The organizational and decision-making characteristics of four school-based management models being developed in Dade County, Florida; Chicago; Los Angeles; and Spain are compared in this paper. The key differences lie in the origin of and reasons for change, and the common focal point is the creation and empowerment of a local school council at each school site. A conclusion is that the models' distinct structures and operating characteristics are generally derived from the power blocks that created them. The lesson of the Spanish experience is that selection of school leaders by local councils leads to politicization of the leadership role. The extent to which the various forms of school-based management will accomplish their goals or improve educational quality cannot yet be predicted. (47 references) (LMI)
SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM:
CASES IN THE USA AND SPAIN

E. Mark Hanson

School of Education and Graduate School of Management
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, California 92521

FAX (714) 787-3942
BIBLIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

E. Mark Hanson is a professor of Education and Management at the University of California, Riverside. He is a Fulbright Scholar, and served as a member of the Fulbright Senior Scholar Advisory Committee (1983-86). Professor Hanson has served in various nations as a consultant to the World Bank and the Agency for International Development on projects involving management development and educational reform.
Abstract

SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM:
CASES IN THE USA AND SPAIN

As the decade of the 1990s began, school-based management had emerged as a centerpiece in the movement to restructure public school education in America. This paper examines the special organizational and decision-making characteristics of the SBM models that are being developed in three of the four largest school districts in the country: Dade County, Florida, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The SBM model in Spain is introduced because of its recorded experience. The paper will identify and explain how and why the various models differ. The distinct structures and operating characteristics of the various SBM models are, by and large, a derivative of the power blocks that propelled them into existence. The Chicago model (a product of the so-called Chicago Revolution) was driven by dissident parents and community activists; the Los Angeles model was the outcome of a bitter teachers' strike; the Dade County model was the product of school board policy; and the Spanish model was driven by a society intent on democratizing the nation after 40 years of dictatorship.
SCHOOL-BASED MANAGEMENT AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM: CASES IN THE USA AND SPAIN

As the decade of the 1990s began, school-based management (SBM) had emerged as a centerpiece in the movement to restructure public education in America. The Secretary of Education, Lauro F. Cavazoz, was traveling the nation celebrating its merits to audiences of eager governors, legislators and educators who were searching for something that would make a difference.¹

Curiously, enthusiasm for SBM seems to have far outstripped a clear understanding of its organizational form, operating characteristics, and outcomes. In fact, as experience with the concept has begun to surface the awareness grows that SBM means very different things to different people.²

Objectives

This paper will examine the school-based management concept as it is being employed in three of the four largest school systems in America: Dade County Florida, Chicago and Los Angeles. Unfortunately, sufficient experience with school-based management does not yet exist in these areas (or anywhere else in the country) to evaluate its impact on schools and schooling.³ Thus, the paper will attempt to identify the special organizational and decision-making characteristics of the distinct models and point out how and why they differ. The three systems were selected because they nicely triangulate the possible models that are developing elsewhere in the country.
Spain also has a version of school-based management, and it is significant because it has been operating since the mid 1980s. An examination of the Spanish model within the mix of the American models should give some indication of the possibilities and problems that lie ahead.

With the new 1990 decade, the American public seemed ready for a change. A Gallup Poll reveals that 63 percent of the American public favor a "school-site management and accountability" program that will greatly empower the principal "to determine who will teach in their schools and how the schools will operate." In return, after several years the principal "would be educationally successful but replaced if the school did not meet established standards." Twenty-six percent of those polled opposed this approach and 11 percent did not have an opinion. Interestingly, this model of SBM is not a serious contender for adoption around the country.

The data for the study of the USA models came from an analysis of contracts, plans, research reports, and conference proceedings. As part of a larger study, the data for the Spanish model were gathered during a 1987 sabbatical in Spain and involved an analysis of more than several hundred documents well as dozens of interviews with educators from top levels of the Ministry to teachers in the classroom.

What is School-Based Management?

The premise of SBM is well articulated by the Carnegie Forum. "The excessively centralized, bureaucratic control of
urban schools must end. Effective local leadership is crucial. Every school should be given the freedom and flexibility required to respond creatively to its educational objectives and, above all, to meet the needs of students."

