A historical overview of the relationship between the business community and the Boston public schools is provided in this paper, with a focus on outcomes of the Boston Compact—a commitment by the corporate community to provide Boston public school graduates with access to jobs if the Boston schools improved attendance, achievement, and completion rates. A review of business community activities is designed to refute the notion that Boston companies withdrew their financial support of public schools because of the school's failure to meet the compact's performance standards. The major point of this paper is that Boston corporations have supported public schools for over 20 years, not always successfully but with generally positive results. Lessons learned from the business/school collaborative experiences are discussed. An appendix contains information about the Institute for Educational Leadership. (9 references) (LMI)
Supporting Leaders for Tomorrow

CORPORATIONS AND URBAN SCHOOL REFORM: LESSONS FROM BOSTON

Occasional Paper #12
CORPORATIONS AND URBAN SCHOOL REFORM: LESSONS FROM BOSTON

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The Institute for Educational Leadership, Inc.
January, 1991
PREFACE

The Institute for Educational Leadership (IEL) with the initial support of the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation has been exploring the evolving relationship between the public schools and the business community. IEL has been particularly interested in examining the extent of business involvement with and commitment to resolving the complex issues pertaining to educational reform.

As we pursue these important issues, we plan to continue to share our information with interested parties from the worlds of business, education and government.

The enclosed Occasional Paper #12, Corporations and Urban School Reform: Lessons from Boston, was prepared by Joseph M. Cronin, President of the Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corporation, and a veteran policy analyst and participant in Massachusetts school affairs. We would welcome your reactions and suggestions for other possible subjects for this series.

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January, 1991
Corporations and Urban School Reform: Lessons from Boston

Joseph M. Cronin

Boston business corporations have reached out to help public education in Boston for more than twenty years. What has been learned from these collaborations?

This paper responds to widely circulated reports that Boston companies backed away from the public schools in 1989 because the schools had failed to meet the performance standards agreed to in the Boston Compact. Most of the nation did not know that another team of corporations and foundations had raised a permanent endowment for the Boston Plan for Excellence in the Public Schools. Others did not know that a new agreement, Compact II, will extend the compact relationship into 1994.

Some have asked whether or not business involvement resulted in total structural reform of Boston Schools. This assumes erroneously that corporations in the 1980's put money behind that goal. In fact the Boston Compact was created mainly to improve the transition from school to work or college. The Boston Plan for Excellence, an urban education foundation, raised funds for teacher-initiated proposals to improve instruction and help students find enough financial aid for college.

The major point of this paper is that Boston corporations are not new participants in public education attracted by the reform movement of the 1980's, but rather have tried to support the city schools for more than twenty years, not always successfully but with excellent and essentially altruistic intentions. Boston for more than two decades has been a laboratory for corporate support of urban school improvement and reform.

The fundamental question remains -- what lessons from Boston's relatively long history of school-business relationships might help to guide corporate and foundation executives willing to help urban schools in the 1990's?

Early Precedents

Business collaboration with Boston Schools began even before the 1974-75 desegregation case. A Harvard University policy research team studying Boston schools from 1968-70 recommended greater assistance from universities, cultural groups and businesses.

The 1970 Harvard report found that "during the 1950's and early 1960's, with isolated exceptions, the Boston business community turned its back on the Boston Schools". The
schools were viewed by most business leaders as too political and resistant to change.

However, the exceptions as of 1970 were prophetic indeed:

1. The New England Mutual Life Insurance Company had already joined forces with Boston school administrators to study the possibility of an industry-education council, and offered to advise the schools on projecting a better public image.
2. The New England Telephone Company had offered to help Dorchester High School create expanded work study opportunities.
3. The New England Merchants Bank and Polaroid each offered to assist the curriculum and community relations departments of the Boston school system.

Richard Sovde, the Harvard Graduate School of Education specialist on corporate initiatives, reviewed pamphlets from the US Chamber of Commerce, the Industrial Conference Board, and a Fortune magazine survey on how business might get involved with schools. He found that California in the 1960's was the hot bed of industry-education councils, a concept later advocated by Willard Wirtz after his service as US Secretary of Labor and which emerged as Private Industry Councils in 1978 legislation. One of the 1970 recommendations was to form a work education council in Boston.

