This fourth document in the Education and Human Services Consortium's Series on Collaboration puts current efforts to create comprehensive and coordinated child and family-serving systems in a 30-year context of related endeavors. Starting from the premise that thinking about ways to structure and improve human services has been clouded by decades of myth, counter-myth, and nonproductive rhetoric, the paper proceeds by systematically sorting through this inheritance to develop a new perspective for the 1990s. In the course of the analysis numerous service and access models of the 1960s and 1970s, and the paper concludes by offering five lessons for the future based on the experiences of the past. The lessons concern: (1) the importance of modesty and humility (that is, of not raising expectations beyond some point of real possibility); (2) an awareness of limited resources; (3) the need for diversity and collaboration; (4) the effects of complexity; and (5) the need to build synergy. The service delivery and access models of multiservice centers and settlement houses are discussed. The planning and resource allocation models considered are the Youth Bureau model and state and local offices for children. Models for specific places, such as Model Cities, are also noted. A commentary by Sidney L. Gardner raises additional issues, including the need for outcome measures, changes in funding approaches, and the need for planning. Contains 5 references. (LB)
SERVING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES EFFECTIVELY:

How the Past Can Help Chart the Future

by PETER B. EDELMAN and BERYL A. RADIN
with a Commentary by SIDNEY L. GARDNER
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This is the fourth document in the Education and Human Services Consortium Series on Collaboration. Initiated in 1988, the Consortium is a loosely-knit coalition of national professional membership organizations, advocacy groups, and social policy and research centers. These diverse groups are united by their shared commitment to the creation of a more responsive system of education and human services for children and families. The Series is designed to develop and widely distribute resources that Consortium members believe contribute significantly to collaborative efforts on behalf of improved policy and practice. In fostering dialogue and constructive action among state and local education and human services policy makers, administrators, and practitioners, Consortium members—and other groups that may choose to join—exemplify the kind of close professional collaboration necessary to forge genuine systems change.

Serving Children and Families Effectively: How the Past Can Help Chart the Future, by Peter B. Edelman and Beryl A. Radin, puts today's efforts to create more comprehensive and coordinated child and family-serving systems in a thirty-year context of related endeavors. The authors argue that thinking about how to structure and improve human services has been clouded by decades of myth, counter-myth and non-productive rhetoric. Systematically sorting through this inheritance, Edelman and Radin develop a new perspective for the '90s, revisit numerous service and access models of the '60s and '70s, and offer today's architects of change five lessons for the future. A commentary by Sidney L. Gardner raises additional issues that sharpen the paper's analysis and utility.

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Other resources in the Series on Collaboration include:

- What It Takes: Structuring Interagency Partnerships to Connect Children and Families with Comprehensive Services, by Atelia I. Melaville with Martin J. Blank, describes what high quality comprehensive services should entail and focuses on inter-agency partnerships as a potential key to the large-scale delivery of such services. It describes the factors that affect local efforts and provides guidelines to help beginning initiatives succeed.
- Thinking Collaboratively: Ten Questions and Answers to Help Policy Makers Improve Children's Services, by Charles Bruner, aids state and local policy makers in considering how to foster collaborations that will truly benefit children and families. Checklists are included to assess key issues in establishing interagency initiatives, demonstration projects and statewide reforms to foster collaboration.

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SERVING CHILDREN AND FAMILIES EFFECTIVELY: HOW THE PAST CAN HELP CHART THE FUTURE

PETER B. EDELMAN and BERYL A. RADIN
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INTRODUCTION

A generation ago a new debate began in the United States over the complex problem of how to structure human service delivery systems. Remarkable political, economic, and social changes have taken place in America over the ensuing three decades, but this issue still enmeshes social policy analysts and advocates. The 1960s brought a number of changes in perspective that continue to frame the boundaries of the debate today. Two of these developments are particularly important: first, an expanded definition of who should receive various kinds of services; and second, a reappraisal of the ability of the existing structure of human services to meet the nation’s needs.

Thirty years ago a national interest in assisting the poor and minorities with services funded by tax dollars appeared for the first time in a non-crisis context. These efforts—which were to become the legacy of JFK’s New Frontier and LBJ’s War on Poverty—combined with the programs of the New Deal to create a fabric of social programs similar to that found in some of the European welfare states. The agreed upon clientele for services expanded, and the federal government came into the picture as a significant, ongoing funding source.

The recognized agenda of needs broadened as well. Problems previously ignored became legitimate targets to be addressed. The nation discovered that the poor routinely endured a wide array of debilitating economic, educational, legal, health, and family problems. The equally diverse set of human services that emerged in response reflected an acceptance of an active and innovative role at the federal level. The rhetoric of rights and high promises was in the air. The new services reflected a “crazy quilt” design rather than an orderly pattern, but, in the optimism of the time, many assumed that a coordinated system would emerge.

So ripe was the climate for change that questions arose across the board about the performance of virtually everyone who had had some role in the earlier, less activist era. Government at all levels was faulted for inertia: old-line federal agencies, and states and local governments across the board. State governments were seen as especially moribund. Professionals of all kinds came under attack: social workers, teachers, doctors, lawyers and bureaucrats. Service delivery institutions were targeted as well. The performance of educational institutions, corporations, trade unions, churches, and foundations came under scrutiny. Residential institutions were particularly suspect: mental hospitals, schools for the retarded, acute-care hospitals and jails.

These developments—the broadened definition of clients and service needs, the acknowledgement of the role of the federal government and significant federal funding, and the questioning of governmental, professional, and institutional performance—played a role in framing the debate over how to deliver services most effectively that has continued on and off ever since.

The debate over these issues—particularly over program structures and strategies—is so entangled with other political battles of the period that it evokes great controversy. For some, the scary and even scarring memories of the period are a barrier to fine-tuned discussion. For others, a broadside attack on the period (or a blanket defense for that matter) is a way of avoiding other issues. Any effort to assess the lessons of the ‘60s and ‘70s strikes at the heart of an extremely difficult policy question: What is the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the programs created during that era? Were their anticipated outcomes intended to eliminate all problems (as the rhetoric of high promise suggested) or were they meant to introduce incremental changes constituting an acknowledgment of profound social problems and a commitment to further increments that would over time evolve into a solid system?
The questions about how to structure and improve human services that were fueled by the momentum of the '60s have never been fully answered. For the last decade they were seldom even asked. As the 1990s begin, there is some indication that they are back on the table. So it is time to query: what have we learned? What has experience taught us about what we should do differently if we get the opportunity to do anything at all?

THE 1960s: SUCCESSES OR FAILURES?

In many ways, the 1960s have become a Rorschach test for the society. People react reflexively to the mention of that era and see in it what they want to see, for good or ill. Because the debate over this experience is waged on so many levels, it is difficult to present a balanced picture of its contributions and limitations, but some conclusions can be drawn safely.

To begin with, the picture for the poor and minorities in the society is improved in many respects over what it was in 1960. Despite the many problems that remain to be solved and complications that have emerged since that time, some things did get better. At the same time, it is not at all clear how well we have institutionalized these changes. We know that millions of people did escape poverty, especially during the period between 1960 and 1973, but current data suggests that the improvements are fragile, at best.