SBM is in many ways a rebirth of the decentralization concept stressed during the 1960s. In those years, however, the focus tended to be on the distribution of power to local communities and the increase of administrative efficiency. As Jane David points out, the SBM movement today places much greater emphasis on improving educational practice through creating "conditions in schools that facilitate improvement, innovation, and continuous professional growth."

Creating these conditions, as Bacharach, Bauer and Shedd, observe, requires that reformers focus less on pointing out the shortcomings of individual teachers and administrators and concentrating more on the nature of schools as work organizations. This requires a greater understanding of how the actions of the key players (e.g., teachers, administrators, parents, school board members, etc.) can be structured, managed and coordinated so that "improvement can be an ongoing and self-sustaining process." 

The yet untested SBM argument is that when schools have the power, resources, and freedom from constraint to resolve their own problems, the payoff will be increased levels of learning.
School-based management involves the redistribution of authority, usually through its transfer to other decision-making units. There are at least two keys to understanding the models of SBM as they are currently emerging: (1) the entity that initiates the redistribution, and (2) the amount of authority that is redistributed.\textsuperscript{12}

There are several governance entities that can be the source of the redistribution of authority, for example, the state legislature, school board, district superintendent, or even school principals. The amount of authority redistributed can roughly exist on a continuum involving the decision-making process with specific points identified as: deconcentration, participation, delegation, and devolution.

Deconcentration involves the transfer of tasks and workload to subunits, but no genuine authority is redistributed. Participation generally means that subordinates have greater input into the decision-making process, but that the right to make the decision still resides with the superordinate.

Delegation is the actual transfer of decision-making authority from higher to lower hierarchical levels. Delegated authority must be exercised within a firm policy framework established at or near the top of the hierarchy. Such delegation stresses the simultaneous existence of what Peters and Waterman call "loose-tight" properties. That is, decisions are ..."on the one hand rigidly controlled, yet at the same time
allow (indeed insist on) autonomy, entrepreneurship, and innovation from the rank and file."³

Devolution involves the shifting of authority to an autonomous unit that can then act with independence. Unlike the other three forms, once redistribution through devolution takes place, the authority is gone and can not be retrieved.

As the next section will point out, the models of the four systems of SBM to be discussed differ in terms of the source and amount of authority redistribution.

How and Why do the Four SBM Models Differ?

Dade County

The Dade County Public School System in Florida is the fourth largest school district in the United States. During the 1987-88 school year it served over 254,000 students, with 14,000 plus teachers, in 272 schools, with a budget in excess of a billion-and-one-half dollars. Ethnically, the student population consisted of 45 percent Hispanic, 33 percent Black, 21 percent White and 1 percent other.

In July of 1986 the Dade County school board unanimously voted to support the creation of a School-Based Management/Shared Decision Making (SBM/SDM) pilot program.⁴ The concept emerged from a task force report, co-chaired by the superintendent and head of the local teachers union, regarding a study of various reforms underway in the educational restructuring movement.
A tentative agreement in the teachers' contract encompassing SBM\SDM led to the board's action. The action was, in part, "a conscious attempt to overcome the detached and depersonalized nature of the school system, which is perhaps inevitable because of the size of the Dade County Public Schools." The same contract increased teachers' salaries over the three year period an average of 28 percent.

The broad goals of the reform were to provide for such things as improved educational programs for students, increased flexibility and teacher responsibility for planning, hiring and budget development as well as encourage community participation in school affairs. Thirty-two schools were selected to participate in the program on a pilot basis, each having developed its own version of SBM\SDM.

The schools typically developed what were called "Leadership Circles" or "Councils" (modeled after the Japanese factory quality circles). These Councils were normally made up of the principal, union steward, and elected teacher, student, staff and parent representatives. Some councils have over 30 members. The teachers and other members who participate in the councils must do so on their own time. That is, the entire effort comes "out of their hides."

Has SMB\SDM made a difference in Dade County? In a study by Croghan and Provenzo conducted 18 months after the program began, they report that "school decision-making structures have changed dramatically as a result of the [program]." Teachers
and other members of the councils are much more involved in issues involving budget, hiring, scheduling and curriculum. Principals have been acting more and more in a collaborative and consultative role.