The 1970 Harvard report also called for leadership from the Boston Chamber of Commerce, the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the Mayor's office, the schools, and the Central Labor Council to implement the recommendations.

Not much happened until 1974-75 when federal district court Judge W. Arthur Garrity encouraged area universities to pair up with Boston's senior high schools which, with varying amounts of enthusiasm and reluctance, they did -- assisted by state desegregation grants which paid for high school coordinators. Corporate sponsors -- a bank, or insurance company, utility, or manufacturer each formed partnerships with the 17 high schools. The Chamber of Commerce, National Alliance of Business and school department formed a Trilateral Commission on Educational Quality to coordinate the corporate partnerships.

Unfortunately, Boston's public school desegregation experience in 1974-76 was turbulent, in part because the elected members of the Boston School Committee and citizens in three of Boston's neighborhoods resisted the court decisions. The Judge issued additional rounds of court orders to mandate the implementation of the court rulings, the city lost a major property tax abatement case, the school superintendency resembled a revolving door, and Time
magazine in 1980 dubbed Boston's schools a national disgrace.

Boston's corporate leadership found the rapidly deteriorating reputation of the city's schools untenable and the loss of confidence in local public education unacceptable. Several bank and insurance company executives during the 1980's resolved to expand their interest in the urban schools.

Another factor positively affected public school reform in Boston at this time. When the Carter administration ended in 1980, Boston won back a large share of the activist intellectuals who had worked in Washington on the federal youth manpower and education initiatives of the late 1970's -- William Spring, Robert Schwartz, Eric Butler among others.

Spring, as Deputy Director of the White House Domestic Council, had worked on youth employment policy and assisted Vice President Mondale in developing policy solutions to the "school-to-work transition" problem. In 1978 the Congress agreed to provide additional Labor Department funds for training but only if private employers participated in a Private Industry Council to support corporate job development, averting the scandals of public employment that scarred the old CETA program. The 1978 Youth Education Partnership Act (YEDPA) reform, however, did not focus sufficient high school attention on the basic skills of disadvantaged youth, one prerequisite to teenage employability. The Carter-Mondale team subsequently offered the Youth Act of 1980, a two billion dollar education and labor initiative which would require high schools to set new goals, develop bolder instructional strategies, and compete for program funds. Although approved by the House, the proposal died in the U.S. Senate during the Iran hostage crisis and election campaign; however, Spring and his friends brought several ideas back to Massachusetts. Spring recalls that the Youth Act would have funded job experiences for at-risk young people through collaboration with local employment and training programs. He helped design the Boston Compact "using the Youth Act as a model. The basic principles of the legislation -- competition, accountability, and combining work experience and opportunity with school improvement -- are key elements in the Compact," Spring subsequently explained.

The Boston Private Industry Council (PIC) emerged as the most important agent of change. Created under the Job Training Partnership Act, the PIC was a group appointed by the Mayor, but with a majority of private employers, to create and implement strategies of job training, planning, manpower development and placements. The PIC was chaired by a series of top corporate executives -- William Edgerly of the State Street Bank, John Larkin Thompson of Blue Cross/Blue Shield, and Frank Morris, President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
Morris hired Bill Spring as an advisor, subsequently as vice-president of the regional Federal Reserve Board to monitor and help run the PIC and Trilateral Commission in Boston.

The original Boston Compact was essentially an accord, an agreement drawn up by the PIC between Boston's employers and educators proposing that Boston public school graduates would be given access to summer jobs upon graduation if the Boston schools improved attendance, achievement and completion rates. Some very specific goals and objectives were set in Compact I.

**For Business:**

These were the commitments:
- 400 employers were to be recruited as signatories to this agreement;
- 600 summer jobs would be provided to Boston youth; and
- 3000 city public school graduates would be given priority for jobs in Boston.

**For the Boston Public Schools:**

These were the objectives:
- test scores in math and reading would be improved by 5 percent per year;
- attendance, which averaged 75 percent in 1980-81, would be raised by 5 percent each year;
- drop out rates would be reduced by 5 percent each year (from 43 percent); and
- college and job placements would increase by 5 percent each year

The Private Industry Council, initially a well funded organization with a staff of 35, would handle job referrals and placements, while the school department would establish a small core staff to coordinate high school efforts.