Still, there were definite gains. Much of what was gained during the civil rights revolution is still largely intact, in legal, if not in economic terms. Legal services for the poor are recognized as important even if current resources for such activities are significantly more limited than two and a half decades ago. A revolution for the rights of women came into its own although it, too, has difficulty in attaining economic justice to go along with legal rights. Health care for the elderly is vastly improved, despite the current attacks on Medicare funding. Health care for the poor, with all its limitations, is far better than it used to be. Services for the mentally retarded and thedevelopmentally disabled have been revolutionized, and the disabled, in general, have come a long way. Our society has acknowledged that early childhood development programs for disadvantaged children are important, as is the need for special nutritional attention for low-income pregnant mothers and young children.

These are not trivial advances, and most of them originated in initiatives that began in the '60s. Despite this, the decade has a bad name, even among many sophisticated people. Much of the debate over the contribution of the 1960s revolves around the Community Action Program and Model Cities—the two most conceptually radical attempts to deal with service delivery problems. Both attempted to create new structures that would perform planning and coordination functions at the grass roots level, providing mechanisms to deliver services to the unserved or underserved more effectively than existing institutions.

Community Action

Under the Community Action Program (CAP), which was a key part of the War on Poverty, some 500 community action agencies were set up around the country. CAP was not a program in and of itself. It was meant to be, as Kaplan and Frieden have written, "a process for mobilizing resources and coordinating other programs."

The Economic Opportunity Act created quite a long list of programs: Head Start, Neighborhood Legal Services, Neighborhood Health Centers, Foster Grandparents, Job Corps, VISTA, and various job training programs to be run through the Department of Labor. The idea was that, for those programs that were to be delivered at the local level, the CAP agency would be the umbrella coordinating agency and might, but need not, run some of the services itself.

This sounds innocuous enough. There were, however, three key features that made the initiative far from business as usual. The

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first was that the CAP agencies were set up outside the political system, and were not accountable to the mayors or any other local elected or appointed officials. Second, CAP agencies were to involve the "maximum feasible participation of the poor," which was widely understood to mean that they were to be controlled, in terms of how their boards would be structured, by the people they were intended to serve. Third, their funding came directly from the federal government, not through any intermediate governmental filter.

What happened next was predictable and, it is generally agreed, intended. CAP agencies began to march on City Hall. They didn't just sue (although they did that, too); they used federal money to rent buses and make signs so they could make demands on city government. They were not beholden to City Hall for anything, and few of them were advised by professionals who might have warned them of the risks of being confrontational. Voicing the outrage of many local governments, Mayor Daley of Chicago came to Congress and prevailed upon Congresswoman Edith Green to amend the law to thwart the CAP agencies' autonomy.

By the early 1970s, the CAP agencies had receded into small social service delivery agencies, basically outside the organized social service delivery system. (That is where many, if not most, of those that survived remain). Although far fewer in number than during the 1960s, CAP agencies still have a small assured source of federal funding via the block grant administered by the Community Services Administration. They can continue to go it alone if they choose to, although a good number of them have become integrated into local service delivery networks (if for no other reason than to get United Way, local foundation, or local government—including Title XX—funding).

This is most emphatically not a sad story. Most of the "mini-categorical" programs which the CAP agencies were supposed to coordinate have survived albeit under new auspices. Some, like Head Start, have made it to the Hall of Fame of successful social programs. All were transferred to other federal agencies.

It is not surprising that parallel programs set up in parallel CAP agencies did not survive in that form. They were conceived as independent efforts so as to escape stultification in a traditional bureaucracy. They were meant to serve as a "yardstick" against which to measure the performance of existing programs and as a goad to push old-line agencies to do better.

This is not a situation that can be expected to last. The programs originally assigned to the Office of Economic Opportunity met a key objective: To wake up other bureaucracies. Had OEO continued as it was, it might well have become as lethargic as the agencies it was designed to change. Indeed, this strategy is not something to be done only once in history. It is entirely appropriate to contemplate a cycle of parallel programs in a parallel agency or agencies every generation or so, to shake things up. While the specifics may be different, it may well be time for another such strategic initiative.

The CAP agencies themselves also made a contribution. During their brief heyday they gave a generation of poor people a taste of having a sense of control over their own lives. They did actually contribute to changing the behavior of some elected officials. And they left behind a group of people who were nurtured there, learned how to use the system, and went on to community leadership in many instances.

The CAP experience has taught us how difficult it is to use public money to set up an alternative politics. Using federal money to fund litigation against governments has been controversial and has barely survived. Political advocacy funded with tax dollars is inherently problematic because the targets of advocacy will fight back.

We have also learned that direct federal funding of a locally untethered set of service delivery agencies runs a particular risk that such agencies will not become part of a local service delivery network. For the long run, local service delivery agencies and entities which are accountable or connected to local governmental or philanthropic institutions or networks are more likely to achieve their objectives than those that are not.

Model Cities

As the Office of Economic Opportunity was being launched, planners for the new
Department of Housing and Urban Development were working on an initiative based on premises somewhat similar to community action. They, too, envisioned a process that would pull together existing categorical programs at the local level to make them more responsive to the needs of the poor. It was widely felt that the urban renewal efforts of the fifties had failed to help the poor, and in many cases had hurt them by destroying their housing and not providing anything with which to replace it.

The task force planning what turned out to be Model Cities believed that physical renewal was not enough, and that housing construction and rehabilitation had to be combined with education, health, and social services. Their report called for a massive housing program, a total approach, and flexibility regarding local building codes, federal bureaucratic rules, and categorical boundaries. It said three principles should govern: 1) concentration of resources; 2) coordination of talent and programs; and 3) mobilization of local leadership. The idea was that, if new money for housing was combined with access to existing federal programs in other areas, enough in the way of resources would be available to stimulate a successful local process to coordinate and build linkages among programs.

The bill finally enacted as Model Cities fell far short of what had been recommended. The Vietnam War robbed it of funds; its implementers were not given the authority that had been sought to pull in funds from other departments. The expediters who were to have been installed to package initiatives for each city were not created. And, on top of everything else, what was originally to have been a small number of concentrated demonstrations was dissipated into some 66 cities. Even without the Vietnam War it is doubtful that enough money would have ever flowed anywhere to demonstrate anything. Lacking either the new money or any way to command access to the existing money, there was no "glue" to cause people at the local level to take the Model Cities planning process seriously.

There was nothing particularly wrong with the original design of Model Cities. The problem was that a watered down version—not the original design—was enacted into law. Is there a lesson? One possibility is that, if there is a desire to demonstrate what can be done in one neighborhood on a concentrated basis, enough resources had better be made available to make a difference. Model Cities is, if nothing else, a lesson in dissipation of limited resources.

COORDINATION INITIATIVES IN THE 1970s

By the end of the 1960s, the scars from the decade pulled strategists away from the community level to focus on coordination and planning at the national level. The initiatives of the '70s were much more modest in scale. In the early '70s programs were advanced within the Department of Health, Education and Welfare aimed at coordinating the array of categorical programs that had been created over the years. Policy planners believed that by developing opportunities for consolidation at the national level, state and local agencies would be able to rationalize the system and create new structures that were more effective deliverers of services. HEW funded a number of demonstration programs aimed at the integration of services at the local level but was never able to obtain congressional approval for large scale reform efforts. During the late '70s, attempts were also made to foster partnerships of city, state, and federal agencies but they, too, remained small-scale programs that were eventually replaced by Reagan Administration block grants.

