly on the side of education for economic development. The Carnegie Foundation report (Boyer, 1983) criticizes those who make schools into a scapegoat for economic problems and argues for educational concerns other than economic development. Altbach (1985) says the 1980s reform movement was conservative, but there was a clear agreement by both camps that the school problem was serious.
In Kentucky

Compared with other states, Kentucky's educational system has not fared at all well during the twentieth century. Table 1 shows the status of the Commonwealth's educational and socioeconomic characteristics before passage of House Bill 940, the Kentucky Educational Reform Act of 1990. The state had the worst illiteracy rate and ranked near the bottom in all educational categories. Federal aid to education was highest. Socioeconomic conditions were no better, with high unemployment, low per-capita income, and many other problems (Sexton, 1989).

Kentucky is a diverse state, to put it mildly. Just under half of the population is rural, making it one of the most rural states in the nation. In simplified terms, there are essentially three parts to the Commonwealth a) the Appalachian section, 49 eastern Kentucky counties designated by the Appalachian Regional Commission in the mid 1960s; b) non-metropolitan, non-Appalachian counties; c) Metropolitan Statistical Areas.

The Appalachian area is noted for its entrenched poverty, with lack of employment opportunities, an underskilled labor force, and historical and cultural factors that have stifled economic, political, and social development (Tickamyer and Tickamyer, 1987). There have been few new industrial plants located within the region. In contrast, most new plants have located in metropolitan and other rural areas (Collins, 1987).

As Figure 1 shows, the Appalachian region lagged behind the rest of the state in per-capita income in 1987. Only one county,
Boyd, in a metropolitan area in Northeastern Kentucky, was in the top income category. Outside of the mountain region, there were no low-income counties in metropolitan areas, and per-capita income in non-Appalachian rural counties tended to be higher.

As might be expected, poverty and low educational levels went hand in hand. Figure 2 shows standardized test scores by county statewide in 1989, the year before the Education Reform Act was passed. Scores for 57 independent school districts are not included. Nonetheless, there is a striking difference between the Appalachian counties and the rest of the state; almost all mountain counties were in the bottom half of test scores. Rural counties in Central and Western Kentucky tended toward the middle, with some in the upper categories, while metropolitan counties tended to do best.

Figure 3 shows the percentage of adults with twelve years or more of education in 1980 by counties, according to U.S. Census figures (Skiles and Swanson 1989). Almost two-thirds of the 49 Appalachian counties had fewer than 38 percent of their adults with more than twelve years of education. Only five counties were in the top category. By contrast, every metropolitan county, except one in Eastern Kentucky, had the highest education levels. Among rural counties, educational levels tended to be lower, but were much higher than those of the mountains.

Given these statewide problems and the national climate for education reform during the mid 1980s, there was growing agreement among Kentucky's leaders that the state had nowhere
near the educational levels needed to face increasing competition for jobs at the national and international levels. Pressure for education reform was growing across the country, and Kentucky's leaders did not want to be left behind.

At least four events in the 1980s signaled the likelihood of major changes in Kentucky's long-standing political economy of education: 1) an unsuccessful effort of the Martha Layne Collins Administration to reform the education system during the 1984 regular legislative session and passage of a reform effort during a 1985 special session; 2) filing of a court suit after the 1985 legislative session by 66 county and independent school districts -- some from metropolitan areas, but mostly nonmetropolitan -- suing the Commonwealth over funding inequities (Figure 4); 3) announcement of the Toyota automobile assembly plant in Scott County, north of Lexington, in December, 1985; 4) the state Supreme Court decision of June, 1989, which ruled the entire Kentucky Public School system unconstitutional.

Collins Administration school reform efforts were limited. The first effort of 1984, which failed to get out of the legislature, was generally considered a hodgepodge (Noe, 1990). The second effort did try to increase funding, raise academic standards, and provide for "academic bankruptcy" to allow the state to take over school districts that were not up to snuff. There was little effort to redress overall funding inequities, and this may have played some role in the decision of the 66 school districts to sue the state.
The Kentucky Supreme Court decision to toss out the school system launched a reform effort aimed at an educational system long pockmarked by abuses and outright corruption. The Lexington Herald-Leader (1990b) documented major abuses in its series, "Cheating Our Children." These included:

1) Underassessment and failure to assess property for school taxes.

Tax assessors, called property valuation administrators (PVAs), had given tax breaks to friends, politicians, including the governor, and businesses. PVAs also had avoided doing property reassessments. These actions helped buy votes, since PVAs are elected in Kentucky. Abuses apparently were worst in Eastern Kentucky, although they had been common statewide. Other reasons given for underassessments included lack of resources in tax collection offices, low pay for assessors, and lack of professionalism. Perhaps most important, the state failed to exercise control over PVAs, even though it knew of abuses.

2) Tax avoidance.

This included outright falsification of deeds when property was sold, failure to file a deed (not required in Kentucky), and not reporting property improvements.

3) Child tax collectors.