The Boston Compact won instant nationwide acclaim nationally as a constructive yet tough-minded commitment by the corporate community. The "business" compact was followed by two additional agreements:

a. A Higher Education Compact pledging resources to achieve a 25 percent increase in the admission of Boston public high school graduates to area universities over a five year period.
b. A Trade Union Compact pledging an expansion of 5 percent per year of union apprenticeships for city public school students.

The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce Education Committee led the effort to sign up 400 companies beyond the larger companies represented on the PIC board. Resistance to signing came in three parts:

1. Unemployment rates were relatively high at that time (1982); Jim Darr, a PIC executive at the time, remembers 9.5 percent unemployment in Boston.  
2. Corporate attorneys were concerned that priority hiring not be considered a legally enforceable employment quota system or job guarantee.
3. Some businesses were not experienced with minority recruitment, or at least had never hired more than 4 or 5 percent in a city with an adult minority population of more than 15 percent.

A legally acceptable "promise to consider applications" was built into the agreement and 300 Boston area companies signed up in the first six months. The remaining 100 were recruited over the next two years. While 500 summer jobs were identified in 1982, the PIC placed 2000 students in summer jobs in 1985 and 3500 in 1990, a massive effort and a major accomplishment.

The nation in 1983 awoke to the fire bells of A Nation at Risk, the report of U.S. Education Secretary Bell's National Commission on Excellence and to the National Science Board's Educating Americans for the 21st Century which began with the finding that:

"Alarming numbers of young Americans are ill-equipped to work in, contribute to, profit from and enjoy our increasingly technological society."

One of many National Science Board recommendations was that "local school boards foster partnerships between the school board, administrators, local officials, business and industry, labor leaders and parents in order to facilitate constructive change" especially in promoting math, science and technology education.  

Similar recommendations accompanied many of the major reports on education. The prestigious Committee on Economic Development in 1985 issued a document on business and the public schools called Investing in Our Children which described the Boston Compact as a clearly focused strategy to increase employability.  

CED urged business leaders to focus on policy-making and lend expertise in business management, math, science and technology
curriculum, and employability not alone but through collaboratives and intermediaries.

The National Alliance for Business in 1986 proposed to the US Department of Health and Human Services a replication of the Boston Compact in other cities called, "Keeping Inner City Youth in School Through Private Sector Job Guarantees". Seven sites were selected in 1987 and five more in 1988 with NAB serving as convener, catalyst, provider of technical assistance and communicator on progress achieved.

Was the Boston Compact a useful model for other cities? The generally positive answer was hedged:

1. The twelve other cities almost immediately added their own public school improvement features such as pre-school programs, school based management, field trips to colleges, donations of computers and software -- none of which were part of the first Boston Compact.

2. Boston decided during the fourth year (1987) to evaluate the Compact since the five year term was almost up. The PIC leadership felt the schools needed to achieve more of the educational objectives and that business should demand more of the schools prior to any renewal of the Compact.

Meanwhile, several other education initiatives had been launched in Boston which allowed Boston business to support not only jobs but other measures to assist teachers and principals.

The Bank of New England in 1983 announced a program to recognize outstanding teachers in the Boston public schools with cash awards which they could use for any purpose -- travel, materials, study or personal use. Boston annually nominated excellent teachers for a state wide "teacher of the year" contest but never had anyone offered these teachers recognition in the form of more money. The Boston Teachers Union, beginning serious contract negotiations, expressed outrage at what looked like "merit pay" and potentially a union-beating ploy by business. Bank of New England President Roderick MacDougall agreed to table the proposal, to let tempers cool and to pick a more favorable time for a fresh proposal aimed at stimulating improved teaching, his personal commitment.

Meanwhile the Bank of Boston, the largest bank in the region, prepared for its 200th birthday in 1984. The bank rejected the idea of a physical gift to the city (such as a statue), pondered the formation of an urban scholarship program, but instead listened carefully to a panel of
senior educators at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, especially Dean Patricia Graham, and Frank Keppel and Harold "Doc" Howe, former US Commissioners of Education, who suggested giving attention and resources to the needs of teachers at individual schools.