THIRTY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE: THESIS, ANTITHESIS, AND SYNTHESIS

Much of what the society believes about the programs of the 1960s is colored by the way these efforts were portrayed—even caricatured—in the 1980s. The debate about effective services became a polemical contest centered around three issues: 1) the role of the federal government; 2) money as a lever for change; and 3) the search for a panacea. Thinking about each of these issues has been clouded by a battle of myths: the efforts of the '60s were reduced to slogans and replaced by mirror-like, opposite slo-
The Great Society oversold its programs and, concomitantly, the efficacy of federal intervention unaccompanied by other initiatives. The mirror-image myth of the '80s pictured the national government as useless in dealing with domestic social problems and, thus, with no role to play.

The Role of the Federal Government

The mythology about the '60s is that people believed that federal programs alone could solve the country's social problems. While there was a tendency in many programs of the '60s to believe that the essential lever for change came from Washington, there were some other efforts that recognized the contribution of other institutional actors. But the lack of experience within the country about the changes in the structure of social programs (and the relative naivete of program designers) contributed to a simplistic approach. No question, the Great Society oversold its programs and, concomitantly, the efficacy of federal intervention unaccompanied by other initiatives. The exaggerated style of the time led to an unreasonable increase in people's expectations. When the problems weren't solved (and new problems such as Vietnam and Watergate emerged) some people became disillusioned and turned away from government.

Given this disillusionment, it is not surprising that the mirror-image myth of the '80s pictured the national government as useless in dealing with domestic social problems and, thus, with no role to play in this effort. Rather than governmental action, we were told that private sector voluntary action alone is the appropriate institution and mode of intervention.

The synthesis for the '90s must combine an awareness that while government has a role to play at all levels, it cannot do the job by itself, even with the full participation of state and local government. Our society's pressing social problems will not be solved without the participation of all of us, individually and in the institutions of which we are a part—our churches, our companies, our unions, the United Way. This new synthesis also recognizes a new balance between rights and responsibilities. The people who need help also have an obligation to take responsibility for themselves and to make the maximum use of the help available to move toward self-sufficiency.

The particular role that government should play constitutes a key question. The federal government's role is relatively easy, apart from debates over how much money it will put in. Other than Social Security, the Veteran's Administration, certain agricultural matters, the federal prisons, and services for the military and their families, the federal government does not deliver services directly. It pays for them, and in recent years it has reduced somewhat the extensive use of tiny categorical programs that tie up state and local governments and private providers in multiple reporting, overlapping and even inconsistent regulations, and multiple planning requirements and grant applications. Nonetheless, while there are fewer tiny categorical aid programs in some program areas than there were in the sixties, the system still has difficulty managing categorical programs. And, even as to programs that are packaged in larger frameworks, there is still a large debate over the degree and form of regulations and mandates that should accompany federal funding.

The number of funding streams that confront one trying to organize comprehensive or multiple services from a neighborhood or community perspective is truly awesome, and raises important questions about the role of state and local government. It is time to explore the possibility of a coordinating or packaging function, particularly for local government, at either the neighborhood or municipal level. A related question is the "make or buy" issue—the extent to which government, either state or local, should deliver services itself through its own employees, and the extent to which it should "privatize" by contracting or using grants to accomplish its purposes.

One theme governing the answers to these questions should be the idea of community. We seem to have lost the idea that a significant social policy aim is embodied in the notion of community, of a social infrastructure that embodies stability and security and shared values. For many today, individual opportunity is nullified because there is no community around them. No matter how
strong their family, the street is a jungle with unsavory and often fatal attractions, pressures, and perils. Surely one role of government is to help rediscover and rebuild the sense of community that we have lost in too many places. Pursuit of this theme should guide new service initiatives as well as efforts to deal with the way services are organized.

Money as the Lever for Change

The era of the '60s has been portrayed as a time in which people thought that simply "throwing money at problems" would make them disappear. While it was true that people during those years had more confidence in the ability of money to evoke social and institutional change, the resources for this task were never made available even at the level authorized by Congress for individual programs, let alone at the scale required to make real change. Viewed in the context of the 1980 budget, it is clear that despite the rhetoric of promises, the fiscal policy was remarkably careful. The average annual deficit during President Johnson's time in office was less than $6 billion, and that includes the years of paying for the Vietnam War.

The 1980s counterpoint to this position was that we could solve social problems without any federal money at all. Somehow, magically, a groundswell from the society would create a climate in which all the needed soup kitchens and homeless shelters would emerge, inspired and guided by a lot of tough talk from Washington. If government funds were required, they would come from the local community or from the state.

The '90s synthesis must be that we cannot solve all of our problems without money, but that money alone will not solve them either. There are deeper structural failings to confront. School bureaucracies are stultified, and principals and teachers are blocked from taking initiatives that would benefit their students. Public housing units in many major cities stand unoccupied for lack of maintenance, not just lack of funds. Our health-care system is still excessively hospital-based and not sufficiently preventive.

That there is a major structural agenda is particularly worth bearing in mind in talking about effective services. Measures to make services comprehensive, accessible, and better coordinated are structural to be sure, but they will miss their mark unless they are accompanied not only by adequate funding but also by a long list of other structural changes including better education and training of those delivering the services and changes in public personnel policies that create sanctions against unproductive workers and rewards for those who are productive.

Search for the Panacea

The third myth about the '60s is that people believed there was a silver bullet, a single magic program that—if we could just find it—would solve all our ills. And, in fact, people have jumped from one quick fix and one panacea to another over the years. Yet we have not stayed with any intervention long enough to see whether it would make a difference and we have not taken the time to correct the flaws in the initial version to see whether it would work better when improved or redesigned.

The reactive myth of the '80s—that nothing works, so why bother to try—is particularly understandable given our persistent naive faith that magic solutions exist and our massive unwillingness to stay with anything long enough to give it time to succeed.

There is a slightly more sophisticated version of these myths that deserves mention as well. This is represented by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan who has said that the '60s were "most successful . . . where we simply transferred income and services to a stable, settled group like the elderly. It had little success—if you like, it failed—where poverty stemmed from social behavior."

This is a vast oversimplification. If Senator Moynihan is saying that primary prevention is more successful than interventions with populations already manifesting social pathology, his observation is unremarkable, indeed obvious. But he seems also to be saying that there is no point in even trying to help those people whose need for services is so complex that it is difficult to assure that the help will be effective. He seems to be questioning the value of crisis services, and, for that matter, services of any kind to poor...
people who already have problems beyond their lack of income. He seems to write off vast groups of people: teens who get into trouble with the law or have babies, drug and alcohol abusers, many of the homeless, and so on.

Our synthesis for the '90s, Senator Moynihan notwithstanding, should be that, although there is no silver bullet, there are many interventions and many programs that do help, including many that demonstrably help multi-problem families. Nonetheless, while some families and some individuals within families can be helped by individual programs, broad progress depends on employing our endeavors in tandem. We have learned that the problems of many of the poor, and of high-poverty neighborhoods as a whole, are interrelated and difficult to separate. We cannot eliminate teen pregnancy without dealing with education, health care, broader family issues, and employment opportunities. To promote individual self-sufficiency we need better schools, child care so parents can take jobs, and health coverage so people will not be tempted to stay on welfare in order to keep Medicaid. And again, to emphasize a key aspect of the point, many of the interventions that we know are effective are on behalf of people “where poverty stemmed from social behavior.”

WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

We know government has a role to play but so do all of us. We know there are serious structural problems in the functioning of government and institutions that must be attended to. We know there are interventions that work but it must become possible to use them in combination and with sensitivity to specific locations. And we know we must act because we will be worse off if we do not.