Children raised $68 million statewide in 1987-88 for schools through fund-raising projects. In one Eastern Kentucky county, children raised $1.7 million through sales of candy, cards, and other items during the 1986-87 school year. In 1987-88, these sales yielded $200,000 more than property taxes. In October, 1989, the county reduced property taxes. In most counties, proceeds paid for extras, such as class trips, but often have paid for essentials in poor counties.

4) Failure to collect delinquent taxes.

Local county attorneys and sheriffs, who also must face election, had failed to collect delinquent taxes. Figure 5 shows property tax delinquency rates in Kentucky counties during 1989. The state considers a 5-percent rate a problem. Most problem counties were in the Appalachian region.

5) Anti-tax tradition.

The property tax system has been central to funding schools,
and has met resistance at all levels, individuals, government agencies, farmers, mining firms, and businesses. Anti-tax sentiment dates from earliest days of the state.

There also was a perception that the education system was adequate and another that school boards are corrupt, with nepotism, patronage, waste, and mismanagement. Many poor counties had refused to collect their full share of taxes because of political pressure on elected tax assessors. This created tension between rich and poor counties, because the state had tried to equalize education by increasing funding for counties with weak local tax efforts.

6) Politics within school systems.

School board control has stifled opposition from employees, teachers, parents, and school superintendents. The power of school boards has been tied in with county courthouses through the funding mechanisms and personal relationships. In addition, many have questioned the motives of school board members, saying they are in it for the power, not for the education of children.

7) Nepotism and political patronage.

School board hiring of relatives had been common, especially in rural counties. Because school boards often are the largest employer in these counties, they have tremendous power, especially in poor counties. Some boards have padded payrolls with extra workers in order to gain votes.

There was one other major factor in education reform that intervened between the filing of the school suit by the 66 school districts and the Supreme Court education decision. The Collins Administration announcement of the Toyota automobile assembly plant near Lexington in December, 1985, marked the beginning of a new phase of large-scale foreign industrial investment in the state. In the wake of the Toyota plant, more than 60 firms, chiefly Japanese, have announced plans to build Kentucky plants for automotive-related products, ranging from radios to brake assemblies. The new employers have tended to demand better-educated workers than before.
The competition to attract Toyota was fierce; Kentucky was one of at least 20 states to negotiate for the plant. Part of the $250-million enticement included state-funded education and training of all potential and actual plant workers. In order to even apply, workers needed either a high school diploma or its equivalent. The state helped workers obtain their General Educational Development (GED) certificates before they entered the hiring pool. There was a large increase in GED certificates issued in the years immediately after the Toyota announcement, following a decline in the first half of the decade (Table 2). In addition, the state footed the bill for first-time job training required at the factory.

The Toyota announcement came near the end of the Collins Administration, and offered grist for candidates in the 1987 gubernatorial primary. Many questioned whether such a large expenditure in one place would pay off. The ultimate winner of that campaign was conservative Democrat Wallace Wilkinson, who emerged as victor when two other candidates from central Kentucky split the statewide party vote. Wilkinson, a rural Casey County native who never finished college and ran as an outsider, emphasized his stature as a self-made millionaire in the general election. In fact, he had built strong ties to the conservative, rural elite and the urban business community through his dealings in textbooks and real estate.

Wilkinson campaigned on a platform of no new taxes, jobs for rural areas, and establishment of a state lottery, ostensibly to
He gave the Toyota package mixed reviews and had little or nothing to offer education, except insisting that public schools could be restructured at a price tag of $70 million (Bishop, 1990).

In his first budget, he did not follow through on Collins Administration plans for increased educational funding, passed in the 1985 special legislative session. This action probably spurred revival of the 1985 school suit that had languished in the court system for more than two years and ultimately resulted in the 1989 Supreme Court decision (Noe, 1990).

Nor can there be much doubt about the connection between the arrival of foreign industrial capital and the court's ruling. Toyota, which initially announced it would employ more than 3,000 workers, required employees to have a high school diploma or its equivalent. The state agreed to pick up the tab for screening and training prospective workers. After the high court decision, Toyota was represented on the governor's task force developing the education reform package for the legislature.

Launching the Reform

Given Kentucky's long history of problems, the national climate, and the state's own changing political economy, it would appear that Kentucky's government had to act in order to become more competitive. In fact, the high court decision went far beyond a lower court ruling in the reform suit and declared the Commonwealth's entire educational system unconstitutional. Citing testimony of many witnesses regarding poor conditions
in schools, the court said the system was not efficient, as required by the Kentucky Constitution. Educational efforts were subject to huge geographic disparities despite legislative efforts to correct the problems. The court ruled that the education system discriminated against 80 percent of the Commonwealth's children.

The high court also pointed to the inadequacy of the Commonwealth's funding mechanisms, which it called a "jigsaw puzzle" (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1989:5). The Minimum Foundation Program, established in the mid 1950s, was never designed to equalize funding, according to the court [although statements by the Kentucky Department of Education at the time said it was (Collins, forthcoming)], and the Power Equalization Program, established in 1978, was underfunded. The local option taxes on occupations, utilities, and for building projects also created problems. The court noted that even if optional taxes were fully implemented, the tax effort would still be inadequate because of variations in population among school districts. In fact, the court ruled such taxes promoted inequality.