The Bank's Senior Vice President Kenneth Rossano recommended to Richard Hill, Chairman, and William Brown, Bank of Boston President:

1. a program of small grants to school faculties to promote excellence and innovation, and
2. a permanent endowment for Boston Schools with a board broadly representative of business, higher education, civic and community leaders.

The Boston Teachers Union President and Mayor were among the appreciative audience at the Old State House when bank officials announced a gift of $1.5 million to finance the School Initiative Grant program which would exist in perpetuity.

Thus was born The Boston Plan for Excellence in the Public Schools, a response to the Nation at Risk excellence report, to the CED and other appeals for business support, and to Harvard’s senior lecturers who suggested considering bottom-up school improvement proposals from teachers and principals.

The Bank of New England then came forth with a fresh proposal offering $60,000 in summer staff development stipends to as many as sixty teachers per year each year for five years, a total of $300,000. The John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company in 1985 gave $1 million for middle school athletic and academic grants, parallel to the Bank of Boston’s school improvement grants. A law firm, Goodwin, Procter and Hoar, contributed $1 million for early childhood pilot programs. The Public Education Fund of Pittsburgh offered the Boston Plan funds to develop a long range plan and one new idea, a youth philanthropy initiative called School and Its Neighborhood (SAIN), a small grant program for high school students to award to a local agency. This collection of programs was placed under the protective umbrella of the Boston Foundation which housed and help finance the Boston Plan for Excellence.

The Boston Plan for Excellence differed from the Compact in several ways:

1. Except for The Bank of New England and Public Education Fund grants, these were permanent endowments for school initiatives administered by a group of donors and private citizens; and
2. the emphasis was neither employability, school-to-work transition, nor system wide reform but rather support for individual school faculties aimed at instructional excellence.

The conceptual origins of the Compact might be traced to YEDPA and the Youth Act; or simply an effort to help Boston youth prepare for jobs. The origins of the Boston Plan flow from several national proposals for business support for excellence. Of course, some of the supporters of the Compact or Boston Plan did not really respond so much to national reports but more fundamentally to an urge to repair a presumably broken school system and to offer hope to students and their teachers.

A third stream of ideas came out of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce and the Massachusetts Higher Education Assistance Corporation (MHEAC). In 1981, the Chamber, then a membership group of 2000 business and social service agencies raised $30,000 for a scholarship fund for vocational education (called STRIVE) and launched an annual subscription drive for a Program of Academic Year Scholarship (PAYS). Ken Rossanc, President of the Chamber Executives Club, promoted these initiatives and, when named chairman of the Chamber of Commerce in 1983, created an education committee. He announced in May 1984 an initiative called the Action Center for Education Services and Scholarships (ACCESS). This idea was not only compatible with the Boston Compact but would help meet the Compact goal of five percent annual gains in college attendance. Architects of ACCESS included Robert Sperber of the Higher Education Partnership, Robert Schwartz, the first director of the Compact and later of The Boston Plan for Excellence, and Harry Johnson of Polaroid who arranged an important start-up grant.

MHEAC contributed staff leadership for the higher education work group of the Compact, for the creation of the Higher Education Information Center at the Boston Public Library, and an early pilot of ACCESS that drew upon school volunteers of Boston to advise Boston high school students on how to obtain financial aid. This initiative grew out of discussions between Superintendent Robert Spillane, Joseph Cronin and Jody Cale of MHEAC in 1981. The use of school volunteers was a prototype but not an enduring source of expertise. The preferred model became the Cleveland (Ohio) Scholarship Program which employed financial aid counselors who would provide expert advice to students and parents.

The New England, formerly New England Mutual Life Insurance company, decided to donate $1 million to endow the ACCESS program. Edward E. Phillips, Chief Executive of The New England agreed that ACCESS should be part of The Boston Plan for Excellence and chaired
the Access Committee for the first four years. Further, he persuaded the Boston Foundation to offer ACCESS a challenge grant of one million dollars, raised $2.5 million in pledges from 60 companies and foundations, and created such a positive climate for ACCESS that MHEAC gave $1 million to endow part of the counseling and information costs. By 1987 corporate pledges totalling $5.5 million made ACCESS the largest component of the Boston Plan for Excellence.