In that context the question arises: How can we deliver more effective services? It is critically important to bear in mind that there are built-in, serious barriers to change.

1. Legislative bodies at all levels of government take both budgeting and substantive action in relatively small increments. It is difficult to get the political decision-making system to act in comprehensive terms.

2. There are few multi-service interest groups. Most interest groups organize themselves according to their own field or discipline and have carved out counterpart power bases in legislative committees and executive agencies. Professionals want to maintain separate identities and power bases. They and their client groups lobby for their claim on scarce resources and do not want to share the limited pie.

3. Whether consciously or not, legislators and administrators alike act to maintain fragmentation as a way of dealing with scarce resources, because fragmentation rations utilization. If access points are unclear, fewer people will use the services and less money will be spent.

In fact, from a totally cynical point of view, fragmentation at the delivery end and block grants at the funding end are a perfect combination. Fragmentation reduces utilization, and block grants weaken constituency support for funding because no one constituency can be sure it will benefit from an increase in funding for the block. Recipient accountability is reduced by the use of block grants because there is no articulated set of standards against which to judge grantee performance. Congress does not easily see the successes that may have transpired at the local level with block grant money after it was handed out by the state (and it is hard for advocates and program administrators to amass the evidence), so it is more difficult to create momentum for increases in (or even to maintain) appropriations for the block.

"The reactive myth of the '80s—that nothing works, so why bother to try—is particularly understandable given our persistent naive faith that magic solutions exist and our massive unwillingness to stay with anything long enough to give it time to succeed."
SEARCHING FOR MODELS

Buried in the inheritance from the past thirty years are a number of models of service and access that are worthy of mention as possible guides for effective services for children and families in the nineties. Some of these efforts were stimulated by direct federal activity, others by indirect means; some came about because of state or local action; still others resulted from innovations within the voluntary sector. In some communities these efforts have been quite successful, while in other settings they have not produced desired effects. They are not large scale, grand schemes; rather, they are modest efforts that are worthy of consideration for those concerned about future change.

These models focus on three different issues in the service process. Some of them intervene at the service delivery point, with multi-service and coordinated efforts at the point where the client comes into the system. These efforts attempt to respond to clients' confusion when they confront a fragmented process and a bureaucratic maze which requires them to move from one service location to another. A second variety focuses on the planning and resource allocation process and seeks to intervene at the point where budgets are made and top officials make determinations about service priorities. A third concerns place specificity: the design of services particularly aimed at defined geographic areas.

Service Delivery and Access Models

Multi-Service Centers and Settlement Houses. There was never a federal program specifically designed to fund multi-service centers, but a number—the Roxbury Multi-Service Center in Boston is a typical example—were funded or stimulated by federal activity in the 1960s. The Door in New York City is an example of a multi-service center directed specifically at high-risk teenagers. The Beethoven Project in Chicago, the Casey Foundation initiatives, and programs like Friends of the Family in Baltimore are current examples directed at families in various ways. An older model, reformed and refurbished in the '60s and '70s in many cities, is the settlement house, which, when properly led and administered, is a multi-service center by another name (or vice versa). A newer model, still more often a suggestion than a reality, is to collocate services in schools. The community schools movement and the Cities in Schools program, nongovernmental initiatives which began in the '70s, have pursued this strategy with mixed results having more to do with the particular people involved in the individual cities than with the validity of the concept.

While every service a family might need cannot be located under one roof, these experiences indicate that it is possible to have a basic intake function as a core, and to have collocated on the premises such services as family counseling, legal services, primary health and mental health services, educational supplementation, child care, and recreational and community activities. Cities and counties could find it possible to locate an office to do eligibility for public assistance, food stamps, WIC and other relevant programs. All of this is far from simple, but it is possible.

This approach is different from the decentralization movement of the '60s and '70s. During that time there was a proliferation of neighborhood centers for separate programs: health centers, community mental health centers, and legal services offices. Each reflected a separate federal funding stream. In addition, there were separate state, county, and/or municipal social services offices and public health clinics, and separate groups of job training and drug treatment programs as well as nonprofit agencies offering a variety of specialized services, funded by combinations of United Way and public dollars and perhaps other local philanthropy.

In most cities, especially the large ones, it was difficult to rationalize these overlapping and uncoordinated centers. Each was naturally jealous of its own sovereignty, and most had vertical relationships with bureaucracies and funding sources that were in turn protective of their own sovereignty. While many of these centers are now defunct because of budget cuts, the underlying turf boundaries are problems that have not disappeared with the passage of time.

"Broad progress depends on employing our endeavors in tandem... To promote individual self-sufficiency we need better schools, child care so parents can take jobs, and health coverage so people will not be tempted to stay on welfare in order to keep Medicaid."
A related problem is that nongovernmental entities which seek to cut across categorical lines have an exceptionally difficult time getting the funds they need. Given that there is no multi-service center or settlement house “program,” they must constantly hustle for public grants and contracts. At any one time they may have employment and training, drug treatment, teen pregnancy prevention, Title XX, or any of a dozen other kinds of money. Often their current mix of activities is skewed by the kind of money that is available.

An especially pernicious problem is the timing of payment under grants and contracts. Typically, the city or county, whether under its own rules or federal or state rules, pays after the service is performed, so the private agency has to somehow front the money. Worse, payment is often unconscionably late. More than a few nongovernmental agencies have been driven out of business by this difficulty.

Little City Halls. A few cities—New York and Boston come to mind—experimented with decentralized outposts of city government in the late sixties and early seventies. Regardless of the name used, these public outposts—when and if competently staffed—could be revived as an access and referral point for services for children and families, cross-cutting the various public departments that offer services relevant to this clientele.

**Planning and Resource Allocation Models**

*The Youth Bureau Model.* If someone in the city or county maps all of the services relevant to a particular clientele and seeks, to the extent resources are available, to fill the gaps that show up, a better array of services should eventuate. If all of those in the area who were represented on the map have a copy of it when it is completed, better referral patterns should result.

In the field of youth services a number of states—New York is one—have adopted a system like the one described. Each county has a youth bureau which annually makes a youth services plan for the county. The state reviews the plan and occasionally rejects portions of it or asks for modifications. When the plan is approved the county is entitled to a certain amount of state funds to effectuate it, on a 50 percent matching basis. In New York State, at least, private providers are eligible for funding, and in some counties United Way supplies much of the local match. The funding is far from sufficient to cover all service needs for adolescents, but it is enough to cause every county to participate. The result is that services are typically more complete and referral patterns more clear than would otherwise be the case.

*Offices for Children.* In the largest states it is difficult to contemplate the creation of an operating agency that would have under its jurisdiction all services for children and families if by that phrase one would mean to include public assistance, food stamps, social services, child welfare protective services, mental health, mental retardation, and juvenile justice. Smaller states have created such “super” agencies with mixed results. In the biggest states such an agency would be extremely unwieldy (unless it was such a loose confederation as to be not a very meaningful consolidation).

What some states (and some local governments) have done, therefore, is to create an office for children as a part of the office of the chief executive. This office generally acquires the planning and legislative relations function for the relevant issues, at least with regard to major initiatives of the chief executive, and often has responsibility for handling particularly difficult individual cases of multi-problem (and therefore multi-agency) children and families who might otherwise be shunted from agency to agency.