The high court defined efficiency to mean that the Kentucky Legislature has sole responsibility for creating and maintaining the public school system so there is "no waste, no duplication, no mismanagement, at any level." (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1989:6) It must provide adequate funding. There must be substantial uniformity across the state, and each child must have equal access to educational opportunities.
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court ruling that there were at least seven goals for an efficient school system: (i) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and (vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in surrounding states, in academics or in the job market. (Kentucky Supreme Court, 1989:6)

After the decision, Wilkinson established an educational task force to study the court's decision, examine alternatives, and develop an educational reform package to be presented to the state legislature for approval during the 1990 session. From the beginning the process came under fire for a number of reasons: First, the original task force had no blacks and few women; one black member was hastily appointed after vocal complaints. Second, with the exception of Education Committee chairs Sen. Nelson Allen and State Sen. Roger Noe, other Education Committee members were left off the original task force; some were later appointed as ex officio members. Third, the task force held numerous secret meetings. There was limited public input at crucial junctures of developing...
plan. This tradition of closed-door meetings was carried into the General Assembly as legislative leaders and the governor bargained to keep the package together and to gain votes for its passage.

Reform and Reaction: The Legislature

In March, 1990, the Kentucky General Assembly passed a $1.3-billion legislative package designed to address concerns of the Kentucky Supreme Court. House Bill 940 redesigned procedures for school governance and curriculum and developed a system of school financing to encourage more local effort and more equitably distribute funds among the counties. The goal was to increase both educational equality and achievement.

Wilkinson maintained a confrontational style during much of the legislative session. His popularity soared among members of the legislature and the media when he finally put his full weight behind educational reform and helped assemble a tax package that would adequately finance it. Although legislative leaders modified the Wilkinson tax plan by increasing the general sales tax, rather than increasing taxes on cigarettes and imposing a sales tax on services, the governor grudgingly agreed and continued to push for the reform.

Table 3 outlines the tax compromise, which essentially shifted the tax burden to a more regressive sales tax, away from a proposed sales tax on services, the growth area of the state's economy. Wilkinson had argued that the service tax would fall more heavily on those with higher incomes, but faced a coalition
of advertising, communications, temporary services, and lawyers' associations opposed to the plan. (Carlton, 1990). In addition, cigarette interests won out when taxes were kept at three cents a pack instead of being increased to ten cents. In 1990, Kentucky had the third lowest cigarette taxes in the country, with only one of its bordering states, Virginia, charging a lower rate (Pack, 1990). That revenue had been declining along with the number of smokers.

The service tax was in trouble from the start for a variety of reasons, including: powerful professional lobbyists, such as lawyers and engineers; the much publicized failure of Florida's 1987 service tax; traditionally, services have not been taxed, and critics worried about enforcement; the effect of the tax on interstate competition of firms which might drive mobile service firms out of the state or cause companies to contract with businesses outside the state; and its effect on small businesses that could not afford accountants (Carlton, 1990).

In return for compromising on the service tax, the governor got legislative leaders to push for his task force's education package, and, of crucial importance, a $600-million bond package, of which $500 million was to go for roads and $100 million for economic development (Geiger and Stroud, 1990).

The education reform and tax package was not introduced until late in the legislative session. The bill itself was about 900 pages long, weighed more than nine pounds, and was drafted over a long weekend. Many legislators complained they did not
have time to read and understand what they were voting for. At various times, legislative leaders, while exhorting passage, admitted even they did not know exactly what would result during implementation over the next five years, but urged legislators to pass the bill and let it work on the premise that changes could be made later.

The bill's opponents claimed that up to half of the $1.3-billion revenue package was "pork barrel," designed to reward supporters. Backers admitted there were incentives, but said more than 90 percent of the bill's funds would be used for education. Much of the so-called "pork barrel" was to pay for one-time projects, such as prison beds, increased funding for human and other state services, higher education building projects, and salary increases (Geiger and Stroud, 1990). Supporters argued that the tax package was designed to fit future education needs over the five-year phase-in period. According to Sexton (1991), schools were to receive about $950 million over the first two years, about 73 percent of the total tax package. In any event, several legislators who voted against the bill were punished by having "pork barrel" projects in their districts withdrawn (Stroud, 1990a; Brammer, 1990; Langfitt, 1990).

Legislative leaders resorted to high-pressure tactics from the beginning in order to push the package through the House Education Committee, where House Speaker Donald Blandford made an impassioned "pep talk," and numerous amendments were left hanging without being considered. It was a tense struggle. In the vote
of the full House, opponents nearly derailed the bill in a hectic session where 39 amendments were tacked on. The bill passed by a 58-42 vote and clearly illustrated rural and urban alliances and splits, as shown in Figure 6.

Many urban legislators, including more than half of the Jefferson County delegation, a few from Lexington, and others from northern Kentucky, voted against the bill. There also were strong pockets of resistance from some Appalachian areas already targeted as severely deficient in education and several counties in West Central Kentucky. Support was strong in rural western Kentucky and in the Bluegrass region, which includes Lexington. Representatives from about a third of the Appalachian counties backed the reform. With a few exceptions, Republicans tended to vote against the measure in both houses of the Legislature.