The announcement of the $5.5 million ACCESS program was enhanced by an amendment to the Boston Compact that Boston public school graduates who completed college would also be given priority consideration upon graduation for professional and managerial jobs in Boston companies. This announcement attracted widespread national media attention and stimulated comparable fund drives in more than a dozen major metropolitan areas.

Boston Plan/ACCESS staff were hired to help students get into and stay in college; PIC staff would, as needed, help arrange the opportunities for interviews as graduation approached four or five years later. The ACCESS Committee recruited key business executives from the Private Industry Council; The Higher Education Partnership, meanwhile, raised very substantial sums in annual scholarships from Boston area universities -- $2 million alone from Boston University each year and dozens of scholarships for Boston public school graduates to attend Northeastern, Boston College and other area colleges as well.

Effectiveness of and Difficulties Encountered by Boston Programs

The ACCESS results as of 1990 were considered very positive:

1. the number of Boston public school graduates attending college rose from 50 percent to 60 percent; and
2. the percentages of those ACCESS students who stayed in college rose to approximately 80 percent as of 1989 when the first four year class graduated from College (previously only 30-40 percent of Boston public school graduates enrolling in college actually graduated).

Could the Compact and ACCESS programs be improved? Were there disappointments? What were the lessons from Boston? One lesson is that the battle for many students minds may be lost by the tenth grade.
1. The offers of jobs and scholarships, so attractive from a corporate or middle class viewpoint, did not by themselves stem the drop-out rate which remained 35-40 percent.

2. No scholarship program by itself can provide the basic academic skills needed to prepare for the admissions tests, the essays, the grade and academic standards.

3. Parents, teachers and administrators collectively must support the idea of college attendance not as a privilege but as an important career option for urban youth.

4. An incentive program such as ACCESS may need an early intervention or a middle school component to persuade students and parents in grades 6 or 7 that money for college will be available if students will stay in school until grade 12.

Was enough done by school officials to stimulate school support? The Boston school leadership, especially two superintendents 1981-90, strongly supported the COMPACT initiatives:

1. Superintendent Spillane required high school headmasters and staff from each school to attend a week long planning session to design program improvements;

2. Superintendent Spillane created a four person unit in the central office to guide the Compact effort from 1982 through 1986; and

3. The Private Industry Council raised outside funds for a Compact Ventures Program with JTPA funds to help at-risk students with personal and academic problems -- with a staff coordinator appointed for each senior high school.

However, by 1986 the PIC realized that Boston's school dropout reduction goals were not going to be achieved and arranged for a May conference on dropouts, sponsored by the Committee on Economic Development, State Street Bank and Federal Reserve Bank. Superintendent Laval Wilson proposed expanding Project Promise, his longer day middle school initiatives and compiled his own very elaborate Boston Education Plan.

How effective was the Boston Compact in achieving its specific goals?

First of all, the schools and the students received a strong message that Boston's business leadership was concerned about school attendance, achievement scores, staying in school, and was willing to offer summer jobs, part time jobs and jobs after graduation.

Second, the schools began to concentrate on the specific goals and objectives with these results 1983-88:

1. high school attendance reportedly rose from 75 percent to 80 percent;
2. Test scores on the Metropolitan Achievement Test rose in four of the five years so that most of the twelfth graders were above average by 1988 (although ten of the smaller high schools were at the 40th percentile);

3. The percentage of graduates going on to college after graduation rose from 50 percent to 60 percent; and

4. The numbers and percentage of Black and Hispanic youth gaining employment grew to parity with Caucasian graduates of the Boston Public Schools, a statistic most remarkable given a generation of national research on urban minority youth employment patterns.

1985 Black and White High School Graduates Employed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>White</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>62%</td>
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How effective was The Boston Plan for Excellence? The first program under The Boston Plan was the provision of small grants to teachers and principals. No formal evaluation has yet been conducted. However, the John Hancock Insurance Company program for the middle schools helped stimulate improved attitudes and productivity at several middle schools.