However, an important point is that in the Dade County model no genuine power has been delegated from school administrators to the councils in general or teachers in specific. Even though the administrators have been approving almost all of the decisions proposed by the councils, they are not obligated to do so. Administrators reserve the right to a final say in all matters. An interesting question is, when the leadership circles begin making tough recommendations that administrators are not inclined to accept, will SBM/SDM survive?

In short, on the school-based management decision-making continuum the Dade County model can be characterized as exhibiting decentralization characteristics of deconcentration and participation, but not delegation or devolution.

As the next section will point out, the Chicago system has taken a very different approach.

The Chicago Revolution

U.S. Secretary of Education William Bennett, speaking to a group of Chicago businessmen in 1987, referred to the Chicago public schools as "the worst in the nation." Whether or not that observation is true is unimportant, but evidence of significant problems was not unnoticed by the public. At mid-decade, only 44.9 percent of the students who entered grade 9 in
a given year were graduating from high school. In terms of student achievement rates (1987), with a national median of 50 percent, Chicago 12th graders scored 36 percent in reading and 37 percent in math. The scores of elementary school students were below the national median, but much closer than those of the high school students.¹

The Chicago Public School System has traditionally been known for its large student population and its large bureaucracy. In June of 1989 the system supported 406,832 elementary and secondary school students in 595 schools.² The ethnic composition of the student population was: 12.9 percent White, 60.0 percent Black, 24 percent Hispanic, 0.2 percent American Indian/Alaskan Native, and 2.9 percent Asian/Pacific Islander.³ With respect to the bureaucracy, Walberg, et al., write:

One of the most prominent characteristics of the Chicago Public Schools is the degree to which management is centralized. A single board of education -- whose members are appointed, not elected -- runs an enterprise with annual revenues of nearly $2 billion. Over three thousand administrators staff central and regional offices. Parental involvement in decision making at the school level is nonexistent or largely illusory. Even principals and school teachers have limited
authority over the day-to-day operation of their schools and classrooms.21

Driven to action by a grassroots rebellion spearheaded by parent activists, community leaders and local business officials, the Illinois State Legislature enacted the Chicago School Reform Law (Public Act 85-1418) which was signed by the governor on December 1, 1988. At the heart of the reform is the formation of a Local School Council for each school in the system.22 "...each public school in Chicago is to be governed primarily by a Local School Council."23

Each LSC is made up of 11 members: six parents, two teachers, two community representatives, one student (nonvoting), and the principal. With the exception of the principal, all members are elected for two year terms. A parent serves as chairman. Also, a parent or community leader serves as the Council's representative to the Subdistrict Council.

The decision-making authority devolved to the LSCs is significant.24 Specifically, each Council approves the school budget, develops a School Improvement Plan, helps choose texts and curricular materials, and recommends new teacher appointments.

Most significantly, each of the 540 School Councils is authorized to hire and fire the principal based on four year performance contracts. One half of the principals' contracts came up for consideration of renewal in March of 1990. Only 49 of the 276 principals reviewed did not have their contracts
renewed, and 30 of these were serving on an interim basis at the time. The other half of the principals will come up for contract consideration by the Councils in March of 1991. If a principal is not reappointed, he or she may be placed on a list for vacant teaching positions. If the former principal is not offered a position teaching somewhere, he or she is out of the education field. As the SBM reform began, the principals argued strongly that this approach to hiring and firing will turn the role from that of an educational leader to that of a politician.

The LSC members all receive training for their new roles. They are trained in school budgets, educational theory regarding each center's particular needs, and personnel selection processes and practices.

In sum, the Chicago Revolution has brought about a genuine transfer of power (devolution) to the newly created Local School Councils. Also, considering where the votes are in each LSC, parents have placed themselves in the controlling role. The school as an organization and the teachers do not appear to be key players in this effort toward change. The principal is cast as hero or villain and will basically stand alone as accountable. Compounding the problems of bringing about significant educational change is the fact that the State Legislature provided no new money for educational improvements.

It will be instructive to find out if the President of the Chicago Teacher Association is correct when he argues that what is taking place is not an educational reform, but a
governance reform. Parents running schools, he asserts, will not necessarily improve them.  