Legislators from wealthier areas believed their districts would be penalized for having already increased their education taxes to relatively high levels. In compliance with the Supreme Court ruling, the legislation effectively capped the ability of the wealthiest districts to increase funding beyond certain levels. Some legislators expressed dismay that tax dollars would flow out of their areas and into rural regions.

Many rural legislators complained that their constituents could not afford the large property tax increases required to obtain additional state education funding. They also said anti-nepotism provisions would gut rural leadership because spouses of supervisors would be unable to serve in the same district.
Analysis of the House vote by occupation (Table 4) gives a glimpse at the depth of class conflict in the Commonwealth. Much impetus for reform came from legislators who identified themselves as professionals, such as lawyers and doctors who actually are members of the petty bourgeoisie. There was additional middle-class support from legislators who hold jobs in local businesses and education. But this class group was by no means unified. The even split among farmers becomes even more interesting when Farm Bureau membership is considered. Four of the five legislators listing Farm Bureau membership voted for the reform package, while four of the five who did not list Farm Bureau membership voted against it. The local service sector of bankers, real estate agents, and auctioneers, most of whom also are members of the petty bourgeoisie, was evenly split.

Opposition also came from those who identified themselves as workers, mostly with ties to labor unions. This is a difficult anomaly to explain. It could well be that workers believed their taxes were too heavy already. Or, there may have been individual factors related to the May, 1990, primary. Or, it could reflect anti-education sentiment among workers' representatives.

Managers, who generally identify with the bourgeoisie, were also opposed. While there was substantial support from the restaurant sector, the Chamber of Commerce, and major companies such as IBM, General Electric and Ashland Oil, coal companies and auto manufacturers General Motors and Ford apparently were silent on the issue (Noe, 1990; Warren, 1990). The Chamber of Commerce
made education its top priority for the 1990 legislative session (Bray, 1989), saying that better education would improve the state's business climate (Poole, 1989). In some cases, the chamber also worked with educators at the county level (Mueller, 1989). In addition, the legislation had the support of statewide groups such as the Prichard Committee on Academic Excellence, which worked throughout for years to upgrade education.

The Reform Package

Table 5 details the workings of House Bill 940. It covers all aspects of Kentucky's educational system, as mandated by the Kentucky Supreme Court. Much of the reform is geared toward increasing state control of educational funding; increasing pressure on localities to raise funding; and changing the nature of local participation with school site management, while decreasing local school board control. The program has a definite aim of making students better workers, with emphasis on basic skills and computer literacy, all suggestions of national reform proposals of the 1980s.

In order to build legitimacy, the legislature tried to balance increased state funding and administrative control with local school-based management, in part to lessen the power of school boards. By July, 1991, just over a year after passage of the reform, more than 300 Kentucky schools, about one-fourth of the overall total, had established local school councils (Sexton, 1991). All schools were to have councils by July 1, 1996. The councils determine the nature of each school's operations,
according to local needs. Nonetheless, students must meet academic standards designed chiefly to make children into competent workers. This was a fundamental assumption of the legislation and a predominant theme in legislative hearings.

Although no one was exactly sure how increased funding would compare with other states, most testimony seemed to indicate Kentucky would move to about the middle of the funding ladder (Geiger, 1990b). Considering the state's dismal funding record in the past century, this is a substantial rise.

Another effect of the legislation has been to considerably narrow the funding gap among school districts (Carlton and Stroud, 1990). As Figure 7 shows, part of this goal was reached for county districts. The map clearly shows that metropolitan county districts did not gain nearly as much as nonmetropolitan counties. Overall, funding statewide climbed substantially, and 150 of the 176 school districts received between $3,000 and $3,500 per student.

But problems remain. The top independent district, Anchorage, Jefferson County, had a projected per-pupil expenditure of $5,185 for the 1990-1991 school year, nearly double Science Hill, Somerset County, the bottom independent district with per pupil spending of $2,777. Anchorage increased $130 from the previous year, compared with $540 for Science Hill. Among county districts, Fayette County was at the top, with $4,310, up $439. Muhlenberg County, a coal and agriculture county in Western Kentucky, was at the bottom at $2,812, up $447.
There was still a difference of almost 33 percent in per-student funding between the top and bottom counties.

Hazard Mayor William D. Gorman (1990) blames a double standard of property tax assessment for the persistence of inequalities in the state. He notes that the counties being reassessed are rural, among the poorest, and have declining economies. He points out that many properties in the Golden Triangle are worth far more than their assessed values. The Herald-Leader (1990b) series, "Cheating Our Children" documents this contention. Gorman argues that, given the shape of rural county economies, the pattern of assessments is no more flawed than those in counties not targeted for reassessment.

The remaining inequalities have led the Council for Better Schools, which brought the original landmark suit, to consider going back to court for more money (Carlton, 1991). The group criticized lawmakers because they did not put enough money into a $20-million fund to reward districts for increasing taxes to the maximum level. The group also suggested the legislature should have required maximum tax increases. As it stood, 108 of the state's 176 districts went to the maximum level. House Budget Committee Chair Joe Clarke, D-Danville, estimated it would take at least $18 million more to fully fund the incentives (Stroud, 1990b).