At least five of the 21 middle schools have made impressive strides towards improving student performance. Eleanor Farrar visited middle schools and described the positive impact of HEART grants at seven of them.

Were the overall improvements in test scores due to the COMPACT or the Boston Plan for Excellence? Probably not. Superintendent Robert Spillane had insisted on new school performance and graduation standards, transferred or retired half of the middle school principals in 1984, published a controversial score card on the relative test score performances of each middle school and allowed several middle schools to experiment with school-based management. His successor, Laval Wilson, concentrated state and city resources into three middle schools under the banner of "Project Promise" which included a longer school day (90 minutes) and six day week (Saturday morning classes) with additional pay ($4000 for the teachers at the Timilty Middle School). Project Promise spelled out higher expectations for
students in the number and quality of written compositions, science projects and other products; these initiatives may show positive results by the mid 1990's at the high school level; as of 1989 middle school morale and productivity and recognition has improved.

The ACCESS scholarship program during 1989 evaluated its first graduating class from four year colleges and universities. Boston officials worry about the retention rate of public school graduates. As few as 35 percent of Boston public school graduates have stayed in college long enough to get a degree, according to statistics at the Boston Higher Education Retention project at Simmons College.

However, 75 percent of the ACCESS recipients of counseling, support and last dollar scholarships completed college and another 5 percent, possibly more, would finish in one or two more years, bringing the completion percentage to 80 percent or higher. Most of the ACCESS recipients were minorities and many graduated from district high schools other than the very selective city-wide college examination schools.

But why was Boston's public high school dropout experience so disappointing? These are possible explanations:

1. Boston's employment situation improved markedly during the 1980's. The city unemployment rate dropped from 9 percent to 3 percent. While top corporate executives urged staying in school, hundreds of small businesses invited 16 and 17 year olds to work full time to meet the consumer demands of an overheated Massachusetts economy.

2. Boston's drug market grew more lucrative, especially with the introduction of crack, a profitable and affordable cocaine derivative. The Los Angeles and New York City syndrome of youth gangs, quick profits and violence damaged the capacity of Boston schools to hold 17 year olds in school when large sums of dollars could be earned on the street.

3. Many of Boston's high schools remained faithful to the early 20th century preoccupation with traditional sorting and screening functions. If you didn't behave, you were suspended and expelled. If you didn't achieve, you were punished and humiliated. Just as the Yankee school masters of the 19th century tyrannized the new immigrants, so now schools tried to teach but also pushed out Boston's low achievers and especially the rowdy non-conformists. Substantial numbers of pregnant teenagers dropped out by grade nine or ten, only a few of them continuing in special high school programs for young mothers.
4. Boston's schools did not encourage much vocational or apprenticeship training or a caring environment for the below average student. Other nations, offer much more attractive and dynamic apprenticeship programs, especially in the European countries.

5. A metropolitan program called METCO and diocesan schools siphoned off several thousand of the most academically oriented students.

**Comparisons with Other Programs**

How does Boston's experience with school partnerships compare with reports of comparable efforts in city schools in the rest of the nation?

The National Alliance of Business (NAB), reviewing partnerships in general and the Boston Compact in particular, drew these conclusions:

1. Individual companies cannot be very effective alone but must join or build a coalition, a structure "to orchestrate action and keep leadership engaged."

2. Business executives need to take time to study education issues and the politics of education, then to develop mutual trust with local educators.

3. The process of educational reform may require considerable patience; quick fixes will not work and a long-term commitment is required.

4. Schools need strong linkages with social service providers to succeed especially urban schools serving large numbers of disadvantaged children.

5. Business and school partners must develop clearly written statements of goals, objectives, timetables, and performance measures -- and a mechanism for refining plans.

A 1989 conference between the Alliance and the Institute for Educational Leadership (IEL) concluded also that the local and state structures for educational governance may need drastic change with more flexibility, more collaboration with human service providers and with general purpose government, e.g. mayors.

Mario Pena, former director of ACCESS and the Boston Plan for Excellence contends that a six year endeavor cannot be expected to cure a problem that has its roots deeply embedded in cultural attitudes -- racism, elitism -- that are many decades old.