These offices cannot be a substitute for real services, however. In some cases, the efficacy of the offices for children has been overstated by elected officials seeking to claim they have done something for children when they either have insufficient resources to spend on needed programs or, even worse, have no wish to tackle problems directly on their merits.

**Place-Specific Models**

A few of the past efforts were constructed on the concept of place-specificity. This is especially relevant to areas where there is a
high concentration of poverty. Elsewhere, multidisciplinary access points and colocated services will improve accessibility and go some of the way toward improving quality. In areas of intense poverty, however, a sense of place in the design of services can play an even more fundamental role, as a part of a strategy to rebuild a feeling of neighborhood and community.

A key lesson to be drawn from the CAP, the Model Cities, and the multi-service center experiences is that, apart from a few individual multi-service centers and settlement houses, a fully funded, highly targeted, comprehensive approach in an area of great poverty has never really been tried.

One possible challenge to pursue for the '90s would be a few such comprehensive approaches, or saturation strategies, in areas of concentrated poverty. The desperate, multi-problem, multi-crisis straits of such areas counsel a broad definition of comprehensiveness—one that goes beyond a single, multi-service initiative, no matter how comprehensive that is in its work.

We should know by now that services alone will not cure poverty or rebuild a sense of community. A low-income family seeking help to find housing will not be helped by services if no housing is available at a price the family can afford. Job training does not help when there are no jobs. Drug treatment is a drop in the ocean when there is a tidal wave of drugs in the street. Tutoring services will not make up for schools that do not teach. The problems of the street will engulf even the most sophisticated multi-service center if that initiative is taken in isolation.

For the '90s a saturation strategy in a single neighborhood of concentrated poverty must to the maximum possible extent go beyond services if it is to offer any hope of making a difference in the life of that area. Attention to housing, the schools, public safety and law enforcement, and economic development should be part of this coordination. This scope requires that any such effort cannot be undertaken by the private sector by itself but must also involve city government as well and state and federal funding for some portions of the endeavor.

The service part of such a comprehensive approach in an area of intense poverty might involve the rediscovery or reinvention of the "settlement house" in a contemporary form. This is a very complex task in and of itself. We cannot expect a turn-of-the-century model to meet current needs and the built-in barriers to comprehensiveness in terms of government and politics and professional identities. A long list of problems must be addressed with the greatest of care.

Today, for example, intake workers in such a place would have to have a Renaissance knowledge of the glossary of human problems and the corresponding services to which one might make a referral. Professionals and other staff delivering services would have to be highly committed and able, and willing to accept the salaries ordinarily associated with such positions. And even a large investment in the settlement house itself would not create the myriad of necessary referral places or assure their responsiveness to a telephone call seeking to make an appointment.

In order to minimize all of these problems, it is important that each service offered in such a center is also a natural part of some larger agency and disciplinary world. Health, mental health, and family services should be based in a relationship to the larger professional worlds of which they are a part. This is important for purposes of future funding, for coordination, and for the development of referral patterns.

The project should not be undertaken without a careful mapping of local perceptions of neighborhood and community needs for service, and community participation in the design and policy direction of the services. Success in the '90s requires a balancing of professional and community involvement that eluded reformers in the '60s.

Patience is a critical virtue, too. Each service may require a different license—the penetration in each case of yet another bureaucracy. Patience requires forbearance in the proclamation of success as well. The last thing we need is another round of prematurely raised expectations. No one should run off to advocate a government program to replicate the initiative until it has been in place long enough to prove its worth, and has undergone rigorous evaluation.

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A PERSPECTIVE FOR THE NINETIES

As this discussion has indicated, much has changed in the past thirty years. We have swung between strategies of extremes. We have moved from an environment of hope and possibility to one of limitations and despair. The fires of change in the 60s were dampened in the 80s by the rains of fear, complexity, and cynicism. Today, as the pendulum appears to be moving toward a new sense of activism and social responsibility, we must learn from the past three decades. We close with five lessons:

Lesson #1: The Importance of Modesty and Humility

We have learned that social change is extremely difficult to achieve. We are still far from knowing enough about what actually "works" and what does not, even though we know much more than we did in 1960 (and if we had the political will to fund fully the things that we know are successful, we would be far better off than we are now). While we want a society in which all citizens have hope for the future, we cannot raise expectations beyond some point of real possibility. Thus, even though we may seek to intervene in a few places as massive a way as possible, we must at the same time do so cautiously, without grand promises, and with the knowledge that we have embarked on a somewhat risky path. Panaceas of any kind are likely to fail.

Lesson #2: Awareness of Limited Resources

Few have to be reminded that programs for children and families are expensive and it is extremely difficult to obtain funding for them in this era of budget limitation. While we know this, we sometimes have to be reminded that we have other resource limitations. Some of these limitations are of our own making and could be addressed. We do not have adequate expertise to guide our action. It has often been difficult to obtain support for program evaluation efforts and other data collection and monitoring schemes that provide program managers with information to modify ongoing programs. And we have found that time is also a scarce resource. Even small demonstration programs take much more time to put into operation than we usually give them. Frequently, the political system is not willing to wait for programs to develop before assessing their impact.

Lesson #3: The Need for Diversity and Collaboration

Over the past thirty years we have learned much about the diversity of situations and populations around the country. We have been forced to acknowledge that the idiosyncrasies of a state, locality, or even a neighborhood can determine the effectiveness of a particular program. We have recognized the importance of beginning programs or projects by mapping local perceptions of needs and finding ways to assure a sense of participation and ownership among those who are the recipients of the services. At the same time, we have learned that change requires partnerships among many different actors: the professionals who actually deliver the services; the elected officials who must provide the resources for them, at least when they come to be replicated on a broad scale; the citizens who are the consumers of the services; and the administrators and managers at national, state, and local levels. As others have noted, the problems that we face require collaborative action among all of these actors.

Lesson #4: The Effects of Complexity

Much of the negative perception about past programs stems from the unintended consequences that emerged from them. Seemingly simple strategies for change opened up numerous Pandora's boxes and created problems that seemed never-ending. For example, a community working to establish a multi-service center may confront a knot of licensing and other bureaucratic requirements so complex that the effort is effectively killed. Similarly, schemes to

address one set of problems may create other difficulties, particularly when eligibility requirements are affected.

Lesson #5: The Need to Build Synergy

We know that the problems faced by children and families are interrelated and interdependent. While public safety, available jobs, school improvement, and affordable housing are separate problems, they are also closely related when we are talking about areas of concentrated poverty. While for many families, even in such areas, there are single interventions that may have great impact, we have learned that others need multiple service intervention: and still others need the benefit that comes from efforts to restore the basic institutions that make up a community. As we devise new schemes for the future, we are challenged to find ways to construct programs that have the ability to build on one another and operate in a related way.

We are well aware that these lessons pose a major dilemma. On the one hand, the lessons of humility, complexity, and resource limitations counsel efforts at modest, incremental approaches to change. On the other, at least insofar as the problem of concentrated, intense, highly impacted poverty areas is concerned, it is time to seek a few demonstrations which are comprehensive on a synergistic scale never before attempted.

We know that there are no panaceas, but we must find ways to create initiatives that demonstrate some level of visible effectiveness. These may be a few highly concentrated efforts in a small number of high poverty neighborhoods or new attempts to ease client access to services; new endeavors to rationalize government funding streams and regulatory strictures; or new programs that respond to specific community-based needs with multi-service, coordinated efforts. We can only hope that this is the beginning of a new public policy breakthrough that will bring us to a new era of public responsibility and compassion.