Reform and Reaction: The Voters

Within months after the passage of House Bill 940, voters had their chance to tell legislators what they thought about the
reform package. The results of the May primary were mixed; a few legislators lost their seats, but not all had voted for the tax increase (Brammer and Miller, 1990). Only seven of 25 solons in contested races met defeat, five from the House and two from the Senate. Among them were two House Republicans from Eastern Kentucky and one House Democrat from Central Kentucky who backed the reforms. In addition, two Senate Democrats from Western Kentucky who had backed the reforms lost in the primaries.

There were some surprises in the 1990 general election, but anti-tax sentiment appeared somewhat muted (Miller and Brammer, 1990). Republicans gained four seats of 19 up for grabs in the Senate, defeating three prominent Democrats who favored the reforms, including: Sen. Nelson Allen, D-Greenup, in Eastern Kentucky, chair of the Senate Education Committee. Senate Republican whip Eugene Stuart of Prospect, near Louisville, also had backed the school reform package and was defeated.

In voting for 100 House races, Republicans gained four seats, bringing their total to 33 of 100. But as Miller and Brammer (1990) point out, there was no clear message about the reform. Both supporters and opponents of the reform package lost. Three of the six House incumbents who lost voted for the tax increase; the three were all from Appalachian Districts.

It is important to note, however, that changes in the Legislature resulting from defeats of incumbents who backed the reforms in both the May primary and the November general election meant the loss of at least seven House votes, four in the primary
and three in the general election. Given the 58-42 margin in the vote on House Bill 940, the losses suggest some fragility of the reformers' position.

Statewide, voters again received a chance to speak during the Democratic gubernatorial primary of 1991. The results of this election again illustrate some contradictions, but also suggest that pro-reform forces have triumphed for now. At the beginning of the campaign, there were four viable candidates and one longshot (Geiger, 1990a): Martha Wilkinson, wife of the incumbent governor, was a reform proponent. Dr. Floyd Poore, who had legally added "Dr." to his name, was a former ally of the Wilkinsons; he said the tax increase was way too much and wanted to repeal part of it. Brereton Jones, a West Virginia native and lieutenant governor, favored the reform and would not roll back taxes, but waffled by saying he would not approve any additional increases. Scotty Baesler, four-term Lexington mayor, was making his first attempt at a statewide office and supported the reform, saying he would seek additional revenue to keep it going if necessary. Gatewood Galbraith, a Lexington lawyer, ran a pro-hemp campaign and received only a small fraction of the votes.

Mrs. Wilkinson, whose campaign got off to an impressive financial start with the backing of numerous wealthy donors, fell by the wayside several weeks before the election when polls suggested she had a tremendously high negative rating. That left the three major contenders, Jones, Baesler, and Poore. Figure 8 shows the victors by county. Jones won the election,
characterized by a high turnout attributed to a constitutional amendment to protect churches from taxation (Hall and Stewart, 1990). Jones, who essentially backed the tax increase, took the Louisville area and most Appalachian counties, where there had been strong opposition to school reform. In addition, he took a smattering of counties across Southern and Western Kentucky. Baesler, a strong reform proponent, did well in the center of the state. Poore, who opposed the tax increase, ran well in his native Northern Kentucky and in the Western part of the state.

Interestingly enough, Jones and Baesler ran well in counties where legislators had voted against the reform in 1990 and had voted out legislators who had backed the reform. Poore, with his opposition to the tax increases, ran well in agricultural western Kentucky, whose farmers were facing increased property taxes. Legislators there had generally backed the education package.

The Republican governor's race also illustrated contradictions. The tax increase split the party, which has always been a small minority in the state. Republicans in the Legislature tended to balk at the reform, and several backers were voted out in the primary and general elections. But, as it turned out, Larry Hopkins, the U.S. congressional representative from the Lexington area and a somewhat warm reform supporter, defeated Larry Forgey, a Lexington lawyer who favored the reform, but opposed the magnitude of the tax increases.

While Jones, the Democratic nominee, was expected to win in November, Hopkins represented the strongest Republican candidate
in many years. Despite differences in the candidates -- Jones was perceived as more liberal, while Hopkins has a conservative voting record in Congress -- both backed the education reform package. It would appear Jones was more of a supporter, however.

Education really was not much of an issue in the fall campaign, which disintegrated into personal attacks by Hopkins on Jones's personal finances. Jones illustrated the dominance of the Democratic party, winning 65 percent of the vote, the largest margin ever for a Democratic candidate (Miller, 1991). Voter turnout was small, 44 percent of registered voters, or about 30 percent of adults eligible to vote (Pack, 1991).

Conclusion

The passage and signing of House Bill 940, the Kentucky Educational Reform Act, marks the continued demise of Kentucky's rural-urban coalition of petty bourgeoisie farmers and bourgeois extractive and industrial capitalists, especially textiles. This group, tied by the need for a low-skill labor force, has managed during much of the twentieth century to stifle major educational reform through control of both local county governments and the state government in Frankfort.