The NAB/IEL conference moves from the focus on "What does business need to learn?" to raise the question "what do educators need to learn?"
The Boston Teachers Union, and Albert Shanker of the American Federation of Teachers, have learned a lesson -- that teachers must accept some "restructuring" proposals to obtain corporate support for early childhood programs, smaller class size, and substantial salary increases for career teachers willing to assume more responsibility. AFT officers understand that high dropout rates and below average scores are unacceptable in a competitive high tech world economy. If teachers can participate in school based management, the AFT will support increased autonomy for schools, choice among public schools, reduced reliance on seniority rights, and more flexibility from city and state regulations.

The lessons for school faculties and individual teachers are ones rarely taught to them in university classes:

1. Corporations have begun to understand that the U.S. cannot compete internationally without more effective urban schools.
2. The best companies will make long term commitments, or even "endow" program in perpetuity without dictating what the curriculum changes must be.
3. Old fashioned high schools emphasizing academic competition and conventional discipline may need to create or tolerate smaller "learning academies" which reach teenagers who can't succeed in larger, impersonal settings.
4. Schools must stress collaborative or cooperative learning, computer skills, and higher order reasoning skills.
5. Teachers may need to spend months, even a semester or more, unlearning conventional teaching techniques and learning how to help direct the high technology or collaborative learning modes needed for the 21st century.

The sense of organized teacher leaders in Boston, Miami, Rochester, Pittsburgh and elsewhere is that change is expected, reform may be rewarded, and that corporate support will be necessary, if public schools are to survive. The NEA, for decades so strongly opposed to testing for teachers or students, or to any radical reform, will now endorse some reform experiments in each state, which is in part a response to corporate criticism.

What else is needed to save our cities, to bring the children of the cities to new levels of productivity and literacy? The Boston business community in 1988-89 created a Compact steering committee with PIC, the AFL-CIO and university participation, along with the mayor and Superintendent Wilson. To dramatize the need for additional changes, PIC chairman Ferdinand Colleredo-Mansfield announced on October 31, 1989 -- with the Mayor and AFT
President Al Shanker present -- that a Compact extension might not be signed unless the School Committee agreed to:

1. implement a new pupil assignment plan that would offer Boston parents more choice; and
2. a new teacher contract that would expand parent and teacher participation in school site management.

The School Committee members expressed concern about the external pressure on them, but by February approved a new student assignment plan and in May, months ahead of contract expiration, approved a bold new union contract including many of the Miami and Rochester contract features, providing for:

1. school site councils to recruit and hire new staff, design schedules and programs;
2. an annual education plan with goals, plans, budgets and measures of success;
3. waivers from the union contracts, state and local policies with consent of a joint union-management committee;
4. provision for mentor teachers, peer assistance programs for teachers, a professional development academy and a practice demonstration school (on the model of Pittsburgh's Schenley High School); and
5. Replacement or reassignment of some or all of school staff who failed to meet goals in the 1990's.

The March 1989 Compact (Compact II) stated five sharply defined goals and sixteen very specific school reform measures. The five goals stipulated:

1. individual school site management, with flexibility in operations in return for meeting performance objectives;
2. more parent involvement, 50 percent or more of the parents to sign a parent pledge to enforce attendance and homework requirements;
3. follow-up services to the graduating classes for four years, with help from unions, ACCESS, the Higher Education Information Center, universities and the Boston Schools;
4. high school completion, including vocational and alternative diploma programs; and
5. increased performance on state wide and national tests and on a new broad based assessment program incorporating some of the ideas of T.R. Sizer at Brown and George Madaus at Boston College which move beyond conventional scorecards or assessment procedures.
What is important to note is that the business, higher education and public school communities, along with the Mayor, agreed to plans for urban school improvement to last well into the 1990s.

Another proposal measure calls for restructured high schools and a comprehensive curriculum, a challenge for Boston which admits academically talented students to two very popular Latin schools at the end of 6th grade reducing the academic competition at another dozen high schools.

What else was Boston doing in 1990?