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A COMMENTARY
by Sidney L. Gardner

Once again, talk of "services integration" and the need for collaborative efforts to "coordinate services," is in the air. As Yogi Berra once remarked, "It's deja vu all over again." Different than the "big yawn" of seasons past, however, players know that this time winning really counts. And staying in the game means being able to pitch the right blend of progressive and conservative values. In their useful paper, Peter Edelman and Beryl Radin find "buried in the inheritance of the past thirty years," a number of lessons for today's new teams. Never succumbing to nostalgia, they look forward to the '90s and beyond by synthesizing the experiences of the '60s and the reactions of the '80s. I cannot dispute their generally cogent points, though I would sharpen some and add others:

LESSEN #1: Large-scale change in service delivery requires radical change in the design of funding streams.

In the second half of their paper, the authors suggest a variety of models as guides for service, including multi-service centers and settlement houses at the service delivery levels, as "modest efforts...worthy of consideration." They observe that turf battles and a constant hustle for grants and contracts characterize most of these initiatives and that the mix of services is often skewed by the kind of money that is available and eroded by unconscionably late payment of funds.

What they do not emphasize is the simple fact that efforts to manipulate and massage a welter of funding streams into coherent delivery packages via partnerships or in multiservice centers are not enough. However successful individually, they simply cannot be ginned up on the scale necessary to make a dent in the numbers of children and families who need a better shot at success.

As Iowa and other states are discovering, we need to look at another strategy from the past and reformulate it to meet the needs of a new era: namely decategorized funding. In the 1970s and '80s, one approach to decategorized funding known as "block grants" won a deservedly bad name as a thinly disguised tool for cutting human services spending. As Edelman and Radin observe:

"...from a totally cynical point of view, fragmentation at the delivery end and block grants at the funding end are a perfect combination. Fragmentation reduces utilization and block grants weaken constituency support for funding because no one constituency can be sure it will benefit from an increase in funding for the block."

Today, in a world made wiser by the lessons of the past, we now know enough to create a new kind of "block grant with a soul." These would be decategorized funds for which state and local governments would have to account fully in terms of tangible improvements in the lives of children and families.

LESSEN #2: Outcome measures are critical to knowing where you are going.

The shift in perspective that can breathe new life into a movement toward decategorization is a genuine valuation of people and a recognition of what we all lose when so many of our children and families fail. This attitude of renewed concern and sense of community is reflected in and measured by the process of developing annual community score cards like those published by Children Now in California. Their message to politicians says: "We are here and watching what is happening to children. And we will be here next year to see what improvements you have made." The purpose of decategorizing funds and integrating services is to improve the lives of children and families. Solid measures of children's well-being offer a firm basis on which to argue for the decategorization of funds and against reliance on weak promises to fund individual pro-
essential (and often very difficult) to convene key decisions in that city are often made. In Washington acronym: BOGSAT (a Bunch Of Guys Sitting Around A Table) that refers to the way the right players—those who can cut through the red tape and ante up the resources needed to make change happen. But no BOGSAT itself ever treated a child, taught a student or helped a parent. The process of building a collaboration is only a means to the far more important end of achieving measurable changes in clients’ lives. Part of that process must entail a long, careful debate about what to measure. Right now, in nearly every community in the nation, we measure almost nothing at the community level. We have no annual community-wide assessment in which the question “How did things get better or worse for our children last year” can be answered with measurable outcomes. We also need more deliberately collected outcomes across individual agencies and programs and the management information systems to collect them. Without a clear picture of what communities offer and what they need to improve, service integration efforts have no direction, no means by which to evaluate their progress, and no basis on which to build the public’s trust.

**LESSON #3: Failing to plan for a better system is planning to fail.**

Naysayers will argue, of course, that services integration, whether achieved broadly via decategorization or in narrower, comprehensive programs or collaborative measures, is no substitute for sorely needed additional resources. When lack of funds forces an abused child and her family to the end of a waiting list that is six months long, it doesn’t matter if services are well-linked and easily accessible. The child and her family aren’t going to get what they need either way. Clearly, resources do matter. No amount of coordination will magically expand budgets already stretched to the breaking point. Nevertheless, those resistant to change will inevitably criticize coordination as a strategy that does nothing about resources. In the short run, it’s a hard argument to beat. But by identifying gaps in services, measuring the impact of this neglect on children’s lives, and publicizing the costs avoided when family needs are met, service integration initiatives can make a compelling case for additional funding. In contrast, the current system, so fragmented that it cannot even count what it spends, the number of children it helps, or convince the public that its overhead costs are justified, will only continue to lose credibility and hence resources.

In the long run, failing to plan for a better system is planning to fail. Planning it right means building consensus, not just getting the plan to read well. And that means negotiations, with professional bargaining units and with all other intergovernmental actors whose approval (or neutrality) are essential to success.

The logic of services integration is overpowering. Yet the political obstacles are, if anything, stronger than those which ravaged efforts in previous eras. Two that complicate Edelman and Radin’s suggestions for ’90s-style collaboration are increased devotion to the status quo and a declining pool of community-oriented change agents. The following lessons speak to these concerns.

**LESSON #4: Services integration, as a reform strategy, works best where good people are willing to work at it.**

The human services system’s growth itself makes a more powerful argument for integration than ever before. When $11 billion is spent on children and youth in a single county, (e.g., in Los Angeles County), the case for something other than more of the same gets stronger—and easier to understand. The size of the system cuts both ways as a factor: it helps the case for reducing fragmentation, but it also deepens the commitment of some to the status quo. The “system” is enormously larger and more complicated than when we tried to change it in the ’70s. What this means—unhappily for reformers—is that there are many more people who believe that their livelihood depends upon the status quo of human services fragmentation. Radical organizational change introduces uncertainties which many of these people may feel are not in their best interests.

Where is the political clout going to come from to make the needed changes? From local elected officials, grass-roots people, community-based organizations, and agencies able to see the writing on the wall: that organizations that refuse to change will be crushed under
Because not all local officials, grass roots representatives and public agencies are willing to challenge the status quo, services integration will not succeed in every community. It works best where good people are willing to work at it."

LESSON #5: Running good pilot projects won't change the system if the universities keep teaching it wrong.

A university can reinforce the practices of the status quo, or it can be a place where leaders who know that their fields must work across disciplines to equip tomorrow's professionals with the diversity of tools and understanding they will need to practice successfully in a rapidly changing world. The vast majority of university teaching, both for pre-service and in-service audiences, is designed to respond to unaltered system. The lesson here is to assess the local climate for change and to proceed only where key actors recognize the stakes involved and accept the risks.

LESSON #6: A source of neighborhood-based leadership is essential.

As Edelman and Radin recall, one of the most important outgrowths of the War on Poverty and other '60s programs was the creation of a rich source of minority professional leadership. Although Model Cities and many community action agencies fell prey to their own oversimplifications, they were extraordinarily successful as breeding grounds for a whole generation of minority professionals. Over the last 30 years this important source has all but dried up. As a result, schools, agencies, and community institutions are hard-pressed to find skilled people with the insight and grass-roots perspective needed to serve our nation's lowest-income children and families.