The persistence of such a coalition presents an interesting contradiction. The capitalist class and some members of the petty bourgeoisie may work in unison at times, but they also may be splintered over certain issues. The advent of foreign and domestic capital -- spurred by Toyota and coupled with the rise of service capital, especially restaurants -- seems to have
altered patterns of dominance that linked economic and political structures to cultural values concerning both education and industrial development.

The relatively narrow margin of approval for the legislation (historically) indicates the depth of resistance to revamping Kentucky's schools. In part, as Jewell and Miller (1988) note, the legislature became more independent in the 1980s; the tumultuous opposition the day House Bill 940 passed is indication of that. But both the voting pattern in the legislature and in the May, 1990, primary, indicate the presence of both class and geographical struggle that is shaping the government. The replacement of legislators who voted in favor of the reform could be read as a warning that certain areas and social classes of Kentucky were upset with the reform. The legislators voted out were mostly from Appalachian districts, the source of most resistance to House Bill 940, the location of some of the poorest schools in the state, low incomes, low skilled workers, and the strongest anti-education sentiment. Resistance in the agricultural sections of Western Kentucky was tied to increased property taxes. Nonetheless, these regions still helped put reform supporter Brereton Jones into the statehouse in the November, 1991, gubernatorial election.

While ties between education and economic development go back more than 100 years in the United States, they have been relatively weak in Kentucky. This does not mean that industrial development and education were not issues in the state. In fact,
there has been an almost continual battle to upgrade schools. But reforms have been slowed by the continued power of a class-based group that has put a low value on education because of its need for a low-skilled labor force and because the cost of education, based in property taxes, fell to heavily on the primary resource of production, land.

The 1990 reform, with its $1.3 billion earmarked for education through 1991, moves the state from near the bottom of the heap in education nationwide to somewhere near the middle, a more competitive position for attracting jobs. The package was designed to meet numerous goals outlined by the state Supreme Court. Two are extremely important: 1) more equalized funding across the school districts; 2) increasing the educational level and skills of children, especially in nonmetropolitan areas, which have lagged behind metropolitan areas.

Curiously, some of Kentucky's changes contradict the general thrust of the nationwide education "excellence" movement in the 1980s. Shor (1986), Spring (1985), Kirst (1984), and others note that educational equity was not on the Reagan agenda. Kentucky's educational reform is a mixed bag, blending equity, progressive education's care for students, liberal arts, vocational pursuits, and economic development with excellence.

Critical issues still face the state, issues with a long history that have defied solution. Some are structural problems, such as uneven development, manifested by inequities in employment markets, stubborn poverty, difficulties with property
evaluation, and continuing political power struggles over schools. Others are cultural, manifested by continuing anti-tax and anti-education sentiment or apathy. Because of years of powerful local school board control and low educational levels of residents of some areas, site-based management might be difficult to initiate. While the state has begun to clean house in some districts, there is still resistance on the part of boards, administrators, and teachers to the changes.

In addition, there have been arguments about how school districts used the new funds, and it will be difficult to do short- and long-term evaluation of the reform and its impacts. This is a long-run state project whose results may not be clear for a generation or more. There is tremendous risk, as well as opportunity (also see Goetz and Debertin, 1991).

If educational reform momentum is to continue, future governors and legislators must be committed not only to implementing the legislation as it is phased in, but also to making education a continuing funding priority in later years. At the same time, the state must deal with the multiplicity of structural and cultural problems that have plagued it for well over a century. It appears traditional forces within Kentucky have been weakened, but the state still faces numerous structural and political problems that will remain as obstacles. The success of the educational reform package is by no means guaranteed, but for pro-education forces, the picture is the brightest in years.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY


Collins, Timothy. 1987. "... Divided We Fall: A Comparison of Appalachian Kentucky and Statewide Industrial Development Patterns." Livingston, KY: Appalachia -- Science in the Public Interest.


TABLE 1: Educational and Socioeconomic Characteristics of Kentucky, Compared with Other States.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>RANK</th>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
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<td></td>
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<td>H.S. diplomas, adults</td>
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<td>College graduates</td>
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<td>Adult illiteracy</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>College attendance</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>Federal education funds</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>Teacher salaries</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>H.S. graduations</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>Education spending/pupil</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>Per-cap. spend., el./sec. educ.</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Child poverty (30%, 1980)</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Infant mortality</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>Women in labor force (1986)</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>Population in poverty</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>Welfare recipients</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Total teen pregnancies</td>
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<td>White teen pregnancies</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Unemployment (1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Per-capita income (1986)</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Poverty increase (1987)</td>
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<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Scientists and engineers</td>
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SOURCE: Sexton, 1989:1

TABLE 2: Number of General Educational Development Certificates Issued in Kentucky, 1980-1989.

<table>
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<th>NUMBER ISSUED</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>NUMBER ISSUED</th>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>13,551</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>9,665</td>
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<td>1981</td>
<td>13,257</td>
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<td>12,870</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>11,394</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>9,207</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>10,463</td>
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Figures may include out-of-state residents, estimated at between 1 and 2 percent of the total.