While the SBM model in Chicago represents a significant change with the past, so does the SBM model in Los Angeles.  

The Los Angeles Model of School-Based-Management  

The Shared Decision Making\School-Based Management (SDM\SBM) reform of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) was the product of a bitter contract dispute between the Board of Education and the United Teachers of Los Angeles (UTLA) teachers union in 1989. The President of the United Teachers of Los Angeles called the contract which included provisions for SBM "a peace treaty" that "evolved out of a war."  

The school administrators were particularly distressed over the process and the outcome because the negotiations were conducted without their participation.  

This SDM\SBM model is important not only because it is structured differently than that of Dade County and Chicago, but also because of the scope of the coverage. In 1989 the Los Angeles School District enrolled 610,149 students, kindergarten through 12th grade, which makes it second only to New York City in total enrollment. The District operates 837 schools and centers with 30,428 regular teachers and manages a budget of over $3,868,000,000. The ethnic composition of the student population is 5.9 percent Asian, 16.7 percent Black, 12.8 percent White, 59.0 percent Hispanic, 0.2 percent Native
American, 0.5 percent Pacific Islander, and 1.9 percent Filipino.\textsuperscript{29}

The Los Angeles model is fundamentally a two stage, incremental process. Shared decision making started up when the contract was signed in 1989. School-based management will come on line only as experience and planning from the first stage has been gained.

With respect to the first stage, as in the case of Dade County and Chicago, the key to making the Los Angeles model work is the formation of Local School Councils at the school site level. Each Council has one basic goal: "to improve the operation of the school so that teachers can become more effective teachers and students can become successful learners."\textsuperscript{30}

Depending on the size of a school, membership on the Council will vary from six to 16. Half of the Council representatives are composed of the principal, elected parents/community members, and an elected non-teaching employee who works at the school. At the secondary school level, a student will also be part of this 50 percent. The other half include the chairperson of the local school UTLA chapter and teachers elected by the faculty. The principal and union chairperson will serve as co-chairs of the Council.

It is important to note that in this Los Angeles model, the teachers will almost assuredly have the votes to control the actions of the Local School Councils. Also, normally two
meetings are held every month: one during the teachers' work day and the other at the convenience of the parents and community members.

The Los Angeles model represents a devolution of power to the local councils. That is, by contract the Local School Councils have the right to make policy decisions about staff development training, student discipline and conduct codes, school activity event scheduling, and use of school equipment (e.g., copy machines). Control over specific budget items has also been devolved to the Councils, such as decisions over instructional materials, lottery funds, state textbooks, and year-round school incentive funds.

When making decisions such as those just listed, "the local school leadership council operates within the same set of powers and constraints as previously applied to the principal." ..."the focus of local council activity shall be upon establishment of local policy and planning direction rather than day-to-day administration or execution of policy and plans." It should be noted that the local Councils do not have the power to hire and fire principals or teachers.

The Los Angeles model provides for a "higher level" Central Council which, among other things, plays a key gatekeeping role in the emergence of the second stage, school-based management component of the reform. While the Central Council does not control the actions of the Local Councils, it is charged with training personnel for carrying out Local
Council duties, distributing information, and studying and recommending more effective operating methods. The critical function of the Central Council is to "review, evaluate and approve the [SBM] plans and proposals submitted to the Central Council by each local school leadership council regarding school-based management." A school's decision to participate in SBM is strictly voluntary.

Individual schools with consensus approval of the Local Council members, the principal, and two-thirds of the teachers' bargaining unit membership can submit plans which if approved by the Central Council have wide latitude to set their own directions regarding academic and administrative issues. These SBM schools may also elect to change the makeup and authority of the Local School Councils.

If SBM local school proposals conflict with Board policy or collective bargaining agreements, waivers will necessarily have to be obtained. While personnel issues will probably be introduced in individual SBM plans, seeking authority to discharge administrators, as is the case in Chicago and Spain, is unlikely. Seeking such authority is unlikely because equivalent authority to discharge teachers might become an issue, and teachers unions do often support such actions.