Part of a new agenda that must rise from the ashes of the '60s is the growth and development of a strong cadre of minority professionals committed to serving children and families: teachers, social workers, community organizers, employment and training specialists, mental health counselors, health professionals and others. Its members would contribute not only the professional skills of their respective disciplines but also the perspectives, cultural understanding and language skills of their respective language and ethnic communities. It is these latter skills that are often essential in building rapport, establishing trust, and empowering clients, students, and families.

Communities need to take a more active role in recruiting and identifying talented youth early on. In teacher education, for example, projected trends show a widening gap between the size of minority student enrollment in higher education and the number of minorities who actually become teachers. While some of this trend reflects the good news that higher-paying corporate jobs and other
opportunities are opening up to minorities, it has negative consequences for students who would benefit from close contact with minority role models as teachers in their classrooms. Reversing this trend demands working at the front end of the system, in junior highs and high schools. A number of minority recruitment programs around the nation have begun to set out the advantages of teaching at the point when students are still in the process of deciding about their career options.

Integrating services runs uphill, against the grain. As such, it takes time far beyond the six months we usually give it. It also takes talent. Service integration efforts should not be seen as vehicles for keeping over-promoted and underskilled supervisors or near-retirees out of sight and out of mind. Redesigning a better system will demand the very best leaders. Key players must be both visionary and pragmatic; eager to make change and willing to exercise patience. They must be able to see many points of view and to find the themes that unite them. They must be adept at negotiation, finance, public relations, and, above all, they must be unflinching advocates for children, families and communities.

LESSON #7: Line professionals matter.

Seymour Sarason’s excellent book, The Predictable Failure of Educational Reform could as easily be discussing the failure of human services reform. Sarason points out how past reformers’ plans were often inadequately political. They seldom involved the line staffs who would eventually be required to carry out the reformers’ carefully crafted visions. Many policy implementation studies of the past two decades have made similar points. Yet we continue to design interventions without including the people who will actually have to do the real work, face-to-face with clients. Of course, there are some good trends—use of focus groups; hard-headed bargaining such as that in the Rochester, New York school district around re-defining the role of teachers as service integrators; and efforts to bring in worker bargaining units in the earliest stages of program design. All of these are signs that some leaders in some sites have learned at least part of this lesson. Many more need to.

LESSON #8: States matter.

In the ‘60s, as Edelman and Radin described, we attempted to “reform” services delivery by making federal grants directly to cities, counties, and local nonprofits or community-based organizations. “We have learned,” they write, “that direct federal funding of a locally untethered set of service delivery agencies runs a particular risk that such agencies will not become part of a local service delivery network.” By the same token, we treated the states as an irritating bypass at best and, more typically, ignored them altogether. These days—like Willie Sutton who knew to rob banks because that’s where the money is—we have finally figured out where the human services money—however limited—is banked. Far more than in other sources of funding, it is in the state agency budgets. If connection to local government or service delivery networks is a criterion of initiatives likely to achieve their objectives, connection to state sources of technical assistance, data, and funding is an equally important hallmark of potential success.

LESSON #9: A "new consensus" requires that service integration efforts be based on a notion of mutual obligation.

Edelman and Radin argue vigorously against the “the reactive myth of the ’80s—that nothing works, so why bother?” Thus, while not faulting Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s analysis that ’60s-style income transfer efforts had little success where poverty stemmed from behavior, they reject any implication that services to people who already have significant problems beyond their lack of income of income are of questionable value. There are no “silver bullets,” they say, but many interventions can and do help multi-problem families.

In uncovering the subtext in Moynihan’s claim that the federal programs that redistributed money were those that worked best, the authors have usefully pointed out how much of the hard work remains ahead of us. Individual behavior does matter. Coordination of social programs is only the beginning of serious efforts to deal with the causes, as well as the consequences, of poverty.

But those efforts need to recognize what Jason DeParle, writing in a recent issue of Washington Monthly, calls “a new consensus of mutual obligation: that the poor deserve more help and that society has a right to set certain standards of individual effort.”

“A strong cadre of minority professionals...[is needed to] contribute not only the professional skills of their respective disciplines but also the perspectives, cultural understanding and language skills of their respective language and ethnic communities.”

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Programs that meet both sides of that burden of proof seem likely to be those that will flourish in the '90s. If the effort is made, generosity will be there—but students must meet specific responsibilities and obligations. In other words, they must earn their rewards.

The message of services integration puts a new spin on a perspective drawn not from the '60s but from an earlier era in social welfare history—and in American history. Until recently, I have used the phrase “Pragmatism is the only native American philosophy” as a way of trying to explain why we are so mired in a narrow program mentality, in which we see a problem, invent a program, and assume the problem is solved. I used this phrase in Phoenix a few months ago, and learned something that will probably stay with me a long time. After my remarks, a woman who works a great deal with Navaho and other tribes came up and gently explained that the real “Native American philosophy” was and remains services integration in its essence: treating the whole person in the whole community, holistically, seeking harmony. For such a person, treating only one of the needs of a child or family would be inconceivable, because it was only the whole person in the family in the community that would make any sense at all.

We need to remember that we are trying to treat whole people in whole communities in our rediscovery of services integration. We need both an ethic of mutual responsibility and, as Edelman and Radin observe, we must “rediscover...shared values.”

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FOR FURTHER READING


ADDITIONAL RESOURCES

Center for Law and Social Policy (CLASP)
Alan W. Houseman, Executive Director
Mark Greenberg, Senior Staff Attorney
1616 P. Street N.W.
Suite 450
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 328-5140

CLASP works to establish effective linkages between U.S. welfare and education systems to help address the problems of America’s poor families. The Center provides information and technical assistance to state and federal officials, school personnel, and legal and policy advocates.

Center for the Study of Social Policy (CSSP)
Tom Joe, Director
Cheryl Rogers, Senior Research Associate
1250 Eye Street N.W.
Suite 503
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 371-1565

The Center provides information on the principles of interagency and intergovernmental planning, budgeting, and service delivery.

Child Welfare League of America, Inc. (CWLA)
Earl N. Stuck, Jr., Director of Residential Care Services
440 First Street N.W.
Suite 310
Washington, DC 20001-2085
(202) 638-2952

CWLA is a 70-year old organization of over 630 child welfare agencies from across the United States and Canada. Together with the 150,000 staff members from our member agencies, CWLA works to ensure quality services for over two million abused, neglected, homeless, and otherwise troubled children, youth and families.

Children's Defense Fund (CDF)
Denise Alston, Senior Program Associate
Education Division
122 C Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 628-8787

CDF, a private, non-profit advocacy organization, gathers data, publishes reports, and provides information on key issues affecting children. It also monitors the development and implementation of federal and state policies, provides technical assistance and support to a network of state and local child advocates, organizations, and public officials and pursues an annual legislative agenda.

Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO)
Cynthia G. Brown, Director, Resource Center on Educational Equity
Glenda Partee, Assistant Director
400 North Capitol Street
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 393-8159

CCSSO is a non-profit organization composed of the heads of the 57 departments of public education in every state, the District of Columbia, the Department of Defense Dependent Schools, and five extra-state jurisdictions. The CCSSO Resource Center on Educational Equity is responsible for implementing various CCSSO leadership initiatives to provide better educational services to children and youth at risk of school failure.

Education Commission of the States (ECS)
Robert M. Paluch, Director of Policy Studies
707 17th Street, Suite 2700
Denver, CO 80202-3427
(303) 299-3600

Created in 1965, ECS is an interstate compact that helps state leaders improve the quality of education. ECS conducts policy research, surveys and special studies; maintains an information clearinghouse; organizes state, regional and national forums; provides technical assistance to states; and fosters nationwide leadership and cooperation in education.