SOURCE: Kentucky Cabinet for Workforce Development, 1990
TABLE 3: Governor Williamson's Original Tax Proposal and Terms of Compromise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services set for taxes in original proposal:</th>
<th>Janitorial</th>
<th>Limousine/ taxi</th>
<th>Finance brokers</th>
<th>Temporary help</th>
<th>Towel and linen</th>
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<tr>
<td>Attorneys</td>
<td>Cable TV</td>
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<td>Advertising</td>
<td>Accounting/auditing</td>
<td>Architecture/surveying</td>
<td>Bill collecting</td>
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Services exempted in original proposal:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Haircuts</th>
<th>Parking</th>
<th>Lawn care</th>
<th>Security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repairs</td>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>Car washing</td>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Original Proposal

** ANNUAL REVENUE (million $)**

** Sales tax on services ** 118.6

** Increase cigarette tax from 3 cents to 10 cents a package ** 37.0

** TOTAL REVENUE ** 155.6

Compromise Tax Proposal

** Raise state sales tax from 5 percent to 6 percent: ** 210.0

* Conform state income tax to federal tax code: * 131.7

* Eliminate federal income tax deduction: * 218.9

* Hike corporate income tax by 1 percent: * 44.9

** TOTAL REVENUE ** 667.5

** Compromise replaced service and cigarette tax with increase in general sales tax. **

Revenue figures based on 1992 projections, when proposal fully implemented.

What Governor Got

* Passage of Task Force on Education Reform proposals largely intact.

* Legislative support for $600-million road bond issue.

* Legislative support for $100-million economic development bond issue.

* Adoption of Governor's budget plan.

### TABLE 4: Kentucky House of Representatives Vote on House Bill 940, by Occupation and Party, for First Vote and Vote to Concur with Senate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVERALL VOTE, BOTH TIMES</th>
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VOTES BY OCCUPATION
FIRST TIME/SECOND TIME (Where Changed)

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<th>MISCELLANEOUS (Includes Self Employed, Housewife, Civic Activist)</th>
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</table>
TABLE 5: Major Provisions of Kentucky's Education Reform Package, House Bill 940.

For the State

* Elected state superintendent of public instruction will become a token official to be replaced by an appointed commissioner of education with wide powers over state school system.

* The first commissioner will be selected by a committee appointed by the governor and legislative leaders. Later, the State Board for Elementary and Secondary Education will handle selection.

* The old Department of Education will be eliminated. The new commissioner will have power to fire everyone and completely restructure the department.

* The legislature will have extensive oversight through the new Office of Education Accountability.

* By the 1994-95 school year, the state will set up a rewards program for schools based on performance goals. In the interim, there will be a testing program.

* Testing will measure communications and mathematics skills and understanding of the sciences, arts and humanities, social sciences, and ability to solve problems. Students also must have an understanding of government and physical and mental well-being.

* The state will establish a model curriculum to guide local schools.

* Will establish 13-member Education Professional Standards Board whose members are appointed by the governor. Eight members will be teachers.

* The new Department of Education will set up a method for determining cash rewards for successful schools. The money will go directly to the schools, and staff members will decide how to spend it by majority vote.

* Will name at least five Kentucky Distinguished Educators to serve for a year. They will be sent to take over troubled schools and districts with broad powers to transfer personnel, hire, and fire.
**TABLE 5: Major Provisions of Kentucky's Education Reform Package, House Bill 940, Cont'd.**

### For Financing

- State sales tax increased from 5 percent to 6 percent.
- Districts required to raise taxes to equal property tax rate of 30 cents for every $100 of valuation. Sources included higher taxes on property on income, insurance, motor vehicles, and utilities. School boards could have been removed for missing deadline.
- Poor districts allowed to raise taxes even more to receive additional state matching funds. Increase not subject to a recall election.
- State income tax increase by conforming to federal income tax code and changing tax rates.

### For School Boards

- Current members ineligible for re-election if relative employed by school district, unless relative was hired before member joined board. No one with relative employed in school system allowed to run for board.
- Members cannot try to influence hiring of employees, except superintendent or school board attorney.
- Relatives of board members cannot be hired or promoted.
- Board appoints superintendents and sets employee wages.
- Can dismiss superintendent by a four-fifths vote and with approval of the state commissioner of education.
- Must set up appeals process for school council decisions. (See below.)
- Board candidates cannot accept contributions from school employees nor have them work on campaigns.
- Cannot accept contributions of more than $100 from individuals and $200 from a political action committee.
- Members can be removed by commissioner of education.
- District that fails to improve over four years will be declared an "educational development district." Local board members and the superintendent will be removed, and control given to a Kentucky Distinguished Educator.
TABLE 5: Major Provisions of Kentucky's Education Reform Package, House Bill 940, Cont'd.

For Schools

* Schools are expected to increase attendance rates and reduce dropout rates.

* Site-based management will be instituted in most school districts by 1996; only schools that excel can opt out. Decisions previously made in the state capital of Frankfort or at the school district's central office are to be made by the school council.