The Central Council has 24 members and comprised of seven parents or community representatives appointed by the Board of Education, five appointed by the superintendent, and the remaining 12 by the UTLA teachers union. Maintaining
balances of power at this Council level as well as at the local Council level is obviously a primary consideration build into the contract agreement.

The Los Angeles 3BM model will place the teachers union in an unaccustomed role. The UTLA union will necessarily have to give considerable attention to formulating vision statements, defining more effective means of education, and promoting strategies of change that will impact on the behaviors of teachers.

In sum, the Los Angeles models of Shared Decision Making and School-Based Management have some very special characteristics: they are incremental and rooted in a negotiated contract between the teachers union and the board of education, the agreements will only last the life of the contract, the Local School Councils are composed of 50 percent teachers and thus will almost assuredly place them in a controlling role, and genuine power has been devolved to the Local Councils. The Central Council, as of this writing, has only one significant power and that is approving or disapproving SBM proposals submitted by Local Councils. A maximum of 70 SBM proposals can be approved each semester.33

As the next section will point out, the Spanish version of SBM looks quite different.

The Spanish Model of School-Based Management

In 1975 General Francisco Franco the dictatorial "Chief of State, Generalisimo of the Army, and by the Grace of God,
Caudillo (maximum leader) of Spain and the Crusade" died. After 40 years a nation long weary of totalitarian rule turned toward democracy. Embedded in the new Constitution of 1978, efforts to democratize the nation reached the schools through programs of decentralization and regionalization of the educational system.

In the field of education, as well as all other public sectors of government, the long years of autocratic rule had led to an intense centralization of power at the national level. Scholarship and intellectual curiosity held low priorities in a system where new ideas could be very dangerous. During much of the Franco period, "education only interested the government as a vehicle for putting across its own ideology." Textbooks repeatedly extolled the themes of God, Franco, family and country as if they embodied the ultimate values of truth, unity and moral wisdom.

The new Spanish Constitution of 1978 brought forth a reform of the educational system as part of a comprehensive reform of public administration. This paper is not the place to discuss the details of these changes in public administration. In brief, however, the 50 provinces previously controlled directly from Madrid were collapsed into 17 regions called Comunidades Autonomas (C.A.) or Autonomous Communities.

Each region established its own legislature and a quasi-federal structure of government was established. Power sharing agreements with each C.A. were negotiated with defined
powers retained by the central government and others devolved to the regions. By 1987 six of the 17 regions had received their competencias (devolved authority). The Constitution provided for an incremental approach to the transfer of power to the regions.

The decentralization process in education assumed an almost classic configuration as it took place within the context of the greater government reform. "The central powers determine the general framework of the educational system and the broad strokes of policy and direction. The regional and local powers amplify and fill in the established framework. The local schools and teaching staffs elaborate and execute the resulting program within a considerable margin of autonomy." [emphasis added]

Certainly, the public educational system of Spain can not be compared directly with the public system of education in the United States. In a county of over 37 million in population, there are over 7 million K-12 students. A measure of the quality of the educational system can be seen in the 1988 Educational Testing Service (ETS) international assessment of 13-year-olds in mathematics and science. Students in five countries (Korea, Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom and the United States) and four Canadian provinces were tested. In the comparison, the American students were last in math and near last in science. While scoring around the mean of all countries and Canadian provinces tested, The Spanish students recorded
scores higher the American students in both subjects at statistically significant (.05) levels.  

While few direct comparisons between the Spanish and American educational systems would be useful, some insight into another form of school-based management can be gained by looking at the model adopted in Spain. As in the American models, a key component to SBM was the formation of a Local School Council in each school of the nation.

The membership of each council consists of: (1) the director of the school, who will serve as chairperson, (2) the chief of academic programs, (3) a representative of city government, (4) a given number of teachers not to be less than one-third the total council membership, to be elected by the teachers of each school, (5) a given number of parents and students elected from among their own membership, not to be less than one-third of the total council membership (only upper grade elementary schools and high schools have voting student members), and (6) the school secretary who will serve as Council secretary with voice but no vote.