Elementary School Center
Allan Sheddin, Jr., Executive Director
2 East 103rd Street
New York, NY 10029
(212) 289-5929

ESC is a national study and resource center committed to elementary and middle schools and their constituents: children, families and staff. ESC also fosters interaction among practitioners in many fields.

Family Resource Coalition
Judy Langford Carter, Executive Director
200 S. Michigan Avenue
Suite 1520
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 341-0900

The Family Resource Coalition is a national organization whose immediate goal is to improve the content and expand the number of programs available to parents that strengthen families. The Coalition serves programs, parents, researchers, and policy makers by providing information and technical assistance related to prevention program models, strategies, and research.
Institute for Educational Leadership (IEL)
Jacqueline P. Danzberger, Director of Governance Programs
Martin J. Blank, Senior Associate
1001 Connecticut Avenue N.W.
Suite 310
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 822-4445
IEL is a non-profit organization dedicated to collaborative problem-solving strategies in education, and among education, human services and other sectors. The Institute's programs focus on leadership development, cross-sector alliances, demographic analyses, business-education partnerships, school restructuring, and programs concerning at-risk youth.

Joining Forces
Janet E. Levy, Director
Sheri Dunn, Project Associate
Robin Kimbrough, Project Associate
400 North Capitol Street
Suite 379
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 393-8159
Joining Forces promotes collaboration between education and social welfare agencies on behalf of children and families at risk. Information is available on strategies and programs for successful collaboration.

National Alliance of Business (NAB)
Center for Excellence in Education
Esther Schaefer, Senior Vice President and Executive Director
Terri Bergman, Director, Program Activities
1201 New York Avenue N.W.
Suite 730
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 289-2888
NAB seeks to help build a quality workforce for America that will provide business with highly qualified, job ready workers. The Alliance carries out its mission by working with private employers and through public/private partnerships.

National Alliance of Pupil Services Organizations
Rhonda Talley
c/o APA Practice Directorate
1200 17th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 331-8769
NAPSO is a coalition of national professional organizations whose members provide a variety of remedial, supportive and preventive services required to assist children to benefit fully from their education.

National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Social Welfare Organizations, Inc.
Gordon A. Raley, Executive Director
Kae G. Dakin, Director of Membership Services
1319 F Street, N.W., Suite 601
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 347-2080
The National Assembly is an association of national voluntary human service organizations that work together to advance the mission of each agency and the human service sector as a whole. The Assembly facilitates organizational advocacy for public policies, programs and resources which are responsive to human service organizations and those they serve.

National Association of Counties (NACo)
Michael L. Benjamin, Associate Legislative Director
Marlou Falls, Research Associate
440 First Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20001
NACo, the only national organization representing county government in the US, serves as a national advocate for county concerns and assists in finding innovative methods for meeting challenges counties face. In human services, NACo's mission is to aid in developing programs designed to encourage self-support, self-reliance, strengthened family life, and the protection of children and adults.

National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
William T. Pound, Executive Director
Candace Romig, Group Director
Human Services Department
1560 Broadway
Suite 700
Denver, CO 80202-5140
(303) 830-2200
NCSL serves the legislators and staffs of the nation's 50 states, its commonwealths and territories. NCSL is a nonpartisan organization with three objectives: 1) to improve the quality and effectiveness of state legislatures; 2) to foster interstate communication and cooperation; and 3) to ensure states a strong and cohesive voice in the federal system. The Children, Youth, and Families Program of NCSL offers an information clearinghouse, research assistance, technical assistance, and publications on state policy issues vital to children and families.

National Governors' Association (NGA)
Evelyn Ganzglass, Director, Training and Employment Program
Linda McCartney, Director, Consortium for the Implementation of the Family Support Act (APWA, NACO, CCSSO, and NGA)
Susan Traiman, Director, Education Program
444 North Capitol Street
Suite 250
Washington, DC 20001
(202) 624-5300
NGA, representing the Governors of the 50 states and the territories, seeks to influence the shaping and implementation of national policy and to apply creative leadership to the solution of state problems. NGA provides assistance to Governors and their staff in the areas of education, social services, employment training, and health policy through research, publications, conferences, and consultation.
National League of Cities (NLC)

John E. Kyle, Project Director
1301 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20004
(202) 626-3030

The NLC represents 1,400 cities directly and 15,000 cities and towns through 49 states municipal leagues. It serves as an advocate for its members in Washington, DC; provides training and technical assistance to municipal officials; and undertakes research and policy analysis on issues of importance to the nation’s cities. The Project on Children and Families in Cities is an ongoing effort to encourage and assist local officials in meeting the needs of children and families.

National School Boards Association

Thomas A. Shannon, Executive Director
Philip A. Smith, Communications Director
1680 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22180
(703) 838-6722

The National School Boards Association is a not-for-profit organization with four basic objectives: 1) advance the quality of education in the nation’s public elementary and secondary schools, 2) provide informational services and management training programs to local school board members, 3) represent the interest of school boards before Congress, federal agencies, and the courts, and 4) strengthen local citizen control of the schools, whereby education policy is determined by school boards directly accountable to the community.

National Youth Employment Coalition (NYEC)

Linda R. Laughlin, Executive Director
1501 Broadway, Room 1111
New York, NY 10036
(212) 840-1834

NYEC, a nonprofit membership organization, has existed since 1979 to increase and promote opportunities for the education, employment, and training of disadvantaged youth. Through a range of activities aimed at disseminating information, monitoring legislation, providing technical assistance, and promoting collaborative efforts, the Coalition brings together 60 member organizations concerned with youth employment.

United States Conference of Mayors

J. Thomas Cochran, Executive Director
Laura Dekoven Waxman, Assistant Executive Director
1620 Eye Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20006
(202) 293-7330

Founded in 1932, the U.S. Conference of Mayors is the official nonpartisan organization of the more than 900 cities with a population of 30,000 or more. Each city is represented in the Conference by its chief elected official, the Mayor. The principal role of the Conference of Mayors is to aid the development of effective national urban policy, to serve as a legislative action force in federal-city relations, to ensure that federal policy meets urban needs, and to provide Mayors with leadership and management tools of value to their cities.

Wider Opportunities for Women (WOW)

Cynthia Marano, Executive Director
1325 G Street N.W.
Lower Level
Washington, DC 20005
(202) 638-3143

WOW is a national women’s employment organization which works to achieve equality of opportunity and economic independence for women. WOW coordinates the Women’s Work Force Network, connecting 450 local employment and training programs and serving 300,000 women each year. WOW’s resources include program models and technical assistance guides related to combining literacy and employment training for single mothers.

William T. Grant Foundation

Commission on Work, Family and Citizenship
Harold Howe II, Chairperson
Samuel Halperin, Study Director
Atela I. Melenville, Senior Associate
1001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 301
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 775-9731

The Grant Commission has released two major reports and two dozen background and information papers on the special needs of the Forgotten Half, the approximately 20 million young people between the ages of 16 and 24 not likely to pursue a college education. The Commission’s office works to implement the recommendations of both reports, and to improve the school-to-work transition of the Forgotten Half by raising public and scholarly awareness, building coalitions, sharing information, consulting, and providing technical assistance to federal, state, and other policy makers.