* Councils will be responsible for setting policy and will consist of two parents, three teachers, and the principal, who will be chair.

* Councils must establish advisory committees of teachers and administrators.

  - They determine curriculum and instructional material, assign staff time, and arrange school schedule.

* They will determine number of employees the school needs in each job classification. They cannot recommend transfers or dismissals. The council also has a say in hiring the principal, picking one of candidates recommended by school superintendent.

* They also consult with principal in filling vacancies recommended from list provided by the superintendent.

* The new system will rate schools on what is learned, instead of regulating teaching methods and other aspects of school operations.

* Each school competes only with itself. Tests and establishment of goals will help each school sets its own benchmark. It will be graded from year to year on how well it does against this benchmark.

* Schools that fail to improve two years in a row will be declared "in crisis." The staff will be put on probation and will be taken over by a Kentucky Distinguished Educator. The school will be eligible for special grants.

* Advanced technology, including computers, is to go into classrooms. Each classroom will have a telephone.
TABLE 5: Major Provisions of Kentucky's Education Reform Package, House Bill 940, Cont'd.

For Superintendents:

* Hired by school board for no more than four years at a time.

* Can be fired by Kentucky Distinguished Educator if school district not performing to standards.

* Can be dismissed by four-fifths vote of local school board and approval of commissioner of education, who must investigate.

* Appoint, promote and transfer principals, supervisors, teachers and other school employees until site-based management goes into effect at a school. (See below.)

* Provide local school councils with lists of people to fill vacancies.

* Recommend names for principals to local school councils.

* Must complete program at Superintendents Training Program and Assessment Center.

* Must notify commissioner of education of any vacancy 30 days before it is filled.

* As of July 1, 1991, no relative of superintendent may work for district unless hired before effective date of reform act.

* Cannot hire or promote relative of school board member.
TABLE 5: Major Provisions of Kentucky's Education Reform Package, House Bill 940, Cont'd.

For Principals

* Head local school councils, which must be in all schools by 1996.
* Fill vacancies, after consulting with school councils, from a list of applicants recommended by local superintendents.
* Selected by local school councils from names recommended by local superintendents.
* Carry out policies set by school councils.
* Must complete training at new Principal Assessment Center by July 1, 1994.
* No relative of principal to be employed in principal's school except non-spouses employed by the school in 1989-90 school year.
* Spouses can be employed in principal's school if no other position can be found in district for which he or she is certified.

For Teachers

* Prohibited from working in school board election campaigns.
* Will have more authority in the classroom, but students must demonstrate improvement.
* Those who succeed will be paid more; those who fail will face state intervention and possible loss of job, despite tenure.
* Will receive help from the state through organizations and grants to help learn the new system and expand their education.
* Eight of thirteen members of Education Professional Standards board will be teachers, making Kentucky one of few states where teachers control licensing.
TABLE 5: Major provisions of Kentucky's education reform package, House Bill 940, cont'd.

For Students

* Beginning with the 1990-91 school year, each school district became responsible for providing five-day-a-week, half-day preschool for underprivileged 4-year-olds. Some poor districts were allowed to delay implementation until 1992.

* Kindergarten through the third grade eventually will be merged into one grade level called the "primary school program." Children will stay in the program until they are ready for the fourth grade.

* The state will establish Family Resource Centers and Youth Centers near schools with more than 20 percent of students eligible for free lunches. All centers should be in place in five years.

* If school is taken over because of deficiencies, students may transfer to successful school, even if it means going to neighboring district.

SOURCE: Lexington Herald-Leader, 1990a
Figure 1: Per-capita Income for Kentucky Counties, 1987, by Quartiles.

Per-capita Income

- 5803-8982
- 8983-10625
- 10626-12098
- 12099-21148

+++++++ MSA Counties

SOURCE: Skees and Swanson, 1989.
Figure 2: County School District Test Scores, 1989.

Test Score Rankings

- Top 45
- 46-89
- 90-133
- 134-177

+++++++ MSA Counties
--- Appalachian Counties

Figure 3: Percent of Adults in Kentucky with 12 Years or More of Education by County, 1980.

Percent with 12 or More Years of Education

- 25-38
- 38-50
- 50-72

SOURCE: Skees and Swanson, 1989.
Figure 4: Districts Involved in Equal Education Lawsuit.

- County School Districts in Suit
- Independent School Districts in Suit
- Independent School Districts

++ MSA Counties
Appalachian Counties

Figure 5: Property Tax Delinquency Rates in Kentucky.

Tax delinquency rates

- Below 5%
- 5-10 percent
- 10-15 percent
- Above 15 percent.

SOURCE: Lexington Herald-Leader, 1990b
Figure 6: First House Vote on Kentucky Education Reform Act of 1990.
Figure 7: Percent change in Per-student Revenue, 1990-91, after passage of House Bill 940, by Quartiles.

Per-pupil Revenue
Percent Change

+++++++ MSA Counties

Figure 8: Democratic Victors by County, 1991 Gubernatorial Primary.

Primary Victors

- Baesler
- Jones
- Poore

+++++++ MSA Counties
------ Appalachian Counties