The decision-making authority devolved to the Local School Councils is quite extensive. The Council members elect the school director for a term of three years, an appointment which can be extended one time for three more years. The director returns to full time teaching when the appointment ends. By a two-thirds vote, the Council can also fire the school director when it so chooses. Unlike the Chicago model, in Spain the
selected school leader will always come from among the teachers employed at the school.

The other school administrators who will form part of the administrative team are proposed by the school director and must be approved by the Council. Working within guidelines established by the Ministry of Education and Science, each Local School Council is authorized to do the following: define the general educational principles and objectives which will give direction to school activities, approve the budget proposal submitted to the Ministry of Education and Science, evaluate the annual academic program, resolve disciplinary problems affecting the students, approve rules for the internal running of the school, and see that the prevailing norms concerning admission of students to the school are being observed.

In sum, the Spanish school-based management program is a product of that society's intense desire to democratize the nation through the regionalization and decentralization of decision-making authority in the public sectors of government. The restructuring program, established in general principle by the post-Franco Constitution, was developed in detail by parliamentary legislation. Thus, the restructuring reform has permanence.

The key to the SBM reform is the creation of a Local School Council in every elementary and secondary school in Spain. These councils, made up of parents, teachers, administrators, community members and students, share power with
the national Ministry of Education and Science. That is, the Ministry has the authority to make a specific set of decisions over the schools, and the Councils have authority over another set. Thus, the Ministry worries about the national implications of education, and the Councils worry about the local implications.

The Spanish Experience With SBM

Even though school-based management in its current form has been functioning in Spain since 1985, no systematic study has been conducted to determine its effectiveness. However, the author spent considerable time discussing the matter with educators ranging from teachers in the classroom in several regions of Spain, up to senior members of the Ministry of Education. The patterns identified here, therefore, lack the objectivity of a scientific survey, but they do represent the perspectives of many Spaniards who are in a position to know.

On the positive side, Local School Councils are now sharing power with the Ministry of Education and Science for the first time in 40 years. Councils are planning for and introducing instructional content that incorporates regional language, historical and cultural education in the schools. The "regionalization" of the academic programs are especially pronounced in the historic territories of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country.

In addition, the Councils are benefiting from the participation of parents, and students are learning something
about democracy though their direct involvement. The Councils are empowered to approve budget requests and expenditures as well as elect the school director and fire him or her if the need arises.

Negatives associated with SBM, however, are also pointed to by Spanish educators. Jose Garcia Garrido points out that the local election of school directors from among the teachers tends to "deprofessionalize" the role. That is, any teacher can be elected whether or not the individual has any special training for the job. 

Incentives to obtain specialized training in the administration of education are therefore significantly reduced.

The Councils tend to be dominated by teachers (although that is not always the case). Thus, teachers select their own superior, and the role often tends to become politicized -- not around party politics but around local school issues. Friendship groups, power blocks and coalitions often dominate the voting, and the elections have less to do with education than they do with alliances. In those schools where difficult changes are definitely needed, the teachers are not prone to select a new director who pledges to make them work harder and do things differently.

Numerous school directors pointed out in the interviews that they feel caught in a vice. As president of the school Council, they are obligated to carry out the wishes of the Council members as exhibited through votes. But, the Education Law states that the school director must always obey educational
policy. It is not uncommon for a Council to tell a school director to purchase an unauthorized budget item or carry out some other act inconsistent with national policy. To deny a directive from the Council can be dangerous business if a director wants to keep the job, so when caught in the middle the anxiety can be high.

Another negative frequently reported was the minimal additional compensation received for doing the additional administrative work. The administrators still have to teach classes, although their instructional loads are somewhat reduced. The lack of incentives and the difficulties limiting the exercise of local leaders' authority has created a condition where only 60 percent of the public schools have a director selected by election of the Local School Council. The problem tends to be, "in almost half the cases, the absence of candidates" who want the job."

Finally, there is the problem of coordinated planning. With individual schools practicing SBM, coordinated planning across a wide sector of education is proving to be difficult.