1. Boston University established a Leadership Academy to groom new Boston school administrators who will be trained by School of Management as well as School of Education faculty.
2. The state declared a willingness to support Carnegie School demonstration projects and invest $100,000 more a year in "opportunity schools" the fifty schools with lowest test scores (more than forty are in Boston). Funds to implement these ideas may have to wait for a turn around in the state economy.
3. The federal government offered Boston a three year, $750,000 grant for a clinical school to implement teacher retraining.
4. The business community supported the Mayor’s efforts to replace the elected school board with a smaller appointed board.
5. The Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce education committee recruited technology partners to finance integrated computer labs at 24 elementary and middle schools to bolster student achievement in math, science and reading.

The Boston corporate school reform strategy for the 1990’s became considerably more complex and sophisticated. Participants now regard the earlier efforts as stages in the learning process. At least sixty corporations have, by contributing to the Boston Plan for Excellence, made a permanent commitment to school improvement. The support of the local, state and national teacher unions has led to a landmark Boston Public Schools teacher contract. No one underestimates the challenge in Boston, or in any other American city which serves as port of entry or shelter to the poor and disadvantaged. No one believes that urban schools in the year 2000 will resemble the segregated, selective and undersupported schools of the 1960’s. Urban populations are complex, and restructuring for excellence cannot occur without sustained attention and support from educators and corporate employers over an extended period of
time. Parents may also need training both to participate in school management councils and to work effectively with the schools in helping their children. These are some of the early lessons of corporate involvement with the Boston Public Schools.
FOOTNOTES


ABOUT THE INSTITUTE FOR EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP

The Institute for Educational Leadership (IEL) has programs in more than 40 states and is unique among the organizations that are working for better schools. It is a Washington-based nonprofit organization dedicated to collaborative problem-solving strategies for education. IEL works at the national, state, and local levels to bring together resources and people from all sectors of society in a new coalition in support of essential change in schools. IEL works to develop the ideas, leadership, resources, and programs that will enable American education to meet today's challenges, and tomorrow's as well. IEL has four primary components that are the driving forces behind its work. These components are as follows.

1. **Coalition Building: Strengthening Business Involvement in Education** -- The strength and vitality of business can be traced directly to the quality of the education America's young people--and business's next generation of workers--receive in our schools. IEL forms the crucial link between the schools and the business community to establish dialogue that creates an understanding of the common interests of business and the schools. From its position as a knowledgeable but uniquely independent participant in school reform, IEL brings business and education together to strengthen both.

2. **Emerging Trends/Policy Issues: Demographic Policy Center** -- America's demographic changes are in evidence everywhere from maternity wards to advertising campaigns, but nowhere are the challenges of these changes more real or pressing than in America's schools. IEL's Demographic Policy Center, headed by nationally prominent demographic analyst Dr. Harold Hodgkinson, is working to generate greater awareness of the forces reshaping our society and to provide services that will make business and political as well as education leaders more responsive to changing needs.

3. **Leadership Development: A Motivator for Informed and Pace-Setting Leadership** -- IEL sponsors a variety of programs that serve to develop and promote leadership. IEL's Education Policy Fellowship Program gives mid-career professionals the opportunity to explore policy issues and to understand better how policy is influenced. In collaboration with the Education Commission of the States, IEL sponsors the State Education Policy Seminars Program which provides for the exchange of ideas and perspectives among key state-level political and educational policymakers. Through a variety of leadership development services to public school systems, IEL has a learning laboratory to work with school-based staff. IEL and the Office of Educational Research and Improvement, U.S. Department of Education, jointly sponsor the National LEADership Network and work in collaboration with the 51 LEAD centers across the U.S.--with principals, with superintendents, and with other school leaders--to promote leadership in schools.

4. **Governance** -- IEL's governance work focuses on all levels of education policy and management, with the emphasis on performance and action to help local education leaders sort out appropriate roles, responsibilities, and trade-offs. Currently, IEL is working through its School Board Effectiveness Program to develop leadership capabilities and is examining various aspects of local school boards to enhance their effectiveness as governing bodies. IEL's Teacher Working Conditions Project seeks to understand and address the workplace conditions and issues which promote or impede teacher effectiveness in urban school systems. This project is part of the overall national effort to professionalize teaching and to gain greater commitment to excellence in learning.
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