Thus, the Spanish experience with school-based management appears to be mixed. However, Spaniards from all walks of life are quick to point out that even though difficulties still exist, what exists now in terms of participation and accomplishment is far-and-away better than what existed during the days of the dictatorship.
School-Based Management Models Compared

As stated earlier, the objective of this paper is to identify the special organizational and decision-making characteristics of the distinct SBM models and point out why and how they differ. One common characteristic is that the focal point of each model was the creation and empowerment of a Local School Council at each school site. Various alternatives were available but not chosen. The principal, an administrative team, or a corps of meritorious teachers might have been empowered instead. The effective schools literature suggests these alternatives as possibilities for improving the quality of education.47

The key to understanding why the various models differ is an awareness of who initiated the change and why. In Dade County, for example, the change was school board driven, in consultation with the teachers' union. The intent was to "personalize" an educational process which had grown large and impersonal. This model stressed deconcentration and participation in decision making, but no real power was transferred to the Councils. If the principal so chooses, he or she still holds all the votes.

In contrast, in the Chicago Public School System the SBM reform was parent and community driven. The school Councils were created by state legislation and not board policy, as was the case in Dade County. The parents and their allies carried out a successful grassroots rebellion against what they considered to
be an ineffective, bureaucratized educational system that was incapable of responding to the needs of students and the communities where they reside.

In Chicago, power was devolved to Local School Councils which means that true decision-making authority changed hands. Parents placed themselves in control of the local Councils by giving themselves the large majority of votes.

The Los Angeles Unified School District model of SDM/SBM was the result of a negotiated settlement to a bitter teachers' strike. Consequently, it is a teacher driven model. The teachers are in a dominant position with half the votes, thus representing the largest voting block. By virtue of the negotiated contract, power has been devolved to the local Councils. However, unlike the Chicago SBM model which was placed in concrete by state legislation, in Los Angeles there is a lack of permanence because the change lasts only as long as the contract. The next negotiated contract might produce something else.

In Spain the SBM model was society driven. That is, in reaction to the long history of centralized dictatorial government, power was devolved to the regional level and then to Local School Councils. Like the Chicago reform, the change has permanence in that it is provided for in the Constitution and rooted in national legislation. In the Spanish reform an attempt was made to balance the voting membership of the Councils between administrators, teachers, parents and students.
No obvious voting advantages were given to parents or teachers as were the cases of the Los Angeles and Chicago School Systems.

The role of the school principal is also a point of considerable difference between the SBM models. In Spain and in Chicago the principals are appointed by the local Councils. However, in the Spanish version the leaders can be removed at any time by a two-thirds vote of the Council, but in Chicago they work under a four year performance contract.

An important lesson from the Spanish experience is that when local Councils select school leaders, the leadership role can quickly become politicized. That is, voting blocks emerge and criteria other than educational excellence can dominate the selection process. In Dade County and Los Angeles, the selection and fate of principals still resides with their administrative superiors and the boards of education.

One final important difference. In Dade County, Florida and in Los Angeles, an incremental approach to the introduction of SBM is underway. That is, various schools present specific proposals to higher authorities with respect to the special type of program they wish to introduce. Different schools develop different programs depending on local needs and conditions. Schools which begin later can therefore learn from the earlier experiences. The other models of SMB examined tend to reverse this process and decentralize power before specific programs for specific schools are worked out.
Thus, while we can see that school-based management takes on many forms, what we can not see is the extent to which the various forms will accomplish the goals set out for each. With the accumulation of SBM experience, important questions await answers.

2. Does any one body (e.g., teachers, administrators, board members, parents) dominate the Local Council decision-making process?
3. Do the separate membership groups on local Councils work by consensus, or are split votes along group lines the common pattern?
4. Do Local Council actions redirect (restructure) the resources, academic programs, personnel procedures, and level of community involvement?

However, the principal outstanding question is, will school-based management in any of its forms improve the quality of education in local public schools?


6. These data were gathered as part of a larger study reported as: E. Mark Hanson, "Education, Administrative Development and Democracy in Spain," International Journal of Educational


43. Ley organica del derecho a la educación y reglamentos (LODE), (Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia, 1985), arts. 36-46.

44. The Statutes of Teaching Establishments Act of June 19, 1980 (partially modified by the Royal Decree of August 12, 1982) set the framework for shared governance in elementary and secondary schools. The Ley organica del derecho a la educación y reglamento (LODE) act of 1985 fully developed the process.
